ORIENTALISMS IN EAST ASIA.
A THEORETICAL MODEL

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Resumen
Hace treinta años, el Orientalismo de Edward Said cambió el curso de los estudios poscoloniales, de los estudios culturales comparativos, del estudio comparativo del discurso y la retórica, y de los estudios del posmodernismo. Algunos que cambiaron las tornas al “orientalismo” escribiendo sobre el “occidentalismo” han hecho importantes contribuciones al análisis crítico del discurso del orientalismo euroestadounidense reexaminando el discurso tradicional de Asia Oriental y sus consecuencias. El discurso orientalista forma parte de la “modernidad” euroestadounidense, y su deconstrucción contribuye a la “posmodernidad”, generando así el “contra-orientalismo”, el “autoorientalismo” y el “retro-orientalismo”. Este texto propone un modelo teórico para el análisis de la construcción de estos nuevos discursos en Asia Oriental como reacción a la modernidad euroestadounidense que contribuye a la construcción de la (pos)modernidad.

Palabras clave
Estudios de Asia Oriental contemporánea, discurso cívico, comunidades epistémicas, construccionalismo social, orientalismo, occidentalismo, autoorientalismo, contra-orientalismo, retro-orientalismo, modernidad, posmodernidad.

Abstract
Thirty years ago, Edward Said’s Orientalism changed the course of postcolonial studies, of comparative cultural studies, of the comparative study of discourse and rhetoric and of studies of postmodernism. Various authors who have turned the tables on ‘orientalism’ and write about ‘occidentalism’ have made important contributions to the critical analysis of Euroamerican orientalist discourse while re-examining traditional East Asian discourse and its consequences. The orientalist discourse forms part of Euroamerican ‘modernity’, and its deconstruction contributes to ‘postmodernity’, producing ‘reverse orientalism’, ‘self-orientalism’ or ‘auto-orientalism’, and ‘retro-orientalism’. This working paper will propose a theoretical model for analysing the construction of these new discourses in East Asia as a reaction to Euroamerican modernity that contributes to the construction of (post) modernity.

Key words
Contemporary East Asian studies, civic discourse, epistemic communities, social constructionism, orientalism, occidentalism, self-orientalism, auto-orientalism, reverse orientalism, retro-orientalism, modernity, postmodernity.
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Preliminary considerations

In contemporary social sciences there is an important tradition of discourse analysis and its relation to power: Antonio Gramsci’s concept of ‘hegemony’, or the control of information, as a counterpart to ‘institutional violence’; Mikhail Bakhtin’s concept of ‘polyphony’ and the ‘dialogic’ nature of discourse; Raymond Williams’ concepts of culture and communication, of language as a constituent element of the social material process; Michel Foucault’s concepts of the ‘archaeology’ and the ‘genealogy’ of discourse, and of discourse as power; Louis Althusser’s concept of ‘interpellation’; Gilles Deleuze’s and Felix Guattari’s concepts of dominant and subversive discourses, or Jürgen Habermas’ concepts of the ‘public sphere’, of ‘civil society’, and of the rules of ‘civic discourse’ and of ‘public communication’, among many others.

In traditional Chinese political thought (Guo 1975, Hsiao 1979, He & Bu 1998, Lewis 1999), the establishment of an official discourse that could order society was a major concern of both thinkers and policy-makers alike, and the Chinese imperial examinations created a system that combined intellectual and literary competence with the administration of power, creating a situation of complicity between the intellectuals and policy-makers that continues to be important today. Now East Asian thinkers are analysing and deconstructing the paradigms and theories created by Euroamerican social scientists, and proposing alternatives based on East Asian paradigms and theories. The construction of the modern discourse of power at the national and international level is being carried out both in government and in academic circles in East Asia. Modernisation and the translation—or recreation—of ‘Western’ modernity is to a large extent the result of debates among the intelligentsia: intellectuals who are also advisers and opinion-makers.

