AGAINST ARGUMENT AUGMENTATION

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The goal of this paper is to solve the Benefactive Paradox: (1) Beneficiaries are not arguments, (2) Beneficiaries behave like arguments. In order to solve it, we show that (2) is essentially right, so that it is (1) that must be mistaken. Two different proposals regarding (1) are discarded, namely Baker's and Larson's. Baker claims that beneficiaries *are* arguments of the verb, and Larson proposes a rule called "Benefactive Augmentation" that turns nonargument beneficiaries into arguments. Against these views, we propose that beneficiaries are not arguments of the verb either inherently or derivatively. In our proposal, beneficiaries are arguments of V', which accounts for their argument behavior. This proposal is free from the problems that affect the other two, and it is well supported by various evidence.

The goal of this paper is to cast some doubts on the existence of the Rule Benefactive Augmentation, such as proposed by Larson (1990). We hope to do so by showing that (i) the rule is not right, and (ii) there is an alternative account. The exact formulation of this rule will be given in section 1. Briefly, what this rule does is to add a Beneficiary theta role to the theta grid of a verb, thus increasing its valency.

Section 1 will be devoted to reviewing the line of reasoning that led Larson to posit this rule. We will show that Benefactive Augmentation (henceforth, BA) is Larson's answer to the paradox that arises when we put (1) and (2) together:

The Benefactive Paradox

(1)   Beneficiaries are not arguments

(2)   Beneficiaries sometimes behave like arguments (for instance,

in the English D(ouble) O(bject) C(onstruction))

If beneficiaries are not arguments but they sometimes behave like arguments, we need a mechanism that can make them arguments. According to Larson, BA is the mechanism.

In section 2 we will turn to Romance languages and will claim that the truth of (2) does not reduce to the English DOC, so that "sometimes" can be replaced with "always". We will do so by showing that only one formal criterion out of four that have been proposed in the literature really distinguishes beneficiaries from goals. This will make it clear that (2) is not the wrong clause in the Benefactive Paradox.

In section 3, we will briefly review Baker's way out of the paradox. Baker simply claims (1) should read as in (1'):

(1')   Beneficiaries *are* arguments

We will try to show why this claim can not go through. If premise (2) is right, (1) must certainly be altered in some way, but not in Baker's way.

In section 4 we will address Larson's solution to the Paradox, which consists of restating clause (1) in the following manner:

(1")   Beneficiaries are not arguments, *but they can become arguments thanks to BA*

At this point, we will argue that Larson's solution can not be right. We will single out a logical problem, an Economy problem, and a semantic problem.

Finally, in section 5 we will suggest an alternative solution to the Paradox. Briefly, we are going to restate premise (1) in this fashion:

(1''') Beneficiaries are not arguments *of V, but they are arguments of V'*

We will argue that this is a legitimate solution to the Paradox, and will provide some evidence —both conceptual and empirical— that strongly supports it.

1. What Is the Need for BA?

The rule of BA, such as proposed by Larson (1990) can be seen in (3):

(3) BA (Optional): Add BENEF to the theta grid of μ.

Condition: μ denotes an event of creation or preparation.

Result: The theme is for the benefit of the beneficiary.

In this section we want to answer the following question: What is the need for BA?

In a 1988 article, Larson proposed an account of the English DOC where the relevant DS is (4) and the statements in (5) are true:

(4)

```
            VP
           /  \
              V'
             /  \
           V      VP
                 /  \
              NP      V'
             /  \    /  \
          a letter  V    PP
                    |    / \
                  send  to Mary
```

(5) (a) the Case assigned to the indirect object is absorbed.
          This amounts to saying that *to* is absorbed.

     (b) the theta role assigned to the subject of (the lower)
          VP undergoes demotion, reducing this position to
          nonthematic status.

     (c) the indirect object undergoes NP movement to the
          (lower) VP subject position.

The structure that can be obtained in this way is the one pictured in (6):

(6)

```
                    VP
                   /  \
                   \   V'
                    \ /  \
                     V    VP
                         /  \
                       NP     V'
                        |    /  \
                      Mary  V'    NP
                           / \    /\
                          V  NP  a letter
                          |   |
                       send   e
```

Raising of *send* into V-head position yields the SS for the VP in a sentence like *John sent Mary a letter.*

Now, a crucial assumption is that, for *to* to be absorbable, the theta role assigned by *to* must be among the theta roles assigned by the verb. Otherwise, the semantic content of *to* would be lost.

