whether elected or senior officials, in order to guarantee the success of the prevention. In fact, municipal aims must be supported and promoted by the mayor who publicly affirms the commitment of the borough council to concerted action in support of urban security. This collaboration calls upon institutions, community organisations as well as businesses while guaranteeing the participation of citizens. The latter can also get involved in maintaining and developing their safety and act in aid of both their own as well as their fellow citizens' quality of life.

The involvement of citizens in their own safety becomes the expression of their rights to safety, but also the acceptance of their responsibility in this matter. Moreover, this is the objective of chapter 6 of the Montreal Charter of Rights and Responsibilities[15], which was adopted in 2005. This chapter specifies the city's involvement in relation to safety and also indicates that citizens are agents of their own safety, notably by means of preventative behaviour.

Beyond this individual participation in safety, the City Council also wanted to make a place for citizens in local consultation and collaboration in public safety. This is one of the objectives pursued by the Policy for a peaceful and safe environment[16], which was adopted in 2007. This policy specifies the municipality's aims in relation to safety and plans the introduction of a local Table for safety in each borough of Montreal and in each of the other towns of the Agglomeration. These local tables, in addition to citizen participation, also rely on the collaboration of the territory's institutions and social, economic and community agents while proposing equal representation of men and women.

Montreal City Council implements many ways to promote the maintenance and development of safe and quality living environments. Municipal actions are in keeping with the results of studies on the success factors. Furthermore, the improvement of the situation over recent years confirms the positive impact of municipal involvement. The City Council must take on the challenge of standing by its aims and of remaining inflexibly involved in promoting safety.

1   The Community in Figures (CMM, La Communauté en chiffres), http://www.cmm. qc.ca visited on 29th May 2010.
2   Montreal City Council: Financial Review (2009)
3   Unless otherwise indicated, the statistical data comes from the City Council's Montréal en Statistiques (Montreal in statistics) website http://ville.montreal.qc.ca/portal/ page?_pageid=2076,2453845&_dad=portal&_ schema=PORTAL which was visited on May 29th 2010 and whose source is the 2006 Statistics Canada five-year census.
4   Collectif quartier, http://www.collectifquartier. org/atlas/idville/carto.php? Visited on 10th June 2010
5   Montreal City Council: Police Service (2009)
6   CIPC, Quebec Observatory on Safety and Prevention. Taking, stocking and analysing the information available on threats to safety in Quebec.
7   Gannon and Mihorean (2004)
8   Mercer (2010)
9   The Service de Police de la Ville de Montréal website: http://spvm.qc.ca visited on 31st May 2010
10 Ville de Montréal, Service de police (2009)
11 Montreal City Council, 2003
12 Montreal City Council, 2008
13 Montreal City Council, 2002
14 IPC, 2007-2009
15 Montreal City Council, 2005
16 Montreal City Council, 2007

URBAN SECURITY IN LARGE FRENCH METROPOLITAN AREAS

Christophe Soullez
Alain Bauer

Introduction

Up until the 17th century, crime in France primarily occurred in the countryside and was the act of bandits who mainly attacked convoys or travellers, whenever it was not committed by foreign troops who terrorised inhabitants in times of war. Transport routes were insecure and the town, by virtue of the way it was both built and used, was considered a safe and protective place.

In the Middle Ages, towns were fortified, in keeping with the towns built in the time of the Roman Empire which were surrounded by walls to protect against invasions. They played a central role in organising society as a seat of feudal power, but also as a place of refuge in times of troubles or outside attacks for the inhabitants of the surrounding area who served the lord on his fief.

From the year 1000 onwards, demographic growth and increased trade resulted in the revival of towns and their expansion.

The consolidation of royal power in the 12th and 13th centuries reduced clashes between feudal lords, but battles with outside powers took place across the territory, during which deserters and dismissed mercenaries pillaged the lands. It was because of this, in reaction to the growing insecurity in the countryside, that the first police force was created: the Marshalcy which was at that time in charge of controlling and monitoring people involved in war with a remit covering the entire kingdom excluding towns.

With the passing of time, the fortified town (the *bourg* or market town) became too confined and dwellings were built outside the walls and were protected by new outer walls in accordance with a radio-concentric development. Urban fabric became denser, public space

was very restricted and limited to the alleys and some squares. At the same time, towns were facing new problems: hygiene (inexistent sewerage, disease, rats, etc.) and insecurity.