In this context, the debate over Edward Said’s concept of ‘orientalism’ (Said 1978, 1993) and its relevance to East Asian circumstances, and the existence or not of an equivalent ‘occidentalism’ (Chen 2002), which has been taking place over the last thirty years, has broadened and deepened the scope of the respective arguments and has also brought to light such parallel concepts as ‘reverse orientalism’, ‘self-orientalism’ or ‘auto-orientalism’, and ‘retro-orientalism’. This debate has as its backdrop the development of postcolonialist and postmodernist theory by various epistemic communities that configure an emergent civil society and an emergent civic discourse in East Asia. In this working paper I will describe the historical sociocultural background of this debate and propose a theoretical model that could help to orientate the debate.

The historical and sociocultural background

The differing conceptual frameworks and conceptual metaphors developed in East Asian and in Euroamerican culture over the millennia were accompanied by differing forms of social organisation and social psychology. The administration of state power in traditional China required complicity between aristocratic warriors who provided the coercive force needed to mobilise armies of both soldiers and workers, and literati with land-owning gentry origins who provided technocratic administration.

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2 Some of these arguments are adapted from my presentation “Retro-Orientalism, Emergent Civil Society and the Construction of (Post)Modernity in China”, at the conference on Chinese Society and Chinese Studies, held at the University of Nanjing, China, 24-26/10/2008.
The dominant East Asian economic, social and political structures, epitomised by China, were based on the rural economy and the countryside was the population base. The Chinese imperial examination system that served to identify the literati and to integrate them into the structure of state power gave an advantage to the gentry class, who could afford to dedicate their sons’ time to the literary studies needed to do well in the exams. The gentry class, whose income was based on the output of their peasants and their lands, opposed the development of a commercial economy or a commercial class that could offer the peasantry an alternative means of livelihood that would deplete the ranks of peasant farmers to the detriment of the gentry class.

Although there were thriving cities in traditional China and there was a commercial economy, neither urbanisation nor capitalism emerged from what Mark Elvin has described as a “high-level equilibrium trap” (Elvin 1973). Urbanisation and capitalism in Europe produced conflicts of interest between the ‘private’ sphere of the individuals who wished to protect the wealth they were acquiring in the market economy and a state power in the hands of the European gentry that could intervene against their interests. Civil society developed in modern Europe as a means of self-protection against the abuse of state power by entering the ‘public’ sphere, to form part of a system of checks and balances, to take part in the forming of opinions, and to influence policy making. The social construction of the ‘individual’ and of the sacrosanct nature of the ‘private sphere’ became important elements of bourgeois ideology.

The situation in traditional East Asian society was very different. To a very large extent, no ‘private’ sphere ever existed. In China, the 保甲 baojia system, based on collective punishment which fomented mutual surveillance and supervision, made it difficult for anyone to function in a purely individualistic way. By means of the imperial examination system, the gentry class was integrated into state power and therefore had ready access to means of protecting its interests. At the highest level of state power ranging from the centre to the provincial and county capitals, there was a state bureaucracy manned by the literati. At the middle level of local government the major gentry families exercised political and administrative power. At the lower local level lineage organisations, temple associations and village elders, as well as ‘secret societies’, were responsible for maintaining order and ensuring compliance with state policies (or protecting their own interests against state policies). Urban society produced crafts guilds and trade associations or chambers of commerce.

[We] can refer to this unique mode of organization in premodern Chinese society as “the integrative capacity of ideology and social organization” ([意識形態和社會組織的一體化] yishixingtai he shehui zuzhi de yitihua) or, in short, “an integrative structure” ([一体化结构] yitihua jiegou). This structure has two basic features. First, the countryside, not the city, forms the core of its social organisation. Second, the basis of social ordering and integration takes the form of identification ([認同] rentong) with a common moral ideology. (Jin 2001)

