De praedicamento relationis
in philosophia arabica et islamica
The Category of Relation in Arabic-Islamic Philosophy (Extended Version)

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Abstract

The main sources for the discussion of the category “relation” were Aristotle’s Categories and Metaphysics. Before their translation into Arabic in the 8th and 9th centuries, Christian theologians and in their footsteps Syriac scholars considered Aristotle’s works to be a useful tool in Christological discussions. This article analyzes the category of relation and its development in Arabic-Islamic philosophy in authors such as Kindī and his student Ahmad Ibn ʿAt-Tayyib as-Saraḥṣī, Fārābī, Ibn Sīnā, Ghazālī, Ibn Ruṣd, the Sufi Ibn ʿArabī and others.

Keywords: relation as dynamic principle; Aristotle; Alexandrian commentaries; Stoa; Neoplatonism; Arabic-Islamic authors; Epistles of the Sincere Brethren; Ramon Llull

Resum. La categoria de relació en la filosofia islàmica

Les principals fonts de discussió sobre la categoria de «relació» foren les Categories i la Metafísica d’Aristòtil. Abans de ser traduïdes a l’àrab durant els segles VIII i IX, els teòlegs cristians i els seus seguidors s’iríen consideraren que les obres d’Aristòtil constituïen un instrument útil en les discussions cristològiques. Aquest article analitza la categoria de relació i el seu desenvolupament en la filosofia araboislàmica en autors com Kindī i el seu deixeble Ahmad Ibn ʿAt-Tayyib as-Saraḥṣī, Fārābī, Ibn Sīnā, Ghazālī, Ibn Ruṣd i el sufi Ibn ʿArabī, entre d’altres.

Paraules clau: relació com a principi dinàmic; Aristòtil; comentaris alexandrins; Stoa; neoplatonisme; autors araboislàmics; Epístoles dels Germans de la Puresa; Ramon Llull
Theological interests, intercultural relations between Antiquity, Syriac Christianity and the arising Islam stimulated the interest in Aristotle’s philosophy and his *Organon*. It was transmitted and enriched with explanations by Alexandrian commentators from the 4th till the 6th century. A Syriac example from pre-Islamic time is the monophysite priest Sergius of Rešʿaynā in the 6th century, who — similar to Augustinus in the footsteps of Aristotle — considered relation as something determined by the related subject.

The first Arabic adaptation of Aristotle’s *Categories* in the 8th century, attributed to Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ and presumably based on a Syriac handbook, deplored Aristotle’s unclear definition, but could not offer another solution.

Decades after 800 AD The *Book of Stones*, attributed to the alchemist Ğābir, offers in an excerpt from Aristotle’s *Categories* the interesting solution that only genera, not particulars are relatives.

Shortly after, this first attempt culminated in Kindī’s (d. between 247/861 and 259/873) classification of *relativa* as something without matter, as a predicate connected with the substance and as something existing in mind. Kindī, the first great philosopher of the Arabs, considered, different from Aristotle and in accordance with the Alexandrians, the first four categories — substance, quantity, quality and relation — as simple, and the following six categories — “where”, “when”, “position”, “possession”, “action” and “passion” — as something that can be connected with a substance. This is further elucidated by Kindī’s student Aḥmad Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib as-Saraḥṣī (d. 286/899), whose short text on categories — until now unknown — will be published here for the first time.

As a reaction on discussions about the value of logic as a universal valid vehicle of intelligible things, superior to single languages — I refer to the dispute in 319/932 between the Nestorian Abū Bišr Mattā Ibn Yūnus and the Muslim scholar Abū Saʿīd as-Sīrāfī — the Andalusian scholar Ibn Ḥazm (384/994 - 456/1064) offers a compromise: He preferred “clear Arabic language” as revealed in the...
Qurʾān and he combined it with his estimation of categories as universals of Arabic and non-Arabic languages and as a tool for the reflexion on Creator, creation and the fundaments of religion. Similar to Kindī, relation is one of the four “fundamentals” substance, quantity, quality and relation. The attributes of the transcendent God are mere names without relation to the world: They do not require correlatives and the relation between God and creation is asymmetrical.

Ibn Ḥazm continues the Neoplatonic trend of the “Brethren of Purity”, who shortly before him developed in their Epistles, in the paraphrase of Aristotle’s Categories, the concept of a “mental logic”, of “mental forms”, which emanate from the divine active intellect. Every language, the linguistic logic, mirrors this “mental logic”, which is a higher reality.

The tendency of the “Brethren of Purity” to shape the Aristotelian categories by Neoplatonic philosophy about God’s transcendence and the emanations is further developed by the Nestorian Christian Abū l-Farağ Ibn at-Ṭayyīb in Baghdad (d. 435/1043). He combined in his commentary on Aristotle’s Categories Alexandrian tradition, especially Olympiodorus, with the Stoic-Neoplatonic concept of a transcendental relation. The Stoics had detected relation as a universal valid category, in which all single entities are connected in the totality of all things, which themselves are penetrated by the pneuma, the hegemonikon, the tonos, that determines the dynamic process of interaction. Consequently, relation appears to be the form, the primary structure of different relata, which correspond to this form. Similarly, Ibn at-Ṭayyib assumed an interdependence of form, matter and accident and an identity of the whole with the parts of it. For this reason, their relativa can be understood with the help of the comparing intellect, which creates an image of the perceived in the soul. The Stoic interrelation of the whole and the parts in the universal valid category of relation appears to be integrated in the Epistles and in Ibn Ḥazm in the Neoplatonic concept of the divine One with subsequent emanations from the divine intellect, which determine the concept of relation created in the human soul.

The interpretations of Aristotle’s Categories, Alexandrian traditions, Stoic and Neoplatonic concepts, constituted the background for a shift to an ontological and metaphysical orientation, already prepared in Aristotle’s Metaphysics. Fārābī (d. 339/950 or 951) did not yet fully develop this metaphysical line and considered relation primarily as a problem of language. He selected the three Aristotelian categories “time”, “place” and “possession”, which shape relation and he distinguished between a relation, called idāfa in a specific sense and a relation, called nisba in an arbitrary manner by the general public, orators and poets. To avoid arbitrary use, Fārābī stressed the necessity of clear definitions of relation and relatives. He introduced the “particles of relation”, like “in” as an additional indication of a real relation with regard to “place”: In the example “Zayd is in the house” the relation is “surrounding”, because Zayd is surrounded by the house. The relation appears to be determined by the state of “surrounding” and — contrary to Aristotle — not by the relatives and their essences. Moreover, Fārābī’s discussion of relation became a part of his theory of communication, in which elements of other logical works by Aristotle were integrated and in which he tried
to reconcile two contrary positions of the already mentioned dispute between Abū Bīšr Mattā Ibn Yūnūs, a defender of logic as a universal valid vehicle of intelligible things and the grammarian Abū Saʿīd as-Sīrāfī, a defender of language as the only access to intelligible things.

The perhaps greatest Islamic philosopher after Fārābī, the Iranian Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna, d. 428/1037) was aware of earlier discussions and knew, besides Aristotle’s work and its commentators, Fārābī and Neoplatonism. In contrast to Fārābī, he made a shift from the linguistic and logical level to the ontological, by elaborating Aristotle’s discussion in his *Metaphysics* (V, 15. 1020 b 26 – 1021 b 10).

Relation is based on some “notion” (*maʿnā*) in one of the two relatives, e.g. in the asymmetrical relation father-son only the father has the relation fatherhood, which is a “notion” or “description of its existence”, of its “being with respect to something else in the father”. The “existential” relation can be apprehended in the intellect, which however also can “invent” relations. In addition to the notion of a relation between father and son in the intellect, the relation is also something related to the categories action and affection, cause and effect. This kind of relation is integrated in an emanational Neoplatonic system of the divine first cause and the inferior effects. This first cause is the divine universal intellect, the giver of forms, from which emanate, in a hierarchical order, the ten Aristotelian categories.

These categories determine the causal relation between the divine necessarily existing One and the multiplicity of the caused, of existing matter.

The Andalusian philosopher Ibn Rušd (Averroes, d. 595/1198) continued the Neoplatonic trend and the ontological orientation. He knew Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā, from whom he deviated in an interesting return to Aristotle: He concentrated again on the substance, according to him, the fundaments of any relation. However, he tried to clarify Aristotle by distinguishing between an essential relation of a substance and an accidental relation, depending on the substrate, the substance. In addition, the relationship is something “conceptualized” in a “conceptualization” (*taṣawwur*), which is dependent on the soul.

Herewith, he criticized Ghazālī (d. 505/1111), who spoke of a plurality of knowledge with regard to the relation, e.g. between father and son. Ghazālī considered relation as part of an epistemological process: Knowledge connects two relatives, which condition each other, and which have as their principle the divine First, who knows himself and who knows the individual genera. Ibn Rušd denied Ghazālī’s epistemological aspects and did not give a clear picture of his concept of a Neoplatonizing indeterminate relation in its connection with the concept of potentiality as “a disposition” in a thing and as its inherent possibility of existing in actuality. He did not develop this to a clear concept of a dynamic process of relation between substance and relative.

The ambivalence of relation as something essential and as something accidental to the substance, as well as the Neoplatonic background of Ibn Rušd and Ibn Sīnā, have some parallels in the Andalusian Ibn ʿArabī (d. 638/1240). This Sufi considered the Aristotelian categories as something “applicable” to the order in the world and as correlated to the divine aspects of the Creator, who is manifesting himself in the world with his attributes and who is an all-permeating infinite power.
and infinite divine acting. Relation, the causal relation between God and world, appears to be transformed to a dynamic process, in which the infinite is procreated from the One. The Sufi philosopher Ibn Sabʿīn (d. 668/1269 or 669/1271) disagreed with him. Ibn ʿArabiʾs concept, however, appears to be favoured by the Catalan philosopher and mystic Ramon Llull (d. 1315 or 1316 AD), who in his Logica nova developed a concept of relatio substantialis, which shares with the Neoplatonizing Islamic philosophers, including the Sufi philosopher Ibn ʿArabi, the classification of relation as a dynamic and active principle. Moreover, he has in common with Ibn ʿArabi the correlation of divine attributes and Aristotelian categories: In his concept of correlatives he correlates God’s act of creating with the category of action, God’s being a Creator with the category of substance and God’s rule of the world with the category of passion. The category of passion implies a causal relation between God and His creation. Here, the category of relation appears as a dynamic principle and herewith it received a new orientation. It is the result of a long process of the rehabilitation of relation since John Scottus Eriugena and it is the result of Neoplatonizing Islamic thinkers.

1. Introduction

The increasing interest in the concept of relation in modern philosophy is the result of discussions about the ontology of relations in Bertrand Russell (1872-1970) and Francis Herbert Bradley (1846-1924). The controversy about internal and external relations becomes part of a linguistic philosophy, which since Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914) is regarding the category of relation as a triadic relation of a linguistic sign between speaker and interpreting listener. The relation R between a and b, aRb became a topic with many perspectives, which in differing manner concentrate on the differing identities of a, b and R and the differing interpretations of R with regard to its relata. Moreover, in modern linguistics relation played a central role; relation became part of the relational logic, which was discussed by Bertrand Russell in The Principles of Mathematics and by some forerunners and contemporaries in the 19th century. A survey of the discussions in Islamic philosophy will be interesting, as they mirror aspects, which reappear in medieval and modern thought with modifications or were taken up in a selective manner with some actualizing and new accentuations. Simultaneously, our survey will try to give an idea of the context of discussions about the concept of relation in a historical interpretation that sheds light on continuities and discrepancies between past and modern philosophical debates. We will exclude the field of

relational syllogism\textsuperscript{7} in Arabic Logic, which since 2010 is available in an exhaustive monograph\textsuperscript{8}.

2. The Category of Relation in Christian and Syriac Transmission

Our survey of the discussion on the category of relation in Islamic philosophy\textsuperscript{9} must begin with the echo of Aristotle’s \textit{Categories} in the Islamic world. This book, which is part of the \textit{Organon}\textsuperscript{10}, especially chapter 7. 6 a 35 – 8 b 24, was — besides Aristotle, \textit{Metaphysics}\textsuperscript{11} V 15. 1020 b 26 – 1021 b 10 — the main source for discussions about \textit{relatio}\textsuperscript{12}. The first transmitters already in pre-Islamic times were Syriac scholars, who had a great interest in Aristotle’s \textit{Organon}, including the \textit{Categories}\textsuperscript{13}. Their translations of the \textit{Organon}, their extracts and comments mirror not only the philosophical curriculum of late antiquity, which combines Aristotle with Neoplatonic and Christian elements and appears to be a symbiosis of philosophy and theology\textsuperscript{14}; primarily, the motivation of Syriac scholars for their study of Aristotle’s \textit{Organon} was the Christian theology of trinity, moreover, the use of dialectic in Christological discussions and later in the dialogue with Islam\textsuperscript{15}. Already Augustinus (354-430 AD) in his work \textit{De trinitate} betrays knowledge of Aristotle’s \textit{Categories}, especially of the chapter on relation (ch. 7)\textsuperscript{16}. Against this background the chapter on relation in the Syriac commentaries on Aristotle’s \textit{Categories} deserves our interest. We will use as an example the discussion of the relatives in a \textit{Treatise on the Categories of Aristotle, the Philosopher}, addressed to Philotheos and written by Sergius of Rešʿaynāʾ (d. 536 AD)\textsuperscript{17}. As in Aristotle, the related subject, the relative (\textit{da-lwat meddem}) determines the relation and not conversely. Sergius mentions the same examples as Aristotle and adds some more from the Aristotelian commentaries, mostly Ammonius and Philoponus. An addi-
tion is the example of a symmetrical relation $R(x,y) \leftrightarrow R(y,x)$, saying that “equal is equal to equal”\(^{18}\) and the example of a “friend which is friend of a friend”\(^{19}\). Contrary to what Sergius and his sources Ammonius\(^{20}\) and Philoponus\(^{21}\) in accordance with Aristotle\(^{22}\) called relatives “homonymously”, “heteronymously” is called a relative\(^{23}\) in the Aristotelian examples master and slave\(^{24}\) or knower and known\(^{25}\). To these examples Sergius and his Greek sources add the relation of father and son — without realizing the asymmetrical feature of this relation\(^{26}\): $R$ (father, son) is not identical with $R$ (son, father). Nor do they realize the internal relation between father and son\(^{27}\): Only that person can be called father, who can be father of a child. In this sense Augustinus could say in a long discussion and critic of Arians and Sabellians: “dicitur ergo relative pater idemque relative dicitur principium […]”; sed pater ad filium dicitur, principium uero ad omnia quae ab ipso sunt. Item dicitur relative filius”\(^{28}\). Aristotle’s discussion of relation appears to be integrated in Augustinus’ concept of Christian trinity, which is based on the dichotomy of the independent divine essence and the relative\(^{29}\). Augustinus belonged to those Christian theologians, who paved the way for the empathy for Aristotelian logic in Christian and later in Muslim circles\(^{30}\).

After the rise of Islam these Christian theologians became transmitters of Greek texts and thoughts\(^{31}\). They knew Greek, they spoke Syriac-Aramaic and Arabic in the West — or Pehlevi during or after the end of the Sassanian Empire (224–651 AD) in the East. They took over the logical curriculum of Alexandrian philosophers, however in a shortening shape, which included Prophyry’s \textit{Isagoge}, Aristotle’s \textit{Categories}, \textit{De interpretatione} and \textit{Analytica priora} — this work mostly\(^{32}\) only until book I 7\(^{33}\).