Royal power undertook, initially in Paris, to provide solutions to isolated problems. Thus, in Paris in 1254, Saint-Louis created the knight of the guard *(chevalier du guet),* who was assisted by 20 cavalry sergeants and 26 foot sergeants and was in charge of ensuring the security of Paris at night. The system quickly spread to all towns throughout the kingdom. It would take until 1667, however, for the first veritable police corps to appear in Paris, and later in the provinces, with the creation of the position of Lieutenant general of police. From the 17th century until the beginning of the 20th century, and as a consequence of the growth of towns, the State progressively put in place a police organisation subject to responding to new threats inherent in the development of towns and the evolution of crime.

Thus, while in the Middle Ages those in power were distrusting of the countryside and its inhabitants, who were often quick to rebel through peasant revolts, little by little, towns and their inhabitants were becoming the object of the public authorities' attention and were increasingly perceived as potentially dangerous territories or inhabitant groups. Town inhabitants became subjects to be watched with a view to limiting the possibilities of power being challenged. Furthermore, intelligence services, which had been quite rudimentary up until then, were reinforced and developed under the Consulate and the Empire.

Throughout the 18th and 19th centuries, the police services, and mainly the public security services, were formed anarchically without any real central organisation. Up until the Vichy regime, every municipality had its own municipal police with the exception of certain municipalities such as Lyon (1851), Marseille (1908), Toulon et la Seyne (1918), Nice (1920), Strasbourg, Metz et Mulhouse (1925), Alger (1930), Toulouse (1940), as well as nineteen municipalities of Seine et Marne and 174 municipalities of Seine et Oise (1935) which, for various historical, political and social reasons, had a State police force.

1. Late state control of town and city police

The Vichy regime, by means of the Law of 23 April 1941, centralised the police services in one regional base to create the first State police. The police was instituted in all of the municipalities with more than 10,000 inhabitants and in smaller municipalities which had been designated by decree of the Minister of the Interior. Paris maintained its special status with the Prefecture of Police. The

police were organised at a regional level, where a prefect was put in charge of the police assisted by a police superintendent and the regional police services. Each administrative political subdivision of the country, known as a department *(département),* comprised a police district, which was managed by a chief district commissioner and subdivided into police wards which were managed by a chief constable or a police superintendent according to their size. Regulations on police civil service were drawn up which made provisions for recruitment based on entrance examinations for the majority and according to qualifications for certain posts.

The system was maintained despite an unsuccessful attempt to return to *the statu quo* ante after France was liberated.

The State regime was then established by the Law of 7 January 1983 which stated that the institution of the State police system was law, as of the 1ˢᵗ January 1985 if the municipal council so requested, in the municipalities with a municipal police force, whenever the conditions regarding workforce, professional qualification or demographic threshold were met.

The Law of 21 January 1995 was completed by regulations which stated that the administrative capitals of departments were to be placed under the State police system *(CGCT, art. R. 2214-1)* and that the State police system could be established in a municipality or in a collection of municipalities forming an urban settlement whenever the following two conditions were met: 1. The population of the municipality or of the collection of municipalities, calculated to include the size of the seasonal population, was over 20,000 inhabitants; 2. The characteristics of crime were the same as those in urban areas.

However, just as the establishing of state control was being facilitated by these various bills, the State police system began to suffer different threats. Indeed, a number of cities with a State police force also had a municipal police force, which created a shortfall in national police force numbers, strong expectations on the inhabitants' behalf with regards to security, or even the need to develop certain missions relinquished by the State police (community policing, surveillance of school entrances and exits, parking police, etc.). The fast development of the municipal police would furthermore lead, in 1999, to political authorities clarifying the remits of this police force with respect to national police and Gendarmerie missions. Subsequently, after 20 years of trial and error, a new police force, the police d'agglomération, began to take shape in Paris and then in the main French urban areas from 2009 onwards.

Nevertheless, in a post-World War II France faced with increasing crime in certain districts, the city was to appear once more as a subject of concern for politicians.

2. French suburbs: at-risk territories

After the Second World War, the urgency for rehousing populations led to a major increase in construction, particularly of large urban housing developments which were concentrated in the outskirts of cities. Despite the high quality of the living conditions offered, this new way of life generated some difficulties. The former inhabitants who had been rehoused in this way witnessed the population of their municipality triple and have its status of small neighbourhood replaced with that of suburb. The new tenants had to conform to the conventions imposed by architecture and community life.

