

THE HUNGRY YEARS: ATHENIAN GRAIN SUPPLY AND THE IMPACT OF ALEXANDER'S CONQUEST OF GREECE*

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The history of Athens during the last third of the 4th century BC contains many strong contrasts. The defeats suffered in 338 and 321 BC against Macedonia meant a hard and definitive strike and a turning point in the History of Ancient Greece as a whole, and particularly in the development of Athens. In this respect, the period between Chaeronea and the Lamian War, usually called the Lycurgan age, has often been considered as prosperous for Athens, as a consequence of the management of the city by Lycurgus himself,¹ to such an extent that it was observed by scholars as a kind of Silver Age,² succeeding the Golden age of Pericles and the Empire. Never-

* This paper had a long life before being published. The first aim was to study in depth what Lindsay Adams wrote in 1996, and I understood his paper as a first step to review Alexander's impact. I began to consider some of these ideas around 2011. Later, I discussed the first stage of the research with some colleagues at an internal workshop organized by Prof. Antoni Nñaco del Hoyo, and I kept working after publishing some preliminary perspectives (Antela-Bernárdez 2016a, 2020a; Verdejo Manchado / Antela-Bernárdez 2021). I owe a great deal to the colleagues and friends who helped me to think and discuss the details and sources, such as the kind Yossi Roisman, my closest colleague Marc Mendoza and my friend Javier Verdejo Manchado. Joseph Roisman shared with me some of his thoughts during a meal at the UAB during the Congress of 2017. My dear colleague Laura Sancho also read every paper before being published, and I also enjoy the brilliant ideas and friendship of Tim Howe, who helped me with some of his papers during the Pandemic confinement of 2020. To everyone involved in this long path of inquiries and discussions, I wish to thank you very much. I wish to remember here all the friends and ties I have made with my colleagues around the world during the last few years. The errors, probably many, on these pages are, however, no one's fault but mine.

¹ Despite his important role in Athens, the bibliography about Lycurgus is quite short. For some basic works, see Durrbach 1890: esp. 1-114; Colin 1928: 189-200; Conomis 1961: 72-152; Renehan 1970; Salamone 1976; Humphreys 1985; Merker 1986; Oikonomides 1986; Mossé 1989; Brun 2005b.

² Mitchel 1965.

theless, during the times of Lycurgus, despite its healthy economy, the city suffered from serious and repeated crises caused by the difficulties to obtain stable channels of grain supply, with the subsequent consequences of hunger and shortages.

Nevertheless, although we have 'many' sources for the period, it is difficult to specify a clear and exact chronology for these crises and shortages. In his classic work on the subject, Peter Garnsey³ defended a series of hypotheses, usually accepted as the absolute reference, although Garnsey seems to offer just a handful of ideas and proposals, but not a certain chronological list of facts. Actually, he does not even show all the evidence to defend his opinions, nor does he analyse in detail a period as complex as the Lycurgan age, when the Greek world suffered from a convulsive process resulting from the submission to Macedonian authority under the rule of Alexander, and the subsequent conquest and expansion to the East, significantly shaking up the whole Greek way of living. Our aim here is to review some of Garnsey's perspectives to try to untangle the relationship between goods, markets and foreign affairs (i.e., the war against Persia) during the age of Lycurgus and Alexander (338-321 BC).

In the light of the evidence, Garnsey points out at least five great crises in grain supply and shortages, which meant hunger, in Greece for our period. The first one is probably the result of Chaeronea, as seems to be shown by the lethal speech of Lycurgus' *Against Leocrates*. In this account, we discover how Leocrates himself had fled from Athens in the city's darkest hour, facing the threat of an imminent siege by Philip of Macedon. Leocrates travelled to Rhodes, where he spread the word that Athens had been captured. As a result of Leocrates' activities, the ships with cargo bound for Athens were seized, retained and even boarded, and the grain that should have travelled to feed the Athenians was redirected to other destinations.⁴ Maybe when the truth about the situation in Athens was known, the flux of trade would have recommenced.⁵ Nevertheless, one may suspect that this stoppage of trade to Athens probably not only worsened the situation of Athens on confronting Philip, but also represented important pressure on the Athenians to negotiate the terms of surrender with the Macedonian king. Also, the grain forced to return to Rhodes, whose initial destination was Athens, was surely sold in other markets (by the Rhodians themselves or by other merchants), before the news about the real situation in Athens

³ Garnsey 1988: 150-164.