(7)   a.   give (... GOAL ...)

        b.   to (GOAL)

In his reply to Larson, Jackendoff observed that *for*-datives pose a problem to this analysis. The fact is that *for*-datives appear in the DOC , but they are not selected by the verb. Should Larson be right, *for* would be absorbable, but it is not, because the theta role it assigns is not among the theta roles assigned by the verb:

(8)   a.   peel (...)

        b.   for (BEN)

Jackendoff suggested a solution himself. He said we could posit a rule adding a Beneficiary argument to the relevant verbs. In this case, the inclusion condition would be met:

(9)   BA: $peel_1$ (...) yields $peel_2$ (... BEN...)

(10)   a. $peel_2$ (... BEN ...)

        b.   for (BEN)

This is exactly the option taken by Larson in his 1990 paper.

Summarizing, the motivation of BA is this one: BA is the device that explains why beneficiaries, which are not really arguments, sometimes behave like arguments.

2.   Do Beneficiaries Thoroughly Behave Like Arguments?

In this section we will turn to beneficiaries in certain Romance languages, with special attention to Spanish. We would like to claim that Spanish beneficiaries always behave like arguments, or nearly always. We hope to prove that beneficiaries pattern with goals with respect to a number of tests. If goals are arguments, and beneficiaries pattern systematically with goals, then beneficiaries seem to be full-time arguments, and the need for BA is dubious.

Some people have tried to give formal criteria to distinguish beneficiaries from goals. At least four tests have been explicitly proposed in the literature: reflexivization, cliticization, lexicalization, and passivization. We will review them in turn. We hope to prove that only one of these four criteria seems to work; in the other three cases, goals and beneficiaries show exactly the same behavior.

2.1. Test One: Reflexivization

The first criterion we want to address is reflexivization. Sánchez Lancis made a distinction between indirect objects (i.e., goals) and datives (a class that includes beneficiaries). According to him, datives can undergo reflexivization, but indirect objects can not:

(11) indirect objects

    a.   *Juan se dio un regalo

           Juan to-himself gave a present

    b.   *Juan se contó un chiste muy malo

           Juan to-himself told a very bad story

    c.   *Yo me niego auxilio

           I to-myself deny help

    d.   *Yo me doy dinero

           I to-myself give money

(12) datives

    a.   Juan se ha construido una casa

           Juan to-himself has built a house

    b.   Juan se ha comprado un libro

           Juan to-himself has bought a book

    c.   ?María se cantó una canción

           María to-herself sang a song

    d.   Pedro se lava las manos

           Pedro to-himself washes the hands

    e.   Pedro se quitó el sombrero

           Pedro to-himself took off the hat

    f.   María se puso el abrigo

           María to-herself put on the coat

The only counterexample that Sánchez Lancis acknowledges is *Juan se regaló un libro* 'Juan to-himself gave a book'.

We do not think Sánchez Lancis is right. To begin with, the judgements in (11) and (12) are disputable. On the other hand, one can find plenty of counterexamples:

(13)   a.   Los gobernantes de Occidente (...) se han visto forzados a prolongar el plazo que se

han dado para destruir el potencial bélico del presidente Saddam Hussein

(*La Vanguardia* 22-1-91)

... dat refl cl give a term ...

b.   Minutos más tarde miles de personas se concentraron ante la central de correos y

telégrafos de la calle Gorky de Moscú para enviarse giros postales a sí mismos que

dieran prueba documental de ingresos legales

(*La Vanguardia* 24-1-91)

... dat refl cl send money orders ...

c.   Los partidos se dan libertad para escoger sus aliados tras las elecciones locales

(*El País* 1-2-91)

... dat refl cl give liberty ...

If Sánchez Lancis is not right, reflexivization can not be used as a formal criterion to distinguish between goals and beneficiaries

2.2.   *Test Two: Cliticization*

The second criterion we want to address is cliticization. Salvador Gutiérrez Ordóñez, in his 1977/1978 article, also made a distinction between indirect objects (i.e., goals) and datives (a class that includes beneficiaries). As for clitics, he claimed the following:

(14) For indirect objects both (a) and (b) are false, whereas

for datives (a) is false but (b) is true.

(a) the dative clitic appears only if [a NP] does

(b) [a NP] only appears if the dative clitic does

In other words, he claimed that datives show obligatory clitic doubling, whereas with indirect objects this phenomenon is optional.

We do not think Gutiérrez Ordóñez is right, for the simple reason that (14b) is true also for indirect objects. We will have a look at some of Victoria Vázquez's data. She scanned two contemporary literary works (*Boquitas pintadas* (BP) and the first 100 pages of *La colmena* (C)), with the following results:

(15)

		BP	C
clitic alone		99	20
a NP alone		1	1
cltic + a NP	a NP fronted	18	23
	a NP in situ	13	4

We think this gives some ground to the claim that indirect objects (tend to) show obligatory clitic doubling in Peninsular Spanish.

