



Analysis of the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programs existing in the world during 2006

March 2007

WITH THE SUPPORT OF



MINISTERIO
DE ASUNTOS EXTERIORES
Y DE COOPERACIÓN



AGENCIA
ESPAÑOLA DE
COOPERACIÓN
INTERNACIONAL

Analysis of DDR programmes in the world during 2006

ANALYSIS OF THE DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILISATION AND REINTEGRATION (DDR) PROGRAMS EXISTING IN THE WORLD DURING 2006

Cover Photo: © ONUB, 2004.

This analysis was prepared by Albert Caramés, Vicenç Fisas and Eneko Sanz, researchers at the Barcelona Autonomous University's Peace Culture School, thanks to a specific grant from the Spanish International Cooperation Agency (AECI) and the structural support of the Catalan Autonomous Government's Agency for Cooperation in Development. The views expressed in this publication are the sole responsibility of the individual authors.

Analysis of DDR programmes in the world during 2006

TABLE OF CONTENTS

BOXES, FIGURES AND TABLES.....	4
GLOSSARY	5
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.....	6
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF EXISTING DDR PROGRAMS IN 2006	12
1. <i>CONTEXT OF THE COUNTRIES WITH DDR PROGRAMS</i>	12
1.1. Nature of contemporary conflicts	12
1.2. DDR prologue: peace agreements or ceasefires.....	12
1.3. International presence.....	14
2. <i>DDR PROCESS</i>	15
2.1. Precedents	15
2.2 Kinds of DDR	16
2.3. Executive bodies	16
2.4. Basic principles	17
2.5. Beneficiaries.....	17
2.6. Most vulnerable groups.....	19
<i>Child soldiers</i>	20
<i>Women</i>	21
<i>Disabled soldiers</i>	22
2.7. DDR budgets.....	22
<i>Donors</i>	24
<i>Budget allocation</i>	25
2.8. Beginning and duration of the programmes.....	25
2.9. Justice and impunity: Is there a political price for peace?	26
2.10. Security Sector Reform (SSR).....	29
3. <i>DDR STAGES</i>	30
3.1. Handing in of weapons in the DDR.....	30
3.2. The demobilisation phase	32
3.3. The rehabilitation and reintegration phases.....	33
4. <i>ASPECTS TO BE ANALYSED</i>	35
ANNEX I. ONGOING DDR PROGRAMS, 2006 – SUMMARY TABLE.....	38
CONSULTED BIBLIOGRAPHY AND WEBSITES RELEVANT TO DDR.....	39

Analysis of DDR programmes in the world during 2006

BOXES, FIGURES AND TABLES

Box 1. DDR definition	8
Figure 1. Practical disarmament and demobilisation measures in peacebuilding	9
Box 2. UN Integrated Standards	11
Table 1. Previous peace agreements to the DDR.....	13
Table 2. Presence of international bodies	14
Table 3. Peacekeeping operations and DDR.....	15
Box 3. A regional view of DDR: the role of the MDRP in the Great Lakes.....	16
Table 4. Beneficiaries of current DDR programmes	18
Table 5. DDR of paramilitary groups.....	19
Box 4. Paramilitaries demobilisation in Colombia	19
Table 6. DDR for the most vulnerable groups.....	20
Table 7. A selection of DDR programmes with the presence of child soldiers	21
Table 8. Main economic magnitudes on the DDR programs	23
Table 9. Main donors for DDR.....	24
Table 10. Beginning and duration of the disarmament and demobilisation stages	25
Table 11. The political price of peace agreements	27
Table 12. Weapons handed in per demobilised combatant in selected countries	30
Figure 3. Armamentistic violence transformation	31
Table 13. Kinds of economic aid towards reintegration	32
Box 5. Community reintegration in Indonesia (Aceh).....	34
Table 14. Main current DDR programs	38

Analysis of DDR programmes in the world during 2006

GLOSSARY

ADB: <i>Asian Development Bank</i>	ISAF: <i>International Security Assistance Force</i>
AF: Governmental Armed Forces	MDRP(BM): <i>Multi-Country Demobilization & Reintegration Program (World Bank)</i>
AP-Wê: <i>Alliance Patriotique du Peuple Wê</i>	MILOCI: <i>Mouvement ivoirien de libération de l'ouest</i>
ASEAN: <i>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</i>	MINUSTAH: <i>United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti</i>
AU: African Union	MNLF: <i>National Liberation Moro Front</i>
AUC: <i>Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia</i>	MONUC: <i>United Nations Mission in DR Congo</i>
BINUB: <i>Bureau Intégré des Nations Unies au Burundi</i>	MoU: <i>Memorandum of Understanding</i>
WB: World Bank	OCHA: <i>United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</i>
HRC: Human Rights Court	ILO: <i>International Labour Organisation</i>
CE: European Commission	NGO: <i>Non Governmental Organisation</i>
ICRC: <i>International Committee of the Red Cross</i>	OAS: <i>Organization of American States</i>
NCDDR: <i>National Commission on DDR</i>	OIM: <i>International Organisation for Migration</i>
DDR: <i>Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration</i>	ONUB: <i>United Nations Mission in Burundi</i>
DfID: <i>Department for International Development</i>	PHRD: <i>Japan Policy and Human Resources Development Fund</i>
HIR: <i>Humanitarian International Right Studier</i>	RRM: <i>Rapid Reaction Mechanisms</i>
DIIS: <i>Dansk Institut for Internationale Studier</i>	SALW: <i>Small Arms and Light Weapons</i>
Dollars: US dollars.	SSR: <i>Security Sector Reform</i>
ECOWAS: <i>Economic Community of West African States</i>	UN: <i>United Nations</i>
EU: European Union	UNAMA: <i>United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan</i>
FAO: <i>United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation</i>	UNDP: <i>United Nations Development Program</i>
FLGO: <i>Front pour la libération du Grand Ouest</i>	UNICEF: <i>United Nations Children's Fund</i>
FUC : <i>Front Uni pour le Changement Démocratique</i>	UNMEE: <i>United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea</i>
GAM: <i>Gerakin Aceh Merdeka (Free Aceh Movement)</i>	UNMIL: <i>United Nations Mission in Liberia</i>
GAO: <i>Opposition Armed Group</i>	UNMIS: <i>United Nations Mission in Sudán</i>
GDP: <i>Gross Domestic Product</i>	UNOCI: <i>United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire</i>
GTZ: <i>Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit</i>	US: <i>United States of America</i>
HDI: <i>Human Development Index</i>	USAID: <i>US Agency for International Development</i>
HRW: <i>Human Rights Watch</i>	WFP: <i>World Food Programme</i>
ICG: <i>International Crisis Group</i>	WHO: <i>World Health Organisation</i>
IDDRS: <i>International Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Standards</i>	
IDP: <i>Internally Displaced people</i>	
IGAD: <i>Intergovernmental Authority on Development</i>	

Analysis of DDR programmes in the world during 2006

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

All peace processes after an armed conflict have to go through a final stage in which, once agreements have been signed, the combatants give up their weapons and reintegrate into civil life. This complex stage is known as DDR, which stands for **Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration**. The **DDR must therefore be one component of a broader peace building strategy**. The DDR must always be the result of a political agreement, a consensus; either as the result of a peace process or of other commitments. In any case, it cannot be the result of an imposition, although it may be induced by means of incentives.

The study presented below is the **update to the one carried out last year**. The aim of this study is to analyse current DDR programmes, not those of the past, in the conviction that those that are being carried out at the moment have a general profile that is quite novel, both in terms of the quantity of experiences existing, and the number of beneficiaries and the international context in which they are produced. Although the historical, geographical, political and other contexts are quite different, there are lessons that can be learnt from each and every one of the cases. The basis for performing this comparative analysis is to be found in the **country briefings of the 22 DDR programmes**.¹ With regard to the previous year's study, the programme in Sierra Leone was completed, and programmes in Nepal, Niger and Uganda have been included. This study has been drawn up in a practical and didactic way, with the result that it may prove just as useful to read the conclusions as to study each of the cases analysed, all of which are very diverse.

Not all DDR processes are the result of a **previous peace agreement**, for the simple reason that many armed conflicts do not end with the signing of this kind of agreement. Frequently, what is agreed upon is simply a **cease of hostilities** that allows a process of political transition to be initiated, with or without power sharing. On other occasions it is a case of achieving a cease fire after years of non-compliance with a previous peace agreement. There are also the cases of reaching a political agreement sponsored by an international organism, or arranging a process of national reconciliation between the confronting parties that entails a sharing of the political power. On the studied cases, there are nine peace agreements, five ceasefire and cessation of hostilities, two memorandums of understanding, one without peace agreement and other three with different formula (United Nations agreement in Cambodia, Reconciliation Conference in Somalia and Amnesty Act in Uganda).

The presence of international bodies tends to be usual for implementing DDR. The **World Bank**, **UNDP** and **UNICEF** are the agencies that are most present in this type of programme. In addition, in all of the countries analysed there are **United Nations agencies** involved in the process. With an average of three international agencies per country, **Angola**, **Ivory Coast** and **Uganda** are the countries with the greatest presence of international bodies collaborating in the DDR, with five each, whereas **Colombia** and **Chad** are those presenting the lowest number of organisations. Seven of the cases studied have **United Nations peacekeeping mission**. At the end of 2006, in the eight aforementioned countries **the United Nations contingent was over 65,700**, 1,300 less than 2005. The majority of them are military, with a joint budget of 4,223 million dollars annually, 446 more millions than the last year. The main variations are explained by the effectives and budget reduction on the Burundi and Liberia missions. Finally, the UNMEE is the only peacekeeping mission that does not involve the implementation of a DDR programme. **The cost of peacekeeping operations** in the countries where there are DDRs, is almost **double the total cost of the DDR programmes** in the 22 countries analysed in this study, and **five times more than the cost of the DDRs** in the seven countries where said forces are operating.

During 2006, over **1,255,510 former combatants participated** in one way or another in some phase of DDR programmes in the 22 countries analysed 40% of these people were involved in

¹ All the information is available at <<http://www.escolapau.org/english/programas/ddr.htm>>.

Analysis of DDR programmes in the world during 2006

armed forces reduction programmes, and the rest in programmes for the disarmament and demobilisation of armed opposition groups or paramilitary groups. **More than a half of the people who have entered to these programmes** belong to seven African countries, which makes the African continent the preferential area for these processes, as it accounts for 16 of the 22 existing cases. This **diversity of participants** is one of the factors that add more complexity to the treatment of current DDR programmes, especially when all of them are present in the same country. DDR programmes exclusively for armed forces tend to be far easier to administer than the remaining programmes, except in the case where they are dealing with soldiers who had been out of the military institution for some time and did not receive benefits of reintegration at that time, and for this reason may threaten to take up arms once again.

In the great majority of cases (13) the decision has been made to opt for the creation of a **National Commission for the DDR (NCDDR)**, with the military component playing a predominant role in this, either because the Commission itself is coordinated by the Ministry of Defence, or due to the existence of a military Sub-commission in the same. More specifically, the responsibility on the execution falls on a mixed way between national and international organisms, while in seven others, there's only state responsibility.

It is estimated that the total cost of the twenty-two DDR programmes comes to some **2 billion dollars**, at an average of **\$1,565 per person demobilised**, 3 times de average annual income per person. In terms of organisations, the World Bank is the organism that concentrates the largest investment in 12 DDR programmes, either by means of regional funds (MDRP) or conceding aid directly to specific countries. The UNDP, with bilateral contributions that are difficult to break down, is the second organisation in terms of financing these programmes, closely followed by the contributions made by the **EU**, which in turn depend on the contributions of its member states. In terms of **countries with direct participation**, **Japan** is the country which has collaborated with the largest amount of aid (221.9 million dollars) especially in Afghanistan and the Philippines, and with lesser quantities in five other countries, followed by the **U.S.** (some 80 million in eight countries), with a particular impact in the Philippines. Obviously, the **initial disarmament and demobilisation phase** is that which involves the least cost, due to its short duration, which may range from **5 to 15% of the total budget**, while the phases of **reinsertion and reintegration** are not always clearly delimited, although together they tend to take up **70% of the total budget**, with rehabilitation being more expensive than reintegration. As for the **special groups** (child soldiers, women and the disabled), the percentage devoted also varies a good deal between **10 to 15%**.

