Campaigning for "Education for all"

Histories, Strategies and Outcomes of Transnational Advocacy Coalitions in Education

Antoni Verger and Mario Novelli (Eds.)

*Sense*Publishers

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Transnational Advocacy Coalitions in Education

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with

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CONTENTS

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Mario Novelli and Antoni Verger
Amsterdam, September 2011

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[1] The papers and presentations of this seminar can be downloaded from:
http://educationanddevelopment.wordpress.com/past-events/civil-society-advocacy-and-efa/

ACRONYMS

ABI	Alternative Budget Initiative (The Philippines)
AIFTO	All India Federation of Teachers Organization
ANCEFA	Africa Network Campaign on Education for All
ASPBAE	Asia South Pacific Association of Basic and Adult Education
BESSIP	Basic Education Sub-Sector Plan (Zambia)
CAQi	Initial Student-Quality-Cost (Brazil)
CBDE	Brazilian Campaign for the Right to Education
CLADE	Latin American Campaign for the Right to Education
CMP	Common Minimum Programme (India)
CNE	National Council of Education (Ecuador and Brazil)
CNTE	National Confederation of Education Workers (Brazil)
CONEB	National Conference for Basic Education (Brazil)
CSE	Social Contract for Education
CSEF	Civil Society Education Fund
CSO	Civil Society Organization
EAC	Education Advocacy Coalitions
EDWATCH	Educational Watch research
EFA	Education For All
FCUBE	Free Compulsory Basic Education Program
FIFA	International Federation of Association Football
FNDP	Fifth National Development Plan (Zambia)
FUNDEF-FUNDEB	Fund for the Development of Basic Education and the Valuation of Teachers *(Brazil)*
GAW	Global Action Week
GCE	Global Campaign for Education
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GER	Gross Enrolment Rate
GMR	Global Monitoring Report
GNECC	Ghana National Education Campaign Coalition
GPRS	Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy paper
HDI	Human Development Index
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INGO	International NGO
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MoE	Ministry of Education (Zambia)
MoESS	Ministry of Education, Science and Sports (Ghana)
MST	Rural Landless Workers Movement (Brazil)
NCE	National Coalition for Education (India)
NER	Net Enrolment Rate
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NNED	Northern Network for Education (Ghana)

ACRONYMS

OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
PEPE	Popular Education for People's Empowerment (The Philippines)
PGRI	Teachers' Association of the Republic of Indonesia
PNE	*National Education Plan (Brazil)*
PIECE	Partners In Education for Community Empowerment
POS	Political Opportunity Structures
PPPs	Public-Private Partnerships
PT	Worker's Party (Brazil)
RTE	Right to Education Act (India)
RWS	Real World Strategies
SMC	School Management Committee (India)
SWAP	Sector Wide Approach
TPE	All for Education (Brazil)
UNE	National Union of Educators (Ecuador)
UNDIME	National Union of Municipal Education Secretaries (Brazil)
UNESCO	United Nations Education, Science and Culture Organization
UNICEF	*United Nations Children's* Fund
UPA	United Progressive Alliance (India)
WEF	World Education Forum
ZANEC	Zambia National Education Campaign coalition

ANTONI VERGER AND MARIO NOVELLI

CHAPTER 1

Introduction to Civil Society Coalitions and Educational Advocacy:
Theoretical and Methodological Insights

INTRODUCTION

In the book *Poverty and Famines*, Amartya Sen presents the main findings of the outstanding research he did on the causes and effects of world famines. One of the starting points of his research was observing that similar types of food crisis (in similar climate conditions, with similar bad crops) that happened in India and China in the fifties had very different consequences in the two countries: Three million people starved to death in China, while many less died in India. So, the driving question of Sen's research was why did such big variations in the management of food crises in apparently two similar situations happen? (Sen 1983).

   The main finding of his work was that, when famines happen, the important issue is not only the availability of food, but the distribution and the lack of purchasing power of the poor. However, and even more importantly for us, he also found that democratic institutions, free media and active civil society networks with the capacity to make their voices heard are determinant when it comes to avoiding the occurrence of famines. His study in India was contextualized at a time that the country had recently gained its Independence from the British Empire, and the country was trying to build a young democratic system sensitive to people's needs. In fact, the social movements that organised themselves to mitigate the effects of the food crisis were the same that contributed to Indian independence as well. Such institutional conditions were far from those occurring in China in the same period, but also in the colonized India of the forties. As Sen himself wrote:

   "Not surprisingly, while India continued to have famines under British rule
   right up to independence… they disappeared suddenly with the establishment
   of a multiparty democracy and a free press" (Sen 2001, p. 8)

On the basis of his results, Amartya Sen concluded that the state should be responsible for enacting laws that ensure food security for all, but that public action from below is equally important to put pressure on government bodies to guarantee that such laws are implemented and that, as a result, the right to food is enacted.

   Sen's research on *Poverty and Famines* represents one of the first conclusive pieces of evidence on the social benefits of a well-articulated and independent civil

society. Even though this was not his main focus, Sen's work contributed to opening up a very important and fascinating area of inquiry on the role and impact of civil society in the warranty of the most basic of human rights. The book you have in your hands is similarly engaging with this still nascent area of inquiry and, specifically, with the role of civil society in the enactment of the right to education worldwide.

The lack of education and, specifically, the lack of relevant and quality education does not have the same dramatic and visual effects that famines produce. However, it too can also have dramatic consequences of a different nature. Lack of education deprives people from wellbeing and future opportunities, disempowers them in terms of civil and political participation and, more broadly speaking, limits their chances to enjoy a full, healthy and productive life. Fortunately, the international community is more and more aware of the important contribution of education to multiple dimensions of human and societal development. Since the nineties, and thanks to a great extent to the World Education Conferences that took place in Jomtien (1990) and Dakar (2000), governments, aid agencies and international organizations are formally committed to the right to quality Education for All (EFA) globally (World Education Forum 2000). In the context of the Dakar conference, they even signed and committed to a Global Action Framework on EFA that establishes six specific education targets that all countries in the world should achieve in the following decades (see Box 2.1 in Mundy's chapter, this volume). In parallel, civil society networks have organized themselves to make sure that these international commitments translate into concrete practice on the ground. Among these networks, the Global Campaign for Education (GCE) stands out as the biggest and most active civil society network advocating for EFA.

The GCE was set up in the late 1990s, in the run up to the Dakar Conference, with the objective of pushing for an ambitious EFA agenda. It brought together several International NGOs (Oxfam, Action Aid, Global March for Labour) and Education International (the global federation of teachers unions). With the passage of time, the GCE evolved into a multi-scalar organization by promoting and strengthening the role of civil society advocacy coalitions operating at the national and regional level. In the context of these coalitions, very different types of organizations work together to put pressure on national governments, donors and international organizations to honour financial and political agreements to deliver high quality education to all (World Education Forum 2000). To date, the GCE counts on the participation of 76 national coalitions and three big regional coalitions (see more details in Mundy in this volume)

ABOUT THIS BOOK

The main aim of this book is to understand *how and to what extent civil society coalitions are able to make the state responsible for expanding educational opportunities and improving the education experience of children in their countries*. This book is the main outcome of a three-year research project that has generated a range of empirically grounded case studies on the role and impact of

civil society education advocacy coalitions (EACs) that are member of the GCE and that, as such, operate in a range of territories.[2]

The book is structured as follows. In this introductory chapter we detail the main conceptual, theoretical and methodological elements that have contributed to building the research framework upon which the book is based. The first chapter after this introductory one is written by one of the most knowledgeable scholars on global civil society and education governance, Karen Mundy. It traces the history, evolution and impact of the GCE at different scales, but with a focus at the supranational one (global and regional). In her chapter, Mundy reflects on the main achievements and challenges that derive from organizing a big social movement that operates at multiple political scales.

