

Philia Networks in the Macedonian Court and the Long Accession of Alexander the Great*

by Julius Guthrie
University of Exeter
jg439@exeter.ac.uk

ABSTRACT This paper reevaluates key moments in the court politics of Alexander the Great's reign through the introduction of *philia*-networks governed by gift-exchange as a template for explaining the relationships between key participants. This approach makes it clear that Alexander initially held a passive role in the political life of his own court and was dependant on others for his succession. These dynamics shifted in the opening years of the Asian expedition as Alexander sought to break these *philia*-networks, building his own and surrounding his person with *philo*i of his own choosing.

KEYWORDS Alexander the Great, *philia*, Aristotle, court politics, conspiracies.

To be a ruler in the ancient world was to be involved in a never-ending game of political chicanery with the elite. The Argead family of Macedonia, although the ruling house from at least the turn of the sixth into the fifth century, were no exception, and neither was the household's most famous name: Alexander III the Great.¹ Alexander, when his father, Philip II, died in 336 was by no means assured of succession to the Macedonian kingship. That Alexander did succeed was due to his support from prominent men – especially Antipater and Parmenio– who controlled vast networks of *philo*i. The recognition of the role played by prominent political factions in Alexander's court is itself nothing new and most recently Waldemar Heckel has argued for the existence of political factions centred on both Antipater and Parmenio at Alexander's court². Furthermore, Heckel's presentation of the struggles between the two groups and the king has been echoed by Strootman, who in his study of Hellenistic courts ties the culture back to the example of the later Argeads.³ Nonetheless, neither of these two

* This paper has had a very long gestation, with the central thesis originally the product of an undergraduate paper written in 2016. My thanks go to Lynette Mitchell, the convenor of that excellent module, not only for starting me on this journey but for her endless encouragement in many endeavours since.

¹ There has been some debate about the exact origins of the Argead household, for which Herodotus (8.137-8) and Thucydides (2.99.2) in rare alignment are the cause. See: MARI 2015, 81; *contra* HAMMOND 1972, 430-40, who also discusses the roots of the Argeads and Temenids.

² HECKEL 2003, divides the power at Alexander's court into Antipatrid, Parmenion-Attalus and Alexander factions, although HECKEL (202-3) underplays the power of Parmenio's *philo*i.

³ STROOTMAN 2014, 118-126.

lines of argument can fully explain the deadly struggles that occurred between Alexander's accession and the death of Parmenio in 330. It is the aim of this paper to provide a new explanation to these struggles through the introduction of *philia*-networks as a template for understanding what have been termed as political factions by others.

This paper will proceed firstly by outlining that the Greek conception of *philia* in a political context, most persuasively defined by Aristotle, can be applied to the court of Alexander. Indeed, *philia* was a core precept of elite Macedonian political life. After establishing this, it will be shown how a new, *philia*-network approach to the "factional politics" of Alexander's court allows a more nuanced understanding of the political position of the king when he began his conquest of the Achaemenid Empire in 334, and how this position evolved as power dynamics shifted until a new phase of *philia*-networking began in 229, when Alexander's own *philo*i sought to build their own networks. It shall be argued that at the outset of his rule Alexander was beholden to the power-dynamics which had secured the throne for him and that, demonstrating a great deal of political acumen, Alexander redressed this power balance in order to stem the influence of *philia*-networks. This was done, largely, by utilising the notion of gift-exchange in both material (land) and immaterial (status, favours) means to create new bonds within the political elite that favoured the king. Naturally, this last element also included promoting and expanding his own network of *philo*i.

***PHILIA* IN MACEDONIAN COURT CULTURE**

It is no great leap to state that the majority of Greek political life was conducted by the elite. Nonetheless, even within this narrow group no elite family could seek to gain political power without the co-option or coercion of fellow elites in order to build a broader base for their dominance⁴. Both the extent and duration of the factional politics which often resulted from tensions between elite families are demonstrated well by a cursory glance at the tensions between the ousters of the Peisistratids: Isagoras and Cleisthenes. Herodotus (5.66) informs us that there was a power struggle between the two men in the vacuum created after the ousting of the Peisistratids tyranny, a power struggle in which Isagoras initially won the upper hand.⁵ However, Isagoras did not hold the archonship at this time having already done so in 525/4, therefore, and as Greg Anderson has noted, the primacy of Isagoras was not from electoral outcomes but from his wider political support⁶. It is this type of factional support, a loose and fluid congregation of men associated with Isagoras, which also prevailed elsewhere, and which can be termed a *philia*-network.

The relationship through which factions such as those who supported Isagoras and Cleisthenes were united was a bond of *philia*. Aristotle gives an insight, albeit from a philosophical standpoint, on the role *philia* played in civic life which demonstrates contemporary awareness the role *philia* played in politics. Aristotle (*Pol.* 1280b38-9)

⁴ The relationship between rulers and elites in the Macedonian context has been examined in some detail by CARNEY 2015; KING 2010 and WEBER 2009. For elite-ruler relations more generally see MITCHELL 2013, who notes similarities between Macedonian kingship and others.

⁵ Although Isagoras initially won supremacy over Athens, his period of prominence was short lived. Herodotus (5.69-73.1) goes on to demonstrate how Cleisthenes drove Isagoras' faction out of Athens and into the hands of Cleomenes I of Sparta. cf. *AP* 20.1-4.

⁶ ANDERSON 2005, 181-2 argues that holding the Archonship was not a way of gaining power but a reflection of who already held power in Athens at that time.

states that *philia* is an essential feature of the polis and forms the bedrock on which civic institutions are built. Of course, not all *philiai* were the same and Aristotle categorised *philoï* into three groups: kin, comrades and *xenoi*⁷. Additionally, *philia* itself could be subdivided into deep-rooted bonds of virtue, bonds of pleasure and, most relevant for this study, bonds of utility⁸. Aristotle (*Nic Eth.* 1156a24-26) states that bonds of utility are most evident in political life and uses the example of sailors who needed to rely on each other to reach their destination safely, but whose bond is then broken upon their return home to emphasise the expedient nature of this kind of relationship. It is likely that the supporters of Isagoras and Cleisthenes would have primarily been bound by this utilitarian conception of *philia*, with the supporters of either man to numerous in number to have all been linked by bonds of kinship.

Why the supporters of men such as Isagoras or Cleisthenes should have been *philoï* in the first place is itself a question which must be answered. It is once again Aristotle (*Nic. Eth.* 1158b1-5) who illuminates us when he introduces the notion of reciprocal exchange as the core mechanism which governed these *philia*-networks and allowed them to propagate and be retained for the future. Lynette Mitchell has examined the use of gift-giving and exchange in a political context and has argued that there existed two categories of reciprocal relationship.⁹ The first, termed the vertical axis of exchange, accounts for the flow of goods and services along the social ladder between *philoï* of unequal social standing. The second, naturally termed the horizontal axis of exchange, is the provision of goods and services by men of roughly equal social rank. The importance of both of these levels of exchange, and the tensions between them, is well elaborated by Xenophon's (*Mem* 2.3.11-14) tale of a debate between Socrates and Chaerecrates, his brother. Socrates berates his brother for his conduct and points out that the most important element of *philia* is its reciprocal nature. Even more importantly, it is essential that the man who wishes to make the acquaintance offer his services first; such an action creates a debt which must be repaid¹⁰.

Of course, both Aristotle and Xenophon were presenting ideal types in their analysis of the role *philia* played in relationships, be they political or social. Nonetheless, the issues at stake in both of their conceptions can be witnessed in the archonship election of 508/7, when Cleisthenes' kinsman Alcmeon was appointed, and the events which followed¹¹. Herodotus (5.69) is certainly in no doubt as to the supremacy of Cleisthenes at this time despite the fact he was not in office. Cleisthenes' influence was a product of his *philia*-network and Alcmeon's election can be viewed on both horizontal and vertical axes of exchange. The horizontal was naturally Cleisthenes' support for Alcmeon, although as a superior partner, with Cleisthenes presumably gaining access to the power that the archonship had to offer through his kin as his end of the bargain. Their kinship should not obscure from the fact that in the political arena they still required a degree of utilitarian benefits from one another, it is merely that as kin we should be less surprised of their alliance. The vertical axis of exchange comes into play when it is considered that we are discussing an election. In exchange for support, Cleisthenes could offer his politically lesser *philoï* some sort of seat at the table of

⁷ Kin: *Nic Eth.* 8,1157b 1-5. Comrades: *Nic Eth.* 8,1161a25-7, 1161b33a1. *Xenoi*: *Nic Eth.* 1161b15-20.

⁸ This distinction is repeated several times but is most notable at Aristotle. *Nic Eth.* 8, 1156a6-10

⁹ The horizontal axis of exchange is described in MITCHELL 1997, 42-6. For the vertical axis see: 46-51.

¹⁰ There are numerous other examples of this sort of reciprocal relationship in practice, Homer (*Il.* 6.120-232) provides perhaps the earliest example.

¹¹ Poll. *Onom.* 8.110 cf. ANDERSON 2005, 182 who has examined this incident from a political perspective.

power –in Cleisthenes case this was through a series of reforms to the Athenian tribal structure¹².

The utilisation of *philia*-networks witnessed in late sixth-century Athens can be translated into the distinct context of the Macedonian court, albeit complicated by the presence of the king at the centre of all political activity¹³. The complication implicit in monarchy comes from the unequal status between the monarch and his (or occasionally her) *philoi* which sits in direct contrast to equality, which was the concept at the very centre of Aristotelian *philia*¹⁴. Nonetheless the problem of inequality between *philoi* is dealt with by Aristotle himself, who was aware that not all relationships could be equal in practice. Furthermore, Aristotle explicitly cites the relationship between the ruler and the ruled in his discussion of how unequal relationships worked (*Nic. Eth.* 1158b7-1159b25). Aristotle (*Nic. Eth.* 1161a10-22) later takes this point further, likening the relationship between a ruler and those he rules to that between a shepherd and his flock and a father and his children. In both cases, Aristotle is keen to point out that the benefits for the ruled outweigh the benefits for the ruler, who is honoured and held in esteem in exchange for offering the benefits of his *philia*.