Up until 1974, major economic growth hid the problems which were taking shape both in housing and in the economic and social insertion of the populations living in the large housing developments. The crisis resulting from the rise in oil prices made these problems gradually and successively appear to be on the brink of awakening a feeling of exclusion among a part of the population and of leading to the marginalisation of certain areas. From August 1976 onwards, security became a concern for politicians and, in 1977, Alain Peyrefitte, Minister of Justice, published the report "Responses to violence" which essentially consisted of recommendations and opened up the debate on prevention and repression, giving rise to the passing of the law on "security and freedom".

The first clashes between police forces and youth groups in France kicked off in 1979 in Vaux-en-Velin, with the first burnt-out cars making headline news. The events that took place in the residential area of Minguettes in Vénissieux in 1981, however, were the first to receive large scale media coverage. The reason behind those riots was the social rebellion of young people from the disadvantaged areas of the suburbs of Lyon and the refusal to accept discrimination and living conditions which were deemed unbearable. These riots were therefore considered the expression of political and social demands.

Following the discussions around the passing of the law on "security and freedom"[1], the change in government in 1981 contributed to the emergence of a prevention policy which was characterised by an essentially social approach to tackling crime. The law gave rise notably to the creation of the first partnership schemes between the State and public bodies as well as to the first measures of what would later officially be termed "Urban Policy".

The 1980s were marked by the increase of incidents between young people and the police in disadvantaged areas. A new peak of violence was reached in the early 1990s. The town of Vaux-en-Velin experienced new riots following the death of a motorbike passenger in a police roadblock. The media immediately made the connection with the events of 1981. Following these riots, the Prime Minster was appointed Ministerial Delegate for Urban Affairs by President François Mitterand, followed by the first thirteen sub-prefects being appointed delegates for Urban Affairs. In 1991, clashes spread to many towns in the Parisian region. Then, throughout the entire decade of the 1990s, numerous municipalities were becoming regular stages for clashes between the police forces and the young inhabitants of disadvantaged districts. In Autumn 2005, France experienced a wave of riots in a great many suburban areas following the tragic accidental death of two minors who hid in an electrical transformer to avoid a police check. The state of emergency, which had not been needed since the Algerian War, was declared on the 8th November 2005 and was extended for a period of three months. These acts of violence, which essentially took the shape of arson and stone-throwing at the police forces, became, in certain cases, riots pitting hundreds of people in the disadvantaged districts against the police forces. Then, in November 2007, two young men in Villiers-le Bel were hit by a police car patrolling the district and died. In response to this, the police station was besieged and set on fire. The clashes lasted two nights and it was the first time ever that offenders in these types of protests used firearms.

Numerous districts were routinely experiencing peaks in tension and witnessing confrontation between the police forces and young people, while young people from different districts were not engaging in conflicts over territory or, more mundanely, to protect trafficking and criminal activity.

3. The poorest territories are the most at-risk

Most urban acts of violence are carried out in the districts classified as disadvantaged urban zones (ZUS, *zones urbaines sensibles).* Hence, if attacks on property recorded in ZUS in 2008 were 15% lower than those recorded in the law enforcement district (CSP, *circonscription de sécurité publique),* attacks on people were slightly more common in these areas (12.2 per 1,000 inhabitants in comparison with 11.4 per 1,000 in their CSP). Nevertheless, the ZUS are more at-risk for certain crimes, such as arson attacks on private property, where the rate of acts recorded per inhabitant is twice as high as those committed in the CSP to which

they belong. There is also a higher risk for other acts of destruction and damage.

In addition, according to the results of the crime victimisation survey "Cadre de Vie et Sécurité" carried out by the ONDRP and the INSEE in 2009, ZUS inhabitants gave number one rankings to problems such as the area's bad image and crime. In January 2009, more than half of these stated that their district was affected by these problems (12% and 26% of households for the other districts of the same suburbs or towns). A feeling of not being safe is also more present in these areas: in January 2009, 25% of ZUS inhabitants stated that they often or occasionally felt insecure in their district, and 13% in their home, whereas these figures are 14% and 8% for the inhabitants of other districts of the same suburbs or towns[2].

Beyond the administrative statistics on crimes and offences recorded by the police services and the Gendarmerie units, the results of the "Cadre de Vie et Sécurité" survey reveal that ZUS inhabitants suffer a larger number of attacks than the inhabitants of other districts. Throughout the course of 2007 and 2008, inhabitants from these districts aged 14 years and over were the victims of 14 incidents of theft involving violence per 1,000 inhabitants (6 per 1,000 for the inhabitants of other districts in the same suburbs or towns). The number of acts of physical violence suffered by these inhabitants rose to 132 per 1,000 (111 per 1,000 for the inhabitants of other districts). In addition, they are much more often witnesses to acts of violence, of crime or of destruction and damage to community facilities (51% compared to 24% in other areas).

