

Miquel de Moragas and Miquel Botella, Editors

The Keys to Success

*The social, sporting, economic
and communications impact of
Barcelona'92*

*Centre d'Estudis Olímpics i de l'Esport
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona
Olympic Museum Lausanne
Fundació Barcelona Olímpica*

The authors

Josep Miquel Abad
Enric Truñó *
Fidel Sust
Manuel Llanos
Lluís Millet
Miquel Botella
Ferran Pastor
Jordi López
Andreu Clapés
Josep Bertran
Miquel de Moragas
Joan Botella
Faustino Miguélez
Ferran Brunet
Fernand Landry
John J. MacAloon
Nancy Rivenburgh
Muriel Ladrón de Guevara
Pilar Carrasquer
Núria García
Xavier Còller
Daniel Romaní
Dolors Aparicio

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Thank you Barcelona. Thank you Catalonia. Thank you Spain. You've done it. These have been without a doubt the best Games in Olympic history. The effort of everybody —the Organizing Committee, the City of Barcelona, the Generalitat of Catalonia, the Government of Spain, as well as the Spanish Olympic Committee, the Superior Sports Council and numerous national and international enterprises— has made this great success possible. Barcelona will not be the same in the future. Nor will our sports be the same after the great victories achieved.

I would like to express my deepest gratitude to Their Majesties the King and Queen of Spain, Don Juan Carlos and Doña Sofía, and all of the Royal Family. They have been with us always, demonstrating in every moment their love for the Olympic idea and their enthusiasm for sport.

Thank you with all my heart to the thousands of volunteers. We are proud of you. You have given the best example of what the youth of our country is today.

I cannot forget the mass media, which has contributed by communicating the great success of this grand festival of sports and culture created by Pierre de Coubertin to all the regions of the world. Television too has taken a new step forward in its relations with sport.

But the main protagonists have been, as always, the athletes of the world. Your enthusiasm, your endeavours and your achievements symbolise that which is best about this truly universal festival of friendship and peace.

My acknowledgments to all the members of the International Olympic Committee, the International Federations and National Olympic Committees. Once again you have demonstrated the strength that unites us.

I now have the honour to present the President of the Organizing Committee and Mayor of Barcelona, Pasqual Maragall, with the Order of the Olympic Gold. He has deserved it.

Finally, then, today, August 9th, 1992, in the city of Barcelona, we declare closed the Games of the XXV Olympiad of the Modern Era.

In accordance with our tradition, I call the youth of the world to meet again four years from now, in 1996, in Atlanta, United States of America, to celebrate with us the Games of the XXVI Olympiad, the Centennial Games.

Thank you to all the world. Thank you Catalonia. Thank you Barcelona.

JOAN ANTONI SAMARANCH

President of the International Olympic Committee

Closing Speech of the Games of the XXV Olympiad,

Barcelona, 1992

PROLOGUE

Barcelona is the city of sport. And of culture. And of civility. And of much more that we have been able to bring to the foreground thanks to the impulse of the 1992 Olympic Games, the engine of the transformation that the city has undergone. For this reason, it is for me a great satisfaction to be able to write the prologue of a book dedicated to a reflection on some of the most significant aspects of the Games that everyone called the best in history.

Three years later, when we are at the doors of Atlanta '96, it is a great satisfaction to see that all of the facilities that we built for the Games are now in use, that 50,000 citizens are regular users of these new facilities, and that last year 300,000 people participated in public sports activities in the streets of Barcelona. The citizens of Barcelona participate in the sports of the city, just as they have turned into the continuation of the Olympic spirit.

The reader will find in this book the key to the success of the 1992 Barcelona Games: cooperation. Cooperation that existed between citizens and their Town Council. Between the Town Council and the other institutions (those of the Metropolitan Area, the Diputació (or Provincial Government), the Generalitat, the State, as well as the trade unions, entrepreneurs, sports federations, the IOC, and others). Only in this way can we understand the practical unanimity that existed around the Barcelona Olympic project, both in the city as well as around Catalonia and all of Spain. This is the «Barcelona model» that everyone has admired and without which the final result would not have been possible: the resurgence and reconstruction of a great European city, which we have placed on the map as one of the great cities of the world and whose citizens have seen a notable increase in their quality of life.

Now, when Barcelona is preparing for its second great transformation, this publication lets us take a look backwards to evaluate the principal urban, economic, social and communicational effects of the Games with the perspective of time. With this collection of articles I believe that we have available the first rigorous and multidisciplinary look at an event that greatly affected the configuration, the image and the character of Barcelona.

The fact that in our day there is a number of sufficiently interesting studies to justify the publication of this volume, is also a consequence of the institutional legacy that the Games

have left. The Barcelona Olympic Foundation and the Centre for Olympic and Sports Studies of the Autonomous University of Barcelona, entities that together with the Olympic Museum of Lausanne and the Banca Catalana have made this volume possible, are now solid realities carrying out an important task in keeping the memory of the Barcelona Games alive as well as the initiative to research Olympic themes.

In celebrating the third anniversary of a year that we have now mysticised, the idea that 1992 was the year of a happy culmination of an era still predominates, though I would like to add that it was the beginning of another era that is even better. We are entering into a new stage where we hope for a wave of transformations of a more technological and cultural nature, directed in turn towards the change of urban behaviour, which will turn Barcelona into the capital of southern Europe.

PASQUAL MARAGALL

President of the COOB '92
Mayor of Barcelona

INTRODUCTION

A SUMMARY OF THE ACTIVITIES OF THE COOB '92¹

JOSEP MIQUEL ABAD²

Not a long time has gone by since we heard the words, «you have made the best Games in history», a judgment that can just as well be applied to the Paralympic Games. The sensation, however, is that this is now something far off, partially lost in our memory.

Some observers, excessively influenced by the immediacy of the situation, presented it as a spectacular and ephemeral bonfire party, with the only thing left being the ashes. «The splendours of '92» is, in this sense, a habitual and symptomatic expression of a very superficial way of understanding and describing what happened, and more specifically, of referring to a group of events that have marked our recent history. Was it really worth it? What remains of all that happened?

The current crisis, which is much worse in terms of spirit and will than in reality—which is enough in itself—sometimes can distort the worth of what has been done. For this reason, I could change the title of this article from Summary of the Activities of the COOB '92 to «Defense of an Effort: Collective Values United to Meet the Crisis».

The summary here will be done, then, more from the perspective of our demonstrated intellectual and moral capacities as a people, than as a simple account of physical projects.

Although I cannot speak from beyond my condition as the Councillor Delegate of the Organizing Committee, I would like it to be understood that everything I will say about the organization that I had the responsibility, honour and above all the pleasure to direct, can be extended and applied—in the positive aspects, of course—to other entities, and public and private professional groups whose activities were ultimately fundamental for the stunning final success.

The Games were conceived from the beginning (now

1. Opening lecture of the 1992 Barcelona Olympic Games Symposium. Impact of the Olympic Games, organised jointly by the Menéndez Pelayo International University and the Centre for Sport and Olympic Studies; in Barcelona from July 14-16, 1993.

2. Councillor Delegate of the COOB'92.

twelve years ago!) as a great pretext. All those involved at that time in the decision—making process knew that the Games were clearly a sporting event. I confess without shame, however, that this did not concern us, since what mattered eleven years ahead of time was to determine the dominating idea that would allow us do in five or six years what had not been done in fifty, with the risk of taking another fifty if the opportunity was not taken. And in the end it was taken, both in tangible and intangible areas, transforming spaces and, more importantly, changing mental attitudes as well.

Not everything was resolved well, it must be recognized, but the overall result was excellent and encouraging. And this was not by chance.

Various studies concerning the physical legacy of Barcelona have been published repeatedly in the mass media; it is a legacy that is handled and used, something that does not always happen in these kinds of operations. More than simply reiterate what everyone knows, I would like to emphasize why things were done in a certain way and what were some of the keys to the entire process. For in these areas there was, in an embryonic way, a moral legacy, the affirmation that we as a country could and knew how to do things well.

It must be admitted that little more than five years ago few people thought that success was possible. It was not that there was opposition as such—it has never existed in any significant way—but that on the street there was a degree of skepticism of the type that said: «Well, it seems that they have everything well planned; let's let them try it, then, because if it works out, great».

Until very shortly before the Games, the public maintained a prudent distance with respect to the event because, even though the urban and road improvements could already be enjoyed, leading to the belief that at least this part of the dream was a reality, the question of our image before the world was still pending: to «come across well», to overcome the fear of universal ridicule.

It was the dazzling opening ceremony—that is, the certainty of success—that totally liberated the collective energy that had been held back, serving as a sign that would allow for anxious and nervous expectation to turn into overwhelming joy and popular participation, giving way to a feeling expressed in the clear affirmation of «we have done it»: that is, the individual and collective certainty of validity and triumph. It is only fair that things turned out this way. It is also fair to recall that beyond the partially reserved attitude of people, the conviction on the part of the driving forces of the project that everything

would go well—a conviction reenforced precisely in the stormiest moments—together with the strongest determination to get to the end without having to renounce essentials, was perhaps the most important key to success.

As is known, the Eixample of Barcelona was developed and consolidated over decades, ignoring the sea, an element that had the potential not only to be reinforcing but even referential. To qualify the operation of Poble Nou, for example, as a failure, as if it were a typical real estate deal and not the most ambitious urban project of the past sixty years which—beyond the most urgent recommendation to improve the day to day management—only really has been under operation for six months, implies a shameful ignorance of the rhythms of transformation, adaptation, revitalization and consolidation of any large size urban space. At the same time it involves the existence of a certain self-destructive spirit, well known in any case among us, a spirit that must be fought against because it is socially demobilizing.

Thus now that the evidence is so spectacular, we are obliged to reaffirm concepts that are quite elemental. For example, that the territorial impact has been quite notable, in spite of the fact that it is only now beginning to have an effect on the ways of life, habits, and what has come to be known as the «new urban culture» of our citizens.

The immense work of these years has been carried out, in fact, without substantially altering the territorial model existent in 1985. The work was done on the basis of a received model, and interventions were made to accelerate the achievement of objectives that could be considered obvious: open the city to the sea, supply it with basic transportation infrastructures, turn the old port into a place for public use, modernize the commercial port and the airport. That is, conceptually, nothing was new; everything had been planned beforehand to some degree. In any case, the resolution was to finish off—if that is this idea of finishing is acceptable in urban planning—a reasonable updating or modernization of Barcelona, on the basis of structural axes that were already generally accepted, brought up to date by democratic city governments with a strongly corrective anti-speculative mentality, which decreased urban density and strengthened urban and «human» space.

The cities that tore down existing walls did so believing that the option was not only possible but necessary. In our case and in our epoch, to believe that the dream was possible and to have the resolution to convert it into reality was the first condition.

The second condition, to have very precise territorial and

organizational objectives, was a consequence of the continuous process of elaboration and refining of proposals between 1980 and the definitive moment in 1986, which corresponded to both fact and reality. These objectives were based upon three essential criteria: a) know what to do; b) know where to do it; c) be convinced of being able to explain the reasons for things.

The third condition was to have very clear basic strategies that would orientate the entire process. On December 10, 1987, on the occasion of the annual meeting of the World Economic Forum, I explained for the first time publically the basic areas of action, which were:

- economic, that is, the need to liquidate the operation of the COOB '92 without a deficit. Easy to define, as can be seen, but extremely difficult and demanding to carry out. In the end, the goal has been amply achieved, with a final surplus of a few hundred million pesetas.

- investment, which meant spending only on necessary things, making what was useful for the Games coincide with what was also useful for the city, subordinating the first to the second. Or, said in another way, it meant that the Organizing Committee would set aside 35,000 million pesetas for infrastructures that were indispensable for the Games and which corresponded to historical demands of the citizens. This figure can and must be considered part of the real benefit of the Games, even in terms of the operating account.

- industrial, expressing the preference of the COOB '92 to contract the immense majority of goods and services used by the organization to Spanish companies, cooperating in this way with the national industrial fabric. Finally, 95% of the total of contracts of provisions or supplies went to enterprises with their production or research centres in Spain.

- territorial, so that the greatest part of the territory possible within logistically acceptable distances for the organization was able to participate in the effort and benefits. That sixteen sub—sites, including Valencia and Saragossa, enthusiastically set out upon fulfilling their part of the commitment with efficiency and elegance, demonstrating that the idea was right.

The fourth condition was the institutional consensus. It is clear that operations of this nature cannot go ahead if there is not a very strong institutional consensus, something not only indispensable but impossible to substitute, and thus something that can be insisted upon. It would not have been acceptable if in a long term commitment such as this, once the public agreement had come to light, it were then broken.

Maintaining the commitment should be necessary until the end of any situation.

The fifth condition, which was vital to the stability of the organization and the final success, was to have strong, consistent and charismatic leadership. Pasqual Maragall, as Mayor of Barcelona and President of the COOB '92, was for a decade able to bring together, above many legitimate differences of a political order, the wills of all public institutions, political parties and all kinds of entities, both public and private. Let it be said, as well, in honour of the other public institutions and their leaders that nobly accepted a secondary role during years, that even though this model was set out in the Olympic Charter, it was understandably difficult to assimilate from a political perspective.

The sixth condition was that the project had an executive direction that was able to act with great authority, able to apply apparently simple operative principles without interferences, which often, given the objective conditions, were difficult but very efficient. As a complement to this, the very positive chemistry that arose between the directors themselves, and between them and the overall organization generated a polyvalent, affective and effective relation, multiplying the individual capacities to limits unknown even by those involved. Projects that demand such superhuman dedication are only bearable if the fascination is greater than the brutality of the stress. And the fascination was produced by an almost chemical combination of two factors: people and objectives.

The seventh condition was the extreme rectitude and transparency of the economic administration. The budget of the COOB '92, which directly handled over 200,000 million pesetas and notably influenced 500,000 million pesetas more, has not at any moment during the process been affected by any doubt of any type. Beyond the required and assumed honesty of any professional, confirmed by the facts, two external audits were applied simultaneously and permanently every day for six years, reinforced by an internal audit, which taken together were the basis of a formal control that did not leave any possibility for incorrect action. This is something the citizens have seen, and they are especially satisfied by this fact.

The eighth condition was the enormous patience and cold blood of the organization. Someone might think that I have just made a verbal slip. Yet there is nothing further from my desire and from the reality we have come through. The organization was patient, so that by thinking longterm it could hold up under difficult situations: the not always justi-

fied pressures and nerves demanding immediate results in moments when we only had paper in front of us; the need to overcome artificially convulsive situations without irremedial traumas; the need to separate the wheat from the chaff in an operation where there were thousands of tons of everything; the need to not lose sense of the vital interests of the city and the entire country in the middle of an immense accumulation of interrelated interests of all kinds; the need to never forget the assurance from the first day that good work is what creates a good image and not the opposite, and that as a consequence, the temptation to try to prematurely exploit, success had to be avoided, especially at the beginning, when the only thing that we could offer were drawings and plans of action, when all we could say was, «it will be done».

The ninth condition, perhaps the most important, was social complicity. Citizens, being undoubtedly those most directly affected, could not, did not want to, nor had to remain ignorant nor distant. They had to be informed, of course. Yet beyond this, they could not remain passive but had to be active partners, giving support to the organization with their participative attitude, both demanding and patient. This great challenge, that of confidence —laid over skepticism if you wish— won out in the end. Only when the citizens had made the project fully their own did it acquire the category of «untouchable», so that nobody, neither political parties nor administrations nor people in general could allow it to be denaturalized or pushed to one side.

An important part of the dream, and the sum of it, was the desire that the Games help to create a more open, more tolerant, more communicative and happier society. And this was the case, at least for a few days.

— The reconciling spirit of the Games allowed for the most universal presence of athletes ever seen.

—The thousands of people involved really felt that they had been entrusted with the hope of Barcelona, Catalonia and Spain. They were conscious that everyone trusted in them and that everyone hoped they would not fail.

—Historically negative stereotypes were broken concerning our capacities, and it was demonstrated, quite simply, that we are neither more nor less than anyone else.

—We saw tens of thousands of self-sacrificing people working with no other motivation than the conviction that they were serving a common and just cause: our volunteers, who will forever form part of our heart and our history.

One learnt to convert work into pleasure, professional re-

lations into affection, weakness into force, difficulties into stimulation, the project into a passion. It is surely for this reason that everything went so well.

A very essential part of this summary is the fact that our society has been able to successfully deal with such incredible and unknown challenges:

- a process of mental renovation took place that was very interesting and necessary.

- as old schemes were not used to solve to new problems, an accelerated modernization of ideas and attitudes was produced.

- stimulation and emulation was created, both of those factors leading to the overcoming of limitations and the strengthening of creative capacities.

- new projects generated new necessities, and these in turn led to new knowledge, improving the intellectual and professional wealth of individuals and the country itself.

- we generated a positive self—image and image to the outside world, which was very healthy.

- the citizens recovered the pride of belonging to this city, to this community, to this society. That indeed has no price.

Few reasonable critics —and of course none of those that were not reasonable— have wondered in what physical and psychic conditions we would confront the crisis if we had not committed ourselves to the better future implied by it. Now it seems clear that we would do so in much worse conditions.

This is then, ladies and gentlemen, my summary, which does not pretend to be objective or distant, but which is, I confess, subjective and passionate, though absolutely convinced and sincere.

ORGANIZATION OF THE GAMES

THE KEYS TO SUCCESS OF THE BARCELONA GAMES

MIQUEL BOTELLA PAHISSA¹

Everyone agrees that the real success of the Barcelona Olympic Games —and the Paralympic Games— was the transformation which the city underwent, with development which normally takes decades taking place in only six years. However, I am not going to talk about this subject in this text; nor about the opening up to the sea, nor the ring roads, nor the airport, nor telecommunications, nor the sports installations that the city and the subsites have and would not have had today had the Games not been held. It was publicly stated right from the beginning of the candidature that the Games were a pretext —or an opportunity, if you prefer— to transform and relaunch the city. And that is precisely what they have been.

However, that the Games were well organized was also a great success, as much for our image as for our self esteem. There was no doubt of this, neither among the headlines in the media, nor in the surveys carried out among athletes, journalists and the foreign visitors who came to the Games as spectators.

In this text I will deal with the reasons for the organizational success. I have to state initially, even if there is no need to, that the following are interpretations of what took place from a personal point of view, in this case, what six years of uninterrupted work in COOB'92 gave me: first, in the field of planning; later on, in the management of human and economic resources, in the Main Operations Center during the Games; and finally, in the writing of the Official Report.

Leaving introductions aside, I will next give the list of re-

1. The author is an economist and has broad professional experience in the field of public administration.

Director of Planning and Control of COOB'92 (1987-1989); General Deputy Director of Administration of COOB'92 (1989-1991); Deputy Director General Resources of COOB'92 (1991-1993). In the present, he is the New Projects Director of Consorci de la Zona Franca de Barcelona.

The author would like to thank Josep Miquel Abad, Armand Calvo, Pedro Fontana, Josep Morist, Xavier Mendoza, Miquel de Moragas, Fernando Riba, Carme San Miguel, Josep Maria Vilà and Joaquín Zuera for their criticisms and comments.

asons, that in my opinion, are fundamental in explaining the organizational success of the Barcelona '92 Olympic and Paralympic Games. And, naturally, I will attempt to substantiate them.

I will first refer to the background, the qualitative and quantitative aspects of the resources used and the characteristics of the management. Afterwards, I will present the questions relating to the planning, organization and control of the Organizing Committee's activities and the institutional framework and the information environment in which it worked; the factors which had most influence when the Games were being celebrated, such as the sports results and public attitudes, will be left to the end.

1. THE LEGACY OF THE CANDIDATURE

The choice of Barcelona, in October 1986, was very competitive. Eight years earlier, Los Angeles had been the sole candidate. For the 1988 Games, Seoul only had to compete with Nagoya. In contrast, there were six candidates for the 1992 Games, among them cities of the importance of Paris, Amsterdam and Brisbane.

This competition led to all types of headaches and tensions for those in charge of the candidature. And, it also required a lot of work, not only in promotion and international public relations, but also in the compiling of the Dossier which had to show that the candidature was viable and, moreover, that it was the best.

In the end, a more than considerable amount of work took place in the field of strategic planning and was without precedent in the history of Olympism. It need only be said that the studies of the territorial implantation of the sports venues, the Olympic village and the telecommunications network were at a very advanced stage, the technological necessities were evaluated and a good approximation of the budget was available. There were also 102,000 people available to generously work as volunteers.

This work led, in the spring of 1987, to the very quick filling in of the Organizing Committee's planning content and the beginning of regular work from the comfortable position resulting from having many of the initial strategies predefined.

Stated in this manner, however, things must be put into perspective by recalling that many of the proposals were at an initial and provisional stage. Thus, limiting ourselves to infrastructural matters, which were by far the most develo-

ped, neither the press villages, nor the hotel plan, nor the telecommunications towers, nor the park and ride, nor even the Olympic port itself were discussed in the Dossier.

2. THE OPPORTUNITIES OF A GROWING ECONOMY

Obtaining good economic results was, for the Organizing Committee, a necessary condition for success. Up until that time only Los Angeles had attained this, since it is well known that the figures from Seoul—where, in fact, organization was mingled with state administration—were decided upon beforehand. And, from what can be drawn from what is taking place in Atlanta at the moment, this also seems to be one of the most problematic points.

In the case of Barcelona, this question was even more important due to the fact that one of the subjects that was regularly brought up in critical considerations directed towards the management team, especially at the beginning, was its lack of business experience (despite the fact that the majority of the team came from private enterprises). Later on, these criticisms became less common—especially in the aftermath of the results obtained in the negotiation of the television rights—and, in the end, the situation was turned right around to the point that their capacity to negotiate and administrate, as well as their integrity, came to be considered a strong point of the Committee. This took place while it was being stated that it was really possible to obtain positive final results.

The aim had been fixed on balancing accounts, which in reality meant a final positive result of nearly 350 million dollars, which is what would have been achieved had the Organizing Committee activated its investments in sports venues rather than handing them over without receiving anything in return.²

It managed to raise two billion dollars,³ the final net value of the budget. As a point of reference it must be remem-

2. The Organizing Committee's net investment in social assets was 32,575 million pesetas. Most of this sum—25,378 million pesetas—was assigned to the construction of new sports venues, the remodelling of existing ones and the urbanization of their surroundings. The remainder went to the permanent adaptations that were carried out so as to bring the different settings up to the requirements of the Olympic competitions.

3. The Organizing Committee's revenue sources were: sponsorship and licensing contracts worth 59,686 million pesetas, radio and television rights 54,164 million pesetas, interests and collections (lotteries, pools, stamps and coins) 46,349 million pesetas, accommodation and the provision of services 23,847 million pesetas, ticket sales 9,454 million pesetas and the sale of assets worth 2,094 million pesetas.

bered that the television rights to the Los Angeles Games were sold for 288 million dollars and those for Barcelona for 635 million dollars. In Seoul the quantity of 407 million dollars had been obtained. In relation to the revenue from sponsorship, which in the end was the main source of finance, the respective figures for Los Angeles and Barcelona are 191 and 520 million dollars at the current rate of exchange. If furthermore, on this last point, it is remembered that the revenue was obtained mainly in the domestic market, it can readily be seen that the Barcelona Organizing Committee obtained an exceptional result in the area of sponsorship.

Behind these spectacular results there was without doubt good advertising; I will go on to outline its most defining features. However, it must also be recognized that not even the best salesperson, nor the most accurate strategy, would have obtained these results had it not been for the economic context which prevailed at the end of the Eighties, and which was marked by a degree of optimism that had not been produced in a long time and that, unfortunately, apparently will take years to come about again.

In this respect, it must be recalled that the Olympic Charter forbids any static advertising in the competition venues, and this makes Olympic sponsorship operate in a different manner than any other type of sports sponsorship. In national Olympic sponsorship hardly any company has precedents, nor reference points, nor the chance to evaluate impact, and for this reason many factors of an intuitive nature enter into the decision of becoming a sponsor. The very optimistic economic context of that time led to many companies deceiving themselves about the commercial possibilities that Olympic sponsorship doubtlessly offers.

In relation to the Organizing Committee's commercial strategy, the criterium of exclusivity in each product category, already applied to international sponsorship, was established for the domestic market; it was decided to have few sponsors and to ask for large fees. Furthermore, sales began very early, when the excitement of hosting the Games was still alive on the street.

It also has to be said that the commercial results would have been even better had it been possible to integrate the ADO plan,⁴ which financed the preparation of the Spanish

4. The *Asociación de Deportes Olímpicos* (ADO) sponsorship program was promoted by the Spanish Olympic Committee, the Consejo Superior de Deportes and *Televisión Española* and was used to obtain resources for the preparation of Spanish Olympic sports people.

Olympic athletes, into the Organizing Committee's commercial plan. In this way the confusion created in the market by having two Olympic organizations offering rights which were difficult to differentiate, in regards to practical application, would have been avoided.

As has already been indicated at the beginning of section, the ability to negotiate and administrate and, to be more specific, to control expenditure, was also decisive in achieving the economic results that were obtained. Creating an internal culture which values the saving of resources is especially difficult for any company, given the demands by clients (sports people, journalists, etc.) who only pay for a very small part of the services they receive and the committee's own requirement to «do the right thing», often stimulated by the environment.

However, in Barcelona control of expenditure was, right from the beginning, an authentic priority of the administration, which was shown especially in matters of minor importance but of large symbolic value, such as invitations, public relations acts or small promotional gifts, which in some cases it could be said did not fit in with Olympic tradition.

The most negative element of the economic policy that was applied in those years for the Organizing Committee's results was the maintenance of the overvaluation of the peseta until November 1992. It need only be remembered that 40% of cash revenue, nearly all the television rights, were in dollars.

It also ought to be remembered that, in the economic field, the State Government supported the Organizing Committee on two essential points. First of all, the Fiscal Law, which made it possible, among other things, for the investments made by companies in Olympic sponsorship to be deductible from taxable revenue. Secondly, the category of authentic commitment which the State gave to previsions made in the initial budget for revenue from lotteries, pools and commemorative coins (programs run entirely by the Central Administration).

3. THE QUALITY AND DEDICATION OF HUMAN RESOURCES

A lot of positive things have been said, as they should have been, about the role of volunteers in the celebration of the Olympic Games and even more so in the Paralympics. Everything that has been said is true. Three quarters of the personnel who supported the operation —34,548 in the

Olympic Games and 8,250 in the Paralympics— were volunteers, and without them the Games simply would not have been possible. There were, in contrast to what more than one person had forecast, practically no desertions, and the image of service and dedication, in some cases self-sacrificing, that they gave will remain in the public's memory, and luckily in the newspaper archives, for many years to come.

There has not been as much said about the committee's personnel team, the one thousand four hundred people who were progressively incorporated between April '87 and February '92, and whose task it was to handle all the preparations for the Games and most of the management of the operation.

The set of problems that affected the subject of personnel was complex, beginning with a growth totally out of the ordinary, which led to a doubling in personnel practically every year.⁵ There was also a need to integrate many professionals into the team who generally worked in specialized fields (journalists, teachers, sports people, doctors, security specialists, etc.), who had very different professional cultures and pay levels and who, in this case, had to participate in truly interdisciplinary work groups. If we add to this the need to incorporate thousands of temporary workers and especially volunteers during the operation, it is readily obvious that real conditions existed for all types of problems and grievances.

To round off the scene, all of this must be placed in the context of the organizational turbulence of an organizing committee. The more than frequent situations of multiple dependence and functional mobility at the heart of the committee, the pressure imbalances between jobs, and also between the different units, were impossible to avoid during the years that the planning of the Games took.

As a final consideration, we have to add that it was when there are very few weeks left until the breaking up of the organization, at a moment in which people were already feeling uncertain about future work, that everyone was asked to make a final effort; and this was when the most anxious moments of pressure were lived through, due to something that could not be postponed in this project: the day when the competitions began.

The reality is that personnel response was exceptional: there was a lot of dedication, there were very few desertions and, in the majority of cases, these were explainable due to

5. The figures corresponding to the end of each year were: 1987, 58 people; 1988, 133; 1989, 342; 1990, 669; 1991, 1078.

problems of fitting into the group or of personal incompatibility, and hardly ever due to the lure of another professional opportunity. No-one was paid for working extra hours, although at times there was an abundance of extra hours put in. And, in such a turbulent context, conflicts, sanctions and court cases were practically nonexistent.

There are many reasons for all of this. However, the most important was without doubt the initial choice to include people who were technically prepared, but at the same time young and capable of building up optimism for the project. This choice was facilitated by a question which at the beginning seemed to be an inconvenience rather than the advantage, that from this point of view, it finally ended up being. I am referring to the nonexistence of automatic job replacement once the Games were over.

The end of the eighties was a period of few offers in the labor market, especially for professional staff with few years experience. It should be remembered that two-thirds of the team who took on the planning of the Games was made up of university graduates. So, the search for professionals for the Committee was difficult and there were many people who, during initial contacts and even in the middle of the selection process, upon realizing that they were not guaranteed replacement by any of the entities that made up COOB'92),⁶ declined to continue the conversation.

This initial obstacle turned out to be a big advantage. Only those who were really prepared to take on risks —the alternative of a permanent job was at that time within everyone's reach— opted to work on the Organizing Committee. Thus the group of trained personnel who are afraid of taking risks and make up the majority of teams in companies and administrations, ruled itself out of participation in the preparation and administration of the Games. Those who accepted the risk did so, above all, because they thought that they would be able to compensate it with the thrill of the job and by serving the city and country, and, of course, also for the experience and the expectations which at that moment were associated with the fact of having worked in the preparation of the Games.

An attempt was also made to guarantee a stable relationship by negotiating a general wages agreement for the to-

6. The *Comitè Organitzador Olímpic Barcelona'92* (COOB'92) was a non-profit making consortium made up of public bodies and a private entity. The former were the Barcelona City Council, the Catalan Autonomous Government and the State Administration; the latter was the Spanish Olympic Committee. It was formed on the 12th of March, 1987.

tal duration of the project. To strengthen the bond, a final payment of 45 days per each year worked was offered. We tako tried to be generous regarding pay; this ended up being almost unavoidable, considering the majority influence that the new incorporation had and within the context of the scarcity of job offers and salary increases the market was producing, which I have made reference to already.

In some cases, this tendency was strengthened by the need to even out the pay of some professions which generally worked in separate markets but which worked side by side and had the same levels of responsibility within the Organizing Committee and which could not be treated in an overly unequal manner without putting in question the equal treatment that every organization has to try to preserve.

In the final stage, when the most turbulence and change in organization took place, the decision to freeze all pay and not to accept even a single change in pay arising from variations in responsibility or job, along with what we considered even riskier, distributing the farewell letters before the celebration of the Games, was a very wise move. It is worth saying that only the thrill of the new responsibilities which everyone was assigned and the degree of commitment to the project that the majority of the team members as well as, naturally, the credibility of the administration that undertook the commitment to apply the rules without making exceptions, explain the success of these types of measures.

The decision that was made about which jobs in the operation phase had to be paid and which had to be in the hands of volunteers also turned out to be very positive. The responsibility or the level of the job in the hierarchy were not the characteristics taken into consideration to separate some jobs from others. It was above all the length of the dedication required which was used as the criterion for demarcation (jobs that demanded continuous dedication of more than a month were considered as jobs for paid personnel). This allowed the incorporation of voluntary personnel at all levels of responsibility without affecting the authority or the efficiency of the teams.

Another piece of personnel policy was the project to help team members find job replacements. Unfortunately, the action of out placement of COOB'92 professionals that took place in the Spring of 92 clashed with the paralysis of the market, and the companies that were collaborating in the Organizing Committee, and which had been forecast as the possible natural destination of some of these professionals, had enough difficulties in reassigning the departments which had been created within their own organizations to meet their Olympic

commitments. The general cancellation of new projects which the city was forced to carry out reinforced these tendencies.

It has been said, correctly, that from the point of view of the replacement of personnel in other jobs, the Games could not have taken place at a more untimely moment. From this perspective, for the majority of professionals working on the Games they were more a parenthesis in their curriculum rather than the springboard for professional projection it was hoped they would be.

At any rate, it must also be said that, apart from local factors and circumstances, the experience of previous Games shows that the staff of committees always come up against problems at the moment of reintegration into the labor market. Naturally, they encounter problems concerning pay levels, as well as problems of adapting to jobs whose rhythm, importance and reputation are quite different from those offered by the Organizing Committee.

4. LEADERSHIP AND PROTECTION OF THE ORGANIZATION

The activity and results of the work of any organizing committee heavily depend on the environment. This dependency is a lot more important than that which companies and the majority of administrations experience. This is due, first of all, to the fact that a lot of the basic resources that are used can neither be obtained from competitive markets organized in the normal fashion, nor from taxation. The voluntary workers, the sports and residential installations and the different types of contributions from sponsors are good examples of this heavy dependence on external agents and their predisposition to collaborate in the project.

It is also necessary, regarding this point, to refer to the more or less continuous tensions and changes that arise from the relationship between the Games' protagonists and their representatives, which in theory should not be a source of conflict since their needs are defined in the Olympic Charter, in the federations' rulebooks, in the different contracts and in the Dossier offered by the city itself. In practice, however, the important national Olympic committees, the federations, the International Olympic Committee itself, the representatives of the sports people, journalists and broadcasters very often alter or try to alter these requirements, which can end up distorting the content and cost of the projects and the work of the Committee itself.

The tensions that inevitably arise among the different en-

tities that make up the consortium constitute an additional element of instability. It must be added that the destabilizing effect of all these external conditions is magnified by the repercussions that the tensions generated in this environment have on the local mass media.

These agents have very free-flowing relationships with the media, and relations and discussions with the Organizing Committee are often transmitted «through the press». All of this inevitably leads, in a local or general manner, to the constant creation of the well-known situations of intensive rumors, tense working atmosphere, and so on, the intensity of which ends up affecting the efficiency of the organization's work.

Furthermore, the intensity of the news is sometimes so great that the impression is given that the Organizing Committee is working in a showcase, from where the rules of discretion and confidentiality that belong to all professional work end up becoming difficult to respect.

On the other hand, the possibility of this environment being influenced by the Management Committee is slim and the possibility of «easing», «guiding» or «directing» the tensions is very small. Due to this, the duty of any organization management in directing relations within the environment, is in this case more difficult and the results are more uncertain so that, for this reason, a big effort must be made in the daily task of influencing professionals who often receive information through the press, which directly or indirectly affects them, before finding out through the internal channel. This gives rise to many negative effects —especially demotivation.

For these reasons it was very important that the management acted as an «umbrella» that allowed internal work to be isolated from the disorder of life outside the organization, fundamentally conditioned by the actions and omissions of the different agents. A relative waterproofing was achieved with difficulty thanks, to a great extent, to the fact that relations with the media were mostly conducted through a spokesperson and that the press office, carrying out a very difficult job, acted as a two-way intermediary in all relations with the news media.

Aside from a protective umbrella, management had to assume the role of providing strategic orientation and a daily impulse within the organization. The proliferation of news often with a sceptical or critical tone, especially in the long preparatory stage of the Games, did not favor, as has been stated, the consolidation of the internal leadership that is indispensable for an organization that had to grow and face new challenges each day.

In this sense, it must be said that the people who held political and executive leadership posts in the Olympic project were capable of overcoming these inconveniences and not even in the most critical moments—for example, one only needs to remember those that followed the opening of the Olympic Stadium—was there any doubt from within the organization about their ability or their commitment. The continuity of their task, which began right from the candidature phase, was another element which contributed in a significant manner to the consolidation of the COOB'92 professional team.

Furthermore, the management also had to directly involve itself in other activities. To give some examples, the most important actions were:

- the negotiation of the utmost important television rights and sponsorship contracts,
- the preparation of the ceremonies,
- management control, especially in the final phase.

5. THE INTERNAL ORGANIZATION OF THE WORK AND THE PLANNING OF ACTIVITIES

Personnel on various levels who are integrated into organizing committees generally do not have previous Olympic experience. This was also the case in Barcelona. What can be learned from previous experiences is limited, due to the great importance of local conditions, with these four years being quite a long period in which a lot of things change. In the case of Seoul, despite the interlocutors' predisposition to help, the differences in organization, financing, political context and peoples' transfer sensibility were so great that any transference was very complex. Furthermore, the cultural differences alone already provided a great barrier in establishing quick and efficient interpersonal communication.

For this reason the planning and organization of the work were difficult to tackle, especially six years prior to the Games which was when the committee was initiated. It is relatively easy to formulate an idea of the final product, the Games, but it is a lot more difficult to answer the question of what had to be done the next day, the next month and the one after. Uncertainty about the processes is, without doubt, a distinctive feature of Olympic organization and a source of extraordinary pressure for the managers.

In order to accurately plan any activity, the processes have to be well known and tested and adjusted by means of successive tests. In the case of the Olympic Games no initial know-

ledge exists and the possibility of testing is always very limited and partial. This is the reason why so many difficulties come about in the planning of organizing committees' activities.

In order to confront this set of problems, in the case of Barcelona, from the beginning there was the idea that the Committee would follow a progressive learning process and, for this reason, the internal processes of mutual adaptation would be as important as the plans. The final result of what took place was sufficient proof of the correctness of this approach. So then, the problem that arose was how to give a relevant role to the mutual adaptation processes without provoking organizational chaos or, put in another way, to minimize the disorder.

A flexible planning model was chosen —the Master Plan— that was revised each semester, and each edition contained the best available forecast of the set of tasks that the Committee had to face up to before the final wind-up of operations and the publication of the report.

The structure of the Master Plan contained projects (more than three hundred) and deadlines that corresponded to the dates on which determined events had to take place (e.g. the approval of requirements, choice of systems, the signing of accords and agreements, the carrying out of tests, or the initiation and termination of jobs). The deadlines took on an executive nature when they were considered to be certain and permanent; the remainder were considered as preliminary. Those of the current semester were almost totally of an executive nature and the further away in the future the event, the more preliminary deadlines there were.

The way in which the plans were elaborated was just as important as the model. There was no group of experts specifically dedicated to the planning tasks. The preparation of the plans was carried out by an «ad hoc» commission —the Planning Commission— which was made up of the people in charge of the planning responsibility of each division. This way of doing things allowed for and gave credibility to the whole procedure because there were many interdependent projects, although priority was often difficult to determine.

This joint work also helped to create the culture and the decision-making criteria that a project as peculiar as the Games needs (e.g. depreciation is of a very different value in a company that has an operative life of fifteen days, and it must be remembered at all times that the majority of the staff do not get paid). A large part of the criteria on levels of decision-making and administrative circuits were also the fruit of the same elaboration effort. It should also be pointed

out that the Master Plan, as well as the corresponding execution reports, were presented and formally approved by the Board of Directors.

- Of the effort that the elaboration of the Master Plan required, especially in the initial stage, it is important to underline these results:

- a) Some discussion forums were created (the Management Committee and the Planning Commission) that made possible a large amount of interaction and accentuated the role that general consensus had to play in the Organizing Committee's first years of work.

- b) Emphasis was put on the definition of general strategies and the basic periods of the activities. In this sense, it can be said that the deadlines and the fundamental strategies of the organization, established in the first two editions of the Master Plan, were respected right up to the end. The following was established in these strategies: the operation of the Games was to be run in a decentralized manner from each Operative Unit; during the summer previous to the Games some tests would be carried out in as general a manner as was possible; some months prior to these tests all the venues would have to be completed; the technological projects and services would have to be ready and human resources trained; the construction work that was the responsibility of the Committee had to be begun by the end of 1989, when the projects and bids had to be ready. The deadlines of the set-up stage were also set: those of the commercial plan, those that referred to sites, accords with the federations, the choice of corporate symbols, and so on.

- c) In the course of the learning process, that had just then started, it was known that some organizational changes would have to be made, along with reassignments of staff and budget resources, variations in the designating of responsibilities and in the activities calendar. For this reason, it was very important to build up a culture of change, an attitude that valued the positive aspects of the transformations that would inevitably take place.

- d) A reference element also had to be found that allowed for the formulation of these changes and thus their definition and their communication in the most precise manner possible. The project was chosen because it was considered that the work which had to be done was the most inalterable element of the Committee's life. Thus, all the necessary actions for the preparation and the execution of the Games were integrated into some project (e.g. Construction of the *Espanya Industrial* pavilion, Accreditations, Ceremonies,

Material Logistics, etc.). Right from the start, budget resources were assigned to projects, the content of the various units was defined by the projects which they were in charge of at each moment, and management control of both resources and activities, took the project as a base. In this sense, the fact of having departed from what is the norm in most organizations —the assignment of resources to the units— avoided a lot of conflicts and absence of decisions; this remained quite clear in comparison with other organizing committees.

A final reflexion on the planning: the affirmation that, in many ways, there was a large degree of coincidence between planning and reality does not mean that the Committee's management was near perfect. What simply happened was that what was planned nearly took place in reality. However, as said at the beginning, the planning of the Games was not guaranteed to be optimum in the sense that is currently given to this term.

For this reason, in retrospect, it is not difficult to identify some actions that could have had better results or could have been carried out with less effort or resources. As an example, we will name a few:

- The effort and the activities that were deployed to keep the volunteers' spirit alive for five years could have been considerably simplified.
- With another negotiating strategy it probably would have been possible to have agreed to lower prices with hoteliers.
- To ask for 100% of the price of the tickets a year before the Games, when they were reserved, was probably excessive.
- Some services, such as transport, were projected at minimum cost, which hardly left any margin for changes and unforeseen changes; in others, such as catering, the resources used were excessively large.
- The closing ceremony of the Paralympic Games was not up to the standard of the other ceremonies and the official film of the Olympic Games did not obtain the expected results.
- It was impossible to obtain the same degree of organizational strictness once the euphoria of the Games had passed and it was not possible to carry out the dismantling operation with the order that was required.

Unfortunately, or fortunately —as we shall see— in this business there are no second chances.

6. THE DECENTRALIZATION OF THE OPERATIVE PHASE

Among the scarce material that the International Olympic Committee passed on to the Organizing Committee when the Committee began the preparation of the Games, was the model of managing the operative phase in a decentralized manner, creating some Operative Units (the venues, the villages and some others) which had enough autonomy, resources and authority to be able to solve the majority of the problems that they were presented with «in situ».

The workability of this model had been favored in previous Olympic experiences and is based on the need to decentralize the decision making processes when operating simultaneously in many units with relatively specific sets of problems.

This organization of the Committee at the moment of celebrating the Games sharply contrasted with the one that prevailed during the long period —five years— that the planning lasted. During these years the structure was of a functional nature (construction, technology, press, marketing, sport, etc.) and each one of these divisions was concerned with the preparation of the activities of their corresponding areas from a perspective that guaranteed the functional cohesion.

The shift from one organization to the other took place in the Spring of 92. The Venue Managers, many of whom were volunteers, received —«keys in hand»— trained personnel in uniform, a fully prepared venue with all the technological equipment installed and even a small budget for unforeseen expenses. This was rounded off with centralized services such as transport, security, data processing, etc. and with the Main Operations Center, that acted as an information and emergency center. The model that was applied to the competition and accomodation units was based on the same criteria.

The competition units were tested in the Summer of 92, with satisfactory results. It was seen, however, that among other things the venues had to be adapted and prepared with more time so as to be able to adjust the technological systems and familiarize the personnel with real working conditions. Looking at this point quickly, it must be said that these tests were very useful in the preparation of the Games. They allowed for more realistic planning of the competition units, they tested out the human team —and especially the volunteers— and they contributed to lessen organizational «stage fright».

The experience of application during the Games showed the extraordinary potential to adapt, and above all to create, of

the decentralized model. The management of the competition units, and to a greater degree of the Olympic villages, knew how to readapt their premises on their own initiative by bringing in volunteers at the last moment, adjusting internal controls, finding specific forms of motivating staff and relating to the local authorities in the subsites, etc. In short, the capacity for improvising with which we are attributed could be seen in action, without putting the harmonious nature of the Games nor the uniformity that the technology requires in jeopardy. Perhaps what is even more difficult, this was done without exhausting the budget for unforeseen expenses.

Seeing things from the Main Operations Center, one can contemplate the negative side of the aforementioned situation: the great difficulty of applying unitary criteria in very different situations. This was witnessed, for example, in the ticket system. When there was confusion in some units, due to changes in capacity and other circumstances, the solutions that came from the Center turned out to be not very feasible. Each unit's direct experience of the problem led to specific «ad hoc» solutions for each case and a probe, that could have led to problems, since it affected individual rights, was resolved in a friendly manner without further incidents.

Continuing the previous point, it can be stated that the most efficient actions that came from the Main Operations Center involved services or central systems. For example, those that affected the collective transport system for the Olympic Family that during the first days showed serious problems of orientation within the renovated Barcelona urban link or the complaints that led to the use of personal transport. In both cases, in collaboration with the Transport Center, real support could be given to improve the service. The main effort to regulate the traffic in the Montjuïc Area that carried out should be included in this paragraph, since the results obtained here were not as satisfactory.

7. TECHNOLOGICAL OPTIONS

From the beginning, great importance was given to the technological contents of the Games and the BIT'92,⁷ which evaluated the technological needs tied in with the Olympic

7. The study «*Barcelona Informàtica i Telecomunicacions*» (BIT'92) was promoted by the Olympic Office. It identified all the technological projects and analyzed the questions concerning systems, television and electronics linked to the organization of the Games.

event, and had already been elaborated at the candidature stage.

The field of technology was previously prepared for resourcefulness. The impact that the Games would have to have on local industry and the impulse they could give to research were examined. Many solutions based on the most advanced technology were also proposed to resolve the great variety of problems produced in organizing the Games.

At the moment of truth, innovative applications were carried out—such as, for example, the video finish or the commentator's terminal—but they were always based on well proven technologies. This was not just a choice of the Organizing Committee: the sponsoring companies, which also had a lot at stake in the Games, had a role to play in this decision. To the credit of the Technology Management, they were not overawed by the situation and they managed to have these choices impose themselves by their own weight.

Furthermore, despite the difficulties that creating situations similar to those of the operation during the Games caused, an extraordinary effort was made to test and retest all the designed applications. Some, such as results management, were subjected to dozens of laboratory and field tests using child athletes and amateurs. It was also decided to be very strict by not accepting any changes once the product had been approved. The effort to explain to the users how the systems worked was also one of the keys in the good results obtained. The system that was organized to give information on the use of the different technologies in the Main Press Center was probably the best example of this effort.

In relation to the subject of innovation, the case of the smart card serves as an illustration of the difficulty of a good technological choice. I believe that it would be difficult to find more than a half dozen service projects in which, at one moment or the other, its use was not proposed. The proposals ranged from opening doors in the villages to storing health information and offering financial services.

These proposals were not eccentric because, taking each one on its own, and with more stable application conditions, they were perfectly viable proposals. Besides, it must be remembered that the degree of excitement and the commitment to doing the right thing, which I referred to earlier, led many people in charge to design what, with a hint of irony, we called «the project of a lifetime». For this reason it was necessary to be very tactful when touching on this subject.

The solution that was adopted in this case was to maintain these applications in the Master Plan, under the heading of

Special Projects. This meant that its development depended on the existence of sufficient resources and time, the factor that in the final hour proved to be most determining. Towards the end of 1990 everyone stopped talking about the smart card.

A project such as high definition television could be explained in a similar manner. In this case the project was carried out, even if only in a experimental and limited manner, and without involving risks or additional costs for the Organizing Committee.

The reasons that recommended the use of proven technology seem, in retrospect, even more convincing. Among the most important were the impossibility of carrying out tests in real conditions, the impossibility of adaptations and long final preparations, the impossibility of repeating or delaying the event, the long maturing process of the technological projects and their interdependence, and the impossibility of any complex training process for operators.

These considerations refer to the technology used by the Organizing Committee, and do not contradict the great innovative impact that the Games caused in the city, especially in the field of telecommunications, and to which I made reference at the beginning.

8. INSTITUTIONAL COOPERATION

It is often stated that only on one occasion, in the seven years of the Organizing Committee's existence, was a majority decision made. On all the other occasions—and the Board of Directors adopted dozens—, they were made unanimously.

The representatives of the various institutions and the members of the management of COOB'92 who made up part of the Board of Directors should be the first to receive credit for the important value of this indicator of institutional harmony. Even more so when, as is well known, the majority of the institutions in the consortium belonged to different political formations and, as is normal in such a long period, all kinds of different moments were lived through.

The initial moments were especially hard. On the one hand, because it was when the distribution of responsibilities and visibility in the whole operation got under way, and also because in those moments the number of variables which could be affected was greater, beginning with the very identity of those who would have to assume the executive responsibility for the Games. To illustrate this, a glance need only be taken at the Barcelona press in the weeks that followed the Se-

oul Games. Later on, as the executive structure became stronger and, above all, when the passage of time made many situations irreversible, tension was reduced. In the end, when the closeness of the Games was being felt in the street, this institutional collaboration lived through its best moments.

It must also be said, however, that, in contrast to what is often believed, the number of political decisions that an organizing committee has to take is not very high. The Olympic Games constitute an event subject to rigidly established rituals that have to be entirely respected, and complicated protocol must be followed even for minor variations.

The decisions in which the political discretion of the Organizing Committee plays an important role are related to the location of the competitions —though the majority of the subsites were already decided upon in the candidature phase—, to the choice of corporate image and symbols —which is precisely where the vote that was referred to earlier took place— to the content of the opening and closing ceremonies, and in our case the use of the official languages, and to some other decisions though not many.

The remainder of the decisions that the Board of Directors had to make in reality the acceptance of technical proposals that referred to how to transport the sports people, how to look after journalists, how to provide first aid for spectators, how to feed volunteers, how to officiate the liturgies of the various religions in one place, how to ensure the dollar exchange rate, and dozens more of a similar character. This was one of the reasons, although not the only one, for the complaints that —in private— some members of the Board of Directors made about not feeling involved enough in the Committee's decision making process.

In this sense, it was also a wise move that the Organizing Committee was awarded exclusively this very important but demanding area in the institutional framework that was set up with the celebration of the Games in mind.⁸ Otherwise, a set of problems would have been added to the already troubled life of the Committee —we could recall the controversy

8. Responsibilities for the two fundamental tasks — transforming the city and organizing the Games — were clearly separated right from the beginning. A group of public institutions and private agents were put in charge of the former, the most important of which was Holding Olímpic (HOLSA). COOB'92 was in charge of the organization of the Olympic and Paralympic Games. The fact that the same Committee assumed the responsibility for organizing both Games was a novelty that, more than of great symbolic value (use of the same venues, of the village, integration of the image, etc.), allowed for a great rationalization of activities and saving of resources.

about extending the metro to Montjuïc or the discussions about the funding of the various pieces of the ringroad—the exact consequences of which were difficult to foresee.

In relation to these issues, it must also be said that the fact that the Games can not be postponed contributes, on the one hand, to the acceleration of the processes and the justification of urgent action and, on the other hand, to helping tensions to be overcome when the very passing of time makes it evident that the item of controversy is beyond the possibilities of the calendar. Obviously the citizens' excitement which the project is capable of generating also acts as a very important incentive for institutional collaboration.

Two final remarks about institutional collaboration. The first one refers to the decisive role of the municipal maintenance and cleaning services, the Municipal Police, the Firemen and the Municipal Operations Center, which coordinated everyone's actions, played a part in the good grade that the city obtained in all appraisals.

The second refers to the collaboration in the area of security that the various administrations with responsibilities in this area (the State, the Catalan Autonomous Government and the Town Halls) showed. Without having in —depth knowledge of the subject, one can say that the quality of the plans that were drawn up and, especially, the model of cooperation between the different police bodies that was designed and put into action for the Games, responded to strategic and operative concepts perfectly comparable to those that were implemented in the services which were the direct responsibility of the Organizing Committee.

The equipment and, especially, the atmosphere that was felt on the premises of the Olympic Security Center, where all the entities involved in the operation worked side by side, made the pioneering character and the excitement that surrounded this experiment clear. More than satisfactory results were also obtained with the incorporation of more than eight thousand volunteers in the functions of access control. Previously there had been reasonable doubts about the feasibility of this operation.

9. THE INVOLVEMENT OF THE MASS MEDIA IN THE DECISIVE MOMENTS

From the Organizing Committee's perspective, during the years that the preparation of the Games took, some local media maintained a position marked by scepticism and unwa-

rranted doubt, while others had attitudes that approached what we could qualify as critical support. All this was despite the serious efforts and the level of resources that the Committee dedicated to this subject.

However, during the Games, and from the same internal perspective, when the impression of really being scrutinized by the whole world was felt, the media decided that «dirty linen had to be washed at home» and they went on to adopt positions of unconditional support for the organization. This transformation had been secretly hoped for, and contributed to raising the morale of all those involved in the operation. A first taste of this had already been had in the final moments of the candidature, when an exciting image of Barcelona might well have been decisive in the jury's final decision.

From the experience of previous Olympic Games it was known that the international press specialized in these subjects would contemplate the Games from a positive perspective because, for a whole list of reasons which are not worth analyzing here, there was a real interest in what is called «inflating the Olympic balloon». This impression was confirmed by the frequent visits that the correspondents of the most influential international media made to Barcelona.

Thus we thought that, unless there were some really serious problems, we could count on the benevolent evaluation of the international media. What nobody could have foreseen was the amount of superlatives that were received ...nor that people would ask for the Games to be held in Barcelona definitively.