Aristotle's view of unequal relationships is to a degree typical of the view of the ruler put forward by Xenophon, who in his *Hiero* (most explicitly: 11.14-15) stresses that a good ruler should aim to be loved by his people for his generosity. Aristotle's view, however, is more practically applicable than this. Aristotle notes (*Nic. Eth.* 1161a33-34) that if the inferior *philoi* has nothing to offer, no *philia* can hope to exist between them. This statement is an acknowledgement of the practicalities of ruling and demonstrates that *philia* has a place in the court politics of a king in the fifth and early fourth centuries. Indeed, the practical nature of *philiai* between rulers and their *philoi* can be seen in the tempestuous rivalry for the ear of Xerxes between Artabanus, his uncle, and Mardonius, son of Gobyras, a leading proponent of the invasion of Greece¹⁵. Xerxes relationship with his uncle is continually challenged due to the failure of Artabanus to provide a useful service to him –although, Herodotus is being ironic here and much of Artabanus' advice is sound and therefore mistakenly ignored by a bad king Xerxes– and, therefore, Artabanus' *philia* with Xerxes inevitably breaks down.

Precisely the role *philia* networks played in the unique Macedonian context can only be guessed at prior to the death of Philip II, due to the dearth of evidence¹⁶. However, an analysis of the movements of various individuals in the wake of Philip's murder reveals clear patterns that demonstrate *philia* networks did indeed have a major role in the Macedonian court¹⁷. This is not the place to attempt a fresh answer to the question

¹² On the reforms of Cleisthenes see DE STE. CROIX 2004a; 2004b.

¹³ The nature of the Macedonian monarchy continues to be the subject of a debate between the followers of either DE FRANCISCI 1948, who believed the Argeads to be highly autocratic, versus the followers of GRANIER 1931, who invented the constitutionalist stance. More recently, HATZOPOULOS 1996 has provided a compelling version of Macedonian monarchy as a national monarchy. See also: MITCHELL 2013.

¹⁴ Aristotle (1157b35) makes the importance of equality in reciprocal exchange clear: “λέγεται γὰρ φιλότις ισότης,” cf. MITCHELL 1997, 8-9.

¹⁵ The pro-war and anti-war factions which these two men represent in Herodotus seems entirely legitimate, even if the speeches and the intense nature of the rivalry between them has the potential to be exaggerated. Their quarrel begins immediately upon Xerxes accession at 7.5 and continues through to 7.53 when Artabanus is sent back to Susa.

¹⁶ RHODES 2010 provides a good summary of the problems relating to the evidence of the period. Cf. MARI 2011.

¹⁷ STROOTMAN 2014 has argued that gift-exchange prevailed as the primary currency between the king and his *philoi* in the context of Hellenistic royal courts. This can certainly be projected back.

of who killed Philip II, however, it is Philip's murder which illuminates two important roles that these *philia* networks held¹⁸. Firstly, the immediate aftermath of Philip's murder demonstrates that the primary aim of *philia* networks amongst the Macedonian elite was to gain access to the person of the king and in doing so to exert influence over the core decision making centre of the Macedonian political system¹⁹. The second, more specific to Alexander III, is that Alexander does not appear to have controlled, but was controlled by, these powerful political forces in the earliest phase of his reign. Additionally, both patterns remained prevalent throughout Alexander's later rule as new groups of *philo*i emerged to compete for the king's ear (dealt with in the second half of this paper).

The first of these two points, the desire to be at the heart of the decision-making process, is evidenced in the movements and the formations of the *philia*-networks existing in 336. In the year prior to his murder Philip II had made a conscious decision to publicly expand his network of *philo*i through marriage to Cleopatra, daughter of Attalus²⁰. As Carney has correctly noted, whilst this decision would have caused natural angst amongst Alexander's supporters, it was nothing out of the ordinary in a polygamous ruling family such as the Argeads²¹. However, this is not the entire story. Curtius (6.19.6) informs us that Attalus had married the daughter of Parmenio, a wedding which must pre-date Philip's death only on account of Attalus' position as one of the two commanders (the other Parmenio himself) leading the advanced guard in Asia Minor at the time Philip was murdered²². The unification of these two families through a formal bond of marriage, making them kin, transformed two already powerful individuals with their own *philia*-networks into an extremely potent bloc within Macedonian elite society (see Figure 1 and Appendix A). Furthermore, this horizontal exchange had a lot to offer each of its participants in the long term and, therefore, must have appeared particularly potent with the potential for the *philia* to extend for a lengthy duration²³.

¹⁸ The majority of the events discussed here occurred after Philip was murdered. Whoever killed Philip II either kept their role in the murder private, aside from the assailant Pausanias himself, or as BOSWORTH 1971, 102 has suggested, Alexander suppressed the identity of the killer for political purposes. Of course, the murderer(s) had the advantage of knowing Philip's death was imminent and, therefore, had an advantage in the factional infighting that followed. Nonetheless, the murderer(s) had no guarantee that their plot would succeed and, if their role(s) was indeed kept private then, they could not openly benefit from them. Excellent discussions of Philip's death include BADIEN 1963 [2012]; 2000 [2012], who views Alexander III as the likely culprit. CARNEY 2015, who discredits the notion of Olympias' involvement in detail. Additionally, CARNEY 2015 has discussed the possible role of the Lyncestian Alexander, who she states must have played a more dominant role than is often assumed. This view can be seen in tandem with BOSWORTH 1971, who places tensions between Upper and Lower Macedonians at the root of the matter. ANTELA-BERNARDEZ 2012 has made note of Attalus' involvement. All arguments have merits.

¹⁹ HECKEL 2003, 206-7 in particular, notes the importance of proximity to the king. For this reason, Heckel places the *somatophylakes* as the position of highest status in the court. Additionally, see SPAWFORTH 2007, 87-8 who highlights the importance of proximity to the king for influence and BRIANT 1996, 200-4, who notes how the nature of Alexander's mobile court system effected such matters.

²⁰ D.S. 17.2.3; Ath 13.560c. CARNEY 2015, 170 has noted that Philip probably wished to take Alexander and Amyntas to Asia and it was therefore expedient to re-marry prior to departure. However, Philip could well have produced a successor with one of his pre-existing wives instead and therefore the marriage must have been political.

²¹ CARNEY 2015, 167. Cf. LANE FOX 2011, 386 who believes Just. 9.7.3 and 11.2.3 can be used to provide evidence that Cleopatra did indeed have a son named Caranos. OGDEN 1999 discussed the implications of polygamy in more general terms.

²² D.S 16.93.8-9 and Justin 9.5.8-9 inform us of Attalus' role in the campaign.

²³ If claims that Attalus wished to rule as regent are to have any substance to them, then Attalus surely needed Parmenio's prestige amongst the troops to stabilise the situation. Parmenio also had friends

Much like his long-time acquaintance Parmenio, Antipater, son of Iolus, was equally involved in the internecine struggles of the Macedonian elite to secure their preferred candidate on the throne after Philip's death²⁴. The 'Antipatrid-Antigonid Group', as it has been coined by Waldemar Heckel, appears to have played an equally significant role in the politics of Alexander's succession (See Appendix B)²⁵. In this case, the links between the group appear more difficult to draw out due to the deaths of many potential protagonists. Nonetheless, it can be said with relative certainty that Antipater's *philo*i included amongst their number: the Lyncestian Alexander, who was related through marriage his to Antipater's daughter and whose role shall be elaborated further below; Alexander of Lyncestis' brothers; Balagros, one of Philip's *somatophylakes* and Antigonos, who was much closer in age to Antipater than Alexander²⁶.

In the middle of this political web was Alexander, who appears to have been at the mercy of those greater forces around him. Even though Alexander's previous actions at Chaeronea (Plu. *Alex* 9.2-3) had proven his right to rule by dint of his charisma, certainly *vis-à-vis* the other candidates, and despite Alexander being surrounded by his own web of *philo*i, his position was precarious. Olympias, being brother to Alexander of Molossia and having been involved in the politics of Philip's court for considerable time, was probably the best placed of Alexander's allies to press his claim²⁷.




Fig. 1: The *philiai* of Parmenio and Attalus.

The accession of Alexander as king of Macedonia was a result of the power struggle between the Antipater and Parmenio *philia*-networks, and brings discussion to point two: Alexander was controlled by these networks in the earliest parts of his reign. When Philip was murdered, whoever murdered him, there was an immediate scramble

amongst the Upper Macedonians, appearing to have links with the sons of Andromenes, eg. Arr. *An.* 3.27.1.

²⁴ HECKEL 2003, 200 has gone further and stated that Antipater's political involvement at this time was in reaction to the Parmenio-Attalus faction. However, the swiftness of political action after Philip's death and the large scale of these *philia* networks must have required some bonds to already have been in place. Antipater was too important to have been politically unaligned. CARNEY 2015, 127-140 has argued that Antipater was but one player in a wider group led instead by the Lyncestian sons of Aëropus. There was clearly a bond between these men, yet, to say which was the more important prior to Alexander's accession is difficult. What can be said is that Antipater emerged as the dominant force.

²⁵ HECKEL 2003, 196.

²⁶ On the relationship between Antigonos and Antipater see HECKEL 2006, 32-33. Much of the evidence for their *philia* post-dates Alexander, nonetheless, the treatment of Antigonos by Alexander is suggestive of a *philia* existing between the two at this time –see below.

