The War of 1592-1598 and National Identity

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Evidence from the war of 1592-1598 points to potent and pervasive identities centred around China, Korea, and Japan: communities imagined as at once political, cultural, and territorial, with long and unbroken histories. This chapter explores how we should situate such identities in the broader context of East Asian and world history, by considering their relationship with 'national' identity. It finds that the identities of 1592-1598 shared substantial common ground with 'nations', but that the Euro-centric discourse around the 'nation' limits the term's utility. Historical experience in China, Korea, and Japan challenges the conventional focus on the nineteenth century as the birthplace of entirely new modes of thinking about community, pointing to the need for further reflection on when and how collective identities came into being, and in precisely what ways 'modern' iterations differed from earlier ones.

We have observed in the preceding chapters evidence of pervasive and developed senses of identity centred around China, Korea, and Japan, which were integral to how people of the time saw the war of 1592-1598. How should we understand these identities in the longer history of thinking about states and communities? Several scholars have postulated that what we see in East Asia at this time, or in the centuries before and after, can be described as 'national' identity. Jahyun Kim Haboush investigated national identity in relation to the war specifically, and is not the only scholar to have raised the question in relation to Korea.[1] Mary E. Berry made the case for the existence of national identity in Japan immediately after the war, in the Edo period (1603-1868).[2] Nicolas Tackett proposes that the birth of Chinese 'nationalism' should be situated as early as the Song dynasty (960-1279).[3] Prasenjit Duara has made a wider case against exclusively privileging the modern period in thinking about national consciousness. Gat, Yakobson and others have further argued that the developed senses of identity in China, Korea, and Japan are to be properly understood as

part of a long history of national thinking, evidenced not just in East Asia but around the world.[4]

The applicability of the term 'nation' in East Asia before the nineteenth century remains contentious, yet Haboush and other scholars have not resiled from the debate because, in the absence of adequate alternative terminology, it is difficult to situate the identities we observe in relation to wider discussions on identity without at least engaging with theories of the development of national identity.[5] To speak of ethnic or cultural identities, for example, would be wholly inadequate, failing to capture the political and institutional aspects. Furthermore, in as far as they were communities imagined around polities, Chinese, Korean, and Japanese identities inescapably shared many elements of national identities, even if they can be said to have diverged in crucial respects. As such, whether or not we ultimately determine the label 'national' to be appropriate, exploring the points of similitude and divergence between identities in the war of 1592-1598 and conceptions of the 'nation' is important if we are to understand their place in the broader evolution of collective identity in East Asian and world history.

DEFINING THE 'NATION'

Debate on the 'nation' and what it signifies has spawned a vast literature, but it will suffice to draw out a few key themes as context for the discussion here. At the core of the idea of national identity is what Ernest Gellner defined as a congruence of ethnic or cultural identity (he used both terms) and the polity.[6] Importantly, this ethnic or cultural identity is envisioned as a community, usually imagined to extend back to a distant origin in history.[7] While 'modernists' argued that such notions of community were entirely modern, Anthony Smith and others saw the nation as having roots in earlier history. Smith noted that collective cultural identity did not require culture to actually have been uniform through time, but that there was *perceived* to be continuity: some sense of it being the 'same' culture.[8]

The core of the controversy over 'when' national identity first emerged arises not from a broad definition such as that given above, but because for modernist scholars the 'nation' is inseparable from its nineteenth-century sense of a political community including all classes.[9] Medieval historians have argued that while previously a large proportion of the 'nation' was never considered to have direct political participation in the nation's fate, during the nineteenth century and afterwards, the ideas inaugurated in the French Revolution came to be seen as integral to the nation: popular sovereignty and equal citizenship were seen as prerequisite to true national community.[10] Given this process of historical development, there is an argument for recognising the political ideas of popular sovereignty and equal citizenship as separate developments in themselves.[11]

As well as these changes in political ideas, modernist theorists of nationalism emphasised the new mass participation that came with the shift to industrialized societies and the rapid communication enabled by print capitalism, defining national consciousness as inseparably bound up with these new experiences.[12] The effects of industrialisation were undoubtedly profound, but, as Duara has eloquently argued: "the empirical record does not furnish the basis for such a strong statement about the polarity between the modern and the premodern".[13] A fervour to deconstruct nationalist narratives as invented and ahistorical led to an over-emphasis on the break national community represented with the past; to act as a foil, agrarian societies were imagined to have been disconnected and localised, save for a small clerisy and aristocracy which lived apart from the rest of the population.[14] While this was a caricature of the past fit to a certain purpose, the insights of scholars of nationalism into the importance of communication and some breadth of participation in the formation of national identity remain valid.

In the remainder of this chapter we will therefore consider mass participation and communication alongside the other aspects of national identity mentioned above (the relationship of cultural identity to the polity and what kind

of community was imagined) in relation to the evidence of identity from the war. The objective is not to come to any general new conclusions on national identity or East Asian identity *per se*, but specifically to explore how identities from the war of 1592-1598 relate to the wider discussion of national identity.

CULTURE AS IDENTITY

"The manner in which we view the world today – that is, divided between equal nations, each of which takes pride in its own cultural uniqueness – is perhaps inappropriate for viewing the world of the East Asian past."

Liam Kelley, *Beyond the Bronze Pillars.* [15]

Turning first to the convergence of polity and cultural community, to what extent did our protagonists see China, Korea, and Japan as distinct cultural identities? On the one hand, we have seen a strong tendency towards universalising notions of culture, rather than community-specific ones. On the other, there is undeniable evidence of people understanding a distinctive culture as belonging to a specific country.

