

Documento 9: Guión utilizado por el Comisario Sir Leon Brittan en el debate de 4 de marzo sobre la propuesta de Directiva sobre el pluralismo en los medios



COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
Office of Sir Leon BRITTAN

Member of Cabinet

Brussels, 3 September 1996

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NOTE TO: COMMISSIONER
FROM: FERNANDO
COPY: CABINET, PETER

Subject: orientation debate on media pluralism
- agenda point No 10 of Commission meeting of 4 September

Updated background

Since the July discussions at Cabinet level we have had UK informal comments in writing - clearly opposing any such directive -, several papers from the European Publishers Council (EPC) some of which have been sent round, around, and I have had discussions with EPC representatives last week to clarify certain points.

Since the Commissioners having reserves on the text have received an EPC position paper, we can leave to them the task of making these points, and instead you could concentrate on one or two political points and on some important technical questions.

List of speaking points

Would like to comment on the questions raised in Mario's information note.

a. Need for a directive and basic approach

I fully agree that any action in this area must be limited to the purpose and object of eliminating barriers to an internal market in media services. In fact, the Community has no competence to deal with media pluralism issues, as Article 128 EEC explicitly excludes "any harmonization of the laws and regulations of the Member States".

Any EC regulatory action in this area should therefore be necessary to achieve an objective of the Treaty - the completion of the internal market -, and be limited to what is strictly necessary to achieve the desired results. Any proposal to harmonize media control by limiting total and national audience shares would fail to meet these two requirements.

First, what are the problems we want to deal with? Media owners have repeatedly told me that they have not faced any problems regarding access to another Member State due to

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differing regulations on media ownership. The only obstacles faced by them are of four types: nationality discriminations, limitations of number of media services providers, limitations on individual shareholdings in media companies, and discretionary powers of licensing authorities. The problem for the internal market in media services is therefore not one of differing regulations, but one of restrictive regulations. Any Community action should therefore deal first and foremost with the elimination of such restrictions to cross-border activities, some of which are simple infringements of the EEC Treaty.

Second, what is necessary and proportionate to deal with the internal market problems identified? Any harmonization of media ownership rules would be both unnecessary and counterproductive:

- politically, media pluralism and ownership is a very difficult political issue within each Member State, leading to very different solutions reflecting a careful balance of interests and views within the country; the proof is that the approaches to deal with the issue are all different, and this has not prevented media groups from expanding across the borders. The issue is a politically vexed and highly sensitive issue, on which the Commission does not need to enter
- if the problem to be addressed is the efficiency of host Member States media pluralism regulations, host Member States are able to control to a very large extent the respect of their regulations: they can block acquisitions, withdraw licences, or impose sanctions: no respectable company would risk operating illegally. The only possible mean of broadcasting which escapes control of host authorities would be satellite broadcasting, but the experience shows that satellite channels are multiplying by dozens and the trend is against concentration and towards easier market entry by newcomers. And, even in this case, if a satellite TV company infringed the domestic law of the host country, the latter could act against the owner which is operating also in the country
- at European level, the application of competition rules is proving an effective mean to avoid the creation or strengthening of dominant positions. The merger regulation and the application of Article 85 for agreements and 86 for abuses are sufficient to ensure that no operator has an dominance, either EU-wide or more often nationally, and that market access and operation by newcomers remains possible. [The Commission has already examined and decided on several cases such as the Holland Media Groep, the Nordic TV Satellite System, or the Kirch/BMG alliance in Germany.]
- the proposed approach is a rare case of *complete harmonisation* of one key aspect of media ownership regulations: instead of proposing certain minimum requirements as the normal approach generally followed in the internal market directives, the ceilings would be the same throughout the EU.

b. Key elements of a possible directive

The technical problems posed by a directive are daunting. Almost every single article of the draft initially proposed poses substantial problems. For instance, and leaving aside many other problems of definition:

- media covered: why weekly newspapers and thematic TV channels are excluded from media concentration rules, even if their influence may be substantial (for instance TIME or Der Spiegel versus regional daily press)? Why the asymmetrical treatment of written press as compared with radio and TV and its exclusion from any 30 % limit?