²⁷ Little can be said of Alexander's *hetairoi* at this time.

amongst the elite to ensure that their preferred candidate ended up on the throne²⁸. Clearly, the Parmenio-Attalus *philia* network would have supported the claims of any child born to Cleopatra. Even if the child were a girl, a suitable match could have been found or Cleopatra remarried to a suitable candidate²⁹. Furthermore, and as argued by Bosworth, the comments placed into the mouth of Alexander by Curtius (6.8.16) that Philotas had supported the claims of Amyntas cannot be ruled out entirely. It is possible that after the murder of Cleopatra Parmenio switched his support to Amyntas before ultimately falling on the side of Alexander. The ambitions of the Parmenio-Attalus *philia* had ramifications also for those on the other side. For someone like Antipater, whose status surely demanded a seat at the highest table, allowing Parmenio and Attalus such influence could only come at his own expense. In this situation Antipater's options were limited; Alexander, eldest son and certainly the only candidate to have conclusively proven his *aretē* on the field of battle or Amyntas, son of Perdiccas III, who appears to have either siezed the opportunity or, as is suggested by Plutarch (*Mor.* 327c), to have been nominated as a figurehead by others with ambition³⁰. That Antipater chose the former over the latter may have come down to a combination of Antipater's personal experiences with Alexander and Alexander's relative youth vis-à-vis the other candidates³¹. Alongside this, Alexander may have had the benefit of being the only candidate present (excluding Philip Arrhidaeus). It is far from a leap to assume that Antipater would prefer a king he could influence over one he could not, that was, after all, the point of all infighting amongst the elites after Philip's death.

Alexander's greatest debt to Antipater was not merely Antipater's support for his claim, but Antipater's ability persuade the Lyncestian Alexander to join his cause at the detriment of his brothers. Carney has made note of the power that the Lyncestian sons of Aëropus may have held at court and has speculated that it was the sons of Aëropus who had pushed the claim of Amyntas as a rival to the throne³². The case for Lyncestian involvement is compelling and if the sons of Aëropus did indeed back Amyntas over Alexander it would have created a formidable power-bloc comprising of Amyntas himself, the three Lyncestian brothers and their adherents in Upper Macedonia (from which many military units came) and any of Amyntas' own *philoï*³³. Nonetheless, the decision of Lyncestian Alexander to publicly declare for Alexander III still warrants

²⁸ The death of Philip II and its aftermath has been the subject of numerous debates, see: BADIAN 1963 [2012]; 2007 [2012], who has placed Alexander III as the chief culprit; BOSWORTH 1971, has highlighted the role of the Lyncestian faction; CARNEY 2015, 167-178 examines the death of Philip from a polygamous perspective and points out the difficulties with providing a credible reason for any to commit the murder –all had motive but all had much to lose. In addition: LANE FOX 1973, 17-25 and 503-505 who builds on Diodorus; *contra* HATZOPOULOS 2005, 43-65 who doubts Diodorus as a source.

²⁹ D.S. 17.2.3 explicitly refers to Attalus as a rival for the throne. HECKEL 1991, 5 rightly notes that he had no obvious legal claim to be king and it seems likely that Diodorus' meaning here is his implied rule through his niece. The remarriage of Cleopatra would have been perfectly acceptable, fitting the model of levirate marriage followed by Macedonian successor states and already in operation as early as 478 in Sicily where Polyxalus married his brother's wife Demarete in a bid to further his claims for the rule of Syracuse. For levirate marriage generally, see OGDEN 1999, xix-xxv.

³⁰ That Amyntas was not behind Philip's murder has been argued convincingly by CARNEY 2015, 177 who notes that Amyntas had little to gain and a lot to lose by committing such a crime. Nonetheless, a group must have supported him.

³¹ Just. 9.4.3 informs us that Antipater had accompanied Alexander to Athens after Chaeronea. Additionally, Isocrates (*Ep.* 4) and Plutarch (*Alex* 9.1) both inform us that Antipater had been regent in Macedonia during Philip's absences. That Antipater and Alexander had a form of *philia* is thus highly likely.

³² CARNEY 2015, 128-131 cf. BOSWORTH 1971.

³³ WORTHINGTON 2003 offers the best overview of Amyntas' role.

fresh assessment through the model of *philia*-networks. Lyncestian Alexander had married the daughter of Antipater which, if pre-dating the events of 366, demonstrates that both men already had a strong political relationship. The horizontal exchange here is also clear to see, with Alexander, son of Aëropus, married into a distinguished family with influence at the centre of Philip's court. In return Antipater widened his *philia*-network to encompass a man with influence in the less-securely controlled regions to the north³⁴. Such a marriage was all the more pertinent if it is also accepted that Parmenio had friends in the regions of Upper Macedonia and, therefore, Antipater was seeking to redress the political imbalance in that region. In any case, what had begun as a relatively typical political marriage in Philip's lifetime became a vital relationship after his death. Antipater needed to ensure his own position was stable and supporting Alexander appears to have been his preferred choice³⁵. Lyncestian Alexander, whose brothers had chosen to back another, was forced to break one of the two competing bonds of *philia*. That he chose to side with Antipater can be explained, once again, in terms of a horizontal exchange of services: Alexander, son of Aëropus, declares for Alexander, son of Philip and splits the Lyncestian support for Amyntas. In return Antipater ensures that Alexander III appropriately rewards his namesake, who was in a stroke uncontested as the leading Lyncestian at court³⁶.

Whatever support remained for Amyntas quickly crumbled and Justin (12.6.14; cf. Arr. An. 1.5.4) informs us that Alexander was able to dispose of his challenger permanently in 335. However, its turn of events was not as assured as it now appears. Even with support amongst Upper Macedonia split Amyntas remained a perfectly viable candidate for the throne and his claim should have been strengthened further when Cleopatra, daughter of Attalus, was murdered by Alexander's *philoi*, severing Attalus' connection with the royal household and effectively ending his *philia* with Parmenio³⁷. Parmenio now had to choose a new side. That he entertained the notion of supporting Amyntas comes from a comment put into the mouth of Alexander by Curtius (6.9.16) where it is stated that Philotas had supported Amyntas against Alexander. The only way to reconcile this comment with the *philia*-networks that had developed at this time is to assume that after Cleopatra was killed, Philotas had been in discussion with Amyntas about supporting his claim. The reason why the support for Amyntas crumbled quickly after this point can be placed at a decision by Parmenio to instead lend his support to Alexander, concluding, for various reasons but likely due to a lack of military support for Amyntas, that Alexander was the better option for his own future. Parmenio's later assassination of Attalus was surely a bid to provide a service to Alexander in exchange for his own exoneration in Attalus' plotting and a continuation of his status as the leading commander in Macedonia. To some extent this was also an inevitable outcome, Parmenio was at that time at the head of a large

³⁴ The marriage of Alexander and Antipater's daughter is attested in Curt 7.1.7; Justin 11.7.1; 12.14.1.

³⁵ This is easy to understand if it is accepted that Antipater served in the capacity of a mentor while Alexander was left as regent of Macedonia during Philip's campaigns.

³⁶ CARNEY 2015, 130 is quite right to state that Alexander of Lyncestis was too important to be killed. His pardon was not a gift, but merely part of the exchange of services between the two Alexanders. The killing of the rest of Aëropus' sons was adequate public action for the death of or the support of a rival claimant to the throne.

³⁷ Just. 9.7.8-9 claims that the murder was committed by Olympias. While she was surely capable of such action, Justin's narrative of the episode is part of a wider attempt to portray Olympias as the murder of Philip and should not be taken at face value. It was politically expedient to murder Cleopatra and any among Alexander's adherents could have done so; Alexander certainly did not intervene.

advanced force with very little to tie it to the new king, it was mutually beneficial for Parmenio to retain his prominence.

The power of *philia*-networks was not broken, but rather strengthened in the events which followed Philip's death and continued to retain its importance in the years leading up to the invasion of Asia Minor in 334. When Alexander marched against the Triballians he did so with Philotas in command of his cavalry (Arr. *An.* 1.2.5). Even with Alexander's great displays of martial prowess both in the north and south in Greece, the makeup of Alexander's forces travelling into Asia Minor in 334 were tribute to his continued embroilment in the *philia*-networks that had secured his succession. The *philoi* of Antipater had been greatly rewarded in the composition of the command structure (Appendix B): Lyncestian Alexander was a hipparch, and moreover in command of the formidable and important Thessalian cavalry; Antigonus commanded some 7,000 Greek mercenaries and Balagros remained a *somatophylax*, the most intimate of positions. Antipater himself was to stay behind, but in the unprecedented role of Strategos Autocrator which appears to have allowed great freedom of action³⁸. Likewise, the high-status roles given to the *philoi* of Parmenio (Appendix A) also demonstrated the dominance of these political groupings at court: Amyntas, son of Andromenes was a taxiarch; Calas, son of Harpalus was a hipparch; Cleander clearly held a military posting, but its nature in 334 is unclear; Hegelochus commanded the *hippeis prodromoi*; Nicanor commanded in the *hypaspists*; Philotas was hipparch of the Companions; Polyperchon was a taxiarch and Parmenio himself was Alexander's senior commander. The positions held by each of these men were more prominent than the roles assumed by men who could be called members of Alexander's own *philia*-network with the exceptions of Cleitus, son of Dropides, and Craterus (see Appendix C).

In addition to holding prestigious commands, the *philoi* of Antipater and Parmenio clearly had a great deal of access to the king which, as outlined previously, was itself a marker of distinction and the aim of court politics in the first place. Particularly well placed amongst Antipater's *philoi* were Balagros and Lyncestian Alexander, whom Arrian (*An.* 1.25.1) makes it clear enjoyed personal access to the king. In the case of Parmenio's grouping, personal access was the privilege of Parmenio himself, of Philotas whose physical closeness to the king is encapsulated by Curtius' (6.9.26-7) statement at the moment of Philotas' downfall that the troops were shocked to see a man usually by the king's side in a feast now on trial before them, and of Demetrius, a *somatophylax* about whom little is known³⁹.

