Nationalism, National Identity and Territory.
The Case of Catalonia

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## CONTENTS

List of Tables…………………………………………………………………………………… vii

List of Maps…………………………………………………………………………………… vii

Introduction…………………………………………………………………………………… ix

### Part One

**Chapter 1 Explanations of Nationalism**……………………………………… 3
  - Introduction……………………………………………………………………………… 3
  - What is Nationalism?………………………………………………………………… 4
    - Patriotism and nationalism………………………………………………………… 4
    - Nationalism: sentiment, ideology or movement?…………………………… 5
    - Nationalism’s claims: the core doctrine……………………………………… 8
  - Approaches to Nationalism………………………………………………………… 10
    - The primordialist approach……………………………………………………….. 10
    - The instrumentalist/modernist approach…………………………………….. 12
  - Conclusions…………………………………………………………………………….. 24

**Chapter 2 Nationalism and Territory**……………………………………… 29
  - Introduction…………………………………………………………………………….. 29
  - Territory in Mainstream Accounts……………………………………………… 30
  - Nationalism and Territory………………………………………………………… 33
    - Territory and territoriality………………………………………………………… 36
    - Territory and place………………………………………………………………… 37
  - National Identity and Territory…………………………………………………… 40
    - Territorial dimensions of ‘we’ and ‘the other’………………………………… 41
    - ‘Objective’ elements of national territorial identity………………………… 43
    - ‘Subjective’ elements of national territorial identity………………………… 45
  - Nationalism, Territory and Ideology…………………………………………… 48
    - Banal nationalism…………………………………………………………………. 49
| Extra-state channels for regional engagement | 110 |
| Reterritorialisation as Threats | 115 |
| Cohesion in the European Union? | 116 |
| Global versus local versus local | 120 |
| Defensive place-based identities and the ‘power of tradition’ | 121 |
| Conclusions | 127 |

**Part Two**

**Chapter 5 Territory and the Origins of Catalan Nationalism** | 135 |
| Introduction | 135 |
| Mainstream Approaches to Catalan Nationalism | 136 |
| Perennialist accounts | 137 |
| Modernist accounts | 140 |
| The centrality of language | 144 |
| The Symbolic Construction of the *Pàtria* | 149 |
| The *Renaixença* and the *Pàtria* | 150 |
| *Vigatanisme* | 154 |
| The Political Significance of the *Renaixença* and *Vigatanisme* | 166 |
| The changing geography of 19th-century Catalonia | 170 |
| Conclusions | 177 |

**Chapter 6 Past and Present: The Continuity of Territorial Themes in Catalan Nationalism** | 179 |
| Introduction | 179 |
| Town versus Country | 180 |
| Territorial Divisions: the comarques | 186 |
| The Extent of the National Homeland: *Els Països Catalans* | 195 |
| The Graphic Representation of the *Pàtria*: maps and mapping | 207 |
| The Hiking Movement | 210 |
| Conclusions | 217 |
LIST OF TABLES

Table 3.1 The reduction in transportation and communication costs, 1920-1990, at constant 1990 US$ ................................................................. 68

Table 3.2 Estimated annual turnover of foreign exchange, 1979-1995 (US$ trillion) .................................................................................. 70

Table 3.3 FDI Movements since 1982 ........................................................................ 72

Table 4.1 Variants of Fordism ........................................................................ 99

Table 5.1 Proportion of the inhabitants of Catalonia living in localities of various sizes ...................................................................................... 173

Table 7.1 Non-Spanish Immigration in Catalonia (1996-2002) ...................... 234

LIST OF MAPS

Map 6.1 The 1936 Comarcal Division .................................................................. 189

Map 6.2 The 1987 Comarcal Division .................................................................. 194

Map 6.3 Els Països Catalans ............................................................................. 198

Map 8.1 El Temps Places Featured in Catalonia (all mentions) ..................... 272

Map 8.2 El Temps Places Featured in the Països Catalans (all mentions) .... 273
INTRODUCTION

Over recent decades, politics in Catalonia have been dominated by the ‘national question’, or rather by the ‘national questions’, such as who should be considered to be Catalan, and what should the relationship be between Catalonia, the Spanish state and even the European Union. In the case of Catalonia, nationalism is not a novel political phenomenon, nor as isolated one: over time we may trace its roots to the 19th century; over space, it can be thought of as part of a wider tendency, reflected in nationalist political mobilisation in places such as Quebec, Scotland, the Basque Country and Brittany, in more violent manifestations of nationalism such as in the former Yugoslavia, and even in sub-state regionalism within Europe.

However, all such forms of political mobilisation have come at a time when the phenomenon of globalisation has made ‘localist’ politics redundant at best, and the “politics of losers” at worst (Hirst and Thompson, 1996: 180). Why then, within this context, has nationalism, and in particular non-state nationalism, emerged as an increasingly important form of political mobilisation?

I wish to argue that both nationalism and globalisation are in effect both spatial phenomena, or, to be more specific, territorial phenomena. On the one hand, nationalism is essentially territorial, in that the political power that it seeks to exercise in the name of the nation depends on the existence of a territory over which power can be exercised, while belonging to the nation comes to be ultimately grounded in the national homeland itself as the source of national identity. Globalisation, on the other hand, can be said to have profound territorial consequences, since in as much as it implies the construction of global flows of people, images, goods and services, we may talk of deterritorialisation, the process whereby territory loses its power and meaning. However, at the same time, we must also talk of reterritorialisation, in that power over and belonging to territory might become more important in certain contexts.

This is not to say that nationalism has somehow become territorial under contemporary conditions of globalisation; since its emergence as a political movement and ideology over two centuries ago, nationalism has always been territorial, although this has not been reflected in mainstream accounts on the subject. Such accounts
generally situate the genesis of the nation and nationalism in the transition to the modern era, whereby it is claimed that nationalism emerges as a key form of political mobilisation that, for example, ‘constructs’ (Gellner, 1983), ‘invents’ (Hobsbawm, 1992) or ‘imagines’ (Anderson, B., 1983) the nation. For such accounts the way in which the nation is defined by nationalists, national identity, comes to be based on cultural, linguistic, historical, religious or even racial elements, that seek to unite the nation internally, while differentiating it from other nations. In terms of the scope of such studies, the majority seek to offer ‘unity of explanation’ concerning the question of why nationalism emerges with such force when it does. Thus, for some, nationalism arises due to the needs of industrial society (Gellner, 1964; 1983), the liberal state (Breuilly, 1985), print capitalism and Enlightenment thought (Anderson, B., 1983), or uneven capitalist development (Nairn, 1981)

However, despite the attention of such reputed scholars, no general theory of nationalism has been able to explain the wide variety of nationalist movements that have emerged over time and space. Consequently, given the relative failure of such works in this respect, my own contribution to the debate centres, not so much on the ‘why’ of nationalism, but rather on the ‘how’, that is on how nationalism works, and on what terms does it mobilise the nation.

My answers to such questions are essentially territorial. Agreeing with the claim that nationalism and the nation are distinctly modern, I first wish to propose that nationalism is territorial in that the political power that it ultimately seeks to exercise, whether outright sovereignty or some form of political autonomy, is premised on the modern concept of the sovereign territorial state.

The second claim I wish to make is that nationalism does not only seek to occupy and control a given territory, but rather it “derives distinctiveness from it” (Anderson, J., 1988: 18). In other words, nationalists invest a series of differentiating characteristics in the territory that is occupied or claimed, to the extent that it becomes the national territory or homeland. The nation thus comes to be defined in terms of the national homeland itself: to belong to the nation, one must belong to the homeland. In this respect, speaking the national language, for example, is not so much a means of expressing direct belonging to the nation itself, but rather of expressing one’s belonging first to the national territory and only then to the nation.
Thirdly, if the nation and national identity are essentially geographical constructs, then we may introduce the idea of the geography of national identity. The nation is an abstract community in a territorial sense, because it is ultimately the result of the fusion of multiple local contexts of action. Thus, during the process of the territorial production and reproduction of the nation, different places will come to be considered more important than others: they will come to represent the ‘heart of the nation’. Where such places are located will change over time, depending on internal and external power relations. For example, English national identity came to be increasingly associated with the ‘Home Counties’, as London emerged not only as the centre of political, economic and cultural power within England, but within a world empire; at the same time, 19th-century Irish national identity came to be increasingly associated with the people, values and landscapes of the wild and windswept West of Ireland, as a means of differentiating the Irish nation from the English one (Rose, 1995).

Overall, there are sound theoretical and empirical reasons for understanding nationalism as an essentially territorial form of political mobilisation, in that not only does it make claims over a given territory, but it justifies such claims by defining the nation in terms of the territory over which control is sought or exercised. How then might we characterise the relationship between nationalism, defined in this way, and globalisation? In order to answer such a question, I first wish to deepen the way in which globalisation will be understood.

