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European solidarity and social class. An uneasy alliance

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Abstract

In response to various crises and a growing Eurosceptic electorate, the European Union (EU) has taken steps to implement solidarity measures aimed at mitigating economic risks and inequalities among member states and their citizens. However, the social basis of support for such redistributive policies in a supranational context remains largely unexplored, despite the ongoing relevance of social class for crucial political outcomes related to European integration, such as Brexit and the growing electoral strength of radical right parties. To address this gap, this article distinguishes between transnational and member state solidarity, scrutinizing how the post-industrial division of social classes shapes these two dimensions of European solidarity. The research reveals that the post-industrial structure of social classes, taking into account both the economic and cultural divisions within social positions, significantly affects both forms of European solidarity, independent of attitudes toward redistribution and European integration. Furthermore, it highlights the limited impact of an exclusivist national identity and Euroscepticism on the endorsement of transnational solidarity for production workers, indicating the transformative potential of supranational redistribution in fostering political support and social cohesion among even the most disengaged segment of European citizens.

Key words: European solidarity; social class; redistribution; exclusive nationalism

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1. Introduction

Recent crises have significantly shaped the EU policy agenda concerning supranational solidarity, defined as institutional arrangements based on sharing risks and resources within the European Union (Bauböck, 2018; Ferrera & Burelli, 2019; Gerhards et al., 2019; Sangiovanni, 2013). While an expanding body of research explores various factors affecting citizen support for EU solidaristic policies, the role of social classes in understanding institutionalized solidarity at the supranational level is often overlooked. This oversight is despite class dynamics playing a crucial role in recent EU political developments, including Brexit, the rise of radical right-wing parties, and the increasing influence of Eurosceptics in the European Parliament (Chan et al., 2020; Kitschelt, 2012; Mckenzie, 2017; Oesch & Rennwald, 2018).

Understanding the role of social classes in shaping supranational solidarity is both an opportunity for expanding knowledge and a conundrum. Social classes continue to play a vital role in determining national redistributive politics (Kulin & Svallfors, 2013), extending beyond "who supports what" to influence the restructuring of welfare states in post-industrial societies (Gingrich & Häusermann, 2015). Analysing the social bases of support for various solidaristic policies at the EU level offers insights into the appeal of these policies to different societal groups and serves as a benchmark for future policy reform. However, the relationship between preferences for national redistributive policies and supranational solidaristic policies remains puzzling, particularly in the case of the working class. Traditionally, the working class has been a core supporter of solidaristic policies in national societies due to their heightened exposure to risk and increased likelihood of benefiting from redistribution (Esping-Andersen, 2013; Kulin & Svallfors, 2013; Stjernø, 2009; Svallfors, 1997). Their disadvantaged social position should make them eligible beneficiaries of solidaristic policies in the EU. Nonetheless, workers are also among the most Eurosceptic classes, strongly opposing EU involvement in redistributive politics (Werts et al., 2013).

Against this backdrop, only a limited number of studies have explored the relevance of class divisions for supranational solidarity (Baute & Meuleman, 2020; Gerhards et al., 2019; Kleider & Stoeckel, 2019). These studies, however, present mixed results regarding social classes' support for redistributive policies within the EU. One possible explanation for these divergent findings is that they do not adequately consider the multidimensionality of solidaristic policies in the EU. Current policymaking primarily focuses on redistribution

between member states and often neglects redistributive policies targeting EU citizens and addressing social inequalities within the Union. Class positions may differ for each of these dimensions depending on whether the recipient of solidarity is member states or EU citizens. Another factor contributing to the varying arguments within the current scholarship on class and solidarity is the reliance on simplified class schemes that are more applicable to industrial societies but have less explanatory power when applied to social divisions and policy preferences in post-industrial economies (Kitschelt & Rehm, 2022).

This article presents a theoretical framework for analysing European solidarity from a social class perspective. It employs the differentiation between transnational (citizen-centred) and member state solidarity to untangle how post-industrial social class divisions influence preferences for these two core dimensions of supranational solidarity. The study then explores the extent to which class's influence operates through attitudes on redistribution and EU support, as well as through European identity and exclusive nationalism. The empirical analysis draws on an original survey conducted in six EU member states in 2013 (Denmark, Germany, Italy, Spain, Romania, and the UK) and the 2016 European Social Survey (ESS). It employs structural equation models and multigroup estimations to disentangle the role of class and relevant attitudes and political identities.

The research reveals that the post-industrial structure of social classes, which considers both economic and cultural divisions of social positions, significantly impacts European solidarity, the net of attitudes toward redistribution, EU support, or exclusive identities. The paper unpacks the heterogeneity of the professional class in relation to European solidarity, by showing the antagonistic degrees of support between socio-cultural professionals on the one hand, and technical and managerial professionals on the other. Furthermore, the study highlights that an exclusivist national identity, a common barrier to supranational policy support, exerts a weaker influence on production workers' support for solidaristic policies that address EU citizens' welfare. This suggests that EU-level solidaristic policies can potentially garner support, from those who may be viewed as the losers or outsiders in the integration process, with profound implications for which policies can contribute to a more cohesive and equitable European Union.

The findings hold significant implications for a comprehensive theory of social solidarity and redistribution. They underscore the enduring importance of social stratification in defining the breadth and reach of redistributive policies within a transnational context. Notably, the finding that nationalist workers are potential supporters of EU-wide social benefit

programs suggests that EU legitimacy and political support can be reinvigorated through a reimagining of EU citizenship and its social aspects (Ross, 2020; Seubert et al., 2018). In this manner, our research contributes to the burgeoning field of Social Europe and the potential of redistributive policies to revitalise the connections between EU citizens and supranational institutions. Furthermore, we enrich the research agenda on the reconfiguration of welfare states and redistributive politics (Häusermann et al., 2019) by reintroducing the supranational dimension and illustrating how the post-industrial class structure moulds preferences for solidarity in the EU context.

2. Solidarity dimensions in a supranational context

Drawing on extensive research on national solidarity, European solidarity has been defined as the willingness of citizens to share risks and resources within the European Union (Ciornei & Recchi, 2017; Gerhards et al., 2019; Reinl, 2022; Stjernø, 2009). Despite this parsimonious definition, the institutionalization of European solidarity encompasses two distinct dimensions, multiple policy fields, and various policy instruments for its implementation (Baute et al., 2019; Ciornei and Ross 2020; Kuhn et al., 2020; Nicoli et al., 2020; Reinl, 2022; Sangiovanni, 2013). The central dimensions of European solidarity are related to its recipients. While national welfare policies typically focus on citizens as direct beneficiaries of redistributive solidarity, the European Union, defined as a partnership of 27 member states and home to over 440 million EU citizens as of 2023, operates on a dual concept of solidarity that extends to both member states and EU citizens. Research by Reinl (2022) and Baute et al. (2019) indicates that member-state and transnational solidarity are correlated aspects of the broader concept of European solidarity, justifying their joint examination.

Recent scholarly work brings substantive contributions by concentrating on different policy fields associated with member state solidarity, such as bailout schemes, emergency funds, the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), and citizen-centered solidarity measures, including European unemployment benefits, EU minimum income, and EU-provided healthcare and pension schemes (Bechtel et al., 2017; Gerhards et al., 2019; Hodson & Howarth, 2023; Kuhn et al., 2020). Furthermore, researchers demonstrate that public support for these measures not only varies across different policy fields but also across specific design features within the same policy domain.

To disentangle the impact of social class on European solidarity, our analysis focuses on support for member state and transnational (citizen-centred) redistributive policies, which

is indicative of fundamental attitudes towards the two dimensions of European solidarity. Fundamental attitudes represent a basic acceptance or rejection of a policy, while contingent attitudes respond to the specific policy design (Bechtel et al.: 875). Member state solidarity involves redistributive policies among EU countries (Ciornei & Recchi, 2017; Ross, 2020; Sangiovanni, 2013), and has gained prominence due to mechanisms for fiscal redistribution (and austerity) following the global financial crisis (Bechtel et al., 2014; Ciornei & Recchi, 2017; Gerhards et al., 2019; Kuhn & Stoeckel, 2014; Lengfeld & Kley, 2021). Subsequent crises, including the arrival of Syrian refugees, the Covid-19 pandemic, and energy dependency, have led to ongoing debates about European solidarity, encompassing both financial and non-financial resource redistribution among member states. Notably, initiatives like the European Instrument for Temporary Support to Mitigate Unemployment Risks in an Emergency (SURE) and the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) aim to mitigate the social and economic impacts of the Covid-19 pandemic and involve considerable risk and resource redistribution among member states.

In contrast to member-state solidarity, transnational solidarity is citizen-centred and presupposes redistributive mechanisms that address European citizens as such (Sangiovanni, 2013). Nonetheless, scholars and prominent figures from the Commission, the European Parliament, and civil society organizations have advocated for redistributive policies among European citizensⁱ. These policies encompass initiatives like child benefit, social housing, a universal basic income, a European unemployment benefit, and non-contributory benefits for less affluent Europeans. The central normative arguments supporting these policies contend that supranational redistribution serves as a tool for promoting social justice, addressing social inequality and exclusion, and enhancing the connection between citizens and European institutions (Ferrera & Burelli, 2019; Ross, 2020; Seubert et al., 2018). Survey data concerning a European unemployment scheme and a minimum benefit indicate substantial citizen support for these policies (Baute & Meuleman, 2020; Nicoli et al., 2020).

3. Post-industrial societies and European solidarity

3.1 Social classes in post-industrial societies

Solidarity in the EU is rooted in the globalization and regional integration processes of the late 20th century, marked by two closely intertwined transformations: the restructuring of social divisions around cultural and integration-related issues, and the reorganization of social classes based on post-industrial production models. Social class is defined as ‘that form of

social inequality that is most consequential for individuals' material well-being, and, in turn, for a wide range of their life chances and life choices' (Goldthorpe, 2016: 90). Class positions are determined by individuals' employment relations and are some of the most robust predictors of a large array of political attitudes related to partisan choice, redistribution, post-materialistic values and regional integration processes.