⁴ Lycurg. *Leocr.* 18: «He landed and entered Rhodes, where, as if he were bringing good news of great successes for his country, he announced that the main city had been captured when he left it, that the Piraeus was blockaded and that he was the only one who had escaped, feeling no shame at speaking of his country's ruin as the occasion of his own safety. The Rhodians took his news so seriously that they manned triremes and brought in their merchantmen; and the traders and shipowners who had intended to sail to Athens unloaded their corn and other cargoes there, because of Leocrates» (transl. Burt 1962). On this speech and Macedonian Hegemony, see Antela-Bernárdez 2016a, 2019.

⁵ Lycurg. *Leocr.* 21.

were known, and therefore probably after that, there was not much grain to be transported to the Athenian markets.

Likewise, although we can consider the trade with Rhodes as one of the main markets for food to Athens since the '30s⁶, like most of the 4th century, the main grain dealer for the Athenians was the kingdom of Bosphorus. This lets us consider the shortage crisis in Chaeronea as not actually resulting from the absence of grain, but probably from the serious rise in prices. As in our other cases of study the problematics of our evidence does not allow us to go further than conjectures.

The words of Lycurgus against Leocrates deserve special attention. First, the aim of the speech was not to describe historical events, but to stress certain facts for the audience during a judgement. The author attempts to insult the accused, showing his guilt, although he does not seem, despite Lycurgus' efforts, to have infringed any Athenian law. Perhaps, this is why Lycurgus stresses the faults of Leocrates as a traitor and responsible for the sufferings of the Athenians after Chaeronea.

On the other hand, the speech should possibly be linked with another different context, as it was the time not of Chaeronea but of the prosecution of Leocrates, six or, probably, eight years later, in 331/0 BC, when Athens and the whole of Greece were dealing with a complex context and difficulties concerning the management and delivery of food and grain supply.

The second crisis defended by Garnsey is dated to 335, in connection with the Theban uprising and Alexander's harsh response. In this respect, we know that some people like the merchant Chrysipus tried to help Athens with donations and services.⁷ Observing carefully the context in detail, and the Athenian position during the conflict, we know that Athens decided not to take part in the Theban rebellion, like the other Greeks, waiting for the result of the siege. Only when Alexander succeeded, and Thebes was razed to the ground, did the Athenians decide to offer shelter to the Theban refugees, gaining Alexander's full attention. Thus, Alexander asked Athens to deliver some of his political enemies, who were actually prominent Athenian politicians opposed to Macedon.⁸ The situation was probably tense, at least for a short period, maybe some weeks, and this probably caused an impact on the markets. The Athenian involvement in the aftermath of the Theban rebellion surely moved most merchants bound for Athens to think twice before landing in the Piraeus. However, this did not last more than a few weeks, which leads us to observe the possible impact of these events on the markets with caution. The situation did represent a rise in prices, probably as a result of speculation by some merchants, as the testimony of

⁶ Maybe linked with the Egyptian grain trade route, as we can infer from Demosthenes' *Against Dionysodorus*. Another possible origin of this grain captured by the Rhodians could be Sicily: Garnsey 1988: 153-154.

⁷ D. XXXIV.38-39.

⁸ Landuci Gattinoni 2008.

Chrysippus seems to stress: Chrysippus donated cash and not goods, as would have been the case if the problem was caused by a shortage of grain.