- media consumption evaluation. Problems here are endless:
 - there is *no single measure of media consumption* nor of its calculation; this leaves with two options: either a complete harmonization - to be ruled out in front of such wide divergencies -, or to leave it to national definition - which would frustrate the very purpose of a harmonized rule
 - *multi-media ceiling of 30 %*: all three media - written press, radio and TV are put together with the same weighting as simple addition, without any regard to the actual influence that they may have -. This is comparing apples not with pears, but with melons
 - the basis for the calculation of ceilings, which is "*all or part of a zone in which the service is accessible to the public*": who decides what is the relevant zone? If it is Member States, they may take a broad definition - the whole EU - or a extremely narrow one - a region, a linguistic area, a village... -, and frustrate the very purpose of the harmonization. And, conversely, we cannot expect getting an EU-wide agreement on what may be the relevant zone, which may in addition change over time
 - what would happen with the smaller countries? The proposed approach *would strangle the expansion of operators in smaller countries* - in most of them there are companies exceeding the limits -, whereas in the larger ones even the largest operators would fail to meet the ceilings: for instance, I am informed that whereas Bertelsmann, one of the world's top three media companies, would not meet the ceiling in its home country, in countries such as Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands and Luxembourg domestic operators would fall foul according to the directive
- [defensive: only three Member States have media pluralism legislation based on audience - IT, NL and UK; but in these three cases the scope of the legislation is much more limited - in the UK, for instance, there are limits only on newspaper owners having a circulation share of over 20 % to own channels 3 and 4, and there are limits on TV for 25 % of audience time.]
- why *automatic ceilings* are imposed instead of reserve powers leaving scope for a more qualitative assessment of the media concentration situation?
- [exceptions: the proposed exclusions indicated in No 4.b) of the information note would include in the definition non-public TV channels.]

c. International aspects

I am most concerned about the impact of a directive imposing EC wide audience based limits on EU-based media services providers. I consider that the net effect of such limits would be encouraging companies which may exceed the limits in one Member State to circumvent the limits by delocalising and operating from outside the EU - be it Norway or Switzerland, from where they could freely operate -. Here I fail to see the rationale of the proposed approach, and we need to be consistent:

- either we recognize that host countries can exercise no or little control for the enforcement of media pluralism regulations vis-à-vis non-established companies, and in this case we have a real problem of delocalisation, since our regulation would have extraterritorial effects and therefore not be accepted by our neighbours; or

- otherwise host countries can exercise such a control - and in this case the rationale of home country control of the directive would disappear.

d. Other considerations

I would like to stop here. But I would like to stress one final point: the economics of the draft proposal are not right. The directive would basically and mostly affect domestic situations, since in most instances media service providers reach the ceilings in their home countries, and only rarely in other countries. According to information provided by the private sector, quite a number of media groups would have to divest, to the detriment of their international competitive position, and this for exclusively exceeding the ceilings in their home country [VNU in Holland, PRISA in Spain, News International, Gruner and Jahr in Germany, CLT in Luxembourg, plus other companies in Fin, Sw, Po and B]. We would therefore end up regulating what is mostly an internal national affair. I cannot therefore see any value or gain in proposing anything which runs counter the subsidiarity principle in a highly sensitive and politically emotional area, especially when the prospects for an agreement in the Council are close to nil.

Annexes:

- letter from Monti
- UK informal reaction
- points made by the publishers (who told me that DG XV tried to buy their support by excluding daily newspapers from the individual 10 % readership ceiling)
- Sir Frank Rogers' briefing.

Documento 10: Portada de la revista mensual de la ENPA (Asociación Europea de editores de periódicos) en la que se muestra el tipo de información que se distribuye entre los grupos de presión. Septiembre de 1996.



ASSOCIATION EUROPÉENNE DES ÉDITEURS DE JOURNAUX

COMPREND :

QUESTIONS DE POLITIQUE EUROPEENNE

VIE DES INSTITUTIONS ET REGLES EUROPEENNES

DÉMARCHES DE L'ENPA

NOUVELLES NATIONALES

NOUVELLES PERSONNELLES

COUP D'OEIL SUR L'AVENIR

AVANT PROPOS

Septembre 1996

CONCENTRATION DES MÉDIAS : FAUSSE ALERTE?

Le report, par la Commission, d'une proposition de Directive en matière de concentration des médias a déjà mené à une première escarmouche avec le Parlement européen.

Le Commissaire Bangemann y a été amené à se déclarer ferme partisan d'une intervention communautaire. Quelques jours plus tard, dans une interview au journal luxembourgeois Tageblatt, le Commissaire Van Miert, en charge de la concurrence, prenait publiquement position pour appuyer les efforts du Commissaire Monti afin qu'aboutisse une initiative européenne.

