
Macedonia's Interests in Thrace and Conflicts with Athens*

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ABSTRACT From the late 6th century BC on, close connections between the political actors of Thrace, Hellespontine Phrygia, Persia, Athens, and, during their times of Greek supremacy, Sparta and Thebes are attested. When Macedonia advanced to the Hellespontine sphere, the basic understanding was ultimately disturbed. Aiming at controlling both sides of the straits, Philip could take the Phrygian satraps at the climax of their influence as an example and pursue a mirror-image policy. This paper explores the ways Philip's connection with Artabazos may have provided him with insights into the political networks and structures in the area. It also considers the history of family ties between the Argeads and the family of Artabazos.

KEYWORDS Artabazos, Hellespontine Phrygia, Macedonia, Philip II, Thrace.

1. INTRODUCTION

Due to the strategic importance of the straits between Asia and Europe regarding the political and economic control of the sea routes, ports, access to land routes, and lines of communication, rival interests in its control required the existence of a certain balance of power, however fragile¹. During the 5th and 4th century BC, different understandings among the major players occurred. These were the Persian Great King, represented by the western Anatolian satraps, Thracian, more specifically Odrysian rulers², Athens, and, during their time of Greek supremacy respectively, Sparta, and Thebes. The appearance of Argead Macedonia under Philip II as a newcomer in the area was a watershed that ultimately challenged the established power structures.

This paper is concerned with the Argead connections, experience, and knowledge regarding the control of the crucial area of eastern Thrace and both sides of the straits. It will take a look at the example of the satraps of Hellespontine Phrygia residing in

* Acknowledgements: I am grateful to Beth Carney for her kind support.

¹ Cf. HEINRICH 1987, 86, 103 n. 353; SEALEY 1993, 184; MACDOWELL 2000, 279; LOUKOPOULOU 2011, 468; HEINRICH 2020c, 251; RUSSELL 2016, 54-56; DIMOVA 2018-2019, 121.

² Ancient writers define Thrace in different ways, dependent on the context, cf. ARCHIBALD 2010, 326. In general it can be understood as being situated between the Danube and the Aegean Sea and extending from the Strymon River to the Black Sea Coast, cf. REHM 2010, 137; LERNER 2017, 8. On the current archaeological fieldwork related to Macedonia and Thrace see DIMOVA 2018-2019.

Daskyleion³. The most prominent of them, Pharnabazos, the satrap who cooperated with Konon against the Spartan fleet in the Aegean, exercised influence over both sides of the straits. A member of this Phrygian satrapal dynasty, Artabazos, spent several years as an exile at the court of Philip II. Consequently, this paper will reflect on the question of what Philip may have learnt about Phrygia and its Hellespontine policies from his experiences and family tradition, particularly concerning the role of Athens in the area and will consider the reasons why the Phrygian satrap Artabazos sought refuge at Philip's court and then left it to return to Persia.

2. OLD ARGEAD-HELLESPONTINE CONNECTIONS

The first Argead link to a political key figure regarding the control of the area dates to the late 6th century BC. This key figure was Dareios I's Persian *strategos* Megabazos who established Persian rule over the Greek Hellespontine cities, Thracian, and Paionian districts, and Macedonia⁴. Herodotos depicts Megabazos as an expert regarding the geopolitics of the Hellespont who had a profound knowledge about the Hellespontine cities, the strategically important sites (preferring Byzantion as the key to the control of the Hellespont to Chalkedon), the political structures of the Thracian-Macedonian sphere, the trading routes and lines of communication, and the political strategies of how to control the area and its political and economic networks⁵. Due to Megabazos' expertise, he appeared as Dareios' adviser on the matter of the foundation of Myrkinos in the Strymon region by the Milesian tyrant Histiaios and showed his knowledge of the area's economic advantages, namely timber and silver mines⁶. In the context of the Macedonian acceptance of Achaemenid overlordship in about 513 BC, this Persian expert in the Thracian-Macedonian and Hellespontine sphere, Megabazos, integrated his house into the Macedonian elite: his son Boubares married Gygaia, a daughter of Dareios' new *hyparchos*, the Macedonian ruler Amyntas I⁷. The wedding may perhaps have taken place early in the reign of Amyntas' son Alexander I as Johannes Heinrichs has argued, since according to Herodotos, Gygaia was given by her brother Alexander to her bridegroom: since the giver of the bride usually was her father, it may be supposed that Amyntas I was dead at the time of the marriage⁸.

The control of the Thracian, Macedonian, and Hellespontine areas crucial to communication lines and military routes between Asia and Greece became a family affair: the territory of Daskyleion that gained satrapal status under Xerxes was governed successively by Megabazos' sons⁹. In addition, Gygaia's and Boubares' son named Amyntas got the chance to support the family network: according to Herodotos, Xerxes

³ On the satrapal family residing in Daskyleion see WEISKOPF 1989, 56-64; WEISKOPF 1994; BRIANT 1996, 718-720, 802-803, 810-811; DÉBORD 1999, 96-99, 117-147; MAFFRE 2007; RUZICKA 2012, 129-133, 155-158; HECKEL 2019; MÜLLER 2019b, 2020c, 337-339; HYLAND 2022; MÜLLER 2023.

⁴ On the historical context of Megabazos' campaign see OLBRYCHT 2010, 343-344; VASILEV 2015, 83-85; AVRAM 2017, 9-12; LERNER 2017, 10; HEINRICHS 2020a, 32; BROSİUS 2021, 73.