3. An 8th-Century Arabic Adaptation Attributed to Ibn al-Muqaffa’

The earliest example in Arabic of this shortening version is a systematizing paraphrase attributed to Muḥammad Ibn ʿAbdallāh Ibn al-Muqaffa’\(^{34}\) in the 8th centu-

\(^{19}\) Elias, 1900: 202, 33f.
\(^{20}\) Ammonius, 1895: 67, 16f.
\(^{21}\) Philoponus (olim Ammonius), 1898: 105, 1f.
\(^{22}\) Aristotle, \textit{Cat.} 1. 1a1-13.
\(^{23}\) Ammonius, 1895: 67, 17-26; Philoponus, 1898: 105, 3-11.
\(^{24}\) Aristotle, \textit{Cat.} 7. 6 a 30; 7 a 35-39.
\(^{25}\) Aristotle “knowledge” and “knowledge of the knowable” (Aristotle, \textit{Cat.} 6 b 34).
\(^{26}\) Cf. Oehler, 1984: 243f.
\(^{27}\) Oehler, 1984: 248.
\(^{30}\) See ch. 6.
\(^{32}\) On the reasons for this shortening version and on exceptions cf. Daiber, 2001: 332-336.
\(^{33}\) \textit{Philosophie in der islamischen Welt} I, 69f. / English version (Gutas): 111f.
ry. The colophon of the unique Beyrouth-Ms. mentions as translator of the work until Analytica priora I 7 the Melkite Christian Hīlyā, whom we cannot identify and whom Dimitri Gutas assumes as the real translator of the work in the midst of the 2nd/8th century. According to Gutas, Ibn al-Muqaffa, the famous prosewriter or translator from Pehlevi, or his son, might have improved the Arabic of the translation, which later again might have been improved by two more translators also mentioned in the colophon of the manuscript, namely the Christian Abū Nūḥ and the Persian Salm from Harran. This explanation has indeed some probability, and in view of the name of the translator, Hīlyā, a rendering of the Christian name Elias with Aramaic ending -ā and the initial <H>, which in Syriac script is a vocal letter for Greek ε, the text might be an Arabic version of one of the numerous Syriac handbooks on Aristotle’s Organon, discussing in a systematic way the main topics from Porphyry’s Isagoge until the Analytica priora I 7. Here we include a translation of the chapter on the relative:

§ 44 After he (sc. Aristotle) had finished the part with the chapter (qismat bāb) on the quantity and (his) record of its specification (ḥilya), he began the chapter on the relative (al-muḍāf). He said: The part on the relative consists of homonyma (al-muttafiq al-asmā’) and heteronyma (al-muḫtalif al-asma’). Examples of the homonyma are the brother, the friend, the comrade (aṣ-ṣāḥib), the companion (al-aṣîr), the partner (aš-šarīk), the neighbour and the similar and so on. Because a man is the brother of his brother, the friend of his friend, the comrade of his comrade and the similar of what is similar to him. Examples of the heteronyma are the height and the bottom, the fundamental (al-aml) and the derivative (al-faṣr), the father and the child, the patron and the citizens (ar-rāʿī wa-r-raʿīya, also “the shepherd and the herd” or “the pastor and the parish”), “the ruler and the ruled”

35. Ibn al-Muqaffa’, 1978. At the end of the 10th century the catalogue of books, the Fihrist by Ibn an-Nadīm, mentions the work by Ibn al-Muqaffa’ as one of the “abbreviations and epitomes”; see the translation by Peters, 1968: 6.
38. Possible Syriacisms: The term qisma in the expressions qismat bāb al- “the part with the chapter” and qismat al-muḍāf an minḥā “the part on the relative consists” is possibly an incorrect rendering of the Syriac purrāšā with the two meanings “separation” and “explanation”, of which the translator erroneously rendered the first meaning “separation” and literally translated it with qisma, apparently with the assumption that qisma has also the second meaning of purrāšā, i.e. “explanation”. — Another example might be hilya “ornament, quality” (Lane s.v.), which we translated with “peculiarity of the relative”: Among possible Syriac renderings of the Syriac dīlāytā “proprietas”, “property, quality, characteristic” or dīlāyūṯā “proprietas”, “property, quality, attribute” or dīlānāyūṯā “proprietas”, “peculiarity, property” seem to have misled the translator to the assumption that hilya has the same semantic field and connotations as dīlāytā, dīlāyūṯā or dīlānāyūṯā. On the Syriac words cf. Payne Smith, 1879-1901: col. 882 and 883 (dīlāytā, dīlāyūṯā, dīlānāyūṯā); col. 3304f. (purrāšā) and the English renderings in Payne Smith, 1990: 439. Possibly this Syriac background affected in Greek-Arabic translations of the 9th century the rendering of ἒνδεκα “Aussehen, Form, Erscheinung” and of χαρακτήρ with hilya. For references see Ullmann, 2002: 304f, and 2007, Supplement II: 796.
39. al-ʿadad for ποσόν (= Aristotle, Cat. 6) also used by Ibn ʿArabī (see Nyberg, 1919: 33). The traditional term is kamm. On the possible Syriacism of the expression qismat bāb see n. 38.
40. On this term, possibly a Syriacism, see n. 38.
§ 45 He said: The substances of things (aʿyān al-umūr) should not be confused with the relation to them (iḍāfatuhā). And nobody should maintain the relation of a riding animal to people with the expression “the horse of so and so” or “the donkey of so and so”. Thus, the horses and the donkeys belong to the category of the relative (al-muḍāf), not to the substances (al-aʿyān). It can be said “the hand of so and so” and “the foot of so and so”: The hands and the feet belong to the relative. Therefore, they do not belong to the substances, but let people know that the horse and the donkey are not related to so and so through its fundamentals. However, both are related to (so and so), because he has both, without being in him some horeness or donkeyness (al-farasiyya wa-l-ḥimāriyya). It is said “the hand of so and so” and “the foot of so and so”; both are related (to so and so) only through interpretation (taʾwīl) of the fundamentals and the derivatives. The fundamentals and the derivatives are related to each other. In this way it can be said “the father of so and so” without occurrence of the relation (between father and child) because of the humanness (al-insāniyya). The father, but not the child is indeed (p. 17) a human before he gets a child. However, they both are related to each other through (their) humanness which exists between both. Each of both belongs to the category of the substances with regard to the fundamental (al-aṣl) and to the category of the relative (al-muḍāf) with regard to (its) relationship (an-nasab).

§ 46 He (Aristotle) has searched for a definition of the relative (al-muḍāf) but was not able. He was content with (its) specification (al-ḥilya) and said: (with regard to) the knowledge of the relative the one shall not precede the other: The father is not known until the child is known; the right side is not known until the left side is known; and the half is not known until the double is known. If one of the two names ceases to exist, (also) the other ceases to exist.

The relative
To (the relative) belong the homonyma (al-muttafiq al-asmāʾ), like the similar and dissimilar, the (one) brother and the (other) brother, the (one) partner (aš-šarīk) and the (other) partner.

The specification (ḥilya) of the relative is (the fact) that the one (the substance) precedes the other (the relative).

To it belong the heteronyma, like the height and the bottom, the father and the child and the fundamental (al-aṣl) and the derivative (al-farʿ) 41.

The text allows two observations:

1) It is written as a guideline to Aristotle’s discussion by concentrating on the crucial points and by admitting that Aristotle was not able to give a clear definition of the relative (Arab. t. 17, 3). The explanation of “relation” is included in a short survey, from which it becomes evident that “the fundamental” (al-aṣl) of “the

substance” (al-ʿayn) precedes “the relative” (al-muḍāf), also called “the derivative” (al-farʿ) and determines “the relation” (al-iḍāfa). The relatives are “homonyma”, in case they have identical names and the same identities, like “humanness” — we can add: If they correlate or if there is a symmetrical relation — otherwise they are “heteronyma”.

2) The examples for “homonyma” and “heteronyma” correspond to those found in Aristotle and the Alexandrian commentators (s. above) — with the following exceptions: Different from the main points at the end of the chapter on the relative, the text at the beginning mentions the additional examples “comrade” (aṣ-ṣāḥib), “companion” (al-ʿašīr), “neighbour” (al-ǧār) and “patron and the citizens” (ar-rāʿī wa-r-raʿiyya). These examples and the example of the “partner” (aš-šarīk) were missing in Aristotle and the commentators. They might be added by the translator or, in our case more likely, by the redactor, supposedly Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ, who in his Kitāb al-ādāb al-kabīr, an instruction in the behaviour of rulers and ruled, used different names for the “friend” and the “comrade”42, including those added in our text to the examples of Aristotle and the commentators.

4. Other Channels of Transmission: Ġābir Ibn Ḥayyān

The text attributed to Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ scarcely had any echo in later philosophical literature43. We can assume that before the Arabic translation of the Categories by Ishāq Ibn Ḥunayn (d. 298/910 or 911) there existed more channels of transmission. A slightly expanded paraphrase of the Categories is excerpted in the Book of Stones (Kitāb al-Aḥǧār) attributed to Ġābir Ibn Ḥayyān and perhaps written “decades after 800 AD”44. Regrettably, this excerpt is restricted to Aristotle, Cat. 8. 8 b 25 - 11 a

43. An echo might be Dāwūd Ibn Marwān al-Muqammiṣ (or: al-Muqammaṣ), ‘Iṣrūn Maqāla, the earliest extant work of Jewish philosophy written in Arabic in the first half of the 9th century in the style of a Kalām work and using Aristotelian logic as a tool for his theology. See the edition and annotated translation by Stroumsa, 1989. A new edition with revised introduction recently appeared in 2016 (see here bibliography). Muqammiṣ gives a list of the 10 categories substance and the accidents “quantity”, “quality”, “relative”, “when”, “where”, “position”, “possession”, “action” and “passion” (ed. transl. Stroumsa, 1989: 55 / 54) similar to Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ (1978: 11, 2-8; cf. 11, 24-12, 5) Both use the Arabic term ḥida “possession” (see Lane, 1893: 2924, col. c); the same term can be found in Ibn Sinā, 1974: 75, 3. Stroumsa wrongly “state (attribution)”. However, there are terminological differences and moreover, Muqammiṣ (ch. 1 § 8, ed. and transl. Stroumsa, 1989: 48/49) contains among other references a quotation from Aristotle, Cat. 8: 11 a 16-20 on the category of quality, which cannot be found in the text of Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ. As al-Muqammiṣ seems to have known Syriac (see Stroumsa, 1989: 19), he might have used a Greek-Syriac textbook, which was also a source of the text attributed to Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ. It might be tempting to parallelize the concept of substance and relative in Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ with the noun and its adjective, musnad and musnad ilayhi and to see a similarity to early grammarians, like al-Farrāʾ and Sībawayh: cf. Ighbariah, 2016: 254-258.
44. David E. Pingree in the foreword to Nomanul Haq, 1994: X; Gannagé (2005: 85 and 92) concludes from her comparison with the translation by Ishāq Ibn Hunayn that the version of the Kitāb al-Aḥḡār is later than Ishāq Ibn Hunayn and must be in its terminology later than the 2nd half of the 9th century. Presumably, the text is not a paraphrase by Ġābir and instead based on a Greek Hellenistic paraphrase.
3745, on “quality” (kayfiyya); only at its end, in the section (Arab. t. 33, 11-17 / transl. 240f.) corresponding to Aristotle, *Cat.* 8.11 a 20-39, we find a remarkable addition to Aristotle’s explanation: Only genera and not particulars can be a relative; knowledge is related to the known, but not to particular knowledge: The Ğābir-text identifies the genera (aǧnās) with “universals” (kullīyya) in contrast to the particulars (al-ġuzwiyāt = al-ġuz’iyāt; al-ašḥās).

5. Alexandrian Repercussions on Kindī and his Student Sarāḥṣī

In a similar manner and presumably during the same time, perhaps in the first half of the 3rd/9th century, the first great Islamic philosopher Kindī (d. between 247/861 and 259/873), also called “philosopher of the Arabs” (faylasūf al-ʿarab), declared the relative to be something “existing without matter” (al-mawḡūd lā ma’a ṭīna); he reckoned it among the “connected predicates of the substance” (al-murakkaba min maḥmūlāt al-ǧawhar) and argued that “fatherhood and sonship derive from the relation that each of the two has to the other and exists through the existence of the other, (just) like the part through the whole. Both are thus in their characterization not connected with matter”46. Kindī, additionally in his division of the categories47, as well as the paraphrase of the Aristotelian text in Ḟābir, follow in their specifications and deviations Alexandrian tradition, as parallels in the commentaries by Olympiodorus, Elias and Simplicius show48. These commentators consider categories in singular cases as something existing in mind49.

Kindī’s distinction between simple (mufrada) and connected “predicates of substances” (maḥmūlāt al-ǧawāhir) is a part of the Alexandrian50 division between

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45. Arabic paraphrase ed. Nomanul Haq, 1994: 30, 1-33, ult.; partly translated and compared with the translation by Ishāq Ibn Hunayn, 230-242. The Arabic text in transliteration, with additional collation of two more mss. and adding a comparison with the translation by Ishāq Ibn Hunayn, can also be found in Gannagé, 2005: 93-101; additional passages can be found on 101-103.

46. Kindī, 1978: 370, 14 - 371, 3. An English translation by Gutas (slightly differing from ours), in addition to some more passages (Kindī, 1978: 370, 11-13; 371, 4 - 372, 1) can be found in Thom, 2015: 31, n. 3. Recently, Adamson and Pormann published an English translation of Kindī’s *Risāla*. See their English translation, 2012: 281-296 and the quoted passage 285, partly differing from our translation; instead of “(just) like the part through the whole. Both are thus in their characterization not connected with matter” the translators have: “But part and whole are not separate from matter in position”, apparently replacing Arabic ʿfī waṣṭihā by ʿfī waḍʿihā.

47. See the article by Thom, 2015: 30-33.


49. Cf. ἐνθύμημα, Olympiodorus, 1902: 55, 28; νοεῖται, Elias, 1900: 159, 15 and below n. 140. Simplicius differs insofar as he considers relation (σχέσις) as ἔννοια and λόγος, in which the relatives participate (Simplicius, 1907: 174, 30 - 175, 3; translated Luna, 1987: 122f.; Simplicius apparently did not consider the relation as product of the intellect, which compares the things (cf. Luna, 1987: 116).

simple and connected categories\textsuperscript{51}. Differing from Aristotle, who regarded the ten categories “substance”, “quantity”, “quality”, “relation”, “where”, “when”, “position”, “possession”, “action” and “passion” as something existing absolutely and “without connection (συμπλοκή)” with something else\textsuperscript{52}, only the first four categories were considered by the Alexandrians as something “simple” (ἁπλαῖ) and the remaining six as “connected” (σύνθετοι)\textsuperscript{53}. Interestingly, this division of the categories reappears in a short summary of the categories by Kindī’s student Aḥmad Ibn at-Ṭayyib as-Saraḫsī (d. 286/899), which until now was assumed to be lost\textsuperscript{54}.

We edit the text from the unique Ms.\textsuperscript{55}:

From a Treatise by Aḥmad Ibn at-Ṭayyib as-Saraḫsī

The categories are ten. They can be divided into two parts, into simple and into connected. The simple consist of four parts: “Substance”, for example heaven and earth; “quantity”, for example two or three cubits\textsuperscript{56}; “quality”, for example whiteness\textsuperscript{57} and blackness; “relative”, for example double of the half and half of the double\textsuperscript{58}. The connected (categories) consist of six parts: “where”, that means a

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\textsuperscript{51} Cf. Elias, 1900: 159, 14-24.
\textsuperscript{52} Aristotle, \textit{Cat.} 4. 1 b 25-26.
\textsuperscript{53} Elias, 1900: 159, 20-21.
\textsuperscript{54} \textit{Muḥtasar (Iḥtisār) Kitāb Qāṭīġūriyās}. The title is mentioned by Rosenthal, 1943: 54 (with reference to Arabic bio-bibliographical sources), followed by Hans Hinrich Biesterfeldt in \textit{Philosophie in der islamischen Welt} I, 151 / English version: 223.
\textsuperscript{55} Saraḫsī, Aya Sofya, 4855 (copied 733/1333), fol. 71r, 1-9.
\textsuperscript{56} Ms.
\textsuperscript{57} The example can be found in Aristotle, \textit{Cat.} 4. 1 b 30 and Elias, 1900: 158, 35.
\textsuperscript{58} The example can be found in Aristotle, \textit{Cat.} 4. 2 a 1 and Elias, 1900: 158, 35.
\textsuperscript{59} Aristotle, \textit{Cat.} 4. 2 a 1 (“double, half, greater”); Elias, 1900: 159, 1 has the example of father and son.
A substance can be connected with a place, for example so-and-so in the market\(^60\); “when”, that means a substance can be connected with time, for example so-and-so was yesterday\(^61\) and will be tomorrow; “possession”, that means a substance can be connected with another substance, for example so-and-so has a slave and a servant\(^62\); “position” \(^63\) \((\text{nūṣba})\), that means a substance can be connected with another substance, for example so-and-so stands upright on the earth\(^63\); “action”, that means a substance can be connected with quality, for example so-and-so cuts and so-and-so burns\(^64\); “passion”, that means a substance can be connected with quality, for example being cut and being burnt\(^65\).


