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## ***IG II<sup>2</sup> 236 and Philip's Common Peace of 337\****

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**ABSTRACT** The inscription IG II<sup>2</sup> 236 is key in the study of Philip II's Common Peace after Chaeronea and in the making and definition of the League of Corinth. However, there are many issues that allow to doubt about this adscription of the epigraphical source. A full review of the tradition concerning its interpretation, and a new date, is purposed in the following pages.

**KEYWORDS** Common Peace, Koiné Eirene, Philip II, League of Corinth.

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It is a particular pleasure to contribute to this volume of essays in honour of Peter Rhodes. I was his first successful graduate student<sup>1</sup>, and over the years I have benefited from his vastly influential work on Greek political history as well as his friendship. During this time, he has hardly ever agreed with anything I've written, and I am sure that trend will continue with the present essay. Nonetheless, I offer it to him in the spirit of something I know he holds dear: a critical approach to all source material.

Philip II's Common Peace of 337 and the establishment of the League of Corinth that formalized the Macedonian hegemony of Greece heralded a new era in Greek politics and Macedonian history. In this essay, I am not so much concerned with the background to the peace and the organization of the league<sup>2</sup>; rather, I want to focus on IG II<sup>2</sup> 236<sup>3</sup>, which is commonly thought to be the Athenian copy of the peace, the earliest evidence for it and the only document we have dealing with that peace. Hence, it takes on a special importance as source material for the formation and workings of the League of Corinth. However, it is extensively restored, and I want to question whether we are right to connect it to Philip's Common Peace, and, if not, to suggest another context. First, it is necessary to set the scene with some comments about the peace.

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<sup>1</sup> I wrote an MA thesis (on Pisistratid Athens) under his supervision and graduated from the University of Durham in 1981. I use "successful" deliberately –in my review of Peter's *Ancient Democracy and Modern Ideology* (=RHODES 2003) in *BMCR* (=WORTHINGTON 2004c), I stated that I was his first graduate student. He pointed out that this was not true and that I was actually his first successful graduate!

<sup>2</sup> On which see, for example, RYDER 1965, 102-106 and 150-162; ELLIS 1976, 204-209; cf. the commentary of RHODES–OSBORNE 2003, no. 76, 376-379; and see now WORTHINGTON 2008, 158-171.

<sup>3</sup> See RHODES–OSBORNE 2003, no. 76, 376-379, citing previous publications.

There had been common peaces before, but nothing like that of Philip, for it was designed specifically to legitimize Macedonian control of Greece and to keep the Greeks passive in perpetuity<sup>4</sup>. Philip's victory over various Greek forces at the Battle of Chaeronea in 338 (D.S. 16.85.5-86.6; Plu. *Alex.* 9.2-3) ended the warfare with Athens and ultimately the Greek resistance to him. he concluded peace with the Athenians (see below) and then undertook various diplomatic and territorial settlements with a number of other Greek states. These settlements included garrisons in Thebes (in which he also installed a pro-Macedonian oligarchy), Chalcis, Ambracia, and Corinth, and frontier reorganization to the benefit of Acadia, Messene, and Argos<sup>5</sup>. Philip then summoned deputations from the Greek *poleis* to meet with him at Corinth in the winter of 338 (D.S. 16.89; Just. 9.5.1-6). There he announced a Common peace and that each state would swear an oath of loyalty to him and his descendants. The executive arm of this peace would be a league of the Greek states (*synedrion*); Macedonia would not be a member of it, but he would head it as *hēgemōn*<sup>6</sup>.

There was nothing voluntary about this peace. although the deputations reported on events at Corinth to their native cities, discussion of them, let alone resistance, was pointless given the reality of the situation. Philip's terms were endorsed by the cities with the exception of Sparta and the ambassadors returned to Corinth for a second meeting with the king in spring 337. Here, the oaths of allegiance were given to Philip and he was formally elected *hēgemōn* of what modern scholarship has come to call the League of Corinth. It was also at this second meeting (technically the first actual meeting of the league proper) that Philip presented his panhellenic plan to invade Persia (D.S. 16.89.1-3).