Following David Harvey (1989; 1993), globalisation will be understood in the context of time-space compression, that is the process whereby, given the need of capitalism to continually speed up turnover times and to constantly expand its geographical reach, space is increasingly annihilated as the time taken to move from one place to another is drastically reduced, due to, for example, the introduction of containerised shipping, jet-airline travel or satellite and cable communications. The result is that one of the most important features of the contemporary world is the emergence of global, deterritorialised flows of goods, people, images, data and so forth that no longer belong to a given place or territory in any meaningful way. However, deterritorialisation is not an isolated process: it cannot be understood without reterritorialisation, since social interaction must take place somewhere. On the one hand, for example, global financial flows have not left Wall Street or the City of London redundant, rather their dominance as world financial centres has actually increased over time (Sassen, 1991), while on the other, place-based mobilisation such as
nationalism is equally salient, if not more so now as it ever was over the last two centuries. Thus we might understand reterritorialisation by referring to a heuristic scheme of opportunities and threats. We may talk of opportunities in the sense that reterritorialisation does not mean that existing territorial scales, such as the nation-state remain unchallenged, rather the opposite: reterritorialisation implies a spatial reconfiguration of political territoriosity that effectively promotes both competition and collaboration between different territorial levels of governance, from the local, regional, non-state national level to the supra-state one. At the same time, reterritorialisation also brings with it the idea of threats, since in as much as all place-based political mobilisation such as nationalism ultimately relies on place-based identities, such identities become increasingly important as a means of resisting the effects of deterritorialisation, at a time when power and meaning might be considered to be more difficult to generate in place. The overall result is that many non-state nationalist movements lead a schizophrenic existence: on the one hand, they embrace nationalism as a means of breaking with the hegemony of the nation-state, while on the other, they recoil from deterritorialised flows that undermine the very bases of territorial power and identity.

The central aim of this dissertation is to explore how Catalan nationalism emerged and how it has developed over time. In order to do so, I shall analyse the way in which Catalan nationalism has constructed and reconstructed the nation in territorial terms, the geography of Catalan national identity, and how the territorial bases of Catalan nationalism have changed under current conditions of time-space compression. More specifically, I wish to pursue the territorial understanding of the way in which nationalism constructs the nation by arguing, in the first place, that the demands of Catalan nationalism for political recognition based on linguistic difference, ultimately rely on territorial premises. In this respect, from the very beginning the Catalan cultural revival, the **Renaixença**, was not so much concerned with converting the Catalan language into one of modern literary prestige, but rather it provided the elements for the grounding of many elements of national identity in the national homeland itself, which consequently became the source of that national identity. Such territorial premises, however implicit, still inform the way in which Catalan nationalism approaches the status of the Catalan language and its role as the principal element of national-identity differentiation. At the same time, and of equal importance, is the way in which from the
Renaixença onwards, conservative Catalan nationalism insists upon the centrality of rural Catalonia as the spiritual heartland of the nation, in opposition to the industrialised, urban Catalonia that with its heavy concentration of immigrant population was seen as a threat to traditional Catalan national identity.

Finally, I shall address the way in which globalisation, understood as time-space compression, has not only altered the way in which national identity comes to be constructed, but also changes the very significance of national identity in contemporary times. This is reflected in the way in which the dichotomy between rural and urban Catalonia continues to be promoted, not as a means of promoting the values and thus interests of rural Catalonia per se, but rather due to the increasing need to seek secure, traditional, place-based identities that act as moorings against the ephemerality produced by time-space compression.

In order to advance such arguments, the present dissertation has been divided into two parts, each containing four chapters: Part 1 concerns more general considerations concerning nationalism, national identity and their relation to time-space compression, while Part 2 applies such arguments to the case of Catalan nationalism.

In more detail, in Chapter 1, I shall discuss some of the most important contributions to the debate on nationalism from both the perennialist and the modernist school, in order to explain why nationalism and the nation must be considered as essentially modern, with the nation effectively being constructed by nationalism. Chapter 2 seeks to explain how and why such accounts are to some extent inadequate, in that they systematically fail to come to terms with territory in the ways outlined above. The remainder of the chapter outlines why and how nationalism must be considered as territorial, and in particular analyses the way in which there exist not only sound theoretical reasons for arguing so and but also empirical ones, in that both state-sponsored nationalism and non-state nationalism have traditionally employed resources to produce and reproduce the nation territorially, which we might consider in terms of national territorial socialisation (Paasi, 1995). Finally in the first part, Chapter 3 and 4 discuss globalisation as time-space compression and its consequences in terms of deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation. Chapter 3, while accepting that the emergence of global flows of people, goods, services, image and finance does reflect certain tendencies towards deterritorialisation, critically challenges at both a theoretical and empirical level the more ‘extreme’ accounts that claim that it is an absolute process
across a wide range of social spheres, from the economic to the political and cultural. In this light, Chapter 4 discusses the ‘other side of the same coin’, in that it considers specifically how and why deterritorialisation cannot be understood without the related process of reterritorialisation. Having analysed the way in which reterritorialisation might offer opportunities for sub-state territorial levels of political mobilisation such as nations without states, regions and localities, the chapter goes on to look at how and why political mobilisation around territorial identities might ultimately be considered to be defensive and problematic.

The second part of the thesis, dedicated to the development over time of Catalan nationalism, begins with an analysis of the origins of Catalan nationalism in the 19th century. In a similar light to Chapter 1, Chapter 5 begins by highlighting the shortcomings of mainstream accounts concerning the origins and development of Catalan nationalism, and more specifically, by discussing their failure to come to terms with the territorial nature of nationalism, before going on to discuss how the Renaixença and with it, vigatanisme, a movement of writers and activists based around the Bishopric of Vic in central Catalonia, make a decisive contribution to the territorial construction of the Catalan nation, and in particular its grounding in rural Catalonia. From such beginnings in the 19th century, Chapter 6 discusses a series of territorial questions that provide continuity over time. Thus, not only is attention focussed on the debate concerning the territorial conception of Catalonia, its nature and extent, but also I will outline two key areas, mapping and the hiking movement, which, despite dictatorial oppression, emerged as a means of continuing the process of national territorial socialisation. Moving through time, Chapter 7 analyses the territorial bases of what has become the most important ideological tendency within Catalan nationalism over the last 30 years, Pujolism, the body of ideas and political praxis promoted by Jordi Pujol, president of the Catalan government, the Generalitat, since the first democratic ‘regional’ elections after the death of Franco. Having outlined Pujol’s political career and the main tenets of his thought, the chapter focuses on two aspects of Pujolism. Firstly, the territorial premises of national identity are discussed. The salience of such a question has been heightened by mass migratory movements to Catalonia, initially from the rest of Spain between the 1950’s and the 1970’s, and the current influx, mainly from non-EU countries. Given the importance of language for Pujolism’s definition of who is regarded as belonging to the Catalan nation, I shall proceed to analyse the way in which the current language policy, that justifies positive discrimination of the Catalan
language, is based on the territorial premise that it is Catalonia’s own language: that is the homeland’s, and not the people’s. Secondly, attention will be paid to the way in which Pujol has made a concerted effort to portray himself and be portrayed as a ‘man of the land’, and thus close to rural Catalonia, whose values and traditions are said to be the backbone of the Catalan nation. Given the importance of rural Catalonia for Pujolism, the final chapter analyses the way in which, through the publicly-owned Catalan television, attempts to socialise the nation in territorial terms continue to be made. However, such a vision is considered to be problematic, in that it is not at all clear whether the opposition between rural and urban Catalonia is sustainable in theoretical or empirical terms. Thus, the vision offered of the Catalan hinterland rests on a romantic vision of rural life, the popularity of which seeks to attract urban sections of the population that seek place-bound tradition in the unstable, ephemeral times that symptomatic of wider time-space compression.

So far in this introductory chapter, I have outlined, at a general level, the arguments that I propose to develop in this dissertation concerning nationalism, national identity and territory, and how such arguments can be illustrated in the case of Catalan nationalism. What I aim to do now is to briefly explain the theoretical premises that underpin this thesis, not only a necessary task in itself, but one which also sheds light on certain methodological issues, such as how and why I have relied on the sources that have been used to inform and support my arguments.

Given that the central object of the study is the way in which nationalism produces and reproduces the nation territorially, we may talk of national territorial socialisation: that is, the way in which individuals are socialised as members of a national, territorial community. By arguing that such a process forms part of and reproduces power relations in society, then national territorial socialisation must be considered to be part of the ideological hegemony that nationalists seek to establish. In this respect, attention will focus not only on political actors such as Jordi Pujol, but also on the role of cultural, intellectual and economic actors and practices in the territorial production and reproduction of the nation. Consequently, my study will include an analysis of the work of writers, priests, bishops and even weathermen, not necessarily due to their direct connections to political actors (although in several cases, this may be argued), but rather without their work, particularly at the symbolic level, the Catalan nation and nationalism would not have taken the form that it has done, nor, possibly,
would it have become the political force that it has over the last century and a half. Consequently, the sources used imply a multi-disciplinary approach, capable of coming to terms with nationalism in the broadest sense. At the same time, similar points could be raised in the case of globalisation, in that, as I will argue in Chapter 3 and 4, it is most difficult to talk of the political consequences of globalisation, without understanding the economic and cultural processes that it necessarily includes.

A further point regards the importance of geographical concepts such as space, place and territory for the analysis presented here. Indeed, it might be argued that political science, like many other social science disciplines, has often taken for granted the spatial scales within which political processes take place, paying too little attention to how such spatial scales are related to power relations, and how they are produced and reproduced. In this respect, I have relied on the work of human and political geographers in order to produce much of the theoretically-informed arguments as to the importance of territory in general, and for nationalism in particular. In addition, in as much as a geographic understanding of society seeks to explain differences over space, the current process of globalisation, that I understand in terms of time-space compression, makes the explanation of such differences increasingly important for many disciplines across the social sciences. I would like to think of this dissertation, to the extent that it is possible, as a contribution to highlighting the importance of space, place and territory for political process and their study.