The following seven chapters analyse the evolution and the main outcomes of EACs operating in a sample of countries. The countries in question are Brazil, The Philippines, Zambia, India, Ghana, Ecuador and Indonesia. These case studies have been undertaken by junior researchers who participated in this project as part of their thesis dissertation in the International Development Studies MSc programme of the University of Amsterdam. The national EACs studies are very rich in empirical terms and are based on dozens of interviews and participatory workshops with activists and key informants and extensive document analysis in each country in question. The case studies contribute to recovering the history, the strategies, the challenges and successes, the main milestones and the internal learning processes that have occurred within the coalitions since their creation. They also highlight the main contributions that the different coalitions have made to the education field in their respective countries.

In the book's conclusion, the country case studies are analysed through a comparative strategy by the coordinators of this project. By doing so, we provide a synthesis of the core issues that have emerged out of the research, which include the varieties of education coalition's profile; the importance of agenda setting processes within the coalitions; the strategies and action repertoires that are more conducive to impact; and the factors explaining the different levels of internal cohesion of EACs, among others.

CIVIL SOCIETY ADVOCACY, AS A RESEARCH AREA

"Civil society" is a very broad and contested category. It includes a big variety of organizations such as international and local NGOs, trade unions, community based organizations, grassroots movements, independent research institutes, etc.[3] These organizations encompass very different numbers of members and manage very different amounts of human and economic resources; some of them are institutionalized and formalized, while others are more spontaneous and oriented

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[2] See the Acknowledgements section for more details about the institutions supporting this research.

[3] If we take into account a more liberal conception of civil society, employers associations and corporate lobby groups could be also included.

towards collective political action; and so on. Given this diversity, the establishment of civil society *coalitions* usually implies the articulation of very different types of constituencies, interests and rationales in a single space, and this is not an easy task at all, as the book demonstrates.

Civil society organizations can decide to establish coalitions for different reasons, which include fundraising partnerships, providing innovative services or undertaking a research initiative. However, quite often, they do so to *advocate* something. Thus, coalitions are usually constituted with the explicit objective of influencing the agendas and decisions of governmental bodies in relation to a particular issue area or problem. This is clearly the case of the GCE coalitions that, as we said above, have emerged to put pressure on governments and the international community to fulfill their commitments with the EFA action framework.

Civil society advocacy coalitions have been understudied, especially in developing societies, and particularly in relation to educational politics and policies. The simple fact of their existence opens a range of areas of inquiry that are worthy of studying. Some of the main research issues around civil society advocacy coalitions, which to a great extent are addressed in this book, are the constitution and organization of coalitions – how and why did they form?; the internal cohesion of coalitions – how do different components of the coalitions interact?; the transnationalization of their operation and actions – How do they operate across geographical space?; and their main outcomes – What did they achieve?.

Constitution and organization

Research questions concerning this particular area of inquiry can be quite descriptive in nature, but they are necessary to get a first sense of the type of organization or movement we are talking about. They include: What are the main drivers for the constitution of civil society advocacy coalitions? Who are their promoters? Who are their members? Why do member organizations take part in such umbrella bodies, and with what level of involvement? Once coalitions have been created, how do they organize and fund themselves? Do the members institutionalize the coalition and, for instance, create a secretariat, or do they rather decide to work in a more informal and *de facto* way? Do coalitions plan to last in time or are they deigned to operate in a particular time juncture or in relation to a specific problem? What types of communication and information systems are built in the context of the coalition? How are decisions adopted? How is power distributed and representation ensured? Etc. etc.

Internal cohesion

Working in coalitions generates mutual learning processes and economies of scale, and can contribute to raising the profile of civil society groups in the public domain. However, coalition building is also a challenging process due to the fact

that the parties involved might count on different political cultures and identities, and need to negotiate particular priorities, interests and objectives. In the process of building education coalitions, the relationship between teachers' unions with other sections of civil society is particularly relevant. Teachers' trade unions, as representatives of members largely within the public sector, have a tendency to be driven both to defend their members' interests, but also to some notion of 'public education'. In the current climate of neoliberal educational reform this is something that often forces them into conflict with the state and into alliances with other sectors of civil society (Robertson et al, 2007). However, this relationship is not without its problems. The balance between defending 'members interests' and the interests of 'public education' on behalf of unions, together with issues of different cultures of political organization, may provoke tensions within coalitions advocating for EFA.

Transnationalism

Civil society coalitions are re-scaling their activity and creating more links at the international level, in parallel to the increasing role of international organizations in the framing of national education policies (Bainton 2009, Gaventa and Mayo 2009). In a global governance scenario, advocacy coalitions feel an increasing pressure to build international networks and, more importantly, to become global themselves. These new types of organization opens up new political opportunities and advocacy strategies such as 'boomerang' effects (see Box 1.1), but also important challenges (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Mundy and Murphy 2001; Tarrow 2001). What is the potential and what are the challenges of organizing transnational advocacy networks? How are the activities coordinated between the local and the international parties of such networks, and what is the division of labor between the different scales of action? What is the comparative advantage for national coalitions to participate in supra-national networks? And, how is transnational advocacy translated into concrete political impact? From our point of view, these are some of the key questions that the globalization of politics introduces to research agendas on social movements and civil society.

Box 1.1: The boomerang effect

The *boomerang effect* is a civil society strategy whereby domestic groups whose demands are being blocked by the national state can try to utilise external pressure to make themselves heard internally – hence the boomerang imagery. It means that in order to overcome blockages and to open political opportunities at the domestic level they internationalize their demands through supra-national networks, key foreign states or international organizations and agreements that, they expect, will put further pressure on national governments to make them more attentive to their demands. To a great extent, the organization of the GCE as a pluri-scalar network, and the use of the EFA global action framework as a political tool, responds to this type of strategy.

Sources: Keck and Sikkink 1998, Tarrow, 2001

Outcomes

The *outcomes* or *impact* of civil society campaigns need to be understood in a multi-dimensional way. Different scholars consider that, at least, three dimensions of impact can be identified. They are: political impact, procedimental, and symbolic (Gomà et al., 2002, Burstein, 1999). *Political impact* refers to the specific effects of civil society action in observable policy outcomes (approval of a new law or changes in some aspects of the existing legislation; budget increases for education; governmental adoption of new education programmes, etc.). *Procedimental impact* refers to changes in the consultation and decision-making procedures that signify some sort of recognition of civil society organizations as legitimate interlocutors with the state. The *symbolic impact* refers to changes at the public opinion level, values or general beliefs concerning a certain theme. These three types of impacts are inter-related since, for instance, having more voice in consultative bodies might facilitate political impact over the short and medium term. Something similar could be said concerning symbolic impact, since changes in public opinion might force, at some point, a re-orientation of governmental educational policy.

THEORETICAL TOOLS

Social movements literature is rich in theories about the origins, the capacities and the impact of civil society actors in politics. According to the theory we are drawing on, different variables and other aspects of social movements' reality are highlighted and brought into focus. For the particular purpose of this research we have found two main theoretical approaches useful: on the one hand, frame analysis, which focuses on the role of ideas and discursive strategies in contentious politics and, on the other hand, the political opportunity structures approach, which focuses on the contextual factors that can enable or hinder the coalitions actions and claims.

Frame analysis

Mass mobilization and economic resources are important factors when it comes to understand social movements success. In social movements literature, materialist approaches, such as the 'resources mobilization' theory, are very well established. Such approaches assume that variables related to the organization and the management of resources (human, economic, etc.) are key elements when it comes to understanding the level of achievement of mobilization. However, more and more social movements scholars are also paying attention to the role of non-material and ideational factors such as persuasion strategies, the interpretation of social problems and the articulation of corresponding discourses by movements (Korzeniewicz and Smith, 2003). In fact, to a great extent, the strength and legitimacy of social movements depends on their principles and beliefs and, especially in the case of advocacy groups, on the scientific evidence they can draw on to support their claims.

Frame theory deals with the role of ideas and, particularly, with how ideas are constructed and disseminated in collective action settings. According to frame theorists, it is not only the content of the ideas that matters, it is also the process of how theses ideas are constructed (and framed) by the movements, and how they are linked to the social order (Benford and Snow, 2000). This approach necessitates looking at the coalitions as strategic producers of meaning and to ideas as dynamic resources in the movements' struggle. It focuses on the interactive processes by which frames are collectively constructed, sustained, contested and changed; the framing contests that occur between movement and non-movement actors such as the government, counter-movements or the media; the consequences of these processes for aspects of mobilization and political impact; and the hindering constraints and enabling factors on these processes (Snow and Benford, 2000).

