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Sexism and the Gender Gap in Support for the Radical Right

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ABSTRACT

Using survey data from Spain we show that the gender gap in the probability of voting for the radical-right party Vox is mainly due to men having higher levels of modern sexism than women. We find inconsistent evidence that differences previously highlighted in the literature may account for a minor portion of the gap. However, results using different decomposition and mediation analysis methods confirm the central role of gender differences regarding sexist attitudes in explaining men's higher propensity to vote for the radical right. The article highlights the importance of considering gender-related attitudes when analyzing the gendered pattern of electoral support for the radical right.

KEYWORDS

Sexism; voting; gender gap; radical right; Vox; decomposition; Spain; gender

Introduction

Men tend to be more likely to vote for radical-right parties than women. Although the size of this gap varies across countries (Donovan 2023; Immerzeel, Coffé, and van der Lippe 2015) and may change over time (Amengay, Durovic, and Mayer 2017), there is ample evidence of this pattern. While there have been several attempts to explain why this gap exists, a fully satisfactory account is still to emerge (Coffé 2018). In this research note we argue that differences in levels of sexism between men and women may be a key component of this gender gap.


A synthetic literature review shows that, surprisingly, attitudes toward gender equality are missing from previous empirical analyses of the gender gap in voting for the radical right, in spite of existing evidence that connects gender, sexism, and vote choice. We use survey data from Spain and focus on the case of Vox, a radical-right party which entered the Spanish Parliament in 2019, becoming its third largest party. We apply various decomposition methods, allowing to distinguish between composition effects (gender differences in levels of sexism) and conditioning effects (gender differences in the extent to which sexism conditions vote choice).

Our methodological approach allows us to consider a large number of potential explanations of the gender gap simultaneously. The results of decomposition analyses show that only compositional differences in terms of sexism seem to account for more than half of the gap. Additionally, a mediation analysis indicates that the impact of gender on support for Vox is mainly due to sexist attitudes. This highlights the importance of considering gender-related attitudes when analyzing the gendered pattern of electoral support for the radical right.

The gender gap in voting for the radical right

Many of the attempts to explain gender gaps in voting for the radical right, as well as other political attitudes and behaviors, have tried to pinpoint the particular aspects in the socialization,

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circumstances, and characteristics of women that may account for their differences with respect to men (Howell and Day 2000). These include a range of socioeconomic conditions as well as political attitudes. For instance, there are fewer women employed in manual occupations, where perceptions of being threatened by immigration may be higher (Coffé 2012). Women tend to be less nativist, less authoritarian (Immerzeel, Coffé, and van der Lippe 2015), more risk averse (Fraile and de Miguel Moyer 2022; Oshri et al. 2022), or more likely to control their prejudices (Harteveld and Ivarsflaten 2018). All these factors seem to account at least partially for the existing gender gap in voting for the radical right; but even after accounting for the composition effects of all these gendered characteristics, women are typically still less likely to vote for the radical right.

Men are often the reference category (Johfre and Freese 2021), in other words, the standard to which women are compared. This has perhaps led to less attention being paid to the characteristics of men's socialization, circumstances, and other patterns that may make them more likely to support radical-right parties. However, some works do pay specific attention to men (and masculinity). Ralph-Morrow (2022) highlights the relevance of masculinity, using ethnographic data to show how radical right organizations use men's rights discourses and practices that likely resonate with those that have masculinist personalities. Men are more likely to have personality traits such as risk taking, assertiveness, independence, and leadership (Coffé 2019). They also show higher levels of masculinity (Coffé et al. 2023). Yet, even after accounting for these gendered personality traits, men are still more likely to vote for the radical right.

Beside these compositional effects where individual characteristics mediate the relationship between gender and vote choice, previous research has found moderating or conditioning effects to also be important (Howell and Day 2000). For example, issue priorities have different consequences for men and women: women are less affected by the issue priorities of regional nationalism and gender equality in the context of Spain when voting for the radical right (Calvo and Ferrín 2023). Masculinity appears to matter for men, but not for women, and its effect is mediated and conditioned by sexism (Coffé et al. 2023). Yet, other works show that the effects of gender-related attitudes on support for the radical right are not significantly different for men and women (Christley 2022). While there is systematic confirmation for composition effects, for conditioning effects the evidence is more nuanced, less clear and sometimes contradicts theoretical expectations (Calvo and Ferrín 2023).