PHILIA POLITICS IN THE PERSIAN CAMPAIGN

Alexander's attempts to break his political encirclement will form the basis of the rest of this paper. That Alexander was politically astute has not always been taken for granted and his attempts to play at politics in the court of Philip II, most notably through his attempts to sabotage the marriage of his half-brother to the daughter of Pixodarus

³⁸ Antipater's dealing with the Spartan revolt of 331 displayed the widespread nature of his authority and is attested by Arr. *An.* 1.11.3 and D.S. 17.62-3.

³⁹ HECKEL 2006, 108 correctly resists conflating this Demetrius the brother of Antigonus Monophthalmus. If the two men were indeed kin it is odd that Antigonus' career suffers no detriment post-Philotas' murder. The only references to this Demetrius come when he is removed from office and Arrian's suspicion (*An.* 3.27.3) that he was executed for his association with Philotas appears to hold cf. Curt. 6.7.15.

of Caria, have often been held as evidence that Alexander was naive in the political arena⁴⁰. Nonetheless, Alexander had grown up at the court of the most powerful man of his generation and had personally experienced the benefits of being in the king's presence and the detriments of exile. It is foolish to assume that Alexander did not gain some nous from his experiences, even if he had made mistakes in earlier life. Furthermore, the exile of Erygius, Harpalus, Nearchus and Ptolemy for their parts in the Pixadarus affair demonstrates that Alexander had his own *philoï* and was himself playing at *philia* politics. As could be expected when your philos is the king, each of these men was hastily recalled when Philip died and would go on to prominence (see Appendix C and discussion below).

Alexander had also shown that he was far from naïve in what it meant to be a king. Although he certainly remained constricted in his scope for political action by the *philia*-networks that surrounded him, Alexander had already begun to show his awareness of self-representation as a crucial facet of his rule. The one moment of Alexander's accession which was conclusively of his own making had been his speech to the assembled troops pledging his loyalty to them, to his father's mode of rule and abolishing taxes for them⁴¹. Furthermore, after his crushing of the Theban-led rebellion to his rule in Greece, Alexander had utilised the festival at Dium to put on a demonstration of his power. Diodorus (17.17.3-4) gives an account of the events which make the festival sound distinctly similar to that of a Hellenistic king, nonetheless there is no reason suggest that Diodorus is incorrect about the events, especially given Philip's increasingly lavish self-representation prior to his death⁴². Additionally, as Spawforth has noted, Alexander made use of similar displays at Ephesus, Soli and Memphis later in his rule to display his power⁴³. Alexander understood kingship well, he merely had to reshape the politics of his court in order to pursue it as he wished.

This process of reclaiming the power at court began immediately for Alexander, although almost certainly unintentionally, with the removal of Antipater from Alexander's presence through Antipater's own advancement to Strategos Autocrator⁴⁴. Nonetheless, what had happened to Antipater was to happen to, although with far less prestige, his *philoï* serving Alexander in 334. It was not a coincidence that many of the earliest Achaemenid satrapies captured by Alexander were given to *philoï* of Antipater⁴⁵. Arrian (*An.* 1.29.3) informs us that Phrygia was given to Antigonus, Lydia to Asander (*An.* 1.17.7) and Cilicia to Balagros in 333/2 (*An.* 2.12). Playing upon the vertical axis of exchange and the desire amongst the elite to gain prestige, Alexander systematically promoted Antipater's *philoï* to the command of satrapies. The exchange was prestige in return for loyalty, with the bonus of separation from court of those Alexander did not want in his inner circle and men desperate to prove their worth placed into strategic positions. Ultimately, the reward of a satrapy placed the office-holder into a debt they were unlikely to repay without exceptional conduct and the efficacy of this

⁴⁰ Eg. RUZICKA 2010, 9-10.

⁴¹ D.S. 17.2.2-3. Only Alexander could have made the speech, therefore, his agency is clear at this time.

⁴² *P. Oxy* 15. 1798 cf. SPAWFORTH 2007, 90; *contra* FREDRICKSMEYER 2000, 191. Other instances include Philip's statue: D.S. 15.92.5, and more generally his hospitality at Aeschin. 2.41-2; 47; 51-2.

⁴³ SPAWFORTH 2007, 92-3.

⁴⁴ The unprecedented power of the position suggests Antipater was not being removed from influence, rather this was a genuine reward for services rendered and, even if Alexander felt constrained by Antipater's presence and that of his *philoï*, Alexander must have trusted Antipater's ability to carry out the role.

⁴⁵ HECKEL 2003, 210 has made passing reference to the use of promotion for political reasons with regards to Antipater's *philoï*.

arrangement was shown by the success of Antigonos' wars in the Taurus Mountains⁴⁶. Alexander's later willingness to punish ineffective or openly abusive satraps, if already the case, certainly would have encouraged such behaviour⁴⁷.

Alexander's desire to remove those he did not fully trust from positions of privilege is also evidenced in the changing composition of the *somatophylakes*. To be a *somatophylax* was to have access and, better still, public acknowledgement of your elevated status. It is then less a surprise than an inevitability that almost all of Alexander's closest *philoi*, his *hetairoi*, were appointed (see also Appendix C). By 329, the *somatophylakes* were: Aristonus, Hephaestion, Leonnatus, Lysimachus, Peithon, Perdikkas and Ptolemy. Alexander's bodyguard had become a reflection of who he trusted and had given official status to go with the informal influence that many of these men must already have held; membership of the *somatophylakes* served as a mark of the king favour and trust. The changes to the *somatophylakes* provide a stark contrast to the movements of Antipater's *philoi*.

Of course, there are always exceptions and the exception amongst the *philoi* of Antipater was Alexander, son of Aëropus. Nonetheless, when viewed through the prism of *philia*-networks Alexander's grizzly demise must be understood as a product of the rivalries between the *philia*-networks of Alexander's court. Alexander owed, at least in part, his position as king to the acceptance of his Lyncestian namesake and Alexander had rewarded him with command of the Thessalian Cavalry and a prominent position at court. Nonetheless, there remains two important features regarding Alexander, son of Aëropus, and his relationship with Alexander, the king. The first, is that Lyncestian Alexander cannot have been above suspicion for his role in the bid of Amyntas for the throne in 336/5. He may have been able to rehabilitate his standing with the king, but he the actions of his brothers and his potential to have been involved was a mark he would have to carry forward. Secondly, Lyncestian Alexander's most prominent political ally was Antipater, who was not only increasingly at odds with Alexander, but was also geographically distant⁴⁸. In the game of court politics, Lyncestian Alexander was an easy target.

The declining position of Lyncestian Alexander was exacerbated and made considerably worse by the choices Alexander (the king) had made to fill the void left by the removal of Antipater's other *philoi*. Alexander's own close adherents, men such as Hephaestion, were attaining prominence at this time and beginning to receive official positions. The decision to allow Hephaestion to choose the king of the Sidonians in the winter of 333/2 and his appointment as a *somatophylax* are both evidence of his increasingly public political role at the time⁴⁹. In tandem with the rise of Alexander's own *philoi* was the continuing power of Parmenio. Alexander had split his forces in the early stages of the campaign, with himself leading half and Parmenio trusted to lead the other half. Such responsibility was not awarded lightly and, whilst the two were to grow estranged later, what the two men had to offer each at this stage far outweighed any

⁴⁶ Curt. 3.1.22, cf. Curt. 4.5.13 for Balagros' role.

⁴⁷ Alexander was not beyond punishing his satraps for misconduct eg. Arr. An. 6.27.4.

⁴⁸ The importance of geographical distance in this affair has been noted by CARNEY 2015, 131f. Carney also makes note of the potential involvement of Olympias and Parmenio, both of whom had motives to see Lyncestian Alexander removed. BADIAN 2000 [2012], 434 blames Alexander himself and calls it a false conspiracy.

⁴⁹ Hephaestion's role in the appointment of the king is recorded in Curt. 4.1.15-26; Plu. Mor. 340c-d and D.S. 17.46.6. His first official position was to ferry goods between Tyre and Gaza as attested by Curt. 4.5.10.

enmity. In this case the horizontal axis of exchange can be witnessed in operation, with a service bound relationship flourishing.

This leads to the supposed plot itself. Arrian states (*An.* 1.25.3; cf. Curt. 3.7.12, who names Nabazanes in place of Darius) Lyncestian Alexander had been in negotiation with Darius III about assassinating King Alexander. The messenger who was bringing the terms of the agreement to Lyncestian Alexander, Sisines, was caught and interrogated by Parmenio, who established Lyncestian Alexander's guilt. Next, Alexander, having arrested his namesake, called a council (*An.* 1.25.5) at which it was decided that Lyncestian Alexander was not only untrustworthy, but that he was too popular with the Thessalians whom he commanded to be left in control.

Ernst Badian has claimed that this entire plot was invented by Alexander to remove his namesake for political reasons; he was not trusted, and he was in Alexander's way⁵⁰. In contrast, Waldemar Heckel has argued that the plot must in fact have been real⁵¹. Heckel makes the case that the year in which the plot occurred, 333 (following the dating from Arr. *An.* 1.25.1-10), was the year in which Alexander appears to have been at his most dependent on the *philo*i of Antipater; this was the year of Antigonos' and Balagros' campaigns in the Taurus Mountains and the year in which Agis III of Sparta began his open revolt against Macedonian hegemony in Greece⁵². However, this explanation is incomplete and does not give credence enough to the role of gift-exchange in reshaping *philia*-networks continually. That Alexander had a dependence on men such as Antigonos at that moment is indisputable, however, to call these men *philo*i of Antipater at that same moment is to miss the subtleties of *philia*-networking. The bond between Antipater and his *philo*i had not been broken, however, these same men now had a debt to repay for Alexander, who had given them their newly acquired status. Furthermore, men such as Antigonos may have been *philo*i of Antipater, but that did not require them to have the same relationship with each other. *Philia* politics was not so neat: what did Antigonos care of the fate of Alexander, son of Aëropus? Those among Antipater's *philo*i who had been rewarded with satrapies were expected to carry out their roles as functionaries of the king and it was in their interests to do so. The next key moment is recorded by Arrian (1.25.5), who states that Alexander consulted a council before coming to his decision. Arrian gives us no hint of who was included in this meeting; however, Hephaestion was almost certainly present in his new capacity as a *somatophylax* and it seems likely that Craterus, another ambitious *philos* of the king was present, as it was his brother who took the verbal message to arrest Lyncestian Alexander to the guard (*An.* 1.25.9-10). In addition, Parmenio had sent Sisines to Alexander for questioning (1.25.4) and, it seems likely, that Philotas would have played some role if he were not with his father at this time, although this cannot be proven.