⁵ Hdt. 4.144.1; 5.23.1-3, 24.1. Cf. HEINRICHS 1987, 17, 87-88; VASILEV 2015, 56-57, 86. On the key position of Byzantion see also Hdt. 6.5.3, 26.1. Cf. RUSSELL 2016, 53-65.

⁶ Hdt. 5.23.1-3, 24.1. Cf. HEINRICHS 1987, 87-88; RUSSELL 2016, 56-57; BROSİUS 2021, 83.

⁷ Hdt. 5.21.2; 8.136.1; Just. 7.8.9. Cf. BORZA 1990, 103 n. 15; BADIAN 1994, 109, 112; CARNEY 2000, 15-16; OLBRYCHT 2010, 343-344; VASILEV 2015, 109-112; MÜLLER 2016, 117-118; CARNEY 2017, 140, 143; LERNER 2017, 10; MÜLLER 2020a, 81. Boubares as Megabazos' son: Hdt. 7.22.2. Cf. HEINRICHS 2020b, 55-56.

⁸ Cf. HEINRICHS 2020b, 56. See also ZAHRNT 1993, 245-246 n. 19; BROSİUS 2003, 230.

⁹ Hdt. 6.33.3; Thuc. 1.129.1. Cf. BALCER 1988, 18; WEISKOPF 1996, 85-90.

made him governor of a Phrygian city¹⁰. Perhaps it was still an effect of the marital bond, familial connections, and encompassing network structures and dynamics that on their withdrawal after Plataiai, Persian soldiers were attacked by Thracians, not by Macedonians: the Persian commander, Artabazos, was in effect a member of another branch of Alexander's new Persian family¹¹.

Herodotos, our source for the Argead-Phrygian connection, also preserves an old Macedonian *logos* linking Phrygia with Macedonia even before this Argead-Phrygian marital bond: reportedly, Phrygians had once settled in Macedonia and Thrace under the names of Briges (Βρίγες) before the Macedonians expelled them¹². According to the earliest known version of the Argead foundation myth told by Herodotos, the Argead founder figure, Perdikkas I, had conquered Midas' former realm when he initially settled with his two brothers in the rose-growing "Gardens of Midas" at the foot of Mount Bermion, the core of his expanding realm¹³. While in the course of times, the Argead foundation myth was revised, Midas was present in the version predominant in the 4th century BC when a new founder figure called Karanos, a predecessor of Perdikkas I¹⁴, was credited with Midas' expulsion from Macedonia¹⁵. Kallisthenes and Theopompos both locate the "Gardens of Midas" at the foot of Mount Bermion in Macedonia¹⁶.

The symbolism of this tradition in the time of Alexander III has been debated intensely by scholars. Crucial to the discussion is Kallisthenes' glorifying account of Alexander's dealings with Midas' wagon and its "Gordian knot" associated with the oracle that anyone undoing it would be the ruler of Asia¹⁷. It has been supposed that by referring to Midas while writing about Alexander's wintering in Phrygian Gordion, Kallisthenes revived a piece of Argead propaganda serving to connect the early Argeads with the Homeric heroes by crediting them with a fight against (migrated) Phrygians or to push back the founding date of Argead rule for the sake of a more ancient heritage¹⁸. Since Kallisthenes stated that Midas' wealth came from the mines at Mount Bermion – Kallisthenes' audience would have assigned it to the Macedonians – in consequence, when Alexander occupied Phrygia and Midas' capital, he reversed history in a kind of payback¹⁹.

¹⁰ Hdt. 8.136.1. XYDOPoulos 2012, 21-37 argues that the correct name of the Phrygian town Amyntas the Younger governed was Alabastra, not Alabanda. The latter form may have been an error in the manuscript.

¹¹ Hdt. 9.89.4. The later claim ([D.] 12.21 that Alexander I captured some Persians in the Strymon valley served as a rhetorical device and does not deserve any credit. Cf. [D.] 13.24 and D. 23.200, mentioning the same claim, while confusing Alexander I with his successor Perdikkas II.

¹² Hdt. 7.73. Cf. Lykoph. *Alex.* 1397-1408; Konon (*ap. Phot. Bibl.* 186.130b.25-131a.3; cf. BROWN 2002, 51-56); Nikandros (*ap. Ath.* 15.683b). Cf. ROLLER 1983, 303; BORZA 1990, 64-65, 74; VASSILEVA 2007, 776-777; DREWS 1993, 11, 15; VASILEV 2015, 149-150; MANEDOLAKIS 2016, 50-51. However, the Phrygians-Briges are also identified as Thracians: Strab. 7.3.2; 7 F 25 (= 7 F 14a RADT).

¹³ Hdt. 8.139.2-3. Cf. VASILEV 2016, 36; HATZOPoulos 2020, 12, 14, 62; MÜLLER 2020b, 237.

¹⁴ Just. 7.2.1; Satyros, *BNJ* 631 F 1; D.S. 7 F 15.

¹⁵ Just. 7.1.11-12. Cf. GREENWALT 1985, 46 n. 11; VASSILEVA 2007, 775; ZACCARIA 2016, 67; MÜLLER 2020b, 240.

¹⁶ Kallisth., *BNJ* 124 F 54; Theopomp., *BNJ* 115 F 74 b. They both call him the "Phrygian" Midas. Cf. PRANDI 1985, 91; ZACCARIA 2016, 59, 64-65.