Another factor to bear in mind when dealing with the critical times of 338 and 335 for Athenian grain supply is piracy. In my opinion, defining piracy in the ancient world is a quite complex mission. A good example of the problems with piracy is shown by a reference in Demosthenes, who mentions the inability of Philip to import or export goods from Macedon because of the action of pirates.⁹ They seem to have been the same people who were responsible for blocking the Macedonian ports, again in another reference in Demosthenes.¹⁰ Who they are, and mainly, how they confronted the most powerful government in the Greek world of the time, are difficult questions to answer.

Thanks to Demosthenes' words, we can observe, at least, that these pirates may have no relationship with Athens, although at specific moments they shared interests with the Athenians. On the other hand, we can consider as pirates the Rhodian ships which had been involved in the boarding of ships with grain for Athens as a result of Leocrates' account of the consequences of Chaeronea for the Athenians in 338. Unfortunately, an overall picture of this problematic situation is hard to build, although we have some information about it. Of special interest is, for our purpose, the naval campaign led by Diotimus, the son of Diopieithes, whose mission was to fight the pirates.¹¹ Diotimus received honours and public awards, promoted by Lycurgus himself, during the Archonship of Ctesicles, that is to say, in 334/3,¹² which means that the naval campaign took place before this year, probably in 335.¹³ This coincidence allows us to suspect a link between the piracy activities and the crisis resulting from the Theban rebellion. On the other hand, we do not know how this campaign occurred, whether any kind of 'military' activity had to be allowed by the Corinthian League, for the date we consider here. Nevertheless, this campaign shows, first, clear maritime insecurity at the time Alexander's campaign began, and the thrill this represented for Alexander's logistics at the start of his invasion of Asia; and, second, the existence of military actions (at least, this one) outside the Corinthian League, in so far as we can hardly consider Diotimus a probable candidate for a mission related to the Macedonian hegemony because of his clear political position against Macedon. Furthermore, Lycurgus would not have celebrated so much the triumph of a successful pro-Macedonian campaign against the pirates if this had taken place in the framework of the Macedonian mechanisms of domination, such as the Corinthian League. In fact, we have no evidence that linked Diotimus' mission with the League

⁹ D. XVIII.145.

¹⁰ D. XIX.315.

¹¹ Plu. *Lycurg.* 52.

¹² *EM* 7177; cf. Schwenk 1985: 134-136, with full references concerning this inscription. A recent new analysis of the data can be found in Verdejo Manchado / Antela-Bernárdez 2021.

¹³ IG II² 1623.

of Corinth. To sum up, the success of Diotimus would mean the establishment of some security on the seas, warranting the circulation of goods for the sake of Greece.

Returning to the pirates, it seems probable enough to suppose a link between the pirates and the campaign against Macedon driven by Persia as a counterattack against Alexander's victorious advance in Asia. We know of Amphoterus' mission in the Aegean, maybe in relation to the third famine crisis of Garnsey's interpretation, around 330/29 BC. The context of these facts is, again, highly complex. First, we know the activities of Alexander on the coast of Asia Minor in 334/3. The conquest of key locations like Miletus and Halicarnassus led the Persians to organize a counteroffensive in the rearguard of the Macedonian army, under the leadership of Memnon of Rhodes, with the aim of isolating the Macedonians in Asia, and returning control of the seas to Persian hands, in order to promote a focus of rebellion against the Macedonian hegemony throughout Greece. This would be for sure a serious blow for Alexander's plans. This Persian counterstrike has received some attention from scholars,¹⁴ but some questions are still open to discussion. For our aims, the fight for control of the Dardanelles, the Thermaic Gulf, and the islands of Mytilene, Tenedos,¹⁵ Chios and Siphnos, is of great importance, that is to say, the main grain route from the Bosphorus to Athens. Another key point at this time would probably have been Crete.¹⁶ The clash for the sea took place between 334 and 333, while the war of Agis and Sparta against Macedon lasted until 331. In this context, the mission of Amphoterus against the pirates, only recorded by Curtius,¹⁷ makes sense for 332. The possibility of linking these pirates near Crete in Amphoterus' mission with those faced by Diotimus is strong enough to consider it. In this respect, the campaign by Diotimus seems to be a first step in the preparations of Alexander's campaign, while the mission of Amphoterus seems to be directed against some small remnants of the Persian army resulting from the maritime counteroffensive of Memnon. Nevertheless, these details are also related to the shortage of grain defended by Grainger for 330/29, just one year after the end of Agis' war on the Greek mainland. It seems hard to me to believe that this shortage of grain and consequently the famine that resulted from it were as short in time as Garnsey argues, and I am tempted to think that it lasted some time longer. Again, we can go back to Lycurgus' *Against Leocrates*, a trial that probably took place in 331, if not even later, but really close to the time of Agis' war. Thus, the criticism of Leocrates' behaviour, and especially his responsibility in the shortage of grain and famine, appear to us as an obvious warning, clearly linked with the times of crisis and maritime strife (333/2) and land war (332/1) experienced