Like his teacher Kindī\(^66\), Saraḫsī was engaged in disputes with Christians and could use his knowledge of the Aristotelian \textit{Organon} in his arguments against the Christians, especially against the doctrine of the trinity\(^67\).

The method to use Greek logic against Christian doctrine and belief continued to be a standard in the 10\(^{th}\) century — despite some dispute between Christian and Muslim scholars about the value of logic: I refer to the discussion in 319/932 between the Nestorian Abū Bišr Mattā Ibn Yūnus and the Muslim scholar Abū Saʾīd as-Strāfī (d. 368/979), a commentator of the grammar by Sibawayh (d. ca. 180/796)\(^68\). According to Abū Bišr, logic is a universal valid vehicle of intelligible things for all nations and superior to languages, which differ among the people and require logic in their grammar. Despite the compromise of Abū Bišr’s pupil Yahyā Ibn ʿAdī (d. 363/974) to identify logic with universal grammar that is behind any particular language, Sīrāfī defends language as only access to intelligible things. Against Hellenism he propagates “clear Arabic language” as it is revealed by God in the Qurʾān.

This reminds us of the Andalusian scholar Ibn Ḥazm (d. 456/1064) who, through his teachers, seems to have had some links with the Baghdad school of logic, including Abū Bišr Mattā Ibn Yūnus\(^69\). He used the Aristotelian \textit{Organon} in his critique of Christian belief and in addition he based his refutation on the textual basis of the Qurʾān and its “clear” (\textit{ẓāhir}) meanings. His logical work \textit{at-Taqrīb}...
*li-ḥadd al-mantiq*\(^70\) (written between 1025 and 1029) is written as a methodological introduction to his theology and his refutation of Christianity. It begins with Porphyry’s *Isagoge* and continues with the *Categories, On Interpretation*, followed by *Analytica priora, Analytica posteriora, Topics* and *Sophistical Refutations*, which Ibn Ḥazm joins together under the title *Kitāb al-Burhān* “Book on Demonstration”, finally *Rhetorics* and *Poetics*. As in his critique of Kindī’s metaphysics, which is mainly based on the Neoplatonism of Proclus\(^71\), Ibn Ḥazm propagates in his refutation of Christianity a strict concept of God’s transcendence, of God’s *tawḥīd*. Ibn Ḥazm based his critique on concepts of logic and language in the *Organon* and the clear meanings of the Qurʾān. The Christians, however, distorted and falsified (*tabdīl, tahrīf*) their fundamentals, the gospels which were full of contradictions (*munāqaḍāt*)\(^72\). Aristotle’s categories (*Cat. 2-5*) are universals\(^73\) of language (not only of Arabic)\(^74\). Similar to the nominalism of medieval scholastics they are mere terms\(^75\), which on the basis of logic are a tool for the correct reflection and knowledge of Creator, creation and the fundamentals of religion, its texts, which must be interpreted as they are and not allegorically. Language and logic are in the service of Islamic theology and polemics against Christianity.

Here, Aristotle’s concept of relation in his *Categories* becomes fundamentally important. Ibn Ḥazm\(^76\) mentions it as one of the “four fundamentals” (*ar-ruʾūs al-arbaʿa*)\(^77\) “substance”, “quantity”, “quality” and “relation”\(^78\), which as we have seen\(^79\), in accordance with the Alexandrian and Kindian tradition appear as “simple” categories and which can be “connected” with the categories “when” (*az-zamān*)\(^80\), “where” (*al-makān*)\(^81\), “position” (*an-nuṣba*)\(^82\), “possession” (*al-milk*)\(^83\), “action” (*al-fāʿil*)\(^84\) and “passion” (*al-munfaʿil*)\(^85\). According to Ibn Ḥazm, God’s names, His attributes, correctly must be understood as categories without relation to the created, as this would contradict God’s transcendence. Through reason (*al-ʿaql*) the soul comes to know that “the (divine) acting (*al-fāʿ il*) is acting

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72. See the monograph by Behloul, 2002 and 2013.
79. See above ch. 5.
(fā‘il) through (His) action (bi-l-fi‘l) or endowed with action (ḏū l-fi‘l)’\(^{86}\). Here-with, Ibn Ḥazm contradicts those, who maintain in an unacceptable syllogism:

- The acting is a body because of its action
- the Creator is acting
- therefore the Creator is a body\(^{87}\).

Ibn Ḥazm was aware of the existence of an asymmetrical relation between God and creation. God’s acting, hearing, seeing and being living, as it is mentioned in the Qur’ān, do not require a correlative. These attributes are proper names of the Creator, who is neither genus nor species or bearer of accidents\(^{88}\). Herewith, the Creator cannot be called one of the simple or connected categories. The expression “God is acting” has the meaning that the predicate “is acting” has a relation to God — not because God is a substance and has the accident “acting”. Simultaneously, God’s acting does not require an object. God’s \(\text{autarkeia}\)\(^{89}\) became a first step in a deviation from the concept of a substance; God is not a substance with accidents, to which God’s creation is “related” (muḍāf), because of the accidents of this substance; therefore, Kindī’s concept of a relation between the divine ʿilla, the cause, and its creation, the \(\text{ma‘lūl}\), the caused, restricts God’s transcendence.

Ibn Ḥazm combines his concept of logic as a tool for everyone\(^{90}\) with his ideal of striving after knowledge through everyone, as far as he is capable to do so\(^{91}\).

Here, it is helpful to draw the attention to an encyclopedia, compiled shortly before Ibn Ḥazm in scholarly circles of the Irak, the \(\text{Rasā‘il Iḥwān as-Ṣafā}’, \text{The Epistles of the Brethren of Purity}\). They propagate the striving after encyclopedic knowledge with the aim to “purify the soul and improve the character” as a way of salvation leading to the final stage in the other world\(^{92}\). Knowledge includes logic, one of the propaedeutical sciences, preceding natural sciences, psychology and epistemology, finally theology and religious sciences. The section on logic (\text{Epistles} 10-14)\(^{93}\) is considered as the best way to truth, to God, a tool to help men to imitate God\(^{94}\). It starts with a paraphrase (with deviations) of Porphyry’s \text{Isagoge-}

\(^{89}\) See on this Neoplatonic concept in Ibn Ḥazm, Daiber, 1986a: 289f.
\(^{90}\) Herewith, he differs from Ibn Sīnā or Ibn Rušd and apparently also from scholars in Alexandria, according to whom Aristotle was understandable only by those, who were capable to it. Cf. Behloul, 2002: 30-33, with reference to Gutas. With regard to Ibn Sīnā, we should be aware that this philosopher regarded philosophical truth as something based on intuition and divine inspiration, which is not accessible to everyone. The limitations of knowledge, according to Ibn Sīnā, do not justify to attribute to him an obfuscatory method with the purpose to conceal knowledge from the unworthy. Cf. Daiber, 2004b.
\(^{92}\) Cf. Daiber, rev. of Susanne Diwald (\text{Arabische Philosophie und Wissenschaft in der Enzyklopädie, Kitāb Iḥwān as-Ṣafā}’ (III), Wiesbaden 1975), Orientalistische Literaturzeitung 76, 1981, col. 46f.; \text{Philosophie der islamischen Welt} 1, 536 / English version 756 (Daniel De Smet).
\(^{93}\) Edited and translated by Baffioni, 2010.
\(^{94}\) Cf. Baffioni, 2010: 2-3; 16.
ge (Epistle 10)\(^{95}\) and continues with Aristotle’s Categories (Epistle 11)\(^{96}\) and De Interpretatione (Epistle 12)\(^{97}\). The following references to Aristotle’s Prior Analytics (Epistle 13)\(^{98}\) and Posterior Analytics (Epistle 14)\(^{99}\) are limited. As Epistle 13 mainly quotes from the first six chapters of Aristotle’s Analytica priora book I\(^{100}\) and as Aristotle’s Topics, Sophistical Refutations, Rhetoric and Poetics are omitted\(^{101}\), we are reminded of the restricted curricula of the Alexandrians and their echo in Syriac and early Arabic textbooks on logic, beginning with Prophyry’s Isagoge and ending with Aristotle’s Analytica priora I 7. A confirmation of the Alexandrian background\(^{102}\) is the classification of logic as “mental logic” (al-manṭiq al-fikrī) or “mental concepts” or “forms”\(^{103}\). Following Neoplatonic philosophy, the Epistles let them emanate from God into the active intellect, then into the Universal Soul, into prime matter and finally into the human souls\(^{104}\). Consequently, any spoken language, the linguistic logic, mirrors that mental logic, a higher reality. This linguistic logic is more than grammar and enables reason, by using syllogism, to reveal contradictions of speeches and to distinguish between falsehood and truth\(^{105}\).

Further Alexandrian traditions are mirrored in the chapter on the relatives\(^{106}\):

1) The Epistles distinguish between “parallel” (an-naẓīr) and “non-parallel” (ḡayr an-naẓīr) relatives, what corresponds to the Alexandrian distinction between “homonyma” and “synonyma”\(^{107}\); to the examples of both kinds, taken from Aristotle\(^{108}\) the Epistles add examples found in Alexandrian commentators, in the Syriac text of Sergius and in the Arabic Epitome attributed to Ibn al-Muqaffa\(^{109}\).

100. As has been observed by Baffioni, 2010: 23.
101. See Baffioni, 2010: 3.
102. Cf. above ch. 2 and 5.
107. See above ch. 2. Accordingly the explanation by Baffioni, 2010: 11 must be revised. The same distinction with mostly identical examples (taken from the Alexandrian tradition) reappears later in Ibn Ḥazm, 1978: 162, 14 - 163, 5. Against Ramón Guerrero, 2013: 413, this can be taken as an indication that Ibn Hazm had some knowledge of the Epistles, which seem to have been known in Andalus around 1000 AD.
108. See the references to Aristotle, given in the notes in Baffioni, 2010: 94.
109. Namely the examples of the brother, the neighbour and the friend. See above ch. 2 and 3.
2) The Epistles distinguish between four simple and six composite relatives\(^{110}\), without giving a clear information about the simple four categories (i.e. “substance”, “quality”, “quantity”, “relation”). They can be combined with the six categories “where”, “when”, “position”, “possession”, “action” and “passion”, which are described in detail\(^{111}\).

The texts and their authors, whom we have discussed so far, mirror the Aristotelian concept of categories and Aristotle’s explanation of the category “relation”, often shaped by the Alexandrian commentators and increasingly by Neoplatonic philosophy about God’s transcendence and the emanations. This reveals to be an important background for new accentuations after the first great philosopher Kindī— namely in Fārābī, Ibn Sīnā and Ibn Ruṣd.

7. Stoic-Neoplatonic Repercussions of Relation on Abū l-Farağ Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib

Before we enter into the discussion of these philosophers we should mention, for the sake of completeness, an epigone of the Aristotelian-Alexandrian tradition at the turn from the 10\(^{th}\) to the 11\(^{th}\) century, the Nestorian Christian Abū l-Farağ Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib in Baghdad (d. 435/1043)\(^{112}\). His commentary on Aristotle’s Categories follows Alexandrian tradition, especially Olympiodorus\(^{113}\). The section on “relation”\(^{114}\) has been analysed by the editor of the Arabic text\(^{115}\). Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib was mainly concerned with an explanation of the Aristotelian text, which is in parts included and systematically commented along Alexandrian tradition, mainly with regard to formal aspects, the arrangement of the categories, their kinds, their nature, their description and their terminology. At first sight the result is not very original. It deserves our attention as his Alexandrian distinction between homonymy and heteronymy of the “relative” (al-muttafiqa asmāʾuhā / al-mutabāyina asmāʾuhā)\(^{116}\), which we come across since the 8\(^{th}\) century\(^{117}\), stimulated Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib to some reflexion on the role of the intellect (al-ʿaql) in the comparison (muqāyasa)\(^{118}\). Relativa, which are “distant from each other” (al-mutabāʾīdāt), can only be “understood” (yufham) by analogy (qiyās)\(^{119}\). And in the discussion of Aristotle, Cat. 7. 8 a 13 — 8 b 21 and 7 b 15 — 8 a 12 about the relativa of the whole and the part of it, Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib distinguishes between the perceived

\(^{110}\) On this cf. above ch. 5 the texts by Kindī and his pupil Saraḫsī and their Alexandrian background.


\(^{113}\) See edition and analysis by Ferrari, 2006.

\(^{114}\) Ed. Ferrari, 2006: 251-300.


\(^{116}\) Cf. (partly with varying terminology) ed. Ferrari, 2006: 253, 2 (nisbat al-wifāq wa-l-ḥilāf); 253, 6 and 14f.; 257, 32f.; 258, 1; 261, 16 - 262, 2; 288, 21-28, etc.

\(^{117}\) See above ch. 3.


(al-maḥsūs) of a “corporal substance” (al-ḡawhar al-ḡusmānī) and the “intelligible” (al-maʿqūl), “the form ocuring in the soul” (aṣ-ṣūra al-hāṣila fī n-naṣṣ)\textsuperscript{120}, also called “the image of the perceived” (miṯāl al-maḥsūs)\textsuperscript{121}. This distinction appears to be important in another discussion of Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib, namely in his commentary on Aristotle, *Cat.* 2. 1 a 16 — 1 b 9, on the qualities of substance and accident\textsuperscript{122}. How can the form be part and not accident of what is composed of form and matter? What is the relation between accident and its substrate? In his report on the different solutions, which partly are mirrored in the Alexandrian commentaries, Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib tends to assume a similarity between the being of the accident and the being of the form in the substrate. Because accidents require the perceivable matter (hayūla qarība “near matter”) as a substrate, which is composed of matter and its accident “form”\textsuperscript{123}, Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib can declare the whole and its parts as identical; the form becomes the composition of all its parts and thus makes its substrate, the matter, perceivable\textsuperscript{124}. Here, we must pay attention to the interdependence of form, matter and accident. Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib illustrates this with his example of the aroma/smell of an apple, which, according to him, shapes the surrounding air, and the form of this shaped air will be imprinted in our senses. Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib refutes other proposals, which he found in the Alexandrian commentaries\textsuperscript{125} and remarkably declares the imprint of the air in the senses to be a “spiritual” (rūḥānī) imprint, different from the “bodily” (ḡusmānī) imprint of the form in the matter\textsuperscript{126}. As Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib considers the imprints in the air and subsequently in the senses as substrates with corresponding forms, his proposal is not very distant from the explanation attributed to Plotinus, according to which the smell of the apple is a substance and not an accident\textsuperscript{127}. Even the second solution, according to which the bodily vapour of the smell is dissolved and then shapes the air, is similar to the proposal attributed to Plotinus and ascribed to him by Olympiodorus\textsuperscript{128}.