When Philip was assassinated in 336, the Greeks revolted and Philip's league effectively was no more. Those states that had Macedonian garrisons or oligarchies installed in them as part of his earlier (post Chaeronea) settlements expelled them. The new king, Alexander III ('the Great'), quickly ended the revolt (D.S. 17.3.4-6) and reestablished the League of Corinth (with himself as *hēgemōn*)<sup>7</sup>, without any deviations from his father's model. Sparta (again) refused to join (Just. 9.5.3), but its defiance was immaterial, for Philip's arrangements in the Peloponnese left the city isolated and a shadow of its former self. The league of alexander would last until the revolt that broke out on his death in 323<sup>8</sup>. Philip's Common Peace was the anchor of Macedonia's hegemony over the Greeks, since states swore allegiance to the Macedonian king and his successors, but at the same time the league and allied *synedrion* allowed the states freedom to pursue their own domestic policies and, except in those in which he had directly intervened, live under the constitution of their choice. It was revolutionary compared to previous common peaces, but it worked because of the military power of Macedonia that had cowed the Greeks into submission at Chaeronea<sup>9</sup>. At the same time, as a result of Philip's designs, the Greeks enjoyed a peace (and prosperity) that many of them had not experienced for generations. Hence, it is easy to see the importance and

<sup>4</sup> The most convenient (and still, i think, best) discussion of Common peaces in Greece is RYDER 1965 (on the differences between this and earlier peaces, see 102-106).

<sup>5</sup> See in detail ROEBUCK 1948, 73-92 (= PERLMAN 1973, 209a-18); ELLIS 1976, 199-204, and HAMMOND-GRIFFITH 1979, 604-623; WORTHINGTON 2008, 154-158; cf. WESTLAKE 1935, 213-216.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. D. 18.201; Plb. 9.33.7; [Plu.] *Mor.* 240a. See also the discussions of ELLIS 1976, 204-209; HAMMOND-GRIFFITH 1979, 623-646; WORTHINGTON 2008, 158-163.

<sup>7</sup> D.S. 17.3-4; Arr. *An.* 1.1.2-3; Plu. *Alex.* 14.1. on the historical background, see most conveniently BOSWORTH 1988, 188-192 and WORTHINGTON 2004a, 50-53.

<sup>8</sup> On Alexander's dealings with the league, cf. RYDER 1965, 106-109.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. CAWKWELL 1996, 98-121; cf. WORTHINGTON 2008, 151, 198.

wideranging effect of Philip's measure, and to understand why, as one scholar put it, the League of Corinth "has been the subject of closer study than any other topic of [Philip's] life and times"<sup>10</sup>. Correspondingly, it is easy to see why, given the lack of contemporary evidence, IG II<sup>2</sup> 236 is so important.

The inscription consists of two badly weathered stones that were found in different parts of Athens and were joined together by Wilhelm<sup>11</sup>. The first part (fragment *a*) gives some of the terms of Philip's peace, and the second part (fragment *b*) is a list of northern and central Greek *poleis* and *ethne* followed by numerals. here is the text as given in Rhodes and Osborne (RHODES–OSBORNE 2003, no. 76) followed by their translation:

*a*

[-----26-----][-----6-----]  
 [ὄρκος. ὀμνύω (?) Δία, Γῆν, Ἥλιον, Ποσειδῶ, Ἀ[θηνᾶ]-  
 [ν, Ἄρη, θεοὺς πάντας καὶ πάσα]ς ἐμμενῶ [ἐν τῆ]-  
 [ι εἰρήνη· (?) καὶ οὔτε τὰς συνθήκας τὰ[ς πρ]-  
 [ὸς Φίλιππον καταλύσω, (?) οὔτ]ε ὅπλα ἐποί[σω ἐ]- 5  
 [πὶ πημονῆ ἐπ' οὐθένα τῶν] ἐμμενότων ἐν τ-  
 [οῖς ὄρκοις (?) οὔτε κατὰ γῆν] οὔτε κατὰ θάλασ-  
 [σαν· οὐδὲ πόλιν οὐδὲ φρο]ύριον καταλήψομ-  
 [αι οὐδὲ λιμένα ἐπὶ πολέ]μοι οὐθενὸς τῶν τ-  
 [ῆς εἰρήνης κοινωνούντ]ων τέχνη οὐδεμι- 10  
 [αὶ οὐδὲ μηχανῆ· οὐδὲ τ]ῆν βασιλείαν [τ]ῆν Φ-  
 [ιλίππου καὶ τῶν ἐγγόν]ων καταλύσω, ὁδὲ τὰ-  
 [ς πολιτείας τὰς οὔσας] παρ' ἐκάστοις ὅτε τ-  
 [οὺς ὄρκους τοὺς περὶ τῆ]ς εἰρήνης ὤμνυον·  
 [οὐδ' αὐτὸς οὐθέν ὑπενα]ντίον ταῖσδε ταῖς 15  
 [συνθήκαις ποιήσω οὐδ' ἄλ]λωι ἐπιτρέψω εἰς  
 [δύναμιν. ἂν δέ τις ποιῆ τι] παράσπονδον πε-  
 [ρὶ τὰς συνθήκας, βοηθή]σω καθότι ἂν παραγ-  
 [γέλλωσιν οἱ ἀδικούμενοι (?)], καὶ πολεμήσω τῶ-  
 [ι τὴν κοινὴν εἰρήνην (?) παρ]αβαίνοντι καθότι 20  
 [ἂν δοκῆι τῶι κοινῶι συνεδ]ρίωι καὶ ὁ ἡγεμῶ-  
 [ν παραγγέλλη, καὶ οὐκ ἐγκ]αταλείψω το[...]  
 [-----23-----]σκ[-----8-----]

*b*

-----  
 -----]: Γ  
 ----- Θεσ]σαλῶν: Δ  
 -ω]ν: Π  
 -]ιωτῶν: Ι  
 (?) Σαμοθράικων καὶ] Θασίων: Π 5  
 -]ων: Π : Ἀμβρακιωτ[ῶν: Ι (?)  
 ----- ἀ]πὸ Θράικης καὶ  
 ----- ] Φωκέων : ΙΙΙ : Λοκρῶν : ΙΙΙ  
 ----- Οἰτ]αίων καὶ Μαλιέων καὶ  
 [Αἰνιάνων ----- Ἀγ]ραίων καὶ Δολόπων : Γ 10  
 ----- Πε]ρραιβῶν : ΙΙ

<sup>10</sup> Griffith in HAMMOND–GRIFFITH 1979, 623.

<sup>11</sup> See HEISSERER 1980, 10-11, plates 2 and 3.

----- Ζακύνθο]υ καὶ Κεφα ληνίας : III  
*vacat*

*a*

Oath. I swear by Zeus, Earth, Sun, Poseidon, Athena, Ares, all the gods and goddesses; I shall abide by the peace (?); and I shall neither break the agreement with Philip (?) nor take up arms for harm against any of those who abide by the oaths (?), neither by land nor by sea; nor shall I take any city or guard-post or harbour, for war, of any of those participating in the peace, by any craft or contrivance, nor shall I overthrow the kingdom of Philip or his descendants, nor the constitutions existing in each state when they swore the oaths concerning the peace; nor shall I myself do anything contrary to these agreements, nor shall I allow any one else as far as possible. If any one does commit any breach of treaty concerning the agreements, I shall go in support as called on by those who are wronged (?), and I shall make war against the one who transgresses the common peace (?), as decided by the common council (*synedrion*) and called on by the *hēgemōn*; and I shall not abandon ---

*b*

-----  
 -----: 5.  
 ----- Thessalians: 10.  
 -ans: 2.  
 -iots: 1.  
 ----- (?) Samothracians and] Thasians: 2.  
 -ans: 2. Ambraciots: [1 (?)  
 ----- from Thrace and  
 ----- Phocians: 3. Locrians: 3.  
 ----- Oet]aeans and Malians and  
 [Aenianians ----- Ag]raeans and Dolopians: 5.  
 ----- Pe]rrhaebians: 2.  
 ----- Zacynthu]s and Cephallenia: 3.

