The position of Barcelona’s *Destino* group and other regime sympathizers with regard to the Second World War: the example of Britain

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It invigorated him to spend those two or three days amongst friends and in an atmosphere of such freedom. During the first meeting, Josep Vergés asked him this question: “Well then, Brunet, what’s to be done?” “We have to publish *Destino*. We have to publish a magazine that is both pro- and anti-regime at one and the same time.” Back then, almost everyone began to laugh. But his words endured and have gathered the strength of an axiom.


**Summary**

Franco’s victory in 1939 abruptly dismantled the entire structure that had governed Catalan thought and its journalism right through the decade. To consolidate its advance, however, the regime also needed to fill the vacuum left by those thinkers who had been sent into exile. They did this by launching new politico-intellectual publications like the local Falange’s weekly *Solidaridad Nacional*, the unashamedly pro-Franco broadsheet *La Vanguardia Española* and the Catalan catholic and nationalist paper *Diario de Barcelona*. But these were soon overshadowed by a far more original and ambitious publishing venture: *Destino, Política de Unidad*. A weekly magazine created in Burgos in 1937 by the Territorial Catalana de Falange (the Catalan cell of the Spanish Falange), *Destino* was privatized and moved to Barcelona in 1939, eventually becoming the regime’s most effective political and cultural platform in Catalonia and the linchpin of a pro-Franco movement which sought to promote anti-Catalan and anti-liberal sentiment, to offer a final solution to the Catalan problem in the so-called “new state”, *Lanueva España*, and forge a new intellectual order.

**Key words**

Introduction

In 1939, in the wake of their destruction of republican Catalonia and the imprisonment or exile of those who had defended it, Franco’s regime quickly busied itself with building a new social, political, cultural, economic and ultimately journalistic order that would make Barcelona the paradigm of its cause. This activity brought together many different pro-regime forces, from the civil and military administrators and their attendant personnel to the returning fugitives of 1936 and the newly-enlisted or veteran rank and file of the falange, and the carlists and catholics of the unified falange forces. And it also involved the members of committees that were entrusted with reviving the economy and industry and all those journalists, writers, essayists, poets and social and political commentators who, as of autumn 1939, became the sole narrators of wartime Europe to the people of Barcelona (indeed, to all the Catalans who read the press of that period), informing them of their Caudillo’s politics and ideology and of his and their role in the so-called “new state”, La nueva España. Always within the strictest dictates of the regime, this self-styled intelligentsia had to provide clear guidelines to those sectors of the public who had been cut adrift from the rest of the nation by three years of war and revolution and many more years of contamination by pro-Catalan sentiment; and the blunt simplicity of the titles of the more notable texts—José Pemartín’s ¿Qué es lo nuevo?, for example (Pemartín, 1938)—indicates how very basic their intended level of instruction was designed to be.

The structure of culture and knowledge that was to replace the republican and Catalan nationalist mindset were assembled with the help of both new and older mechanisms, by appropriating political platforms and cells that had existed before 1936 and combining these with the conviction that journalists—or rather, the analysts and chroniclers of the daily and weekly newspapers—could become the means to transmit the new power. This is what Santiago Nadal observed in March 1940,\(^1\) when, in line with his words to Arriba on 2 May 1939, he described this ‘new order’ journalism as “a review of the facts of current affairs exactly as they stand but after they have been subject to the scrutiny of a higher, discerning force that can give them order and authority. This means, therefore, that the journalist must serve and that in serving he must prove his most humble submission to the mandates decreed by this new order...”.

So it was that in Barcelona the local falange cell commanded by Luis G. Santamaria (aka Luys Santa Marina and Luis G. Santamaria) took control of

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1. Nadal (1940b) made no bones about the relationship between journalists and the new state: “To my mind and when combined with the interest our war inspires in national matters, the official version of neutrality and the public’s effective neutrality can favour the task of the propagandist, journalist or politician but only as long as he is strictly guided by criteria that protects our national interests.”
La Vanguardia (renamed La Vanguardia Española) and of El Correo Catalán, and transformed the confiscated Solidaridad Obrera into the fascist Nacional (Fabre 1996). But before very long, more ambitious groups of thinkers began to appear, spearheaded by the magazine Destino. Política de Unidad (Cabellos and Pérez Vallverdú, 2007; Geli and Huertas, 1996). Younger analysts made a name for themselves in the city’s cultural or media forums and the veteran chroniclers from republican times also returned from exile to share in one common, all-important mission to help Catalan people address a barrage of urgent issues: to clarify just what had happened in the years before the Civil War (Tallada, 1939) and how, by 1939, the country could have reached the state it was in (VallsTaberner, 1939; VallsTaberner, 1940); to decide what should be done with the remains of Catalan nationalism (Palau, 1939); and to explain how the Spanish should respond to the outbreak of war in Europe, according to the doctrine and precepts of their “highest ruling force”.

A product of the regime and a producer and disseminator of new or familiar discourse, this journalistic, “intellectual” Barcelona was a world of its own but a fairly heterogeneous one: the ‘Catalan-Spanish’ victors of the Civil War prided themselves on their unity and embraced Spain’s fascist cause, but there were inevitably internal differences, prompted by the origins of a given circle or movement or because of the differences in how movements grew and interacted. So the party line in Luis de Galinsoga’s La Vanguardia Española didn’t quite match the carlist convictions of the rough and ready “priest of the people” in El Correo Catalán; and the falange cell directed by Gutiérrez Santamarina, who attempted to make Solidaridad Nacional the benchmark publication of the new official culture, was not quite the same as the circle of Santamarina’s own ex-colleagues at Destino (for colleagues is exactly what they had been in 1937 and had continued to be in 1939), “a magazine of champions” published by thinkers whose governing and business structure had become independent from the Barcelona Falange but who “continued to be falangists, not because they were militants but because their ideology had the same roots” (Cabellos and Pérez Vallverdú, no date).

However, the illusion of plurality created by so many forums could not really hide the intentions of the dictatorship, whose stone tablet would never accept an alternative political discourse. But the few answers were to be given by a whole series of different groups who had merged either before or during the war into “more or less effectively organized counter-revolutionary initiatives bearing a notable resemblance to one another and marching to the beat of European fascism in general and Italian fascism in particular: that ideology which would replace republicanism with a new anti-liberal, anti-Marxist and counter-revolutionary order” (Moliner and Ysàs, 1992: 12). Sánchez Recio has also observed that at every level of political power, from the national arena right down to regional and local administrations, the dictatorship armed itself with “a
fairly wide net of civilian collaborators whose political ideologies and persuasions were diverse but whose common conviction on one count was absolute: that they would deter the attempt to revive the policies of the Second Spanish Republic and strive, instead, to recover and wield such power as would favour the interests of the society’s conservative sector” (Sánchez Recio, 1996: 27).