¹⁷ Arr. *An.* 2.3.2-7; Curt. 3.1.11-18; Just. 11.7.5-16 (the wagon of Midas' father Gordias); Plu. *Alex.* 18.1-2 (exaggeration: rule over the *oikoumene*). Cf. ROLLER 1984, 256, 259; MUNN 2008, 109; MÜLLER 2019a, 221-222. On Antigonos Monophthalmos in Phrygia (cf. ANSON 1988) and the myth see MÜLLER 2022.

¹⁸ Cf. VASSILEVA 2007, 779; MUNN 2008, 116-117. In any case, the association with Midas, renowned for his proverbial wealth, symbolized the fertility of the realm chosen by the Temenid founder figure. VASILEV 2016, 37 thinks that the tradition may derive from the Argead court.

¹⁹ Kallisth., *BNJ* 124 F 54. Cf. MÜLLER 2022, 45-48. On Kallisthenes see now DJURSLEV 2024, 408-411.

While this might have been the interpretation of Alexander's contemporaries, the story that the Phrygians of Midas, famous in the Greek world because of his rich offerings to Delphic Apollon²⁰, once had settled in Macedonia (and Thrace) and then moved back to Asia Minor will have had a different meaning to Herodotus, his audience, and his Macedonian informants. On the base, it was a story of kinship²¹ and references to kinship ties were frequent to ancient diplomacy and political self-fashioning²². Midas as the figurehead of Phrygia in Greek cultural memory provided a link between Phrygia and Argead Macedonia²³. While the authenticity of this link is a matter of scholarly debate²⁴, it may at least reflect the historical marital bond between Megabazos' house, represented by Boubares, and the Argeads, represented by Gygaia. To develop this thought, it may also be worth considering that it might be possible that the Macedonian *logos* concerning old kinship ties between Phrygia and Macedonia were, if not even triggered, at least refreshed by Gygaia's marriage. Such a story may have justified the marital bond of the ruler's daughter to a representative to the new Persian overlords.

Notably, the earliest known version of the Argead foundation myth was in all likelihood created and spread by Alexander I, the brother of Gygaia and uncle of her and Boubares' son Amyntas²⁵. After the Persian defeat in Greece, Alexander I, formerly a loyal ally of Xerxes, did his best to save his realm from the punishments of the victors and re-create the memory of Macedonia under Persian rule²⁶. While the marriage of his sister was not denied or passed over silently, it was re-interpreted as a strategy to appease the Persians, styled as ruthless invaders²⁷, and embedded in the broader context of universal history, stressing that in the end, the Argeads had had the upper hand.

Since it was obviously preserved by Alexander I's son and successor Perdikkas II – it is supposed by some scholars that Herodotus heard of it during Perdikkas' reign²⁸ –, one could assume that the Argead kinship ties to Phrygia that may have been considered a token of special prestige, did not cease to play a certain role in Argead family history.

3. THE ARRIVAL OF ATHENS

After the Persians had left, the control of the straits was shared by different powers. The Athenians became the major force in the Aegean and controlled the coastal lines crucial to their supremacy, economic and trade networks, and grain fleet from the Black

²⁰ Hdt. 1.14.2: the first foreigner who made a dedication there. Cf. ROLLER 1983, 301.

²¹ Cf. DREWS 1993, 19-20; SORABELLA 2007, 242; MUNN 2008, 115.

²² Cf. CHANIOTIS 2005, 106, 108-109; GAZZANO 2019, 61.

²³ Cf. BORZA 1990, 81 n. 8; MUNN 2008, 112.

²⁴ Some scholars regard the story of the Phrygian migration as authentic, in particular in the context of archaeological or linguistic comparative approaches. For an overview of the debate see HATZOPoulos 2020, 77-79. As a compromise, it is supposed that the *logos* about the Phrygian migration triggered the idea of placing Midas in Macedonia and integrating him into the Argead foundation myth: VASSILEVA 1997, 13-14.

²⁵ Cf. WIRTH 1985, 19; MÜLLER 2016, 85; HEINRICH 2020b, 59-60; MÜLLER 2020b, 236; FINN 2024, 87-87.

²⁶ Cf. MÜLLER 2016, 111-134; HEINRICH 2020b, 59-60.

²⁷ Hdt. 5.18-21; Just. 7.3.4-9. Cf. MÜLLER 2016, 114-116.

²⁸ Cf. VASILEV 2016.

Sea²⁹. Inland, the Odrysian kingdom gained predominance³⁰. But connectivity in terms of routes of access and personal connections with Persia did not cease to exist, even more so given the proximity between Hellespontine Phrygia and the eastern Thracian shore. According to Thucydides, in 430 BC, thus at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War, Peloponnesian envoys on their way to Persia supposed to come back with funds, made a stop-over in the territory of the Odrysian ruler Sitalkes, an ally of Athens. They tried to convince him to join the Peloponnesians instead and hoped he would serve as the door opener to Daskyleion. In this shared responsibility, the Phrygian satrap Pharnakes was supposed to receive them and send them to Susa³¹. Thucydides' report shows that it was widely known in Greece that there existed a kind of shared Thracian-Phrygian responsibility for the Hellespont³². It also illustrates the efforts of the Athenians to take part in this share. They had given their citizenship to Sitalkes' son Sadokos and it paid off: instigated by the Athenians, Sadokos made sure that the Peloponnesian envoys never crossed the Hellespont³³.