As for American Spanish, we want to retrieve the observation Paola Bentivoglio made in a 1978 paper:

In the corpus we analyzed there is not a single sentence where the indirect object NP is not doubled by a clitic [this is a free translation of (1978:24)]

This holds for "la modalidad culta del español hablado en Caracas". The corpus referred to by Bentivoglio was twofold: oral (a tape 12 and a half hours long) and written (a test with 30 sentences).

In a footnote, Bentivoglio observed that the "dialecto culto de la ciudad de México" and the "dialecto culto de Santiago de Chile" also show this obligatoriness. Unfortunately, we have not been able to find the works she cites. Suñer (1988) also noticed that indirect object clitic doubling is obligatory in Chilean Spanish, but we did not have access to the work she cites, either.

Among the other Romance languages, there are languages that allow clitic doubling (Romanian), languages that exclude it (Italian, French, Sardinian), and languages that require it (Trentino, and perhaps Catalan). In those languages where clitic doubling is prohibited, it is interesting to notice that what Gutiérrez Ordóñez calls "indirect object" and what he calls "dative" behave alike. To illustrate, here are some Italian data (from Calabrese & Cordin (1988)):

(16)   indirect object

    a.   *Gli ho dato un libro a Carlo ieri

        dat cl (I) have given a book to Carlo yesterday

    b.   *Le mando una lettera a Mario spesso

        dat cl (I) send a letter to Mario often

(17)   dative

    a.   *Il padre gli ha comprato una macchina a Piero ieri

        the father dat cl has bought a car to Piero yesterday

    b.   *Mario gli ha bevuto il caffè a Carlo

        Mario dat cl has drunk the coffee to Carlo

    c.   *Alfredo gli ha restaurato un quadro a Franco l'anno scorso

        Alfredo dat cl has restored a painting to Franco last year

So the criterion does not distinguish datives from indirect objects in these languages either.

2.3. Test Three: Lexicalization

Rooryck (1988) gives two formal criteria for French. He makes a distinction between lexical datives (i.e., goals) and nonlexical datives (a class that includes beneficiaries). Let us assume that datives (now in the broad sense, including both beneficiaries and goals) are clitic pronouns that can be lexicalized as a phrase of the form [à NP]. In a first approximation, nonlexical datives are defined as dative clitic pronouns that "can hardly be lexicalized" (1988:98). Some examples, with different degrees of acceptability, can be seen in (18)-(21):

(18) a.   Je leur cuis un gâteau

          I dat cl bake a cake

     b.   Je cuis un gâteau aux enfants

          I bake a cake to-the kids

(19) a.   Je lui ai trouvé un emploi

          I dat cl have found a job

     b.   ?J'ai trouvé un emploi à Théophile

          I have found a job to Théophile

(20) a.   Le gosse lui a démoli son pull

          the kid dat cl has destroyed his pull

     b.   ??Le gosse a démoli son pull à sa mère

          the kid has destroyed his pull to his mother

(21) a   Elle lui a tiré dans le ventre

          she dat cl has shot in the belly

     b.   *Elle a tiré dans le ventre à Jean

          she has shot in the belly to Jean

Based on this, Rooryck formulates his first criterion, which can be stated as follows:

(22) Sentences with a lexicalized nonlexical dative are completely out if the direct object is a clitic.

Some relevant examples can be seen in (23):

(23) a. *(Quant au gâteau,) j'en ai cuit un aux enfants

(as for the cake,) I of-it have baked one to-the kids

b. *(Quant à un emploi,) j'en ai trouvé un à Théophile

(as for a job,) I of-it have found one to Théophile

c. *(Ce pull,) le gosse l'a démoli à sa mère

(this pull,) the kid acc cl has destroyed to his mother

These examples are to be compared with those in (24), where datives are lexical:

(24) a. (Ce livre,) je le donne à Cunégonde

(this book,) I acc cl give to Cunégonde

b. (Ce droit,) le gouvernement l'a reconnu aux ouvriers

(this right,) the government acc cl has granted to-the workers

c. (Ces fleurs,) elle en vend beaucoup aux touristes

(these flowers,) she of-it sells many to-the tourists

The obvious problem with this criterion is that it does not work for languages that (tend to) show obligatory dative clitic doubling. The Spanish counterparts of (23) and (24) are equally bad:

(25) *(Este jersey,) el niño lo ha deshecho a su madre

(these pull,) the kid acc cl has destroyed to his mother

(26) *(Este libro,) lo doy a Cunégonde

(this book,) acc cl give-1S to Cunégonde

So we must conclude that Rooryck's criterion does not hold in the language we are focusing on.