The final point of this introductory chapter the originality or otherwise of the sources used to support my arguments concerning the territorial nature of nationalism in general, and Catalan nationalism in particular. In terms of the Renaixença, the cultural revival that prefigured more explicit national political mobilisation, rather than rely on novel sources, I have interpreted existing ones from a territorial point of view. This might also apply to the development of Catalan nationalism over time. Geographers and regional planners, for example, have long since debated questions such as internal territorial divisions, and the opposition of rural and urban Catalonia, while the hiking movement has always been recognised as a key element within Catalan nationalism. However, perhaps the originality of my own study rests on its ability to place such debates and practices within a specific framework of analysis, that ultimately rests on a territorial understanding of nationalism and the way in which it defines the nation in territorial terms.
PART ONE
CHAPTER 1
EXPLANATIONS OF NATIONALISM

Introduction

Nationalism as a political phenomenon has been one of the most important features of politics in the Western world over the last two centuries. Men (rarely women) have fought and died in the name of the nation, with national loyalty seemingly transcending all others. Nairn, building on Gellner’s assertion that it was the steam engine and the industrial revolution that have provided the subject of philosophical enquiry over the last two hundred years, goes further and claims that it has been nationalism itself (Nairn, 1997: 1). Despite the importance of the phenomenon, social scientists have consistently failed to come to terms with it, nor have they been able to offer any kind of conclusive arguments as to how and why nationalist movements emerged when they did, and, indeed, why they continue to do so. It was commonplace until the 1970’s and even beyond to begin any discussion on the subject with “remarks about the paucity of literature and the fact that many interpretations saw it as an irrational force rooted in atavistic sentiment” (Johnston et al., 1988: 1. See also, for example, Kellas, 1993: 49-50, and Keating, 1988: 1).

However, as Benedict Anderson points out, “the post 1960’s period has seen an explosion of sophisticated writing about nationalism” (Anderson, B., 1998: 9). Such “sophisticated writing” refers to a series of general theory that has basically centred on finding answers to the question “why such [nationalist] movements became so important when they did” (Breuilly, 1998: 149), with attention focussing on the origins of nationalism and its development in Western Europe and beyond from the late Middle Ages onwards, although the majority of authors have narrowed the temporal scope of their work, beginning with the 18th century. Benedict Anderson, in the introduction to one of the numerous, extremely useful texts that seek to offer a broad spectrum of approaches to nationalism, contends that despite the great quantity and quality of academic literature on the subject to have appeared over recent decades, “it is hard to think of any political phenomenon which remain so puzzling and about which there is
less analytical consensus” (Anderson, B., 1998: 1). Disagreement rages over basic definitional questions, such as ‘what is the nation?’, ‘what is its relation to nationalism and to the state?’, ‘why and how did nationalism emerge with such force when it did?’ In more recent times, particularly since the collapse of the bipolar world order, a new context has emerged for nationalism, globalisation, that might be considered as replacing the state as the key context within which nationalism may be analysed. However, as we shall see in Chapters 3 and 4, the traditional problems surrounding nationalism from an academic point of view have meant that once more, there is little basic consensus about the nature of the phenomena under conditions of globalisation.

In this context, the current chapter seeks to discuss some of the key questions that nationalism raises and also some of the most important theoretical contributions to answering such questions. The objective is to critically engage such accounts in order to be able to ground my own understanding of nationalism, before going on to develop such an understanding in Chapter 2, where the discussion moves on to the questions of why and how territory must be included in any analysis of nationalism.

What is Nationalism?

Patriotism and nationalism

For over two hundred years, the term ‘nation-state’ has loomed large in the vocabulary of almost all parts of the world: “[t]he state needs the nation for legitimacy, and the nation needs the state to fulfil its aspirations” (Kaplan, 1999: 34). The question arises as to the extent to which patriotism and nationalism can be conceptually distinguished. On the one hand, some scholars and certain nationalists themselves argue that there is a fundamental difference, with the former reflecting political mobilisation around and loyalty to the state and its symbols, such as the constitution or the crown, while nationalism relates to the nation itself. In current Spanish politics, for example, the ruling Partido Popular, invokes Habermas’ concept of ‘constitutional patriotism’ in opposition to the ‘nationalism’ of the Basques and Catalans. However, Billig is critical of the way in which the term of ‘nationalism’ is restricted to “social movements, which seek to re-draw existing territorial boundaries and which, thereby, threaten the existing national status quo” since “nationalism becomes identified as a problem: it occurs
‘there’ on the periphery, not ‘here’ at the centre. The separatists, the fascists and the guerrillas are the problem of nationalism” (Billig, 1995: 6). The consequences are that the “ideological habits by which ‘our’ nations are reproduced as nations, are unnamed and, thereby unnoticed” (Billig, 1995: 6). In order to differentiate semantically, although not in its essence, between the “flag waved by Serbian ethnic cleansers and that hanging unobtrusively outside the US post office”, he introduces the term ‘banal nationalism’ (Billig, 1995: 6). However, the point to be made here, is that conceptually there is very little difference between state nationalism and non-state nationalism; the term ‘nation’ trips off the tongue with equal ease. The ‘State of the Nation’ address, the ‘national’ football side presuppose the existence of a nation and as such form part of the phenomenon of nationalism as much as any campaign for national self-determination or for signatures in favour of the establishment of ‘national’ teams for a nation without a state. Consequently, it may be argued that the term ‘patriotism’ merely seeks to perpetuate the dominance of one national group over another by taking for granted the existence of ‘our’ nation, whilst putting in doubt that of the ‘other’.

Nationalism: sentiment, ideology or movement?

The next question that arises is how, at a general level, can nationalism be conceptualised? In the extensive literature on the subject, nationalism has variously been understood as popular sentiments towards the nation, as an ideology or doctrine, and as a political movement (see for example Hall, 1993; Breuilly, 1998; and Smith, 1994). The first approach focuses on the extent to which a population develops sentiments of national belonging or national consciousness (Breuilly, 1998: 147), of which Guibernau provides an excellent example when she says that: “[b]y ‘nationalism’ I mean the sentiment of belonging to a community whose members identify with a set of symbols, beliefs and ways of life, and have the will to decide upon their common political destiny” (Guibernau, 1999: 14). While a seemingly attractive approach, it would appear to imply a series of problems. First of all, attempts to measure the strength of such feelings over time are especially difficult, particularly if one focuses attention on the emergence of nationalism in the nineteenth century, given the absence of reliable quantifiable evidence. Secondly, as Smith (1994) points out, there is not always a strict correlation between the development of nationalist ideology, political movements and
national consciousness. The former generally precede the latter, although not always. Thirdly, by placing national consciousness at the centre of a conceptualisation of nationalism, there would appear to exist the temptation to pre-empt its existence, and as such treat it as a ‘given’. The problems associated with this approach are discussed below in dealing with primordialist accounts of nationalism and the nation.

Leaving aside such an approach, the dilemma remains as to whether it is preferable to study nationalism as an ideology or as a political movement, or as a combination of the two. While numerous works exist that use either one or other of these approaches, Smith argues rather convincingly that:

“[i]deology and movement [...] usually go together. One could, of course, have the ideology without the movement, in the sense that one might identify a few writers who held nationalist beliefs but who were too few to form a movement with political demands; but the reverse is inconceivable, by definition. In practice, there is a relatively swift transition from the early nationalist intellectuals to the birth of a nationalist movement” (Smith, 1994: 379).

As such, he treats nationalism as an ideological movement, although he recognises Hroch’s contention that there exist several, analytically separate stages in the process of nationalist mobilisation¹.

Thus, the conceptualisation of nationalism that will inform my own work on the subject will be the ‘mixed’ approach, defended by Smith, in which emphasis is placed on both the work of intellectuals in developing nationalist ideology, that informs and to some extent justifies the political praxis of political entrepreneurs and nationalist movements in general. However, I do not wish to discard the element of national sentiment altogether, since whatever suspicions exist over the true motives of nationalism, nationalist discourse is by definition social, in that it makes claims on behalf of a community, the nation. In addition, there appear to be good grounds for relating the rise of nationalism with the rise of mass society; in Nairn’s famous words, “[t]he new middle-class intelligentsia of nationalism had to invite the masses into

¹ Miroslav Hroch’s work (see, for example, 1985, 1998) seeks, among other things, to overcome one of the main problems associated with Gellner’s theory of nationalism, namely its inability to come to terms with the emergence of nationalism at different times, including pre-industrial ones. As such, Hroch constructs a framework for the comparative analysis of nationalism that divides its development into stages, beginning with small-scale intellectual activity, right through to the stage of mass mobilization.
history” (Nairn, 1981: 340). As such, while nationalism will mainly be understood as an intimate mixture of ideology and political praxis, the extent to which it resonates in wider society must surely be taken into account, since nationalism has been and is important in many areas of the world precisely when it is able to mobilise broad sections of the population.

Before going on, it is perhaps worthwhile to clarify what we might mean by the concept of ideology, given that since the invention of the term in the midst of the Enlightenment as the ‘science of ideas’, it has come to mean very different things: from misrepresentations, illusions and false consciousness to ideas and beliefs in general (Paasi, 1995: 29). Without wishing to pre-empt the discussion that follows on my own understanding of the nature of nationalism, a definition of ideology that would appear to ‘fit’ such an understanding is that put forward by James Anderson, whereby ideology represents “a system of ideas which give a distorted and partial accounts of reality, with the objective and often unintended effect of serving the partial interests of a particular group or class. Typically they do so by appearing to represent the interests of all the various groups in society” (Anderson, J., 1973: 1). Thus, for the moment, let us say that nationalism is ideological in that it seeks to appeal to the category of nation above and beyond other social categories such as gender, class, age, etc. In Chapter 2, we shall see in what way nationalism is a territorial ideology.

To sum up briefly then, I will understand nationalism as an ideological and political movement, with the key participation of intellectuals and political entrepreneurs that make a series of claims in the name of the nation. While clear, for the moment it is not particularly useful in that it must be built upon since, as Sack points out, a definition must not only be clear but also useful, it must: in other words, not only tell us what nationalism is, but also tells us what it does, and in order to do this it must “point to connections with other attributes” (Sack, 1986: 18). The next part of this chapter seeks to discuss the claims that nationalism makes on behalf of the nation, and the interpretations that leading theorists have made of them.
Nationalism’s claims: the core doctrine

If nationalism is about making claims on behalf of the nation, what claims does it make? Are such claims justifiable? What can they tell us about the relationship between nationalism, the nation and national identity?