The idea that there was a universal standard in the cultural sphere, against which each country or people's attainment is measured, is most evident in the Chinese and Korean accounts of Chosŏn's standing in the world. This recalls Liam Kelley's findings in his study of Vietnam, where he points to a universalist notion of 'civility', which each country could manifest (or not). [16] Just as for Vietnamese literati, Chosŏn's equal attainment with China to a universal notion of 'civility' was a point of great pride for the country's elite. The Sino-Korean descriptions of the Wo/Wae (i.e., Japanese) and Japan as savage or barbarous represent the other side of the same coin: depicting the Japanese as failing to manifest civility.[17] Such universalist notions were not exclusive to the continent, either. Japanese Buddhist perspectives (most overt in Keinen's writing but also a

background influence in Yoshino and other samurais' writing) similarly judged all lands and peoples by their attainment in terms of universal Buddhist knowledge and wisdom. [18]

Alongside these universalist notions of civility and knowledge, however, we have seen many instances of distinctive culture cast as the proprietary property of one country or another. While the elite in Vietnam and Chosŏn preferred to think in terms of universal civility, in Ming Chinese sources we see clear expressions of cultural ownership of the very same body of high culture. Thus, Xu Yihou wrote of Chinese characters in Japan as "our Great Ming letters". [19] Whether it was literati writing in the Ming heartland or Xu Yihou exiled in Japan, there was no ambiguity for Chinese writers as to which country had ownership of the Chinese script or literature. For them, while the elite of Chosŏn or Vietnam might be judged by the same standards, these standards were unambiguously Chinese ones. In the unequal power relations between Ming China and its closest tributaries, it benefited one side more than the other to emphasise the universal nature of civility. [20]

Even on the Chosŏn side, the universalist picture in literary works is complicated by the practical experience of the war. The classical Chinese introduction of Chosŏn we saw in Chapter VI, *Chaoxian ji* 朝鮮記, exemplifies a description of Chosŏn devoid of any cultural element that would appear alien to the Chinese audience for which it was intended. [21] This was the preferred self-positioning of the Chosŏn literati. Yet, the wartime cross-border interaction with the Japanese reveals a different picture. Faced with stark differences and a cultural threat, even the literati began to discuss distinctively Korean cultural markers. When travelling to Japan, the Chosŏn ambassador Hwang Shin not only contrasted Japanese and Chosŏn customs, but lamented that the Chosŏn subjects in Japan were forgetting Korean, the language of "our country". [22] This resonates with Haboush's observation that the Korean language attained new significance during the war, both as a Korean-only space and a site of active contestation with

the Japanese, who promoted Japanese language and custom in occupied territories.[23] While literati sought to present Chosŏn as the embodiment of Neo-Confucian ideals when writing about the country's place in the world, we must recognise that this universalist vision was always aspirational.[24] The lived context of the war, meanwhile, gave renewed importance to elements of a distinct Korean cultural identity.

Buddhist visions of the world notwithstanding, we see examples of an overt and potent sense of distinct Japanese culture during the war. This is nowhere more evident than in the attempts to forcibly export Japanese culture by insisting residents in captured Chosŏn territory follow Japanese customs.[25] The invading forces were acting on the orders of Hideyoshi, someone who, in another context, had even displayed a sense of cultural relativism in the religious realm, when he effectively told missionaries that they should keep the god of their country and the Japanese would keep theirs.[26] The writings of those tasked with implementing Hideyoshi's policies similarly assumed that the Japanese cultural realm should be coterminous with the extent of the Japanese state.[27]

With the immensity of continental civilisation on their doorstep, the Japanese could not mirror the Chinese in imagining their culture to be the one true definition of civility, as it was impossible to escape Chinese culture as a point of reference; nor had Neo-Confucian universalist ideas taken hold in the more geographically removed Japan as they had in Chosŏn. Of the three countries, the position of Japan was perhaps most conducive to seeing culture as entirely relative, and Japanese culture as synonymous with a distinct identity.

Both universal and country-specific notions of culture evidently co-existed, though to differing extents in each country. That these competing universalist and ethnic conceptions of culture co-existed is important in the context of national identity because, while the former runs counter to the ethno-nationalist conception of every nation possessing a unique culture, the latter is fully consistent with it.[28] At the same time, we should note that as even the universalist

rhetoric deployed by Chosŏn literati was used to argue for Chosŏn's unique position in the world (as most civilised of vassal states), it was *functionally* very similar to an argument of unique cultural identity. [29]

IMAGINED COMMUNITIES

Benedict Anderson's famous description of nations as 'imagined communities' poetically captures two key aspects of the nation: its invocation of a community, and the artificial or constructed nature of that community, which claims unity and continuity in spite of historical discontinuity and diversity. [30] Both aspects can be seen in the Chinese, Korean, and Japanese identities from the war, but it is worth reflecting on the nature of the communities being imagined.

The stories that contemporary sources told about Ming China, Chosŏn Korea, and Japan under Hideyoshi share with later national narratives their imagination of the current polity as stretching back through time, constant in essence and untroubled by diversity. With the stroke of a brush they obliviated shifting borders and ethnicities, and claimed for the present polity the cultural achievements and territorial gains of ancient kingdoms. Thus, the Ming inherited ownership of Chinese civilisation, Chosŏn subsumed the diverse kingdoms on the peninsula that had preceded it, and Hideyoshi's Japan was the same Japan that had 'conquered' the Korean peninsula a millennium before and repulsed a Mongol invasion centuries later.[31]

Another distinctive aspect of all the narratives around China, Korea, and Japan was that they generally centred not on the people but on the state, or its territory. That is to say, we do not see claims to a common ancestry or other common inception as a people, for example. In the samurai Yoshino's depiction of the 'Land of the Gods', it was from the land of Japan's status that the warriors born there gained their ferocity: it was not by lineage or some formative experience of the people of Japan. [32] The exhortations of Chosŏn volunteer commanders echoed this apparent emphasis of soil over blood, one letter

explicitly claiming that it was from the soil of Chosŏn that its people obtained their blood.[33] We can imagine how conceiving of the community in this way was more natural for the noble authors of these letters in Chosŏn: not only was it the land that needed to be held against the enemy, but emphasising an ancestral bond with their slaves may also have been an awkward proposition. In the Chinese texts, from Xu Yihou in Japan to Xu Xizhen on the Chinese heartland, any need for some common origin or uniting force was seemingly obviated by the presence of the great Ming state, which sat unchallenged in its claim to embody China, politically, territorially and culturally.[34]

The significance of the community being defined by the extent of the state, rather than the state embodying a community that preceded it, is best demonstrated by contrast. Susan Reynolds cites the Scottish letter to the papacy of 1320, known as the Declaration of Arbroath, as an eloquent portrayal of a polity embodying a pre-existing ethnic community. Despite a reality of mixed cultural groups, the letter claimed that the Scots were one people who had moved from the Mediterranean before settling in Scotland, and had a right to political self-determination.[35] The Scottish case was not an isolated example: in the Western European context, it appears to have been the idea of a community of common ancestry and law that appeared first, with the idea of a people embodied in a kingdom gradually developing afterwards[36] While any meaningful comparison with Europe would require a study in itself, this example serves as a foil to highlight how Chinese, Korean, and Japanese writers from 1592-1598 portrayed their respective countries not as peoples of common origin but as polities from their ancient conception.[37]