The allusion to Plotinus and the classification of sense perceptions, like the smell of an apple, as a “spiritual” imprint in the senses, in my opinion does not allow an explanation from the background of Aristotle’s doctrine of sense-perception (*De anima*, book B 419 a), as has been proposed\textsuperscript{129} under the impression of Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib himself, who attributed his solution to the school of Aristotle\textsuperscript{130}. In my opinion we should have a look in another direction, in the Stoic discussion of “relation” and its transcendental aspects. Its echo in Neoplatonic philosophy became influential in the 10\textsuperscript{th} century, in the *Epistles of the Brethren of Purity* and

\begin{itemize}
\item 121. Ed. Ferrari, 2006: 285, 31
\item 122. Ed. Ferrari, 2006: 55-69. Cf. the article by Ferrari, 2004 (the pages 92-105 are nearly identical with the pages 63-74 in Ferrari, 2006).
\item 123. Ferrari, 2004: 94f.
\item 126. Ferrari, 2004: 100
\item 127. Ferrari, 2004: 98; cf. 98 and 102f.
\item 128. Ferrari, 2004: 103.
\item 129. Ferrari, 2004: 104.
\item 130. Ferrari, 2004: 100.
\end{itemize}
their classification of the intellect as mediator between God and human soul\footnote{131}. As has been shown in a monograph from the year 1986\footnote{132}, the Stoics detected the “relation” as a universal valid category, in which all single entities are connected in the totality of all things. This totality of all things is the cosmos, which is penetrated by the \textit{pneuma}, the \textit{hegemomonikos}, the \textit{tonos}, that determines the dynamic process of interaction. The Stoic concept of the immanence of the \textit{pneuma}, the divine dynamic and continuous medium, is mirrored in the Stoic doctrine of the interpenetration of all substances, of the total mixture of matter and \textit{pneuma}\footnote{133}. This interpenetration of all substances became important for the Stoic theory of the relations of “place” (prerequisites of quantitative and qualitative identity, similarity and dissimilarity), “time” and movement as well as “action” and “passion”\footnote{134}. Because of their universality these relations were considered as primary structures, which were object of thought and perceivable in a dynamic and time-related process of realization, the \textit{physis} in the relatives, the secondary things\footnote{135}. As these secondary things, the beings, were dynamic processes, they can only be the object of a propositional logic, in which names and concepts remain incomplete statements\footnote{136}. Their primary structure of “relation” is something transcendental\footnote{137}, which, as determining norm of all single realizations, becomes the \textit{logos} and in the unity beyond the objective reality the divine \textit{nous}\footnote{138}. Consequently, in this theory of “relation”, the “relation” appears to be the form, the primary structure of different \textit{relata}, which correspond to this form\footnote{139}.

Only spolia of this Stoic concept of “relation” did enter Islamic philosophy, namely through the mediation of Neoplatonism, in which the Stoic immanence of the divine dynamic medium, the \textit{pneuma}, is replaced by a concept of the divine One, who as divine intellect is both — immanent and transcendent\footnote{140}. Here, two aspects become important in the Islamic period: The role of reason and intellect in the reflexion on the category of “relation” and the emanation of the divine intellect determining the concept of “relation” created in the human soul. We mentioned Ibn Ḥazm, the \textit{Epistles of the Brethren of Purity} and Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib, who possibly were inspired by some Alexandrian Neoplatonizing commentators of Aristotle\footnote{141}.

We shall consider now the place of the great philosophers Fārābī, Ibn Sīnā and Ibn Rušd between philosophical linguistic and metaphysical interpretations of the “relation”. Here, the texts which we have discussed so far, will be a helpful background for their interpretations.

\footnote{131}{See above ch. 6, n. 103.}
\footnote{132}{Löbl, 1986.}
\footnote{133}{Alexander of Aphrodisias dedicated a work to this doctrine: see Todd, 1976, quoted by Löbl, 1986: 120.}
\footnote{134}{Löbl, 1986: 120-129.}
\footnote{135}{Löbl, 1986: 132.}
\footnote{136}{Löbl, 1986: 132f.}
\footnote{137}{Löbl, 1986: 134-141.}
\footnote{138}{Löbl, 1986: 137.}
\footnote{139}{Löbl, 1986: 129.}
\footnote{140}{Cf. Daiber, 2015a: 9.}
\footnote{141}{Cf. ἐνθύμημα, Olympiodorus, 1902: 55, 28; νοεῖται, Elias, 1900: 159, 15. — Cf. n. 50.}
8. Fārābī

Fārābī (258/872 — 339/950 or 951) seems to have been the first Muslim philosopher, who had written a word-by-word commentary on Aristotle’s *Categories*, which is classified as “Long commentary” (*Tafsīr, Šarḥ*). Only fragments are available in a Hebrew version, perhaps by Šemuel of Marseilles from the 14th century. Regrettably, they do not contain Fārābī’s comments on the category of “relation”. Another treatise by Fārābī, his *Book on the Categories* (*Kitāb Qāṭāġūriyās*), is in fact an expanding version based on the Arabic translation by Ishāq Ibn Ḥunayn (died 910 or 911 AD), and not a “paraphrase”. It is a kind of preparatory work to Fārābī’s *Book of Letters*, *Kitāb al-Ḥurūf*, which we will discuss later. Fārābī mentions the main points of Aristotle, but in a slightly differing order, with new accentuations and with additions. The chapter on the relatives is followed by aspects, which were discussed by Aristotle separately on different places and which were studied by Fārābī as something referring to “relation”, namely “time” and “place”. The last-mentioned category is followed in the Fārābī-text by sections on the categories “position”, “possession”, “passion” (*an yanfaʿil*) and “action” (*an yafʿala*). The complete sequence corresponds to Aristotle. Fārābī, however, does not consider “position”, “possession”, “passion” and “action” as belonging to the category “relation”, nor does he include “quantity” and “quality”. The category “quality”, according to him, can be confused with “relation”, because of its ambiguity with regard to genus and

145. §§ 29-31; cf. Aristotle, *Cat*. 12 and 13; as part of quantity *Cat*. 6. 5 b 5f.
146. §§ 32-33; cf. Aristotle, *Cat*. 6. 6 a 12, as part of quantity.
150. *Cat*. 4. 1 b 26-28; the sections themselves in the following text keep to this sequence, with the exception of the sections on time (see n. 146) and place (see n. 147).
species. According to Fārābī, the same ambiguity exists in “the other categories, for example “substance” (al-ǧawhar), “position” (al-wad”), etc.154

This is the reason why Fārābī does not follow the Alexandrians and the school of Kindī, where the categories “substance” (Aristotle, Cat. 5), “quality” (Aristotle, Cat. 8), “quantity” (Aristotle, Cat. 6) and “relation” (Aristotle, Cat. 7) were considered as belonging to the “simple” part and as combinable with the “connective” categories “time”, “place”, “position”, “possession”, “passion” and “action”. In the section on the category “when” Fārābī explicitly dissociates himself from unnamed scholars (apparently the Alexandrians and the school of Kindī), who declare the meaning of “when” as “time” (zamān) or as something composed from “substance” (ǧawhar) and “time”155. And in his Book on the Letters Fārābī criticizes unnamed scholars, who in differing manner declare kinds of “connections” (asnâf an-nisab) between things as “relation” (idâfa)156. Not everything that has a kind of connection with something else can be classified as “relation”. First indications of Fārābī’s own view we find in the mentioned Book on the Categories: Here, Fārābī mentions the “particles of connections” (ḥurūf an-nisab)157, which are “employed in referring each one (of the relatives) to the other” and he mentions the condition that essence (mâhiya) and “existence” (wuǧūd) of the correlated things “have a certain kind of relation”. In addition, in the description (yūṣafu) of the “relation” the names (asmâʾ) should indicate the “essence” and “existence” of both relatives158. In case there are no generally accepted names (asmâʾ mašhûra)159, common people (al-ǧumhūr) in a careless and arbitrary way use names, which actually belong to another category and they add “particles of connection”160. Here, Fārābī adds chapters on the peculiarities (ḫawāṣṣ) of the “relation”, which should avoid confusion about the relation between two things: He mentions as conditions the “homogeneity in the speech” (at-takāfuʾ fi l-qawl) with regard to two relatives (“the son” is “the son of the father”)161; the simultaneousness of two relatives (wuǧūduhumā maʿan)162; the equality of the relatives with regard to their genus, species or individuality163 and the existence of “generally accepted names” (al-asmâʾ al-mašhûra)164.

From this background we shall have a look at the section on “relation” in Fārābī’s Book of Letters (Kitāb al-Hurûf) where he clarifies and, above all, specifies his own position165:

§ 41 (p. 85, 9). Each of two relatives is related to the other through one common notion (maʿnā), which simultaneously exists for each one. An example is two relatives being Alif and Bāʾ: If that common notion is taken to be the letters “Alif until Bāʾ”, [thereby the letter Alif is related to Bāʾ], If it is taken to be the letters “Bāʾ until Alif” [until Alif]”, thereby the letter Bāʾ is related to Alif. That common notion is “relation” (idāfa). Through this each one of both can be said to be related to the other. That single notion is the way (tarīq) between the roof and the earth of the house, which is called descent (hubūṭ), if its beginning is taken from the roof and its ending (p. 85, 15) on the earth; and it is called ascent (ṣuʿūd), if its beginning is made from the earth and its ending the roof. There is no difference (in the notion), taken its two outermost points. Similarly, the two relatives are the outermost points of the relation, so that (the relation) one time can be taken from Alif to Bāʾ and the other time from Bāʾ to Alif.

§ 42. Some of the kinds of relation do not at all have a name (ism). Consequently, two relatives have no name insofar as they have that kind of relation. Thus, the names of both, which (p. 85, 20) indicate their essences, cannot be deduced from their being two relatives, so that they both could be used in the relation. (P. 86, 1) The notion of relation does not become evident in both.

Some (of the kinds of relation) have a name, if (that name) is taken for one of both (outermost points). (Some) have no name, if (that name) is taken for the other (outermost point), so that the name of that other (outermost point), which through the relation indicates its essence, could be used and (so that) the name of the first (outermost point), which indicates its (essence), (could be used), because it has that kind of relation.

<Some (of the kinds of relation) have two names, of which each one (of the relatives) indicates one of the two relatives, insofar as it has that (p. 86, 5) kind of relation>. Thus, the name ([of the “relative”) indicating it insofar as it has that kind of relation, can be taken for both in the relation of each one to the other. To these (kinds of relation) belong (two relatives), of which the names differ from each other — for example “father” and “son”. To that belong (two relatives) that have two names, (each) derivable from something, like “the owner” (al-mālik) and the “owned” (al-mamlūk); to that belong (two relatives), where the name of the one can be derived from the other, like “the knower” (al-ʿalīm) and “the known” (al-maʿlūm); to that belong (two relatives), where the names of both are completely identical, like “the friend” and “the friend” (aṣ-sadīq), “the partner” (p. 86, 10) and “the partner” (aš-šārīk). In many things, that have two names, the speaker in a careless manner can take the one or each one in relation to the other and pertaining to the other, being indicated through the names of both, which indicate the very essence of both (muğarrad dāṭayhimā). He does so, without taking the names of both (relatives), which give an indication of themselves, because of some kind of relation, through which each one could be related to the other — as we can say “the ox of Zayd”. For, neither the ox nor Zayd indicate a kind of relation, because of which the ox could be attributed (p. 86, 15) to Zayd. However, if we say “the ox, owned (by someone) — Zayd is his owner”, (the words) “owned” (al-mamlūk) and “the owner” (al-mālik) are the names of both, insofar they both have that kind of relation. “Zayd” is his name, which indicates the essence of what is related to him, but it
does not indicate it, because he has this kind of relation. If we would say “so-and-so is the slave of Zayd, his master”, we would designate both with their names, which indicate both, because they both have this kind of relation. To the relatives belong two correlatives (al-mutaḍāyifāni), the genus of which is a name for each one of both, because they both possess the genus of the relation(ship), which they both have; they both do not possess a (common) name, because they both have some kind of relation(ship) belonging to that genus, (p. 87, 1) for example “knowledge” (al-ʿilm) and “the known” (al-maʿlūm). Thus, “knowledge” (al-ʿilm) is knowledge belonging to the “known” (al-maʿlūm) and the “known” (al-maʿlūm) is known as belonging to “knowledge” (al-ʿilm). The (different) kinds of knowledge do not have a name, because kinds of relation belong to them — of which knowledge is its genus — with the kinds of the known which is the genus of (the “relative”). An example (is) “grammar” (an-naḥw) and “rhetoric” (al-ḫaṭāba): With regard to that it is not possible to say: “The grammar is grammar of something which is known as “grammar”; however, if we want to relate grammar to something (p. 87, 5) from the known things of grammar, to which it (can) have a relation, we take (grammar) as something with the attribute of a genus and we say: “Grammar is knowledge of something (aš-šayʾ) which is known as grammar”.

§ 43. The condition of two relatives is, that each of them is taken as something, which is indicated by its name, which indicates it because it has that kind of relation. Therefore, Aristotle said: “Two relatives are those, which are found to be related in some kind of relation”\(^{166}\). And therefore, (p. 87, 10) if we find in the language something related to something else through some particle (ḥarf) of relation or if the shape of (the two relatives) or of one of them is the shape of a “relative”, it is not appropriate to say: “They both are relatives, until their names indicate them, because they both have that kind of relation”. Then it is appropriate to say that they both are relatives.

§ 44. The general public, the orators (al-ḫuṭabāʾ) and the poets are careless and arbitrary in their expression. (P. 87, 15) Therefore, they declare each of both (relatives), of which the one is said to be with regard (bi-l-qiyās) to the other, to be a relative: (These two relatives) exist through their names, which indicate them, because they have that kind of relation; or they exist through their names, which indicate their essences (ḏāt); or one of (both relatives) can be obtained through its name, which indicates its essence. Herewith, the “relative” can be described (yursamu) primarily, as the “relative” unhesitatingly has this description. Therefore, (p. 87, 20) Aristotle described (the related) at the beginning of the chapter on the “relative” in his \textit{Book of the Categories}, with the words: “About things it is maintained that they belong to the relatives, when their essences (māhiyātuhā) are maintained with regard to the other, in some manner of connection (nisba), whatever manner it is”\(^{167}\). (Aristotle) had in mind with his saying “their essences” what its expressions (alḥāzuhā) indicate at any rate\(^{168}\) and generally. (The expression) indicates

167. The quotation is a literal rendering (with few deviations, perhaps due to the transmission of Fārábī’s \textit{Kitāb al-Ḥurūf}) of the Arabic translation by Ibn Ḥunayn, 1980: 48, 8-9 (= Aristotle, \textit{Cat.} 7. 6 a 36f.).
168. Read \textit{kayfamā} instead of \textit{kayfa}.
(the essences), because (the essences) are kinds (p. 88, 1) of relation, belonging to them. Or, what is indicated through its expressions are its essences (ḏawāṭuḥā). Therefore, as Aristotle was eager to outline the notions of the “relative”, from them necessarily resulted what is evident in (the situation) that the first description (by Aristotle\textsuperscript{169}) is not (yet) a sufficient definition of the “relative”. — Then (Aristotle) allotted another description (rasm) to the “relative”\textsuperscript{170} and thus the notion of the “relative” is accomplished by that (description) as one single notion, which is reached through a definition (ḥadd)\textsuperscript{171} of the relatives, without any disturbance\textsuperscript{172}.

§ 45 (p. 88, 5). These are the relatives, this is the relation, and these are the names that should be maintained with regard to the “relative” and the relation. All you hear, what the Arabic grammarians say about (the relatives) that they are related, belongs to the “relative” of which we mentioned the aspects that exist among the orators and poets and which correspond to the first (insufficient)\textsuperscript{173} description, that Aristotle applied to the “relative” in his book On Categories. They are, however, relatives (in which) the relator (al-muḍīf) is remiss or arbitrary in making (p. 88, 10) one thing related to the other in an equal relation. This is not in accordance with <the second-mentioned>\textsuperscript{174} description, which Aristotle dedicated in that book to the “relative”. You should call the “relative” only what belongs to the second-mentioned description. This is a relation, in which the one is related to the other in an equal relation.