The inscription tells us little of the nature of this Common Peace or machinery of the League of Corinth, other than that there was an oath of allegiance to Philip and his descendants (the latter part is restored) and (again, mostly restored) there was to be a *hēgemōn* apparently of an allied council (something reminiscent of the allied *synedrion* in the Second Athenian Naval Confederacy)<sup>12</sup>. Our other sources on this period, Diodorus 16.89 and Justin 9.5.1-7, deal with the settlement superficially and their accounts are also marred with inaccuracy. Diodorus focuses mostly on the second

<sup>12</sup> *IG II<sup>2</sup> 43* = RHODES–OSBORNE 2003, no. 22, citing previous publications.

meeting at Corinth, at which Philip outlined his plan to invade Persia and requested allied troops. He does not refer to a Common Peace as such, or that Philip was elected *hēgemōn* of an allied council, merely that the king wanted to be leader of all the Greeks and to discuss with the cities “matters of common advantage”. Justin describes the first meeting and Philip’s conditions for peace and the establishment of an allied *synedrion*, but he goes on to outline the plan to invade Persia and the actual troop numbers the king wanted as part of the same meeting. Most information about the league and the status of the Greeks under the Common Peace comes from [Demosthenes] 17, *On The Treaty with Alexander*<sup>13</sup>, which deals with Alexander’s apparent breaches of the peace (as originally established by Philip) and calls the Greeks to arms against Macedonia. For example, the Greeks were to swear oaths (2, 6), they were to be free and autonomous (8), they were to have an allied council or *synedrion* (15), they had to help other members who were attacked (6, 8, 19), they were forbidden to receive support from foreign powers (10, 15-16), and there were to be reprisals for anyone breaking the Common Peace (6, 10).

Much of our inscription is lost and scarcely half of any line exists<sup>14</sup>; it has been heavily restored in many key places, based for the most part on the information in [Demosthenes] 17<sup>15</sup>. The oath and earlier part of the stone are restored with some certainty<sup>16</sup>, and clearly point to a treaty or alliance. That we are dealing with something to do with Philip II is shown by the reference to the kingdom of P[hilip] in line 11, for Philip III (323-317) or Philip V (221-179) hardly fit. It is understandable to connect it with the 337 peace, given that the language refers to the swearing of an oath to uphold a peace with Philip and to maintain amicable relations apparently with the other Greeks (fragment b clearly listed more states originally) and the overlap with [Demosthenes] 17.

Now, however, we get to the problems, for there is a dispute whether this document records an actual common peace (*koinē eirēnē*) as opposed to a general alliance (*symmachia*) with Philip or even to the formal declaration of war against Persia that was the product of the second meeting at Corinth<sup>17</sup>. Now, a Common Peace treaty encompassed all Greek states (regardless of whether the individual states actually swore to them), although in practice this was probably limited to the mainland Greeks, the Aegean and Ionian islands, and the coastal cities from Corcyra in the west to Byzantium in the east<sup>18</sup>. Therefore, given this geographical range of places, why do we have only one copy of Philip’s peace (the Athenian) and not more? to the best of my knowledge, no one has asked this obvious question before, and it raises doubts about whether we are right after all to assign the inscription to the Common Peace of 337.