The public security issue in France is therefore concentrated in almost 700 districts which are to a large extent spread out over the outskirts of large cities. Public authorities, therefore, need to establish a policy aiming at preventing the phenomena of "acts of urban violence", but also define a security strategy which is based on the fight against the underground economy and illegal trafficking which are at the very heart of the marginalisation process of disadvantaged districts.

4. Turf wars

When defining strategies, public security in major French cities involves above all recognising the territory and how it is used by certain young people.

Territory is a unifying element. The estate, the district, serves as a reference and means of identification for many young people (who get older over time). Young people form groups in the space around the estate which may become, if necessary, the site of conflict as well

as the object of what is at stake. This is a phenomenon which is associated with territorialisation and a form of tribalisation and leads to conflict between social order and an "other" order: that of the district.

Territory equally leads to strong solidarity among inhabitants, particularly among young people, living in the same district or block of flats. Such is the nature of this solidarity and identification with the territory that it leads to an appropriation of public space.

Urban crime therefore takes on an indisputable territorial dimension. Thus, the cause of numerous acts is the defence of the territory from intruders. This defence becomes a reality in the form of the rejection of all those who do not belong to the district and of an extreme solidarity between young people from the same district. If a young person is reprimanded by the police forces or by youths from other districts, regardless of the nature of the acts, the youths from the same district will immediately come to the "rescue".

Lastly, the methods of appropriation of the territory by traffickers can equally explain the concentration of illegal activities in certain hands. In the districts where a gang leader system is gradually established, the will to control the whole of a district or an estate can only be realised by acquiring a maximum number of local trafficking operations. Potential competition is thus neutralised and the constitution of an extensive client network represents the certainty of controlling the territory for the gang leader while benefiting from a certain level of protection provided by the inhabitants. The representation of the places concerned and the way in which the spaces in estates are used socially are gradually structured by the economy of trafficking operations, especially that of drug-trafficking. In many districts, entire areas of the space (pavements, alleyways, walkways etc.) are thus monopolised by the traffickers. These phenomena of territorial appropriation then become increasingly difficult to reverse and thus contribute to stigmatising the districts.

5. Territories structured around trafficking

Interpenetration between the levels of engagement in crime is more commonly observed in certain districts. It is as if a type of economic integration and distribution of work were being established among the major traffickers and the more petty delinquents. Hardened traffickers no longer hesitate in lending drugs or money to local delinquents so they may "set up" small deals, in return for the support of these "helping hands" with their own delivery, lookout or intimidation operations.

A rather sizeable diffusion of techniques, which were until then reserved for the bigger criminals, ensues from these exchanges: use of location scouting, of techniques to overcome police observation or tailing, of fake identity documents, of blackmail or of retaliatory acts of punishment which are sometimes barbarous.

Furthermore, these mutations within crime are often part and parcel of a strategy of appropriation and territorial defence which aims to either protect the activity of the groups practising it through the existence of a concealed support base or to guarantee them an outlet market for the proceeds of certain theft or trafficking operations.

The use of violence as an instrument for controlling trafficking operations, the growing use of firearms and attack dogs, the increase in the amount of score-settling between dealers as well as increased attacks, sometimes planned, on the police force, have become the elements of a will to make sanctuaries of certain territories for traffickers. The latter are also skilfully capable of buying support or neutrality by providing smaller helpers with payment or "redistributional" profit-sharing.

For this reason, it is becoming increasingly complex to analyse and interpret certain events which constitute a disturbance of public order and which are all too often termed "urban violence".

In numerous cases, the burning of vehicles belongs to a "ludic", "mimetic" or sometimes "anti-establishment" retaliatory crime. But such a staging, however, can also serve as a convenient smoke screen for the will to cover up all usable traces following a car theft operation, or to mask insurance fraud. Setting rubbish bins, letter boxes or basements on fire sometimes constitute bullying or acts of intimidation or revenge on residents who would be likely to oppose the development of trafficking operations or to act as police witnesses. Lastly, violent turbulence also frequently comes into play in "acts of retaliation" following a police investigation operation as a means of pressurising the local area and dissuading the authorities from launching similar future operations.

The use of violence for controlling trafficking operations brushes aside the utopian dimension that characterised the practices regarding communitarian space (squatting, communes) and drugs in the wake of "May '68". The consolidation of certain trafficking operations in given territories generates specific types of violence which are very difficult to control. The rooting of trafficking operations in a given district, having reached a certain level of sophistication, generates acts of violence which are linked to increasing trade tensions

between all of the trafficking agents or to their need to defend their territory.