Within the message of civil society groups, different dimensions of frames can be distinguished. They include *diagnostic* frames (problem identification and attribution of culpability), *prognostic* frames (possible solutions and alternatives to the problems) and *motivational* frames (telling people that action is viable and has a good chance of being effective). If one of these dimensions fails, is weak or is not coherently linked to the others within the discourse of civil society or advocacy groups, collective action has more chance of being unproductive.

Appropriate framing can contribute to a movements' success when the resulting message is clearly understandable by different sectors of society and/or when different social groups identify themselves with the problems that the movement points to (Goodwin and Jasper 2004). *Resonation* is a key concept in this respect. For a movement to make its message resonate in society, it needs to sound credible and salient. The *credibility* of a message is related to elements such us empirical commensurability (i.e. the apparent fit between the framings of the coalition and events in the world) or the status of the frame articulators (i.e. the greater the perceived expertise of the coalition representatives, the more resonant will be their claims). The *salience* of the message, on its part, corresponds to how important are the societal values and beliefs of the movement for its target population (whether it refers to decision-makers, some media groups, or to a broader public opinion), or to what extent the movement frames are resonant with the everyday experience of the population they want to convince or mobilize (Benford and Snow 2000).

Summing up, the greater the salience and the greater the credibility of the civil society groups' discourse the greater the resonance and the prospects of mobilization and political impact. In other words, an excessive distance between the discourse of the activists and the rest of society can reduce the effectiveness of mobilization (Dellaporta and Diani 2006). However, it should also be noticed that being too strategic in this respect could upset the more radical or principled-driven sectors of a coalition, which can perceive that they are becoming too adaptable to the *status quo* or feel that they have been co-opted (Maney et al 2009).

Political opportunities and other contextual elements

Putting excessive emphasis on frames and ideas when doing research on social movements could mean that we imply that politics can be reduced to a simple difference of opinion, or that reality can be changed by simply changing the opinion of key political agents (Olivier and Johnston 2000). Actually, when taking decisions, policymakers (or other actors usually targeted by advocacy coalitions such as the media) are not necessarily guided by the "truth" or by the most convincing arguments (Haas 2004). Electoral interests, ideological divergences, material interests, group loyalties and other political variables need to be contemplated as well to understand civil society influence. Here is where approaches such as the *Political Opportunity Structures* (POS) can contribute importantly to the analysis of the role and impact of civil society coalitions since they bring the 'political context' into the analytical framework.

Broadly speaking, POS refer to the political conditions that favour or make it difficult for movements to produce certain effects. Such conditions can refer to, on the one hand, systemic factors and, on the other hand, to factors of a more relational nature. *Systemic factors* include variables that refer to the main features of the political system in a certain territory. The main examples are the level of centralization (or decentralization) of the state, the level of openness (or closeness) of the political system to external actors, the independence of the different state powers (legislative, executive, judicial), and the level of repression existing in a certain country (Tarrow 1994). It should be also noticed that in some countries, the model of public administration is based on Roman Law, which is resistant to external contacts and influences, while in other countries, especially Anglo-Saxon ones, the administrative model opens more channels to lobbying and civil society participation (Dellaporta and Diani 2006).

The variation in these features of the political system affects the chances of social mobilization succeeding. However, it is not always clear in which direction these variables work. For instance, the level of decentralization of a country generates a sort of paradox for collective action. The more power is distributed to local governments the greater the chances movements have in accessing decision-making processes, since the nearer an administrative unit is to ordinary citizens the easier it is to gain access to it. However, decentralization also means that the field of struggle becomes more fragmented and that the demands of civil society groups are more difficult to penetrate at the national level (Dellaporta and Diani 2006). Something similar can be said about repression. Repression, while apparently discouraging mobilization, can in many cases lead to radicalization and the more effective organization of social movements.

Relational factors are less formal or permanent than systemic ones. They include the level of cohesiveness or the divide between political elites, the possibilities for the coalition to establish alliances with elites (or with other influential actors such as bureaucrats from certain public agencies), or the presence of antagonist or enemy coalitions in the political field (Tarrow, 1994, McAdam 1996). In relation to the latter, the coalition will be probably more successful if there are not powerful actors that prosecute opposing aims to the coalition ones in

the same political field. In relational terms, the fact that left-wing political parties are in power often has the potential to affect the relationship between the movement and the state. The members of left-wing parties are normally involved in progressive social movements (they count on what is known as double militants). When these parties are in government, they are supposed to enhance the influence of protestors due to their personal links and the affinity between their ideas. However, the organic relationship between party and movements also has a price, since the government can try to co-opt the movement and/or try to manage and control the protest in a paternalistic way. When the left is in power, the claims of the movement might resonate deeper within governmental bodies, but, at the same time, mobilization becomes more difficult and the relationship between civil society and the state becomes more complex.

Another political factor to take into account is how strong the government in power is or feels (according, for instance, to whether it has been elected by a big majority of citizens or not). Governments that are strong and ideologically homogeneous tend to exclude opposing actors and 'external' ideas from their every-day action. In contrast, more heterogeneous governments are more open to the participation of external actors. A weak executive may ease access to the decision-making process, however it should also be acknowledged that it will have less capacity for implementing those policies that meet the social movements demands (Dellaporta and Diani 2006).

As we can observe, from the POS perspective it is very important to understand and pay attention to the state and its relationship with civil society actors, since "the state is simultaneously the target, sponsor, and antagonist for social movements as well as the organizer of the political system and the arbiter of victory" (Jenkins and Klandermans 1995: 3)

Beyond POSs, another contextual dimension to keep in mind when analyzing the evolution and outcomes of social movements refers to the *issue characteristics* of the theme that the movement in question deals with. In the same political context, there are not the same opportunities (or difficulties) to advocate over different issues. Climate change, peace, gender equality or 'education for all' are very distinct issues in nature that can count on very variable levels of centrality in political and media agendas and/or on very variable levels of support in society. In other words, the level of awareness, and the type of sentiments, beliefs or norms that prevail in society in relation to different policy issues, can vary substantially and this is something that frames importantly the opportunities and the strategies of different advocacy coalitions.

Today, many social and political agents agree on the importance of education in society, although they might do so for different reasons. Civil society groups usually do so because they see education as a human right, but other groups support investment in education for its strategic contribution to the economic competitiveness of countries, or for their positive externalities in health, family planning, or civic participation. Education advocacy is also looked upon favorably today because the issue of education is quite central in global agendas. In fact, education fulfills the three necessary conditions to be considered a so-called

'global political priority' (see Shiffman and Smith 2007). The first of these conditions is that international and national leaders have publicly expressed sustained concern and support for education; the best example of this can be found in the World Education Conferences celebrated in Jomtien and Dakar. Second, international organizations and governments have enacted policies to address the main education problems, such as the EFA global action framework or a range of Education Plans in many developing countries. And third, the international community has provided resources to solve these problems, both bilaterally and multilaterally, through mechanisms such as Fast Track Initiative (now known as the Global Partnership for Education).

However, being considered a global political priority alone is not sufficient to address education problems successfully. Education is a very complex and multi-dimensional policy issue. Many can agree in its importance for society broadly speaking, but disagree on the levels of funding that education should enjoy, on who should participate in the governance and funding of education, or on how it should be provided and regulated and by whom. In fact, today, the debate between what should be the role of the public and private sectors in different areas of educational policy is very central in the global arena (Robertson et al 2012). Everyone also agrees today on the fact that education access is not enough and that the education to be provided should be one of 'quality'. However, what quality education means is also the object of passionate discussions in both the academic and political fields. In these types of variables and details, and not necessarily on the importance of education in abstract terms, is where the struggle of the EACs actually focuses.

To sum up, what the POSs and the 'issue characteristic' approaches tell us is that the context in which advocacy coalitions operate is 'selective'. As we develop below, in different periods and places, the context favours certain strategies, actors and discourses over others. Therefore, not all the outcomes are possible for every coalition, for every strategy and in every moment (Hay, 2002).