We should note that this general focus on the state and territory did not imagine a world solely defined in those terms: the conception of *other* groups could be quite different. Chinese and Korean accounts frequently discussed the Japanese in terms of a stateless people, helped by the existence of the *de facto* ethnonym for the Japanese, Wo 倭 (K. Wae). The Jurchen in the north (who

would soon form the Qing dynasty) were also depicted as belonging to this category, as an ethnically distinct group. It is important to distinguish this 'othering' of foreign peoples from the concept of self-identifying as a political community, however. As Leo Shin has shown in his study of Ming thinking on the *hua* vs. *yi* 華夷 (Chinese/non-Chinese, or civilised/barbarian) distinction, an influential notion was that the *hua* "mixed with and assimilated to one another" (混而同) while the *yi* had retained great variety (i.e., cultural diversity).[38] In such a conception, the *hua* category (to which, incidentally, Chosŏn literati also self-identified) was not originally necessarily one people, of common custom or ancestry, but came to share a common civility. Hobsbawm discussed this awareness of only other groups' traits, while overlooking one's own group's diversity, as 'negative ethnicity'.[39] Thinking in this way did not require that the Chinese or Koreans necessarily viewed *themselves* as ethnic groups.

In this context, we must bear in mind that precisely because the sources from the war do not frame communities in terms of genealogical groups, or link blood to culture, we cannot make definitive statements about what the authors in question thought on the subject. What we can say is that they did not consider those ideas salient, and presented sophisticated visions of their communities based on state, land, culture and their history.[40]

MASS PARTICIPATION

The third main facet of national identity that we will consider here is mass participation and communication: the extent to which the wider population was included and participated in the 'nation'. Here it is important to distinguish between three questions: whether the community was imagined to include the whole population, whether all members were equal participants, and whether the wider population shared this sense of community.[41]

Evidence of mass participation and ideas of popular sovereignty were central to Haboush's case for the war representing the birth of a Korean nation.[42]

A key development Haboush cited as a moment of 'nationalization' was the circulation of Calls to Arms in 1592-1593 by civilians opening up a 'communicative space'.[43] While the growing sense of a people of Chosŏn in the diarist Oh Hŭimun's writing implied mass *inclusion* (i.e., not excluding certain classes), the Calls to Arms went further, demanding from every (male) member of the population *participation* in the fight to defend Chosŏn.

Oh copied out some of these open letters from volunteer commanders, which called on their fellow countrymen to rise up and fight.[44] In doing so, they invoked a collective responsibility for defence of the land, people, and their way of life. The effective collapse of the state in 1592 (and for several years afterwards in the occupied areas) encouraged members of the scholar-official class to put into action their developed doctrine of loyalty to king and country. Out of necessity, they called on as many of their countrymen as they could to join them. With neither the carrots nor the sticks of the state to aid them, they relied on rhetorical appeals to duty (as well as enlightened self-interest). Haboush showed how, by at least one author of these letters, even the lowliest slave was explicitly attributed with a sense of patriotic duty.[45] Patriotic duty was largely discussed in terms of loyalty, which Haboush argued was re-interpreted as a call to independent action in the new context of the invasion.[46] More than simply calls for all to be loyal subjects of the crown, these letters promoted a certain sense of popular ownership of Chosŏn: when the state failed, it fell to the people to defend the land.

In demanding patriotic action from every man, the language of the Calls to Arms was not completely new or peculiar to Chosŏn. The acts of patriotism of Xu Yihou, the Chinese volunteer spy in Japan, are at least as daring as that of the volunteer commanders in Chosŏn, and represented putting into action what they laid out in words.[47] While Xu was one of only a few Chinese men in Satsuma to actually take action, it is also clear that he felt his fellow countrymen in Japan all shared an implicit patriotic duty by virtue of being Chinese.[48] Both Xu and his Chosŏn counterparts shared as context for their patriotism and anti-barbarian

rhetoric the examples of Song-dynasty (960-1279) scholar-officials taking up arms to defend their country. Song-dynasty loyalists had also imagined their fight in terms of defending the civility that China represented from falling to barbarian hordes.[49] For Zhao Shizhen, whom we met in the previous chapter, it was a matter of course that even after the Song dynasty fell to the Mongols, the wider populace remained loyal to the Song.[50] With Song precedent before them, it seems the general idea of patriotic duty applying to the wider populace was a natural one in the Ming and Chosŏn.

What is less clear, is the extent to which literati believed the lowest classes were capable of comprehending their duty to their country. Neither Xu Yihou nor the majority of Chosŏn sources seem to have supposed that they could.[51] The example of the Call to Arms asserting that a slave might feel the call to loyal and patriotic action appears exceptional. It may represent the beginnings of a movement towards a fuller expectation of participation, born in the 1592 moment of crisis, but which would grow after the war as popular Chosŏn tales increasingly included lowly figures.[52]

If, rather than focusing on expressions of the populace having shared responsibility or ownership, we consider mass participation in a broader sense, then the point of greatest significance is perhaps that already discussed in the previous chapter: that the sources demonstrate how the war of 1592-1598 made belonging to either China, Korea, or Japan relevant for everyone either involved in or hearing about the war, regardless of class. That even the Japanese monk Keinen, who despised the samurai and ignored their victories, finally came to identify with Japan and its fate at the climax of the battle of Ulsan is but the most poignant example.[53] We have also seen how ideas and news moved fast and wide during the war, between both written and spoken word: Xu Yihou's report from Satsuma was on the lips of officials in North China within weeks; rumours of Ming betrayal or Japanese duplicity spread like wildfire in Chosŏn. Thus, we have seen how print, manuscript, letter, word of mouth and monument were all

part of the complex tapestry of communication through which people experienced their country at war.[54] The picture the empirical record paints of populations connected and interacting, alive to news and debate, puts paid to any notion that society at this time was too disconnected for people to imagine a common past, present, and future.[55]

At the same time, we must recognize the inherent limitations of our sources, which point to the experience of the wider illiterate populace but cannot return voices to them; of that rich tapestry of communication, we can gain only a glimpse. Thus, while we know the population was connected and can infer the relevance of identity, we have extremely limited evidence for what that identity meant to them. As identifying with one country or another does not necessarily equate to a sense of a community of shared obligations or shared culture, we must not assume that the wider populace imagined their countries as communities in the same way as our literate protagonists appear to have done.[56] Thus, if one were to argue for national consciousness in the context of the sources from the war, it would be prudent not to extend it beyond the narrower sense employed by Tackett in his study of Song China, of a consciousness among the elite.[57]