Unlike industrial societies, characterized by low and intermediate-skilled routine manufacturing jobs with a small percentage of high-income and highly educated positions (comprising roughly 5-10% of the population), post-industrial societies are defined by deindustrialization, the predominance of the service sector, the emphasis on knowledge and technological innovation, and the proliferation of professional occupations demanding higher education and ongoing specialization (Bell, 2004; Kitschelt & Rehm, 2022). Presently, in most OECD countries, around 50% of the population has tertiary education. Simultaneously, post-industrialism has led to the dualization of labour markets into insiders (unionized workers with permanent contracts and employment protection) and outsiders (unprotected workers with part-time and temporary contracts and minimal employment security) (Natili et al., 2023; Rueda, 2014). As a result, post-industrialism has brought about a profound transformation in the social class structure. This transformation is characterized by a substantial increase and diversification of highly skilled professional occupations, and the fragmentation and loss of income protection of routine and low-skilled positions. The expansion and specialization of highly skilled professionals and the decline and dualization of working classes introduce greater heterogeneity within the same class (Güveli, 2007; Kriesi, 1989; Oesch, 2006).

There is a widespread scholarly consensus that, both in industrial and post-industrial societies, occupations remain the most reliable predictors for understanding fundamental social relationships and exposure to risk and inequalities (Connelly et al., 2016; Erikson & Goldthorpe, 1992; Rose & Pevalin, 2003). However, in post-industrial societies, occupations are categorized not only by the required skill level but also by the underlying work logic. This includes factors such as the work environment, skill type, relation to authority, and primary orientations involved (Oesch, 2003, 2006). These logics, which encompass socio-cultural, technical, and bureaucratic dimensions, overlay the vertical division of labour that distinguishes occupations based on marketable skills and education. Combining both divisions, Oesch (2003) proposes a 17-class or condensed 8-class scheme (see Figure A1 in Appendix).

The reconfiguration of social divisions in post-industrial societies does not result in class dealignment from welfare policy preferences and electoral politics (Brooks & Manza, 1997). On the contrary, an individual's class position significantly shapes their economic and cultural attitudes (Ares, 2020; Emmenegger et al., 2012; H. Kitschelt & Rehm, 2014; Oesch & Rennwald, 2018). The structural characteristics of work, including factors such as complexity, supervision, and the level of routinization, determine individuals' orientation towards political and social matters (Kiecolt, 1988; Kohn & Schooler, 1983). Occupations serve as a nexus for the formation of political attitudes, with experiences from the workplace generalizing and transposing into broader societal attitudes, influencing how individuals approach economic, cultural, and authoritative issues (Kitschelt & Rehm, 2014). While the classical division of social classes proposed by Goldthorpe and others shapes attitudes related to resource distribution, the horizontal differentiation among occupations is particularly pertinent for influencing attitudes regarding group inclusion and preferences for different types of authority.

Consequently, extant scholarship posits that an individual's class position exerts influence over their political attitudes regarding matters of redistribution, authority, and group boundaries. This line of thought implies that class location also plays a pivotal role in shaping one's endorsement of European solidarity. However, to date, there exists a notable gap in the literature concerning how the novel class configuration in post-industrial societies impacts support for solidarity within the European Union. Several arguments have been posited: high-income professionals tend to favour member state solidarity (Kleider & Stoeckel, 2019), while skilled workers are inclined to oppose solidarity among EU citizens (Baute et al., 2019). Conversely, findings by Gerhards et al. (2019) suggest that unskilled workers are more likely to support welfare solidarity among EU citizens, with lower-middle classes showing resistance to member state solidarity. These divergent outcomes may be attributed to variations in work logics observed between the middle (professional) and working classes, along with the existence of distinct support coalitions for supranational solidarity within the same class.

3. 2 The effect of class on European solidarity

Within the middle class, socio-cultural professionals exhibit a heightened tendency for endorsing European solidarity, both in terms of redistributive measures among member states and their citizens. Extant literature explores several mechanisms elucidating socio-cultural professionals' support for redistributive policies and cultural openness (Güveli, 2007; Lamont, 1987; Oesch & Rennwald, 2018; Werfhorst & Graaf, 2004). Foremost among these

mechanisms is the formative influence of education on socio-cultural professionals (Brint, 1984; Werfhorst & Graaf, 2004). Disciplines such as social sciences, humanities, or medicine equip students with the capacity to comprehend and empathize with diverse perspectives and needs, facilitating the extrapolation of individual and social issues from a subjective realm to a broader societal context. Another critical mechanism lies in the nature of their work, characterized by a focus on social interactions aimed at "attending" or "caring" for clients or patients, rather than being solely profit-driven (Lamont, 1987; Oesch, 2006). Furthermore, the economic activities of these professionals underscore professional autonomy, relative job security and a reliance on the public sector, further predisposing them toward supporting redistributive policies and state intervention in the economy (Lamont, 1987; Savage, 2003; Negri et al 2022). Consequently, their dependence on a robust welfare state and the social interactions integral to their educational and professional experiences predisposes them to support redistributive policies and to be more tolerant and receptive to individuals from diverse countries and cultures (Güveli, 2007; Lamont, 1987; Oesch & Rennwald, 2018; Werfhorst & Graaf, 2004).

However, we do not expect that European solidarity will elicit a similar level of support from the other highly skilled social classes, such as managers and technical professionals. The work logic of managers and administrators is marked by what can be termed a 'bureaucratic division of labour,' characterized by a distinct hierarchical arrangement and a primary focus on the efficiency and success of the employing organization. These characteristics, along with the relatively advantageous market position it bestows, are linked to diminished endorsement of redistribution and the espousal of relatively conservative cultural values (Oesch & Rennwald, 2018). As regards the technical work logic, which centres on technical production parameters and the expertise of the professional community, it allows limited space for social interactions that could foster empathy for those in disadvantaged social positions. Additionally, the educational training of technical professionals has faced criticism for emphasizing 'hard' technical skills at the expense of 'soft' social skills such as communication and empathy (Bancino & Zevalkink, 2007). Consequently, due to their limited social interaction skills, a job orientation focused on profit-maximization and privileged market position, both managers and technical professionals are expected to demonstrate tepid support for redistributive policies (Lamont, 1987; Werfhorst & Graaf, 2004). This leads to the following hypotheses:

H1. Socio-cultural professionals show a higher degree of support for member state and transnational solidarity respectively when compared to managers and technical professionals.

The upper strata of the independent work logic, such as large employers and self-employed professionals, are expected to exhibit a nuanced level of support for European solidarity. This support is influenced by their strong endorsement of globalization and European integration on one hand, and their limited support for redistribution on the other. Given their pro-market and pro-globalization orientation (Oesch, 2006), large employers may endorse solidarity among member states as a means to ensure the sustainability of the free movement of goods, capital, and labour. Their support for open borders is even more pronounced than that of managers and technical professionals because their economic prosperity depends even more heavily on cross-border integration and free exchange. However, they are likely to resist solidarity policies that primarily benefit less privileged EU citizens due to their conservative stance on redistribution (Ciornei & Recchi, 2017). Consequently, it is expected that:

Large employers and self-employed professionals are likely to display high support for member state solidarity (H2a) and low degree of support for transnational solidarity (H2b) when compared to socio-cultural professionals.

Conversely, the social classes most inclined to oppose European solidarity include small business owners and skilled routine workers (clerks), primarily due to their cultural aversion to multiculturalism and open borders, their economic preference for reduced redistribution and high support for the radical right (Kriesi et al. 2008; Oesch and Rennwald 2018). In the case of clerks, despite their inclusion in the skilled working class, their relatively secure employment may lead them to resist solidarity arrangements that challenge the existing order. This conjecture is supported by the findings of Gerhards et al. (2019), who demonstrated that self-employed individuals and small business owners are less likely than middle and working classes to endorse EU-level social security policies. Consequently, we hypothesise that:

H3. Small business owners and clerks are the least likely to support member state and transnational solidarity respectively when compared to socio-cultural professionals.

The impact of the working class on European solidarity is complex and subject to competing theoretical expectations. Production and service workers could reasonably be

expected to resist European solidarity. Often portrayed as the 'losers' of globalization, these workers have experienced challenges such as unemployment, difficulty transitioning their skills to other sectors, and competition from unskilled immigrant labour. Consequently, workers tend to be among the most ardent advocates of Euroscepticism and welfare chauvinism, driven by their opposition to immigration, economic competition, and strong support for national culture and traditions (Mewes & Mau, 2012; Oesch & Rennwald, 2018; Werts et al 2013). However, production and service workers might endorse supranational forms of redistribution that directly benefit them. They are likely to be critical of solidarity between member states since it presupposes transnational group boundaries and a new authority locus, coupled with a redistributive outcome that lacks clear beneficiaries. Nonetheless, they are expected to support solidarity policies targeting the most economically disadvantaged segments of the European population, from which they could potentially benefit. However, service workers could be more inclined than production workers to support member state solidarity, due to their interpersonal and communicative skills that may contribute to more support for redistribution to social groups located beyond national borders. Consequently, the hypothesis posits that:

Production and service workers show lower support for member state solidarity (H4a) and similarly high support for transnational solidarity relative to socio-cultural professionals (H4b). Service workers are expected to show more support for member state solidarity when compared with production workers (H5c).

3.3 Mechanisms of class influence on European solidarity

The mechanisms through which social class position influences support for solidaristic policies in the EU are related to core values and attitudes, as demonstrated in prior welfare state research (Kitschelt & Rehm, 2014; Kulin & Svallfors, 2013). Preferences for European solidarity are positioned within a two-dimensional framework, which encompasses economic ideology concerning redistribution, social equality, and state intervention on one axis, and the transnational/cultural cleavage that shapes issues related to European integration, solidarity boundaries, and political authority on the other (Baute & Meuleman, 2020; Kuhn et al., 2020; Nicoli et al., 2020).

