Virtuality in Aquinas and Deleuze: Current Tropes in Ancient Cloaks

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Abstract.

This study suggests the benefits of including virtuality as part of the analysis of our experience. Recovery by Deleuze from Aquinas’ use of virtuality is shown first by displaying Aquinas’ texts on cognitive and normative virtuality, divine, angelic and human virtuality, followed by Deleuze’ uptake of virtuality into his metaphysical analysis. This provides one commonplace where diachronic cross-disciplinarity can appear helpfully.

Key words: Aquinas, Deleuze, virtuality, divine, angelic.

Resumen. La virtualidad de Aquino y Deleuze: Tropes actuales en Capas antiguas

Este estudio sugiere los beneficios de incluir el concepto de virtualidad como parte del análisis de nuestra experiencia. En primer lugar se muestra la recuperación por Deleuze del uso de virtualidad de Aquino en textos sobre virtualidad cognitiva y normativa, virtualidad divina, angélica y humana, seguido por la absorción de Deleuze de la virtualidad en su análisis metafísico. Esto proporciona un lugar común donde una interdisciplinariedad diacrónica puede ser de ayuda.

Palabras clave: Aquino, Deleuze, virtualidad, divino, angelical.

The claim in this study is that the concept of virtuality is a useful tool for the analysis of data, and not simply a fashionable excess for undisciplined thought.¹ The reason that the concept of virtuality does useful work is because the fact of virtuality is real. The work which the concept can do is illustrated by its use in the metaphysical realism of Thomas Aquinas. The realism about virtuality Aquinas takes for granted is what Gilles Deleuze’ masterwork had to struggle to restore several centuries later.²

Aquinas’ use of virtuality is set out not by an explicit methodology in his books, as potentiality is treated early in his career by the Principles of Nature and by Being and Essence³. Virtuality remains less well interpreted until Deleuze. But Aquinas’ use of virtuality as an explanatory tool shows its distinction from the potentiality which made it suspect. So starting with his various uses is the way to enter the study.

Virtuous Virtuality
The most visible display of virtuality is in Aquinas’ discussion of virtue. The mature treatment of this occurs in his *Summa Theologiae*. While derivation of the term is not discussed here any more than elsewhere, its root is uncovered and let spread.

The concept of virtue includes successful exercise of capacities for human excellence. The Latin term *virtus*, *virtutis* evokes the gendered human, not the generic: *vir, viris*, not *homo, hominis*. It is manliness, indeed male potency, that the term evokes, unlike the ungendered Greek term *arete, aretes* for the best in humans, in disregard as much of the gendered *aner, andros* as of the generic *anthropos, anthropou*, however gendered its concept may have been. This is furthered by virtue’s association with the term *vis, viris* for force, power, potency, but stopping short of potentiality. The sense of virtuality is often expressed by the ablative of the term for virtue, where *virtute* or *in virtute*, “in virtue of”, mean the procedure which Aquinas also calls adverbially *virtualiter* or adjectivally *virtualis*, virtual.

The concept of virtue in Aquinas’ Summa as elsewhere in his writings is derivative from Aristotle’s text in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, except that the roster of virtues now includes ones that are gifts, not earned, and that their culmination is not in responsible character but in the grant of beatific vision hereafter. While the first part of the Summa surveys the layout of God, world and humans, as well as our fall, the two parts of the second treat the natural remedies for this, but insufficient ones and so calling for incarnation and its prolongation by sacraments in the third. Natural remedies include upright action, and the character to persist in it. Character involves virtues, the habits of upright action in regard to one’s self (prudence, temperance, fortitude) and toward others (justice).

Justice is in focus because therein is found a prominent display of the work done by virtuality (II-II, 58, 6, c). Following Aristotle, Aquinas admits two senses of justice, one general (or “legal”) and the other special. Justice generally picks out the fact that all virtues involve what is due, even if figuratively to oneself; but justice specially refers only to what is due to another person. The special use predicates its distinctive characteristic, its essential feature, the relationship of which justice is predicated essentially. Of the other virtues, it is not predicated essentially, for each of those has its own distinctive characteristic, said of that virtue with what is truly a predication. When justice is said of them, instead, this is an equivocal or logical predication; justice here is predicated virtually. General justice is the same as other virtues by its operation, by its power to unify them.

