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Analysis of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programmes existing in the World during 2005.

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Analysis of DDR programmes in the World during 2005

Contents

SUMMARY

o   The DDR should be a process that dignifies those intervening in it.
o   It should be one component of a broader peace building strategy.
o   It involves political, security, humanitarian and socio-economic factors.
o   It should benefit the civil population as a whole.
o   It should prevent future outbreaks of violence, free resources and contribute to reconciliation.
o   The acting parties intervening in DDRs are of a widely different makeup.
o   Not all DDRs are the result of a previous peace process.
o   The real beginning of a DDR usually takes place several months after the signing of a peace agreement.
o   In 2005, more than a million people benefited from DDR programmes in 20 counties.
o   Two thirds of the people who have entered these programmes belong to African countries.
o   42% of the combatants demobilised are Armed Forces, 37% militia, 14% guerrillas and 6% paramilitaries.
o   There are DDRs for paramilitary groups in four countries.
o   Except for Colombia, in other countries the demobilisation of paramilitary groups has occurred in parallel with the demobilisation of militias, guerrillas and armed forces, and as a result of global political agreements.
o   The cost of United Nations peacekeeping operations in the eight countries where there are also DDRs, is almost double the total cost of the 20 DDR programmes.
o   When all the confronting parties agree to the cessation of hostilities and the beginning of a new political cycle, a psychosocial context may be produced that encourages amnesty, forgiving and reconciliation.
o   In the other cases, as in Colombia, the aforementioned context cannot develop to the same extent, since the cycle of violence has not been completely closed.
o   In all the contexts where there are DDRs, there exist precedents for a process of this type.
o   In the majority of cases, a National Commission for the DDR (NCDDR) has been created.
o   When one of the requirements for accepting the option of a DDR is the possession and handing over of weapons, various groups can be excluded from the demobilisation.
o   It is common for between 8 and 10% of demobilised people to be minors.
o   Women are often excluded from DDR processes.
o   Many programmes are planned without knowing exactly the number of beneficiaries.
o   The average cost per person of a DDR is equivalent to 4.7 times the average income per inhabitant of the country.
o   The 20 existing programmes have a total cost of 1,900 million dollars, at an average of $1,686 per person.
o   The majority of DDRs are carried out in the planet's poorest countries.
o   The initial disarmament and demobilisation phase takes up between 5 and 15% of the total budget.
o   The World Bank is the body that concentrates the greatest investment in DDR programmes. The EU is the second financing organism.
o   By country, Japan is the country that has collaborated with the largest amount of aid, followed by the U.S., the Netherlands, Canada and the United Kingdom.
o   Generally speaking, a DDR programme lasts 3½ years. The disarmament and demobilisation phase usually lasts a few months. The rehabilitation and reintegration phases tend to last two years.
o   There exists a certain lack of control and limited monitoring of the final destination of the weapons collected.
o   The average percentage is of one weapon handed in for every two people demobilised.

Introduction: What is a DDR?

All peace processes related to armed conflicts have to pass through a final stage in which, once agreements have been signed, the combatants give up their weapons and reintegrate into civil life. This complex stage is known as the DDR, which stands for **Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration**, although it is sometimes referred to as DDRRR, when adding to it the concepts of Repatriation and Rehabilitation.

Many DDRs end in failure and have been the reason for new hostilities, and this is due to their having been based on a false DDR concept, i.e.: thinking that the abbreviation stands for Defeat, Distain and Surrender (*Rendición* in Spanish). Nevertheless, in order to succeed, even moderately, the DDR must never signify capitulation, de-politicisation, demonisation, marginalisation, bribery, subordination or especially, humiliation. Just the opposite, **it has to be a process that dignifies the people involved in it, since they have to give up their weapons voluntarily and as a result of a negotiation and an agreement.** There are no magic or unique formulae in DDRs, since each country and each context is a different case. Every experience is unique, however it is possible to learn a great deal from past lessons.

The DDR has its specific moment for being carried out, and needs certain specific conditions, especially of a political nature, to ensure that it does not fail. Occasionally also, a DDR programme may be set up when there is only one or various groups (but not all) willing to demobilise. If it is done well, the DDR of these groups can be an incentive for the remaining groups to do so as well, yet in any case it will have to deal with a series of difficulties to become implemented at a time when violence is still continuing in the country.

Past experiences show us that **it is not a good idea to be in too much of a hurry or to try and link a DDR to another unrealistic objective** (early elections, for example, as occurred in Angola in 1992 or in Liberia in 1997), since the combatants may take up weapons again if they lose said elections. Neither is it a good idea to postpone the phase indefinitely, due to fear or incapacity, since the presence of weapons encourages the resumption of hostilities. On too many occasions, a premature peace agreement has been forced without anticipating this phase.

The DDR (RR) is already a process in itself. It is not possible to carry out a part of it (disarmament, for instance), if this is not accompanied by a proper planning of the rest of the components or phases. In addition, the DDR forms a part of wider commitments negotiated in the peace process (justice, reform of the police system, changes in the Armed Forces, elections, political changes, etc.). The **DDR must therefore be one component of a broader peace building strategy**. The DDR must always be the result of a political agreement, a consensus; either as the result of a peace process or of other commitments. In any case, it cannot be the result of an imposition, although it may be induced by means of incentives.

A Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programme for former combatants is **a complex process that involves political, military, security, humanitarian and socioeconomic factors.** Their setting tends to be post-conflict contexts, with the result that everything that this factor signifies has to be added, a factor that is often associated with institutional weakness, political transition, democratic fragility, problems of security, destruction of infrastructures and economic dependence on international cooperation.

Whatever the case, the DDR represents **an opportunity for building security**, and is thus one of the most important ingredients for **achieving stability and building peace**, since it tends to be carried out at a highly crucial moment such as the transition from armed conflict to peace, with peace being understood not only as the end to armed violence but the in-depth treatment of the causes that originated the armed conflict. In addition, the very nature of these programmes can transform the former combatants into active participants in economic and social development. Although the great majority of programmes focus their attention on the former combatants, the ultimate goal is to achieve the development of the whole community.

Thus the goals that these programmes pursue are fundamentally the following:

- **To contribute to improving the security and political stability** of the country. For this reason, the DDR must be initiated as soon as possible after the signing of peace agreements

- To re-establish the conditions that allow **the reintegration of the armed participants or factions** that have been in dispute. On many occasions, this type of programme attends exclusively to armed participants, and this represents a serious problem since it excludes **the civil population as a whole as a beneficiary of the DDR programme.**

- **To prevent future outbreaks of violence.** The lessons that can be learnt from contexts where this type of programme has been carried out with little success show that a bad DDR can bring about the outbreak of new escalations of violence. The fact that there are thousands of combat-trained people, probably still armed, whose needs have not been seen to or the initial promises kept, encourages this possibility.

- **To contribute to national reconciliation.** Although attention is focused on former combatants as a first priority, the civil population as a while must not be forgotten. One of the recent tools that is beginning to be developed in this sense are the **Transitional Justice measures**.

- **To free resources**, both human and financial ones, for post-war reconstruction and development. Another measure that must accompany DDR programmes is the **Security Sector Reform (SSR)**, with the aim of reducing and democratising the Armed Forces and security bodies.

According to the UNDP, the DDR is a priority factor in the **rehabilitation and development strategy of post-war contexts**. Therefore, it should be integrated within a much broader framework of recovery and development, in coordination with other kinds of associated measures, such as:

- Dealing with violations of human rights.
- Restructuring and reforming the security forces.
- Contributing to public security and the surrendering of police accounts.
- Supporting the correct holding of elections, guaranteeing judicial independence and the upholding of the law.
- Promoting peace and reconciliation initiatives, both on a local and national level.
- Promoting government by means of the surrendering of public institution accounts.
- Attending to the needs of displaced persons and refuges, as well as other vulnerable groups.
- Guaranteeing real human development.

The DDR **usually follows the guidelines of a somewhat typical timeline**, although its components are not always considered sufficiently or in their totality, given rise to vacuums and errors in the strategy for carrying them out. The aim in this study is to analyse current DDR programmes, and not those of the past, in the conviction that those that are being carried out at the moment have a general profile that is quite novel, both in terms of the quantity of experiences existing, and the number of beneficiaries and the international context in which they are produced.

This study has been drawn up in a practical and didactic way, with the result that it may prove just as useful to read the conclusions as to study each of the twenty cases analysed, all of which are very diverse. And although the historical, geographical, political and other contexts are quite different, there are lessons that can be learnt from each and every one of the cases.

The context of the conflicts analysed

The nature of armed conflicts that have subsequently led to the carrying out of a DDR programme respond to the typical characteristics of contemporary conflicts, i.e. **they are predominantly intra-state conflicts**, and in many of them the essential reason has been the struggle for political power. Each context has, however, its own particular specificities, whether it be due to the religious instrumentalising of the conflict, calls for autonomy or independence of a territory, or the struggle for the control of natural resources. **The participants involved also vary a great deal in their origin**, since they may include non-state armed groups (militias, paramilitaries, guerrillas) and a country own armed forces (who have been fighting against these opposition groups), including the occasions where part of the military have risen up against their commanders. Nevertheless, trafficking in people and arms, the recruiting of combatants in refugee camps, the support for armed opposition groups from neighbouring countries, and the large number of people who have had to seek refuge abroad, mean that these internal conflicts take on a very important **regional dimension**.