§ 46 (p. 88, 15). The way to give an answer on “where is something?” is primarily by (mentioning) the “place” (al-makān) in connection with one of the relational particles, mostly with the particle “in” (fī), as we say: “Where is Zayd?”, whereupon it is answered: “In the house” or “in the market”. — The notion of these particles that precedes in the thought of man, is the relation of something to a place or to its place, which it has in particular (ḥāṣṣatan), either because of its kind (li-nawʿiḥī) or because of its genus (li-ǧinsihī). It seems that these particles can be transferred to all things, whenever in them a relation to the place can be imagined (tuḥayyal). As the place is enclosing and surrounding something and as the thing related to the place is surrounded by the place — thus the surrounded is surrounding the surrounded and the surrounded (p. 89, 1) herewith is surrounded by the surrounding — therefore the place with this notion belongs to the “relative”. In addition, as Aristotle defined the place in his Physics\textsuperscript{175} and said “it is the limit of the surrounding (nihāyat al-muḥīṭ)”, he made the surrounding a part of the definition of place and he made the essence (māhiya) (of the place) complete through its being surrounding. Through its being (in(n)jīyya/an(n)jīyya) it is surrounding; the surrounding is

\textsuperscript{169} Given at the beginning of Aristotle, Cat. 7, see above.

\textsuperscript{170} In the sections following the introductory definition in Aristotle, Cat. 7.


\textsuperscript{172} wa-lam yuḫalla. Cf. the expression fa-lā taḫtalla in Fārābī’s Kitāb Qāṭāʿūriyās (ed. Dunlop, 1957/1959: 181, 10).

\textsuperscript{173} See above § 43 in Fārābī’s text.

\textsuperscript{174} Fārābī means Aristotle’s detailed discussion after his first short and thus insufficient definition at the beginning of Aristotle, Cat. 7; see above § 44 in Fārābī’s text.

\textsuperscript{175} Cf. Aristotle, Physics IV, ch. 4.
surrounding that, what is surrounded and the surrounded by it is what (exists) in a place. If the notion (p. 89, 5) of our saying “in” is “surrounded”, then our saying “in” here indicates the relatives. Consequently, the answer to “where?” belongs to the relatives. Hence, “where” belongs to the relatives.

§ 47. However, if we do not mean with our saying “Zayd is in the house” that he is surrounded by the house — although in accordance with the definition of the place he necessarily must be surrounded — and (if) we do not mean with our saying “in the house” this (kind) of relation, but another connection (nisba), which does not belong to (p. 89, 10) the relatives, in that case the category of “where” does not belong to the relatives and it happens to (that category) that it is (assigned) to the relatives not with respect to what the category “where” (normally) is and because herewith an answer is given upon the question “where?”. The meaning of the particle (ḥarf) “in” here becomes another connection (nisba), different from the connection of relation (nisbat al-iḍāfa). Now, if to that (connection) at the same time the connection of relation is attached, it has two kinds of connections with the place: One is appropriate for giving an answer upon (the question) “where?” and the other becomes through that (connection) a part of (p. 89, 15) the relation.

§ 48. However, for example in our saying “the ox of Zayd”, and “the slave (ḡulām) of Zayd” someone could utter something that prevents (this connection) to have two connections, in one of which exists the name of each of both that indicates its essence (ḏāt). That does not belong to the relatives (al-muḍāf). It belongs to the relatives (al-muḍāf) (only), if of each one of both the description (rasm) is kept that indicates (the “relative”), because it has some kind of relation (iḍāfa) (p. 89, 20). In case it is not so and instead this and similar things are relatives, the expression of which is tolerated — how should our saying “Zayd is in the house” not be a “relative”, the expression of which is tolerated? If its expression is presented, then it could be said: “Zayd, who is surrounded by it, is in the house, which surrounds him” and then it would be clear that (this) belongs to the relatives. If our saying “this ox belongs to Zayd” and “this speech belongs to Zayd” do not receive two connections, <one connection that is not (p. 90, 1) a relation (iḍāfa) and> (another) connection, which is indicated in our saying “this ox which is owned by Zayd who possesses him” — then the connected in that first connection, which is not a relation (iḍāfa) has a relation in another respect and in addition even or saying “this ox belongs to Zayd” from the beginning can be made a relation, the expression of which is tolerated, relying (ittikālan) on what is in the mind (ḍamīr) of the listener and on (the fact) that only the possession of Zayd can be understood from it. (P. 90, 5) How can, in addition, our saying “Zayd is in the house” apriori not be made a relation, which is tolerated in its expression, relying on what is in the mind (ḍamīr) of the listener and (on the fact) that only he is surrounded by the house. Consequently, the meaning of the particle (ḥarf) “in” is apriori the surrounding (al-iḥāṭa).

§ 49. We say: This is correct — I mean: Zayd is surrounded by the house and the house is surrounding Zayd. Both are relatives, whenever both are taken (uḥiḍā) in this way. However, that with regard to what we maintain (p. 90, 10) a connection (nisba), consists of two kinds: One kind is one common notion (ma’ nā) between two (things), namely its two outermost parts (jarāfāḥu), of which each of both is understood as beginning and the other as the end. Sometimes, this can be made a
beginning and that an end, so that this can be said between two (things); even more: It is only from one (side) of both to the other, so that one of both is the beginning and not the other and that other is the end and not the first. It is not possible to understand the other as beginning with exactly that notion. On the contrary, the first can only be said to be something with regard to the second. This (p. 90, 15) can be called "connection" (an-nisba) particularly and that (other) can be specified with the name "relation" (al-īdāfa). With this kind only one of both can be described and (this one) only has (this kind of relation), because this and not the other can be attributed to it (maḥmūl ʿalayhi). If that other occurs simultaneously with it and is a part by which the attribute (al-maḥmūl) is completed — in our saying “Zayd is the father of ʿAmr” “ʿAmr” occurs simultaneously with “the father” because he is an attributive part (gūzʿ maḥmūl), and in our saying “ʿAmr, the son of Zayd” “Zayd” occurs simultaneously with “the son”, because (p. 90, 20) he is an attributive part (gūzʿ maḥmūl) — then each of both is at times an object (mawḏūʿ) and at times an attributive part, if both are taken as two relatives. In our saying “Zayd is in the house” “the house” is an attributive part and we cannot make “Zayd” an attributive part176 of the house with the meaning of what we said about Zayd that he is “in the house”. (P. 91, 1) However, if we say “the house is the possession of Zayd”, then “Zayd” is the attributive part177 with the meaning different from the first (case). This comprises the “where”, the “when” and “that it belongs to him”.

§ 50. These two kinds are the two kinds of a connection (nisba), because it is a common name, in which does not exist the condition that is peculiar to each of both kinds. However, (the common name) is understood in an absolute manner, namely as a connection (an-nisba), (p. 91, 5) which includes each of both kinds and which includes the “where”, the “when” and the “belonging to him”. (What has a common name, can) differ, according to the different genera, which the connection (an-nisba) can come across. The one does not fall under the other: Neither “place” (falls) under “time”, nor “time” under “place”, nor the clothing under one of both (mentioned). For, the clothing is a body laid around the body, which is connected with it; “place” is not a body, but the surface and the limit of a body; “time” is remote from clothes. The fact that each of (p. 91, 10) these things with connection (al-ašyāʾ al-mansūba), which we can reckon among the category of the relatives, should not make us doubt the relation attached to it. The relation can be attached to every other category178.

The translated text gives rise to the following observations:

The examples, which were used by Fārābī, were taken from Aristotle (examples of father – son179, slave – master180, knower – known181) and in one case can be traced to the Alexandrians (friend – friend182) and to Ibn al-Muqaffa’ (partner –

176. al-ḡuzʿ a l-maḥmūla. The edition of Mahdi has instead ḡuzʿ a l-maḥmūli “part of the attributed”.
177. al-ḡuzʿ a l-maḥmūla. The edition of Mahdi has instead ḡuzʿ a l-maḥmūli “part of the attributed”.
178. The ms. has al-maʿqūlāt “intelligibila” instead of al-maqūlāt “categories”.
182. Fārābī, 1970: § 42.
partner)\textsuperscript{183}. These examples and Fārābī’s own examples (house\textsuperscript{184}, owner – own with the example ox – Zayd\textsuperscript{185}, speech\textsuperscript{186}, grammar\textsuperscript{187}, Zayd the father of ‘Amr\textsuperscript{188}) were interpreted by Fārābī in a manner that differs considerably from Aristotle and his commentators.

He introduced three factors, which he selected from Aristotle and which, according to him, solely can determine a “relation”, namely “time”, “place” and “possession”.

In addition\textsuperscript{189}, he distinguished between the “relation” (\textit{idāfa}) in the true sense of the word (because of its “kind” or its “genus”\textsuperscript{190}) and the connection (\textit{nisba})\textsuperscript{191}, which in arbitrary use of the language by the “general public”, “orators” and “poets” wrongly might be considered as real relation\textsuperscript{192}.

He introduced the “particles of relation”, i.e. prepositions like “in”, as an additional indication of a real relation\textsuperscript{193}. A real and complete relation in “Zayd in the house” is the notion that Zayd is surrounded by the house. The relation is “surrounding” (\textit{iḥāṭa})\textsuperscript{194}.

He defined relation as a “way” (\textit{tarīq}) between two outermost points, in case of the roof of a house built on the ground Fārābī speaks of “descent” from the roof and “ascent” from the ground. As in the definition of the preposition “in” in “Zayd in the house” relation appears here to be determined by the state of “surrounding” and not by the relatives and their essences.

In this sense, Fārābī considered besides “place” also “time” and “possession” as states of relation. Simultaneousness of “time” appears in the example of “Zayd is the father of ‘Amr”\textsuperscript{195}, in addition it is evident in the examples of two friends and two companions; moreover, the example of “grammar (which) is knowledge of something which is known as grammar”: Here, knowledge (\textit{ʿilm}) is a relation qua genus, a generic state of relation between grammar and what is known (\textit{maʿlūm}) as grammar\textsuperscript{196}. The relation of “possession”, its state of relation, is exemplified by the examples “the ox of Zayd”, “the speech of Zayd”, “the slave of Zayd”\textsuperscript{197} and “the house owned by Zayd”\textsuperscript{198}.

\textsuperscript{183} Fārābī, 1970: § 42.
\textsuperscript{184} Fārābī, 1970: §§ 41, 46, 47, 48.
\textsuperscript{185} Fārābī, 1970: §§ 42, 48.
\textsuperscript{186} Fārābī, 1970: § 48.
\textsuperscript{187} Fārābī, 1970: § 42.
\textsuperscript{188} Fārābī, 1970: § 49.
\textsuperscript{189} Cf. the conclusion Fārābī, 1970: § 49.
\textsuperscript{190} Fārābī, 1970: § 46. Cf. Abed, 1991: 11-15. The genus as factor of a real relation can also be found in a fragment of the Aristotelian Categories in the \textit{Kitāb al-aḥğār} attributed to Ġābir (see above ch. 4).
\textsuperscript{192} Cf. Fārābī, 1970: § 44.
\textsuperscript{193} Cf. Fārābī, 1970: §§ 43, 46, 47, 48, 49.
\textsuperscript{194} Fārābī, 1970: § 48 end.
\textsuperscript{195} Fārābī, 1970: § 49.
\textsuperscript{196} Fārābī, 1970: § 42.
\textsuperscript{197} Fārābī, 1970: §§ 42, 48.
\textsuperscript{198} Fārābī, 1970: § 49 end.
Fārābī’s discussion of relation bears witness to his endeavour, to give a clear definition of relation and “relative” and the names used for both. He refers to Aristotle’s statement at the beginning of _Cat._ 7, which he found an insufficient description that Aristotle is said to have supplemented with his subsequent descriptions. On this occasion, Fārābī’s text stresses the necessity of a clear and unmistakable (“without any disturbance”) definition (ḥadd) of the relative things, leading to a uniform (“one single”) notion. Fārābī here is criticizing the “general public, the orators and the poets”, moreover the “grammarians”, who were “remit and arbitrary” in their expressions, who restrict themselves to the still insufficient description of relation at the beginning of Aristotle, _Cat._ 7 and who claim to relate things to each other in an “equal relation”. In his quotation from Aristotle, _Cat._ 7, Fārābī could explain Aristotle’s term “essences” (māhiyāt) of the relations as “what their expressions indicate at any rate and generally”.

However, at the same time Fārābī seems to be aware that the meaning of an expression is also “something what is in the mind of the listener” and that expressions might be used in an arbitrary way. This remark is an indication that Fārābī’s discussion of the category “relation” with the aspects of “place”, “time” and “possession” and its classification as a state between two outermost points evolves to be an essential element in his theory of communication. This is not yet fully elaborated in an article by the late Stéphane Diebler, who analysed Fārābī’s doctrine of categories as part of Fārābī’s theory of communication, in which Aristotle’s _Categories_ are combined with Aristotle’s art of scientific demonstration (_Analytica posteriora_), Aristotle’s dialectic (_Topica_), his sophistic art (_Sophistical Refutations_), _Rhetoric_ and _Poetics_. Fārābī integrated his theory of communication in his doctrine of the ideal state and its ruler, who must be a philosopher and teacher with intellectual qualities necessary for communication and teaching his subjects, and for gaining increasing knowledge, inspired by the divine active intellect.

Fārābī’s theory of communication presupposes a concept of language, which becomes clear in his discussion of relation: Language is conditional on descriptions and definitions, which are the constituents of relations between relatives; relations are correlated to “time”, “place” and “possession”; their linguistic tool are the

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199. See Fārābī, 1970: § 44.
203. See above § 45 in Fārābī’s text.
204. In his innovative article Diebler, 2005: 275-305, esp. 286-290. The article contains on 295-305 a list of the topics of Fārābī’s “Book of Letters”, his _Kitāb al-Ḥurūf_.
socalled “particles” (ḥurūf), e.g. the preposition “in”, which herewith are not restricted to a grammatical function. They have mainly a logical function and simultaneously they create the context for descriptions and definitions, for the correct understanding of the meaning of “expressions” (al-fāẓ) and herewith for the communication. In this manner, Fārābī gives a clear indication of his own standpoint in the discussion (which might have been known to Fārābī)\(^\text{207}\) from 932 AD between Abū Bišr Mattā Ibn Yūnus, a defender of logic as a universal valid vehicle of intelligible things, and the grammarian Abū Saʿīd as-Sīrāfī, a defender of language as only access to intelligible things\(^\text{208}\). Fārābī dissociates himself from the grammarians, whom he criticizes for their arbitrary use of expressions\(^\text{209}\) and he favours the exact descriptions and definitions in the use of categories (including “relation”, “time”, “place” and “possession”). As Fārābī elsewhere explains\(^\text{210}\), the sensible objects (mušār ilayhi), our statements (maqūlāt) and our thinking (maʿqūl “what is conceived in the intellect”, the “intelligible”) are interrelated. Fārābī apparently was followed by Abū Bišr’s pupil Yahyā Ibn ʿAdī\(^\text{211}\), who identified logic with universal grammar that is behind any particular language\(^\text{212}\). Fārābī tried to reconcile grammar and logic; both are interrelated and require each other\(^\text{213}\).

In view of his borrowings from Neoplatonic emanational thought, especially in his doctrine of the divine intellect\(^\text{214}\), we should expect some impact of Fārābī’s metaphysics on his concept of “relation”. This seems not to be the case, and Fārābī remains to be heavily indebted to Aristotle’s Organon. His thesis of an interrelation between grammar and logic is based on the interrelation of language and thought\(^\text{215}\), which in the person of the ruler of the perfect state gets inspirations from the divine intellect\(^\text{216}\). There are no Stoic-Neoplatonic tendencies, as we find

\(^{207}\) Cf. Versteegh, 1997: 78. Fārābī is said to have studied grammar with Ibn as-Sarrāǧ (d. 316/928), the teacher of as-Sīrāfī, and Ibn as-Sarrāǧ himself is said to have studied logic and music with Fārābī.

\(^{208}\) See above ch. 6.