The “essential” feature here is virtuality, not universality; virtuality does the work of leading each virtue to its orientation toward the common good, while universality has no power to do this.

“All the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethics, V, 1) that ‘many are able to be virtuous in matters affecting themselves, but are unable to be virtuous in matters relating to others,’ and (Politics, III, 2) that ‘the virtue of the good man is not strictly the same as the virtue of the good citizen.’ Now the virtue of a good citizen is general justice, whereby a man
is directed to the common good. Therefore general justice is not the same as virtue in
general, and it is possible to have one without the other.”

“I answer that, A thing is said to be general in two ways. First, by predication: thus
‘animal’ is general in relation to man and horse and the like: and in this sense that which
is general must needs be essentially the same as the things in relation to which it is
general, for the reason that the genus belongs to the essence of the species, and forms
part of its definition. Secondly, a thing is said to be general virtually (virtute); thus a
universal cause is general in relation to all its effects, the sun, for instance, in relation to
all bodies that are illumined, or transmuted by its power; and in this sense there is no
need for that which is general to be essentially the same as those things in relation to
which it is general, since cause and effect are not essentially the same. Now it is in the
latter sense that, according to what has been said (a. 5), legal justice is said to be a general
virtue, in as much, to wit, as it directs the acts of the other virtues to its own end, and this
is to move all the other virtues by its command; for just as charity may be called a general
virtue in so far as it directs the acts of all the virtues to the divine good, so too is legal
justice, in so far as it directs the acts of all the virtues to the common good. Accordingly,
just as charity which regards the divine good as its proper object, is a special virtue in
respect of its essence, to too legal justice is a special virtue in respect of its essence, in so
far as it regards the common good as its proper object. And thus it is in the sovereign
principally and by way of a master-craft, while it is secondarily and administratively in
his subject.”

“However the name of legal justice can be given to every virtue, in so far as every virtue
is directed to the common good by the aforesaid legal justice, which though special
essentially (in essentia) is nevertheless virtually (virtualiter) general. Speaking in this way,
legal justice is essentially the same as all virtue, but differs therefrom logically (ratione):
and it is in this sense that the Philosopher speaks.”

And, in the preceding article, “It follows therefore that the good of any virtue, whether
such virtue directs man in relation to himself, or in relation to certain other individual
persons, is referable to the common good, to which justice directs: so that all acts of virtue
can pertain to justice, in so far as it directs man to the common good. It is in this sense that
justice is called a general virtue. And since it belongs to the law to direct to the common
good, as stated above (I-II, q. 90, a. 2), it follows that the justice which is in this way styled
general, is called ‘legal justice’ because thereby man is in harmony with the law which
directs the acts of all the virtues to the common good.”
Authoritative Virtuality

The power of virtuality is mediated to other contexts from the context of virtue in actions, that was just rehearsed. Remaining “with human affairs” to illustrate the virtuality by which God is in creation, God is at work there as is a king in the whole kingdom, namely, by his power, although he is not present there (I, 8, 3, c). “How God is in other things created by him, may be considered from human affairs. A king, for example, is said to be in the whole kingdom by his power (virtute), although he is not everywhere present. Again, a thing is said to be by its presence in other things which are subject to its inspection; as things in a house are said to be present to anyone, who nevertheless may not in substance be in every part of the house. Lastly a thing is said to be by way of substance or essence in that place in which its substance may be.” The ploys of the Carolingian and the Byzantine inheritors of empire resonate through the first of these, with their presence to their territories by their written edicts or by their drawn images, respectively.

Divine Virtuality

Detached from this kingly comparison, virtual divine presence by power is treated more adequately in other texts. God is “in” all things by his activity of keeping each in being; all beings and truths are virtually in God (I, 19, 6, ad 2).

In showing that everything which is, is from God (Summa contra gentiles [SCG], I, 15), Aquinas says: “Further, God is the maker of things in so far as he is in act, as shown above (ch.7). But he comprehends all the perfections of things by his actuality and perfection, as was shown (I, 1, c, 16); and so he is virtually [virtualiter] all things.”