The local press' point of inflexion was clearly stated a few weeks before the Games and took place at the same time as excitement about the Games was increasing on the street. Thus, the obstacles and incidents that obviously took place during the Games were classified as anecdotes. In this way they contributed to reinforce and make the peculiar atmosphere of euphoria which the city lived through even more realistic and credible. This was reflected both in people's polite attitudes and the decoration of balconies.

10. THE QUALITY OF THE OPENING CEREMONY

It may be difficult to understand, but once the opening ceremony was over there were many of us within the organization who believed that half of the work was done. This also contributed, in the same manner as has been stated in the previous point in relation to the media's attitude, to creating

the «morale of victory» which everyone needs in the decisive moments. Furthermore, in this case the torch relay had followed a crescendo which culminated in a tremendous manner with its arrival in Barcelona, and this left an undoubtable stamp of good organization everywhere.

This is not the moment, nor do I feel myself able, to make a technical evaluation of the ceremony. Someone has said that the television coverage did not give the same impression as seeing the event in the stadium allowed, but all the verdicts, and the research carried out later on, give more than positive assessments. Furthermore, everyone is quite sure that the final balance of the Games would not have been the same by a long shot if they had not begun, and ended, in such a brilliant manner, and if the creative ability that we were attributed with had not had the chance to be demonstrated.

11. THE SPANISH ATHLETES' EXCELLENT RESULTS

I will not say too much on this point either though it occupies a true place in the Olympic chronicles. It only needs to be pointed out that, in this case too, the forecasts of the most optimistic specialist—who predicted about fourteen medals—were proven totally wrong by the results achieved. Twenty two medals were won, thirteen of which were gold. As a reference, it only need be remembered that in all the previous Olympics—and the Games were revived almost a century ago—Spanish athletes had achieved a total of twenty six medals, only four of which were gold.

And maybe just as important as the number of medals was the fact that some of them were won in sports that are considered to be basic in the Olympic program: athletics and swimming. The gold medal was also won for the first time in team sports: in soccer and womens' hockey.

The triumph was even more resounding in the Paralympic Games, in which Spanish athletes won 107 medals. No one doubts that all these results had an important role to play in the euphoria that was felt in the Summer of 92.

12. TOTAL COLLABORATION

Discussion of the strategy to adopt in carrying out the preparation of the Olympic venues was especially complex. This is a delicate operation in which it would not be possible to exclude even the best equipped of the available venues.

This is because the Olympic Games have requirements that are above those of any other sports event. Metal detectors had to be installed at all the access points, a large section of the stands had to be converted into work desks for journalists, impressive press rooms had to be installed along with results management centers, anti-doping control centers, apartments and rooms so VIPs could rest, with a lot of office space, etc.

In short, work had to be carried out in a wide range of venues and, in general, had to be completed in two or three months, which was the margin between the end of the regular competitions of the teams who usually use these venues and the beginning of the Games. This had to be done simultaneously in fifty or so units in which we operated.

The adaptation projects were already at an advanced stage and it seemed clear that it would be safer and also more economic to know how to deal directly with the final contractors—there would have to be more than four hundred of them—than leaving this work in the hands of one or more companies who would act as main contractors.

Even so, everyone was conscious of the great difficulty of having this work ready in time within the budget available. It was known that changes in the projects would take place when put into practice, that the venues would not always be available at the moment desired and that the integration of the different manufacturers would be a lot more complex in practice than on paper.

COOB'92 had the sword of Damocles hanging overhead on the day that the competitions began and, besides, was a company that was destined to disappear immediately. For this reason everyone knew that it would never commission any other work. Additional weaknesses were derived from the need to adjust many projects and terms on the spot. It was also known that the manufacturers would be laden down with work, and for all these reasons, we saw some very narrow margins of negotiation. A long list was made with the possible, and many of them substantiated, causes of unfinished projects and overcost.

So then, at the moment of truth, work was carried out within the preestablished limits and cost. Although the Committee had an invaluable team tied up in the work in each venue, it would not be fair to believe that the results obtained only derived from their professionalism and enthusiasm.

All the obstacles which were foreseen and known of beforehand were present, but the reaction of the companies and workers was not what was expected of a purely business re-

lationship. On the contrary: they took on changes and adjustments, they worked the hours that were needed to finish the work and they respected the price conditions that had been agreed on. Only one company, and what is more a foreign one, tried to profit from the situation by extorting the Committee.

In addition, many of the venue owners, overcoming initial reluctance, ended up authorizing entry to certain strategic zones, such as the Technology Rooms, which considerably facilitated the task of fitting out the most difficult installations.

This spirit not just of collaboration but of authentic commitment to the project, which was shown by the contracted companies, the administrations, the collaborating companies, the volunteers and their families, the company workers and the committee itself, constituted the decisive element of success.

Thinking along the same lines, I remember that, during the first working days in the Main Operations Center, the authentic lack of incidents taking place was a reason for surprise. It seemed statistically impossible that none of the foreseen emergency scenes took place: no coach crashes, no muggings, no pickpocketing, no poisonings, no electric power nor telephone communications failures, none of the incidents that form part of daily reality in every big city.

At first the tendency was to think that we were blessed with luck. When the scene became more stable day after day, we agreed that what was happening could not be explained on its own by good preparation or luck but rather, and above all, by everyone's eagerness for things to go well.

Maybe we were lucky in that we were able to know about the good weather that accompanied us for the whole competition —although it must also be remembered that the calendar was made out after a careful analysis of the meteorological weather sequences.

I would like to finish up with two personal anecdotes that helped me realize the importance that the citizens had in the success of the event:

— During the Games, a high-level executive from one of the multinational sponsors went into a dry cleaner's at eight in the evening when they were closing with a stained suit that he needed first thing the next day. The owner, who did not speak English, upon seeing that he had something to do with the Games by the accreditation he was wearing, made it understood to him that, despite the fact that his staff were closing up, he personally would see to the job. And the next day at eight o'clock in the morning he handed over the clean

suit. This sponsor enthusiastically told me the anecdote of the dry cleaner with precision a few months after the Games, when his memory of the ceremonies, the medals and the records was already visibly fading.

— The working day was continuous in the Main Operations Center and, if you were not on duty, you would only get out to rest for a few hours. The Games were about to end and all I had been able to see of them was on television. When there were only two or three days left to the end, the director of the Center gave me a night off. I had heard a lot of talk about the extraordinary atmosphere at night on «l'Avinguda de Maria Cristina», in front of the Main Press Center, and with my wife —and my personal pager just in case something happened— I headed off there. The atmosphere was, sure enough, extraordinary, and when I got near the Magic Fountain I could hear the applause that accompanied the changes in form and color of the water. It did not surprise me because from the time I was a child I knew that the Magic Fountain was one of the main tourist attractions in Barcelona. What really surprised me was when, arriving at the fountain, I realized that all the people congregated there were Catalans and that there must only have been at most a dozen foreigners among those applauding. That crowd had seen the fountain in action all their lives and in the changing of colors they simply found an excuse for doing what they felt like doing, which was applauding.

SPORTS

BARCELONA, CITY OF SPORT

ENRIC TRUÑO¹

The Barcelona Olympic Games represented a huge step forward for this city in many different respects; sport in the city was also affected, and in a very special way. The consequences of the Games are now visible in the urban transformation of the city and its sports installations, but the Games also had a less visible impact on the city which was just as —if not more— important: the legacy of acquired skills (know-how) and that of a new attitude on the part of the city's inhabitants towards active sporting activity.

1. SPORTS INFRASTRUCTURE

The first great impact of the Barcelona Games —from the sporting point of view— has been the set of sports installations created as a result of the Games, and which now make up the most important part of the city's sporting heritage.

When Barcelona decided to become a candidate host city for the Olympics, special emphasis was placed on the role the Games would have to play as the driving force behind large-scale projects of urban transformation, projects which had been held back under the Francoist dictatorship. A leap forward had to be made which would be great enough to make up for lost time and to enable the city to prepare itself fully in order to face the social, economic and cultural challenges present on the eve of the 21st Century.

The underlying philosophy of the Olympic Project —as far as installations and supporting infrastructure were concerned— was therefore underpinned by two basic elements: town planning and sports.

Basic requirements

The proposed blueprint for the Olympic installations was based on an analysis carried out by a group of town planners²

1. Member of the COOB'92 Permanent Commission. Sports Councillor for the Barcelona Town Council.

2. See Lluís Millet's chapter, in this book.

of the situation regarding sports facilities in the city of Barcelona in 1982. On the basis of their report, an evaluation was made of existing deficiencies which served as a guideline for the final blueprint for the Olympic installations.

The entire installations programme was conditioned by three basic requirements:

- Investments in sports infrastructure would have to be based on a real, concrete need for sports facilities, which would later be exploited in suitable fashion.

- The new building work would be carried out in areas which suffered from a widespread lack of sports installations or which had considerable structural deficiencies, and where building projects would also have an obvious impact in terms of urbanistic regeneration and territorial equilibrium.

- Other projects would have to be dedicated to the modernisation of existing—but outdated— facilities, endowing the latter with the infrastructure required so that any international event might be organised there, and that the requirements of high-level sports competitions could be fully met.

Of the 43 facilities used in the course of the Games, 15 were new building projects (8 in the city of Barcelona and 7 in the Olympic subsidiary host cities), 10 were renovations, and the other 18 were existing installations which only required temporary renovation in order to make them suitable for use in the Olympic Games.

This proposal conformed to the Plan for Sports Installations in the City of Barcelona: on the one hand, the group of installations would be distributed territorially so as to avoid a lack of balance between different districts and to bring the installations closer to the public, and, on the other hand, to diversify the offer of sports activities and amenities, while ensuring that these amenities would be of the best possible quality.

A key element in the overall process was the compromise reached between the Barcelona Town Council and the COOB'92 (Barcelona Olympic Organising Committee) with the aim of finding the right balance between the legitimate requirements of each party: on the one hand the installations needed to be located in those areas which were most convenient from the point of view of improving the city's sporting infrastructure and with a capacity which would facilitate their use after the Games were over, and on the other hand, they needed to be located and equipped in such a way that they could meet the special and highly specific needs of the Olympic Games.

The skill used in combining the interests of both parties in a positive fashion gave rise to some highly imaginative ideas and strategies. Thus it was that the concept of a «contain-

er» installation arose, in order to cope with certain particular sports, the performance of which did not require a specific type of installation. In this manner, the economic resources of the COOB which had been earmarked for creating competition space for these sports were spent on the city in a useful fashion. For example, the restoration and recuperation for the community of the Estació del Nord (a railway station of considerable architectural interest, abandoned at the time) was one of the city's long-standing aspirations and had been on the list of municipal projects since 1983, but it had not been easy to get the required financing. When COOB'92 asked the Council for a «container» space for the table tennis competitions, the requirements of both parties coincided. Similarly, the building of a large sports centre (L'Espanya Industrial) in a district lacking in sports facilities became possible when it was used to host the Olympic weightlifting competitions. Or then again there was the Municipal Sailing Centre, built as a complement to the Olympic Port and financed by funds proceeding from the sale of moorings and commercial premises.

The training installations provide another example of this. No new buildings were erected. Priority was given to the updating of the existing system of sports facilities, with renovation being aimed primarily at achieving greater social use of the latter (80% of the installations used were in public ownership). The priority given to the adaptation of the installations was clearly reflected in the distribution of funding: five sixths of the overall budget for the training plan was dedicated to improvements and renovations of a permanent nature, whereas only one sixth was used for rental and other temporary expenses.

The Decentralised Games

The underlying philosophy of the Olympic Project ensured that the Games were decentralised. The idea of concentrating all installations in an Olympic Park—as had been the case in Seoul—was immediately rejected. Barcelona decided to share the Games with as many subsidiary host cities as possible. The Olympic installations programme designated four Olympic areas within the city of Barcelona and 15 subsidiary Olympic host cities.

The games installations located within the four designated Olympic areas, the training installations set up in several different districts of the city and the road network which connected them and surrounded them, all together made up

a network which involved the entire city in the Olympic project.

The four Olympic areas were selected according to criteria such as sporting tradition and the structural reality of the territory in question. On the one hand, there were two areas that were virtually obligatory, given their historical sports installations. First came Montjuïc, where the city had built several emblematic buildings at different moments in its history (such as the Olympic Stadium, built when the city was a candidate for the 1936 Olympics, or the Picornell swimming-pools, built when it was a candidate in 1972). The time had come to modernise and complete the facilities, and to complete the urbanisation of the mountain of Montjuïc. Second was the Diagonal, which had the largest concentration of private sports facilities in the city. It was a question of using the existing facilities, while seeking help from private institutions in order to adapt these facilities for the temporary needs of the Games and, at the same time, renewing and modernising the installations for normal, daily use.

But it was also necessary to establish a counterbalance, by redistributing the range of sports amenities and placing installations in areas of the city where these were lacking. The other two designated areas —Parc de Mar and the Vall d'Hebron— underwent a process of urban renovation, to a certain extent.

The Parc de Mar (the Olympic Village) was an excuse for opening the city up to the sea, thus realising a long-standing aspiration of the citizens, and the Vall d'Hebron provided an opportunity for organising and urbanising a chaotic urban space. In these two new areas, new facilities were provided, following the city plan for sports installations.

As far as the subsidiary host cities were concerned, these were selected on the basis of Catalan sporting history and tradition, in which a network of medium-sized towns had been pioneers and leaders in several different sporting disciplines. It was only right to acknowledge the contributions made to popular sport by Granollers (handball), Badalona (basketball), Terrassa (hockey) or Viladecans (baseball), for example.

On the other hand, everything had to be organised in a rational fashion. A high-capacity venue for handball, for example, was unnecessary in Barcelona, but there *was* a need for one in Granollers, which required a high-quality installation in order to complete its network of facilities. In Barcelona more «neighbourhood centres» were needed, covered arenas for intensive use, but no more venues with a capacity greater than five thousand spectators were required.

Inter-institutional collaboration

The organisation of the Olympic Games—from the days of the candidature up to their actual celebration—marked a period of tremendous cooperation between different institutions, in the field of sport. Through the COOB and its sports commission, cooperation between institutions was extremely positive and helped favour contacts between institutions and the different members of the sporting family, and in particular with the federations.

As a result of this climate of cooperation, an unwritten agreement—which was accepted implicitly by the institutions involved—came into being when the Barcelona Games were being prepared. Thanks to this pact, COOB'92 gave priority to investing its resources in Barcelona, building sports installations on sites ceded by the Town Council and using these buildings for the Games and then ceding them in their turn, to the Council afterwards. While the State, the Catalan Autonomous Government and the Barcelona Diputacion each invested as they saw fit in a single emblematic installation in Barcelona (the Olympic Stadium, the Catalan National Institute of Physical Education, and the Palau Sant Jordi, respectively), and dedicated their financial efforts to the subsidiary host city projects.

At the same time, the Barcelona Town Council made the largest single investment in its history in order to complete the territorial equilibrium of the Olympic project. In Barcelona, 42,566 million pesetas were invested in the 15 large-scale installations for Olympic competitions, and between 1982 and 1992 a further 7,000 million pesetas were invested in non-Olympic installations. An economic effort of this magnitude and in such a short space of time could not have been made without the stimulus provided by the Olympics.

If the number of installations available in Barcelona in 1982 is compared with those available after 1992, it can be seen that the Olympic and non-Olympic investment effort resulted in an increase of 75.8% as far as installations were concerned, and of 126.4% in the case of sports venues. All together, a total surface area of nearly 300,000 square metres was involved.

Innovation of sports facilities

Another development worth pointing out is the contribution of specific sporting material to sporting—and, above all,

FINESTRA PROJECT

COMMISSIONS GIVEN TO PROFESSIONALS

- The container holding magnesium carbonate for the gymnasts (Carles Martínez and Quim d'Espona)
- The obstacles for the showjumping events (Elies Torres and José A. Martínez)
- The obstacles for the all-round equestrian events (Dani Freixes)
- The judges' booth for equestrian events (Eduard Samsó)
- The judges chairs for tennis, table tennis, badminton and swimming (Josep Llusà)

COMMISSIONS GIVEN TO SCHOOLS OF DESIGN

- The stand for judo belts (Escola Massana)
 - The repairs trolley (Escola Massana)
 - The starting block (Escola Elisava)
 - The throwing events footstop (La Llotja)
 - The score boards for Olympic and worldwide records in athletic events (La Llotja)
 - The starting chair for canoeing through rapids (Escola Elisava)
 - The cart for handballs (La Llotja)
 - The cart for volleyballs (La Llotja)
 - The cart for waterpolo balls (La Llotja)
-

to training—venues. The COOB invested around 3,000 million pesetas in the purchase of state-of-the-art sporting material.

Moreover, the COOB General Sports Management—in collaboration with the Cultural Olympiad—planned the revision and renovation of part of the auxiliary equipment for the Olympic Games sports venues. A range of objects were selected which had a potentially much higher visual profile in front of the television cameras. Given its origins, the design programme was called «Finestra» (*Window*).

The novelty of designing auxiliary sports equipment for the Olympic Games was extended to the way in which the commissions for such work were organised. Five projects were commissioned directly from a small group of professionals, designers and architects. Another 14 projects were commissioned from Barcelona's four main design schools: Eina, Elisava, Llotja and Massana. Each school presented different proposals, from which a winner and five runners-up were selected; a final selection was made of 9 projects. The students were able to participate in the industrial production of the pieces. The results were spectacular and some of the designed objects have continued to be used in other international events.

All these objects were displayed at the «Olympic Design» exhibition, organised by the Cultural Olympiad, in which the image created for the Barcelona'92 candidature was shown together with the innovatory sports designs created for the Barcelona Games.

The creation of the CAR and the new headquarters of the INEFC

Out of all the new initiatives and sports installations that came into being especially for the Barcelona Games, special mention should be made of two, which were absolutely fundamental, given their impact on the training and improvement of this country's sportsmen and women.

The Centre for High Sporting Performance (CAR), built in Sant Cugat del Vallès (Barcelona) towards the end of 1987 at the behest of the Catalan Autonomous Government, in collaboration with the Spanish Higher Council for Sport, was started with the aim of helping technicians and sportspeople to improve their performance vis-à-vis the world elite. The CAR was a descendant of existing sports training organisations, above all of the *Residències Blume*, created in 1960, and of the Technification Centres.

It played an absolutely vital role in the Barcelona Games. It contributed to the obtaining of 8 medals for the Spanish

Olympic team, by means of scientific control and monitoring programmes which were developed for the athletes taking part in a number of different specialised sports (cycling, athletics, boxing, tennis, archery, hockey, ice hockey, taekwondo).

The CAR also contributed to the success of the Games thanks to the excellent work carried out in the field of biomechanics, and in particular to the number of research projects carried out in the course of the Games, and to the quality of the information pertaining to biomechanics and the quickness with which it was presented to TV stations from around the world.

After the Games, the CAR has continued to expand its important work of sports training and research, not only to the advantage of Spanish athletes but also to that of many others around the world through the Olympic Solidarity programme dedicated to the preparation of athletes from less developed countries.

The Catalan National Institute of Physical Education (INEFC), created in 1975) with headquarters in both Barcelona and Lleida, found the Olympic Games to be a tremendous stimulus. The construction of the new building on the Olympic Ring, designed by Ricardo Bofill and host to the wrestling events in the course of the Games, has ensured that this institution is now equipped with a series of installations which incorporate the latest technology.

The INEFC, affiliated to the University of Barcelona, is the headquarters of the European Network of Sports Sciences. Its Study Plan is organised in two cycles: the first consists of three courses (Diploma in Physical Education) and the second, of two courses (B.A. in Physical Education). It also offers M.A. and post-graduate courses. It has some magnificent sports installations, research laboratories of its own, together with a book/media library specialising in physical education, sports, and sciences applied to sport.

2. KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED THROUGH ORGANISATION OF THE GAMES

For the Barcelona sports world, the organisation of the Olympic Games has meant a tremendous opportunity for improving its methods of management, its organisational capacity, for linking up better with the international sports network—and especially with the federations—and therefore for being better prepared to serve the city's daily sports requirements.

The clubs, sports federations, and sports management

companies have also benefited from the accumulated know-how, having improved their workforces with the addition of workers and contributors involved with COOB'92, or with volunteers who took part in the preparation and celebration of the Games and who were now able to contribute their acquired knowledge on a daily basis to the above-mentioned organisations.

New sports installations: new systems of management

The Barcelona Town Council made an effort to get its management systems ready for the imminent concentration of investment in the city. The gathering of all the new Olympic installations under the umbrella of Council management would have meant increasing the municipal staff to the tune of 500 people. This was logistically impossible to cope with. It was therefore necessary to find other forms of management.

As a result, a new by-law was passed in 1991 affecting the use of municipal sports installations. Firstly, this by-law was passed unanimously by all the political groupings within the Council, thus indicating the unity of vision required for the city's management of sports issues. Secondly, the by-law introduced new management systems, including what was known as «concerned management» based on the State's new contract laws and the new law affecting local government.

«Concerned management» meant that a private organisation could obtain management of a municipal installation by entering a public competition, although the Council would maintain control of and monitor this management by means of a monitoring commission, and would also have the power to make vital decisions concerning issues such as service rates, programmes of action, budgeting, and maintenance plans.

This «concerned management» formula also carried on the city's sporting tradition, in which the Council had usually delegated or ceded installations to clubs, associations or to the sports federations themselves. One of the keys to the successful functioning of the city's new sports facilities was precisely this management model, which made it possible for local administration to close the gap between itself and the average citizen by means of sports organisations which were in touch with the day-to-day reality of sporting activity and which were well-known in their respective neighbourhoods.

Another initiative which was taken in the field of municipal sports management was the creation of a municipal joint-stock company, with 100% municipal capital, called «Barcelona Promoció» (*Barcelona Promotion*).

The purpose of this company was to manage four flagship installations (the Palau Sant Jordi, the Olympic Stadium, the Palau Municipal d'Esports, and the Velòdrom) which were purpose-built for shows and spectacles, in particular for high-level sporting events, but also for musical, recreational and civic events.

The Palau Sant Jordi was the ultimate example of this kind of installation. The brief given to the Japanese architect Arata Isozaki already indicated that the new space would be used in many different ways and that the tiers and adjacent spaces would have to be designed in such a way that they could accommodate a considerable variety of events. The Palau Sant Jordi is a venue in which almost anything can be staged. Thanks to its technical advantages, its floor can be used for a basketball game or an indoor athletics championship, it can be converted into an Alpine ski station or a stretch of sea for windsurfing on, or into a trial-bike track or a circus, into an opera set or the stage for a rock concert.

This type of multi-functional installation requires a kind of management which is able to adapt itself to market needs and which has the capacity to contract and produce both competitive events and shows. «Barcelona Promoció» forms part of the European Arenas Association, where it is considered to be one of the most dynamic and creative member organisations when it comes to planning initiatives for different functions and for show production. Economically, «Barcelona Promoció» has always been in the black in its 6 years of existence. In other words, it has managed to finance itself, without having to rely on contributions from public funds.

	<i>Palau d'Esports</i>		<i>Velòdrom d'Horta</i>		<i>Olympic Stadium</i>		<i>Palau Sant Jordi</i>		<i>Total</i>	
	<i>Events</i>	<i>Spectators</i>	<i>Events</i>	<i>Spectators</i>	<i>Events</i>	<i>Spectators</i>	<i>Events</i>	<i>Spectators</i>	<i>Events</i>	<i>Spectators</i>
Sports events	35	51.392	3	8.095	12	213.821	38	268.984		
Musical events	24	63.355	64	39.641	2	64.500	17	151.624		
Family events	14	28.738	0	—	0	—	10	96.120		
Various	9	39.173	0	—	54	46.124	64	442.781		
Total	82	182.658	67	47.736	68	324.445	129	959.509	346	1.514.348

Number of events and spectators in the course of 1994 in the four installations run by Barcelona Promoció.

To give an idea of the repercussion of the new management systems, 420 new jobs have been created in these installations through assigning competitions which have taken place since the Games. To these, the 42 new permanent jobs created by «Barcelona Promoció» should be added, together with the jobs it has created indirectly, through maintenance, security, and cleaning contracts.

It can therefore be safely said that as far as management is concerned, suitable methods have been found both for neighbourhood sports facilities and for installations which are used for international competition events and massive spectacles, methods which guarantee the social, sporting and economic performance of these installations.

The Olympic and Paralympic Games—with their organisational complexity and the large-scale building required to make the Olympic project a reality—have obliged us to develop technologies, to create companies, to extend new styles and methods of working over a large area. This accumulated knowledge, this acquired know-how, will be an extremely important asset vis-à-vis the work which will need to be done in the coming years.

3. NEW SPORTING HABITS AND CUSTOMS OF THE COMMUNITY

We maintain that apart from the objective improvements in sports infrastructure and in new management methods, there has been a psychological improvement in the population at large and in improvement in the attitude of citizens as regards physical activity and sports.

The week before Barcelona was nominated as the Olympic host city in 1987, a survey was published in one of the city's newspapers («El Periódico») according to which 91% of the citizens were in favour of the Olympic project. This acceptance had a further dimension: «I agree that the Olympic Games should be in Barcelona, but I also want to take part, I also want to do some sport: at school, in the neighbourhood.» If the Olympic Games were given to Barcelona it was clearly because sport had considerable social backing there. But what was more, as the candidature went ahead, there was a noted social acceptance—incorporating new, popular sectors of the population—which became apparent through a will to take an active part in sporting activities.

The Games of participation and solidarity

Two examples can be given which will illustrate this. Firstly, special mention should be made once more of the Olympic volunteers, who symbolised the support and enthusiasm of the average citizen vis-à-vis the Olympic project; it is also an example of how the enthusiasm of many people — including a large proportion of young people — was converted into direct contributions to a collective project, without any financial reward being given.

Secondly, Barcelona made the decision to spare nothing for the organisation of the Paralympic Games, which were organised by the same Olympic Organising Committee, and which got record attendance figures, with some installations being too small for the number of spectators on several occasions. This was another sign of how the Barcelonans wished to take part in the sporting life of the city, and not just watch from the sidelines. The Paralympic Games became a symbol for the normalisation and integration of physically disabled people, summed up in Pasqual Maragall's statement: «We are all paralympics.»³ These were, without a doubt, the Games which represented solidarity above all, and which helped spread the message that everybody can participate in sports and that everybody can go beyond their own limitations.

More sport and more participation

The mood which predominated in the course of the preparation for the Games was conducive to motivating the population to take an active part in this sporting event. Barcelona saw a notable increase in the participation of new social sectors of the population in active sports. There are two pieces of evidence for this phenomenon.

A. The figures for use of new sports centres created after the Games: in all the installations which accept subscribers or members, there has been an increase of 46,000 new users.

B. The survey carried out by the Council in 1995 on the sporting habits of the adult Barcelonan population (between 16 and 60 years old), which can be compared with a similar survey carried out in 1985. The survey shows that the general attitude of the population towards sport has grown more positive.

3. Words of Barcelona Mayor Pasqual Maragall in the Opening Ceremony of the IX Paralympic Games.

The proportion of the population which does some kind of physical or sporting activity at least once a week has grown from 36% in 1983, to 47% in 1989, and went up to 51% in 1995. Similarly, the percentage of women participating in sporting activity has increased from 35% in 1989 to 45% in 1995.

In 1994, more than 300,000 people took part in sporting events on the streets of Barcelona which involved the city's inhabitants (athletic competitions, popular marathon, the bicycle festival, the roller-skating festival etc.). The citizens have turned the city streets into the world's largest stadium. One example: in Barcelona, by the end of 1995, there will be almost 50 km of bicycle paths. Barcelona currently has over three thousand sports venues, over seven hundred of which are public property. Around 300,000 citizens belong to one of the city's 1,200 sports associations and organisations, which together offer more than 100 different types of sporting activities.

It is also worth pointing out that the new installations have brought sports which have traditionally been the preserve of a minority closer to the population at large:

— The Municipal Sailing Centre —right next to the metro— has made it possible for everybody can take their first steps yachting, water-skiing, canoeing in the open sea, dinghy sailing in all its many forms, and windsurfing. In the last three years, 16,000 different people have taken part in these activities. A telling piece of information is the fact that two of the city's public schools have already including sailing as an optional subject at secondary school level.

— The Foixarda Municipal Riding School had made it possible for young people and adults to begin riding, in a public space near the city centre.

— The Picornell swimming-pools can be used for everything from swimming and waterpolo to rock-climbing on artificial walls. In the summer of 1994, they were used by 230,000 people.

— The Municipal swimming-pool not only has an Olympic diving board, but also an artificial ski slope.

Sport at school

Another consequence of the Olympic candidature was the launching, in 1985, of the «More sport than ever at school» campaign.

On the one hand, the aim was to improve the objective level of physical education and sports installations in the city's public schools, and, on the other hand, to create a project

which would stimulate sport and the Olympic spirit at a time when the city was still a candidate.

One of the main objectives of this campaign was the up-grading of 230 practising teachers, in 650-hour courses lasting two years, so that they could become physical education instructors equipment. Secondly, 700 million pesetas were invested in sports installations within walking distance of schools, and a further 12 to 15 million pesetas were distributed annually to pay for sports material and equipment. The Olympic Bus was also created, by means of which 25,000 schoolchildren could visit the Olympic installations.

By way of continuing the Olympic tradition, the Council launched the «Campus Olímpia» in 1993, a programme of sporting activities to be carried out in the Olympic installations, with the aim of stimulating sporting activity in children and young people from Barcelona during the summer months.

	<i>Campus Olímpia'93</i>	<i>Campus Olímpia'94</i>	<i>Increase %</i>	<i>Campus Olímpia'95 (Estimates)</i>	<i>Increase %</i>
Installations	7	19	171	25	131
Campus	13	28	115	44	57
Activitiets	17	37	117	49	32
Participants	1,750	4,502	157	6,557	45.5
Mobilised capital (in millions of pesetas)		63		101	

Comparative tables for the Campus Olímpia

In a nutshell, the new demands of the inhabitants of the city as regards sport can be summed up in one crucial word: quality, be it the quality of equipment or of the maintenance of public installations, or of services and the activities made available in these installations. Barcelonans currently enjoy access to more sports than ever before (swimming, horseback riding, tennis, cycling, athletics, rock-climbing), together with new services (massage rooms, saunas, hydromassage, medical and nursing services with individualised programmes for each user), new sports programmes (corrective and keep-fit gymnastics, aerobics, yoga) and new facilities (both as regards quantity and quality). The Olympic Games of 1992 have made this possible.

THE PARTICIPATION OF THE SPANISH OLYMPIC COMMITTEE IN THE SUCCESS OF 1992

MANUEL LLANOS¹

The experience acquired in Spain in the years before the Olympic Games, with the organization of large sporting events, and especially the Soccer World Cup in 1982, convinced the Spanish Olympic Committee and other sports institutions in the country of the need for the Spanish Olympic Team to come up with dignified results in the Barcelona Olympic Games. If this did not occur there was the risk that in spite of the great organizational effort, the Spanish public could be disappointed.

In 1987, the Spanish Olympic Committee (COE), independently from its participation in the governing bodies of the COOB '92, set out various plans to initiate the following five programs, whether on its own initiative and or in concert with other institutions:

- ADO '92 Program, the authentic engine of the sports success obtained by Spanish athletes.

- Organizational and Logistical Support Program, through which the situation and material resources of the Spanish Olympic Team were guaranteed in accord with the effort made over a five year period.

- The Technical Information and Control Program, through which support was given on a daily basis to directors, trainers and athletes, before and after the celebration of the Games, by gaining exhaustive knowledge of all circumstances and details that went with the competition itself. Furthermore, as much true and objective information as possible was offered to the mass media, which was fundamental in creating the atmosphere of «controlled euphoria» so necessary for success, something the Spanish Olympic Committee was assured of once the previously described programs had been carried out.

1. Manuel Llanos Riera. Degree in Physical Education from the National Institute of Physical Educational of Madrid. Member of the Technical Commission of the ADO'92. Director of Sport for the Spanish Olympic Committee. Executive Director of the Master in Elite Sports Achievement of the Autonomus University of Madrid.

— Program of Assessment and Support of the Press Office to the Information Media.

— Support and Consulting Program for the Spanish Olympic Family.

1. ADO '92 PROGRAM: AN INITIATIVE FOR COMPETITIVE SPORT

The Program of the Olympic Sports Association (ADO '92) came to life in 1988 as a basic initiative for the support of competitive sports with the events of Barcelona '92 in mind. This support was seen in the participation of private sponsors for the first time in the history of Spanish sport, making possible the financing of specific plans for Olympic participation.

The Olympic Sports Association was made up of three organisms —the Spanish Olympic Committee (COE), the Supreme Sports Council (CSD), and Radio Televisión Española (RTVE)— which made up a non-profit association focussed towards the attainment of financial resources to support the Spanish Olympic preparation. Representatives of these three bodies made up the board of ADO '92, which was the guiding body of programs meant to adjust the Olympic preparation to the resources available.

ADO '92 worked as a private administrative entity that managed and supplied to each federation the economic resources that came from sponsors, while controlling the development of the different sports plans that these federations presented each year.

In 1988, after various months of work and interchange of ideas of the team organized by Javier Gómez Navarro, the Secretary of State for Sport, the Spanish Olympic committee joined in. Fundamental here was Carlos Ferrer Salat as its head, with his entrepreneurial experience and vision, and the organizational model based on the very notable technical participation of Spanish sports federations.

One of the elements that the initial partners (the CSD and the COE) of the ADO '92 Program saw most clearly was that this project had to be financed solely by private enterprises through the sponsorship of different Olympic sports that were on the program of Barcelona '92.

28 different disciplines needed 28 enterprises willing to set out on a journey that was until then unknown for most of them. The difficulty was to unite a select group of enterprises willing to invest an average of 100 million pesetas per year from 1988 to 1992.

Compensations for the Sponsor

A fundamental aspect was the question of what could be offered to the sponsor to make the idea attractive. An alternative emerged immediately: a third partner was needed that would offer something new and truly attractive, and this partner was none other than television.

In that moment Televisión Española (TVE) was the third basic point of the program, given that the benefits in publicity that the enterprises of ADO '92 could see over the following years, could be greater if one of the partners in the project could guarantee the highest audiences in the world of sport. If to this we add the fact that Televisión Española offered an attractive discount for sponsors in its advertising rates, there was no question that the option of having it participate was not only a good idea but a necessary one.

Obtaining financial resources

The intervention of COE president Carlos Ferrer Salat with some of the largest enterprises of the country was essential in assuring ADO '92 resources of about 2,300 million pesetas for 1988, while at the same confirming that elite sport in our country would be backed up economically in an important way, not only by the Program III or the CSD, but also by private enterprise. With this program a form of financing had been born that would undoubtedly be what elite sport would need in the future so as to not depend excessively on government contributions.

Sports operation of the program

Once financing had been achieved, the basis of the ADO '92 Program was —as is logical— the sports structure that was going to be followed. The problem was not simply to receive more money from an enterprise and pass it onto the corresponding federation to increase its annual budget, but, in contrast, to take care to ensure that these resources would be used effectively in the preparation of the best athletes in each specialty.

In order to do this, the Technical Commission of ADO '92 —comprised during the Olympic period of Manuel Fonseca (1987), Alfredo Goyeneche (1987-1992), Fernando Sánchez

<i>Sponsor</i>	<i>Contribution in millions of pesetas</i>
Coca-cola	1.445
Castellblanch	117
Banco Exterior	681
Freixenet	367
Seat	722
Hispano Americano	867
Endisa	285
Banesto	722
Seguros La Estrella	577
Leche Pascual	867
Cuétara	462
BBV	292
Uralita	88
Renfe	578
Unesa	578
Bimbo	722
Pikolín	231
Tabacalera	1.054
Nestlé	578
Nutrexpa	231
Camp	155
BCI	156
Huarte	40
Banco de Santander	104
ONCE	403
Kelme	95
Iberia	120
Santa Lucía	60
Total	12.597

ADO sponsors, Barcelona'92 program.

Bañuelos (1988-1992), Manuel Llanos (1988), Ramiro Merino (1989), Francisco Guzón (1990-1992), and Stephan Pasczyk (1991-1992)— held a series of meetings with each of the federations to find out their needs and adjust the annual quantities to be received to the importance of the sport and its levels of expenditure.

Once these quantities were established and the sponsors assigned to each sport, a double-sided economic and sports program began to be elaborated with each federation, that

would be the basis for the action of the ADO '92 and the federations themselves for their annual operations. In these programs the federation heads proposed the areas where funds were needed to ADO '92, along with the sports objectives that they hoped to fulfill in order to continue working within the program.

Needless to say, during the first year especially this new way of working brought about certain problems in relations with different federations that were not very used to such a strict control of their expenditures and their sports results; yet this was a logical adjustment that with time was fine tuned until it worked almost automatically in the majority of cases.

In its sports aspects, the ADO '92 Program was not based simply upon specific grants for the best athletes of each discipline. The proposals for assistance included the following elements:

- annual designations for athletes in function of their needs, oscillating from a minimum of 840,000 pesetas to a maximum of 7,800,000 pesetas (the average was at about 3,000,000 pesetas in 1992);

- hiring of the best coaches in each discipline to prepare the athletes with the most advanced techniques;

- financing to participate in competitions, both in Spain and outside of the country, according to the necessities of each sport;

- financing to acquire the most technologically advanced material;

- highly specialized biomedical controls made by the unit working under the auspices of ADO '92, and through the various controls carried out by the medical team of the COE.

Technical control

The sports department of ADO '92 was not satisfied simply with the cold analysis of results or the frequent meetings of the Technical Commission with the federations. Over these years a team of professionals from the world of Physical Education carried out occasional controls of each of the sports in their most important competitions and in training sessions. The resultant reports, together with the final results of each competition as they appeared in the annual program of the federations, lead as a result to an analysis of each discipline on the part of the Technical Commission, which was then transferred to the Board of Directors where the corresponding decisions were made.

From quantity to quality

Almost 900 athletes received aid from ADO '92 in 1989. That decision was made to carry out a selection of the best athletes in each speciality through hard and demanding annual tests. This decision was polemical due to its rigour, but the results justified the decision of the Sports Commission. In the end the best athletes made it to the Olympic competition: 268 athletes; along the way more than 600 others had been left behind.

2. ORGANIZATIONAL AND LOGISTICAL SUPPORT PROGRAM OF THE SPANISH OLYMPIC TEAM

Once the Seoul Olympic Games had ended what was to become the Organizational and Logistical Support Program of the Spanish Olympic Team began to be organized. Previous experiences were insufficient, since the circumstances and responsibilities involved on this occasion would be very special.

One of the successful points of the COE was the fact that there was, from the very beginning, three people with experience who continued in their posts: Alfredo Goyeneche, First Vice—president of the COE, and Joaquín Dualde, Mission Head, as the institutional appointments, and Joaquín Agulla, Head of the Deputy Mission, who was given professional responsibility for the Olympic Mission.

The different areas of work were designed before beginning formal operations, and had to fulfill previously established deadlines, while trying to foresee provisional adjustments in their development. In this program five institutional officials and eighteen professionals participated.

Equipment

Two years before the Games the work was initiated on the equipment and ceremonial, free time and competition uniforms for the Spanish team. It should be pointed out that for the first time in history the Spanish Olympic Committee accepted the responsibility of preparing all the clothing for competition of all athletes and sports, however specific or technical it may have been. In this way a unified identification was ensured, which was considered very positive; in

contrast, this made the design and manufacturing of the articles more complex.

The design for free time was chosen by a commission, after carrying out different tests for textiles and colours, as well as for a large number of accessories.

The competition design had to adjust itself to the needs of each sports discipline, while maintaining a common identification for all the Olympic team, especially through colour. The various options presented for each sport and modality were selected by a commission to be later ratified by each federation.

The footwear for competition was chosen freely by athletes and teams.

Fifteen days before the beginning of the Olympic Games all of the clothing was delivered in individual packages to the athletes, coaches and officials that made up the Spanish Olympic Team. In the Olympic Village a warehouse/workshop was prepared to do changes and repairs when necessary.

In summary, it should be noted that 34,600 articles of clothing were prepared with the help of 250 different sponsors, with each member of the Olympic team receiving at least 57 articles of clothing.

Travel

Travel to Barcelona was programmed individually, following the suggestions of coaches and athletes, so that there were teams and athletes who arrived in Barcelona ten days before the beginning of the Games, and others only hours before competing. There were odd cases of athletes who attended the Opening Ceremony and returned to their training sites away from Barcelona until the day they had to compete. With this strategy the idea was to not interrupt the training programs.

Those athletes who had finished their competitions had 48 hours to return to their places of origin, so that there would not be interferences with the concentration of the other members of the Olympic Team.

Accreditations

Travel plans were perfectly coordinated with the accreditation program. The day and hour of arrival of each athlete was determined beforehand so there would not be dead times

in the access to the Olympic Village. No Spanish athlete or member of the Olympic Mission had to wait for more than fifteen minutes to be accredited.

Lodging

The Spanish mission was located in the front row of buildings facing the Olympic port, in the area where all general services were found (restaurant, bank, recreation rooms, laundries, bus stops, etc.). In the choice of the location the Athletes Commission of the COE offered their advice.

Six months before the beginning of the Games the first distribution of apartments was made according to sports, sexes and ages. One month before the opening of the Olympic Village each apartment had a specific assignment.

In summary, it can be affirmed that once an athlete arrived at the airport, he or she took between 30 and 45 minutes to be comfortably lodged in the Olympic Village.

Medical Services

Although for these Games all sports had their own doctor and physiotherapist, in the Olympic Village there was a permanent clinic (coordinated by Dr. Marcos Becerro) for the athletes and other members of the mission that needed urgent medical attention.

Pre—competition Training

Training sessions organized after the opening of the Olympic Village but before the opening of the Games were programmed in contact with the coaches of the different sports, one month before the opening, who communicated to the COOB all necessities and the most appropriate schedules, with control over this important aspect made especially for team sports and precision sports.

External relations

In order to make the stay in the Olympic Village comfortable and foment a serious atmosphere at the same time, the Department of External Affairs of the COE programmed and organized the visits of family members, directors, journalists and others, while keeping in mind that each athlete needed to be well—rested and remain concentrated.

As a final conclusion, it can be said that the Organizational and Logistical Support Program of the Spanish Olympic Team did not receive a single complaint concerning its activities either before nor during the Olympic Games.

3. INFORMATION AND TECHNICAL CONTROL PROGRAM OF THE SPANISH OLYMPIC TEAM

The control program for the Spanish Olympic Team was designed to fulfill two objectives:

- Obtain the most objective and complete reports possible of the development of the Olympic competition and other events related to the Spanish participation.

- Offer support to coaches and athletes through the presence of human resources tied both to their preparation and to the Spanish Olympic Committee, both during the competitions and in other situations related to the technical area.

In fulfilling these objectives a series of previously prepared measures were covered, such as the daily press conference in the Main Press Centre to offer mass media an evaluation of the COE of the performance of the Spanish Olympic Team. On the other hand, there was also a direct relation with different federation officials, coaches and athletes during this activity, and material needed for the final report was gathered on a daily basis.

The direction for this control was established by Alfredo Goyeneche, First Vice—president of the COE and President of the Competitive Sports Commission.

Phases of the program

Before the opening of the Olympic Games

On the 4th of June, 1992, a project of visits was sent to the General Director of Sports of the CSD, Manuel Fonseca, to coordinate the schedules and the head of the various Olympic installations. The program was developed, under the orders of Mr. Fonseca, by Daniel Carbonell, Director of Relations with International Federations and National Olympic Committees of the COOB '92, and by Manuel Llanos, Sports Director of the COE.

Of the different visits to the facilities the following information was required:

- Access of athletes and officials to the installations.
- Parking (public, athletes, officials, VIPs).
- Changing rooms.

- Warm—up areas.
- Competition areas and their characteristics.
- Locations for press conferences in the facilities.
- Sanitary services.
- Interior movement within the facilities.

As a consequence of these visits a chart was prepared where all information of interest concerning the venue where the Games were held was gathered; it included information of those responsible for the different areas, contact telephones, accesses, and so on. Besides, the distances and times of movement from one sports facility to another in order to anticipate any unexpected situations was observed *in situ*.

Before the beginning of the competitions, and from the 16th to the 23rd of July, different visits were programmed both to individual and team training sites and to the Olympic Village and International Press Centre, in order to analyze the functioning of the various installations and other logistic areas, and, above all, to be able to interchange views and get to know the teams that were already in Barcelona.

For the first time in history, a month before the Games the Spanish Olympic Committee had sufficient information available to be able to plan the sports activity of our representatives without last minute problems, in the same way as the Olympic Committees of countries like the U.S.A., Germany, Great Britain, Italy, and others had done for many years.

A control team was made up of the following people: Fernando Sánchez Bañuelos, Technical Director of ADO '92, Juan Carlos Razquin, an official of ADO '92, Cipriano Garro, an official of ADO '92, Nicolás Terrados, a ADO '92 doctor; Esteban Gorostiaga, a ADO '92 doctor, Silvio Rubio, a ADO '92 Doctor, and Manuel Llanos, Sports Director of the COE.

During the Games this team resided in the Olympic Village. Those belonging to ADO '92, as well as offering control and biomedical support, gave the necessary information to the COE as considered appropriate. In this program there was one institutional member and seven professionals.

During the celebration of the Olympic Games

The day to day work schedule during the Games was as follows.

The day began at 8:00 A.M. in the Hotel Princesa Sofía, where the institutional representatives of the COE resided, with the delivery to Alfredo Goyeneche (COE spokesperson)

of a report with the information of the results of the previous day and the forecasts for the day to come. Later, this document would be enlarged with commentaries and notes about the athletes, the Olympic Village, and so on, and was rounded off with a necessary medical report. At 8:30 there was a meeting in the offices of the COE in the Main Press Centre to complete the data and prepare the daily press conference.

Between 9:00 and 9:10 the press conference began in the Main Press Centre. It was moderated by someone designated by the COOB and presided normally by the First Vice—president of the COE, Alfredo Goyeneche, and by the General Secretary of the COE, Feliciano Mayoral. The sequence followed was to give the sports results, along with a succinct evaluation of them. On some occasions successful athletes from the previous day were invited. When the press conference ended the field work of the day began.

The day ended at 24:00 with a meeting in the headquarters of the COE in the Olympic Village of all the control team. Each member of the team brought computerized documentation of the results of the sports they were assigned, as well as their personal evaluation; a summary document was then drafted. Finally, the program for the following day was reviewed to prepare necessary adjustments.

When the meeting ended, at 1:30 A.M. a fax was sent with the official results to the centre of the COE in the Hotel Princesa Sofía, thus completing the work day.

The press conferences were considered to be very useful since they meant that in many cases the journalists did not have to go to the Olympic Village. Once the press conference had finished, the control of competitions where Spanish teams or athletes participated began.

It can be affirmed that the work carried out fulfilled the objectives set out in the beginning. The development of the competitions was followed and reports with specific objectives were made of everything that happened in relation to the Spanish Olympic team, supplying the press with objective and adequate information, which was fundamental for the stability of the athletes. On some days the spokesperson even indicated the sport, the place and the time when success could possibly be obtained.

4. PROGRAM OF ASSESSMENT AND SUPPORT OF THE PRESS OFFICE TO THE INFORMATION MEDIA

Distribution of accreditations

Before the beginning of the Games, as the guide of the International Olympic Committee indicated, the corresponding National Committee was responsible for accrediting all national press without acquired rights.

In order to do this, and given the difficulty that the delivery of accreditations meant due to the number of requests beyond the amount conceded by the IOC, a commission was created with representatives of the COE (in the person of Antonio Bustillo), the COOB '92, the Association of Sports Journalists, the National Association of Graphic Editors, and the inclusion of Mr. Mercé Varela as the Spanish representative in the IOC Press Commission.

This commission, created a year before the Games, finally accredited 500 professionals from the mass media, satisfying almost all of the petitions received.

Work Groups

The Press Office of the COE installed two functional offices, and created a support group for the celebration of the Games.

One of the offices was installed in the Main Press Centre, as it was the centre of attention for news professionals, as well as the work area for the main newspapers and national and international agencies. Its principal task consisted of attending all requests for information referring to the Spanish Olympic Team and supplying all the information generated by the Spanish Olympic Committee.

The second office was installed in the Olympic Village, which is traditionally an unending source of news items, as on this occasion there was great demand for information on the part of the mass media. Its principal task was to regulate the access of the press to the Village and put journalists in contact with the members of the Spanish Olympic Committee, as well as supply information generated by the COE.

Necessary space was also prepared for the installation of a set for Televisión Española (TVE) and a studio for Radio Nacional de España (RNE).

The Press Office also had a support group, made up of a group of media professionals who went daily to the competition sites and drafted reports on the activity of the Spanish athletes. This work group collaborated in the same way with the offices installed in the Main Press Centre and the Olympic Village.

Press conferences

From the day before the opening of the Games to the final day, the COE offered a daily press conference at nine in the morning, through spokesperson Alfredo Goyeneche. On various occasions the President of the COE, Carlos Ferrer Salat, and the Secretary of State for Sport, Javier Gómez Navarro, as well as athletes who had received medals, came to this press conference.

Upon request of the media professionals who had come to the Games, every afternoon there was an information meeting, as a complement to the morning conferences, in which the most important news of the day and the program of participation of Spanish athletes for the following day was offered.

The Press Office of the COE also presented some of the teams participating in the Olympic Games to the media. Furthermore, a Participation Book was prepared with information on all of the components of the Spanish Olympic Team, with the original addition of a dedication by each of the athletes.

Eleven professionals and volunteers worked in this program.

5. SUPPORT AND CONSULTING PROGRAM FOR THE SPANISH OLYMPIC FAMILY

We started to work on this program two years before the Olympic Games began, as the members of the Spanish Olympic Family, especially from the COE and the sponsors of the ADO '92, were eager to attend various Olympic events.

Tickets and accreditations

The most delicate sections before the beginning of the Olympic Games were those of ticket reservations and the request for accreditations.

The COE had the responsibility of reserving tickets for sports entities in Barcelona, Spanish and Spanish regional sports federations, the members of the COE, the sponsors of ADO '92, and the various commitments with public institutions.

The total number of reserved tickets was about 45,000, which gives an idea of the effort of the COE in this respect, increased by the need to deal with requests for accreditations by members of the Olympic Family.

COE Institutional Office in Barcelona

A week before the opening of the Games, an administrative office was opened in the Hotel Princesa Sofia, with the space ceded by Mr. Joan Gaspart without charge. This office served as the centre for institutional operations of the COE.

In this office the above—mentioned ticket reservations and accreditations were handled. All requests for information and advice from the Olympic Family were dealt with, as well as, for example: confirmation of calendar and schedules; reservation of tickets with high demand; reservation of visits to the Olympic Village; distribution of gifts and souvenirs; distribution of the automobile fleet.

Besides these aspects the office also coordinated all events sponsored by the COE and its president, organizing protocol and invitations, as well as dealing with other National Olympic Committees and International Federations.

The support to the COE from the Royal Family deserves special mention; a program of attendance of sports events was prepared with special attention. Once information was received on a daily basis from the Olympic Village, a plan of attendance of competitions was proposed, after studying schedules and in function of the forecast of results. This was without a doubt a highly gratifying task.

The program was organized by the General Secretary of the COE, Feliciano Mayoral, as the institutional representative, and Antonio Pérez de Guzmán as the professional representative. The team was made up of six professionals, three volunteers, and nine drivers.

6. REFLECTIONS ON THE SPANISH PARTICIPATION

Now that three years have passed since the end of the 1992 Barcelona Olympic Games, the sports results obtained

OLIMPIC MEDAL COUNT

<i>Country</i>	<i>Gold</i>	<i>Silver</i>	<i>Bronze</i>	<i>Total</i>
OIS	45	38	29	112
US	37	34	37	108
Germany	33	21	28	82
China	16	22	16	54
Cuba	14	6	11	31
Spain	13	7	2	22

A total of 64 National Olympic committees (countries) won medals, out if a participation of 179 NOC's (countries).