Traditional East Asian society did not share the same bases as traditional European society. As a result, the development of civil society and a public sphere could not have come about in any way similar to their evolution in Europe. The ‘universality’ of European Enlightenment values and social theories was based far more on local European circumstances and values than is ever generally admitted by the defenders of this ‘universality’ (as Said made clear in the case of orientalism). Their imposition on non-European societies, without regard for the values and social theories of non-European societies or for their stages of economic development, through the process of colonisation that accompanied the modernisation of Europe in the Enlightenment period, and through the process driven by neoliberal ideology that is accompanying globalisation today, has created major social, political and geopolitical problems. (Amin 1989; Golden 2006)
The introduction of ‘modernity’ into traditional East Asian society was traumatic. It was the result of gunboat ‘diplomacy’ and the use of superior technological and military advantage to oblige China and Japan to open themselves up to foreign exploitation. One response to the constant foreign aggression and the debilitating decadence of the traditional imperial system was the call to modernise China and Japan along Euroamerican lines. For the more radical reformers, traditional East Asian values were an obstacle to modernisation and they advocated complete rejection of the past and wholesale importation of ‘Western’ modernity personified as ‘Mr. Science’ and ‘Mr. Democracy’. In China, conservatives and moderate reformers tried to reconcile the essence (國粹 guocui) of traditional Chinese culture with the utility of ‘Western’ science and technology, on the one hand, and of ‘Western’ economic development, on the other, without abandoning traditional Chinese culture (中學為體西學為用 zhongxue wei ti, xixue wei yong; use Chinese learning as the essence, use Western learning where practical).

The traditional role of the Confucian gentry-based literati as bureaucrats of state power and as guardians of traditional values and learning who were at the same time integrated into the apparatus of state power meant that the major reform movements as well as the major resistance to reform both came from the gentrified literati base, and this meant that many reform battles would be fought in the cultural terrain. Late 19th century intellectual reformers in both Japan and China translated what they considered to be the most important Western social and political texts and tried to create a correspondingly new terminology in order to modernise East Asia (Liu 1995, 2000, 2004). In the 1920’s and 1930’s in China, what came to be known as the May Fourth Movement (五四運動 wusi yundong) deliberately set out to import Euroamerican ‘modernity’ and Enlightenment values as a substitute for traditional Chinese culture, an enterprise that was revived in the 1980’s in China, a decade that would come to be characterized by a ‘New Enlightenment Movement’ (新啟蒙運動 Xin Qimeng yundong) and as a period of ‘Culture Fever’ or ‘Cultural Studies Fever’ (文化熱 wenhuare) (Barmé 2000; Chen, Jin, Chen, Chin 1998; Chow 1993, 1998; Davies 2001; Fewsmith 2008; Liu, Tang, Xiaobing 1993; Louie, Hodge 1998; Saussy 2001; Wang Chaohua 2003; Wang Hui 2003; Wang Jing 1996).

But by the end of the century, the validity and the universality of Euroamerican Enlightenment values was being questioned on all fronts in East Asia (Golden 2004). Said contributed to this debate with his analysis of ‘orientalism’, which then became both a tool for analysis and an object of counter-analysis.

The impact of Orientalism on contemporary East Asian intellectual discourse

One particular aspect of the debate has to do with the impact of Said’s theory of ‘orientalism’ and the variations it has inspired. Said analysed the role of orientalism in distorting European perceptions of the ‘Orient’ as Europe’s ‘Other’ and demonstrated the ideological underpinnings of those biased analyses and interpretations (Said 1978). Samir Amin went further and analysed the origins of ‘Eurocentrism’ as a constituent element of European imperialism (Amin 1989). Adrian Hsia produced a kind of companion volume to Said’s study which showed how orientalism was at work in the perception of China in England throughout the British imperial period (Hsia 1998). All of these studies have to do with how Europe perceived (and distorted) its “East”. Figure 1 shows how the lens through which Euroamerican ethnocentrism views East Asia automatically and inevitably distorts the image of East Asia that the Euroamerican observer receives. This distorted image would respond to Said’s idea of ‘orientalism’.
Postcolonial studies have spawned a variety of reactions to Said’s orientalism. ‘Occidentalism’ has been described as an equivalent but inverted process: how the ‘Orient’ perceived and distorted the ‘Occident’. In this case, Chen Xiaomei has published a sensitive study of how different and incompatible forms of occidentalism can compete with and oppose each other simultaneously in contemporary China (Chen 2002). Each form of occidentalism would represent a biased and distorting perception of the ‘West’, each with its own ideological underpinnings. Some represent the ‘West’ in an entirely hostile fashion (Buruma & Margalit 2004), while others represent the ‘West’ in an entirely favourable light (Su & Wang 1991). ‘Ethnocentrism’ cuts both ways, however, and Figure 2 shows how the lens through which East Asian ethnocentrism views Euroamerica automatically and inevitably distorts the image of Euroamerica that the East Asian observer receives. This distorted image would respond to ‘occidentalism’.