All in all, men and women seem to show differences in terms of the composition of different characteristics related to voting for the radical right, as well as some more limited differences in reactions to these characteristics. Still, previous accounts seem to leave a significant portion of the gender gap in voting for the radical right unexplained, something which could be at least partially accounted for by attitudes related to gender equality.

Sexism and the gender gap

It is surprising that attitudes toward gender equality have barely been considered in the list of explanations of the gender-gap, considering that several works have argued the connection between gender and radical right politics (Kováts, Poim, and Pető 2015; Kuhar and Paternotte 2017; Lavizzari and Pirro 2024; Ralph-Morrow 2022). Radical right actors use sexist discourses and practices that are likely to resonate particularly with those that have sexist attitudes. Sexism as an individual attitude helps translate psychological and organizational elements into the analysis of the gender gap in vote choice.

Sexism can, for this purpose, be defined as an attitude that supports the maintenance of sex-based inequality in society (Becker and Sibley 2016). Over the past decades, sexism has expanded the scope of its meaning. It no longer includes only beliefs related to traditional gender roles that consider men to have a higher status than women (Swim and Hyers 2009), but now involves a whole array of more complex attitudes that include benevolent and hostile attitudes toward women (Bareket and Fiske 2023), as well as perceptions regarding the extent to which gender inequality exists and what to do about it. This latter dimension of sexism is what has been called modern sexism (Swim et al. 1995).

Traditional sexism (Christley 2022), hostile sexism (Owen and Wei 2024; Ratliff et al. 2019; Valentino, Wayne, and Ocen 2018; Winter 2023), modern sexism (Anduiza and Rico 2024; Lodders and Weldon 2019), and combined indexes of sexism (Coffé et al. 2023) have all been connected to support for the radical right. When women agree on the positions held by radical-right parties on gender equality they are more likely to vote for them (Chueri and Damerow 2023). Research has also widely shown that on average, men tend to score higher on sexism than women (see for example Barreto and Doyle 2023; Davis and Robinson 1991; Simas and Bumgardner 2017).

All in all, there is evidence that men are more likely to vote for radical-right parties, that sexism is connected to voting for the radical right, and that men tend to have higher levels of sexism. It comes as a natural conclusion that sexism may be a reasonable explanation for the gender gap in support for the radical right. In particular, modern sexism seems like a plausible account because of how close radical-right discourses are to its components: denial of gender-based inequality and rejection of the strategies to correct it (Bernardez-Rodal, Rey, and Franco 2020; Fernández-Suárez 2021).

It is important to note that the idea is not to establish a causal link connecting sex, sexism and support for the radical right, but to assess to what extent differences in sexist attitudes between men and women are a relevant factor in explaining the gender gap in vote choice. We cannot argue that being a man “causes” higher levels of sexism. There is nothing intrinsic about a man that makes one sexist. Rather, this relation between being a man and certain attitudes is produced by socially gendered interactions and social structures. It is reasonable to expect that women will be more likely than men to be aware of the discriminations they still suffer, and to support women’s demands and policies that seek to redress discrimination. Hence women are expected to show lower levels of modern sexism. Previous work has indeed found that women are more likely to have egalitarian values and support feminism and anti-discrimination policies than men (Bolzendahl and Myers 2004; Shorrocks 2018). But again, there is nothing intrinsic about “being a woman” that causally affects sexism.

Men, on the other hand, may be more likely to find sexist radical right discourses and arguments more appealing than women for a number of reasons: they may be less exposed or sensitive to gender-based discrimination, and unaware as of how it reinforces their dominant position in society (Gough 1998). Sexist attitudes may contribute to reducing men’s discomfort and cognitive dissonance.