The trafficker's main resource is much more connected to the territory than to the product itself. That is the reason for trafficking being very fragmented and in the hands of a large diversity of gangs and districts, or more precisely of district gangs. While North or South American gangs often look to spread their influence and their activities beyond their original territory, in France district gangs generally look to limit themselves to their territory or even to get hold of another estate's resale network, but only if that estate is situated nearby and its network is weak, for example, if all its leaders have been imprisoned. Therefore, resellers' actions are in line with a rationale of securing business around the points of sale that they control. Therefore, the set-up is such that it is the client who comes to the trafficker and not the other way round, leading to a major flow of activity in the district and promoting the fragmentation of trade into multiple independent small structures. Once trafficking is more organised, once it is structured around one or two families or brotherhoods, we then go from a gang rationale to the more classic crime rationale. For the specialised services of the national police, there is a distinction to be made between estate gangs who organise trafficking within their estate and trafficking gangs, those classic networks whose main concern is importation. In the latter case, the gang is cemented by members belonging to the same ethnic group or having got to know each other in prison, rather than by the geographical rationale. It is particularly in these situations that certain districts which appear relatively quiet are victims of the dominance of delinquent gangs, having chosen to "keep the peace" instead of providing the police services with specific reasons to intervene.

The increase in the number of networks also makes it more difficult for the judicial services to act, as they have to fight against the small gangs which are easily replaced, as opposed to a more elaborate structure which is easily thrown off balance.

6. New urban risks

Confrontations or encounters between gangs sometimes take place outside of the home territory of gang members and in neutral areas such as stations, shopping centres, concert arenas, discos, public transport, etc. These areas are used just as much for carrying out "shady affairs" as for the immediate settling of these. They may even involve certain schools if the selection of places respects a certain geographical diversity. Random clashes regularly take place at concerts or other social events where young people meet. Yet at these "neutral" places, events unfold according to rationales which are different from those that govern in the estate. It is the ill-timed encounter or an initiating act which will trigger the clash without there being any premeditation: a sideways glance between two youth gangs, the end of a concert, a police check, (the triggering element of the events at the Gare du Nord in Paris in April 2007). Clashes between gangs or with the police in thoroughfares take place according to numerous random factors, which actually limits the number of them and consequently makes it much more difficult for the police forces to anticipate or intervene in them.

Public space is also a place of expression and protest. Long ago, a well-established tradition made it possible for a partially organised confrontation to oppose the central peace-keeping services of the unions and the law enforcement forces. The last case of this was at the time of the very violent steelworkers' protest in 1979. From the student protests of 1986 onwards, the appearance of a "cluster" in front of the police services front line attacking the police forces before taking shelter within the crowd of protesters was being recorded. The high school students' protests in April 1990 were characterised by numerous clashes with the law enforcement forces and the ransacking of several shops. Again, in 1994, during the protests against the work insertion contract (CIP, *Contrat d'Insertion Professionnelle),* "rioters" used the protests to loot shops before taking refuge in the crowd of protesters, making intervention very difficult for the law enforcement forces. The targets had been clearly identified (the shops), the objectives set (looting) and the clashes with the police forces limited. From 2005 (protests against the Fillon law) onwards, the same delinquents were also attacking the protesters themselves. Rioter violence was thus moving up a notch.

An accumulation of three types of operations riding on protests was therefore being observed: operations against the law enforcement forces and public buildings, against shops and against the protesters, which was particularly visible during the protests against the First Employment Contract (CPE, *Contrat Première Embauche)* in 2006. Youth gangs, coming predominantly from the disadvantaged districts of the Parisian suburbs, directly attacked other young people, mugging them while within the crowd itself. On 23rd March 2006, at the height of the movement, close to 2,000 particularly violent delinquents came up against the police forces while wrecking certain businesses and attacking young protesters.