Through a more integrated framework

As we noted earlier, placing too much importance on frames and ideas can make researchers have an understanding of the political field that is too intentionalist and ideationalist. As the Political Opportunity Structures approach warns, the power of actors advocating a cause is sensitive to the power of the political context to inhibit or enhance political support, as well as to the power of their allies and enemies (Shiffman and Smith 2007). However, at the same time, we also should bear in mind that an excessive emphasis on POSs could neglect the importance of activists' agency and their ideational and non-ideational strategies (Meyer and Minkoff 2004).

Therefore, to try to solve this 'structure-agency' or 'context-ideas' dilemma, it is necessary to understand that while coalitions are strategic actors with the potential to transform their context, they are also operating in strategic and discursively selective contexts. The context imposes 'discursive selectivity', selecting *for* and selecting *against* particular ideas, narratives and claims (Hay

2002). However, at the same time, as Tarrow (1994) noted, political opportunities, even when they are consistent, are not necessarily formal or permanent and, even more interestingly, they can be altered by social movements agency.

Thus, in social movements research frameworks, structure and agency, context and ideas need to be understood as mutually constituted. 'Ideas' and 'context' are not independent or totally differentiable elements. Ideas play a crucial mediatory role in the relationship between the context and the strategy of the coalitions. For instance, the analysis of the environment carried out by advocacy coalitions – whether this is done in a more explicit or implicit way – plays a crucial role in the formation of the coalition actions, claims and messages and, consequently, affects the political change process they try to promote. In this sense, what matters are not only the objective opportunities or difficulties that political opportunities provide, but also the perception of these opportunities and difficulties by activists. In other words, ideas and, particularly, *reflexivity* are important concepts to link structure and agency since they provide the point of mediation between actors' strategies and their context.

<div align="center">Box 1.2. Reflexivity and social movements: Are activists too optimistic?</div>

Reflexivity requires agency (and giving importance to agency in analytical terms), and refers to the capacity of actors to reflect on the environment, its previous actions and its consequences. We should keep in mind that there is always some relationship between the context and the ideas actors hold about that context, but not a perfect correlation. In other words, reality is something different from the perception of actors over their own reality. Strategic actors need to make assumptions over the context and build hypotheses over the future consequences of their (and other agents') actions over the context.

     Some scholars perceive activists as people that are optimistic by default about opportunities and, to some extent, as 'naïve agents' that do not necessarily calculate with any rigor the prospects for successful mobilization or generating policy reform: "they just keep trying". However, this is not necessarily negative. There are cases in which movement activists have interpreted POs in ways that emphasize opportunities rather than constraints and, by doing so, they stimulate actions that change opportunity, making their opportunity frame a sort of self-fulfilling prophecy.

Sources: Hay, 2002, Meyer and Minkoff, 2004

In the following figure (Figure 1.1) we detail how we have sought to integrate reflexivity and the other theoretical concepts developed in this section in a single but dynamic analytical framework. The figure, is based on the political analysis framework suggested by Hay (2002), and shows how critical reflexivity over both the context and the previous actions of coalitions over the context is a key element when it comes to framing the new strategies pursued by the coalition. These new strategies will partially transform the context, but will also allow internal learning processes within the coalition and, as a consequence, contribute to the following round of strategic actions as shown in the figure.

Figure 1.1. Context, ideas and coalition strategies

To sum up, looking at the structural or political opportunities without considering the cognitive processes that intervene between structure and action could be misleading. Because of this reason, this research tries to integrate ideas within both agential and structural factors when it comes to understand the role and impact of civil society coalitions in educational politics. This theoretical point has important methodological implications because it means that it is important to retrieve data about the activists' understandings and interpretations of the available opportunities for them, and document what are the lenses through which they view potential opportunities for their movements. In the following section we advance some of the methodological strategies that we have developed in order to address this challenge.

METHODOLOGY

Analyzing the role and impact of advocacy coalitions is not an easy task. There are so many variables in the political influence game, that identifying regularities and causal factors through research is very challenging. There are three main methodological problems that scholars that analyze civil society influence face at some point in their research.

The *first* problem consists on the attribution of causality, i.e., how to ascertain that the social movement or coalition action is the explanatory variable of a certain political outcome. For instance, let's take the case of coalition A that organizes a campaign that advocates an education budget increase in country X. Some months after the campaign starts, the government of X makes public that they will increase

the education budget for the next year. A superficial observer would be tempted to deduce that the government took this decision because of coalition A's pressure. However, the government may have done it because another coalition or lobby that is also acting in the country (coalition B) had a similar demand, or because the government already planned to do it before coalition A's campaign started. Finally, we should also consider the possibility that the coalition campaign had political effects and outcomes, but that these effects were not related to their explicit claims and demands (unintended effects) (Giugni 1998).

A *second* problem is how to analyze the political impact of advocacy coalitions in a context where politics have been deterritorialized and where the state authority has been distributed beyond the national scale, both to local and to supra-national scales. Quite often, social movements research has a methodologically nationalist bias, i.e. it assumes that the nation-state is the main unit of analysis and that decision-making dynamics are not affected by agents and processes that are based 'outside' the borders of the nation. However, civil society organizations are intervening today in a context in which international organizations, on the one hand, and local (sub-national) governments, on the other, are more and more involved in political processes affecting education. Thus, in the global era, a new set of political actors and political scales introduce complexity to the analysis of the political influence of non-state actors

A *third* problem is how to get the appropriate and the necessary data to empirically demonstrate the political impact of advocacy coalitions. On the one hand, what are the sources, the time periods and the empirical evidence we need to consider to rigorously attribute to coalitions action the responsibility of a certain political change? And, on the other hand, are the stakeholders' sources reliable? We raise the latter question because it is well-known that activists usually have a triumphalist and, consequently, biased discourse about the impact of their action. At the same time, a government representative could also tell the interviewer that they have met the demands of the civil society groups, because they know how to articulate a politically correct discourse on the importance of civil society participation, democracy, and so on and so forth. Again, the superficial analyst would take the activist or the policy-maker's words as the truth and, consequently, would reach easy conclusions that might not correspond with the complexity of influence dynamics.

These are, indeed, very different methodological problems in nature. To a great extent, they need to be resolved by resorting to theoretical tools as, for instance, those specified in the section above. However, in parallel, we can also apply a range of methodological strategies that contribute to the validity and reliability of our results. Specifically, in the context of this research project we have applied the following:

a) *Process tracing and thick description.* Quite often, the best way of explaining a phenomenon is by describing it in-depth. Process tracing requires the detailed historical reconstruction of different advocacy campaigns, its key events and its relation to broader policy processes. It also requires the systematization of the chain of actions and interactions hosted by different actors in such policy

processes (Bestill and Corell, 2001). Process tracing will allow us to examine how political opportunities work and how the responses that social movements provoke alter the grounds on which they can mobilize and influence (McAdam 2001).

b) *Multi-stakeholder analysis.* To overcome the bias that particular stakeholders might have when assessing the role and impact of civil society campaigns, a range of actors and key informants that are both internal and external to the coalitions and that operate at a range of scales should be interviewed (including activists, researchers, policy-makers, local governments, international NGOs, donor agencies, journalists, etc.)

c) *Document equivalence.* Another way of contrasting empirically the effects of civil society groups' actions is to compare the advocacy documents they produce with the documents (laws, agreements, etc.) finally approved by decision-makers.

d) *Counterfactual analysis.* Counterfactual analysis means understanding 'what something is' in relation to 'what it is not'. This type of analysis assumes that we can only discern the necessary, constitutive properties of a phenomenon by relating these properties to what is not constitutive (but rather an accidental circumstance). According to counterfactual analysis, after having done the empirical work, we should be able to answer the counter-factual question: "Would the outcome of the policy process be different if coalition X had not intervened?" (Korzeniewicz and Smith, 2003, Guzzini, 2005).

e) *Comparison.* Research on the influence of coalitions can finally benefit from explicit comparisons across different contexts. Comparative research is especially adequate to analyze the political impact of civil society actors, due to the fact that it allows us to explore the conditions and circumstances of the realization (or non-realization) of the impact (Giugni et al., 1999). A comparative strategy will allow us to answer the question why do similar coalitions obtain different political outcomes, or, alternatively, why do coalitions operating in similar contexts obtain different results.