Striking another dimension of this, while showing that God is everywhere and in all things (SCG, III, 68), he says: “Everything which is in a place or in any thing, touches it in some way…. An incorporeal thing is said to be in another, however, by contact of power (virtutis), since it lacks dimensional quantity. The non-bodily thing is so situated that it is in another by its power (virtutem), as a bodily one is in another by dimensional quantity. … Therefore, if there is some incorporeal thing having infinite power, it must be everywhere. …” Continuing, “agent and recipient have to be simultaneous. … [I]f therefore God is present to one only of his effects, as to the first moveable which is moved without mediation by him, it would follow that his action on others cannot be derived unless by means of this medium. But this does not work. For … it would have to respond proportionally to the agent by all its power (virtutem); for it is not possible for the agent to use all its power … But no creature can exhaust divine power.”

The most straightforward answer (I, 8, c) to whether God is in all things is:

In answering that God is in all things; not, indeed, as part of their essence, nor as an accident; but as an agent is present to that upon which it works. For an agent must
be joined to that wherein it acts immediately, and touch it by its power (*virtute*) … therefore as long as a thing has being, God must be present to it according to its mode of being. But being is innermost in each thing and most fundamentally inherent in all things since it is formal in respect of everything found in a thing, as was shown above (q. 7, a. 1). Hence it must be that God is in all things, and innermost.

Continuing (ad 2) , “Although corporeal things are said to be in another as in that which contains them, nevertheless spiritual things contain those things in which they are; as the soul contains the body. Hence also God is in things as containing them. …”

God has virtual contact by moving creatures, while not actually touching them (I, 105, 2, ad 1). “There are two kinds of contact: corporeal contact, when two bodies touch each other; and virtual (*virtualis*) contact, as the cause of sadness is said to touch the one made sad. According to the first kind of contact, God, as being incorporeal, neither touches nor is touched; but according to virtual (*virtualis*) contact, he touches creatures by moving them; but he is not touched, because the natural power of a creature cannot move up to him.” (SCG, II, 56)

The practical dimension of this (I, 19, 6, ad 2) as to whether the will of God is always fulfilled (because it seems that not everything true exists, so not everything good exists, and not every will of God is fulfilled) is: “An act of the cognitive faculty is according as the thing known is in the knower; while an act of the appetitive faculty is directed to things as they exist in themselves. But all that can have the nature of being and truth exists virtually (*virtualiter*) in God, though it does not all exist in created things. Therefore, God knows all truth, but does not will all good, except so far as he wills himself, in whom all good virtually (*virtualiter*) exists.”

**Angelic Virtuality**

As the opening discussion of virtue would have led one to expect, the power of virtuality is not a preserve of divinity, but is exercised by created agents, angelic as well as human. Angels as spirits are located wherever they act, without need for our usual determinants of location (I, 53, 1, c; I 52, 1, c). They are virtually in contact with bodies by their power, too, not actually by dimensional quantity (I, 8, 2, ad 1).

This issue is recovered when asking (I, 52, 1, c), whether an angel is in a place. “A body is said to be in a place in such a way that it is applied to such place according to the contact of dimensional quantity; but there is no such quantity in the angels, for theirs is a virtual (*virtualis*) one. Consequently an angel is said to be in a corporeal place by application of the angelic power in any manner whatever to any place. … In similar fashion it is not necessary on this account for the angel to be contained by a place; because an incorporeal substance virtually (*virtualiter*) contains the thing with which it comes into contact, and is
not contained by it: for the soul is in the body as containing it, not as contained by it. In the same way an angel is said to be in a place which is corporeal, not as the thing contained, but as somehow containing it.”

Asking (a.2) whether an angel can be in several places at once, he replies: because angels’ power is finite and God’s infinite, “God through his power touches all things, and is not merely present in some place, but is everywhere [while angels are present only to one determined thing]. Hence, since the angel is in a place by the application of his power to the place, it follows that he is not everywhere, nor in several places, but in only one place.…”

Continuing, “some who were unable to go beyond the reach of their imaginations supposed the indivisibility of an angel to be like that of a point. … so then it is evident that to be in a place appertains quite differently to a body, to an angel, and to God. For a body is in a place in a circumscribed fashion, since it is measured by the place. An angel, however is not there in a circumscribed fashion, since he is not measured by the place, but definitively, because he is one place in such a manner that he is not in another. But God is neither circumscriptively nor definitively there, because he is everywhere.”

Angelic power extends virtually, when determining whether the soul is a body (I, 75, 1, ad 3). “There are two kinds of contact: of quantity, and of power (virtute). By the former a body can be touched only by a body; by the latter a body can be touched by an incorporeal thing, which moves that body.”