In general, and with very few exceptions, DDR programmes tend to be commitments made by the confronting parties during the signing of peace agreements, or due to agreements made soon after said peace agreements. Despite this, near **15 months** usually go by before they actually begin (on average, one year), either because of not having the necessary planning, or because the organisms charged with carrying out the programme or the minimum financing needed to begin the process still do not exist. **The rapid beginning of a DDR** does not however guarantee in the least its good progress or the **shortness of the disarmament and demobilisation period**. In general, **a DDR programme has an average duration of 3 and half years**, although this period occasionally needs to be extended due to deficiencies that have developed during its different stages, including the lack of financing.

At the time of carrying out the evaluation of the DDR programmes, based on their management and how they have evolved, one should not only extract improvement elements for the context being analysed, but rather, in turn, attempt to glean certain **lessons learnt** that may or not be able to be applied, or in this case, elements to take into consideration to avoid repeating them in the implementation of current and future programmes.

Analysis of DDR programmes in the world during 2006

INTRODUCTION: WHAT IS A DDR PROGRAM?

All peace processes related to armed conflicts have to pass through a final stage in which, once agreements have been signed, the combatants give up their weapons and reintegrate into civil life. This complex stage is known as the DDR, which stands for **Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration**. The **DDR must therefore be one component of a broader peace building strategy**. The DDR must always be the result of a political agreement, a consensus; either as the result of a peace process or of other commitments. In any case, it cannot be the result of an imposition, although it may be induced by means of incentives.

Box 1. DDR definition²

A **DDR** could be understood as the process where a specific number of combatants, on a collective or individual way, and belonging to an Armed Force or an opposition armed group, agree to deliver their arms, demilitarise and reintegrate to a civilian life or to the security bodies of the country. More specifically, by phases would be:

- **Disarmament.** Disarmament is the collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons of combatants and often also of the civilian population. Disarmament also includes the development of responsible arms management programmes.
- **Demobilization.** Demobilization is the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces or other armed groups. The first stage of demobilization may extend from the processing of individual combatants in temporary centres to the massing of troops in camps designated for this purpose (cantonment sites, encampments, assembly areas or barracks). The second stage of demobilization encompasses the support package provided to the demobilized, which is called reinsertion.
- **Reintegration.** Reintegration is the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income. Reintegration is essentially a social and economic process with an open time frame, primarily taking place in communities at the local level. It is part of the general development of a country and a national responsibility and often necessitates long-term external assistance.

Further, the goals of a DDR program, according to the UNDP, are:

- **To contribute to improving the security and political stability** of the country.
- To re-establish the conditions that allow **the reintegration of the armed participants or factions** that has been in dispute.
- **To prevent future outbreaks of violence.**
- **To contribute to national reconciliation.**
- **To free resources**, both human and financial ones, for post-war reconstruction and development.

DDR is a **complex process that involves political, military, security, humanitarian and socioeconomic factors**. Its setting tends to be post-conflict contexts, often associated with institutional weakness, political transition, democratic fragility, problems of security, destruction of infrastructures and economic dependence on international aid.

The study presented below is an update to the one carried out last year, and thus the same structure has been adhered to: a first part with the **comparative analysis of the DDR programmes** which **during 2006**, being either already in an early planning phase or in their last reintegration activities, remained active. The base for carrying out this comparative


² UNDP; *Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration. Practice Note*. UNDP, 2005, at <http://www.undp.org/bcpr/whats_new/ddr_practice_note.pdf>.

Analysis of DDR programmes in the world during 2006

analysis has to be found in the **analysis records of the 22 DDR programmes**, in the conviction that those that has been carried out at the moment have a general profile that is quite novel, both in terms of the quantity of experiences existing, and the number of beneficiaries and the international context in which they are produced. With regard to the **comparative analysis for 2005**, the programme in **Sierra Leone** was considered to have been completed, and programmes in **Nepal, Niger and Uganda** have been included. This study has been drawn up in a practical and didactic way, with the result that it may prove just as useful to read the conclusions as to study each of the cases analysed, all of which are very diverse.

More specifically, this type of programme falls within the framework of **practical disarmament measures**. These were defined by the UN General Assembly in 1996, and consists of a wider term that also includes measures such as the control of the acquiring and use of arms, the creation of trust-building measures, mine removal or the conversion of military industry, as well as restrictions on the production and transfer of arms. It also involves the collecting of weapons from the civil society, either in the framework of peace processes or as an element for building public safety.

Figure 1. Practical disarmament and demobilisation measures in peacebuilding



Source: Escola de Cultura de Pau, *DDR y ddr*, 2006 at <http://www.escolapau.org/img/programas/desarme/ddr002.pdf>.

The DDR (RR) is already a process in itself. It is not possible to carry out a part of it (disarmament, for instance), if this is not accompanied by a proper planning of the rest of the components or phases. In addition, the DDR takes part of wider commitments negotiated in the peace process (justice, reform of the police system, changes in the Armed Forces, elections, political changes, etc.). The DDR has its specific moment for being carried out, and needs certain specific conditions, especially of a political nature, to ensure that it does not fail. Occasionally, a DDR programme may be set up when there is only one or various groups (but not all) willing to demobilise. If it is done well, the DDR of these groups can be an incentive for the remaining groups to do so as well, yet in any case it will have to deal with a series of difficulties to become implemented at a time when violence is still continuing in the country. The DDR **usually follows the guidelines of a somewhat typical timeline**, although its components are not always considered sufficiently or in their totality, given rise to vacuums and errors in the strategy for carrying them out. By combining the majority of these possibilities we can establish a classic timeline of events going from the first cease fire to the post-war rehabilitation phase.

Many DDR end in failure and have been the reason for new hostilities, and this is due to their having been based on a false DDR concept. Nevertheless, in order to succeed, even moderately, the DDR must never signify capitulation, de-politicisation, demonisation, marginalisation, bribery, subordination or especially, humiliation. Just the opposite, it has to be a process that **dignifies** the people involved in it, since they have to give up their weapons voluntarily and as a **result of a negotiation and an agreement**.


Analysis of DDR programmes in the world during 2006

To date, no DDR programme in recent years has given optimum results, **due to the deficiencies detected in various spheres**, whether it is owing to poor planning, an implementation that does not pay sufficient attention to the most vulnerable groups, or due to ineffective follow up and evaluation mechanisms.

Planning has to be initiated during the peace process, in order to prevent as much instability as possible and the duplication of structures and activities. In addition, it is necessary to bear in mind the background existing in the majority of contexts functioning, combined with the growing number of application tools and the lessons learnt (to be repeated or avoided) from other programmes. In addition, all the needs of the groups to be demobilised need to be identified and harmonised with those of the host communities³. There are no magic or unique formulae in DDRs, since each country and each context is a different case. Every experience is unique, however it is possible to learn (or unlearn) a great deal from past lessons.

With regard to **implementation**, a programme of this type must be promoted at all levels, where the host communities should feel as if they are participants in a process in which the way it is carried out ("how") is considered as high a priority as its objectives ("what").

One element that should be more firmly included in DDR programmes is a **follow-up and monitoring process**, which is necessary in order to track the degree of compliance with the programme as it was originally planned and understood. This will also act as a mechanism to reinforce trust between the participating organisations and donors. Although there are quantifiable indicators that can be used to assess the disarmament and demobilisation stages, these are insufficient when making a complete evaluation. However, the reintegration phase, which takes much longer and is assessed more qualitatively, presents more problems due to a lack of effective indicators, generating mistrust among the different financing organisations or states.



Analysis of DDR programmes in the world during 2006

Thus, a DDR process must be linked to **security sector reform** through, in many cases, the reduction of troop numbers, the professionalisation of institutions and training that is focused on human rights and international law. The decisions taken regarding reform of the security sector may have repercussions on the DDR process in respect of issues such as the size of the new army or the eligibility of former combatants from armed opposition groups. Similarly, although it must be remembered that the two processes have their own singular aspects, some measures are, in practice, identical in both cases, such as absorption into the new armed forces, the demobilisation of child soldiers, medical check-ups, etc.

Box 2. UN Integrated Standards

In terms of international initiatives, 2006 was the year of the official launch of the ex-combatants' **United Nations Integrated Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS)**⁴. This strategy responds to an effort by this international body to improve its multidimensional capacity in peace building. To this end, over the last two years 15 of this organisation's agencies, member states, regional organisations, NGOs and the World Bank have held an intense debate over the conception of this type of programme. To produce it, the readings and best practices of each and every one of the departments have been drawn on in order to provide the United Nations system with a series of policies, guides and procedures for planning, implementing and evaluating DDR programmes in peace-keeping contexts.

These Standards have three **common goals**: the making of firm decisions by those executing DDR programmes in the field; initiation of an integrated operational planning, both at central headquarters and in the field; and resources for the training of specialists in DDR. At the same time, the Standards are subdivided into five **modules**, each of which is independent though interrelated with each other:

- 1- **Introduction** to the Strategy, glossary and definitions.
- 2- **UN approach to DDR**: peace building activities construction and recovery in post-war contexts.
- 3- **Structures and processes**: integral approach, programs design, national institutions, DDR programs and support programs to DDR, budget, personnel and monitoring.
- 4- **Operations, programs and support**: disarmament, SALW control, security and development, demobilisation, social and economic reintegration, military and police roles and responsibilities, public information and communication strategies.
- 5- **Transversal aspects**: gender, child soldiers, migratory movements, food assistance, health and HIV/AIDS prevention.

This **Integrated Strategy** has the initial aim of focusing on people; being flexible, transparent and responsible; being configured by means of national empowerment; and being integrated and well planned. In the medium and long term, this standardisation should serve to improve the understanding that DDR programmes have about the political, social and economic processes in post-war rehabilitation contexts. As an assessment, although this strategy may establish good planning bases, it needs to be seen whether or not the same mistakes are repeated and the enormous distance existing between the theoretical capacities of central headquarters and their implementation in the field is maintained, as occurs in many areas, leading to them being diverted from that initially proposed.

⁴ UN; *Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards*, 2006, at <<http://www.unddr.org>>.

Analysis of DDR programmes in the world during 2006

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF EXISTING DDR PROGRAMS IN 2006

In order to preserve the document's didactic methodology, this maintains the structure of the analysis records for the different DDR programmes. Thus, along general lines, we shall analyse the **context** of each of the programmes (armed conflict, peace process and international presence), their **structure** (backgrounds, type, basic principles, executing bodies, groups to be demobilised, most vulnerable groups, budget, timetable and other topics: justice and the security sector reform), the development of its **phases** and **aspects to be analysed**.

1. Context of the countries with DDR programs

1.1. Nature of contemporary conflicts

The nature of armed conflicts that have subsequently led to the carrying out of a DDR programme respond to the typical characteristics of contemporary conflicts, i.e. they are predominantly **intra-state conflicts** (internally and localized, but with an important regional and international influence and dimension), and with new combat strategies and a globalised war economy⁵. However, in Niger, where it begins again a reintegration previously started, so the current process bellows to an older armed conflict. In addition, it deals with conflicts that are recently terminated, although cases such as that of **Niger** should not be forgotten, where the second reintegration phase of a process that began with the signing of a peace agreement in 1998 is currently being carried out. Another case to be analysed is **Haiti**, where it is difficult to establish whether the country is in a post-conflict situation as such, in the absence of a clear definition of the armed groups to be demobilised and without a peace agreement⁶. Nevertheless, trafficking in people and arms, the recruiting of combatants in refugee camps, the support for armed opposition groups from neighbouring countries, and the large number of people who have had to seek refuge abroad, mean that these internal conflicts take on a very important **regional dimension**.

In the majority of these contexts, the essential reason has been the political power fight. Each context has, however, its own particular specificities, whether it is due to a religious manipulation of the conflict, calls for autonomy or independence of a territory, or the struggle for the control of natural resources. **The participants involved also vary a great deal in their origin**, since they may include non-state armed groups (militias, paramilitaries) and a country own armed forces (who have been fighting against those opposition groups), including the occasions where part of the military have risen up against their commanders.

Among the main **consequences** that can be pointed to in these conflicts, we can stress the considerable number of deaths, a factor which varies depending on the intensity and length of the conflict, the massive internal displacements or the overgrown size of the armies, which has led to the need for a **security sector reform** in many of them.

1.2. DDR prologue: peace agreements or ceasefires

Not all DDR processes are the result of a **previous peace agreement**, for the simple reasons that many armed conflicts do not end with the signing of this kind of agreement. Frequently, what is agreed upon is a simply **ceasing of hostilities** that allows a process of political transition to be initiated, with or without power sharing. On other occasions it is a case of achieving a cease fire after years of non-compliance with a previous peace agreement. There are also the cases of reaching a political agreement sponsored by an international organism, or arranging a process of national reconciliation between the confronting parties that entails a

⁵ Kaldor, M.; *New wars. Organised violence in the global era*. Tusquets, Barcelona, 2001.