Among the main **consequences** that can be pointed to in these conflicts, we can stress the considerable number of deaths, a factor which varies depending on the intensity and length of the conflict, the massive internal displacements or the overgrown size of the armies, which has led to the need for a security sector reform in many of them.

The prelude to DDRs: peace agreements or cessation of hostilities

No all DDR processes are the result of a previous peace agreement, for the simple reason that many armed conflicts do not end with the signing of this kind of agreement. **Frequently, what is a agreed upon is a simply ceasing of hostilities** that allows a process of political transition to be initiated, with or without power sharing. On other occasions it is a case of achieving a cease fire after years of non-compliance with a previous peace agreement. There are also the cases of reaching a political agreement sponsored by an international organism, or arranging a process of national reconciliation between the confronting parties that entails a sharing of the political power.

Political agreements prior to the DDR	
Afghanistan	Coordination agreement between the winning parties
Angola	Memorandum of Understanding that improves and modifies a previous Peace Agreement, not complied with
Burundi	A cease fire two years after signing a Peace Agreement, not complied with
Cambodia	Political agreement sponsored by the United Nations
CAR	Peace Agreement, with political transition
Chad	No peace agreement
Colombia (AUC)	Agreement on ceasing hostilities and re-establishing the monopoly of the forces in the hands of the State
Côte d'Ivoire	Peace Agreement by which a Government of national unity is created
Eritrea	Agreement on Ceasing Hostilities with Ethiopia
Guinea-Bissau	Peace Agreement broken by successive coups d'état
Haití	No peace agreement
Indonesia (GAM)	Memorandum of Understanding equivalent to a formal Peace Agreement
Liberia	Peace Agreement, with political transition
Philippines	Peace Agreement by which an autonomy is conceded to the southern provinces
DR Congo	Peace Agreement, with political transition
Rep. Congo	Agreement on Ceasing Hostilities, with political transition
Rwanda	Agreement on Ceasing Hostilities with DR Congo
Sierra Leone	Peace Agreement, with political power sharing

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| Somalia | Conference on National Reconciliation |
| Sudan | Peace Agreement, with autonomy for the south of the country |

By combining the majority of these possibilities we can establish a classic timeline of events going from the first cease fire to the post-war rehabilitation phase, as shown in the following table.

The process for arriving at a DDR
o   Cease fire and /or Cessation of hostilities o   Political agreement o   Clarity of the DDR phase with respect to the peace process as a whole o   Clarity and agreement in the timeline to follow in the DDR phase (Code of Conduct governing the DDR phase) o   Agreement on whether a verification and a national and/or international supervision has to exist throughout the phase o   Withdrawal to defensive areas and enough separation of the confronting forces, limitation of movements of all military forces o   Paralysing of military capacities o   Creation of "security, humanitarian or peace areas" o   Mechanisms for supervising/verifying the cease fire or cessation of hostilities o   Sanction mechanisms for not complying with the agreement o   Exchange of prisoners o   Dismantlement of paramilitary groups o   Withdrawal of detention or capture orders o   Arrival of international quartering protection forces o   Agreement on the places and conditions of quartering o   Quartering of military forces (and families) in the areas agreed upon o   Storage of weapons, under own custody or "triple key" and in the previously agreed upon conditions (this may be in un-revealed locations and subject to monitoring by third parties) o   Amnesty o   Safety/security guarantees o   Disarmament o   Collection / destruction of weapons o   Demobilisation o   Integration in the Armed Forces o   Reinsertion /Resettling o   Post-war rehabilitation

It should also be pointed out that, **in seven specific cases, the peace agreements specifically contemplate the carrying out of a DDR programme**, and in another two, the reform of the armed forces and the security system. **No process is known in which, in order to enter in the negotiation phase culminating in a peace agreement, there has been financing to sustain the combatants** during the cessation of hostilities, however there has been substantial economic aid for the settlement communities of demobilised groups.

Beginning and duration of the programmes

In general, and with very few exceptions, DDR programmes tend to be commitments made by the confronting parties during the signing of peace agreements, or due to agreements made soon after said peace agreements. Despite this, **several month usually go by before they actually begin (on average, one year)**, either because of not having the necessary planning, or because the organisms charged with carrying out the programme or the minimum financing needed to begin the process still do not exist. As an example of two extremes, we can point to the early beginning of the programmes in Angola, Indonesia, Republic of the Congo, Sierra Leone and Colombia, with a maximum of four months from the signing of the agreement and the beginning of the DDR. At the other extreme, we can cite the cases in Burundi, Afghanistan,

Côte d'Ivoire (where only a symbolic act has been made), Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau and Central African Republic (CAR), where almost two years have gone by before the beginning of the DDR.

The rapid beginning of a DDR does not however guarantee in the least its good progress nor the shortness of the disarmament and demobilisation period. In fact, and with the exceptional cases of Indonesia and Angola, in which a rapid beginning was accompanied by a finalisation of the demobilisation phase in a very short period of time (less than four months), ,the rest of the countries have had to overcome numerous difficulties over a period of a year and a half, and even more than two years. In this sense, the longest processes have been those in Colombia and Sierra Leone, countries that have suffered interruptions of several months throughout the process.

Beginning of the DDR and duration of the initial disarmament and demobilisation phase.				
Country	Peace Agreement or Ceasefire	DDR begun	Difference In months	Months disarmament and demobilisation lasted
Afghanistan	12 - 2001	10 - 2003	22	20
Angola	04 - 2002	04 -2002	0	4
Burundi	12 - 2002	12 – 2004	24	10 *(1)*
Cambodia	----	10 - 2001	----	8 *(2)*
CAR	03 – 2003	12 – 2004	21	under way
Colombia	07 – 2003	11 – 2003	4	27 *(3)*
Congo	11 - 1999	01 – 2000	2	---- *(4)*
Côte d'Ivoire	07 – 2003	05 – 2005	22	under way *(5)*
Eritrea	12 – 2000	10 – 2002	22	24
Guinea-Bissau	11 – 1998	08 – 2000	21	20
Indonesia (Aceh)	08 – 2005	09 – 2005	1	3
Liberia	08 – 2003	12 – 2003	4	12
DR Congo	04 – 2003	07 – 2004	15	under way
Rwanda	----	04 - 2002	----	18
Sierra Leone	07 – 1999	10 – 1999	3	27 *(6)*
Somalia	01 - 2004	01- 2005	12	under way
Sudan	01 - 2005	09 - 2005	8	under way
Average			**12**	**+ 16**

(1) This refers exclusively to the first phase of demobilisation, which includes all the armed groups.
(2) This refers to two phases, of 2 and 3 months respectively, with three months' halt in between.
(3) Has been carried out by blocks and in four stages, due to the various crises that originated periods when no demobilisation was carried out, especially throughout 2004.
(4) It is not appropriate to indicate the duration, as it is a process with seven different stages that combine partial DDRs with arms purchase programmes.
(5) It is not appropriate to indicate the duration, as its beginning has been continuously delayed.
(6) The process suffered several interruptions from May 2001 onwards. The final phase lasted 8 months.

Beneficiaries

During 2005, over a million people (1,129,000 to be exact) participated in one way or another in some phase of DDR programmes in the 20 countries analyse,. 42.7% of these people were involved in armed forces reduction programmes, and the rest in programmes for the disarmament and demobilisation of armed opposition groups or paramilitary groups.

Two thirds of the people who have entered these programmes belong to six African countries, totalling 752,000 individuals (Eritrea, DR Congo, Angola, Liberia, Burundi and Sierra

Leone), which makes the African continent the preferential area for these processes, as it accounts for 14 of the 20 existing cases.

As a guide, and given the difficulties on some occasions of differentiating guerrilla groups from different types of militia, an initial approximation would make it possible to reveal that the existing DDR programmes benefit, in addition to the aforementioned armed forces, some 423,000 militia, 157,000 guerrillas and 67,000 paramilitary, as indicated in the following table.

Those benefiting from current DDR programmes		
Armed Forces	482,000	42.7%
Militia	423,000	37.5%
Guerrillas	157,000	13.9%
Paramilitary	67,000	5.9%
TOTAL	**1,129,000**	**100.0%**

This diversity of participants is one of the factors that adds more complexity to the treatment of current DDR programmes, especially when all of them are present in the same country. DDR programmes exclusively for armed forces tend to be far easier to administer than the remaining programmes, except in the case where they are dealing with soldiers who had been out of the military institution for some time and did not receive benefits of reintegration at that time, and for this reason may threaten to take up arms once again. In the case of DDRs for militia, they tend in general to have a less political component than the DDR applied to guerrilla groups, who do not usually agree to disarm without previous political counter-demands. As for paramilitary groups, whether they be appendages of the armed forces or of political groups (either in power or of the opposition), their treatment depends to a great extent on the authority of the Government leading the DDR and the incentives that can be conceded to encourage them to enter into a demobilisation process.