SPANISH MEDAL COUNT BY SPORTS FOR THE OLIMPICS GAMES

<i>Sport</i>	<i>Gold</i>	<i>Silver</i>	<i>Bronze</i>	<i>Total</i>
Sailing	7	2	1	10
Track and field	2	2	2	6
Judo	2			2
Hokey	1	1	1	3
Equestrian	1	1		2
Football	1	1		2
Skeet shooting		1		1
Archery	1			1
Swimming	1		2	3
Cycling	1			1
Tennis		3	1	4
Canoeing		2	2	4
Olympic shooting		1	1	2
Boxing		1	1	2
Gimnastics		1		1
Waterpolo		1		1
Polo		1		1
Basketball		1		1
Rowing		1		1
Total	17	20	11	48

SPANISH MEDALS IN THE HISTORY OF THE OLYMPIC GAMES

<i>Year</i>	<i>Gold</i>	<i>Silver</i>	<i>Bronze</i>	<i>Total</i>
Paris 1900		Skeet shooting (individual)		
Amberes 1920		Football Polo (Team)		
Amsterdam 1928	Equestrian (Team)			
Los Angeles 1932			Sailing (Monotype)	
London 1948		Equestrian (Team)		
Helsinki 1952		Shooting (Free pistol)		
Rome 1960			Hockey (Team)	
Munich 1972			Boxing (flyweight)	
Montreal 1976		Canoeing (K4)	Sailing (470)	
Moscow 1980	Sailing (Flying Dutchman)	Track (50 Km. Walking)	Swimming (100 m. Butterfly)	
		Canoeing (K-2 500m.)	Canoeing (K-2 1000m.)	
		Hockey (Team)		
Los Angeles 1984	Sailing (470)	Basketball (Team)	Track (1500 m.)	
		Rowing (coxless pairs)	Canoeing (K-2 1000m)	

Seoul 1988	Sailing (Finn)	Tennis (men's doubles)	Swimming (200m. freestyle)
			Olympic shooting (skeet)
Total	4	12	10
			26
Barcelona 1992	Track (1500 m.)	Tennis (individual)	Field (Pole vault)
	Track (20 K. march)	Tennis (women's doubles)	Tennis (women's single)
	Cycling (1K. vs. clock)	Sailing (women's Europe)	
	Swimming	Boxing	
	Judo (women's middle weight)	Track and Field (decathlon)	
	Judo (women's light weight)		
	Sailing (women's 470)	Rhythmic Gymnastics	
	Sailing (Flying Dutchman)	Waterpolo (team)	
	Sailing (470)		
	Sailing (Finn)		
	Archery (team)		
	Women's Field Hockey (team)		
	Football (team)		
Total	13	7	2
			22

continue to cause us to reflect and, to a certain extent, allow us to extract conclusions on a daily basis so that we might continue to apply them now.

The fact that the Spanish Olympic team won 22 medals and forty diplomas, is a historic reality that was unthinkable for the Spanish public. More important that this, however, was to see how widely distributed the medals were. Medals were won in 12 sports (Athletics, Boxing, Cycling, Football, Gymnastics, Field Hockey, Judo, Swimming, Waterpolo, Tennis, Archery, and Sailing), with 14 going to men and 8 to women. At the same time diplomas were won in almost all disciplines and very good results were achieved in the three demonstration sports.

A truly significant data was the participation of Spanish athletes, with 447 individuals and team members, of which 231 obtained medals or diplomas; the proportion is very significant. Never before had a country improved its results by 500% in the Olympic Games due to the fact of being the host.

The results also confirmed the validity of a system that arose from setting out medium and long term goals, and a system of overall coordinated financing from public and private resources.

State and private funding meant an significant effort. Yet it is necessary to make clear from the beginning that private funding represented a great amount that was not merely complementary to public funding, but a supplement without which it would be impossible to meet the demands of current Olympic levels. The success of the system was seen precisely when private sponsors entered into our sport and not before.

It should not be forgotten that in 1987 Spanish Olympic sport had a given level and that the ADO '92 program did not start from zero. The Spanish Sports Federations and the Spanish Olympic Committee had carried out their roles internationally almost exclusively with public financing.

After the Seoul Olympic Games, and after ADO '92 had been under way for a year, the situation was addressed more formally with new concepts of private enterprise and initiative, establishing criteria of programs with objectives, sports profitability, public image, and degree of fulfillment. In effect, the goal was to «invest more, and better».

This change in the philosophy and culture of Spanish

Olympic sport was put into place through years of hard work from 1988 to 1992, with the contribution of private initiative something that should not be lost. Now all levels of sports promotion know or can know where, when and in what way they need to act in order to meet their goals.

MASS MEDIA

TELEVISION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF IDENTITY: BARCELONA, OLYMPIC HOST¹

MIQUEL DE MORAGAS SPÀ,
NANCY K. RIVENBURGH, NURIA GARCÍA²

The athletes never had a chance. No matter how well they jumped and ran and rowed, they could never dominate these Summer Games.

The city won the Games. The people of Catalonia won the Games. Always, there were the fantastic spires of Sagrada Família shimmering in the background, or the fountains of Montjuïc, or the towers of Tibidabo in the distance.

Day or night, no matter how exercised we got over the Irish boxer or the Canadian rower or the African runners or the American basketball players, we always knew something was happening on the Ramblas. Somebody was cooking calamaris. Somebody was pouring the cava. Somebody was singing. Real people were dancing the sardana, the sweet folk dance of Catalonia, in some haunting plaza. We could feel it. We could hear it. New York Times, August 10, 1992.

Holding the Olympic Games in one's own home is truly exceptional for any world culture, and in particular for cultures largely unknown as was the case for Catalan culture

1. This chapter comes from a larger study that looked at all aspects of television in the Olympics and can be found, in its original version, in Miquel de Moragas Spà, Nancy K. Rivenburgh, and James F. Larson (1996). *Television in the Olympics*. London: John Libbey & Co. Ltd.

2. Miquel de Moragas i Spà. Professor in Communications Theory at the Faculty of Communications Sciences at the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Director of the Centre d'Estudis Olímpics i de l'Esport at the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona.

Autor of *Semiòtica y Comunicación* (1976); *Teorías de la Comunicación* (1982); *Sociología de la Comunicación de Masas* (1984); *Espais de Comunicació* (1988); *Los Juegos de la Comunicación* (1992); *Descentralization in the global era* (1995); *Television in the Olympics* (1995).

Nancy Rivenburgh, Doctor in Communication for the Communications School at the University of Washington. Teacher at the Communications School at the University of Washington. Autor of *Television in the Olympics* (1995).

Núria García in Information Sciences at the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Researcher at the Centre d'Estudis Olímpics i de l'Esport at the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona.

and the Olympic Games. Catalonia is an Autonomous Community (Nation) within the Spanish state of which the 1992 host city of Barcelona is the capital.³ Catalonia has its own national language (Catalan) and a Mediterranean culture, history, personality and folk tradition quite distinct from other parts of Spain.

There is a belief by Olympics hosts that holding a Games represents an opportunity to enhance one's image abroad. While this is not necessarily true, or is true to a much less extent than believed, it is nonetheless a compelling motivation for cities and countries to take on such a challenging and expensive feat of hosting an Olympic Games. For Barcelona and Catalonia, hosting the Olympics held the promise of having a global coming out party. A party where residents could carefully plan for six years just what to wear as their best clothes.

3. An introductory note about Catalonia. Catalonia («Catalunya» in Catalan) is a historic and autonomous community that covers an area of approximately 32,000 square kilometers. The population is more than 6,000,000 which is about 16% of the total population of Spain. The capital is Barcelona whose metropolitan area has a population of approximately 3,000,000. It is a nation which has managed to preserve its social and cultural traditions throughout the centuries, even in the face of the most adverse political situations.

Franco's victory in the Spanish Civil War (1936-39) brought about the repeal of the Statute of Autonomy which had been passed by the republican parliament in 1932. Within the legal framework of the 1978 Spanish Constitution, Catalonia now has a new Statute of Autonomy (1979) which recognizes *its own* government and parliament (the Generalitat) with different responsibilities in communication policies and exclusive legal control in education and cultural affairs. In 1992, the parliamentary majority and the government was made up of a nationalistic coalition (CiU) whose principal leader was Mr. Jordi Pujol. The main opposition is provided by the socialist party of Catalonia, associated with the PSOE (PSC-PSOE) in Madrid. The mayor of Barcelona in 1992 and president of COOB'92, Mr. Pascual Maragall is one of the Catalan socialist party leaders.

Catalonia's own official language is Catalan, a Romance language that reaches a population base of about 10.5 million (of which 6 million speak the language), primarily in northeastern Spain (i.e., Catalonia, parts of València and Aragon), Andorra, several counties of southern France, the Balearic Islands, and part of the island of Sardinia. The Catalan language is going through a period of linguistic normalization. Its use in public and in the mass media is slowly increasing, but it is still far from overtaking Spanish, which still enjoys the status of majority language in Catalan territory.

Besides the presence of TVE, the Spanish state public television station, and the private stations Antena 3, Tele 5 and Canal Plus (pay channel), Catalonia has two autonomous television channels, TV3 and Canal 33, which broadcast in Catalan.

The Barcelona Organizing Committee of the Olympic Games (COOB'92) was made up of the Barcelona City Council, the Spanish Olympic Committee, the Higher Council for Sports (Spanish Government), and the Catalan autonomous government (the Generalitat).

Along with this exciting possibility, however, also comes the inherent fear of hosting an unsuccessful or unflattering event. In reality, the amount of attention brought about by hosting the Olympics far exceeds the amount of control the host ultimately has over the outcome of the Games — despite meticulous planning. This tension is fundamental to understanding how an event which lasts only 17 days can hold a city in suspense for six years.

This study outlines the identity goals of the Barcelona Olympic organizers then compares what 25 international broadcasters presented to home audiences about Barcelona, Catalonia and Spain as Olympic host and Europe as Olympic setting. The results can be explained to some degree by the preparation of broadcasters, as well as their motivation to educate or entertain audiences. But it is also clear that the broadcaster portrayals are conditioned by domestic contexts, influencing, for example, whether to present Catalonia as a national and cultural entity distinct from Spain.

1. PLANNING AN IDENTITY

Present day Opening and Closing Olympic ceremony structures allow for significant amounts of cultural presentation by the host. For example, in the Barcelona 1992 Opening Ceremony a full 1 hour, 14 minutes of a 3 hour, 10 minute ceremony was dedicated to host culture performances. In 1986 when Barcelona was put forward as a candidate, well before the ceremonies were designed, the process of developing a host identity had already begun. That process involved a number of important steps:

1. Selecting the geopolitical reference for the host (in this case, «how much» of the host should be identified as Barcelona, Catalonia, or Spain, and how should these relationships be presented);

2. Defining a desired «character» for the host (or hosts as in this case), grounded in reality yet promoting the host's most positive features;

3. Choosing appropriate symbolic representations of that character, using existing urban and geographic features, as well as newly designed elements such as a logo and mascot;

4. Developing an approach for the dissemination of the host identity locally (e.g., sign, city, and venue design) and internationally (materials for media), and;

5. Creating Opening and Closing Ceremony performances which present the host culture in an accessible and appealing way to international audiences.

To locate a starting point, the ceremony producers Ovi-
deo Bassat Sport conducted an international survey. The results revealed that there existed remarkably few image associations (outside of Europe) with Barcelona — beyond the fact that it would be an Olympic host. Further, there was absolutely no recognition of Catalonia outside of western Europe. Finally, international associations with Spain were largely limited to tourist-oriented stereotypes: southern European location, beautiful women, sun, cheap wine, siestas after lunch, bull fights and flamenco. While many of these stereotypical images have been attractive for tourism over the years they were considered a drawback for the host in terms of presenting an international picture of Spain as an advanced economy and a modern democracy.

1.1 Establishing an Olympic peace among planners

In order to devise a workable plan a consensus needed to be reached between the various actors involved in the organizing efforts: the Spanish Government, the Catalan autonomous government (the Generalitat), Barcelona City Council, the European Community, and the Olympic Committees. These actors represented the different «image» stakeholders in the outcome of the 1992 Games.

For these planners it was a relatively easy task to develop a list of identity goals for each of the above host entities. The greater challenge was deciding how, which, and to what degree, these chosen attributes of Barcelona, Catalonia, and Spain would manifest themselves in the design of the ceremonies and elsewhere. To make the task even more challenging, good advertising principles dictated that a complex reality be consolidated into a relatively few identity attributes that were easy to grasp and well suited to audio-visual portrayals, thus raising the possibility that the groups involved might have to compete for the inclusion of «their» desired image agenda as part of the identity campaign.

To an amazing degree the identity goals (outlined below) were ultimately realized in the design of the ceremonies and look of the city despite the diverse interests of the organizing factions entering into the process. In large part this was due to the common desire of the organizing committee, and others involved, for everything to run smoothly. Along the way there

came the realization that if the Games were not successful, then everyone would lose.⁴ Also, each of the parties had slightly different priorities, making compromises possible.

This does not mean there was no controversy over those six years of planning. Quite the contrary. In Catalonia, and throughout Spain, there was much discussion, debate, and speculation over what the Olympic organizers should and would do in terms of the balance between Catalonia and Spain as hosts.⁵ Interestingly, this continuous and at times contentious local dialogue never found the same intensity in international media and as such did not leave Spanish borders in any significant way.

1.2 Identity goals for Barcelona, Catalonia, and Spain as Olympic host

To get a sense of the success, or not, of the host's identity campaign as interpreted by international broadcasters, it is necessary to briefly review what was intended by the Olympic planners.

A passionate and democratic Spain

For Spain, one of the main cultural objectives of the ceremonies was to eliminate some of the tourist stereotypes (siestas, bullfights, slow moving). However, not all of the existing stereotypes noted above were seen as negative. The organizers decided to promote the widely held image of Spain as a land of «passion.» In addition, the «sun» (also a central symbol in Spain's tourist advertising campaign, «Spain. Everything under the sun») appeared as elemental to several ceremony performances. More broadly, it was desired that Spain be represented as diverse, democratic, modern, and cultured. To emphasize Spain as a land of «culture,» it was decided to focus on artistic representatives that already had international recognition. For example, the artists Picasso, Dalí and Miró

4. Two years before the Olympics there was a ceremony for the opening of the Montjuïc Olympic stadium. It rained. Everyone got soaked. The event was rife with problems and delays, including nationalistic demonstrations and police preventing Catalan flags from entering the stadium. According to sources, that event acted as a turning point of sorts in that it occurred to all groups that the Olympics could fail and everyone would lose if they did not work closely together to the end.

5. For a discussion of local discourse about host identity issues see Blain, N., R. Boyle, and H. O'Donnell (1993). «Centrality and Peripherality at the Barcelona Olympics: Spain, Catalonia, Scotland, Portugal,» *Sport and National Identity in the European Media*, London: Leicester University Press, 156-199.

were chosen as design models for signs, color, and ceremony settings, and world famous entertainers such as Montserrat Caballé and Josep Carreras were chosen to sing in the ceremony. Politically, the image of the King Juan Carlos I and Queen Sofia in the dignitaries' box and at various venues throughout the Games constituted the primary symbol of Spain throughout the Games.

A politically and culturally distinct Catalonia

The producers of the ceremony themselves suggested that their project was to produce a 3-hour television commercial spot whose aim was to «put Barcelona and Catalonia on the map.»⁶ It was a concern within many sectors of Catalan public opinion that Spain, as the familiar international presence, would overshadow any reference whatsoever to Catalonia and its national identity. Therefore the primary identity objectives for Catalonia were first to become known, and second to be understood as having a distinct political, cultural, and linguistic identity relative to Spain. Particularly in the ceremonies it was felt that the presentation of Catalonia and Catalan culture should be «undiluted» and differentiated from that of Spain (but not necessarily in conflict with Spain). This goal was primarily achieved through the use of Catalan language as an official Olympic language (along with Spanish, English, and French), the entrance of the Catalan flag along side the flags of Spain and Barcelona, the playing of the Catalan national anthem, and by dedicating specific performance segments to the avant-garde and Mediterranean spirit of Catalan music, art, and folk traditions (specifically the segments of the «Sardana», a traditional Catalan circle dance, and «Els Castellers» or the human pyramids). Catalan residents joined in the effort by displaying Catalan flags in the stadium, out windows, and over balconies throughout the city.

Modern, yet historic Barcelona

For the host city, Barcelona, the image objectives were more conventional and along the lines of what is termed «city marketing,» a strategy aimed at attracting projects that encourage local economic activity and development. Barcelona wanted to present itself to the world as a modern city

6. Bassat, Lluís (1992). «The Olympics and History's Longest Commercial,» *Viewpoint*. Chicago: Ogilvy and Mather. Also, see Bassat, Lluís (1993). *El libro rojo de la publicidad*. Barcelona: Folio.

which welcomed economic activity and initiatives; it wanted to promote the city as the economic hub for southern Europe. It was desired that Barcelona be perceived as a thriving, cosmopolitan city ready for the next century, but also a city built upon centuries of colorful history. To serve these goals, it was obvious that the city's outstanding architectural character would provide excellent televisual symbols (for example, the Montjuïc Olympic stadium, the Gaudi-designed Sagrada Familia cathedral, the statue of Columbus, etc.). In addition, certain competition venues, such as that for diving, were designed to offer television cameras scenic background images of Barcelona during the competitions. RTO'92, as Olympic host broadcaster, set up five «beauty» cameras around the city to offer colorful and characteristic city scenes for international broadcasters to use.⁷

Another goal was to demonstrate that Barcelona was economically and administratively capable of successfully organizing one of the most complex and popular events of our times. In this sense, planners wanted the Games to be seen as technologically innovative and well-organized (yet friendly and human), dispensing with any generalized Spanish stereotypes of lateness, laziness, or inefficiency.

As is the case with any marketing or advertising process, the negative elements also present in the city (pollution; discrimination, rubbish, poverty, traffic, noise, transportation, humidity, asphalt, etc.) were left out of the image selection process.

A Mediterranean Olympics

Central to the host identity campaign was the decision to emphasize the 1992 Games' Mediterranean setting. Using the Mediterranean as an overall framework for the Olympic host identity both respected and solved many issues for the Olympic planners. First, because of the evidence that the Olympic Games are a sports and cultural phenomenon whose historic roots are found in the Mediterranean, and more specifically in Greek culture, this identity strategy conveyed an attitude of respect towards the protagonism of Greece in Olympic history. The Barcelona organizers felt this even more important when

7. The host broadcaster, in this case RTO'92, is responsible for producing a visual and sound-only international television signal for use by international broadcasters. The international signal (IS) is intended to be a neutral and comprehensive broadcast of all Olympic events. Once received, international broadcasters then add commentary to the IS. They are also free to edit and alter the signal in any way they choose before sending the Games broadcast to home audiences.

it became known that Athens would not be host to the Games in the Centenary year in 1996, and that the U.S. city of Atlanta had been chosen for this anniversary event.

Second, the Mediterranean provided the needed rubric with in which the respective identities of Barcelona, Catalonia and Spain — and even Europe — could all comfortably fit. This concept facilitated the establishment of consensus among the different political actors involved in the organization.

Finally, the Mediterranean concept is not only an internationally recognized geographic referent, but also a recognizable «feeling» and cultural concept that links well to aesthetic expression. The Mediterranean concept was integrated in all design aspects of the host identity, including the Barcelona'92 mascot and logo, the design of the torch, signage colors, and ultimately the Opening and Closing ceremonies.

As an example, the Barcelona'92 logo, a vibrant blue, yellow, and red symbol, was intended as an expression of Mediterranean aesthetics. Blue represented the sea and the sky, yellow as the sun, and combined with red was intended to evoke the idea of passion, human qualities and friendship. The logo was also a reproduction of the human body in movement, thus expressing the humanist concepts of classicism, as well as the Mediterranean character of joy for life.⁸

2. BROADCAST PRESENTATIONS OF SPAIN, CATALONIA, AND BARCELONA

This study used a quantitative (close to 200 content categories) and qualitative analysis of 25 Opening Ceremony broadcasts to better understand how broadcasters chose to characterize the 1992 Olympic host.⁹ The broadcasts were chosen to

8. The representation of this symbol during the Opening Ceremony caused various international television channels to recognize this «Mediterraneanness», and some others such as Russian television, for example, to make some quite amazing interpretations:

«Perhaps, after the first look it's hard to determine what this emblem means. However, as its creator Josep Trias believes, everything is obvious: a figure of the man in movement is pictured on the white background; and the colors in which the symbolic parts of the body are colored, unmistakably point at his Mediterranean origin. (...) Blue represents the sea, yellow the sun, red life (...). But, to tell you the truth, it (the emblem) also reminds me of a head of a bull; and corrida and Spain — these are inseparable.» (Ostankino 1, Russia, Opening Ceremony).

9. The Barcelona Opening Ceremony broadcasts included in this study include the following: ET1, Greece; NBC, USA; TF1, France; Canal Olímpic, Catalonia; SBC 12, Singapore; Canal 13, Mexico; CTV (English language) and TVA (French language), Canada; TVRI, Indonesia; RTV, Romania; 2nd Channel, Slovenia;

represent a diverse selection of geographic location, media systems, and level of economic development. The broadcast countries include Greece, USA, France, Catalonia, Singapore, Mexico, Canada, Indonesia, Romania, Slovenia, Japan, Russia, South Africa, Brazil, Australia, Germany, Korea, the United Kingdom, Spain, Cuba, Egypt, Colombia, and China. The study also employed research «correspondents» native to each of the countries involved to provide additional observation and interpretation of the broadcast presentations concerning the perception of the Olympic host in their respective countries. While Closing Ceremony broadcasts were not subjected to the same analysis, it should be said that through correspondent reports and a review of Closing Ceremony broadcasts it was clear that knowledge about Barcelona and Catalonia as hosts increased substantially over the course of the Games (and should be kept in mind when reviewing the Opening Ceremony findings). Add to this the success of the Games and plenty of visual exposure for the host city and it is safe to say that broadcasters finished their Olympics commentary full of positive regard for its host. The broad identity objective of creating or enhancing a «favorable» image was certainly achieved.

2.1 Attention to the host

But what of more specific identity objectives? Reflective both of differences in the overall quantity of broadcaster commentary and interest in presenting cultural aspects of the Opening Ceremony, broadcasters varied in the relative amount of attention spent characterizing the host and narrating the cultural performances in terms which reflected on a host identity. Figure 1 compares these levels of attention by comparing the number of distinct comments or associations broadcast commentators made that relate in some way to the portrayal of the host either directly or indirectly (through the characterization of cultural segments). This figure does not reflect purely descriptive commentary about the cultural performances («There are now 1200 dancers entering the stadium»), but only commentary which educates or pre-

NHK, Japan; Ostankino 1, Russia; SABC, South Africa; TV Globo, Brazil; Ch. 7, Australia; ARD, Germany; MBC, Korea; TVE-2, Spain; Tele-Rebelde, Cuba; RCN, Colombia; CRTV, Cameroon; CCTV, China; BBC, UK; and ERTU2, Egypt.

Each broadcast was both visually and verbally transcribed (and translated if necessary) for analysis purposes. For a more complete description of methods and list of content analysis categories used in this study, contact the Centre d'Estudis Olímpics i de l'Esport, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Spain.

sents, in some way, information regarding the host («they are now dancing the Sardana, a traditional Catalan dance»). Oddly, there is little to explain how broadcasters are distributed along this figure — except at the extremes, where the CCTV (China) commentator not only didn't say much in general, but showed no interest whatsoever in the cultural or political distinctiveness of Barcelona and Catalonia (discussed below), while ET1 (Greece) commentators clearly revealed in the «return» of the Olympics to a Mediterranean port.




Figure 1: Broadcaster Attention to Host Identity and Performances

2.2 *The portrayal of Spain*

The Royal Family

Attention to Spain, across nearly all broadcasters, mostly focused on the King and the royal family, most often prompted by visual images of King Juan Carlos I and family in the tribunal. As organizers hoped, a few broadcasters emphasized the success and stability of Spain's democratic transition (in particular NBC, USA; CTV, Canada; Canal 13, Mexico), identifying the King as the protagonist of the new Spanish democracy.

And so does [King] Juan Carlos deserve this moment, so instrumental in guiding his nation through treacherous waters toward democracy and out of the dark ages of fascism under Generalissimo Francisco Franco (NBC, USA, Opening Ceremony)

Canal 13 (Mexico), Ostankino 1 (Russia) and ARD (Germany) emphasized the popularity of the King in the management of political power. The Russian commentator, in particular, communicated a sense of a country united by love for the King. Several broadcasters emphasized aspects of the King that were significantly less political, such as his sportiness (TVE, Spain; SABC, South Africa; 2nd Channel, Slovenia; and NHK, Japan). Strangely enough, this non-political approach to the royal family is also the case for the BBC which apparently did not want to establish any comparisons between the British monarchy which, at the time of the opening of the Games, was less popular than the Spanish monarchy. CCTV China did not make any political reference to the figure of the King whatsoever.

Passion for life

With one of the performance segments (flamenco dance and opera) titled «Land of Passion» it was not surprising that 10 of the broadcasts specifically associate this attribute with the Spanish people. All told, 62% of the broadcasts characterized the Spanish people as having a deeply felt passion and love of life expressed through music, festival, and color. Only NHK (Japan) commentators refer to more traditional stereotypes of bullfights and joined NBC (USA) and TF1 (France) in remarking on the beautiful Spanish women. (Also, the BBC UK chose as part of its opening graphic for its daily

Olympic broadcast a picture of a bullfighter, flamenco dancer, and red carnations). One Chinese press account after the Opening Ceremony was quoted as saying, «although there was not the symbol of Spain — bullfighting — in the performances at the Opening Ceremony, the performances as a whole were very cultural and colorful.»¹⁰

A «cultured» host

The goal of the Olympic planners for Spain to be associated with high culture was met in the sense that most of the broadcasts mentioned well known artists (Picasso, Miró, etc.) and nearly all made general comments about the Spanish love of music and art («Spain has offered so much to the world in culture, art, architecture, music, sports,» SABC, South Africa, Opening Ceremony). However, any sense of a specific artistic tradition (e.g., modernism) was tied much more to the presentation of Barcelona than of Spain.

Also, few broadcasts attempted to place various dance or music segments in their Spanish contexts (Andalusian, Aragón, etc.) or show much affinity for the relatively long segments of opera presented by some world famous Spanish artists. As an example, Langer described a central tension in the Australian Channel 7 broadcast as the commentators positioned as «uncultured» outsiders trying to grasp «European high culture» (opera, arts, theater). He said that «a symptom of this tension was the virtual silence of the commentators while the opening cultural pageant unfolded compared with the verbosity of these commentators once the athletes joined in.»¹¹ In fact, across several broadcasts the relatively long, performance segments of opera, devoid of action, served more to silence the largely sports-oriented commentators than to provoke commentary about Spain and its high culture. Awatef Abd El-Rahman, reporting perceptions of the ceremony in Egypt, suggested that the opera singing, while consistent with the ceremony, was contrary to «the Arab mood which is not in favor with that sort of singing.»¹² This attitude was also reflected in the comments of the study correspondents from the United Kingdom:

10. *Wenhui Bao*, 26 July 1992. This is a Shanghai newspaper geared to intellectuals.

11. Langer, John (1992). «Correspondent Report for Australia,» *Television in the Olympics Project Archive*. Barcelona: Centre d'Estudis Olímpics i de l'Esport, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona.

12. El-Rahman, Awatef Abd et al (1992). «Correspondent Report for Egypt,» *Television in the Olympics Project Archive*. Barcelona: Centre d'Estudis Olímpics i de l'Esport, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona.

Among the less relevant symbolism as perceived through the BBC's coverage was the sight of half a dozen people (including some conspicuous heavyweights) dressed in faintly absurd clothes and singing lollipop fragments of opera. [The BBC commentator] did not indicate what this meant in the context of the ceremony, and it was left hanging uncertainly as a celebration of Spanish or European culture. It also became (through costume, «classicism» and fat) a celebration of wealth and power...¹³

2.3 Catalonia's coming out party

Much to the delight of the Generalitat of Catalonia there was a much greater recognition of Catalonia in international media than expected. Looking specifically at the broadcasters in this study most found the idea of «Catalanness» something worth presenting to home audiences. For NHK (Japan), for example, the existence of Catalonia provided a basic introductory framework to the Opening Ceremony as a whole:

K: Mr. Hirano, for spectators to able to enjoy the ceremony, we need to explain something about Catalonia, right?

H: Yes, that's right, because Spain is a country with a strong sense of autonomy. The people of each region insist on his own sense of autonomy and among them the Catalans are strongest. Many centuries ago in this region was a time in which it was independent, very prosperous with its center in Barcelona. Accordingly, from the point of view of Catalan people and Barcelonans this opportunity is not a Spanish, but Catalan Olympics. (NHK, Japan, Opening Ceremony)

Table 1 summarizes the percentage of broadcasts that recognize Catalonia, either directly or indirectly, as a distinct political and cultural unit. It should be noted, however, that this particular table represents «mentions» only and does not mean there was an accompanying explanation of what, just exactly, Catalonia «is.» For example, every broadcaster mentioned the visual entrance of the Catalan flag into the stadium, but CCTV (China) did not explain its meaning or ever mention Catalonia again in its broadcast.

13. Izod, John, Peter Meech, and Tim Hornicroft, with the collaboration of Richard Kilborn (1992). «Correspondent Report for United Kingdom,» *Television in the Olympics Project Archive*. Barcelona: Centre d'Estudis Olímpics i de l'Esport, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona.

Refer to Catalonia as a nation or politically autonomous region	32% (8)
Refer to the Catalan anthem	60% (15)
Refer to the Catalan flag	100% (25)
Refer to the Catalan language	68% (17)
Refer to the «sardana» performance as Catalan folklore	76% (19)
Refer to the «human pyramids» as Catalan folklore or tradition	80% (20)
Name Jordi Pujol as the President of the Generalitat of Catalonia	64% (16)
Refer to Catalonia as having a distinct history	56% (14)

* N = 25

Table 1 Recognition of Catalan Political and Cultural Symbols

While the majority of broadcasters recognized the existence of Catalonia as evidenced in the above table, they varied considerably in the clarity and theme of that presentation. Each of the broadcast presentations of Catalonia in this analysis could be described as falling into one of the following four identity orientations:

1. Catalonia is an autonomous political and cultural identity distinct from, and at times in conflict, with Spain. The Opening Ceremony design is seen as representative of both the cooperative and conflictual nature of this relationship.
2. Catalonia has a cultural and political identity distinct from, but fully compatible with, the rest of Spain. The Opening Ceremony is seen as an opportunity for audiences to experience Catalan culture, but the display does not hold any political connotations.
3. Catalonia is mentioned — and thus implied as distinct in some way, but it is not really explained. Catalonia is used interchangeably with Spain as host.
4. Catalonia is not presented in any way as a politically, culturally, or linguistically distinct entity.

The Opening Ceremony as a victory for Catalonia

In contrast to some of the negative pre-event media framing concerning the possibility that North Korea or student activists might disrupt the Seoul Olympics, the international media at Barcelona appeared to reject any central story line involving potential conflict or terrorism. For their part, the call for «Olympic peace» was well heeded by Catalan nationalist groups who, in line with their general tendency to reject

violence as a way of defending their identity, at no time whatsoever decided on mounting a boycott. Instead, they proposed festive ways of demonstrating their identity at all times (encouraging of flags and decorations on balconies, streets festivals, etc.) which, given the inherently positive context of the Olympics, seemed to prove more attractive to international sports media than the staging of nationalist demonstrations. There was interest expressed by several broadcasters in the political dimensions of the Barcelona Olympic Games. In the end, however, this vein of discourse largely ended up as compliments on the ability of all parties to work cooperatively.

Even so, the broadcasts of NBC (USA), ET1 (Greece), CTV (Canada), Channel 7 (Australia), Canal A (Colombia), TF1 (France), Canal 13 (Mexico), NHK (Japan), ARD (Germany), BBC (UK) and TVA (Canada) fall generally within the first identity orientation in that they all recognized the political dimension of the relationship between Catalonia and Spain and saw the Opening Ceremony as somehow emblematic of that relationship.

Well after the bitter civil war and dictatorship, there was a sensitive question. Should the Games be more or less Catalan or more or less Spanish? It was only settled after semi-formal negotiations between the national government and the Catalonians and tonight we'll see the compromise (BBC, UK, in introductory comments to Opening Ceremony).

These broadcasters readily note the presence of Catalan symbols at the ceremony (flag, anthem, language, and folk performance, political representatives) and imply their presence as a victory of sorts for Catalonia. For example, when King Juan Carlos I of Spain made his official declaration of the opening of the Games, he spoke alternately in Catalan and Spanish. Here's how the NBC commentators reacted to the King:

C: The reaction of the crowd! King Juan Carlos spoke Catalan, and that is significant. The Mayor [of Barcelona] was quoted as saying only a couple of days ago, «let us make this an occasion of Catalan pride, pride in Barcelona, but not antagonism toward any other region of Spain at large, let's come together for this one.» As apparently they have.

E: Incredible concession. You heard the appreciative reaction of the Catalans in the Olympic stadium...(NBC, USA, Opening Ceremony)

For NBC, these were definitely Catalan Olympics, and at times the U.S. broadcaster seemed to give the ceremony

more political significance than the Olympic planners did. Earlier in the ceremony NBC even went well beyond the boundaries of the ceremony's official script to re-interpret the Mediterranean Sea segment as a representation of the Catalans' historic effort to defend their identity.¹⁴

E: Many of the great explorers of history were either Spanish or sailed under the Spanish flag: Columbus, Magellan, Ponce de León, Cortez, Pizarro. In a sense, you might think this [the performance] represents their adventures, the peril they encountered, seeking a new world, going off toward uncharted territory. In a sense, that's true, but it's also meant to represent the fierce independence of Barcelona and Catalonia, the vicissitude of their existence, rocked from to and fro by conquerors from other lands, dictators from Spain at large, their fierce determination to fight off those influences and be sovereign, determine their circumstances themselves, again, no matter what evil, what adversity...(NBC, USA, Opening Ceremony)

And, as if to underscore just who the «real» host was NBC commentators introduced the «Land of Passion» flamenco performance segment as «not a bit Catalan» then cut away to conduct interviews outside the stadium.

As noted, the U.S. broadcast was not the only ones to imbue political importance into some of the ritual, folkloric and musical performances of the ceremonies. Here is how two other broadcasters characterized the Catalan folk dance, the «sardana»:

This sardana was prohibited during the Franco era. It became, like the language, a symbol of Catalan autonomy. (ARD, Germany, Opening Ceremony)

The interlocked hands represent the solidarity and the collective strength of the Catalan people. (BBC, Great Britain, Opening Ceremony).

14. The «Mediterranean Sea, Olympic Sea» performance was produced for the Barcelona Opening Ceremony by the avant garde Barcelona theatrical group La Fura del Baus. The segment begins with a mythical, giant mechanical Hercules participating in the first Olympic Games. Then the Olympic spirit, symbolized by a boat, travels metaphorically through time and space from the first Games of ancient Greece, crossing the Mediterranean Sea (the stadium floor covered with performers elaborately costumed in blue), to the Barcelona Games of 1992. On its way, the ship and its crew confront a variety of fantastical monsters representing the evils that have plagued humankind and threatened the existence of the Olympic Games over the centuries: illness, war, hunger, etc. In this end, good triumphs and Hercules' renewed spirit arrives in Barcelona 1992 to pay homage to the achievements of modern civilization and stage a new Olympic Games. Key symbolic elements in this performance segment are water (the Mediterranean Sea), the sun, and Greek mythology related to Hercules as son of Zeus, hero and Olympic victor.

The BBC suggested that the tension between Catalan and Spanish nationalism was harmonized in several segments of the ceremony with the inclusion of both the sardana and some «flamenco steps,» too. They also note that a musical «consensus» was arrived at when both «El Concierto de Aranjuez» (Spanish) and «El cant dels ocells» by Pau Casals (Catalan) were played.¹⁵ This idea of consensus was also underscored by other broadcasters at more ritualistic moments of the ceremony, particularly in the choice of the final flame carriers:

It's [a final torch] relay...to Juan Antonio San Epitanio, a basketball player, representing the city of Barcelona, whereas Mr. Menéndez [who entered the stadium with the torch] was from Madrid, also a symbol of these two cities sharing the last race, that of the flame to its final destination, at least for 1992. (TVA, Canada, Opening Ceremony)

The French TF1 broadcaster, in particular, focused on the cooperative outcome of the relationship between Catalonia and Spain throughout its broadcast. Referring to the fact that the Spanish and Catalan flags are both red and yellow, the commentator said:

...different tones but ultimately there is that unity of red and yellow which expresses so well the relations between Spain and Catalonia, who are so different but have such close ties. It's something that is not very comprehensible, perhaps not even very logical, but which is profoundly rich and creative. (TF1, France, Opening Ceremony)

Although agreement was not always possible, as when the BBC commentator noted that the use of French to introduce entering teams during the athletes' parade was because «the Catalans and the Spanish couldn't agree.»

Acknowledgment of the political dimension of Catalonia did not necessarily mean that these broadcasters delved into the same level of historical detail as, for example, the NBC (USA) broadcast did. According to Langer, most of the comments by Australia's Channel 7 about the «fervently Catalan city» of Barcelona were mostly «throw away» lines or «momentary gestures,» passing by quickly, without follow up or substance.¹⁶

15. Izod et al (1992), op cit.

16. Langer (1992), op cit.

The Opening Ceremony as an introduction to Catalan culture

While the two primary «Catalan» performance segments, the «sardana» segment and «Els Castellers» were recognized by 75% of the broadcasts as based on Catalan folklore, not all broadcasters chose to bestow any political dimension to their presence in the ceremony. The broadcasts of Ostankino 1 (Russia), 2nd Channel (Slovenia), RTV (Romania), and SBC 12 (Singapore), for example, readily acknowledged the Catalan origins of these performance segments and other ceremony symbols, but did not relate these to any relationship between Catalonia and Spain. For these broadcasters «Catalanness» was a cultural presence, not a political one. For the Slovenian 2nd Channel commentator, for example, the linguistic attributes of Catalonia found some affinity with the strong linguistic nationalism associated with Slovenia. Again, while acknowledgments of Catalonia were distinct there was rarely a sense of depth to these comments, as our Russian correspondent noted, «Catalonia was mentioned, but ignored...[the image was] positive, but insufficient.»¹⁷

Catalonia as undefined

For those broadcasters remaining, ERTU2 (Egypt), Tele-Rebelde (Cuba), TVRI (Indonesia), SABC (South Africa), and MBC (Korea), Catalonia «exists» in that it was mentioned. Any definition, however, not only lacked depth, but was decidedly vague — particularly in relation to Spain. Catalonia and Spain were used interchangeably to describe ceremony features, with Barcelona most frequently cited as host. For example, the Indonesian commentator said, referring to the sardana:

This dance is often performed in open spaces in the cities around Catalonia. (...). And as we are seeing on the television screen these dancers do not include only young people but also those who are not young any more. Older people are also participating. Because indeed this dance is owned by all Catalonians. (TVRI, Indonesia, Opening Ceremony)

He then referred to this as a «Spanish tradition» in the next sentence.

The South African broadcaster (SABC) missed the entire

17. Zassoursky, Yassen, with Svetlana Kolesnik, and Andrei Richter (1992). «Correspondent Report for Russia,» *Television in the Olympics Project Archive*. Barcelona: Centre d'Estudis Olímpics i de l'Esport, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona.

first segment of the ceremony intended to present Catalan culture to the world — and thus missed the opportunity to introduce the ceremony design as reflective of its Catalan host. (In fact, advertisements took up over a third of the cultural performances in SABC's broadcast, affecting any coherent cultural narrative that commentators might engaged in.)

There is no Catalonia

The fourth identity orientation included only one broadcaster in this study: China's CCTV. Other than one brief and unexplained reference to the Catalan flag as it entered the stadium (alongside flags of Barcelona and Spain), no aspect of Catalonia — its language, culture or political autonomy — was mentioned at any time in the broadcast. That said, it should also be mentioned that little detail, if any, is offered by the CCTV commentator about the Spanish monarchy, Spain or even Europe. One Chinese press commentary actually wondered about the absence of Spain:

Although there was not the symbol of Spain — bullfighting — in the performances at the Opening Ceremony, as a whole they were very cultural and colorful.¹⁸

Instead the CCTV commentator's interest concentrated more on aspects such as the unifying tradition of the cultural segments rather than their national origin.

Domestic context influencing broadcaster recognition of Catalonia

There existed a wide range of preparation and interest on the part of different broadcasters in interpreting, rather than just describing, the Opening Ceremony. For the most part ceremony planners got their wish that Catalonia would be «presented» as unique, in some way, to global audiences. The limits to their identity objectives were found in the presentation of Catalonia as an autonomous political community. This outcome, however, was likely beyond the efforts of the ceremony planners to control. Reviewing the findings concerning the presentation of Catalonia it is clear that the broadcasters associated with the three identity orientations that did not under-

18. From an article in the Chinese newspaper *Wenhui Bao*, as reported in Kong, Xiang-an (1992). «Correspondent Report for China,» *Television in the Olympics Project Archive*. Barcelona: Centre d'Estudis Olímpics i de l'Esport, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Kong does suggest that some press coverage of Catalonia did appear in China during the Games.

score the political dimension of Catalonia's character represented specific types of geopolitical and social environments listed below. These domestic contexts may well have affected their presentation of Catalonia as host:

— Broadcasters from countries that have cultural, linguistic or national plurality problems that politically condition the commentators. This is the case, for example, for CCTV (China) and TVRI (Indonesia).

— Broadcasters from countries that have social or development problems which clearly affect the interest their commentators may have in the problem of national and linguistic minorities in Europe. This is the case, for example, for ERTU2 (Egypt), and CRTV (Cameroon).

— Broadcasters from countries that are subject to situations of social conflict that cast a shadow over their interest in these questions of identity. This is the case of the extreme complexity for SABC (South Africa), whose television channel does mention that differences exist between Catalonia and Spain although hardly considers the political dimensions of this difference.

— Broadcasters from countries that are currently experiencing great transformations with dramatic nationalistic implications and which prefer to concentrate their attention on other aspects of the ceremony such as the freedom and creativity of expression (Ostankino 1, Russia), the union of the athletes and the value of Olympism (RTV, Romania and 2nd Channel, Slovenia).

— Broadcasters from countries that are culturally more distant from Europe whose commentators are more interested in the global aspects of a Mediterranean culture than in the specific features of the cultural or national identity of Catalonia. Specific descriptions related to Catalan culture are given more global interpretations. This is the case for a broadcaster such as MBC (Korea).

Before leaving this discussion of Catalonia as a host identity, it is worth reflecting on a few special cases.

Surprise and acceptance in Latin America. The image of Catalonia and Spain in Latin America, as a consequence of their important historic, cultural and linguistic relationships, deserves some special attention. Analysis of the commentaries of TV Globo (Brazil), Canal 13 (Mexico), Tele-Rebelde (Cuba), and RCN (Colombia) revealed two interesting reactions to the host identity in the ceremony. First, there is more surprise than in other parts of the world about the pre-

sence — and existence — of such cultural and linguistic variety in Spain. Second, there is a special interest that these diversities express themselves in a positive Catalonia-Spain relationship. The Brazilian commentator suggested to his viewers that «they are becoming immersed in the capital of Catalonia.» With that identification, the duality of Catalonia / Spain or of Spanish / Catalan culture is fully accepted.

«Let's see...this is a symbol of the Olympiad. A smile of all Spaniards, not only Catalans, but from all Spaniards to everyone in the world». (TV Globo, Brazil, Opening Ceremony)

This surprise and acceptance of the Catalan / Spanish relationship is even more evident when considering the Catalan language, its protagonism as the official language, and its use by some of the most important dignitaries in the ceremonies.

Even more intriguing to several of the Latin American commentators, however, was the modernization of Spain, of which Barcelona seemed an admirable expression.

J.R.F. Barcelona is proof of a new Spain. A re-urbanized Barcelona, a modern Barcelona with its grand architecture and grand port that's a door to Europe...

J.S.: Barcelona has been radically transformed in the last years, a transformation that cost 7-8 million dollars! But today Barcelona is a beautiful city.(Canal 13, Mexico, Opening Ceremony)

Quebec and Catalonia: birds of a feather? One of the reasons that the French Canadian broadcaster TVA was included in this study was an interest in some of the similarities between Quebec and Catalonia — both nations with a sense of being linguistically and culturally unique within their home state. As it turned out explicit parallels between Catalonia and Quebec were not made by TVA commentators although, without reading too much into their commentary, they did show a special interest in Catalonia, in particular the Catalan language, and suggested at times a sense of camaraderie, as in the following comment:

[Our] Catalan friends...a generous people, a warm people...a people with traditions...a people which is marked by its culture, but its architects, but its artists and its painters...by its musicians and by its dynamism during the 1990s (TVA, Canada, Opening Ceremony)

The Spanish broadcasters: self presentation of the most humble kind. One final reference should be made to the truly

unique treatment of Catalonia and the Catalonia/Spain issue by the Spanish TVE and Catalan Canal Olímpic television channels. There is a great degree of self-control on the part of the commentators (in contrast to the spontaneity and ease of several other international broadcasters) when dealing with the issue of the Catalonia-Spain relationship. The rhetoric seemed to avoid conflictive questions altogether. In fact, there is not one explicit reference whatsoever throughout both ceremony broadcasts to the national question of Catalonia or to its relationship with Spain. The exception is some emotional references to a Catalan symbol in TVE and making a single unqualified mention of the Catalan language in the Catalan Canal Olímpic broadcast.

2.4 The presentation of the official host: Barcelona

Because of the physical presence of Olympic activities within the host city, the image of Barcelona was by nature quite different from presentations of the more imaged entities of Catalonia and Spain. The city was uniformly seen through its unique architectural, artistic and urban planning features. Probably as a consequence of its visual accessibility, the number of items defining its image had more breadth and heterogeneity, but the resulting image was also remarkably consistent across broadcasts.

Most broadly, Barcelona was interpreted as the place where an historic event was occurring which affects the whole of humanity. Barcelona was identified as the capital of Catalonia in nearly half of the broadcasts, but it was a city being transformed — for the duration of the Games — into a «capital of the world.» This «special» Olympic capital city status allowed many commentators to present Barcelona as the most fascinating and compelling city, especially regarding the quality of life and the attractions it offers to people visiting it. These references would become more and more persistent and enthusiastic by the time of the Closing Ceremony.

A splendid city. It's a city that gives you a feeling after a few hours of an intensity, a vitality, a creativity, an intense creativity. Life is everywhere, art is everywhere, with a simplicity in community life that is stunning. (TF1, France, Opening Ceremony)

A city of contrasts and creativity

Specifically meeting the goals of the Olympic planners, Barcelona was interpreted at one and the same time as being

old and new («The old and the new mixed in Barcelona,» TV Globo, Brazil, Opening Ceremony), as historic and modern, as a city that lives in the streets. Much of this was able to be expressed using the television cameras.

For several broadcasters «La Rambla,» Barcelona's most famous street, offered an excellent visual representation of the «personality» of Barcelona and its inhabitants. For example, NBC (USA) began its broadcast of the Opening Ceremony with some camera images of this famous promenade, pointing out that the widest part was given over to pedestrians while the narrowest parts on each side were reserved for cars.

Eight o'clock, Saturday evening in Barcelona, and what you're seeing in this Opening Ceremony, a tribute to the signature boulevard of Barcelona, Las Ramblas. Flower people, bird people, here's a look at Las Ramblas. There's no other boulevard quite like it in the entire world, a pedestrian walkway where those on foot occupy the wide center cut and automobiles negotiate the narrow sidelines, as if they were consigned to the sidewalks. Newspaper kiosks seemingly almost every ten or fifteen yards. There's the huge food market, you saw just a moment ago, la Boqueria, and just about every twenty or thirty yards you'll see merchants selling caged birds or colorful flowers, and that's what the people down on the stadium infield are meant to represent here....Las Ramblas is a nearly 24 hours a day kaleidoscope of humanity, street performers, mimes, home to vagabond and aristocrat alike, you might say. If you had just one day or night to spend in Barcelona, and you wanted to absorb a good portion of what the city is about, you'd spend it strolling from the center of the city down to the Columbus statue alongside the Mediterranean, Las Ramblas. (NBC, USA, Opening Ceremony)

Through this type of commentary Barcelona was portrayed as a colorful and creative city that has been able to offer the world great «avant-garde» artists such as Gaudí, Miró, Picasso, Dalí, etc. Some broadcasters such as Japan's NHK, used specially designed studio sets which replicated Gaudi architecture or represented other artistic styles of Barcelona as background the television commentators.

A city of renewal

One of the items most emphasized by the international press over the Games' preparatory period was the exceptional urban renovation experienced by Barcelona during the Olympic planning period. During the Opening Ceremony, the television commentators also referred to the urban rene-

wal of Barcelona, especially as related it to the sports facilities (e.g., the renovation of the stadium). References to the modernization process, the wealth of Catalonia and Barcelona, and the efficiency of the organization of the Games were most frequent in the broadcasts of Indonesia (TVRI), Egypt (ERTU2), Cuba (Tele-Rebelde), Romania (RTV), Slovenia (2nd channel) and China (CCTV). Barcelona was definitely not associated with a siesta-style pace.

The progress achieved by Barcelona, in culture, economics...gives Barcelona a good chance to become the greatest city in the world. And they have proved this. They are capable of becoming the host of the 25th Olympics (TVRI, Indonesia, Opening Ceremony)

Broadcasters demonstrated little interest in more strictly economic realms, such as trade and industry attributes, although there were generalized references to Barcelona as the «economic capital» of Spain (e.g., ERTU2, Egypt). Despite a few references in some Opening Ceremony broadcasts to traffic, high hotel prices, unfriendly police, and the like, Barcelona came away looking through the lens of the television camera like a gem of art, and architecture with sports-loving and hospitable people, more than capable of hosting a successful Olympic Games.

3. THE CULTURAL CONTEXT FOR THE GAMES

3.1 *Europe as part of the host identity*

The European Community in 1992 (now European Union) also saw itself as host. To this end, the European Commission established an EC Olympic Programme and contributed money to have a presence in Barcelona (through street flags and banners) and in the Opening Ceremony during a 22-minute performance part entitled «Music and Europe» which included opera, the human pyramids («Els Castellers which linked a traditional Catalan folk activity to the symbols of the EC flag and its 12 member nations), and the playing of the European anthem «Ode to Joy» with accompanying fireworks.¹⁹ Locally,

19. In the introduction to the Opening Ceremony Press Guide, a few indirect references to Europe were made: «Spain is the south-eastern gateway to Europe,» «Barcelona is a great European city.» The guide defined the European Community as: «Today, twelve countries go to make up the Community Europe, a land where 348 million speak at least nine different languages. United by the blue flag

the EC actively promoted itself to visitors and professionals in attendance at the Games. For example, broadcasters in the international media center were exposed to the EC's promotion of its high-definition television (HDTV) technology. The EC had involved itself in a similar way earlier in the year at the Albertville, France winter Olympics.²⁰

Did broadcasters notice this publicity campaign? The answer would have to be only marginally and never to the level of centrality that Barcelona, Catalonia and Spain played as host entities. To understand this outcome, it is worth pointing out some of the challenges the EC faced in trying to promote its image through an Olympic Games.

First, the image of Europe that was projected in Barcelona faced the difficulty of confusion over the global idea of Europe and the idea of the European Union as a political and economic entity of 12 European states. The idea of European culture, moreover, extends beyond the present boundaries of the «Europe of the 12.» Further, any incorrect delimitation could have caused dissatisfaction among the non-Community European countries and posed a problem of matching the European political identity to the cultural identity.

Second, the image of the European Union came up against some special difficulties in the framework of the Olympic Games, dominated by the central role that «nation-states» play in constructing the mythologies of sports representation and ceremony protocol. The European Union did not act as a nation among nations in the Olympic Games, and did not appear as such in the athletes' parade.

Finally, this was a time of great historic changes, which were presenting difficulties in the consolidation process (Maastricht Treaty), with unresolved expectations of extending the Union (Austria, Sweden, Norway, etc.) and the rupture of the historic division between East and West with the subsequent opening up of new European relations.

Under these conditions, the idea of Europe was develo-

with twelve golden stars, the countries of the European Community share the goals of economic policy and are on their way to political union. Today, the European Community is the world's largest market and the cradle of freedom and democracy that reflects the richness of its cultural diversity. The EC is formed by: Germany, Belgium, Denmark, Spain, France, Greece, Holland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal and the United Kingdom.» (COOB'92, Opening Ceremony. Press Guide). The EC also provided a supplementary media guide to broadcasters, which was not noticeably used in the broadcast commentaries.

20. For example, the EC backed a series of advertisements and banners in the streets of Barcelona and Albertville representing the image of an athlete holding a torch decorated with the 12 stars of the community flag.

ped at risk of appearing, in the eyes of other international communities, as a «competitive community,» as a «market» or even as a yet politically undefined and incomplete entity. Given the challenges noted above, the EC chose the positive aspect of this image, the idea of the cooperative community of the future, as its image focus. However, in the end, even this fairly unthreatening strategy did not find its niche within the geopolitical images of Barcelona'92.

Table 2 summarizes references to Europe and the European Community demonstrating the marginal focus put on this aspect of the host identity. The broadcasts that carried no explicit mention of Europe are ARD (Germany), CCTV (China), ERTU2 (Egypt) and Ostankino 1 (Russia). Over 70% of the mentions of Europe came during the human pyramids (Els Castellers) segment as intended by the ceremony planners. Only six of the broadcasts referred to Europe during the playing of the European anthem «Ode to Joy,» and these broadcasters tended to link their mentions of Europe and its anthem with references to the values of universality, unity, solidarity, and so forth, more in keeping with the Olympic spirit. For the Japanese NHK commentators, the European anthem evoked reference to German unification. For Mexican (Canal 13) commentators, the European anthem was the «world anthem.» For Russian (Ostankino 1) and Romanian (RTV) commentators, the anthem had more humanitarian and emotional connotations than European ones:

What's happening in the Olympic stadium now is very symbolic. The Ode to Joy is being performed by a 13-year-old boy (...) Here they are - the Olympic Games! The celebration, that unites all of humanity has finally begun». (Ostankino 1, Russia, Opening Ceremony).

Only Greek (ET1) television, the broadcaster that emphasized the European context most, described the «Ode to Joy» in terms of European unity as was the intent of ceremony planners.