Historically, conflicts over national solidarity have revolved around the economic cleavage represented by the working class, a staunch proponent of redistribution and state intervention to reduce income inequalities, and the privileged classes comprising business

owners and professionals, who endorsed less redistribution and less state intervention in economy. In post-industrial societies, political conflicts extend beyond issues of redistribution and equality. This expansion of political conflicts is a consequence of heightened economic, cultural, and political competition involving actors who transcend national borders through migration, economic globalisation, or political integration (Hooghe & Marks, 2018; Kriesi et al., 2012; Zürn, 2022). This process gives rise to new social risks linked to economic, cultural and political uncertainties, creating a group of potential 'losers,' while also conferring a competitive advantage on potential 'winners,' including highly skilled and cosmopolitan individuals (Fligstein, 2008; Kriesi et al., 2012). These winners and losers of globalization are not primarily divided along lines of economic redistribution, but rather along an integration/demarcation dimension, representing a transnational/nationalistic pole (Hooghe & Marks, 2018; Kriesi et al., 2012). Individuals situated within these divides exhibit fundamental differences in their political identities and hold contrasting views on European integration. Those aligned with the demarcation pole tend to harbour exclusive national identities and espouse Eurosceptic views, while integrationists are more inclined to express supranational identities and support for the EU (Hooghe & Marks, 2009; Kuhn, 2019). The integration/demarcation conflict does not arise only as a result of economic and cultural insecurities, but also as opposition to the increasing role of non-majoritarian institutions, such as the EU, in shaping and deciding domestic politics (Zürn, 2022). The consequential hypothesis is the following:

Egalitarian ideology and integration/demarcation values and identities mediate the relationship between social class and European solidarity (H5).

Certain social classes tend to align more closely with one pole of the cleavage, such as socio-cultural professionals embracing integration values (Kriesi, 1989) while workers and small business owners gravitating toward the demarcation pole (Afonso & Rennwald, 2018; Oesch, 2006). In contrast, some classes are less straightforward to categorize along this divide, including technical professionals and managers. Hence, Euroscepticism and exclusive national identities are expected to exert a negative influence on the relationship between class position and supranational solidarity for all social classes, while European identity is expected to increase the positive association between class and endorsement of European solidarity.

However, for production and service workers, it is expected that exclusive national identities and Euroscepticism will exert a less potent effect on their support for citizen-centered solidarity in the EU. The rationale is that transnational solidarity, which involves

redistribution toward the most vulnerable regardless of their state of residence and migration status, can serve as a compensatory mechanism for Eurosceptic and nationalistic workers who may otherwise feel threatened by European integration, offshoring, and immigration. Social psychology theories suggest that feelings of threat and socio-economic insecurities drive individuals to seek compensatory control, often provided by political parties with anti-immigration, anti-EU, and authoritarian discourses (Lucassen & Lubbers, 2012; Mirisola et al., 2014). Nevertheless, this mechanism can be reversed if workers perceive that the economic and cultural threats attributed to regional integration and globalization are mitigated by supranational redistributive policies. Normative scholars have argued that supranational welfare measures, such as minimum income, could potentially reinvigorate the more Eurosceptic and economically vulnerable segments of the European population (Bruzelius & Seeleib-Kaiser, 2017). Therefore, our hypothesis posits that:

Exclusive national identities and Euroscepticism have a weaker negative effect on workers' support for transnational (citizen-centred) solidarity (H6).

4. Data and methods

To the best of the authors' knowledge, no existing survey allows for the comprehensive examination of both member state and transnational solidarity in conjunction with the post-industrial configuration of social classes. The primary obstacle to conducting such an analysis lies in the fact that most datasets containing information on preferences related to supranational solidarity lack the detailed data on respondent professions, which are integral for the derivation of post-industrial class classifications. Considering this limitation, the analysis in this study relies on two distinct datasets that facilitate the empirical testing of the hypotheses advanced: the first dataset comprises random survey responses collected from six European Union member states during the period of December 2012 and January 2013, as part of the ANONYMUS project. The second dataset stems from the European Social Survey (ESS), specifically round 8, which was conducted in 2016 and is limited to a sample of 18 EU countries.

The ANONYMOUS dataset is the result of a large-scale telephone survey (n=6016) conducted in Denmark, Germany, Italy, Romania, Spain and the United Kingdom using CATI technology and representative for the national population of the respective countries. The ESS is among the most well-established surveys conducted in Europe and employs face-to-face interviews on a representative sample of respondents in each country. The choice of the two

surveys is determined by their complementarity. While the ANONYMOUS survey contains a question of solidarity between member states, the ESS 2016 wave allows for the analysis of transnational solidarity. Both surveys have information on respondent occupation, which allows the coding of social class. Table A1 in Appendix proves the comparability of the two datasets by showing that the relationship between social classes and several other dependent variables, such as European identification, support for European integration and vote for a far-right party is isomorphic, i.e., regression correlation coefficients display the same sign and significance levels. Consequently, the robustness checks shown in Table A1, Appendix, justify the comparability of the two surveys and the joint interpretation of findings that we detail in the next sections.

Member state solidarity is measured on a 1-5 scale, based on the ANONYMOUS survey, by individual support for redistribution between member states in times of economic hardship. *Transnational solidarity* (citizen-centred solidarity) is measured on a 1-4 scale in the ESS survey and refers to a redistributive scheme at the Union level for a social benefit that targets the most vulnerable part of the European citizenry. The scheme addresses all European citizens regardless of their member state of residence and previous economic contributions. The core explanatory variable, *social class*, is identically generated in both datasets (Figure A1, Appendix): the coding of self-reported occupation measured on the ISCO-08 scale into the Oesch 8-class scheme based on the Stata script of Kaiser (2018).

The mediating variables are similarly measured in both surveys. *Egalitarian ideology* is measured in the ESS survey on a 1-5 scale and refers to government's prerogative to reduce differences in income levels. Since the ANONYMOUS survey does not contain a direct measure of egalitarianism, we use a highly correlated measure of ideological self-placement on the left-right scale that ranges from 1, measuring extreme left, to 5, referring to extreme right. Other alternative answers such as 'Left and right do not exist anymore' have been discarded. Integration/demarcation variables are operationalised by the following items: Euroscepticism, European identity, and exclusive nationalism, based on previous works by Hooghe & Marks (2018), Kriesi (2012), Kuhn (2019) and Zurn (2022) among others. *Euroscepticism* is measured as the sum of two items indicating preferences for enlargement and devolution of powers to member states in the ANONYMOUS survey. Higher scores denote higher rates of Euroscepticism. The ESS 2016 complementary item measures agreement with further EU integration. The scale of the variable has been subsequently reversed (11-value) so that it goes in the same direction as the measurement based on the

ANONYMOUS survey. We operationalise *European identity* as the affective dimension of political identities, which refers to individual's attachment towards Europe (Borz et al 2022). *Exclusive nationalism* is the difference between respondent's emotional attachment to country and emotional attachment to Europe, higher scores denoting higher exclusive nationalism. The detailed formulation of the questions as well as the measurement scales are specified in Table A2, Appendix.

The main estimations control for age and gender. Based on Kitchelt and Rhem (2022) we do not control for education and income in the main models. Social class schemes already contain information on education and income and would imply a high degree of collinearity. Education and income can be used as *alternative* measures of socio-economic stratification, and their combination (low/high education; low/high income) is indicative for the classification of social classes in industrial and post-industrial societies (ibid). For robustness checks, we estimate the models with education and income, however, we show that the best model fit is obtained when discarding these two variables (Tables A11 and A12, Appendix). These controls do not change the main findings presented in the paper.

The estimation is based on ordinary least square regressions for testing hypotheses 1-4, structural equation modelling (SEM) using path analysis for the testing of hypothesis 5 (Figure 1), and multigroup linear SEM for the testing of hypothesis 6. All estimations contain country fixed effects and clustered standard errors. To better disentangle the mediated effects, the structural equation models introduce the integration/demarcation indicators sequentially as well as combined. Euroscepticism and exclusive nationalism perform the best in explaining social class support for transnational solidarity (RMSEA<0.05; CFI>0.995). European attachment gives the best model fit for member-state solidarity (RMSEA=0.036; CFI=0.999). Given the high correlation between the integration/demarcation mediators, the model that introduces all of them does not display satisfactory fit statistics in explaining transnational and member state solidarity respectively (RMSEA>0.05, CFI<0.900). Tables A5 and A6 in Appendix shows the SEM direct effect coefficients and fit indices of the models tested. We discard using a latent factor for the three demarcation/integration indicators since they tap into distinct dimensions, that capture both attitudes and identities (also see Boomgaarden et al. (2011)).

One limitation of using country fixed effects is the generalisability of results beyond the sample of countries included in the analysis. However, the small number of countries in the ANONYMOUS survey (six) is representative for the major positions expressed by

member-state governments regarding Eurobonds and fiscal transfer to the most affected EU countries during the economic and sovereign debt crisis (2008-2013). In this regard, the survey offers representative public opinion data from Germany, the most vociferous opposer to Eurobonds and unconditional transfers at that time, and Spain and Italy, some of the most ardent supporters of these policies. In the case of the ESS 2016 survey, the sample covers most of the EU member states at that time (18 countries) covering a wide and representative sample of EU citizens' opinions regarding transnational solidarity.




Figure 1. SEM path analysis model used in estimations.

5. Results

5.1 The effects of class on European solidarity

Both member state and transnational solidarity receive widespread popular support. Member state solidarity has an average score of 3.5 out of 5 for the six countries included in the ANONYMOUS survey, indicating that, in general, respondents tend to agree to measures that promote redistribution between member states. Similarly, more than two thirds of the ESS sample express agreement with the enactment of a social benefit for poorer Europeans.

However, there is significant variation in the support of each dimension of European solidarity among post-industrial social classes. Figure 2 presents the linear regression coefficients for support for transnational solidarity with 95% confidence intervals (CI) and

clustered standard errors (SE). The results show that compared to socio-cultural professionals, all social classes except for service and industrial workers display significantly less support for citizen-centred solidarity. This finding confirms H1, which posits that socio-cultural professionals show the highest degree of solidarity when compared with the other middle-class professionals and also H4b, according to which workers are expected to display a comparatively high level of support for citizen-centred redistribution. The third hypothesis is not confirmed in the case of clerks and small business owners. While their level of support is clearly lower than in the case of socio-cultural professionals and workers, it is part of the affluent middle class (managers) who display the lowest level of endorsement of transnational solidarity.




Figure 2. Support for transnational solidarity, ESS survey. Reference category for class: Socio-cultural professionals. Reference category for country: Germany. N=27,881

It is important to highlight that support for transnational solidarity is built around similar support coalitions for national redistributive policies (Gingrich & Häusermann, 2015a), pointing to a complementarity logic between national and supranational redistribution. We can also observe a significant country of residence effect. Compared to Germany which is used as reference category, citizens in Southern and Eastern European countries are significantly more supportive for transnational solidarity, while respondents from Scandinavian and Western member states are considerably less in favour. While not directly tested, the country effects are most likely determined by the generosity of the welfare regime

and citizen' perceptions of EU performance in managing a social benefit scheme (Baute & Meuleman, 2020).