2.4. Test Four: Passivization

Rooryck's second criterion is the one in (27):

(27)   The passivization of sentences that contain a nonlexical dative yields unacceptable results

Some examples that support this statement can be seen below:

(28)   a.   *?Un emploi lui a été trouvé

            a job dat cl has been found

       b.   *Un emploi a été trouvé à Théophile

            a job has been found to Théophile

(29)   a.   *?Ce pull lui a été démoli par le gosse

            this pullover dat cl has been destroyed by the kid

       b.   *Ce pull a été démoli à Léontine

            this pullover has been destroyed to Léontine

(30)   a.   *Un gâteau leur a été cuit

            a cake dat cl has been baked

       b.   *Un gâteau a été cuit aux gosses

            a cake has been baked to the kids

The examples in (31)-(33) show that this restriction does not apply to lexical datives.

(31)   a.   Ce livre lui a été donné

            this book dat cl has been given

       b.   Ce livre a été donné a Cunégonde

            this book has been given to Cunégonde

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(32) a. Ce droit leur a été reconnu

        this right dat cl has been acknowledged

     b. Ce droit a été reconnu aux ouvriers

        this right has been acknowledged to the workers

(33) a. Beaucoup de fleurs leur ont été vendues

        plenty of flowers dat cl have been sold

     b. Beaucoup de fleurs ont été vendues aux touristes

        plenty of flowers have been sold to the tourists

It seems that this situation carries over to Spanish:

(34) ??El vestido le ha sido hecho a Carmencita

     the garment dat cl has been made to Carmencita

(35) El paquete le ha sido entregado al interesado

     the parcel dat cl has been delivered to the interested party

For some reason, though, passivization of a sentence containing *dar* 'give' is a bit less ok:

(36) ?El paquete le ha sido dado al interesado

We are ready to accept that this formal criterion works also for the language we are focusing on, but at the same time we must warn the reader that no account has been proposed of why the facts are so. Rooryck observes that this test shows that there is a selectional "solidarity" between the nonlexical dative and the direct object, but he does not draw any firm conclusion in phrase structure terms.

An observation that comes to mind is that lexical and nonlexical datives do not seem to show any difference with respect to other constructions where the object is not in the VP.

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Neither in *wh*-movement constructions ((37)) nor in cleft constructions ((38)) do lexical and nonlexical datives differ in behavior.

(37) nonlexical

    a. Qu'est-ce que tu as preparé aux enfants?

       what you have prepared to the kids?

    b. ¿Qué les has preparado a los niños?

    lexical

    a. Qu'est-ce que tu as donné aux enfants?

       what you have given to the kids?

    b. ¿Qué les has dado a los niños?

(38) nonlexical

    a. C'est un gâteau que j'ai preparé aux enfants

       it is a cake that I have prepared to the kids

    b. Es un pastel lo que les he preparado a los niños

    lexical

    a. C'est un gâteau que j'ai donné aux enfants

    b. Es un pastel lo que les he dado a los niños

3. Why Can't We Say that Beneficiaries Are Arguments?

In the preceding section we have shown that beneficiaries in certain Romance languages seem to behave like arguments with respect to the tests given in the literature. This could simply mean that they are arguments after all. If this were so, the need for BA would be called into question. Remember that BA is the way out from a paradox, that results from putting (1) and (2) together:

The Benefactive Paradox

(1) Beneficiaries are not arguments

(2) Beneficiaries behave like arguments

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Of course, if beneficiaries are arguments, there is no paradox whatsoever. When you are an argument, you usually behave like an argument.

In this section we want to argue that, in spite of their behavior, beneficiaries are not arguments of the verb. There is at least one linguist who has claimed that beneficiaries are arguments, namely Mark Baker:

> I assume that benefactive (...) phrases are (optional) arguments of the verb (1988b:359)

In his 1988 book, Baker gives two reasons for assuming that.

3.1. Reason One: Semantic Intuition

The first reason is based on the intuition that both the prepositional element and the verb seem to play a role in determining the semantic role of the beneficiary NP. Baker argues that the prepositional element gives its associated NP a general meaning of 'person who the actor (intends to) affect by the action', but notices that the particular verb involved further specifies this meaning. Let us have a look at his Chichewa examples:

(39) a. Mtsikana a-na-phik-ir-a ana nsima

   girl SP-PAST-cook-APPL-ASP children cornmeal

   'The girl cooked cornmeal for the children'

   b. Kambuku a-na-b-er-a mkango njinga

   leopard SP-PAST-steal-APPL-ASP lion bicycle

   'The leopard stole the bicycle from the lion'

(40) a. Atsikana a-na-vin-ir-a mfumu

   girls SP-PAST-dance-APPL-ASP chief

   'The girls danced for the chief'