As noted already, one of the most striking features of attempts to theorise about nationalism, the nation and national identity is the lack of consensus among the majority of those who have contributed to the field. The disparity of nationalist movements across time and space has led some to renounce the term ‘nationalism’ in favour of the plural ‘nationalisms’ (see, for example Hall, 1993; and Nogué i Font, 1991). However, it is possible to perceive certain consensus as to the nature of the principle claims, or core doctrine, of nationalism, although, once more, this must be qualified. Anthony Smith (Smith, 1983, 1994) defends the universality of such claims, in that he argues that they form part of what may be considered to be a ‘world view’, and thus particular nationalists’ claim are valid for all nations, while Breuilly comments that such a position means that the Nazism of Hitler’s Germany is denied the label of nationalism in that it denied a similar status for other would-be nations (Breuilly 1983). Thus, in order to overcome this perceived problem, Breuilly offers a more ‘particularist’ approach, in that the claims made by individual nationalist movements, are said to be made only on behalf of the particular nation in question. In the context of post-1978 politics in Spain, for example, differences very definitely emerge between nationalist doctrine and nationalist political praxis, in that while the principal non-Spanish nationalist parties agree, at an abstract level, on the need for recognition of special rights for each of the history nations of Spain, in practice nationalist demands of the Spanish state have been very much focused on obtaining benefits for the individual national community in question.

But if we can agree that by baring away the bones we may identify a series of basic claims that nationalism makes in the name of the nation, then such claims could be summarised in the following way:

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2 For a fuller discussion on nationalism’s core doctrine, see Benner (2001).
– The first claim is that “there exists a nation, a special group which is set apart from all other human beings” (Breuilly, 1998: 149).

– Secondly, nationalists generally seek to ground national identity in history, a history which in many cases reveals a golden or idyllic past.

– Thirdly, the nation has a goal or a destiny which is best realised within the context of a sovereign state, or if not, some form of political autonomy. Thus, actually existing states seek to maintain sovereignty over national territory to ensure the survival and/or development of the nation, while nations without states, claim independent states as the best means of fulfilling the nation’s destiny (see, for example, Breuily 1982; Gellner 1983; Hobsbawn 1992)³.

– Finally, “political identity and loyalty are, first and foremost, with and to the nation” (Breuilly, 1998: 149).

By analysing these claims we can go at least some way to understanding nationalism better, and its relation with the nation and national identity. Of course, whether such claims can be taken at face value is the subject of fierce debate. At both the substantive and the theoretical level, approaches to nationalism have been divided on two main questions:

– Firstly, whether the nation is an organic or primordial entity (primordialists or essentialists), or on the contrary, the nation is a social construct, somehow ‘invented’, ‘created’ or ‘imagined’ by nationalists (instrumentalists); and

– secondly, whether nations are perennial, extremely old, if not eternal (perennialists), or, on the other hand, they are more recent products of the modern age (modernists).

³ Of course, a key objection to such a claim is, what happens when a self-defined nation stops short of demanding an independent state and appears satisfied with ‘mere’ political autonomy, as in the case of Scotland, Wales, and Catalonia, for example. For such cases, Yiftachel prefers the term ‘ethnorregionalism’ as “distinct from ethnonationalism by its lack of drive for ethnic sovereignty” (Yiftachel, 1999: 241). Others, such as Keating prefer the term regionalism to nationalism not to deny the nationalist aspirations of such nations as the Scots, Galicians and Catalans, but rather to reflect “the movement away from framing such aspirations in terms of the nation-state towards the broader continental or even global context” (Keating, 1996: 40). However, on the one hand, Herb points out that “the fact that the Catalans seem to be content with a large degree of autonomy within an existing state does not contradict this claim. At a pragmatic level, this might simply be the most expedient solution. However, as soon as the political realities threaten crucial aspects of the nation, the demand for an independent state will resurface” (Herb, 1998: 16. See also Hroch, 1998: 97 n4). On the other, expediency apart, nationalism is qualitatively different from regionalism in the claims that it makes on behalf of the community in question, the nation, and is thus worthy of study apart, irrespective of whether sovereignty is the declared, explicit goal of a particular nationalist movement at any one time.
In general, there can be said to be a certain overlap between the various approaches. As one might expect, perennialists and primordialists may share assumptions relating to the nation and nationalism, while the same may be said of modernists and instrumentalists. However, as one might also expect, in the case of what are undoubtedly most problematic phenomena, exceptions are perhaps the rule, and as such it is perhaps worthwhile analysing some of the more influential contributions to the debates on nation and nationalism, not so much to ‘present’ such theories, which are, in any case well known and are covered by a rich and informative body of work already, but rather in order to clarify and deepen the understanding of nationalism that I wish to propose here.

Approaches to Nationalism

The primordialist approach

The primordialist or essentialist approach to nationalism is that adopted by many nationalists themselves, and is based upon an intellectual tradition that can be traced back to writings of Herder and Fichter in early 19th-century Germany, although “is at present out of fashion among scholars of ethnicity and nationality” (Smith, 1994: 376). The central premise of primordialists is that the nation exists, not as a social construct, as instrumentalists would have us believe, but as a given, organic entity. As such one is born into the national community, much as one is born into a family. The nation, in this approach, was originally defined as a language community, although as Nairn points out, “for around a hundred years, various forms of scientific or, as we know now, pseudo-scientific racism appropriated this mode of discourse and made it into a justification for the domination, oppression and occasionally extermination” (Nairn, 1997: 9). With the defeat of Nazi Germany and the rise of social modernisation theory, primordialist approaches to nationalism based on racial definition of the nations went very much out of fashion, adopting instead primordialism based upon cultural and historic factors, even allowing for subjective or ‘participants’ primordialism with the work of Shils (1957) and Geertz (1963).
“Here the primordial sentiment was attributed to the participants. It was and is the members of ethnic communities and nations who feel their communities are primordial, existing almost ‘out of time’ and having an ‘ineffable’ binding and almost overpowering quality. It is no part of this approach to suggest that such communities are primordial, only that the members feel they are” (Smith, 1994: 376).

More recently, the trend might seem to have been reversed, at least partially, with attempts by sociobiologists such as Van den Berghe (1979) “to explain ethnic ties in terms of genetic reproductive success and inclusive fitness, the ethnic community representing an extended family in time and space” (Smith, 1994: 376).

Overall, and in terms of a world view, primordialists see the world naturally divided into nations, with Herb highlighting “the geographer Bernard Nietschman (1994) [who] claims that there are 5,000-8,000 nations in the world. He considers them the only true or organic group entities and crucial for the survival of the planet because these nations have evolved through a harmonious relationship with the local environment” (Herb 1999: 14).

From this central premise of the giveness of the nation, primordialists overlap with perennialists in that, as an organic entity, the nation is unchanged over time, and thus its roots go back, if not indefinitely, then at least a very long time, for example to the settlement of tribes in a given area

Looking forward over time, the destiny of this unchanging, organic entity that is the nation is best ensured, in the current context, by self-government, preferably, although not necessarily in the form of a state. Primordialists, and above all nationalists, thus find it ‘natural’ that the national community commands the supreme loyalty of its members, who are thus willing to make the ultimate sacrifice in its defence.

Thus, individuals are bounded by ties of blood, language and history to the nation, an organic entity that is reified to the extent that it is invested with its own will and destiny. As such, “nationalism is the expression of the nation. The nation desires independence and the nationalists simply articulate and try to realise that desire”

4 Nairn for example talks of how Slovakian nationalists trace their origins back to the settlement of Slavic tribes in the “Tatra-Danubian homelands”, with a direct parallel made with Scots in Scotland (Nairn, 1997: 7).
(Breuilly, 1998: 18-19). In other words, it is the nation that produces nationalism and not vice-versa.

**The instrumentalist/modernist approach**

For the majority of scholars of nationalism, especially those who adopt the instrumentalist/modernist approach, the interpretation of nationalism’s core doctrine made by the primordialists must be called into serious question. Such scholars contend that the nation does not generate nationalism, but rather it is nationalism that ‘invents’, ‘creates’ or ‘imagines’ the nation. The general position is founded on two premises: firstly that the nation, far from being an organic, natural entity is very much a social construct. Nationalists either take advantage of existing ethnic ties such as language or culture, or reinvent them in order to provide a “social and political resource, a constructed repertoire of cultural elements that afford a site for political mobilization” (Smith, 1994: 377).

Secondly, the nation is not immemorial nor perennial, but was rather invented by nationalists relatively recently, during the transition from traditional to modern society, characterised by phenomena like “capitalism, industrialism, the bureaucratic state, urbanisation and secularism” (Smith, 1994: 377). In this respect, many modernist theorists have centred their attention on the efforts of nationalists to invent traditions, hence the importance in many nationalist movements of intellectuals such as historians, ethnographers and archaeologists. The work on nationalism of Hobsbawn (1992, 1983) probably represents the firmest rejection of such theses, with his views on this point summed up in the following passage:

“I cannot but add that no serious historian of nations and nationalisms can be a committed political nationalist, except in the sense in which believers in the literal truth of the Scriptures, while unable to make contributions to evolutionary theory, are not precluded from making contributions to archaeology and Semitic philology. Nationalism requires too much belief in what is patently not so. As Renan said: ‘Getting history wrong is part of being a nation’. Historians are professionally obliged not to get it wrong, or at least to make an effort not to. [...] Some nationalist historians have been unable to do so” (Hobsbawm, 1992: 12-13).
However, of all the theorists of nationalism that can be included within the instrumentalist/modernist approach, Ernest Gellner deserves special attention. The publication of the chapter entitled “Nationalism” in a collection of essays *Thought and Change*, in 1964, which was later built upon by *Nations and Nationalism* in 1983, “represented the first full-blown attempt to understand nationalism from a theoretical point of view” (Nairn, 1997: 1), and Gellner’s works have been praised as the “most complex and original attempts to come to terms with the ubiquitous phenomenon of nationalism” (Smith, 1983: 109). In an area of research that can only be characterised as a minefield, Gellner’s works have been the object of many critiques, although they have without doubt established the terms of debate surrounding the study of nations and nationalism over the last thirty years or so, and as such they are probably the best place to start any analysis of instrumentalist/modernist theories of nationalism.