In this way, for modern sexism, our expectation is mostly a composition effect where men have higher levels of sexism than women, which in turn would explain the gender gap in voting for the radical right. We are agnostic about whether men and women should be differently affected by sexism in their vote choice, that is, whether we expect to find any conditioning effects. As argued before, previous evidence of these conditioning effects is contradictory and in principle, the appeal of the radical right could be equal for men and women that hold high levels of sexist attitudes, making composition effects even more relevant.

Data and methods

To analyze the role of sexism in explaining the gender gap we use the case of Spain and its radical-right party Vox. A relatively new addition to the family of radical-right parties, Vox was founded in 2013 and entered the national parliament for the first time in 2019, in the context of the failed Catalan secessionist attempt, amid corruption scandals affecting the mainstream right (Rama et al. 2021), and after important feminist mobilizations which could make Spain a likely case to show a relevant role of sexism in accounting for the gender gap. Vox shows some of the typical features of a radical-right party: nativism, (Spanish) nationalism, traditionalism as well as some secondary populist elements (Marcos-Marne, Plaza-Colodro, and O’Flynn 2024). Anti-feminist elements are also present in its discourse (Beatley 2019; Bernardez-Rodal, Rey, and Franco 2020; Fernández-Suárez 2021). At the time of the survey Vox had 52 seats out of 350 in Parliament (*Congreso de los Diputados*) and direct vote intention for Vox was between 12% and 17% (depending on the survey, see *electocracia.com*). Vox can be considered a typical case of a radical-right party, and as we shall see below, the gender gap in its voters is close to average European levels. Sexism and anti-feminist attitudes have been found to

predict vote choice for this party (Anduiza and Rico 2024; Ramis-Moyano, Pasadas-Del-Amo, and Font 2023). However, vote choice for Vox is also importantly conditioned by factors related to the territorial conflict and immigration that should be considered in any analysis (Marcos-Marne, Plaza-Colodro, and O’Flynn 2024; Rama et al. 2021; Ramis-Moyano, Pasadas-Del-Amo, and Font 2023). The first question is particularly relevant as men give more priority than women to the territorial conflict in Spain (Calvo and Ferrín 2023).

We analyze the relationship between sexism and gender gap in support for this radical-right party using survey data taken from the POLAT Dataset (Pannico et al. 2024), fielded in Spain in June 2021 ($N = 2,096$). This survey fulfills the key requirements of including measures of sexism and vote choice, as well as an extensive list of controls to account for potential alternative explanations of the gender gap in voting for the radical right.

The dependent variable is the reported probability of voting for Vox on a scale from 0 (would never vote for Vox) to 10 (would definitely vote for Vox). The modal probability of voting for Vox on a 0–10 scale in our survey was zero (see Figure 1(a)), which is consistent with research showing the prevalence of strong negative sentiments toward radical right parties among European publics (Harteveld, Mendoza, and Rooduijn 2022; Meléndez and Kaltwasser 2019). However, a sizable 39% of respondents conceded a nonzero probability of supporting Vox, with 18% giving a probability above the midscale.

Modern sexism was measured using an expanded version of Swim et al. (1995) scale, much in line with measures of “new,” covert, or symbolic racism (Sears 1988). Agreement with each of the statements was gauged using seven-point scales (see the Online Appendix for details). The additive index reaches a high level of internal consistency ($\alpha = 0.90$). Although levels of modern sexism in our sample vary considerably among both female and male respondents, men’s averages (0.45 on a 0–1 scale) are significantly higher than women’s (0.37) (see Figure 1(b)).

Our models include a comprehensive series of controls to account for other potential drivers of the gender gap in support for the radical right: age, education, employment status, partner status, religion, aversion to risk, interest in politics, internal political efficacy, ideological identification, economic left-right orientation, nativism, authoritarianism, territorial preferences, and government approval (see Appendix for wording details). Besides being important predictors of radical-right voting in the Spanish case as argued earlier, most of these variables are also included in explanatory voting models in the literature (Stockemer, Lentz, and Mayer 2018).