(40)　b.　Ndi-na-yend-er-a kalulu

　　　　　1sS-PAST-walk-APPL-ASP hare

　　　　　'I walked for the hare'

In these sentences, all the NPs immediately after the verb are beneficiaries. In addition, though, "ana" in (39a) is a kind of goal of the cornmeal, and "mkango" in (39b) is a kind of source of the bicycle. On the other hand, the normal interpretation of (40a) is that "the dancing takes place so that the chief can watch and enjoy it", whereas (40b) is normally interpreted as meaning that "I walk because the hare is responsible for walking for some reason and I fulfill that responsability for him". Baker claims that the verb is responsible for these refinements of the general meaning of 'person who the actor (intends to) affect by the action'.

3.2. Reason Two: Extraction

The second reason for saying that beneficiaries are arguments is related to extraction. Baker observes that the ECP can be used to test whether a given phrase is theta-marked or not, just by letting it move in the relevant contexts. Looking at the cases in (41) (=Baker's (34b)), Baker concludes that beneficiaries are arguments indeed.

(41)　a.　?For which of your friends do you know how to bake a cake (that they will enjoy)?

　　　b.　?For whom do you remember how to buy clothes (that will fit properly)?

The same situation carries over to Romance. Look at the following Catalan and Italian examples.

(42)　a.　A qui no saps què li han regalat?

　　　　　to whom not (you) know what dat cl (they) have given

　　　　　'To whom don't you know what they have given?'

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(42) b. A qui no saps què li han comprat?

to whom not (you) know what dat cl (they) have bought

'To whom don't you know what they have bought?'

Our intuition is that there is no difference in grammaticality between (42a) (goal extraction) and (42b) (beneficiary extraction). The same results obtain in Italian:

(43) a. Questo è il ragazzo a cui mi chiedo perchè ho dato il mio indirizzo

this is the boy to whom (I) myself ask why (I) have given my address

   b. Questo è il venditore a cui mi chiedo perchè ho aperto la porta

this is the salesman to whom (I) myself ask why (I) have opened the door

Two Italian speakers judged these sentences. One speaker found (43a) and (43b) fully grammatical, the other would mark both with a question mark. What is essential to our discussion is that there is no contrast in grammaticality between (43a) and (43b).

Why can't Baker be right? (i.e., why can't we say that beneficiaries are arguments?). We will provide an answer to this question in the following way. First, we will determine, once and for all, what an optional argument is. Then we will argue that beneficiaries are not optional arguments (and hence are not arguments).

3.3. Optional Arguments

What is an optional argument? In order to answer this question, we are going to assume that verbs have a theta grid and an LCS as well, as in Hale and Keyser (1986)'s proposal. In this paper, Hale and Keyser propose and defend a distinction between what they call "Lexical Conceptual Structure" (henceforth, LCS) and the standard notion of theta grid (which they later on choose to call "Lexical Form"). A crucial fact to their work is that the number of variables in the LCS of a given verb does not need to be the same as the number of theta roles in its theta grid. To be exact, they explicitly acknowledge that the theta grid of a given verb can contain *less*

items than its LCS. For a verb like *buy*, we would have the following (here we are adopting Fillmore's idea that the action of buying implies a buyer, a seller, money, and goods):

(44) *buy*   LCS (roughly):   x BUY y from z for w

          theta grid   :   AG   TH

Now we are in a position to state what an optional argument is. An optional argument is an LCS variable of a verb that does not have a corresponding theta role in the theta grid of the same verb. According to this definition, the seller and the money are optional arguments of the verb *buy*.

Now the question is whether beneficiaries are in the LCS of the relevant verbs. To put it another way, are there verbs, among the relevant class, that presuppose a beneficiary?

If we leave Baker aside, we do not know of any linguist who thinks there are such verbs. To illustrate:

> The fact that a verb like *geven* 'give' normally has three constituents related to it, is an intrinsic part of the meaning of this verb. A verb like *inschenken* 'pour', on the other hand, does not necessarily imply that there is someone the act of pouring is performed for; in other words, in the meaning of *inschenken* only two relata are implied, i.e. *inschenken* is a two place predicate (Hoekstra (1980:152f))

> The main difference between [the benefactive alternation and the dative shift alternation] lies in the fact that, although *give* and related verbs (*hand, throw*, etc) may be argued to include a slot for a goal argument in their P-A structures, there is little reason to believe that a benefactive slot appears in the P-A structure of verbs like *bake* (Marantz (1984:175))

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Let us consider the following sentences:

(2.6.) a.   Jean donne la poire a Brigitte

[Jean gives the pear to Brigitte]

b.   Jean beurre une tartine à Brigitte

[Jean butters a tart to Brigitte]

It can intuitively be understood that the action of giving implies the dative complement, whereas the action of butttering does not seem to involve such an implication [this is a free translation of Herslund (1988:33)]

The *for*-phrase of Beneficiary is invariably an adjunct; the Beneficiary NP receives no theta role from the verb. For instance, in (63), it is not an essential part of the action of jumping, eating, singing, or peeling that it is done for someone's benefit.