Gellner’s neo-Weberian theory of nationalism situates the rise of the nation and nationalism in the transition from what he calls agrarian society to industrial society. At the level of definition, nationalism is considered as “primarily a political principle which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent”, which may give rise to national sentiment, “the feeling of anger aroused by the violation of the principle, or the feeling of satisfaction aroused by its fulfilment”, and also nationalist movements, which are “actuated by a sentiment of this kind” (Gellner, 1983: 1).

Gellner’s account of nationalism and the nation seeks to demonstrate that it is nationalism that creates the nation and that this occurs with the transition from agrarian to industrial society, and as such both the nation and nationalism are considered to be essentially modern. Before the age of modernity,

“[t]here was no room for nations or nationalism in agrarian society, for there was no need to unify the tiny elite strata and the vast mass of peasant food-producers and tribesmen subdivided into their many local cultures. Nor was there any chance of generating a sense or ideology of the nation from an aristocratic or clerical culture that stressed its elite status” (Smith, 1994: 377).

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5 Gellner’s theory represent “a sort of compromise between historical materialism and common sense” (James, 1996: 130), although he goes out of his way to avoid overtly Marxist terminology such as ‘feudal’ and ‘capitalist’ society. This was mainly due to the fact that Gellner was a “conservative liberal who detested political Marxism, and spent his last years, back home in Prague, trying to ensure nothing like that would ever happen again in Central Europe” (Nairn, 1997: 12).
Thus, agrarian society was marked by the establishment of horizontal cultural cleavages between the ruling classes and the food-producing masses. All of this changes, according to Gellner’s account, with the transition to industrial society, which requires a complex division of labour, geographical and occupational mobility. Society’s members “must possess that generic training which enables them to follow the manuals and instructions of a new activity or occupation” (Gellner, 1983: 35), and they must be able to communicate with relative strangers, both verbally and in written form. “Hence these communications must be in the same shared and standardised linguistic medium and script. The educational system which guarantees this social achievement becomes large and is indispensable” (Gellner, 1983: 35), with only the state being large enough to guarantee it and to control it. He goes on to ask,

“What are the implications of all this for society an for its members? The employability, dignity, security and self-respect of individuals, typically, and for the majority of men now hinges on their education; and the limits of the culture within which they were educated are also the limits of the world within which they can, morally and professionally, breathe. A man’s education is by far his most precious investment, and in effect confers his identity on him. Modern man is not loyal to a monarch or a land or a faith, whatever he may say, but to a culture” (Gellner, 1983: 36).

Thus the state, and the political power that it represents, must no longer be culturally differentiated from the members of society, since the cultural cleavages between rulers and the ruled of agrarian society necessarily disappear with the irruption of industrial society

Following this logic, it is not difficult to see how the nationalist principle of political legitimacy emerged, whereby “ethnic (or cultural) boundaries should not cut across political ones, and ethnic (or cultural) boundaries within a state should not separate the power-holders from the rest” (Gellner, 1983: 1). Gellner goes on to recognise that nationalism as a principle has been very difficult to implement, in that political boundaries very rarely fully coincide with cultural ones, and thus “the age of transition to industrialism was bound, according to our model, also to be an age of nationalism, or a period of turbulent adjustment [...] violent and conflict ridden. Actual
historical facts fully confirm these expectations” (Gellner, 1983: 40). Despite this turbulence, for Gellner it would be somehow wrong to demonise nationalism, to blame it for the violent upheavals, often perpetrated in its name. Nationalism is not the result of the machinations of evil-minded intellectuals and politicians, but is rather the objective response to the functional demands of industrialisation. However, this is not to say that nationalism, despite its functionality, is not a very powerful principle, indeed it “has very, very deep roots in our shared current condition, is not at all contingent, and will not be easily denied” (Gellner 1983: 56) precisely because of the loyalty that culture inspires within the population, which thus seeks to make the culturally-defined nation compatible with the state. Thus nationalism, objectively determined at a general level by the transition from traditional to industrial society, inverts the relationship between the nation and nationalism that nationalists themselves put forward:

“it is nationalism that engenders nations and not the other way round. Admittedly, nationalism uses the pre-existing, historically inherited proliferation of cultures or cultural wealth, though it uses them very selectively, and it most often transforms them radically. Dead languages can be revived, traditions invented, quite fictitious pristine purities restored” (Gellner, 1983: 55-6).

By way of overall summary, Gellner’s approach may be resumed in the following passage:

“It is not the case that the ‘age of nationalism’ is a mere summation of the awakening and political self-assertion of this, that, or the other nation. Rather, when general social conditions make for standardised, homogeneous, centrally sustained high cultures, pervading entire populations and not just elite minorities, a situation arises in which well-defined educationally sanctioned and unified cultures constitute very nearly the only kind of unit with which men willingly identify. The cultures now seem to be the natural repositories of political legitimacy. Only then does it come to appear that any defiance of their boundaries by political units constitutes a scandal” (Gellner, 1983: 55).

As noted above, Gellner’s work has had an enormous influence over the academic study of nationalism in the last four decades, and has, indeed, provided the
starting point for many authors who have, in one way or another, sought to ‘fill the gaps’ that they perceive Gellner to have left. From within what might be referred to as the social modernization approach, two areas of criticism may be identified. Firstly, as James points out “we need to take seriously the fact that people are prepared to die for their nation, and not simply because of a willed national spirit or a deluding national ideology” (James, 1996: 126). Gellner’s ‘top-down’ approach, which concentrates on nationalism as fulfilling the functional needs of the industrialising state, has been identified as being unable to explain this kind of sacrifice, and this is precisely what Benedict Anderson’s work on nationalism, among others, seeks to explain. Secondly, problems have been highlighted by, among others Breuilly and Hroch, on the causal relation within Gellner’s account between industrialisation and nationalism, in that nationalism has emerged in societies in which industrialisation was absent. The aim here is to discuss such attempts to fill the gaps that Gellner would appear to have left, from within the social modernization approach, before going on to discuss other accounts of nationalism outside such an approach that may contribute to our overall understanding of the phenomenon.

Turning, then, to Benedict Anderson, whose *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism*, seeks to explain “why, today [nationality and nationalism] command such emotional legitimacy” (Anderson, B., 1983: 13-14). First of all, Anderson proposes that, while accepting that the nation is a recent, modern construct, brought into being by nationalism, we treat the latter alongside kinship and religion, in other words as a sentiment, as opposed to an ideology such a liberalism or fascism, with the nation conceived of as “an imagined political community - and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign” (Anderson, B., 1983: 15). In this respect, he takes issue with Gellner’s famous phrase that “nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations where they do not exist”. For Anderson, the “drawback to this formula is that Gellner is so anxious to show that nationalism masquerades under false pretences that he assimilates ‘invention’ to ‘falsification’ and ‘falsity’, rather than to ‘imagining’ and ‘creation” (Anderson, B., 1983: 15). As such “all communities larger than the primordial villages of face-to-face contact (and perhaps even these) are imagined” (Anderson, B., 1983: 15). What we need to explore and analyse is what particular kind of imagination emerged to permit ‘national imagination’, and what is it that “makes the shrunken imaginings of recent
history (scarcely more than two centuries) generate such colossal sacrifices” (Anderson, B., 1983: 16).

For Anderson, at least in the case of Western Europe, the heart of the matter can be found in two key historical developments. Firstly, the invention of the printing press, coupled with the Reformation, led to the development of ‘print capitalism’, with publications, especially the Bible, being produced not so much in Latin, but rather in the ‘vernacular’ languages that ‘ordinary’ people could understand. In this sense, the foundations were laid for the later emergence of ‘imagined communities’, based on a shared language. However, this kind of imagination capable of ‘creating’, at an abstract level, the nation, was only possible with the development of Enlightenment thought, which not only broke with the cyclical, seasonal conception of time, but also allowed people to think of simultaneity in time, that is that other actions could be imagined to be taking place at the same time as one’s own. Thus,

“the idea of a sociological organism moving calendrically through homogeneous, empty time is a precise analogue of the idea of the nation, which is also conceived as a solid community moving steadily down (or up) history. An American will never meet, or even know the names of more than a handful of his 240,000-odd fellow-Americans. He has no idea of what they are up to at any one time. But he has complete confidence in their steady, anonymous, simultaneous activity” (Anderson, B., 1983: 31).