A different pattern emerges in the case of member state solidarity (Figure 3). When compared to socio-cultural professionals, all social classes display significantly lower levels of support with the notable exception of self-employed professionals and large employers. These results confirm H2, according to which independent professionals and large business owners are likely to endorse member state solidarity at the expense of citizen-centred solidarity. Moreover, albeit the two dimensions of EU solidarity are correlated, the social bases of support are different, most likely prompted by distinct perceptions of the prospective costs and benefits involved. Thus, while industrial and service workers may perceive a European minimum income scheme as complementary to national welfare policies, they do not necessarily consider redistribution between member-states as a policy that may directly address their interests, confirming H4a and b. As regards H4c, the results show that service workers have a slightly higher degree of support for member state solidarity when compared to production workers, albeit the coefficient does not reach statistical significance. In a similar vein, self-employed professionals support member state redistribution in times of economic hardship as an adequate policy for maintaining the stability of the single market and the broader benefits of European integration, but significantly oppose citizen-centred redistribution.




Figure 3. Support for member-state solidarity, ANONYMOUS survey. Reference category for class: Socio-cultural professionals. Reference category for country: Germany. N=3,523

5.2 Mechanisms of class influence on European solidarity

The relationship between social class and transnational solidarity is significantly mediated by economic ideology, as well as by integration and demarcation attitudes and identities, in accordance with the hypothesis H5. Figure 4 presents both the direct and mediated impacts of social class, channeled through economic ideology and Euroscepticism. The complete list of standardized and unstandardized coefficients is presented in Table A7 in Appendix. As discussed in the preceding section, large and small business owners, along with those in the technical and bureaucratic segments of the professional class, exhibit considerably lower levels of support for citizen-centric solidarity when compared to socio-cultural professionals and the working class. Approximately 25% to 30% of the disparity in support between socio-cultural professionals and their counterparts in the independent work logic and technical and managerial professions can be attributed to variations in ideology and Euroscepticismⁱⁱ. Upon comparing the role of these mediators across different social classes, it becomes apparent that the lukewarm stance of self-employed professionals and large business owners towards transnational solidarity primarily stems from their less enthusiastic support for egalitarianism and income redistribution. Conversely, technical professionals, managers, and small business owners, exhibit reduced support for citizen-centric solidarity due to a combination of Euroscepticism and diminished support for egalitarianism.

In the case of skilled workers adhering to the bureaucratic work logic (clerks), their diminished support for transnational solidarity can be attributed to higher levels of Euroscepticism when compared to socio-cultural professionals. Industrial and service workers tend to have mixed sentiments, combining strong support for egalitarianism with Eurosceptic leanings, whose combined effects cancel each other. Consequently, working classes and socio-cultural professionals' positions on transnational solidarity do not significantly differ from each other. Comparable findings emerge when scrutinising the class effect through the lens of exclusive nationalism, although the influence of this latter predictor is somewhat less pronounced than Euroscepticism (see Table A9 in the Appendix). Approximately 20% of the variance in class support can be attributed to the combined effect of egalitarianism and exclusive nationalism, particularly notable in the case of managers, technical professionals, and small business owners.




Figure 4. Direct, indirect and total effects of social class on transnational solidarity through Euroscepticism and egalitarianism. Standardised coefficients. Effects of age, gender and country estimated but not shown. Supporting table: Table A7, Appendix.

As regards member state solidarity, economic ideology, quantified in the ANONYMOUS dataset as self-placement along the left-right spectrum, along with integration/demarcation values and identities, play a significant mediating role. Notably, the most robust integration/demarcation indicator in this context is European identity, while Euroscepticism and exclusive nationalism offer a comparatively weaker explanation for class-based variations in support for European solidarity. These distinctions are evident from the model fit indices provided in Table A6 in the Appendix.

Figure 5 reveals that a substantial proportion, ranging from 50% to 80%, of the diversity in social class support for member state solidarity can be attributed to the differing levels of European identification and economic ideology across these social classes (Table A8

provides a complete estimation of direct, indirect and total effects). In the case of self-employed professionals, large business owners, managers, and small business owners, the divergence is chiefly explained by contrasting economic ideology perspectives. In contrast, technical professionals, clerks, and workers exhibit both lower degrees of European identity and a more right-wing ideology compared to socio-cultural professionals.




Figure 5. Direct, indirect and total effects of social class on member-state solidarity through Euroscepticism and egalitarianism. Standardised coefficients. Effects of age, gender and country estimated but not shown. Supporting table: Table A8, Appendix.

Consequently, when we analyze the mechanisms by which class support for European solidarity operates, it becomes evident that these two dimensions exist within a bidimensional framework, characterized by economic ideology on one axis and integration/demarcation attitudes and identities on the other. In the context of the latter, it is opposition to European integration and exclusive nationalism that primarily hinder support for redistribution among

EU citizens, while European identity serves as the principal channel boosting support for member-state solidarity. Furthermore, attitudes and identities play a more significant role in explaining the variations in class support for member-state solidarity, whereas their influence is relatively limited in accounting for citizen-centred solidarity. This observation underscores the fact that citizen-centered solidarity remains a social class issue, with distinct preferences and support coalitions aligned along the vertical and horizontal divisions inherent to post-industrial social classes. In contrast, support for member-state solidarity transcends these divisions and is primarily anchored in European identity and left-wing orientations. It is also worth noting the heterogeneity within the professional class regarding their stance on European solidarity. Managers, and to an even greater extent, technical professionals, exhibit a heightened opposition to both dimensions of European solidarity. This underscores the significance of horizontal divisions among social classes in shaping key policies related to social cohesion and redistribution within the European Union.

5.3. The heterogenous effects of economic ideology and integration/demarcation indicators

In continuation, we proceed to test H6, which postulates a comparatively weaker negative effect of Euroscepticism and exclusive nationalism on the endorsement of transnational solidarity among workers. The validation of this hypothesis involves a two-step process. First, we conduct a multigroup analysis of the path model depicted in Figure 1 across the different social classes. We compare a fully constrained model, where the effects of integration/demarcation indicators and economic ideology on transnational solidarity do not vary across classes, with a partially constrained model, where these paths exhibit significant variation across the eight industrial social classes. The comparison of fit indices between these two multigroup estimations indicates that the partially constrained model, where both integration/demarcation indicators and economic ideology vary across classes, offers a superior fit (indicated by lower AIC and higher CFI). In a second step, we compute the differentiated impact of the mediators by social class, as presented in Figure 4 and Table A8, Appendix.

The results reveal that the influence of Euroscepticism and exclusive nationalism is the weakest among service and production workers, thereby confirming H6. The most plausible explanation for this phenomenon is that Eurosceptic and exclusive nationalist workers are less resolute in their rejection of citizen-centered solidarity when compared to individuals with similar leanings in other social classes. In other words, redistributive policies are likely to

encounter less resistance among one of the most Eurosceptic segments of the electorate, underscoring their potential to form a support coalition among European citizens who otherwise hold strong reservations regarding European integration processes and policies. Similarly, economic ideology also plays a diminished role in the case of production and service workers, emphasizing the distinct "class effect" associated with transnational solidarity, which extends beyond integration/demarcation and ideological differences within this class.

In analyzing the influence of European identity and economic ideology on the relationship between post-industrial class positions and member-state solidarity, we find that a partially constrained model does not offer a superior fit when compared to a fully constrained model. This suggests that European identity and economic ideology consistently affect the link between class and member-state solidarity. European identity enhances this connection, while right-wing ideology diminishes it. Although variations were observed across social classes, they did not reach statistical significance.




Figure 6. Multigroup SEM by social-class. Partially constrained models. Constrained effects of age, gender and country estimated but not shown in this figure. Supporting table: Table A10, Appendix

6. Conclusions

The ‘new’ social classes of the post-industrial era are important determinants of European solidarity, underscoring the salience of intra-class differences in predicting attitudes on welfare and redistribution in a supranational context. However, despite recent work demonstrating that member state and transnational solidarity capture distinct but interrelated dimensions of solidarity in the EU (Baute et al., 2018; Reintl, 2022), the analysis shows that the support coalitions for the two policies are significantly different. Consequently, European solidarity encounters a relatively broad social consensus, albeit the policies implementing it receive differentiated support, depending on individual socio-economic position and stakes in European integration.

Citizen-centred solidarity is mainly endorsed by socio-cultural professionals and workers and contested by the technical and managerial professionals and the large and small business owners and entrepreneurs alike. In this case, transnational solidarity tends to reproduce the blueprint of national solidarity support coalitions in the post-industrial age (Gingrich & Häusermann, 2015b). More importantly, transnational solidarity does not receive staunch opposition from nationalistic and Eurosceptic workers, a fact that points to its transformative force. Redistributive mechanisms towards European citizens are one of the few supranational policy initiatives that can garner the support of the most sceptic and nationalist voters.

Member state solidarity is supported by large business owners, independent professionals and the socio-cultural division of the middle class. The first two are the most likely to benefit from an integrated economic area and the free movement regime that, in times of economic downturn, can be sustained by fiscal transfers between countries. The socio-cultural professionals, driven by social equality and cultural openness, distinguish themselves in the support for solidarity among member states. At the opposite pole are technical professionals and managers followed by the skilled and unskilled working class. Most differences between the two poles of support for member-state solidarity are primarily explained by distinct degrees of European identity.

Two important observations arise from these findings. The first is the heterogeneity of the middle class, currently constituting almost half of the electorate in advanced economies, in supporting redistributive policies in the EU. While mature welfare states rely on a consensus among the more highly skilled and affluent classes (Kulin & Svallfors, 2013), existing and

prospective solidaristic policies in the EU only attract the support of socio-cultural professionals and face important opposition from managers and technical professionals. This differentiation within the middle class may explain why our findings diverge from Baute and Meuleman (2019)'s, who show that white-collar and blue-collar workers have a similar support for citizen-centred solidarity as the high service class. In most European economies, socio-cultural professionals are public sector employees, which, in turn, constitute an important share of total employment (Eurostat 2022). This configuration may assure a stable support coalition for member state and citizen-centred solidarity policies in the short run. However, the occupational transformation of digital economies presupposes an exponential increase of technical professions, which in turn, may have a substantive impact on the support for fiscal transfers among member states and EU citizens in the long run. Technical professionals' lukewarm support for solidarity among member states can be linked to recent calls from the sociology of professions and education to infuse 'soft skills' in the preparation of technical professionals, allegedly able to solve complex mathematical problems but falling short of mastering communication, listening, addressing social skills and working in teams (Bancino & Zevalkink, 2007; Johnson, 2015; Thompson et al., 2003).