Les opposants, menés par Sir Leon Brittan, ont l'avantage d'être majoritaires. Les majorités peuvent changer...

L'Assemblée de l'ENPA, le 18 octobre prochain à Dublin, aura à se prononcer sur notre prise de position. Celle-ci devrait insister sur le caractère discutable des critères envisagés (pourcentages d'audience) tant au plan « technique » qu'au niveau des conséquences pour la presse locale et régionale, tout particulièrement.

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Documento 11: Guión del Gobierno norteamericano de 1995 en el que se detalla la estrategia para fomentar sus exportaciones en las tecnologías de la información y sus contenidos. Documento facilitado por la Oficina de la Eurodiputada Carole Tongue. (Fax original y transcripción literal)

From: Paul Evans To: Carlos Llorens

Date: 18/06/98 Time: 15:46:26

Page 2 of 2

1. APR. 1998 12:56

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NO. 050 P. 1/1

**USC Global Audiovisual Strategy
Phase I: January - April 1995**

Introduction

This strategy that follows represents a systematic approach on the part of the U.S. Government to the growing number of audiovisual products, many of which appear to be interrelated, that the audiovisual industry today faces in its global operations.

Key countries/regions

The EU and Canada: Ensure that the current situation is not made more restrictive, either by a tightening of the current rules of restriction or by expanding those restrictions to apply to new communications technologies. Improve the investment climate for U.S. investors by clarifying and liberalizing existing definitions and regulations.

Mexico: Through the NAFTA, as applicable, remove current restrictions on U.S. audiovisual products and ensure that further restrictions are not introduced.

South America: Through free trade area negotiations, remove current restrictions on U.S. audiovisual products (including covering the CFTA "cultural exemption"), and ensure that further restrictions are not introduced.

APEC: Through APEC negotiations, remove current restrictions on U.S. audiovisual products and ensure that further restrictions are not introduced.

China, Russia, Vietnam, South Africa: Exert a favorable influence on "new markets" to ensure that they develop their audiovisual and intellectual property regimes in accordance with market-oriented principles. (Point #4 below is especially appropriate for these countries.)

3. Strategy

1. Avoid unnecessarily raising the level of rhetoric on cultural issues. Sound out key government and private sector representatives to allow them to discuss their concerns. Seek to build common areas of interest with foreign interests through such discussions.

2. Respond to egregious actions in a carefully targeted manner when such a response will lead to removal of egregious action or serve as deterrent to future actions.

3. Link audiovisual issues to the development of advanced telecommunications and communications technologies.

4. Discreetly enlist the support of domestic constituencies

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From the Office of Carole Tongue, Labour Member of the European Parliament for London East.
Socialist Group Co-ordinator on the Media, Culture, Youth, Education and Sport Committee.

To: Carlos Llorens
Company:

Fax Number: 00 32 81 72 52 02

From: Paul Evans
Company:

Fax Number: 44-+181-365 3140

Message:

Dear Mr Llorens,

Further to your fax of the 18 June 1998, please find attached a copy of the document you requested.

I would be grateful if you would refrain from circulating this document.

Yours sincerely

Paul Evans

The Office of Carole Tongue MEP

TRANSCRIPCIÓN LITERAL

USG Global Audiovisual Strategy — Phase I: January — April 1995

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4. Discreetly enlist the support of domestic constituents.

ANEXO 3:
Tablas de facturación de las 50
empresas audiovisuales
 europeas y mundiales
(1993-1998)

Tabla 1. Factuación de las 50 primeras empresas del sector audiovisual en Europa. (1993-1998).