Charting the *philiai* of those involved suggests that Lyncestian Alexander was probably the victim of the dynamics of a violent court in which he had few *philo*i. The entire affair appears to have occurred very swiftly, Arrian makes no comment of Lyncestian Alexander being given the opportunity to defend himself, and Curtius' account (7.1.6-10) suggests that he was only given the opportunity some three years

⁵⁰ BADIAN 2000 [2012], 56-60.

⁵¹ HECKEL 2003 [2012], 213 n.68. However, the individual Alexander most relied upon, Antigonos, had no reason not to serve Alexander well in this year regardless of any personal convictions. Alexander had given him his position and if Alexander's campaign was to prove unsuccessful, Antigonos would certainly have lost his satrapy, and the wealth and status it came with, to the advancing army of Darius. Additionally, Alexander remained sufficiently close and sufficiently powerful to extract revenge.

⁵² HECKEL 2003, 213 n. 68. For Antigonos' war in Cilicia see: Curt. 4.1.35. For Balagros: Curt. 4.5.13-4. For Agis III: D.S. 17.48.1; 62.8-63.4; Arr. *An.* 1.11.3.

later, prior to his long-delayed execution. Ultimately, the truth of the tale, as with the death of Philip, is less important than the role it played in the power dynamics between the competing *philia*-networks of Alexander's court. Antipater's *philo*i suffered from their patron's absence and their lack of connections with other networks. The pattern of Alexander's reign had been set firmly, the king would do what was necessary to break his political fetters.

Of course, Alexander's engagement with *philia*-networks was not restricted to a systematic removal of Antipater's *philo*i, but extended to *philo*i of Parmenio also. Understandably, much of the focus regarding the downfall of Parmenio has related to the "Philotas Affair" of 330, however, Parmenio's *philia*-network was vast and the "Philotas Affair" must be contextualised as the culmination of a process which, as noted by Badian, had begun much earlier⁵³. The *philia* between Alexander and Parmenio had begun as one of utility. Parmenio had killed Attalus, both exonerating himself of conspiracy and removing Alexander's remaining adversary in a demonstration of loyalty by Parmenio. Alexander, in turn, needed both Parmenio's generalship and his political presence as a counter-weight to Antipater at a time when he simply could not promote his own *philo*i without overt nepotism and neglecting the man to whom he was indebted. Nonetheless, with each satrapy awarded to a *philos* of Antipater, Alexander's political reliance on Parmenio was reduced and with each military victory, his own increasing status made Parmenio's popularity amongst the men a hindrance rather than a help⁵⁴.

Several flashpoints between Alexander and Parmenio, as well as their respective *philo*i, demonstrated the growing tensions that would eventually break their *philia*. The earliest attested incident was at Granicus in 334, where Parmenio attempted to dissuade Alexander from launching his assault late in the day (Arr. *An.* 1.13.2-13; Plu. *Alex.* 16.3) and, although this confrontation was hardly a major incident, it remains a useful marker from which to chart the growing disconnect between a youthful and impetuous king and his conservatively minded general. The next episode occurred in Egypt, where Arrian (*An.* 3.26.1) states that Philotas was saved by his father from charges of treason. This episode, far more serious than the first, showed how the tension between Alexander and Parmenio was paralleled in the tensions between Alexander's and Parmenio's *philo*i, who were undoubtedly competing factions by this time⁵⁵. Philotas had probably always been unpopular. Certainly, the plot to oust him in Egypt appears to have been orchestrated by Craterus, who was in political ascendancy at that time⁵⁶. Nonetheless, the basis of Craterus' accusations –the notion that Philotas had spoken ill of Alexander and his divine pretensions post-Siwa– were certainly in keeping with the conservative Macedonian outlook espoused by Philotas' father, Parmenio, and thus the root of the tale is believable. Additionally, if Curtius' Hegelochus conspiracy (Curt. 6.11.22-29) is indeed historical, Philotas' views appear even more typical of the *philo*i

⁵³ BADIAN 1960 [2012], 327. However, Badian's argument, based on Arr. *An.* 3.11.10 that Parmenio was disgraced through inglorious roles on the battlefield is an oversimplification. Parmenio's role in the infantry can just as easily be placed as a tactical necessity on account of Parmenio's brilliance as a general coupled with Alexander's own preference for cavalry command.

⁵⁴ Popularity demonstrated when the troops revolted upon Parmenio's death: D.S 17.80 cf. Curt. 7.2.35. Alexander's desire to change the character of his rule was also important in the shaping his relationship with Parmenio. These matters have been discussed numerous: for the visit to the Zeus Ammon oracle at Siwa see BADIAN 1981 [2012], 27-71; FREDRICKSMEYER 2003, 270-78; LANE FOX 1973, 200-18.

⁵⁵ The notion of Alexander's *philo*i seeing Parmenio's faction, and Philotas in particular, as a block to their own advancement has already been well established: HECKEL 2003, 98-99,

⁵⁶ See Plu. *Alex.* 59; Curt. 6.8.2.

of Parmenio and thus Craterus' accusations even more believable. It is not difficult to understand why the continued presence of Philotas at the highest level of Alexander's court frustrated his own *philoï*.

In addition to these two major incidents several other moments of tension are recorded in the sources: Parmenio's desire to accept peace (Plu. *Alex* 29.7-9; Arr. *An.* 2.25.1; D.S. 17.54; Curt. 4.11.1-14 and Justin 11.12.1-10); Parmenio's attempts to persuade Alexander to fight by night at Gaugamela (Arr. *An.* 3.10.1-2 cf. Curt. 4.13.4) and most famously Parmenio's recall of Alexander at Gaugamela (Arr. *An.* 3.15.1-2). Despite the fact that all these incidents, as Heckel has noted, appear to fit within a tradition set against Parmenio, it is clear that he and Alexander were at a crossroads in their relationship by 330⁵⁷.

The events of 330, in which Parmenio and Philotas both lost their lives, serve to demonstrate the lethal nature of *philia* politics and the depth of the rivalry between Alexander's and Parmenio's *philoï*. The first major moment was Alexander's decision to leave Parmenio in Ecbatana before advancing east. Viewed as a gift-exchange, the position in Ecbatana served as a suitable reward for the services that Parmenio had rendered for Alexander in the campaign to that point⁵⁸. Indeed, if the station were to be permanent, such a vital position could be represented as an adequate match for the role Antipater was performing in Europe, with Alexander due to continue east. Nonetheless, it cannot escape notice that the decision to leave Parmenio in Ecbatana at the point where the *philia* between himself and Alexander was at its most stretched appears very similar to Alexander's use to satrapal appointments to separate himself from the *philoï* of Antipater in Asia Minor.

The removal of Parmenio from court was to be followed by the execution of Philotas on charges of treason, and by Parmenio's own demise later that year. Both deaths were the result of changing balances of power among *philia*-networks in a highly charged and militarised environment, and both occurred with Alexander's blessing. The *philoï* of Parmenio lost a great deal of security with the removal of their chief benefactor from court. Men such as Coenus, the sons of Andromenes and most importantly Philotas were outside of the direct favour of Alexander and clearly set against the rising political power of men such as Hephaestion, Leonnatus, Craterus and Ptolemy. The increasing status of Alexander's own *philoï* had been never more apparent, with the appointment of Hephaestion (Arr. *An.* 1.22.4) and Leonnatus (3.5.5) as *somatophylakes* and Craterus' command of a substantial body of infantry at Issus (2.8.4). Importantly, the appointment of Hephaestion and Leonnatus as *somatophylakes* must have had the important effect of controlling access to the king, at the very least ensuring their own access to the king, to the detriment of Parmenio's *philoï*. Such a situation emboldened Alexander's *philoï* and could only lead to infighting.

These were the politics that led to Philotas' downfall. The "Philotas Affair", as the incident is commonly known, must have been the result of a real conspiracy⁵⁹. Nonetheless, the downfall of Philotas as a collaborator in the conspiracy was certainly the work of Alexander's *philoï*. It is impossible, as with the murder of Philip, to come

⁵⁷ HECKEL 2006, 191 and n. 516 where it is noted that the tradition likely originates in the immediate aftermath of Alexander's death with one of the first historians of events.

⁵⁸ That Parmenio was never supposed to join the expedition again cannot be known for certain, however, Alexander had proceeded as far as Phrada, which was a considerable distance from Ecbatana, and this does not suggest that Alexander had any intention to waiting for his general to catch up. Additionally, the fact that Alexander and Parmenio's relationship had soured does not mean Parmenio could not be trusted to play his part at Ecbatana; any suggestion Parmenio would commit treason is surely overblown.