Demobilisation of paramilitary groups

Close to 6% of the people in demobilisation phase in 2005 belonged to paramilitary groups of various kinds, including pro-government militia or supporters of a previous government, who acted under the traditional scheme of paramilitarism. **This phenomenon has affected four countries especially**, three of them African (Burundi, Côte d'Ivoire and Liberia), and one Latin American (Colombia), **totalling some 67,000 troops.**

As a common denominator, the majority of these processes have suffered delays in their implementation, and have had problems in identifying combatants, as well as problems of an economic kind for their financing. **With the exception of the situation in Colombia, where the current collective DDR is exclusively for the AUC, in the rest of the countries demobilisation of paramilitary groups has continued in parallel with the demobilisation of militias, guerrillas and the armed forces, as a result of global political agreements**, and in spite of the difficulties still present in the Côte d'Ivoire.

| DDR of paramilitary groups			
Country	Troops	Name	Comments
Burundi	21,500	11,733 *Guardiens de la paix* 9,668 Combatant Militants	Quartered in differentiated camps from the opposition political groups After their demobilisation they receive a one-off payment of $91, as opposed to the $586 for the rest of the demobilised combatants
Colombia	20,115	Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC)	The process has suffered several interruptions due to a lack of clarification about the legal situation of those affected
Côte d'Ivoire	10,000	7,000 FLGO 1,200 AP-Wê 1,800 UPRGO MILOCI	The process has been delayed on several occasions due to the demands of other the armed groups that the paramilitaries be demobilised first
Liberia	15,600	Pro-government militia	Lack of planning regarding the number of people to be demobilised, and insufficient funding for the DDR
TOTAL	**67,2000**		

International presence

Eight of the cases studied have a United Nations peacekeeping mission. In addition, in Afghanistan the EU troops, Eurocorps, are operating. As can be seen from the following table, the efforts both in terms of troops and in budgetary material must be taken into consideration due to their considerable magnitude, questioning up to a point the cost of a protection that is not always effective. At the end of 2005, in the eight aforementioned countries the United Nations contingent was over 67,000, the majority of them military, with a joint budget of 3,766 million dollars annually. **The cost of peacekeeping operations in the countries where there are DDRs, is almost double the total cost of the DDR programmes in the 20 countries analysed in this study, and four times more than the cost of the DDRs in the eight countries where said forces are operating.** It is equally significant that the cost of the Liberia operation is far higher than that country's GDP, and that in Burundi and Sierra Leone it comes to half of their respective GDPs. In short, the average of these values indicates that United Nations peacekeeping mission budgets come to an overall average of 8.4% of the GDP of these eight countries.

DDR and peacekeeping operations					
Country	Name	Troops	Budget (million $)	GDP (million $)	% Budget / GDP
Burundi	ONUB	5,650	307	600	51.2
Côte d'Ivoire	UNOCI	7,558	386	13,700	2.8
Eritrea	UNMEE	3,622	186	800	23.1
Haiti	MINUSTAH	9,930	307	3,535	8.7
Liberia	UNMIL	16,000	846	448	188.8
DR Congo	MONUC	16,200	403	5,700	7.1
Sierra Leone (1)	UNAMSIL	1,711	373	800	46.6
Sudan	UNMIS	6,385	969	19,500	5.0
TOTAL		**67,056**	**3,777**	**45,083**	**8.4**

(1) The mission was maintained until 2005

The UNMEE is the only peacekeeping mission that does not involve the implementation of a DDR programme. **In addition, in al of the 20 countries analysed there are United Nations agencies involved in the process.** Thirteen countries have a peacekeeping operation (PKO) or a United Nations Office, in 15 countries there is a UNDP present and in 13 one of UNICEF, basically for child soldier programmes. The World Food Programme (WFP) collaborates in 6 countries with a DDR, and the International labour Organisation (ILO) and the International Organisation for Migration (OIM) in another five. The World Bank collaborates in 13 of the 20 countries, the AU or ECOWAS in six African countries, and the EU in another four. **Côte**

d'Ivoire and Sierra Leone are the countries with the greatest presence of international organisms collaborating with the DDR, while Colombia and Chad are those that present a more reduced number of organisms.

Presence of international organisms									
Country	UN	W.B.	EU	AU Ecowas	UNDP	Unicef	WFP	IOM	ILO
Afghanistan			●		●	●			
Angola		●			●	●	●		●
Burundi (1)	PKO	●				●	●		
Central African Republic	Office	●		●	●				
Colombia (2)						●			
Côte d'Ivoire	PKO	●		●	●	●	●		
Haiti	PKO				●				
Indonesia (5)			●		●	●		●	
Liberia (6)	PKO			●	●	●	●		
Philippines-MNLF (4)		●			●	●			●
DR Congo	PKO	●	●		●	●			
Rep. Congo (3)	Office	●			●			●	●
Rwanda (7)	MONUC	●				●			●
Sierra Leone	PKO	●		●	●	●		●	
Somalia (8)	Office		●	●	●				●
Sudan	PKO			●	●	●			
Subtotal	11	9	4	6	13	12	4	3	5
Armed Forces demobilisations									
Cambodia		●				●	●	●	
Chad		●			●				
Eritrea	PKO	●			●		●		
Guinea-Bissau	Office	●						●	
Subtotal	2	4	-	-	2	1	2	2	-
TOTAL	13	13	4	6	15	13	6	5	5

Justice and impunity: Is there a political price for peace?

One of the most controversial aspects of DDR programmes is the legal and political treatment that ex-combatants receive once they have handed over their weapons. With the exception of cases of Armed Forces DDR, in which due to their nature, these aspects are not considered, since it is simply a case of reducing the number of troops, the discussion revolves around the **legal responsibility of the different groups that have participated in a conflict**, when serious human rights offences have occurred, including massacres, crimes against humanity, genocide, etc.

As has already been mentioned, almost all DDR programmes begin after achieving a peace agreement that puts an end to an armed conflict, and where **all the confronting parties agree to a cessation of hostilities and the beginning of a new political cycle**, normally with an agreement to participate jointly in political and military power. In these circumstances, and more so if the armed conflict has lasted a long time and has claimed many lives, **a psychosocial context may be produced which is favourable to amnesty, forgiveness and reconciliation**, not without difficulties, contradictions and opposition from many of the most affected individuals or groups. In addition, reconciliation is a very long process that always includes a large dose of truth, justice and reparation, not necessarily at odds with generosity and magnanimity if determined circumstances are allowed to develop. Nothing therefore is automatic in this area, but comes as a result of individual and collective processes in the search for a greater good and a better future that will allow the individual pain of the moment to be transcended. It is very significant, as can be seen from the following table, that the normal rule following a cease fire, the ceasing of hostilities and the signing of a peace agreement, is the offering of amnesty, the creation of transition structures, the sharing of political power, the restructuring of the armed

forces and the reform of the security sector, among other aspects, with very little presence of special courts, Truth and Reconciliation Commissions and other possibilities related to the vectors of truth, justice and reparation.

In the rare cases, such as in Colombia, where the demobilisation does not affect all the armed groups collectively, but only one of them, and therefore said demobilisation does not put an end to the armed conflict completely, the aforementioned psychosocial context favourable to amnesty and forgiveness cannot develop to the same extent, since the cycle of violence is not completely closed, and in contrast one is left with the sensation that a certain impunity or a very favourable treatment has been conceded to people or groups to whom horrendous crimes have been attributed. Nevertheless, the Justice and Peace Law approved in Colombia in 2005, despite all its limitations, is a quite exceptional case on an international level, since laws of this type do not usually exist, unless they have been designed to be applied solely for the only collective demobilisation existing in the country, without it being known what would occur if other armed groups were demobilised or without knowing the exact "civil and military" structure of the paralmilitarism.

Another element to be taken into account, while not attempting to justify the reality, is the fact that **the majority of peace agreements and DDR processes refer to African countries with very little tradition of democracy and shared power**, which makes the application of rules associated with justice and reparation enormously difficult. At the most, the practice of enforced exile of a particular leader is applied.

The political price of peace agreements		
Country	**Basic aspects of the peace agreement**	**Political situation of the demobilised persons**
Afghanistan	Offer of amnesty, creation of a new political transition structure and holding of elections Formation of a new armed forces	Integration in the new armed forces (ANA) or social reintegration. Political participation provided the person is disassociated from armed groups. Special benefits for the commanders. Lack of security (death of several candidates to the presidential elections).
Angola	Ceasefire, amnesty, demobilisation, reintegration and restructuring of the armed forces	Social reintegration. 6,500 ex-combatants employed by the Government. Political participation is pending the holding of elections in 2006. Intimidation and threats of members of the Government to members of the armed opposition group. Call for greater protection for ex-combatants and greater dialogue between the Government and civil society.
Burundi	Immunity, constitutional reforms, establishing of a 3 year transition period and the holding of elections.	Integration in the new armed forces, social reintegration and occupying of positions of political power after the elections. The new President is the former leader of the armed opposition group CNDD-FDD. Lack of security for the municipal elections in April 2006. Lack of compliance with the subsidies to be paid to hundreds of members of armed groups, which has provoked a renewal of the DDR Commission by the new Executive.
Colombia (AUC)	Cessation of hostilities, demobilisation and submitting to the Justice and Peace law.	Non-compliance with cessation of hostilities and social reintegration. Pending compliance of the Justice and Peace Law and its regulations.
Côte d'Ivoire	General amnesty, political reforms and formation of a Government of National Unity. Holding of elections with legislative reform. Formation of a new armed forces.	Sharing of political power. Stagnation of the beginning of the DDR process due to the divergences in the electoral legislation and the sharing of political power. The heads of the militia have no intention of disarming until the paramilitary groups also do so.
Guinea-Bissau	Cease fire, creation of a Government of Transition, reinforcing of political dialogue, national reconciliation and democratic normality. Reform of the security sector and reduction of the armed forces.	Community reintegration in society Political instability.
Indonesia	Amnesty for political prisoners, self-government and demilitarisation for the Aceh region. Reform of the security sector. Creation of local political parties.	Reintegration in society (land share-out) and participation in the political power (establishment of local political parties, system of independent courts and holding of local elections in April 2006).