		1993		1994		1995		1996		1997		1998
1	ARD	4755	ARD	4815	ARD	5170	ARD	5086	ARD	5584	ARD	5653
2	Polygram	3418	Polygram	4000	Polygram	4230	Polygram	4438	Polygram	5024	Bertelsmann	4176
3	Kirch	2983	Kirch	3550	Kirch	4023	Bertelsmann	3845	Bertelsmann	4297	BBC	3812
4	Bertelsmann	2643	Bertelsmann	3068	Bertelsmann	3929	Thorn EMI	3116	BBC	3852	Kirch	3544
5	BBC	2617	Thorn EM	2832	Thorn Emi	3643	BBC	3097	Thorn EMI	3628	EMI	3510
6	RAI	2209	BBC	2732	BBC	2520	RAI	2376	CLT-UFA	2581	Polygram	3293
7	Thorn EMI	2188	RAI	2152	CLT	2466	CLT-UFA	2315	Carlton	2562	CLT-UFA	2742
8	Fininvest	2106	CLT	1935	RAI	1917	Carlton	2099	RAI	2544	RAI	2654
9	CLT	1723	Fininvest	1929	Carlton	1903	Kirch	2094	Kirch	2244	Carlton	2493
10	CANAL+	1308	Carlton	1801	CANAL+	1496	CANAL+	1634	BSkyB	2102	BSkyB	2257
11	Carlton	1288	CANAL+	1396	TF1	1407	Mediaset	1601	Canal+	1795	Canal+	1988
12	ZDF	1203	TF1	1280	Mediaset	1373	TF1	1492	Mediaset	1749	Mediaset	1879
13	TF1	1170	RTL	1167	BSkyB	1215	RTL	1349	TF1	1567	TF1	1662
14	RTL	1146	ZDF	1085	ZDF	1149	BSkyB	1262	RTL	1415	ZDF	1448
15	Rank	804	BSkyB	997	RTL	1137	ZDF	1145	ZDF	1407	Granada	1406
16	RTVE	750	Rank	874	Rank Group	910	SAT 1	885	Rank Group	1281	Yorkshire	162
17	BSkyB	706	SAT1	815	SAT 1	868	France 3	839	Granada	983	Rank Group	1379
18	France 3	691	ORF	781	France 2	842	France 2	830	PRO 7	929	RTL	1263
19	ORF	685	France 2	750	France 3	808	UIP	775	SAT 1	892	PRO 7	959
20	SAT1	664	France 3	729	PRO 7	749	Rank Group	762	France 3	836	Sat 1	912
21	France 2	659	SSR	699	ORF	743	PRO 7	761	Channel 4	803	Channel 4	868
22	SSR	613	PRO 7	575	SSR	739	Viacom (NL)	747	France 2	762	SSR	867
23	Hachette-M	442	Granada	527	Nethold	733	Granada	738	Viacom	747	Unit. N & M	837
24	Channel 4	440	Channel 4	524	RTVE	634	SSR	709	ORF	725	France 3	812
25	Central TV	411	RTVE	486	Channel 4	559	ORF	698	SSR	709	France 2	811
26	NOS	397	NOS	486	NOS	557	NOS	694	UIP	605	ORF	763
27	PRO 7	370	Central TV	137	MAI	425	Channel 4	638	NOS	598	Viacom	745

		1993		1994		1995		1996		1997		1998
28	Radio France	360	Yorkshire	381	Radio France	394	RTVE	598	Kinnevik	578	RTVE	641
29	LWT	331	UIP	375	Antena 3	386	Antena 3	461	Unit. N & M	577	NOS	628
30	Granada	329	Radio France	364	Time Waner	367	Time Warner	441	RTVE	550	Sogecable	621
31	Sverige radio	327	Antena 3	343	Hachette-M.	361	CANAL+ (E)	441	Pearson	509	UIP	590
32	UIP	325	Deutsche W.	337	Yorkshire	352	Radio France	436	Cinema Int.	469	Pearson	507
33	Yorkshire	320	Sverige radio	335	YLE	344	Hachette-M.	430	M6	459	M6	506
34	Antena 3	309	LWT	138	Kinnevik	342	Kinnevik	427	Hachette-M.	437	Europe 1	503
35	Tele 5	301	Hachette-M.	322	Sverige TV	342	Endemol	421	CANAL+ (E)	429	Cinema Int.	469
36	DR	301	DR	319	DR	334	Time Warner	410	Radio France	425	Time Warner	451
37	Deutsche W.	289	Time Warner	314	Deutsche W.	334	Sverige TV	405	Endemol	417	Antena3	440
38	PRT	280	YLE	306	M6	331	Cinema Int.	393	Time Warner	410	Endemol	433
39	YLE	277	PRT	294	Endemol	309	M6	370	Antena3	389	Radio France	426
40	NRK	274	MAI	284	CANAL+ (E)	308	TVP	361	Sverige TV	387	Premiere	421
41	Kinnevik	257	Endemol	284	UIP	305	YLE	349	TVP	386	RTL 2	417
42	Deutsche R.	239	NRK	281	NRK	285	DR	343	Premiere	376	Tele 5	405
43	M6	235	Tele 5	262	TVP	284	Yorkshire	338	Deutsche W.	353	Sverige TV	391
44	Endemol	235	M6	275	RTBF	249	Premiere	306	Tele 5	347	Viacom	385
45	RTL-4	226	RTL-4	272	BRTN	248	NRK	283	DR	344	DR	369
46	RTBF	220	MTV	256	Nethold	247	Deutsche W.	274	YLE	340	United Cine.	363
47	BRTN	217	Kinnevik	251	Pearson	238	United Cine.	274	NRK	315	TVP	359
48	MTV	212	CANAL+ (E)	246	Tele 5	233	Unit. N & M	263	United Cine.	309	YLE	351
49	Time Warner	202	Deutsche R.	239	Premiere	221	Tele 5	261	Gaumont	289	MTG	344
50	CANAL+ (E)	199	BRTN	229	Egmont	217	Pearson	251	Yorkshire	162	NRK	338
		46647		48829		53176		54561		61478		63253