**Human Virtuality**

These considerations answer questions not only about angels, but about humans when inquiring, whether the soul is a body (I, 75, 1, ad 3). This also determines at length whether intellectual substance can be united to body and in what way. (SCG, II, 56)

Likewise it is clear that intellectual substance cannot be united to body by way of contact taken in its proper sense. For touching belongs only to bodies; for the touched things are those whose boundaries (ultima) are in the same place (simul), such as points or lines, or surfaces which are the boundaries of bodies. … There is, however, another mode of contact, by which an intellectual substance can be united to body.

For natural bodies alter each other in touching, and so are united to each other, not only by their quantitative boundaries, but according to their simultaneity in quality or form, since the one doing the alteration impresses its form on the one altered … For some celestial bodies touch elementary bodies in this way, and so alter them; but they are not touched by those, because they receive nothing from them. … Or we say that distress
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... This is not the touch of quantity, but of power (*virtutis*); and so it differs from bodily touch in three ways.

First, because by this touching what is indivisible can touch what is divisible.... Secondly, because quantitative touch regards only the boundaries, while touch by power goes on regarding the whole thing that is touched; for it is touched as it receives and is moved, but this happens so far as it is in potency, and potency has to do with the whole, and not the boundaries only; so the whole is touched. And from this a third difference follows because in the quantitative touch which goes on between boundaries, it has to happen by the one touching extrinsic to what is touched, and the toucher cannot enter into the other but is blocked by it. In touch by power (*virtutis*) which belongs to intellectual substances, since it goes on toward the interior (*intima*), makes the touching substance to be inside (*intra*) what is touched, and enter it by itself without blockage. So intellectual substance can be united to body by such a contact of power.

What are made one according to this contact are not one simply; for they are one in acting and receiving, which is not to be one simply; for it is said to be one and being in a certain manner only; so to be one in acting is not to be one simply. To be one simply is said in three ways: either as indivisible, or as continuum, or as what is one rationally (*ratione*). From intellectual substance and body one which is indivisible cannot be made (for that would have to be a composite out of two); nor is it continuous, because the parts of a continuum are quantified. It is left to ask whether one can be made of an intellectual substance and a body in a manner that is one by reason (*ratione*). ... That appears to be impossible when considered reasonably. ... Again, the operative power (*virtus*) of a thing cannot be higher than its essence, since its power follows upon the principles of its essence.

Regarding our future state, as well (I, 77, 8), concerning whether all the powers remain in the soul when separated from the body, he answers: “As we have said already (art. 5, 6, 7), all the powers of the soul belong to the soul alone as their principle. But some powers belong to the soul alone as their subject; as the intelligence and the will. But other powers are subjected in the composite, as are all the powers of the sensitive and nutritive parts. Now accidents cannot remain after the destruction of the subject. Wherefore, the composite being destroyed, such powers do not remain actually; but they remain virtually {virtualiter} in the soul, as in their principle or root.” Continuing (ad 3), “These powers are said not to be weakened when the body becomes weak, because the soul remains unchangeable, and is the virtual (*virtualis*) principle of these powers.
Cognitive Virtuality

The object of intellectual knowledge is present in the knower virtually, by the species which represents it there, and makes that object one with the knower (expressed in the commonplace that “the knower in act is the known in act”), a profound and exact mutual determination (I, 68, 2, c). “The likeness of a thing known is not of necessity actually in the nature of the knower; but given that a thing which knows potentially, and afterward knows actually, the likeness of the thing known must be in the nature of the knower, not actually, but only potentially ....” (I, 75, 1, ad 2). This is more virtual than potential, however, as will follow.

In tackling Meno’s conundrum, “Must not one know before he learns?” (Commentary on Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics [CPA], I, lesson III), Aquinas says: “First he determines the truth, saying that before induction or syllogism is brought forward to give knowledge of some conclusion, that conclusion is known in one way, and in another not: simply one does not know, but knows only in a way (secundum quid). … He has the principles for the conclusions in demonstrations, as the active causes for their effects in natural things. … But before the effect is produced in act, it preexists somehow in the active causes virtually (virtute), not however in act, which is simply to exist. And similarly before the conclusion is deduced from the principles of demonstration, in these foreknown principles the conclusion is foreknown virtually (virtute), but not actually.”