(63) a.   Harriet jumped up and down for the coach

b.   Susan ate an apple for the audience

c.   Enrico sang (an aria) for Luisa

d.   Beulah peeled a grape for Mae

(...) There is nothing in the inherent meaning of singing an aria, peeling a grape, or fixing a sandwich that requires an intended Beneficiary —one could just be doing these things for the hell of it (Jackendoff (1990:447f))

So there seems to be a certain agreement on this issue. For yet unsatisfied readers, it would be interesting to have a look at the entries for the relevant verbs in ordinary dictionaries (remember that Hale and Keyser suggested that LCSs of verbs roughly correspond to their "dictionary meaning"). Now, the fact is that no dictionary meaning of the relevant verbs contains a beneficiary. To illustrate, take the verb *peel*: dictionaries tell us that this verb means (for

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somebody) to remove the peel of (something), suggesting an LCS of the form "x PEEL y",
where no beneficiary is implied.

We would like to conclude that no verb of the relevant class presupposes a beneficiary. This
means that beneficiaries are not in the LCS of verbs and hence are not optional arguments.
According to this, Baker is wrong and we cannot say that beneficiaries are arguments.

4.   Why Is BA Wrong?

In section 2 we showed that beneficiaries thoroughly behave like arguments. This could suggest
that they are arguments, as Baker has claimed. If this were so, BA would not be necessary
(remember that BA relies on the assumption that beneficiaries are *not* arguments). In section 3
we dismissed the claim that beneficiaries are arguments. But this does not entail that BA is
right. In the present section, it is our intention to argue that BA is wrong, not because it relies
on the wrong assumption, but due to the three problems that we are going to single out.

4.1. Problem One: Logic

We want to argue here that Larson's solution is not correct on logical grounds. We think that
this solution can be subject to a criticism of a Davidsonian type. Let us start with the sentence in
(45):

(45)   Beulah peeled Mae a grape

Larson's analysis amounts to saying that *peel* in (45) is a three-place predicate. Let us
paraphrase Davidson (1966) now:

> If we go on to analyse 'Beulah peeled a grape' as containing a two-place predicate,
>
> we obliterate the logical relations between these sentences, namely that [(45)] entails
>
> the other one. Or, to put the objection another way, the original sentences contain a

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common syntactic element ('peeled') which we intuitively recognize as relevant to the meaning relations of the sentences. But the proposed analysis shows no such common element

A possible way out would be to say that in fact we are dealing with the same verb, for *peel* in the second sentence is also a three-place predicate, with a non-realized third argument. But this is rather inconvenient. If *peel* were always a three-place predicate, there would be no need for BA, and thus Larson would refute himself. On the other hand, we showed in the previous section that *peel* is *never* a three-place predicate.

4.2. *Problem Two: Economy*

We want to argue here that Larson's solution is antieconomic and hence incorrect, if Economy principles hold also in the lexicon. This point seems to us extremely indisputable. Suppose you normally get theta grids just by looking about. Verbs are like oysters in this sense. You find one, you open it, and you discover a set of pearls. Now, suppose there is also a mechanism that gives you some other theta grids. You take your set of pearls and add another pearl to it (perhaps with the secrete purpose of making a necklace for your mother-in-law). If the theta grids you obtain in this way are such that you could have gotten them just by looking about, the mechanism is superfluous, and you can (in fact, must, if Economy holds) dispense with it and say that *all* theta grids are obtained in the former way. We will posit the following constraint:

(46)   If μ is a possible theta grid, μ can not be obtained by rule application

Now the question is: Is a beneficiary-containing theta grid a possible theta grid? We believe it is. We have shown above that no verb of the relevant class contains a beneficiary in its LCS (and so neither in its theta grid), but this does not entail that beneficiary-containing theta grids are excluded in principle.

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We would like to link this line of reasoning to a 1987 paper by Ian Roberts. The starting point of this paper was Keenan and Timberlake's claim that argument structures can be reduced or expanded by rule application. Against this view, Roberts undertook the task of showing that there are no valency decreasing rules, and briefly pointed out that there are no valency increasing rules either. The latter is precisely the aim of the present paper.