We should note that the restorations of *eirēnē* in lines 3 and 10, *koinē eirēnē* in line 20 and *synthēkai* (agreement) in lines 16 and 18 are based on the use of *eirēnē* in line 14 and *synthēkai* in line 4 and especially because such terms (as well as *horkos* or *horkoi* and *hē eirēnē homologia*) occur frequently in [Demosthenes] 17 whereas *symmachia* or *symmachos* (alliance or ally) do not. Such considerations would set our inscription

<sup>13</sup> This speech (if it was actually delivered) is probably not to be dated to 336, when Alexander became king, but to either 333 (e.g. WILL 1982, 202-213) or more likely 331 (e.g. CAWKWELL 1961, 74-78), when Agis III was challenging Macedonian authority.

<sup>14</sup> Various restorations have been proposed over the years; cf. the comments of TOD 1948, 225 and the apparatus criticus and commentary of RHODES–OSBORNE 2003, no. 76.

<sup>15</sup> Cf. RHODES–OSBORNE 2003, 376.

<sup>16</sup> Cf. RHODES–OSBORNE 2003, 377, citing other instances.

<sup>17</sup> Conveniently discussed, citing bibliography, by TOD 1948, 228-229; cf. RYDER 1965, 150-159.

<sup>18</sup> See further, RYDER 1965, 173.

in the context of Philip's peace. Against these, however, is that it is possible to restore *symmachia* in line 4, which would point to an alliance as opposed to a common peace. It is also very odd not to have any reference to the startling guarantee of freedom and autonomy for the member states, to which [Demosthenes] 17.8 attests. Moreover, the provision to go to the aid of members when in dire straits is not found in all of the previous common peaces<sup>19</sup>, and it does not follow that the restoration is accurate in ours. Rhodes himself exhibited caution three decades ago in a note in his LACTOR collection of translations: "comparison with other documents makes the restoration *fairly* [my italics] safe"<sup>20</sup>.

[Demosthenes] 17 is indeed full of references to, and apparent quotations from, Alexander's treaty, a renewal of the peace previously made by Philip (e.g. 6, 8, 10, 15, 16, 19), which he concluded with the Greeks on his accession, and there is no mention of an alliance between Athens and Philip that lay outside the Common Peace treaty. However, it is dangerous to use this speech, given its shortcomings, to restore our inscription. As an example of this, consider *IG II<sup>2</sup> 329*<sup>21</sup>, a fragmentary inscription also from Athens. Wilhelm (the same first editor as for our inscription) restored it based on reference to troop provisioning (cf. fragment *b* of ours) and the reference to "those in charge of the common peace" (lines 12-14) in [Demosthenes] 17.15, and he assigned it to Alexander's renewal of his father's peace in 336. Since then that context has been rarely questioned. However, I argued on a number of grounds, not least the complete restoration of "those in charge of the common peace" in the inscription, and the fact that that body had its headquarters at Pydna according to the inscription and not Corinth as one would expect (!), that it has nothing to do with Alexander's renewal of Philip's Common Peace. A more plausible context is that of a treaty between Alexander and Athens, which I dated to 333<sup>22</sup>.

Then there are the puzzling places –some are *poleis* and others *ethnē*– and numbers in fragment *b*, puzzling because of their order and the enigmatic numerals. The list is geographically haphazard to say the least: the Thessalians precede inhabitants of some unknown places, then we have the islands of Samothrace and Thasos in the north Aegean, the Ambracians in the west, the Phocians and the Locrians in central Greece, various places in northern Greece, and the list as we have it ends with islands off the west coast of Greece. The states named seem to come towards the end of the stone, but some of the restorations are doubtful<sup>23</sup>, and the earlier part may have included Boeotia (in line 3?), Athens, Megara, the Peloponnese (except for Sparta), Euboea, and the Cyclades.