⁵⁹ The view of HECKEL 2003, 216-19; *contra* BADIAN 2000 [2012], 66-70.

to a clear conclusion of the actual events that occurred due to the contrary nature of the source material. Nonetheless, the evidence from the aftermath of the conspiracy reveals a conspiracy of its own, hatched by *philoi* of the king to remove a rival for their own benefit. Curtius (6.2.8) places the decision to execute Philotas into the mouth of Craterus, and whilst the tale itself cannot be corroborated Curtius' version of events sits neatly with the *philia* politics of the moment. As noted above, the enmity between Craterus and Philotas was evident as early as Egypt and can only have grown since. Alongside this, the chief beneficiaries of the execution of Philotas were Hephaestion and Cleitus, son of Dropides, who attain joint leadership of the Companion Cavalry (Arr. An. 3.27.4), two of Alexander's closest *philoi* and certainly not men who appear to have openly rivalled Craterus at this time⁶⁰.

Alongside the trial of Philotas himself a number of other men were either prosecuted or put on trial by Alexander for their roles in the supposed conspiracy against him. Once again, the connections of the majority of those involved suggests that the prime motivator for these trials was court politics rather than the conspiracy of Dimnus. Arrian (An. 3.27.1-3) states that the sons of Andromenes –Amyntas, Attalus, Polemon and Simmias– were tried, but Amyntas, Attalus and Simmias were found to be innocent and Polemon, who had fled the scene, was acquitted upon his return. The decision to attempt prosecution of the sons of Andromenes was itself the result of *philia*-networking, with all those closely associated with Philotas, and by extension Parmenio, being bought to trial⁶¹. In particular, the trial of Amyntas –who appears closest to Philotas– discredited any potential defence of Philotas through besmirching Amyntas' name. Nonetheless, that the sons of Andromenes were bound to escape prosecution has been alluded to by Waldemar Heckel, who notes the link between Andromenes and Polyperchon, son of Simias, meant that the sons of Andromenes could have had supporters from as many as one-third of the Macedonian infantry⁶². Once again the intertangled webs caused by *philia*-networking can be seen at play. The sons of Andromenes may have been connected with Philotas on one side, but they also had support and loyalty amongst entirely different networks who were sufficiently important to ensure their survival. Alexander may have been content to sanction murder of Philotas as it gave him an excuse to be rid of Parmenio, but this would have been a dangerous moment to test further the loyalty of the army. Whilst the politics of *philia* had resulted in the death of Philotas and Parmenio, it had also saved the sons of Andromenes.

The political ramifications of the Dimnus Plot did not end here. Parmenio and Philotas both counted amongst their *philoi* the brothers Coenus and Cleander, with the former married to Parmenio's daughter⁶³. It is telling that neither brother spoke in defence of their *philos* and both appear to have benefited from his downfall. In Arrian's (An. 4.17.3) narrative Coenus emerges next in the historical record as the commander of a detachment subjugating Sogdiana and continues to hold prominent positions within

⁶⁰ Although later Hephaestion and Craterus were to come to blows, most famously being separated by Alexander himself.

⁶¹ Arrian's statement (An. 3.27.2) that the flight of Polemon added credence to the theory that a plot had taken place and, presumably also adding weight to the charges that the sons of Andromenes were involved is intriguing and probably reflects how the incident of Polemon's flight must have appeared. However, it is just as likely that Polemon, much like Coenus (see below), could sense the way that the wind was blowing and took the opportunity to flee. If Polemon were guilty of the plot itself it seems unlikely he would have been acquitted, Alexander had been content to remove the brothers of Alexander, son of Aëropus, whilst leaving Alexander himself untouched to maintain the balance of power required at court in 336.

⁶² See HECKEL 2006, 25.

⁶³ HECKEL 1991, 15; Curt. 6.8.17.

the army throughout the rest of his life, eventually dying on the return of India (Arr. *An.* 6.1.1, 2.1; cf. 5.29.5; Curt 9.3.20).⁶⁴ Meanwhile, Arrian (*An.* 3.26.3) directly implicates Cleander in the murder of Parmenio, stating that he orchestrated events in Ecbatana. When Cleander next surfaces, it is to face crimes of maladministration for which he faced execution (Arr. *An.* 6.27.4; Curt 10.1.1-7), having remained in Media when Alexander continued to India. The success of the sons of Polemocrates after a plot in which they were likely to have been implicated must be the result of an exchange of services between the brothers and Alexander, or the brothers and Alexander's *philoi*; likely both. Cleander was, ironically, in a similar position to Parmenio in 336, turning his back on his *philoi* in order to save his own life and position. In return for his part in the murder, he was exonerated for his previous association. Coenus' position was even more tenuous in 330. He was physically at court and implicating him in the murder would have been the simple solution to be rid of him. Additionally, due to his kinship with Philotas his involvement would have been believable. In return for his life, he could be expected to remain loyal to the king and in return for that loyalty status would steadily follow. Alexander had repositioned the loyalty of the sons of Polemocrates, placing them into his ever increasing *philia*-network.

The extent to which the conviction of Philotas was also a turning point in the *philia* politics of Alexander's court cannot be overstated. It comes as no surprise that the members of Alexander's council –Coenus, Craterus, Erigyius, Hephaestion and Leonnatus– almost all attained great success in the years that followed (See Appendix C). For example, Hephaestion was not only a *somatophylax* but had become a hipparch of the Companion Cavalry after the execution of Philotas (Arr. *An.* 2.27.4). Prior to this, Hephaestion's only military role is given to us by Curtius (4.5.10) who states that Hephaestion had been given command of the supply fleet sending siege equipment from Tyre to Gaza. Nonetheless, even this early command demonstrates *philia* politics in action. At the time, Alexander's chief naval officer appears to have been Hegelochus, a *philos* of Parmenio. Nonetheless, the substantial gap between Hephaestion's command in the Mediterranean and his command of the Companions is testament to the hold on offices Parmenio's *philoi* held. Later, Hephaestion would become chiliarch (Arr. *An.* 7.14.10) and the most powerful of Alexander's *philoi* completing the process of surrounding himself with men he trusted.

Much like Hephaestion, Craterus owed his great position in Macedonian society to Alexander. A commander of the *pezhetairoi* at Granicus in 334, by 332 Craterus had an independent command –overseeing the siege of Tyre in the absence of Alexander⁶⁵. Additionally, both Arrian (*An.* 3.18.4-8) and Curtius (5.4.14-34) place Craterus as the commander who led an entire portion (the greater portion) of the army whilst Alexander outflanked Ariobarzanes at the Persian Gates. This was a command which could quite conceivably have been given to Parmenio and as such the decision to give it to Craterus was political as much as it was military; the decision to promote Craterus to the role and leave Parmenio in Ecbatana was not the same as leaving Craterus in command of the siege of Tyre. Alexander had not begun the project and left to settle other affairs, taking Parmenio with him in the process and thus denying him command through having need of him elsewhere. In this instance, Alexander was sending a clear statement about the future roles of the two men in his forces: Parmenio's time on the battlefield

⁶⁴ Of course, the death of Coenus has been viewed with suspicion on account of its convenient timing, once again demonstrating that the political networks in Alexander's court were extremely fluid. See BADIEN 1961 [2012], 22-3 who casts doubts on the death not only of Coenus, but also of Cleander.

⁶⁵ Curt. 4.3.1.

was over and Craterus' time to lead had arrived. It was time for one of Alexander's own *philoi* to occupy the role. The reciprocal exchange between Alexander and Craterus is also clear: Alexander had given Craterus everything, loyalty was what he expected in return. Craterus' desire to demonstrate this loyalty may also have played a part in his longing to see Philotas, whom he had suspected since Egypt, to be removed from the king's presence. There is nothing to suggest that his own hatred of Philotas and his sense of duty to Alexander were mutually exclusive, both could have been motivators.

Alexander may have promoted the interests of his *philoi* more vigorously than was necessary of a king, perhaps due to the insecurity that the early parts of his life and reign had imbedded in him, but Alexander always acted with a high degree of political acumen in the period until 328⁶⁶. For example, Hephaestion was promoted to command the Companions, but Cleitus was promoted alongside him and presumably carried out the role in practice⁶⁷. In the shadow of Alexander's calculated treatment of others, the peculiar career of Harpalus, son of Machatas, becomes even more curious. Harpalus had been a *philos* of Alexander since youth and had evidently supported his *philos* in his bid to claim the daughter of Pixodarus in marriage in 336 (Arr. *An.* 3.6.5; Plu. *Alex.* 10.4). Harpalus' support for Alexander at this early stage in his life was not forgotten, with Harpalus returning to accompany Alexander into Asia before fleeing prior to the Battle of Issus with a large bulk of money⁶⁸. Harpalus then returned to Alexander, apparently forgiven, and was instated as treasurer to the king at Ecbatana. Harpalus must also have played a role in carrying out the murder of Parmenio, once again lending his support to Alexander in a difficult moment⁶⁹. Events after this are not of concern here, but the fact that Harpalus' behaviour in his second stint as treasurer was even worse can surely not have surprised Alexander. Yet, Alexander was willing to continue to promote Harpalus' interests even when it was clearly to the detriment of his own rule.

Harpalus, and his deviant behaviour, is testament to the weakness of *philia*-networks as a method of conducting court politics. As Aristotle (eg. 1161a33-34) makes clear, bonds of *philia* were nearly always fluid, especially if they were *philiai* of utility. It appears that the bond between Alexander and Harpalus ran much deeper, although the sources do not reveal any details to substantiate the claim beyond the fact that Harpalus was involved in the 'Pixodarus affair' and Alexander forgave him for fleeing prior to Issus. Nonetheless, this is the only explanation that accounts for Alexander's actions. Harpalus was the exception that proved the rule when it came to Alexander's careful utilisation of *philia*-networks, and simultaneously a portent of what was to come later in Alexander's reign as the king's struggles with his own ambitious *philoi* grew⁷⁰. By the time Alexander defeated Satibarzanes in early 329 the makeup of his military command and court was radically different to the one which had set out in 334. In 334

⁶⁶ 328 saw the murder of Cleitus, perhaps the first sign of Alexander losing firm control over his own *philoi*. The politics of the period from 328-323 were marked by power-struggles between Craterus and Hephaestion, attempts to reorganise the empire, revolts and attempts by Alexander to fuse the Argead and Achaemenid models of rule. On the murder of Cleitus see TRITLE 2000, 56-61; BADIAN 2000 [2012], 69-71.