In terms of the popularity of nationalism, Anderson’s answer rests on the claim that until the Enlightenment and the rationalist secularism that went with it, religion had somehow made sense of life and death, human suffering and destiny. However,

“[w]ith the ebbing of religious belief, the suffering which belief in part composed did not disappear. Disintegration of paradise: nothing makes fatality more arbitrary. Absurdity of salvation: nothing makes another style of continuity more necessary. What then was required was a secular transformation of fatality into continuity, contingency into meaning [...] Few things were better suited to this end than an idea of nation. If nation-states are widely conceded to be ‘new’ and ‘historical’, the nations to which they gave political expression always loom at of an immemorial past, and, still more important, glide into a limitless future”
If Anderson sought to overcome the perceived failure of Gellner’s approach to deal with the deep-rootedness of nationalism and its ability to inspire human sacrifice, then John Breuilly’s account is a good example of how the causal relationship that Gellner establishes between industrialisation and nationalism must be questioned. At one level, for example, Breuilly points out that Gellner’s functional explanation that the mass education systems arose “due to the need for a minimally qualified labour force” (Breuilly, 1998: 161) is too limited, noting that “it is quite clear that in many cases there were other intentions behind the extension of schooling such as discipline, humanitarianism and concern with a new youth problem created by the changing relationship between home, age and work” (Breuilly, 1998: 161). At a more general level, Breuilly points out that nationalism, variously understood as sentiment, movement and ideology exists in societies that have yet to undergo the transition to industrial societies, and that commercial agriculture, mass education and modern systems of communication can all produce the effects Gellner relates to industrialisation. To remedy such perceived failings in Gellner’s accounts, Breuilly proposes that we go beyond the new economic division of labour associated with the rise of industrial capitalism, and instead cites a fundamental change in the generic division, whereby is “the very broadest categories of human activity- coercion, cognition and production (or in more conventional terms: power, culture and economy) are redefined and placed in a different relation to one another” (Breuilly, 1998: 63).

But how, then, does Breuilly account for the rise of nationalism? As has already been pointed out, Breuilly’s understanding of nationalism is essentially narrow, with nationalism being understood as a form of politics. Nationalism, according to this account has had such a strong influence on the modern world because it was the nation that could somehow provide the ‘glue’ to stick together the newly separate categories of state and civil society, where there was a powerful emphasis on members of society as individuals, and not members of corporate associations such as guilds.

Thus, for Breuilly, nationalism emerges as the “sleight of hand ideology which tries to connect, on the one hand, liberal individualism, and on the other, the existence of corporate groups who could not be reconciled to the abstract, rational character of liberalism, especially if formal participation rights masked real, socially structured inequality” (Breuilly, 1998: 166).
Overall, Breuilly, like Gellner, presents an instrumentalist account of nationalism, which is at the same time put forward as essentially modern. However, he questions Gellner’s insistence on industrialisation as the key causal element behind nationalism, preferring instead to concentrate on wider changes in society, concerned with the new generic division of labour, and the consequences for new kinds of politics.

Miroslav Hroch, like Gellner, is Czech, belonging to the “generation born before the Second World War and the atomic age”, although “he stressed exactly what Gellner brushed aside - the variability of world-timing among these nationalist movements, as well as their very different economic circumstances” (Anderson, B., 1998: 10). Two basic premises would appear to inform his work: on the one hand, he shies away from “the significant amount of new literature in recent years, much of it produced by social scientists developing theoretical frameworks, and then illustrating their generalisations with selected examples” (Hroch, 1998: 78). Instead, Hroch has based his approach on empirical research in order to develop “effective methods for the classification and assessment of experiences of nation-building as a process set within a wider social and cultural history - treated not as so many singular and unrepeatable events, but as part of a broad transformation of society that is amenable to controlled generalisations” (Hroch, 1998: 78). Secondly, Hroch declares that

“there is widespread conceptual confusion. For today the process whereby nations were formed in Europe is typically represented as the unfolding or the spread of the ideas of ‘nationalism’ [...] Yet nation-building was never a mere project of narcissistic intellectuals [...] intellectuals can only invent national communities only if certain objective preconditions for the formation of a nation exist” (Hroch, 1998: 79).

Consequently, Hroch calls for an approach that looks for the “underlying similarity of reasons why people accepted a new national identity” (Hroch, 1998: 79). Hroch’s empirical research has centred on the development of national movements\(^6\) in

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\(^6\) Hroch makes an interesting definitional difference between national movements groups “seeking to persuade their compatriots of the importance of consciously belonging to a nation” (Hroch, 1998: 80), and nationalism, “namely that outlook which gives an absolute priority to the values of the nation over all other values and interests” (Hroch, 1998: 80).
Central and Eastern Europe, considered different to Western Europe, although not without exceptions, in that “an exogenous ruling class dominated ethnic groups which occupied a compact territory but lacked ‘their own’ nobility, political unit or continuous literary tradition” (Hroch, 1998: 80). The first step in this approach was to develop a periodisation of national movements in order to be able to permit meaningful comparisons, and consequently he identifies three structural phases in the development of national movements. In Phase A, “the energies of the activists were above all devoted to scholarly inquiry into and dissemination of an awareness of the linguistic, cultural, social and sometimes historical attributes of the non-dominant group” (Hroch, 1998: 81), although stopping short of making explicit political demands to remedy such shortcomings. Phase B, involves the “patriotic agitation” by “a new range of activists” in order to “‘awaken’ national consciousness” among a wide audience. It is Phase C that “the major part of the population came to set special store by their national identity, and a mass movement was formed” (Hroch, 1998: 81).

The empirical nature of Hroch’s work allows him to identify the “central significance for any typology of national movements in Central and Eastern Europe (but not only there) of the relationship between the transition to Phase B and then to Phase C, on the one hand, and the transition to a constitutional society based on equality before the law, on the other hand - what is often called the moment of ‘bourgeois revolution’” (Hroch, 1998: 82). Thus, combining these two transitions, Hroch is able to distinguish four kinds of national movements. The first type includes the Czech national movement in Bohemia, that of Hungary and of Norway, whereby Phase B “occurred under the old regime of absolutism, but it acquired a mass character in a time of revolutionary changes in the political system, when an organized labour movement was beginning to assert itself” (Hroch, 1998: 82). In the second type of national movement, the shift from Phase B to Phase C takes place only after constitutional revolution. This delay could be caused by uneven economic development as in the case of Lithuania, Latvia, or Croatia, for example, or by foreign oppression, as was the case of Slovenia or the Ukraine. Thirdly, come those national movements “that acquired a mass character already under the old regime” (Hroch, 1998: 83), such as the national movements that arose in the lands of the Ottoman Empire in Europe, such as in Serbia, Greece and Bulgaria. Finally, the fourth type of national movement is mainly restricted to Western Europe, such as in Catalonia, the Basque Country, and Flanders, whereby Phase B began in a constitutional setting and under conditions of developed capitalism.
The question remains as to the exact relation between these two transitions; the development of national movements on the one hand and the transition from absolutist to bourgeois societies, on the other. In this respect, Hroch explicitly rejects Gellner’s theory based on industrialisation, since “most of the national movements in Europe emerged well before the arrival of modern industry, and usually completed the decisive Phase B of their development before they had any contact with it - many of them, indeed, in overwhelmingly agrarian conditions” (Hroch: 1998: 85).

As would seem coherent with his empirical approach, Hroch points to several factors, as opposed to a single one, behind the development of national movements. While in basic agreement with Deutsch’s theory of social communication, Hroch adds the elements of “a crisis of legitimacy, linked to social, moral and cultural strains” and “nationally relevant conflicts of interest” (Hroch, 1998: 87-88). Overall, in some ways similar to Gellner’s, and indeed to Breuilly’s modernist/instrumentalist approach, Hroch is distinguished from such theories in that his model is based on empirical findings and does not pretend to offer the answer to the question of nationalism. Instead of applying a macro theory to individual cases, he offers an approach based on the study of individual ‘national’ movements and their comparison, through which he seeks to discover the “similarity of reasons” for nationalism, that reflect the diversity of cases over time and space.

So far we have analysed different accounts of nationalism that generally share the premises that were outlined at the beginning of this particular discussion, namely that, the nation is a construct of nationalism (whether ‘created’, ‘invented’ or ‘imagined’), and, secondly, the modernist premise that holds that both the nation and nationalism are essentially modern. In this respect, the works of Anthony Smith emerge as a means of overcoming what he sees as the problems associated with the dichotomy that perennialist and modernist approaches introduce. Smith attempts to bridge the gap by insisting that while the nation, as we conceive it today, is essentially modern, it can only be understood by linking it to the ethnic communities or ‘ethnies’ of pre-modern society.

In an excellent, self-effacing critique (Smith, 1998), Smith relates how his own approach to nationalism and the nation has changed over time. Smith’s early work on nationalism was inspired by the work of Ernest Gellner himself, and as such Smith based his account on the constructivist premises, whereby it was intellectuals who were
granted a key role in national mobilization, effectively ‘creating’ the nation by inspiring national sentiment among the population at large. However, over time, Smith became increasingly aware of what he considered to be the problems associated with such a ‘top-down’ approach. Firstly, it had difficulty explaining why such intellectuals should abandon ‘abstract reason’ and embrace with such passion ‘indigenous history and culture’. Secondly, “emphasis on intellectuals and elites often obscured the broad, often cross-class nature of the movement and the national attachments of middle and lower strata” (Smith, 1998: 190). Finally, Smith considers problematic calling nationalism both the ideological movement and the sentiments that are generated, in that while nationalism as an explicit ideological project is considered to be very much modern, national sentiments are not necessarily so. Thus, according to Smith, by treating them together, we run the risk of ignoring the pre-modern origins of such sentiments, which nationalists seek, with varying degrees of success, to mobilise. Following this line of argument, could it be that, while the nation as we know it today is modern, it relies on pre-modern forerunners? For Smith, there does exist a certain continuity between the modern nation, and what he calls ‘ethnic communities’ or ‘ethnies’. Nations are defined as a “named community of history and culture, possessing a unified territory, economy, mass education system and common legal rights” (Smith, 1989: 342). Such a definition is presented as an ideal type, and as such the emergence of any given nation is considered to be contingent on a whole range of factors:

“geographical environment, and the political accidents of warfare, may provide a setting for a group to form into a nation, but whether it will subsequently do so may depend on how far the group, or its ruling classes, become conscious of their identity and reinforce it through education, legal codes and administrative centralisation” (Smith, 1989: 342).

