

Racionalitat**2013/2014**

Codi: 42535

Crèdits: 6

Titulació	Tipus	Curs	Semestre
4313410 Reptes de la Filosofia Contemporània	OT	0	2

Professor de contacte

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Utilització d'idiomes

Llengua vehicular majoritària: anglès (eng)

Prerequisites

- Good reading abilities in English language; participation in class discussion can be done both in Spanish and English.
- Interest in philosophical and psychological debates over rationality, including its relation to language
- Interest in the critical discussion of classical and current texts on the class topic
- Knowledge of basic logic is necessary; knowledge of theories of probability and rational decision is helpful.
- Willingness to prepare the class discussion of one of the readings (summary of one article/book chapter plus preparation of discussion questions and/or critical evaluation of the arguments contained)
- Readings are obligatory unless noted otherwise. Don't just read the course texts passively; work actively with them and come well-prepared to classes. Three questions are always central: What's the author's main claim? What is his argument for the claim? What should we think of the argument's form and premises? Especially for your own presentation of an article/book chapter, please use these questions as guidelines.

Objectius

Theories of rationality should ideally provide us with tools for a number of important tasks: We want to avoid irrationality, or aim at justifying our beliefs and decisions by certain standards of rationality. We want to be clear about whether the reasons for our beliefs and actions are valid or reasonable. Furthermore, we often have to communicate with others about our beliefs and decisions, such as in scientific, ethical, or political contexts, and so we try to convince them using language.

But what do we mean when we say that something, or someone, is rational (or irrational)? What are the normative standards of rationality? How is rationality related to language? How should a theory of rationality be built? What are its presuppositions, its potentials and limits? In the answers to such questions, different thinkers have introduced a bewildering variety of distinctions - such as theoretical versus practical, instrumental versus non-instrumental, individual versus collective, formal versus content-based, or optimizing versus "bounded" concepts of rationality. Similarly, different ideas of language and its functioning have been in the background of many of these debates. The course presents a survey of both classical and current debates in which such understandings of rationality and language emerge. To do so, the course will deal with two major topics: (I) The philosophy and psychology of epistemic rationality (taught by Thomas Sturm); (II) normativity and intentionality in language (taught by Antoni Defez).

Competències

Reptes de la Filosofia Contemporània

- Analitzar críticament i sintetitzar informació obtinguda d'un article o una monografia especialitzada, així com informació de qualitat distribuïda per Internet.
- Analitzar i interpretar temes i problemes de la recerca filosòfica contemporània actual fonamentats en la relació entre ètica, art i política.
- Buscar, seleccionar i gestionar informació de manera autònoma, tant en fonts estructurades (bases de dades, bibliografies, revistes especialitzades) com en informació distribuïda a la xarxa.
- Contribuir als debats de la recerca filosòfica actual fent aportacions significatives, crítiques, amb precisió conceptual i mestria argumentativa a través de l'exposició pública
- Relacionar els conceptes i els coneixements entre les diferents àrees de la recerca filosòfica actual en relació amb les dependències entre ciència i tecnologia i les implicacions ètiques i polítiques d'aquestes dependències.

Resultats d'aprenentatge

1. Analitzar críticament i sintetitzar informació obtinguda d'un article o una monografia especialitzada, així com informació de qualitat distribuïda per Internet.
2. Aplicar en una contribució escrita o oral heurística associada a les teories de la racionalitat que facilitin aquests processos comunicatius.
3. Buscar, seleccionar i gestionar informació de manera autònoma, tant en fonts estructurades (bases de dades, bibliografies, revistes especialitzades) com en informació distribuïda a la xarxa.
4. Explicar de quina manera una teoria de la racionalitat permet mostrar i justificar les relacions entre ètica, art i política.
5. Tenir coneixements de les principals teories contemporànies sobre la racionalitat, especialment de les implicacions socials, polítiques, ètiques i cognitives que tenen per al desenvolupament científic i tecnològic.

Continguts

Part 1. The Rationality of Language: Normativity and Intentionality

Antoni Defez

Rationality is closely related to language: We have to communicate with others about our beliefs and decisions, and we try to convince them or realize our intentions using linguistic means. Moreover, to make this possible, language must itself possess features of rationality, such as normativity or intentionality. In other words, language is an intentional activity subject to rules: language always speaks about something different to itself, and it is a social activity regulated by semantic, syntactic and contextual constraints. So, some philosophical explanation of its intentional and normative character is required. We will discuss classical texts from Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, and Ludwig Wittgenstein in order to explore the way in which two classic antithetical positions have attempted to deal with these issues: the so-called Cartesian explanation and the alternative position of the later Ludwig Wittgenstein.