⁶ It can even be debated whether this is a genuine DDR program, given the profound restructuring it has been undergoing.

Analysis of DDR programmes in the world during 2006

sharing of the political power. On the studied cases, there are nine peace agreements, five ceasefire and cessation of hostilities, two memorandums of understanding, one without peace agreement and other three with different formula (United Nations agreement in Cambodia, Reconciliation Conference in Somalia and Amnesty Act in Uganda).

Table 1. Previous peace agreements to the DDR

Country	Agreement	Characteristics
Afghanistan	Bonn Peace agreement (2001)	Coordination agreement between the winning parties to create a political transition structure.
Angola	Luena Memorandum of Understanding (2002)	Improves and modifies a previous Peace Agreement, not complied with. Amnesty Law for all committed crimes.
Burundi	Arusha Peace agreement (2002)	A cease fire two years after signing a Peace Agreement, not complied with. Constitutional reforms and three years transition period.
Cambodia	Political agreement in 1988 sponsored by the United Nations	
Central African R.	Bangui agreements (2003)	Peace Agreement, with political transition and peace and security reinstitution.
Chad	Peace agreement (2006)	Integration immediate plan (in the following three months) for the integration of the FUC members into the Armed Forces.
Colombia (AUC)	Santa Fe de Ralito agreement (2003)	Ceasing hostilities and re-establishing the monopoly of the forces in the hands of the State
Côte d'Ivoire	Linas-Marcoussis agreement (2003)	Peace Agreement by which a Government of national unity is created
DR Congo	Lusaka Ceasefire agreement (1999)	Peace Agreement, with political transition. Start point of a long reconciliation process.
Eritrea	Argel Ceasefire agreement (2000)	Agreement on Ceasing Hostilities with Ethiopia. Creation of the UNMEE. With the later General peace agreement, establishment of a Temporary Security Area.
Guinea-Bissau	Abuja Peace agreement	
Haiti	No peace agreement	
Indonesia (GAM)	Helsinki Memorandum of Understanding (2005)	Memorandum of Understanding equivalent to a formal Peace Agreement. Establishment of a democratic system.
Liberia	Accra peace agreement (2003)	Peace Agreement, with political transition.
Nepal	Peace agreement (2006)	Multiparty government system, political arrangement.
Niger	Ouagadougou (1995), Argel (1997) and N'Dajema (1998) peace agreements	Preceded by the 1999 Constitution and 2000 elections, which were used to stabilize the country.
Philippines (Mindanao)	Peace agreement	Peace Agreement by which an autonomy is conceded to the southern provinces
Rep. Congo	Ceasefire agreements (1999)	Agreement on Ceasing Hostilities, with political transition
Rwanda	Pretoria agreement (2002)	Agreement on Ceasing Hostilities with DR Congo for the troops withdrawal.
Somalia	National Reconciliation conference (2000)	Agreement to create a Transition National Assembly to precede a Transition National Government
Sudan	Nairobi Peace agreement	Peace Agreement, with autonomy for the south of the country
Uganda	Amnesty Act (2000)	Judiciary charges amnesty

It should also be pointed out that, **in seven specific cases, the peace agreements specifically contemplate the carrying out of a DDR programme**, and in another two, the reform of the armed forces and the security system. **No process is known in which, in order**

Analysis of DDR programmes in the world during 2006

to enter in the negotiation phase culminating in a peace agreement, there has been financing to sustain the combatants during the cessation of hostilities, however there has been substantial economic aid for the settlement communities of demobilised groups.

1.3. International presence

The presence of international bodies tends to be usual for implementing DDRs. The **World Bank**, **UNDP** and **UNICEF** are the agencies that are most present in this type of programme. In addition, in all of the countries analysed there are **United Nations agencies** involved in the process. With an average of three international agencies per country, **Angola**, **Ivory Coast** and **Uganda** are the countries with the greatest presence of international bodies collaborating in the DDR, with five each, whereas **Colombia** and **Chad** are those presenting the lowest number of organisations.

Table 2. Presence of international bodies

Country	UN	WB	EU	AU Ecowas	UNDP	Unicef	WFP	IOM	OIT	Total
Afghanistan			•		•	•				3
Angola		•			•	•	•		•	5
Burundi	PKO	•				•	•			2
Cambodia		•				•	•	•		3
Central African R.	Ofic.	•		•	•					3
Colombia						•				1
Côte d'Ivoire	PKO	•		•	•	•	•			5
Chad		•			•					2
DR Congo	PKO	•	•		•	•				4
Eritrea	PKO	•			•		•			3
Filipinas (Mindanao)		•			•	•			•	4
Guinea-Bissau	Ofic.	•						•		2
Haiti	PKO				•					1
Indonesia			•		•	•		•		4
Liberia	PKO			•	•	•	•			4
Nepal						•				1
Niger						•				2
Rep. Congo	Ofic.	•			•			•	•	3
Rwanda	PKO*	•				•			•	3
Somalia	Ofic.		•	•	•				•	3
Sudan	PKO			•	•	•				3
Uganda	PKO*	•	•			•	•	•		5
TOTAL	13	13	5	5	14	13	6	5	5	3

* MONUC.

Seven of the cases studied have a United Nations peacekeeping mission. In addition, in Afghanistan the EU troops, Eurocorps, are operating, while in Burundi, the ONUB was substituted at the end of year by an UN integrated Mission, the BINUB. The main changes in comparison with 2005 are explained by the decreasing in effectives and budget in the Burundi and Liberia missions. As can be seen from the following table, the efforts both in terms of troops and in budgetary material must be taken into consideration due to their considerable magnitude, questioning up to a point the cost of a protection that is not always effective. At the end of 2006, in the eight aforementioned countries **the United Nations contingent was over 65,700**, 1,300 less than 2005. The majority of them are military, with a joint budget of 4,223 million dollars annually, 446 more millions than the last year. The main variations are explained by the effectives and budget reduction on the Burundi and Liberia missions. Finally, The UNMEE is the only peacekeeping mission that does not involve the implementation of a DDR programme.

Analysis of DDR programmes in the world during 2006

Table 3. Peacekeeping operations and DDR

Country	Name	Effectives	Budget (Million dollars)	GDP (billion dollars)	% Budget / GDP	% difference (2005)
Burundi	ONUB	1,745 (-3,905)	82.40 (-224.60)	657	12.5	-38.7
Côte d'Ivoire	UNOCI	9,036 (+1,478)	438.37 (+52.37)	15,475	2.8	0
Eritrea	UNMEE	4,200 (+578)	182.24 (-3.76)	925	19.7	-3.4
Haiti	MINUSTAH	8,360 (- 1,570)	510 (-336)	3,530	14.4	5.7
Liberia	UNMIL	15,638 (-362)	745.57 (-100.43)	492	151.5	-37.3
RD Congo	MONUC	16,700 (+500)	1,138 (+735)	6,628	17.1	10
Sudan	UNMIS	10,023 (+3,638)	1,126.30 (+157.3)	21,098	5.3	0.3
TOTAL	7	65,702 (-1,354)	4,223.21 (+446.21)	48,805	8.6	0.2

Note: On parenthesis, the difference respect 2005. It must be taken in account that the comparative analysis were done on eight countries (this year, the Sierra Leone program was ended).

The cost of peacekeeping operations in the countries where there are DDR, is almost **double the total cost of the DDR programmes** in the 22 countries analysed in this study, and **five times more than the cost of the DDR** in the seven countries where said forces are operating. It is equally significant that the cost of the Liberia operation is far higher than that country's GDP, and that in Burundi and Sierra Leone it comes to half of their respective GDPs. In short, the average of these values indicates that United Nations peacekeeping mission budgets come to an overall average of 8.6% of the GDP of these seven countries, despite there has been percentage variations, in different measures, specifically due to the budgets allocated to this operations.

2. DDR process

2.1. Precedents

In all the contexts where DDR programmes are currently being run there are precedents of a process of this type, with the exceptions of Nepal and Sudan. Previous experiences should have brought with them a certain amount of baggage and lessons learnt, either due to the carrying out of previous phases of this programme (Cambodia, Chad, Eritrea, Niger, Republic of the Congo and Rwanda) or due to the carrying out of a **pilot programme** (Burundi, Cambodia, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia and the Central African Republic). These latter programmes are carried out prior to the formal commencement of the same, in a limited quartering camp and for demobilisation of a group of between 500 and 1000 combatants, for the sake of making the final adjustments to ensure the proper carrying out of the general programme. However, this type of programme led to the temporary suspension of the beginning of the process in Liberia, due both to the poor conditions in the quartering camps and the delay in the deployment of the UNMIL. In the remaining cases, the preparation of a National Commission on the DDR and the design of the programme's strategy itself have marked out the DDR's preparatory period. It could also happen that, as in the Niger example, it could restart a reintegration process initiated previously, so that means that the current process does not belong to a just ended armed conflict.

Analysis of DDR programmes in the world during 2006

2.2 Kinds of DDR

Depending on the elements brought together or considered by a DDR, this may take on a greater or lesser degree of complexity. **A programme that is not very complex would be one that only affects a single armed group that has come to an agreement with a country's Government.** The complexity increases on the following variables:

- DDR running in parallel with a sharing of political power.
- The security situation in the country.
- Absence of a regulatory body regulating aspects of justice.
- Diverse several armed groups participate in the DDR.
- Divergences in these groups between the commanders or internal divisions;
- Presence of paramilitary groups.
- The number of beneficiaries is very high.
- Necessity to demobilise the most vulnerable groups (child soldiers; women and disabled).
- Necessity to disarm and return militia operating from a third party country (trans-border dimension)
- Reform of the security system or a reduction in the armed forces.
- Any phase of the process is missing (no disarmament; for example) or any of these phases is not carried out properly.
- Several initiatives are running in parallel and are not coordinated.
- The financing arrives in time or is insufficient.

In the cases analysed; models of this type occur. In any event, **the important thing is that in the initial planning, all the elements that will intervene and influence the process are taken into account**, be they of a logistical, institutional, economic, cultural, political, social, psychological, military, gender-based, internal or external nature.

2.3. Executive bodies

In the great majority of cases, 13, the decision has been made to opt for the creation of a **National Commission for the DDR (NCDDR)**, with the military component playing a predominant role in this, either because the Commission itself is coordinated by the Ministry of Defence, or due to the existence of a military Sub-commission in the same. More specifically, the responsibility on the execution falls on a mixed way between national and international organisms, while in seven others, there's only state responsibility⁷. Other main characteristics of these organisms are the international support they receive from various bodies (UNDP, World Bank, MDRP), the setting up of various regional offices and the arranging in various departments for a better distribution of tasks and responsibilities: Disarmament and demobilisation, child soldiers and vulnerable groups, information and awareness; monitoring and evaluation, rehabilitation and reintegration, etc.

Box 3. A regional view of DDR: the role of the MDRP in the Great Lakes

This MDRP is a **regional DDR strategy for the establishment of peace and security which also addresses issues such as sustainable growth and poverty reduction in the Great Lakes** region of Africa. It is sponsored by the World Bank together with donor countries, United Nations agencies and governments. This regional approach is necessary to ensure conflict prevention through cooperation, the mobilisation of resources, the benefits of working together, incentives, empowerment and coordination. The programmes are divided up into the following sections:

- *National programmes:* verification, registration, identification, orientation, transport, cash

⁷ See Annex I.

Analysis of DDR programmes in the world during 2006

- payments, teaching and skill development, healthcare and help with social reintegration.
- *Special projects*: focusing on the most sensitive groups (women, child soldiers, etc.) and combatants located in other countries.
- *Regional activities*: awareness and information campaigns in border areas, research and the monitoring of border areas.

At present, following an assessment made during 2006, it is estimated that as part of the seven processes that remain ongoing in the region (the most prolific of this kind of programme), more than **476,000 combatants** are being demobilised, some **46% of the total number**. As regards financing, it is estimated that these programmes will cost a total of around 640 million dollars, 32% of the total budgets. From these programs, the main ones which concentrate the major numbers of combatants to demobilise and reintegration and resources are Angola and DR Congo.