The same premise also held for the Barcelona of the pro-regime essayists, journalists and analysts who explained to their readers exactly what the European arena of the Second World War should mean to them (as well as instructing them in any number of other, equally important issues). And the political landscape of platforms and individuals was therefore characterized by many different shades of grey, even though the majority views were essentially the same. (As Ysàs observes, their “diverse origins” did not undermine the “coincidence” of their “analysis and conclusions”. See Ysàs, 2005: 15.) In the pre-war period, some of these writers had been more or less directly involved in the regionalist political and cultural ventures of Francesc Cambó and, as we shall see below, some went on to form Destino. And although there were sometimes problematic differences in origins, the various circles of writers and thinkers were not impervious to one another. For example, Santiago Nadal, Ignacio Agustí and Carlos Sentís all published in both Destino and La Vanguardia Española, which was managed by the somewhat theatrical Luis de Galinsoga under the aegis of the Count of Godó. None of these three would have been ready to bow and scrape to Galinsoga and he was probably not particularly enamoured of them either; but neither would he have considered them a dissident force or threat to his own position. And so the common ground between the biggest papers and magazines allowed these ‘new order’ analysts to appear in more than one publication at a time and to consolidate their self-styled role as the period’s social and political analysts.

Some analysts, like Ramón Garriga, came from the world of Francesc Cambó (note, however, that Santiago Nadal did not): Garriga was a friend and associate of Ramón Serrano Suñer and La Vanguardia Española’s correspondent in Berlin and Switzerland. That he was also one of this paper’s analysts assured him the enmity of the local falange cells, which became increasingly more desperate as the Second World War escalated and the Spanish regime turned its back on them. Indeed, to truly appreciate what unleashed the falange diatribe against Ignacio Agustí, we need to understand the dictatorship’s internecine trouble, its particular balance of power and influence and the disappointment of those who believed certain objectives had not been achieved.²

² “…when things were going badly, far away from the Front in Burgos IA [Ignacio Agustí] was giving himself up to an impassioned expression of Castilian. Cultivating a falange moustache, he began that series of articles which were to be gathered in the book Unsiglo
Certainly, the content of the text cited in Footnote 2 is very much in tune with the times in which it was written—March 1945, in this particular case—and confirms what few are actually aware of: that in the mid-forties, during this final stage of the Second World War, the falangist writers of the weekly broadsheet Estilo had suffered a decisive defeat and had been abandoned by the Catalan reading public in favour of more challenging, complex styles of journalism that were more relevant to their lives. The new voices were of writers like Ignacio Agustí in his weekly column in Destino, which of course had originally emerged from the the Catalan cell of that same Spanish Falange (the Territorial Catalana de Falange). One year earlier, in March 1944, Santiago Nadal had also been criticised for his article “Verona y Argel” (Nadal, 1944). If Agustí was made to pay for his old-school Catalan nationalist position and for having betrayed the Falange by “wresting” the weekly from them (with the help of JosepVergés), Nadal was also penalized for being a monarchist and for writing in a publication that had turned its back on its origins to recall a Catalan past that was not by nature nationalist.

However, there were other thinkers whose origins and activities were less suspect than Destino’s “second-time converts” or who, for example, were at least more discreet and appeared to be fewer in number than the contributors to La Vanguardia Española. Either associated with or responsible for the political and ideological mainstream of the regime in Catalonia, this circle controlled the production of Catalonia’s ideological discourse; but in some ways precisely because of this, it had less influence at the more cultured end of society (which supported the national cause in the war and revolution but expected more something more sophisticated than the parade of slogans and arguments manufactured by the dictatorship’s propaganda machine). The carlistfalangist Feliciano Baratech was one of these, a champion of the fascist unification movement of April 1937, a mainstay in the publication Solidaridad Nacional and an influential contributor to the magazine Azor (which, in 1942, had been reinstated after its demise in the Republican years). Baratech declared himself a fervent germanophile in that year, convinced that the Nazi victory was irreversible and that Spain would join Germany in “a new world order” (Baratech, 1942). Other no less notable figures de Cataluña and covered the entire spectrum of authorial sentiment, from the most heartfelt homage to the Falange to the most unreserved apology for German nationalism. Nor should we forget the book’s date of publication, 1940. [...]Had I. A. kept a little quieter, his discursive skill might yet have helped him avoid the painful consequences of some well-deserved diatribes. But he took it into his head to initiate some kind of transformation, harking after Portela, and made it his business to argue that the results of the War might be detrimental to the Falange... Indeed, he has been so eager that, just as once before (and in the words of the exiled writer) he “sold his Catalan nationalism to the best buyer”, now he is ready to sell his Spanish pride, the difference being that now it is the worst, whatever he says.” (unknown author, 1945).
were Baratech’s fellow correspondent Fernando P. de Cambra, whose supposed expertise as a military analyst did not belie his anti-Semitic fervour in articles on the Jewish exodus during the fall of France (Cambra, 1940), and the veteran Catalan nationalist and fiercely fundamentalist Christian democrat Jaime Ruiz Manent, who because of that common ground between different publications wrote for both for Destino and Solidaridad Nacional (more occasionally, in the latter case) and who had succumbed to the dominant tide of anti-Semitism (Ruiz Manent, 1941).

Along with Baratech and Cambra, there was also Luys Santa Marina, the national counsellor of the Falange who was also variously involved in Barcelona’s first post-war Ateneu (its athenaeum or intellectual society) and directed Solidaridad Nacional. Santa Maria wrote little but was a familiar figure in many circles, as was his friend and associate Félix Ros, an aspiring member of the literati and an influential voice in the early post-war period. With this group’s support and the help of other writers, the journalist and self-appointed whistleblower Miguel Utrillo was able to publish “Fantasmones rojos” (literally, ‘Red braggarts’), a long series of articles systematically bent on discrediting Catalan nationalist and republican politicians and intellectuals. Unfortunately, Utrillo’s attempt to become the intellectual arbiter of Pemartín’s new-state ideology in Catalonia backfired spectacularly (Fabre, c. 1996; 88). 3

Years before the final disaster, however, the editors of Solidaridad Nacional had attempted two separate manoeuvres. First, they recruited a number of eminent men of letters who could give the paper respectability and authority: Josep M. Millàs i Vallicrosa, Martí de Riquer, Jaime Ruiz Manent, Félix Ros, and the Díaz-Plaja brothers were all asked to contribute to the paper for these reasons, at least during the first two years of the War. Other important figures were the new representatives of the regime who were arriving in Barcelona. The most formidable was Martín Almagro, who took charge of and dismantled the legacy of the University of Barcelona’s Pere Bosch Gimpera Chair and who, once settled in the city, decided to make the falangist newspaper his particular platform. Solidaridad Nacional’s second manoeuvre consisted in taking advantage of the local falangists’ organizational dependence on the headquarters in Madrid, turning

3. Jaume Fabre observes, however, that the impact of Solidaridad Nacional during this period was considerable: “From an initial edition of just 12,000 copies and thanks to official patronage of various kinds, [the newspaper] upped its production to 100,000, the maximum number allowed by wartime paper rationing. Every government office had its own copy and many cafés and barbershops were expected to subscribe to the paper, whether or not they wanted to. Indeed, just having a copy in full view of those coming in and out of the room was enough to avoid certain kinds of unpleasantness” (Fabre, 1996: 88). And again Fabre notes that, coming as the end of the War, the year 1945 “provoked a terrible crisis” (Fabre, 1996: 88).
to its advantage the constant toing and froing of writers between Solidaridad Nacional and the Spanish Falange’s official publication Arriba, directed by Ramón Serrano Suñer and a handful of men chosen by him. This was how the influential Manuel Aznar recovered his position in Barcelona after his brief career as co-director of La Vanguardia Española with his friend Josep Pla (Aznar, 1940a, 1940b).