¹⁴ Burn 1952: 81-84; Bosworth 1975: 27-43; Ruzicka 1988: 131-151.

¹⁵ [D.] XVII.20.

¹⁶ Cf. Curt. IV.1.39-40. On the other hand, Rhodes, the main agent for the grain trade in the Mediterranean (as we have seen through *Against Leocrates*), remained initially neutral, but finally decided to take part on Alexander's side, sending him ten triremes. Arr. An. II.20; Curt. IV.5.4.

¹⁷ Curt. IV.8.15.

by the Greeks who, undoubtedly, encountered difficulties concerning the grain trade and famines around Greece.

A well-known text, falsely attributed to Demosthenes, seems to indicate, for example, that some needs of war allowed the Macedonians to seize grain,¹⁸ and we must therefore consider that the Persians probably did the same, either to solve army needs or as a measure to ensure or guarantee the loyalty of their allies.

Chrysippus talks about three moments of crisis in which he and his relatives helped the Athenians, and it seems clear that the first of these was related to the Theban rebellion. The other two moments, nevertheless, are chronologically obscure, and we can only offer hypotheses. However, if we consider the date of the speech, 328/7,¹⁹ we can trace the details of a possible chronology: one would probably be that of 330/29, and the other, maybe, can be dated to the same 328/7. However, as far as Chrysippus talks about past crises, it does not seem likely that his assessment can refer to the speech's present time. Likewise, we have defended that what Garnsey dated in 330/29 should in fact be considered from a wider scope within a serious long war crisis, between 334 and 331, which provoked continuous shortages in the delivery of goods, mainly grain. In the light of this, we can consider the last phases of this critical moment as the hardest ones, with a rise in prices²⁰, shortages²¹ and famines, in what we can call a long crisis. Finally, then, the third crisis of Chrysippus' speech may be dated to the year before, in 328.²² On the other hand, both the maritime activities of Diotimus in 335/4 and the interest of Persia and Macedon to control the Aegean route during the period 333-331, clearly seem to show, instead, that the main route for grain to Athens, as it was throughout the 4th century, was mainly the Bosphorus. Some exceptional measures stress this point. Thus, during the '40s, the relation between the Bosphorus and Athens suffered from some decline.²³ We know the existence of a decree dated around 344/3 in honour of Paerisades,²⁴ that reflects that at least the desire of Athens was to maintain the friendship with the kingdom of Bosphorus. Nevertheless, this may have changed during the '30s. Aeschines' aggressive assessment against Demosthenes, calling him the descendant of some Bosphoreans,²⁵ may be proof of the decline of this

¹⁸ [D.] XVII.20: «Now, men of Athens, you have most distinctly seen this done by the Macedonians; for they have grown so arrogant that they forced all our ships coming from the Black Sea to put in at Tenedos, and under one pretence or another refused to release them until you passed a decree to man and launch a hundred war-galleys instantly, and you put Menestheus in command».