The complex nature of the networks of the Thracian-Macedonian regions became visible during the Ionian War, when after the failure of the Sicilian Expedition in 413, Athens' established power structures crumbled. In the years 411-407, particularly due to the efforts of four Athenian generals (Alkibiades (after his re-entry into Athenian politics), Thrasyboulos, Thrasyllos, and Theramenes) who acted as commanders and fundraisers simultaneously, Athens' naval supremacy in the Aegean and control over the Hellespont was restored³⁴. The diplomatic and military moves of the Athenian generals in the Hellespont highlight the importance of the Thracian coast, friendly relations with the Odrysians and the Argead ruler. After the Athenian generals had defeated the Peloponnesian fleet twice in 411 and crushed it in 410, they tried to encircle the Hellespontine area by carefully coordinated operations at the Thracian-Macedonian coast³⁵.

Apparently, Alkibiades with his diplomatic skills, negotiated with the Odrysians and established a *philia* relationship with Amedokos and Seuthes (the later Seuthes II) attested for 405, but likely dating to about 410³⁶. Thrasyboulos was active more than once on the Thracian coast, particularly at the Chersonese, Thasos, and Abdera (in 410-408/7)³⁷. In 410, apparently simultaneously with Thrasyboulos' first Thracian expedition, Theramenes, dispatched by the Athenians with a fleet, assisted Archelaos

²⁹ Cf. HEINRICHS 1987, 88; GABRIELSEN 2007, 292-295; hesitating in regard to grain: BRAUND 2007; RUSSELL 2016, 73-78 (more trade than grain); HEINRICHS 2020c; EICH 2021, 59-61. For the fourth century BC, this is attested by D. 9.18-20; 18.301-302; 20.32. Cf. LAMBERT 2018, 8, 35-36, 73-74.

³⁰ On the Odrysians see Hdt. 7.137; Thuc. 2.97.1-3; D.S. 12.50.1-3. Cf. ARCHIBALD 1998, 107-112; MIRÓN 2014; ZAHRNT 2015, 40-42; VASSILEVA 2015, 324; ARCHIBALD 2020. For a critical assessment of their depiction in the ancient sources see XYDOPoulos 2010.

³¹ Thuc. 2.67.1. Cf. HORNBLOWER 1991, 350-351; LOUKOPOULOU-LAITAR 2000, 914-915.

³² Cf. REHM 2010, 143, 154, 152-153.

³³ Thuc. 2.67.1. On the bestowal of the Athenian *politeia* on Sadokos: Thuc. 2.29.1, 4-7; Aristoph. *Ach.* 141-150; D.S. 12.50.3. Cf. ARCHIBALD 1998, 118; SEARS 2013, 75; ZAHRNT 2015, 40; MÜLLER 2017, 148-150, 162-164.

³⁴ Cf. ANDREWES 1953; BUCK 1998, 21-60; HAMEL 1998, 202-203, 210-212; TRITLE 2010, 167-218; KENNELL 2010, 124-128. On their actions and networks, see now MÜLLER 2024.

³⁵ Kynossema: Thuc. 8.104.1-106.5; D.S. 13.39.1-40.4; Abydos: X. *HG* 1.1.1-7; Plu. *Alk.* 27.2-4; D.S. 13.45.2-46.6; Kyzikos: X. *HG* 1.1.14-19; D.S. 13.49.2-51.8; Polyaen. 1.40.9. Cf. BUCK 1998, 31-9; TRITLE 2010, 181-187; KENNELL 2010, 125; POWNALL 2021, 37.

³⁶ D.S. 13.105.3. Cf. ARCHIBALD 1998, 123; LOUKOPOULOU-LAITAR 2000, 914-915.

³⁷ Thrasyboulos' operations at the Thracian coast are attested insufficiently. For a reconstruction see BUCK 1998, 40-41, 125. On joined Greek (particularly Athenian), Chalkidean, Macedonian, Thracian, and Persian networks in the Northern Aegean see TSIAFAKI 2020, 414-420.

in capturing Pydna which had shaken off Argead control³⁸. Theramenes was the son of Hagnon, the *oikistes* of Amphipolis who had operated in the Thracian and Macedonian regions and might have been well connected there³⁹. However, Athenian help for Argead expansion, even more at the coast, was exceptional. It shows that the Athenians were in urgent need of timber, preferably at a true "mate's rate." The *philia* with the Argead ruler paid off: Archelaos provided Theramenes with twenty ships⁴⁰.

By 408, Spartan attempts to win the war by blockading the Athenian grain supply from the Black Sea had failed: Athens controlled the European side of the straits and many of the Ionian cities again⁴¹. Given the proximity between Hellespontine Phrygia and the eastern Thracian shore, it would have been a major coup to win over the Phrygian satrap Pharnabazos and, through him as an intermediary, the Persian king. This is exactly what the Athenian generals tried to do. They may have hoped that the shared Thracian-Phrygian responsibility for the Hellespont did not cease to exist and that their friendly connections with the Odrysians would help them to win over the Great King. However, while Pharnabazos, frustrated with the Peloponnesian military performance, was willing to act as an intermediary, the Persian king Dareios II made clear that he had no intention to ally with Athens⁴².

When Athens' defeat at Aigospotamoi in 405 turned the tables and the Athenians lost their supremacy in the Aegean, their need to secure their grain route intensified their interest in friendly relations with Thrace and Hellespontine Phrygia. Pharnabazos became well-known in Athens as a benefactor of the *demos*: during the Spartan supremacy, he had helped to crush the Spartan fleet in the Aegean and donated money to rebuild the walls of the Piraeus and Athens' Long Walls, torn down in 404⁴³.