And again: “[The conclusion is] known not simply, but in a way (secundum quid) which is virtually (in virtute) in its principles. … It is the same with natural forms, which Anaxagoras claimed preexisted before generation in the matter simply, while Aristotle claimed they preexisted in potency (potentia) and not simply. … What is generated is not fully (omnino) being before generation, but is in a way being and in another way not being. It is being in potency, not being in act. And this is what generation is, to bring from potency into act. So neither is what someone learns completely known before that, as Plato said, nor is it completely unknown, as was said in the solution that was disproven earlier. But it was known in potency (potentia), or virtually (virtute) in the foreknown principles, while unknown in act in terms of the knowledge proper. And to learn is to bring from potential or virtual or from universal knowing (potentiali seu virtuali aut universali), into proper actual knowing.”

For the practical application of why Aristotle was interested in this argument (CPA, I, l. IV), “The Philosopher intended to define knowing simply, not knowing accidentally. That sense of knowing is sophistical. For the sophists used that way of arguing. I know Coriscus, Coriscus is coming, so I know the person coming.” Queries about the morning star and the evening star are more famous.

To wrap up the issue, “Note that to know something scientifically (scire) is to know (cognoscere) it perfectly; this is, however, perfectly to grasp (apprehendere) its truth. For the
principles of the thing and the truth are the same, as shown in the second book of the Metaphysics. Therefore the one knowing, if knowing perfectly must know the cause of the things known. And so he says: ‘When we judge its cause.’ But if one knows only the cause, he does not know the effect in act, which is not to know simply, but only virtually (virtute), which is to know only in a way and accidentally.”

In his more broadly focused texts, Aquinas sets this virtuality into its forward trajectory, in asking (I, 93, 7, c) whether the image of God is to be found in the acts of the soul? “[S]ince the principles of acts are the habits and powers, and everything exists virtually [virtualiter] in its principle, therefore, secondarily and consequently, the image of the Trinity may be considered as existing in the powers, and still more in the habits, forasmuch as they virtually [virtualiter] exist therein.”

Deleuze’ Virtuality

What needs to be recalled is that in the long quotations above, virtuality was not unreal until it becomes actualized. It is not the mere duplicate of reality, adding nothing real once it is actualized, nor having any force upon that actualization until then; that is the way mere potentiality is purported to operate. Instead virtuality is in each of its conceptual employments the real exercise of force. It explains the differences between operations in distinct domains of agents, and in particular the most commonplace features of our own exercises.

It takes some centuries to recover the delicacy of this tool for analysis, after its eclipse by more obtuse elements in the nominalist tradition which swept European universities in and after the Renaissance. Virtuality understood not as challenging assumptions about authentic reality by interlacing our perceptions with technology, but as rejecting the claim that the real is only what is actual: that is what needs recovery. Deleuze makes the recovery in the name of Scotus, not Aquinas a half century earlier, and in the guise of nominalist himself, by reason of his allergy to analogy. Assuming readers’ acquaintance with his research, unlike Aquinas, no attention will be given to explicating his overall project, nor terminology dispensible from the treatment of virtuality sampled hereafter.

Virtuality appears in Deleuze’ main work as part of his relief from the negativity of conceptual thought. The power of virtuality lies in its drive toward actuality. As Aristotle, so much of this drive is cast in terms of organic development. “[T]his is all we wish to say – the negative appears neither in the process of differentiation or differenciation. No more is its make-up by differenciation a dependence upon negativity and non-being, than is the differenciation which issues into actuality. … However, this high level of generality has nothing to do with an abstract taxonomic concept since it is, as such, lived by the embryo. It refers on the one hand, to the differential relations which constitute the virtuality which exists prior to the actualisation of the species; on the other hand, it refers to the first
movements of that actualisation, and particularly to its condition – namely, individual as it finds its field of constitution in the egg.” (249) “We call the determination of the virtual content of an Idea differentiation; we call the actualisation of that virtuality into species and distinguished parts differenciation.” (207).