Some authors also refer to ‘reverse orientalism’, a ‘nativist’ project in the postcolonialist context that denies any possibility that someone from a different culture could fully or correctly understand the conceptual bases of one’s own culture (Wixted 1989, Saussy 2001). As part of the postcolonial process, ‘nativism’ can promote an ideological stance that does not permit any form of comparative cultural studies because it does not admit the possibility of any non-native understanding of native culture, as Figure 3 shows, nor does it encourage any critical deconstruction of the ‘native’ culture itself (Andersen 1983).
Occidentalism refers to ways in which the West is perceived by the East, but there is also a form of ‘self-orientalism’ (sometimes referred to as ‘auto-orientalism’) by means of which an ‘Eastern’ author distorts the representation of his or her own culture by presenting it or explaining it to the ‘West’ within the terms of the orientalist Western discourse or within the ‘Western’ value system. This has been said of Feng Youlan’s attempt to fit Chinese ‘Thought’ to the paradigms of Western ‘Philosophy’, for instance, or the attempts by the Japanese authors Kakuzo Okakura and Inazo Nitobe to explain Japanese culture in ‘Western’ terms in The Book of Tea and Bushido, the soul of Japan (Defoort 2001, Cheng 2007, Rodríguez Navarro 2008). Figure 4 shows how, when the asymmetrical relation of power assigns prestige to the Euroamerican vision of the world and marginalises the alternative world vision of East Asia, a process of ‘self-orientalism’ or ‘auto-orientalism’ can arise in which East Asia tries to adapt its own world vision to the expectations of the Euroamerican observer who has already been conditioned by ‘orientalism’. This too is a process that can be analysed in a colonialist-postcolonialist context.

Finally, I think we can begin to describe a new kind of postcolonialist and postmodernist project of ‘retro-orientalism’ in which an ‘Eastern’ author or artist makes ironic use of a ‘Western’ orientalising vision of his or her own culture in order to deconstruct that orientalist vision. Figure 5 suggests the possibility of a post-postcolonialist process in which East Asia ceases to understand itself or present itself according to the expectations of Euroamerica and can begin to parody or to...
deconstruct the orientalist vision thanks to a newly acquired cultural self-confidence and the resulting independence from orientalist criteria that the process of retro-orientalism confers and conveys.³

3 For a vivid visual example of retro-orientalism see Retro-Orientalism Redux #1 at <http://www.flickr.com/photos/dhkong/1030541571/> (Consulted 1 December 2009).

A Theoretical Model for Analysing Orientalisms⁴

I would like to propose a theoretical model for analysing the processes involved in orientalism, occidentalism, self-orientalism, reverse orientalism and retro-orientalism, based on aspects of Karl Popper's 'Three World conjecture', on Hans Georg Gadamer's metaphor of a cultural 'horizon', and on the concept of a 'hermeneutic circle' initiated by Friedrich Schleiermacher.

One of the fundamental debates in modern European philosophy with immediate relevance for the study of communication (cross-cultural or otherwise) concerns the opposition between idealism and empiricism. Carried to its solipsistic extreme, idealism would deny that two people have ever shared the same experience of the world and that would make mutual understanding impossible; everything would be relative to the individual. Carried to its materialist extreme, empiricism would state that external material reality is determinant. Materialism would provide a universal basis for mutual understanding (or conditioned response).