4. THE CLIMAX AND DECLINE OF THE POWER OF THE SATRAPS OF HELLESPONTINE PHRYGIA

When Ariobarzanes, the successor and perhaps son of Pharnabazos⁴⁴, was at the heights of his power, he controlled the northwestern coast of Anatolia, great parts of the Troad, and the Hellespontic strongpoints Assos, Adramytteion, Abydos, Sestos, Krithote, and

³⁸ D.S. 13.49.2-3; X. *HG* 1.1.12. Cf. HAMMOND 1989, 85, 98; BUCK 1998, 40; ROISMAN 2010, 155; SEARS 2013, 94; PSOMA 2014, 135; SEARS 2015, 311; POWNALL 2020b, 127.

³⁹ Hagnon and Amphipolis: Thuc. 1.100.3; 4.102.3, 108.1; D.S. 12.32.3, 68.2; Polyaen. 6.53. In command at Poteidaia in 430: Thuc. 2.58.1. Accompanied Sitalkes' raid of Perdikkas II's realm: Thuc. 2.95.3; D.S. 12.46.2-6. Cf. PESELY 1989, 199, 203-204; DEVELIN 1989, 121; SEARS 2013, 74, 77-79; MÜLLER 2017, 126-132, 136-138, 155-161.

⁴⁰ X. *HG* 1.1.12. Cf. POWNALL 2020a, 96; POWNALL 2020b, 127.

⁴¹ Cf. HEINRICH 2021, 265: "It was clear that the conflict would be decided by the side that would cut its opponent's grain supply." Cf. ANDREWES 1953, 2; RUSSELL 2016, 74. Alkibiades and Thrasyboulus had restored Byzantium, Chalkedon, and Selymbria: Thuc. 8.80.3; D.S. 13.66.3; X. *HG* 1.3.8-15; Polyaen. 1.47.2; Ath. 12.535c; *IG* I³ 118. Cf. D. 5.26. See RUSSELL 2016, 63-64.

⁴² X. *HG* 1.3.8-13. Cf. WIESEHÖFER 2006, 661-662; ROP 2018, 60; BINDER 2021, 460; BROSUS 2021, 164; HEINRICH 2021, 265-266.

⁴³ X. *HG* 4.3.11-13, 4.8.1-10; D.S. 14.81.4-6; Nep. 9.2.2-4.5; Ath. 13.570c; *IG* II² 356. Cf. Ruzicka 2012, 60; MÜLLER 2019b, 284-285. However, the epigraphical evidence shows that the rebuilding of the walls had already begun in 394: *RO* no. 9, 46-48.

⁴⁴ His descent is debated. I follow the argument of WEISKOPF 1989, 27-30, 53-56 that he was a son of Pharnabazos (pointing at X. *HG* 5.1.28) since the name Ariobarzanes runs in the family. Thus, it might be a dynastic marker. In addition, the position of the Phrygian satrap was a family matter, comparable to Hekatomnid Karia.

Perinthos⁴⁵. Since he was the Eminence Grise in the Thracian Chersonese, crucial to the Athenian grain route and home of many Athenian settlers, the Athenians gave their citizenship to him and also to his official Philiskos who controlled Perinthos by troops of professional soldiers he had on his payroll⁴⁶. Demosthenes is upset about the privileges granted to Ariobarzanes and his kin but he was apparently aware of the political dynamics behind the privileges, as the comparison with Charidemos on account of his relations with Kersobleptes shows⁴⁷.

Ariobarzanes' career also illustrates the fragile nature of the balance of power in the straits. Only a strong Phrygian satrap with friendly relations to the leading Greek cities and a good standing at the Persian court could provide some political stability. Every shift of power in Thrace or Greece, every crisis in Phrygian relations with either the Great King or with the neighboring satrapies disturbed this balance. Therefore, as soon as Ariobarzanes fell from grace with Artaxerxes II in the 360s⁴⁸, the fight for the redistribution of power in the area was on. Shortly after, in 365, the Odrysian ruler Kotys started to besiege Sestos, the major crossing point. Eager to establish a new balance of power and get the upper hand, the Athenians hurried to come to Ariobarzanes' aid and also Agesilaos II of Sparta was quick to appear on the scene⁴⁹. The turn of the tides became manifest when Ariobarzanes gave Sestos and Krithote to Athens: Achaimenid control over both sides of the straits, exerted by the Phrygian satrap as the Great King's representative, was lost⁵⁰.

Ariobarzanes' successor Artabazos (a son of Pharnabazos and the Achaimenid Apame, maybe Ariobarzanes' younger half-brother) replaced him in 363/2 BC and tried to restore the formerly powerful Phrygian position⁵¹, but he was hampered by internal trouble. However, the Athenians considered him to be influential enough to cultivate links with him. Unfortunately, we have only scattered, poor evidence. However, testimonies that he was remembered as a benefactor of Athens (the decree formerly known as the Memnon Decree, now thought to honor Thymondas, the nephew of Memnon of Rhodes) and as a wealthy satrap who paid well (as expressed by

⁴⁵ Cf. WEISKOPF 1989, 26, 33-34; LOUKOPOULOU-LAITAR 1994, 920; BUCKLER 2003, 352. BALLESTEROS PASTOR 2012, 367-370 argues in favor of an imitation of the Pontic Mithridatids of the Phrygian satraps' control of the straits. D.S. 17.17.6. Cf. HESKEL 1997, 123-125, 131-132, 136; BUCKLER 2003, 352-353.