Fuente: Anuarios del Observatorio del Audiovisual Europeo (1995-2000). En millones de euros

Tabla 2. Factuación de las 50 primeras empresas del sector audiovisual en el mundo. (1993-1998).

		1993		1.994		1.995		1.996		1.997		1.998
1	Sony	7320	Sony	7.905	Sony	8.837	Walt Disney	14.237	Walt Disney	17.459	Walt Disney	17.444
2	Time Warner	5755	Time Warner	6.267	Viacom	8.772	Viacom	9.818	Viacom	10.866	Viacom	11.259
3	ARD	5579	Marsuh. MCA	6.162	Walt Disney	8.150	Sony	9.087	Sony	9.872	Sony	10.492
4	Marsuh. MCA	5443	NHK	5.743	ARD	6.746	Time Warner E.	7.498	Time Warner	8.122	Time Warner	9.267
5	NHK	5254	ARD	5.650	TimeWarner E.	6.718	ARD	6.790	TimeWarner E.	7.531	TimeWarner E.	8.373
6	ABC /CC	4663	ABC /CC	5.277	NHK	6.043	News Corp	6.200	News Corp.	7.328	News Corp	8.265
7	Nintendo	4502	Walt Disney	4.793	ABC /CC	5.728	Polygram	5.628	ARD	6.295	CBS Corp.	6.805
8	Fujisankei	4155	PolyGram	4.725	Polygram	5.479	NHK	5.617	PolyGram	5.686	Seagram	6.682
9	PolyGram	3992	Fujisankei	4.725	Thorn/EMI	5.263	GE/NBC	5.232	Seagram	5.455	ARD	6.327
10	Walt Disney	3673	Kirch	4.200	News Corp	4.881	Time Warner	5.084	GE/ NBC	5.153	GE NBC	5.269
11	CBS	3510	Nintendo	4.183	Seagram	4.744	Bertelsmann	4.879	NHK	5.091	NHK	4.964
12	Kirch	3500	Time Warner	3.986	Time Warner	4.196	Seagram	4.876	Bertelsmann	4.844	Bertelsmann	4.674
13	Time Warner	3334	News Corp	3.801	Bertelsmann	4.062	CBS/West.	4.145	BBC	4.363	Nintendo	4.048
14	GE/NBC	3102	CBS	3.711	GE/NBC	3.919	Thorn/EMI	3.952	Thorn Emi	4.090	BBC	3.977
15	Bertelsmann	3101	Bertelsmann	3.862	CBS	3.712	Nintendo	3.713	CBS/West.	3.888	Kirch	3.969
16	BBC	3065	Viacom	3.427	Nintendo	3.672	BBC	3.336	Nintendo	3.368	EMI	3.932
17	News Corp	2881	Thorn Emi	3.404	BBC	3.269	CLT	2.938	Fuji TV	3.332	Polygram	3.689
18	Paramount	2837	GE/NBC	3.361	TBS	3.231	RAI	2.792	CLT-UFA	2.910	CLT-UFA	3.072
19	SEGA	2792	BBC	3.274	CLT	2.891	Nippon TV	2.784	Carlton	2.889	Fuji TV	3.066
20	RAI	2583	TBS	2.668	Fuji TV	2.548	Fuji TV	2.690	RAI	2.883	RAI	2.960
21	Thorn Emi	2567	RAI	2.553	RAI	2.507	Carlton	2.662	Kirch	2.530	Carlton	2.793
22	Fininvest	2463	NTN	2.428	Kirch	2.500	Kirch	2.600	Nippon TV	2.509	BSkyB	2.528
23	Blocbuster	2227	SEGA	2.366	Carlton	2.493	Turner BS	2.571	BSkyB	2.370	Nippon TV	2.482
24	CLT	2015	CLT	2.294	Tokyo B.S.	2.449	Tokyo B.S.	2.282	Canal+	2.034	Comcast QVC	2.403
25	NTN	2011	Fininvest	2.292	Nippon TV	2.429	Canal +	2.202	Comcast QVC	1.975	Globo	2.291
26	Viacom	2004	Tokyo B.S.	2.222	SEGA	2.143	Mediaset	2.031	Mediaset	1.972	Canal+	2.227
27	TBS	1761	Carlton	2.151	Canal +	1.957	PBS	1.956	PBS	1.932	Usa Networks	2.212