The point being that nations are not merely the work of nationalists, but rather “there need to be some core networks of association and culture, around which and on which nations can be built” (Smith, 1989: 343), with language being a key factor. What such ‘core networks’ are and how they develop over time is key to Smith’s analysis of the development of the nation and nationalism. An important caveat must be introduced at this point: Smith explicitly rejects the notion that nations are “natural and perennial” and that “people had a nationality as they had speech or sight” (Smith, 1989: 343). In
addition, Smith notes that care must be taken not to fall into the trap of retrospective nationalism; accepting the claims of the nationalists themselves that their nation has existed unchanged over history is inadmissible from an academic point of view. Yet despite such caveats, it does not necessarily hold, as modernists do, that there were “no durable cultural communities in antiquity or the Middle Ages”, that we are not necessarily “being retrospective nationalists in attributing some common history and culture to ancient Greeks and Persians or medieval Serbs and Irish” (Smith, 1989: 344). Thus Smith uses the terms ethnies, as the forerunner to some modern nations, and defines them as “named human populations with shared ancestry myths, histories and cultures, having an association with a specific territory, and a sense of solidarity” (Smith, 1998: 191).

With the development of the theory of the ethnic origin of nations, Smith’s work has been dedicated to tracing the ‘ethnic’ past of modern nations as a means of explaining why some nations appeared before others, and why some emerged more strongly than others, as a way out of the problems associated with the lack of historical continuity on which modernist accounts of nations and nationalism insist. In this sense, Smith’s account, rather than concerning nationalism per se, is perhaps best understood as a theory of the nation, with the attention centred on the process whereby pre-modern ethnic communities develop into nations in the modern sense.

In order to round off this necessarily brief discussion of the various approaches and accounts that have tried to explain nationalism and its relation to the nation, I would now like to turn to the works of Tom Nairn. To call his works on nationalism to be iconoclastic would appear to be something of an understatement, but their inclusion here is more than justified given their thought-provoking nature, and for the fact that they allow us, in some ways, to come full circle back to the works of Gellner, and to go beyond them. Nairn’s account of nationalism, within the Marxist tradition, has been considered to be one of the most important. However, from within both neo-orthodox Marxism, and beyond, doubts have been raised over the compatibility of Nairn’s theory with historical materialism. As James notes, “Gellner believes Nairn’s ‘concrete theory

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7 James notes that “Anthony Giddens, in his second volume of A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism, a study specifically aimed at exploring in dialogue with Marxism the contours of a post-Marxist interpretation of the nation-state, refers only to Nairn’s work when discussing the contemporary group of approaches written within the framework of historical materialism” (James, 1996: 108-109).
of nationalism [...] to be substantially correct’, but is puzzled as to how Nairn could think his theory was at all compatible with Marxism” (James, 1996: 108. See also Hobsbawm, 1977).

Indeed, there are a number of similarities between Nairn’s account and Gellner’s own. Nairn, like Gellner, points to socio-economic changes to be at the heart of the rise of nationalism, but instead of the shift from ‘agrarian to industrial society’, Nairn talks of the transition from feudal to capitalist society, with the key being the uneven development inherent in the spread of industrial capitalism.

“Industrialisation erupted among remote, squabbling, hirsute tribes of the extreme periphery, and spread out from there amid warfare and mayhem to reach the great world imperium last of all. Accident, unevenness and conflict may not inhere in ‘development’ as such, but they have undoubtedly structured the way it happened. This is why the rough edge of nationalism was inevitable. Because the breakthrough occurred in one population rather than another, it could not fail to give a developmental edge or lead to that population, including all its distinguishing marks of language, customs, faith, etc. (ethnic traits as they were later labelled)” (Nairn, 1997: 3).

Thus, for Nairn, as for Gellner, nationalism far from being a reaction to modernity, is part of it. “There was nothing generally ‘wilful’, egregiously ‘idealist’ or romantic about the process at all: Gellner’s point was that the subjective noise or nonsense accompanying ‘nationalism’, laughable, deplorable or dangerous as it may be, is quite objectively determined” (Nairn, 1997: 2). While sharing the objective nature of nationalism as a whole, Nairn, unlike Gellner does allow more for the role of educated elites; they were the key actors in the quest not to be left behind by industrial modernisation. However, it would be wrong to consider Nairn’s account to be elite-centric, since one of the key points in Nairn’s analysis is that the masses had to be invited into history for the first time in a language that they understood. Thus:

“the arrival of nationalism in a distinctively modern sense was tied to the political baptism of the lower classes [...] Although sometimes hostile to democracy, nationalist movements have been invariably populist in outlook and sought to induct the lower classes into political life. In its most typical version,
this assumed the shape of a restless middle-class and intellectual leadership trying to stir up and channel popular class energies into support for new states” (Nairn: 1977: 41).

Overall, at this level at least, it is safe to say that differentiated vocabulary and emphasis apart, many similarities between Gellner’s and Nairn’s account may be found, and in this sense, we come full circle. However, it is at this point that we can point to major differences between not just Nairn and Gellner, but between the former and the social modernisation school, in whose premises all of the accounts discussed here, are in some way based. Whereas Gellner, for example, is unambiguous over the fact that the nation is a form of construct, ‘invented’ by nationalism, Nairn is not. At the same time, while for the latter, nationalism is very definitely a modern phenomenon, nations and ‘nationality’ are considered in Nairn’s work, at least in some cases, to be both primordial and perennial. James comments on how in the *Break Up of Britain*, England is described as a “country of ancient and settled nationality” (James, 1996: 113), while elsewhere, Benedict Anderson chides Nairn for “his good nationalist tendency to treat his ‘Scotland’ as an unproblematic, primordial given” (Anderson, B. 1983: 85). In a recent publication, such an ‘ambiguous tendency’ is reflected in the way in which Nairn seeks to overcome the dispute between, on the one hand, the modernist/instrumentalist approach and, on the other, the primordialist/perennialist approach. In order to do so, he proposes the arena of ‘life sciences’:

“in a sense which extends from the new genetics, via ‘biosociology’ and palaeoanthropology, to the sociology which Gellner and the modernists chiefly relied upon. Any new paradigm depends, in other words, on establishing a more plausible link between biology and kinship on the one hand, and the world of political nation-states and resurgent nationality on the other.” (Nairn, 1997: 13).

Is this the ultimate heresy? Will Nairn be for ever drummed out of the Marxist Brownies for substituting historical materialism for the ties of blood and kinship? If Eric Hobsbawm had his way, then Nairn certainly would be. But is Marx really turning in his grave? As Benedict Anderson so helpfully points out:

“Nationalism [...] for Marxist theory [...] has largely been elided rather than
confronted. How else to explain Marx’s own failure to explicate the crucial
pronoun in his memorable formulation of 1848: ‘The proletariat of each country
must, of course, first of all settle matters with its own bourgeoisie’? How else to
account for the use, for over a century, of the concept ‘national bourgeoisie’
without any serious attempt to justify theoretically the relevance of the adjective?’

While this is probably not the place to go into the historic failings of Marxism to
come to terms with nationalism and the nation, suffice to say that the ambiguities with
which Marx himself maintained within his works make it difficult to discard one
account or other for supposed primordialism, as neo-orthodox Marxists such as
Hobsbawm would have us believe.

Conclusions

Having briefly discussed what might be considered to be an internal debate or
dialogue among several of the leading theorists of nationalism and the nation, by way of
conclusion, I would like to draw certain lessons from this debate in order to be able to
clarify my own understanding of nationalism, and secondly to explain how such an
understanding will be used to inform the rest of this exercise.

In terms of the nature of the relationship between the nation and nationalism, an
issue that has not only occupied the major part of this chapter, but also of the majority
of theoretical work on the subject, I wish to agree with the arguments put forward by the
modernists and instrumentalists, who point to the nation as a modern phenomenon, and
one that cannot exist without the contribution of nationalists to its construction,
invention or imagination. In this respect, the nation is a very specific kind of
community, and one that is unthinkable before the transition to the modern age that
provides the necessary conditions for the emergence of the nation.

Consequently, nationalism might be defined as a political movement and
ideology that makes claims on behalf of the nation. In this respect, national identity
emerges as the means by which the nation is defined, or the characteristics which the
nation in question is said to have that makes it unique and thus different from all other
nations. The majority of studies frame national identity in terms of historical and
cultural elements such as language and common myths, whereas I will argue in the next section that national identity is intimately linked to territory, since nationalism itself is a territorial ideology.

However, this is not to say that accounts of nationalism, such as those reviewed here, are not unproblematic. Firstly, no account is able to come to terms with all cases of nationalism over time and space. This inevitably casts doubt on the utility of attempting to construct a general level theory of nationalism, since so varied are the cases of nationalism, that theories of industrialisation, uneven capitalist development, the birth of the liberal state and so forth, are unable to provide the kind of unity of explanation to cope with such diversity. In this respect, Hroch’s attempt to construct a framework of explanation based on comparative analysis of cases seeks to overcome such problems, but nevertheless runs the risk of being unable to draw any meaningful theoretical lessons in order to answer the central question as to why nationalism appears when it does. A second problematical area for many general level theories of nationalism concerns their search for the ‘why’ of nationalism, which in some cases means that they fail to provide sufficient arguments that explain the tremendous power that the nationalist principle has gathered over the last two centuries or so.