The second observation we emphasize is the role of integration/demarcation values and political identities in elucidating class positions on European solidarity (also see Nicoli et al., 2020). On the one hand, citizen-centred solidarity elicits attitudes associated with Euroscepticism and exclusive nationalism, indicating that support for such policies triggers assessments related to the political authority and delineation of group boundaries within the supranational redistributive framework (Zurn, 2022). On the other hand, member-state solidarity predominantly hinges on emotional attachment to Europe, signifying that this dimension of solidarity is particularly tied to a sense of community individuals acknowledge when evaluating redistributive policies among member states.

These findings provide an original contribution to various fields of literature. In dialogue with the literature on exclusive national identities and Euroscepticism (Baute et al., 2019; Boomgaarden et al., 2011; De Vries & Edwards, 2009; Hooghe & Marks, 2007; McLaren, 2007; Weßels, 2007), the paper shows that transnational solidarity in the form of redistributive policies for European citizens can prompt support among the more exclusive nationalist segments of the European demos and can have pushback and mitigation effects for European integration backlash (Walter, 2021). This empirical finding also opens a dialogue with recent normative literature on European citizenship, claiming that European citizenship

must embrace its social dimension in order to become meaningful for most Europeans (Bruzelius & Seeleib-Kaiser, 2017; Ross, 2020; Seubert et al., 2018). Importantly, not all supranational redistributive policies can garner the support of nationalistic workers. Policies sustaining member state solidarity, such as fiscal transfers, the SURE scheme, NextGenEU and other mechanisms that address states and not citizens as their beneficiaries, tend to reproduce the patterns of support and opposition as other supranational integration policies.

The paper also contributes to recent welfare state research (Baldwin, 1990; Beramendi, 2017; Gingrich & Häusermann, 2015b; Svallfors, 1997) by inquiring about the relevance of social class for a theory of solidarity in a transnational setting. It shows that the post-industrial articulation of social classes is a relevant instrument for explaining patterns of opposition and support to supranational redistribution. This is extremely relevant since identifying “who wants what” explains existing power resources and policy preferences that set the agenda for future reforms in the field of European solidarity. Moreover, ‘Social Europe’ could revive the support of the working classes and shift the opinions of its more nationalistic segment, whilst continuing to engender the opposition of part of the middle class and large employers.

This study also encounters several limitations that we aim to address in future research. The focus of our investigation centers on two core dimensions of supranational solidarity, specifically member-state and citizen-centered redistribution. While support for these dimensions provides insight into the fundamental attitudes of social classes towards European solidarity (Bechtel et al., 2014), it does not encompass the more nuanced, contingent attitudes that respond to specific policy designs. Recent studies have demonstrated the multidimensionality of European solidarity, not only in relation to its core aspects but also concerning how public preferences diverge based on the specific features of policy design (Bechtel et al., 2014; Beetsma et al., 2022; Burgoon et al., 2022; Kuhn et al., 2020; Nicoli et al., 2020). Analyzing how support varies according to policy design would provide a more comprehensive understanding of class endorsement of European solidarity. Secondly, our research does not delve into how national contexts influence the relationship between social class and transnational solidarity. As discussed by Baute & Meuleman (2020), the generosity of welfare state transfers and perceptions of the EU's capacity to manage a social benefit scheme are significant country-level factors that interact with individual attitudes and preferences. Lastly, it's worth noting that although the post-industrial class scheme employed in this study is validated and utilized across various strands of literature (Emmenegger et al., 2012; Häusermann et al., 2019; Oesch & Rennwald, 2018), alternative schemes of social

stratification could be considered, such as the combined effects of education and income as employed by Kitschelt & Rehm (2022) or labor market dualization (Häusermann & Schwander, 2009; Natili et al., 2023; Rueda, 2014).

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Supplementary material

European solidarity and social class. An uneasy alliance Irina Ciornei & Alfredo
Hernandez Sanchez

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Summary

1. **Robustness checks**
2. **Variable description**
3. **Cross-tabulations**
4. **Structural equation model results**
5. **Additional estimations**

1. Robustness checks

Given the distinct sources of data for the two dimensions of transnational solidarity analysed in this article, Table A1 presents the association between post-industrial classes and some of the most relevant independent variables used in the analysis: exclusive national identity, Euroscepticism and radical right support. The results show similar mechanisms that explain the variables analysed between the two surveys, a fact that justifies a comparative interpretation of the findings presented in the previous section. The analyses, however, indicate that European solidarity clusters distinct patterns of opposition and support among social groupings, distinct from those prompted by European integration in general. For this reason, attitudes towards European solidarity, and in particular, transnational solidarity, are not reduced to support for European integration, but mainly reproduce the support coalitions that can be observed in the case of national welfare states (also see Baute et al., 2019).

Models 1a and 1b show that exclusive national identities are indeed driven by the cleavage between the middle and working classes, confirming previous arguments of Hooghe & Marks (2018) and Kuhn (2019). Importantly, both the employer and professional classes show similar degrees of exclusive identities, while their endorsement is significantly differentiated in the case of European solidarity. This finding restates that support for European solidarity is a question of class (having its core supporters among socio-cultural professionals and workers) and not only a consequence of political identities. As analyses in Tables 1-2 show, nested political identities do increase support for supranational solidarity, but the mechanism occurs independently of the class location of individuals.

Models 2a and 2b illustrate that class support for European integration is almost completely explained by differences in political identities, cosmopolitanism and education, and that no distinctive ‘class’ effect can be observed with the exception of small business owners in the EUCROSS survey. Lastly, both data sources confirm the relationship between class and radical right support as argued by Oesch & Rennwald (2018). Thus, large employers, managers and small business owners are more likely to support the radical right than socio-cultural professionals. A small difference in results can be observed in the case of service workers, most likely driven by the distinct country samples used (also see Oesch and Rennwald (2018) for country differentiated support of service workers for the radical right). In the case of production workers, the class effect is absorbed by education and political identities. An important observation is the distinction between technical professionals’ and managers’ voting preferences, with the latter being more driven towards the radical right pole, despite their similar attitudes in relation to supranational solidarity. Thus, the three work logics of the professional class do engender significant differences in terms of political preferences, while the technical and organisational work logics do not necessarily mark a difference in the case of supranational solidarity. The location of socio-cultural professionals on the support pole of redistribution *and* at the highest end of integration values explains their differentiated effect among the professional class.

Table A1. Social class and attitudes towards the EU. Fixed effects regressions with clustered SE.

	(1a) Exclusive national identity ANON.	(1b) Exclusive national attachment ESS 2016	(2a) Euro scepticism ANON.	(2b) Euro scepticism ESS 2016	(3a) Radical ideology ANON.	right ESS	(3b) Radical ideology 2016	right ESS
Socio-cultural	Ref	Ref	Ref	Ref	Ref		Ref	
(semi)professionals								
Self-employed professionals and large employers	-0.173 (0.145)	-0.044 (0.395)	0.090 (0.169)	-0.019 (0.099)	0.710** (0.237)		0.619** (0.189)	
Small business owners	0.116 (0.153)	0.125 (0.161)	0.161* (0.061)	0.120 (0.096)	0.897*** (0.239)		0.451*** (0.136)	
Technical (semi)professionals	0.091 (0.165)	-0.110 (0.244)	0.243 (0.146)	-0.001 (0.079)	-0.103 (0.397)		0.016 (0.125)	
(Associate) managers	0.118 (0.072)	-0.212 (0.222)	-0.057 (0.091)	-0.068 (0.073)	0.489+ (0.289)		0.226* (0.112)	
Clerks	0.255 (0.156)	-0.146 (0.242)	0.106 (0.145)	-0.004 (0.073)	0.388 (0.344)		0.090 (0.112)	
Production workers	0.226* (0.099)	0.405* (0.195)	0.312 (0.218)	0.204 (0.103)	0.228 (0.251)		-0.155 (0.108)	
Service workers	0.385* (0.157)	0.230 (0.173)	0.136 (0.161)	0.102 (0.109)	0.684** (0.229)		-0.060 (0.103)	
Exclusive national identity			0.435** (0.097)	1.215*** (0.164)	0.331* (0.158)		0.540*** (0.164)	
Euro scepticism	0.104*** (0.029)	0.202*** (0.033)			0.089* (0.037)		0.010 (0.027)	
Cosmopolitanism	-0.170*** (0.038)	-0.161*** (0.022)	-0.274*** (0.033)	-0.390*** (0.031)	-0.178*** (0.045)		-0.092** (0.032)	
Right wing ideology	0.308* (0.153)	0.528*** (0.159)	0.375 (0.153)	0.058 (0.165)				
Tertiary education	-0.187*** (0.016)	-0.345** (0.116)	-0.169* (0.045)	-0.272*** (0.066)	-0.126* (0.061)		0.049 (0.061)	
Age	-0.005 (0.003)	0.016*** (0.005)	0.007 (0.004)	0.006** (0.002)	0.000 (0.006)		0.010** (0.003)	
Female	0.290* (0.117)	0.096 (0.111)	0.219 (0.118)	0.039 (0.048)	-0.049 (0.078)		-0.325*** (0.050)	

Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	-0.430 (0.351)	-5.112*** (0.318)	8.410*** (0.379)	7.980*** (0.155)	-2.815*** (0.646)	-2.329*** (0.229)
Observations	4114	29370	4114	29370	4114	29370
R^2			0.153	0.182		

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2. Main variable description