\(^{209}\) On this cf. Versteegh, 1997: 76f., with a quotation from Fārābī’s Kitāb al-Alfāẓ al-mustaʿmala fī l-mantiq (Fārābī, 1968: 41-43), according to which Fārābī criticizes unnamed grammarians, who recognize only those meanings of grammatical categories, which were used by the general public, not by logicians. On the deficiencies of Arabic grammarians since Sībawayh, whose classifications of the parts of speech were insufficient according to Fārābī cf. Versteegh, 1997: 84.

\(^{210}\) Cf. the references given by Rudolph in Philosophie in der islamischen Welt I, 414f. / English version: 601f., and the article by Druart, 2007.


\(^{212}\) See above ch. 6.

\(^{213}\) The rules of grammar guarantee a correct expression of a particular nation and logic creates universal rules valid for the expressions of all nations: Versteegh, 1997: 86.


\(^{215}\) Cf. Daiber, 1986b: 8f.

\(^{216}\) Cf. Daiber, 1986b: 15f. In view of this, it appears to be worthwhile to investigate Fārābī’s concept of being (mawǧūd), including the interrelation of language and thought, not only as something shaped by Aristotle’s Metaphysics (thus Menn, 2008), but also from the background of the Neo-platonic hierarchy of emanations from the divine cause and active intellect and from the background of the intelligibles, which include the being as “second intelligible” (al-maʿqūl aṯ-ṯānī,
them in the *Epistles of the Brethren of Purity*\textsuperscript{217} or in Ibn ʿaṭ-Ṭayyīb\textsuperscript{218}. Fārābī and the discussions in his time about the relation of grammar and logic prepared the ground for the concept of a “mental logic” (*al-maṭṭiq al-fikrī*), mirrored in any language — thus the *Epistles of the Brethren of Purity*. Moreover, reason and intellect begin to rate high in the reflexion on the category of “relation”, as we saw in Ibn Ḥazm\textsuperscript{219}.

### 9. Ibn Sīnā

Now we turn to the perhaps greatest Islamic philosopher after Fārābī, to Ibn Sīnā (370/980 - 428/1037). He was acquainted with Fārābī’s thought and he developed different accentuations. Ibn Sīnā had a critical attitude towards the placing of the *Categories* in the logical section of his encyclopaedia *aš-Šifā*\textsuperscript{220}. He had some doubts about the value of the *Categories* for the student of logic and therefore he did not extensively discuss them in the logic sections of his books *an-Naqāǧ*\textsuperscript{221}, *al-Ḥikma al-ʿArūdiyya*\textsuperscript{222}, *al-Mašriquyyūn*, *al-Iṣārāt wa-t-tanbīḥāt*, *ʿUyūn al-ḥikma*\textsuperscript{223} and *al-Ḥidāya*\textsuperscript{224}. Nevertheless, he devoted to them a separate discussion in his encyclopaedia *aš-Šifā*\textsuperscript{225} and in the earlier written *al-Muḥtaṣar al-awsaṭ ʻī l-maṭṭiq*\textsuperscript{226}. In his *al-Muḥtaṣar* Ibn Sīnā mainly follows the contents of Aristotle\textsuperscript{227}, including moderate criticisms directed against some traditions of Aristotle’s commentators, esp. Simplicius\textsuperscript{228}. At the end of the short section on the “relative” (*al-muḍāf*)\textsuperscript{229} he lists the 10 categories “substance” (*ǧawhar*), “quantity” (*kamm*), “quality” (*kayf*), “relative”, “where”, “when”, “position”, “possession”, “action” and “passion” and adds that the “relative”, according to its nature, concerns all of them\textsuperscript{230}. This and its echo in Ibn Sīnā’s *Dānish nāmeh*\textsuperscript{231} appears to be further developed in Ibn Sīnā’s *aš-Šifā*, *Maqūlāt*: Here he describes a modified division

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\textsuperscript{218} See above ch. 7.

\textsuperscript{219} See above ch. 6.


\textsuperscript{222} On these two books, their comparison with *al-Muḥtaṣar al-awsaṭ ʻī l-maṭṭiq* and his *aš-Šifā*’ cf. Eichner, 2013: 64-85.

\textsuperscript{223} Ibn Sīnā, 1954: 2, 17 - 3, 9 (the 10 categories *ǧawhar*, kammiyya, kayfiyya, idāfā, ayna, matā, al-waḍʿ, al-milk, an yafʿala šayʾun, an yanfaʿila šayʾun).

\textsuperscript{224} Ibn Sīnā, 1974: 71-76.

\textsuperscript{225} Ibn Sīnā, 1959.

\textsuperscript{226} Edited by Kalbarczyk, 2012: 326-349.

\textsuperscript{227} See Kalbarczyk, 2012: 351.


\textsuperscript{229} Ed. Kalbarczyk, 2012: 338ff.

\textsuperscript{230} On this cf. also Lizzini, 2013: 175, n. 45.

\textsuperscript{231} Cf. the figure in Thom, 2015: 45.
of the categories which, according to him, is “widely accepted” and which corresponds to a Latin paraphrase from the 4th century, attributed to Augustine but possibly composed or translated by a follower of Themistius. As recently Paul Thom tried to show, this modified division is elaborated by Ibn Sīnā to a complex system on the assumption of a relationship to an external thing and on the basis of dichotomous divisions, for example the division of non-relational accidents into those that involve an internal relationship of the subject’s parts and those that do not involve this. Non-relational accidents that do not involve an internal relationship of the subject’s parts, either involve number (= “quantity”) or do not (= “quality”). As elaborated by Thom, Ibn Sīnā modifies the common assumptions about the categories “position”, “action”, “passion” and “possession” and contrasts the category “substance” with the accidental categories, which are divided into “quantity” and “quality” on the one side and “relative”, “where”, “when”, “action”, “passion”, “position” and “possession” (the last is mentioned with some doubts) on the other side. The mentioned seven categories depend on comparison, the category of relatives is related to the intrinsic nature of the subject and the six remaining to something extrinsic. We mention an example given by Ibn Sīnā. It discusses the relationship between a man in the house and this house: Ibn Sīnā argues that an additional word between “man” and “the house”, namely “the owner of” creates a relationship between “man” and “house”. Here, the “intrinsic nature” of the subject “man/owner” points at the same time to something extrinsic, the “house”.

Already Fārābī used this example: He used grammar and additional particles and distinguished between “the house owned by Zayd” and “the house surrounding Zayd” (= Zayd in the house). However, the relationship is neither something intrinsic of the inhabitant of the house nor something extrinsic depending on the house; it is something, the expression of which is tolerated, “relying on what is in the mind (ṣamīr) of the listener and relying on (the fact) that only the “possession” (or the habitation) “of Zayd can be understood from it”.

Here, we realize a shift from the linguistic and logical level to the ontological. The ontological level is existing as well in Ibn Sīnā’s Šifāʾ, al-Maqūlāt and has affected Ibn Sīnā’s concept of homonymy, which Aristotle mentioned at the beginning of his Categories (1. 1 a 1-6). The ontological level is further developed.
in Ibn Sīnā’s Šifāʾ, *Metaphysics*, in the chapter on relatives\(^{243}\). This chapter is an elaboration of the section on “relation” in Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* V 15. 1020 b 26 - 1021 b 10. In this elaboration Ibn Sīnā declares the “relation” (iḍāfa) to be based on some “notion” (maʿnā)\(^{244}\) in one of the two relatives (muḍāfāt), e.g. in the asymmetrical relation father-son only the father has the relation fatherhood, which Ibn Sīnā called “notion” or “description of its existence” (waṣf wuǧūdihī), of its “being with respect to something else in the father”\(^{245}\). Because of this “description” the “relative” has its external existence\(^{246}\); the “definition” (ḥadd) of the “relative” “in its existence” (fī l-wuǧūd) makes of the “relative” an accident (ʿaraḍ), “which has the mentioned description (i.e. fatherhood al-abuwwa)\(^{248}\), when it is in the intellect apprehended (ʿuqila)\(^{249}\).

Consequently, Ibn Sīnā distinguished between “intellectual relation” (al-iḍāfa al-ʿaqliyya) and “existential relation” (al-iḍāfa al-wuǧūdiyya)\(^{250}\), the “existential relation”, the existence of the “relative” in concrete things (al-aʿyān) exists, according to Ibn Sīnā. However, the “intellectual relation” must not always have a corresponding relation in existence\(^{251}\). He argues: “It is possible to have invent-
ed relations (*idāfāt muhtaraʿa*) in the intellect by reason of the special property the intellect has with respect of them\(^2^{252}\).

In *aš-Šifāʾ*, *al-Maqūlāt* Ibn Sīnā follows the same ontological line, when he declares that the conception (*taṣawwur*) of the notion (*maʿnā*) of something requires the conception of the notion of something outside, as for example the conception of the notion of the roof requires simultaneously the conception of the notion of the wall, although the quiddity (*māhiya*) of the roof is not predicated in relationship with (*bi-l-qiyās ilā*) the wall\(^2^{253}\).

In the same manner Ibn Sīnā could, with regard to the example of father and son, formulate an asymmetrical relation: “The relation (of the father) to fatherhood (*al-abuwwa*) — which is the description of (the father) — is in the father alone. However, (the description) belongs only to the father with respect to another thing in the father. And his being with respect to the other (thing) does not make him exist in the other. Because fatherhood is not in the son. […] Rather fatherhood is in the father. The case is similar with the state (*hāl*) of the son with respect to the father. There is nothing at all which is in both of them. Here, we have nothing but fatherhood or sonship. As for a state (*hāla*) posited for [both] fatherhood and sonship, this is something unknown to us and has no name\(^2^{254}\).

Ibn Sīnā’s student Bahmanyār Ibn Marzubān did not follow this idea and was not aware of Ibn Sīnā’s discussion of the particular relation of father and son versus relation related to the species father and son, i.e. particular multiplicity versus the oneness of one notion (*maʿnā wāḥid*), namely “humanity” (*insāniyya*): cf. Ibn Sīnā, 2005, *Šifāʾ*, Metaphysics: 247, 17 - 248, 1; with Bahmanyār, 1970, *at-Taḥṣīl*: 31, 1-3: “(To the categories) belongs the relation, which is a notion (*maʿnā*), which in case of its existence or mental conception is definitely conceived in the mind (*maʿqūl*) with respect to something different and together with this. It has no other existence — just as fatherhood (*al-abuwwa*) with respect to sonship (*al-banuwwa*) and not like a father who has another existence different from him (and preceding him). This (notion of relation) is “humanity”.

However, this statement, based on the distinction between real and mental relation in Ibn Sīnā\(^2^{255}\), seems to be an echo of summarizing remarks or discussions in two other works by Ibn Sīnā, his *Kitāb an-Naǧāt*\(^2^{256}\) and his *at-Taʿlīqāt*\(^2^{257}\). An echo of these discussions can be found in Zayn ad-Dīn ʿUmar Ibn Sahlān as-Sāwī (from Sāwa between Ray and Hamadan; d. 450/1058), *al-Baṣāʾir an-Naṣīriyya fī ʿilm al-manṭiq*, ed. Rafīq al-ʿAǧam, annotated by Muḥammad ʿAbduh\(^2^{258}\). The concept of a mental relation (*iʿtibārāt ʿaqliyya, mulāḥaẓāt*...
ʿaqliyya) is defended in Šihāb ad-Dīn Yahyā Ibn Ḥašaš Ibn ʿAmīrak as-Suhrawardī (549/1154 - 587/1191), *Hikmat al-Iṣrāq*, as-Suhrawardī is said to have studied Sāwī’s book *al-Baṣāʿir an-Naṣīriyya*\(^{259}\). The Jewish philosopher Ibn Kammūna (d. 683/1284) and following Ibn Kammūna also the Iranian philosopher Quṭb ad-Dīn as-Sīrāzī (d. 710/1311) in his Persian *Durrat at-tāğ Ṣumla 2*, fann 2, maqāla 6\(^{260}\), integrated Ibn Sīnā’s concept of a mental relation into his discussion of relation in his work *al-Kāṣif al-ǧadīd fī l-ḥikma*\(^{261}\); “fatherhood” (*abuwwa*) is a relation (*iḍāfa*) “added to the notion (*mafhūm*) of two related things, although it is something in (our) reflection (*amr iʿtibārī*); it does not constitute the essence (*ḏāt*) and the humanness (*insāniyya*) of a person, who became father, “after he was not (a father)”.

Interestingly, the Andalusian scholar Abū ṣ-Ṣalt Umayya Ibn ʿAbdalʿazīz Ibn Abī ṣ-Ṣalt ad-Dānī, commonly known as Abu Salt of Denia (459/1067 – 528/1134), seems to be inspired by Ibn Sīnā, when he describes in his summary of the Aristotelian logic, his *Taqwīm ad-ḏihn*, the relation between father and son or between slave and master as something existing “potentially” (*bi-l-quwwa*) or “really” (*bi-l-fiʿl*): “Each one of both (e.g. father and son) can be designated (*yuʿabbaru*) by its name, which indicates it insofar as it has a relation (*muḍāf*)\(^{262}\).

A late echo, shaped by intermediate sources, is the distinction between accidental and existing (*ʿaraḍ mawǧūd*) relation (*iḍāfa, nisba*) and “reflective” (*iʿtibārī*), non-existing relation (*an-nisba al-ʿadamiyya*) in Muḥammad Ibn Muḥammad al-Ḥasanī al-Andalusī al-Mālikī al-Bulaydī (from al-Bulayda, a town in Algeria; a student of Zabīdī, who came to Cairo in 1167/1754), *al-Maqūlāt al-ʿašr* or *Nayl as-Saʿādāt fī ʿilm al-maqūlāt*\(^{263}\).

Ibn Sīnā later argues that the assumption of relations in things would lead to an infinite chain of relations, e.g. between father and son, who each will have an equal relation\(^{264}\).

This relation between father and son is classified by Ibn Sīnā as pertaining to “action and passion” (*al-fiʿl wa-l-infiʿāl*), one of the categories related to relation\(^{265}\). “Action and passion” is an alternative rendering of cause and effect; it confirms a recent interpretation of causality as relation in Ibn Sīnā and in Ghazālī and its exemplification in the God-world relationship, as elaborated by Ibn Sīnā\(^{266}\).

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259. See Suhrawardī, 1999: 49 § 65; and Walbridge’s and Ziai’s introduction to the edition.
However, Ibn Sīnā’s doctrine of intermediate causes between the absolute first cause and the effect is not only a “reinterpretation” of Aristotle’s “analysis of causality”\(^\text{267}\). It is an elaboration of Aristotle’s denial of an infinite chain of causes in favour of the first unmoved mover\(^\text{268}\), by integrating the Neoplatonic doctrine of a transcendent God and of intermediate causes, emanating from the divine first cause\(^\text{269}\). Simultaneously, the intermediate causes are ontologically inferior to the divine first cause, and for this reason Ibn Sīnā differed from Aristotle’s principle of “man begets man” (ἄνθρωπος ἄνθρωπον γεννᾷ) and assumed a difference between cause and effect. The cause is superior to existence and there are different modes of existence (esse, wuǧūd) with regard to priority and posteriority, self-sufficiency and need, necessity and possibility. Consequently, the divine first cause has more “truth” than the effect and the cause-effect relationship includes both, similarity and dissimilarity\(^\text{270}\).

This observation is momentous for the relation between cause and effect, including the relation between father and son, respectively between fatherhood and sonship. Ibn Sīnā declares: “As for a state (ḥāla) posited for [both] fatherhood and sonship, this is something unknown to us and has no name”\(^\text{271}\). Ibn Sīnā dissociates himself from Fārābī’s assumption of a common notion between e.g. roof and house or father and son\(^\text{272}\), and consequently dissociates himself from Fārābī’s suggestion that the name of a “relative” “can be taken for both in the relation of each one to the other”\(^\text{273}\). For Ibn Sīnā any relation assumed between two relatives is something developed in the human intellect — equally any relation between the first divine cause and the world. He says: “We do not mean by ‘the First’ an idea (maʿnā) that is added to the necessity of His existence so that, by it, the necessity of His existence becomes multiple, but by it we mean a consideration (iʿtibār) of His relation to [what is] other [than Him]”\(^\text{274}\). This aspect of relation as something developed in the human intellect was taken over in the Middle Ages: Through the Latin translation of his Kitāb aš-Šifāʾ in the 12th century in Toledo Ibn Sīnā might have inspired medieval theories about relations as entia rationis\(^\text{275}\).