Liberia	Amnesty, creation of a transition Government and the holding of elections. Establishing of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Reform of the political and military structure.	Social reintegration without specifying possibilities of political participation. Protests from ex-combatants and former armed forces troops about the lack of payment of subsidies (shortage of funds for the programme). Reform of the Armed Forces by a private US security firm. Feeling in the civil society of an unfair treatment in favour of the combatants.
Central African Republic	Process of political transition, reform of the armed forces. National reconciliation and return to the rule of law.	Community social reintegration.
Philippines-MNLF	Autonomy for the provinces of Southern Mindanao. Rise of a new political front demanding independence.	Political preparation, social reintegration or integration in the armed forces and the National police. Goal of transforming the MNLF's revolutionary structures into popular democratic organisations that allow the mobilisation of resources for the communities. Development of a joint programme in the autonomous areas. Beginning of a training and development programme for former MNLF combatants.
DR Congo	Reconciliation, inclusive agreement for a democratic transition, withdrawal of foreign troops. Reform of the security sector.	Social reintegration. Presence of militias from Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda, and the need to reinforce the borders with Sudan (regional dimension).
Rep. Congo	Reinitiating of conflicts after a constitutional change. Subsequent cessation of hostilities and amnesty for handing over of weapons.	Social reintegration with community projects. Request from the CNR armed opposition group to form a Government of national unity in exchange for the destruction of its arms arsenal.
Rwanda	Withdrawal of troops abroad and the return of ex-combatants.	The lack of reform in the security sector promotes national and regional political instability. Formation of Gacaca local courts. Community social reintegration. Lack of conditions for repatriation from DR Congo.
Sierra Leone	Amnesty, conversion of the armed group into a political group, sharing of political power, holding of elections and the joint creation of Armed Forces and policy.	Social reintegration or integration in the armed forces or police force.
Somalia	Cease fire, amnesty and formation of a Federal Government of Transition starting with an electoral process.	Emphasis on rehabilitation. Social reintegration, sharing of political power.

N.B. The cases in which there have only been reductions in the Armed Forces have been have been excluded, since only social reinsertion programmes fit into these table.

STRUCTURE of the DDR

Precedents

In all the contexts where DDR programmes are currently being run there are precedents of a process of this type, with the exception of Sudan. Previous experiences should have brought with them a certain amount of baggage and lessons learnt, either due to the carrying out of previous phases of this programme (Cambodia, Chad, Eritrea, Republic of the Congo and Rwanda) or due to the carrying out of a **pilot programme** (Burundi, Cambodia, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia and the Central African Republic). These latter programmes are carried out prior to the formal commencement of the same, in a limited quartering camp and for demobilisation of a group of between 500 and 1000 combatants, for the sake of making the final adjustments to ensure the proper carrying out of the general ,programme. Nevertheless, this type of programme led to the temporary suspension of the beginning of the process in Liberia, due both to the poor conditions in the quartering camps and the delay in the deployment of the UNMIL. In the remaining cases, the preparation of a National Commission on the DDR and the design of the programme's strategy itself have marked out the DDR's preparatory period.

Types of DDR

Depending on the elements brought together or considered by a DDR, this may take on a greater or lesser degree of complexity. **A programme that is not very complex would be one that only affects a single armed group that has come to an agreement with a country's**

Government. The complexity increases once several armed groups participate in the DDR; if the number of beneficiaries is very high; if there are divergences in these groups between the commanders or internal divisions; if in addition there are paramilitary groups present; if as a result a reform of the security system and a reduction in the armed forces is produced; if there are child soldiers; women and disabled who require special programmes; if the DDR is running in parallel with a sharing of political power; if there is a need to disarm and return militia operating from a third party country (trans-border dimension); if several initiatives are running in parallel and are not coordinated; whether or not there is a regulatory body regulating aspects of justice; if any phase of the process is missing (no disarmament; for example) or any of these phases is not carried out properly; if the security situation in the country is good or poor at the time of the DDR; if the financing arrives in time or is insufficient; etc. In the cases analysed; models of this type occur. In any event, **the important thing is that in the initial planning, all the elements that will intervene and influence the process are taken into account**, be they of a logistical, institutional, economic, cultural, political, social, psychological, military, gender-based, internal or external nature.

Executing organisms

In the great majority of cases, 14, the decision has been made to opt for the creation of a National Commission for the DDR (NDDRC), with the military component playing a predominant role in this, either because the Commission itself is coordinated by the Ministry of Defence, or due to the existence of a military Sub-commission in the same. Other main characteristics of these organisms are the international support they receive from various bodies (UNDP, World Bank, MDRP), the setting up of various regional offices and the arranging in various departments for a better distribution of tasks and responsibilities: Disarmament and demobilisation, child soldiers and vulnerable groups, information and awareness; monitoring and evaluation, rehabilitation and reintegration, etc.

Basic principles

Logically, the **demobilisation and reintegration** of former combatants presents itself as the main goal to be achieved. In some cases, however, other basic principles are set out that have to be complied with as a result of this process: the **reduction of military spending** (in the cases of Burundi, Cambodia, Chad, Eritrea and Sudan), the **reform of the armed forces** (Cambodia, Eritrea and the Republic of the Congo) and the **collection of light weapons** (Afghanistan, Central African Republic, Indonesia, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia and Sudan). In addition, some programmes have placed a greater emphasis on achieving the **demobilisation of former combatants** (Afghanistan, Burundi or Cambodia), while in other contexts the emphasis has been aimed at reintegration (Angola, Chad, Haiti, Rwanda, Somalia and Sudan), in order to encourage the process of transition and reconciliation.

The most vulnerable groups

In the process of demobilising former combatants, it is important to differentiate between different groups which, by their nature, have different requirements and call for different types of intervention. **One of the points of inflection is when one of a DDR programme's acceptance requirements is the possession of a weapon, which can exclude various groups.** This is particularly worrying in those groups that are more vulnerable, above all in terms of the rehabilitation phase. The following table shows the programmes that have considered in a significant way, and by means of special activities, the needs of the groups with that are the most vulnerable: child soldiers, women and disabled soldiers:

Analysis of DDR programmes in the World during 2005

DDR for the most vulnerable groups			
	Child soldiers	**Women**	**Disabled soldiers**
Afghanistan	●		
Angola	●	●	●
Burundi	●		
Chad	-	-	-
Cambodia	●		
Central African Republic	-	-	-
Colombia	●		
Eritrea		●	●
Guinea-Bissau	-	-	-
Indonesia (Aceh)	●		
Liberia	●		
Philippines (Mindanao)	●		
Rep. Congo	●		
DR Congo	●		
Rwanda	●	●	●
Sierra Leone	●		
Somalia	●		
Sudan	●	●	●

CHILD SOLDIERS

Very little attention has traditionally bee paid to the demobilising of child soldiers, despite the brutal experience and the trauma that direct involvement in an armed conflict entails, as has been denounced by the UN General Secretary himself. If the programmes analysed, the majority of them present among the troops to be demobilised a significant number of child soldiers, with the exception of Central African Republic, Chad, Cambodia and Eritrea, where the aim of the DDR was directed towards the reform of the security service.

As can be seen from the table below, **the presence of minors among the armed groups to be demobilised often involves substantial numbers, with a percentage of between 8 and 10% of the combatants being common.** The initiation of DDR programmes for child soldiers is often subordinated to projects carried out by UNICEF. There is reconciliation work to be done with the accepting community, and especially where appropriate, with the families, either by means of reintegration committees (with local NGOs as in Afghanistan), family recovery agencies (the case in Liberia), work of instilling awareness in the families to prevent new recruitment (Burundi), or work to unite families (Rwanda), that serve to carry out prevention work, sometimes just as important as the demobilisation itself. Mention should be made of the efforts being attempted in Burundi, where minors are removed from demobilisation camps in an attempt to reintegrate them with their families and/or foster communities during the first 8 months. These demobilisations require a previous phase in which psychological care plays a fundamental role, as well as the possibility of access to education and training.

Some DDR programmes with the presence of child soldiers			
Country	**Minors**	**TOTAL to be Demobilised**	**%Minors / Total**
Afghanistan	8,000	63,000	12.7
Angola	6,000	138,000	4.3
Burundi	3,500	85,000	4.1
Colombia	2,000	20.100	10.0
Côte d'Ivoire	3,000	50,000	6.0
Philippines (Mindanao)	3,250	25,000	13.0
Liberia	11,000	107,000	10.3
DR Congo	15,000	150,000	10.0
Rep. Congo	1,875	30,000	6.2

Rwanda	2,500	45,000	5.5
Sierra Leone	6,845	72,500	9.4
Sudan *(1)*	14,000	(45,000)	---
TOTAL	**77,000**	**830,100**	**9.3**

(1) At the present time in Sudan only the people to be demobilised from the vulnerable groups are known, and thus an estimate of the other former combatants who might also benefit from the DDR has been made.