As a footnote to our discussion of mass participation, and in the context of the voiceless, we can consider once more the power of the physical monument. In the previous chapter we saw how a Chinese shrine in the Chosŏn capital awed the local populace, but Haboush drew our attention to a potentially more powerful monument from the war: a shrine to the patriotic martyrs of Chinju 晉州. From 1593 to 1908, the state commemorated all those who died in the defence and fall of Chinju, the city which valiantly stood alone against the 1592 invasion but whose inhabitants were massacred in retaliation the following year.[58] The potency of this symbol lay in the fact that the commemorations were not for named soldiers only, but even for the unidentified dead. This, then, is perhaps the first Tomb of the Unknown Soldier – except it is even more inclusive,

remembering civilians too. Believing such monuments to have no precedents before the advent of nationalism, Anderson described the sites as "saturated with national imaginings", potent symbols of the nation imbuing death with new meaning.[59] The state ritual at Chinju meant that the dead no longer belonged only to their families or local community, but to Chosŏn. In their death, perhaps the image of a truly national community was born.[60]

TO BE OR NOT TO BE A NATION

The evidence we have from the war of 1592-1598 points to people's ideas of China, Korea, and Japan sharing core elements with 'nations', as they have often been conceived: imagined communities of converging cultural and political identity, sharing a common past, present, and future; not exclusive by class and relevant to a wide population, even demanding a degree of active participation. The war was clearly also a formative moment in this regard, particularly for people in Chosŏn.[61] At the same time, the different emphases of the imagined communities and different significance of 'mass participation' reflect a historical context distinct from the ferment of early-modern Western Europe, seen as the definitive birthplace of the nation. We are therefore left, as ever, with the same dilemma: if we speak of 'national' identities in 1592-1598, we risk obscuring the nuance of the historical context, and conflating the ideas from the time of the war with ideas of the distinct historical tradition of Western thought;[62] if we proclaim these identities around China, Korea, and Japan not to be 'national', we risk suggesting that they were somehow 'proto-national' or simply 'less' than national – not as potent and pervasive as they were.[63] It is a question of whether it is more important to emphasise similarity, by expanding the usage of the term 'nation' to encompass new historical contexts, recognizing its 'protean' nature, as Berry has suggested, or whether it is prudent to emphasise difference.[64]

It is certainly beyond this small study to solve such a difficult dilemma, nor was that the purpose here. A solution would require either entirely new terminology, or for the consensus to shift to accept a more flexible definition of

the 'nation'. Without either change, scholars either do not have adequate terms with which to build links across time and space, or must appropriate the term 'nation', only for the ensuing debate to focus on semantics rather than substance: on whether the example in question fulfils all the criteria of the Euro-centric, modernist definition of 'nation'. The fact that other examples are inevitably not identical to the European ones then distracts from what we can learn from the great deal of commonality that is found.[65] The European experience undoubtedly went on to be historically influential, but from a longer perspective it is ultimately an arbitrary point of reference. Moreover, a black-and-white debate over classification is unproductive when inevitably the world is shades of grey. It must be for another study, synthesising findings from a much broader evidence base, to offer a way forward by conceiving of a more holistic theory of state-centred identity formation taking into account the longer span of history and examples from around the world.

In the meantime, a revealing thought experiment is to reverse the question of definition: what might the theory of 'national' identity look like had East Asia in 1600, rather than Western Europe, been the primary point of reference?[66] If East Asian history was the starting point, China, Korea and Japan would certainly not be "rare examples",[67] but rather prototypes. Instead of arguing that new "arbitrary historical inventions" were suddenly created in the nineteenth century out of "cultural shreds and patches",[68] theorists might think in terms of established identities evolving over time in response to changing circumstances, and consider how those identities moved from having minority to mass relevance. Scholars would probably argue that crucial to fostering cohesive national community was centuries of centralising institutions such as examinations and conscription, state-centred histories, a shared literary space rich in memory, and, most pertinently here: foreign invasions as galvanising moments.[69] In other words, the component elements would not be alien, but the emphases and assumptions about continuity would be radically different.

Ultimately, whether we classify identities during the war as national or otherwise, the classification is a device for our benefit; it exists in our perception rather than in the empirical record.   While we might decide that the emerging of a stronger sense of 'the Chosŏn people' during the war was a nascent sense of nation, for example, this crossing of a classificatory boundary holds significance only for us. There is no evidence that Oh Hŭimun or the literati writing open letters believed they were describing Chosŏn or its people in a new way.[70] The utility of classification is to aid us in considering similitude and dissimilitude across time and space. Considerations of the development of identity in East Asia over the long term, or comparative studies in world history, may therefore come to different conclusions on how to define the evidence from the war studied here.

When seeking to classify and define, we must also remember that identity is never fixed or mono-faceted, but necessarily exists as overlapping and layered ideas and sentiments. Which elements of identity come into focus depends as much on the specific context of the moment as inherited tradition.[71] The war of 1592-1598 was a war between states, and this must account to a large extent for the fact that identity coalesced most strongly in that formation. We have seen through the various accounts in this book that different elements of Chinese, Korean, and Japanese identities all co-existed. The emphasis on the state or country that we have observed should not be taken to preclude an apparently seamless shift to emphasise more ethnic senses of identity, focusing on blood as much as soil, for example. A more ethnic sense of Chineseness had been emphasised in the past, was emphasised in certain contexts around the time of the war, and would come to the fore again as people responded to changing circumstances.[72]

At the turn of the seventeenth century, a major change in circumstances was in fact just over the horizon. The relatively neat picture of China, Korea, and Japan painted by those who lived through the war of 1592-1598 would be

fundamentally upset by the rise of the Jurchen/Manchus and their conquest of 'China', when they supplanted the Ming empire with a Qing one. Where the notions of civility, the Ming state, and China had all been happily imagined as synonymous, now there was dissonance: the mantle of Chinese state and civilisation had been usurped by 'barbarians'. This momentous perceived change would not only provoke soul-searching and a hardening of ethnic identity in China, but also prompted the elite in Korea and Japan to reimagine their countries' roles in the world. As the world changed in the years to come, people in all three countries would think more, and not less, about who they were and to which community they belonged.

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NOTES

1   Regarding Haboush's work, see the discussion below. Other examples include: Duncan, John, 'Proto-Nationalism in Premodern Korea', in *Perspectives on Korea*, ed. Lee, Sang Oak and Duk-Soo. Park (Sydney: Wild Peony, 1998 г.), 198–221; Rogers, Michael C., 'National Consciousness in Medieval Korea: The Impact of Liao and Chin on Koryŏ', in *China among Equals*, ed. Rossabi, Morris (Berkeley (Calif.): University of California Press, 1983 г.), 151–72.