(Teaching will be in Spanish)

1. (March 25): The theory of judgment and intensional contexts in the origins of Analytic Philosophy: Frege, Russell and the early Wittgenstein

Frege, G., *El Pensamiento. Una investigación lógica*. In *Escritos lógico-semánticos*. Madrid: Tecnos, 1974. (OPTIONAL AND COMPLEMENTARY READING)

Russell, B., *Els problemes de la filosofia*. Girona: Accent, 2008. Cap. XII. (OPTIONAL AND COMPLEMENTARY READING)

Russell, B., "Coneixement per relació i coneixement per descripció", in: *Misticisme i Lògica*. Barcelona: Edic. 62. Barcelona, 1969.

Russell, B., *La filosofia de l'atomisme lògic* (Cap. IV), en *Lògica i coneixement*. Barcelona: Laia, 1985.

Wittgenstein, L., *Tractatus lógico-philosophicus*. Barcelona: Edic. 62, 1989. (#5.54-5.5422).

Wittgenstein, L., *Cuadernos de notas (1914-1916)*. Madrid: Síntesis, 2009.(OPTIONAL AND COMPLEMENTARY READING)

2. and 3. (March 26-27): Learning, rules and private language

Wittgenstein, L., *Investigacions filosòfiques*. Barcelona: Edic. 62, 1997. (I, #142, 243-315, 317, 350- 363, 384, 398-421; II, iv, ix).

4 and 5. (May 19-20): Knowledge and belief in Wittgenstein's late philosophy

Wittgenstein, L. *De la certesa*. Barcelona: Edic. 62, 1983.

Part 2. The Philosophy and Psychology of Epistemic Rationality

Thomas Sturm

"Epistemic rationality" refers to the idea that our knowledge-claims or judgments can be evaluated according to certain standards of reasoning. But which norms should guide our inferences? How are the norms related to the actual ways in which human beings reason? And how responsible do we have to be for our beliefs to be rational? Finally, can we answer these questions from the philosophical armchair, or by the methods and results of the empirical sciences? To answer such questions, we will look at a heated debate in philosophy and psychology over human rationality. This part of the course has three interrelated aims: First, it provides exercises in epistemic reasoning and fallacies; second, it is a philosophical study of a controversy in cognitive psychology; thirdly, it aims at an analysis of epistemological naturalism, its potentials and limits.

(Teaching will be in English, discussion can be in English or Spanish)

1. (March 24): Introduction: Rationality, reasoning and its pitfalls

Botterill, G. & Carruthers, P. (1999). *The philosophy of psychology* (pp. 105-130, "Reasoning and irrationality"). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Tversky, A. & Kahneman, D. (1974). Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. *Science*, 185, 1124-1131.

2. (May 21): Two early philosophical reactions to "Heuristics and biases"

Cohen, L.J. (1981). Can human irrationality be experimentally demonstrated? *Behavioral and Brain Sciences*, 4, 317-331 (comments and responses, 331-59).

Stich, S. (1985). Could man be an irrational animal? Some notes on the epistemology of rationality. *Synthese*, 64, 115-135.

3. (May 22): The "rationality wars" in psychology

Gigerenzer, G. (1991). How to make cognitive illusions disappear: Beyond heuristics and biases. *European Review of Social Psychology*, 2, 83-115.

Kahneman, D. & Tversky, A. (1996). On the reality of cognitive illusions. *Psychological Review*, 103, 582-591.

Gigerenzer, G. (1996). On narrow norms and vague heuristics: A rebuttal to Kahneman and Tversky. *Psychological Review*, 103, 592-596.

4. (June 11): Philosophical reactions to the "rationality wars"

Samuels, R., Stich, S. & Bishop, M., 2002. Ending the rationality wars: How to make disputes about human rationality disappear. In: R. Elio (ed.), *Common Sense, Reasoning and Rationality*. Oxford: Oxford University

Press, 236-268.

Goldman, A. (2008). Human rationality: Epistemological and psychological perspectives. In: A. Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), Philosophie: Grundlagen und Anwendungen (pp. 230-247). Paderborn: Mentis.

Bishop, M. (2008). Reflections on a normative psychology. In: A. Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), Philosophie: Grundlagen und Anwendungen (pp. 249-262). Paderborn: Mentis.

5. (June 12): Rationality and responsibility

Bishop, M. (2000). In praise of epistemic irresponsibility: How lazy and ignorant can you be? Synthese, 122, 179-208

Hieronymi, P. (2008). Responsibility for believing. Synthese, 161, 357-373.