⁴⁶ D. 23.141. The date is debated: cf. ZAJONZ 2022, 478-482. WEISKOPF 1989, 34-35, with n. 61 argues plausibly against the traditional view that the *politeia* was a gift in return after Ariobarzanes had given Sestos and Krithote to Athens (cf. DANDAMAYEV 1986, 406; HARRIS 1989, 269). Since the Athenians hardly wasted their *politeia* on a weakened politician, an earlier date is likely. WEISKOPF 1989, 34-35 suggests the involvement of Timotheos, the son of Pharnabazos' old combattant Konon (cf. D. 15.9), in the bestowal of the *politeia* on Ariobarzanes.

⁴⁷ D. 23.141.

⁴⁸ Polyaen. 7.26.1; X. *Ages.* 2.26. WEISKOPF 1989, 38, 41-42, 53-54 suggests that due to rival interests in the Troad, the Lydian satrap Autophradates wanted to get rid of Ariobarzanes and that Artaxerxes II's approval of Sparta's replacement as Greek hegemonic force by Thebes collided with Ariobarzanes' cultivation of strong links to Sparta. Cf. SEALEY 1993, 88; HESKEL 1997, 150.

⁴⁹ X. *Ages.* 2.26; Nep. 13.1.3. Cf. HARRIS 1989, 269; WEISKOPF 1989, 34, 37, 46-47; BUCKLER 2003, 352; TZVETKOVA 2007, 659-660. The Athenians' support of a satrap who had come into conflict with the Persian king is explained by their disappointment about Artaxerxes II's favorable treatment of Thebes: it forced them to find a new eastern ally (X. *HG* 7.1.37), cf. KALLET 1983, 246; FUNKE 1998, 219. Demosthenes (23.179) describes a comparable disturbance in the balance of power when he complains about the Thracian ruler Kersobleptes: as long as Athens had forces in the Hellespont, he tried to flatter her; but as soon as the tables had turned, he tried to expand his Thracian realm.

⁵⁰ Nep. 13.1.3; Isoc. 15.108, 112.

⁵¹ Cf. WEISKOPF 1989, 53-54; HESKEL 1997, 150. See also JACOBS 1994, 134-135.

Demosthenes) may reflect Athenian attempts to be on good terms with him⁵². In any case, Artabazos had several Greek commanders in his service: his brothers-in-law Mentor and Memnon of Rhodes, Charidemos, Chares, and the Theban Pammenes⁵³. In about 353/2 BC, after a fierce fight for his satrapy that may have started in 356/5 BC, Artabazos was expelled by Artaxerxes III, the new Great King. It is unclear what caused Artabazos' fall from grace⁵⁴. Stephen Ruzicka assumes that Artaxerxes was suspicious of Artabazos in general and wanted to remove him from his satrapy⁵⁵. Jeffrey Rop sees Artabazos' Greek relationships as a reason⁵⁶. However, perhaps Artaxerxes' attitude towards Artabazos had something to do with inner-dynastic Achaimenid matters. Artaxerxes' accession to the throne did not go smoothly. On its eve, his two full brothers Dareios and Ariaspes, and half-brother Arsames were eliminated⁵⁷. It is possible that Artabazos, an Achaimenid himself, did not form part of Artaxerxes III's supporters but was a member of a faction of one of his brothers and therefore viewed with suspicion by Artaxerxes III. The king might be particularly worried given the strategic importance of Hellespontine Phrygia.

Pammenes may have helped his former employer: Artabazos and his family found shelter at the court of Philip II who once had lived as a teenage hostage in Pammenes' house⁵⁸. After roughly 150 years, there was another connection between the Argeads and the leading family of Hellespontine Phrygia.

5. THE RISE OF MACEDONIA

Unfortunately, nothing is known exactly about the nature of the relations between Philip and Artabazos: if they were close, if they were discussing strategical matters, and what Philip may have learnt from Artabazos, particularly about his experience in governing Phrygia and about his Thracian and Greek networks. We can only guess that Philip may have been particularly interested in Artabazos' dealings with Athenian generals operating in Thrace or with any dealings with the Odrysian house⁵⁹.

⁵² *IG II² 356* (= *RO* no. 98); D. 4.24. Cf. SCHWENK 1985, 289-294; LAMBERT 2018, 141-143, 152; MÜLLER 2019b, 301-303.

⁵³ Charidemos, Memnon, and Mentor: D. 23.154; D.S. 16.22.1, 34.1. Chares: D.S. 16.22.1-2, 34.1; Schol. *ap. Dem.* 4.19. Cf. Ruzicka 2012 155, 157-158; LANDUCCI GATTINONI 1994, 52-58. Pammenes: D.S. 16.34.1-2; Polyaen. 7.33.2.

⁵⁴ The main source, Diodoros, only states that Artabazos revolted against Artaxerxes III: D.S. 16.22.1, 34.1, 52.3. Cf. KUHRT 2007, 662, n. 5.

⁵⁵ Cf. Ruzicka 2012, 155, 157-158.

⁵⁶ Cf. ROP 2019, 119-147.

⁵⁷ *Plu. Art.* 30.5. Cf. BROSIUS 2021, 199.