Another key figure in Barcelona’s regime (although in a slightly different manner to those described above) was the editor of La Vanguardia Española, Luis de Galinsoga. Galinsoga was in Barcelona to monitor the political climate and gauge the citizens’ levels of patriotism and adhesion to the Fascist cause. His tasks were to give counsel on how the events of the times should be strained through the media filter, from the Battle of Stalingrad to the fall of Mussolini or the Nuremberg Trials, and to direct the city’s most influential paper. Through that paper, he was to impose upon the public a new language and style of discourse that could help them understand the realities of the world beyond Spain on three different scales (Gallofré i Virgili, 1998): locally, nationally (the Spanish rather than Catalan notion of the word, of course) and internationally. Internationally, that reality was divided in three main blocks: the decadent democracies, the German-Italian axis and the barbaric Asian countries. No further distinctions were deemed necessary. And from the pages of La Vanguardia Española, he chose his moments to intervene and comment on any of these three blocks. He did nothing when his correspondent Santiago Nadal was imprisoned for the article “Verona and Argel”, which Destino had published in March 1944, and he generally kept himself apart from Catalan society, which he felt would never respond to the fascist cause in any completely satisfactory way (for all the effort invested in it by the Caudillo).

Luis de Galinsoga was also responsible for another interesting area of operation: instead of encouraging the local Catalan community to contribute to La Vanguardia Española and make it their benchmark (and even a formidable rival for Destino), he allowed the paper to have a cultural, ideological and linguistic flavour that was quite alien to many of his readers. We might wonder, for example, why he assigned the task of writing a series of articles to commemorate the “liberation” of Barcelona in 1942 to Manuel Machado (“Letanía de Barcelona”), Alfredo Kindelán (“El vigía de Montdedeu”), W. Fernández Flores (“Lo que iba con las tropas”), M. Fernández Almagro (“Emoción de la unidad en Barcelona”) and Eugenio Montes (“Cataluña de ayer y hoy”); or why, in 1943, he assigned articles to José M. Pemán (“26 de enero”), Joaquín Arrarás (“La pequeña historia. Intimidades del Gobierno rojo”) and Eduardo Marquina (“Recordatorio”); and again, why in 1945, he asked both Manuel Machado and Fernández Almagro to write further articles (“Loores de Barcelona liberada y libre” and “Pasos que sonaban a gran historia” respectively) and also brought Eugenio d’Orsin to the paper (“Liberación, resurrección”). The list goes on, including such writers as
Francisco de Cossío, José Francés, Eduardo Marquina and Juan Aparicio.

In short, although some local writers were more or less regularly included in the newspaper (Ferran Valls Taberner, Josep M. Junoy and Josep M. Tallada, for example) there were not enough to balance the scales. These choices made by the Godó family’s newspaper and officially attributed to Galinsoga were a deliberate strategy to allow the other newsheets room to manoeuvre. The more general public announcements and obituaries of Solidaridad Nacional continued to be read but its political and intellectual content could not be made to suit a reading public who wanted something else.

Finally, like the Blanco y Negro— and ABC—signed Hungarian writer Andres Révesz (who, in between translating and writing romance fiction also contributed to Destino and to a lesser extent to Solidaridad Nacional), Galinsoga was never totally accepted in Barcelona’s intellectual milieu, even by those who read his work or at least looked through his paper to find out what was happening outside Spain (Gallofré i Virgili, 2000: 209). As time went by, an increasing number of “indigenous” hybrid formulae began to gather weight in the paper, as they had in Destino, because apart from being well written the publication attempted to cater to the readers who missed the kinds of columns that had been published before the War. In the long run, however, this “readiness” to instruct readers who had already decided what they wanted may have obliged Galinsoga’s correspondents to “modify their attitudes” (Cabellos and Pérez Vallverdú, no date: 149).

Destino, its writers and supposed readers: a complex political and intellectual artefact

The entry of the Nationalist Army to the provinces of Lleida and its partial occupation of the capital of Segrià at the beginning of April 1938 was a turning point for the Catalan Front: the fascist forces immediately declared the Statute of Autonomy null and void; believing that the final Catalan Offensive was imminent, Lluís Companys ordered his counsellors to send their families across the borders of Catalonia to safety; and the “Burgos Catalans” responsible for Destino prepared for their move to Catalonia and their first contact with new readers.5 These Catalans, it was understood, would initially reject any discussion of the “national zone” and it was only natural that the publication should find obstacles

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4 In 1946, Galinsoga was considered a source of irritation rather than a man whose opinion counted. As Barcelona’s Chief of Propaganda observed in a report cited by M. Josep Gallofré, “The people of Barcelona do not like Don Luis’s somewhat mannered and often turgid style” (Gallofré 2000: 209).
to new projects and new ideas at the beginning; after all, these were the people who had attempted to destroy “the very foundations of Spanish identity, wiping the slate of history clean in order to reinstate prehistoric man, that barbarian from the cold” (Montes 1941).

But although the writers of Destino were prepared to face and somehow get round these obstacles, they appreciated that some serious reflection was needed to understand who and what had put them there in the first place. After an initial period focused on the slogans against the League (unknown author, 1937b) and FrancescCambó (unknown author, 1937c), what they eventually needed was a much more detailed analysis of the factors that might impede the success of Destino's reception in Catalonia. The man entrusted with this analysis was one of the period's most formidable thinkers and journalists: Santiago Nadal Gaya. Originally from Lleida, during the 1930s Nadal had gone to school in Barcelona's most fiercely monarchist, anti-republican circle of thinkers (Manent, 1986; Molas, 1972; Culla, 1977; Molas and Culla, 2000). In the summer of 1936 he had fled from Barcelona and after travelling through Italy had settled in nationalist-occupied Spain, where he wrote for different papers including Destino. An excellent analyst and thinker, Nadal could discuss peace in Westphalia or the consequences of the Congress of Vienna or the Crimean War with the same elegance that characterized his eulogies on the subject of iron surgeons (recalling regenerationist Joaquín Costa's notion that Spain was in need of an “iron surgeon” to accomplish its urgent reforms) and various major figures in politics, from Bismarck and Cánovas del Castillo to Hitler, Mussolini and Franco.

It was Nadal, then, who was given the task of bringing to the fore the most important social group in Catalonia at the time: those who came from “Catalan families and who, born in Catalonia, were loyal to the call of their blood, which coursed through their veins in Spanish” (Nadal, 1939a). This was to be Destino's model, both for its correspondents and for the readers who were to embrace it as the vanguard that celebrated Catalonia's recovery by Spain. Nadal explained that those...
Catalan-born Spaniards who “would proclaim their Spanish identity” had suffered “a veritable Calvary” at the hands of both left- and right-wing Catalan nationalists who strategically controlled all political cells of activity and “to whom those who did not submit were destined to fail” (Nadal, 1939a). Nadal’s political background and career differed considerably from the origins of men like Ferran Valls Taberner, a Catalan traditionalist and correspondent for La Vanguardia Española whose article La falsa ruta argued that the Catalan regionalists had in some sense “fallen from grace” (Valls described this as their extravío); instead, Nadal argued, the Catalan nationalist hegemony had so overpowered society that many people had to accept it to survive.6 Faced by this overwhelming force, which was also supported by the republican forces in Madrid, initiative was finally taken by a series of “resistant cells of younger people”.7

This, we might argue, was the cornerstone of the Destino project: to create a political and cultural artefact that could rescue Spanish Catalonia from the overwhelming forces of Catalan nationalism or, more specifically and in the words of Nadal himself, “to imbue the Catalan bourgeoisie soul with the essence of Spain”; or again (and after thirty years), to finally disprove that “Spain had in some way been the malign force or was merely ‘the peninsula’, i.e., a geographic fact, or else ‘the Spanish State’, i.e., a political fact—and an undesirable one at that; and to prove, instead, that it did constitute the Catalans’ true homeland” (Nadal, 1939b).