\(^{267}\) Lizzini, 2013: 169.
\(^{269}\) On the Neoplatonic doctrine and its impact on Ghazālī’s theory of causality cf. Daiber, 2015a; Lizzini, 2013: 180, n. 67 mentions possible Neoplatonic echoes only incidentally and does not elaborate this important and decisive detail.
\(^{270}\) Cf. Daiber, 2004b: 32.
\(^{271}\) See n. 255.
\(^{272}\) See his Kitāb al-Ḥurūf, Fārābī, 1970: 85, 9-17, which is translated above ch. 8, in the text § 41 and referred to by Marmura, 1975: 87, n. 16.
\(^{273}\) Fārābī, 1970: 86, 5f. / translated above ch. 8 (§ 42 in the text).
As has been shown recently\(^{276}\), Ibn Sīnā considered the ten Aristotelian categories as emanations from the divine universal intellect (\(al-\text{‘}aql\text{ al-kull}\)), which later is called the active intellect (\(al-\text{‘}aql\text{ al-fa‘āl}\)), the giver of forms\(^{277}\). The process of the integration of the ten categories in his emanationist doctrine begins with early texts like Ibn Sīnā’s *Compendium of the Soul* (\(Kitāb\ fī n-Nafs \text{ al-lān sunnat al-ि́fṣīr}\)) and *al-Ḥikma al- arūdiyya* and is followed by *al-Muḥtaṣar al-awsat* and finally the *Ṣifā‘*. During this process Ibn Sīnā began to distinguish between substantial forms and accidental qualities\(^{278}\) and to develop his “metaphysics of the rational soul (\(an-nafs an-nāṭiqah\))”, which through its intellectual activity can return to its divine first cause\(^{279}\).

Remarkably, Ibn Sīnā mentions in his early *al-Ḥikma al-arūdiyya*\(^{280}\) the ten Aristotelian categories in two lists, one containing all categories (including “substance”) and another one distinguishing between substances and their accidents “quality”, “quantity”, “passion”, “where”, “position” and “relation” — omitting “when”, “possession” and “action”. This omission can be explained with the observation that the accidental “concomitants” (\(lawāzim\))\(^{281}\), the categories related to the substances, cannot be “action”, cannot have “possession” on their own and cannot have their own space of “time” (“when”). Moreover, it seems that Ibn Sīnā considered the “first body” to be identical with the “material form”\(^{282}\), to be endowed with “quality” and “quantity” and “passion”. Consequently, the existence of the “second” (body) is related to “where” and “position”, this in addition to the other categories (except for “substance”). The categories have a hierarchical order with “substance”, at the beginning followed by the “accidents”, “in accordance with their (kinds of) existence due to them” (\(fī\ istiḥqāq al-wuḡūd\)). A central role is attributed to “relation”, which is said to exist “with the existence of the first caused”. Relation here is causal relation between the divine necessarily existing One, and the multiplicity of the caused, of existing matter\(^{283}\). This multiplicity can be interpreted as something determined by the categories which shape the accidents of the substance.

At the same time, any relation, assumed between two relatives is — as already said — something developed in the human intellect — equally any relation between the first divine cause and the world. Ibn Sīnā says: “We do not mean by ‘the First’ an idea (\(ma‘nā\)) that is added to the necessity of His existence so that, by it, the necessity of His existence becomes multiple, but by it we mean a consideration (\(i‘ribār\)) of His relation to [what is] other [than Him]”\(^{284}\).

Ibn Sīnā’s philosophy of relation appears to be a complex combination of Aristotelian and Neoplatonic concepts, in which Fārābī played a considerable role.

\(^{276}\) Eichner, 2013.
\(^{278}\) For details see the article by Eichner, 2013.
\(^{281}\) Cf. Eichner, 2013: 71f.
\(^{282}\) Cf. Eichner, 2013: 75.
\(^{283}\) Cf. Eichner, 2013: 70.
\(^{284}\) See n. 274.
His echo in Ibn Sīnā mirrors sympathy and critique and through Ibn Sīnā and the Latin translations of Ibn Sīnā’s works his ideas became known in Islamic philosophy in the West, although in a modified manner.

10. Ibn Rušd and his Critique of Ghazālī

After Ibn Sīnā the great Andalusian philosopher Ibn Rušd/Averroes (520/1126 - 595/1198) and the Latin translations of his works disseminated essential ideas of Ibn Sīnā (including Fārābī), although in the shape of critical objections.

Ibn Rušd kept to the Neoplatonic background and the ontological interpretation, combined with the Farabian-Avicennian logic of relation. Simultaneously, Ibn Rušd deviated from Ibn Sīnā in an interesting return to Aristotle. Like Aristotle he concentrated on the relata, the fundaments of any relation, and in his so-called Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Categories Ibn Rušd does not only present a faithful description. In one point he tries to clarify Aristotle’s discussion of the “substance” as a “relative”, a classification, which — according to Aristotle — must be denied in the case of e.g. a head or a hand, which both cannot be related to someone, whose head or hand they are definitely, according to our knowledge. Ibn Rušd missed a clear judgement about categories belonging to relation, and in view of Aristotle’s vagueness with regard to a clear classification of categories as relatives he refers in his commentary on Aristotle, Cat. 7 b 15 - 8 a 12, at the end of ch. 6, to Aristotle, Metaphysics, where Aristotle is said to distinguish between essential and accidental correlatives. Accordingly, Ibn Rušd explains Aristotle’s example of the head belonging to a man not as being a “true relation” (iḍāfa ḥaqīqiyya), but as an “accidental relation” (iḍāfa ʿaraḍiyya).

In his monograph on metaphysics, called Epitome of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, a rearrangement of the Aristotelian material, Ibn Rušd further developed his classification of the categories, namely “substance”, and the accidents “quantity”, “quality”, “relation”, “where”, “when”, “position”, “possession”, “action” and “passion”. From these ten categories the category “substance” is extensively discussed by Ibn Rušd, because it is the only category, which can become essen-

286. Aristotle, Cat. 7. 8 a 14 — 8 b 21.
290. Ibn Rušd, 1958: 13, 5 - 14, 14 / transl. Armzen, 2010: 32f. Ibn Rušd’s Talḥīš mā baʿd at-ṭabīʿa, in the edition and Spanish translation by Quirós Rodríguez, 1919, Compendio de Metafísica, was the basis of the only article on relation in Ibn Rušd by Gómez Nogales, 1976: 302-305, supplemented by other texts. The article (regrettably often without exact references to the sources) can still be recommended, although we differ in details and accentuations, because of additional texts and interpretations, which appeared in the meantime.
tially a “relative” e.g. “fatherhood and sonship” (*al-abuwwa wa-l-banuwwa*)291.
The thing’s essence and its quiddity is declared as the numerical one in allusion to Aristotle, *Metaph.* V 6. 1016 b 3-5 and defended against Ibn Sīnā’s classification of the numerical one only as an accident in the substance “or anything else that is isolated”292. It is also “one essentially intelligible concept”293 and “one” in genus and species294. “The category of “substance” is self-constituted and with respect to its existence independent from any of the accidental categories, while these in turn for their existence depend on “substance” and are caused by it”295. To these categories, depending on “substance”, belongs “relation”, which neither can be separated from its substrate “substance”, nor from the remaining categories because of their relatedness to substrates296.

Ibn Rušd did not confine himself to a substance-orientated concept of “relation” and reveals indications of a new evaluation of “relation”: He says, with regard to Aristotle’s simultaneousness of two correlatives297, that “both are simultaneous in being and in knowledge” and argues that “this category (sc. “relation”) is something the soul introduces into the existents”. He adds, that through this relationship (*al-iḍāfa*) the two subjects of the correlated things can be conceptualized (*taṣawwur*) and vice versa the relationship of the two subjects can be conceptualized298. The conceptualization is dependent on the soul.

This is further explained in Ibn Rušd’s *Tahāfut at-Tahāfut*, in a critique of Ghazālī’s statement that “the relation and two relatives form a plurality of knowledge, and that for instance our knowledge of fatherhood is different from our knowledge of the father and the son”299.

According to Ghazālī, there are three kinds of knowledge: Knowledge of the essence (*ḏāt*) of the father, knowledge of the essence of the son, and knowledge of the “relation” which is enclosed (*muḍamman*) in the two preceding kinds of knowledge. They “condition each other” (baʿḍuhā mašrūṭatun fī l-baʿḍ)300. Ghazālī explains this301 with the divine “First”, knowing Himself and the “individual genera” (*āḥād al-aǧnās*), to which He has a relation as their “principle” (mabda’). “Otherwise, the relation’s being known to Him becomes unintelligible (lam yuʿqal)”. Ghazālī’s statement is remarkable for several reasons:

297. Cf. Cat. 7. 7 b 15-31; 13. 14 b 24-35.
1) He considers “relation” as causal connection between two relatives.

2) Relation is part of an epistemological process and knowledge is the bridge between two relatives.

3) The example of the divine “principle” illustrates the causal relation between knower and known, and also between cause and effect.

4) Aristotle’s classification of “knowledge” (ἐπιστήμη) as a “relative”, because knowledge and knowable things condition each other302, appears to tend to a new evaluation of “relation” and the “relative”, which is already alluded to in Aristotle’s statement “and if those things are relatives for which being is the same as being somehow related to something, then perhaps some answer may be found.”303 Ghazālī did not develop this into a new concept of “relation” but added to this the concept of knowledge as connecting relation between knower and known304. Regrettably, other logical works by Ghazālī do not discuss this in a more detailed manner and instead give — in the footsteps of Ibn Sīnā — summarizing reports of the ten Aristotelian categories, including the substance and the nine accidental categories305.

In his critique of Ghazālī’s Incoherence of the Philosophers Ibn Rušd did not realize the subtleties of Ghazālī’s remarks and denied Ghazālī’s epistemological aspects. Instead he says: “Now, the truth is that the relation is an attribute additional to two correlated things, from outside the soul and in the existents; however, the relation in the concepts (al-maʿqūlāt) is rather a state (ḥāl) than an attribute (ṣifa) additional to two correlated things”. The following passage can be interpreted as an indication of the inexplicability of this state of fatherhood; the human knowledge (al-ʿilm al-insānī) of it cannot reach the stage of divine eternal knowledge (al-ʿilm al-azalī) in a way “from the visible to the invisible” (min aš-šāhid ilā l-ġāʾib)306. Only accessible to human knowledge are existents, which share the same genus or species307. This looks like an elaboration of Ibn Sīnā’s already quoted statement “as for a state (ḥāla) posited for [both] fatherhood and sonship, this is something unknown to us and has no name”308. Ibn Rušd’s declaration is, as in Ibn Sīnā, based on the Neoplatonic doctrine of the First Intellect: “It is pure act and cause; (God’s) knowledge cannot be compared to human knowledge”309. It culminates in Ibn Rušd’s description of the human intellect as “conceptualization (tašawwur) of the

302. Cat. 7. 6 b 2; cf. 6 b 34-36.
305. Cf. n. 248.
308. See n. 255.
order and system present in this world and in each of its parts and (as) the knowledge of all that is in this (world) through its remote and proximate causes up to a complete (knowledge of) the world."310. In accordance with the Neoplatonic system of emanations in gradations from first, intermediate to last effects311 and the assumed dissimilarity between cause and effect, the epistemological consequence for the human conceptualization of relationship can be summarized as follows:

1) As the subject of human conceptualization (taṣawwur) “consists of material things (al-umūr al-hayūlāniyya) only”312, human concepts of relation are restricted to the substances and its accidents, the categories “quantity”, “quality”, “relation”, “where”, “when”, “position”, “possession”, “action” and “passion”.

2) The process of conceptualization is affected by the soul.

3) The imperfectness of this conceptualization is an echo of the indeterminateness of the relation between the relatives.

4) The Neoplatonic concept of indeterminate relation313 appears in Ibn Rušd to be connected with the concept of potentiality as “a disposition (istiʿdād) in a thing and (as) its inherent possibility (imkān) of existing in actuality”314.

5) The indeterminateness of relation and its correlation with the concept of potentiality is not developed to a clear concept of a dynamic process between relation, relatives and linguistic conceptualization. In his Great Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics, on Aristotle’s classification of the continuous and of matter and form as “relative”315, Ibn Rušd declares relation as something accompanying any transmutation316.

This explanation must be understood from the context of Aristotle’s concept of motion as a process from potentiality to actuality, namely with regard to the three categories “quality”, “quantity” and “place”317, a concept which Ibn Rušd

On Ibn Rušd’s concept of causality, which in his Tahāfut at-Tahāfut and in his Great Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics appears to be overshadowed by the Aristotelian model: see Kogan, 1987: 310f.
313. Cf. Plotinus, 1988, Enneads VI 3. 28 and VI 1. 7 and 8; the “existence” (ὑπόστασις) of relation depends on the state of relation (σχέσις) and not on the related subjects (ὑποκείμενα), see Plotinus, 1988: VI 1. 7, 24-28; moreover, states of relation (σχέσεις) are rational principles (λόγοι) and their causes are “participations in forms” καὶ εἰδῶν μεταλήψεις αἰτίας (Plotinus, 1988: VI 1. 9, 7-9).
316. Aristotelis Opera cum Averrois commentariis IV: Physica (Venice 1562-1574, repr. Frankfurt/M.: Minerva 1962), text comm. 9, p. 345, quoted by Gómez Nogales, 1976: 301, n. 41. According to Gómez Nogales, the concept of relation as accident and as something affecting all categories, including the substances, has similarity to relativism in modern philosophy: “Toda la realidad está afectada de cierto relativismo”. Cf. also Ibn Rušd, 1958: 38, 10-12 / Arnzen, 2010: 56: “For a thing is related to time only in so far it is changeable or one conceives a process of change in it. But the changeable is necessarily a body, as has been shown in Physics”. Arnzen (2010: 277, n. 190) refers to Aristotle, Physics. IV 11. 218 b 22 — 219 a 14 and to Ibn Rušd, 1983: 96-101.
took over from Ibn Sīnā, aš-Šifāʾ, Physics, who had added the category of “position” as fourth category and who considered “substance” as an object of motion, and no more as a substrate for accidents, herein followed later in the 13th century by Barhebraeus, a scholar of the Syriac orthodox church and chief bishop of Persia, in his encyclopaedia Butyrum sapientiae, the book on Physics318. He explained motion in the category of “substance” as the change of man from potentiality — i.e. seed — into actuality — i.e. humanness; in a corresponding manner motion is in the category of “relation” the change from fatherhood in potentiality into fatherhood in reality, the father of a son319. Relation is causality, as explained by Ibn Sīnā320 and taken over by Barhebraeus321. As in the late Aristotle categories are universals existing as “mere potencies in other existents”321a.