⁶⁷ See Arr. *An.* 3.27.4.

⁶⁸ Arr. *An.* 3.6.4-7.

⁶⁹ A detailed analysis of Harpalus' role in Alexander's court is given by BADIAN 1961 [2012], 23-4.

⁷⁰ Events later than the immediate fallout of the Dinmus plot are outside of the scope of this article. Alexander's control of his *philoi* was to eventually disintegrate, perhaps due to his failure to balance them against each other and his desire to support those who supported his more Achaemenid presentation. This was to lead to a confrontation between Hephaestion and Craterus in India where the king himself had to intervene: cf. Plu. *Alex.* 47.11-12.

Alexander was a king who had proven himself to be charismatic on the field of battle, but also a king who was indebted to key figures of his father's reign who had chosen to support him. By the time the dust had settled on the plot of Dimnus Alexander's court reflected the desires and prejudices of the king himself, who now firmly sat atop the political ladder. *Philia*-networks based upon reciprocal relationships were key to the political life of the Macedonian court in Alexander's reign. The elite could only hope to exercise power through the king, which required proximity to his person. This could only be attained through advancement, especially in Alexander's highly militarised court-on-the-move, and advancement only came from Alexander. Therefore, to advance was to have *philo*i in high places who could make a case for your own progress and in return a *philos* must do a favour. Alexander's success at manipulating this social mechanism and placing his own *philo*i in power can be summarised through listing the names of the men still surviving when the king died who had also been present for either the 'Pixodarus Affair' or were on Alexander's council in the trial of Philotas: Craterus, Leonnatus, Nearchus and Ptolemy; all four were to be major players in the aftermath of the king's demise, a suitable exchange in return for their loyalty?

APPENDIX A: *PHILOI* OF PARMENIO

NAME	POSITION(S) SPRING 334, INITIAL EXPEDITIONARY FORCE	POSITION(S) 331, PRIOR TO GAUGAMELA	POSITION(S) 329, END OF SUMMER
PARMENIO	Conducted operations in Asia Minor (e.g. Siege of Pitane: D.S. 17.17.9). Commander of the Infantry (Arr. <i>An.</i> 1.11.6; D.S. 17.17.3).	Commanded the left wing at Granicus (Arr. <i>An.</i> 1.14.1). Again, at Issus (Arr. <i>An.</i> 2.8.9-10; Curt. 3.9.8-10) and at Gaugamela (Arr. <i>An.</i> 3.11.10)	Placed in charge of Media and then murdered.
AMYNTAS, SON OF ANDROMENES	Taxiarch (Arr. <i>An.</i> 1.8.2.).	Sent for reinforcements in Macedonia (D.S. 17.49.1; Curt. 7.1.15; 37-8).	Killed in action (Arr. <i>An.</i> 3.27.3).
ATTALUS (PATRONYMIC UNKNOWN)	Killed.	—	—
ATTALUS, SON OF ANDROMENES	<i>somatophylax</i> ? (D.S. 16.94.4).	Unknown.	Unknown (would later serve as taxiarch).
CALAS, SON OF HARPALUS	Hipparch of the Thessalian Cavalry (D.S. 17.17.4).	Satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia (Arr. <i>An.</i> 1.17.1-2).	No Change.
CLEANDER, SON OF POLEMOCRATES	Assumed to have a military role.	Recruiting mission (Arr. <i>An.</i> 1.24.2; Curt. 3.1.1.). Commander of mercenaries (Arr. <i>An.</i> 3.6.8; 3.12.2).	Unknown (later executed).
COENUS, SON OF POLEMOCRATES	Commander as early as 335 (Arr. <i>An.</i> 1.6.9).	Sent on a recruiting mission (Arr. <i>An.</i> 1.24.1-2). Commanded troops at Issus (Arr. <i>An.</i> 2.8.3; Curt. 3.9.7) and Gaugamela (Arr. <i>An.</i> 3.11.9; Curt. 4.13.28; D.S. 17.57.2).	One of the commanders at the Persian Gates (Arr. <i>An.</i> 3.18.6)
HECTOR, SON OF PARMENIO	No office.	Drowned in the Nile (Curt. 4.8.7-8; 6.9.27).	—
HEGELOCHUS, SON OF HIPPOSTRATUS	Commanded in the <i>hippeis prodromoi</i> (Arr. <i>An.</i> 1.12.7).	Joint commander of the fleet (Arr. <i>An.</i> 3.2.6). Died at Gaugamela (Arr. <i>An.</i> 3.11.8).	—
NICANOR, SON OF PARMENIO	Commanded the hypaspists in the Getic war (Arr. <i>An.</i> 1.4.2).	No change. (continued role attested in Arr. <i>An.</i> 1.14.2; 2.8.3; 3.11.9; cf. Curt. 3.9.7; 4.13.27).	Died of illness (Arr. <i>An.</i> 3.25.4; Curt. 6.6.18).

PHILOTAS, SON OF PARMENIO	Cavalry Command in the Triballian campaign (Arr. <i>An.</i> 1.2.5). Commander of the Companion Cavalry (Curt. 6.9.21; D.S. 17.17.4).	No change, commanded the Companions at Gaugamela (Arr. <i>An.</i> 3.11.8; Curt. 4.13.26; D.S. 17.57.1).	Executed.
POLEMON, SON OF ANDROMENES	—	—	Member of the <i>Paides Basilikoi</i> (Curt. 7.2.4).
POLYPERCHON, SON OF SIMMIAS	Unknown.	Taxiarch (D.S. 17.57.2).	No change attested.
SIMMIAS, SON OF ANDROMENES	Unknown.	Likely commanded Amyntas' troops at Gaugamela (Arr. <i>An.</i> 3.11.9; D.S. 17.57.3).	Unknown.

APPENDIX B: *PHILOI* OF ANTIPATER

NAME	POSITION(S) 334, SPRING INITIAL EXPEDITIONARY FORCE	POSITION(S) 331, PRIOR TO GUAGAMELA	POSITION(S) 329, END OF SUMMER
ANTIPATER, SON OF IOLAS	Strategos in Europe (Arr. <i>An.</i> 1.11.3; Curt 4.1.39; Justin. 11.7.1; D.S. 18.12.1).	No change.	No change.
ALEXANDER, SON OF AEROPUS	Hipparch, Thessalian Cavalry (Arr. <i>An.</i> 1.25.2).	Imprisoned (Arr. <i>An.</i> 1.25.3-10; Diod. 17.32).	Executed. (Curt. 7.1.5-9; D.S. 17.80.2; Just. 12.14.1)
AMYNTAS, SON OF ARRHEBAEUS	Commanded a scouting party of from the <i>hippeis prodromoi</i> (Arr. <i>An.</i> 1.12.7).	Commands the left-wing at Sagalassus (Arr. <i>An.</i> 1.28.4)	Unknown.
ANTIGONUS MONOPHTHALMUS, SON OF PHILIP	Commanded 7,000 Greek mercenaries (D.S. 17.17.3).	Satrap of Phrygia. (Arr. <i>An.</i> 1.29.3; Curt. 4.1.35 states Lydia).	No Change.
BALAGROS (BALACRUS) SON OF NICANOR	<i>somatophylax</i>	Satrap of Cilicia (Arr. <i>An.</i> 2.12.2; D.S. 18.22.1).	Either no change or perished in Lycaonia (Curt. 4.5.13).
CASSANDER, SON OF ANTIPATER	—	—	—
IOLUS, SON OF ANTIPATER	—	—	<i>Paides Basilikoi</i> (Justin. 12.14.6-9).
PHILIP, SON OF ANTIPATER	—	—	<i>Paides Basilikoi</i> (Justin. 12.14.6-9).

APPENDIX C: *PHILOI* OF ALEXANDER

NAME.	POSITION(S) SPRING 334, INITIAL EXPEDITIONARY FORCE	POSITION(S) 331, PRIOR TO GAUGAMELA	POSITION(S) 329, END OF SUMMER
CLEITUS, SON OF DROPIDAS	Ilarch of the <i>Ile Basilike</i> (Arr. <i>An.</i> 1.15).	No Change.	Hipparch of the Companion Cavalry (Arr. <i>An.</i> 2.27.4).
CRATERUS, SON OF ALEXANDER	Commander of the <i>pezhetairoi</i> (Arr. <i>An.</i> 1.14).	Commander of infantry at Issus (Arr. <i>An.</i> 2.8.4).	Held a string of independent commands (e.g. Oversaw a siege: Arr. <i>An.</i> 4.2.2; Curt. 7.6.16).
DEMETRIUS, SON OF ALTHAEMENES	Ilarch?	Ilarch (Arr. <i>An.</i> 3.11.8).	Unknown, next seen as a hipparch in 327 (Arr. <i>An.</i> 4.27.5).
ERIGYIUS, SON OF LARICHUS	Possibly commanded a cavalry force (D.S. 17.17.4).	Commander of the Thessalian Cavalry and then Peloponnesian allies (Arr. <i>An.</i> 3.11.10; Curt. 4.13.29; D.S. 17.57.4).	Command against Satibarzanes (Arr. <i>An.</i> 3.28.2-3; Curt. 7.4.32-4).
HARPALUS, SON OF MACHATAS	Treasurer (Arr. <i>An.</i> 3.6.4-7).	Absconded and returned (Arr. <i>An.</i> 3.6.4).	Left in Ecbatana with Parmenio, exact role undefined (Arr. <i>An.</i> 3.19.7; cf. Curt. 10.1.1ff)
HEPHAESTION, SON OF AMYNTOR	No formal role attested.	Asked to choose a king for the Sidonians (Curt. 4.1.15-26; Plu. <i>Mor.</i> 340c-d; D.S. 17.46.6). Oversaw logistics of the siege of Gaza (Curt. 4.5.10). <i>somatophylax</i> (Arr. <i>An.</i> 1.22.4,7 informs us of the death of Ptolemy, a <i>somatophylax</i> , and provides a likely date.)	Commander of the Companion Cavalry (Arr. <i>An.</i> 3.27.4).
LEONNATUS, SON OF ANTEAS	<i>somatophylax</i> to Philip II (D.S. 16.94.4).	Appointed a <i>somatophylax</i> to Alexander (Arr. <i>An.</i> 3.5.5).	No commands, prominent later.
LYSIMACHUS, SON OF AGATHOCLES	Unknown.	Likely period of appointment as <i>somatophylax</i> (explicitly so: Arr. <i>An.</i> 5.24.5, 6.28.4, certainly by 328: Curt. 8.1.13-17).	
NEARCHUS, SON OF ANDROTIMUS	No Role.	Satrap of Lycia and Pamphylia (Arr. <i>An.</i> 3.6.6; Just. 13.4.15).	No change, prominent later.