Public authorities are increasingly faced with new uses of public space and of the temporary privatisation of these for new types of groupings or gatherings. The development of information technologies as well as social networks has recently led to the phenomenon of mass social gatherings which are characterised by their illegality as well as by their way of bursting into urban spaces (flash-mobs, parties in the underground, Facebook parties, etc.). Beyond the purely juridical matters regarding their legality, these gatherings of a new kind pose public order and security problems. How do you handle tens of thousands of people, often young people, never having met before, who gather spontaneously in a public space without being able, as in the majority of cases, to identify the person in charge of the event? Furthermore, the prospect of the appearance of violent, delinquent or terrorist flash-mobs is not just a mere high-school hypothesis. The use of technologies enables anonymity, group mobilisation and coordination without any direct links. Terrorist action could thus go from being a system of cells and closed networks to an open and virtual system before proceeding to the act. Similarly, there is nothing to hinder the development of delinquent flash-mobs, as was the case on the 2nd June 2009 in Philadelphia, when dozens of young people responded to a meeting at a community site aiming to ransack a petrol station. One must also bear in mind the possibility of clashes between the pacifists attending these new gatherings and certain delinquent gangs, who use the same means of mobilisation to engage in attacks while benefiting from anonymity and the diversity of the targets.

The democratisation of public transport, the advent of a consumer and leisure society and the moving of numerous economic poles have considerably modified urban space and have increased the exchange of people between the centres and peripheral areas of large cities. Transport networks have become the vehicles as well as the zones of crime. Flow management and control represents a veritable challenge for public authorities.

7. (Over-) Diversified public policies

France has responded to the development of urban insecurity with approaches that have varied considerably over the course of the past thirty years.

After the sometimes ridiculous discussions around the passing of the law on "security and freedom", the change of government in 1981 contributed to the emergence of a prevention policy which was characterised by an essentially social approach to tackling crime. The founding of the National Committee for the Social Development of Districts (CNDSQ, *Commission Nationale pour le Développement Social des Quartiers)* and of the mayors committee for security,

termed the "Bonnemaison" committee, gave rise to the establishment of local and departmental councils for the prevention of crime (CCPD, *Conseils Communaux et Départementaux de Prévention de la Délinquance)* that were in charge of developing partnerships and implementing actions for improving the daily living of the inhabitants of disadvantaged districts.

Then, at the beginning of the 1990s, urban policy, which until then had been working towards the social development of districts, experienced a significant change of course, as seen in the context of increased unemployment and urban problems. The actions and discussions of 1990 as well as the president of the Republic's speech at the "Banlieue 89" conference in Bron led to the appointment of a minister of state in charge of urban policy on the 21st December 1990 and to the appointment of 13 sub-prefects in charge of urban policy missions in January 1991.

This "urban policy" aimed at improving inhabitants' living conditions using numerous and diverse actions ranging from housing rehabilitation to the promotion of local associative life and including the development of leisure facilities for young people or the setting up of specific schemes which promoted employment access for young people. All of these measures, as well as the sums of money allocated to them over the past thirty years, were to contribute to lowering crime and curbing urban violence, according to the creators of this new doctrine.

Throughout the course of the past thirty years, this policy has known many variations: from the Conventions for the Social Development of Districts (CDSQ, *Conventions Développement Social des Quartiers)* to the Urban Agreements for Social Unity (CUCS, *Contrats Urbain de Cohésion Sociale)* with the City Contracts *(Contrats de Ville),* the measures of the City Revitalisation Pact *(Pacte de Relance pour la Ville)* in 1996, the creation of the disadvantaged urban zones, the urban re-stimulation zones or the tax exempt urban zones and the Pact for Suburban Hopes *(Pacte Espoirs Banlieue)* in 2008 coming somewhere in between, and not forgetting the creation of the National Agency for Urban Renovation (ANRU, l'*Agence Nationale de la Rénovation Urbaine)* in 2004, the Agency for Social Unity and Equal Opportunities (ACSE, l'Agence de la Cohesión Sociale at l'Egalité des Chances) in 2006, the implementation in 2007 of the Interministerial Committee for the Prevention of Crime (CIPD, *Comité Interministériel de Prévention de la Délinquance)*, etc.

Schemes and laws have stacked up without any assessment. Territories which are (positively) discriminated

against have increased in number and there has been a major increase in the sums allocated, despite it being very difficult to fully comprehend the amount of money dedicated to this policy. But all of this was carried out without much consistency, with allocations and subsidies inextricably overlapping or piling up to the point that one could use the expression "jungle of grants and aids"[3].

If urban policy has made it possible to forge partnerships which didn't exist beforehand, its impact in other domains, notably in the field of crime prevention, has been very limited. Moreover, it has often been implemented too late, when problems have already reached the point of no return and intervention is therefore much more difficult.