2   Berry argues that the 1600s saw a significant departure from previous imagining of Japan. Berry, Mary Elizabeth, *Japan in Print: Information and Nation in the Early Modern Period* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 2006).

3   Nicolas. Tackett, *The Origins of the Chinese Nation. Song China and the Forging of an East Asian World Order.* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017).

4   Duara, *Rescuing History from the Nation*; Gat and Yakobson, *Nations*.

5   Haboush long pointed to the need to constructively engage the national question in the context of the war of 1592-1598 and the inadequacy of alternative terminology. Her contribution to this debate informs the discussion below. See for example, Haboush, 'Dead Bodies in the Postwar Discourse of Identity in Seventeenth-Century Korea'.

6   Ernest Gellner, "From Kinship to Ethnicity," in *Encounters with Nationalism* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), 34-46, cited in Gat and Yakobson, *Nations*, 6.

7   See, for example: Benedict R. O'G Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, Rev. ed. (London: Verso, 1991); Anthony D. Smith, *National Identity* (London: Penguin Books, 1991), e.g. 6-7.

8   Smith, *National Identity*, 25-33.

9   This is evident in the definitions of the nation offered by its most prominent theorists. Gellner, for example, places the following condition on nationhood: "A mere category of persons […] becomes a nation if and when the members of the category firmly recognise certain *mutual rights and duties* to each other in virtue of their shared membership of it." *(Emphasis added.)* Implicit in this are ideas related to citizenship, of the sort inaugurated in the French Revolution. Anderson defines the nation as sovereign, explicitly because he sees the concept being born in the age of the "Enlightenment and Revolution". Ernest Gellner, *Nations and*

Nationalism, *New Perspectives on the Past* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983), 7; Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 6-7. See also discussion in: Susan Reynolds, *Kingdoms and Communities in Western Europe, 900-1300* (Oxford: Clarendon Press , 1984), 254; Gat and Yakobson, *Nations*, 9-11.

10 In the medieval European context, although not all people in a realm were considered to have or need direct political representation, that did not imply that they were excluded from the community. Reynolds, *Kingdoms and Communities*, 250–51.

11 The counter-argument is that these later notions of political community have become too strongly associated with nationhood to disentangle, so applying the term 'nation' would be misleading in contexts where equal citizenship and popular sovereignty were not relevant concepts. The problem of definition and redefinition is touched on again near the end of this chapter.

12 Gellner demands that the homogenised cultural and linguistic high culture that forms the central space in which the nation is imagined must be a mass phenomenon and not confined to a small elite. Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, e.g. 55. See also Gat and Yakobson, *Nations*, 9. This view leaves unresolved the key question of what is 'mass' and what is a 'small' elite. The distinction is clear in Gellner's drastically simplified dichotomy of agrarian and industrial societies, but less so in the context of China, Korea, and Japan, where print and literacy gradually expanded over time.

13 Duara, *Rescuing History from the Nation*, 53-4. In fact, the divide between modernist and traditionalist (such as Smith) positions is often over-stated: key modernists such as Hans Kohn, Eric Hobsbawm and Ernest Gellner all accepted similar modes of identity existed earlier in history. Hobsbawm described these as 'proto-national'. The difference is that modernists placed great emphasis on modern ideas being unprecedently intense and consistent. It is in this context that Haboush argues that remembrance of the 1592-1598 war fostered national identity due to the unprecedented intensity and persistence of national narrative and imagery. As the focus of this book is on the war itself rather than evidence from subsequent centuries, further investigation of the war's legacy must await other studies. Gat and Yakobson, *Nations*, 8-9; Haboush, *The Great East Asian War*, e.g. 13-14.

14 For example, see Gellner's depiction of agrarian society: Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, 8-18,

39. For a critique of the modernist emphasis on discontinuity: Gat and Yakobson, *Nations*, 1-

13. The horrors that the nationalism visited upon the world in the twentieth centuries was

undoubtedly the backdrop to the dominant theories of nationalism that have emerged. Some

scholars of national identity have been very explicit about the politically activist role they see

it as their duty to play: to undermine the national myths that lead to bloodshed in the present

day by presenting historical complexity. See, for example: Geary, Patrick J., *The Myth of

Nations : The Medieval Origins of Europe* (Princeton, N.J.; Oxford: Princeton University Press,

2003), 1-14.

15 Liam C. Kelley, *Beyond the Bronze Pillars: Envoy Poetry and the Sino-Vietnamese Relationship*

(Honolulu, T.H.: University of Hawai'i Press, 2005), 28.

16 Kelley, *Beyond the Bronze Pillars*, e.g. 32.

17 See the discussion of the Chosŏn ambassadors' accounts of Japan in Chapter IV.

18 See the discussion of Buddhist worldviews in Chapter II and of Keinen's worldview in

Chapter V.

19 「我大明文字」. Xu's report (discussed in Chapter I) can be found in Hou, Jigao 侯繼高,

'Quan Zhe bing zhi kao' 全浙兵制考 (Military System of the Entire Zhe Region) n.d., National

Archives of Japan (https://www.digital.archives.go.jp), 史 198-14 卷二附録「近報倭警」.

20 In relation to these competing visions of universal civility and proprietary culture, we can

reconsider the term translated in Chapter VI as 'Little China': *xiao Zhonghua* 小中華. While

there it appeared in the Chinese text circulated in Chosŏn, *Chaoxian ji*, it was also used in

Chosŏn texts (K. *so Chunghwa/chunghwa*). Haboush translated the term's use in a Chosŏn text

very differently, as "Small Brilliant Center". Both translations can be justified, but each

reflects a different interpretation of the culture (or civility) which Ming China was seen to

embody: as either universal or inherently 'Chinese'. For Haboush's translation see Haboush,

The Great East Asian War, 49.

21 *Chaoxian ji* is discussed in Chapter VI.

22 See Chapter IV.

23 Not only did the Korean vernacular script help to create a Korean-only space, but in a fascinating example of cultural contestation, King Sŏnjo ordered that signs be put up in the capital banning Japanese speech after the capital was recaptured from the Japanese. See Haboush, *The Great East Asian War*, 91, 93-120.