⁵⁸ D.S. 16.22.1, 34.1, 52.3-4; Polyaen. 7.33.2. Cf. OLBRYCHT 2010, 347. On Pammenes as the Theban host of teenage Philip II as a hostage: *Plu. Pelop.* 26.5. The kinship link between Philip and Pammenes was still cultivated after his return and in Philip's own reign, cf. WORTHINGTON 2008, 56-57. On Artabazos and his family in general see WEISKOPF 1989, 56-54; BRIANT 1996, 718-720, 802-803, 810-811; CARNEY 2000, 100-105; SHAYEGAN 2007, 101-102; HECKEL 2019; MÜLLER 2019b; MÜLLER 2020c; HECKEL 2021, 104-105; HYLAND 2022; MÜLLER 2024.

⁵⁹ In 357 BC, Athens had concluded a treaty with the Thracian rulers Berisades, Amadokos and Kersobleptes, coming to terms with them regarding the matter of Athens' Greek allies in Thrace who were simultaneously tributary to the Thracian rulers (*IG II² 126*). Cf. MACDOWELL 2000, 275-276. In 356 BC, there was a short-lived (though ineffective) alliance between Athens and Philip's enemies in his neighborhood, Ketriporis and his brothers from Thrace, the Illyrian ruler Grabos, and the Paionian ruler Lyppeios. It came to naught, Philip defeated them (D.S. 16.22.3). Cf. ROBINSON 1938, 46-47. See the article by Johannes Heinrichs in this volume.

Pammenes, the personal link between Artabazos and Philip, may have been a kind of Thracian expert, too: at least, in 354, he accompanied Philip to a conference with the Thracian ruler Amadokos and a representative of Kersobleptes at Maroneia⁶⁰. Again, it would be helpful if we knew more about Pammenes' career and what recommended him as Philip's companion at the Thracian conference.

Philip's Thracian campaigns in the late 340s fulfilled the worst Athenian fears about their grain supply and settlers in the Thracian Chersonese⁶¹. The Macedonian threat to eastern Thrace drew Persia and Athens closer. Under the faction of Demosthenes and Hegesippos, the Athenians changed from chilly lack of enthusiasm to a policy already set on a collision course⁶². A prime example is the infamous quibbling when in 343, Demosthenes and his supporters rebuffed Philip's diplomatic offer to give the Athenians the small island of Halonnesos as a gesture of goodwill by arguing that he could not give (*didomi*) it to them, but only give it back (*apodidomi*) as Athens' rightful possession⁶³.

Demosthenes' speeches and policy reveal his knowledge and strategical understanding of the fragile nature of the balance of power in the Hellespont and the geo-strategic consequences of the designs of Philip⁶⁴. In addition, Demosthenes was one of the focal persons in a network of political actors involved in the political affairs associated with the Aegean and Hellespontine sphere⁶⁵. It is not surprising that Demosthenes appears as an intermediary regarding Athens and the Persian king⁶⁶. Chares was another focal person of the Athenian networks connected with the Persian defense against Macedonia⁶⁷. Since a strong front against Macedonia was needed, Demosthenes abandoned his former suspicious attitude towards the Persians and started to advocate a Persian-Athenian cooperation⁶⁸. In 341/40, his political ally Ephialtes was sent to Persia and reportedly came back with subsidies⁶⁹.

During these years on the edge of escalation, when Philip gained the upper hand in Thrace, the Macedonian-Phrygian connection came to an end: Artabazos and his family

⁶⁰ D. 23.154.

⁶¹ Cf. POWNALL 2021, 41. Just in 342, Diopeithes brought new Athenian settlers to the Chersonese: D. 8.6. On Philip's Thracian campaigns in the 340s see BADIAN 1983, 62-70; JORDANOV 1995; LOUKOPOULOU 2011, 467.

⁶² In 343, Philip's offer to revise the Peace of Philokrates was sabotaged: [D.] 7.24-29. In 342, the Athenian *strategos* Diopeithes attacked Philip's ally Kardia and imprisoned a Macedonian envoy: [D.] 12.3. Philip protested in vain; Diopeithes' actions were defended by Demosthenes in the Athenian Assembly: D. 8.19. Cf. WIRTH 1985, 118; SEALEY 1993, 178-182; BUCKLER 2003, 458-472; WORTHINGTON 2012, 199-221; WEISSENBERGER 2019, 218; WIRTH 2020, 418-419.

⁶³ Aeschin. 3.83; [D.] 7.2; [D.] 12.12-14. It was vividly echoed by Attic comic poets, cf. Ath. 6.223d-224b; Alexis, F 212 K-A. Cf. WORTHINGTON 2008, 114, 117-118, 125.

⁶⁴ E.g., D. 5.25; 8.3, 13-17, 44-45; 9.18-20; 11.5-6; 18.27, 30, 301-302; 19.78-79. Cf. WEISSENBERGER 2019, 225.

⁶⁵ Cf. MÜLLER 2019b, 294-299; MÜLLER 2020d, 15. On Philip's plans to invade Asia Minor and the importance of Athens' connections to Asia Minor to him see ANTELA-BERNÁRDEZ 2024, 61.

⁶⁶ Aeschin. 3.164, 239; Din. 1.10; Hyp. 5 col. 17; D.S. 17.7.2. Cf. LANDUCCI GATTINONI 1994, 37-38; OLBRYCHT 2010, 350; WIRTH 1999, 75; MÜLLER 2019b, 282-283.

⁶⁷ Cf. GABRIELSEN 2015, 183-184, 206; MÜLLER 2019b, 294-299; 2020d, 10-18. See also LANDUCCI GATTINONI 1994, 52-58; BIANCO 2002; HECKEL 2021, 139.