2.4. Basic principles

Logically, the **demobilisation and reintegration** of former combatants presents itself as the main goal to be achieved. In some cases, however, other basic principles are set out that have to be complied with as a result of this process: the **reduction of military spending** (in the cases of Burundi, Cambodia, Chad, Eritrea and Sudan), the **reform of the armed forces** (Cambodia, Eritrea and the Republic of the Congo) and the **collection of light weapons** (Afghanistan, Central African Republic, Indonesia, Liberia, Nepal, Somalia and Sudan). In addition, some programmes have placed a greater emphasis on achieving the **demobilisation of former combatants** (Afghanistan, Burundi, Cambodia and Uganda), while in other contexts the emphasis has been aimed at **reintegration** (Angola, Chad, Haiti, Niger, Rwanda, Somalia and Sudan), in order to encourage the process of **transition** and **reconciliation**.

In short, the reintegration phase in DDR programmes must be the decisive step for the consolidation of **security (short-term perspective)** in the process for **peace building**. However, one of the main issues concerning this phase is whether they can also be used to take the first step towards development (long term perspective). The strategies used are a key aspect in this question, and are mainly based on the type of aid and its beneficiaries.⁸

2.5. Beneficiaries

During 2006, over **1,255,510 former combatants participated** in one way or another in some phase of DDR programmes in the 22 countries analysed 40% of these people were involved in armed forces reduction programmes, and the rest in programmes for the disarmament and demobilisation of armed opposition groups or paramilitary groups. **More than a half of the people who have entered to these programmes** belong to seven African countries, which makes the African continent the preferential area for these processes, as it accounts for 16 of the 22 existing cases. This **diversity of participants** is one of the factors that add more complexity to the treatment of current DDR programmes, especially when all of them are present in the same country. DDR programmes exclusively for armed forces tend to be far easier to administer than the remaining programmes, except in the case where they are dealing with soldiers who had been out of the military institution for some time and did not receive benefits of reintegration at that time, and for this reason may threaten to take up arms once again. In the case of DDRs for militia, they tend in general to have a less political component than the DDR applied to guerrilla groups, who do not usually agree to disarm without previous political counter-demands.

⁸ See section 3.3. Reinsertion and reintegration phases.

Analysis of DDR programmes in the world during 2006

As it could be observed on the following table, the number of estimated combatants differs from the practically demobilised (61.7%), due to the fact there are some programs still running, as well as an awful planning on the estimation of effectives.

Table 4. Beneficiaries of current DDR programmes				
Country	Combatants	Composition	Demobilized (%)	Situation
Afghanistan	63,380	Militias	62,000 (98.4)	Ended
Angola	138,000	105,000 militias and 33,000 AF	97,115 (70)	Demobilisation
Burundi	78,000	41,000 AF, 21,500 militias and 15,500 guerrillas	21,769 (39)*	Demobilisation
Cambodia	30,000	AF	40,000 (133)	Demobilisation [†]
Central Africa R.	7,565	Militias	7,565 (100)	Reintegration
Chad	9,000	AF	9,000	Reintegration
Colombia (AUC)	30,000	Paramilitaries	31,761 (105.9)	Reintegration
Côte d'Ivoire	45,000	41,000 Militias and 4,000 AF	981 (2)	Interrupted
DR Congo	150,000	112,000 militias and 38,000 AF [§]	102,331 (68)	Demobilisation
Eritrea	200,000	AF	200,000	Reintegration
Filipinas (Mindanao)	25,000	Guerrillas	-	Reintegration
Guinea-Bissau	12,595	10,544 AF and 2,051 militias	11,445 (90.8)	Reintegration
Haiti	6,000 [‡]	Militias	128 (2.1)	Prospecting
Indonesia (GAM)	5,000	Guerrillas	6,145 (123)	Reintegration
Liberia	119,000	12,000 AF, 91,000 guerrillas y 16,000 militias	101,495 (85.3)	Reintegration
Nepal	12,000 [‡]	Guerrillas	-	Cantonment
Niger	3,160	Militias	3,160	Reintegration
Rep. Congo	30,000	Militias	17,400 (58)	Demobilisation
Rwanda	45,000	30,000 militias and 15,000 AF	26,436 (58.5)	Demobilisation
Somalia	53,000	Militias	1,266 (2.3)	Pilot stage
Sudan[‡]	178,500	121,000 AF, 40,500 guerrillas and 17,000 vulnerable groups	21,500 (12)	Demobilisation
Uganda	15,310	Guerrillas	16,133 (105)	Reintegration
TOTAL (22)	1,255,510	741,466 OAG y 513,544 AF	783,049 (61.7)	

* Armed Forces demobilisation not taken in account.

† Process interrupted between 2003 and 2005, due to lack of funds.

‡ Estimate.

§ 23,000 belonging to foreign troops from Burundi (4,000), Republic of Congo (4,000) and Rwanda (15,000).

As for **paramilitary groups**, whether they be appendages of the armed forces or of political groups (either in power or of the opposition), their treatment depends to a great extent on the authority of the Government leading the DDR and the incentives that can be conceded to encourage them to enter into a demobilisation process. Close to 6% of the people in demobilisation phase in 2006 belonged to paramilitary groups of various kinds, including pro-government militia or supporters of a previous government, who acted under the traditional scheme of paramilitaries. This phenomenon has affected **four countries** especially, three of

Analysis of DDR programmes in the world during 2006

them African (Burundi, Côte d'Ivoire and Liberia), and one Latin American (Colombia), totalling some **78,000 troops**.

Table 5. DDR of paramilitary groups

Country	Troops	Name	Comments
Burundi	21,500	11,733 <i>Guardiens de la paix</i> 9,668 Militant Combatants	Quartered in differentiated camps from the opposition political groups. After their demobilisation they receive a one-off payment of \$91, as opposed to the \$586 for the rest of the demobilised combatants.
Colombia	31,761	Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC)	The process ended during 2006 with more than 31,000 effectives demobilized and 18,000 arms and 2.5 munitions unities collected.
Côte d'Ivoire	10,000	7,000 FLGO 1,200 AP-Wê 1,800 UPRGO MILOCI	The process has been delayed on several occasions due to the demands of other the armed groups that the paramilitaries be demobilised first.
Liberia	15,600	Pro-government militia	Lack of planning regarding the number of people to be demobilised, and insufficient funding for the DDR.
TOTAL	78,861		

As a common denominator, the majority of these processes has suffered delays in their implementation, and has had problems in identifying combatants, as well as problems of an economic kind for their financing. With the exception of the situation in **Colombia**, where the current collective DDR is exclusively for the **AUC**, in the rest of the countries demobilisation of paramilitary groups has continued **in parallel with the demobilisation of militias and the armed forces**, as a result of global political agreements, and in spite of the difficulties still present in the Côte d'Ivoire.

Box 4. Paramilitaries demobilisation in Colombia

Colombia completed the demobilisation of the AUC blocks, with over 31,000 troops demobilised, and 18,000 weapons and 2.5 million munitions units collected. Nonetheless, the OAS affirmed that at least 4,000 demobilised paramilitaries have returned to their criminal activities, as well as relating the connection these groups have with drug trafficking and territorial control for the export of cocaine and contraband weapons. The NGO *Human Rights Watch* insisted that the Colombian Government may legitimise this process if it implements the recent decision taken by the Constitutional Court, which offers the demobilised paramilitary reduced sentences for their crimes in cases where they confess to these, as well as the revealing and reparation of the victims.

Year	Combatants	Arms	Arms/combatant
2003	1,035	546	0.53
2004	2,645	2,110	0.8
2005	10,417	6,834	0.66
2006	17,573	8,561	0.49
TOTAL	31,671	18,051	0.57

2.6. Most vulnerable groups

In the process of demobilising former combatants, it is important to differentiate between different groups which, by their nature, have different requirements and call for different types of intervention. One of the points of inflection is when one of a DDR programme's acceptance requirements is the **possession of a weapon**, which can exclude various groups. This is particularly worrying in those groups that are more vulnerable, above all in terms of the rehabilitation phase. For all these reasons, it is necessary to define a number of selection

Analysis of DDR programmes in the world during 2006

criteria that are transparent, easy to understand, unequivocal and applicable for the participants in a DDR programme, with the aim of minimising the feelings of favouritism or victimisation felt by any group in particular, especially those who do not possess a weapon (the most often used, sometimes the only, criteria for acceptance on the DDR). Once the selection criteria have been agreed upon, which will depend on the context, on the details of the peace agreement and on the nature of the DDR process, they should be incorporated in the communication plan for the DDR process and be widely disseminated. The following table shows the programmes that have considered in a significant way, and by means of special activities, the needs of the groups with that are the most vulnerable: **child soldiers** (with 16 programs), **women** (10) and **disabled soldiers** (five):

Table 6. DDR for the most vulnerable groups			
Country	Child soldiers	Women	Disabled soldiers
Afghanistan	•	•	
Angola	•	•	•
Burundi	•		•
Cambodia	-	-	-
Central African R.	-	-	-
Chad	•		
Colombia (AUC)	•		
Côte d'Ivoire	•	•	
DR Congo	•	•	
Eritrea		•	•
Filipinas (Mindanao)	•		
Guinea-Bissau			
Haiti	•		
Indonesia (GAM)	•		
Liberia	•		
Nepal			
Niger		•	
Rep. Congo	•	•	
Rwanda	•	•	•
Somalia	•		
Sudan	•	•	•
Uganda	•	•	
TOTAL (22)	16	10	5

Child soldiers

Very little attention has traditionally been paid to the demobilising of child soldiers, despite the brutal experience and the trauma that direct involvement in an armed conflict entails, as has been denounced by the UN General Secretary himself⁹. The drafting of the peace accords and the agreements negotiated should recognise the rights of under age soldiers to special benefits and rights. Studies should be made of this group at the outset of the demobilisation process, and specific programmes drawn up for reintegrating them in civil life. As can be seen from the table below, the presence of minors among the armed groups to be demobilised often involves substantial numbers, with a percentage of 8% of the combatants being common, with

⁹ See the complete report *Childs in armed conflict*, at <<http://www.acnur.org/biblioteca/pdf/4723.pdf>>.

Analysis of DDR programmes in the world during 2006

the exceptions of Sudan or Uganda, which percentage are higher. The initiation of DDR programmes for child soldiers is often subordinated to projects carried out by UNICEF.

Table 7. A selection of DDR programmes with the presence of child soldiers

Country	Minors	TOTAL to be demobilise	% Minors / Total
Afghanistan	8,000	63,380	12.7
Angola	6,000	138,000	4.3
Burundi	3,500	78,000	4.5
Colombia	2,200	31,761	6.9
Côte d'Ivoire	4,000	45,000	8.8
DR Congo	3,250	25,000	13.0
Liberia	11,000	119,000	9.2
Philippines (MNLF)	15,000	150,000	10.0
Rep. Congo	1,800	30,000	6.2
Rwanda	2,500	45,000	5.5
Sudan (1)	14,000	178,500	7.8
Uganda	6,000	15,310	39.2
TOTAL	77,250	918,951	8.4

(1) At the present time in Sudan only the people to be demobilised from the vulnerable groups are known,

(2) and thus an estimate of the other former combatants who might also benefit from the DDR has been made.

There is **reconciliation** work to be done with the **accepting community**, and especially where appropriate, with the families, either by means of reintegration committees (with local NGOs as in Afghanistan), family recovery agencies (the case in Liberia), work of instilling awareness in the families to prevent new recruitment (Burundi), or work to unite families (Rwanda), that serve to carry out prevention work, sometimes just as important as the demobilisation itself. Noteworthy efforts have been made in Sudan, for instance, where the type of activities contemplated for reintegration are community-based, by means of activities for development, including educational opportunities, basic training, recreational activities, informal education and professional training that is relevant for the community. Nonetheless, despite these efforts, there are a host of contexts where the **recruiting of minors by armed groups** continues to be reported, be the latter government ones or otherwise: Burundi, Colombia, Nepal, DR Congo, Sudan and Uganda.

Women

Those with war wounds are considered as one of the categories of ex-combatants that is most difficult to access and reintegrate. Generally they find themselves very far from their communities of origin when the confrontations cease, and they lack the means or the physical capability to return there. In addition, they are often disabled to such an extent that integration of any kind is impossible, unless they submit themselves to an **intensive training** and a **psychophysical rehabilitation**. The verification that **women are often excluded from the DDR process** should lead to the reformulation of many of the programmes that are being implemented, not only to ensure that their participation is with the same conditions as the other combatants, but also to include their specific needs in the programming of the DDR (including protection against sexual violence), as well as those of the minors in their charge.