		1993		1.994		1.995		1.996		1.997		1.998
28	Tokyo B.S.	1753	Canal +	1.648	PBS	1.917	TF1	1.893	Tokyo B.S.	1.895	Mediaset	2.006
29	Televisa	1712	Blocbuster	1.626	TF1	1.832	Comcast	1.836	TF1	1.766	PBS	1.932
30	Carlton	1639	TCI	1.580	Mediaset	1.813	SEGA	1.830	Globo	1.740	Tf1	1.848
31	Canal +	1531	Televisa	1.567	Globo	1.760	Globo	1.760	Sega	1.733	Direct TV	1.816
32	ZDF	1420	TF1	1.517	BSkyB	1.591	RTL	1.711	RTL	1.595	Tokyo B.S.	1.729
33	PBS	1381	RTL	1.384	ZDF	1.499	BSkyB	1.600	ZDF	1.586	Cox Co.	1.626
34	TF1	1370	PBS	1.383	RTL	1.484	ZDF	1.452	Cox Comm.	1.532	ZDF	1.593
35	RTL	1341	ZDF	1.285	Comcast	1.480	TCI	1.339	Rank Group	1.445	Granada	1.560
36	Toho	1209	Toho	1.217	TCI	1.441	Cox Co.	1.239	Direct TV	1.277	Rank Group	1.531
37	TCI	1191	BSkyB	1.191	Toho	1.218	Toho	1.219	Televisa	1.161	Televisa	1.447
38	Liberty Media	1153	Home S. N.	1.126	Rank	1.192	SAT 1	1.122	Granada	1.108	RTL	1.415
39	Home S. N.	1047	Rank	1.041	Cox Co.	1.142	Televisa	1.103	Tribune	1.057	MGM	1.204
40	CBC-SRC	1030	CBC-SRC	999	SAT 1	1.133	Home S. N.	1.068	PRO 7	1.048	Toho	1.168
41	Rank	947	SAT 1	965	Fr 3	1.057	Fr 3	1.064	Home S. N.	1.037	Tribune	1.153
42	BSkyB	838	ORF	928	Televisa	1.037	Fr2	1.053	SAT 1	1.006	Pro 7	1.070
43	Asahi Broad.	815	France 2	889	Home S. N.	1.019	Rank	967	Gannet	959	Sega	1.034
44	France 3	809	France 3	863	Fr2	1.017	Pro 7	966	France 3	943	SAT 1	1.022
46	SAT 1	779	Asahi Broad.	832	Pro 7	977	Granada	937	Channel 4	905	SRG-SSR	970
47	France 2	771	Liberty Media	790	ORF	972	ORF	885	Toho	888	Channel 4	968
48	Rede Globo	728	Tribune	764	CBC-SRC	923	Tribune	877	France 2	859	Gannett	962
49	Tribune	727	Toei	734	Ashai Broad.	915	CBC-SRC	836	MGM	831	France 3	901
50	SSR-SRG	717	Rede Globo	728	Granada	886	Ashai Broad.	820	ORF	818	CBC/SRC	864
51	Toei	662	Paramount	684	Tribune	829	Channel 4	809				
52					Channel 4	736	ABC/CC	477				
53					CBS/West	635						
		122461		134003		150827		157414		164864		176280

Fuente: Anuarios del Observatorio del Audiovisual Europeo (1995-2000). **En millones de dólares.**

En algunos años se enumeran más de 50 empresas audiovisuales como consecuencia de diversos procesos de fusión, pues los resultados de la empresa fusionada y las dos originarias corresponden a trimestres separados.