PERDICCAS, SON OF ORONTES	Commanded a taxis in the European conflicts (Arr. 1.6.9, 1.8.1-3; D.S. 17.12.3).	Commanded a <i>taxis</i> at both Issus and Gaugamela (Arr. An. 2.8.3; 3.11.9; Curt. 3.9.7, 4.13.28). <i>somatophylax</i> (Arr. An. 3.16.9; cf. Curt. 6.8.16).	No change, hipparch shortly after.
PEUCESTAS, SON OF ALEXANDER	Prominence out of period.		
PTOLEMY, SON OF LAGUS	Unknown.	Unknown.	First command (Arr. An. 3.18.9). Appointed <i>somatophylax</i> (Arr. An. 3.27.5).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- ANDERSON, G. (2005): "Before turannoi were Tyrants: Rethinking a Chapter of Early Greek History", *CA* 24.2: 173-222.
- ANTELA-BERNÁRDEZ, A. (2012): "Philip and Pausanias: A Deadly Love in Macedonian Politics", *CQ* 62.2: 859-861.
- BADIAN, E. (1960 [2012]): "The Death of Parmenio", *TAPA* 91: 324-338 (Repr. in E. BADIAN: *Collected Papers on Alexander the Great*, London: 36-47).
- (1961 [2012]): "Harpalus", *JHS* 81: 16-43 (Repr. in E. BADIAN: *Collected Papers on Alexander the Great*, London: 58-95).
- (1963 [2012]): "The Death of Philip II", *Phoenix* 17: 244-250 (Reprinted in E. BADIAN: *Collected Papers on Alexander the Great*, London: 106-112).
- (1964 [2012]): "Alexander the Great and the loneliness of power", in E. BADIAN: *Studies in Greek and Roman History*, Oxford: 192-205 (Repr. in E. BADIAN: *Collected papers on Alexander the Great*, London: 96-105).
- (1981 [2012]): "The Deification of Alexander the Great", in E. N. BORZA – H. DELL (eds.): *Ancient Macedonian Studies in Honor of Charles. F. Edson*, Thessaloniki: 27-71 (Repr. in E. BADIAN: *Collected Papers on Alexander the Great*, London: 244-281).
- (2000 [2012]): "Conspiracies", in A. B. BOSWORTH – E. BAYNHAM (eds.): *Alexander the Great in Fact and Fiction*, Oxford: 50-95 (Repr. in E. BADIAN: *Collected Papers on Alexander the Great*, London: 434-439).
- BOSWORTH, A. B. (1971): "Philip II and Upper Macedonia", *CQ* 21/1: 93-105.
- (1983): "The Indian Satrapies under Alexander", *Antichthon* 17: 37-46.
- BRIANT, P. (2002): *From Cyrus to Alexander: A History of the Persian Empire*, Winona Lake.
- (2009): "Alexander and the Persian Empire, between 'decline' and 'renovation'", in

-
- W. HECKEL – L. A. TRITLE (eds.): *Alexander the Great: A New History*, London: 26-52.
- BROSIUS, M. (2003): “Alexander and the Persians”, in J. Roisman (ed.): *Brill’s Companion to Alexander the Great*, Leiden: 169-193.
- CARNEY, E. (2010): “Macedonian Women”, in J. ROISMAN – I. WORTHINGTON (eds.): *A Companion to Ancient Macedonia*, Oxford: 409-427.
- (2015): *King and Court in Ancient Macedonia: Rivalry, Treason and Conspiracy*, Swansea.
- DE FRANCISCI, P. (1948): *Arcana Imperii*, 2 vols, Milano.
- DE STE. CROIX, G. E. M. (2004a): “Cleisthenes I: The Constitution”, in D. HARVEY – R. PARKER (eds.): *Athenian Democratic Origins: and Other Essays*, Oxford: 129-180.
- (2004b): “Cleisthenes II: Ostracism, Archons and Strategoi”, in D. HARVEY – R. PARKER (eds.): *Athenian Democratic Origins: and Other Essays*, Oxford: 181-233.
- ERRINGTON, R. M. (1978): “The Nature of the Macedonian State under the Monarchy”, *Chiron* 8: 77-133.
- FREDRICKSMAYER, E. (2000): “Alexander the Great and the Kingship of Asia”, in A. B. BOSWORTH – E. BAYNHAM (eds.): *Alexander the Great in Fact and Fiction*, Oxford: 137-166.
- (2002): “Alexander’s Religion and Divinity”, in J. ROISMAN (ed.): *Brill’s Companion to Alexander the Great*, Leiden: 256-278.
- HAMMOND, N. G. L. (1972): *A History of Macedonia, vol. I*, Oxford.
- HATZOPOULOS, M. B. (1996): *Macedonian Institutions under the Kings*, 2 vols, Athens.
- HECKEL, W. (1977): “The Conspiracy against Philotas”, *Phoenix* 31.1: 9-21.
- (1986): “Somatophylakia. A Macedonian ‘Cursus Honorum’”, *Phoenix* 40.3: 279-294.
- (1992): *The Marshall’s of Empire*, London.
- (2003): “King and ‘Companions’: Observations on the nature of power in the reign of Alexander”, in J. ROISMAN (ed.): *Brill’s Companion to Alexander the Great*, Leiden: 195-225.
- (2006): *Who’s Who in the Age of Alexander the Great*, London.
- (2009): “Alexander’s Conquest of Asia”, in W. HECKEL – L. A. TRITLE (eds.): *Alexander the Great: A New History*, London: 26-52.
- (2012): *The Conquests of Alexander the Great*, Cambridge.
- KING, C. (2010): “Macedonian kingship and other political institutions”, in J. ROISMAN – I. WORTHINGTON (eds.): *A Companion to Ancient Macedonia*, Oxford: 373-391.
- LANE FOX, R. (1973): *Alexander the Great*, London
- MARI, M. (2011): “Archaic and Early Classic Macedon”, in R. LANE FOX (ed.): *Brill’s Companion to Ancient Macedon*, Leiden: 79-92.
- MITCHELL, L. (1998): *Greek’s Bearing Gifts: The public use of private relationships in the Greek World, 435-323 BC*, Cambridge.

- (2009): “The Rules of the Game: Three studies in friendship, equality and politics”, in L. MITCHELL – L. RUBENSTEIN (eds.): *Greek History and Epigraphy: Essays in honour of P. J. Rhodes*, Swansea: 1-32.
- (2013): *The Heroic Rulers of Archaic and Classical Greece*, London–New York.
- MITCHELL, L.; RHODES, P. (1996): “Friends and Enemies in Athenian Politics”, *G&R* 43.1: 11-30.
- OGDEN, D. (1999): *Polygamy, Prostitutes and Death: The Hellenistic Dynasties*, London.
- RHODES, P. J. (2010): “The Literary and Epigraphic Evidence to the Roman Conquest”, in J. ROISMAN – I. WORTHINGTON (eds.): *A Companion to Ancient Macedonia*, Oxford: 23-40.
- RIESBECK, D. (2016): *Aristotle on Political Community*, Cambridge.
- ROISMAN, J. (2003): “Honor in Alexander’s Campaign”, in J. ROISMAN (ed.): *Brill’s Companion to Alexander the Great*, Leiden: 279-321.
- RUZICKA, S. (2010): “The Pixadaros Affair”, in D. OGDEN – E. CARNEY (eds.): *Philip II and Alexander the Great. Father and Son, lives and afterlives*, Oxford: 3-12.
- SAMUEL, A. (1988): “Philip and Alexander as Kings: Macedonian Monarchy and Merovingian Parallels”, *AHR* 93.5: 1270-1286.
- SPAWFORTH, A. (2007): “The Court of Alexander the Great between Europe and Asia”, in A. SPAWFORTH (ed.): *The Court and Court Society of Ancient Monarchies*, Cambridge: 82-120.
- STRAUSS, B. (2003): “Alexander: The military campaign”, in J. ROISMAN (ed.): *Brill’s Companion to Alexander the Great*, Leiden: 134-157.
- STROOTMAN, R. (2014): *Courts and Elites in the Hellenistic Empires: The Near East After the Achaemenids c.330 to 30 BCE*, Edinburgh.
- TRITLE, L. (2003): “Alexander and the Killing of Cleitus the Black”, in W. HECKEL- L. A. TRITLE (eds.): *Crossroads of History. The Age of Alexander*, Claremont CA: 127-146.
- WEBER, G. (2009): “The Court of Alexander the Great as a social system”, in W. HECKEL – L. A. TRITLE (eds.): *Alexander the Great: A New History*, London: 83-98.
- WIRTH, G. (1985): *Philip II. Geschichte Makedoniens I*, Stuttgart.
- WORTHINGTON, I. (2003): *Alexander the Great: A Reader*, London.