Table A2. Detailed formulation of survey questions

Variable	Wording	Scale
Member state solidarity	'The EU member states are currently pooling national state funds to help EU countries having difficulties in paying their debts. On a scale from one to five, where one means "strongly disagree" and five means "strongly agree": Please tell me how much you agree with this measure?'	1-5
Transnational solidarity	'It has been proposed that there should be a European Union-wide social benefit scheme for all poor people. In a moment I will ask you to tell me whether you are against or in favour of this scheme. First, look at the highlighted box at the top of this card, which shows the main features of the scheme. A European Union-wide social benefit scheme includes all of the following: - The purpose is to guarantee a minimum standard of living for all poor people in the European Union; - The level of social benefit people receive will be adjusted to reflect the cost of living in their country; - The scheme would require richer European Union countries to pay more into such a scheme than poorer European Union countries'.	1-4
Egalitarian ideology (ESS)	'Government should reduce differences in income levels'	1-5
Egalitarian ideology (EUCROSS survey)	'In politics people often speak about left and right. Where would you place yourself on the following scale: Extreme left/ 2. Centre left/ 3. Centre/ 4. Centre right/ 5. Extreme right/ 6. Left and right do not exist anymore	1-5
Euroscepticism (EUCROSS)	SUM of: 'The EU should not continue to accept new member states (1 strongly disagree to 5 strongly agree)' and 'EU institutions should transfer some of their decision-making power back to the member states (1 strongly disagree to 5 strongly agree)'	
Euroscepticism (ESS)	'EU unification already gone too far (1) to EU unification should go further (10)'.	0-10, reversed
European identity (EUCROSS)	'How much do you agree with the following: "I feel European"'	1-5
European identity (ESS)	'How emotionally attached do you feel to Europe?'	0-10
Exclusive nationalism (EUCROSS)	DIFFERENCE between: 'I feel [country of residence demonym]' – 'I feel European'.	-5-+5
Exclusive nationalism (ESS)	DIFFERENCE between: 'How emotionally attached do you feel to [country]?' – 'And how emotionally attached do you feel to Europe?'	-10-10

Figure A1. Class scheme in post-industrial societies. Source Oesch and Grennwald (2018)

Interpersonal service logic	Technical work logic	Organisational work logic	Independent work logic
<i>Sociocultural (semi-) professionals</i>	<i>Technical (semi-) professionals</i>	<i>(Associate) managers</i>	<i>Liberal professionals and large employers</i>
Medical doctors	Engineers	Administrators	Entrepreneurs
Teachers	Architects	Consultants	Lawyers
Social workers	Informational technology specialists	Accountants	Dentists
<i>Service workers</i>	<i>Production workers</i>	<i>Office clerks</i>	<i>Small business owners and farmers</i>
Waiters	Mechanics	Secretaries	Shop owners
Nursing aides	Carpenters	Receptionists	Independent artisans
Shop assistants	Assemblers	Mail clerks	Farmers

3. Cross-tabulation of European solidarity dimensions by class and country

Table A3. Solidarity and social class. Means and SD based on the EUCROSS and ESS8 surveys respectively

Class	Mean member state solidarity (1-5 scale)	SD member state solidarity	Mean transnational solidarity (1-4 scale)	SD transnational solidarity
Liberal professionals and large employers	3.69	1.33	2.57	0.80
Small business owners and farmers	3.41	1.40	2.62	0.74
Technical (semi-)professionals	3.30	1.39	2.60	0.79
Production workers	3.50	1.41	2.72	0.76
Associate managers	3.39	1.32	2.58	0.77
Clerks	3.55	1.28	2.65	0.75
Socio-cultural (semi-)professionals	3.74	1.18	2.70	0.74
Service workers	3.44	1.38	2.73	0.74

Table A4. Member state solidarity and country of residence. Means (1-5 scale) and SD based on the EUCROSS survey

Country	Mean	SD
Germany	2.96	1.26
Denmark	3.24	1.19
United Kingdom	3.07	1.32
Italy	4.07	1.18
Romania	3.57	1.45
Spain	4.15	1.09

Table A5. Transnational solidarity and country of residence. Means (1-4 scale) and SD based on the ESS survey

Country	Mean	SD
Austria	2.35	.90
Belgium	2.69	.66
Czech Republic	2.59	.87
Germany	2.59	.73
Greece	2.67	.66
Spain	3.02	.61
Finland	2.43	.70
France	2.55	.76
United Kingdom	2.41	.75
Hungary	2.99	.70
Ireland	2.67	.74
Italy	2.92	.59
Lithuania	3.01	.66
Netherlands	2.43	.68
Poland	2.83	.62
Portugal	3.07	.53
Sweden	2.38	.91
Slovenia	2.96	.54

4. Structural equation models

Table A5. SEM estimations for transnational solidarity, direct effects. Linear estimations with country fixed effects and clustered SE. Country dummies omitted from output. Source: ESS 2016

	(1) Mediators Exclusive nat/ Egalitarianism	(2) Mediators Exclusive nat/ Eurocepticism/ Egalitarianism	(3) Mediators Eurocepticism/ Egalitarianism	(4) Mediators European identity/ Egalitarianism
DV: Transnational solidarity				
Exclusive nationalism	-0.034*** (0.008)	-0.023*** (0.006)		
Eurocepticism		-0.034*** (0.008)	-0.040*** (0.010)	
European identity				0.029*** (0.006)
Egalitarianism	0.129*** (0.009)	0.129*** (0.009)	0.127*** (0.009)	0.128*** (0.009)
Self-employed professionals and large business owners	-0.116** (0.037)	-0.114** (0.038)	-0.108** (0.038)	-0.112** (0.037)
(Associate managers)	-0.103*** (0.021)	-0.100*** (0.021)	-0.100*** (0.021)	-0.102*** (0.023)
Technical (semi)professionals	-0.082** (0.026)	-0.076** (0.026)	-0.077** (0.027)	-0.077** (0.026)
Small business owners	-0.094*** (0.024)	-0.080*** (0.024)	-0.086*** (0.023)	-0.092*** (0.024)
Clerks	-0.058* (0.026)	-0.047* (0.024)	-0.048* (0.024)	-0.054* (0.027)
Production workers	-0.037 (0.028)	-0.017 (0.026)	-0.027 (0.027)	-0.031 (0.030)
Service worker	0.001 (0.028)	0.017 (0.026)	0.012 (0.027)	0.008 (0.029)
Constant	2.294*** (0.110)	2.385*** (0.117)	2.155*** (0.076)	1.716*** (0.052)
DV: Exclusive nationalism				
Self employed professionals and large business owners	-0.356** (0.111)	-0.356** (0.111)		
(Associate managers)	0.028 (0.091)	0.028 (0.091)		
Technical (semi)professionals	0.133 (0.092)	0.133 (0.092)		
Small business owners	0.349*** (0.097)	0.349*** (0.097)		
Clerks	0.202* (0.084)	0.202* (0.084)		
Production workers	0.617*** (0.095)	0.617*** (0.095)		
Service worker	0.449*** (0.094)	0.449*** (0.094)		
Age	0.023*** (0.003)	0.023*** (0.003)		
Gender	-0.006 (0.059)	-0.006 (0.059)		
Constant	10.732*** (0.192)	10.732*** (0.192)		
DV: Egalitarianism				
Self employed professionals and large business owners	-0.325*** (0.061)	-0.325*** (0.061)	-0.325*** (0.061)	-0.325*** (0.061)

(Associate managers)	-0.180*** (0.031)	-0.180*** (0.031)	-0.180*** (0.031)	-0.180*** (0.031)
Technical (semi)professionals	-0.141*** (0.033)	-0.141*** (0.033)	-0.141*** (0.033)	-0.141*** (0.033)
Small business owners	-0.169*** (0.037)	-0.169*** (0.037)	-0.169*** (0.037)	-0.169*** (0.037)
Clerks	-0.004 (0.030)	-0.004 (0.030)	-0.004 (0.030)	-0.004 (0.030)
Production workers	0.111** (0.035)	0.111** (0.035)	0.111** (0.035)	0.111** (0.035)
Service worker	0.097** (0.031)	0.097** (0.031)	0.097** (0.031)	0.097** (0.031)
Age	0.004*** (0.001)	0.004*** (0.001)	0.004*** (0.001)	0.004*** (0.001)
Gender	0.091*** (0.020)	0.091*** (0.020)	0.091*** (0.020)	0.091*** (0.020)
Constant	3.638*** (0.057)	3.638*** (0.057)	3.638*** (0.057)	3.638*** (0.057)
DV: Euroscepticism				
Self employed professionals and large business owners		-0.023 (0.087)	-0.023 (0.087)	
(Associate managers)		0.115 (0.080)	0.115 (0.080)	
Technical (semi)professionals		0.258*** (0.065)	0.258*** (0.065)	
Small business owners		0.522*** (0.111)	0.522*** (0.111)	
Clerks		0.386*** (0.071)	0.386*** (0.071)	
Production workers		0.798*** (0.112)	0.798*** (0.112)	
Service worker		0.624*** (0.103)	0.624*** (0.103)	
Age		0.011*** (0.003)	0.011*** (0.003)	
Gender		0.049 (0.062)	0.049 (0.062)	
Constant		5.732*** (0.158)	5.732*** (0.158)	
DV: European identity				
Self employed professionals and large business owners				0.203** (0.077)
(Associate managers)				-0.032 (0.075)
Technical (semi)professionals				-0.248*** (0.075)
Small business owners				-0.495*** (0.068)
Clerks				-0.322*** (0.067)
Production workers				-0.859*** (0.075)
Service worker				-0.631*** (0.072)
Age				0.003 (0.003)
Gender				0.141* (0.057)

Constant				6.028*** (0.194)
var(e.Transnational solidarity)	0.503*** (0.033)	0.496*** (0.031)	0.499*** (0.032)	0.505*** (0.033)
var(e.Exclusive nationalism)	6.137*** (0.301)	6.137*** (0.301)		
var(e.Egalitarian)	0.921*** (0.046)	0.921*** (0.046)	0.921*** (0.046)	0.921*** (0.046)
var(e.Euroscepticism)		6.800*** (0.277)	6.800*** (0.277)	
var(e.European identity)				5.739*** (0.166)
Observations	27881	27881	27881	27881
RMSEA	0.009	0.130	0.007	0.020
CFI	0.999	0.826	0.999	0.996
SRMR	0.001	0.012	0.001	0.002

Table A6. SEM estimations for member-state solidarity, direct effects. Linear estimations with country fixed effects and clustered SE. Country dummies omitted from output. Source: EUCROSS survey 2013