WOMEN

The verification that **women are often excluded from the DDR process** should lead to the reformulation of many of the programmes that are being implemented, not only to ensure that their participation is with the same conditions as the other combatants, but also to include their specific needs in the programming of the DDR (including protection against sexual violence), as well as those of the minors in their charge. In this sense, and a as a counterpoint, the case of Liberia is quite significant, since the criterion of inclusion in the programme is not based on the holding of weapons, with the result that women represent 24.2% of the people to be demobilised.

During the quartering phase and the demobilisation period, and although in the majority of cases former combatants are separated by sexes, not all women's needs are anticipated (hygiene and menstruation, care of their children, medical care in pregnancy, etc.). A slow response by the government with regard to time and the lack of adequate conditions for women may be a strategy to ensure that they have no alternative but to abandon the programme and opt for spontaneous reintegration, thereby helping to reduce the economic costs of the DDR. Another aspect to be taken into account in the quartering areas is their physical safety, which should be totally guaranteed. Girl soldiers should also be immediately separated from adult combatants, in order that they may enter in specific previously prepared centres, with trained personnel and suitable physical infrastructures. They must not be visited by male ex-combatants unless the girl so requests and the encounter must occur in the presence of a social worker to guarantee her protection and to prevent the reviving of situations of violence. It is essential to treat the traumas derived from sexual aggressions, if they have been suffered, as well as other aspects related to post-traumatic stress.

Before proceeding to reunite families, awareness and education measures need to have been carried out in the receiving community, once it has been evaluated if these are appropriate or whether, to the contrary, it is preferable, bearing in mind the cultural context, to maintain confidentiality. Return to school with other children who have not participated in the armed conflict, with the aim of returning them to normality as soon as possible, is a measure that should be brought about as soon as possible.

Wives of former combatants, war widows, orphans of former combatants and dependant relatives should also be included in programmes for their reintegration. In Liberia, family members of former combatants are not allowed to stay in the quartering areas, whereas in Angola a space was provided for them. In the Central African Republic, reintegration was aimed at the families of former combatants by means of programmes that provided them with employment, and in the DR Congo they considered the joint repatriation of former combatants and their families to their countries of origin (Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda). The women of the communities can play a supporting role in the DDR process. We have an example of this in Somalia, where the creation of a National DDR Commission is planned that includes the elderly and women in order to persuade combatants to join the process. The participation of this group in the reconciliation, by means of their capacity for creating organisations and maintaining social connections, can be fundamental in activities of reconciliation.

DISABLED SOLDIERS

Specific assistance for disabled soldiers in activities such as assessment and professional training, credits, jobs and subsidies, agricultural support and housing (always depending on

their disability, including also the chronically ill) **can be seen in 4 of the 20 cases analysed**: Angola, Eritrea, Rwanda and Sudan.

Security Sector Reform (SSR)

The reduction or simple reform of the armed forces and police forces has been a strategy carried out in 19 of the cases studied, although in 4 of these they still need to be decided upon: Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti and Indonesia. One of the aims of this reform is to achieve a substantial cut in military budgets on entering a post-war phase, and to create new, more cost-effective and efficient security organisms. The only case where a reform of the security system has not taken place is in Colombia, due to the fact that the armed conflict has still not ended and only one of the armed groups operating in the country has been demobilised, although there is a presidential proposal for creating a civic police with some of the rehabilitated people.

DDR budgets

Many DDR programmes are planned without knowing exactly how many people are going to benefit and whether the necessary resources will be obtained from the international community. There are budgets therefore that have to be rectified along the way to adapt to the reality of the situation. Most of the resources needed are obtained from abroad, either by means of bilateral donations or with the participation of the World Bank and different United Nations agencies (UNDP, UNICEF, WFP, IOM, etc.), and in some cases a specific Fund is set up to collect the resources needed for the DDR in a country or region (as in the case of the Great Lakes, with the MDRP Trust Fund).

There is no general standard for the average cost of a DDR programme, since there are notable differences regarding the amount. It can, however, be said that, independently of the countries' income, there is a minimum ceiling in costs that usually need to be considered, and which can be estimated at $800 per person. With this figure as a starting point, the cost per person demobilised will increase depending on how much greater the per capita income of the country is. The adjusted average of the twenty processes analysed gives a **final result of DDR cost per person equivalent to multiplying the income per inhabitant by 4.7**. Therefore, and on average, the DDR for a person demobilised in a country with an average income of $500 per inhabitant, would be the result of multiplying 500 by 4.7, i.e. $2,350. However, the data set out in the following table allow us to observe great differences between some countries and others, with cases indicated like those of Haiti, where the ratio is 19 (four times higher than the average), Afghanistan (17.1), Guinea-Bissau (12.9), Burundi (12), Liberia (11.9) or DR Congo (11.5). These very high costs can be explained by the combination of two factors: these are processes which mostly affect many people (421,000 to be exact, i.e. 37% of all the people analysed in this study), and who live in exceedingly poor countries, with an average income per inhabitant of $119, with the result that it is normal for the cost of the DDR to be higher on multiplying said income by the aforementioned average of 4.7. An additional explicatory factor is that referring to Afghanistan, where there is a suspicion that a part of the cost of the DDR may be explained by the large sums paid to the militia chiefs as an incentive for them to disarm.

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Analysis of DDR programmes in the World during 2005

Main economic figures for DDRs				
Country	$ income per inhabitant	Cost of the DDR per person ($)	Number of beneficiaries	Total cost in millions of $	DDR/ RPC
Afghanistan	160	2,750	63,000	174.3	17.1
Angola	975	1,800	138,000	248.0	1.8
Burundi (1)	83	1,000	85,000	84.4	12.0
Central African Rep.	309	1,758	7,500	13.3	5.7
Colombia (2)	1,764	(13,000)	20,100	(261.0)	(7.4)
Congo (3)	949	1,060	30,000	31.8	1.1
Côte d'Ivoire	816	3.125	50,000	150.0	3.8
Haiti	390	7,420	3,800	(28.2)	19.0
Indonesia (5)	810	2,666	3,000	8.0	3.3
Liberia (6)	130	1,550	107,000	160.0	11.9
Philippines-MNLF (4)	320	(3,000)	25,000	(75.0)	9.4
DR Congo	104	1,228	150,000	200.0	11.5
Rwanda (7)	195	800	45,000	53.3	4.1
Sierra Leone	150	623	72,500	45.2	4.2
Somalia (8)	…	440	53,000	23.3	(3.0)
Sudan	460	2,832	24,500	69.4	6.1
Subtotal	**408**	**1,850**	**877,400**	**1625.2**	**4.5**
Armed Forces demobilisations					
Cambodia	315	1,400	30,000	42.0	4.4
Chad	304	1,110	9,000	10.0	3.7
Eritrea	171	985	200,000	197.2	5.8
Guinea-Bissau	160	2,063	12,600	26.0	12.9
Subtotal	**192**	**1,094**	**251,600**	**275.2**	**5.7**
TOTAL	**361**	**1,686**	**1,129,000**	**1900.4**	**4.7**

(1) 78,000 people were finally demobilised.
(2) The real cost of the DDR is not exactly known, but it may be less than the figure indicated in the table.
(3) To estimate the total cost various programmes carried out in recent years have been added.
(4) The total cost of the DDR is our own estimate from the different contributions made in recent years.
(5) The total cost of the DDR is our own estimate from the contributions coming basically from the EU.
(6) The total cost of the DDR is our own estimate from the cost per person made by the UNPD in mid 2004.
(7) In calculating this cost, an additional number of individuals who will also benefit from the reinsertion programme have been taken into account.
(8) All the data are estimates.

In total, we estimate that **the total cost of the twenty DDR programmes comes to some 1,900 million dollars, at an average of $1,686 per person demobilised.** To understand this last figure, we insist that we are referring to a group of countries with a very low or extremely low income, where, with the exception of Colombia, none exceed the $1,000 income per inhabitant, and where 15 fail to reach $500. **DDRs therefore occur generally in the poorest countries on the planet**, which are those that have suffered the greatest share of contemporary armed conflicts. According to the Human Development Index (HDI), drawn up every year by the UNPD, 10 of the countries analysed are situated among the 20 with lowest human development ratio.

Distribution of the budget

The absence of reliable statistics or budgetary breakdown in many DDR programmes, in addition to the additional cost caused by delays in putting them into operation or the increase in the number of people benefiting, makes it enormously difficult to draw up a comparative table that allows definitive conclusions to be drawn. Obviously, however the **initial disarmament and demobilisation phase is that which involves the least cost, due to its short duration, which may range from 5 to 15% of the total budget.** The phases of rehabilitation and reintegration are not always clearly delimited, although together they tend to take up 70% of the total budget, with rehabilitation being more expensive than reintegration. As for the special

groups (child soldiers, women and the disabled), the percentage devoted also varies a good deal (between 1 and 5%), due to the fact that in some countries they only include some of these groups, but not all of them, and the number of people affected is also very different. Whatever the case, the DDR cost for each person in the vulnerable groups is considerably higher than the rest, since they need much more individualised and specialised care.