Reservations and inertia remain excessively present in an urban policy which appeals to goodwill in areas where it often needs to impose. This is a domain where the State should be strong, abstaining from vain boasting, while showing a good example by establishing its services at the heart of the difficult estates. This requires putting a price on it, including in the area of agent remuneration, by breaking, quite significantly for those affected, from the perpetual rule of equality of all civil servants. The latter, often young and from the countryside, sometimes only think about one thing: leaving again. It is possible to motivate them to come and stay by means of faster promotion, subsequent bonuses, provision of (decent) accommodation, and this could even "produce" volunteers. In return, an assessment of their involvement and of their results should be implemented. The State should take the liberty of being able to select all of its civil servants who are to work in the most disadvantaged areas, at all levels of the hierarchy. The solution to the most difficult problems lies in exceptional solutions.

Over the past ten years, the State has also been seeking to develop situational prevention by accelerating in particular the use of video protection in public transport as well as in public areas[4].

Likewise, aware that urban planning could be a risk factor, the law on the organisation of security passed in 1995 made provision for an especially detailed study on public security to be carried out for all amenities submitted for planning permission which, "by their size, location or their characteristics, could impact on the protection of people and property". This pioneering measure is actually fraught with consequences. Apart from making this study a factual issue for planning permission, it assumes that the applicant has the relevant expertise or resources to carry it out, and that State agents have the training needed to deliver an opinion based on the studies

performed. The law on crime prevention of 5 March 2007 enabled article 111-3-1 of the Building and Urban Land Use Code to be adapted to the changes in urban development law and to the practices of land developers. Thus, the new drafting of this article aimed to promote talks between project developers, public authorities and those involved in community work. The procedure arranged for a systematic review of the preliminary public security study (EPSP, *étude préalable de sécurité publique)* by a departmental commission. It took, however, 12 years for the implementing decrees to finally be published[5].

8. Evolving police strategies

In addition to reinforcing the investigative ability of police forces and creating new penal charges, which aim to take into further consideration the development of urban crime phenomena, such as the recent phenomenon gang participation, public authorities have also sought to adapt police organisation to changes in crime.

Two emblematic reforms exemplify this will. The first, implemented in 2002, aims to tackle the underground economy more effectively, which is corrupting many districts, by creating new police investigation units: the regional intervention groups (GIR, *groupes d'intervention régionaux).* The GIR's mission is to fight against the underground economy and the various forms of organised crime. In Metropolitan France, there are 29 GIRs, 21 of which have their remit within the jurisdiction of an administrative region and 8 of which are attached to the Île de France region and have a departmental remit. The GIRs are made up of police and gendarme officers as well as customs and tax officers and agents from the economic competition services. They act mainly with a view to uncovering the networks at work in the estates.

In September 2009, a protocol signed between the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Finance also planned the assignment of the tax service officers specifically to monitoring the districts in which the underground economy thrives. This mainly involves detecting outward signs of the local gang leaders' wealth and of confronting them about their tax declarations and possibly about suspect bank transactions.

The objective of the second reform, implemented in September 2009 as part of the "Greater Paris" reform, is to adapt the organisation of the Parisian police to the scope of the crime pool of Greater Paris. A new urban police force, the police d'agglomération, was therefore created by extending the remit of the Police Headquarters (Préfecture de Police) beyond inner-city Paris[6]. Since

then, the Police Headquarters has been leading and coordinating the fight against crime in Paris and in three departments of the outer suburban area (92, 93 and 94) which has 6.4 million inhabitants. This reform should make it possible to pool the units so as to offer support to the territorial units within the framework for creating intervention forces that can be quickly mobilised and deployed. Bearing in mind the mobility of crime and gangs, as well as the attraction of Paris, the act of sharing all information and operational intelligence obtained by the various intelligence services will likely help to list and monitor gang movements. At the criminal investigation level, "estate" groups have been created in Paris, in the Hauts-de-Seine and Val-de-Marne areas[7], so as to better identify all of the members of a trafficking operation. Other French cities will shortly adopt an identical organisation.

Thus, the city will no longer be the place for crime, but the place of the police. From the faubourgs of yesteryear to the suburbs of today, urban balance depends on the connection between the city-centre and its periphery.

1 The discussions regarding Law no. 81-82 of 2 February 1981, which reinforced security and protected people's freedom, had seen the defenders of a repressive policy and those who favoured a more global approach to delinquency pitted against each other.
2 See Masurel (2009).
3 See the Court of Auditors' report, *La politique de la ville (Urban policy),* February 2002.
4 See Bauer & Soullez (2009) and Bauer & Freynet (2009).
5 Decree no. 2007-1177 of 3 August 2007
6 Decree no. 2009-898 of 24 July and Order of 9 August 2009
7 There was already one in Seine-Saint-Denis.