Roberts' overall conclusion is that the principle in (47) is operative in natural languages:

(47)   Predicate-argument properties are fixed

Why should this be so? We have already suggested that Economy principles may play a role in the lexicon. (47) could also be related to learnability requisites. If theta grids were not fixed, the task of the language learner would be troublesome and, ultimately, impossible.

4.3. Problem Three: Semantics

We want to argue here that Larson's solution is counterintuitive on semantic grounds. What BA does is turn a beneficiary into an argument of the input verb (say, *peel*), which does not catch the long-standing observation that beneficiaries are not arguments of just the verb. To put it in Herslund's words, who cites works by several people, "le datif libre se rattacherait, non pas au verbe, mais à une tranche plus grande".

Summarizing, three problems have been mentioned here that affect Larson's solution to the Benefactive Paradox, namely a logical problem, an Economy problem, and a semantic problem. We believe that these problems are significant enough to refuse Larson's solution to the Benefactive Paradox. Such a move would be licit even if we did not have anything to offer instead. In the remainder of this paper we do intend to suggest an alternative solution. We do not know whether it is better or not, but we think we can prove that it overcomes, without much stipulation, the three problems we discussed in this section.

5. What Is the Alternative?

In the preceding sections we assumed that beneficiaries are argument-like, but we excluded the possibility that (either directly, or derivatively) they get a theta role from the verb. In this section we want to suggest that there is something which beneficiaries can get a theta role from. This is not the verb, as it has been shown, nor can it be the verb plus a preposition. How about the preposition alone? This option can easily be excluded. First, if beneficiaries got their theta role exclusively from the preposition, they would be adjuncts, according to the conventional wisdom, and this would contradict their behavior as arguments. Second, the preposition *cannot* give beneficiaries a theta role, if people are right who believe that it is just a Case mark with no semantic content.

So it seems that we are left with no candidate. Are we? We would like to suggest that it is V' that beneficiaries are arguments of and get their theta role from.[1] What can be said in support of this claim?

### 5.1. Support One: Elimination

Beneficiaries do bear a theta role, but we have eliminated all the possible candidates for theta role assigner. If we admit (see 5.2) that V' can assign theta roles, V' *must* assign the role for beneficiaries.

5.2. Support Two: V' as Theta Marker

It has been suggested by various people (Jayaseelan (1984), Fukui (1986)) that theta marking is always done under strict sisterhood. If we also assume strict binary branching, this entails that theta roles must be promoted from V to higher projections of V in order to be assigned.

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(48)

V'——►NP

——► promotion

——► assignment

If we accept this, we are accepting that V' is an entity that is able to carry a (partial) theta grid. In (48), this (partial) theta grid is inherited from the verb. If there are additional reasons to do so, nothing prevents us from saying that V' can have a theta grid of its own.

This may be linked to theory (yet to be developed) of constructional theta roles. Constructional theta roles are not there by virtue of being lexical properties of a head; they arise as sentences are built.

The label "constructional theta role" appears in Hale and Keyser (1986). There, they give the following example:

(49)   John slid across the floor

In this sentence, the subject can get an agentive interpretation, even though the only theta role that the verb assigns is Theme. Hale and Keyser account for this interpretation by claiming that in (49) there is an Agent role involved that is *constructionally* determined and additional to the role that the verb assigns.

In Hale and Keyser's example, *John* gets two theta roles —a lexical one (Theme) from the verb, and a constructional one (Agent) from a VP. What our proposal amounts to saying is that there are arguments that can get just a constructional theta role.

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5.3. Support Three: Empirical Evidence

The claim that V' theta marks the beneficiary implies that V' must be there when a beneficiary is present. So we can predict that there will be no beneficiaries with intransitive verbs. The reason why this should be so is easy to explain: with intransitive verbs, V' is non-branching, hence it plays no role in the structure, hence it can (and, in fact, must, if Economy holds) be pruned off. Of course, our claim does not entail that *any* V' can license a beneficiary. V' is a necessary condition for beneficiaries, but clearly not a sufficient one.

Now, the prediction made above is largely fulfilled. The fact that intransitives (in a loose sense) do not take beneficiaries has been observed for French and Sardinian (at least), and it can be observed in Spanish as well.

5.3.1. French.

Barnes (1985:192, fn 9) noticed "the impossibility of nonlexical datives in the absence of a verb complement". Her examples are:

(50)   a.   *Il lui a chanté pendant une heure

             'He sang for/to him/her for an hour'

       b.   Il lui a chanté la même chanson pendant une heure

             'He sang him/her the same song for an hour'

Barnes had already observed in her 1980 paper that "the question of lexical *vs* nonlexical datives does not arise for intransitive verbs, since extended dative constructions [a class that includes beneficiaries] occur only with transitive verbs".