To establish a surer footing for the modern scientific method, Karl Popper proposed the Three World conjecture as a model of reality (Popper 1972): World 1 (the material world of physics, chemistry, biology, etc.), World 2 (the individual psychological experience of the world, mental states, feelings, etc.), and World 3 (the sum of the abstract products of the human mind, such as mathematics, scientific theories, social and cultural values, beliefs; similar to Richard Dawkins' 'memes', Dawkins 1992). Popper situated the individual subjective experience of the world (World 2) between the conditioning aspects of the material world (World 1) and the world of intangible realities (World 3). Figure 6 illustrates how Popper visualized his Three World conjecture. World 1 (the material world) overlaps with World 2 (the individual experience of the world) and World 3 (intangible reality). It overlaps and thereby conditions or determines, in part, many

⁴ Part of this proposal is adapted from Golden 2009.
aspects of Worlds 2 and 3. At the same time, however, World 3 overlaps with Worlds 1 and 2 and World 2 overlaps with Worlds 1 and 3. Part of each World remains outside the conditioning aspects of each of the other Worlds, while another part of each World is over-determined by each of the other Worlds.

This model can be readily adapted to the field of comparative cultural studies. World 1 would correspond to the material base of a culture. The sociocultural organization of a society would have to respond adequately to this world (cf. Haurricourt 1962 on how the differing material bases affected the development of the Chinese and the Semitic languages). At the same time, the Sociocultural World could modify the Material World as well, in order to overcome the limitations it imposed. The Individual World is highly determined by both the Material and the Sociocultural Worlds, but can also modify or manipulate the material base, or innovate in the world of ideas or scientific discoveries.

An individual assimilates and internalizes the values, norms and beliefs of a particular sociocultural group, and these values, norms and beliefs define what that individual would consider to be ‘normal’. Hence the problem of ethnocentrism in cross-cultural communication: each individual unconsciously considers his or her own values, norms and beliefs, that is to say, those of her or his own sociocultural group, to be normal, and any others will be different by comparison, and therefore not normal. In order to escape this inevitable ethnocentric conditioning, individuals would have to acquire consciousness of their own conditioning.

For the purposes of linguistic and literary studies, it might be useful to focus on those elements of the Sociocultural World that would constitute its imagine, on the one hand, and its linguistic and literary aspects, on the other. In the case of the writer or writing, these elements would exercise a poetic or productive function, while in the case of the reader or reading, they would exercise an aesthetic or receptive function, as is illustrated in Figure 7.
To a certain extent, these two versions of the Three World conjecture would have to overlap for full mutual understanding to occur, although imagination can go a long way toward creating virtual overlaps, but I do not think this model goes far enough to contextualize the problematic of either intracultural or intercultural studies.

The acquisition of one’s own culture is a process known as ‘enculturation’. Hans Georg Gadamer has developed a theory of reader reception that could help to contextualize the ethnocentric problematic of enculturation (Gadamer 1975, 1977). He proposes the concept of a cultural ‘horizon’ that is common to everyone who forms part of a given sociocultural group in a given place in a given era. Members of such a group will share the same cultural references within (but not beyond) their horizon. By sharing these cultural references, they participate in the ‘intertextuality’ of their own culture’s texts or semiotic manifestations. As a result, they participate in the ‘intersubjectivity’ that will be common to the comprehension of the texts or semiotic manifestations of their own group. The concept of intersubjectivity implies that there are many cultural references that every member of the group will share in common, and many subjective experiences that, though individual in each case, take place within commonly shared sociocultural structures. As a result, all members of the same group, in the same place in the same era, will share common elements that will permit mutual comprehension. Gadamer’s ‘horizon’ delimits everyone’s cultural perception of the world, just as the sea-faring horizon marks the outer limit of what a sailor can see. Figure 8 depicts the concept of the cultural ‘horizon’.

Reader reception theory also speaks of the ‘hermeneutic circle’. ‘Hermeneutics’ refers to the interpretation of texts, the discovery (if not invention) of the different meanings contained in a text, implicitly as well as explicitly. ‘Semiotics’ extends hermeneutics to the interpretation of non-semantic sociocultural phenomena as well. People who form part of the same sociocultural group in the same place in the same era will also share the same criteria for interpreting phenomena and cultural manifestations within the shared cultural horizon of their shared world, in roughly the same way. This common way of interpreting things is one of the most fundamental elements of their enculturation. As a result, the hermeneutic circle acts as a complementary horizon that conditions people’s capacity to interpret their world. Figure 9 combines the cultural horizon and the hermeneutic circle.