And this is the Ode to Joy, the European anthem sang by a boy 13 years old. (...). This year's Olympic Games coincide with a historic event for Europe. Beginning with the first day of 1993 all economic barriers will be removed between the member countries of the European Economic Community. The Olympic Games and the Expo'92 both of which are being held here in Seville, carry a message, important for all Europeans: Unite. (ET1, Greece, Opening Ceremony)

Mention Europe and the European Community	58% (15)
Mention Europe but not the European Community	11% (3)
Do not mention Europe	15% (4)
Mention Barcelona as a European city	7% (2)

* N = 26

Table 2. References to Europe and the EC in the Opening Ceremony

While perhaps the image of Europe in the Games was in fact a faithful reflection of the limits and conditions in line with which the image of the European Community at that time, the marginal degree of attention paid to things European also relates to the structure of the narration of the ceremony, which did not situate things European in the center of its discourse. Inclusion of «Europe» in the design of the ceremony is as an arbitrary symbolic referent. Thus, for example, in the human pyramid segment, the references to Europe do not arise directly from the narrative of what it represents. Instead, they arise from indirect references: twelve human pyramids that represent the twelve countries of the European Community. Thus, two identification symbols are employed: Catalan folklore (cultural referent) and its homage to Europe (arbitrary symbolic referent). In addition, the segment lost some of its intended impact when, ignoring the instructions that they had been given, the spectators began to light up their flares (which were intended to present the EC flag) at the wrong time (earlier when the Olympic torch entered the stadium), effectively ruining the iconic force planned for this segment and, of course, losing the references to Europe that had been foreseen with the participation of the spectators.²¹

Finally in the segment dedicated to opera lasting 13.5 minutes, performances were given by Spanish singers only, and as such did not manage to evoke the idea of Europe in spite of the official indications («The music Europe created for the

21. Izod et al (1992) op cit. suggest that the design of the segment itself was quite ill-conceived. They said, «It was not a strong moment, not least because only some of the twelve castles were seen [on television]...Furthermore the major struggle in each tower building exercise was involved in building each castle [symbolically one EC country] — any overarching structure linking them would have been architecturally inconceivable. Thus the symbolism served its ostensible purpose weakly.»

universe,» «A clear example of European culture») offered in the media script and guide. Instead, the opera segment acted more as a sign of prestige for the organizers — Catalan and Spanish — than as a sign of identification of Europe and its culture. The only broadcaster that referred to the European meaning of opera were TVE of Spain and Tele-Rebelde of Cuba.

As NBC (USA) did with the political meaning of Catalonia, only the Greek ET1 commentators take their references to Europe, European culture and Europeanness of the Games far beyond the proposals contained in the official script:

We have to say to those who are watching what is going on now. People from Catalonia have begun to form 12 human pyramids. This officially marks the third part of the Opening Ceremony of the Olympic Games. What do these pyramids stand for? They represent the 12 member countries of the European Community. I think we mentioned earlier that the people of Spain have put great emphasis on their role in the European Community.

But so did we. In the ceremony that took place on the hill of Olympia on June 6 and during the festivities in the Panathenaikon Stadium two days later, in both cases we raised the flag of Europe and played the anthem of the European Economic Community (...) it is very obvious that Europe is the future of the world... These castells, these pyramids that are being formed represent the unity of strength and solidarity of the construction of Europe. (ET1, Greece, Opening Ceremony).

3.2 The Mediterranean culture of the Barcelona'92 Olympic Games

Ultimately more attractive to the international broadcasters than the idea of a «European culture» hosting the Games was the host as Mediterranean culture. In fact, 17 or 68% of the broadcasts studied explicitly identify Catalonia as a Mediterranean country and/or Barcelona as a Mediterranean city, while there were no explicit references to identify either Catalonia or Spain as a «European countries» (and only two which identify Barcelona as European, Mexico's Canal 13 and Indonesia's TVRI). The Mediterranean, unlike Europe, appears to be a non-political and non-institutional concept, much easier to identify with the Catalan identity than with the concept of Europe. Further it was consistently interpreted as a positive cultural value: historic, representative of renewal, and creative.

As noted earlier, this interpretation by broadcasters was

fully compatible with the desires of the Olympic planners who, from the initial stages of candidature, felt comfortable with the idea of expressing Mediterranean values as a starting point, framework, and common denominator in the cultural identity program. And, many broadcasters related well to the choice of this well known body of water as context for the aforementioned performance segment called «The Mediterranean Sea.» It's worth noting that as with the European context, for Greek ET1 commentators the choice of the Mediterranean concept as central to the Games and to the Opening Ceremony held very special meaning. It represented the main link among classical Olympism, the renewal of the Games in Athens in 1896, and the «new Mediterranean Games» in Barcelona'92.

We hear the first notes of «Mediterranea» 360 drums shatter the silence with their loud beat (...). And the part that follows ladies and gentlemen has as theme the Mediterranean the Olympic Sea (...), the theme could have also been «return to the Mediterranean.» After 96 years the Olympic Games returned to the Mediterranean. The first Games were held at the Panathenaikon Stadium of Athens in 1896. Since then all the Olympiads have been hosted by countries close to the Mediterranean but never bordered by this peace offering sea, the sea of civilization. And they have come back to the Mediterranean after 96 years. Understandably therefore, the people of Spain, the Catalans, honor the Mediterranean, our sea, here in Barcelona (...). Ryuichi Sakamoto, Japanese, 40 years old has composed this piece dedicated to the Mediterranean and it is ironic the fact that someone from Japan has written a music honoring the Mediterranean (...). (ET1, Greece, Opening Ceremony)

4. THE PLAN SUCCEEDS

The strategy to project a favorable host identity succeeded in the ways deemed most important to Olympic planners. They were not only able to balance the presentation the different geopolitical entities involved, but were able to consolidate the discrete needs of these different hosts into simplified visual and cultural themes that truly emphasized the intersection of these identities: Mediterranean, color, life, modernity, history, passion, art, and warmth. Further, the planners seemed to succeed in connecting these local cultural attributes to more universal feelings.

4.1 *Projecting a local culture as global*

In large part the identity goal for Catalonia — to get on the map — was readily met. Catalan culture was presented, by most broadcasters, as elemental to cultural aspects of the ceremony. However, it is doubtful that most international audiences came away with an understanding of Catalonia as a politically autonomous community within Spain. Only a few broadcasts really pursued a story line of a history of political and cultural conflict between Catalonia and the rest of Spain, and even this was primarily used by these broadcasters to promote a more transcendent, universal emotion of the Games as a place for resolution and not to further a political agenda for the Catalan people.

This outcome, however, does not contradict the identity goals of the planners. In fact, it was considered critical to the success of the Opening Ceremony to have the local aspects of the folkloric performances seen within the context of a global event, serving to connect the host to a broader global condition. Thus, for example, the stress the commentators put on the «Catalan,» «Canarian,» «Madrid,» «Andalusian,» etc. origin of the various singers and actors was hoped to seem perfectly compatible with the international nature of these same figures. The opera singer Montserrat Caballé, for example, was on many occasions in broadcast commentaries referenced as both «Catalan» and «universal» or «world famous,» and her image upholds this ambiguity perfectly well. Similarly, it was the desire of Olympic planners to give the character of Barcelona, Catalonia, and Spain international essence and connection. Rothenbuhler admires the audacity of this attempt: «Ultimately, it was charming to realize that Barcelona was portraying itself as at the center of the origin of civilization — and doing it with convincing style.»²²

4.2 *The influence of television on host identity*

Thinking of television in the Olympics, most broadcaster presentations of the Olympic host discussed here were prompted by tangible, visual imagery strategically located by Olympic planners within the ceremony and around the city: Catalan flags in the streets of Barcelona prompted Channel 7

22. Rothenbuhler, Eric (1992). «Correspondent Report for the United States,» *Television in the Olympics Project Archive*. Barcelona: Centre d'Estudis Olímpics i de l'Esport, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona.

(Australian) commentators to characterize the city as «fervently Catalan,» the linked hands of the sardana circle dance provoked an association with the collective spirit of Catalonia, a smiling King Juan Carlos speaking Catalan represented a positive Spanish / Catalonia relationship, and so forth. More abstract identity goals (democratic stability, encouragement of economic initiative, political history, growing industries, a European community) were less noticed by broadcasters and not brought up without some specific connection between a broadcaster's cultural context and the host (e.g., an interest in urban renovation) and in some cases was purposely avoided (China's CCTV not wanting to underscore the political autonomy or nationalism of Catalonia within Spain). In particular, several of the study correspondents wrote of the impact that visual images had on perceptions of Barcelona, by associating local landmarks, people, architecture, cultural performance, Olympic venue settings and design features. Somehow these images encouraged television broadcasters to link the host identity with passion, history, culture, innovation, modernism, Mediterranean, and so forth with great consistency across broadcasts. Thus, it was to credit of the 1992 Olympic organizers that they chose host identity goals not only compatible with the visual character of television, but which held a simplicity of meaning readily understood across many different cultural orientations.

THE IMAGE OF BARCELONA '92 IN THE INTERNATIONAL PRESS

MURIEL LADRÓN DE GUEVARA
XAVIER CÓLLER / DANIEL ROMANÍ¹

To open a copy of a paper like the *International Herald Tribune* towards the end of July, 1992, and see the names of Barcelona, Reus, Terrassa or Mollet in the headlines that indicated each item of news — where normally you would expect to see Tokyo, Brussels, New York, or Paris — made us feel both strange and pleased. Barcelona had never before launched a promotional campaign of this scope. The city itself was on the front page of more than 15,000 newspapers around the world, with a total estimated circulation of 500 million copies. 12,000 accredited journalists were covering the Games, not only more than for any previous Olympic event, but also a record figure in the world of news coverage in general. In the Barcelona Games, in fact, the journalists outnumbered the athletes.

But what was the image given of Barcelona '92 by the international press? It would be literally impossible to provide a comprehensive worldwide answer to this question. But the systematic monitoring of a selection of publications in the course of 1991 and 1992 — key months involving the run up to, and celebration of, the Games — provided us with a closer look at the subject matter and points of view which together helped to give us a generalised but significant idea of the media treatment handed out to Barcelona by print media around the world.²

A total of 17 newspapers, 4 news agencies, and 3 news

1. Muriel Ladrón de Guevara. BA in Political Sciences and Sociology at the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. General coordinator for the Olympic Studies and Sport Centre at the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona.

Xavier Còller. BA in Information Sciences and Political Science and Sociology at the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Researcher at the Sociology Department.

Daniel Romaní. BA in Information Sciences and Political Science and Sociology at the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Worked in the Press Operations Division for COOB'92. He is a member of the team preparing Barcelona's candidature for European Cultural Capital in the year 2001.

2. Further information can be found in the studies on which this article has been based: Ladrón de Guevara, Muriel/Cóller, Xavier (1993) *La imatge de*

weeklies were selected, on the basis that they provided the most important points of reference in press terms, thanks to their circulation, quality, and influence, in three European countries (France, Italy, United Kingdom), and the United States of America. The publications chosen were: in France: *Le Monde*, *Le Figaro*, *l'Equipe*, *Agence France Presse*; from Italy: *Il Corriere della Sera*, *La Repubblica*, *La Stampa*; from the UK: *The Times*, *The Daily Telegraph*, *The Guardian*, *Financial Times*, *The European*, *Reuter*; in the US: *The New York Times*, *The New Yorker*, *The Washington Post*, *The Wall Street Journal*, *The International Herald Tribune*, *USA Today*, *Time*, *Newsweek*, *Associated Press*, *United Press Independent*.

All these publications were monitored between January 1, 1991, and August, 1992. Out of all the items of news published in the course of this period, 186 were selected for a detailed analysis of their content.

This analysis has made it possible for us to identify the main issues covered by the international press, and to give an idea of the image of Barcelona '92 that was passed on to the readers of the publications in question, together with an indication of the ideas which were assimilated by the journalists who had come to Barcelona, with the emphasis being placed both on what they said and what they left out, and on the relationships which they established with the main players involved in the organisation of the Games, and the way in which disagreements between these players were described. It should not be forgotten that the press was there not simply to report on the more technical and political aspects of the organisation of the Games, but also to criticise where criticism was due.

Main issues

In a short space of time, thousands of journalists who had had no previous contact with the city, and who had never written anything either about it or its country arrived in Barcelona. Some of them arrived with certain preconceived ideas and their work here was largely a matter of searching for statements and figures in order to confirm these ideas. Others, however, went deeper and put together reports which provided their countries of origin with previously unknown information.

Catalunya. Una aproximació al tractament de Catalunya a la premsa internacional a propòsit dels Jocs Olímpics, Centre d'Estudis Olímpics i de l'Esport, Working Paper No. 14.

Romaní, Daniel (1995) *Observats per la premsa internacional*, Centre d'Estudis Olímpics i de l'Esport, Working Paper No. 34.

At all events, it is hardly surprising that most journalists were fascinated by the same subjects, from the urban transformation which Barcelona was undergoing — by far the most well-covered issue — to the Catalan national question, the high hotel prices, the traffic flow, the peculiarities of Catalan popular culture, or the city's night life.

Similarly, the same sources were constantly referred to for information: the designer Xavier Mariscal, the writers Manuel Vázquez Montalbán, Eduardo Mendoza and Joan Barril, the architect Oriol Bohigas, the painter Antoni Tàpies and — it goes without saying — the Mayor Pasqual Maragall, the President of the Catalan Autonomous Government (Generalitat), Jordi Pujol, and the Councillor Delegate of the COOB (Barcelona Olympic Organising Committee) Josep Miquel Abad, were all representative members of the select group of Catalan public figures courted assiduously by the international press.

An article in the American magazine *The New Yorker* stressed this tendency to repeatedly interview the same figures. The author of the article, William Finnegan, describes the scene when he had to interview the «gourmand and democratic communist» Vázquez Montalbán: «I got there just behind two TV crews, who interviewed Montalbán in Catalan and French respectively, and just ahead of a third TV crew who — after our chat — interviewed him in Italian.»

Speaking generally, journalists got the idea that they were in an organised, efficient country. It can therefore be concluded that the national image fostered by clichés such as paella, sun, bullfights, tambourines and improvisation was laid to rest or, at least, put seriously into question, and partially replaced by positive points of reference such as as modernity and design, and, in general, by a sense of responsibility and punctuality.

Other concepts involving the Barcelona Games that were widely circulated throughout the international press were linked to values such as security, hospitality, punctuality, planning, and efficiency. The climate of participation was widely praised, with respect to the accommodation provided for visitors, the massive turnout at the different sporting events, and the generous collaboration of the Olympic Volunteers. The media also brought across the concepts of universality and fraternity promoted by the Games, expressed in the slogan «Friends for Life». Moreover, Barcelona'92 provided an image which previous Olympic cities had been unable to give, that of playing host to a universal Olympiad, with the presence of Russia, Cuba, South Africa, the two Germanies united, and of all the countries which had been at loggerheads a year and a half before, in the Gulf War.

From out of this complex network of images, we will analyse five central issues which we believe to be central to the vision of Barcelona'92 held by the international press:

- The host city: the image of Barcelona. The Games as the driving force behind urban renovation.
- The political and cultural identity of Catalonia.
- Security: the terrorist threat.
- The economy: the Games as investment.
- The Opening Ceremony of the Games.

For each of these sections, quotes and references have been taken from articles in order to highlight the opinion of the press with respect to each of these issues.

1. THE HOST CITY: THE IMAGE OF BARCELONA

The Games as the driving force behind urban renovation

In the years previous to the Games, one issue which raised considerable interest in the international press was the process of urban renovation that Barcelona was going through. There were numerous articles dedicated specifically to this issue. Indeed, reporters were quick to note what has been described by Mayor Maragall as «the most important transformation in the history of Barcelona since the demolishing of the town walls at the end of the 19th century».

In these reports, there is a frequent use of expressions referring to the «authentic renaissance» of the city, or to the «metamorphosis» of Barcelona. A sub-heading in *Libération* on July 26, 1992, gives a good idea of the image they were trying to get across: «The great mass of stone has given birth to a Barcelona—Janus, in which the modern is on friendly terms with the old. The urban layout and traffic networks have undergone an impressive facelift in order to prepare the city for the post—Olympic future.» The *Wall Street Journal* used similar terms in this headline for 21 July, 1992: «In Barcelona, Olympics are used as an engine of Civic rejuvenation.» The *Times* newspaper wrote, on the 24th of the same month: «Barcelona, the capital of Catalonia, is undergoing a Renaissance.»

On the other hand, this image of urban renewal was seen to be a success for the city and its rulers. The Games were seen as an excuse for the carrying out of a complete overhaul of the city which made up for a 40 year setback in comparison to the progress of other main European cities. The *Wall Street Journal* was thus able to affirm, in the article mentioned above:

«Barcelona's ambitions developers have exploited the Olympics as few other cities have done-perhaps as no city will do again.» The recurring theme in all these reports is that the great merit of Barcelona lies not only in having known how to take advantage of the Olympic Games in order to build a few emblematic and isolated buildings — as had been the case in other Olympic cities — but also in having taken advantage of the «Olympic requirements» in order to implement a widespread series of improvements throughout the city. The weekly magazine *Newsweek* was thus able to affirm in an article on May 18, 1992: «Barcelona is simply not what it used to be — and that is due to careful planning.»

The city of Barcelona was widely praised with respect to this issue. Here are just a few examples: *The Guardian* newspaper (16/7/92) stated that «Olympic Barcelona is perhaps the only great event in the history of post-war town planning involving a city as a whole.»; *The European* (7/4/91) describes the rebuilding of the city as «futuristic»; the *Washington Post* (25/4/92) affirmed that «the first medal of the Olympic Games goes to the new city.»; and, to finish, the *Guardian* newspaper (16/7/92) had this unambiguous headline for one of its articles: «Homage to Catalan planning».

Weak points

The international press analysed here also gave some coverage to the problems created by the Olympic Games and by the preparations for them. Particular mention should be made here of the reports on the way in which the citizens of Barcelona were negatively affected in the course of the six year build-up to the Games, by the building work, by worries about the possibly excessive debts being contracted by the city, the criticisms of certain Olympic buildings and the political quarrels which put a stop to some projects (such as the extension of the metro to Montjuïc mountain, the connection of the Ring Roads to the airport, or the projected building of new hotels).

We would like to deal separately with one of the negative aspects which the reporters devoted a lot of space to: the fact that Barcelona had become one of the most expensive cities in Europe. *Agence France Presse*, for example, stressed the increase in prices — which had made Barcelona the most expensive city in Spain — in an article dated April 13, 1992. Meanwhile, the Mayor of Barcelona and COOB'92 itself urged those involved to exercise moderation when it came to making money. The *International Herald Tribune* pointed out on November 6, 1991 that site prices were four times more expen-

sive than in 1986. The *European*, on July 10, 1992, revealed that prices had reached a new high in the Olympic city. The *Reuter* agency, on July 26, 1992, dealt extensively with the same issue, albeit with reference to Spain as a whole.

The atmosphere in Barcelona

As with previous Olympic events, on the the days leading up to the opening ceremony, the media focussed on the atmosphere to be found in the streets of the host city. In the case of Barcelona, as the *Herald Tribune* (24/7/92) pointed out, this pre-Olympic atmosphere was an event in itself. The report stresses the festive mood of the city which «reflected the Catalans' pride at being at the centre of the world stage».

The press gave widespread coverage to the enthusiastic participation of the citizens of Barcelona in the celebration of the Games: the streets were packed every day, every evening, every night. Phrases such as «Games on a human scale, carried out without needless monumental gestures, and determined by the needs of the city,» (*La Repubblica*) were commonplace in the international press throughout July and August of 1992. Special mention was made of the atmosphere of the city. Corine Lesnes, *Le Monde's* opinion columnist for the Olympic period, wrote several columns in which she emphasised the tremendous atmosphere of the city, the exceptional response made by the citizens, the nightlife of the athletes and the Barcelonans, and the «conquest of Montjuïc».

Meanwhile the popular newspaper *USA Today* — in an article published while the Games were actually in progress — made special mention of the festive and welcoming atmosphere to be found in the city. The commentator was agreeably surprised to find women walking around fearlessly on their own or in groups in the city streets at any hour, day or night. Another remark he made was «pickpocketing is an art here, but there is little violence».

This warm, friendly and hospitable atmosphere made a decisive contribution — according to the press — to the success of the Games. Certain reports give us the impression that some correspondents had even fallen in love with the city. This was the impression given by George Vercey of the *New York Times* when he wrote — two days after the Games' closing ceremony — «The athletes never had a chance. It doesn't matter how high they jumped or how fast they ran, they just couldn't win the Games. The Gold Medal went to Barcelona.»

A significant example of the way in which the success of the Games helped change the opinions of certain media is to be

found in *The Wall Street Journal*. When the journalists Craig Forman, Lee Lescaze and Cartla Vitzhum entered Pasqual Maragall's office during the frenetic spring of 1992, the first thing the Mayor did was remark on an article which had been written two years ago by Nicholas Bray, one-time correspondent for the paper in Madrid, and which went as follows: «This is the city of paradoxes. While Barcelona spirit fuels ambitions plans, many go unrealized. (...). Barcelona is desperately overcrowded. Traffic jams block the Seafront boulevard between its port and the city center. Its picturesque Gothic quarter is a nest of poverty, prostitution and petty crime.» In the Summer of 1992, this financial newspaper — considered to be one of the most influential in the world — praised Barcelona — it spoke of the city's energy and of its efficient organisation — and dedicated an unprecedented daily page to news concerning the Olympic Games.

2. THE NATIONAL QUESTION: THE IMAGE OF CATALONIA

The political and national context of the host city

The international press referred repeatedly to the existence of two politico—cultural tendencies: one which stressed the city's role as a showcase for the Spanish state, and another which laid the emphasis on the fact that Barcelona was an expression of Catalan culture.

One image policy tried to ensure that the Games were interpreted as simply one more event among the others that were taking place in Spain in 1992, such as the Seville Expo and «Madrid Cultural Capital». A revealing indication of this interpretation is given by the headline of a *Newsweek* report for December, 1991: «The year of Spain», in which reference was made to the great events of 1992.

Another image policy tried to ensure that journalists would recognise Barcelona as the capital of Catalonia, and Catalonia as a country with its own culture, language and identity. Special mention should be made of the advertising campaign carried out by the Catalan government (Generalitat de Catalunya) and which consisted of the appearance — in the main international papers, just one week before the Games — of a two-page colour advertisement in which, next to a map on which Catalonia and Barcelona were clearly marked, the text read: «In which country would you locate this point (Barcelona)? In Catalonia, of course. A country inside Spain which has its own culture, language and identity.» Some headlines in the international press commented on the philosophy behind this campaign. For

example, this *New York Times* article: «The place where the 1992 Olympics are going to be held? Well, Catalonia!», or the *Time* headline: «Welcome to the Catalan Olympics».

This campaign was linked to different images of Catalonia in the pages of the international press. On the one hand, it was interpreted as an attempt on the part of the Catalan government to stress that Catalonia was a country and not merely a region (for example, *Le Figaro* of 21/7/92, and the *International Herald Tribune* of 18/7/92). On the other hand, coverage was given to criticisms of this campaign, which was seen as playing a part in an excessive Catalanisation of the Games (see *The Times* for 21/7/92 and 25/7/92, or *Le Figaro* for 21/7/92). Last but not least, some reports expressed a fear that this campaign would fan the flames of more radical nationalist groups («perhaps even terrorists», as the *Times* newspaper said) who could boycott the celebration of the Games. The call for tolerance and respect for symbols held in common with other Spanish peoples made by Pasqual Maragall, the mayor of the city and the president of COOB'92, confirms the existence of a potential conflict to a certain extent, while making it clear that points of view differed in varying degrees on this issue (see the *Reuter* reports for 18/7/92 and 19/7/92).

Aspirations to Home Rule

Our analysis has led us to the conclusion that, in general, Catalonia was presented as a community whose aspirations to home rule had been satisfied in part, but that there existed historical wrongs which were responsible for continuous tension between Catalonia and the State (see articles in the *International Herald Tribune* for 6/11/91, *Libération* for 20/3/92 and *The European* for 9/4/92, among others).

As an example of such tensions, mention should be made of the different ways in which the international press interpreted the campaign undertaken by the Catalan Olympic Committee (COC) in order to win recognition from the IOC. Some of the reports which refer to the COC show Catalan nationalism as a radical movement, aiming at eventual independence for Catalonia. For example, the *Reuter* news agency published the following on 14/4/91: «The powerful region of Catalonia is after independence from Spain and its Olympic committee is asking to be recognised by the IOC.» Other reports pointed out that the aspirations for separate recognition on the part of the Catalan Olympic delegation from the Spanish Olympic delegation did not imply that the former had independentist aspirations. The same news agency affirmed, two months later: «Barcelona

is the capital of the Spanish region located in the North East, which wishes to participate in the Olympic movement as a separate territory, without seeking independence from Spain.»

Despite inaccuracies and differing points of view concerning the autonomous regions, the nationalities and decentralisation, there was a generalised recognition of the existence of Catalonia's political and cultural identity as distinct from that of the rest of the Spanish State. The advertisement published by the Generalitat ended up by becoming a point of reference for understanding the identity of Catalonia.

The nationalist parties

The international press also pointed out the differences between the minority of nationalists who pursued an independentist policy, represented by Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC) and the majority nationalist party which did not seek independence from the Spanish state, represented by Jordi Pujol and the coalition led by him, *Convergència i Unió* (CiU).

Catalonia's aspirations to self-government were seen as broad-based claims which the Spanish government could only satisfy with difficulty. However, special mention was made of the fact that in Catalonia — as opposed to the Basque Country — tensions were expressed through moderate political parties. This moderate image of Catalan politics was a constant factor, even in articles which analysed the possible links between terrorism, the political situation and possible repercussions of the latter on the Games.

The press stressed the pacific nature of Catalan nationalism, which defended its separatist beliefs in a determined fashion, but without recourse to the use of violence. The negotiations over the use of Catalan symbols in the Olympic protocol and Ceremonies were commented on in reports as a pact between three political players: the Mayor of Barcelona and the President of the COOB'92, the President of the Generalitat, and the more radical nationalist sectors (ERC, *la Crida*, COC). The signing of the agreement in June, 1992 — between the «very nationalist» President of the Catalan government, Jordi Pujol, and Mayor Pasqual Maragall «Catalan, but a socialist and thus closer to the Spanish administration» (according to *Agence France Presse*) — which ensured the presence of the Catalan flag and national anthem at the Games, was held to be a real victory for Jordi Pujol (see, for example, articles by *Agence France Presse* for 5/7/92, in the *International Herald Tribune* for 18/7/92) or *Libération* for 24/7/92).

The international press made special mention of the extraordinary presence of Catalan flags — both on the balconies of flats and in the street — along the route taken by the Olympic Torch. The international reporters were astonished by the overwhelming presence of Catalan flags, and made news items out of those which carried the slogan «Freedom for Catalonia» or the word *independence*.

By way of example, we have a quote from the French newspaper *Libération* (27/7/92): «and everywhere are the flags of blood and gold, and independentist slogans, including the inevitable *Freedom for Catalonia*.» Other reports stress the complete absence of Spanish flags, such as those made by *Agence France Presse* (5/7/92), *Reuter* (25/7/92) or the *Times* newspaper (25/7/92). The *Corriere della Sera* (26/7/92) explained events in the following somewhat dramatic fashion: «During these days it is the Catalan and not the Spanish flag which flutters in the wind or hangs from the balconies of all the houses. The people shout *Freedom for Catalonia* in the street, showing banners which have been prepared and thought-out beforehand. Freedom for Catalonia, right in the King's face.»

The vast quantity of Catalan flags was interpreted as a sign of Catalan society's proud wish for autonomy. This was the view taken by the *Associated Press* agency, which published the following just one day before the opening of the Games: «The whole of Catalonia is using these two weeks in which exceptional attention is being paid to the area in order to proclaim their national identity and their language, suppressed by Madrid during the dictatorship of General Francisco Franco.»

The overall image of Catalonia to be gleaned from the reports which have been analysed is that of a social reality which is different from that of other communities in Spain and Europe, and which had a certain tendency to draw attention to these differences by using the international repercussion of the Olympic Games. Catalonia was also presented as a culture which had managed to recover quickly after the Francoist repression.

Special attention was paid to the linguistic identity and the co-official status in Catalonia of both the Catalan and Castilian languages. The considerable use of the Catalan language both in official circles and in daily life, explained the ease with which the IOC accepted Catalan as one of the four official languages of the Games.

Special mention should be made of articles published in

The New York Times (19/4/91) «Catalan is spoken with pride here. Did you hear that, Madrid?», or the *International Herald Tribune* (18/7/92) «Barcelona: Catalonia's appearance on the world stage», or *Libération*, «Do you speak Spanish? No, Castilian!»

The presence of Catalan symbols (language, anthem, flag) during the celebration of the games was held by some reporters to be a historically unprecedented concession on the part of the International Olympic Committee and as proof that the Olympic movement had recognised that Catalonia was different (see, for example, *The Times* (21/7/92) or *Libération* (27/7/92).

Other reports assured us that the real reason for these concessions lay in the fact that the President of the IOC, J.A. Samaranch was a Catalan and a Barcelonan. What the international press really stressed in the end was the simple fact of official recognition, to a greater or lesser degree, of the existence of a differential factor within a plurinational state.

Catalan idiosyncrasy

Reports can be found which mention a supposedly specific Catalan mentality. The *Reuter* news agency pointed to certain stereotypes: «the Catalans have certain qualities which could be described as Northern European: they go to bed early, they're hard working, and don't like throwing their money away.» Similarly, *The Times* newspaper (21/7/92) described Catalonia as one of the hardest-working regions of Europe, and the Catalans as the businessmen of Spain.

A less favourable view of Catalan idiosyncrasies was taken by the weekly magazine *Newsweek* (18/5/92) or the French newspaper *Le Figaro* (19/7/92). *Newsweek* described the Catalans as being known for their superior airs and for their considerable chauvinism. It explained that: «they are eager to promote Barcelona as an international capital, while insisting at the same time on the use of Catalan, a peculiar dialect, in state schools, in official documents and as one of the four official languages of the Games». *Le Figaro* is hardly any friendlier in its report: «eternally dissatisfied, they blow their own trumpets. Wherever they go, they proclaim their virtues.» «They're a little overwhelming,» a diplomat explained to the *Figaro* correspondent, «but also terribly efficient».

3. SECURITY: THE TERRORIST THREAT

A year before the Games, one of the most important news issues for the international press was the security of the Games and the risk of terrorist attacks. News concerning armed groups — ETA especially — was linked directly to the Olympic Games by questioning the security arrangements for the latter, while at the same time providing information about the historical and political context of Catalonia.

The main events which attracted the interest of the press and news agencies were the following:

— The series of bombs placed by the Basque terrorist group ETA towards the end of May, 1991, in different cities (Rome, Alacant, Malaga).

— The ETA attack on the Civil Guard barracks in the Olympic sub-site of Vic and the capture afterwards of those responsible, who called themselves the «Barcelona commando».

— The voluntary disbanding of the Catalan terrorist group «Terra Lliure» and the entry of its members into the political party Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya.

Taking the analysed reports as a whole, a complex reality emerges around four points of reference: Spain, Catalonia, Barcelona and the Olympic Games.

Spain, through its administration (government, police), is identified as relating to *authority and power*, faced with the task of confronting the terrorist threat and guaranteeing the security of the games.

Barcelona appears as *the main geographical reference point* which hypothetical terrorist attacks would be centred on. It thus becomes an *object of reference*. Reports on terrorist attacks were linked one way or another with Barcelona. For example, by indicating the distance between the city and a terrorist target town such as Vic, Alacant or Malaga.

Catalonia is presented as a *secondary geographical reference point*, much vaguer than Barcelona, but submerged in a political reality (Spain) of which it forms a part. Catalonia is an area whose inhabitants abhor terrorist activity, but it is also the area within which the Olympic Games will be celebrated. It should also be pointed out that as the process of preparation for the Games continued, and due to the direct contact of journalists with Spanish social and political realities, Catalonia gradually became a reference point as important as or more important than Spain. This process reached its climax at the Games' Opening Ceremony.

Finally, the Olympic Games are used as a *time reference*,

marking given periods: «with only a few months to go before the celebration of the Olympic games...»; but, above all, as a great echo chamber on a worldwide scale, as regards the use terrorists could make of it in terms of propaganda.

Illustrations of the treatment given to these reference points are the reports which appeared on May 30 and 31, 1991, concerning the ETA attack in Vic, in the following newspapers: *Le Figaro*, *Le Monde*, *Il Corriere della Sera*, *La Repubblica* and the reports put together by the *Associated Press*, *Reuter* and *France Presse* news agencies.

The positive development of political conflicts that might have influenced attempts at violent action, and the neutralisation of terrorist groups thanks to a thorough police clamp-down, meant that in the end security came to be one of the issues which least interested the international press. Examples of this can be found in extracts from reports published in *Le Monde* (10/7/92), *Reuter* (17/7/92), *The International Herald Tribune* (24/7/92), *Libération*, (24/7/92), *The Daily Telegraph* (25/7/92) *Time* (27/7/92).

4. THE ECONOMY: THE GAMES AS INVESTMENT

The international press recognised that the Olympic Games represented a golden opportunity for strengthening and improving economic infrastructures. The press pointed out that investments related to the Olympic Games had not been concentrated exclusively in the city of Barcelona, but that they had been distributed among the sub-sites which were hosting different Olympic competitions.

On the other hand, it is worth stressing that it is precisely in the economic reports that the Olympic Games are considered as simply another of the 1992 events, along with the Seville Expo, the status of Madrid as Cultural Capital, and the celebration of the 500th Centenary, all of which were taking place in Spain and which were designed to function as a boost for the development of the Spanish economy and as the country's answer to the economic challenges presented by European unification (see *The Wall Street Journal* (24/6/91), *The New York Times* (1/6/91), or *The Sunday Times Magazine*, for example).

The Games as an international boost for Barcelona

The huge effort made by Barcelona demonstrated its wish to become a commercial and cultural centre in the Mediterranean region and one of Europe's main cities. To this effect,

The Times wrote that «The city is emerging from years of Francoist repression and is turning into one of the main focal points of Europe.»

In fact, Barcelona was presented as the centre of an important metropolitan area with over 4 million inhabitants and as the capital of one of the most powerful regions in Europe: «The capital of Catalonia sees itself as a centre of industrial strength within Spain and as an emerging force in Europe» claimed the *Reuter* news agency (11/7/91). For *The Wall Street Journal* (21/7/92) «the Olympic Games have not only changed the city's body but also its mind» and added that now Barcelona felt strong enough to compete with the most important European cities.

All together, these reports bring across the dynamism and energy of the city which — according to certain reports — is constantly searching for new projects with which it can project itself. «Barcelona is insatiable» claimed the French newspaper *Le Figaro* (19/7/92).

Catalonia: an image of economic strength

The news, reports and articles which appeared in the international press over the period analysed by us present an image of Catalonia in which special mention is made of the country's economic and industrial wealth. In general terms, this image is based on four main lines of development: industry, tourism, financial operations, and investments of Spanish and foreign capital.

The *Le Figaro* (7/6/91) described it as «one of the four motors of the Old Continent». The *International Herald Tribune*, on November 6, 1991, presented it as one of Europe's most important financial markets. The *Wall Street Journal* for August 6, 1992, commented that Catalonia was a region of spectacular economic growth. *Time*, on July 27, 1992, said that Barcelona had always been an industrial area and that the Catalans were «producers rather than dreamers».

5. THE OPENING CEREMONY.

A GREAT MULTICULTURAL DISPLAY

Most of the reports which dealt with the Opening Ceremony stressed the Catalan differential factor more than before. The playing of the Catalan national anthem, the presence of the Catalan flag, the reference to Lluís Companys — the President of the Generalitat who was shot by Franco — made

by Mayor Pasqual Maragall and other symbols which appeared in the Ceremony provided plenty of material for journalists, so that they could start investigating the reality of Catalonia, on the basis of this Ceremony.

Most reports also pointed out that the Ceremony differed in concept from previous ceremonies of this type and introduced a whole new dimension in which symbolism and modernity were combined, resulting in an improvement on all the other Opening Ceremonies. The idea that the Ceremony recuperated the Mediterranean spirit of the Olympic Games was another recurring theme. Examples of this are to be found in articles published in *The New York Times* (26/7/92), *The Sunday Times* (26/7/92), *The Times* (27/7/92), *Libération* (27/7/92), and *Time* (3/8/92).

The originality (of the Ceremony) was well received, although more than one country had trouble in understanding the meaning of some of the scenes. The use of symbology was excessive in the opinion of some countries, and it was claimed that this created a certain amount of confusion for some media. Indeed certain sections (of the Ceremony) met with the disapproval of more than one national culture.

According to *USA Today* «the ceremony was impressive. And very serious, no revelry, no light music.» In another paragraph it also added that «to compare this Ceremony with the Los Angeles one is like comparing the myth of Hercules with Mickey Mouse. Which of the two is stronger?» On the other hand, the important Japanese newspaper *Asahi Shimbun's* permanent correspondent in Barcelona, Chihiro Ito, wrote: «The opera was the best in the world and the stage felt like the Liceu. The fireworks were magnificent.»

But the praise was not unanimous. Some media, especially in France and Italy, openly criticised certain aspects of the ceremony. Almost all the French newspapers stressed the fact that the President of the French Republic had merely mentioned, as he left, that he had liked the singing. Other extracts which we have selected speak for themselves: «A disappointment» said the sports paper *L'Equipe*, insisting: «too many Spanish clichés»; while *Le Figaro* revelled in adjectives such as «absurd...dull...a huge disaster». Jerome Bureau, of *L'Equipe Magazine*, claimed that «it was a disappointing ceremony. There was no feeling. The show had too much classical music and too much Spanish cliché, like the Flamenco dancing. The scene with the ship was highly superficial, it didn't get to the bottom of things, and the entire ceremony was too much geared to television. I expected more.» His colleague Jean Louis Pierrat, of *Libération*, provided a clue as

to the reason for the criticisms made by the French press: «There were some very good ideas — such as the sea — and some grandoliquent ideas, such as that of the arrow. But, in general terms, it lacked emotion. It is difficult to compare it with Albertville, because that ceremony was so original that there will always be a before and an after Albertville».

This attitude on the part of the French press brought the following comment from the London newspaper *The Times*: «Others might ignore the insolence of the French, but not Barcelona, whose antennae are finely tuned to the image created by the city around the world. The ridicule of the French is a double blow, given that Catalonia has always preferred to describe itself as being closer to France than to the Baroque and emotional power of Madrid.»

Some Italian newspapers — perhaps due to a certain cultural closeness — were also somewhat critical as far as the Ceremony was concerned. More than one newspaper made the comment that the archer had misfired because the arrow carrying the Olympic flame had not really entered the burner, comments which had to be corrected the following day. For *La Repubblica*, «The arrow landed way past the target, but the burner ignited anyway. It is obvious that by allowing Rebollo's mistake to be spotlighted in this way, with cynical precision, reduces the symbolic value which the creators of the Barcelona ceremony had wished to create by putting the symbolic gesture of world sport in the hands of a paraplegic athlete.» A few paragraphs further down, the same publication says that «he had missed the target twice in previous training sessions». As far as the Ceremony in general was concerned, we have found comments in the Italian press which are not exactly flattering: «kitsch Ceremony» was the banner headline of the *Corriere della Sera*; «the Ceremony has been splendid, but as it went on it seemed to us that it got got further and further away from the subject of sport», claimed *La Stampa*.

The *Financial Times* described the ceremony as «extravagant». The *International Herald Tribune* considered it to be a «multicoloured, confusing» Ceremony. «Often pretty, occasionally magnificent, and just about always incomprehensible.. Seriously, that first hour of the Opening Ceremony, what was that all about?», was how Tony Kornheiser's opinion article began. However, this journalist acknowledged that it was a spectacular ceremony, but ended up by revealing his personal tastes: «the organisers lost an opportunity to show other Spanish scenes apart from the Flamenco dancers. For example, there was no bullfight.»

The Opening Ceremony of the Olympic Games represent-

ed the culmination of the process in the course of which the international press had been incorporating Catalonia as a cultural and political frame of reference for Barcelona'92. On 26 July the *New York Times* opened its sports supplement with the following headline: «The Olympic opening ceremony is the celebration of a region». *The Times* published, on July 27: «Catalonia bares its soul to the world». *Il Corriere della Sera*, published this headline on July 26: «Barcelona in Catalonia, capital of the TV kingdom».

To finish, multiculturalism was associated with universal values. The *New York Times* decribed the ceremony as «a careful mix of Catalan and Spanish culture.». Similarly, *Time* said on August 3 that the ceremony contributed a «quadrilingual perspective in a multicultural future». *Le Monde* insisted on July 27 that the Ceremony had been an internationalist success. *Il Corriere della Sera*, remembering Barcelona's four failed attempts to host the Games in the past, wrote on July 26: «History has asked to be forgiven for the delay by giving Barcelona the first Olympic Games free of hatred between Americans and Russians, Games with Nelson Mandela as a spectator and black athletes playing for South Africa, with hundreds of Eastern European champions walking along the Rambla without any spies or political commissars by their side, with Germany united and without much doping.»

PARALYMPIC GAMES BARCELONA '92

PARALYMPIC GAMES AND SOCIAL INTEGRATION¹

FERNAND LANDRY²

1. HUMAN BEINGS...

«I am sure that the social integration of the disabled, which we wish for in all fields, will spread naturally and inevitably to top level sports competitions.»

JOSÉ MARÍA ARROYO

(COOB'92 and Fundación ONCE (Eds.), 1993: 17)

In his opening speech at the Opening Ceremony of the IXth Paralympic Games, the President of the ONCE Foundation could have *expressed* better the long standing aspirations as well as the patient struggle of disabled athletes the world over for full social acceptance, integration and recognition.

Estadi Olímpic, Barcelona, September 3rd, 1992, 6 PM. In a tremendous expression of empathy, understanding and solidarity, 65.000 spectators and guests, able-bodied individuals and disabled persons intermingled, greeted with deep respect, wide open hearts and genuine enthusiasm some 4,158 athletes and other participants from 82 delegations stemming from the five continents. An incredible atmosphere of *humaness* permeated space, time and everyone present. Participants and spectators were as one. And everyone knew from the very beginning of the ceremony that they were taking part in an unprecedented gathering of human beings. No distinctions. Just human beings, caring for each other, united in their aspirations for an ever better world.

«We are all disabled in some way...» said Pasqual Maragall, President of COOB'92, as he introduced the ceremonial speakers to all present and to the whole world as well as

1. Some parts of this paper have been abstracted and/or adapted from two previous presentations: Landry, 1993: 28-57; Landry, 1994: 488-499.

2. Ph. D.h.c. University of Illinois Professor at Laval University, in Québec City (Canada).

through the broadcasting media. «*I amb a blind man...*» declared after him ONCE President José María Arroyo, «...on this day however, I feel I am a very fortunate man. I can sense perfectly your emotion and your hope» (COOB'92 and Fundación ONCE, 1993:94, 95).

Unforgettable moments of emotion were indeed experienced. Day after day, during the entire IXth Paralympic Games, Barcelona 1992, astonishing demonstrations were made of dire will power, dedication, energy, skill, and thought as well:

- in the prominent acts of disabled athletes Santos Po-yatos, Purificación Santamarta and her guide dog Dan, Neus Álvarez Costa, Bertrand de Five Pranger, Antonio Rebollo, amongst others, during the soul-stirring rituals of the Opening Ceremony;

- in the spirited contributions of disabled actress Glòria Rognoni, director of the Paralympic Ceremonies;

- in the moving and forceful social message of disabled cosmologist Stephen W. Hawking;

- in the magnificent efforts of all 3.020 athletes competing during 10 days in the disciplines and events of the 15 sports on the program of Games (COOB'92 and Fundación ONCE (Eds.), 1993: 129, 153).

2. SPORTS WITHOUT LIMITS

«*Sports without limits*»: the thought provoking theme chosen for the Barcelona IXth Paralympic Games. A positive and doubly meaningful slogan:

- on the one hand emphasizing the variety of limitations overcome by so many individuals and a salute to so many who have challenged themselves successfully and were prepared and ready to perform in top-level sports for the sensorially and physically handicapped;

- yet, on the other, pointing to the need for continuing the struggle for increased societal awareness around the world for citizens with disabilities and the matter of their integration into all facets of community life, including sport and high quality competitive and performance opportunities.

July 28, 1948: a milestone date: 16 paraplegic (14 men, 2 women) competed in archery on the field of Stoke. The Stoke Mandeville Games were born. The use of sport as remedial exercise and means of social reintegration and recognition, under the vigorous and pioneering leadership

of Sir Ludwig Guttman, would take on an unprecedented and world-wide momentum not only for spinal cord sufferers, but eventually also for other categories of disabled persons.

July 28, 1948: coincidentally, also the date of the Opening Ceremonies of the Games of the XIVth Olympiad-London, the first celebrated after World War II which left in its wake so many young and not so young people severely disabled and socially isolated. Few people at the time (except perhaps Sir Ludwig) would have dared forecast that the Stoke Mandeville Games would be so successful from the start and would rather quickly flourish into a broad and influential network of national, continental and world-wide competitions culminating in the present-day multidisability Paralympic Games Movement.

To an observer of the international sporting scene, it appears that the sports movement for the «disabled» was bound from the start to converge on the sports movement for the «able-bodied». «Stoke Mandeville Games», «Olympic-Year Games», «Olympics for the Paralyzed», «Sports Movement for the Paralyzed», «Olympics for the Disabled», «Torontolympiad» (sic, the particular label of the Paralympic Games held in conjunction with the Games of the XXIst Olympiad-Montréal-1976), «International Games for the Disabled», «Special Olympics», «Paralympic Games», are expressions that bear witness to the vigorous process by which the sports movement for the disabled has focussed its energies, expanded and diversified its programs and services, acquired international stature, penetrated public consciousness. It is now a manifest and an increasingly accepted fact that sports, and indeed their logical extension into top-caliber performance, is no longer the sole prerogative of the «able-bodied» and/or «normal» individual.³

The impact of the social and educational message associated with the entire movement continues to be considerable world-wide. From a philosophical perspective, the motto of the Barcelona'92 IXth Paralympic Games «*Sports without limits*» was perfectly in tune with Pierre de Coubertin's vision of Modern Olympism. For him, the *core values* of sport were to be found in the *manner*, in the *spirit* with which an athlete, as a whole human being, acts and achieves, often *in spite of apparently unsurmountable obstacles* as Guttman wrote in 1976 (Guttman, 1976: 195-197). In that

3. For other published material on this topic, see references above: Landry, 1993: 51-55; Landry, 1994: 496-499.

perspective, the expression «Paralympism» appears somewhat superfluous, pleonastic; «Olympism» is sufficient... it says it all.

The acquisition of international identity and momentum by various facets of the international sporting movement for the disabled does not go without new problems and challenges. The very advent of the *Ist Paralympic Congress* held in conjunction with the IXth Paralympic Games in Barcelona, the six aims expressed in its official program, and the 13 recommendations adopted unanimously by the plenary session of the Congress (Fundación ONCE, 1993: 692-698) stand as a clear statement of intent, by the various memberships in the field of sports for handicapped persons, to exchange views, share knowledge and experiences, debate issues, and work cooperatively at strategies, programs and services directed at the development and consolidation of the overall movement, as well as at a *rapprochement* with respect to the Olympic Games. Clearly, the *VISTA'93* International Conference held in Edmonton, Canada, in May 1993 (Steadward, Nelson, Wheeler, 1994:582) was a further effort in the same direction, just as was also the Second Paralympic Congress held in March 1994 in association with the XVIIIth Olympic Winter Games of Lillehammer.⁴

3. «HUMAN» PERFORMANCES

It appears that the Paralympic Movement has in recent years taken up a very difficult philosophical and social challenge. In as much as the contemporary pursuit of excellence—in all fields including international (and Olympic) sport—has become a metaphor of the world system, the Paralympic Movement has in recent years had a strong impact on the matter of social values and behavior models, especially so since it has successfully affiliated with the IOC and the Olympic Movement. The Paralympic Movement has favorably raised public consciousness, trans-nationally and trans-culturally too, with respect to the philosophical concept and meaning of a *human* performance, thereby opening the debate wider and pointing to a number of difficulties and paradoxes pertaining to a long tradition—so deeply entrenched in western philosophies—of valuing, accepting and re-

4. See LOOC-94, *Second Paralympic Congress: Toward the year 2000 in Society and Sports*. Information brochure. Lillehammer: Royal Norwegian Ministry of Cultural Affairs (Unadated), pp. 7.

cognizing sporting performances first and foremost in *absolute* quantitative terms.

To many observers of the Olympic Movement, there is a striking contradiction between the universality of play and games as cultural manifestations, on the one hand, and, on the other, the present outlines of high performance sports including those of the Olympic program. In spite of Coubertin's initial dream («...all countries, ...all sports»), the current Olympic program is hardly the reflection of the cultural identities of a very large number of nation-states. The prevailing objectives underlying international competition, its present variety of forms and manifestations, and the governing structures themselves are clearly those of western culture, predominantly that of Europe and North-America. From a philosophical and historical perspective, competitive, high performance (including «Olympic») sport has radiated from Western centers, mostly following former colonial trade and control lines. It has then rapidly managed to get peripheral acceptance and support, thereby producing a so-called «universal» sports movement which in fact bears the strong imprint of the sociocultural code of the senders (Galtung, 1991: 147-155; Landry, 1991: 51-69).

Some concepts or aspects of western culture that have had an indelible influence on modern and Olympic sport can be succinctly characterized as follows:

— *Entrenched cultural belief.* Legitimacy and valorization of striving, achieving, domination, supremacy. Consequence: performances are judged, classified, and valued in absolute terms; sporting competitions typically manifest themselves vertically; rankings, records, medals, «Being No. 1...»

— *Concept of space.* Causal forces of the social universe are highly concentrated in the West and radiate to the periphery. Prestigious international sporting activities are mostly of Western origin.

— *Concept of time.* Life is drama, movement; there must be progress, linear or exponential. Sport also is drama, crisis: catharsis (winning); apocalypse (losing).

— *Concept of knowledge.* The universe, nature, and beings are conceived in terms of well-defined dimensions, most of them quantifiable. Sporting achievements, performances, are operationalized in strict quantitative/qualitative dimensions nowadays divisible in minute fractions.

— *Concept of nature.* Under its many variables, nature must be mastered, conquered. Control/management of fac-

tors affecting behavior and performance. High performance unfolds in super-controlled, lab-like conditions.

— *Person-to-person relations*. Individualistic combined with vertical: competitiveness, «survival of the fittest...» *Citius-Altius-Fortius* is conceived as limitless process and goal, the pursuit of which must be encouraged, sustained, rewarded.

— *Transpersonal relations*. Hierarchies are in structures/operations of various configurations of «actors», «believers», «followers». Hierarchies are also within and between sport governing bodies, classification of gains and wins; ultrasymbolism of records and medals; IOC, IFs [International Federations], stand central and sovereign in the international sporting order.

These are some of the cultural characteristics and antecedents of contemporary elite sport. Yet in this perspective, it is nonetheless a fact that modern sport offers unique opportunities and channels for self development and self expression, genuine occasions to obtain and surpass what has «already been done». Yet on the other hand, it is also a fact that there is an inescapable propensity of the elite/high performance sporting systems to conceive and value performance in net or absolute terms, i. e. in ranking people solely on the basis of results. Process, possibilities, and/or conditions limiting performance (as relevant factors indeed with respect to the—at times paradoxical—matter of «equality of opportunity»), surprisingly perhaps, hardly ever come to the fore. To this point in time, and regrettably perhaps for the immediate future, this situation is likely to continue to stand as an obstacle of particular significance on the converging courses of the able-bodied and disabled sport movements.

4. OLYMPISM... OR PARALYMPISM?

Time and again throughout his life, Coubertin insisted on the transcendental character and value of performance in sport. For him, the three words of Father Didon *citius-fortius-altius* encompassed the philosophy of «Olympism». One can speculate that originally, the Renovator had willfully placed «altius» at the end of the Olympic motto to emphasize, no doubt, the immaterial, moral aspects of his program of Olympic education (Coubertin, 1894: 1). To Coubertin, what was most worthy of commendation in an athlete was his/her *ambition*, *willpower*, and *self control*, not first and foremost the *result* achieved. To him, beauty and nobility in sport resi-

ded indeed in the nature and form of a given sporting activity, yet also just as much in the higher values («*altius*»), the *manner* in which sport is indulged in, the *spirit* permeating personal commitment and involvement.⁵

Just as «play» can be labelled the «raw material» of sport, so can one choose to describe the constituent atoms of the molecule of «Olympism» functionally as: the pursuit of *excellence* in sport; *fair play*; disinterestedness as regards *material* gains; rejection of *discrimination* under any and all its forms; promotion of mutual *respect*, understanding, cooperation and *peace* between individuals and nations. In Coubertin's mind, the notion had from the start indispensable *social* and *cultural* connotations. One can sense throughout his writings that his cherished hope was to have the spirit of «Olympism» spread beyond the sports arenas to permeate the daily activities which are at the heart of social and community life (Landry, 1991: 60-65). In the course of its thirty-seven years of history, the Paralympic Games Movement has manifestedly developed and matured along the course of the higher ideals of Olympism. Clearly, the Paralympic Games have served:

- as a unique testing ground for overcoming difficult barriers and severe limitations;
- as golden opportunities and stepping stones for self expression and self realization;
- as an open stage where truly remarkable levels of enthusiasm, energy, confidence; audacity, courage, skill, and remarkable achievements can be (and indeed have been repeatedly) demonstrated.