	(1) Mediators European identity/ Egalitarianism	(2) Mediators European identity/ Euroscepticism/ Egalitarianism	(3) Mediators Euroscepticism/ Egalitarianism	(4) Mediators Exclusive nationalism/ Egalitarianism
DV: Member state solidarity				
European identity	0.195*** (0.035)	0.172*** (0.025)		
Euroscepticism		-0.085*** (0.023)	-0.099*** (0.028)	
Exclusive nationalism				-0.132*** (0.043)
Ideology	-0.118*** (0.033)	-0.098*** (0.028)	-0.103*** (0.032)	-0.107*** (0.032)
Self-employed professionals and large employers	-0.076 (0.058)	-0.092* (0.051)	-0.104* (0.055)	-0.110* (0.064)
Managers	-0.115* (0.065)	-0.126** (0.057)	-0.162** (0.064)	-0.141* (0.074)
Technical (semi)professionals	-0.300*** (0.099)	-0.287*** (0.096)	-0.326*** (0.095)	-0.331*** (0.096)
Small business owners	-0.284*** (0.080)	-0.265*** (0.081)	-0.285*** (0.079)	-0.310*** (0.075)
Clerks	-0.232** (0.103)	-0.212** (0.105)	-0.249** (0.108)	-0.254** (0.112)
Production worker	-0.278** (0.120)	-0.221* (0.123)	-0.261** (0.125)	-0.294** (0.110)
Service worker	-0.229*** (0.048)	-0.204*** (0.044)	-0.243*** (0.048)	-0.246*** (0.048)
Constant	2.724*** (0.110)	3.289*** (0.134)	4.111*** (0.244)	3.536*** (0.106)
DV: European identity				
Self-employed professionals and large employers	-0.060 (0.063)	-0.060 (0.063)		
Managers	-0.202* (0.106)	-0.202* (0.106)		
Technical (semi)professionals	-0.245*** (0.085)	-0.245*** (0.085)		

Small business owners	-0.147 (0.106)	-0.147 (0.106)		
Clerks	-0.237*** (0.060)	-0.237*** (0.060)		
Production worker	-0.275** (0.102)	-0.275** (0.102)		
Service worker	-0.223*** (0.072)	-0.223*** (0.072)		
Age	0.007** (0.003)	0.007** (0.003)		
Woman	0.032 (0.053)	0.032 (0.053)		
Constant	3.867*** (0.200)	3.867*** (0.200)		
DV: Ideology				
Self-employed professionals and large employers	0.548*** (0.092)	0.548*** (0.092)	0.548*** (0.092)	0.548*** (0.092)
Managers	0.368*** (0.105)	0.368*** (0.105)	0.368*** (0.105)	0.368*** (0.105)
Technical (semi)professionals	0.223* (0.123)	0.223* (0.123)	0.223* (0.123)	0.223* (0.123)
Small business owners	0.644*** (0.100)	0.644*** (0.100)	0.644*** (0.100)	0.644*** (0.100)
Clerks	0.334*** (0.104)	0.334*** (0.104)	0.334*** (0.104)	0.334*** (0.104)
Production worker	0.277*** (0.059)	0.277*** (0.059)	0.277*** (0.059)	0.277*** (0.059)
Service worker	0.368*** (0.077)	0.368*** (0.077)	0.368*** (0.077)	0.368*** (0.077)
Age	0.003 (0.002)	0.003 (0.002)	0.003 (0.002)	0.003 (0.002)
Woman	-0.029 (0.036)	-0.029 (0.036)	-0.029 (0.036)	-0.029 (0.036)
Constant	2.300*** (0.156)	2.300*** (0.156)	2.300*** (0.156)	2.300*** (0.156)
DV: Euroscepticism				
Self-employed professionals and large employers		0.126 (0.150)	0.126 (0.150)	
Managers		0.111 (0.138)	0.111 (0.138)	
Technical (semi)professionals		0.427** (0.183)	0.427** (0.183)	
Small business owners		0.550*** (0.070)	0.550*** (0.070)	
Clerks		0.427*** (0.136)	0.427*** (0.136)	
Production worker		1.006*** (0.285)	1.006*** (0.285)	
Service worker		0.559*** (0.196)	0.559*** (0.196)	
Age		0.012*** (0.003)	0.012*** (0.003)	
Woman		0.314*** (0.110)	0.314*** (0.110)	
Constant		5.211*** (0.190)	5.211*** (0.190)	
DV: Exclusive nationalism				

Self-employed professionals and large employers				-0.067 (0.101)
Managers				0.164 (0.108)
Technical (semi)professionals				0.180 (0.128)
Small business owners				0.125 (0.103)
Clerks				0.246*** (0.086)
Production worker				0.377*** (0.110)
Service worker				0.323*** (0.084)
Age				0.002 (0.003)
Woman				0.025 (0.055)
Constant				0.025 (0.210)
var(e.Member state solidarity)	1.410*** (0.105)	1.376*** (0.104)	1.417*** (0.103)	1.432*** (0.099)
var(e.European identity)	1.396*** (0.102)	1.396*** (0.102)		
var(e.Ideology)	1.423*** (0.143)	1.423*** (0.143)	1.423*** (0.143)	1.423*** (0.143)
var(e.Euroscepticism)		4.746*** (0.225)	4.746*** (0.225)	
var(e.Exclusive nationalism)				1.799*** (0.204)
Observations	3523	3523	3523	3523
RMSEA	0.036	0.081	0.078	0.095
CFI	0.990	0.949	0.951	0.915
SRMR	0.005	0.011	0.010	0.016

Table A7. Direct, indirect and total effects of Euroscepticism and economic ideology on transnational solidarity.

	Direct effects			Indirect effects ⁺⁺				Total effects		
	Coef.	S.E.	Std. coef	Coef.	S.E.	Std. coef	Coef.	S.E.	Std. coef	
DV: Transnational solidarity										
Eurosceptic	-0.040	***	0.010	-0.142						
Egalitarian	0.127	***	0.009	0.168						
Self-employed professionals and small business owners	-0.108	**	0.038	-0.022	-0.040	***	0.008	-0.008	-0.148	***
Manager	-0.100	***	0.021	-0.046	-0.028	***	0.006	-0.013	-0.128	***
Technical professionals	-0.077	**	0.027	-0.027	-0.028	***	0.007	-0.010	-0.106	***
Small business owners	-0.086	***	0.023	-0.036	-0.042	***	0.010	-0.018	-0.129	***
Clerks	-0.048	*	0.024	-0.019	-0.016	*	0.007	-0.006	-0.064	*
Production workers	-0.027		0.027	-0.015	-0.018	*	0.011	-0.010	-0.045	
Service workers	0.012		0.027	0.007	-0.013		0.009	-0.007	0.000	
Age									0.000	
Gender									0.010	*
DV: Eurosceptic										
Self-employed professionals and small business owners	-0.023		0.087	-0.001					-0.023	
Managers	0.115		0.080	0.015					0.115	
Technical professionals	0.258	***	0.065	0.025					0.258	***
Small business owners	0.522	***	0.111	0.062					0.522	***
Clerks	0.386	***	0.071	0.043					0.386	***
Production workers	0.798	***	0.112	0.123					0.798	***
Service workers	0.624	***	0.103	0.092					0.624	***
Age	0.011	***	0.003	0.070					0.011	***
Gender	0.049		0.062	0.009					0.049	
DV: Egalitarian										
Self-employed professionals and small business owners	-0.325	***	0.061	-0.050					-0.325	***
Managers	-0.180	***	0.031	-0.063					-0.180	***
Technical professionals	-0.141	***	0.033	-0.037					-0.141	***
Small business owners	-0.169	***	0.037	-0.054					-0.169	***
Clerks	-0.004		0.030	-0.001					-0.004	
Production workers	0.111	**	0.035	0.046					0.111	**
Service workers	0.097	**	0.031	0.038					0.097	**
Age	0.004	***	0.001	0.069					0.004	***
Gender	0.091	***	0.020	0.045					0.091	***

+All models include country fixed effects and clustered SE. Country coefficients omitted from output. Reference category for social class: socio-cultural professionals. N=27,881.

⁺⁺Indirect effects are the sum of indirect effects of class on transnational solidarity via Euroscepticism and egalitarian ideology.

Table A8. Direct, indirect and total effects of European identity and economic ideology on member-state solidarity.

Direct effects	<i>Coef</i>	<i>S.E</i>	<i>Std. Coef</i>	Indirect effects⁺⁺			Total effects					
				<i>Coef</i>	<i>S.E</i>	<i>Std. Coef</i>	<i>Coef</i>	<i>S.E</i>	<i>Std. Coef</i>			
DV: Member-state solidarity												
European identity	0.195	***	0.035	0.184				0.195	***	0.035	0.184	
Ideology (L-R)	-0.118	***	0.033	-0.111				-0.118	***	0.033	-0.111	
Self-employed professionals and large employers	-0.076		0.058	-0.012	-0.077	*	0.026	-0.012	-0.153	*	0.078	-0.024
Managers	-0.115		0.065	-0.033	-0.083	*	0.042	-0.024	-0.198	**	0.071	-0.057
Technical professionals	-0.300	**	0.099	-0.065	-0.074	*	0.033	-0.016	-0.375	***	0.095	-0.081
Small business owners	-0.284	***	0.080	-0.072	-0.105	*	0.035	-0.026	-0.389	***	0.088	-0.098
Clerks	-0.232	*	0.103	-0.058	-0.086	*	0.034	-0.022	-0.318	**	0.101	-0.080
Production workers	-0.278	*	0.120	-0.072	-0.086	*	0.036	-0.022	-0.364	**	0.140	-0.094
Service workers	-0.229	***	0.048	-0.056	-0.087	**	0.029	-0.021	-0.316	***	0.059	-0.078
Age					0.001		0.001	0.011	0.001		0.001	0.011
Gender					0.010		0.008	0.004	0.010		0.008	0.004
DV: European identity												
Self-employed professionals and large employers	-0.060		0.063	-0.010					-0.060		0.063	-0.010
Managers	-0.202		0.106	-0.062					-0.202		0.106	-0.062
Technical professionals	-0.245	**	0.085	-0.056					-0.245	**	0.085	-0.056
Small business owners	-0.147		0.106	-0.039					-0.147		0.106	-0.039
Clerks	-0.237	***	0.060	-0.063					-0.237	***	0.060	-0.063
Production workers	-0.275	**	0.102	-0.075					-0.275	**	0.102	-0.075
Service workers	-0.223	**	0.072	-0.058					-0.223	**	0.072	-0.058
Age	0.007	*	0.003	0.080					0.007	*	0.003	0.080
Gender	0.032		0.053	0.013					0.032		0.053	0.013
DV: Ideology (L-R)												
Self-employed professionals and large employers	0.548	***	0.092	0.091					0.548	***	0.092	0.091
Managers	0.368	***	0.105	0.113					0.368	***	0.105	0.113
Technical professionals	0.223	*	0.123	0.051					0.223	*	0.123	0.051
Small business owners	0.644	***	0.100	0.174					0.644	***	0.100	0.174
Clerks	0.334	**	0.104	0.090					0.334	**	0.104	0.090
Production workers	0.277	***	0.059	0.077					0.277	***	0.059	0.077
Service workers	0.368	***	0.077	0.097					0.368	***	0.077	0.097
Age	0.003		0.002	0.032					0.003		0.002	0.032
Gender	-0.029		0.036	-0.012					-0.029		0.036	-0.012

+All models include country fixed effects and clustered SE. Country coefficients omitted from output. Reference category for social class: socio-cultural professionals. N=3,523

++Indirect effects are the sum of indirect effects of class on member state solidarity via European identity and economic ideology.