We could now fuse the Three World conjecture with the cultural horizon and the hermeneutic circle, as in Figure 10.
So far we have considered the situation of individuals who have been enculturated within the same sociocultural group. What happens when someone wishes to understand a completely different culture? The other culture has its own Material and Sociocultural Worlds, and the Individual World of another culture has been enculturated within its own cultural horizon and hermeneutic circle. In the case of different Euroamerican cultures there will be a high degree of overlapping but in the case of the East Asian and Euroamerican cultures there will be very little (until the existence of a somewhat shared history in modern times). They are two very different sociocultural complexes that do not share cultural horizons or hermeneutic circles. They are to a large extent separate worlds (see Figure 11).

In this case, a person who has been enculturated in the Euroamerican context would have to make an effort to understand the bases of East Asian culture. The process of acquiring another culture is ‘acculturation’, and it is different from enculturation because it is a conscious process that requires, in this case, a broadening of one’s Euroamerican cultural horizon in order to include a minimum of overlapping with the East Asian cultural horizon (Figure 12).
The acquisition of cultural references from a different culture is not sufficient to facilitate understanding of their role as referents in that culture, however. Interpreting these cultural referents according to one’s own hermeneutic circle is likely to produce misunderstandings or distortions. This is one of the dangers of ethnocentrism and in this sense, orientalism and occidentalism and their variants are examples of ethnocentrism tinged by ideology.

Interpreting ‘Eastern’ cultural referents and references through a ‘Western’ hermeneutic circle produces ‘orientalism’, while the opposite process produces ‘occidentalism’. Interpreting one’s own ‘Eastern’ cultural referents and references through a ‘Western’ hermeneutic circle produces ‘self-orientalism’. Insisting that the ‘Eastern’ hermeneutic circle is the only one that is valid for interpreting ‘Eastern’ cultural referents and references produces ‘reverse orientalism’. Interpreting ‘Western’ referents and references through an ‘Eastern’ hermeneutic circle opens the way to ‘retro-orientalism’.

To avoid orientalism, Euroamericans must also broaden their own hermeneutic circle to include a minimum of overlapping with the East Asian hermeneutic circle in order to understand the bases of East Asian culture on their own terms, without imposing ethnocentric cultural/ideological imperatives or filters (and vice versa):

The previous graphic representation of the process of acculturation is much more modest than that depicted in Figure 14, which tries to englobe both cultures within a single (and static) perspective, granting the observer a point of view that is superior to either of the cultures in question. It thereby raises ideological implications that would be difficult to defend – such as attributing to oneself an ahistorical and asociocultural omniscience; or the overbearing (and self-deluding) self-confidence of an imperial metropolis.
Conclusion

The models and paradigms of civil society, the public sphere, public communication and civic discourse developed by Euroamerican social scientists on the basis of Euroamerican history and culture cannot be applied directly to the historical and cultural situation of East Asia. The almost total integration of the literati and their gentry class in the apparatus of state power and control made the emergence of civil society in opposition to the state apparatus unnecessary until East Asia was forced to modernise in highly unfavourable circumstances as a response to foreign intervention.

‘Western’ modernity could not be imposed unaltered on East Asia; ‘Western’ modernity and ‘East Asian’ modernity were not isomorphic. The kind of post-feudal civil society that developed during the bourgeois revolution in Europe could not have developed in pre-capitalist East Asia. The present role of the East Asian intelligentsia has its roots in traditional East Asian culture and the traditional relationship between state power and the literati, but the new circumstances imposed by economic liberalisation, the creation of a free market economy, and the consequent commoditisation of cultural, academic and intellectual life, all in the context of a process of globalisation that transcends national borders and sovereignty, require the intelligentsia to both adapt and to justify their traditional role.

One of the key debates involved in the process of creating an international civil society and developing an international civic discourse, as well as in promoting political and economic reform in East Asia (and around the world) involves the differing concepts of orientalism, occidentalism, self-orientalism, reverse orientalism and retro-orientalism, whose dynamics can perhaps be understood better through the application of the theoretical model for comparative cultural studies proposed here.

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