If Olympism is «...a philosophy of life, exalting and combining in a balanced whole the qualities of body, will and mind. [...]» (Fundamental Principle n.° 2, September 5th, 1994 Edition of the Olympic Charter), there is then little basis or need to use a different expression («Paralympism», Παρά=Greek for «next to») to allude to an ideology which in every way also speaks of» [...] *Blending sport with culture and education, seeks to create a way of life based on the joy found in effort, the educational value of good example and respect for uni-*

5. [«...Ce que l'on admire [chez l'athlète], ce sont l'*ambition* et la *volonté*: ambition de faire plus que les autres, volonté d'y parvenir. Rien n'est enthousiasmant comme l'emballage final [d'un geste sportif]; mais ce spectacle est enthousiasmant, par *réflexion*, pour ceux qui savent ce qu'il a fallu [à l'athlète] de poignante énergie et de possession de soi-même; les autres *ne comprennent pas*: ils admirent de confiance. Tout [l'Olympisme]¶ tient en ces trois mots [du Père Didon]: *citius, fortius, altius*; plus vite - plus fort - plus haut. Ils forment un programme de beauté morale. L'esthétique du sport est une esthétique *immatérielle*»]. [...]. [Emphasis added]. (Coubertin, 1896: 146-149).

versal fundamental ethical principles». It can be argued that there is nothing in the Olympic Charter now in force that characterizes athletes and sporting performances in such absolute terms as to serve as a basis to preclude the Disabled Sport Movement from converging toward major international sporting events or to discourage it from continuing to seek some form of formal inclusion in the Olympic family and program. In terms of the primary process through which a man or a woman advances on the road to, or up the ladder of relative perfection, there is little philosophical difference indeed between «olympism» and «paralympism», between an «olympic» athlete and a «paralympic» athlete. Early in this century, Coubertin had been surprisingly liberal concerning the extension and uses of the expression «Olympic».⁶ Later on, he also put in a nutshell the essentials of «being an athlete»: «*Athletae proprium est se ipsum noscere, ducere et vincere*» (Coubertin, 1929:14).

In doing just that, scores of handicapped persons throughout the world have created a new awareness of the human potential and abilities of the disabled. Some feats of vision, generosity, courage, endurance, and sheer dedication to a cause—as was for example the case in Canada with the incredible challenges that disabled athletes Terry Fox and Rick Hansen set for themselves—captured public imagination and empathy, «spurred heart-thumping national pride», made an indelible social imprint, created and guaranteed lasting philanthropic legacies the likes of which are difficult to find in numbers. Terry Fox lost his battle with cancer; he passed away on June 28, 1981. But his indomitable, truly Olympian will has been passed on, like the Olympic flame, «creating new inspirations». His *Marathon of Hope* across Canada raised more than 23 million dollars, all of which went to support and enhance cancer research. When Rick Hansen wrapped up his round-the-world trek in Vancouver

6. «[(The word "Olympic") est un terme qui est dans le *domaine public*. Si vous ne craignez pas le ridicule, si votre effort est assez considérable pour être comparé à celui que nécessite l'organisation d'une Olympiade régulière, *utilisez-le*. Personne n'a le droit de vous en empêcher. Mais de grâce, ne commettez pas cette hérésie de l'appliquer à une seule catégorie de sports et de célébrer des cultes de petite chapelle sous le vocable d'une grande église. [...] Ce qui est olympique est universel. Les Jeux Olympiques sont le temple de l'activité musculaire sous les formes les plus diverses sans qu'il y ait à leur conférer des degrés dans une hiérarchie de beauté et de noblesse. Ce qui est beau et noble, ce n'est point gel ou tel sport en soi, mais la façon dont il est pratiqué, l'esprit dont il est animé, l'âme qu'y met l'homme [...] Il ne peut rien y avoir d'olympique en dehors du contact et de la collaboration des diverses branches de sport unies sur un pied de parfaite égalité pour le perfectionnement de l'humanité".]

in May 1987 (29,901.55 miles in a wheelchair), his name and his cause made national and international headlines, bringing again to the fore the need for increased awareness of the potential of disabled persons. In the course of his odyssean tour, the «*Man In Motion*» raised and deposited some 19.5 million Canadian dollars in a legacy fund destined to support spinal cord injured persons in their attempts to rebuild their lives.

And what extraordinary example of athletic achievement was given to the world at the Barcelona Paralympic Games by Purificación Santamarta, the blind athlete from Spain, as she won the gold medal in the 100 m, 200 m, 400 m, and 800 m events of the B1 category, establishing new world records on each occasion. How merited it was that she received her fourth gold medal from none other than Spanish President Felipe González (COOB'92 and Fundación ONCE, 1993:166, 167, 335-336).

Three formidable legends... each one indeed of «Olympian» if not of «Olympic» proportions...! We are here at the core of the nucleus of the deeper and broader concept of «Olympism». In the case of Canadians Fox and Hansen, and in that of Santamarta, the female athlete *par excellence* of the Barcelona Paralympic Games, the public everywhere, intuitively, knew it, and responded accordingly.⁷

In point of fact, who can argue that at the very core of the notion, «Paralympism» is different from «Olympism»? And could not the same be said of the notion of *Olympic Movement*? From the structural viewpoint, the main actors of the «Olympic Movement» are usually described and taken as the International Olympic Committee, the National Olympic Committees, the International Federations, the Organizing Committees of the Olympic Games OCOG. To those, one should obviously add the rank and file of the institutions and individuals on which the entire edifice rests: the National Federations, the Clubs or similar units, and, last but indeed not least, the athletes, and those who support them directly. In today's world, through be it strictly from a structural standpoint, the Olympic Movement is a well integrated and powerful system in contemporary sport (Galtung, 1991; Landry, 1991:51-69). Yet, in a broader sociological sense, one could be justified in also considering as «shareholders» of the «movement» (and thus of «Olympism») any and everyone

7. See for example: «Hearts beat strongly», «Paralympic People», in COOB'92 and Fundación ONCE, 1993: 283-301; Jorden, 1987: 8-12; Shatenshtein, 1982: 457-464.

thinking and *acting* within the *letter* and *spirit* of the Olympic Charter. Again in point of fact, who would argue that at least conceptually, the «Paralympic Movement» does not fit into the broader concept of «Olympism» and of the «Olympic Movement»?

5. PERSPECTIVE AND MERIT

In the course of its first century of existence, the modern Olympic Movement has reflected and at times also anticipated global social evolution. To many observers, the Olympic Games themselves have been a revealing indicator of change, a window as well, through which one could observe the dominant socio-economic principles and practices, policies and strategies «at work». The same can also be said about the «Paralympic» and the «Special Olympics» Games celebrated in Spain in 1992, and of those celebrated in association with the 1994 Olympic Winter Games, in Lillehammer.⁸ A significant trend amongst others: never in the history of the Disabled Sport Movement have its major Games been so elaborate nor have converged so closely to the Olympic Games proper.

The Xth Paralympic Games (summer) are already scheduled to take place in Atlanta, August 16-27th, 1996, shortly after the Centennial Olympic Games and in close association with them. Again, the Paralympic Games will be preceded by a *Paralympic Congress*, the third of its kind. Its theme — *Humanity, Equality, Destiny*— indeed speaks for itself, both philosophically and socially.⁹ But there shall be even more in Atlanta. The *Paralympiad* [sic] —*a two year celebration of the triumphs and achievements of people with physical disabilities*— will take place. For the first time in Paralympics history, a series of formal cultural events will, celebrate the work of disabled artists of international renown, increase public awareness for the Paralympic Games and promote greater understanding between people *with* and *without* disabilities.¹⁰

During the first three decades of their existence by name

8. Paralympic Winter Games were held in Lillehammer (for locomotor and blind athletes), March 10-20, 1994, in the wake of the XVIIth Olympic Winter Games.

9. See ACOG'96, *The Third Paralympic Congress*, August 12-16, 1996: A World Congress on Disability. Information brochure, pp. 7.

10. See: ACOG'96, *Press Guide*, February 1995: Paralympics, Paralympiad, pp. 89-90.

(since 1960), the Paralympic Games (summer) have been held seven times (1960, 64, 72, 76, 84, 88, 92) in the host *country* of the Games of the Olympiad; four times (1960, 1964, 1988, 1992) in the host *city* of the Games of the Olympiad. As for the Winter Paralympic Games, they occurred on two occasions (1992, 1994) in the host *city* and *facilities* of the Olympic Winter Games. Also noteworthy is the fact that in Barcelona, Albertville and Lillehammer, the Paralympic Games were staged in the same facilities as those of each of the Olympic Games concerned. A remarkable achievement indeed, and a strong indicator of the convergence of the two phenomena. In addition, for the first time in history, the Olympic Games and the Paralympic Games were staged in Barcelona by the very same *organizing committee*.¹¹

With respect to symbolism and the sending of a socio-cultural message, convergence was remarkable in Barcelona between the Olympic and Paralympic Games. The flame was the same; kept alive after the Olympic Games at the Barcelona City Council Hall, and then joyously carried through 30 municipalities and a distance of 248 kilometers by 505 bearers (COOB'92 and Fundación ONCE, 1993:61-75). The torch was the same, Catalanian artist André Richard having discreetly set two distinctive identifying inscriptions on a unique, beautiful, and single torch design. And furthermore, the Opening Ceremonies struck the imagination with their deeply significant and artistic complementarity: those of the Games of the XXVth Olympiad climaxed in a message of joy, hope and peace addressed to the world: *Friends for Life*; those of the IXth Paralympic Games stood as a vibrant tribute to courage and creativity, culminating in powerful inspirational messages from dignitaries (Maragall, Arroyo, Cabezas, and Hawking) passionately delivered to the handicapped athletes present, yet also sent to all the citizens of the world, handicapped or not: *The Triumph of Light*.

6. ELITE SPORT AND SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY

The immense successes of the Olympic and Paralympic Games staged in 1992 in Barcelona and Madrid (in the latter case, the first *Paralympics* for athletes with mental handicaps)¹²

11. Documentation pertaining to the Paralympic Games Movement, both published and unpublished, personal archives of F. Landry.

12. See: ANDE, *Paralympics Madrid '92. Program Guide*, n.° 35, September 1992, pp. 76.

have underscored again that such periodic and international events are truly and irreversibly an integral part of the world system of interrelations and interdependence. The young and/or recently restructured Nation-States have understood. Full of hope, they have joined the Olympic and Paralympic families (or made representations to that effect). On the sports fields, they come indeed to perform, to do their best—but also for other purposes. They come indeed also for—identification-differentiation-acceptance—mutual respect. Having an NOC, being an Olympic or Paralympic athlete, and marching in the Opening Ceremonies of the «Games», have nowadays very much to do with global intercommunication, i.e. new aspirations for world-wide identification, acceptance and recognition of nations, peoples and individuals *with a difference*. The logotype of the IXth Paralympic Games, designed by Josep Maria Trias, was a most notable signal of the kind. It stood as a subtle adaptation of the initial logo of the Barcelona 1992 Olympic Games emphasizing the profound desire for integration present not only in «Paralympic» athletes, but also in millions of handicapped people the world over (COOB'92 and Fundación ONCE, 1993: 74-75). The World's most prestigious international competitions and Games nowadays find themselves in a unique position to contribute further to the current momentum of positive social change. For the Olympic Movement, leaning in that direction by giving fuller acceptance and legitimacy to athletes with a disability does not constitute a mutation in, but rather a re-surfacing of, the fundamental values of Olympism: the promotion of mutual understanding, mutual respect, and cooperation (Landry, 1993). This matter takes on particular importance as regards the social mission of both the Paralympic and the Olympic Sport Movements.

That international events of such magnitude and character as the Paralympic Summer and Winter Games can be planned, organized and successfully conducted is *de facto* proof of the existence of high quality expertise, extensive experience, international leadership and readiness to cooperate among and between specialized sport governing bodies as the IPC, its International Member Organizations, and their respective memberships of national and international disabled sport organizations. Worthy of international recognition and praise are not only the IOC and many IFs,¹³ but

13. As an example, the IAAF has for years included such events as the 1500 m events (wheelchair) for handicapped athletes in its international championships and Grand Prix.

also the governing bodies of the disabled sport movement such as the IBSA, ISOD, ISMWSF, CP-ISRA, and INAS-FMH, amongst others.

Decidedly, the international sporting community has endorsed the aims and purposes of the Paralympic Movement. At the Closing Ceremony of the 1992 1st Paralympic Congress of Barcelona, IOC President Samaranch unequivocally pledged his encouragement and support to the Paralympic Movement (Fundación ONCE, 1993: 708-713); and since then, President Samaranch has indeed fulfilled his promise.

Yet, the acquisition of international identity and momentum by the Paralympic Movement does not go without problems and further challenges. The most obvious one has to do with inter-sport governing-body relationships. Extreme care ought to be taken by the Paralympic Movement to avoid conflicts of interest with the IOC and the IFs, particularly with respect to the delicate matters of marketing campaigns, searches for sponsors, advertizing principles and long established procedures in international and Olympic sport. Also for the Paralympic Movement lurks the danger of becoming top-heavy, of concentrating ever more energies and financial resources on fewer rather than on the equally deserving majority. The sensible chord of overall social responsibility and accountability should thus continue to be the guiding light of the Paralympic Movement. This does not appear to be always the case as concerns the ever-resource-hungry-elite-high-performance-sporting-system. On that topic, there will obviously always be matters of philosophical, scientific, social and economic nature worthy of continuing analysis and debate. Such are the requirements and price of «playing hard ball» in the complex and highly competitive sports world.

7. THE LIGHT OF INSPIRATION

Stephen W. Hawking's address and the first verse of the «Paralympic Anthem» sung at the Opening Ceremonies of the IXth Paralympic Games of Barcelona, three years ago, stand as solemn reminders of the central objective of the sports movement for disabled or handicapped individuals: the noble task of remaining equally at the service of the many as well as of its elite. Recently, and to the satisfaction of so many around the world, the Paralympic Movement has experienced sharply increased visibility and success.

On the potential of *any* and *all* human beings...

Three years ago, loud and clear resounded in Montjuïc Stadium, the computerized voice of cosmologist Stephen W. Hawking:¹⁴

«Those of us who are disabled should not think of ourselves as set apart. Rather, we are normal beings who just have certain special needs. [...] We are all different. We are all special in our own way. Each one of us has within us a spark of fire, a creative force...»

And with respect to the service potential of the *Paralympic Games* movement, the words of the Paralympic anthem summarize it all.¹⁵

«Born in silence like the dawn, it grows and spreads over all the world. It is a force that moves mountains, and day by day, reaches new horizons. The flag you have hoisted waves proudly in the wind. Your achievement has been a cry of courage and heroic feats.» Josep Maria Andreu, Paralympic Games Anthem, verse 1. Barcelona, September 3rd, 1992.

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14. See: *The Stephen W. Hawking Message*, in Opening Ceremony Program, IXth Paralympic Games. COOB'92 S.A., September 3, 1992 (Unpaged document)

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POLITICS

THE POLITICAL GAMES: AGENTS AND STRATEGIES IN THE 1992 BARCELONA OLYMPIC GAMES¹

JOAN BOTELLA²

An event of the size and impact of the Olympic Games cannot be considered a politically irrelevant event. Quite frequently it is relevant in terms of international politics (we only have to recall the alternative absences and presences of the United States and the Soviet Union in various Games), but also when dealing with the lesser known dimension of internal politics.

Some political impacts are produced in the medium or long term. The processes of urban change in the organizing city can bring about, accentuate or delay certain tendencies of social change; it would be impossible for these changes not to have a political impact.

Political impacts also come about in the short term. The economic costs of the preparation of the Games, the involvement of various public administrations, the way in which these relate to each other and to the private sector, or the importance of symbolic elements in the area of sports make the great Olympic event an opportunity for various political forces, and potentially a terrain for confrontation.

The 1992 Barcelona Olympic Games were a particularly adequate event for the study of these phenomena. In effect, four types of specific circumstances gave them the potential for considerable political impact.

First, the preparation and organization of the Games was conducted directly by public institutions, in contrast with Los Angeles 1984, for example, where an essentially private model was opted for.

Second, all of the public administrations were involved in their organization. In contrast with other cases where the

1. This text is based on a presentation made in the symposium «Impacts of the Olympic Games», directed by Miquel de Moragas within the courses of the Menéndez Pelayo International University (Barcelona, July 1993). Due to its origin, we have reduced to a minimum notes, citations and so on. The author wishes to thank the commentaries of participants in the course.

2. Joan Botella Corral. PhD. is Law Professor of Political Science at the Autonomous University of Barcelona.

role of the organizing city was almost exclusive, the case of Barcelona came closer to the precedents of Munich, Montreal or (though in different conditions) Seoul, with a strong influence of the central government and the government of the Generalitat de Catalunya, as well, obviously, as the local government of the organizing city,³ as is natural.

Third, the preparation of the Games occurred in a context of strong political competition. From the designation of the Barcelona as organizing city until the Games themselves, there was one general election, two local elections and two regional elections; in the period from 1986 to 1992 only in one year was there no election. This competitiveness was more intense in the case of Catalonia than in the rest of Spain: while in other areas of the country there was a complete socialist hegemony (this was especially the case of Andalusia, which serves as a partial contrast to Barcelona with the Seville Universal Exposition), this was less the case in Catalonia, where the regional government is in the hands of a centre-right coalition, CiU (Convergence and Union), which increased its electoral predominance in this period, contrasting with the socialist administration of Barcelona and the central government, also in the hands of the PSOE (Spanish Socialist Workers Party).

Finally, the specific linguistic and cultural problem of Catalonia uncovered a potentially conflictive situation in an event as rich in symbolic elements as the Olympic Games. This symbolic density was even accentuated by the enormous impact of worldwide television. The potential linguistic-cultural conflictivity and the perception of the Games as an «opportunity» for international projection reciprocally fed conflict and were a part of it, expressed until the closing moment.

Besides this multiplicity of territories, there was simultaneously a diversity of institutional agents involved in the preparation of the Olympic Games, that we can summarize in

3. As is known, the Games were not limited to the city of Barcelona. About twenty other cities had the status of sub-sites, in some cases with important investments. The Diputació de Barcelona (provincial government) played an important role in the preparation and coordination of the network of sub-sites and the financing of many of the corresponding installations. However, the leading role of the City of Barcelona, the fact that its Mayor was also the President of the Organizing Committee (COOB) and the political similarity in terms of political party of the City of Barcelona, the *Diputació* and many sub-sites, allow us to consider the role of the city of Barcelona only in this context. This is not to undervalue the importance of these other institutions, nor minimize the relevance of certain concrete conflicts which came about in some cases.

three: the City of Barcelona, the government of the Generalitat, and the central government.⁴ Each of these institutional agents operates as the leader of a wider group of other agents (political parties, groups of opinion, communication media, and so on), so that, for example, the reference to the central government has to be understood as a reference to the PSOE overall, while the reference to the Government of the Generalitat is also applicable to organizations as diverse as CiU, the «Joventut Nacionalista de Catalunya» (Nationalist Youth of Catalonia), or more occasionally, entities such as the «Crida», or the movement for an independent Catalan Olympic Committee.

The three institutional agents that we will consider here (and that, I repeat, can be seen as leaders and spokespersons for a group of political and social movements) interact in the various areas defined by the four above-mentioned dimensions. Yet these interactions, this game of alliances and counterpositions, generates a complex situation that cannot be reduced to simply being «for» or «against».

We will try to focus in more precisely. Effectively, and beyond rhetoric and discourses, what did the various agents mentioned propose? What were the goals they sought to fulfill? I will allow myself to examine what these goals were, introducing a distinction that I hope will be justified by the rest of the paper: these objectives were both «substantial» (results to be attained) and of a «procedural» nature (organization and ways of participation in the decision-making process).

For the central government, the Barcelona Olympic Games were a piece within the overall group of events of the «1992 project». They were not only in coincidence with the Seville Universal Exposition and the Madrid European Cultural Capital, but in a wider sense, the will of the central government was to show the world how Spanish society had modernized and transformed, and aspired to play an important role in the heart of the European Community. The start-up of the European single market, the inauguration of a high velocity train or the success of the three above-mentioned events (in spite of being completely heterogenous realities) had to lead to the strengthening of the new international image of Spain as a developed society, free and competitive.

As is logical, given this global perspective, the central government aspired to coordinate and supervise the overall group of events. Yet it wanted to go even further: the extra-

4. See the comment in the above note.

ordinarily high cost of the projects required an attitude of watchfulness and constant presence to ensure both adequate financing and the homogeneous transmission of the image it wished to project. Thus from a procedural point of view, the objective of the central government was to assure global control of the process (understanding by «control», I repeat, not so much a direct and meticulous direction, as a key role in financing and a position that would allow it to coordinate and supervise the group of events, in order to ensure a certain coherence).

For the government of the Generalitat, and in a wider sense for various nationalist circles in Catalonia, the Olympic Games were seen simultaneously as an opportunity and a danger: an opportunity in the sense of the possibilities for international promotion, and a danger in that Catalan identity could be dissolved within the wider «1992 project», which for its overall Spanish characteristics and its international projection could represent a factor in the loss of importance of specifically Catalan elements. If, furthermore, we recall the element of competition between parties that we have mentioned, it can be understood that the desire of the Generalitat to Catalanize the Games did not just represent a goal of a cultural nature, but a desire to establish a differentiating element, which had to permit it to emerge from the overall «1992 project» and give it its own presence.

This political will meant, from an operational point of view, being actively present in the financing and in the machinery of the preparation and organization of the Games. Weighing the possible risk of being sandwiched between the preponderant role that the Olympic Charter gives to the organizing city and the globalizing will of the central government, the Generalitat established its procedural interest in its participation in the mechanism of preparation and organization of the Games.

For the City of Barcelona the situation was set out in different terms. In an explicit way, both City Hall and the organizers of the Games declared that the Olympic event had an instrumental character, with the goal of projecting the city internationally and going ahead with a number of projects and transformations that would «complete the city».

On the one hand, situating the city on the international circuit would allow it to welcome enterprises and activities of a high level, as a response to changes undergone in the previous fifteen years (the process of de-industrialization, the demographic decline, and so on), all of which threatened the city with—in the words of the Mayor himself—a situa-

tion of «Marseillization». In second place there was the construction or improvement of a number of infrastructures that would resolve the traditional deficiencies of the city, completing its urban identity while respecting (relatively, at least) the traditional identity of the city and its neighbourhoods.

TABLE 1

<i>Agents</i>	<i>Goals</i>	
	<i>Substantial</i>	<i>Procedural</i>
Central Government	«1992»	Control
Government of the Generalitat	Catalanization of the Games	Participation
City of Barcelona	Urban change	Autonomy

Barcelona 1992. Goals of the various institutional agents.
(Source: the author)

Yet this perspective, derived from a strongly urban and not merely sport-related point of view, would play an important role in the preparatory process of the Games. The decisions concerning infrastructures, mechanisms of financing, or affecting urban administration, had to be taken by the local government itself, involving other agents without being pulled in by their behavioural logic. In other words, the procedural goal of City Hall was to assure that if its role was not one of leadership, at least it would have autonomy in the processes, so that it would be a secondary and subservient agent (which was what happened to the City of Seville in the preparation of the Universal Exposition).⁵

In a very synthetic fashion, Table 1 resumes this analysis of both the substantial and procedural goals that the various institutional agents pursued.

What happened when these different strategies entered into contact? How did they act with one another? These questions are important to be able to read the results of the Games for the various agents in terms of success and failure.

5. As is shown by the study of Seville carried out by G. Roulland, «L'exposition Universelle de Séville (1992). Etude du Système local de Décision», Bordeaux (Les Cahiers du Cerul), n° 1, 1991.

It should be said that this contrasting is not simple, since from the very moment that the city was designated in October of 1986 until the days the Games themselves were held, the preparation was involved in a multitude of conflicts and polemics, during which the positions of each agent were not necessarily coherent. On the other hand, the multiplicity of subjects of conflict partially altered the «visibility» of the respective positions. Yet we can try to conduct an exercise of reconstructing the woods without letting the trees obstruct us. We might deal with the question in the following terms: what was the attitude of each public administration (and by extension, of the «constellation» of political and social forces that each represented) when faced with the goals of the other agents?

For the central government, the overall operation of 1992 was the key element. Yet for its global role in the coordination and supervision of all the projects, it could prefer a position of not opposing itself to the objectives of other agents. Thus, in spite of the extreme tone that the claims for a Catalanization of the Games often took on, the government adopted quite systematically a position of reducing conflict, notably underplaying its positions, even though it did show itself to be uncomfortable upon occasion (we might think of the polemic over the Olympic mascot, the famous Cobi; the scandal over the opening of the Olympic Stadium upon the occasion of the World Track and Field Championship in September 1989; or the long polemic over the use of Catalan or the presence of the Catalan flag in the Olympic ceremonies). In the same way (though with greater enthusiasm and a financial commitment of the first degree) the government was sensitive to the aspirations of City Hall, both from a substantial and a procedural point of view, accepting the desire of the Mayor to preside the organizing committee, or the naming of Santiago Roldán, an economist, and an old friend and university colleague of the Mayor, as the head of governmental participation in financing.

If the Generalitat put its emphasis on the «Catalanizing» aspect of the Games, that did not necessarily mean that it enthusiastically accepted the «1992 project». Just the opposite was true: until the last moment it took up positions to alert everyone of the risks of «Spanishization» that the Olympic event could have, and the risk of seeing the presence of Catalonia as a differentiated reality dissolved. Less negative, however, was the perception of urban change; the Generalitat was deeply involved in some of the elements of the urban process, even though maintaining strong disagreements

(over questions of financing, urban planning licenses, the hotel plan, and others).

For City Hall, the insertion of the Games in the overall set of operations of 1992 was a key question. Instead of a vision of competition with the events that took place in Madrid or Seville, the City of Barcelona chose to situate itself in the front row, calculating (probably rightly) that a global success would make the success of Barcelona greater and that the Olympic Games would probably provide the best results of the three events. In his closing speech for the Games, the Mayor affirmed that «Spain is Barcelona» (and not the opposite, as would seem to be required from a logical point of view). Nothing demonstrated better the desire to be at the heart of the «1992 project» than to tell the world that the characteristics that it had seen in Barcelona for 15 days (a great spectacle, a permanent popular festival, organizational rigour down to the last detail) were characteristics of the new Spain.

Perhaps it is more interesting to state that the City Hall also participated in an active way in the project to Catalanize the Games. Here two different elements coincided: first, the wide acceptance of Catalanizing positions amongst the Catalan political elite (something not always understood in the rest of Spain, where the tendency is to interpret Catalanism in terms of political parties); second, this position allowed City Hall to separate itself, albeit slightly, from the positions of the central government, given that party identity could easily have dissolved the positions of the Catalan socialists into those of the PSOE) and come closer to, or at least reduce the potential conflict with, the positions of the government of the Generalitat.

In effect, as Table 2 shows, the real conflict was much smaller than could have been expected. Conflict was in fact quite small, limited to the persistent reticence of the executive of the Generalitat with regards to the strategy of globality that hovered over the overall plans for 1992.

Readers should not come to the conclusion, however, that the process of the preparation and organization of the Games was a bed of roses. Two important stages can be identified: the first, from 1986 to 1989, was marked essentially by debates and confrontation between the different agents, where one notes a visible effort by all sides involved to position themselves in the process and acquire the most relevant positions possible. This is where the debates over the organization of the Games came from, as well as the debated presidency of the Organizing Committee by the Mayor of the city,

or the problem of how to incorporate the private sector into decision-making bodies.

Undoubtably the end of the stage came with a concrete event: the inauguration, in September of 1989 of the emblematic Montjuïc stadium as the venue of the World Track and Field Championship. Under a spectacular storm, it was seen that the building, the darling of the Barcelonan architectural elite, had leaks, and that there were organized nuclei that could organize noisy protests against the monarch and the Spanish flag. The events of the opening of the stadium, in other words, indicated that the Olympic Games could come across badly, both from an organizational and a political point of view.

TABLE 2

	«1992»	Catalani- zation	Urban Change
Central government	+	=	≠
Government of the Generalitat	-	+	=
City of Barcelona	+	+	+

Symbols used:

- + signifies a positive perception of each goal, either as a central goal for the respective agent, or by its participation in goals sought by another agent.
- = denotes an attitude of passive participation, of tolerance with regards to a goal sought by another agent.
- denotes an attitude of opposition to a goal sought by another of the agents involved.

Attitude of institutional agents towards different goals
(Source: the author)

The consequence was immediate. If the Seoul Olympic Games (which had been visited by a large group of Barcelona Olympic officials) had been impressive for the demonstration of strong cooperation between different administrations, the events of the inauguration of the stadium had a visible effect on the positions of the various public administrations involved in the Barcelona Games, who opted to deactivate the conflict, not enter into reciprocal quarrels, and, more in the long term, actively set out to ensure the success of the Games. In other words, the perception arose that to

ensure the success of the Games they had to be « Everybody's Games», so that no political force nor administration could hope to capitalize on them to the detriment of others.

As for general reasons, the participation of the central government and the government of the city in the organization of the Games were two obvious elements, that did not do anything but ensure the involvement of the Generalitat and other Catalan nationalists in the Olympic event. In spite of a multitude of previously threatening signs, neither the «Crida» nor ERC (Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya) developed actions against it, nor did the proposal to create a Catalan Olympic committee receive significant support from the Generalitat (something that was bitterly noted later on by the promoters of the admission of Catalonia into the IOC).

This had a result in public opinion. As various surveys showed before and after the Games, the financial contribution and international projection of the Generalitat was evaluated higher than that of the central government (when in financial terms the proportion was 3 to 1 in favour of the latter). Thus in a survey of residents of Catalonia published in *La Vanguardia* (July 19, 1992), it was seen that a third of those asked (32.8%) put the contribution of the City of Barcelona highest; 15.4% pointed to the contribution of the Generalitat, while only 6.7% mentioned the contribution of the central government as the most important.

TABLE 3

Juan Carlos I, King of Spain	8.6
Pasqual Maragall (Mayor of Barcelona)	8.6
Juan Antonio Samaranch (President of the IOC)	8.5
Jordi Pujol (President of the Generalitat)	7.3
Narcís Serra (Deputy Prime Minister)	6.5
Felipe González (Prime Minister)	5.6

Evaluation of the role of various personalities in the celebration of the Olympic Games (scale from a minimum of 0 to a maximum of 10)

(Source: OPINA survey for *La Vanguardia*, 11/8/92, from a sample of 800 residents of Catalonia).

The same phenomenon was seen in the evaluation of the role of various Spanish personalities in the Games. If we wish, we might easily understand the role of the Monarch given his presence throughout the Games and the participa-

tion of the Prince of Asturias in the Spanish team. In the same way the high evaluation for the president of the IOC, Mr. Samaranch, could seem obvious. But the fact that the President of the Generalitat could be higher than the Prime Minister of the Spanish Government, or its deputy Prime Minister, former city mayor, Mr. Serra, is a sign of the perception of the relative role played by the various public institutions. A survey after the Games asked those surveyed to evaluate from 0 to 10 the participation of various Spanish personalities in the celebration of the Games. The results are seen in Table 3.

Even still, there is another side to the coin. There were few images as symbolic as the football final in the stadium of Football Club Barcelona, which is charged with Catalanist symbolism. The vision of Nou Camp presided by the King, full of Spanish flags, watching the Spanish team win the gold medal, showed in the clearest way possible that the Games had meant an enormously significant shift in the integration of Catalonia into Spain, without at all denigrating its own symbols of cultural and social identity.

SOCIETY

THE REPERCUSSION OF THE OLYMPIC GAMES ON LABOUR¹

FAUSTINO MIGUÉLEZ / PILAR CARRASQUER²

1. INTRODUCTION

Barcelona and its area of influence, along with the rest of Spain, initiated a process of economic recovery in 1986 which affected the service sector, arising in the context of the following three factors.

In the first place there was the international recovery, and with it, the entrance of Spain into the European Economic Community, which conditioned the Spanish recovery in a much more dependent way (Lope, Miguélez, Recio, Roca, 1993) than had occurred in the past.

In the second place there was a rise in internal demand, in particular in the construction, commerce, and hotel and restaurant sectors, as well as in services to enterprises and personal services.

In the third place there were a number of specific phenomena, which though peripheral were of great economic importance, above all because they affected construction and revitalized public initiative. This was the case of the preparation and development of the Olympic Games.

Our goal has been to study the repercussion of economic change on enterprises and labour. In this period the rate of

1. This article is a summary of a study carried out by a team of researchers of the *Grup d'Estudis Sociològics* (Sociological Studies Group) on *Treball i Vida Quotidiana* (Labour and Everyday Life) in the context of the changes in labour in the Region of Barcelona between 1986 and 1992, with special attention on the phenomenon of the Olympic Games. This study was assigned to the ADI-PROC, a labour organism, and financed by the COOB '92, the Diputació (Province) of Barcelona, and the City of Barcelona. The team was made up of Albert Recio, Antonio Martín, Andreu Lope, Carlos Lozares, Pedro López, Javier Collier, Oscar Rebollo, Inma Pastor, Pilar Carrasquer and Faustino Miguélez.

2. Faustino Miguélez Lobo. PhD. in History from the Autonomous University of Barcelona. Professor of the Department of Sociology of the Faculty of Political Science and Sociology of the Autonomous University of Barcelona.

Pilar Carrasquer Oto. BA. in Sociology from the Autonomous University of Barcelona. Professor of Sociology of the Faculty of Political Science and Sociology of the Autonomous University of Barcelona.

unemployment clearly diminished in Barcelona and its area of influence by 6 to 7 points, even though the rate began to rise again at the end of 1992. Still, what should be pointed out above all is that both the infrastructure of labour and labour conditions have undergone a very significant transformation: less stability, lower salaries in certain sectors, worsened labour conditions.

Various recent studies (see, for example, Prieto, 1991; Bilbao, 1991; Miguélez, Recio, Alós, 1988, 1989, 1990; Martín, 1992) have pointed to very important processes in the transformation of enterprises: decentralization, subcontracting, shrinkage. A different type of enterprise from those of the past is pictured: smaller, horizontally extended in a number of branches, with a nucleus of stable employees and a wide periphery of unstable workers. In this type of enterprise the administration of labour and its organization can be different from what it was in the past, and labour relations must necessarily reflect these changes in the form of weakened unions, in the possible appearance of new forms of representation, and in the development of negotiation with smaller groups of workers or individuals. This study has paid special attention to all of these questions, centering in particular on the period and the enterprises most related to the preparation of the Olympic Games.

For all of these reasons, it makes sense to wonder what changes in enterprises and labour during this period could be concretely attributed to a specific phenomena of economic and social importance such as the Olympic Games. To what degree did these changes result in or have as a consequence changes in the strategies of social agents of labour relations, with the possibility of continuity after the mentioned period?

One of the features that has defined the specificity of the context of preparation and development of the Olympic Games has been the presence of the public administration. The public administration has been the principal client, not only commissioning large projects in infrastructures, but also entering directly into the management of labour, interested that everything follow the planned program. The administration has become the great figure, through the impulse of a kind of local social agreement, of neo-guild characteristics restricted during a period when guild attitudes were actually in decline. In this agreement, workers and their representatives obtained jobs, better labour conditions, and improvement in the capacity of the unions to intervene. Entrepreneurs, especially large ones, did good business and above

all, strengthened their ties with the administration for future cooperation (we must not forget that an important part of the concessions went to enterprises which normally work with the public administration anyway). Above all, the public administration, in general and local terms, obtained political benefits in carrying out the program as planned, which reinforced its image of efficacy and modernity as a result.

The agreement worked in general terms, principally because the public administration carefully watched over all economic activities. It is also clear that in a time when the productive economy decreased in favour of services, the administration ended up playing an important role in the restructuring of the labour market, in labour relations, and in the very structure of enterprises, whether directly through public works or through other types of interventions.

Finally, we might offer some words about the methodology of the study. Apart from existing data, which is frequently overly aggregated, the study has emphasized three types of sources: first, interviews with different participants in economic-labour activity: entrepreneurs, managers of entrepreneurial organizations, sectorial and company labour leaders, workers, administrators, labour inspectors, economic experts, jurists and sociologists. Second, there was a survey of a representative sample of workplaces with ten or more employees in the metropolitan area of Barcelona, responded to by personnel directors or their equivalent. Finally, studies were made of about 30 cases of medium and large-sized enterprises which were typologically relevant to the different forms of administration of human resources in different production and service sectors.

The second of the techniques mentioned is not frequently utilized given economic problems and the time it usually implies. With it, a data source has been constituted that could be useful for future additions to these considerations.

2. ENTERPRISES RELATED TO THE PREPARATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE OLYMPIC GAMES

The activity generated by the Olympic event was not distributed homogeneously nor casually among enterprises. We have wanted to find out what type of enterprises were best able to benefit from a circumstance of this nature, what it could mean for the economy and employment, why there

were some types of enterprises involved and not others, and what this meant in relation to possible labour policies and strategies of the agents, as well as what might remain of it all in the future.

28% of the sample of workplaces in the metropolitan area of Barcelona with 10 or more employees have had some degree of direct and detectable involvement in the preparation and/or development of the Olympic Games (17% with a medium and high involvement and 11% with a low involvement). Within the metropolitan area the majority of the Olympic projects and activities were developed in the *comarca* (administrative district) of Barcelonés; perhaps for this reason, the enterprises with headquarters in this *comarca* are those who most benefited from this tie (31.7%).

In spite of the fact that a certain generalized presence of the Olympic phenomenon was seen in the different areas of activity, the participation was preeminent in certain sectors: public administration (55.2%), hotels and restaurants (48.1%), construction (48.1%), transport and communications (44%), and the rest of services (40.5%). That is, it was seen in those sectors that were objectively more linked to the projects or development of the Games as such. In this regard it is worth pointing out the key role played by the administration, which was also present in transportation and in certain sub-sectors of the rest of services. Yet the participation also took on notable relevance in other service sectors such as finances and services to enterprises (33.0%), education and health (27.6%), and commerce (20.9%). In industry it was lower, though in this case it was especially relevant in the steel sector and that part of industry related to construction activities.

Other two structural variables of enterprises which influenced competitiveness were the size of the workforces and their economic potential (this last measure in terms of the business volume of the most recent year). The great beneficiaries of Olympic activity have been strong enterprises (with over 100,000 million pesetas in annual sales), with more than 500 employees (70% of which participated in the Olympic event). Meanwhile, of those enterprises that do not have more than 25 employees and 300 million pesetas in business volume a year—the immense majority of enterprises in the area—only 14% declared involvement. For the rest of the sizes, or about 30%, participation has been about average.

Thus when there is strong and attractive business, however controlled it might be by the administration, small enter-

prises on their own and in terms of the logic of the market are not able to compete. They must be content, in all probability, with the indirect consequences of the event. This, on the other hand, is indicative of the strong relation that normally exists between large enterprises (especially in the service sector) and the public administration.

Enterprises have had more possibility of being involved in the Olympic phenomenon when they have formed part of subcontracting networks, whether in terms of subcontractors or those subcontracted (frequently the same enterprise carries out both roles). For, in fact, somewhat more than 40% of the enterprises that subcontract part of their production and about 34% of those which dedicate themselves to cover part of the productive necessities of other enterprises, indicate that they have had some degree of participation in the Olympic event.

The type of relation studied allows us at the same time to sustain a complementary hypothesis: those enterprises that have been strongly involved in this phenomenon have as a consequence made their workforces more flexible. This flexibility, however, has not always brought about labour uncertainty, at least in terms of the quantity of salary received, such as when it has affected qualified positions requiring trained personnel.

These types of enterprises have turned to external flexibilization (short term labour contracts) to a degree above or well above average, especially those in sectors most linked to the Olympic Games, such as construction or services. It is evident that this form of flexibility of the workforce has at the same time been important in allowing these enterprises to opt competitively for the preparatory activities or the development itself of the Olympic Games. Yet there are other key elements that have also contributed to strengthening enterprises with this competitiveness, such as those related to «professional enrichment» (carrying out of non-repetitive tasks), and the quality of labour skills. Furthermore, many «Olympic enterprises» have maintained a clearly dualized workforce: an established nucleus with a high degree of mobility—probably in exchange for economic and labour benefits—and a periphery fed by various forms of flexible hiring.

This dualization, or «internal labour market», has been referred to by various authors as the confirming indicator of the differentiated strategies of labour management carried out by enterprises (Ker, Shumann, 1988; Dore, 1992). We can now see that this dualization is functional even in times

of growth, especially if the expansion is circumstantial, as it was in this case.

Thus enterprises also were better able to link themselves to the Olympic event if their workforces had a medium or high degree of geographical or functional mobility, if in recent years they have tended to increase their workforces, particularly as regards technicians (in part, we might assume, thanks to the Olympic phenomenon itself), and if they have workforces with an above-average percentage (between 10% and 30% of those employed) or a well above average level (above 30%) of employees with university degrees.

Finally, «Olympic enterprises» tend to stand out in processes of both technological and organizational modernization. Nevertheless, in both cases it should be noted that the study verifies that the proportion of enterprises in the metropolitan area with high levels of technological innovation or sharp changes in labour organization is not particularly high. All in all, «Olympic enterprises» are found among those with a higher level of modernization than in other categories. We are speaking here of innovation in administrative or productive processes, the automization of production, the use of prefabricated and new materials in the case of technological innovation, and of quality circles, work groups, enriched tasks, and just-in-time production in terms of organizational change. We might rightly hold that these technological and organizational qualities have better positioned them to capture new markets.

3. INTENSITY OF ECONOMIC AND LABOUR INVOLVEMENT

To what degree, we might ask, does involvement in Olympic works and activities constitute a relevant economic impulse—apart from the indirect impulse that we have not measured here, which is related to direct impulses—for these enterprises, and as a consequence for the economic area of Barcelona? To respond to this question we solicited from the enterprises an estimate of the proportion both of business volume and workforce tied to Olympic involvement in its strongest year. We are dealing, then, with an indirect estimate and not a precise quantification.

It is necessary to point out that almost 40% of the centres involved in Olympic activity did not respond to these questions, alleging that they did not know the answer, or by simply ignoring the question. Of the enterprises that did respond, the majority pointed to an economic and labour im-

fact of less than 20% of their business volume and the size of their workforce. An impact over 20% was recognized by 14% of enterprises in economic terms and 19% in terms of workforce.

In regards to those enterprises strongly affected we could point out that they are found in those sectors most directly linked to the preparation and development of the Olympic Games: construction, the hotel and restaurant sector, and the rest of services. Yet they tend to be medium rather than large enterprises, repeating in turn the rest of the characteristics already mentioned on their most noteworthy level: the most dynamic, flexible and modern enterprises.

With the notable exception of the construction sector, the «Olympic enterprises» tended to expect better perspectives for 1993 than the rest, although this was not precisely for their Olympic character, but for what allowed them to be so in the first place. That is, these enterprises had a competitive and relational capacity that allowed them, on the one hand, to enter into Olympic-related business, and, on the other, to continue to maintain positive expectations once 1992 had ended. This is not the case for the construction sector, which once the Olympic event had ended, tended to decrease in activity. This data seems to be coherent with the interpretation of the current crisis as essentially industrial, with the construction sector being presumably affected by the end of a cycle of public investment.

With all this in mind, can we come to a viable conclusion in regards to the creation of employment directly tied to the preparation and development of the Olympic Games? There is no completely clear answer on the basis of this micro-analysis of enterprises, as the increase in «Olympic» work could have been absorbed by optimizing an up to then under-used workforce, or increasing extra hours without having to hire new staff. There is a basis to conclude that the enterprises with 10 or more employees in the metropolitan area increased their workforces by between 10% and 20%, on average, due to the Olympic Games. We do not know the duration of this shift, though we can presume that we are speaking of generally short periods of time because of the nature of activities and the hiring methods typically used. Therefore, to have a more solid basis of argument we have proceeded to a more detailed analysis of two of the sectors with the greatest «Olympic» activity: construction, and hotels and restaurants (and, partially, other services such as commerce, sanitation and security).

4. THE EMBLEMATIC «OLYMPIC SECTORS»

4.1. *Construction*

The construction sector in the province of Barcelona — there are no data for the metropolitan area — grew from 76,025 employees in 1985 to 110,837 in 1987 and 145,000 in 1991, returning in 1992 to levels before those of the previous year, according to data from the EPA (*Encuesta de Población Activa*, the national employment survey). The strongest growth, which can be attributed to the real estate boom and to some degree to the development of infrastructures, occurred from 1985 to 1987. From this latter date until the end of the pre-Olympic year, the increase of employed workers was 34,163 people, equivalent to 30.8%. This figure would grow to 40% if we were to consider a few thousand illegal workers and foreigners not accounted for in the official statistics. To what degree can this employment be attributed to Olympic activity, keeping in mind that a year after the Olympics the figures fell considerably? To what degree, in contrast, can these jobs be attributed to the housing market? We consider that the jobs generated by Olympic-related work in the broad sense of the idea oscillated between 20,000 and 25,000 people. In order to make this conclusion we based our study on interviews with constructors, union leaders, labour inspectors, administrators of Olympic projects, and in the figures for active construction workers from some of the more emblematic projects.

This volume of employment is lower than that which some studies had previously claimed (see, for example, the forecasts in issue 9 of the magazine *Barcelona Olímpica*, from May 1989). From among the reasons that would explain this phenomena, two should be pointed out. On the one hand, was the use of new technologies in the construction process. This is an important factor to keep in mind for the future, as we cannot forget that up until 10 years ago the construction sector had maintained rather traditional methods, where changes were basically related to transportation. Yet in recent years (Miguélez, Recio, Alós, 1990) innovation has made itself manifest as a factor in the elimination of both skilled and unskilled workers.

At the same time, another factor was the intensification of labour, principally in the form of overtime, the consequence of a certain coincidence of interests between enterprises and employees. In order to fulfill pre-established schedules, it was necessary to work as many hours as possible at

the fastest rhythm reasonably possible. All of those interviewed agreed in affirming that the working days in the Olympic projects had been extraordinarily long—around 12 hours for many workers, rising to 16 hours in some cases according to the labour inspection itself—which in fact meant working more than the legal limit for overtime. For enterprises this practice was less costly than hiring additional workers, while for many workers who had come from elsewhere it was an opportunity to increase their salaries notably. Only with difficulty could the unions intervene in practices that the workers agreed to, as an important part of their salaries depended upon them. A good part of the success of the preparatory projects of the Olympic Games, as well as a good part of the profits of the enterprises in question, should be attributed to working overtime.

The interviews carried out show that the immense majority of those hired for Olympic projects were temporary (in 1990, 50.6% of the construction employment contracts were temporary while the average was 33.4% for other sectors). To a great degree these were shorter contracts than those in other economic sectors, with greater rotation from one enterprise to another. It could be argued that it had to be this way due to the occasional nature of Olympic construction. Taken together, this instability had other negative consequences for the training of workers, the possibilities of integration, and the quality of work, not to mention the negative effects there could have been for the future of employees.

New workers came largely from other regions of Spain (Aragon, Galicia) and from other countries. The number of foreign workers is difficult to quantify—some information from organized industry spoke of 12,000, although it is quite possible that the figure was not even half this due to different labour circumstances: those brought directly by the construction company; those comprising qualified technical staff; seasonal immigrants; and immigrants considered to be illegal.

The general opinion is that legality and current norms had to be respected more than ever, possibly because all of those involved were interested in assuring that everything went well, though perhaps for different reasons. However, the extraordinary, complex chain of subcontracting that can mean that in a single project there are up to 6 or even 8 enterprises, makes it difficult to verify the rectitude of all situations, in spite of labour and union inspections.

The shrinkage of the construction sector—which as we have noted coincided with the end of Olympic projects and the boom in housing construction—lead to a significant

decrease in employees in the sector. Yet this decrease did not translate into an equivalent proportion of unemployed in Barcelona, since many workers in this period had returned to their original homes and other economic sectors. In these areas and sectors the unemployment rate went up as well.

The most frequent type of contracts were for projects or services, or those designed to promote employment. Especially prominent was the first of these, given that it allowed for short term hiring without later commitments. These contracts are highly flexible, and were used most in those sectors least affected by the presence of labour unions.

The fixed single-project contract had a certain importance in more unionized enterprises undergoing a certain revitalization of labour representation. Whatever the case, the stability of the fixed single-project contract was not particularly high, given the weakening of the very concept of a single-project in relation to the enterprise carrying it out. For an enterprise intervening in a number of projects, a single project could last for a very short time.

In the areas of security and hygiene, and in the qualification of employees, there were changes as well. In the first case, important steps were taken to create a control structure more closely linked to projects that firmly involved enterprises, unions and labour inspection; the experience of the Olympic projects allows us to maintain a certain hope that the high accident rate in the sector might drop, providing this experience continues.

As for the qualification and training of employees, important steps were taken during these years —with agreements on training and the creation of the Institut-Escola Gaudí— where Olympic experiences have played a role. Yet it would be necessary to bring training inside the enterprises further, and stabilize employment, as no one will want to spend time in training if in a few months he or she is to end up in another sector. The dramatic experience of the Olympic projects, obliging enterprises to rehire older workers who might have been retired or working in other jobs, demonstrates the destructive effect of instability on this sector.

All of these aspects bring to light the new representative role of unions, which had become more difficult in previous years due to the extreme decentralization of the sector. In this sense, pioneer experiences such as the «labour relations agreement» signed by the UGT (Unión General de Trabajadores), CCOO (Comisiones Obreras), VOSA and AOMSA, with the goal of giving unions an on-site presence in those

Olympic constructions the two latter entities were responsible for, could be a basis for future action.

4.2. *Services*

In services, and particularly in the hotel and restaurant sector, the effect of the Olympic Games varies from that reflected in the construction sector, given that it was observable only a few weeks before the event began. The levels of employment in the hotel and restaurant sector and commerce—the data is combined—rises from 305,229 people in 1987 to 320,451 in 1990. This represents an increase of 5% in the province of Barcelona, falling notably in 1991 and recovering lightly in 1992, according to data from the EPA. To what degree and with what characteristics was this recovery the effect of Olympic activities, and to what degree did it reflect the ups and downs of a period of economic expansion?

In order to respond to this question we have in the first place compared hiring through the INEM (the national employment institute) in July of 1991 and in the same year in 1992, in the city and province of Barcelona. Although the source used does not allow us to itemize the analysis, we can affirm that for total services part-time hiring increases, as well as contracts for projects, services, or market necessities. Keeping this in mind, it is probable that the increase of 10,000 contracts in 1992 in relation to 1991 in the city of Barcelona (there are only 2,000 more in the rest of the province) had to do almost exclusively with Olympic activity.

On the basis of the interviews made, the employment created in all services could be estimated to be between 20,000 and 25,000 jobs. This is less than expected (for example, there was no job creation in commerce) due to a number of factors. On the one hand, there was less demand for services than expected (due in part to overly optimistic visitor forecasts) and thus less need to generate new employment. On the other hand, enterprises underwent an enormous effort in assuring the cooperation of their employees by advancing or delaying vacations, or having them do overtime beyond that allowed, which significantly limited the need for new hiring.

This search for cooperation, which could be of great importance in understanding forms of competitiveness in the future, has occurred in this case due to the characteristics of the event itself, favouring the expectation that everything would «turn out right». Yet it was also due to the nature of the hired labour: young people and students, as well as family members of those already employed. A different case, which also

had a significant repercussion on employment, was that of the «Olympic volunteers». We do not mean to suggest that the COOB interfered in bad faith in the labour market—in fact the Olympic organization took special care to ensure that this was not the case—but that these types of events always develop certain necessities that many citizens are willing to respond to outside of the logic of the market, for more idealistic motives.

The jobs in this sector were of short duration, sometimes lasting only a few days. The forms of hiring—for projects, services, or market necessities—made them enormously flexible, at the same time that they brought about a high degree of precariousness for workers, given that they did not even know if they would work the time stipulated in their contracts. In the same way, there seems to have been a certain degree of illegal labour in types of activity where it is common: sanitation and hotel-restaurant services, especially in enterprises that cannot be so easily controlled, whether on the part of the COOB, the unions, or labour inspectors. This difficulty arose to a great degree because of the complex chains of subcontracting that these enterprises tend to be immersed in.

Finally, as a new factor from the point of view of labour relations, we must point out that the Olympic Games meant an impulse in the search for new areas of activity in the sector. As in the case of construction, the interest of the administration in assuring good results for the Olympic event favoured the agreement between the COOB and the unions to guarantee their «in situ» presence during the Olympic Games, as well as their activity as institutionally legitimized agents in the resolution of whatever conflicts could arise. As in the case of the construction sector, we do not know to what degree these types of initiatives will have continuity in the future. Yet there is no doubt that the celebration of the Olympic Games brought to the fore new and interesting union experiences.