During the quartering phase and the demobilisation period, and although in the majority of cases former combatants are separated by sexes, not all women's **needs** are anticipated (hygiene and menstruation, care of their children, medical care in pregnancy, etc.). A slow

Analysis of DDR programmes in the world during 2006

response by the government with regard to time and the lack of adequate conditions for women may be a strategy to ensure that they have no alternative but to abandon the programme and opt for spontaneous reintegration, thereby helping to reduce the economic costs of the DDR. Another aspect to be taken into account in the quartering areas is their **physical safety**, which should be totally guaranteed. Girl soldiers should also be immediately separated from adult combatants, in order that they may enter in specific previously prepared centres, with trained personnel and suitable physical infrastructures. It is essential to treat the **traumas derived from sexual aggressions**, if they have been suffered, as well as other aspects related to post-traumatic stress.

Before proceeding to **reunite families**, awareness and education measures need to have been carried out in the receiving community, once it has been evaluated if these are appropriate or whether, to the contrary, it is preferable, bearing in mind the cultural context, to maintain confidentiality. Return to school with other children who have not participated in the armed conflict, with the aim of returning them to normality as soon as possible, is a measure that should be brought about as soon as possible, but it does not always happens due to the **stigmatisation** of these girls.

Experience has shown that there are almost always women and children linked to armed forces and groups (both government and the opposition ones). Finally, the **equal access by women to training and assistance** must be guaranteed, and all the combatants should receive information about HIV/AIDS, gender-based sexual violence and the non-violent resolving of conflicts. In **Niger** there is a project that has 12 women's cooperatives, composed of ex-combatants and victims of the conflict. They are provided with support in terms of awareness and organising of income-generating activities, for which financing is still required. Wives of former combatants, war widows, orphans of former combatants and dependant relatives should also be included in programmes for their reintegration. We have an example in **Sudan**, where there is the *Hakamas* initiative, women associated with armed groups who have been engaged in training sessions for conflict-solving, reconciliation and the prevention of HIV/AIDS. In the Central African Republic, reintegration was aimed at the families of former combatants by means of programmes that provided them with employment, and in the DR Congo they considered the joint repatriation of former combatants and their families to their countries of origin (Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda).

Disabled soldiers

The disabled soldiers are considered one of the most difficult categories to reintegrate. Generally, they are far away from their origin communities at the end of the conflict and haven't any resources or the physical capacity to return there. On another hand, their disability to generate any income, except if they are submitted to an **intensive training** and a **rehabilitation process**. Specific assistance for disabled soldiers in activities such as assessment and professional training, credits, jobs and subsidies, agricultural support and housing (always depending on their disability, including also the chronically ill) **can be seen in four of the 22 cases analysed**: Angola, Eritrea, Rwanda and Sudan.

2.7. DDR budgets

Many DDR programmes are planned without knowing exactly how many people are going to benefit and whether the necessary resources will be obtained from the international community. There are budgets therefore that have to be rectified along the way to adapt to the reality of the situation. Some of the necessary requisites for an effective funding of this kind of programmes are a harmonized planning, flexible, feasible, and linked with other mechanisms and activities from the post-war rehabilitation and understood as an indivisible process, which minimizes the activities duplication and is focused on the reintegration.

Analysis of DDR programmes in the world during 2006

Table 8. Main economic dimensions of DDR programs

Country	Total cost (million \$)	Combatants	Cost DDR person (\$)	Income (\$)	DDR/IPC
Afghanistan	140.90	63,380	2,238.1	217	10.2
Angola	255.80	138,000	1,853.6	1,350	1.4
Burundi	84.40	78,000	1,082	100	10.8
Cambodia	42	30,000	1,400	380	3.7
Central African R.	10	9,000	1,111.1	400	2.8
Chad	302.60	31,761	9,567.1	2,290	4.2
Colombia (AUC) (1)	150	45,000	3,120.8	840	3.7
Côte d'Ivoire (2)	197.20	200,000	986	220	4.5
DR Congo	254	25,000	(10,160)	820	(12.3)
Eritrea	26	12,595	2,064	180	11.4
Filipinas (Mindanao) (2)	15.75	(6,000)	(2,625)	450	(5.8)
Guinea-Bissau	(35)	5,000	7,000	1,280	5.4
Haiti (3)	71	119,000	596.6	130	4.5
Indonesia (GAM) (2)	5.90	12,000	491.6	270	1.8
Liberia (2)	2.40	3,160	759.5	240	3.2
Nepal	13.30	7,565	1,758.1	350	5
Niger	200	150,000	1,333.3	120	11.1
Rep. Congo (2)	25	30,000	833.3	950	0.9
Rwanda (2)	57.30	45,000	1,273.3	230	6.1
Somalia (2)	32.80	53,000	618.8	-	-
Sudan (5)	69.40	178,500	388.8	640	5.7
Uganda (2)	6	15,310	440.3	280	1.6
TOTAL (22)	1996.75	1,255,510	1,566.5	546.6	2.9

(1) The real exact cost for DDR is not known, which could be a lower figure that is indicated on the table.

(2) Planning stage of the program.

(3) To estimate the total cost, it has been added several programs implemented during last years. The number of combatants is estimation.

(4) Actually, in Sudan is only known the effectives to demobilise on the most vulnerable groups, so it has been done an estimation of the other adult former combatant who could take part on the DDR process.

In table 8, a compendium of the main magnitudes in the DDR program budgets is shown. The total cost of the twenty-two DDR programmes comes to some **2 billion dollars**, at an average of **\$1,565 per demobilised person**. This figure is referred to a group of countries with a very low or extremely low income, where, with the exception of Colombia, none exceed the \$1,000 income per inhabitant, and where 13 fail to reach \$500. DDR therefore occur generally in the poorest countries on the planet, which are those that have suffered the greatest share of contemporary armed conflicts. According to the Human Development Index (HDI), drawn up every year by the UNPD, 10 of the countries analysed are situated among the 22 with lowest human development ratio.¹⁰

There is no general standard for the average cost of a DDR programme, since there are notable differences regarding the amount. It can, however, be said that, independently of the countries' income, there is a minimum ceiling in costs that usually need to be considered, and which can be estimated at \$800 per person. With this figure as a starting point, the cost per demobilised person will increase depending on how much greater the per capita income of the country is. The adjusted average of the 22 processes analysed gives a **final result of DDR cost per person it's three times the income per inhabitant**. Therefore, and on average, the DDR for a person demobilised in a country with an average income of \$500 per inhabitant, would be the result of multiplying 500 by 4.7, i.e. \$2,350. However, the data set out in the following table allow us to observe great differences between some countries and others, with cases indicated like those DR Congo (11.1 the average) or Burundi (10.8).

¹⁰ UNDP, *Human Development Report 2006*, UNDP 2006.

Analysis of DDR programmes in the world during 2006

Donors

One of the clearest difficulties of the analysis of DDR processes is discovering in detail the **organisms and countries that have made economic contributions** for their starting up and development. In some cases, there are contributions that go beyond the DDR and go towards supporting communities or regional development plans, for example. In other cases, the figures have simply not been released, or the quantities contributed by a list of countries have not been specified, despite it being public knowledge that they have collaborated. Finally, it is an impossible task to break down the contributions made by some countries to international organisms which, in turn, have subsequently invested in DDR programmes.

Most of the resources needed are obtained from abroad, either by means of bilateral donations or with the participation of the World Bank and different United Nations agencies (UNDP, UNICEF, WFP, IOM, etc.), and in some cases a specific Fund is set up to collect the resources needed for the DDR in a country or region (as in the case of the Great Lakes, with the MDRP Trust Fund). In some case, funds from the peacekeeping mission or rapid response funds can also be used, although in one of the most recurrent variables, especially in the Great Lakes region of Africa, a specific Fund has been formed to collect the resources needed for the DDR of a country or a region (**MDRP**)¹¹. In terms of organisations, the World Bank is the organism that concentrates the largest investment in 12 DDR programmes, either by means of regional funds (the abovementioned MDRP) or conceding aid directly to specific countries. The UNDP, with bilateral contributions that are difficult to break down, is the second organisation in terms of financing these programmes, closely followed by the contributions made by the **EU**, which in turn depend on the contributions of its member states.

In terms of **countries with direct participation**, **Japan** is the country which has collaborated with the largest amount of aid (221.9 million dollars) especially in Afghanistan and the Philippines, and with lesser quantities in five other countries, followed by the **U.S.** (some 80 million in eight countries), with a particular impact in the Philippines. The choice of Afghanistan and the Philippines as priority countries may be in line with the strategy of both countries of combating the terrorist phenomenon through economic and social development of the areas susceptible to the establishing of groups that practise or could practise terrorism. Of the remaining countries, we should mention the United Kingdom, Canada and Germany, with quantities between 25 and 50 million dollars, and Sweden, Australia or the Netherlands among others, with lesser quantities. Finally, one should not underestimate the contributions made by some state governments where the programme is being carried out (Angola, Cambodia, Colombia, Nepal, Niger, Rwanda), and other bilateral contributions for which a breakdown is not yet available.

Table 9. Main donors for DDR (contributions over 2 million dollars)

Body / country	Contribution	Organism / country	Contribution
World Bank	627.3 (MDRP 222,.2)	Germany	25.9
Local governments	471.2	Sweden	15.4
Japan	221.9	Australia	12.7
Bilateral donors	156.9	The Netherlands	6.1
USA	78.6	France	5.1
UNDP	76.7	Italy	4
EU	74.5	Norway	2.5
United Kingdom	50.9	Belgium	2.4
Canada	34.6		

* Main individual donors in bold.

¹¹ See chart 3.

Analysis of DDR programmes in the world during 2006

Budget allocation

The absence of reliable statistics or budgetary breakdown in many DDR programmes, in addition to the additional cost caused by delays in putting them into operation or the increase in the number of people benefiting, makes it enormously difficult to draw up a comparative table that allows definitive conclusions to be drawn. Obviously, however the **initial disarmament and demobilisation phase** is that which involves the least cost, due to its short duration, which may range from **5 to 15% of the total budget**. The phases of **reinsertion and reintegration** are not always clearly delimited, although together they tend to take up **70% of the total budget**, with rehabilitation being more expensive than reintegration. As for the **special groups** (child soldiers, women and the disabled), the percentage devoted also varies a good deal between **10 to 15%**, due to the fact that in some countries they only include some of these groups, but not all of them, and the number of people affected is also very different. Whatever the case, the DDR cost for each person in the vulnerable groups is considerably higher than the rest, since they need much more individualised and specialised care.

2.8. Beginning and duration of the programmes

In general, and with very few exceptions, DDR programmes tend to be commitments made by the confronting parties during the signing of peace agreements, or due to agreements made soon after said peace agreements. Despite this, near **15 months** usually go by before they actually begin (on average, one year), either because of not having the necessary planning, or because the organisms charged with carrying out the programme or the minimum financing needed to begin the process still do not exist. As an example of two extremes, we can point to the early beginning of the programmes in Angola, Indonesia, Republic of the Congo and Nepal, with a maximum of four months from the signing of the agreement and the beginning of the DDR. At the other extreme, we can cite the cases in Burundi, Afghanistan, Côte d'Ivoire (where only a symbolic act has been made), Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau and Central African Republic (CAR), where almost two years have gone by before the beginning of the DDR.

The rapid beginning of a DDR does not however guarantee in the least its good progress or the **shortness of the disarmament and demobilisation period**. In fact, and with the exceptional cases of Indonesia and Angola, in which a rapid beginning was accompanied by a finalisation of the demobilisation phase in a very short period of time (less than four months) the rest of the countries have had to overcome numerous difficulties over a period of a year and a half, and even more than two years. In this sense, the longest processes have been those in Colombia, Niger and DR Congo, countries that have suffered interruptions of several months throughout the process. In general, **a DDR programme has an average duration of 3 and half years**, although this period occasionally needs to be extended due to deficiencies that have developed during its different stages, including the lack of financing. In some countries the period has been very short (two years in Eritrea, for instance), and in others five years have been required (Chad, Guinea-Bissau). By phases, **the correct situation is for disarmament and demobilisation to last a few months** if there are no setbacks (an uncommon thing, with the result that the average is increased to 16 months), whereas the **rehabilitation and reintegration phase normally lasts two years**, although it is frequently extended some months more, even coming to last as long as three years.