Finally we would like to note that we selected the country sample for this research on the basis of two main criteria. The first criterion was choosing coalitions that are highly active in their countries.[4] This would allow us to compare organizations that are similarly active, but that operate in different political, cultural and socio-economic contexts. The second criterion was geographical representation. As a result we have case studies from Asia (India, Indonesia and the Philippines), Africa (Ghana and Zambia) and Latin America (Brazil and Ecuador).

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[4] Because of methodological reasons, we have selected seven coalitions that are very active and relatively successful in the territories where they operate. Thus, this book does not necessarily reflect the reality of the GCE member-coalitions globally.

CLOSING WORDS

On the basis of the theoretical and methodological elements described above, this book analyses the strategies and outcomes of civil society coalitions in advocating for the right to education. While the book focuses on a specific organization, the Global Campaign for Education, we hope our work contributes more broadly to a critical reflection on the emerging role of civil society actors in global governance structures and to a better understanding of the potential, but also the challenges, of organizing transnational coalitions that can act at a range of scales, from the local to the global.

Furthermore, for research purposes, we hope this book contributes to further reflection and debate on methodological strategies and instruments to better understand the outcomes of civil society at different levels (agenda setting, recognition, political outcomes, etc.) as well as on the levels of cohesiveness of coalitions in a far more rigorous way.

Centrally, we hope that this book will help practitioners and activists that are part of civil society groups to better identify those strategies and practices that can strengthen the quality of the advocacy processes they are involved in, and in that way to make a modest contribution to progressive political change in the education field.

Finally, we wish to conclude this chapter by returning to Amartya Sen's findings mentioned in the beginning on the importance of civil society. As the reader will note as they read through the chapters of this book, while civil society advocacy in education is composed of a varied and diverse set of practices and activities, in all of the cases here presented it has succeeded in contributing to the better provision of public education in their respective countries. While there is a great deal that remains to be done, children in the countries studied are receiving better education today because of the commitment and activities of these coalitions. For education to be guaranteed as a human right, the state should remain the key actor in the funding, delivery and coordination of education. However, education is far too important a task to be left to the state alone. An active and organized civil society – linked together transnationally - advocating for the right to education, and lobbying national and international organizations to ensure that they deliver on their commitments, is one of the best ways to ensure that one day all children in the world will enjoy relevant and quality education.

KAREN MUNDY

CHAPTER 2

The Global Campaign for Education and the Realization of
"Education For All"

INTRODUCTION

Formed in 1999, the Global Campaign for Education (GCE) has emerged over the past decade as the globally recognized voice for civil society actors on the issue of "Education for All" (EFA). From its early founding by a small cluster of international nongovernmental organizations, the GCE has grown enormously. Today it has affiliated members in over 100 countries, including the participation of major international and regional non-governmental organizations, Education International (the international federation of teachers' unions); three regional umbrella bodies (ANCEFA in Africa, CLADE in Latin America and the Caribbean, and ASPBAE in South-East Asia),[5] and a growing number of nationally-based coalitions (76 at most recent count, up from 37 in 2002).

The scope of its aspirations, geographic membership, and funding, places the GCE among the largest of the transnational advocacy organizations active on issues of human rights and world poverty. This chapter explores its origins, evolution, key achievements and challenges. It describes in some detail the way that the GCE has sought to support national educational coalitions, whose work is the focus of this volume. The chapter will conclude with an assessment of the GCE's efforts to frame a global right to education and achieve political and policy changes to affect its achievement.

ORIGINS AND EARLY EVOLUTION OF THE GCE: 1999-2007

The Global Campaign for Education was born in 1999 at a meeting hosted by ActionAid, Oxfam International, Education International (the international federation of teachers' unions), and the Global March against Child Labour (a grassroots movement formed in 1998 that links education with eradicating child labour). It was initially conceived of as a short-term campaign focused on ensuring that *"the World Education Forum in Dakar, April 2000, would result in concrete*

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[5] ANCEFA: Africa Network Campaign on Education for All; CLADE: Campaña Latinoamericana por el Derecho a la Educación; ASPBAE: Asia South Pacific Association for Basic and Adult Education.

commitments and viable policies to implement the Education for All (EFA) goals, including gender equity by 2005, universal enrolment in and completion of free primary education by 2015, and a 50% reduction in adult literacy by 2015" (GCE Constitution 2001).[6]

The early GCE was influenced by the different approaches to advocacy and campaigning taken by its founding members. Oxfam, an International Non-Governmental Organization (INGO) not previously active in education, had decided in 1998 to use the theme of "education for all" as a venue for advancing its broader advocacy for debt relief and better development cooperation. Its "Education Now" campaign was launched with an empirical study of global trends in educational access and funding, and included new EFA targets and demands for the revitalization of international funding for EFA. Oxfam efforts were linked to the highly visible Jubilee 2000 campaign for debt relief, and included direct advocacy to senior officials in the World Bank and Unicef about its proposed plan of action. This led to a spot for Oxfam on the inter-agency EFA Steering Committee in the summer of 1999. From the Oxfam campaign, the GCE inherited a strong focus on education finance and a tradition of working for direct change in international networks.

Box 2.1: Education for All Goals

1. Expand and improve comprehensive early childhood care and education, especially for the most vulnerable and disadvantaged children.
2. Ensure that by 2015 all children, particularly girls, those in difficult circumstances, and those belonging to ethnic minorities, have access to and complete, free, and compulsory primary education of good quality.
3. Ensure that the learning needs of all young people and adults are met through equitable access to appropriate learning and life-skills programs.
4. Achieve a 50 % improvement in adult literacy by 2015, especially for women, and equitable access to basic and continuing education for all adults.
5. Eliminate gender disparities in primary and secondary education by 2005, and achieve gender equality in education by 2015, with a focus on ensuring girls' full and equal access to and achievement in basic education of good quality.
6. Improve all aspects of the quality of education and ensure the excellence of all so that recognized and measurable learning outcomes are achieved by all, especially in literacy, numeracy and essential life skills.

Several other organizations also launched education for all campaigns in 1999, including ActionAid and Education International. ActionAid's Elimu campaign

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[6] In addition to these four institutional members, key Southern education networks (members of ActionAid's Elimu campaign on education) were present at the meeting. A Steering Committee was elected, consisting of six Southern representatives and the four founding members.

focused on the development of national level NGO networks capable of engaging in local educational policy debates – a focus that would be picked up by the GCE. Education International's campaign concentrated on re-invigorating the advocacy role played by teachers unions and teachers associations at the national and international levels. From EI, the GCE would inherit a strong interest in issues of teachers work, as well as an absolute insistence on publicly provided and finance education while from Actionaid and important focus on building the capacity of local citizens in the majority world to demand a basic right to good quality equitable education. A final founding member, Global March Against Child Labour, joined the GCE as a founding member in recognition of the important link between campaigns against child labour and educational opportunity.

In the months that followed its establishment, the GCE network expanded and began to focus on ensuring a place for civil society at the World Education Forum (Dakar 2000). The Campaign grew rapidly, to include over 30 national coalitions, 8 regional members, and 8 INGOs and international networks. At the World Education Forum in Dakar, the GCE emerged as the leading voice for civil society, playing an important role in ensuring that the financing of EFA remained at the centre of conference discussions. The GCE also influenced the World Bank's presentation of its first version of the Education for All Fast-track plan, for which the GCE announced its support (World Education Forum, 2000). It was nominated to speak on behalf of civil society in the final drafting committee, where it succeeded in keeping such issues as international financing targets and the idea of education as a basic right on the forum's agenda (Mundy and Murphy 2001; Murphy and Mundy 2002). It helped to ensure that the Dakar declaration referred to "free" (rather than affordable") education for all; included all six of the EFA goals set at Jomtien; and included language that recognized civil society as policy partners and not only providers of services (see Table 2.1, below). These were all significant achievements. Subsequent to Dakar, universal primary education was named as one of the Millennium Development Goals.