All predictors except age (in years) are coded to run from 0 to 1. Besides the above-mentioned differences in sexism, male respondents in our sample are slightly older, less likely to be unemployed, less likely to be Catholic, and less averse to risk. They report more interest in politics as well as higher levels of self-perceived political competence than women (see Table B1 of the Online Appendix for




Figure 1. Distribution of Reported Probability of Voting for Vox and Modern Sexism, by Gender.

a correlation matrix of all predictors and Table B2 for the mean differences between female and male respondents).

We start with an OLS regression analysis to estimate the size of the gender gap and how much this is reduced by including other predictors of radical-right vote. We then move to a Kitagawa-Oaxaca-Blinder (KOB) decomposition which provides a more robust estimation of how specific variables may be contributing to the gender gap, allowing us to split it into an explained portion (usually called the “endowments” portion in the econometric literature), which is attributable to compositional differences in the predictor variables considered in the model, and an unexplained (or “coefficients”) portion, that might be attributable to differences in the size of the regression coefficients across groups but also to potential differences in factors omitted from the model (Blinder 1973; Kitagawa 1955; Oaxaca 1973). This method also allows us to identify the individual contribution made by the observed predictors to each portion of the gap, considering several predictors at once.

The KOB decomposition is based on the notion that the average difference in the outcome (probability of voting for Vox) between the two groups (men and women) results from the average differences between each group’s levels of predictors and the differences in the coefficients of the predictors from separate group linear models. Using this information, the decomposition works in a counterfactual manner: what would the gap be if group means and regression coefficients were identical? To determine the relative contribution of compositional and coefficient differences, a counterfactual baseline is established from which to assess deviations. Rather than using men or women as the reference group, here the coefficients are set from a pooled model (of both female and male respondents) as the baseline estimates (Jann 2008).

Finally, we run a mediation analysis based on the counterfactual or potential outcomes framework (Imai, Keele, and Tingley 2010; VanderWeele 2015) to delve on the potential causal relationship between sexism and far-right voting. Because both sexism and support for Vox are measured as continuous variables, they are modeled using linear regression. All the explanatory variables included in our decomposition models are also added as covariates to the mediator and outcome models. As generally advised, we account for a possible interaction between treatment (gender) and mediator (sexism) in the outcome equation, thus allowing the impact of sexism to vary depending on the gender of a respondent.¹

Results

A preliminary analysis regressing the probability of voting for Vox only on gender shows that men are on average 0.453 points more likely to vote for Vox on the 0–10 scale (see Table 1, Model 1).² When we account for all predictors except sexism (Model 2), the gender gap is reduced by one fifth (0.364) but remains statistically significant. The estimates indicate that people who are younger, less educated, non-Catholic, more politically interested, internally efficacious, right-wing, against tax increases, nativist, authoritarian, pro-centralization, populist, and government-disapproving report significantly higher levels of support for the radical right. When adding modern sexism to the model (Model 3), it becomes apparent not only that this is the second most important factor in support for Vox (after ideological identification) but also that its inclusion reduces the gender gap by 73% (compared to Model 1), with the remaining “unexplained” portion of the gap (0.125) becoming no longer significant. This strongly suggests that differences in sexist attitudes between men and women might play an important role in explaining the gender gap in support for the radical right.³

The KOB decomposition analysis estimates show that the combined differences in the group means of all predictors explain 0.33 points of the overall 0.45-point difference between men and women – representing 73% of the gender gap (see Table D1 of the Online Appendix). As shown in Figure 2, the detailed decomposition of this portion of the gap indicates that most of the divergence stems from differences in sexism between male and female respondents, which account for 77% of the gap that is ascribable to compositional differences and 56% of the overall gap. Specifically, the results imply that, if men and women displayed the same level of sexism, the gap would be reduced by 0.25 points.

Table 1. OLS Regression Models Predicting the Probability of Voting for Vox.