24 We can think of Chosŏn's position as 'Small Brilliant Center' to borrow Haboush's term, or a land of 'manifest civility' to borrow Kelley's, as being aspirational in the sense that it represented what Chosŏn literati wished and argued their country to be. That status had to be constantly asserted, demonstrated, and recognized by others in order to remain true, in a way that would not have been the case had they thought in terms of a uniquely 'Chosŏn' cultural identity. By contrast, in the absence of credible rivals to the claim of being 'China', for literati in the Ming, Chinese identity was not something they needed to strive towards or actively maintain.

25 Whence came the Japanese desire to export Japanese culture through the invasion, and its relationship with Chinese universalist notions of culture, are questions worthy of further investigation. On Hideyoshi's part it appears to be the cultural aspect of his ambition to unseat China and have Japan ruling from the centre of the world (expressed politically in moving the Emperor of Japan to the Chinese capital). Regarding Japanese policy in occupied territories, see Haboush, *The Great East Asian War*, 73-91; regarding Hideyoshi's ambitions, see Takeda Mariko 武田万里子, 'Toyotomi Hideyoshi no Ajia chiri ninshiki' 臣秀吉のアジア地理認識 (Toyotomi Hideyoshi's Geographical Conception of Asia), *Kaiji-shi kenkyū* 海事史研究 67 (2010).

26 Atobe gives an example of one of Hideyoshi's letters (drafted in his name) : "If the priestly and lay people of our country were to enter [your] land, and by preaching the Way of the Spirits (*shintō*) put the people into confusion and disarray, then would the ruler of the country be pleased?" (若本邦真俗入其地 説神道而惑乱人民 則国主可歓悦乎). This idea that each sovereign realm had a distinct culture, and the close relationship of state and culture, continued to be expressed by the Tokugawa regime in the seventeenth century. See Atobe Makoto 跡部信, 'Toyotomi seiken ki no taigai kankei to chitsujokan' 豊臣政権期の対外関係と秩序観 (Foreign Relations and View of the World Order during the Toyotomi Government

Period), *Nihon-shi kenkyū* 日本史研究 585 (2011): 56–82; Herman Ooms, *Tokugawa Ideology: Early Constructs, 1570-1680* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), esp. 45-50.

27 An example can be seen in the writings of the monk Shukuro Toshitake 宿蘆俊岳, who was attached to Yoshikawa Hiroe's 吉川廣家 (1561-1625) army. In a poem composed soon after occupying Kaesŏng, he wrote, "Japan and Chosŏn are ruled as one, let the people not lament the transplanting of the country's customs…" (日本朝鮮一統治 黎民莫恨國風移 無私花柳吾王化 誰不生逢堯舜時). For a fuller discussion of what could be termed colonnial cultural policy, see Haboush, cited above. Shukuro Toshitake 宿蘆俊岳, 'Shukuro kō' 宿蘆稿 (Shukuro Manuscript), in *Zoku Gunsho ruijū* 續群書類從, by Hanawa Hokiichi et al. 塙保己一, vol. 415, (National Archives of Japan: https://www.digital.archives.go.jp), 10a (image 11 of 24).

28   In Haboush's posthumously published study, the leitmotifs evoked in the Calls to Arms (letters of exhortation) are described as those of ethno-nationalism. (Haboush, *The Great East Asian War*, 51.) In the context of our discussion here, we should note that the cultural reference points these Neo-Confucian scholars gave were universalist. (This is in the same context in which the phrase 'Small Brilliant Center' is used – see note above.) Whether or not the 'distinct culture' element normally integral to ethno-nationalism is present is a significant point, as moving to adopt an idea of exclusively Korean culture in response to ethno-nationalist ideas was a major development in elite thinking that was not fully realized until the twentieth century. It was the background to a fierce universalist vs. nationalist debate between Korean and Japanese scholars in 1915, for example. For discussion of elite universalist thinking in the later Chosŏn period, see Kim Yŏngmin, 'Chosŏn chunghwajuŭi-ŭi chaegŏmt'o: ironjŏk chŏpkŭn' (Reconsidering Sinocentrism In Late Choson Korea), *Han'guksa hakhoe*, 162 (2013.09): 211–52; regarding the 1915 debate, see Choi Chaemok and Yi Hyojin, 'Chang Jiyŏn-gwa Takahashi Tōru-ŭi 'chisang nonjeng'-e taehayŏ', *Ilbon munhwa yŏngu*, no. 32 (2009): 515–48. The archetype of the ethno-nationalist worldview, where each people has a unique culture rather than sharing universal values, is expressed in Johann Gottfried von Herder's (1704-1803) seminal work: Johann Gottfried von Herder, *Reflections on the Philosophy of the History of Mankind*, trans. Frank Edward Manuel (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968).

29 In other words, while the presumptions of a universal civility runs counter to the under-
pinning assertion of ethno-nationalism, that each nation possesses and should bring to full
expression its own culture, universalism in no way diminishes the Chosŏn sense of identity,
the cultural aspect of which was absolutely central.

30 Anderson, *Imagined Communities*.

31 This melding of past and present into a continuum are found across multiple sources; for just
some examples, see: regarding China, Xu Yihou's report in Chapter I; regarding Chosŏn,
discussion of *Chaoxian ji* in Chapter VI; regarding Japan, Yoshino's account in Chapter II and
the monk Genso's comments in the Prologue.

32 This is in contrast to other times and places when the idea of the Land of the Gods (or spirits)
was linked to an idea of the population being descended from the spirits. See Chapter II. Satō
Hirō 佐藤弘夫, *Kami・butsu・ōken no chūsei* 神・仏・王権の中世 (The Middle Period: Spirits,
Buddha, and Monarchy) (Kyoto: Hōzōkan 法藏館, 1998), 333.

33 The language of the Calls to Arms positively imbued the land with the civility imagined of
Chosŏn, inseparably linking defence of the Chosŏn homeland with defence of that civility.
(Haboush, *The Great East Asian War*, 41.) The Calls to Arms are also discussed in Chapter III.

34 Regarding Xu Yihou, see Chapter I; for discussion of Xu Xizhen, see Chapter VII.

35 Despite a reality of disunion, differing languages and descent, the declaration is notable for
the belief in unity it expresses. Over decades of war with England, the Scots had varied
arguments for independence, but common descent as a separate people was put forward as a
key argument. Reynolds, *Kingdoms and Communities*, 274-76.