Table 2.1. Influence of Campaigners on the Dakar Framework for Action

Early Draft of Dakar Framework for Action	**Final Text**
1. "Affordable" not free education	Free and compulsory education by 2015
2. NGOs as service providers	CSOs as partners in policy dialogue, planning, and monitoring
3. EFA structures did not provide for participation or representation of Southern governments or civil society in the South	EFA structures to be democratized and streamlined. Focus is on building from National EFA Forums upwards, with civil society engagement specified as essential at all levels
4. No clear/time-bound national level follow up	National EFA plans by 2002 developed by government through

		transparent and democratic processes with civil society
5.	Emphasis on UPE	National plans to address all six Dakar goals
6.	No provision made for monitoring implementation of Dakar framework	Emphasis on high level annual review "to hold global community to account for commitments made in Dakar"
7.	No concrete targets for increased aid to education	Donors "to ensure viable national education plans will not be thwarted for lack of resources"
8.	HIV-AIDS mentioned	Separate strategic objective on HIV-AIDS
9.	Quality gap not linked to equity gap	Language "equity in quality" adopted
10.	No commitment to change in donor practices	Donor support to be "consistent, coordinated and coherent"
11.	No concrete targets for increased domestic spending	National plans to include appropriate budget priorities

Source: Elimu (2000) World Education Forum – Dakar, Senegal: Outcomes and Next Steps. http:/www.elimu.org/newstest1.htm, (as cited in Murphy and Mundy 2002).

Success at Dakar led the members of the initial GCE coalition to establish a more permanent organizational structure. At its first World Assembly (Delhi 2001), the GCE adopted a constitution and set up its key governing structures (a General Assembly, a 13-member Board and a small Secretariat). A key decision was made to give Southern voices a greater percentage of the Board's voting power (Gaventa and Mayo 2009), and to encourage the expansion of national coalitions and regional networks. Mass mobilization led by its regional and national members around an annual EFA Global Action Week quickly became a hallmark of the campaign, with millions of participants in dozens of countries by 2004 (Culey, Martin and Lewer 2007: 16).

From this starting point, the GCE continued to grow, according to one evaluator: "incrementally and organically…rather than consistently towards a long-term strategic goal" (Culey, Martin and Lewer 2007: 12). At the GCE's second World Assembly (Johannesburg, 2004) members revisited the tensions between the GCE's commitment to highlighting the full EFA agenda, and the tendency of its secretariat to focus more on the Millennium Development Goals related to primary schooling (Culey et. al 2007). There were renewed calls for building and strengthening national coalitions and ensuring that Southern voices and Southern citizenship activism remained a core focus for the organization. Fundamental differences in the views and approaches to education for all taken by NGOs and teachers unions emerged – a theme which surfaces in some of the case studies in this volume. The campaigning objectives of the organization – which focused on quantifiable financial targets for aid and for improved global

policies -- tended to chosen in a top down manner and thus were sometimes in tension with the organization's other identities as looser, social movement network, and as a capacity building forum for national and regional civil society advocacy.

Post Johannesburg, efforts followed to strengthen GCE's organizational capacity so that it might meet all three of these objectives. A permanent Secretariat based in Johannesburg was established, and a decision was taken to pool existing financial contributions from founding members into a common budget for the organization. Fund-raising led to the GCE's first grant, from the Hewlett Foundation, which subsequently provided the organization with a substantial part of its core operating costs (more than US $5 million) between 2004 and 2010. Funding was also received from the Dutch government for the Real World Strategies program to support member coalition capacity in the South (25 countries under phase 1; 43 under phase 2), as highlighted in chapters of this volume (see also Moriarty 2010). A second window of funding emerged when GCE UK members convinced the British Government to establish the Commonwealth Education Fund, to provide direct support to Southern national coalitions in 16 commonwealth countries, as well as the GCE itself (Tomlinson and Macpherson 2007a; 2007b).

Throughout this period the GCE's membership grew rapidly, rising to 25 international members and 46 national coalitions by 2007 (up from 15 in 2000). At the global level, it maintained a strong presence at international meetings and gained permanent representation on the Fast Track Initiative Board, the UNESCO High Level EFA Working Group, the board of UNGEI, and the board of the UNESCO EFA Global Monitoring Report. Despite some criticism from its members, it proved itself adapt at playing an insider/outside role in these venues – for example, by sponsoring critical reviews of the FTI while also participating in the FTI Board (Rose 2003).

Yet tensions within the coalition continued. At the end of 2007, an external evaluation of the GCE was carried out, in preparation for the Third World Assembly in Sao-Paulo in January 2008 (Culey, Martin and Lewer 2007). This evaluation pointed out the enormous improvements in organizational and partnership capacity that had been made between 2004 and 2007. But it also identified several crucial challenges for the GCE. Among these, it pointed out that while the GCE was now at the global policy table for EFA, its ability to shape policy change was less clear. The GCE was felt to be underplaying its capacity to call for change in the global aid architecture and only weakly monitoring the quality of aid to education. The GCE's use of media and its communications with members were weak. The evaluation also pointed out that the GCE faced very difficult political opportunity structures going forward: education had become a 2nd tier issue in global development, while global commitments for basic education were stalling. What, the evaluators asked, should GCE do to respond to the fact the 6 EFA goals were unlikely to be met? Thus the report highlighted the "need for a single, coherent, long-term strategy." (Culey et. al, p. 59).

But the largest challenge facing the GCE was clearly at the national level – where the opportunities created by the popularity of the Global Action Week were by and large not being translated into effective policy analysis and policy advocacy by strong national advocacy groups in the poorest and most educationally marginalized countries. A renewed call in Sao Paulo – familiar from goals adopted at the 2001 and 2004 General Assemblies, was for "more focus on the national level" and better efforts to "realize the potential of the regions" (p. 59).

THE EVOLUTION OF THE GCE, 2008-2011

The past four years have been momentous ones for the GCE. For the first time the organization could boast a reasonably clear and targeted strategic framework; a stable secretariat; and new sources of funding to expand both its reach and the activities of its members.

At the GCE's Third World Assembly (Sao Paulo, January 2008), the organization adopted its first three-year strategic plan. This plan suggested three goals around which GCE activities would be oriented for the period 2008-2011. The strategy established three key goals and three cross-cutting themes for the GCE, as described in the figure below.[7]

Table 2.2. Goals and Themes of GCE's 3-year Strategic Plan, 2008

Goals	Strategic Themes
1. To demand that state bodies make measurable progress towards the achievement of education for all at the national level in poorer countries.	1. Focus on Impact and Results
2. To demand that richer countries and international institutions deliver good quality aid to reach the "fair share" investment and conducive policies to realize a global compact on EFA.	2. More focus on Poorer Countries, Quality and the Full EFA agenda
3. To Have Grown the Scale and Strength of the GCE, GCE members and the Education for All Movement.	3. Bolder messaging and actions all year round

The Strategic Plan also laid out the key actions that the GCE believed need to be taken to advance each of its three Strategic Goals. Under *Goal 1* (progress in poorer countries) the GCE's planned actions focused on enabling national

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[7] The GCE members also put forward 26 motions on EFA, ranking them in importance, which gave the GCE clarity on where members thought its emphasis should be (top 5: quality education; enforcing the right to education; adult literacy; financing quality education; abolishing fees. The GCE has no document in which it addresses how the Strategic Plan was modified to reflect the members' priorities.

coalitions to become better policy influencers (with attention to policy advocacy and mass mobilization). Actions listed under *Goal 2* (progress among donors) had two dimensions: GCE-led efforts to influence donor governments and international donor organizations; and capacity support for Northern coalitions. *Goal 3* is a cross-cutting goal, mainly focused on mass mobilization, but also with some attention to expansion of the GCE membership and improving organizational capacity.