We have no idea what the numerals represent: perhaps Philip's demand of military levies (cf. D.S. 16.89.3; Just. 9.5.4, 6) or money from each member state or even the number of votes each state could cast at league meetings. If the last, then this was a clear departure from the Second Athenian Naval Confederacy (which may have been Philip's blueprint for the League of Corinth), in which each ally had one vote in the allied *synedrion*. If these are the allies in the League of Corinth, and the allies are grouped together for voting purposes, it has been estimated that Philip intended the

<sup>19</sup> Cf. RYDER 1965, 72-73.

<sup>20</sup> RHODES 1971, 23.

<sup>21</sup> TOD 183; the inscription is not in RHODES-OSBORNE 2003, but they discuss it on 379.

<sup>22</sup> See in detail, WORTHINGTON 2004b, 59-71 (note that in that article i still thought our inscription was connected to the League of Corinth.) My views were criticized by ANTELA-BERNÁRDEZ 2007, 77-78, to which i reply in WORTHINGTON 2007, 114-116.

<sup>23</sup> Cf. TOD 1948, 230, citing bibliography.

allies in the Council to cast 100 votes, with some being able to cast more than others<sup>24</sup>. At the end of the day, however, we simply do not know why these places are organized as they are or to what the numbers refer; hence, it is dangerous to think they can relate only to the League of Corinth.

If the attribution to the Common Peace can be questioned, as it can, to what can our inscription refer? The only plausible answer is a bilateral peace between Philip and Athens. The peace of Philocrates of 346 may be ruled out, which leaves us with the peace of 338 that ended the second war. The latter would also explain why we have only the one Athenian copy. We know that after Chaeronea Philip made treaties with various states that included some territorial changes<sup>25</sup> before he summoned the deputations to Corinth.

One of the first treaties he made was with Athens to end the war that he had declared on the city in 340<sup>26</sup>. Although we know next to nothing about this peace, it was one of friendship and alliance (*philia kai symmachia*) according to Diodorus 16.87.3. In a benevolent gesture that was very different from the treatment he meted out to the Thebans, for example, Philip sent his son and heir Alexander at the head of an official Macedonian delegation to return the Athenian dead from the battle and allowed the city to retain its democratic constitution. In return the Athenians awarded citizenship to him and Alexander.

I suggest that our inscription records this peace. Even though the Common Peace would, in effect, render a peace treaty between Philip and Athens superfluous, the former did not take place for several months after Chaeronea –not until spring 337 in fact. It was necessary for Athens and Philip to swear to peace and thus formally end their second war and for the king to bring to an end Athens' hegemony of the Second Athenian Naval Confederacy. This had to have taken place before the autumn meeting of the *naopoioi* at Delphi and then the king's settlement of the Peloponnese. That there was a separate peace followed by an alliance is indicated by references in later authors, for example, in the context of Alexander's release of Greek prisoners in 330, Arrian, *Anabasis* 3.24.5, says that he "also released other Greeks who before peace and alliance with the Macedonians served the Persians as mercenaries".

Moreover, if we look at just the extant parts of the inscription, we can see that there is nothing in the Greek to indicate anything other than a bilateral peace between two powers, with the loser swearing not to act aggressively towards the victor and to uphold peace between the two powers. Let us not forget that in the peace of Philocrates the Athenians swore an oath of allegiance to the kingdom of Philip and his descendants (D. 19.48). That peace was a bilateral one (cf. Aeschin. 3.68-72), which Philip was later willing to change to a common peace. Such an alteration would have detrimentally affected Athens' hegemony of its naval confederacy, as Demosthenes saw, and so was rejected. The peace that Philip and the Athenians concluded in 338 did much the same thing in ending Athens' hegemony of its allies, and it served as a prelude to how Greece, including Athens, would be affected by the common peace settlement that came some months later.

True, there are the references to a *synedrion* and *hēgemōn* in line 21 of our inscription, but again there is no guarantee that they have to refer only to the League of

<sup>24</sup> Cf. TOD 1948, 230-231, citing previous bibliography.

<sup>25</sup> For details of these, see the works cited in n. 5.