Financers

One of the clearest difficulties of the analysis of DDR processes is discovering in detail the organisms and countries that have made economic contributions for their starting up and development. In some cases, there are contributions that go beyond the DDR and go towards supporting communities or regional development plans, for example. In other cases, the figures have simply not been released, or the quantities contributed by a list of countries have not been specified, despite it being public knowledge that they have collaborated. Finally, it is an impossible task to break down the contributions made by some countries to international organisms which, in turn, have subsequently invested in DDR programmes.

Despite these difficulties, and again by way of a guide, it can be mentioned that the **World Bank is the organism that concentrates the largest investment in DDR programmes**, either by means of regional funds or conceding aid directly to specific countries. The World Bank acts to a greater or lesser extent in at least 12 countries, with its contributions being especially noteworthy to the DR Congo DDR (200 million dollars). **The EU, for its part, comes second in the list of organisms financing** these programmes, with around 10 million dollars.

By country, Japan is the one that collaborates with the greatest amount of aid (230 million dollars), especially in Afghanistan and the Philippines, and in lesser quantities in another six countries, followed by the US (some 113 million in eight countries), with particular incidence in the Philippines. The choice of Afghanistan and the Philippines as priority countries may be in line with the strategy of both countries of combating the terrorist phenomenon through economic and social development of the areas susceptible to the establishing of groups that practise or could practise terrorism.

Of the rest of the countries that finance DDR programmes, one should mention the Netherlands, Canada and the United Kingdom, with quantities of over 50 million dollars, and Germany, Sweden, Australia, Belgium, Norway, Denmark, France, Italy and Switzerland, with lesser amounts.

Main financers of DDR programmes	
Over $200 million	World Bank Japan
Between $100 and $200 million	United States
Between $50 and $100 million	European Union The Netherlands Canada United Kingdom
Between $25 and $50 million	UNDP Germany Sweden Australia

Duration of the DDR

In general, a DDR programme has an average duration of 3 ½ years, although this period occasionally needs to be extended due to deficiencies that have developed during its different stages, including the lack of financing. In some countries the period has been very short (2 years in Eritrea, for instance), and in others 5 years have been required (Chad, Guinea-Bissau or Sierra Leone).

By phases, **the correct situation is for disarmament and demobilisation to last a few months** if there are no setbacks (an uncommon thing, with the result that the average is increased to 16 months), whereas the **rehabilitation and reintegration phase normally lasts two years**, although it is frequently extended some months more, even coming to last as long as three years.

The disarmament and demobilisation phase

This is the first phase of the process, **and is an essential condition for being able to enter into the rehabilitation and reintegration phases**. In a period of just a few days, the combatants are quartered or concentrated in specified places so that they can hand in their weapons, be identified, receive a demobilisation certificate and be registered in order to enter in subsequent phases. On some rare occasions, and when one is not talking about a conventional DDR as such, the handing over of weapons is voluntary and individual, and less as a result of an agreement that involves all the members of an armed group, so that in these cases the Government can then begin a programme of forced disarmament. In Central African Republic, DR Congo or Somalia, the voluntary handing over of arms has been a pilot experience for subsequently initiating a normalised DDR.

In the disarmament phase light weapons and ammunition are normally collected, and rarely are there handovers of heavy weapons (such as in Afghanistan). As regards the weapon collection process, in the majority of cases they remain under the custody of the Armed Forces or the police, although in some experiences (Burundi, Côte d'Ivoire, CAR), the weapons are destroyed in public ceremonies loaded with symbolism. In the majority of cases however, **there exists a certain lack of control and poor monitoring of the final destination of the weapons collected, with the consequent risk of them being diverted towards illegal markets**.

On several occasions, especially when the weapons handed over are few in relation to the number of people demobilised, following the disarmament phase the Governments usually carry out weapon collection programmes of a voluntary nature, under campaigns of the "weapons for development" kind, providing incentives for their handover in exchange for aid in employment rehabilitation, educational programmes, micro-credits, etc.

As for demobilisation, one of the main problems observed is that on **many occasions the number of combatants to be demobilised is unknown**, either due to a lack of advanced planning, or due to extortion of the high command of the armed opposition groups. These situations, which have occurred in contexts such as Afghanistan, with an exaggeration of the number of combatants declared, in order to obtain greater profits. Another consequence of this, as in Burundi and Liberia, is the alarming lack of funds for the payment of ex-combatants, which can in turn lead to the rebellion of sectors of combatants who demand the payments promised to them. In addition, and depending on the compensations established for the demobilisation, the phenomenon may occur of participants who were not combatants but who join the programme for the incentives being given, a phenomenon known as **ghost combatants** (as can be seen in the case of Cambodia or DR Congo).

As might seem logical, not al the combatants can be demobilised at once when the number is very high, but rather in such cases **it is usually carried out in phases** (as was clearly specified in programmes such as those in Burundi, Eritrea, DR Congo or Rwanda). The possibility of a much higher number of people being finally demobilised can lead to a saturation of these quartering camps, as well as a clear deterioration of conditions of hygiene. Examples of this type of problem are the experiences in Angola or Burundi, due to the deplorable conditions present in their camps (malnutrition, sanitary problems, spread of cholera, climate of tension, insecurity, etc.).

In some contexts, immediately after finalising the demobilisation there is a first economic compensation for each person, independent of the payment or the aid that is conceded

subsequently in the rehabilitation phase. **The normal procedure is for a variety of services to be offered in the demobilisation phase**, such as a medical check-up to evaluate both the physical and psychological harm suffered, provision of basic care (food, hygiene, clothing, etc.), definition of the social and employment profile of each ex-combatant, providing of information about his or her status and possibilities for rehabilitation, education and work training, and even in some cases, subsequent transport to the acceptance communities.

Depending on the number of activities to be carried out, as well as the groups and total quantity of combatants to be demobilised, the number of days that each combatant remains in a quartering camp may vary: on the cases analysed, it may be a stay of one day (as in the case of Afghanistan, where he is given information and assessment on his rehabilitation, together with a packet containing shoes and food), to 15 (in the context of Rwanda, where the combatant is identified, given health education in matters of HIV/AIDS and information regarding the benefits of reintegration is diffused).

Handing in of weapons in the DDR

One of the most controversial aspects of the DDR is the quantity of weapons handed in by the combatants in the disarmament phase. Although the popular idea is that each combatant has one weapon, in reality in the majority of armed groups, such a distribution does not exist, as there are troops that do not enter into combat, do not have a weapon and yet can be demobilised at the moment of initiating the DDR. It is also true, and the history of demobilisations has proved it so, that a determined quantity of weapons is normally hidden by ex-combatants, or unusable weapons or those in poor condition are handed in. Whatever the case, and in current process where there is information regarding this (which are less than half of them), **the average percentage is of one weapon handed in for every two combatants demobilised**.

Afghanistan, Colombia and Sierra Leone, in this order, are the three cases where a percentage higher than the average has been registered. In contrast, the low percentage of weapons registered Liberia, Indonesia (Aceh) and Angola is noteworthy. The case of Colombia is also surprising, where in the large demobilisations carried out in January 2006, almost the last ones, the AUC presented a rate of 0.45 weapons per combatant, whereas in previous demobilisations they had been as high as 0.7. It should also be pointed out that current percentages are lower than those of some demobilisations of the past decade, in conflicts associated with the Cold War, in which large quantities of arms had accumulated.

Weapons handed in per demobilised combatant in some countries				
Country	People demobilised	Weapons handed in	Weapons/person	Years
Afghanistan	63,000	47,575	0.75	2003-2005
Angola	85,000	33,000	0.38	2002
Colombia	20,115	12,240	0.61	2004-2006
Congo	15,000	6,500	0.43	2000
Philippines-MNLF	10,000	4,874	0.49	1999
Indonesia (Aceh)	3,000	840	0.28	2005
Liberia	107,000	28,314	0.26	2005
Sierra Leone	72,500	42,300	0.58	2002
TOTAL group	**375,615**	**175,642**	**0.47**	
Nicaragua (contra)	23,000	17,000	0.74	1990
El Salvador (FMLN)	11,000	10,200	0.93	1992
Guatemala (URNG)	3,000	1,824	0.61	1997

The rehabilitation and reintegration phases

This stage can be subdivided into two phases, although in various countries it occurs as a single combined one. After demobilisation, the combatants are left without their usual source of

income or means of survival. During this initial period known as **rehabilitation** the ex-combatants and their families have to be provided with the necessary means for living in a dignified way, by satisfying their **basic needs**. In short, this means guaranteeing the **return to their communities in the first months** after giving up arms. In some countries, they are provided with an initial economic aid, a survival kit and means of transport.