From this summary of goals and actions, one gets a clearer picture of the GCE's central theory of change. Most prominently, the GCE believes that widespread public pressure by citizens based on the realization of their human rights is necessary to encourage Southern governments and Northern donor institutions to meet EFA goals. In the GCE's analysis:

> "the main barriers to achieving the goals are political. The technical and financial barriers to achieving universal education can be overcome – if, but only if, there is sustained and substantial public pressure on leaders to take the steps necessary….the GCE and the wider education movement need to achieve our own breakthrough in the level of civil society campaigning and influence on education, so we can secure new political spaces and build a mass movement backed by millions, in order to amplify our demands so loudly that they cannot be ignored." (GCE Three Year Strategic Plan, 2008: 3)

Mass mobilization and campaigning techniques are proposed as the *central* way to create public pressure and the necessary political will. This is to occur both in the North (targeting support for increased aid) and in the South (targeting increased government commitment to EFA). At the same time, GCE also planned to balance mass mobilization with insider and outsider forms of policy advocacy, relying on research, policy analysis, and direct engagement with policy makers to achieve policy change. Insider techniques involve direct collaboration with policy makers – for example, GCE sits on the FTI board and has established a group of Government Champions through its Class of 2015 initiative. Outsider techniques are more confrontational, as for example, the GCE's critical publications on the World Bank and the IMF efforts to impose wage ceilings that limit spending on teachers; or its efforts to single out "failed donors" in its annual School Report Card publication. Finally the GCE aimed to support national coalitions to use both traditional advocacy and mass mobilization techniques to directly influence national governments. In turn, the GCE planned to aggregate and coordinate popular demand for EFA at the international level.

To support this agenda the GCE has had remarkable success in fundraising. The GCE's core secretariat budget stood at a little over $2 million/annum in the 2009/2010, based on funding from the Hewlett Foundation, its founding members (ActionAid, Oxfam, Education International) and membership fees. But it is in funding for special projects that the GCE saw its greatest successes. In addition to the Real World Strategies programs funded by the Dutch government, the GCE

was successful in attracting short term funding for its 1Goal campaign from Britain, FIFA and other OECD donors; it also received a grant from the Education for All Fast Track Initiative of $17.6 million over four years to support national civil society coalitions and the establishment of Civil Society Education Funds (FTI 2011: 48-56). Combining it secretariat budget with special project funds, one estimate put its total budget at $12.2 million in 2009 (Mundy and Haggerty, 2010).[8] This amount of overall funding places the GCE comfortably within the category of well-resourced transnational advocacy campaigns on issues of world poverty.[9]

This funding has enabled the GCE to achieve a great deal in symbolic, procedural and political terms at the global scale. The GCE has not only been "at the table" in global discussions – it has increasingly been able invite others to its own table, for example by creating a group of high level champions drawn from governments and the private sector, through its Class of 2015 initiative; as part of its 1Goal campaign with the World Soccer Federation; in its support for the creation of a Global Fund for Education and the reform of the Fast Track Initiative; and in its more recent high-level panel on EFA, which is led by Gordon Brown. Though intermittent, its work in tracking international funding for EFA – mainly through its publication of national "School Report Cards" – created and framed the debate on "fair share" in global discussions on international financing for education, adding this to notion to the lexicon of global education policy makers. The GCE has also expanded its efforts to track multilateral funding and policies and their impact on education – with key analytic works on the IMF and the World Bank. In its global work the central frame has been on greater financing for EFA – a theme that is reflected in the activities of the coalitions represented in this book. As discussed below, the GCE's challenge since 2008 has been to find a way of advancing this financing frame in the context of a global economic crisis and donor fatigue. More pointedly, GCE's focus on financing is not aligned with the strategy of its key funder, the Hewlett Foundation, which wants attention to shift from inputs to learning outcomes.

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[8] The GCE prefers to count only the portion of project funds that are used by the Secretariat as part of its overall budget. However, since the GCE is the formal recipient and manager of these funds, including them as part of GCE's overall budget seems equally accurate.

[9] Comparison was drawn to the Millennium Development Campaign (recent annual budget just over US$6 million) and the GCAP campaign (3-year global-level budget of US$2.4 million between 2006 and 2008). In contrast, the GCE Secretariat is far less well-resourced than the ONE campaign against extreme poverty, which received a little under US$28 million from the Gates Foundation in 2009 for its advocacy work over the next 4 years (http://www.gatesfoundation.org/Grants-2009/Pages/The-One-Campaign-OPPGD1050.aspx).

Table 2.3. Number of countries and people participating in Global Action Week, 2002-2009

Table 2.4. Membership Growth of the Global Campaign for Education, 2002-20010

	2002	2005	2007	2008, Jan.	2010 Jan.	*Breakdown of Members, Jan. 2010*
National Coalitions *(paid members)*	37	42	46	56	64	23 African; 12 Latin American; 11 Asian 17 Northern; 6 Middle Eastern
International and Regional Members	16	19	n/a	31	35	10 regional members; 23 INGOs; 1 Education International; 1 Global March

At the national level, GCE achievements have also been substantial. Its Global Action Week has continued to grow in size and strength (see figure above), and in a recent survey was described as a very highly valued part of the GCE's overall work with its members (Mundy and Haggerty 2010). Research conducted in Nigeria and India by Gaventa and Mayo (2009) suggests that one reason the GAW has such high legitimacy among members is that it has allowed for significant input from members coalitions, whose voice and achievements are also recorded and collected as part of the larger gains for the whole coalition, in the annual publication of the GCE "Big Book". While there are still concerns about the relevance of the GAW among some members (see Philippine case study in this volume), overall the GCE's Global Action Week seems have moved to new levels of efficacy. It now not only provides a common moment for the GCE's global

membership and rising numbers of supporters to feel connected to a global movement, but also links more frequently than ever before to year-round strategies for policy influencing.

Furthermore, through the Real World Strategies Initiative and the Civil Society Education Fund program, the GCE can be credited with supporting the development or strengthening of national education coalitions in more than four-dozen countries. The overall number of formally registered national coalitions belonging to the GCE has virtually doubled (see table above). Several recent studies, as well as chapters in this book, provide examples of increased capacity to influence policy within Southern coalitions, including reports of impact on external policy outcomes, and of intermediate outcomes, such as routine inclusion of civil society in education decision-making at the national level, and examples of good quality policy analyses (Mundy and Haggerty 2010; Moriarty 2010).

Box 2.2. The GCE's Main Programs to Support Southern Coalitions

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1. Real World Strategies II Program
Fund: 5 million Euros from 2006-2010 from the Dutch Government (The pilot RWS-I from 2002-2005 addressed 26 coalitions).
RWS-II is a program managed by GCE, ASPBAE, ANCEFA and CLADE to support capacity development in 51 national coalitions. Each region developed a slightly different focus: in Africa most workshops appeared to be skills-based (communications, budget tracking, and campaigning); in Asia workshops were focused on creating national analysis of progress on EFA ("Education Watch reports") and supporting campaigns; in Latin America the focus was on justiciability, advocating for free education and quality education. The RWS initiative has also supported regional partners to coordinate advocacy targeted at regional policy bodies, and to create opportunities for cross-organizational learning.

2. Civil Society Education Fund Program
Fund: $17.6 million over three years (2009/10-2011/12), provided by the Fast Track Initiative. (Additional funds raised from Spain to support CSEF in Latin America from 2010).

Funding to provide core support to coalitions in up to 65 FTI approved countries. The project aims to provide support to the core work of national education coalitions so that they can fully engage in the development of education sector programmes with government and donors, and track the progress of national governments and local donor groups in working towards the EFA goals. As part of this program each coalition is to establish a National Civil Society Education Fund and raise funds to support advocacy initiatives in their country. Only the core funding for the coalitions is provided under this grant, at typically between $75,000-250,000 per coalition per annum. Capacity support is primarily delivered by ANCEFA, ASBPAE, and CLADE, each of which hosts a CSEF Secretariat, while financial oversight is provided by Oxfam, EI and ActionAid, and funding decisions are made by a regional funding committees comprised of representatives from a range of INGO and other CSOs

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However, an expansion of funding and activities on this scale – particularly funding that comes in the form of project funding, can be a double-edged sword for

an organization that is trying to manage relations among a large and diverse membership.