Virtuality is not a vacant space for reality. It is not actual, but it is fully real, the reality of power that does work, for cognition as well. “The virtual is opposed not to the real but to the actual. The virtual is fully real in so far as it is virtual.” (208) “Indeed, the virtual must be defined as strictly a part of the real object. … The reality of the virtual consists of the differential elements and relations, along with the singular points which correspond to them. The reality of the virtual is structure. We must avoid giving the elements and relations which form a structure an actuality which they do not have, and withdrawing from them a reality which they have.” (209) “[F]ar from being undetermined, the virtual is completely determined. … [W]e must carefully distinguish the object in so far as it is complete and the object in so far as it is whole. What is complete is only the ideal part of the object …. What the complete determination lacks is the whole set of relations belonging to actual existence.” (210)

Not opposed to reality, virtuality is distinguished from possibility. Possibility is the reservoir of negativity. That is what a blunted empiricism had lathered onto virtuality, and then proceeded easily to shave off both with the razor of parsimony.

The only danger in all this is that the virtual could be confused with the possible. The possible is opposed to the real; the process undergone by the possible is therefore a ‘realisation’. By contrast, the virtual is not opposed to the real; it possesses a full reality by itself. (207)

[I]t is a question of existence itself. Every time we pose the question in terms of possible and real, we are forced to conceive of existence as a brute eruption, a pure act or lead which always occurs behind our backs and is subject to a law of all or nothing. What difference can there be between the existent and the non-existent if the non-existent is already possible, already included in the concept and having all the characteristics that the concept confers upon it as a possibility? Existence is the same as but outside the concept. Secondly, the possible and the virtual are further distinguished by the fact that one refers to the form of identity in the concept, whereas the other designates a pure multiplicity in the Idea which radically excludes the identical as a prior condition.” (207)

[T]he real is supposed to resemble the possible. That is why it is difficult to understand what existence adds to the concept when all it does is double like with like. … The actualisation of the virtual, on the contrary, always takes place by difference, divergence or differenciation. Actualisation breaks with resemblance as a process no less than it does with identity as a principle. Actual terms never resemble the singularities they incarnate.
… Difference and repetition in the virtual ground the movement of actualisation, of
differentiation as creation. They are thereby substituted for the identity and the
resemblance of the possible. (212)

The virtuality of the Idea has nothing to do with possibility. Multiplicity tolerates no
dependence on the identical in the subject or in the object. The events and singularities
of the Idea do not allow any positing of an essence as ‘what the thing is’. No doubt, if
one insists, the word ‘essence’ might be preserved, but only on condition of saying that
the essence is precisely the accident, the event, the sense; not simply the contrary of what
is ordinarily called the essence but the contrary of the contrary. Multiplicity is no more
appearance than essence, no more multiple than one. (191)

Conclusion

My interest in this study has been to suggest the benefits of including virtuality as a
part of respectful analysis upon our experience. This was done by displaying the work
that virtuality can accomplish in the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas. The recovery and
professional popularization of this in Gilles Deleuze’ rhizomatic analysis serves to redeem
it for contemporaries more familiar with his than with a medieval’s texts. Deleuze’ self-
distinction from part of that arboreal analysis does not obstruct this use; for his central
concerns, to diminish conceptual analogy and to insist upon the positivity of singular
essence, are shared by Aquinas, whose central role for analogy is restrained to the discourse
upon transcendence, and not for predicking the uniqueness of singular natures which
he affirms with the Philosopher. Virtuality provides one commonplace where diachronic
cross-disciplinarity can appear helpfully.

1An application of these arguments to law appears, without the scope and textual
display of this study, in C.B. Gray, “Topoi in Summa: Virtual Justice as Determinant
325-338.

2That medieval thought is set within a realism that supports virtuality is a famous claim
by Umberto Eco, in “Dreaming of the Middle Ages,” Travels in Hyperreality: Essays, tr.

3Both available easily in Selected Writings of St. Thomas Aquinas. Tr. R. P. Goodwin,
Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill, 1965.

4Summa Theologica, 2 vols., tr. Fathers of the English Dominican Province, New York,
Benziger Brothers, 1947. The Latin text used for this and his other writings is the
Omnia opera [Parma, Typi Pietro Fiaccadori, 1852-73] New York, Musurgia Publ., 1948 reprint. Citations in my text are from the English text of the Summa, unless indicated otherwise; from elsewhere, they follow my translation. Citations from the Summa use a standard format: by part, e.g., I; by question in that part, e.g., 2; by article in that question, e.g., 3; and by position in that article where needed, e.g., “c” for the body of its text, or “ad 4” for the answer to the second objection; all of these connected by commas, e.g, I, 2, 3, ad 4.