	(1)		(2)		(3)	
	Coef.	(SE)	Coef.	(SE)	Coef.	(SE)
Male	0.453**	(0.143)	0.364**	(0.120)	0.125	(0.122)
Age			−0.027***	(0.006)	−0.027***	(0.006)
Upper secondary			−0.229	(0.172)	−0.217	(0.169)
Tertiary			−0.449**	(0.143)	−0.429**	(0.140)
Unemployed			0.197	(0.155)	0.231	(0.152)
Lives with partner			0.120	(0.125)	0.098	(0.123)
Catholic			0.659***	(0.126)	0.606***	(0.124)
Risk aversion			−0.441	(0.265)	−0.330	(0.261)
Interest in politics			0.741**	(0.245)	0.707**	(0.241)
Internal efficacy			1.159***	(0.302)	1.120***	(0.297)
Ideological identification			5.635***	(0.332)	4.962***	(0.336)
Services vs. taxes			0.886***	(0.230)	0.616**	(0.228)
Nativism			0.956**	(0.334)	0.410	(0.335)
Authoritarianism			0.978***	(0.233)	0.771***	(0.230)
Territorial preference			−0.819***	(0.194)	−0.610**	(0.192)
Populism			−0.902*	(0.357)	−0.757*	(0.351)
Government approval			−1.581***	(0.244)	−1.320***	(0.242)
Sexism					2.977***	(0.351)
Constant	2.013***	(0.100)	−0.147	(0.489)	−0.751	(0.486)
Observations	2096		2096		2096	

Note: Unstandardized OLS coefficients. SE = standard error. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.




Figure 2. Kitagawa-Oaxaca-Blinder Decomposition of the Vox Gender Gap. Note: Variables contributing to each portion of the gap with 95% confidence intervals, as estimated in Table D1 in the Online Appendix.

Differences in levels of political interest and internal political efficacy also contribute positively to the gap, each accounting for approximately 16% of the overall gap. On the other hand, the fact that women are more likely to be Catholic as well as slightly younger than men in our sample appears to work to reduce the gap by approximately 10% of the overall difference for each factor.

The remaining 33% of the gap cannot be explained by compositional differences. The estimates in the right-hand panel of Figure 2 suggest that the only variable that consistently predicts this unexplained part of the gender gap is territorial preferences. Because the association between opinions about Spanish territorial organization and the likelihood of supporting Vox is significantly weaker among women than it is among men (confirming findings by Calvo and Ferrín 2023), this predictor might contribute to reducing the size of the

Table 2. Causal Mediation Analysis of the Effect of Gender on Support for Vox Through Sexist Attitudes.

Average effect	Gender fixed at . . .	
	Female	Male
Indirect	0.234*** (0.043)	0.245*** (0.043)
Direct	0.130 (0.117)	0.119 (0.130)
Total	0.364** (0.121)	
% mediated	64.2** (21.4)	67.3** (25.8)

Note: Point estimates with robust standard errors in parentheses. $N = 2096$. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

unexplained portion of the gap. As for differences in the returns of sexist attitudes, estimates suggest that, if anything, these would decrease this part of the gap; however, the relationship between support for Vox and sexism is not significantly weaker among women than among men.⁴

Decomposition analysis is particularly useful for quantifying the contribution of multiple factors to disparities between groups. In this sense, our results clearly suggest that gender differences in sexist attitudes constitute the main driver of the gap in support for Vox. However, because the KOB method does not explicitly address potential confounding, its estimates cannot be interpreted as being causal (Jackson and VanderWeele 2018; Opacic, Wei, and Zhou 2025).

To gain insight into the potential influence of gender through sexism, once the latter's key statistical relevance has been established, we turn to a causal mediation analysis. Here, the interest lies in how much (if any) of the total effect of gender on the probability of voting for Vox is mediated through sexist attitudes.

Table 2 presents the results of the mediation model (the estimates for the mediator and outcome models are shown in Section F of the Supplementary Materials). The total effect of gender on support for Vox is estimated to be 0.364 points on the 0–10 probability-of-voting-for scale. The indirect effects are estimated to be 0.234 (with gender fixed at female) and 0.245 (with gender fixed at male). The estimates thus indicate that approximately two thirds of the total effect of gender on support for Vox is mediated through sexism. It is worth noting that not only are the indirect effects much greater than the direct effects, but while the former are highly significant, the latter do not significantly differ from zero. The results thus suggest that gender differences in support for Vox are primarily due to men's higher levels of modern sexism.