¹⁹ Garnsey 1988: 155.

²⁰ Milns 1999.

²¹ D. XXXIV.39.

²² In D. XXXIV.8, Chrysippus explains that during the same year of the trial, Paerisades had to face a war against the Scythians, usually dated for 327.

²³ Garnsey 1988: 153.

²⁴ IG II² 212; cf. Engen 2010: 308.

²⁵ Aeschin. III.171-172.

friendship between Athens and the Bosphorus.²⁶ At the same time, the exemption of taxes that Paerisades offered those merchants bringing grain to Athens, dated in 327, shows the renewal of the understanding between the two governments.²⁷ Nevertheless, these changes in the perception of the relation between Athens and the Bosphorus led the Athenians to look for other dealers and markets to ensure the grain supply, initially during the '30s and most often during the '20s. One of these 'new' suppliers was Egypt.

On the other hand, in the speech *Against Phormio*, we can read a harsh description of a crisis easily datable to 327:

«And he did this, men of the jury, though he was resident at Athens, and had a wife and children here, and although the laws have prescribed the severest penalties if anyone resident at Athens should transport grain to any other place than to the Athenian market; besides, he did this at a critical time, when those of you who dwelt in the city were having their barley-meal measured out to them in the Odeum, and those who dwelt in Peiraeus were receiving their loaves at an obol each in the dockyard and in the long-porch, having their meal measured out to them a gallon at a time, and being nearly trampled to death» (D. XXXIV.37).²⁸

The text clearly shows the intense hardness of this crisis, especially if we remember that this was the time of the law forbidding the transport of grain outside Athens, a fact that led us to consider the possibility that this shortage probably began the year before.²⁹

In relation to this crisis of 328 or 327, some evidence could be linked to a better understanding of this context. First, we know that Alexander was then in the East, far from the Aegean. The government of Egypt was in the hands of Cleomenes of Naucratis, an obscure character. Of him, we know that in a year of low harvest that produced

²⁶ Engen 2010: 308-309; *contra* Garnsey 1988: 151.

²⁷ D. XXXIV.36-37: «Now, men of the jury, if it were toward myself only that Lampis were showing contempt, it would be nothing to cause surprise; but in reality he has acted far more outrageously than Phormio toward you all. For when Paerisades had published a decree in Bosphorus that whoever wished to transport grain to Athens for the Athenian market might export it free of duty, Lampis, who was at the time in Bosphorus, obtained permission to export grain and the exemption from duty in the name of the state; and having loaded a large vessel with grain, carried it to Acanthus and there disposed of it, –he, who had made himself the partner of Phormio here with our money. And he did this, men of the jury, though he was resident at Athens, and had a wife and children here, and although the laws have prescribed the severest penalties if anyone resident at Athens should transport grain to any other place than to the Athenian market; besides, he did this at a critical time, when those of you who dwelt in the city were having their barley-meal measured out to them in the Odeum,¹ and those who dwelt in Peiraeus were receiving their loaves at an obol each in the dockyard and in the long-porch, having their meal measured out to them a gallon at a time, and being nearly trampled to death» (transl. Murray 1939). However, although this could have been a XXXIV, not extended to other years, it is also a clue to question the argued harmony of the relationships between both states.

²⁸ Transl. DeWitt 1946.