5. CONCLUSIONS

1. From the point of view of employment, the Olympic Games have not been the basic economic impulse for Catalonia or for the metropolitan area of Barcelona that many had expected and that the public institutions had often suggested they would be. There are two reasons for this: first, it was a limited phenomenon that for this reason only affected some economic sectors. Second, it occurred in the context of

an international recession that also affected Spain. It is quite possible that a better overall situation in 1991 and 1992 would have «enlivened» the economic activity related to the Games even more. The case of commerce and the hotel and restaurant sector is illustrative of this. Throughout the summer of 1992 commerce did not do a volume of business above that of previous years, while in regards to the hotel and restaurant sector, there were better results in 1993 and 1994 than in 1992. All in all, the economic impulse of the Olympic Games, though limited, probably contributed to delay the effect of the recession which otherwise would have made itself evident beforehand with particular vehemence.

2. The «Olympic enterprise» was a medium or large enterprise, with modernized technology and organization. The enterprises that directly benefited from the preparatory activities of the Games have not been small ones, although some business did come to them through chains of subcontracting.

In order to obtain contracts for projects, enterprises have had to have flexibility, economic capacity and access to the complex world of public administration. The study carried out in the construction sector, which was the most emblematic, has shown that there were only a few enterprises commissioned to do the projects, but that a long and complex chain of subcontracting was developed from them, which in many cases affected small enterprises and independent workers. This capacity for distribution and coordination is available to only a few enterprises, those with economic potential, good technical teams to respond to the demands of the public administration, and strong ties to other enterprises, whether Spanish or foreign.

Furthermore, the presence of the public administration in Olympic projects strengthened the possibility of social control of the administration and unions, and of employment. Even so, this control was limited, as could not have been otherwise. The presence in a given project of many enterprises at the same time, in a very limited space and for a very short period of time made any type of control difficult.

3. The volume of employment created was less than expected. We have verified that there are three reasons for this gap (here we must note that perhaps the forecasts were due to a self-interested or unrealistic optimism). In the first place, technological innovation allowed enterprises to carry out the same activity with less employees, or lead them to import labour and new materials that could not be supplied sufficiently from within Spain; this was especially true in the

construction sector. Second, the demand for services, especially in hotels-restaurants and commerce—in this case during the actual celebration of the Olympic Games—was much less than expected and had an effect on employment, in general tending to be short term. Third, and most importantly, was the intensification of working hours so as to lower costs and not have to deal with the complications of reducing staff after the event.

The employment created was basically temporary, and as a consequence, was not maintained after the Games, with few exceptions. Yet an important part of the temporary employment created was of a type in construction, communications, and tourism that meant that labour periods, whether long or short, also became periods of apprenticeship that would have put these workers in better conditions to find a job position later or once the particular task had been completed.

It should be pointed out that the fact that in a sector with such a high accident rate as construction, the levels of security and hygiene increased in the Olympic projects, thanks to greater union control, in turn leading to the enterprises' fulfillment of current security norms. This is an indication that social control of working conditions is not inefficient, especially if carried out by the representatives of those directly affected, and done on the work site itself.

4. If we keep in mind the enormous volume of projects in the preparation of the Games and the complex labour activity throughout, it is noteworthy that there was relatively little labour conflict. A kind of «Olympic social peace» was one of the dominating factors. In this there was the influence of all of the social and political agents, who did not wish to be responsible for serious delays or the poor operation of an event of such importance, which would have meant a significant cost in political terms. The characterization of labour relations also affected this situation: the sectors affected were not highly formalized in terms of labour relations, especially because the presence of unions and labour committees was low and the organization between enterprises (the *patronales*) was strong. As a consequence, labour relations worked on the basis of *ad hoc* agreements on training, security and hygiene, with the explicitly agreed upon presence of unions on site, the important role of labour inspectors, and the interest of the public administration in assuring respect for norms and agreements. This role of the public administration was decisive and can be explained above all because the public administration was the principal client.

The good mutual understanding in terms of labour ques-

tions must be understood within the context of a social agreement to contribute to the economic and social progress of Barcelona, known as the *Barcelona 2000 Strategic Plan*. The political and social forces of the city, together with universities, various institutions, neighbourhood associations, and many enterprises, have consciously undergone a process of debate and consensus in a series of measures that could define the future of the city in the medium term in certain strategic areas of economic policy. Perhaps more important than the content of the agreements and their effective fulfillment, is the fact that for various years these entities have met together to move forward within this very framework. Upon this ground a consensus has been established that allowed for the peaceful preparation of the Games and many other initiatives.

Perhaps we are faced with a formalization of new guild-like agreements, this time on a local level, that should be carefully studied. These agreements could be extraordinarily interesting both for local powers and large enterprises that operate in the city, but which are further distanced from the interests of social and politically weaker groups, as is seen by the fact that social measures are the most difficult to have respected as there are not sufficient resources nor a sufficient level of concretion that could further to oblige all participants to cooperate. Yet the Olympic Games were a ground upon which some of these common interests were able to come together more easily.

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VOLUNTEERS OF BARCELONA '92: THE GREAT CELEBRATION OF PARTICIPATION

ANDREU CLAPÉS¹

At the end of the Barcelona Olympic Games a great emptiness filled the city and the hearts of many people. It was not easy to forget the previous four years.

Success, however, was the best compensation for the great effort the entire city made in bringing it about. The group that received the widest and most unanimous recognition was that of the volunteers. The world press confirmed this fact, along with the gratitude made manifest by public institutions and citizens in general.

1. AN INNOVATIVE AND RISKY PROPOSAL

1.1. *The difference from other Games*

Over the years, the organization of the Olympic Games has become more and more complex, requiring a more and more complicated organizational process, as well as an increasingly numerous human operational structure.

The point of inflection, without a doubt, was the 1984 Los Angeles Games, where for fundamentally economic reasons the decision was made to use a significant number of volunteers. This same posture was taken in Seoul '88. However, the objective in both cases was to strictly fulfill organizational needs, looking for maximum efficacy with minimum cost, high though this latter was in both cases.

It is worth mentioning the case of Calgary, organizing city of the 1988 Winter Games, which was a source of inspiration for the initial activities of Barcelona '92. The city had a great tradition in organizing a large public event, the Stampede. It benefited from this potential to consolidate and give worldwide promotion to their particular volunteer

1. Andreu Clapés i Flaqué. B.A. in Geography and History, Autonomous University of Barcelona. Sub-director of the Olympic Volunteers for Barcelona '92. Director of the Volunteers Attention Office and Ombudsman of the Olympic Volunteers during the Olympic Games.

movement, especially as it involved adults and retired people.

In the volunteer centre in Calgary a series of activities was planned to establish a well prepared and efficient team that would above all be *highly motivated*. From the beginning, continuity after the Olympic Games was planned, keeping in mind the social significance and pragmatic regular activity of their own festival. The building used during the Games as the volunteer centre was ceded to the volunteers of the city.

Barcelona wished to assure the cooperation of its population from the very beginning. It set out to be an open and participative candidature. For this reason it established a starting point that, with relation to other organizational experiences, was differentiated and innovative: to achieve the participation of the population as future Olympic volunteers in the phase of the candidature, even before being nominated as the Olympic host.

1.2. *Participation campaign*

The project of the candidature of Barcelona '92 established as one of its goals a maximum number of participants in the Olympic Games. The idea was to show the Olympic family the impact and expectation that the project of Barcelona '92 could give rise to among its population, and to generate an image of a dynamic, efficient and open candidature.

The goal was set to include a minimum of 40,000 signatures of support from citizens from the entire state in the candidature package.

To this end a participation campaign was designed, articulated fundamentally in a travelling exhibit (with the slogan «Participation is what counts. Be an Olympic volunteer») which was mounted on a large truck (the Olympic bus) and travelled to the capitals of the 17 Spanish autonomous communities, all of the *comarcas* (administrative districts) of Catalonia, and all of the districts of Barcelona, starting in February of 1986.

In order to gather participations, information brochures were published with a detachable card where basic personal data could be entered, which served as the basis for the later elaboration of a cardfile of possible candidates for the volunteer organization.

After touring for five months, 55,000 signatures had been received. When the candidature was presented in September of 1986, there were more than 61,000. The campaign closed off at the end of the year, when 102,000 signatures had been received.

If the number of signatures was important, even more so was the reception for the campaign. The touring exhibit turned into a public festival. It was very clear that the index of optimism was on the rise.

The promotional strategy was based upon two basic ideas: contact the most important athletes in each area; and involve the local press in the promotion of the campaign.

With this campaign, the first part of the success of the Games had been achieved. From then on it was necessary to put the whole adventure in gear and move forward.

1.3. *The start-up*

On January 1, 1988, the Volunteers Department was created with a minimal staff of nine people, within the Operative Services Division of the then legally-formalized COOB '92.

The first task was to put the 102,000 volunteer cards in order. Two great difficulties were involved in this job: remake contact after a year and a half, and decide which of these people still wished to continue as volunteers.

The other real issue that had to be quickly solved was to find a sponsor which would finance the entire volunteer project, which was budgeted at 1,000 million pesetas. After a few months of negotiation with three enterprises, SEAT decided it could harmonize its commercial interests with the «volunteer» project.

1.4. *The objectives*

Four general objectives were defined to ideologically aid the development of the project:

1. Prepare and train the necessary volunteers for the organization of the Olympic Games.


2. Promote the link with Barcelona and maintain a commitment with those who had given their support to the candidature of Barcelona '92.

3. Transmit Olympic values.

4. Contribute to the strengthening of civil society.

It was clear that in no case could the objective that justified the entire operation be lost: the celebration of the Olympic Games. Yet if this had been the only objective it would have been enough to initiate the volunteer program only 2 years beforehand.

It is clear that the proposal of Barcelona was different. We did not only wish to achieve the final goal, but to keep in mind what would happen after 1992, benefiting from the



strong investment that the Games generated. It was thus necessary to assure that the program would be beneficial for the future.

This operation was attractive enough for the different political forces to seek to capitalize on it. The solution to this was in the constitution of the COOB '92. All of the institutions that formed part of the consortium were actively integrated into the Consulting Commission for the Barcelona '92 Volunteer Project. This was undoubtedly one of the most assuring experiences of the entire process, due to the degree of involvement and cooperation achieved.

Having representatives from all of the Autonomous Communities was a communication vehicle that had to be strengthened. The potential volunteers had to take Barcelona to all the homes of the nation and, in turn, all of the nation had to feel involved, informed and in contact with Barcelona. The support given by all of Spanish society to Barcelona had to be translated into a connection with the preparation process and the celebration of the Games.

In a society that is often considered materialist, and where the image of young people is associated with apathy and drugs, it was necessary to subtly present a new image of Spanish youth: dynamic, with initiative, altruistic, capable of doing things for nothing, generous, and optimistic.

It was decided to recover and strengthen the series of universal values that Pierre de Coubertin, as a good educator, had gathered in the Olympic Charter and that for their universal character could still be spread. It was also fundamental to benefit from the advantages and accessibility of the mass media to continue to spread the culture of voluntary action, beyond the world of sport. What was truly important was to speak of voluntary action so that it might receive social recognition. This did not mean, clearly, that before the existence of Olympic volunteers it did not exist. Nevertheless, the extension and social recognition of volunteerism in Spain is a merit that must be attributed to the movement generated by the Barcelona Olympic Games.

2. A FOUR-YEAR PLAN

2.1. *Basic training*

The basic training plan included two areas of action. On the one hand there was the training and motivation of personnel to achieve optimal cooperation. On the other,

this process also had to be useful in the selection of volunteers.

Basic training, which had to cover the years 1988, 1989 and 1990, had two clearly differentiated branches: Courses, and Active Participation.

Courses

Using the Olympic colours, six educational modules were designed:

- Red: Active participation: What does it mean to be a volunteer? First Aid.

- White: The Olympic movement and culture: the Olympic world. The history of the Games. The Olympic Charter. The Program of the Cultural Olympics.

- Blue: The city and its environment: knowledge of the city of Barcelona. Knowledge of the Olympic sub-sites.

- Black: Languages: linguistic knowledge.

- Yellow: Barcelona '92: the candidature project and the Olympic project. Organization of the COOB '92. Financing.

- Green: Sport and humanity: the Olympic disciplines and their technical evolution over time.

The courses were given in classrooms as normal classes, in centres all over Spain. Those in Catalonia were done in conjunction with City Halls and those in the rest of the autonomous communities were done through the National Youth Institute (INJUVE). The team of educators of the Volunteers Department was made responsible for content, pedagogical resources and methodology, starting from scratch in many aspects, as there was no material nor systematized documentation available.

The volunteers from Barcelona and the sub-sites received special treatment for cultural reasons and others related to availability. Volunteers between 14 and 22 years old had to attend classes. Those over 23 years-old did group interviews with the Volunteers Division and were offered the possibility of studying the dossiers on their own, without having to attend classes, as well as being invited to participate in all activities that could widen their knowledge (lectures, showing of films, and so on).

The courses made it possible to begin to establish a cohesive group from an originally unconnected group of people from different geographical and cultural contexts; more than 35,000 people attended them throughout Spain. At the same time, teachers began to detect possible «leaders» and problematic people. Finally, a number of group interviews were programmed, where besides presenting training materials a

group dynamic was carried out to discover aptitude profiles that could be useful when assigning concrete tasks to the volunteers.

RESULT OF PARTICIPATION IN THE BASIC TRAINING STAGE

TRAINING COURSES

<i>Area</i>	<i>Coordinators</i>	<i>Teachers</i>	<i>Volunteers</i>
Barcelona	3	96	18.728
Sub-sites	15	52	6.664
Catalonia	58	178	5.118
Autonomous communities	15	130	5.132
Total	91	456	35.642

ACTIVE PARTICIPATION

<i>Area</i>	<i>Participations</i>	<i>Volunteers</i>
Barcelona	114	8.600
Sub-sites	150	3.700
Catalonia	220	3.500
Autonomous communities	150	4.500
Total	634	20.300

Active participation

The activity developed in class had to be complemented with activities on the street, performing tasks similar to what they would have to do during the Games. At the same time people had to get used to seeing the volunteers, supporting them and recognizing their worth.

Each volunteer in his or her own territory had the opportunity to do activities. In the end this was to be one of the most important motivational and unifying elements for the group.

The activities were programmed to become news items (through the COOB press department) and arouse the press to respond to them. This situation was good for the group, though it received strong criticism from other social volunteers, who felt that they were not representative of altruistic and generous volunteerism, which acts without expecting to receive compensation or social recognition, and which remains anonymous. They were right to a degree, though we were convinced that the Olympic volunteers not only did not harm other groups, but in the long term helped to confirm volunteerism as a social phenomenon.

The motivational plan

This theoretical-practical training had to be accompanied by a very concrete motivational plan.

It was thought that the most adequate solution was to link the motivational plan to the process of training and integration of the group itself. This premise was ethically defensible and coherent with the overall position and the established objectives.

The principal initiatives of the plan were:

- Define a particular style for the Volunteer Division, designed by the creator of the image of Barcelona '92, Josep Maria Trias. A line of products was created especially for the volunteers: caps, t-shirts, stickers, pins, watches, which were



Cobi brandishing the 1992 Volunteers' symbol.

considered as small incentives for the group. These products were financed by the sponsoring partners and collaborators of the Games.

- 1,000 grants to study French in France or English in England for a month were distributed by a lottery system, verified by notary.

- 2,000 other volunteers, after a selection test, received grants to study French or English during the school year in one of the language academies of the network of the *Associació d'Idiomes de Catalunya* (ADIC) (The Languages Association of Catalonia).

- In order to maintain direct contact with the volunteers, a magazine was published as the vehicle for news and the transmission of the evolution of the overall project in preparation for the final celebration. 13 issues came out, though irregularly.

- A program to visit the Olympic installations called «Roda Barcelona» (Coasting Barcelona) was organized. A total of 15,251 volunteers from all over Spain took advantage of this campaign.

- Over a period of almost four years a weekly program called *Voluntaris Olímpics* (Olympic Volunteers) was broadcast on Radio 4 and Radio 5, which included contests on Olympic themes, with the prizes being trips to Greece to discover the origins of the Olympic Games.

- The very dynamic of the volunteers lead to the systematic organization of a number of festivals and encounters («Fes-te a la festa» (Do it at the party)), with the idea of offering a place for encounters in a relaxed and leisurely context, and aid in the integration of individuals in the group and in the project. As an aside, a good number of couples formed as a result of the volunteer movement, some of which resulted in children, the first of whom was given the name Olímpia.

2.2. *Specific training*

The key objective of the design of the COOB '92 Training Plan was that everyone involved in a task could do it with maximum skill, efficiency and security in him or herself and in the system. For this reason it was necessary to be specifically trained for the tasks one was assigned.

The criteria used in designing the training plan were essential when bringing the plan into practice. It was not necessary to train anyone as if they were studying for a Masters degree. It was fundamental to respect the availability of those involved, with austerity and careful budget control.

For the great majority of volunteers the apprenticeship was simple to assimilate: the tasks that had to be carried out were not difficult. Yet for a smaller though nevertheless numerous group of volunteers, more exact training was involved, requiring greater time and dedication. The rhythms of implementation of the training process had to be different, adjusted to each task. These criteria determined what, how and when the training had to be done.

Those responsible for the content were designated in the functional divisions of the Organizing Committee. The first draft, which arose from the contributions of various thematic heads, created necessities that would have required the rental of the University of Barcelona for a year and a half! The process involved constant cutting and negotiation with those in charge. That this occurred was understandable, as everyone wished to assure maximum perfection within their own areas of responsibility. For this reason it was vital to have someone with decision-making power to adjust positions and programs.

This same problem appeared when establishing the requirements so that each functional area could determine its own necessities in terms of volunteers. The first estimation required 75,000 volunteers.

In fact, each thematic and functional area took a different approach. Within each area there was an important grading of cases, in function of the level of responsibility and technical criticality. Starting from a common design, the quantity of materials put together for training (dossiers, manuals, audiovisual material) was truly varied and complex.

It should be pointed out that there was significant cooperation with the enterprises associated with the COOB '92, which backed up this process with materials and trained personnel, especially in technical theme areas, or in the supply of specialized apparatus.

The Specific Training began in 1990. The Test Proofs held in the Summer of 1991 helped to evaluate the adjustment of various tested and applied training plans. There was little room for manouever, though enough to allow for a relatively small amount of corrections. Overall, the plan was satisfactory, well planned, and rational.

2.3. Designation of Work Posts

From the initial potential of 102,000 volunteers in 1986, the final figure, adjusted to necessities, was of 35,000 volunteers.

The methodological and functional criteria for the designation of volunteers to concrete work positions was based on the systemization of the list of selected people in function of similar aptitudinal profiles, forming groups called «modules». At the same time a list of well-defined work posts, adjusted to the level of technicians and professionals, was created on the basis of criticality, technical knowledge required, social abilities, languages, and so on.

ORIGIN OF VOLUNTEERS

<i>Olympic venues and sub-sites</i>	24.577
Barcelona	16.868
Badalona	1.641
Banyoles	258
Castelldefels	310
Granollers	326
La Seu d'Urgell	404
L'Hospitalet	1.340
Mollet	330
Reus	214
Sabadell	690
Sant Sadurní	153
Terrassa	793
Vic	194
Viladecans	288
Saragossa	410
València	358
<i>Rest of Catalonia</i>	8.414
<i>Rest of Spain</i>	1.435
<i>Total</i>	34.426

On the basis of these modules, the volunteers were assigned to a concrete Territorial Unit (the installation of a sports competition, lodging, or logistic support) according to the requirements in each case. When the volunteer and the person in charge of the Territorial Unit agreed, the person in charge validated the volunteer and this latter was then registered in the project and assigned to the specific tasks to be carried out. In some cases this was done after a personal or group interview, depending upon the criticality

of the work position and the level of responsibility. Later—and in some cases simultaneously—the Specific Training began.

The designation of each volunteer to the Territorial Unit had to be adequately assimilated and detailed on computer so as to prepare the adequate accreditation and designation of the corresponding uniform which would have to be worn during the Games.

2.4. Specialized volunteers

The designation process for work posts lead to the identification of «gaps», tasks that could not be filled with the profiles of the available volunteers. This lead to the activity know as «recruitment of specialized volunteers».

To establish those responsible for the direction of groups public institutions were consulted (Generalitat de Catalunya, City of Barcelona, Delegation of the Central Government in Catalonia, Diputació (provincial government) of Barcelona).

The Royal Automobile Club of Catalonia supplied 3,000 drivers.

The sports federations could not be kept apart from the event, since it was the maximum expression of the activities that they normally carried out; they thus supplied people of high technical level in each of the sports disciplines represented.

The students of the Tourism Schools had the opportunity to participate in the specific tasks for which they were being prepared. This was a testing ground that would never be repeated again and signified the perfect culmination and exercise of practice in their respective careers of informers, guides, receptionists, and so on.

Students of the Catalan National Institute for Physical Education (INEFC) and other specialized schools were also able to carry out their respective specialties.

Individuals were asked to cooperate as volunteers for their administrative capacity in posts where their professional profiles would guarantee optimum management.

A cooperation agreement was signed between the COOB '92 and the Ministry of Defense so that 3,000 soldiers could cooperate with the Olympic and Paralympic volunteers, with time worked discounted from obligatory military service.

3. THE VOLUNTEERS DURING THE GAMES

3.1. *Support volunteers*

Once assigned to a tasks and to a Territorial Unit, on-site training was begun. The enormous group of people willing to cooperate in the organization had the difficult challenge of having to confront a hard and uncertain task. In spite of planning, they would certainly have to confront an important number of unexpected situations and changes.

On the basis of the experience of other Games it was known that one of the serious problems that arises in the last moment is that large multi-national enterprises hire Olympic volunteers for their own particular needs. The sums are offered to them are not insignificant. The response was, in spite of this, very positive: the level of desertion was not higher than 1%. Evidently this was a credit to the volunteers themselves, who demonstrated once again their high level of motivation.

750 volunteers from other autonomous communities and distant points of Catalonia were lodged in the homes of other volunteers. The operation, initiated a few years earlier under the name «A friend awaits», was quite successful, and the number of problems was quite low.

Mention should also be made of what we might call the «support volunteers». Though their role is difficult to measure and evaluate, we should mention all of those people who gave logistical support to the volunteers themselves (including parents, friends, siblings, grandparents, neighbours), thanks to whom the volunteers had their schedules freed up, their uniforms washed, were fed, and so on, not only during the Games but also during the previous years of training and preparation. This was an important support movement made up of many anonymous people who should be recognized and thanked publically.

3.2. *Support for volunteers*

From early on one of the imperatives was to ensure that the volunteer felt he or she was being treated with careful support by those in charge and by the organization as a structure.

Volunteer personnel were treated with the same consideration as the rest of the personnel. In fact, volunteers, hired personnel, and the personnel of the COOB '92 formed a single body, EQUIP '92 (TEAM '92).

The person in charge of an installation could be a volunteer. This meant that the levels of responsibility were occupied indiscriminately by hired personnel and volunteer personnel. Thus in many cases, salaried personnel were directed by volunteer personnel. This gave considerable validity to the figure of the volunteer, undoing the belief that they were only acting in an auxiliary mode.

In each installation there was a person in charge of human resources, and within their team, a specific person who took care of the volunteers. A *Manual of Aid to the Volunteer* specified in clear language how the volunteer had to be treated. Evidently the result was unequal, depending upon the sensibility of the person who held this responsibility. Overall, however, almost everyone assumed their responsibilities professionally.

It was felt that there should be an explicit recognition of the rights and responsibilities of the volunteer as a guarantee of their seriousness and respect for the work they had to perform. In this way the *10 X 10 of the Olympic Volunteer* was created, a type of «carta magna» that regulated the contractual relations of the two parts, even though legally it was only binding for the organization and not for the individual working for it.

Since it was not binding for the volunteer, different ways were studied to in some way ensure the volunteer's commitment. Finally there was no other option but to trust the moral commitment that they had made before society. This commitment was not even formalized in writing, even though this possibility was considered. The result was satisfactory enough, and the volunteers understood this clearly.

The fulfillment of and respect for rights and responsibilities from both sides created moral credibility and trust. This was reinforced publically when members of the press or elite sports personalities were seriously disrespectful towards volunteers and their accreditation was taken away. The press commented upon these incidents and word was spread throughout EQUIP '92, raising trust in the organization, so that at every moment the volunteers felt truly supported.

As a final piece, the figure of the Volunteer's Ombudsman was created, similar to political ombudsmen. A complementary group of eight volunteers was chosen to initially attend claims and complaints at the «Volunteer Attention Office».

This office did not only receive complaints, but the team of volunteers at the office reviewed all of the installations to keep a check on the spirits of the group, solving *in situ* any

small problems that arose. When the questions went beyond their capacity for decision, the complaint was transferred to the Ombudsman, who took the relevant measures or passed the problem on to the Main Operations Centre if it was particularly grave, so that measures could be taken.

The volunteers had a uniform code of conduct found in the Volunteer's Manual, two versions of which had already been tested, one for the Active Participation training and the other for the Test Proofs of 1991.

Establishing a series of norms for conduct was a difficult challenge, as it was easy to resort to the classic, overused urbanity manual of another era. A conscientious norm was drafted using up-to-date language that was both synthetic and practical. In order to ensure that it reach more people, a video with rap music was made, which was shown in the different installations during the training period.

The most conflictive issues on a group level were related to food and to the drivers. As for the food, it should be said that this was foreseen to a degree. It is always complicated to satisfy the tastes of thousands of people on a daily basis. The other theme was that of the chauffeurs, who found that they spent many hours in car pools with nothing to do. The degree of complaints and uneasiness was quite significant. In all cases the conflicts were overcome. The quickness with which solutions were found was one of the most important characteristics of the organization.

Other overall issues that generated conflicts and the intervention of the ombudsman was that of the uniforms, and of tickets to see the dress rehearsal of the opening ceremony. Cars, motorcycles, motorboats, launches, and buses transporting such a great number of people could make one imagine a great number of accidents. There was only one person who died in an accident when he was off duty, and another of a certain age who had a heart attack at home.

4. AFTER THE GAMES

Once the games had ended, a diploma accrediting their participation was given to all volunteers, along with a commemorative medal of the 1992 Barcelona Olympic Games.

So that historical memory would not be left blank, the final issue of the volunteer magazine was published in two parts: the magazine itself, with a photo album of the volunteers, point of view of the 1992 Barcelona Olympic Games, so that this visual record could be taken home, and the *Golden*

Book of EQUIP '92, which gathered together the names of everyone who had participated according to the installation where they worked, whether they were from the COOB '92, or volunteers.

The evaluation of what this event has meant in terms of volunteers is a task that time will have to make with objectivity. Overall the result was a success, since the response of society made it a success, filling the streets of the city in every moment, as if it were the grand festival of all humanity.

BARCELONA '92: THE PERSPECTIVE OF CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY

JOHN MACALOON¹

As with any great public work of art, it is impossible to anticipate the social and political consequences of the Barcelona Olympiad so soon after its conclusion. These effects will take years to know for the various sectors of Barcelonan, Catalan, and Spanish society, not to speak of social actors around the world. From the perspective of international anthropology, there was no one Barcelona Olympics, but rather thousands of them, as many as there were cultural communities interpreting the Games. Reduction of these multiple discourses to some «bottom-line» statements can be nothing more than an imperialist appropriation of the world to one or another parochial point of view.

At the same time, an irresistible demand for such statements is created by an alliance of powerful forces: the host community's need to justify its enormous investment; the Olympic Movement's claims of universalism; the illusions of modern cosmopolitanism and modern science; contemporary talk of globalization with its mistaken assumption that forms of transnational interconnection like mass media, big business, sports, security operations, mass spectacles, art connoisseurship, and tourism lead inevitably to standardized meanings. The logic of the contemporary «world system» is in fact quite different. Interconnection and diversification are not opposing processes, but rather two sides of the same intercultural coin.

Some social and political significances associated with the Barcelona Olympics are already recognizable and will be implicated in institutional appropriations of these Olympics anywhere. But like stones thrown in the pond of world affairs, there can be no predicting what the wave patterns will look like as they reach and rebound from various and distant shores. I will comment on two such representations: the city

1. Professor of Cultural Anthropology and Director of the Social Sciences Master's Degree Program at the University of Chicago. International Professor of Olympic Studies for 1995.

itself with its cult of modernist urbanism, and the nation-state form in global perspective. These two themes are related, but dialectically and multiply so. They array social diversities of history, conception, and experience around themselves, including important diversities within Europe and «the West». Indeed, expression of these themes in Barcelona offered an important temporal disruption, a transgressive explosion of the intended celebration of linear social progress at the end of the twentieth century. While themes like post-communism, the end of the cold war and apartheid, and European unification pointed toward the potential political novelty of the future, the ideological and performative representations of nation-state and city in Barcelona revealed how profoundly nineteenth-century our logics of social life remain.

A preliminary review of Olympic media coverage, especially outside of Western continental Europe, shows striking agreement that the city of Barcelona itself was the star of the Games. Naturally, at all Olympics, attention is focused on the character of the host city and its culture, but 1992 was something quite unusual. Foreign journalists, no less than foreign sport fans, sport workers, academics, and general tourists, seemed to be talking more about the city than about any particular Olympic controversy, ceremony, or sports event. In a sense, Barcelona upstaged the Olympics, though in another sense the Olympics created this «Barcelona».

The features of the city singled out in these commentaries vary, of course, with the cultures and conditions of the speakers. Middle-class visitors from disorganized urban sprawls like São Paulo, Tokyo, Los Angeles, Athens, and Bombay marvelled at the compactness and ease of getting around in Barcelona. Foreigners from whom vast street crowds at home are unusual, worrisome, or even frightening repeatedly commented on the scores of thousands of ordinary citizens who turned up nightly on Montjuïc for no other reason than to be among everyone else. The nightly flows of people on the Ramblas, and the fact that the sociability of evening extended so quickly and deeply in to the wee morning hours, attracted participation and special social rapport from persons in whose home environments pleasures are taken indoors and «the streets are rolled up» at midnight.

For many visitors, this code of seeing and being seen brought the people and the material city of Barcelona into a common expression of spectacle logic. The aesthetic beauties of Barcelona's great vistas and her intimate alleys, the cleanliness of even poorer neighborhoods (to the extent that

any Olympic visitors saw them), and the general sense of a city that evidently cares for how it looks through the apparent competence of social services: such themes repeat themselves in foreign commentary, often in the end crowding out the shock and suffering of foreigners and locals alike because of extraordinary prices and price-gouging. Even where it bordered on narcissistic parochialism, the extreme self-consciousness of Barcelonans and Catalans about their built environment was another factor singled out for positive notice by foreign commentators.

In the early days of the Games, some international officials and Olympic *aficionados* complained of it seeming more like «the Barcelona and Catalonia Expo» than the Olympic Games. The victories of Spanish athletes helped change all that, drawing local populations who had appeared not to care about sport at all into the stadiums and in front of television sets, in full view of foreigners moving in the opposite direction, having come for the Games and being drawn into the city. This public meeting of guest and host populations, *while both were so fully in passage*, was unprecedented in my experience of summer Olympic Games. I believe it is what will be remembered about Barcelona for those who were there, long after the outcomes of this or that competition or the grandiose entertainments of the opening ceremonies have been forgotten.

Domestic and foreign talk often seemed to constitute Barcelona as a free and autonomous entity in the world, thereby revealing the endurance of a feature of eighteenth and nineteenth-century utopianism, when the great city had not yet been so thoroughly brought to heel by the encompassing nation-state. Today, however, such civic attainments are thoroughly dependent upon political identities, parties, and formations irrevocably tied to nationalist discourse. Just so, the old panhumanisms of European modernism —whether socialist, liberal, or romantic— which lie at the core of Olympism, established transnational entities like the IOC and the UN, and emergent forms like the EC cannot make any appearance without direct reference to the world of nation-states. The new alliance between the global and the local cannot yet detach itself from the national, and available models of nation-ness remain firmly embedded in the past.

These facts were symbolized repeatedly in Barcelona in the «battles of the flags». In the streets, shop windows, bars, restaurants, stadiums, government and COOB offices, international installations, and lobbies of official hotels, the flags of the IOC, EC, Spain, Catalonia, Barcelona and the COOB

(joined in some context by the banners of Catalan independence) were forced to dance with each other. Sometimes the dance was a happy sardana, sometimes a wary modernist ballet, and sometimes a violently postmodern slam-dance. No expression of identity and ownership, however joyful, went uncontested or unmediated by the others. It is under the all-surveying eye that sociopolitical identities feel the greatest fear of exclusion.

At the end of the Games, IOC President Samaranch remarked «that the world now knew that Spain was not the culture of siestas and mañana». But who was «the world» supposedly benighted by such stereotypes? I for one have never met Koreans, Indians, Indonesians, or Kenyans who shared them. North Americans? If so, then not Spain but the far more relevant Hispanic cultures of Mexico, Central and South America are those to be defended. To the extent that Spain itself has remained on the popular cultural map of North Americans, the stereotypes to worry about are probably not those of indolence but of the «black lie» in both its early modern and mid-20th century versions. Though he has reason to be only too aware of these, Samaranch did not mention them. Therefore, one cannot help arriving at the conclusion that «the world» Samaranch declared newly enlightened was really that of Northern Europe. For their parts, other Catalans declared that Samaranch should have said «Catalonia» not «Spain», consonant with the extensive campaign on the part of several Barcelonan elites—including some Olympic ceremonies designers and certainly the Generalitat—to reassert Catalonia's claim to be the most European part of Spain.

Though of rather different political formation than Samaranch, Barcelona Mayor Pasqual Maragall's marked declarations of civic autonomy turned out upon inspection to be similarly directed. Sounding for all the world like a big city Mayor from the country in which he studied to become the technocrat he was before politics claimed him, Maragall declared on the eve of the Olympics that he wanted Barcelona to be remembered above all as «the city that functioned». After the Games, when this desire had been granted in spades, he felt freer to specify his real audience. Having proved itself to be a great European city, Maragall declared that Barcelona should now become «*the great European city*». Maragall's double status as Mayor and Olympics chief, his positions in the EC organization of municipalities, his outreach to the Mayors of war-torn Yugoslavia, and his citation during the opening ceremonies of personal requests to him by the

UN all indicate the new relations between local and transnational entities which depend upon nation-state meditation even as they try to circumvent them. Jordi Pujol tried to take advantage of these mediations through the Generalitat's press campaign seeking to have Catalonia recognized as «a country in Europe» in major international newspapers. Post-Olympic claims that people around the world now know that Catalonia is not the same as Spain are probably accurate. But much of the local discourse remained perplexing if not somewhat irritating to many foreigners. Non-European contingents at the Barcelona Olympics were sometimes made to feel as if they were intruding upon or being used as pawns in an intra-European conversation. The effect was deepened by the disinterest (relative to past Olympic Games) shown by COOB, Olympic art organizers, local journalists, and academic elites toward foreign cultures represented in their midst, in particular the non-European and especially the non-Western ones. The important political entailments directed at the EC by representations of a Mediterranean identity were accompanied for many South Americans, North Americans, Scandinavians, and British by shock at certain «Mediterranean» practices with respect to race and gender, at least as these appeared in mainstream newspapers. Perhaps more surprising that the «black Sambo» cartoons, «black/other» medal counts, and surreptitious photographs of women athletes undressing in their Olympic Village rooms was Catalan and Spanish disinterest in or inability to grasp why things might be offensive to citizens of more determinedly creole and pluralist states. Of course, every Olympic Games results in such cultural imbroglios and political boundary-definitions among host and guest societies. What showed here on a world-historical scale was the continuing incommunicability among the different classical models of nationalism: the creole nationalism of South America, the continental European ideal of one state/one ethnicity/one language, the Anglo-Saxon model of many cultures/one state, and the hierarchical-wholistic nationalisms of East and South Asia.

Deep connections between rival models of the nation-state and the theme of utopian urbanism may compose the distinctive sociopolitical contribution of Barcelona '92. Without the Olympics, the economic capital could not have been generated so quickly, or maybe at all, to open Barcelona to the sea, refurbish the beaches and the parks, renew the districts of Vall d'Hebron and Poble Nou, build the ring road, the communications towers, the sports pavillions, the train sta-

tions, and the airport terminals, or finish any of the other urban infrastructural projects that in the planners' understanding have not so much transformed as «completed» the city. (In the discourse of Barcelonan urbanism, it is as if Sert and the Eixample had been patiently awaiting all these years for their wider setting to be realized). The Barcelonan modernism of art and architecture differs in important ways from other European and international modernisms, but in the utopian centralization of its visions, its ethos of making one integrated urban environment, it just as surely references the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The ideology is clear even in its official treatment of the peripheral, collar communities, within the bounds of the mountains and the sea, yet built for and occupied by working class immigrants from elsewhere in Spain. As HOLSA and city guides like to put it (on marvelous tours which foreign visitors showed little interest in taking), the ring road and its overlying parks have had progressive effects, for «central city-dwelling bourgeois now actually see these communities». (Notwithstanding subway rides in and out of Barcelona for basketball, few foreign visitors discovered them).

But as in Seoul (the other major Olympic urban transformation, conducted on an even greater scale than Barcelona), Olympic economic capital could not have been generated without the accompanying political capital provided by the various nationalisms. In South Korea, the process was driven by central national state bureaucracies appealing on the one hand to national emergence into world consciousness from under the screen of that Western Orientalism which suppresses all differences with China and Japan, and, on the other hand, to literally paving the way for reunification with North Korea. In Barcelona, by contrast, the political capital was generated by a whole series of energizing oppositions: between Catalonia and the Spanish state, between the Generalitat and the Ajuntament, between the Catalan bourgeoisie and the immigrant populations, and between the socialists, the center-right, and the radicals. Far from being the consequence of an ancient city and modern technocracy set free from all distracting nationalist and anti-nationalist discourse, the triumphant *urbanismo* of Barcelona now being celebrated around the world is the product of these very struggles over national identity. Modernism is itself so cultivated in Barcelona because it is identified with opposition to dictatorship at the national center and with extramural claims on European status and identity. Thus the dreams of the rationalizing modernists of Barcelona, past and present, remain

tied to a certain model of nation-ness which in turn appeals for legitimation to certain transnational cultural formations and (with the EC) political institutions. Here is a paradigm revealed for us in the Barcelona experience. Brasilia, the rational utopian capital of a proudly creole state was now soliciting the millennial Olympic Games in hope of overcoming the North/South divide. It's rivals included Manchester and Beijing. Manchester sought to renew itself as an international multicultural city on the ruins of the industrial ratioanlities which gave it birth. Beijing wished to transform itself as Seoul did, but in the logic of the exemplary center of hierarchical nationalism in special reference to the agencies of Orientalism and the cold war. In the end, the «new» city of Sydney won the prize. While related, indeed *because they are related*, these logics are *extremely different from another*. The paradigm not only makes interconnection possible, it commands differentiation and diversity. How but on the ground of difference can the IOC decide? This is an IOC itself, it must be added, that in its politically opportune but riskily precedent-setting decisions in Barcelona about who is allowed to be represented as a nation, showed itself to be desperately in need of greater self-consciousness about the «world system» of which it is a part.

With recognition of the true paradigm of intercultural relations in the world system today, is not the next step to discover whether and how partisans of one model can remain committed to it while nevertheless coming to more serious recognition and consideration of the other models constructed to similar ends by the peoples of the world? The significance of Barcelona for the future was to make this challenge abundantly clear as well.

URBANISM

THE GAMES OF THE CITY

LLUÍS MILLET I SERRA¹

INTRODUCTION

In 1992, Barcelona entered into the limited group of cities that have hosted the Summer Olympic Games. Of the approximately 130 cities in the world that are capitals of metropolitan areas theoretically large enough to host an event of this size, only nineteen have done so. In this selective group we find, among others, Athens, Paris, London, Los Angeles, Berlin, Stockholm, Rome, Tokyo, Mexico City, Munich, Montreal, Seoul, all of them cities that we could qualify as among the most important and advanced in the world.

In all of these cases, the Games have been a sporting and organizational success. This success has become more and more clear with the added factor of television. In this positive evaluation of the Games the distant spectator and the inhabitant of the host city both participate. Not even situations as serious and tragic as those of Munich in 1972 were able to distort the Games as an event. In the case of Montreal, the excessive economic difficulties provoked by the inability to pay for the project, were not so great so as to distort the attraction of the Games as something desirable and worthwhile for a city. The Moscow and Los Angeles Games were also successful, in spite of the fact that the universal spirit of the Games was partially broken for political reasons: failure, in these cases, belonged to the countries that ended up boycotting the Games.

As we have seen, sporting and organizational success is practically guaranteed by the very logic of the event. From the initial idea of hosting the Olympics project onwards, however, cities tend to look for another kind of success that would allow them to show the world some special quality or capacity. For this reason, in spite of the fact that the sports program is always more or less the same, all Olympic Games are different and unique, characterized by the specific nature of the city that hosts them. Thus the Munich Games could

1. Lluís Millet i Serra. Architect. Director of the Infrastructures Division of the COOB '92.

be qualified as the success of technology and industrial capacity, the Los Angeles Games as an entrepreneurial and economic success, and the Seoul Games as a political success which recovered the universal character of the Games. The Sydney Games of the year 2000 will probably be the ecological Games. In this sense, it seems that we would all agree that the Barcelona Games represented the success of the City in capital letters, of Civility, of the Polis.

The Barcelona Games will only with difficulty be known as a technological event, in spite of having outdone the levels of quality and complexity of all previous editions. Nor will they be recalled as a commercial success, in spite of the fact that the economic management was considerably more brilliant than in Los Angeles. Nor will they take on a significant political meaning, even though they coincided with historical changes in Eastern Europe, making them the most universal Games in history.

Even though all simplistic and reductionist visions are unfair for these and many other aspects of the complex organization of the Games, everyone would agree —as Miquel Botella has said at the beginning of his paper— that the true success of the Barcelona Games lay in the transformation the city underwent. This success is still with us, not only in the appreciation of what was done, making the citizens of Barcelona proud, but also in the admiration and self-reflection that the city has awakened in many other cities.

In order to try to explain the fundamental and specific traits of the transformation as a result of the Olympic project, it seems correct to continue to ask what would have happened if Barcelona had not been nominated. Would the process of transformation have continued at a slower rate within the same global coherence? Would the operations that would not have been done affected the reconstruction process of Barcelona? Would it have been possible to maintain the scale of intervention?

In this paper I will try to explain the reasons and the process followed in the definition of the strategies of the Olympic project, not just as another episode in the overall set of sectorial projects designed to give form to the same idea of the transformation of the city, but as a qualitatively different project, without which Barcelona would not be what it is today. Furthermore, it seems that the urban project of the Barcelona Olympic Games was an «obvious» project, that is, that there was no other way to formulate it. This is an interesting reflection in that it allows us to ask whether the transformation of Barcelona would have been the same and would have had

the same sense, with the modification of some of the fundamental elements of the Olympic project. This is not a theoretical or speculative exercise, since, as we shall see, there were in fact many proposals for the initial modification of urban schemes which, if they had been succesful, would have undoubtedly produced essentially different results both in Barcelona and in other municipalities of the metropolitan area.

THE GAMES AS AMBITION AND PRETEXT

As the Mayors Narcís Serra and Pasqual Maragall repeatedly stated in the initial years of the candidature process, Barcelona needed a global project that would bring together a great variety of citizens' energies in a similar way, as had happened before in 1888 and 1929 for the Universal Expositions. «Any city grows out of specific platforms, in projects or «pretexts» —if we might use a supposedly negative expression— in the context of which great proposals of change are articulated», affirmed Pasqual Maragall in an interview published in the architecture and design magazine *CAU* shortly before the nomination of Barcelona in 1986.

The first years of «balsamic» urban planning, begun in 1980, had been successful, giving priority to small scale actions, focussed in public spaces —squares, gardens, streets— with the objective of strengthening the local systems of the city that had suffered from the lack of any urban initiative for many years. Narcís Serra referred to this patient and systematic labour as a «patch-up job», pointing to the need to have a global project for the city to allow it to establish more ambitious goals that could be carried out in the medium term.

In turn, the General Metropolitan Plan approved in 1976 had conceived the implantation of a clear urban discipline in relation to the speculative processes that had carried the day in previous epochs, allowing for the attainment of important reserves of land for public spaces, community services, and facilities, and pointing to the bases for territorial coordination of a greater scale, in the attempt to strengthen metropolitan space, as well as make it more balanced in uses and densities. In spite of these intentions, the General Plan was an obligatory reference that nevertheless failed to serve as the adequate instrument to drive forward the project Mayor Serra had called for. The architect Oriol Bohigas clearly pointed out the limitations of the Plan,² among them being

2. Oriol Bohigas, *Reconstrucció de Barcelona*, Edicions 62, Barcelona 1984.

«its excessive hardness and inflexibility, the consequence of having used only the repressive measures of former plans, instead of promoting discretion —with norms, needless to say, to avoid arbitrary decisions— which would be more characteristic of the processes and methods of the city's project, as well as the lack of a great enough power given the volume of proposals, thus leading to positions that were contradictory to what would have to be the essential bases of a project's direction». In effect, Bohigas also was calling for a framework for projects for Barcelona in affirming that a city is constructed and controlled through projects and construction and not through the action programs of these positions.

The political direction of the project that the city hoped to get off the ground was expressed with great clarity and technical precision. First of all, it was necessary to vertebrate the city, giving it a road system that would add to Barcelona's relation with other cities of the metropolitan area, and would solve the difficult east-west transit of the city, connecting it to the total urban territory with systems of regional transportation. In the same sense it was necessary to define a new rail transportation system, like the metro, which would tie together the main cities of metropolitan Barcelona.

Second, it was absolutely necessary to provide the city with new facilities. The tremendously low level of public investment that had characterized the period previous to the eighties had made the city poorer, damaging its place as a capital. In the previous twenty years almost no buildings had been built for leisure, culture or sport that were able to add to the capital value of the historical facilities of Barcelona. This fact had allowed for growth only in quantitative terms, since quality was denied by the lack of public space and facilities. This policy of facilities had to be especially directed towards the attainment of large public spaces that would give way to a new perception of the city, opening it to the sea on one side and defining its upper limits with the Collserola Park on the other.

Third, it was necessary to redefine centrality, rethinking the meagre city centre defined until then by the axis that ran from Passeig de Gràcia and Diagonal to Francesc Macià Square. This meant determining the area of service and influence that the city centre hoped to mark out, that is, define an articulated system of this centre and of other cities of the metropolitan area and the region.

Finally, a balancing of the city was needed. The idea was to avoid qualitative growth that would occur mostly in a very specific area of the city in detriment of the other districts. Until then, the majority of public and private investment in

important urban facilities had occurred on Montjuïc, in the districts of Les Corts, and in Sarrià-Sant Gervasi. The sports facilities of F.C. Barcelona, the Royal Polo Club, the Turó Tennis Club or the Laietà Sports Club are examples of the location preferences and strategies that private initiative had followed. Yet the University of Barcelona, the Polytechnical University, the Picornell swimming pools, or the Serrahima Stadium are examples of how «prestigious» public investments followed the same logic. In contrast, the east of the city did not have any representative public or private facilities, and the community services did not come up to the level these neighbourhoods needed.

The instrument needed to supply the necessary energy, consensus and hope to strengthen the transportation system, create facilities, define the central space, and balance out the city, was the project for the Olympic Games.

BASIC TRAITS OF THE OLYMPIC PROJECT

Starting from these premises and from the knowledge acquired of the city's sports facilities through a number of studies³ carried out since 1970, Romà Cuyàs, commissioner of the Mayor for the Barcelona '92 project, commissioned me in 1982 to do an initial study of the urban project of the Olympic Games. The problem was to design, in a few months, a territorial translation of the requirements of the Olympic program and confirm what their impact could be on the city. Until that moment, no one was very clear about how many acres of urban land would be required, how many existing sports installations were usable, and how many were lacking. The proposal that we formulated, brought together in the first candidature document,⁴ already anticipated the creation of four Olympic areas in Barcelona as well as the decentralization of various sports installations out towards the principal cities of the metropolitan area.

This initial scheme, which was easy to conceptualize and imagine, was not altered in the following ten years. The technical team that drafted it up formed part of the Olympic Office throughout the candidature process, and later entered

3. *Estudio sobre los equipamientos de deportes y de espacios libres para el ocio en Barcelona y comarca*, Comisión de Urbanismo y Servicios Comunes de Barcelona y otros municipios, Barcelona, 1973.

Guia de l'esport a Barcelona '82, City of Barcelona, 1982.

4. *Projecte Jocs Olímpics. Barcelona 1992. Primeres aproximacions*, Romà Cuyàs i Sol, October, 1982.

into the Organizing Committee, adding to the conceptual continuity of the project.

Out of these initial schemes, drafted in 1982, the Olympic project came into shape as a re-urbanization project, creating new facilities, and thus intervening in public space by acting upon what already existed through urban renovation projects that would have a strong impact on those parts of the city that had already been constructed.

When we speak of the Olympic project, we are in fact speaking of a great bundle of projects with very diverse characteristics, whose completion was considered necessary to make the city more coherent overall. Basically there were two types of projects: the Olympic parks or areas, with facilities for competitions and training; and the projects that would connect the city, the ring roads and large infrastructures. The administration of the first group of projects was directly carried out by the Games Organizing Committee, while the second group was administered by the *Institut Municipal de Promoció Urbaniística* (Municipal Institute for Urban Promotion) (IMPU), and, later, by *Holding Olímpic S.A. (HOLSA)*.

The idea or central scheme of the project rested upon the placement of four large parks —the four Olympic areas— in the corners of the central rectangle of the city. The reference to geometry defined by four Olympic areas maintains a dominant presence after its definition in 1982 in all of the projects integrated in the Olympic «catalogue». Montjuïc, Diagonal, Vall d'Hebron, and the Sea Park now have a clearly central position in relation to the metropolis. If during the 1960s these territories could be considered peripheral or suburban, in our day this is no longer the case, as they have acquired a privileged position as connecting nexae between the centre of the city and the periphery, pointing to the complex qualitative values of the city as well.

The key «piece» of the Olympic project was, however, the road infrastructure operation and, more concretely the construction of the Ring Roads (Ronda de Dalt, and Ronda Litoral), which ring the entire city. The Olympic Games were the excuse to guarantee that the circuit was completed before 1992, as they were necessary for the effective connection of the four Olympic areas. The importance of the Ring Roads as a vertebrating element in the expanding urban nature of Barcelona was unarguable from the opening day of the Games onward. As Jose Antonio Acebillo explains,⁵ the new ring ro-

5. «El progressiu canvi d'escala en les intervencions urbanes a Barcelona entre 1980 i 1992», in *Barcelona olímpica. La ciutat renovada*, HOLSA, 1992.

ads served as collecting and distributing roads between regional and local routes, allowing for a more metropolitan interpretation of the urban territory, where geographical barriers and distances were overcome by the road structure formed by large distribution rings and for the entrance and exit roads that connected them with regional transportation systems.

The four Olympic areas and the connecting roads or axes that tied them together define a rectangle that sets out what we could call the central city, occupying the geometrical centre of the map of Barcelona between the Llobregat and the Besòs rivers. Over the past ten years this territory has been submitted to an intense process of urban redefinition which began with the projects to create new faces to the sea and the mountain.

The new maritime facade of Barcelona, from Montjuïc to the Olympic Village and the River Besòs, and, further on, in Badalona and up to the mountain of Montgat, is without a doubt the most spectacular element of transformation derived from the Olympic project. As a parallel, on the mountain side, the line of the Ronda de Dalt ring road, with a changing design according to the urban fabric it passes through, has come to define the limit between urban space and the large central park of metropolitan Barcelona that is Collserola, while resolving problems in the east-west suturing of many neighbourhoods that until recently had formed a de-urbanized periphery, with anarchical planning and a lack of open spaces, facilities and services. This re-urbanizing process did not end with the Olympic areas of Diagonal or Vall d'Hebron, but continued as far as L'Hospitalet and Prat de Llobregat on the one side, and to Santa Coloma de Gramenet and Badalona on the other, completing the Ronda de Dalt ring road's function in providing metropolitan cohesion.

The new geometry of the central space was defined by the axis that connected the Montjuïc mountain to the Diagonal area along Tarragona Street and Numància Street, and continued further up with the Vallvidrera Tunnel, ultimately connecting up with Sant Cugat, Rubí and Terrassa. On the other side of the city another connecting line can be drawn running perpendicular to the coast, between the Olympic Village and the Vall d'Hebron area, along Marina Street and the Rovira Tunnel. In the future, this axis will be prolonged as far as Cerdanyola and Sabadell through the Horta Tunnel, and will improve the relation of the city centre with other cities in the metropolitan area.

Once the edges of this central space were defined, a series of changes confirming the enormous vitality of the city cen-

tre have come about by induction with no direct relation to the Olympic project, though generally generated by private initiative with private resources, though in some cases complemented with public investment. We are speaking of projects for numerous hotels, commercial centres, offices, sports facilities, museums and art galleries, and university centres, all of which have been initiated and developed in a very short period of time, possibly driven on by the inextricable Olympic calendar. We are witness to a dimensional change in the city similar to what occurred in the second half of the last century after the tearing down of the city walls and the Eixample plan of the engineer Ildefons Cerdà. We can no longer refer to the old quarter as a historical city, as all of the Eixample and especially the central rectangle, have become part of the historical city centre.

The Olympic project translated the indications and ambitions expressed by the City of Barcelona to strengthen the metropolitan area by giving the city conditions to compete with the most important capitals of the world, balancing quality of life throughout the total urban space. I believe that the real Olympic project went well beyond what was originally imagined, in the same way that the later impact and consequences of the Games will be much wider than the most optimistic expectations.