11. Ibn ‘Arabī

“Relation” in Ibn Rušd appears to be something accidental to the “substance” and simultaneously something essential322. This ambivalence and the Neoplatonic background, which Ibn Rušd shares with Ibn Sina, have parallels in the younger contemporary Ibn ‘Arabī, a Sufi born in Murcia in 560/1165 (d. 638/1240 in Damascus) and a representative of a trend introducing philosophical elements in sufism in the footsteps of Ghazālī322, his model324. Ibn ‘Arabī perhaps is inspired by Ibn Rušd’s and Ibn Sīnā’s concept of categories and their Neoplatonic idea of the emanational connection between the divine absolute being and the world of creation. This would explain, why Ibn ‘Arabī related the ten divine aspects of the “Creator” (al-mūǧid) to the ten Aristotelian categories applicable to “every order in the world”325:

(1) God’s “essence” (dār) to the “substance (ḡawhar) of the world”
(2) God’s “attributes” (ṣifāt) to the “accident” (ʿarad)
(3) God’s “eternity” (azal) to the “time” (zamān)
(4) God’s “sitting” on the throne (istiwāʾ) to the “place” (makān)
(5) God’s “names” (asmāʾ) to the “quantity” (kamm)
(6) God’s “assent” and “indignation” (riḍāʾ and ḡaḍab) to the “quality” (kayf)
(7) God’s “word” (kalām) to the “position” (al-waḍʿ)
(8) God’s “lordship” (rubūbiyya) to the “relation” (iḍāfa)

320. See n. 267.
322. This ambivalence caused Pico della Mirandola in the 15th century to reject the accidentality of relations and to defend its essentiality with a reference to Averroes: Cf. Flasch, 1974: here 20-22.
(9) His “creating” (īǧād) to “action” (an yafʿala)
(10) God’s “response” (īǧāba) to man’s prayers to “passion” (an yanfaʿila)326.

These relations can explain, why Ibn Arabī calls the bridge between God and the world with the sufi term an-nafas ar-raḥmānī (Ibn Ṭ Many: at-tanaffus ar-raḥmānī or nafas ar-raḥmānī327) “the breath of compassion”, which became a vehicle for God’s words, His creatures. The divine essence (= the category “substance”) is manifested in the world (they correspond in the world to the category “accident”), namely “Living”, “Knowing”, “Willing” and “Saying” or “the First”, “the Last”, “the Manifest” and “the Hidden”328. Mere explaining analogies are the “fundamental categories” (ummahāt al-maqūlāt) “substance”, “accident”, “time” and “place”329. Moreover, within the sufi concept of an identity of the all-permeating infinite divine power and infinite divine acting330, we find the category of “relation” of God’s sovereignty to the world and the category of “passion” (an yanfaʿila) of God, who answers (al-muǧīb) man’s prayer of request331.

Ibn Ṭ Arabī’s integration of the categories in a Neoplatonic concept of an emanational connection between the divine absolute being and the world of creation through the all-permeating divine power transformed “relation” into a dynamic process, in which the infinite is procreated from the One332.

Herewith, Ibn Ṭ Arabī gave his own answer in contemporary discussions about the often discussed question, if and how the divine One creates multiplicity. Ibn Sinā and in his footsteps William of Auvergne (born between 1180 and 1190), but also Ibn Ruṣd333 defended the principle “Ex Uno, secundum quod unum, non nisi unum”334. Ibn Ṭ Arabī, who met Ibn Ruṣd in Cordoba around 1185335, expressis verbis denies this dictum, which he attributes to al-ḥakīm “the philosopher”336.

326. See Ibn Ṭ Arabī, 1968: II, 211, 29-33; and on the equation with the divine aspects, 435, 8-11. Remarkable is the identical terminology an yafʿala and an yanfaʿila in Ibn Sinā (see n. 224) and before him in Fārābī (see n. 150). On the reception of the Aristotelian categories in Ibn Arabī cf. Nyberg, 1919: 33-38; Rosenthal, 1988: 23; and the article Gril, 2005. On the equation of the divine aspects with the ten categories Gril, 2005: 160; interestingly, the divine attributes appear to be replaced by the category “accident”. Nyberg, Rosenthal and Gril refrain from a detailed comparison with Islamic philosophers. Pacheco, 2010, does not discuss the Aristotelian categories.
328. See Gril, 2005: 162, n. 23.
He might have encouraged his younger contemporary Naṣīraddīn aṭ-Ṭūsī in his critical attitude towards Ibn Sīnā’s dictum that “from the truly One only one can proceed”\textsuperscript{337}.

12. Ibn Sabʿīn

A younger contemporary of Ibn ‘Arabī, the Sufi philosopher Ibn Sabʿīn (ca 614/1217 - 668/1269 or 669/1271) appears to have disagreed with the position of Ibn ‘Arabī in his philosophical work *Budd al-ʿārif wa-ʿaqīdat al-muḥaqqiq al-muqarrrib al-kāšif wa-ṭariq as-sālik al-mutabattil al-ʿākif* “The escape of the knower and the belief of the seeker of truth, who is approaching and investigating (it) and the way of the traveller, who remains retired and secluded (from the world)”. The chapter on “relation” (*iḍāfa*)\textsuperscript{338} begins with the bipartition of the relation into *naẓīr* and *ġayr an-naẓīr*, and classifies it as a “simple” category, which like substance, quantity and quality can be combined with the six “composed” categories “where” (*ayna*), “when” (*matā*), “possession” (*lahū*), “position” (*nuṣba*), “action” (*fāʿil*) and “passion” (*yanfaʿil*).\textsuperscript{339}

This appears to be based on the *Epistles of the Brethren of Purity*\textsuperscript{340}. The chapter ends\textsuperscript{341} with a critical evaluation of the relation belonging to the “kind of quality” like the relation between knowledge (*al-ʿilm*) and known (*al-maʿlūm*) or perceived (*al-mahṣūs*) and other “contrary things” (*mutaqābilāt*)\textsuperscript{342}: They are imperfect (*nāqiṣa wa-mankūsa*)\textsuperscript{343} because of their multiplicity (*kaṯra*), they are opposing the “supreme (divine) attributes” (*aṣ-ṣifāt al-ʿaliyya*) and the “unity (*tawḥīd*) of the (divine) attributes (*al-ḫawāṣṣ*)”\textsuperscript{345}. Ibn Sabʿīn remarks: “Strictly speaking from relation only imagination (*wahm*) remains, which vanishes (*yaḏhab*); through its disappearance (*ḏahāb*) perfection (*kamāl*) can occur among those who investigate the truth (*al-muḥaqqiqīn*)”\textsuperscript{346}. Apparently, Ibn Sabʿīn criticized the use of the

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\textsuperscript{337} According to Hermann Landolt Ṭūsī modified Ibn Sīnā’s explanation by referring to Ismailite and Ishrāqī philosophy: see Landolt, 2000: 22-28. Ṭūsī’s solution to introduce the (Neoplatonic) intermediary between the divine One and the many things also appears in *al-Kāšif* (*al-ǧadīd fī l-ḥikma*, cf. Ibn Kammūna, 2008: 124, 5-7) of his contemporary, the Jewish philosopher Ibn Kammūna (d. 683/1284), who, however, does not follow the Ismailis, who identified the intermediary with God’s “Command” or “Word”.

\textsuperscript{338} Ibn Sabʿīn, 1978: 71f.


\textsuperscript{340} See ch. 6. On further parallels between Ibn Sabʿīn and the *Epistles* cf. Lohr, 1984: 71f.

\textsuperscript{341} Ibn Sabʿīn, 1978: 72, 3-17.

\textsuperscript{342} Cf. Aristotle, *Cat.* 6 b 34f.; 11 a 25-27, and on the contrary quality 10 b 13.

\textsuperscript{343} Ibn Sabʿīn, 1978: 72, 4.

\textsuperscript{344} Ibn Sabʿīn, 1978: 72, 7.

\textsuperscript{345} Ibn Sabʿīn, 1978: 72, 11.

\textsuperscript{346} Cf. Ibn Sabʿīn, 1978: 72, 6.
categories in Sufi theology, especially the category “relation” as something ending in “imagination”. Their use implies multiplicity and affects God’s unity. It might be a critical allusion to the school of Ibn Ḥaḍād and his model al-Ghazālī and prefers the position of Ibn Sīnā or Ibn Ruṣd. This critical attitude is perhaps an additional reason why Ibn Sabʿīn could say about Ghazālī: “One time he is a Sufi, another time a philosopher, a third time an Ashʿarite, a fourth time a jurist, and a fifth time a perplexed man”347.

Remarkably, Ibn Sabʿīn’s critical attitude towards the Sufism of Ibn Arabī is not yet developed in his Masāʾ il as-siqilliyya addressed to the emperor Frederick II, in which he does not consider the categories as something imperfect and instead assesses the ten categories as “the world generally” (alʿālam bi-l-ġumla) and man as a being in which the categories are “collected” (maḡmūʿ a); “this is necessarily comprehended in the intellect (maʿqūl), and in the conception (taṣawwur) and necessarily accepted as true (taṣdīq)”; man and world “resemble each other” (mutamāṯil); “man and world are one”348. This is an allusion to Ibn Ḥaḍād’s doctrine of macrocosm and microcosm, according to which God manifests Himself in the heart of man349. It confirms Ibn Ḥaḍād’s assessment of the categories as fundamentals of the world (s. above); according to Ibn Sabʿīn’s al-Masāʾ il as-siqilliyya the categories are in a Neoplatonizing manner necessary, have no cause, exist by themselves, are permanently, do not change and are essentially one350.

13. A Medieval Latin Echo of Neoplatonizing Islamic Thought: Ramon Llull

Interestingly, Ibn Sabʿīn’s critical view of the category of “relation” in his Buddha al-ʿārif is not shared by his younger contemporary Ramon Llull (1232 -1315 or 1316 AD). This Catalan philosopher and mystic had knowledge of the Aristotelian Organon, including the categories and wrote a Compendium logicae Algazelis, in which he used Ghazālī’s Maqāṣid al-falāsifa, a description of Ibn Sīnā’s philosophy on the basis of Ibn Sīnā’s Persian Dānišnāma351. In addition, Llull must have known other Arabic sources, including Ibn Sabʿīn352. With regard to Llull’s concept of the categories, especially of relation, we detect parallels with the sufi philosopher Ibn Ḥaḍād. We can contrast Llull’s concept of relatio substantialis with Ibn Ḥaḍād’s category (1) “substance” qua “Creator” or divine “essence”, (2) “relation” qua divine “lordship” and (3) “action” qua act of “creating”353: Llull gives as an example the substantial relation, existing in God, between Father, Son and Holy

353. See ch. 11.
Ghost\textsuperscript{354} and the corresponding relation in created things, e.g. the relation between form and matter in the substance fire; this relation \textit{qua} form indicates multiplicity, “like the multiplicity (\textit{pluralitas}) between father and son”\textsuperscript{355}. Relation is a “coessential” (\textit{coessentiale}) (real) relative, something that coessentially can have a relation (\textit{referible}) and (coessentially) is the act of relation (\textit{referre}). In the same way substance, which has relation, is something that makes it a (real) substance (\textit{subsstantiativum}), a substance potentially (\textit{substantiabile}) and the act of being substance (\textit{substantiare})\textsuperscript{356}. Relation is a basic principle (\textit{principium primitivum}), and like substance it can have coessential principles, like action and passion or quantity (\textit{maioritas, minoritas}) and quality\textsuperscript{357}. Relation can be an accident, inferior to the substantial relation\textsuperscript{358}. It is a cause of accidental or substantial action (\textit{actio}) and passion (\textit{passio})\textsuperscript{359}. These few selected descriptions\textsuperscript{360} clearly reveal the new evaluation of relation, which in contrast to Aristotle is no more concentrating on relation as something dependent on the substance. With the Neoplatonizing Islamic philosophers — including the sufi philosopher Ibn \textasciiacute{'}Arab\textasciiacute{i} — he shares the classification of relation as a dynamic and active principle and with Ibn \textasciiacute{'}Arab\textasciiacute{i} he shares the use of the categories as universal forms with a “naturally physical and metaphysical status”\textsuperscript{361}: Ibn \textasciiacute{'}Arab\textasciiacute{i} developed his concept of categories as something applicable to the order of the world and as something mirrored in the divine aspects of the Creator; remarkably, Ibn \textasciiacute{'}Arab\textasciiacute{i}’s divine categories 1) “substance” = Creator, 2) “relation” = God’s “lordship” and 3) “acting” = God’s act of creating\textsuperscript{362}, can be paralleled with Llull’s trinitarian concept of the substantial relation, existing in God, between Father, Son and Holy Ghost and also with Llull’s concept of the correlative, in which the divine attributes appear in a correlation of “acting” (= Ibn \textasciiacute{'}Arab\textasciiacute{i}: God’s act of creating), “action” (= Ibn \textasciiacute{'}Arab\textasciiacute{i}: Creator = substance) and “passion” (= Ibn \textasciiacute{'}Arab\textasciiacute{i}: God’s “lordship” = relation)\textsuperscript{363}, e.g. in the correlation of the divine act of \textit{intellegere}, the divine \textit{intellectus intelligens} and the divine \textit{objectum intellectum}\textsuperscript{364}. Apparently, Llull did not follow the alleged Avicennian and the Averroistic thesis of “ex Uno, secundum quod unum, non nisi unum”\textsuperscript{365}, and similar to Ibn \textasciiacute{'}Arab\textasciiacute{i} he developed a relationship between God and His crea-

\textsuperscript{354} Ramon Llull, 1985: 106, B.
\textsuperscript{356} Ramon Llull, 1985: 108, C.2.
\textsuperscript{357} Ramon Llull, 1985: 110, D.2.
\textsuperscript{358} Ramon Llull, 1985: 110, D.3.
\textsuperscript{359} Ramon Llull, 1985: 110, E.1
\textsuperscript{360} Cf. also the chapters on categories in Johnston, 1987: 62-73 and, on the \textit{Logica nova}, 202-205; and Vittorio Hößle in the introduction to Ramon Llull, 1985: LXVII-LXXV.
\textsuperscript{361} Cf. on Llull Johnston, 1987: 66.
\textsuperscript{362} See ch. 11.
\textsuperscript{363} Here, we should be aware that Ibn \textasciiacute{'}Arab\textasciiacute{i}’s “lordship” not only means God’s rule over the world, but also the world being ruled by God. Moreover, we should be aware that Ibn \textasciiacute{'}Arab\textasciiacute{i} in a differing manner correlates the category “passion” as something related to God, His “response” to man’s prayers.
\textsuperscript{364} Cf. Daiber, 2004a: 151, 158 and 161f.
\textsuperscript{365} See n. 333, 334 and 336.
tion, in which the category “relation” received a new orientation. In “relation”, cause and effect are correlated and “relation” is a dynamic process between substance and relative\textsuperscript{366}. Its integration in Llull’s Christian trinitarian theology, in which the created world is an image of the divine trinity\textsuperscript{367}, offers an interesting alternative to the Augustinian trinitarian theology, which is also based on Aristotle’s \textit{Categories}, especially his concept of relation\textsuperscript{368}. The rehabilitation of relation since John Scottus Eriugena (ca 801 - ca 877 AD) until Bonaventura (1221-1274 AD) and (in an inconsistent manner) Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274 AD)\textsuperscript{369} culminated in new accentuations of Ramon Llull, developed under the impression of Neoplatonizing Islamic philosophers including the sufi Ibn ‘Arabī. His discussion of relation\textsuperscript{370} forms an essential part of his contributions to logic, which according to Alexander Fidora consists in the “dynamization of logical predicates”\textsuperscript{371}.

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\textit{ASL} & \textit{Aristoteles Semitico-Latinus}. Leiden.  \\
\textit{CAG} & \textit{Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca}. Berolini.  \\
\textit{IPTS} & \textit{Islamic Philosophy, Theology and Science. Texts and Studies}. Leiden. \\
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\textsuperscript{366} Cf. Hösle in the introduction to Ramon Llull, 1985: LXVI-LXVII.

\textsuperscript{367} Cf. Hösle in the introduction to Ramon Llull, 1985: Lif.

\textsuperscript{368} Cf. Daiber, 2004a: 161; and Kany, 2007: 356.

\textsuperscript{369} Cf. Hösle in the introduction to Ramon Llull, 1985: LXX-LXXII.

\textsuperscript{370} Cf. the articles by Platzeck, 1963 and 1964/1965: esp. 73-81, who stresses the Aristotelian and Platonic background.

\textsuperscript{371} Fidora, 2007: 86. A recent publication has the aim to include Lull’s theory of communication (\textit{affatus}) in the discussion of Ramon Llull as a forerunner of modern semiotics and relational logic: see Navarro Lluch, 2016. Regrettably, the monograph does not sufficiently refer to Lullian texts and their context.
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