⁶⁸ D. 9.71; 10.31; 11.6. Cf. SEALEY 1993, 182-183; BRIANT 1996, 709; WORTHINGTON 2012, 225-226. As for the debate about the authenticity of the *Fourth Philippic*, most scholars argue that it was a speech by Demosthenes, dating to 341 BC: SEALEY 1993, 182; BRIANT 1996, 707; HAJDÚ 2002, 44-49; MACDOWELL 2009, 354-355.

⁶⁹ [Plu.] *Vit. X Or.* 847f; 848e; Philoch., *BNJ* 328 F 157. Cf. [D.] 12.7. On Ephialtes' links with Demosthenes: Din. 1.32-33. Cf. WIRTH 1985, 125; LANDUCCI GATTINONI 1994, 41-43; WORTHINGTON 2012, 224, 226; MÜLLER 2020d, 15; HECKEL 2021, 180.

left Pella (about 342/1?)⁷⁰. According to Diodoros, Mentor effected their return to Persia: thanks to his achievements in Artaxerxes' Egyptian campaign (343/2), the Persian king granted Mentor's wish to pardon his family⁷¹.

However, the real reason may have been the threat of the Macedonian eastward expansion. Persons with useful insider information about foreign powers (such as Hippias, Themistokles or Charidemos) were welcomed at the Persian court⁷². Artabazos and Memnon could be expected to have background information about Macedonian political and military structures, weaponry and training, strengths and weaknesses⁷³. Judging from Artabazos and Memnon's united stand against the Macedonian invasion as staunch supporters of Dareios III –their whole clan was involved⁷⁴–, they might have wanted to distance themselves from their former Macedonian host.

It may be no sign of distrust that Artabazos was not re-installed in his former satrapy. Removing his successor Arsites who remained in control of Phrygia would have caused unnecessary troubles⁷⁵. Thus, it may have been the complex interplay of Athenian, Thracian, and Persian interests in the straits, threatened by Philip's eastward advance that led to the return of Artabazos' house. During the years before, both sides –Argead and Phrygian– may have learnt a lot from each other and their respective agenda that became useful when the Macedonians entered the Hellespontine area and the Persian side tried to stop them.

6. CONCLUSIONS

Summing up, Philip's conquest of the crucial area of eastern Thrace and siege of Perinthos and Byzantion led to the predictable collision with the established powers in the area. Sharing the common interest in stopping the Macedonians, Persians and Athenians were particularly close and existing personal links were reactivated or intensified. Still under Alexander, in 331/30 BC, a Thracian called Rheboulas, apparently an Odrysian, was honored by the Athenians⁷⁶. It is suggested that he may have been a brother of Kotys I, sent to renew the old Odrysian alliance with Athens⁷⁷. A few years later, in 326 BC, the Athenians honored a member of the family of Pharnabazos and Artabazos: again old connections⁷⁸.

As for Macedonia, aiming at controlling both sides of the straits, Philip could take the Phrygian satraps at the climax of their influence as an example and pursue a mirror-

⁷⁰ D.S. 16.52.3-4. On Philip's conquest of Kersobleptes' realm: D.S. 16.71.1-2; Just. 8.3.13-14. Cf. MACDOWELL 2000, 5-8; HEINRICH 2020c, 252; WIRTH 2020, 418.

⁷¹ D.S. 16.52.1-3. Cf. SEALEY 1993, 183-184; BRIANT 1996, 802; CARNEY 2003, 243-244; OLBRYCHT 2010, 347. SHABAZI 1986 suggests that the reason for his return was Philip's plan to campaign against Persia. However, this is problematic since we cannot date exactly when Artabazos departed from Pella and when Philip first conceived his plan or presented it to a wider courtly audience, cf. WORTHINGTON 2008, 160; MÜLLER 2010, 178-179. The official declaration of war took place in 337 (Just. 9.5.1-7; D.S. 16.77.2, 89).

⁷² Cf. BECKMAN 2020.

⁷³ Cf. BRUNT 1962, 144.

⁷⁴ Cf. RUZICKA 1988; HECKEL 2019; MÜLLER 2019b; 2020c.

⁷⁵ Arr. *An.* 1.12.10; Paus. 1.29.10. On Arsites see SHAYEGAN 2007, 101; HECKEL 2021, 104. DÉBORD 1999, 104 supposes that he was also a Pharnakid family member.

⁷⁶ *IG II³* 1, 351.

⁷⁷ Cf. XYDOPoulos 2010, 215; LAMBERT 2018, 239, 252, 253 n. 62: a prominent foreigner who was already an Athenian citizen.

⁷⁸ *IG II²* 356 (= *RO* no. 98).

image policy. His connection with Artabazos may have provided him with insights into the political networks and structures in the area. But we can only guess to what extent.

In any case, ever since the Persians had abandoned the control over Macedonian and Thracian areas and both sides of the straits, Argead Macedonia was the first political power to rule the whole area. In this sense, Macedonia followed in the footsteps of the Persians, represented by Megabazos, someone from the past who was even related by marriage to the Argeads. He was the father-in-law of the sister of Philip's great-great-grandfather. Artabazos came from another branch of the family: his great-great-great-grandfather was a brother of Megabazos' father. Thus, while Artabazos and Philip were only very distant relatives and this relationship may have not counted as much as Artabazos' useful insider knowledge of Persian power structures and particularly networks in Asia Minor when Philip granted him refuge, as for the history of Macedonian-Phrygian links, in a way, we have come full circle.

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