Following the methodology and projectual mechanisms used in Barcelona, the Olympic project was extended to the majority of cities which hosted some sporting event as sub-sites. The idea was always to use these projects as tools to rezone and equip strategic urban areas which, by induction, had to offer urban transformations throughout the city in question. This was the case in Terrassa and the project for the Abad Marced Sports Complex, in Badalona with the Montigalà Village and the new Olympic Sports Palace, in Castelldefels and the Olympic Canoeing Channel, in Banyoles with the project for the lake and the consolidation of the park around it, and in La Seu de Urgell with the construction of the Segre Park.

SPORT AND CITY

I have not wished to speak of sport until now, so as to make it clear that, in my opinion, the Olympic project affected the totality of the city and went beyond a group of projects for sports facilities. I believe, however, that this aspect deserves detailed explanation.

Barcelona is a city with a long sporting history, where a

complex system of sports practices has developed responding to various activities, set out in a heterogenous manner throughout the city.

The program for new sports facilities that the Olympic project had to incorporate had as its starting point the analysis of the existing sports system, which was quite highly evolved and diversified, and had been completed in previous years through the construction of many small buildings designed to provide neighbourhood sports services.

The most evident dysfunctions in the system were not so much quantitative —Barcelona has more than 1,500 sport facilities that in theory ensure an acceptable level of practice— but qualitative. The majority of sports facilities responded to very elemental typologies: football fields, of which there were 95, and multi-use cement courts, with more than 250 in the city. These elemental facilities were distributed quite uniformly throughout the city with the exception of the central districts. At the same time the lack of high level facilities, qualified for elite competition or sports spectacles, was notable: the F.C. Barcelona football stadium was already 25 years old and the Picornell swimming pools —the most recent single constructions— were more than ten years old.

The Olympic project thus had to complete the sports system by constructing a good number of typologically different sports facilities. It also had to be useful in balancing out the quality facilities in the city with new sports facilities to be located in the eastern part of the city. Finally, it was necessary to add to the quality of basic existing facilities, with complex installations of the highest technical and sporting level.

Sports facilities do not need to be distributed homogeneously and equally through the territory, but should form an articulated and structured system of elements with specific functions. Sports facilities are organized on different levels of service and complexity —metropolitan, urban, neighbourhood— and carry out different functions —education, training, competition, spectacles, leisure, maintenance— being administered by institutions and organisms with very diverse characteristics, such as clubs, sports associations, the municipality, or private and public schools.

The logic of the Olympic project fit in perfectly with the conclusions of the diagnosis of the existing Barcelona sports system: complex and highly qualified installations were lacking to serve the urban and metropolitan areas, allowing for Barcelona's character as a sports capital to be reaffirmed. The placement of these new centres had to respond to criteria —maximum accessibility from all areas of service— re-

solving the concentration/dispersion duality. In turn, they had to respond as well to the logic of the administration systems that had been developed, choosing either large complexes or numerous independent units.

The classical solution, adopted by the majority of Olympic cities—Los Angeles was an exception—has been to construct a completely new «Olympic Park» where the majority of the facilities used for the Games are concentrated, forming a monumental group that normally is difficult to digest when it comes to later use.

Barcelona chose an innovative solution; for the first time in history the Olympic Park was divided into four smaller sized areas, placed around the city but at least 5 kilometres from the city centre. The result was that from an Olympic point of view, the territorial solution was the most concentrated to date, best resolving the relation between sport and the city. If, as was demonstrated during the Games, the Olympic festival became a great urban festival, three years later the effectivity of the solution chosen is clear from the point of view of daily use.

All too often after an exceptional event, however, buildings that are excessively large or inadequate for daily needs remain in the city. There are many examples of Olympic constructions that have not been used or have been hardly used afterwards. It has been difficult to pay for them and no one knows what to do with them. In contrast, Barcelona has not built a single structure thinking only of the Olympic Games, but basically in later use. When a use could not be assured, as in the case of minority interest sports or those with minor popularity—wrestling, fencing, weightlifting—the decision was made to hold these competitions in buildings normally used for other functions.

The result of this strategy has been to facilitate the integration of Olympic buildings into the city, and their easy adaptation for «normal» uses, with accessible maintenance costs and profitable spaces. All of the Olympic constructions—both in the four Olympic areas in Barcelona and in all the sub-sites—are used regularly, and their use generally covers maintenance costs. In some cases, the enterprises created to run them have been able to report positive economic results. This reality differentiates the Barcelona Games from the majority of cases that preceded it.

The Barcelona Olympic project has fled from monumentalism and has limited itself to complete the sports facilities system in Catalonia. As we have said earlier, during the ten years preceding the Olympic Games, the evolution of the Cata-

lan sports system was spectacular. The cooperative action of the Generalitat de Catalunya, City Halls and provincial *diputacions*, corrected the majority of accumulated deficiencies of the previous forty years. The sports facilities adjust themselves to the modernization of society, and the practice of sport runs at about 35% of the population, reaching levels equal to or above those in the majority of European countries.

Even still, in Spain and Catalonia it was difficult to hold international level events for a great number of sports in a dignified fashion. The organization of the Olympic Games was a decisive step in completing the most qualified and singular part of the sports facilities system, diversifying the typology of large-scale facilities and rounding out the system throughout the territory. High level facilities were built for many sports: field hockey, baseball, jai alai, canoeing, shooting, badminton, equestrian sports, and volleyball, among others. Each new installation was located near to places where there was a base of activity and tradition in each sport. In this way the pyramidal structure of the sports system was rounded off.

We might make another observation in relation to the planning of sports facilities: their changing character in time and need to be multi-use. Earlier we referred to the diversity and changeability of sports practices; in the planning of spaces for sports it is necessary to keep in mind the necessity for changes and successive adaptations. For the same reason, more and more sports are integrated into other cultural and leisure activities, and thus venues for sports also become the stages of many other cultural and popular manifestations, reaffirming their role in accepting multiple superimposed uses. At the same time, sports invade urban locations that are not necessarily reserved for its practices —unexpected spaces— thus demonstrating a compatibility with the totality of daily public activities.

In this sense, the large Olympic facilities have served as a strong instrument in urban rezoning and have contributed to the definition and reordering of urban territory. Rescuing sports activity from urban marginalization that had been subject to rigorous zoning —with the result of a progressively suburban character for sports— and returning it the centre, to the proximity of other uses, and to diversified activity, has been one of the goals of the Olympic project. The results can be evaluated in two ways. First, they have been able to maintain the Olympic installations in continuous activity: three years after the Games, an inventory could be made of all the events that have been held in the sum total of facilities, and a surprising list of spectacles and activities would be obtained. Reality

has outdone the forecasts. Second, the mutual existence of sports activities with games, leisure, amusements, and activity in commerce and the hotel and restaurant sector allowed for the focussing of an intense urban life around the Olympic Games, so that daily life almost erased the Olympic moment, replacing it with daily spectacle. In spite of having been the «best and most brilliant» Olympic Games in history, the sports structures that were built have not been very «Olympic», but instead very urban, very close to the citizens of the city.

BARCELONA WITHOUT THE GAMES, OR WITH ANOTHER GAMES

It is risky to make hypotheses about things that have not occurred. If Barcelona had not obtained the Olympic Games it surely would have been able to find other enlivening projects, but only with difficulty would they have taken on the magnitude of the Olympic Games. Where would we be at this time? It seems clear that the overall investments that were concentrated in Barcelona in the five years before the Olympic Games would have decreased considerably. Said simply, we would at least be four or five hundred million pesetas behind. The situation would probably be the following: only with difficulty would we have finished the Palau Sant Jordi, the first project begun, along with the Olympic Stadium. A modification of the project for this latter was made, in case of not obtaining the Games, which reduced the capacity by 20-25,000 spectators, leaving off the upper deck. The rest of Montjuïc probably would have remained as it was.

Neither would it be an overstatement to say that without the Olympic Games, the maritime coastline of Poble Nou would have evolved very little and the quantity of public funds necessary to initiate the operation would still be under negotiation. The Diagonal Area, in my opinion, would not have evolved at all, since it was not a priority urban problem, and Vall d'Hebron, where all the land was already municipal, certain projects for local improvement could have been developed. Most seriously, however, would have been that the ring roads would still be left to do: in the previous twenty years only four kilometres of ring roads had been built, while in the four years before the Olympics 40 kilometres were built. If we were to look at a complete list of projects in the Olympic catalogue and their budgets beside them, one might make a real hypothesis of what it would have meant to not have made such investments.

Another quite realistic exercise would be to compare the

Olympic projects with others not included in the mentioned catalogue, comparing it with the speed of their evolution. The Convent dels Àngels, for example, which was meant to be the municipal photography archive and press archive, has been under construction for more than twelve years: 800 million pesetas are needed to finish it. For the last ten years the Casa de l'Ardiaca, where the historical archive of the city is located, has required urgent construction to consolidate and adequate it, which 400 million pesetas would be needed to do. The program of the new Auditorium of Barcelona had to be reduced, since the administrations committed to financing it did not have the will to provide the necessary financial resources. The Gran Teatre del Liceu had projects for its reform for many years, which never received adequate economic support before it burnt down. As for the construction on the Museum of Art of Catalonia, in spite of the initial impulse produced by resources and the «Olympic» calendar, the end is not in sight. In citing these examples, which could be supplemented by many others, I would not want to imply any criticism of the administration of these projects. On the contrary, I wish to point to the difficulty in finding sufficient economic resources to finance them.

When one of these unique projects is not finished in time, the city is partially affected, but continues on its way: they are faults or occasional problems that do not affect overall urban identity. In the case of the Olympic Games this would have been different: clearly we are not speaking of a stadium more or a stadium less, but the overall activity of the city, the expectation generated by the Olympic project, and the renewed trust in the city's own capacity for administration and transformation. Without the Olympic Project, Barcelona would not have changed in this respect.

Sometimes people have wanted to explain the recent urban history of Barcelona as a natural process from projects on a local scale to more and more complex projects, until arriving at large-scale interventions. In these explanations, the Olympic project is not even cited or is reduced to an anecdote or a provisional rarity. Without the Olympic Games, I believe that we would still be putting the city together bit by bit and the metropolitan dimension that we spoke of earlier would not have been reached. Without this change in scale we would not be able to speak today of new town centres, the hotel plan, nor the completion of the Diagonal, nor the majority of the induced effects that are still underway.

It remains to respond to the question of whether another project for the Games would have been possible. The answer, clearly, is yes. There is no question that other solutions could

have been imagined. In fact, in the candidature project prepared for the 1972 Olympics, Barcelona co-hosted the Games with Madrid, which though not successful (for obvious reasons), planned to locate all the installations that corresponded to our city —sports port, sailing channel, swimming and diving pools, athletes village, and so on— in the municipalities of Gavà and Viladecans. These were options to colonize new territories, whose impact on Barcelona would have been quite different.

The temptation towards speculative solutions also existed during the candidature process. At a certain time there was a proposal to construct the Olympic village near Castelldefels, adequately rezoning the necessary lands to develop a tourist-residential operation; there was also a study made to place it in Vallés. Fortunately these options were not successful and the idea of the Sea Park was maintained.

Another facility that was highly debated was the sports port. In the first candidature document there was an error that left open the location of the nautical base. This brought about a wave of «disinterested» offers, the wildest of which was of German promoters who offered to produce the sports port in an environmentally protected area of the Costa Brava, in Tossa de Mar.

The sporting world put a lot of pressure on the candidature to change the location of the stadium, since it was considered inadequate to locate it on the top of a hill. The construction of a large sports centre in Vallés was proposed to direct future growth towards Sant Cugat and Cerdanyola. The proposal to hold all the basketball competitions in Badalona was also highly criticized. The international field hockey federation considered the location of Terrassa to be too far away and wanted it suppressed. For other reasons, the sub-site of Sabadell was about to be annulled. The inclusion of La Seu d'Urgell had to be negotiated since the wild water program had not been included in the Olympic calendar since 1972.

As can be seen, the argument for one particular option to locate a certain facility in a particular place could have many reasons, and some locations undoubtedly could have been improved from the point of view of later users. I believe that both the technical responsibilities and the political decisions rightly defended the permanence of the four areas of Barcelona. If one of them had been eliminated —the Sea Park was the most criticized— the territorial model would have been unbalanced and in all probability the current city would continue to favour the western areas. I also doubt that the part of the ring roads on the side of the River Besós would have been

completed. It was also correct to maintain all of the sub-sites initially proposed. It is certain that there could have been a better football stadium than the one in Sabadell, but it did seem a valid priority to defend the system of cities in the metropolitan area. The only weak point in this strategy was the impossibility of finding an appropriate sports program for the city of Mataró, which in spite of this was maintained in a symbolic way as the starting point for the Marathon.

THE CITY OF THE GAMES, THE GAMES OF THE CITY

I think that the Barcelona of today is the Barcelona of the Games. And it will continue to be so for many years, until new ambitions come along to drive the city forward, allowing for new changes. The city of the Games still has a long history to fulfill: the positions won have to be consolidated, the renovation of Ciutat Vella and the central area should be completed, as well as the numerous already initiated constructions mentioned: extend the urban fabric towards new areas to the east; consolidate productive activities; strengthen the new town centres and the service and commercial areas. It is also necessary to reaffirm the overall group of metropolitan cities and the specificity of each one of them. In this sense there are still projects remaining to strengthen this territory that correspond to public transportation, and especially to the rail system and the extension of the metro system.

Many of these activities have already been initiated, and thus confirm the utility of the Olympic project and the legacy of the Games. The exhibition «Barcelona New Projects» held in the summer of 1993, was a sign of the vitality of the city, where a great number of projects underway were indicated: the completion of large infrastructures for logistics and distribution; the completion of the maritime project; the continuation of the advance of Diagonal to the sea; the creation of new business areas; the development of the renovation of the urban fabric already consolidated in Barcelona; the transformation and improvement of the residential areas of the city. All of these projects and those to come are children of the Barcelona Games.

In this Barcelona, a particular change has occurred, visible from without: the city has become more welcoming, friendlier, cleaner, more athletic, more pleasant, more cultivated, more urban, more Olympic. And all of this is a consequence of having organized the Games of the City.

ECONOMICS

AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE BARCELONA '92 OLYMPIC GAMES: RESOURCES, FINANCING, AND IMPACT

FERRAN BRUNET¹

Barcelona is a Mediterranean city, the heart of the industrialization and the social, political, and cultural movements of contemporary Spain. Like other European and American cities, Barcelona must face up to the costs of being a large metropolis while lacking the income deriving from being a political capital. The expansion of the city of Barcelona is tied to its *Ensanche* and to the driving forces of the Universal Expositions of 1888 and 1929. In 1959 a new stage of economic growth and urban speculation began. The Spanish political transition to democracy initiated in 1975 came to coincide with the general economic crisis. Barcelona entered into a stage of difficulties, aggravated by the transfer of industry outside of the city, the stagnation of the population, and decreased political activity.

In this context, the best way to revive the city, which brought together efforts in urban renovation and external projection, was its nomination in October of 1986 for the organization of the Games of the XXV Olympiad in the summer of 1992. Between these two dates, Barcelona would go from depression to economic boom.

1. THE ORGANIZATION OF THE BARCELONA OLYMPIC GAMES

1.1. *The model of the 1992 Barcelona Olympic Games*

The objectives and forms of any Olympic Games are set by their model of organization. The goals of Barcelona in organizing the 1992 Olympic Games were to become a better forum for the meeting of athletes from around the world, offer excellent competitions in accord with the Olympic spirit, and promote a great urban transformation that would improve the

1. Ferran Brunet i Cid. PhD. in Economic Sciences, University of Barcelona. Professor in the Faculty of Economic and Business Sciences in the Autonomous University of Barcelona.

quality of life and attraction of the city. In all probability, due to its nature and its size, between 1986 and 1993 Barcelona carried out the most important urban change in Europe. (See for example HOLSA, 1992b.)

The organization of the Olympic Games was sustained in three ways:

- A. By the inter-institutional agreement between the City of Barcelona (promotor of the initiative), the Spanish government, the Generalitat (the autonomous government of Catalonia), the Spanish Olympic Committee, and the International Olympic Committee.
- B. By a joint venture, with agreement and shared administration of the public sector and private initiative.
- C. By the creation of special administrative bodies, not associated with the ordinary public administration, with a separation between investment functions and organizational functions.

Without a doubt, the key to the good work and success of the 1992 Olympic Games lay in the strength of the goal (projection and transformation of the city) and in its form of organization (institutional agreement, special bodies and joint ventures), all brought together in the great capacity shown by the Barcelona economy to respond to Olympic stimuli and to attract investment (see Table 1).

1.2. *The budget of the COOB '92 in revenue and expenditure*

The organizational tasks were entrusted to the *Comité Organitzador Olímpic Barcelona 1992*, S.A. (COOB '92) (Barcelona Olympic Organizing Committee '92, Ltd.). Upon liquidating the budget of the COOB '92 in July of 1993 revenue was set at 195,594 million pesetas, or US \$1,638,000,000. Against this there were expenditures of 195,236 million pesetas (or US \$1,635,000,000) 42,448 million of which were carried by sponsors. The difference between revenue and expenditures liquidated leaves a positive account of 358 million pesetas (COOB'92, 1992).

In relation to other Olympic Games, it could be noted that in the 1992 Barcelona Games revenue rose sharply, especially that generated by the entity, which rose to 75.2% of the total. This is the most notorious characteristic of the organizational budget of the Barcelona Games: the high proportion of its own income, made up of contributions of the sponsors (58,152 million, with 42,448 million worth in goods) and television rights (54,164 million pesetas).

In the 1992 Games sponsorship reached 30.5% of revenue.

TABLE 1. OVERALL ECONOMIC INDICATORS OF BARCELONA

	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	Variation 1985/1992
Electrical consumption Index 1985=100	100.0	102.2	113.6	117.8	126.3	127.4	135.2	145.5	45.5%
Gas consumption Index 1985=100	100.0	97.2	102.9	101.2	105.8	108.1	124.8	129.7	29.7%
Collection of urban refuse Index 1985=100	100.0	108.2	117.2	125.8	130.8	135.2	141.9	145.9	45.9%
Kilograms per resident	262.9	286.2	313.2	340.3	358.5	376.3	399.4	410.2	56.0%
Passengers Barcelona Airport (in thousands)									
National	3,676	3,876	4,335	4,752	5,144	5,654	5,710	6,123	66.6%
International	1,783	2,221	2,345	2,482	3,002	3,388	3,266	3,913	119.5%
International as % of total	32.7%	36.4%	35.1%	34.3%	36.9%	37.5%	36.4%	39.0%	19.4%
Telephone calls (in thousands)									
Interurban	166,905	177,386	193,867	210,798	241,070	248,055	229,393	240,736	44.2%
International	7,080	8,037	9,731	12,524	16,475	19,062	23,593	28,760	306.2%
International as % of total	4.1%	4.3%	4.8%	5.6%	6.4%	7.1%	9.3%	10.7%	162.2%

Source: The author, from data with the City of Barcelona and the Statistical Institute of Catalonia.

TABLE 2. TELEVISION REVENUE OF THE OLYMPIC GAMES, 1960-1992

REVENUE OF THE ORGANIZING COMMITTEE AND THE INTERNATIONAL OLYMPIC COMMITTEE FOR TELEVISION RIGHTS AND TECHNICAL SERVICES (IN \$US)

<i>Zone</i>	<i>Entity</i>	<i>Network</i>	<i>Rome</i>	<i>Tokyo</i>	<i>Mexico City</i>	<i>Munich</i>	<i>Montreal</i>	<i>Moscow</i>	<i>Los Angeles</i>	<i>Seoul</i>	<i>Barcelona '92</i>
United States		ABC			4,500,000	6,500,000	12,500,000		225,000,000		
		NBC		1,500,000		+ts 6,000,000	+ts 12,500,000	22,333,333	300,000,000	401,000,000	
		CBS	394,940					+ts 50,000,000			
Canada (CTV)		CBC			250,000	257,000	300,000	1,044,000	3,000,000	3,600,000	16,500,000
Europe	UER		667,967		1,000,000	1,745,000	2,250,000	4,702,500	19,800,000	28,000,000	90,000,000
							25,000	+ts 950,000			
	OIRT		66,320		300,000		1,000,000	1,500,000	2,500,000	3,000,000	4,000,000
							+ts 1,000,000				
Latin America	OTI			2,500,000		300,000	1,060,000	2,150,000	2,920,000	3,550,000	
							+ts 300,000				
Asia	ABU						1,050,000	150,000			
							+ts 1,050,000				
	NHK ANB		48,400		1,000,000	1,000,000		4,500,000	18,500,000	52,000,000	62,500,000

Africa	URTNA					25,000 +ts 25,000 25,000 +ts 25,000	64,000		
	SABC								
Oceania Australia and New Zealand	CHANNEL						1,360,284	10,600,000	7,000,000 33,750,000
Arab States	ASBU					75,000 +ts 75,000	300,000		
Various		630	77,778		990,000	31,100 +ts 31,000	20,000	6,793,000	10,613,000 24,260,000
Total rights Technical services (ts)		1,178,257	1,577,778	9,750,000	11,792,000 +ts 6,000,000	17,581,100 +ts 17,281,100	37,034,117 +ts 50,950,000		
General total		1,178,257	1,577,778	9,750,000	17,792,000	34,862,200	87,984,117	288,343,000	407,133,000 635,560,000

Source: the author, with data from the IOC and the COOB '92.

Expressed in dollars, and in comparison with the figures obtained in Los Angeles '84, income for sponsorship was 3.7 times higher and television income 1.9 times higher (see Table 2). Sponsorship was organized according to Collaborating Partners, World Sponsors and Sponsors, Suppliers, Licensers, Suppliers of Sporting Material, and Collaborators of the Cultural Olympics (COOB'92, 1991).

The principal programs developed by the COOB '92 and its resources were: installations and preparation of facilities (45,866 million pesetas); services to the Olympic Family (37,023 million pesetas); telecommunications and electronics (24,791 million pesetas); competitions (14,045 million pesetas); commercial management (10,681 million pesetas); ceremonies and cultural acts (9,053 million pesetas); image (7,937 million pesetas); and security (4,671 million pesetas).

In classifying the expenditures of the COOB '92 one will see that the principal item was the acquirement of services (49.9% of the total). The COOB '92 was the axis of the organization of the Games, though it was careful to not assume directly the initiative in all areas. Here then, personnel represented only 11.2 % of expenditure (21,919 million pesetas) and purchase of material 5.1%. On the other hand, COOB '92 investments reached 65,931 million pesetas (33.8% of the total) (Brunet, 1993b: 42 ff).

The personnel required for the organization of the Olympic Games varied radically from 57 employees in 1987 to 5,965 on August 9, 1992. Including indirect personnel, on the closing day of the Olympic Games the human resources of Barcelona '92 included 89,723 people, with 34,548 volunteers, 23,467 employees of service enterprises, and 21,116 people employed in security (COOB'92, 1992c).

2. THE RESOURCES AND FINANCING OF THE BARCELONA OLYMPIC GAMES

2.1. *Construction projects*

Barcelona Holding Olímpic, S.A. (HOLSA) integrated the activity of the Spanish State and the City of Barcelona. HOLSA was the matrix company of the constructions in the Olympic ring, the majority of the 78 new kilometers of roads and the Olympic Village. The work developed represented 275,000 million pesetas (figure from July 1993) (HOLSA, 1992a).

Given the model of the Barcelona Games, many projects had to be completed and many more would end up being generated, the majority of which were not directly necessary for the

Games themselves. This was precisely one of the intended impacts: leave behind the greatest number of fully useful investments for after the Games.

In this way, beginning with the final results of HOLSA, COOB '92, the City of Barcelona, the Generalitat de Catalunya, the Ministry of Economy and Treasury, and the rest of the agents involved in the Games, we estimate that the direct investments related to the Games of Barcelona from 1986 to 1993 reached a figure of 956,630 million pesetas (US \$8,012,000,000) (See Table 3).

588,625 million pesetas were designated for civil projects, or 61.5% of the Olympic investments, while construction projects received the remaining 368,364 million pesetas. This confirms another key aspect of Olympic investments: the structural effect on the city. Thus we can deduce that the most important effects of the Olympic projects will be long term.

The principal classes of Olympic projects were as follows, in order of importance:

1. Road and transportation infrastructures.
2. Housing, offices and commercial venues.
3. Telecommunications and services.
4. Hotel facilities.
5. Sports facilities.
6. Environmental infrastructures.

The construction of the ring roads of Barcelona -key roads to move around the circumference of Barcelona- the opening of Barcelona to the sea with the construction of the Olympic Village, the creation of various new centres and the Olympic zones of Montjuïc, Diagonal and Vall d'Hebron are the main projects in the City of Barcelona.

However, the Barcelona Games were characterized by geographical decentralization into a number of towns that were Olympic sub-sites in the regions of Catalonia, Valencia and Aragon. Only 38.5% of the Olympic investments were made in Barcelona. 61.5% of the Olympic projects were carried out in the metropolitan area (29%), the rest of Catalonia (16%), or were not limited to a specific location (20%), such as investment in telecommunications.

The importance of the urban transformation of Barcelona due to the Games is seen in these proportions: in relation to the dimension in 1989, the new road projects meant an increase of 15%, the new sewerage systems an increase of 17%, new green zones and beaches an increase of 78%, and ponds and fountains, an increase of 268%. As for the annual cost of maintenance of these roads, sewerage systems, green spaces and additional accessible coastline, it can be estimated in 2,900 million

TABLE 3. CONSTRUCTION FOR THE 1992 BARCELONA OLYMPIC GAMES

<i>Investment projected and initiated between 1986 and 1993</i>	<i>Accumulated values in current pesetas</i>	<i>Distribution</i>
Road construction projects	343,804,115,303	35.9%
Ronda Litoral and Nus Trinitat (includes land, services and facilities)	77,501,540,000	8.1%
Ronda de Dalt and Nus Llobregat (includes land, services and facilities)	68,839,310,000	7.2%
Ronda de Mig (first ring road)	2,536,397,316	0.3%
Other projects of internal connections in Barcelona	15,848,662,684	1.7%
Computerized traffic control system	5,250,000,000	0.5%
Metropolitan connections	88,533,355,303	9.3%
Regional connections (including Girona Airport)	51,791,600,000	5.4%
Barcelona Airport	27,756,250,000	2.9%
Parking (outside of Olympic areas)	5,747,000,000	0.6%
Construction at the Poble Nou Olympic Area	212,681,960,000	22.2%
Olympic Village Private development	100,980,000,000	10.6%
Public development in Poble Nou Area	75,203,560,627	7.8%
Other projects in Poble Nou	36,498,399,373	3.8%
Construction in other Olympic areas of Barcelona	117,973,650,000	12.3%
Montjuic Area	58,138,020,000	6.1%

Vall d'Hebron Area	29,425,740,000	3.1%
Diagonal Area	30,409,890,000	3.2%
Other Projects in Barcelona	182,449,775,658	19.1%
New western urban axis (Numancia-Tarragona Area)	7,979,130,000	0.8%
New eastern urban axis (North-Glories Area)	16,395,880,000	1.7%
Remodelation of Old Port (Phase I)	6,890,000,000	0.7%
Service Galleries	10,071,325,658	1.1%
Other facilities (cultural, sanitary and other)	21,229,090,000	2.2%
Improvement of hotel facilities	119,884,350,000	12.5%
Projects in Olympic sub-sites	69,916,420,000	7.3%
Other sports infrastructure projects	29,804,169,039	3.1%
Other COOB '92 infrastructures	13,643,000,000	1.4%
Other Barcelona sports centres	1,107,169,039	0.1%
Other sports infrastructures	15,054,000,000	1.6%
Total	956,630,090,000	100.0%

Source: The author, from data with COOB '92, HOLSA, City of Barcelona, and the Generalitat de Catalunya.

pesetas (excluding the cost of the security, cleaning and illumination of the ring roads).

Another revealing aspect is how the projects in sports infrastructure, conditioning and facilities only represented 9.1% of the total of Olympic investments. This proportion is explained by the great level of overall investment, the principal effect that the Olympic Games had on Barcelona. (On the urban transformation, see: IMPU, Ajuntament de Barcelona, 1988; *La Vanguardia*, 1992.)

2.2. Private and public investment

32.7% of the Olympic projects were promoted by private initiative. Private Olympic investments from 1986 to 1993 reached 313,017 million pesetas. Of this total, more than a third came from foreign capital. Basically, the private projects have been oriented towards the following areas:

1. Housing
2. Hotels
3. Entrepreneurial centres
4. Toll motorways


The high degree of private investment in the projects related to the 1992 Barcelona Olympic Games corresponds to the great expectation created by the attractiveness of the city of Barcelona. In spite of this, the immediate context in which these private investments have come of age is not the most ideal. In effect, after the Olympic Games, in 1993, the economic crisis which had been visible in many countries in 1990 began to show itself clearly in Barcelona.

Public investment came to 643,613 million pesetas. It represented 67.3% of the total of Olympic activities. Classifying it by governmental levels, the Spanish State contributed 193,572 million pesetas, 77,948 million of which were channelled through HOLSA. Enterprises under the auspices of the central administration carried out 20.3% of the total of «public» investment. In this way, a good part of the «public» investment in Barcelona '92 was made by enterprises which in spite of being state-owned, operated according to market criteria. In these cases, Olympic investment helped the business strategy of these enterprises, even though they were public, and was thus benefited from in the same way as other investments.


The municipal administration contributed 100,237 million pesetas. The concentration in HOLSA of the Olympic projects of the city of Barcelona and the Spanish state in an original joint venture made the investment process more agile. HOLSA is an extraordinary example of a joint venture. Of the

CHART 1. CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS FOR THE 1992 BARCELONA OLYMPIC GAMES

Geographical distribution of construction projects



Types of projects



275,000 million pesetas administered by HOLSA, 125,000 were designated to projects delegated by other institutions, and 149,546 million pesetas were for projects made by its own enterprises, 11,722 of these on Montjuïc, 67,692 million in the Olympic Village and the coast, and 70,132 million on roads (see Chart 1).

The growth of HOLSA projects in 29,000 million pesetas was compensated by 14,000 million pesetas in increase income. The recourse of credit represented 131,000 million pesetas on July 31, 1993. Until the year 2009 the annual payments will be about 16,000 million pesetas, to be covered equally by the Spanish state and the City of Barcelona. For the city the annual payment of 8,000 millions that must be passed onto to HOLSA until that date represents less than 5% of the budget of 1993 (City of Barcelona, 1991: 578-590; 1992b; 1993).

The Generalitat de Catalunya, the regional autonomous government, contributed to the effort in public investment for the Olympic Games with the significant amount of 22% of the pu-

blic investment or 142,726 million pesetas which went basically to the Barcelona ring roads, transportation infrastructures for towns that were Olympic sub-sites, and sports and cultural facilities.

2.3. The dynamic of the Olympic projects

The excess of activity could well have sharpened the imbalances inevitably produced in some markets of prime materials, and in labour. The Olympic program also could have been hurt by its own success. There was the risk that the Olympic whirlpool would devour the Olympics themselves.

The main risks were as follows:

— Internal prices and costs. The accumulative index, from its starting point in 1983, shows that in Barcelona there was an increase in the cost of living 20% above that in the rest of Catalonia. (Brunet 1993b: 20-24, 110 ff.) The effect was clear: from 1986 on the difference in the price index grew, with 1990 and 1991 being the crucial years.

— Exchange rates. It was clear that television rights and the rest of commercial contracts established in foreign currency, with the added instability of the exchange rate and the devaluation of the dollar, were a serious risk. To counteract this risk, the COOB '92 insured the exchange rate established for these operations.

— Project Calendar. The calendar was kept without technical or social difficulties.

— Participation and audience. The participation of national committees and athletes evolved in the best way possible, so that the 1992 Games brought together the greatest number of committees and athletes. The Gulf War, which had broken out in August of 1990, augured badly for the Olympics, but once it was over the rest of the international factors evolved favourably for the development of the Barcelona Olympics. As a result, the Barcelona Games appeared as the first of a new world, without conflict between different political blocs.

2.4. Cost of the Olympic Games and the financing of investments

There was considerable sensitivity to questions of «cost», the necessary resources, and the «financing» of a social event of the importance of the Olympic Games. Thus a distinction was made between organizational expenditures (those for aspects not usable after the event) and project expenditures (those

usable after the event). The expenditures in projects were made up of direct investments (or those necessary for the development of the event), indirect investments, and investments induced by the event. The organizational expenditures were the true «cost», the net cost, of which nothing would remain afterwards. For this reason effort was made to minimize them. On the other hand, the investment expenditures are the legacy, what remains. For this reason the effort was made to maximize them.

In the consideration of these questions a double tendency appears:

- A. If one wishes to establish the cost of the Olympic Games, the tendency will be to minimize the «Olympic» works, reducing them to their strict nucleus and concerning oneself with the upward fluctuations for expansion of projects or higher costs.
- B. If the goal is to evaluate the impact of the Olympic Games, the tendency will be to maximize the «Olympic» works, widening this category and making note of the upward variations for growth of projects or the amplification of their scale.

Also noteworthy was the difference between organizational expenditures (162,880 million pesetas) and direct investment (956,630 million pesetas) (see Table 4). Investments represented 85.5% of all Olympic expenditures! A distinction has also been made according to whether revenue had a commercial origin (investments of private and public enterprises, revenue of the COOB '92 itself in television rights, sponsorship and licences, and lotteries) or a tax origin (from public budgets).

By matching up the origin with the destination various conclusions can be reached concerning the use of Olympic resources. The «cost» of the Olympic Games was only 162,880 million pesetas. This true cost is only 14.5% of the resources of Barcelona '92, in its majority self-financed with the income of the COOB'92 itself. This entity only received 12,947 million pesetas from public budgets, which were the direct cost for the Spanish State of the Olympic Games.

However, the central administration and the remaining public institutions contributed up to 338,533 million pesetas from their budgets, and until the year 2009 will contribute 112,590 million more. As a consequence, if from the 451,000 million pesetas supplied by taxes we take off the 13,000 million transferred to the COOB '92 for its organizational expenditures, we arrive at a total of 438,000 million pesetas supplied by the budgets of all public administrations and applied to Olympic investment.

TABLE 4. ORIGIN AND DESTINATION OF REVENUE FROM THE 1992 BARCELONA OLYMPIC GAMES

<i>Period 1986-1993</i>	<i>In current pesetas</i>	<i>Distribution</i>
A. ORIGIN OR FINANCING OF REVENUE		
1. Commercial revenue		
Private national investment	668,386,640,000	59.7%
Private foreign investment	204,697,131,130	18.3%
Investment of state enterprises	108,320,328,870	9.7%
HOLSA: self-generated revenue of the enterprises of the group	130,416,240,000	11.6%
COOB '92: self-generated revenue	42,305,840,000	3.8%
COOB '92: contribution of sponsors of materials	120,055,700,000	10.7%
COOB '92: lotteries	42,448,000,000	3.8%
	20,143,400,000	1.8%
2. Revenue from taxation		
Investments in public budgets	451,123,080,000	40.3%
HOLSA: credit (contributions of the Ministry of Economy and Taxation, and the City of Barcelona)	325,586,180,000	29.1%
Transfer payments from the Central State to the COOB '92	112,590,000,000	10.1%
	12,946,900,000	1.2%

A = B	ORIGIN = APPLICATION	1,119,509,720,000	100.0%
B. APPLICATION OR USE OF RESOURCES			
1.	Resources applied to the organization Programs of the COOB '92	162,879,720,000	14.5%
		162,879,720,000	14.5%
2.	Resources applied to construction projects	956,630,000,000	85.5%
	Investments of private enterprises	313,017,460,000	28.0%
	Investments of State enterprises	130,416,240,000	11.6%
	Investments of the Central State	116,123,760,000	10.4%
	Investments of the City of Barcelona	22,788,580,000	2.0%
	Investments of HOLSA	154,895,840,000	13.8%
	Investments of the Generalitat de Catalunya	142,726,000,000	12.7%
	Investments of the COOB '92	32,714,280,000	2.9%
	Investments of other public administrations	43,947,840,000	3.9%

Source: the author, from data from the Ministry of Economy and Taxation, the COOB '92, the City of Barcelona, and the Generalitat de Catalunya.

The previous investments from public coffers were complemented by 130,000 million pesetas invested by public enterprises (Telefónica, RENFE, and others). Besides, we know that the Olympic Games contributed 313,000 million more in private investments. Thus the overall direct investments (956,630 million pesetas worth) and organizational expenditures (162,880 million) give us a total of 1,119,510 million pesetas, equivalent to US \$9,376,000,000 (see Chart 2).


In the development of the Olympic project the forecasts went from 237,000 million pesetas in April 1985, to an estimated 768,368 million in March 1991, to the final figure of 1,119,510 million pesetas in July of 1993 (real definitive figures, accumulated to July, 1993) presented here.

This series of figures indicates a sharp rise, but they do not indicate the «budget» of the Olympic Games, nor their cost (which would be legitimate to try to minimize). We are speaking of «Olympic» investments (precisely what one should try to maximize). For this reason, the growth of Olympic projects should be considered in positive terms.


If we consider the previous figures of the resources of the 1992 Barcelona Games as definitive, reflecting «costs» exactly, organizational expenditures, and direct public and private

CHART 2

Origin of the economic resources of Barcelona '92



Destination of economic resources of Barcelona '92



«Olympic» investments, the impact of all Olympic resources on the economy and the capacity to generate additional demand could be considered.

3. THE IMPACTS OF THE 1992 BARCELONA OLYMPIC GAMES

3.1. *The overall economic impact*

Direct and indirect Olympic investments (1,119,510 million pesetas) were really exceptional, as seen by comparing them to other Olympic Games (see Table 5). In effect, direct investment is exceptional not only in absolute terms (Brunet, 1993: 63 ff.). The induced impact is as well, along with investment demand and the consumption generated by direct investments of the Olympic Games. Barcelona '92 was unusual. As seen in this report, only the Tokyo Olympic Games generated more direct investment than those of Barcelona.

The induced impact in the period from 1987 to 1992 was calculated to be 1,942,000,000 million pesetas (16.6 billion dollars). Adding the direct impact to this (1,166,000,000 million) the total impact of the 1992 Barcelona Olympic Games could

be calculated to be 3,108,000,000 million pesetas (or 26.048 million dollars) (see Table 6 and Chart 3).

In order to round off this perspective, we should briefly consider the estimate of the tax and commercial balances of the 1992 Barcelona Olympic Games. Although there are limitations in the availability of data, certain generally valid conclusions clearly stand out. Thus a consideration of all revenue and expenditures of the public administrations -excluding public enterprises- whether explicit -with the budgetary designation independent from other State expenditures and revenue- or implicit -without a separate designation-, whether past- corresponding to the period from 1986 to 1993- or future -after the event- as well as direct, indirect and induced -as the permanent increase of income and capital are deductible- will be illustrative concerning the tax balance for the public treasury of the Olympic Games.

In the area of «Olympic» tax income, there was an accumulated total (before and after the Olympic Games) of 889,848 million and an annual flux after the Olympic Games of 27,500 million. As for the expenditures for the public treasury, the accumulated total was 522,569,000 million and the annual flux after the Olympic Games some 51,000 million pesetas. As a result, the «Olympic» tax balance for the public administration resulted in a surplus of accumulated values for the period from 1986 to 1993 of about 371,279 million pesetas (+- 100,000 million) and an annual deficit (from 1993) of 23,500 million (+-15,000 million) (see Table 7).

In spite of the limitations of the sources and estimates, two conclusions are unquestionable: a) the tax balance of the Olympic Games up to 1992 is very positive; and b) the tax balance of the Olympic Games after 1992 is slightly negative.

On the other hand, in the estimate of the external balance of payments or external commercial trade balance and capital of the Olympic Games, there appeared a negative commercial balance of 358,210 million pesetas, due to the fact that the elevated imported component of direct and induced investments was greater than income from television rights and sponsorship. The capital balance or exterior investment balance was positive, however, indicating the great attraction of Barcelona.

The principal spectator of any Olympic Games is in front of the television. For this reason: a) economic success depended on the income in this area; and b) the success of the image and the international impact depended upon the television audience and the message that was sent out to it.

It is for this reason that the number of visitors to Barcelona

TABLE 5. INVESTMENT RELATED TO THE OLYMPIC GAMES

<i>In millions of \$US</i>	<i>Tokyo 1964</i> <i>M of \$</i>	<i>Tokyo 1964</i> <i>%</i>	<i>Montreal 1976</i> <i>M of \$</i>	<i>Montreal 1976</i> <i>%</i>	<i>Los Angeles 1984</i> <i>M of \$</i>	<i>Los Angeles 1984</i> <i>%</i>	<i>Seoul 1988</i> <i>M of \$</i>	<i>Seoul 1988</i> <i>%</i>	<i>Barcelona 1992</i> <i>M of \$</i>	<i>Barcelona 1992</i> <i>%</i>
Direct expenditures	452,116	2.7%	2,824,863	89.0%	522,436	100.0%	1,467,853	46.5%	2,460,855	26.2%
Operational expenditures	169,510	1.0%	411,857	13.0%	450,394	86.2%	478,204	15.2%	1,361,156	14.5%
Direct investments	282,605	1.7%	2,413,006	76.0%	72,042	13.8%	989,649	31.4%	1,099,699	11.7%
Indirect expenditures										
Indirect investments	6,373,372	97.3%	350,012	11.0%	-	-	1,687,423	53.5%	6,915,274	73.8%
Total Olympic investments	16,825,488	100.0%	3,174,875	100.0%	522,436	100.0%	3,155,276	100.0%	9,376,129	100.0%

Source: the author, with data from the IOC, the SOOC, and the COOB '92.

TABLE 6. ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE 1992 BARCELONA OLYMPIC GAMES

<i>Period 1986-1993</i>	<i>In Millions of current pesetas</i>	<i>Distribution</i>
Direct accumulated impact		
Investment	1,165,600	37.5%
Public Investment	956,630	30.8%
City of Barcelona	643,613	20.7%
Central Administration	22,789	0.7%
HOLSA: investment	246,540	7.9%
Generalitat de Catalunya	154,896	5.0%
COOB '92: investment	142,726	4.6%
Other public administrations	32,714	1.1%
Private investment	43,948	1.4%
Consumption	313,017	10.1%
COOB '92: current expenditures	208,970	6.7%
Consumption of visitors	162,880	5.2%
	46,090	1.5%
Induced accumulated impact	1,942,188	62.5%
Total accumulated impact	3,107,788	100.0%

Source: The author, with data from the Ministry of Economy and Taxation, the COOB '92, the City of Barcelona, and the Generalitat de Catalunya.

CHART 3. CALENDAR OF THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF BARCELONA '92




TABLE 7. TAX BALANCE OF THE 1992 BARCELONA OLYMPIC GAMES

A. Revenue from the public administrations (in millions of pesetas)

Synthesis	
Accumulated total before and during the Olympic Games	893,848
Annual total after the Olympic Games	27,500

Details of revenue

Central Administration	
Accumulated before the Olympic Games	
Value Added Tax (a)	152,750
Savings of unemployment benefits (a)	212,098
Personal Income Tax and Social Security payments of supplementary employed (a)	525,000
Annual, after the Olympic Games	
Value Added Tax, Personal Income Tax, Social Security payments and others (capital and those related to permanent employment)	25,000
City of Barcelona	
Accumulated before the Olympic Games	
Increase in the benefits of the Economic Activities Tax	2,000
Increase in the benefits of the Property Tax	3,000
Annual, after the Olympic Games	
Increase in the benefits of the Economic Activities Tax	1,000
Increase in the benefits of the Property Tax	1,500

B. Expenditures of the public administrations (in millions of pesetas)

Synthesis	
Accumulated total before and during the Olympic Games	522,569
Annual total after the Olympic Games	51,000

Details of expenditures

All public administrations (a)	
Contributions from public budgets	338,533
Central Administration	
Before the Olympic Games, without independent accounting	
Security forces (a)	80,000
Olympic tasks of the administration without independent accounting (diplomatic service, Superior Sports Council, and others)	20,000
Annual, after the Olympic Games HOLSA annual payment	8,000
City of Barcelona	
Accumulated before the Olympic Games, without independent accounting	
Various areas	20,000
During the Olympic Games, without independent accounting	
Exceptional municipal services	4,036
Annual, after the Olympic Games, without independent accounting	
Maintenance of civil work and new municipal buildings (cleaning and profitability of the ring roads, parks, urban mobility, buildings and facilities)	20,000
HOLSA annual payment	8,000
Other public administrations	
Accumulated, before and during the Olympic Games	60,000
Annual, after the Olympic Games, without independent accounting	15,000

A-B: Tax balance = Income minus the expenditures of all public administrations

Estimate of accumulated values in the 1986-1993 period	Tax surplus of 371,279 million (+/- 100 thousand million)
Annual estimate after the Olympic Games	Tax deficit of 23,500 million (+/- 15 thousand million)

Note (a): see the technical details in Brunet (1994: 184-186).

Source: the author with data from the Ministry of Economy and Taxation, the COOB '92, the City of Barcelona, the Generalitat de Catalunya, and the European Community.

was not the principal effect of the Olympic Games, although the greater attention they received was primordial. There had been great expectations as to the number of visitors, but was realite limited by hotel space. As a result of significant private investment, from 1990 to 1992 hotel space grew 38% in Barcelona. On July 25, 1992 there were 25,641 hotel spaces in the city. If to these another 15,000 are added from the area of Olympic influence, the supply of hotel space was 40,641 spaces, allowing for a maximum of 422,666 Olympic tourist visits. Together with the expenditures of the Olympic family, local consumption by non-resident visitors can be estimated at 46,090 million pesetas (Brunet, 1993b: 105 ff.).

3.2. *The urban transformation of Barcelona*

In the analysis of the impact the effects generated by the change of an element on the components of a system are estimated, and the transformation for a specific modification are recounted. Impact analysis can be preventative, like that in the dossiers of the candidature for the organization of the Olympic Games, or the final dossiers, after the Games. This report hopes to contribute to the final impact analysis of the 1992 Barcelona Olympic Games.

The impact of the nomination of a city as organizer and the necessary decisions and investments for its organization, range from the most physical (construction projects) to the most intangible (local self-esteem or international impact, one of the most valued effects).

Among the physical impacts—which *per se* can have important economic effects—is the impact on urbanism. Change in the urban configuration and potential of Barcelona due to the 1992 Olympic Games has been enormous. The Olympic nomination was the spark that lead to the application of a previously elaborated urban plan concerning the project of Barcelona. (See for example: Bohigas, 1995; Busquets, 1992.) Beyond the Olympic Games there has been a leap forward in the perception of the city of itself, in terms of urban planning in Barcelona. Thus, from the perception of Barcelona as relatively uniform, where the differences were residual and where there was no significant differentiation between different districts and streets, the situation changed so as to promote actions that would make urban spaces specialized.

In this point we would like to point out to the reader an aspect where the extraordinarily synthetic mode of Barcelona's urban transformation was reflected, as generated by «Olympic» investments: the circulation of motor vehicles. The change in

the urban model can be seen immediately by comparing the density of traffic in 1990 before the ring roads were built, with the density of 1993, after the opening of the Dalt and Litoral ring roads. The changes in traffic due to the effect of these roads was one of the most synthetic expressions of the impact of the Olympic Games on the city.

3.3. *Construction and housing*

The construction sector best reflects the economic boom in Barcelona between 1986 and 1993 (Brunet, 1993b: 85 ff.). From this we might conclude the following:

- The population employed in the construction sector grew 72% from 1985 to 1992.
- The peak of construction employment was in 1991.
- The consumption of cement rose 74% between 1985 and 1993.
- The consumption of electricity in the production of construction materials rose 55% from 1985 to 1993.
- The consumption of electricity in construction rose 142% from 1985 to 1993.

Presented by function and specific projects, the construction that stands out during the years 1988 to 1991 was surface area of parking lots (34% of the total), housing (23%), commercial venues (13%), offices (12%) and hotels (5%). In this period in Barcelona, 605,688 square metres of office space were constructed, an increase of 21%, which to a large degree compensated previous unavailability and expense. The dynamic of offices construction in Barcelona is important, surpassing the construction of offices in Brussels and Madrid although not reaching the feverish pitch of London and Paris. As a consequence, the expectation of investment in this sector is still high.

One of the most notable impacts of the 1992 Barcelona Olympic Games was the growth in housing, due to the increasing attraction of Barcelona, the lack of buildable land, increased construction costs, the rise in available family income, and the difference in prices between the Spanish market and the rest of Europe.

The revival of the real estate market was rapid and voracious, from the Olympic nomination in October 1986 to the middle of 1990. From that point on, the economic crisis, and perhaps the availability of housing in the Olympic Village, depressed the market, especially in relation to housing that was not of new construction: the market price of new and pre-

viously-built housing between 1986 and 1992 grew, respectively, 240% and 287% (see Chart 4).

3.4. *Employment*

The nomination of Barcelona as the organizing city for the 1992 Olympic Games produced a sharp effect: in December 1986 unemployment, which until then had been on the rise, began to fall. The curve of the temporary shifts in unemployment changed drastically and began to fall until August of 1992. The labour market in Barcelona, all its metropolitan area, and in all of Catalonia improved substantially during the period of preparation for the Olympic Games (Brunet, 1993a).

Synthetically, the number of registered unemployed fell from a historical maximum of 127,774 people in November of 1986 (the month following the Olympic nomination) to a minimum of 60,885 unemployed in July 1992, in the middle of the Olympic Games (see Table 8).

From October 1986 to July 1992, the general rate of unemployment in Barcelona fell from 18.4% to 9.6%. In 1986 in Barcelona, its province, Catalonia, and all of Spain, the unemployment rates ranged from 18.4% and 23.7%. In 1992, the rates varied from 9.6% in Barcelona to 15.5% in the rest of Spain. The reduction in half of the number of registered unemployed in Barcelona was even more significant if one considers that the number of active employable people in Barcelona in this period grew by 1.1%.

As a complement to this, while unemployment was reduced by half between 1986 and 1992, the number of work contracts rose 2.5 times. Registered unemployment and labour hiring formed an «X»: while the fall in unemployment was sharp, so was the rise in hiring.

In comparing these figures with the levels of unemployment in July 1993 (78,251), one sees that a year after the Olympic Games there were still 49,523 unemployed less than in November of 1986 (127,774). After the Olympic Games, the economy of Barcelona showed a greater capacity to resist the economic crisis which had also appeared in the city, even though it has only appeared since 1993.

Moving from bust to boom, the economic situation in Barcelona improved notably between October 1986 and August 1992. The crisis died down and gave way to a general revival of activity, and even euphoria in some sectors. In sum, the crisis appeared in Barcelona much later than in other places, and the situation the local economy finds itself in is better.

Price of new housing in Barcelona (in pesetas/square metres)



Price of old housing in Barcelona (in pesetas/square metres)



CHART 4

Preu de les vivendes

TABLE 8. ACTIVITY AND EMPLOYMENT IN BARCELONA

	Situation on 31.12	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	Variation	
									1986-1992	1991-1992
Active		707,772	743,348	728,704	734,746	741,662	722,870	715,774	1.1%	-1.0%
Employed		582,078	624,946	631,697	664,104	675,424	656,575	645,833	11.0%	-1.6%
Unemployed		125,694	118,402	97,007	70,642	66,238	66,295	69,941	-44.4%	5.5%

Source: The author, with data from the City of Barcelona and the INEM (National Employment Institute).

Thus the 1992 Barcelona Olympic Games were a protective buffer against the economic crisis that affected Europe (see Table 9).

Relevant conclusions can be made concerning employment from the data obtained. Thus in comparing July 1992 with July 1993 one can observe the «Olympic» effect of 17,366 fewer jobs, a figure close to the annual employment of the COOB '92. Here we might conclude that the jobs lost corresponded directly to the organization of the Olympic Games. Other jobs appeared to resist this change (see Chart 5).

On the basis of various analytic procedures (analysis of employment, production, investment and income), the following can be concluded:

- There was annual average employment (1987-1992) related to direct expenditures (organization by the COOB '92 plus direct public and private Olympic investments) of 35,309 people.
- There was annual average employment (1987-1992) related to the induced impact (generation of the induced demand) of 24,019 people.
- There was a permanent effect of the Olympic Games (additional employment arising from capitalization and changes in economic structures) that could be calculated to be 20,000 people (Brunet, 1993b: 74 ff.).

In sum, the annual average effect of employment for the period 1987-1992 from the economic impact of the Games was 59,328 people. The result was that the drop in unemployment in Barcelona between November 1986 and July 1992 in 66,889 people was due (at least 88.7% of it) to the impact of the organization of the Olympic Games of 1992.

3.5. *The confidence of citizens, the opinion of visitors, and the attraction for investors*

The confidence of Barcelonans in the 1992 Games was almost unanimous, and many visitors were surprised by the unanimity and passion the city showed for the Olympic Games. The projects in the streets were so numerous that it was thought that the situation had to lead to improvements. Surveys showed this tendency both before the Olympic Games and afterwards.