²⁹ This fact can explain the magnanimous exemption of taxes Paerisades gave to Athens.

hunger, Cleomenes forbade the exports of Egyptian grain, and although later he finally allowed the grain to be exported, he raised the prices with a high tax, gaining a great benefit on selling a small part of the grain.³⁰ This impressive task of Cleomenes as a speculator has a better clue when he raises the prices to a level of 32 drachmas for each *medimnos*.³¹ This measure had a terrible impact on the capacity of Greek cities to ensure their grain supply. Also, a speech of the Demosthenic Corpus, with a dubious date³² of 322, reveals a kind of trade network managed by Cleomenes:

«This Dionysodorus, men of Athens, and his partner Parmeniscus came to us last year in the month Metageitnion, and said that they desired to borrow money on their ship on the terms that she should sail to Egypt and from Egypt to Rhodes or Athens, and they agreed to pay the interest for the voyage to either one of these ports. We answered, men of the jury, that we would not lend money for a voyage to any other port than Athens, and so they agreed to return here, and with this understanding they borrowed from us three thousand drachmae on the security of their ship for the voyage out and home; and they entered into a written agreement to these terms. In the contract Pamphilus here was named the lender; but I, although not mentioned, was a sharer in the loan. In accordance with this agreement, men of the jury, Dionysodorus here and his partner Parmeniscus, when they had got the money from us, despatched their ship from Athens to Egypt. Parmeniscus sailed in charge of the ship; Dionysodorus remained at Athens. All these men, I would have you know, men of the jury, were underlings and confederates of Cleomenes, the former ruler of Egypt, who from the time he received the government did no small harm to your state, or rather to the rest of the Greeks as well, by buying up grain for resale and fixing its price, and in this he had these men as his confederates. Some of them would despatch the stuff from Egypt, others would sail in charge of the shipments, while still others would remain here in Athens and dispose of the consignments. Then those who remained here would send letters to those abroad advising them of the prevailing prices, so that if grain were dear in your market, they might bring it here, and if the price should fall, they might put in to some other port. This was the chief rea-

³⁰ [Arist.] *Oec.* 1352a.

³¹ [Arist.] *Oec.* 1352b. We must keep in mind that D. XXXIV.39 mentions the price of 16 drachms at a moment prior to the crisis. The price of 32 drachms by Cleomenes meant he doubled the price.

³² In my opinion, many pieces of evidence allow us to doubt the date of 322 for this speech. Firstly, the text mentions on two occasions that the prosecutors had been waiting two years for their money (D. LVI.16.34). If the speech was delivered in 322, the facts would then be dated around 324. The period of 324/3 in Athens is very complex due to the conflict between Athens and Macedon after Harpalus' flight. Bearing in mind that Harpalus kept a great amount of money with him, if any kind of price rise took place in Athens, it seems strange that Harpalus was not mentioned in the speech. Also, the kind of words dedicated to Cleomenes, an officer of Alexander's administration, seems strange if we confront them with the silence about Harpalus. The text mentions Cleomenes, but says nothing about Alexander or his death in 323, nor about Ptolemy or his deposition of Cleomenes, all these facts closely linked with what the speech explains. The silence seems, then, very controversial. On Harpalus, cf. Badian 1961; Howe 2020. Also, Antela-Bernárdez 2020a.

son, men of the jury, why the price of grain advanced; it was due to such letters and conspiracies. Well then, when these men despatched their ship from Athens, they left the price of grain here pretty high, and for this reason they submitted to have the clause written in the agreement binding them to sail to Athens and to no other port. Afterwards, however, men of the jury, when the ships from Sicily had arrived, and the prices of grain here were falling, and their ship had reached Egypt, the defendant straightway sent a man to Rhodes to inform his partner Parmeniscus of the state of things here, well knowing that his ship would be forced to touch at Rhodes. The outcome was that Parmeniscus, the defendant's partner, when he had received the letter sent by him and had learned the price of grain prevailing here, discharged his cargo of grain at Rhodes and sold it there in defiance of the agreement, men of the jury, and of the penalties to which they had of their own will bound themselves, in case they should commit any breach of the agreement, and in contempt also of your laws which ordain that shipowners and supercargoes shall sail to the port to which they have agreed to sail or else be liable to the severest penalties» (D. LVI.5-10).³³