Table 10. Beginning and duration of the disarmament and demobilisation stages

Country	Peace or Ceasefire agreement	Beg. DDR	Difference in months	Duration of disarmament and demobilisation stages
Afghanistan	12/01	10/03	22	20
Angola	04/02	04/02	0	4
Burundi	12/02	12/04	24	10 (1)
Cambodia	-	10/01	-	8 (2)

Analysis of DDR programmes in the world during 2006

Colombia	07/03	11/03	4	33 (3)
Côte d'Ivoire	07/03	07/06	36	interrupted (4)
Eritrea	12/00	10/02	22	24
Guinea-Bissau	11/98	08/00	21	20
Indonesia (Aceh)	08/05	09/05	1	3 (5)
Liberia	08/03	12/03	4	12
Nepal	11/06	01/07	2	ongoing
Niger	08/98 (6)	01/02	40	discontinued
Central African R.	03/03	12/04	21	ongoing
DR Congo	04/03	07/04	15	ongoing
Rep. Congo	11/99	01/00	2	- (7)
Rwanda	-	04/02	-	18
Somalia	01/04	01/05	12	ongoing (8)
Sudan	01/05	09/05	8	ongoing
Uganda	01/00	01/02	24	ongoing
Average			15	> 14

- (1) This refers exclusively to the first phase of demobilisation, which includes all the armed groups.
 (2) This refers to two phases, of 2 and 3 months respectively, with three months' halt in between.
 (3) Has been carried out by blocks and in four stages, due to the various crises that originated periods when no demobilisation was carried out, especially throughout 2004.
 (4) It is not appropriate to indicate the duration, as it is a process with seven different stages that combine partial DDRs with arms purchase programmes.
 (5) It is not appropriate to indicate the duration, as its beginning has been continuously delayed.
 (6) The process suffered several interruptions from May 2001 onwards. The final phase lasted 8 months.

2.9. Justice and impunity: Is there a political price for peace?

As has already been mentioned, almost all DDR programmes begin after achieving a peace agreement that puts an end to an armed conflict, and where **all the confronting parties agree to a cessation of hostilities and the beginning of a new political cycle**, normally with an agreement to participate jointly in political and military power. One of the most controversial aspects of DDR programmes is the legal and political treatment that ex-combatants receive once they have handed over their weapons. With the exception of cases of Armed Forces DDR, in which due to their nature, these aspects are not considered, since it is simply a case of reducing the number of troops, the discussion revolves around the **legal responsibility of the different groups that have participated in a conflict**, when serious human rights offences have occurred, including massacres, crimes against humanity, genocide, etc.

The modification, change and construction of the international framework following an armed conflict require the application of **transitional justice**. This concept can be understood as the *combination of interrelated processes of indictment, surrendering of accounts, dissemination of the truth, recognition of reparations, and institutional reforms that may occur in a transition following a peace agreement*. Among its **objectives** is the search for truth, the clarification of the identity and whereabouts of victims, the identification of victims, the establishing of responsibilities, and the attempt to develop reparation mechanisms. In these circumstances, and more so if the armed conflict has lasted a long time and has claimed many lives, a **psychosocial context** may be produced which is favourable to **amnesty, forgiveness and reconciliation**, not without difficulties, contradictions and opposition from many of the most affected individuals or groups. In addition, reconciliation is a very long process that always includes a large dose of truth, justice and reparation, not necessarily at odds with generosity and magnanimity if determined circumstances are allowed to develop. Nothing therefore is automatic in this area, but comes as a result of individual and collective processes in the search for a greater good and a better future that will allow the individual pain of the moment to be transcended.

Analysis of DDR programmes in the world during 2006

In the rare cases, such as in **Colombia**, where **the demobilisation does not affect all the armed groups collectively, but only one of them**, and therefore said demobilisation does not put an end to the armed conflict completely, **the aforementioned psychosocial context favourable to amnesty and forgiveness cannot develop to the same extent, since the cycle of violence is not completely closed**, and in contrast one is left with the sensation that a certain impunity or a very favourable treatment has been conceded to people or groups to whom horrendous crimes have been attributed. Nevertheless, the Justice and Peace Law approved in Colombia in 2005, and the amendments made by the Constitutional Court in 2006, offering to the demobilised reduced sentences in their crimes in case of confession, offering the revelation and reparation of the victims, is a quite exceptional case on an international level. Since laws of this type do not usually exist, unless they have been designed to be applied solely for the only collective demobilisation existing in the country, without it being known what would occur if other armed groups were demobilised or without knowing the exact "civil and military" structure of the paramilitary's.

Another element to be taken into account, while not attempting to justify the reality, is the fact that **the majority of peace agreements and DDR processes refer to African countries with very little tradition of democracy and shared power**, which makes the application of rules associated with justice and reparation enormously difficult. At the most, the practice of enforced exile of a particular leader is applied. It is very significant, as can be seen from the following table, that the normal rule following a cease fire, the ceasing of hostilities and the signing of a peace agreement, is the offering of **amnesty**, the **creation of transition structures**, the **sharing of political power**, the **restructuring of the armed forces and the reform of the security sector**, among other aspects, with very little presence of **special courts**, **Truth and Reconciliation Commissions** and other possibilities related to the vectors of truth, justice and reparation.

Table 11. The political price of peace agreements*

Country	Basic aspects of the peace agreement	Political situation of the demobilised
Afghanistan	Offer of amnesty, creation of a new political transition structure and holding of elections Formation of a new armed forces	Integration in the new armed forces (ANA) or social reintegration. Political participation provided the person is disassociated from armed groups.
Angola	Ceasefire, amnesty, demobilisation, reintegration and restructuring of the armed forces	Social reintegration. 6,500 ex-combatants employed by the Government. Political participation is pending the holding of elections in 2006, without new data established. Intimidation and threats of members of the Government to members of the armed opposition group. Call for greater protection for ex-combatants and greater dialogue between the Government and civil society.
Burundi	Immunity, constitutional reforms, establishing of a 3 year transition period and the holding of elections. Creation of a Truth and Reconciliation National commission and a Rehabilitation national Commission.	Integration in the new armed forces, social reintegration and occupying of positions of political power after the elections. The new President is the former leader of the armed opposition group CNDD-FDD.
Central African Republic	Process of political transition, reform of the armed forces. National reconciliation and return to the rule of law.	Community social reintegration. Government planned the possibility of an amnesty to encourage the combatants participation on DDR.

Analysis of DDR programmes in the world during 2006

Table 11. The political price of peace agreements*

Country	Basic aspects of the peace agreement	Political situation of the demobilised
Colombia (AUC)	Cessation of hostilities, demobilisation and submitting to the Justice and Peace law.	Non-compliance with cessation of hostilities and social reintegration. The Constitutional Court amended the Justice and Peace Law, offering to the demobilized paramilitaries a reduction on their crime sentences in case of confessing them, as well as victims disclosure and reparation.
Côte d'Ivoire	General amnesty, political reforms and formation of a Government of National Unity. Holding of elections with legislative reform. Formation of new armed forces.	Sharing of political power. Stagnation of the beginning of the DDR process due to the divergences in the electoral legislation and the sharing of political power.
DR Congo	Reconciliation, inclusive agreement for a democratic transition, withdrawal of foreign troops. Reform of the security sector.	Social reintegration. Presence of militias from Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda, and the need to reinforce the borders with Sudan (regional dimension).
Guinea-Bissau	Cease fire, creation of a Government of Transition, reinforcing of political dialogue, national reconciliation and democratic normality. Reform of the security sector and reduction of the armed forces.	Community reintegration in society Political instability.
Indonesia	Amnesty for political prisoners, self-government and demilitarisation for the Aceh region. Reform of the security sector. Creation of local political parties.	Reintegration in society (land share-out) and participation in the political power. Major number of demobilized from the agreed (problems with the resources distribution), balanced with the high level of acceptance by the host communities.
Liberia	Amnesty, creation of a transition Government and the holding of elections. Establishing of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Reform of the political and military structure.	Social reintegration without specifying possibilities of political participation. Protests from ex-combatants and former armed forces troops about the lack of payment of subsidies (shortage of funds for the programme). Feeling in the civil society of an unfair treatment in favour of the combatants.
Nepal	Multiparty government system, political state amendment	Presence of 73 members, out of a total of 330, of the Maoist party in the Parliament,
Philippines-Mindanao	Autonomy for the provinces of Southern Mindanao. Rise of a new political front demanding independence.	Political preparation, social reintegration or integration in the armed forces and the National police. Goal of transforming the MNLF's revolutionary structures into popular democratic organisations that allow the mobilisation of resources for the communities. Development of a joint programme in the autonomous areas. Beginning of a training and development programme for former MNLF combatants.
Rep. Congo	Reinitiating of conflicts after a constitutional change. Subsequent cessation of hostilities and amnesty for handing over of weapons.	Request from the CNR armed opposition group to form a Government of national unity in exchange for the destruction of its arms arsenal. Delay on the demobilized benefits. Social reintegration with community projects.

Analysis of DDR programmes in the world during 2006

Table 11. The political price of peace agreements*

Country	Basic aspects of the peace agreement	Political situation of the demobilised
Rwanda	Withdrawal of troops abroad and the return of ex-combatants.	The lack of reform in the security sector promotes national and regional political instability. Formation of Gacaca local courts. Community social reintegration. Lack of conditions for repatriation from DR Congo. Social community reintegration. Facilitation of wanted leaders as responsible of the most serious crimes. Around 55,000 accused persons will be sentenced to realise community services.
Somalia	Cease fire, amnesty and formation of a Federal Government of Transition starting with an electoral process.	Emphasis on rehabilitation. Social reintegration, sharing of political power.
Sudan	Autonomy in the South during six years and self-determination referendum	Insecurity situation persistent a east and south of the country
Uganda	Amnesty, forces repatriation from DR Congo	Amnesty Commission creation with a wide civilian support
Country	Offer of amnesty, creation of a new political transition structure and holding of elections Formation of a new armed forces	Integration in the new armed forces (ANA) or social reintegration. Political participation provided the person is disassociated from armed groups.

* N.B. The cases in which there have only been reductions in the Armed Forces have been excluded, since only social reinsercion programmes fit into this table.

2.10. Security Sector Reform (SSR)

One of the long-term aims of peace building in post-war rehabilitation processes is the compliance with the peace dividend, i.e. the reassigning of public expenses so that they are transferred from the military sector to other areas of a more economic and social complexion. To do so, the DDR must associate itself with the **reform of the security sector**, through the reduction, in many cases, of its troops, making its institutions more professional, and with a training that focuses on human rights and international law. The decisions taken for the reform of the security sector will have an impact on the DDR process, such as the size of the new army, eligibility criteria for ex-combatants from the opposition armed groups, etc. In addition, while the particularities of the two processes must be taken into consideration in a practical order, there are certain steps that are identical in both cases: absorption into the new armed forces, demobilisation of under-age soldiers or the exploration of HIV/AIDS, among others.

The reduction or simple reform of the armed forces and police forces has been a strategy carried out in 19 of the cases studied, although in four of these they still need to be decided upon: Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti and Indonesia. One of the aims of this reform is to achieve a substantial cut in military budgets on entering a post-war phase, and to create new, more cost-effective and efficient security organisms. The only case where a reform of the security system has not taken place is in Colombia, due to the fact that the armed conflict has still not ended and only one of the armed groups operating in the country has been demobilised, although there is a presidential proposal for creating a civic police with some of the rehabilitated people.

Analysis of DDR programmes in the world during 2006

3. DDR stages

3.1. Handing in of weapons in the DDR

This is an activity that is usually identified by the body that as such already has it, although it is also very common to situate it in the demobilisation phase. This case may arise when there is a certain level of security, while the operating methods are based on projects fostering awareness and communicating information about the problem of the proliferation of light arms, as well as a mapping of weapon possession... In addition, **pilot disarmament projects** can be carried out, especially when the weapons handed in are few in number compared to the number of people demobilised. Following the disarmament phase the Governments usually carry out weapon collection programmes on a voluntary basis, under campaigns in the style of "arms for development", providing incentives for the handing over of weapons by offering in exchange aid for work rehabilitation, educational programmes, micro-credits, etc. Examples of this type, at least in the planning phase, are to be found in countries such as the Central African Republic, the Republic of the Congo or Rwanda. In the disarmament phase small arms and ammunition are normally collected, and rarely are there handovers of heavy weapons (such as in Afghanistan). As regards the weapon collection process, in the majority of cases they remain under the custody of the Armed Forces or the police, although in some experiences (Burundi, Côte d'Ivoire, CAR), the weapons are destroyed in public ceremonies loaded with symbolism. In the majority of cases however, there exists a certain **lack of control and poor monitoring of the final destination of the weapons collected**, with the consequent **risk of them being diverted towards illegal markets**. On some rare occasions, and when one is not talking about a conventional DDR as such, the handing over of weapons is voluntary and individual. In Central African Republic, DR Congo or Rwanda, the voluntary handing over of arms has been a pilot experience for subsequently initiating a normalised DDR¹². On several occasions, especially when the weapons handed over are few in relation to the number of people demobilised, following the disarmament phase the Governments usually carry out weapon collection programmes of a voluntary nature, under campaigns of the "weapons for development" kind, providing incentives for their handover in exchange for aid in employment rehabilitation, educational programmes, micro-credits, etc.