Discussion

Despite abundant evidence that there is a significant overrepresentation of men among radical right voters, the reasons for this phenomenon have not yet been fully elucidated. Extant research on the subject has suggested that gender disparities in political engagement, risk aversion, or authoritarian attitudes, among other factors, might play a role. Perhaps because the radical right tends to prioritize other issues over gender equality, or because sexist attitudes have often been considered secondary in explaining the likelihood of voters supporting these parties, the literature has often overlooked the role of sexism in explaining the gender gap in support for the radical right. In line with recent studies that show the relevance of gender-based attitudes to the radical right vote – particularly in contexts where the issue salience of gender is heightened (e.g., Anduiza and Rico 2024; Off 2023) but also in contexts where gender fails to be significantly primed (Green and Shorrocks 2023) – this article has argued that sexism may be a crucial factor (if not the most important) in understanding why men are more likely to vote for radical right parties.

Drawing on the Spanish case, and combining decomposition and potential outcomes approaches, we found robust evidence to support this expectation. Our results indicate that, even after controlling for a host of existing explanations, a significant gender gap persists unless respondents' sexism is accounted for. The KOB decomposition suggested that differences in sociodemographic and attitudinal characteristics between men and women represent 73% of the gender gap, and, more importantly, that sexism alone accounts for most (77%) of these differences and a significant portion (56%) of the total gap. Other variables such as interest and efficacy seemed to also play a role but proved far less relevant. The TED analysis further confirmed the key contribution of sexism to the gender gap. Using entropy balancing as a more robust estimator, results suggested that if men and women were aligned in their sexist attitudes, the difference in support for the radical right would be reduced by 60%, rendering it not significantly different from zero. Once the effect of sexism is balanced, no other variable is found to alter the gap in a substantial way. The relevance of modern sexism in the explanation of the gender gap is largely confirmed by a mediation analysis.

Because the current study focused on the case of Vox, its findings may or may not be generalizable to other contexts. Indeed, gender-equality views among radical-right parties may vary considerably, as may levels of feminist mobilization and implementation of gender equality policies. All these factors may resonate with levels of public opinion regarding modern sexism and affect the role that this attitude may play in accounting for the gender gap in voting for the radical right. Future research should hence systematically investigate whether sexist rhetoric is more appealing to men across a variety of political contexts.

Notes

1. It should be noted that, since the causal mediation model relies on strong confounding assumptions that are unlikely to hold in our study, estimates of direct and indirect cannot be considered to provide a strict causal interpretation.
2. When measured as vote intention, 12% of men report intending to vote for Vox, versus 7% of women. The ratio (1.7) is higher than the average (1.4) in the recent large comparative study carried out by Donovan (2023).
3. As shown in Section C of the Online Appendix, the results are robust for both fractional response (Papke and Wooldridge 1996) and ordered logistic regression, in that the gender gap remains sizable and significant when all predictors except sexism are considered, but becomes not significantly different from zero when sexist attitudes are included in the models.
4. We also conducted a Treatment Effect Deviation (TED) decomposition, which evaluates how the omission of specific covariates affects the outcome gap. This allows for the use of nonparametric estimators and is hence more suitable for counterfactual interpretations (An and Glynn 2021). As shown in Section E of the Supplementary Materials, the results of this method align with those of the KOB decomposition, emphasizing the key role of sexism in explaining the differences between male and female respondents in their propensity to support the radical right.

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Disclosure statement

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Data availability statement

Data and replication material can be found here: https://www.dropbox.com/scl/fo/p97jiu6nkbd1hu2pv0d1w/ANjDGC99mD40PX_njHA2KaE?rlkey=6n867yc3vxxxbybr2x23szzla&st=fmzr131q&dl=0

Ethics

The POLAT survey has approval from the Ethics Committee of the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona (CEEAH 5995).

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