For example, ensuring that the growth in national educational coalitions is matched by strong advocacy capacity within these coalitions has been a vexing problem for the GCE (Mundy et al, 2006). Both philosophically, and because of the small size of its secretariat, the GCE early on made a decision to push its funding for national coalition capacity development out to its regional coalition members: ASPBAE, ANCEFA and CLADE. The different capacities and approaches to advocacy taken by the three regional bodies has led in turn to highly uneven results among member coalitions, contributing (for a variety of reasons[10]), to particular weaknesses in the advocacy capacity of coalitions in some of the poorest countries in the world. The decision to keep the secretariat small and push capacity development out to the regions has also undermined the ability of the GCE to act as a relay of information across scales (from national coalitions to global policy discussions) and across coalitions themselves. As studies in this volume suggest, the result has been a certain unevenness in members' sense of "belonging" to the campaign, and their engagement with global campaign initiatives. Thus a recent study of the Real World Strategies initiative comments:

> "It seems reasonable to conclude that so little focus was given at the global level that it had a detrimental effect on the project's potential outcomes. The global centre could have served an important function in terms of centralised mechanism for sharing materials, facilitating cross- project learning and actions, and making more explicit links between national and international advocacy....GCE did not fully implement its vision of change through RWS II. It was not able to adequately connect the local level concerns to the international policy objectives of GCE. And it failed to create meaningful links between coalitions from different parts of the world. (Moriarty et al, p. 44 & 50).

The GCE's 2008 Goals included a commitment to support coalitions' ability to do research and monitoring of national policies; and to support for them to do research and policy advocacy in such common areas of concern: transparency, national EFA plans, quality education models, justiciability; goals re-articulated in the GCE's new plan (GCE 2011). While case studies in this volume (and other recent reports) suggest some progress in all of these areas, the sustainability of such efforts and GCE's ability to contribute to them is arguably more precarious today than ever, since the Netherlands has pulled out of the Real World Strategies Program, and the Fast Track Initiative funding window that financed the Civil Society Education

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[10] As Moriarty (2010) shows, each of the regional bodies has taken a different approach to capacity development – ANCEFA has focused on building the number of coalitions in its region, and supports more than two times the number as compared to the other regional networks; ASPBAE has focused on coaching a small number of coalitions to produce high quality policy analysis and advocacy strategies; CLADE has played a stronger role in building a regional agenda for advocacy (p. 28).

Fund (CSEF) initiative has been closed (Mundy and Haggerty 2010; Moriarty 2010; Fast Track Initiative 2011).

The GCE's success in funding-raising for its global advocacy work has also brought mixed blessings to the organization. In particular the agreement to accept large scale, one year funding for the 1Goal campaign with FIFA, without wide consultation among the GCE membership, undermined confidence in the Secretariat among some key members. Some critics (including core funders of the GCE) questioned the 1Goal campaign for its reliance on online "sign up" campaigning. This type of campaigning – popularized by the UK based Make Poverty History Campaign and ONE, is quite different from the GCE's customary focus on sustained grassroots organizing, and its concentration on finance and access goals (Martin, Culey and Evans 2005; Chapman and Mancini 2009). Others believe it cemented a UK centric focus in the GCE's global campaigning approach, leaving it poorly positioned to switch its advocacy efforts in ways appropriate to the global power shift occurring between the West and emerging economies, and the tailwinds of an ongoing economic crisis (Mundy and Haggerty 2010, p. 29-35).

Box 2.3. The 1Goal Campaign

In June 2009 the GCE signed an agreement with DFID and FIFA to host a large, mass mobilization campaign leading up to a media of world leaders at the 2010 World Cup in South Africa. A significant feature of the campaign was an online sign-up, which yielded more than 12 million signatures. The British government committed £1 million for the campaign.

Whatever the validity of these criticisms, the sheer shifts in staffing within the secretariat required to implement two multi-million dollar projects (CSEF and 1Goal) in 2009 and 2010 left many of the organizations' core functions understaffed. Basic competencies that might be expected of any civil society organization – transparency and communication about the sources of its funding, publicly available reports on its projects and their outcomes, updated information about policies and governance structures; and the development of clear, democratic, and effective structures for communication and engagement of members on key strategic decisions (many of which are taken between World Assemblies) were neglected.[11] At a time of rapidly growing membership in both southern and donor countries, the GCE's ability to coordinate and build synergies across national, regional and global scales did not keep pace with the growth of its membership. Efforts to expand the organization's ambitions based on short term and unpredictable finance had the

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11 For a brief on basic principles of transparency and accountability see CIVICUS. (2007). Understanding LTA [Legitimacy, Transparency and Accountability]. Retrieved April 10, 2010 from http://www.civicus.org/lta/1237

ironic side effect of leaving the organization particularly vulnerable when these sources of external funding began to shrink in 2011.

WAYS FORWARD FOR THE GCE

Although the Global Campaign emerged initially as a short term, issue oriented coalition in the lead up to the Dakar World Education Forum, over time it has expanded into what Sidney Tarrow has described as a "campaign coalition," distinguishable from both event coalitions and longer term, formal federations by its combination of longer term sustained collaboration among a rather horizontally organized platform of members (see also Gaventa and Mayo 2010). It has been remarkably successful in expanding the resource base for both its global and its national advocacy efforts in recent years, and it has made significant achievements at both of these scales, using a variety of advocacy strategies and tactics. At its recent World Assembly the GCE promised to continue these efforts – by continuing to advocate for national and global policies to ensure expanded and more equal educational opportunities, by building the capacity of its members, and by focusing more specifically on discrimination in education as a common mobilizing theme for its membership (GCE 2011a).

The GCE's procedural gains – those that build space, voice and recognition for citizen claims making at national and international scales – have arguably been its most substantial. Gaventa and Moyo, in their comparative study of global social justice movements, describe the GCE as particularly successful in developing a common framework for advocacy across diverse national contexts, in ways that both scale up to citizen voice on a global scale, and deepen citizen engagement at the national level. The GCE has managed to sustain a diverse membership of organizations committed to working together to achieve a common set of goals in more than 100 countries, and it has supported a global movement to ensure that civil society actors sit both at the national and international policy tables for education.

Symbolically, the GCE and its membership have done much to keep basic education in the public eye. It has been innovative and taken risks to keep education on the public policy agenda, experimenting with new forms of mass campaigning via 1Goal, and rapidly expanding its efforts to support southern advocacy capacity. Unfortunately, these efforts – based on short term project funding -- may have had negative consequences for the organization, in terms of internal trust and core organizational capacities, highlighting some of the longer term tensions between vertical and more centrally driven forms of campaigning; and more diffuse, horizontally organized forms of social movement organizing.

The GCE's political impact on the decisions of governments and the international community have been less even, but still important. Despite the rapid expansion of both its global advocacy and national coalition building efforts since 2005, there has not been a substantial increase in aid for basic education or public expenditures. Perhaps this is too much to expect, especially in the more recent context of global economic restructuring. Still the coalition can lay claim to having contributed to sustained aid commitments from the UK government and recent

announcements of expanded funding from the World Bank ($750 million) and Australia ($5 bn) in 2010. It has played a profound role in publicizing the need to reform the Fast Track Initiative (recently rebranded the Global Partnership for Education). At the national level, much evidence in this volume and elsewhere suggests that at least some among the GCE's national coalitions have had success in advocating locally for policy changes and budget share. The GCE's new strategy recognizes the need to build on these successes, and commits the organization to a renewed focus building national advocacy capacity.

Going forward, the GCE faces a series of challenges. It needs to re-think its approaches to advocacy in light of softening global support for education aid, and the expected near-term contraction of fiscal space for education in the national budgets of least-developed countries. It is yet to find a sustainable funding base for its activities and is extremely vulnerable to cuts in its core funding from private donors. It will need to undergo a major process of organizational reform and reflection on its theory of change if it wishes to maintain its core identity as membership driven "campaign coalition" capable of bringing together both domestic and international monitoring of states' commitments to the right to education.

Yet there is no other body in the EFA policy arena with as large and wide a reach as the GCE, nor with as strong and committed a membership in the societies of the majority world. It has proven how valuable a civil society counterbalance can be in global efforts to frame "education for all" as a dimension of global social policy.