This first stage is followed by the **reintegration** phase, which usually lasts for two years. As vulnerable groups, demobilised individuals do not have the necessary tools to integrate themselves into economic and social life. It is also a group that are used to living with weapons. The idea of this phase is to attempt to **provide them with sustainable means for living**, as well as health, social, economic, educational and occupational assistance. A variety of activities are carried out: mainly the undertaking of micro-projects, education, vocational training, the creation of micro-companies, public works (in the majority, those concerned with rehabilitating the infrastructures in the country) or access to employment in various sectors, be they rural (agriculture, livestock and fishing, as in the example of the Republic of the Congo), in a more urban sphere (Sierra Leone) or even through the participation of the civil society or the private sector (Angola). In some cases there is a subdivision between economic and social reintegration, as in the cases of Angola, Eritrea, the Republic of the Congo and Rwanda. Social integration consists of carrying out awareness programmes, information supporting community social rehabilitation, whereas economic integration is that which attempts to create new professional challenges for the former combatants. Although with very marked differences, the majority of the countries offer economic aid (or Transitory Subsistence Assignation – TSA) to every ex-combatant in this phase.

Kinds of economic aid towards reintegration	
Afghanistan	Daily pay of $3 or $4 for two to four months
Angola	Payment of $100 once they reach their places of origin
Burundi	From $515 to $586 according to rank, in 10 instalments (militias only receive one assignation of $91)
Central African R.	Payment of $500 at the end of the period
Colombia	Monthly subsidy of $155 for a year and a half
Côte d'Ivoire	Payment of $924 in three instalments
Eritrea	Payment of $50 monthly for one year
Indonesia	$600 aid to the communities for each combatant returned
Liberia	Payment of $300 for primary needs, in two instalments
DR Congo	Payment of $300 in two instalments
Rep. Congo	Credits of $350 for each ex-combatant
Rwanda	Payment of $330 in two instalments

The lack of economic expansion evidently hinders the possibility of creating new employment opportunities (for example, in Afghanistan, where the bulk of ex-combatants return to agricultural work). The delay in the payments or their poor planning has also led to certain problems in programmes that have seen how prospective programmes have not been carried out (Philippines), the lack of financing for educational programmes (in Liberia, for example, where the majority of ex-combatants opted for professional training or educational programmes), or the lack of state Government involvement, as in Angola, despite its high level of financing. The structure of the process of reintegration has a much more decentralised character and bases much of its efforts on the work that can be done with the host communities, which in turn receive the support of the body implementing the programme itself. A clear example of this can be seen in Chad, Eritrea, Republic of the Congo and Rwanda, which situate them specifically in the reinsertion and social rehabilitation phase. Other contexts do not follow the same criterion. In addition to the aforementioned cases where a simple payment of subsidies is given, the context of Cambodia is a good example of this: the social and economical services provided to its families and communities have had very little civil participation, which has led to the expectations placed in the presented projects not being realised.

Appendix 1. Lessons learnt: 150 aspects not to be repeated

PLANNING

Leaders / combatants:

- Refusal of many militia leaders to submit to the process. It is estimated that there are 850 groups, with some 65,000 militia, that have not participated in the process. *(Afghanistan)*
- A considerable number of ex-combatants seem to have been forced to participate in these programmes. *(Afghanistan)*
- Evidence that several "warlords" who have participated in the DDR have kept weapons for their own interests, and continue to control the drugs business, despite the preferential treatment they have received. *(Afghanistan)*
- Extortion of several leaders of their combatants. *(Afghanistan)*
- Slow down in the demobilisation phase due to reticence of former combatants to give up their military status. (*Eritrea*)
- Pressures by their leaders on the combatants that want to demobilise *(DR Congo and Rwanda)*
- Many armed groups have failed to mention the presence of minors in their troops, thereby excluding them from the DDR process. Parallel plans need to be established for these minors (boys and girls) who do not figure as combatants, as well as for family members and dependents who are usually excluded from any benefit. (*Sierra Leone*)

Number of combatants:

- Initial lack of information and/or exaggeration of the number of combatants (in order to obtain more economic resources) and subsequent disagreements about the number of troops in each group, faced with the possibility of the existence of the phenomenon of "ghost combatants". (*Afghanistan, Burundi, Cambodia, Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia, and DR Congo*)

Programme planning and configuration

- Very militarised programme, i.e. highly focused on aspects of demobilisation, yet with very little social focus on the problems of reintegration (which was, a priori, the most important aspect). (*Angola*)
- Delays and non-compliance with the initial deadlines. (*Burundi*)
- Lack of consultation about the role and deployment of international missions. (*Burundi*)
- Lack of initial planning, improvisation. (*Burundi*)
- Disagreement about where to locate the quartering areas. (*Burundi*)
- Absence of an operational plan for the reintegration of the army. (*Burundi*)
- Lack of operational decentralisation of provincial offices. (*Burundi*)
- Lack of definition about the plans for reforming the Armed Forces. (*Cambodia*)
- Lack of clarification about the share-out of land. (*Cambodia*)
- Excessive length of time for the demobilisation, due to the characteristics of the AUC. (*Colombia*)
- Lack of clear rules in the process. (*Colombia*)
- Important delay in the beginning of the DDR because of arguments about who should occupy the ministerial posts of Defence and National Security, and the demand that the militias be demobilised first. *(Côte d'Ivoire)*
- Lack of a comprehensive overview of the process. (*Eritrea*)
- Specific DDR for the former Armed Forces, without armed opposition groups or specialised programmes for child soldiers. (*Eritrea*)
- Delay in implementing the programme (*Guinea-Bissau*)

- Delay in completing the census of the military to be demobilised. (*Guinea-Bissau*)
- Confusion about the times initially planned for the programme. (*Liberia*)
- Absence of a genuine DDR programme. (*Republic of the Congo*)
- Lack of control, monitoring and evaluation. *(Republic of the Congo)*

FINANCING:

Delay:

- Delay in salary payments for those demobilised (*Afghanistan*, *Cambodia* and *Guinea-Bissau*).
- Delay in World Bank financing, due to failure to comply with the guarantees demanded. (*Angola*)
- Lack of funds for the AMIB (*Burundi*)

Shortage of resources:

- Limited collection of the money promised. (*Afghanistan*, *Somalia* and *Sudan*)
- Difficulties in reintegration because of the country's limited economic expansion. In addition, in some areas an excess of professional training has been detected for the same job, which has forced many ex-combatants on the programme to emigrate to be able to have greater possibilities of finding work. *(Afghanistan)*
- Financial difficulties for a programme with a very high cost. *(Côte d'Ivoire)*
- Some donors suspended their contributions. (*Guinea-Bissau*)
- Budgetary limitations: need for a larger budget than expected, and receipt of a portion of the contributions promised. (*Liberia*)
- Problems for the financing of educational programmes. (*Liberia*)
- Failure of the credits system for micro-companies. *(Republic of the Congo)*

Drawbacks that have arisen:

- Excessive cash payments in relation to local salaries. (*Angola*)
- Lack of control over the World Bank credit. *(Cambodia)*
- Corruption in an important moped purchasing contract. *(Cambodia)*
- Little clarity about the budget for the whole process. (*Colombia*)
- Insufficient government investment for the areas controlled by the AUC. (*Colombia*)
- Initial disagreement between the Government and the UN about the payment for the DDR. *(Côte d'Ivoire)*
- The regional "call effect" or "pull effect" because of the high amount of the payments (almost 1,000 dollars per combatant). *(Côte d'Ivoire)*
- Part of the resources for 2000 (0.5 million dollars) were diverted for other Government expenses. (*Guinea-Bissau*)
- Changes in the quantity and method of payments. (*Liberia*)
- Disagreement by the combatants on the method for receiving the payments. (*Liberia*)
- Mistrust of the donors about the DDR management organisms. (*DR Congo*)
- Internal tensions about said organisms. *(DR Congo)*
- Government tendency to maximise the bilateral agreements in order to take more advantage of individual aid. *(DR Congo)*

THE DDR PROCESS:

DDR:

- Little attention paid to ex-combatant women (*Afghanistan* and *Angola*)

- Little supervision in the demobilisation and reintegration phases. (*Cambodia*)
- Little civil and popular participation in the process *(Cambodia)*
- Delays in the implementation of many government projects. *(Philippines)*
- Mistrust of the Government itself with regard to the DDR process. *(DR Congo)*
- Interruption of the programme with the Ninja for one year. *(Republic of the Congo)*
- Decentralised structure of the DDR process. (*Sierra Leone*)
- Decentralising and federal process. (*Somalia*)
- Suspicion about the participation of troops coming from neighbouring countries. (*Somalia*)
- Worry about the partial use of State institutions, such as the police or the Armed Forces. (*Sudan*)

Disarmament:

- Little emphasis on the collection of light weapons. Handing in of very old weapons and the perception of collective and not individual weapons. *(Afghanistan)*
- No allowance for a disarmament programme in the programme (very few weapons collected from the ex-combatants) nor for the civil society either. (*Angola*)
- Absence of a disarmament phase, and poor planning for disarming the civil population. (*Burundi*)
- Little success in weapons collection programmes. *(Cambodia)*
- Initial handing in of very old weapons and in a partial fashion. *(Côte d'Ivoire)*
- Very small quantity of weapons collected in comparison with the number of combatants demobilised. (*Liberia*)
- Delay in the handing in of weapons by members of MODEL, due to their belief that if they were to do so in the Côte d'Ivoire, they would receive triple the money. (*Liberia*)
- Highly programmed disarmament phase. Awareness and education, public destruction, although the process of repurchase created doubts. *(Central African Republic)*
- Repurchasing of weapons. The economic incentives in these aspects always turn out to be dangerous, due to the generation of incomes that may lead to the purchase of new weapons. *(Central African Republic)*
- Suspicion about the effectiveness of forced disarmament. *(DR Congo)*
- Lack of specification of the disarmament process, which is felt to be voluntary and without guarantees of a reduction in violence and of stability. (*Rwanda*)