Metodologia

El mòdul s'estructura en 10 sessions de 3 hores i mitja, organitzades en 2 blocs o assignatures, de 5 sessions cadascuna. Les sessions alternaran de manera regular la classe magistral i el seminari, on es llegiran i discutiran els textos fonamentals del curs. Els alumnes participaran de forma activa en les sessions. En les tutories, els professors supervisaran l'elaboració del treball de mòdul, que consisteix en un treball d'unes 10-15 pàgines on s'analitza algun dels aspectes treballats al llarg del mòdul.

The module is structured into 10 session of 3.5 hours each, organized into 2 blocks of 5 sessions each. The sessions alternate between lecturing and seminar discussion of basic course readings. In the tutorials, professors will supervise the preparation of a written paper of 10-15 pages related to some topic treated in the module.

Activitats formatives

Títol	Hores	ECTS	Resultats d'aprenentatge
Tipus: Dirigides			
Classes	37	1,48	1, 2, 3, 5
Tipus: Supervisades			
Supervisadas	13	0,52	1, 2, 3, 5
Tipus: Autònomes			
Estudi, lectures i obtenció d'informació	100	4	1, 2, 3, 5

Avaluació

Please check the master's general guidelines.

Both class participation, quality of presentations and final written work (when applicable) in each segment of the module will contribute to your final mark.

Activitats d'avaluació

Títol	Pes	Hores	ECTS	Resultats d'aprenentatge
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Elaboració treball escrit	50%	0	0	1, 2, 3, 4, 5
Presentació a classe	50%	0	0	1, 2, 3, 4, 5

Bibliografia

- Bishop, M. (2000). In praise of epistemic irresponsibility: How lazy and ignorant can you be? *Synthese*, 122, 179-208
- Bishop, M. (2008). Reflections on a normative psychology. In: A. Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), *Philosophie: Grundlagen und Anwendungen* (pp. 249-262). Paderborn: Mentis.
- Bishop, M.A. & Trout, J.D. (2005) *Epistemology and the psychology of human judgment*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Botterill, G. & Carruthers, P. (1999). The philosophy of psychology (pp. 105-130, "Reasoning and irrationality"). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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- Frege, G., *El Pensamiento. Una investigación lógica*. In: *Escritos lógico-semánticos*. Madrid: Tecnos, 1974.
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- Gigerenzer, G. (1996). On narrow norms and vague heuristics: A rebuttal to Kahneman and Tversky. *Psychological Review*, 103, 592-596.
- Gigerenzer, G. (2008). Bounded and rational. In: A. Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), *Philosophie: Grundlagen und Anwendungen* (pp. 203-228). Paderborn: Mentis.
- Gigerenzer, G. & Sturm, T. (2012). How (far) can rationality be naturalized? *Synthese*, 187, 243-268.
- Goldman, A. (2008). Human rationality: Epistemological and psychological perspectives. In: A. Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), *Philosophie: Grundlagen und Anwendungen* (pp. 230-247). Paderborn: Mentis.
- Grice, P. (1975). Logic and conversation. In: P. Cole & J. L. Morgan (Eds.), *Syntax and semantics 3: Speech acts* (pp. 41-58). New York: Academic.
- Hieronymi, P. (2008). Responsibility for believing. *Synthese*, 161, 357-373.
- Kahneman, D. & Tversky, A. (1996). On the reality of cognitive illusions. *Psychological Review*, 103, 582-591.
- Lopes, L., 1991. The rhetoric of irrationality. *Theory and Psychology*, 1, 65-82.
- Nozick, R. (1993). *The nature of rationality*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP.
- Russell, B. (2008). *Els problemes de la filosofia*. Girona: Accent.
- Russell, B. (1969). Coneixement per relació i coneixement per descripció. In: *Misticisme i Lògica*. Barcelona: Edic. 62. Barcelona.
- Russell, B. (1985). La filosofia de l'atomisme lògic (Cap. IV), en *Lògica i coneixement*. Barcelona: Laia.
- Samuels, R., Stich, S. & Bishop, M. (2002). Ending the rationality wars: How to make disputes about human rationality disappear. In: R. Elio (ed.), *Common Sense, reasoning and rationality*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 236-268.
- Stich, S. (1985). Could man be an irrational animal? Some notes on the epistemology of rationality. *Synthese*,

64, 115-135.

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Wittgenstein, L. (1997). *Investigacions filosòfiques*. Barcelona: Edic. 62.

Wittgenstein, L. (1983). *De la certesa*. Barcelona: Edic. 62.