CONCLUSIONS

PUBLIC SAFETY FROM A METROPOLITAN PERSPECTIVE: THE CASE OF BARCELONA

Carles González Murciano
Marta Murrià Sangenís

1. Public safety, a metropolitan problem

To speak of common spaces is to speak of safety. In recent years, everybody has assumed -to a greater or lesser degree- that entering and leaving these spaces means exposure to a wide range of risks, from rudeness to threats or robberies and even violence. We have also learned -with greater or lesser success- to protect ourselves in these situations. The response generally depends on the resources of the legal system and, above all, of the police. After all, it is the responsibility of the

police forces to establish surveillance and prevention strategies so that crime does not happen. There is a conviction that protecting public safety and exercising public freedoms are basic requirements for coexistence in a democratic society[1]. Although we all recognise the professionalism of our police force and their dedication, it is also increasingly clear that the population's needs with regard to public safety are more extensive. It is necessary therefore, to use more resources than those which are strictly dissuasive.

In recent years, this issue has aroused great interest and made many a pen run dry. It starts from the confirmation that insecurity depend both on real and definite exposure to different manifestations of crime (criminal rates measured by experts) and the way that people live safely together and interact in public spaces. Thus and foremost, it is important to tackle the spatial dimension of safety, because the physical design of spaces can generate insecurity. We all agree that dark and narrow alleys and deserted corners where few people pass by can make us feeling insecure. A long tradition of analysis –from situational criminology to theory on defendable spaces, etc.- has also proven that lighting, upkeep of facilities, their ability to be adapted to different uses and users, thus favouring group appropriation, and avoiding degeneration and vandalism, are all factors that decisively effect the way in which safety and security are attributed to certain spaces.

Secondly, the social dimension of safety. In an urban world like the present one, the history of the city is largely the history of society. However, if urban life is in itself the cause of many positive factors, it paradoxically also generates negative ones, including insecurity. At this point, in the terrain of misunderstandings, there is a big one that must be corrected. It consists of considering that greater quotas of urban wellbeing lead, like a magic trick or a medical cure, to more safety. Since the time cities were first founded, they saw the convergence of both the wealthy and the poor and, consequently, the problems and conflicts that this proximity cannot help but engender[2]. On the street or in the park, the presence of people whose behaviour disturbs or bothers us, especially if they act as if they owned these spaces and make us feel unwelcome in a public space, generates bewilderment and discomfort. They can even cause fear, particularly if these people form part of the collective imagination of danger shared by a majority of the population. Then it is the same whether they experienced a threat, an attack or not, if a criminal event occurred or not, because the feeling of insecurity and risk increases among people who live there.

1.1 The study of public safety in Barcelona and its metropolitan area

From the above, we can deduce that managing public safety is a complex social policy. Aware of this reality, in 1983 the mayor of Barcelona, Pasqual Maragall, established the Technical Committee on Urban Security. Its objective was to create a programme to define basic action areas and propose measures for effective action that the government team could undertake. After 14 months of work, the committee drew up conclusions and several proposals. The final document concluded that the information available in this area represented little more than an initial approach. Thus, it proposed initiating a serious research and study policy framed within global policy on public safety[3].

The *Victimisation Survey and Opinion on Safety in Barcelona* was published in this setting. This study has been performed annually and continuously since 1984, giving rise to one of the most extensive analytical report series on urban security ever drawn up by a local government[4]. The survey was, and is, much more than a mere intellectual operation. It is an excellent tool for well-informed and decentralised political management. Its fundamental objective is to study the distribution of crime and the feeling of safety at a city-wide scope. Inequalities in its territorial shape are understood to be associated with the social differences and different uses of the neighbourhoods and districts (the different appropriation of the city by different social classes).

However, nearly 30 years have passed since the committee's work started. Throughout this period of time, cities have accrued decades of population and activity growth that have made them increasingly larger, as they have developed according to the social needs at any given time. In this process, Barcelona has become the central hub of the continuous city that we know today as the Barcelona Metropolitan Area (BMA). A space has sprung up around it formed of functional relationships, of urban concurrence, of the shared use of supplies and services. All this lets us speak of a differentiated and unique environment with special features and specific needs[5].

With an area of 636 km^2 and a population of 3,218,071 inhabitants[6], the 36 municipalities make up a metropolitan area that is ranked among the most densely populated urban agglomerates in Europe with 5060 inhabitants per km^2. Life in the BMA is dense due to the concentrated population, and it is also mobile. There is a daily interchange of jobs, education, culture, commerce and leisure between the towns in this bustling mass, which make this territorial reality a dynamic, interactive and highly-heterogeneous space.