Designed in this way for readers who had been inoculated against Catalan nationalist or revolutionary temptation, the magazine was launched by an editorial board and team of writers of the very highest intellectual calibre: with a pre-war background in the regionalist politics of Francesc Cambó, there were Ignacio

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6 “[T]o get the government councils, big businesses and newspapers to accommodate them, meaning not only to let them to work and prosper but to liberate them from the ‘spell of silence’ and the systematic disregard with which all values not inspired by Catalan nationalism were treated (while a formidable propaganda machine praised whatever mediocrity was supported by Catalan rule).” (Nadal, 1939a)

7 “Young Catalans joined under the Spanish flag and swearing absolute allegiance to the State as it had existed before and during the Republic, these custodians of memory recalled those institutions that had formerly unified their country, proclaimed their Spanish identity and were almost alone in remembering that Catalonia was also Spanish. Of a tender age, they weathered their opponents’ hostility and contempt, the attempts to impede their advance and the vacuum in which the separatists forced them to live… Their enlightened struggle—offensive to those Catalan nationalists only because it proved that one can be both Catalan and Spanish—has finally borne fruit. The sacred flame of patriotism they watched over has leapt higher and now illuminates the ranks of the fifty thousand sons of Spain who marched forwards from a new, impassioned Catalonia to endure unimaginable trials and fight and die in Spain… It would be unjust and foolish to ignore such lessons of experience in this painful moment of Spain’s resurrection.”
Agustí and Manuel Brunet, the latter having made a name for himself as one of the most articulate polemicists of the 1920s and 1930s. From the ranks of the Catalan nationalist christian democrats and the newspaper *El Matí* there was Jaime Ruiz Manent who, deeply affected by the War and the revolution, had cultivated a decidedly fundamentalist and anti-Semitic style of discourse. Further contributors included Nadal, who (as observed above) came from a different ideological background and who Juan Ramón Masoliver described as “a young man who, here in Barcelona, can rightfully claim to represent the essence of Spanish identity as it stood long before the Movimiento and whose mission to do just this has always been reflected in his essays and articles” (Gracia, 2007: 51). In more general terms, Nadal, Agustí and Brunet took most of the responsibility for the magazine’s national and international political analysis, while the contributors Joan Teixidor, Guillermo Díaz-Plaja, Rafael Vázquez Zamora and of course Josep Pla wrote on cultural affairs. As is widely known, Pla’s own column “Calendario sin fecha” played a key role in attracting readers who no longer found satisfaction in any other quarter and who often subscribed to Pla’s articles simply for want of something better (Cabellos and Pérez Vallverdú, 2007: 49).

From the beginning, the position *Destino*’s correspondents took to sell their particular vision of the Second World War was fairly uncompromising: a ferocious anti-communism that was both radical and persistent in nature (Pons, 2004: 83–84); the conviction that the European arena was essentially a battlefield where Christian civilization as the West knew it would either be saved or would expire (in this sense, it was also the continuation of Spain’s own Civil War and Franco’s victory); unreserved contempt for liberal democratic systems, which the magazine judged to be weak-minded and decadent, preyed upon by communist ideologies or else simply supportive of Bolshevism; and, finally, the belief that Spain’s salvation was on a par with the salvation of Europe because of the role that Spain must eventually play in a new European order freed from its liberal and capitalist empires. These were the positions Agustí, Nadal and Brunet defended in their weekly analyses; and reading between the lines, one might be conclude that together they created a body of discourse that went far beyond their journalist’s task. In other words, they became specialists of a sort, thinkers who could generate very specific wartime opinions that their readers would then hold, who would always follow the party line but whose take on current affairs would be considerably more stimulating.

On the one hand, we should note that many of the issues they addressed were subject to the course of events and might disappear as quickly as they had appeared: in the years 1940 and 1941, for example, the magazine still regularly lauded the Nazi model of conquest and the genius of Hitler, the future hopes of fascist Italy and the promise of a new European order controlled by the three great anti-communist powers; but as the weakening military power of Germany
and Italy became more difficult to ignore, such feelings were less strongly expressed. On the other hand and regardless of the turn of events, certain positions not only remained a fixture of *Destino* but were redoubled, as was the magazine’s anti-communist line and its strong roman catholic sympathies. As the power of Axis declined, the magazine simply replaced one major concern with another (in this case, Nazi Germany with the spectre of Soviet expansionism), compared the two totalitarian systems and entertained the idea that the British, American and French alliance would be able to contain the Bolshevik threat with Franco’s political, cultural and ideological support.

If this is all true, then what was the basis for certain claims that *Destino* was pro-ally? In what circumstances did this notion gather legitimacy? One factor might be the passage of time itself, meaning the many opportunities across the years for history to be rewritten and for its actors to be recast. But the fact that the weekly paper’s analyses did not imitate the fairly basic dogma produced by most of the regime’s broadsheets would also have given it a certain intellectual edge and might have intimated, even, that it sometimes assumed a pro-ally position. *Destino*’s columns were intelligent pieces of at least middle-brow writing and for this reason the quality of the magazine was very definitely above average. Perhaps because Luis de Galinsoga was there to blame, *Destino* became very much appreciated after 1945. But did its writers really sympathize with the Allies or not?

**Pro-ally? Britain as an example between 1940 and 1941**

In 1942 and during a series of conferences on journalism in Barcelona, Santiago Nadal declared that “all manifestations of contemporary war” were “monsters of democratic origin” and the direct consequence of the egalitarianism and nationalism of the French Revolution (Nadal, 1942: 59). Attributing the responsibility for the various evils of contemporary society to the French Revolution was hardly new, but his use of the term ‘nationalism’ referred to two different things: on the one hand, the troublesome French chauvinism that had become the clearest force of its kind in any European nation-state (but also, unfortunately, an entirely republican and lay example); and on the other, the European national minorities and revolutionaries who had played a leading role in the Paris Peace Conference (in order not to regress to 1848) and who had been responsible for such tragic events as the destruction of Austria-Hungary.

The most significant point in his argument in 1942, however, was that democratic systems were what most clearly lead to war. At that time, the Second World War was about to enter its third year and had already stretched beyond
Europe’s frontiers to include the United States and the Soviet Union in one arena and Japan in another. In other words, the War was so far advanced that an objective analysis of how it had originally come about was already going to be a somewhat tall order. But Nadal’s words were tame in comparison to the regime’s accusations of just three years earlier, in 1939: “One thing is absolutely clear, however, and that is the contrast between Germany’s conciliatory intentions and Poland’s intransigence. As for England, it only thinks of how it might turn the situation to its advantage—or rather, it has only thought in such terms, given that it is always at the ready for whatever might drop” (unknown author, 1939). This is just one example—and by no means a falangist example—of the Regime’s generalized view that it was France and Britain who had started the War.