In 1987, 61.4% put the urban changes in first place among the perceived benefits the Games would bring the city. 81.7% believed that there was enough time to develop the Olympic project, while 38.0% expected that it would result in benefits. A half a year before the Olympic Games, this optimism not only

TABLE 9. UNEMPLOYMENT RATE IN BARCELONA, CATALONIA AND SPAIN

<i>Registered unemployed as a % of the active population</i>	<i>Variation</i>									
	<i>Situation on 31/12</i>	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1986-1992	1991-1992
Barcelona		18.4	17.4	14.3	10.4	9.7	9.2	9.6	-47.8%	4.2%
Province of Barcelona		23.7	19.3	16.0	12.0	11.3	11.0	11.7	-50.6%	6.0%
Catalonia		21.0	18.3	15.2	11.6	10.9	10.7	11.2	-46.7%	4.5%
Spain		20.9	20.9	18.8	16.2	15.6	15.4	15.5	-25.8%	0.6%

Source: the author, from data with the City of Barcelona and the INEM (National Employment Institute).

GRÀFIC 5. TOTAL EMPLOYMENT GENERATED
BY THE 1992 BARCELONA OLYMPIC GAMES



remained intact but had even increased. 87% of all Catalans believed that Barcelona would come across well during the Olympic Games. 55% felt that the construction projects would be finished on time, although 48% were afraid that the city would become apathetic in 1993.

Immediately after the Olympic Games the average mark given of those questioned was 8.78 out of 10. 23% had attended some Olympic event. The King of Spain, the Mayor of Barcelona, and the President of the International Olympic Committee received the highest evaluations of all leaders. The aspect of the Olympic Games that received the highest qualification was security (8.9), followed by street atmosphere (8.7), access to facilities (8.2), public transportation (7.9), and traffic (7.6%). 39% felt that Barcelona would become apathetic after the Olympic Games had ended, 9% less than half a year earlier.

A year after the Olympic Games, the positive evaluation of the Olympic Games shown by the citizens before and immediately after the event held up, in spite of the fact that the economic crisis of the 90's had arisen in Barcelona as well. The degree of satisfaction of living in Barcelona was 7.9 out of 10. Only 47.7% believed that after the Olympic Games Barcelona had become apathetic. Thus the positive evaluation of the citizenry towards the 1992 Olympic Games not only held up, but in fact grew.

Another aspect to keep in mind is the impression from the outside. Visitors to the Olympics gave a very high evaluation to

the 1992 Games, especially for the Olympic events, the Olympic atmosphere, Olympic facilities, and Olympic signage (Brunet, 1993b: 109-110).

It is felt that the preference of enterprises to locate themselves in Barcelona is an excellent synthetic indication of its attractiveness, the availability of services (offices, industrial land, housing, and so on) and labour, its market, and overall competitiveness. In 1991, in midst of the pre-Olympic boom, the excellent expectation for Barcelona was already felt, reaching the eighth position in the ranking of European cities. In contrast, by 1992 it had fallen to 13th due to the rise in rental prices and the cost of office space (Maragall, 1993-1994).

In 1993 Barcelona rose again to the tenth position, due to the Olympic effect and the lower price of office space. In this year, the other 9 preferred cities in terms of location of enterprises were London, Paris, Frankfurt, Brussels, Amsterdam, Zurich, Glasgow, and Manchester. The strongest aspects of Barcelona were quality of life of employees (5th in Europe), office prices (6th), availability of directors and their cost (8th), proximity and accessibility to the market (10th), transportation infrastructures (15th) and telecommunications (19th).

3.6. The legacy of the Olympic Games and the strategic perspectives of Barcelona

The direct and indirect investments of the Olympic Games were seen in civil construction projects and infrastructures, as well as building and installations. Significant public and private capital that had come together during the preparatory effort of the Olympic Games, together with permanent employment created, constitute the legacy of the 1992 Barcelona Olympic Games.

This legacy is synthesized in the urban transformation of Barcelona and in the economic structure (greater capitalization, growth of the service sector, internationalization, attractiveness, centrality, productivity, competitiveness).

European integration strengthens the Western Mediterranean region, as a bridge between the centre and the south of Europe. In this context, Barcelona also has another powerful attraction: its metropolitan area, found in a central axis of European communications. Barcelona is thus an excellent location for head offices and its metropolitan area excellent for the introduction of their plants. The possibilities of capitalizing on the Olympic impulse, consolidating its new role as a service centre specialized in activities with high surplus value, seems clear.

The organization and development of the 1992 Olympic Games could be considered to have been an exceptional and fabulous experience. During the Games an excellent forum for athletes from all over the world was provided, a great spectacle in tune with the Olympic spirit, strengthening both new and old attractions of the city of Barcelona.

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TECNOLOGY

BARCELONA '92: STRATEGIES OF TECHNOLOGY

FERRAN PASTOR BERNADAS / JORDI LÓPEZ BENASAT¹

1. INTRODUCTION

Few human activities in our day escape the use of information technologies. The Olympic Games are not an exception; on the contrary, the growing use and importance of technology is more notable than in other activities, for a number of reasons:

- the very evolution of the Olympic Games has turned them into the most watched spectacle in the world. Here the contribution of television and telecommunications has been decisive;

- the increase in its size to unexpected limits: number of federations, countries, athletes, competitions, spectators, television spectators and so on;

- the excellence and quality that the Olympic Games demand in all aspects, and their commercial implications, so that many world-wide enterprises wish to see their names associated with them. Technological enterprises are no exception, and indeed are the leaders in these types of strategies.

Another phenomenon that should be pointed to is the growing integration of different technologies that participate in the Games. From the first use of computers in Rome 1960 and Tokyo 1964 to give information of the results, to the present day, new functions have been added based upon computer support of telecommunications.

In the 1984 Olympic Games (Los Angeles and Sarajevo) the classic areas of functionality supplied by information technologies began to be designed:

1. Ferran Pastor Bernadas. Industrial Engineer. Director of the Computer Division of the COOB '92. Director of the Centre for Information and Technological Operations (CIOT) during the Olympic Games.

Jordi López Benasat. Telecommunications Engineer. Director of the Telecommunications and Electronics Division of the COOB '92. Director of the Centre for Information and Technological Operations (CIOT) during the Olympic Games.

1. Functions necessary for the Organizing Committee during the period of preparation and organization. Basically, these are related to telephone systems, the automatization of offices, internal information, publications, security, reproductions, and so on.

2. Treatment of the results with many components and destinations, with the participation of all kinds of information technologies.

3. Information systems for the Olympic Family.

4. Logistical support systems for the Olympic Games, for accreditations, lodging, transportation, and so on.

5. Systems related to security.

6. Teams related to sound and the monitoring of images.

7. Private telecommunications, such as in the transmission of data, the CATV, radiocommunications, pagers, and so on.

8. Public Telecommunications.

These differentiated blocks have been basically the same in the Olympic Games of 1988 (Seoul and Calgary), and 1992 (Barcelona and Albertville).

Constructing this service complex, raising it to a maximum quality level and advancing in the integration of technologies, improving the experiences of former editions of the Olympic Games, was the challenge that Barcelona '92 faced.

2. THE CANDIDATURE

In 1983 the Barcelona Olympic Office drafted a project that had as its goal the approval of the candidature of Barcelona by the Spanish Olympic Committee and the support of the Spanish central government.

The need was perceived to develop a project that would structure an adequate technological proposal for the organization of the Games while demonstrating the capacity of the city and of its citizens and enterprises to successfully confront so great a challenge.

The project was titled *Planificació de les necessitats Informàtiques i de Telecomunicacions per als Jocs Olímpics de 1992* (Planning of the Information and Telecommunication necessities of the 1992 Olympic Games), also known as BIT '92 (*Barcelona Informàtica i Telecomunicacions 1992*). This project set out the goals and ends of the use of technology that would be maintained until 1992. It represented the collaboration of 50 people, and lasted a year, with 10,000 hours of work involved.

The work method of BIT '92 was structured into three phases:

- Analysis of necessities and requirements.
- Elaboration of strategies in relation to hardware, software, applications, communications, electronics, security, and television.
- Development of plans, where the respective projects were described.

Time has shown the importance and utility of BIT'92. Its incorporation in the Candidature Dossier gave solidity to the technical area. It allowed for a promotional campaign to make the candidature known, stimulate sponsorship of large enterprises and prepare the offers of the industry itself. BIT '92 was in general an instrument that increased trust in the possibilities of the Organizing Committee.

The forecasts of the size and number of projects necessary eight years beforehand were quite accurate, considering the rapid evolution of technological services. The strength of its content allowed for the initiation of the activities of the Technology Division of the COOB and the revision made at the end of 1987, as well as the selection of necessary projects, and the revision of the volumes of material, resources and the budget. Finally, a promotional campaign was started to initiate the long negotiations with the enterprises involved.

3. PROGRAMMING PHASES

The various projects of the Technology Division, which included such varied disciplines as information technologies, telecommunications and electronics, responded to the same programming process, which can be schematically summarized in five large phases (see Table 1):

- a) Planning
- b) Development/Project
- c) Installation
- d) Preparation for Operation
- e) Operation

3.1. *Planning: work strategies*

All of the organizational process, both in form and in dynamism, was based upon the application of strategic actions that would define the working philosophy of the Technology Division of the COOB '92.

TABLE 1. PROGRAMMING PHASES

	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992
Planning					
Development/ Project					
Installation					
Operation preparation					
Operation					

A project with a fixed date

The project had to enter into service at an immovable fixed date, which meant that all of the developmental tasks, including installation and preparation, had to be ready in a margin of time that would avoid unnecessary risks. To confront this goal three basic criteria were defined:

- a) conservative planning;
- b) participation in binding tests;
- c) priority of functionality.

Through conservative planning the idea was to have the technological systems that needed a certain degree of development ready a year before the Olympic Games, so as to have time to absorb any unforeseen delays, and also to be able to dedicate necessary time to the tasks of preparation of the operation.

Knowing that established planning is often not sufficient motivation if not accompanied by absolutely unavoidable commitments for everyone involved, commitments were made to participate in important tests that would take place in times coinciding with the terms of completion of the projects according to conservative planning.

Finally, a third criteria was the priority of functionality, included in each of the three planned versions of the technological projects, so that the first version would include the absolutely necessary functions, and the following versions would add other convenient functionalities.

Short duration

The second characteristic of the service was its short duration, and thus, the impossibility of correcting faults or, as is common in many cases, refining a system once put into operation. The organizational strategy established two actions:

- d) operative evaluation;
- e) simulations.

The life cycle of technological systems implies a development even after a cycle has ended and once laboratory tests and the first acceptance have been made. We have called this phase the operative evaluation, consisting in advancing the operation of the system with the simulation of the real application, through simulation tests and rehearsals that allow for those things lacking to be discovered, which only the operation itself can make evident.

Large volumes

Another characteristic of this technological service are the large volumes that it has to cover. This characteristic takes on much more force when related to the two we have analyzed until now, that is, the fixed date and the short duration. Added to the simulation tool, which we have already mentioned, the decision was made to apply two basic ideas in the installation process, in the preparation of the operation, and in the operation itself:

- f) normalization;
- g) the industrialization of certain processes.

Large volumes were needed to supply 28 sports competitions, which implied that many services had to give simultaneous information in many different venues. In a certain way this implied that after the development of a system it was necessary to make a «response» (often with small adaptations) for each of the territorial units where it was in operation. The normalization made the response much easier both in terms of design and in the assignment of the installation task, and the industrialization of the installation process itself. This normalization, guaranteeing the homogeneity necessary when dealing with such high volumes of application, also has positive repercussions in the operation: it allows one to make the operative procedures more uniform; it gives great flexibility in the assignment of human resources; it has many advantages for the training of personnel.

The other basic strategy that the large volumes gave rise to was the industrialization of processes, applied especially to installation tasks. The design efforts and the organization of the processes made over time, when time was still available, allowed to rapidly make actions that otherwise would go over the time limits available. This could be applied, for example, to the set-up of the information teams and their preparation for the operation.

Criticality and visibility

Two characteristics, criticality and visibility, could have increased the negative consequences of poor functionality. Here, as well, strategies were developed that can be synthesized as follows :

- h) use of proven technologies;
- i) freezing of innovations;
- j) redundancies in solutions;
- k) emergency procedures.

The use of proven technologies that are at the same time up-to-date obliges one to choose carefully in each case. When a technology is introduced which due to its nature is still in a position to suffer regular innovations, it is very important to know how to decide how to freeze a version leaving aside advantages that a new version could bring, for there is always the risk of a lack of stability in its use.

It was also necessary to take other precautions to confront unforeseen circumstances, the most elemental of which was to have solutions prepared to be applied in case the procedure designed had any problem. Emergency procedures also had to be prepared so that given minimum functionality, the operation of the Olympic Games would not be stopped.

Training and preparation of users

A very typical characteristic of this great sporting event is the fact that it is practically impossible to prepare users previously in the majority of systems. On the one hand, a large part of the users were volunteers, and it was necessary to plan training that was not overly excessive based upon a previously-stated dedication to the Olympic Games. On the other hand, the second large group of users were members of the Olympic Family, for whom it is practically impossible to plan training due to their sheer numbers, arrival dates and the very logistic previous to the opening of the Games. For these reasons two norms were established:

- l) user-friendly designs;
- m) clear documentation.

When possible, touch screens were used to simplify the operation (as in the case of the commentators' system and the EPH). In other cases the advantages of PS/2 computer terminals were considered; playing with colours, design was able to facilitate dialogue. In all of these cases a strong help function aided use.

In all systems that had to be directly operated by the members of the Olympic Family, a numerous group of volunteers were trained to solve any doubts that could arise in spite of the friendly design and the operative documentation.

Estimate of requirements

The development of technological systems had to be carried out—or at least had to begin—without the direct participation of the final users. Many of them came on the

scene for the first time a few days before the Olympic Games opened, while others joined the organizational structure of the COOB '92 much later than the final date to begin the technological projects. This was quite important for the definition of the requirements which, contrary to what would have been ideal, had to be done in a speculative manner to be able to move forward.

There were two strategies to cover the risks derived from these unavoidable situations:

- n) flexible applications;
- o) operative evaluation.

The design of the applications and the tools used in the system were such that they allowed for flexibility in the change of some requirements (especially in reference to outlets) without great effort.

We have already mentioned the stage known as the operative evaluation, during which the systems were put into service well before the Olympic Games. This was an excellent moment to try to bring the final users as close as possible to the already designed operative system, since it was still possible to introduce changes that would not signify structural modification.

Subcontracting

The general norm in planning and organizing each aspect of the Olympic Project was to use as much subcontracting as possible in the development and finishing of projects, while always trying to attain a maximum Olympic commitment from the enterprises assigned to each project. Furthermore, the projects allowed for the use of volunteers in a great part of the operations.

This position had many advantages. On the one hand it assured that the projects would be developed by enterprises with experience within each of the functional areas. On the other hand, the staff of the COOB '92 was reduced, which, given the logical disappearance of the Committee afterwards, would produce minimal distortion in the labour market. Another positive aspect allowed for the concentration of efforts of personnel in the initial planning of projects, dialogue with users when possible, control of development, and, finally and most critically, the preparation of the final operation.

Sponsorship

The choice of enterprises to carry out the projects was done according to the following criteria, besides traditional

considerations of cost, quality, and guarantees of fulfillment of due dates:

- experience and presence in Barcelona, needed especially in the final participation of the operation;
- a commitment to the Olympic Games, seen in the form of sponsorship;
- the desire for corresponding visibility;
- the capacity of participation in the operation.

Volunteers

The use of volunteers lead to the assurance of being able to count on all necessary personnel, who showed the enthusiasm and good will that being a volunteer implied. This also meant a challenge for their choice and preparation.

The strategy defined to respond to all of these challenges was maintained in three areas of action:

- p) specific criteria in the identification of volunteers;
- q) specific training of volunteers;
- r) integration of volunteers in the structure.

For the identification of volunteers, file cards were analyzed to find those with the best characteristics to work with technological systems. People with proven experience as directors or technicians were invited to cooperate to cover specialized positions, or unfilled positions after jobs were matched with the volunteer cards.

During the first semester of 1992, a process of specific training took place in the technological systems that each employee had to operate, as well as the integration of the operative structure where each person had to carry out their tasks.

Costs

Finally, as in all good organizations, logical budgetary limitations and limitations in human resources were taken into account. The cost of the Games' technology, with the exception of the areas of radio and television, reached 30,000 million pesetas, itemized into the large categories seen in Table 2.

It should be noted that more than 60% of this quantity was sponsored by enterprises within the commercial programs already mentioned. It is worth noting that the investment of Telefónica related to the Olympic Games was around 92,000 million pesetas. The 3,000 million invested in the preparation of the technology of the Olympic Games and its operation corresponded basically to the cost of human resources. There was also revenue in the sale of technological

assets once the Olympic Games had ended, to a value of 900 million pesetas.

TABLE 2. TECHNOLOGY BUDGET
OF THE BARCELONA GAMES

Telecommunications	7,000 million pesetas
Electronics	3,500 million pesetas
Electronic Security	1,600 million pesetas
Hardware	5,500 million pesetas
Software	5,200 million pesetas
Services	4,200 million pesetas
<hr/>	
Preparation cost of Olympic Games technology and its operation	3,000 million pesetas
<hr/>	
Total	30,000 million pesetas

3.2. *Project Development*

The assignment of projects to enterprises was made at the end of 1988 so that the developmental phase for the majority of projects could begin in early 1989.

The organizational model applied was tailored to specialization, designating «leadership» of each project in function of its specific nature. This was also reflected in the organization chart, with hierarchical structures (project, system, division) included within the Information Systems, Telecommunications and Electronics Division (see Table 3).

The principal tasks to facilitate the step to the following phases were:

- Determine the number of terminal elements and their location (necessary for the installation phase).
- Determine necessary human resources.
- Prepare documentation for training and for users (necessary for the preparation of the operation).

In considering this phase of development/project and especially of the installation, it should be recalled that not all projects were equal.

In Table 4 the projects appear ordered by blocks from lesser to greater complexity, each of them affecting development and installation in a different way.

TABLE 3. DESIGNATION OF PROJECTS AND SERVICES

<i>System</i>	<i>Enterprises</i>		<i>System</i>	<i>Enterprises</i>
Internal Telephone	Network	Telefonica	Methodology of Project Control	
	Switchboards	Ericsson	Information Systems	
	Cable	Sintel	Central systems	IBM
Public Networks		Telefonica	Central systems	IBM
Transmission Network		Ibermic/Telefonica	Local systems	IBM
Terminals	Telephones	Telefonica	Basic systems	IBM
	FAX	Ricoh	Technical support	IBM
	Videconferences	Telefonica	Design of local networks	IBM
	Radio communications	Philips/Indelec	Simulation	IBM/UIB
	Walkie-talkies	Motorola	SW monitoring and control	IBM/Bidisa (Legend)/ /Selesa (Candle)
Radio Networks		Telefonica		
Spectrum control		DG Telecom.		
CATV		Jerrold/Televies	Software	
	Credits	Sintel	Business administration system (SIGE)	Calculation and management
	Cables			EDS
	Televisions	Philips	Results system (SIR)	
	Videos	Panasonic	Commentators System (CIS)	IBM

Ground instruments	Transmission Teams	Alcatel	and equipment system	Xerox
Scoreboards	Alfanumerics	Seiko	distribution of printed results (EPH's)	
		Seiko	FO Information System (AMIC)	Eritel
	Sports	Baybor/Olimpex	Operative administration system (SIGO)	USE (SEMA Group, T&G)
Large Screens		Vidiwall/Philips		
Sound		Jumbotron/Sony		
CCTV Sports		Philips	Reproduction	Xerox
Accreditations		Panasonic	Publications centre	Xerox
Personal control	Photography	Kodak	Archive documentation	Philips
access		Iecisa	Administration of spaces and design aid (CAD)	Disel
Material control				
access	Metal detectors	Kryptos/Garret	Management facilities	Sema Group
	X-Rays	Siemens	Local support to users and venues	Centrisa
CCTV security		ECV	Ophthalmics	
		Aisa	(equipment and software)	Apple
Systems intrusion			Olympic Games Promotion	Compuservice
			<i>Olimpia</i> data base	CIDC

TABLE 4. SYSTEMS TYPOLOGY

<i>Block</i>	<i>Characteristics</i>	<i>Projects</i>
1	Distribution of standard equipment. Non-essential special installations (only electrical energy)	Photocopiers Pagers TV Screens Radio-telephony (closed group) Short-range Radio-telephony Mobile telephones Electronic security Conference rooms CATV CCTV Sports Telephones Ophimatics Sound Video conferences Accreditations photography
2	Distribution of standard equipment. Special installation needed (normally cables previous design)	Results systems (SIR) Commentators systems (SICO) Information system (AMIC) Business Administration systems (SIGE) Ground instruments (Seiko) Scoreboards (Seiko) Results distribution system (EPH's)
3	Systems development (hard and soft)	Internal telephone Data telecommunications network Data processing centre Publications centre Private radio-telephony network Public networks
4	Complex central services	

3.3. *Installation*

It was of great interest to have sufficient time to install and test all equipment and systems. Thus it was necessary to have the sports, residential, logistical and operative facilities available with maximum lead time. This was not always possible, either because the owners did not cede their spaces until the last minute, because they were still in the phase of construction or reform, or because the COOB had to pay for their use in function of the time they would be occupied.

The installation phase kept five elements in mind in planning:

— *Standard installation plan*

A common process was followed in all venues and synchronized with other projects, so that the mechanisms of modification and adaptation could be facilitated.

- *Decentralization of the facility*
Each facility had its own team, which would be responsible for the operation during the Games, though under the coordination of the *Centre d'Informació i Operacions de Tecnologia* (Information and Operational Technology Centre) (CIOT), which covered the phases of installation, operation, adaptation until the Paralympic Games and the final take down.
- *Associated Logistical Planning*
In parallel and in coordinated fashion, there were projects for the transportation and storage of material, accreditations, catering for personnel, internal security, and so on.
- *Acceptance Tests*
Systematic acceptance tests of the teams were carried out with maximum lead time to avoid problems.
- *Maintenance*
The maintenance plan had a double structure: one part (personnel and replacement material) in the venues, and another centralized part made up of expert personnel and reserve material with mobility to displace it to the venues or act in special cases, as in ceremonies.

3.4. *Preparation of the Operation*

In this phase the human structure that had to act during the Games was completed. The staff was widened in the Technology Services, with staff incorporated to the COOB for a period of less than six months, and the volunteers incorporated to round off their training.

This was a transitional phase where many of those in charge still did more than one task until obtaining a precise adjustment of the total human and technical structure. Furthermore, due to the delay in finishing the projects, there was little time to carry out this phase. The beginning of this phase was the result of a firm decision of the Direction of the organization to break off the temptation to continue perfecting projects until the last moment.

3.5. *Operation*

The calendar for systems based on information technologies was linked to the organizational functions which supported them. Thus the operability of the overall group of systems was not done on the same day nor in the same

month. For a long period of time operative systems coexisted with others that were still being tested, which gave rise to problems when common resources were shared (the central computer, for example).

TABLE 5

HUMANS RESOURCES			
	<i>Preparation</i>		<i>Operation</i>
Source	COOB'92 Staff	90	COOB'92 Staff 90
	Enterprises	575	Enterprises 2,530
	Total	665	Part-time 300
			Volunteers 2,600
			Total 5,520
Function	Direction	50	Direction 50
	Project Directors	50	Territorial Direction 300
	Technicians	500	Technicians 1,070
	Administrative Staff	65	Operating Staff 2,600
	Total	665	External Services (TE) 1,500
			Total 5,520

In any case, the weight of the operation fell in the beginning of July with the opening of the Olympic Village and the Main Press Centre. The end did not correspond to the last day of the Games. The majority of systems continued to be operative as long as the Olympic Family was in Barcelona.

The principal challenge of this phase was the great number of resources that had to enter into operation almost simultaneously. In all probability the Olympic Games moves more human resources and more advanced technological equipment in a short operation period than any other event in the world.

The new applied technologies in the Barcelona Games were as follows:

- CD-I for hymns
- Videofinish
- Integrated system for results
- Touch screen terminals for commentators
- Information systems for commentators
- EPH - Electronic Pigeon Holes

- Optical archive systems
- Integrated information systems -AMIC
- Pre-Games information system
- Massive fibre optics system
- Digital network of integrated services
- Digital network of data transmission
- Videotelephones
- GSM and GPS
- Image transmission for video-security
- Cable television system

The incorporation of volunteers was widespread and effective. For example, User Aid Centres were maintained which in some cases were open 24 hours, as with the International Radio and Television Centre.

From the CIOT all problems communicated by different venues were registered and kept under control, while the functioning of all systems was monitored one by one. Thus in the cases of results, security, the central computer, and so on, there was a duplicated control that ensured the efficiency of the service.

4. FINAL RESULT

The final result for technological systems is positive if no «noise» is produced due to gaps or faults —that is, if the services go unnoticed. If any «noise» was produced, especially in the mass media, this was to praise the systems.

In all sincerity, this was the case of the Barcelona Games, where the basic technological systems went unnoticed in the best sense of the term, and those that were visible, such as those used by the Olympic Family, had unprecedented success in terms of use (in some cases three times that of Seoul, a great advance) and were highly praised.

THE TECHNOLOGICAL IMAGE OF THE BARCELONA OLYMPIC GAMES

JOSEP BERTRAN VALL¹

In our day the technology used in any Olympic Games, or in any other sporting event, is understood not only as a means to inform people of the results as they occur, but as a fundamental element in turning the event into a cultural spectacle, and in this way create solid societal values. In winning medals, athletes do not only consolidate their athletic excellence, but also spread the word concerning the values of the society that they represent.

The technological challenge was considered in these terms. It is not enough to obtain perfection, that is, something finished and beautiful. The COOB '92 tried to obtain excellence, the best, the most advanced. A society that demonstrates that it is able to obtain high sporting and technological levels—and do so in accordance with Olympic values—can at the same time achieve a high level of social welfare, social equality, development and justice.

The technology of the Olympic Games as an economic instrument

The COOB'92 assumed the investments in technology as a necessary expenditure for the development of competitions during the Olympic Games, convinced that in the search for excellence in design, human and technical factors would come into play that would not disappear when the Games ended.

Thus, for example, the work of familiarizing 400 specialists with the most advanced technology assured a qualitative and long-lasting increase of the technological level of the industrial fabric of our society. Two thousand volunteers in

1. Industrial Engineer. Head of Technological Marketing of the COOB '92 from 1989 to 1992. Profesor of International Marketing in the Universitat Pompeu Fabra in Barcelona. Promotor of International Cooperation Projects between enterprises in the entrepreneurs' association Foment de Treball. Author of *Marketing Internacional y Exportación* (1994).

information services, who worked on a innovative and precise computer network, offered a vision of sport as a vehicle for spreading cultural values associated with doing a job well. The gradual increase in services offered by cooperating enterprises assured the creation of entrepreneurial strategies of a national dimension that could be expected to be consolidated beyond the Games.

Consolidating the prestige of technology meant demonstrating to future users the technological level that a group of people was creating. It was key to develop a campaign to sensitize users, especially international ones, so that when arriving in Barcelona a few days before the Olympic Games, they would be willing to accept the information services offered by the Organizing Committee. The technological image of Spain in the time the Games were being prepared was not exactly a factor in its favour. In Atlanta, for example, initially they will have to make less effort to get users to show a willingness to accept the technological proposals of its Organizing Committee, simply because of the preconceived image of American technology in the mind of Americans and non-Americans.

The association of a product with a country means establishing a series of inherent attributes which are automatically converted into commercial arguments. If these coincide with the promotional guidelines they add value to the product. If they do not, they reduce its value.

In Spain, for example, German engineering is not only the description of a product, but an attribute, a commercial argument. It is associated with robustness, precision, durability, and so on. In contrast, Spanish products in developed countries like the United States for example, are perceived as low quality and low cost crafts, rather than high quality technology.

In this context, the objective was to create favourable opinion towards certain high technology services that could not be shown to the users until the first day of real use, the only moment when they were available. Given that the different technological services had to be hired months ahead of time, the state of opinion took on a relevant role. All of the possible elements of judgement of the purchaser of the service, in this case made up the commercial package previous to purchase.

The COOB '92 proposed submitting its technological services to the analytical opinion of professionals in the field, while promoting its activity through the mass media.

Trade shows, symposiums and lectures on technology,

meeting points for professionals in the field and the specialized press, became the first venues of promotion of the technology available. Upon receiving an invitation for a member of the technological department to explain the state of a given project in a given event, the answer was to send the most qualified specialist in the organization. It was thus necessary to have abundant audiovisual material available that would guarantee a uniform model for presentations. The tasks of technical staff of the COOB '92 became more and more frequent in the contexts here described, becoming more and more uniform as the available material for presentations improved in quality.

Furthermore, a little more than two years before the opening of the Olympic Games, the technological systems began to be tested. To do so it was necessary to develop internal coordination in the setting up of computers, telephones and scoreboards. Paradoxically, the COOB'92 technicians were more numerous than the athletes. Activity was intensified with a double objective in mind: in the first place, to raise quality control; and second, as [a] way of making advances in systems of different communication media better known. The public relations strategy was greatly effective, though it was difficult to make invited people understand that they were not seeing the definitive system, but an unfinished model that was being perfected. Upon occasion, small errors became news items, to the disappointment of the technicians responsible.

The complexity of technology and its echo in society

Systematic and continuous access through the appearance of technical articles in specialized publications in the field, served to create a state of opinion that brought credibility to the technological project. The induced effect, generated by the fact that specialized publications were interested and had analyzed the technological projects developed by the CCOB '92, awakened the interest of the non-specialized press in the social aspects of the projects.

In the mass media the commercial argument had to be set forth in more general, less technical terms, so that it would be attractive and so the social component would stand out—that is, the consideration of how technology is a service to society. Thus for the same news item, one could go from an announcement that read «the technology used in this computer is DS-2» to another type that said «the tech-

nology employed in this Spanish-made computer is the most modern in the world». The first item interested technicians, while the second caught the attention of the general public.

In the same way that the specialized press represented the first step before publication in magazines and newspapers with wider readership, the Spanish press set the stage for the technological news published in international media. The interest for technology that would be used in the Olympic Games, began to create interest in specialized international magazines the more it was referred to in *La Vanguardia*, *El País*, *El Periodico* and other similar media that covered some concrete aspect of it. Given that the closer the opening of the Olympic Games the more intense became the news about them, there was an increasing number of consultations that had to be attended by the technology division that came from outside of Spain: letters, FAXes, and above all visits by journalists.

To explain the technological services in an interesting and intelligible way represented an additional difficulty. There are few professionals in the mass media who are interested in writing articles on technical innovations, as the audience for this type of article is small. Yet journalists in the mass media gather a great deal of information that comes from those responsible for political and social questions (colloquially know as VIPs), whose influence is high and whose opinions are constantly valued by the press.

The method to inform these persons was very efficient in converting technical items into news. If treated as «a job creation method» that would «energize the economy of the city», the explanation by a Barcelona politician, for example, of the technological services of the COOB '92 (though probably over his head), would probably become a news item after one of many press appearances.

The creativity of the Department of Technology in preparing messages was well-received by the VIPs, becoming a powerful way to generate news, so that later some news media would wish to go deeper into the question. Here the networking techniques employed had as their objective the commitment of time on the schedule of some well known person to present the service, doing so in a way that benefitted both sides.

On the other hand, the characteristics of the Organizing Committee as a large enterprise, assured a great wealth of contacts. In obtaining the complicity of all of the different departments of the enterprise so that its contacts would



The technological Cobi

speak correctly of the technological projects was one of the objectives of the Department of Technology. In the case of the COOB '92, in analyzing the results with the benefit of time, it was seen how people far from the technology were good propagators of the advantages of the systems.

The technological Cobi

The fundamental difference between a product and a service from the point of view of promotion, is that the service is intangible: it cannot be touched nor seen, it can only be described, explained, and tested. For this reason it was necessary to in some way allow for the identification of the service with an element which would help people to recall it in a way that could make an impression.

In this case, the challenge was to have the Olympic mascot, Cobi, in one of his many facets, imitate the actions of the users of technology. The option was not to use Cobi to create an image, but have him help explain in a drawing some of the technological services that were going to be emblematic of the Organizing Committee.


For example, the COOB '92 was the creator of a specific computer program for journalists. The journalist who «bought» it would continue to use the computer, only receiv-

ing more functions and better service. A mascot like Cobi working on a computer, happy to receive the news from the screen, recalled the service in every moment and became an element that contributed to its synthesis.

It was necessary to select the most attractive services from the perspective of communication, that is, those technological services that were set out for the many, those most visible, and those which had a greater capacity to generate news. The projects to supply information of the events during the competitions, were potentially of very high visibility, since all of the athletes were necessarily going to use them. Other services such as electronic security in the facilities, implied a great technological operation but had less interest from the point of view of global communication.

The idea of the image campaign consisted in selecting some of the services and giving them a higher profile. If the projection of the «star services» reached the foreseen level, it would generate confidence through an induced effect in the rest of the technological services. Once the star services had been selected, they were christened with names that would come across well in a multicultural context, but which, if they had any meaning, would be in consonance with some value clearly identified with the culture of our country: AMIC, SIR, SIGO.

The material produced within the image parameters indicated (Cobis, brochures, proper names, posters, pins, videos) completed the communications campaign in allowing for the possibility of enriching all types of explanations.



Evaluation of results

The design of the promotional campaign as described here implied having from the very beginning resources, both human and economic, in order that each time a promotional activity took place, its results could be measured and the success of the decisions taken could be checked. There are still no serious studies that have quantified the impact produced by these campaigns on the image of Spansih technology; up until now there are only perceptions of changes made both nationally and internationally. A few significative examples can be cited:

- In Miami various bars with the name Barcelona have opened. They feature high design and technological effects.

- Only technicians from Barcelona were able to solve a problem in the connection of the *Token ring* computer network.

- The brand «Barcelona» applied to various commercial products, adds the value of design and technology.

The analysts of the brand image of the country have established the goal of identifying this change, which must occur on a long term basis. As a provisional opinion, we can say that if indeed it is reasonable to suppose that the image of the city and the country was altered, improving the image of quality of services and capacity of organization, it is also reasonable to acknowledge that there has been a substantial improvement in the perception of the technology the city is able to produce and manage.

EPILOGUE

THE SPORTS LEGACY OF THE BARCELONA GAMES

FIDEL SUST I MITJANS

In July 1993, in the context of the summer courses organized by the Universidad Internacional Menéndez y Pelayo, the Centre for Olympic and Sport Studies ran a symposium commemorating the first anniversary of the Barcelona Olympic Games.

The organizers were kind enough to invite me to participate, asking me to give a paper concerning the sports heritage of the Barcelona Games, the infrastructure and facilities they left behind them and the influence the Games had with regard to the evolution of sports activities throughout the different counties of Catalonia.

And once more I have been asked to lend a hand, to close a collection of articles concerning the impact the Barcelona Games have had. My previous paper started with a quote from the Chief Executive Office of COOB'92, Josep Miquel Abad who, referring to the Barcelona Games, said that all those who had been involved in the organization of the Games had every right in the world to feel subjective and passionate about them.

Well, being objective, and not the slightest bit passionate, I believe that the history of our country will be described in terms of the pre and post-Games periods. Why a post-Games period? Here is a subject I would like to make a few reflections on.

*Why are the Olympic Games of interest to a city,
to a country?*

Today sport is *the* universal activity, the activity which attracts the greatest interest. It is also an activity of the greatest importance to our modern economies. There are virtually no economic areas or human activities in which sport is not found to be of greater or lesser importance.

The Olympic Games are the most important sports event in the world. They are held on such a vast scale that their impact goes far beyond that of other purely sports events, and econo-

mic, political, cultural and social sectors all become involved. All those who experienced the Barcelona Olympic Games saw this quite clearly. The Games changed both the city and the country, and have had far reaching effects, not only on sport in general, but also on all of the other areas of activity involved.

The organization of the Olympic Games does not only affect the sports world. Organization, on such a scale, is essential for a country seeking to progress, to show the world what it is really like, its aspirations and idiosyncrasies, the things which distinguish it, which establish its identity.

*Why was Barcelona able to do it?
Where did the capital come from?*

For its people and for its history. For all those men and women who, for over one hundred years, had worked to further the cause of sport in Catalonia.

Barcelona's bid for the organization of the Games was supported by powerful arguments. It had already been a candidate four times. Between 1926 and 1972, four of the presidents of the International Olympic Committee had recognized its organizational capacity and the city's Olympic vocation.

All of this: history, organizational capacity, infrastructure and facilities, and above all, our human resources, made us confident that Barcelona was a capable candidate. And that's where the capital came from.

*Why did Barcelona get the games?
What was done during the period of its candidacy?*

With regard to any event, however important it may be, albeit that each and every one is backed up by quite legitimate criteria, there is normally a diversity of opinion. Such was not the case with Barcelona.

From the very highest instances of the State, Generalitat, City Council, and even the Spanish Olympic Committee, everybody threw themselves heart and soul into the project. The sports bodies and civil society as a whole stood firmly besides them. The Catalan business world poured financial support into the candidature project.

We had to convince the International Olympic Committee of the worth of our project. Travelling all of the world to seek out just the right solution for the concerns of the members of the I.O.C. was one of our most important tasks. In

this respect the work of the President of the Spanish Olympic Committee, Carles Ferrer Salat, the entrepreneur Leopoldo Rodes, the journalist Andreu Mercé Varela and that of our good friend (no longer with us), Ambassador Ignasi Masferrer, cannot go unpraised.

In Catalonia the institutions held their doors open to all. With regard to the Generalitat, I myself witnessed the dedication with which President Pujol worked to achieve our common objective.

And I am also very well aware of the efforts made and dedication of the Barcelona City Council, the Spanish Olympic Committee and the State Authorities, and of the decisive role played by the Royal Family.

The figure of Joan Antoni Samaranch was at all times a leading light. What better guarantee for Barcelona could international sport want than to be led by a president who has come from the world of sport in Catalonia.

How was COOB structured to ensure the successful organization of the games?

Throughout the course of this publication, the different authors have really answered this question, and with a more authoritative pen than mine.

Suffice it to say that the structure of COOB more than amply demonstrated its effectiveness. In all fields, such as transport, communications, hotel and catering, health, infrastructure and facilities, sports or information technology, the work done was both professional and effective.

The role of the volunteers ensured, on the one hand, the operation of key services while, on the other, it filled our lungs with a breath of fresh air: to see the magnificence of civil society, a characteristic which has so marked both the people of our country and people from the world of sport in general. Without a shadow of a doubt, the volunteers represented a key factor, one of COOB's undeniable successes.

They also established the bases by which to ensure that an unquestionably Catalan presence would be felt at all of the events.

Why did the Games work so well?

At the close of the Games the opinion was unanimous—they had been the best Games ever. After a time, the con-

clusions of the spectators and press from all over the world confirmed that first impression. Barcelona had proven itself to be worthy of the trust that the rest of the world had placed in it when it was chosen as the venue for the 25th Olympic Games. Indeed, it has set such high standards that Atlanta will be hard pressed if it wishes to better them.

In short, what it all boils down to is that people did their work well, things were done properly and that, as is always the case, we were lucky enough to be able to achieve such a great success.

The excellent results our athletes achieved were also a key component in the feeling that the Games had gone well. The issue of Catalan Identity was treated in a most appropriate way. I would even go as far as to say excellent, in all aspects. And all of this combined with the great warmth of the people, rounded off with the spectacular success of the Paralympic Games and Special Olympics.

What have they left behind them?

Barcelona has never been able to grow at a steady pace. It has always been forced to move forwards in fits and starts. The Universal Expositions of 1888 and 1929 both gave rise to the expansion and modernization of the city. At the beginning of the 80's Barcelona was suffering from a want of infrastructure and facilities, while the old systems were decaying and crumbling away. The Olympic Games permitted the transformation of the city, providing it with those services it so much needed, and the heavy investment that would otherwise have taken many years to have come. Barcelona once again turning its face to the sea, the Olympic Village, the airport, the roadways and communications, the hotel network, all of which were essential to its becoming a competitive city in the scenario of today's Europe.

One of the great successes of the project was the decentralization of activities, with a series of secondary venues. Barcelona was so generous, following the most deep-seated of sports traditions in Catalonia, that now there are sports which are associated with a particular town, city or county, such as basketball and Badalona or handball and Granollers. This policy meant that thanks to the Olympic Games several other parts of Catalonia were also endowed with new facilities.

Without a shadow of a doubt, the sports heritage left after the Games goes far beyond those aspects that I have mentioned up to now. When in Lausanne on October 17, 1986,

the President of the International Olympic Committee, Juan Antonio Samaranch, pronounced, with his native Catalan pronunciation, the word «Barcelona», there was an explosion of joy, both in its capital city and throughout the rest of Catalonia. For at last there had been a response to the repeated attempts at nomination the city had made over the preceding sixty years and for the recognition of the long-standing Olympic tradition of Catalan sport.

Such a heritage must mean far more than just the financial benefits obtained from the investment made, the new facilities, the sports played, and so on. It must also be reflected in the moral fabric, in the country itself. For such aspects we must other factors.

- A. It should represent a moral strengthening, both ours and that of the rest of the world. We have shown ourselves capable of organising the best Games ever with administrative rigour, excellent management capabilities, effectiveness and optimal use of our economic, human and financial resources.
- B. The Games have shown the rest of the world a specific identity, ours. An identity which the world closely associates with an occasion of such undeniable prestige.

In short, many initiatives were taken which, without the enthusiasm, the thrust the Games provided, would probably never have seen the light of day.

There is one final reflection I would like to make. The true heritage of Catalan sport is its managers, sports-people and all those who work to further the interests of sport in general. Without this great group of people, those of us who live, love, eat and breathe sport, there would be no organized sport. However, we should never lose sight of the future, that which the evolution of our society will demand of sport, what it will expect of it, what it will need. To such ends the General Secretary for Sport and the Union of Catalan Sports Federations jointly organized the Catalan Sports Congress, held over an eight month period (November 1993 - June 1994) which is also part of the heritage of the Games.

How right Pierre de Coubertin was when, after a visit to Barcelona in 1926 he said, «I had always felt sure I knew just what the Olympic vocation of a city meant until I came to Barcelona» May such a vocation live on in our country forever.

FIDEL SUST I MITJANS

General Director for Sport
for the Generalitat de Catalunya

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The documents have been grouped together under the following headings:

1. Barcelona '92
2. Urbanism and construction
3. Economy
4. Communication
5. Design
6. Law and Politics
7. History
8. Sub-sites
9. Paralympics
10. Volunteers
11. Cultural Olympics

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APPENDIX

CENTRE FOR OLYMPIC AND SPORTS STUDIES INTERNATIONAL OLYMPIC CHAIR

The Autonomous University of Barcelona, coinciding with the challenge that the nomination of Barcelona as the site of the XXV Olympiad signified, created in 1988 the Centre for Olympic and Sports Studies, dedicated to research, documentation, training and the spread of information concerning the Olympic movement and sport.

With this academic activity, the Autonomous University of Barcelona contributes to the promotion of the values and ideas of peace found in the Olympic movement and in sport.

The centre is governed by a consortium made up of the Autonomous University of Barcelona, the Spanish Olympic Committee, the City of Barcelona, and the *Diputació* (or provincial administration) of Barcelona.

Various agreements and collaborations have been set up with the International Olympic Committee, the Superior Sports Council, the General Secretariat for Sport of the Generalitat of Catalonia, the Caixa d'Estalvis i de Pensions de Barcelona, the Fundación ONCE, and Football Club Barcelona.

International Olympic Chair

The first International Olympic Chair was created as a result of a specific agreement signed between the Autonomous University of Barcelona and the International Olympic Committee in Lausanne, in January, 1995.

The Chair has a Coordinating Committee made up of representatives of the Autonomous University of Barcelona and the International Olympic Committee.

The Centre for Olympic and Sports Studies is the administrator of the Chair. The Autonomous University of Barcelona and the International Olympic Committee designated as the first general coordinator Dr. Miquel de Moragas, Professor of Communication.

The holders of the Chair assume the post on a temporary basis and have the condition of International Olympics Professors, being professors of renowned prestige in the social sciences and humanities. The first International Olympic

Chair was held by Dr. John MacAloon of the University of Chicago.

OBJECTIVES

The Centre for Olympic and Sports Studies and the International Olympic Chair have the following priorities:

1. Collaborate with the international Olympic movement and with different national and international sports bodies in academic, scientific and cultural questions.

2. Carry out research tasks on the Olympic movement and sport, especially in the areas of humanities and the social sciences.

3. Organize informational university courses and a Post Graduate program on the Olympic movement and sport.

4. Bring together and make available documentation to students and researchers through an information and documentation service.

5. Promote international academic activities and coordination between specialized university centres and institutes.

6. Assist in the scientific and social extensions of studies done, through symposiums, lectures, and publications.

ACTIVITIES

The Centre for Olympic and Sports Studies and the International Olympic Chair carry out the following activities:

Educational activities

- Master in Communication and Sport

The Centre for Olympic and Sports Studies, in cooperation with the Faculty of Information Sciences, the Faculty of Political Science and Sociology, the Department of Journalism and the Department of Audio-Visual Communication and Publicity, along with the Catalan National Institute of Physical Education, offers students with degrees and professionals in the sector highly specialized training in communication and sport.

- University Program in Marketing and Sports Sponsorship

Sponsorship and sport establish multiple relations that condition the sports administration, while at the same time affecting many related commercial activities in aspects such as economic administration, the planning of mass media and publicity strategies of a great number of commercial inter-

ests, which cannot be understood without these new relations.

The goal of this program is to train highly qualified professionals able to respond to this new situation.

- **University Program in Television and Sport**

The goal of this program is to train expert professionals in the various relations between television and sport and its effects on consumer society, as well as the promotion and spread of information concerning research on television and sport from a multidisciplinary approach.

Research activities

- **Areas of Research**

- Mass media, sport and the Olympic movement
- Olympic ceremonies
- Olympic Games, environment and urban planning
- Adapted sport and the Paralympic Games
- Politics/Law/Economics of sport
- Olympic and sports documentation
- Olympic and sports history
- Sports and Olympic sponsorship
- Sports pedagogy and education
- International relations and the Olympic Games
- Psychology of sport.

The International Olympic Chair establishes an annual program of research subject to the approval of the Chair's Coordinating Committee.

- **Consulting services**

The centre offers a consulting service in all areas of its research specialties to institutions and sports bodies, sponsoring enterprises of sport, the mass media, and others.

Publications

- Working papers (38 publications in 1995)
- Academic monographs
- Symposium proceedings

Documentation Services

The centre has available an information and documentation service specialized in the Olympic movement and sport. It is connected on-line with the library service of the Autonomous

University of Barcelona and has sufficient technological resources to connect up with international data bases.

The International Olympic Chair is specialized in documentation corresponding to the modern period in the Olympic movement, from the Games of 1972 to the 1996 Centennial, with special interest in the 1992 Barcelona Olympic Games.

Information and promotion of Olympic ideals

The International Olympic Chair, in cooperation with the Association of National Olympic Committees and the Olympic Academies, participates in the extension of information concerning the Olympic movement internationally.

The first symposium organized by the Chair in 1995 was dedicated to the Olympic ceremonies.

CENTRE FOR OLYMPIC AND SPORTS STUDIES INTERNATIONAL OLYMPIC CHAIR

Autonomous University of Barcelona
Edifici B. 08193 Bellaterra (Barcelona)
Tel. (3) 581-1992 / FAX (3) 581-2139
E-mail: ICEO2@ cc.uab.es
Internet: Telnet BABEL.UAB.ES

BARCELONA OLYMPIC FOUNDATION

In February of 1993 the Barcelona Olympic Foundation was founded. For the first time after the end of an Olympic Games, the Organizing Committee created a foundation and a permanent exhibition where the most significant and exciting moments of the Barcelona Games could be relived.

The Foundation is governed by a board made up of the following institutions and individuals with life participation: the City of Barcelona, the Spanish Olympic Committee, the Spanish Government —through the Superior Sports Council— and the Honourable Joan Antoni Samaranch. Others patrons are the Barcelona '92 Entrepreneurs Association, the President of Barcelona Promotion, the Olympic Volunteers, and well-known figures linked to the organization of the Games: Mr. Josep Miquel Abad and Mr. Romà Cuyàs.

The first Board of the Barcelona Olympic Foundation is comprised of the following people:

<i>President</i>	The Honourable Pasqual Maragall i Mira (City of Barcelona)
<i>First Vice-President</i>	The Honourable Carlos Ferrer Salat (Spanish Olympic Committee)
<i>Second Vice-President</i>	The Honourable Rafael Cortés Elvira (Superior Sports Council)
<i>Third Vice-President</i>	The Honourable Josep Lluís Vilaseca i Guasch (Generalitat de Catalunya)
<i>Lifetime trustee</i>	The Honourable Juan Antonio Samaranch
<i>Trustee/General Representative</i>	The Honourable Josep Miquel Abad
<i>Trustee</i>	The Honourable Romà Cuyàs
<i>Trustee</i>	Mr. Leopoldo Rodés (Barcelona '92 Entrepreneur's Association)
<i>Trustee</i>	The Honourable Enric Truño (Barcelona Promoció, S.A.)
<i>Trustee</i>	A representative of the Olympic Volunteers
<i>Secretary</i>	Mr. Raimon Bergós
<i>Director</i>	Mr. Miquel Torres

OBJECTIVES

The Barcelona Olympic Foundation has as its objective the spread of information concerning the Barcelona Olympic Games, as well the promotion and investigation of cultural, ethical, sports and other values arising from the Olympic ideals.

It has as its specific objective, among other more general objectives, the establishment, maintenance and promotion of an exhibition and a permanent centre of information and investigation, available to the public, that offers a global vision of the Barcelona Olympic Games and all that they represented, as well as a more general knowledge of the Olympic movement.

The Barcelona Olympic Foundation hopes to establish agreements with other institutions to carry out projects in cooperation.

FACILITIES

The Barcelona Olympic Foundation is found in the emblematic Montjuïc Olympic Stadium, the ideal place for the development of its objectives. With a space of 1,535 square metres,

prepared by the architects Ricard Sans and Lluís Samaranch, these facilities have the qualities necessary to carry out the expected activities.

The Barcelona Olympic Foundation has six spaces: the permanent exhibition; the temporary exhibition; the photo and video library, reference room and archives; the reception/shop; the administration area; the auditorium; and a space dedicated to the Olympic movement.

Olympic Gallery

The Olympic Gallery has a large space of 760 square metres divided into the following spaces:

The Permanent Exhibition. 484 square metres of space are dedicated to the Games of the XXV Olympiad and the IX Paralympic Games of Barcelona '92.

The Temporary Exhibition. The gallery has a space of 276 square metres reserved for the presentation of temporary exhibitions (with themes on culture, sport and the Olympic movement). The first temporary exhibition was dedicated to the opening ceremonies of the Olympic Games and Paralympics.

ACTIVITIES

The Barcelona Olympic Foundation has organised various activities of a cultural and research nature in the world of sport and the Olympic movement. Research grants have been given for studies of sport and the Olympic movement. Courses for Occupational Training, practicums for students of Professional Training schools and Audio-Visual seminars have been organized. In 1995 the Olympic Forum and Audio-visual Biennial are being organized.

SERVICES

Photography Library. The photographic archive is made up of approximately 200,000 images, with 30,000 of them copied on laser disk.

Video and Audio-Visual Library. The Video collection has 5,000 tapes produced from 1983 to 1992. There are also 2,600 tapes made by the RTO during the Olympic Games.

Reference Room. This room is equipped with necessary media to consult photography, videos, publications and documentation.

Auditorium-Projection Room. The foundation has a multi-use room with capacity for 180 people where a complete program of audio-visual productions are offered daily. Furthermore, its can house meetings, seminars, symposiums, lectures and press conferences, among other events.

Audio-Visual Department. This department responds to all demands received from individuals, enterprises, agencies and institutions concerning the images of the Olympic Games, whether video or photographic.

BOUTIQUE

The visitor to the Olympic Gallery can acquire various objects related to the Barcelona Games and the Olympic movement (publications, posters, videos, t-shirts, pins and others).

FUNDACIÓ BARCELONA OLÍMPICA

Estadi Olímpic
Pg. Olímpia s/n, baixos
08038 Barcelona
Tel. (3) 426-0660/ FAX (3) 426-9200

Content themes

Organization of the Games

Sports

Mass Media

Paralympic Games

Politics

Society

Urbanism

Economics

Technology

Literature

"The Keys to Success: The social, sporting, economic and communications impact of Barcelona '92" is a collection of 16 articles which analyze the sporting, social, political, communicative, urban, technological and economic impacts of the 1992 Barcelona Olympic Games.

With the distance that years after the Games allows these articles examine more carefully and precisely the consequences of the Games and establish the fundamental traits that characterize Games that can be defined and remembered for their success in a number of areas: in popular participation, the sports results, and the urban transformation of the city, due to an investment policy thought in terms of social benefit.

This book, coordinated by Miquel de Moragas and Miquel Botella, is a product of the initiative of the Centre for Olympic and Sports Studies of the Autonomous University of Barcelona, with the cooperation of the Olympic Museum Lausanne and the Barcelona Olympic Foundation.



MUSEE OLYMPIQUE LAUSANNE



Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona



Centre d'Estudis Olímpics i de l'Esport
Càtedra Internacional d'Olimpisme



Fundació Barcelona Olímpica

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