One of the most controversial aspects of the DDR is the **quantity of weapons handed in by the combatants** in the disarmament phase. Although the popular idea is that each combatant has one weapon, in reality in the majority of armed groups, such a distribution does not exist, as there are troops that do not participate into combat, do not have a weapon and yet can be demobilised at the moment of initiating the DDR. It is also true, and the history of demobilisations has proved it so, that a determined quantity of weapons is normally hidden by former combatants, or unusable weapons or those in poor condition are handed in.

Table 12. Weapons handed in per demobilised combatant in selected countries

Country	People demobilised	Weapons handed in	Weapons/person	Years
Afghanistan	62,000	48,819	0.78	2003-2006
Angola	97,115	33,000	0.34	2002-2006
Burundi	21,769	26,295	1.2	2004-2006
Colombia	31,761	18,051	0.57	2004-2006
Côte d'Ivoire (1)	981	110	0.11	2006
Indonesia (Aceh)	3,000	840	0.28	2005
Liberia	101,405	28,364	0.28	2005
Rep. Congo	17,400	11,776	0.68	2000-2006
TOTAL group	335,521	167,525	0.49	
El Salvador (FMLN)	11,000	10,200	0.93	1992
Guatemala (URNG)	3,000	1,24	0.61	1997

¹² As it was mentioned in section 2.10. *The most vulnerable groups*, in several occasions the main and only requisite is the possession of an arm.

Analysis of DDR programmes in the world during 2006

Mozambique	80,000	46,193	0.58	1996
Nicaragua (Contra)	23,000	17,000	0.74	1990


(1) Interrupted due to the low handed-in arms per combatant rate achieved.

Afghanistan, Republic of Congo and Colombia, in this order, are the three cases where a percentage higher than the average has been registered, which in 2006 has been allocated **is of one weapon handed in for every two combatants demobilised**¹³. In contrast, the low percentage of weapons registered in Angola, Côte d'Ivoire, Indonesia (Aceh) and Liberia is noteworthy. The case of Colombia is also surprising, where in the large demobilisations carried out in January 2006, almost the last ones, the AUC presented a rate of 0.57 weapons per combatant, whereas in previous demobilisations they had been as high as 0.7. It should also be pointed out that current percentages are lower than those of some demobilisations of the past decade, in conflicts associated with the Cold War, in which large quantities of arms had accumulated.

The practical disarmament and demobilisation measures that are carried out will only be useful in collecting those **weapons that are seen as surplus**, i.e. those that are not needed to preserve security itself, whether it be a part of an arsenal or complete arsenals. To put it another way, **these practical DDR measures must be accompanied by structural and cultural transformations** that palliate the inadequacies that arise in these contexts of armed violence, whether it be those considered as traditional conflicts or those known as "new wars".

Practical disarmament and demobilisation measures propound, by means of the elements that are indeed visible – such as the **presence and impact of firearms** - the **management of the invisible elements of violence**, such as the structural and cultural phenomena that generate the demand. In addition, these programmes also offer other added potentialities. On a **structural level**, for instance, they could help in the creation of political areas of contact where the civil society and public power meet, where in exchange for the disarmament of the civil population, the public power must recognise and confront the vices and perversions that have created this particular situation. Obviously, this also helps to strengthen the structure and to bring about the social rehabilitation of this community. On a **cultural level**, it is obvious that these changes involve the foundations of a particular society, given that if certain elements are not modified (the glorification of force, patriarchy, predatory individualism, etc.) there is always the risk of returning to the initial state.

Figure 3. Armamentistic violence transformation



Source: Escola de Cultura de Pau, *DDR y ddr*, 2006 at
<<http://www.escolapau.org/img/programas/desarme/ddr002.pdf>>

¹³ Differing from last year, it has been taken into account the percentage of delivered arms from the demobilised combatants and not on the planned ones.

Analysis of DDR programmes in the world during 2006

3.2. The demobilisation phase

In a period of just a few days, the combatants are **quartered** or concentrated in specified places so that they can hand in their weapons, be identified, receive a demobilisation certificate and be registered in order to enter in subsequent phases. The normal procedure is for a variety of **services** to be offered in the demobilisation phase, such as a medical check-up to evaluate both the physical and psychological harm suffered, provision of basic care (food, hygiene, clothing, etc.), definition of the social and employment profile of each ex-combatant, providing of information about his or her status and possibilities for rehabilitation, education and work training, and even in some cases, subsequent transport to the acceptance communities. Depending on the number of **activities** to be carried out, as well as the groups and total quantity of combatants to be demobilised, the number of days that each combatant remains in a quartering camp may vary: on the cases analysed, it may be a stay of one day (as in the case of Afghanistan, where he is given information and assessment on his rehabilitation, together with a packet containing shoes and food), to 15 (in the context of Rwanda, where the combatant is identified, given health education in matters of HIV/AIDS and information regarding the benefits of reintegration is diffused).

In some contexts, immediately after finalising the demobilisation there is a first **economic compensation** for each person, independent of the payment or the aid that is conceded subsequently in the rehabilitation phase. Although with very marked differences, the majority of the countries offer economic aid (Transitory Subsistence Allowance) to every ex-combatant in this phase. There exists a debate about the suitability of these cash payments, where there are arguments in favour (attractive model, easy to implement, accelerates the process, diminishes the economic load for the communities, etc.), but also against (creation of an illegal arms market, risk of insecurity by feeding expectations, community resentment, etc.).

Table 13. Kinds of economic aid towards reintegration

Afghanistan	Between 180 and 480 dollars in a period between two and four months
Angola	Payment equivalent to five months salary (between 300 and 900 dollars), 100 dollars more when they arrive to their origin places.
Burundi	From 515 to 586 dollars according to rank, in 10 instalments (militias only receive one assignation of \$91)
Central African R.	Payment of 500 dollars at the end of the period
Colombia	Monthly subsidy of 155 dollars for a year and a half
DR Congo	Payment of 11 dollars at leaving the orientation centres, as well as a 25 dollar monthly instalment
Eritrea	Payment of 50 dollars monthly for one year
Indonesia	Payment of 500 dollars to each combatant in three instalments every two months (200, 150 and 150)
Liberia	Payment of 300 dollars for primary needs, in two instalments
Rep. Congo	Credits of \$350 for each ex-combatant
Rwanda	Payment of 330 dollars in two instalments
Afghanistan	Between 180 and 480 dollars in a period between two and four months
Angola	Payment equivalent to five months salary (between 300 and 900 dollars), 100 dollars more when they arrive to their origin places.

As might seem logical, not all the combatants can be demobilised at once when the number is very high, but rather in such cases it is usually carried out in **phases** (as was clearly specified in programmes such as those in Burundi, Eritrea, DR Congo or Rwanda). The possibility of a much higher number of people being finally demobilised can lead to a saturation of these quartering camps, as well as a clear deterioration of conditions of hygiene. Examples of this type of problem are the experiences in Angola or Burundi, due to the deplorable conditions present in their camps (malnutrition, sanitary problems, spread of cholera, climate of tension, insecurity, etc.). On the opposite case, the high maintenance costs of these camps for a reduced number of combatants lead to its suspension, as it has happened in DR Congo.

Analysis of DDR programmes in the world during 2006

As for demobilisation, one of the main problems observed is that on **many occasions the number of combatants to be demobilised is unknown**, either due to a lack of advanced planning, or due to extortion of the high command of the armed opposition groups. These situations, which have occurred in contexts such as Afghanistan, with an exaggeration of the number of combatants declared, in order to obtain greater profits. Another consequence of this, as in Burundi and Liberia, is the alarming lack of funds for the payment of ex-combatants, which can in turn lead to the rebellion of sectors of combatants who demand the payments promised to them. In addition, and depending on the compensations established for the demobilisation, the phenomenon may occur of participants who were not combatants but who join the programme for the incentives being given, a phenomenon known as **ghost combatants** (as can be seen in the case of Cambodia or DR Congo).

3.3. The rehabilitation and reintegration phases

The reintegration phase is one of the most complexes in the **DDR programmes** for ex-combatants. While the previous phases are seen as more temporary and transitional, there is a debate in reintegration as to whether to consolidate this transition phase, or also to go into more depth in the development and reconstruction of a society in a post-war situation. If **reintegration** is deemed simply to be a transition from military to civil life, a strategy of **short-term stabilisation** should be chosen, which moves combatants away from criminality until a peacekeeping mission is deployed and/or reform of the security or political sector has been completed. However, these conditions are almost never met in post-conflict contexts. Furthermore, the most widespread view of reintegration is not based on a transitional security strategy, but rather on a long-term commitment to development and transformation¹⁴.

This stage can be subdivided into two phases, although in various countries it occurs as a single combined one. After demobilisation, the combatants are left without their usual source of income or means of survival. During this initial period known as **rehabilitation** the ex-combatants and their families have to be provided with the necessary means for living in a dignified way, by satisfying their **basic needs**. In short, this means guaranteeing the **return to their communities in the first months** after giving up arms. In some countries, they are provided with an initial economic aid, a survival kit and means of transport. This first stage is followed by the **reintegration** phase, which usually lasts for two years. As vulnerable groups, demobilised individuals do not have the necessary tools to integrate themselves into economic and social life. It is also a group that are used to living with weapons. The idea of this phase is to attempt to **provide them with sustainable means for living**, as well as health, social, economic, educational and occupational assistance.

A variety of **activities** are carried out: mainly the undertaking of micro-projects, education, vocational training, the creation of micro-companies, public works (in the majority, those concerned with rehabilitating the infrastructures in the country) or access to employment in various sectors, be they rural (agriculture, livestock and fishing, as in the example of the Republic of the Congo), in a more urban sphere (Sierra Leone) or even through the participation of the civil society or the private sector (Angola). In some cases there is a subdivision between economic and social reintegration, as in the cases of Angola, Eritrea, the Republic of the Congo and Rwanda. **Social integration** consists of carrying out awareness programmes, information supporting community social rehabilitation, whereas **economic integration** is that which attempts to create new professional challenges for the former combatants.

The **lack of economic expansion** evidently hinders the possibility of creating new employment opportunities (for example, in Afghanistan, where the bulk of ex-combatants

¹⁴ International Peace Academy. *Transforming War Economies: Challenges for Peacemaking and Peacebuilding Report of the 725th Wilton Park Conference*. IPA, 2003.

Analysis of DDR programmes in the world during 2006

return to agricultural work). The delay in the payments or their poor planning has also led to certain problems in programmes that have seen how prospective programmes have not been carried out (Philippines), the lack of financing for educational programmes (in Liberia, for example, where the majority of ex-combatants opted for professional training or educational programmes), or the lack of state Government involvement, as in Angola, despite its high level of financing. The structure of the process of reintegration has a much more decentralised character and bases much of its efforts on the work that can be done with the host communities, which in turn receive the support of the body implementing the programme itself. A clear example of this can be seen in Chad, Eritrea, Republic of the Congo and Rwanda, which situate them specifically in the reinsertion and social rehabilitation phase. Other contexts do not follow the same criterion. In addition to the aforementioned cases where a simple payment of subsidies is given, the context of Cambodia is a good example of this: the social and economical services provided to its families and communities have had very little civil participation, which has led to the expectations placed in the presented projects not being realised.


Box 5. Community reintegration in Indonesia (Aceh)

Community reintegration is also seen as the process of providing *communities* with the tools and skills to support the reintegration of ex-combatants¹⁵. Disarmament and demobilisation are directly linked to a wider recovery strategy based on the community. Ex-combatants cease to be a specific support objective for sustenance. This approach is more appropriate when the ex-combatants do not constitute a threat to the security of their communities, or at least, no more so than other groups affected by war, such as in armed conflicts for national defence or liberation.

The **World Bank's** study of the **reintegration requirements in the programme for the Indonesian region** of Aceh identified the community that would be accepting demobilised combatants as being of the highest priority in order to ensure benefits for the communities affected by the conflict, prevent tensions and facilitate peace-building efforts and the reduction of inequalities. In general terms, the **level of acceptance of former combatants in the community is very high** (around 90%). The report recommends the **provision of community benefits in the form of public assets**: the rehabilitation of small- and medium-size infrastructure, improvements in public and private development, market relations and credit systems, and the implementation of short-term projects managed by the community itself in regions affected by the conflict. The following diagram shows the interaction between individual and community support programmes, distinguishing between the types of beneficiary and types of goods. These reintegration programmes, which are implemented by the IOM, are still the subject of debate.