Demobilisation:

- Lack of forethought in the demobilisation programme, manifested in a lengthening of the planned duration, which led to the whole programme being interrupted for over a year. (*Angola*)
- Poor sanitary and humanitarian conditions in the quartering camps, which led to serious cases of malnutrition. There have also been logistical problems caused by the arrival of hundreds of thousands of family members to the quartering centres. *(Angola)*
- Absence of minimum conditions in the quartering areas, especially of a sanitary kind. *(Burundi)*
- Delay in the armed forces returning to barracks. (*Burundi*)
- Shortage of equipment, personnel and remuneration. (*Burundi*)
- Lack of definition about the combatant statute and lack of consensus about the harmonising of military ranks *(Burundi)*
- Demobilisations inflated by people from outside of the AUC. (*Colombia*)
- Delay in completing the census of the military to be demobilised. (*Guinea-Bissau*)
- Absence of a clear demobilisation phase. Lack of psychosocial care, career training, etc. *(Indonesia)*
- Serious deficiencies in infrastructure, and of congestion in the first quartering camps. *(Liberia)*

- Apart from becoming part of the Armed Forces or joining training programmes, no other type of process is stipulated: psycho-social care, registering of socio-economic profile, etc. *(Central African Republic)*
- Very prolonged delay in the start of demobilisation of already registered militia. *(Republic of the Congo)*
- Poor career training. *(Republic of the Congo)*
- A large number of combatants opted for disarmament and demobilisation in Freetown, possibly because the city guaranteed them anonymity. (*Sierra Leone*)
- The number of ex-combatants expected was much less than the number of real combatants that finally joined the programme (61% more than initially planned for). It should be asked if this was because of a lack of adequate methodology when drawing up the previous studies, due to poor information management, or whether people had joined the programme without having the status of combatant. (*Sierra Leone*)
- The Stopgap Programmes were established, while the ex-combatants were expecting reintegration programmes. The fact that they carried out work for the community was a measure that generated trust. In addition, the fact that they had something to do was able to improve the security in the areas where the demobilisation centres are located. (*Sierra Leone*)

Rehabilitation and reintegration:

- Lack of reintegration programme planning, little involvement of local government. (*Angola*)
- Little transparency in reintegration plans. (*Burundi*).
- Difficulties in appointing representatives in the concentration areas. (*Burundi*)
- Delay in the armed forces returning to barracks. (*Burundi*)
- Shortage of equipment, personnel and remuneration. (*Burundi*)
- Lack of support for the various projects and activities and social reintegration. (*Burundi*)
- Excessive concentration of those rehabilitated in the outskirts of the capital. (*Liberia*)
- Scant forethought in the starting up of reinsertion programmes. (*Liberia*)
- Slowness in the repatriation of the combatants set up in DR Congo. (*Burundi*)
- Poor operation of the Area Reintegration Councils in the reintegration phase. (*Guinea-Bissau*)
- Lack of planning for the reintegration phase. (*Indonesia*)
- Financing and structure still to be established for the reintegration phase. The reconstruction work following the tsunami on December 26th 2004 may have meant a source of job creation. (*Indonesia*)
- Lack of growth in the reintegration projects. (*Liberia*)
- Return of combatants. Those combatants who were residents of DR Congo returning home may mean a new destabilising effect for the national DDR programme and for the host communities. *(Central African Republic)*
- Slowness in the repatriation of foreign militia. *(DR Congo)*
- Presence of military and militias from other countries (Gabon and the Central African Republic). *(DR Congo)*
- Social reintegration remains a challenge despite the positive advances made in this respect, with the need for greater advance planning. (*Rwanda*)
- It seems that some of the ex-combatants used the subsidies to purchase material for extracting diamonds, for example, and opted for "self-reintegration". This may be due to the stigma attached to being a former combatant. (*Sierra Leone*)
- The DDR programme provides for short term reintegration (6 months to 1 year). Bearing in mind the poor job expectations in reality, it may be thought to be insufficient. *(Sierra Leone)*
- Lack of efficient reintegration programmes. *(Sudan)*

CONTEXT:

Precedents and conditioning elements:

- Presence of drug trafficking. (*Afghanistan, Colombia*)
- Use of combatants by private security companies. *(Afghanistan)*
- The division of work in the reform of the security system has produced a certain amount of poor coordination. *(Afghanistan)*
- Formation of new paramilitary groups with demobilised people. (*Colombia*)
- Bad experiences in the past. (*Chad*)
- Internal divisions in the LURD. (*Liberia*)
- Regional factor: the presence of members of the FLDR in DR Congo and the voluntary nature of their repatriation leads to a persistence in the instability not only of the country, but now on a regional basis also. (*Rwanda*)
- Arrest of the Leader of the RUF, F. Sankoh, in May 2000, which prevented him from entering the political arena. *(Sierra Leone)*
- The programme has been interrupted several times by the resumption of conflicts. *(Sierra Leone)*
- Clan-like structure where weapons form a part of the culture of protection. (*Somalia*)
- Porous frontiers. (*Somalia*)
- Proliferation of weapons and easy access to these. (*Somalia*)
- National dimension of the context, cannot be located solely in the south of the country. (*Sudan*)
- Inadequate infrastructure throughout the country. (*Sudan*)

Peace process:

- Absence of possibilities for negotiation and DDR with the guerrillas. (*Colombia*)
- Lack of public access to the content of the agreement, with the result that it remains at a political level. (*Indonesia*)
- The local participants can reinforce the illegal activities in the area, with the result that a greater regional control is needed. (*Indonesia*)
- Reintegration of the GAM: erosion of trust and relations between communities and the State, as well as between communities and the GAM, which casts the reconciliation into doubt. (*Indonesia*)

International presence:

- Lack of international cooperation. (*Angola*)
- Disagreement between the U.S. and UNAMA regarding the low involvement of the former in the DDR. *(Afghanistan)*
- US interferences with its extradition demands against AUC leaders accused of drugs trafficking. (*Colombia*)
- Lack of resources of the OAS to comply with its verification commitment. (*Colombia*)
- Delay in the deployment of the UNMIL. (*Liberia*)
- Disinterest of the international community, as occurred in 1994, demonstrating this time the absence of a United Nations peacekeeping force. In spite of this, the presence of the MONUC in DR Congo also plays an important role. (*Rwanda*)
- International pressure on C. Taylor, president of Liberia at that time. In addition, the failure of his operation against Guinea caused him to lose prestige among the RUF combatants. (*Sierra Leone*)
- The role of the UK. They arrived in the country in May 2000 with a mandate for combat when UNAMSIL was not operational due to the kidnapping of its members by the RUF and because its first mandate did not envisage an armed intervention. (*Sierra Leone*)

Structure:

- Very little coordination between the NGOs that collaborate in the projects. (*Angola*)
- Limitations of the IRSEM. (*Angola*)
- Poorly defined legal framework. (*Chad*)
- Inadequate institutional framework. (*Chad*)
- Excessive differences in the quality of the services provided by different agencies. (*Liberia*)
- Little collaboration between Government ministries. (*Sierra Leone*)
- NGOs limited capacity. (*Sierra Leone*)

Violence and security:

- The new police force is more interested in protecting the State than the civil population. (*Afghanistan*)
- Violations of the cessation of hostilities, with the killing of hundreds of people during the process. (*Colombia*)
- Killing of over a hundred former combatants. (*Colombia*)
- Deterioration of the security situation in the middle of the process. (*Guinea-Bissau*)
- Political instability (*Guinea-Bissau*)

Justice:

- General impunity in almost all the processes
- Lack of State recognition for its historical links and its responsibility regarding the emergence and development of the paramilitary phenomenon. (*Colombia*)
- Lack of social and political consensus regarding the application of justice. (*Colombia, Sierra Leone*)
- Lack of pressure on the AUC to compensate the victims by returning their land and property usurped during the conflict. (*Colombia*)
- Culture of impunity. (*Somalia*)

Other aspects:

- Problems with the mediation of South African. (*Côte d'Ivoire*)
- Elections delayed for one year. (*Côte d'Ivoire*)
- Internal fighting in the AUC and with other paramilitary groups. (*Colombia*)
- Regional dimension of the programme in relation to the conflict with Ethiopia. (*Eritrea*)

Appendix 2. Directory about DDRs

World Bank
www.worldbank.org

Bonn International Centre for Conversion (BICC)
www.bicc.de

Crisis Prevention and Recovery from the United Nations Development Programme (BCPR / UNDP)
www.undp.org/bcpr/

United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UN-DPKO)
www.un.org/Depts/dpko/

Escola de Cultura de Pau
www.escolapau.org

Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform (GFN-SSR)
www.gfn-ssr.org/home.cfm

International Crisis Group (ICG)
www.crisisgroup.org

Multi-Country Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (MDRP)
http://www.mdrp.org/

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)
ochaonline.un.org/

International Organisation for Migration (IOM)
www.iom.int

Small Arms Survey
www.smallarmssurvey.org

Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (SIDDR)
www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/4890

Swedish National Defence College
www.fhs.se/upload/DDRHandbook.pdf