Bearing in mind these proposals—either the earlier ones made in 1939 or the later ones made in 1942—we need to read between the lines of the articles of those times to determine the accuracy of the repeated claims that many reporters at papers like Destino, Madrid’s monarchist ABC or La Vanguardia Española were actually pro-ally in their views (in the last case, in spite of the vigilance of Luis de Galinsoga) but could not express this between 1939 and 1943 and could only express it to a certain degree between 1943 and the end of the War. When we consider the literature, the list of those who are considered to have been ally sympathizers (and fully-fledged ones at that) includes Santiago Nadal, Ignacio Agustí, Manuel Brunet, the international news team at La Vanguardia Española and special foreign correspondents like Augusto Assía and Carlos Sentís; even the Count of Godó is supposed to have been a firm supporter of the Allies (Arias, 2005a; Arias, 2005b; Nadal, 2005; Sentís, 2007).

But beyond the controversies about whether certain journalists in Barcelona were pro-ally but unable to express this because of the regime’s censorship, we can see that many of the values that defined the Western Allies’ programs would never have been acceptable to Spanish journalists and not just because the regime might be looking over their shoulders. The Allies shared a series of objectives that these journalists would never have wished to be part of, from the defeat of fascism in its Italian and German varieties to the reconstruction of democratic systems of government and the recovery of freedom in the states that had been occupied by Germany; from their hopes that a new Europe could be guaranteed peace in a just and equitable manner to their determination to rebuild Europe according to the tenets of democracy, federalism and intercontinental cooperation; or from the defence of human rights and the rejection of solutions that could only be imposed by brute force to the reconstruction of an arena for international cooperation that would be like the League of Nations but stronger still.

Another factor would also have held these journalists back: to be pro-ally meant having a particular political profile which would be very difficult to maintain in either Barcelona or Madrid. To start with, one would need to be anti-
fascist. Of course, nobody felt obliged to hide their anti-communist feelings—Winston Churchill and Charles de Gaulle certainly never did—but all those states which had been threatened by the Axis powers were anti-Nazi and anti-fascist. Moreover, one might defend the notions of the republic or the monarchy, but always in democratic terms and with constitutional systems that could be homologated to those systems that had already existed in most of Western Europe. Did this position necessary exclude the communists? From a liberal-conservative point of view or for a christian democrat or social democrat, surely this was so. But Winston Churchill—whose conservative politics hardly qualified him as a communist sympathizer—had already identified the real enemy: not communism, at least not in the years 1939, 1940 or 1943, but Nazi Germany, its allies and everything that Nazism sought to destroy (starting with human rights and civil liberties and culminating in the legacy of Europe’s Age of Enlightenment). Churchill went even further: the real danger was Nazi Germany’s expansionist nature, which threatened to undermine the balance between different nations and states across the European continent. Like a game of nine-pins, when France had fallen there would be nothing left between Germany and Britain and the Soviet Union; the Third Reich would systematically bowl over one country and then the other.

Driven by their visceral anti-communism and their contempt for democratic forms of government, the Barcelona journalists were incapable of understanding this idea. This became evident in 1940, for example, when after the French defeat Santiago Nadal displayed a conspicuous lack of regard for London’s call to resist and to go on believing that victory might be distant but was not impossible.8

8 “Meanwhile England is beginning to feel increasingly uneasy and the difficulties are becoming more and more apparent, as witnessed by the official measures taken against supposed defeatists and alarmists, by the constant denials of rumours and by the restrictions being adopted. Seeing how things are from here in Spain, it does not seem in any way absurd to suppose that “Peace Campaigners” should actually exist or even that their numbers should grow so constantly; this is not just some vague manifestation of the spirit that would be but a hard fact, demonstrated by the real measures adopted against [Oswald] Mosley’s followers and others in different fields, including the Duke of Windsor, no less; and demonstrated, even, by rumours of impending changes in the government, with the possible replacement of [Prime Minister Neville] Chamberlain. The long and the short of it is that there is nothing new about this conciliatory sector of the English public that would take the Central powers for an ally. The increasing intensity of the German bombing will remain an important conditioner in such matters, we can be sure. Whatever the case may be, the photographs of young men armed with nothing more than a helmet, gas mask and rifle and going clumsily through the motions of military drills does not say much about England’s power to defend itself, were the Germans to set foot upon their island. In the course of history, whatever proof the world has had of their bravery, these improvised soldiers are certainly no match for the Führer’s magnificently prepared warriors in arms” (Nadal, 1940d).
Britain’s position was certainly a complex one. But in contrast to the dictatorships of that period, it knew exactly what it was facing. On 18 June 1940 just after Paris had fallen and with the French Third Republic hanging by a thread, Churchill stood before the House of Commons and, in the peroration to the speech popularly known as “Their Finest Hour”, he formally acknowledged Britain’s lack of military strength, the difficulties its civilians were facing and its isolation at that time; but he also argued that Britain had the support of the Commonwealth and that there were “good and reasonable hopes of final victory”; and he concluded with the solemn declaration that would be the subject of scorn in Franco’s Spain:

“The whole fury and might of the enemy must very soon be turned on us. Hitler knows that he will have to break us in this island or lose the war. If we can stand up to him, all Europe may be freed and the life of the world may move forward into broad, sunlit uplands. But if we fail, then the whole world, including the United States, including all that we have known and cared for, will sink into the abyss of a new dark age made more sinister, and perhaps more protracted, by the lights of perverted science.”

(Churchill, 1948)

In regime circles in Barcelona and Madrid, this speech was almost entirely ignored because nobody believed in Britain’s ability to defend itself or in the danger that might be posed by the French general Charles de Gaulle, who had escaped London and who had called upon the French nation to rise up against the German invaders. Nadal considered the French government in London to be a “pretence” and added that “it is so bereft of power and so clearly controlled by the British nation that it cannot seriously hope to succeed” (Nadal 1940c). In the prevailing climate it was logical that Hitler’s promises of peace to Britain (unknown author, 1940; Colville, 1989) should be welcomed with such great expectation and, what is more, with such clear and precise expectations: London could only accept the German dictator’s offer of peace. Refusal to do so, wrote Nadal in Barcelona, would put Britain in an “awkward and unenviable position” with the rest of the world which, generally speaking, “wished the War to end” (Nadal, 1940f). Informed by his reading of Mein Kampf, the analyst from Lleida was convinced that only one thing could now happen: Britain would have to accept the “new situation created in Europe”. But would it? His doubts, of course, were justified.9

9 “How would Hitler’s position be received in England? The Government would probably refuse to listen, but we can be sure that it has had its effect on the people and on those political forces that are stronger than is generally supposed and that already before the war had promulgated the development and defence of the Empire, united in their views with Germany and acknowledging Germany’s potential as a world power and leader of
Britain neither surrendered nor accepted any kind of pact with the Nazis but this did not help Barcelona’s journalists to gain any greater understanding of the political and ideological complexities that the War had woven together. On the contrary, during the year 1940-1941, between the fall of France and the beginning of the German invasion of the Soviet Union, the regime’s discourse had scarcely varied from the earlier period of 1939–1940: Franco’s Spain continued to praise the new European order, to celebrate the promise of the great fascist states and to announce the final defeat of liberalism and the democracies, as well as Britain’s irredeemable decadence.