¹⁵ Support for reintegration also includes other groups, such as IDPs, refugees and other vulnerable groups.

Analysis of DDR programmes in the world during 2006



Source: World Bank: *GAM Reintegration Needs Assessment. Enhancing Peace through Community-Level Development Planning*, March 2006, at <<http://www.conflictanddevelopment.org>>.

4. Aspects to be analysed

At the time of carrying out the evaluation of the DDR programmes, based on their management and how they have evolved, one should not only extract improvement elements for the context being analysed. In turn, attempt to show certain **lessons learnt** that may or not be able to be applied, or in this case, elements to take into consideration to avoid repeating them in the implementation of current and future programmes. Starting with **planning**, it is necessary to take into account the possible reluctance of ex-combatants to join the programme (Afghanistan) or to abandon their military status (Eritrea). The extortion carried out by the high command on their combatants (DR Congo and Rwanda) and the omission of the most vulnerable groups, are elements that should be considered. This extortion and omission is related to the lack of knowledge and the exaggeration (in order to obtain more resources) of the number of combatants, and subsequent disagreements about the number of troops in each group, with the possibility of there existing the phenomenon of "ghost combatants" (Afghanistan, Burundi, Cambodia, Ivory Coast, Indonesia, Liberia, DR Congo and Uganda). The type of DDR that is desired to be carried out in the absence of a peace agreement, and without a clear configuration of the participants to be demobilised (Haiti), also has to be considered.

Beyond the combatants, the **configuration** of certain programmes tends to be excessively militarised and with very little focus on the social aspects of the reintegration programme – a priori, the most important aspect (Angola). In addition, the non-compliance and delay in carrying out the programme may be explained by a number of reasons: a lack of consultation about the function and deployment of international missions (Burundi), disagreement about where to site the holding areas, absence of a common operational plan for reintegration of the army, lack of operational decentralisation of the provincial offices (Burundi), or a lack of clarification about land redistribution (Cambodia). As far as **structure** is concerned, there exists the possibility of a lack of coordination between the executing organisations (Angola), which in turn may have a limited capacity for acting, with excessive differences in the quality of

Analysis of DDR programmes in the world during 2006

the services provided by the different agencies (Liberia) or lacking a system of awareness raising and information (Niger).

Another element to be evaluated, as has been commented in Section 2.11, is that of **financing**. The **delay** in the payments of salaries (Afghanistan, Cambodia and Guinea-Bissau), the (absence of) financing by international bodies (Angola), or the lack of funds (Burundi), is some elements that need reforming. In addition, it is a matter of concern that a **shortage of resources** can occur, either due to insufficient collecting of the money promised (Afghanistan, Sudan, Uganda), the difficulties in reintegration as a result of the poor economic expansion of the country (Afghanistan) or because the cost is very high (Ivory Coast), the suspension of contributions by the donors (Guinea-Bissau) or the failure in the credit system for micro-companies (Rep. of the Congo). Furthermore, the setbacks arising during the process are another alarming aspect. A good example of this are the excessive cash payments in comparison with local wages or the lack of control over credit from the World Bank (Cambodia), the changes in the quantity and type of payment due to disagreement of ex-combatants (Liberia), the regional "call effect" (Ivory Coast), the diversion of resources (Guinea-Bissau) or the lack of trust on the part of the donors regarding the DDR administering bodies (DR Congo).

With regard to the **DDR process itself**, there are also a wide range of factors that may cause problems, as has been demonstrated in earlier programmes: a lack of civil and popular participation in the process (Cambodia), the mistrust of the Government itself with regard to the DDR process (DR Congo), a decentralising and federal process, or the suspicions about the participation of troops from neighbouring countries (Somalia). In the **disarmament** phase, in some cases little emphasis is placed on the collection of light arms or these end up being very old ones, under the perception that weapons are usually collective and not individualised (Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Ivory Coast), the quantity of weapons collected is very small in comparison with the number of combatants demobilised, certain doubts arise due to the process of repurchase (Central African Rep., DR Congo and Sudan), or the situation is one of a clan structure where weapons form a part of the culture of protection and there is an easy access to these (Somalia).

In the case of the **demobilisation** phase, there have been cases of poor health and humanitarian conditions in the holding camps (Angola, Burundi and Liberia), lack of equipment, personnel and remuneration, a lack of definition about the combatant statute and a lack of consensus about the harmonisation of military ranks (Burundi and Central African Rep.), and poor professional training (Rep. of the Congo). With regard to **reintegration**, the lack of transparency in the planning (Burundi), the shortage of equipment, personnel and remuneration (Burundi), the excessive concentration of rehabilitated ex-combatants in the areas around the capital and the lack of growth in the number of reintegration projects (Liberia) or the slowness of the repatriation process (Burundi and DR Congo), are some of the elements not to be repeated.

The characteristics that **each context** brings, and which influence the DDR process, cannot be ignored. Especially relevant are the **background and determining factors**, where drug trafficking (Afghanistan and Colombia), the internal divisions among armed participants (Colombia and Liberia), the inadequate structures throughout the country (Sudan), unemployment (Angola), the very low community participation (Central African Rep.) or the regional dimension of this type of programme (region of the Great Lakes) are drawbacks to be taken into account. Related to these is the progress of the **peace process**, where the absence of perspectives of negotiation with other armed groups (Colombia), problems with mediation (Ivory Coast, under mediation of South Africa) or the lack of public access to the contents of the agreement, being kept at a political level (Indonesia), may be new impediments to an efficient development of the DDR programmes.

Analysis of DDR programmes in the world during 2006

In addition, the **international presence** also plays an essential role, either because of its absence (Angola and Rwanda), the delay in its deployment (Liberia) or the disagreements and interferences that they sometimes cause (the role of the US in Afghanistan and Colombia). As these are contexts that follow a conflict, the levels of **violence and security** also take on a special relevance, with violations of the cessation of hostilities occurring (Colombia), the lack of funds for an international mission (Burundi) or the possibility of a situation of political instability (Guinea-Bissau). In parallel, the general impunity in all the processes is the main characteristic as far as **justice** is concerned. In the case of Colombia, there is a lack of recognition by the State of its historical ties, and its responsibility for the emergence and development of the paramilitary phenomenon, as well as a lack of sufficient pressure on the AUC to compensate victims by means of the return of lands and property usurped during the conflict.

Analysis of DDR programmes in the world during 2006

Annex I. Ongoing DDR programs, 2006 – Summary table

DDR programs present a wide diversity in terms of the number of **troops to be demobilised** and reintegrated, the **costs of the programmes**, or the **executive and financing bodies**. As can be seen, the role of the international bodies, both in the functions of running as well as financing the programmes, is quite broad, although it should be pointed out that this financing is often aimed solely at the initial phases, with quite well-defined time periods and specific objectives, whereas resources are lacking for the periods of reintegration of these ex-combatants. Finally, the substantial presence of **under-age soldiers** among these groups is also a cause for concern, and requires a different approach to this problem. Lastly, the following table aims to perform the function of a summary of the approach to the DDR programmes that have been presented in this comparative analysis.

Country	Executive bodies	Period (beginning and ending dates)	Combatants to be demobilised		Programs for vulnerable groups			Total budget (Million \$)	Donor formula		
			AF	OAG	Ch	W	D		WB	M	C
Afghanistan	M	10/03 - 06/06	-	63,000	•	•		140.90			•
Angola	N	08/02 - 06/06	33,000	105,000	•	•	•	255.80		•	
Burundi	M	12/04 - 12/08	41,000	37,000	•		•	84.40	•	•	
Cambodia	M	10/01 -	30,000		•			42	•		•
Chad	N	12/05 - 12/10	9,000	-	-	-	-	10	•		•
Colombia (AUC)	N	11/03 - 02/06	-	31,761	•			302.60			•
Côte d'Ivoire	M	-	4,000	41,000	•	•		150		•	
Eritrea	N	10/02 -	200,000			•	•	197.20	•	•	
Filipinas (Mindanao)	M	97/06		25,000	•			254			•
Guinea-Bissau	M	01/01 -	10,544	2,051				26			
Haiti	M	08/06 -	-	6,000	•			15.75		•	
Indonesia (Aceh)	N	09/05 - 06/06	-	5,000	•			35		•	
Liberia	M	12/03 - 12/06	12,000	107,000	•			71		•	
Nepal	M	12/06 -		12,000				5.90			•
Niger	Int	03/06 - 12/07	-	3,160		•		2.40			•
Central African R.	M	12/04 - 12/07	-	7,565	-	-	-	13.30		•	
DR Congo	M	01/04 - 12/07	23,000	127,000	•	•		200	•	•	
Rep. Congo	M	12/05 - 12/08	-	30,000	•	•		25	•		•
Rwanda	N	12/01 -	15,000	30,000	•	•	•	57.30	•	•	•
Somalia	M	01/05 - 06/06	-	53,000	•			32.80		•	•
Sudan	M	01/05 - 12/07	121,000	57,500	•	•	•	69.40		•	•
Uganda	N	-	-	15,310	•	•		6.74		•	
TOTAL (22)			513,544	741,966	16	10	5	1996.75	7	13	11
<i>Executive bodies:</i> N- National / Int- International / M- Mixed. <i>Vulnerable groups:</i> Ch- Child soldiers / W- Women combatants / D: Disabled soldiers <i>Budget formula:</i> WB- World Bank / M- Multinational Funds/ C- Country funds.											

Analysis of DDR programmes in the world during 2006

CONSULTED BIBLIOGRAPHY AND WEBSITES RELEVANT TO DDR

Bibliography

- World Bank: *GAM Reintegration Needs Assessment. Enhancing Peace through Community-Level Development Planning*, 2006, at <http://www.conflictanddevelopment.org>.
 - *World Development Indicators Database*, April 2006, at <http://devdata.worldbank.org>.
- Escola de Cultura de Pau: *Análisis de los Programas de DDR Existentes en el Mundo durante 2005*, Escola de Cultura de Pau, 2006, at <http://www.escolapau.org/img/programas/desarme/ddr001.pdf>.
 - *DDR y ddr*, Escola de Cultura de Pau, 2006, at <http://www.escolapau.org/img/programas/desarme/ddr002.pdf>.
 - *La Reintegración Comunitaria*. Escola de Cultura de Pau, 2006, at <http://www.escolapau.org/img/programas/desarme/informes/06informe022.pdf>.
 - *Alerta 2007. Informe sobre Conflictos, Derechos Humanos y Construcción de Paz*, Icaria editorial, Barcelona, 2007.
- *Children and armed conflict. Report of the Secretary-General*, UN, October 2006, at <http://www.acnur.org/biblioteca/pdf/4723.pdf>.
- International Peace Academy: *Transforming War Economies: Challenges for Peacemaking and Peacebuilding Report of the 725th Wilton Park Conference*. IPA, 2003.
- Kaldor, M.: *Las Nuevas Guerras. Violencia Organizada en la Era Global*. Tusquets, Barcelona, 2001.
- United Nations: *Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards*, UN, 2006, at <http://www.unddr.org>.
- Swedish National Defence College et al.: *Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration: A Practical Field and Classroom Guide*. GTZ, 2004, at <http://www.smallarmsnet.org/pubs/gtzddr.pdf>.
- UNDP: *Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration. Practice Note*. UNDP, 2005, at http://www.undp.org/bcpr/whats_new/ddr_practice_note.pdf.
 - *Human Development Report 2006*, PNUD, 2006.

Websites relevant to DDR

- World Bank, at <http://www.worldbank.org>.
- Bonn International Centre for Conversion (BICC), at <http://www.bicc.de>.
- Centre for European Security Studies (CESS), at <http://www.cess.org>.
- Zentrum für Internationale Friedenseinsätze (ZIF), at <http://www.zif-berlin.org>.
- Crisis Prevention and Recovery from the United Nations Development Programme (BCPR / UNDP), at <http://www.undp.org/bcpr>.
- UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UN-DPKO), at <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko>.
- Escola de Cultura de Pau (ECP), at <http://www.escolapau.org>.
- Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform (GFN-SSR), at <http://www.gfn-ssr.org>.
- International Crisis Group (ICG), at <http://www.crisisgroup.org>.
- Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP), at <http://www.mdrp.org>.
- Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, at <http://www.peaceoperations.org>.
- Small Arms Survey, at <http://www.smallarmssurvey.org>.
- Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (SIDDR), at <http://www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/4890>.
- Swedish National Defence College, at <http://www.fhs.se>.
- United Nations - Integrated Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS), at <http://www.unddr.org>.