36 Ibid. The idea of a people (*gens*) as a community of common custom, law, and descent
appears to have been established in Western Europe at least by the tenth century, and
evidence shows the idea of a people constituting a kingdom developing over the next couple
of centuries. It should be noted that the findings of historians of medieval Europe regarding
the development of identity differ substantially from how the pre-modern period has been
characterised by modernist theorists of nationalism, who sought to downplay similarities with
later nations. Reynolds, *Kingdoms and Communities in Western Europe*, 250–59; Gat and
Yakobson, *Nations*, 1-8; Hans-Werner Goetz, Jorg Jarnut, and Walter Pohl, eds., *Regna and*

Gentes: The Relationship Between Late Antique and Early Medieval Peoples and Kingdoms in the Transformation of the Roman World (Leiden; Boston: Brill Academic Publishers, 2003), 599; also Patrick Wadden, "Theories of National Identity in Early Medieval Ireland" (DPhil, University of Oxford, 2011).

37 This distinction is analogous to Anthony Smith's distinction between 'ethnic' and 'territorial' nations, although he had in mind the much later examples of Britain and a new France. It is in this context that we should consider arguments such as that of Eric Hobsbawm, that China, Korea, and Japan were "among the extremely rare examples of historic states composed of a population that is ethnically almost or entirely homogeneous", if we are not to confuse the causal relationship between state-centred identity and perceived ethnic boundaries. Smith, Anthony D., *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), 134-145; Hobsbawm, E. J. (Eric J.), *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality*, 2nd ed., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 66.

38 Shin was analysing the work of the influential thinker Qiu Jun 丘濬 (1421-95) . Shin, Leo Kwok-yueh, *The Making of the Chinese State: Ethnicity and Expansion on the Ming Borderlands* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 160-5.

39 Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism*, 66.

40 Elements of ethnicity in Chinese and Korean identities is a complex question (as indeed it is in the Japanese context). As argued in the final section below, identity is context-specific and therefore a proper discussion of this aspect should keep as context other contemporaneous evidence, in addition to the more state-centred conflict of the 1592-1598 war. For example, the integration of Japanese defectors into Chosŏn society after the war could be a context in which the question of ethnicity was brought to the fore. Further relevant background to consider is the long historical discussion of culturalist vs. ethnic emphases in Chinese identity, and the crucial changes in the Song dynasty, which equally affected subsequent Chosŏn thinking. Regarding cultural and ethnic identities in the Song dynasty and before, see: Shao-yun Yang, *The Way of the Barbarians: Redrawing Ethnic Boundaries in Tang and Song China* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2019); Tackett, *The Origins of the Chinese Nation*.

41 In discussing the 'mass' relevance of national identity, the conception of the national community as including the entire population is often conflated with the extent 'the masses' actually participated, or related to the idea of the nation (i.e., what proportion of the population identified with the nation). While the historical reality is often interlinked, these should properly be seen as two distinct questions: one concerning the history of ideas, and the other the spread of those ideas. Tackett makes this distinction by explicitly focusing on 'national consciousness' among elite thinkers in the Song dynasty, for example: Tackett, *The Origins of the Chinese Nation*.

42 As well as looking at sources from the war, Haboush considered the background of Chosŏn discussions of popular sovereignty prior to the war. These belong, of course, to an entirely distinct tradition from the ideas of popular sovereignty and equality of citizens developed by European thinkers such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1788), which became deeply entangled with the notion of nationhood: they are part of a shared tradition shared with China of thinking about the Mandate of Heaven and (in an abstract sense) the will of the people. Haboush, *The Great East Asian War*, 65-69.

43 Haboush, *The Great East Asian War*, 70-71 . In Haboush's work these open letters, known as *kyŏngmun* 檄文 or *t'ongmun* 通文, are referred to as 'letters of exhortation'.

44 These letters are discussed in Chapter III.

45 Haboush, *The Great East Asian War*, 50.

46 Haboush, *The Great East Asian War*, 70-71 .

47 Living as he was 'behind enemy lines' in Satsuma, Japan, Xu Yihou risked everything to warn the Ming of the looming invasion despite being under no pressure to do so. By contrast, Chosŏn literati were seeking to band together to defend their homes. Xu's actions and motivations were discussed in Chapter I.

48 Xu felt the need to explain to the Ming government why the various other Chinese people in Satsuma would not help him. See discussion in Chapter I.

49 As discussed in Chapter IV, the Chosŏn elite's definition of their own civility in opposition to barbarians was rooted in Neo-Confucian thought, built on the works of Southern Song scholars such as Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130-1200). The echoes of Song rhetoric in the Calls to Arms

was also noted in Chapter III. Stories of patriotic heroes of the Southern Song, who defended their country and the civility it represented from the barbarians, in some cases on their own initiative, were immediate and potent examples for both Chosŏn and Chinese literati. Such stories also had a much wider appeal than those dedicated to Confucian self-cultivation, as the themes infused stories such as those of the Three Kingdoms (220-280) period, which enjoyed wide circulation in multiple formats at this time, in both China and Korea (see Chapters VI & VII). Regarding increasingly ethnically-charged Song patriotism and its influence on popular stories, see Ge Zhaoguang, *Here in 'China' I Dwell* (Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 2017), 29-52; also, on Song patriotism, see Trauzettel, Rolf, 'Sung patriotism as a first step toward Chinese nationalism', in *Crisis and prosperity in Sung China*, ed. Haeger, John Winthrop (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1975 г.), 199–214.

50   In the context of explaining that the Mongol invasions of Japan failed not due to Japanese military might but due to other factors, Zhao asserted that the former Song subjects the Mongols had conscripted not only did not apply themselves, but would delight in Mongol defeat: 「新募南人 又皆趙宋遺黎 既不為用 復懷幸敗之心」Zhao, 'Dong shi sheng yan,' 2a.

51 Xu Yihou explained that the uneducated majority of the Chinese immigrant community in Satsuma were not able to help him because they did "not comprehend matters of state" (不達國務) . Xu's report (discussed in Chapter I) can be found in Hou, 'Quan Zhe bing zhi kao', 卷二附録「近報倭警」.

52 As noted at the end of Chapter VI, the stories of courtesans and other lowly characters in subsequent tales of the war represented a much more inclusive picture than Oh Hŭimun's contemporary account, in which he only reported on the involvement of his fellow nobles, especially when thinking about virtuous acts.

53 See discussion in Chapter V.

54 Throughout the book we have seen how letters, documents, reported conversations, and books all moved swiftly around the region. As discussed in Chapter VI, Oh Hŭimun's diary shows how he used his full social network to remain connected to different parts of the country, and obtain the news and written word he records. This flow of information back and

forth allowed people to learn about events as they unfolded, and understand how people in foreign lands viewed them and their country.