This incomprehension was transformed into a fierce and merciless attack when, on 22 June 1941, Winston Churchill delivered his speech “The Fourth Climacteric”, which was to permanently alter the way the world understood war, politics and ideology. With the German invasion of the Soviet Union looming on the horizon, once again he pointed his finger at the real enemy:

“The Nazi régime is indistinguishable from the worst features of Communism. It is devoid of all theme and principle except appetite and racial domination. It excels all forms of human wickedness in the efficiency of its cruelty and ferocious aggression. Noone has been a more consistent opponent of Communism than I have for the last twenty-five years. I will unsay no word that I have spoken about it. But all this fades away before the spectacle which is now unfolding. The past with its crimes, its follies and its tragedies flashes away. I see the Russian soldiers standing on the threshold of their native land, guarding the fields which their fathers have tilled from time immemorial.”

And then came his declarations of Britain’s intentions, which were nothing if not explicit:

“We have but one aim and one single, irrevocable purpose. We are resolved to destroy Hitler and every vestige of the Nazi régime. From this nothing will turn us – nothing. We will never parley, we will never
negotiate with Hitler or any of his gang. We shall fight him by land, we shall fight him by sea, we shall fight him in the air, until with God’s help we have rid the earth of his shadow and liberated its peoples from his yoke. Any man or state who fights on against Nazidom will have our aid.”

After that, as he reached the last part of his speech, he returned to one of the subjects he had raised on the eve of the War:

“[Hitler] wishes to destroy the Russian power because he hopes that if he succeeds in this, he will be able to bring back the main strength of his army and air force from the East and hurl it upon this Island, which he knows he must conquer or suffer the penalty of his crimes. His invasion of Russia is no more than a prelude to an attempted invasion of the British Isles. [...] He hopes that he may once again repeat, upon a greater scale than ever before, that process of destroying his enemies one by one, by which he has so long thrived and prospered, and that then the scene will be clear for the final act, without which all his conquests would be in vain – namely, the subjugation of the Western Hemisphere to his will and to his system.”

And finally, just before the end, his words again became crystal clear:

“The Russian danger is therefore our danger and the danger of the United States just as the cause of any Russian fighting for his hearth and home is the cause of free men and free peoples in every quarter of the globe.”

(Churchill, 1948)

But we should now consider the regime’s response to Churchill’s “dramatic” speech, as Colville put it (“a speech that has impressed us all”) (See Colville, 1989). Here is an example:

“With Churchill as its spokesman, Britain has taken pains to offer its services to the USSR. A graceless gesture in political terms, if ever there was one, and the last in a long line of diplomatic blunders committed by the British in this War: on the one hand, because it will be impossible for Britain to provide Russia with truly efficient assistance, given that Russia already has more men, supplies and raw materials than it needs and is totally isolated; and on the other, because by attempting to move in this direction Britain has assumed the odious role of ally to the most monstrously inhuman regime that history has ever known in the very moment when the world is holding its breath and hoping that this regime might collapse (and collapse more dramatically than any other ever has); and because it sarcastically calls Russia ‘a free nation’ and refused to ally itself with the true free nations,
the Baltic states and the Finns, in the moment when they suffered the brutal Soviet aggression.”

As if he wanted to prove that he had not listened to Churchill’s speech of 22 June, Santiago Nadal recalled some of the British premier’s more literary anti-communist declarations from before the War and concluded that Britain’s moral force had been undermined by its failure to meet the demands of the situation: it had chosen to ally itself with the USSR, “the foundation of the most dangerous and hateful of all ideologies”, and had not recognized that Hitler had chosen the perfect moment to mount an attack on the Soviets, “clearly anticipating the Kremlin’s Machiavellian objectives” rather than waiting “ingenuously for Stalin to choose the moment to enforce his communism” (Nadal, 1941b).

Nadal was not the only analyst to describe Churchill’s fatal errors during June and July of 1941. Madrid’s monarchist weekly ABC also observed the “surprising levity” with which the premier had committed his “gravest mistake” and had provided the world with “an object lesson about what happens when one loses one’s calm” (unknown author, 1941c). The falangist Fernando Barangó-Solís proposed that in their hurry to position themselves against the threat of the ‘German Fatherland’, Britain’s union with Stalin and “the Soviet hordes” was actually worse for them than losing the War would be (Barangó-Solís, 1941). Further examples abound.

Nadal’s colleagues at Destino generally followed suit. The analyst Andres Revesz (who also occasionally wrote for Solidaridad Nacional and for ABC and Blanco y Negro in Madrid and who would later be considered an ally sympathizer) declared that Churchill had written off his nation to a country doomed to military failure.

To avoid precisely this, Churchill had decided to act upon his celebrated promise to ‘sign a pact with the Devil’ (Colville, 1989) because in 1941 he knew only too well that the real danger was coming from an Austrian corporal who

10 Unknown author, 1941a.

11 “In moral terms [Stalin] lost the war some time ago and Churchill should never have allied himself with the Russians. The Russians don’t fight for England’s interests anyway, but for their own. And in reality, England’s assistance has amounted to nothing more than the waste of many millions of pounds, the postponement of England’s own re-armament and the transformation of the USSR’s defeat into the indirect defeat of Britain itself. And what will the Anglo-Saxons have to say about the defeat of their allies? Perhaps they will regret having forged such close ties with a regime that was destined to disappear. I do not only speak in moral terms, however. A good hard look at the facts indicates that London and Washington have committed a tactical blunder” (Revesz, 1946). And in what was almost a paraphrase of “The Fourth Climacteric”, he concluded: “The campaign has really finished now, not only in the East but all over Europe. Germany has overthrown each of its adversaries one by one”.

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had turned himself into the dictator of a powerful state. According to Santiago Nadal, however, the positive side to Churchill’s mistake was that because the Russian army was doomed to defeat (in spite of its formidable power and its ability to resist), once the Soviet spectre had been removed there would be no need to help Britain or give it political satisfaction (Nadal, 1941b). Perhaps then and in the painful knowledge of his error, Churchill would be forced to accept Germany’s new European order.