Table A9. Direct, indirect and total effects of exclusive nationalism and economic ideology on transnational solidarity.

Direct effects					Indirect effects ++				Total effects			
	Coef	S.E	P	Std. Coef	Coef	S.E	P	Std. Coef	Coef	S.E	P	Std. Coef
DV: Transnational solidarity												
Exclusive nationalism	-0.034	0.008	***	-0.113					-0.034	0.008	***	-0.113
Egalitarian	0.129	0.009	***	0.170					0.129	0.009	***	0.170
Self-employed professionals and small business owners	-0.116	0.037	**	-0.024	-0.030	0.009	***	-0.006	-0.146	0.036	***	-0.030
Manager	-0.103	0.021	***	-0.047	-0.024	0.005	***	-0.011	-0.127	0.023	***	-0.059
Technical professionals	-0.082	0.026	**	-0.028	-0.023	0.006	***	-0.008	-0.105	0.029	***	-0.036
Small business owners	-0.094	0.024	***	-0.039	-0.033	0.006	***	-0.014	-0.127	0.025	***	-0.053
Clerks	-0.058	0.026	*	-0.023	-0.007	0.006		-0.003	-0.065	0.030	*	-0.026
Production workers	-0.037	0.028		-0.020	-0.006	0.008		-0.004	-0.043	0.032		-0.024
Service workers	0.001	0.028		0.001	-0.003	0.007		-0.001	-0.001	0.032		-0.001
Age					0.000	0.000		-0.006	0.000	0.000		-0.006
Gender					0.012	0.004	**	0.008	0.012	0.004	**	0.008
DV: Exclusive nationalism												
Self-employed professionals and small business owners	-0.356	0.111	***	-0.022					-0.356	0.111	**	-0.022
Manager	0.028	0.091		0.004					0.028	0.091		0.004
Technical professionals	0.133	0.092		0.013					0.133	0.092		0.013
Small business owners	0.349	0.097	***	0.043					0.349	0.097	***	0.043
Clerks	0.202	0.084	***	0.024					0.202	0.084	*	0.024
Production workers	0.617	0.095	***	0.099					0.617	0.095	***	0.099
Service workers	0.448	0.094	***	0.069					0.449	0.094	***	0.070
Age	0.023	0.003		0.156					0.0233	0.002	***	0.155
Genner	-0.006	0.059		-0.001					-0.006	0.059		-0.001
DV: Egalitarian												
Self-employed professionals and small business owners	-0.325	0.061	***	-0.050					-0.325	0.061	***	-0.050
Manager	-0.180	0.031	***	-0.063					-0.180	0.031	***	-0.063
Technical professionals	-0.141	0.033	***	-0.037					-0.141	0.033	***	-0.037
Small business owners	-0.169	0.037	***	-0.054					-0.169	0.037	***	-0.054
Clerks	-0.004	0.030		-0.001					-0.004	0.030		-0.001
Production workers	0.111	0.035	***	0.046					0.111	0.035	**	0.046
Service workers	0.097	0.031	***	0.038					0.097	0.031	**	0.038
Age	0.004	0.001		0.069					0.004	0.001	***	0.069
Gender	0.091	0.020	***	0.045					0.091	0.020	***	0.045
Observations	27881											

+All models include country fixed effects and clustered SE. Country coefficients omitted from output. Reference category for social class: socio-cultural professionals. N=27,881.

++Indirect effects are the sum of indirect effects of class on transnational solidarity via exclusive nationalism and egalitarian ideology.

Table A10. Multigroup SEM by social-class. Partially constrained models. Constrained effects of age, gender and country estimated but not shown in this table. N=27,881

	Model 1	Model 2
Self-employed professionals and large employers # Euroscepticism	-0.063*** (0.010)	
Small business owners # Euroscepticism	-0.041*** (0.004)	
Technical professionals # Euroscepticism	-0.043*** (0.006)	
Production workers # Euroscepticism	-0.030*** (0.003)	
Managers # Euroscepticism	-0.042*** (0.004)	
Clerks # Euroscepticism	-0.051*** (0.005)	
Socio-cultural professionals # Euroscepticism	-0.047*** (0.005)	
Service workers # Euroscepticism	-0.034*** (0.004)	
Self-employed professionals and large employers # Exclusive nationalism		-0.054*** (0.011)
Small business owners # Exclusive nationalism		-0.042*** (0.005)
Technical professionals # Exclusive nationalism		-0.048*** (0.007)
Production worker # Exclusive nationalism		-0.017*** (0.003)
Managers # Exclusive nationalism		-0.043*** (0.005)
Clerks# Exclusive nationalism		-0.035*** (0.005)
Socio-cultural professionals # Exclusive nationalism		-0.049*** (0.005)
Service workers # Exclusive nationalism		-0.024*** (0.004)
Self-employed professionals and large employers # Egalitarianism	0.126*** (0.024)	0.132*** (0.024)
Small business owners# Egalitarianism	0.123*** (0.012)	0.125*** (0.012)
Technical professionals # Egalitarianism	0.153*** (0.015)	0.153*** (0.015)
Production workers# Egalitarianism	0.100*** (0.010)	0.100*** (0.010)
Managers# Egalitarianism	0.147*** (0.011)	0.147*** (0.011)
Clerks # Egalitarianism	0.140*** (0.013)	0.139*** (0.013)
Socio-cultural professionals# Egalitarianism	0.139*** (0.013)	0.141*** (0.013)
Service workers# Egalitarianism	0.117*** (0.010)	0.118*** (0.010)
AIC fully constrained vs partly constrained model	405119/ 405104	405119/ 401637

5. Additional estimations

Table A11. SEM estimations for transnational solidarity, models with education and income. Direct effects only.

	(1)
DV: Transnational solidarity	
Euroscepticism	-0.040*** (0.010)
Egalitarianism	0.127*** (0.009)
Self employed professionals and large business owners (Associate managers)	-0.109** (0.038) -0.103*** (0.022)
Technical (semi)professionals	-0.082** (0.026)
Small business owners	-0.089*** (0.023)
Clerks	-0.050* (0.024)
Production workers	-0.030 (0.027)
Service worker	0.011 (0.027)
Constant	2.154*** (0.076)
DV: Euroscepticism	
Self employed professionals and large business owners (Associate managers)	-0.004 (0.076) 0.051 (0.078)
Technical (semi)professionals	0.172** (0.064)
Small business owners	0.261** (0.100)
Clerks	0.114 (0.070)
Production workers	0.377*** (0.101)
Service worker	0.242* (0.109)
Tertiary education	-0.433*** (0.077)
Income	0.298*** (0.060)
Age	0.009*** (0.003)
Gender	0.022 (0.061)
Constant	5.653*** (0.230)
DV: Egalitarianism	
Self employed professionals and large business owners (Associate managers)	-0.302*** (0.059) -0.192*** (0.029)
Technical (semi)professionals	-0.161*** (0.029)
Small business owners	-0.244*** (0.035)

Clerks	-0.086** (0.028)
Production workers	-0.024 (0.032)
Service worker	-0.025 (0.025)
Tertiary education	-0.100*** (0.022)
Income	0.151*** (0.016)
Age	0.003*** (0.001)
Gender	0.079*** (0.020)
Constant	3.505*** (0.065)
var(e.Transnational solidarity)	0.499*** (0.032)
var(e.Euroscepticism)	6.716*** (0.270)
var(e.Egalitarianism)	0.907*** (0.044)
Observations	27718
RMSEA	0.021
CFI	0.994
SRMR	0.002

Table A12. SEM estimations for member state solidarity, models with education and income. Direct effects only.

	(1)
DV: Member state solidarity	
European identity	0.196*** (0.035)
Ideology	-0.117*** (0.033)
Self-employed professionals and large employers	-0.077 (0.059)
Managers	-0.115* (0.064)
Technical (semi)professionals	-0.300*** (0.101)
Small business owners	-0.282*** (0.082)
Clerks	-0.233** (0.106)
Production worker	-0.265** (0.116)
Service worker	-0.233*** (0.049)
Constant	2.711*** (0.112)
DV: European identity	
Self-employed professionals and large employers	-0.056 (0.061)
Managers	-0.172* (0.092)
Technical (semi)professionals	-0.219*** (0.072)
Small business owners	-0.089

Clerks	(0.077) -0.189*** (0.033)
Production worker	-0.177* (0.094)
Service worker	-0.150** (0.071)
Education	0.053 (0.039)
Age	0.007** (0.003)
Woman	0.042 (0.052)
Constant	3.642*** (0.174)
DV: Ideology	
Self-employed professionals and large employers	0.553*** (0.097)
Managers	0.344*** (0.108)
Technical (semi)professionals	0.197 (0.130)
Small business owners	0.566*** (0.108)
Clerks	0.267** (0.111)
Production worker	0.138* (0.078)
Service worker	0.264*** (0.093)
Education	-0.081*** (0.013)
Age	0.002 (0.002)
Woman	-0.038 (0.034)
Constant	2.617*** (0.198)
var(e.Member state solidarity)	1.409*** (0.106)
var(e.European identity)	1.389*** (0.098)
var(e.Ideology)	1.420*** (0.142)
Observations	3504
RMSEA	0.046
CFI	0.978
SRMR	0.007

ⁱ <https://www.euractiv.com/section/economy-jobs/news/eurogroup-to-discuss-eu-wide-unemployment-reinsurance-scheme/>;

ⁱⁱ The proportion of variance explained by indirect effects is calculated as the ratio between proportion between the beta (standardised) coefficients of indirect effects and the beta coefficients of total effects