5.3.2. Sardinian.

In his book on Sardinian syntax, Jones notices the following:

> All the examples of datives of interest [a class that includes beneficiaries] presented
> so far involve transitive verbs. Indeed, the possibility of a dative of interest seems

to be dependent on the presence of a complement of some sort. In particular, such

datives (...) do not occur readily with genuine intransitive verbs.

Some of his examples can be seen in (51):

(51)   a.   *Juanne ti ballat

'John (will) dance for you'

b.   ??Su pitzinnu m'at cascatu

'The boy yawned for/at/on me'

c.   *Maria lis at travallatu

'Mary worked for them'

5.3.3. Spanish. Sánchez Lancis (1985) worked on a corpus of 460 Spanish verbs. 170 of

these are able to carry a beneficiary. Now, the interesting point is that only 8 verbs out of 170

are marked [+beneficiary, -direct object]. These verbs are listed below.

(52)

	DO	EXP	GOAL	SOURCE	POSS	BEN	PP
valer (a)	-	-	-	-	-	+	-
tardar	-	-	-	-	-	+	-
servir (b)	-	-	-	-	-	+	+
ser	-	-	-	-	-	+	-
salir (b)	-	-	-	-	-	+	+
represen-tar (b)	-	-	-	-	-	+	-
llegar	-	-	-	-	+	+	+
abrirse	-	-	-	-	+	+	-

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We do not think any of these verbs constitutes a real counterexample. To begin with, verbs that take a PP complement do have a branching V'. On the other hand, some of the verbs in (52) are ergatives and hence also have a branching V'. Some of the verbs, finally, are wrongly listed, for the dative they take is an experiencer rather than a beneficiary.

5.4. Support Four: Problems Overcome

So far we have given three facts that back our proposal. Additional support, of course, comes from the fact that the three problems mentioned in section 4 are easily overcome. Let us briefly show that.

5.4.1. Problem One Revisited. Remember we were dealing with the sentence in (45) (repeated here as (53)):

(53)   Beulah peeled Mae a grape

Can we properly capture the fact that (53) entails *Beulah peeled a grape* ? We simply have to say that *peel* is a two-place predicate in the two sentences. This permits us to catch the fact that the two sentences "contain a common syntactic element which we intuitively recognize as relevant to the meaning relations of the sentences", without getting into trouble with devices such as BA.

5.4.2. Problem Two Revisited. The problem with Larson's analysis was that it forced us to postulate two separate ways in which verbs happen to have theta roles. In his analysis, most theta roles are given, but there is an additional mechanism that adds a theta role to a given theta grid. Our analysis does not have to assume this. According to it, *all* theta roles are given. Where? For V theta roles, the answer is obvious (i.e., in the lexicon). For V' roles, we do not have an answer yet. Everything hinges on a theory of constructional theta roles that, as far as we know, has not yet been developed.

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5.4.3. Problem Three Revisited. It can easily be shown that our analysis complies with the observation mentioned above, namely that beneficiaries do not relate to just the verb but to a bigger chunk. This chunk must be at least V'. The structure we are going to posit can be seen in (54):

(54)

```
            V^j
           /   \
          /     \
        V'       NP
       /  \      ben
      /    \
     V      NP
```

where j=1 or j=2

6. Summary

In this paper we have tried to assess the rightness of Larson's rule of Benefactive Augmentation. In section 1, we showed that BA is an answer to the Benefactive Paradox, which says that (1) beneficiaries are not arguments, and (2) beneficiaries behave like arguments. Section 2 was devoted to showing that (2) is basically right, since beneficiaries (at least in Spanish) only differ from goals with respect to one criterion, out of four that have been reviewed. This could have led us to say, along with Baker, that beneficiaries are arguments after all, and that (1) is accordingly wrong, and hence there is no paradox, and hence no need for a way out from it. This possibility was discarded in section 3, where it was claimed that, in spite of their behavior, beneficiaries are not arguments in the usual sense. So the paradox was still a paradox, and a way out from it was still called for. In section 4 we examined Larson's way out, and singled out three problems that make his proposal untenable, namely a logical problem, an Economy problem, and a semantic problem. Finally, in section 5, we suggested an alternative account. In a nutshell, it was claimed that (1) is right but incomplete, for beneficiaries are not arguments of V, *but they are arguments of V'*. Since they are arguments, it

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is not surprising that they show argument behavior, and the paradox boils down to be an illusion. It was also claimed that this proposal is free from the problems that affect Larson's.

Notes

[1] Betsy K. Barnes already suggested something along these lines in her 1985 article. Anna Bartra, a teacher of ours, once hinted at this possibility in her class lectures (1985/1986).

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