The impossible ally sympathies of the Franco’s Catalan (and Spanish) followers

As the two main junctures in the first part of the War, June and July of 1940 and June and July of 1941 are particularly significant moments for Britain, certainly in the manner that Franco’s regime understood the War politically and intellectually. As with the fall of France in June 1940 or the defeat of Italian fascism in July 1943, Britain’s refusal to surrender to Germany and its support of the Soviet Union helped to draw out the ideological essence of the regime’s interpretation the War. For Franco’s Spain, it was impossible for anyone to consider themselves pro-ally, especially when apart from the condemnations of Winston Churchill there was not a single analysis of even a vaguely impartial nature, let alone any neutral voice. The men involved might protest that the government watched their production far too closely for them to write in any other way than they did and with any greater complexity than they did. This, indeed, is what some complained of and to a certain extent it was the truth. At the beginning of January 1942, the National Delegation for Propaganda issued a very clear warning that communist propaganda was increasing in the democracies because of certain “agreements” that these democracies had signed.12

But beyond the political pressure and censorship they were subject to, some of the main thinkers in this period did actually explain what their supposed ally sympathy amounted to; and in their explanations there was no real mention of a political power exerting official pressure on them or indeed any real indication that they were sympathetic with the Allies’ ideas. Along these lines, Ignacio

12 “The agreements recently made between representatives of the democratic states and the bolshevik bosses constitute a serious danger for all Europe... In return for allowing them to join him, Stalin has demanded and obtained from all the democracies carte blanche for all manner of bolshevik propaganda. And thus, the powers in London and Washington have subjugated themselves to the service of European bolshevism and the annihilation of Western culture. The Moscow agreement on Europe’s post-war reconstruction and the destruction of Germany as the chief obstacle to communism allows us to see with perfect clarity just how far the democracies are prepared to go.” (SevillanoCalero, 2000: 61-62)
Agustí proposed that his sympathies and the sympathies of his colleagues at *Destino* were purely sartorial. And if there was still any doubt, this was dispelled by what he had to say on one occasion: “We never said that the Allies would win the War; [we said that] the Allies might not lose” (Agustí, 1974: 375).

At the beginning of 1944, when the end of the War was some way off but Italy had fallen and the Red Army was advancing on the Eastern Front, some particularly interesting explanations were being offered in Madrid as to what exactly ally sympathy or pro-British sentiment meant.

This, perhaps, is one of the clearest explanations of what it meant to be pro-ally during Franco’s regime. As long as Britain went on displaying this “comprehension” of Spain’s problems and maintained a “neutral” position with regard to these—in other words, as long as it neither announced its support for an alternative to the regime nor prepared itself in any way to attack the peninsula—the anglophile trend increased in different social spheres. The reasoning and its quirky double standard were eminently clear: one could be an anglophile—or even pro-ally—just as long as the Allies did not threaten Franco’s Spain and recognized the “loyal attitude” of their “neutrality”. It was as simple as that. During regime times, an anglophile in Spain didn’t even have to want the Allies’ victory in the War, in any visible way.

In certain cases, it would appear that the activities of the regime’s censors and the National Delegation for Propaganda and other similar services help to explain the tone and content of certain analyses and commentaries on the War. The truth, however, may be somewhat different: for obvious reasons of ideological affinity, the coincidences between the dictatorship’s party line

13 “During the day, our ostentatious ally sympathies were perhaps even more apparent. Vergés, myself and sometimes other correspondents for *Destino* would stroll around town in bowler hats, just like they do in the City. There were quite a few of us in Barcelona at that time who’d revived interest that particular item of clothing and who wore the hats to show their adherence to England in its time of difficulty, even while their love for their own country was of course paramount to them.” (Agustí, 1974: 388)

14 “The attitudes displayed by British diplomacy had influenced the affective relations between Spain and Britain. But one important thing had been achieved: in Spain, the anglophile trend actually gathered force in different social spheres. Britain’s sympathy when it came to the dilemmas of our homeland, as a country that had reached out to collaborate in post-war Spain; and on the Spanish side, our innate sense of nobility [in Spanish, *hidalguía*], which makes us ever ready to repay generosity with greater generosity still. These are the things that have helped us see Britain’s attitude to Spain with other eyes and fostered an impartial and friendly relationship between the two nations; more important still, as this had stemmed at least in part from our loyal attitude of neutrality and from England’s sensibility with regard to the problems facing Spain, it was reasonable to hope that the relationship would endure.” (unknown author, 1944)
and the writings of Revesz, Nadal, Brunet, Agustí, Masoliver and their contemporaries were arguable and perfectly visible. The common ground for Franco’s bureaucrats and these aspiring thinkers (who, it must be remembered, were not university professors or cultural arbiters but simply journalists) had been well marked out: they shared the arenas of anti-communism, anti-liberalism, national catholicism, radical Spanish nationalism and the discourse of the new order in a new Europe. Taking as a point of reference the pre-war group Acción Española, Miguel Ángel Ruiz Carnicer describes these men as members of the “reactionary anti-Republican coalition” who defended “a hostile position that was not only a policy but actively sought to forbid what they perceived as the ‘essence of Spanish identity’ identified with catholicism, nationalism, and social tradition and immobilism, to which they added “authoritarian regenenerationism” and “the badly learnt Fascist solution” (Gra-cia and Ruiz Carnicer, 2001: 157 and 158).

But the program of this “reactionary coalition” did not only affect the Spanish project. On the contrary, there was a direct link between the Alzamiento and its contents and the War in Europe; and this link had existed long before the German offensive against the Soviet Union prompted people to speak of «España, precursora» (unknown author, 1941c), to declare that “Our Crusade is the now the Crusade of the World” (Agustí, 1941), or to propose that, against the Soviets, “we are all co-participants and enemies” and that “we feel our appetite for revenge and the certainty of our rightness” (Agustí, 1941). One year before all this, after the French defeat in June 1940 and with his customary literary elegance, Santiago Nadal made the connection between the regime’s 18 July and the new European order in a text that he would neither support nor refute in later years.15 Note, in that analysis, his proposal that Spain rose to the occasion “of its own account and by no other force”. And note how perfectly he understood that the order which would ultimately “rule over the continent” was not the one the British-led Allies were defending in either 1940 or in 1945.

So was there ever a particular moment when the custodians of the regime’s official party line and the journalists examined in this paper actually collided, ideologically speaking? The short answer is, no. Indeed, the many moments when these two groups agreed and even the manner in which they agreed disproves the thesis –always proposed long after the facts themselves– that perhaps those

15 “The prophetic nature of the events of 18 July 1936 is now wholly clear; we see it in the way the Spanish army rose to Spain’s defence, supported by the anti-republican forces. We see that it was on this very day that Spain readied itself, four years ahead of time, to take its place in the new order that would rule over the continent. And it did so instinctively, because it believed in the national necessity, of its own account and by no other force, neither by persuasion from those who were abroad nor by the events that had taken place there.” (Nadal, 1940c)
journalists had no choice and were forced to tow the party line, that they could not swim against the current, that the censorship was impossible to bypass, or that the politicians left the editors and owners of the various papers with no room to manoeuvre.

Not only were the coincidences between the two camps and their identification with one other quite notable; there were also signs that both the party liners and the journalists had assessed the realities of the War according to the same specific criteria. For at the end of 1944, when most of France had been liberated, Ignacio Agustí was still writing on the subject of a German Arcadia populated by occupied countries.16

There is further evidence for this. In one revealing moment, Santiago Nadal shared with his Barcelona readers what he considered the most serious effects of the War: snapshots that had reached the press room at La Vanguardia Española portraying Soviet officials dancing in the imperial ballrooms of Hofburg Palace in Vienna. “The tragedy of Europe,” Nadal concluded, “is more clearly visible in these photographs than in any newsreel of fugitive convoys or concentration camps, because Vienna has become home to one of the main political reasons why this continent is sinking” (Nadal, 1945). What set of values was Nadal working from when he set the blame for the war on the shoulders of the Soviets who had occupied Vienna rather than on the men who had created the terrifying reality of the Nazi extermination camps? What principles did he use to analyze the War and its aftermath? What exactly lay behind the strange choice he made between two kinds of photographs? Was it representative of what he normally wrote (and wrote without undue pressure) for mass consumption by his countrymen? Summing up the year 1945, Andrés Revesz was another writer who only focused on the problems related to communism and Russian imperialism.17 In his text, there was not a single mention of defeated Germany, of what should be done with the Nazi apparatus, the war criminals, the extermination camps, the material devastation or the economic problems that the country now faced.