55 Gellner and other modernists formed a contrast with industrial societies capable of nationalist consciousness by depicting agrarian societies as typically disconnected both horizontally (locality to locality) and vertically (by class). The purpose was to show that a common communicative space including the wider population could not emerge until later technological developments allowed it. Duara, *Rescuing History from the Nation*, 53-54; Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, 8-18.

56 For example, we should be careful not to assume that an increased sense of common plight in Chosŏn was felt in the same way by people of differing social stations. How far the self-image of Chosŏn as a land of civility was relevant to those of the lower classes is also questionable.

57 Tackett, *The Origins of the Chinese Nation*.

58 Haboush, *The Great East Asian War*, 137-138.

59 Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 9.

60 The reader may recall that the story of the courtesan martyr Non'gae 論介 was also from Chinju, and similarly represented the participation of all parts of society (see final section of Chapter VI). Here we may say the 'image' of a national community because, to comply with the full modernist definition, all members of the community must accept and identify with it, recognising their fellow members as such. (Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, 7.) The state ritual sent a clear signal, but what the population made of that signal is less clear.

61 Chosŏn was unarguably the most affected, as almost its entire population had direct experience of the war. While only part of the Japanese population was directly affected, the Japanese sources left to us point to a deep psychological impact on those who took part. Large-scale mobilisation and logistical efforts, as well as Korean immigration, also widened the experience of the war beyond those who crossed the sea. In China, the shock following early defeats at the hands of the Japanese and the conceit made possible by final victory evidently concentrated minds on what China signified. Yet, the simple fact that, relative to Chosŏn and Japan, a much smaller proportion of the population took part, and that the war in

Chosŏn was but one of several conflicts taking place at that time, necessarily decreased its relative impact in China.

62 Gellner explicitly rejected the importance of traditions in political thought (in his desire to portray nationalism as entirely novel) and placed the greatest emphasis on changing socio-historic context, which he viewed as determining the inevitable rise of nationalist thinking. Looking from the perspective of East Asian history, however, the ideas of political participation now considered to be inextricably bound up with the nation were the product of particular European traditions and in a European context. Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, e.g. 55-56.

63 The term 'proto-national', used by Hobsbawm and others, is highly problematic because it implies a teleology, a linear path of development from something less developed to a fully-fledged national identity. Even when 'proto-national' is not the term used, emphasising a modernist clean-break with the past (usually envisaged to have taken place in the nineteenth century in East Asia) risks an implied diminution of earlier ideas as less than national.

64 Haboush made this dilemma explicit and ultimately took the position that, despite the problems of adopting a term rooted in Western historical experience, the benefits of expanding the term 'nation' to incorporate new meaning outweigh the risk of isolating discussion of East Asia by resorting to new or localized terminology. Haboush, *The Great East Asian War*, 5-14; Berry, *Japan in Print*, 211.

65 Nicolas Tackett, for example, has made the case for national consciousness in the Song dynasty, arguing that we should re-conceive the Western European nation-states as but one iteration in a longer series of similar modes of thinking. He seeks to do this in part by using a less historically-specific definition of the nation and nationalism. It is a constructive proposition, but by appropriating the word 'nationalism', he has predictably drawn the criticism that his examples do not fulfil all the criteria for that term (as defined by the modernist scholars based on Western European examples). While there is still constructive debate on the substance of his findings and methodology, the core point of contention remains the appropriateness or otherwise of redefining the terms of debate. See for example, the debate between Tackett and De Weerdt in Hilde De Weerdt, Review of Tackett, Nicolas, *The*

Origins of the Chinese Nation: Song China and the Forging of an East Asian World Order, (H-Nationalism, H-Net Reviews, August 2018).

66 The most-cited theorists of nationalism, such as Gellner, Anderson, and Smith, all made explicit that they situated the birthplace of nations and nationalism in Western Europe, and their understanding of that region's historical experience can be seen to form the core of their theses, even while they discussed wider examples (most non-European consideration is given to post-colonial cases). Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations,* e.g., 144; Anderson, *Imagined Communities*; Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism.*

67 Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780*, 66.

68 These are the terms that Gellner, perhaps most determined of all the major theorists to deny any history to national thinking and nationalism, applied to narratives of the nation. Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, 56.

69 We think not only of the war studied here but of the many other such moments: the effect of the invasions of the Song dynasty by the Khitan, Jurchen and then Mongols; of Koryǒ's invasion by the Mongols and Chosǒn's invasion by the Jurchen in 1636; and of the formative moment that the Mongol invasions evidently held in Japanese memory.

70 On the contrary, the open letters by literati described the crisis facing the country entirely in terms of classical example and established Neo-Confucian values, particularly loyalty. As discussed, Song dynasty martyrs also provided precedent.

71 In her study of the British context, Linda Colley artfully demonstrated how identities exist in multiple layers and depend on context. She explored how *prima facia* conflicting Irish, Scottish, Welsh and English identities co-existed with a common British identity, which arose in the face of a common Other. Colley, Linda, 'Britishness and Otherness: An Argument', *Journal of British Studies* 31, no. 4 (1992): 309–29.

72 For example, when the Song state (960-1279) was confronted to their north with credible rivals to the mantle of Chinese empire, contemporary writing evidences a marked shift towards a hardened ethnic sense of identity. Again, following the Manchu conquest and the establishment in Beijing of the Qing dynasty (1644-1911), there would be a resurgence in interpreting what it meant to be 'Chinese' in ethnic terms, in reaction to conquest by an ethnic

'other'. This is exemplified in the vitriolic anti-Manchu diatribes of Wang Fuzhi 王夫之 (1612-92), who called for the Chinese to defend their kind just as ants defend an ant-hill. Leo Shin's study of Ming policy towards 'non-Chinese', cited above, demonstrates that a more ethnic way of thinking was prevalent in certain contexts in the sixteenth century. Regarding Song ethnic identity see Trauzettel, 'Sung patriotism as a first step toward Chinese nationalism' and Strange, Mark, 'An Eleventh-Century View of Chinese Ethnic Policy: Sima Guang on the Fall of Western Jin', Journal of Historical Sociology 20, no. 3 (2007 г.): 235–58; Wang Fuzhi's rhetoric is cited in Jacques Gernet, Joseph Reginald Foster, and Charles Hartman, *A History of Chinese Civilization* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 502; regarding Ming ethnic policy, see Shin, *The Making of the Chinese State*, esp. 1-5, 149-171.