This evidence reveals a great amount of information. First, it is worth recalling here the details of the text *Against Phormio*, especially on the question of the exemption of taxes offered by Paerisades that some merchants, like Lapis and Phormio, used to buy grain at a low price and after that, they sold it where they wanted. Probably, in the case of Lapis, who sold this grain in Acanthus, he had already gained a good profit in the Athenian market. Likewise, delivering his cargo to Acanthus, Lampis acted illegally, in Athenian terms, as far as the transport of grain to anywhere else was forbidden, due to the constant risks of famine and shortage. We must infer here that the prices in Acanthus were probably higher than those of Athens. Thus, Lapis looked for his best benefit, a kind of behaviour that, as we have seen, seems to be widespread among the merchants during the '20s in Greece, if we compare the information of *Against Phormio* and *Against Dionisodorus*.

Secondly, Egypt seems to have been the main supplier of grain for Greece during the 320s. In the agreement between Dionisodorus and his partners, later his prosecutors, they pointed out that the journey had to be from Athens to Egypt and back,³⁴ although Dionisodorus' aims had probably been to start a route between Athens, Egypt and Rhodes.³⁵ Likewise, after his visit to Egypt, Dionisodorus decided to go to Rhodes, where he found better prices than the Athenian ones. Despite the prosecutors' opposition, it seems that the ship of Dionisodorus maintained a continuous route between Egypt and Rhodes, always trading with grain.

³³ Transl. DeWitt 1946.

³⁴ Maybe the ban on importing grain to ports outside Attica for Athenians was not in force at the time, or on the contrary it can be also an element to accuse Dionisodorus by his prosecutors.

³⁵ D. LVI.5.

Both the speech of Demosthenes *Against Dionisodorus* and the *Economics* of Pseudo-Aristotle share a common view of the responsibility of Cleomenes of Naucratis in shortages and control of grain market prices. We hear for the first time about Cleomenes during Alexander's visit to Egypt in 332. It is quite difficult to know whether the speculative activities of Cleomenes began so early, but the coincidence between the time of his first appearance in 332 and the context of conflict and shortage resulting from the war with Agis is not deniable.

On the other hand, Cleomenes' actions were for sure related to the economic policies ordered by Alexander himself. We know, of course, of the excesses committed by some of Alexander's governors while he was far away, conquering the Far East. Nevertheless, when Alexander came back, he punished all those behaviours, and we know nothing about punishing Cleomenes. Also, the strong network led by Cleomenes on controlling the grain trade in the Eastern Mediterranean seems to imply a great political power rather than a simple governor of a conquered region within Alexander's empire. Furthermore, we know of the aim of Cleomenes to gain Alexander's favour by managing some buildings in Alexandria. After Alexander's death, Cleomenes survived the purge and the first distributions of territories in Babylon between the Diadochi, and therefore he remained at the head of Egypt until the arrival of Ptolemy, who found a sum of 8,000 talents in the Egyptian treasury.³⁶

This kind of accumulation of wealth by Cleomenes was not unique among the men Alexander put in charge of economic matters, like for example the famous Harpalus. What is surprising here is that this wealth did not seem to be for Cleomenes' own sake, but for the treasury of the satrapy he managed.³⁷ Although the criticism the Greeks made of Cleomenes' speculation did not link it with Alexander, I guess Cleomenes, like other similar characters such as Antimenes of Rhodes, was just a field agent applying taxation and measures that had the consent of Alexander himself, a measure that we must be sure came from the King's own administration and economic planning.

To sum up, this paper has shown the close links between some critical moments in the everyday life of the Greeks, mainly the Athenians, during Alexander's campaign, first as a consequence of the war against the Persians, and later of Alexander's own desire to collect taxes and obtain profits to manage his own projects.

³⁶ D.S. XVIII.14.1.

³⁷ Actually, Alexander appointed Cleomenes as the chief of the Egyptian economy, in charge of the collection of taxes: Arr. *An.* III.5.4. On Cleomenes, see Mendoza 2020. About the other officials of Alexander's economic administration, cf. Antela-Bernárdez 2021b.