16 “The formula is to bring the European nations into Germany’s wider sphere of influence. Because most of them are vassals of Germany in either political or economic terms, Europe’s nations must learn that what’s best for them is simply to collaborate with rather than surrender to the victors. Aware of the temporal nature of its mandate, Germany is making haste to implement its system and demonstrate the benefits of its particular Arcadia to all the countries around it.” (Agustí, 1944)

17 “The year 1945 began with the Anglo-Russian rivalry and at the end of the last month the political problem remains the same: Marshal Tito and leftist totalitarianism in Bulgaria, Romania and Poland, the Greek National Liberation Front as an instrument of Moscow’s imperialism and the Russian expansion towards the Eastern Mediterranean.” (Revesz, 1946)
Revesz reiterates the importance of one course of action which the regime might have considered to make the best of its new, uncomfortable reality but which it never really did: the notion that in one sudden move it might replace its economic, intellectual and ideological commitment to Nazi Germany with its resistance to the new Soviet expansionist policies and that it might run up an anti-communist, anti-Soviet flag that could be shared with the Allies. In the event, it managed to do neither. Neither a modest display of approval at the Allies’ victory, nor a critical assessment or self-assessment of the Nazi experiment or of fascism in general (Brunet, 1954a, 1945b, 1945c, 1946a, 1946b). On the contrary, the regime busied itself with making sure that no internal instability would now become a challenge. In August 1944 and on the eve of the liberation of Paris, the regime stood fast by its declaration that the “key to the question” was a sustained anti-communist front and, in relation to this, the consequences of the War (SevillanoCalero, 2000: 61-62). At that decisive moment, it appeared, the country had nothing better to do than pursue Franco’s curious theory about the two or three wars that were being simultaneously fought.18

18 On 9 June 1942, when the new American ambassador Carlton Hayes was formally presenting his credentials, General Franco explained to him that Spain’s non-belligerence meant that his country was not neutral in the fight against Communism, “especially in the War between Germany and Russia”, even while it did not take any part in the conflict between the Axis powers on one hand and the Allies on the other. On 11 May 1944, he repeated this idea: “For us the struggle against the Bolsheviks and the Western conflict between civilized Western nations are two separate issues. Communism is not some state of being which remains within the borders of whatever country espouses it; it is a revolutionary activity that expands and targets all those around it, working to undermine the peace and order of other countries” (RosAgudo, 2002: 18). As Río Cisneros has observed (see the text “Orden y orientaciones sobre la actual situación de la guerra en Europa y el tono de información del frente oriental y del frente occidental, con los matiz...”): “The Caudillo understood that the Second World War was not just a simple set of historical facts and could not be easily understood; that the powers that fought in it were not a homogenous group. In practical terms there existed—there had always existed—wars that simultaneously served different political purposes and embraced many conflicting interests. Because of this, within the strictures of the tactical agreements imposed by military necessity, the various warring sides always revealed different attitudes and chose different roads in the aftermath of conflict. An objective examination of war would always lead us to the same conclusion: a country would have an initial position with regard to war and a final position with regard to the peace that came afterwards. And the Caudillo further observed the radical difference between our expectations about the War in the East, where the subject of dispute was a communist border, and the conflict in the Western European arena, whose protagonists were christian nations and with whom we have maintained friendly relations marked by cultural and economic exchange. This Spanish view has gained force in recent times and its common sense is well understood by other countries” (Río Cisneros, 1977: 330–331).
The fact is that even if their political or ideological persuasions differed, thinkers in many camps actually agreed on the most important things, which of course meant the dictates of the Caudillo. They could be monarchists of different kinds, Catalan ex-regionalists, supporters of the regime and Falangists, catholic fundamentalists or traditionalists—but no matter who they were, their basic views coincided and matched with their leader’s. Was this proof of the power that can be exercised over a media structure, however big it is or however prestigious its exponents are? Or was it the logical result of political and ideological coincidences between people who shared a project, if not their origins, and a certain way of understanding the world? As argued above, the idea that such individuals “could do nothing else” does not actually ring true when we consider their writerly conviction. The notion that the threat of censorship might dissuade them from writing and publishing an alternative discourse does not sit well with the facts and it is difficult to imagine these men, in the years 1942 or 1945, sitting down to write articles denouncing their regime and its dictator. But there is another way of understanding their circumstances. Men like Santiago Nadal, Ramón Garriga, Andres, Revesz, Manuel Brunet, Ignacio Agustí and even Antonio Tovar (Gracia, 2007: 154) were too good as writers to allow their texts to be stymied by state censorship. Their intellectual class, the substance of their professional careers and their acute cultural sensibilities would never have allowed them to become mere scribes for the powers above them.

It’s true that Santiago Nadal encountered trouble in his relationship with the regime’s permanent watchdog in Barcelona, La Vanguardia Española’s director Luis de Galinsoga (Barcelona’s citizens were not sufficiently appreciative of the regime to be left alone during these times). It’s true that he had even more serious problems with the city’s civil governor Antonio Correa Véglison in March 1944, because of his article “Verona y Argel”. It’s also clear that Destino eventually grew away from its falange origins and that, in time, its writers, readers and intentions became very clearly distanced from Solidaridad Nacional, just as the paper ABC could not be equated with Arriba. In this period of Spain’s history, we might argue, there were no Nazis but everyone supported the regime, simply because to one degree or another everyone shared the regime’s politics, ideology and common mission. As a monarchist and adherent to the Provençal author Charles Maurras, what Santiago Nadal really wanted was for

19. Antonio Tovar’s political coherence was particularly clear. As late as January 1945, he had this to write to Dionisio Ridruejo: “Have you seen the German offensive? What men! Almost mythical in stature, veritable superhuman beings that loom over the likes of Churchill, Roosevelt or Eisenhower. As for that other giant, Don José [Stalin], we’ll just have see what happens. But those reactionaries and “democrats” and all the other radical pigs that we know so well can just go and stew in their own juices! There’ll be no world left for them to take.” (Gracia, 2007: 154).
the monarchy to be reinstated while someone like his colleague Manuel Aznar was happy enough to move in the motley circle of falangists, catholics and Spanish nationalists surrounding the Caudillo. But neither man dreamt of the day when Spain would implement a system of democracy in its lands and form a legal state on a par with those nation-states that populated Western Europe from 1945 onwards. Instead and in almost official terms, these different writers and intellectuals were considered to be the “reactionary coalition” and they were ruled over with absolute power by General Franco. Monarchists, falangists, catholics, right-wing thinkers of various kinds or traditionalists, practically all of them shared “some degree of catholic fundamentalism, bolstered by a basic traditionalism and what we might call the fascist solution badly learnt”. This combination produced a style of discourse that condemned without reservation “the symbols of Spain’s modest free-thinking past” and the Europe’s Age of Enlightenment in general (Gracia and Ruiz Carnicer, 2001: 158-159). Precisely for this reason, Santiago Nadal was able to blame the French Revolution for what happened at the end of the War and to propose that all traditional Europe’s ills had originated in 1789.

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