<sup>26</sup> I reject the widely-accepted belief that the Athenians declared war on him in 340 after he seized their corn fleet, and agree with e.g. BUCKLER 1996, 87-89, that, based on the wording of [Demosthenes] 12.23, he declared war on them during his defence of Cardia; see further, WORTHINGTON 2008, 128-129, 132-133.

Corinth, and thus that the restorations before them are accurate. The context could well refer to the end of Athens as *hēgemōn* of its naval confederacy and the dissolution of the allied *synedrion*, both of which, as said above, were of vital importance for Philip (Paus. 1.25.3). Indeed, the reference to allies in our inscription could even be to Athens' now ex-allies, whose security Philip presumably protected against any Athenian aggression.

This leaves fragment *b*. If the first fragment does not refer to Philip's peace what do the places listed in the second fragment have to do with a bilateral peace between Philip and Athens? The answer is nothing, and the simplest explanation is that the two fragments were incorrectly joined in the first place. Fragment *b* may well list the states of the Common Peace, grouped together for voting purposes in a *synedrion*, and I think it more likely that the numerals indicate the number of votes that each could cast rather than represent troop levies as and when needed. According to Justin 9.1.6, the total number of troops demanded by the king was 200,000 infantry and 15,000 cavalry. However, if the numbers represent military levies, and Philip ordered each ally to supply 500 hoplites and 200 cavalry, then Thessaly (10 votes) would have to provide 2000 cavalry, which was possible<sup>27</sup>, but could the Aetolians (5 votes) really furnish 1,000? or Zacynthus and Cephallenia (3 votes) 600?

The differing numbers, and in particular the favouring of some states or groups with more votes than others, is to be expected. There is no evidence that in his 337 settlement Philip was attempting to divide the Greeks into formal groups<sup>28</sup>, nor did the Athenians try to do so in their list of allies at the end of the charter of the Second Athenian Naval Confederacy<sup>29</sup>. Rather, I suspect Philip was influenced by the power that larger states wielded over smaller ones in the Amphictyonic League (a particularly important body for Philip and Alexander). Hence, he deliberately gave states that had loyal contacts with the Macedonian throne and which he favoured (such as Thessaly) extra votes. Since Macedonia was not a member of the allied *synedrion*, it was reasonable for him to expect that states especially loyal to him would keep others in line with league policy, and hence contribute to keeping Greece passive while he was away in Asia. In reality, Macedonia's non-membership of the *synedrion* meant little, for everyone knew who pulled the strings, but the appearance of Greeks in charge of their own affairs was what Philip was banking on to sweeten the pill of subservience. This would explain why Athens, and especially Thebes, received fewer votes, given their previous animosity to him<sup>30</sup>.

On the other hand, accepting the numbers as referring to votes is not without its problems. If Philip intended to add to his allies and hence increase the size of the *synedrion* during his campaigns (for example, the Greek states of Asia Minor)<sup>31</sup>, why would the Athenians (and other member states) go to the trouble of recording a list of allies that, as far as they knew, would be obsolete in the very near future? Hence, fragment *b* raises all sorts of problems that cannot be satisfactorily solved, and the places named may have nothing to do with the 337 settlement. I would argue the same for fragment *a*, given the questions that can be raised about it and the extent of its

<sup>27</sup> WESTLAKE 1935, 215-216.

<sup>28</sup> Cf. RYDER 1965, 160, citing Hampl.

<sup>29</sup> RHODES-OSBORNE 2003, 22, lines 79ff.

<sup>30</sup> Not to mention the personal dislike he felt for Thebes which originated in his time there as a hostage and which played a role in his dealings with the central Greeks throughout his reign: see further, WORTHINGTON 2008, 84-86, 88, 90, 95, 98-101, 142.

<sup>31</sup> Cf. TOD 1948, 230-231, citing previous bibliography.



restorations. Instead, I suggest we cannot exclude the very real possibility that it refers to the treaty between Philip and Athens concluding their second war of 340-338.

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