In the light of these two problematic areas of accounts of nationalism, I wish to centre my own analysis, not so much on why nationalism occurs, but on how it functions, and in particular, how it has functioned and continues to function in the case of Catalan nationalism. In the following chapter, I will argue that in order to fully understand how nationalism works we must come to terms with the centrality of territory for all nationalist movements. Nationalism, it will be claimed is territorial in that it seeks to control a given territory, but, in order to do so, such control must be justified in the name of the nation. As such, the nation comes to be defined in terms of the national territory itself. Before presenting such arguments, I shall briefly outline why and how leading theories of nationalism fail to come to terms with the territorial element of nationalism.
CHAPTER 2
NATIONALISM AND TERRITORY

Introduction

Up to this point, the discussion that has been presented has centred on the various attempts to account for nationalism and the nation that have emerged above all since the publication of Gellner’s path-breaking work in the 1960’s. While such accounts in the main seek to deal with the emergence of nationalism as a historical phenomenon, mainly located in the 19th century, they were no doubt influenced by the rising tide of nationalism in both post-colonial settings and among nations without states in Western Europe in the second half of the 20th century. Through the discussion of the relative merits of certain key accounts, I hope to have arrived at the point where the way in which nationalism is to be understood in the present context is somehow grounded in the rich work of established authors.

The next section, however, argues that in order to build on such an understanding of nationalism, we must include the concept of territory. After briefly highlighting how and why traditional accounts of nationalism have failed to incorporate this aspect into their understanding of the phenomenon, the remainder of the chapter discusses how territory and nationalism are closely related to the point where it is difficult to understand the latter without the former. I wish to argue that control over a given territory is a key claim of nationalism and that in order to justify the claims that are made in the name of the nation, the nation itself is defined in terms of the territory. Having outlined the territorial elements implicit and explicit in the nationalist construction of the nation, the chapter seeks to discuss the consequences of this for nationalism and how it may be studied. In this respect, special emphasis will be placed on the ideological process of the production and reproduction of the national homeland, which in turn will lead to a discussion of some of the key instruments used by nationalists in this process.
Territory in Mainstream Accounts

At a general level, we have seen in the previous section how the principle debate surrounding nationalism has centred on the dimension of time: in one form or another, the competing versions of nationalism seek to explain how the apparent modernity of nationalism and the nation can be reconciled with, on the one hand, the claims made by nationalists as to the antiquity of their own nation, and, on the other, the political power of nationalism and the deep roots that it has taken in the hearts and minds of millions of people throughout the world. As such, attention has been directed above all to the way in which nationalism interprets history and not to the way in which nationalists interpret space in order to construct both symbolically and materially the national territory or homeland.

In Gellner’s account, nationalism is understood as “a theory of political legitimacy, which requires that ethnic boundaries should not cut across political ones” (Gellner: 1983: 1). In other words, the boundaries of the state as a territorial political unit should coincide with those of the nation, a cultural community. Yet no mention is made of how such a cultural/ethnic community might be tied to a specific territory, despite the recognition of the potential or actual problems involved in aligning political and cultural boundaries. In Gellner’s theory, the territorial element has not so much been ‘elided’ as consciously omitted. A dichotomy is established between the new, standardised high culture that emerges with industrialisation, and any tie, ancient or modern, with the land: “modern man,” he states, “is not loyal to a monarch or a land or a faith, whatever he may say, but to a culture” (Gellner, 1983: 36). Indeed, it is this “school transmitted culture alone [that] confers his usability and dignity and self-respect on industrial man [...] nothing else can do it for him to any comparable extent” (Gellner, 1983: 36). Certainly no tie to the land is capable of this, since it is mobility, both social and geographic that is the key to industrial society, although no mention is made of where and how the geographic boundaries to this mobility should be located, despite the recognition that this is a key problem of nationalism.

Benedict Anderson’s account also makes it difficult for the territorial element of nationalism to be incorporated. On the one hand, Anderson explains how nationalism gathered strength at a time when a religious understanding and explanation of the passage of time had become challenged by secular, rationalist thought at the end of the eighteenth century. Again, his explanation is based on time and not on space. At a more
concrete level, Anderson’s nations are abstract communities in that they are imagined culturally and not geographically, despite the fact that nations are considered to be abstractions precisely because “all communities larger than the primordial villages of face-to-face contact (and perhaps even there) are imagined” (Anderson, B. 1983: 15). However, no effort is made to pursue the geographical possibilities inherent in this basic premise; no mention is made of how the nation might be imagined territorially.

In a similar light, Conversi, who has also pursued the idea of bounded communities, states, encouragingly from our point of view, that

“[m]odern nationalism cannot be conceived without this spatial dimension. Territory lies at the heart of all nationalist programmes, hence the importance of maps and mapping in their strategy. Ultimately, in a world of nation-states, an ethnic group can only feel fully protected if it achieves the formation of its own nation state” (Conversi: 1997: 6).

However, he immediately continues to propose the irrelevance of demands for independence or separation, and thus the irrelevance of territory, since “if a group has a sufficiently strong identity and feels confident about its future survival within the existing nation state” (Conversi: 1997: 6), there is no need to make special claims over a given national territory. Once more, the communities that he talks of are culturally, and not territorially bounded. Conversi’s account is partly based on the experience of Catalan nationalism, in that one of the reasons that is advanced for the lack of a strong pro-independence tendency within Catalan nationalism has been the cultural self-confidence displayed by the Catalan nation, particularly in terms of the Catalan language. As such, no mention is made of the role of territory in the construction of the Catalan nation.

Anthony Smith’s extensive work on the nation and nationalism, unlike the previous authors that we have looked at, does contain explicit references to the importance of territory for the nation, and together with C.H. Williams (Williams and Smith, 1983), has indeed published an influential article on the subject. However, beyond this article, which is difficult to situate within Smith’s overall theory of nationalism, it is not at all easy to obtain a clear understanding of the link between nationalism, national identity, the nation and territory, since at one level, Smith’s overall concern centres on the temporal question of the modernity or otherwise of the
nation, and consequently the importance of territory as a spatial setting for the (re)creation of national identity remains untheorised and often ambiguous.

At another level, we have seen that Smith’s account rests on three basic forms: “ethnic categories, ethnic communities and modern nations” (Smith, 1994: 382). In the first, “there is no sense of common territory” (Smith, 1994: 382), while ethnic communities are characterised by a “strong association with historic territories and homeland” (Smith, 1994: 382-3). In the case of the modern nation, for nationalism to achieve the common goals of national autonomy, unity and identity, it needs certain “networks of associations and culture around which and on which nations can be built” (Smith, 1989: 343). However, the importance of language groups are highlighted, above religious sects and historic territories, and thus the latter is by no means presented as a key part of ethnic identity.

Smith’s ambiguous, if not to say contradictory attitude to the role of territory in nation-formation emerges when he talks of the mixture of ‘ethnic’ and ‘civic’ elements required for a modern nation to be considered as such. Among the former he includes “a common myth of origin and descent, common memories and common symbols of culture” (Smith, 1998: 194) whereas it is only in the latter that territory appears alongside “political, educational and economic elements” (Smith, 1998: 196). Thus, overall, despite making explicit reference to territory, far from placing it in the centre of his analysis, Smith’s treatment of it is often ambiguous, and in the main it is relegated to a peripheral place in his analysis.

In general, then, the concept of territory in the accounts that we have reviewed here is not altogether ignored, but it by no means has a privileged place in the majority of them. In this respect, the reasons for the underestimation of the territorial factor of nationalism might be attributed to the wider academic problem of Enlightenment-inspired social sciences, whereby concern has centred on the importance of time, to the detriment of place. Both liberalism and Marxism have both shared an interest in how societies developed over time, while “very few social theorists have bothered themselves with matters geographical or spatial, and hardly any have sought to incorporate the notion that places are ‘moving towards one another’” (Leyshon, 1995: 17). Of course, such issues have taken on greater importance within the overall debate on globalisation, in which the spatial reconfiguration of social activities would appear to be at the centre of the question. While this will be the subject of discussion in the
following chapters, over recent years, such concerns for a more geographical understanding of societal processes have led to an increasing number of studies that have sought to highlight the territorial element of nationalism. In this sense, it has been political geographers who have come forward with interesting contributions to the debate. Over the past two decades, most interesting publications have emerged that vindicate the importance of the relationship between geography and nationalism at a general level and also discuss the role of territory in individual nationalist movements1.

However, despite the increasing body of literature emanating above all from political geography and related fields, it is still the case that “the relationship between territory and the nation is only implied or hinted at in the majority of the existing theoretical literature” (Herb, 1999: 17). In general, it might be argued that the study of nationalism, particularly in recent decades, has suffered from a certain lack of dialogue between what are in effect temporal theories of nationalism and more spatially-centred work developed basically by geographers.

Of course, at this stage, having established that relatively little attention has been paid to the relationship between nationalism and territory in mainstream literature, the question arises as to why such a relation should be taken into account, and consequently, how we should go about constructing a framework of analysis to do just that. The remainder of the current chapter seeks to address these issues.

**Nationalism and Territory**

At the most basic, practical level, the relationship between nationalism and territory is obvious. According to the way nationalism is understood in the current exercise, nationalism’s first and most important claim on behalf of the nation is that it should have its own sovereign state, or at least a large degree of political autonomy, with the possibility of the exercise of the collective right to its own state (national self-determination). Given that the modern state is essentially a territorial concept, with state sovereignty exercised over a defined territory, then nationalism must either make claims over or possess a territory.

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1 In this respect, scholars such as R. J. Johnston, (1986), David B. Knight (1982; 1984), James Anderson (1986), David Hooson (1994) have all highlighted the importance of place and territory for nationalism.
The modern state system dates back to the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, whereby each state became the “sole political authority with exclusive possession of a defined territory. The state became the dominant form of government, accepting no other agency as rival. The Middle Ages had known no such singular relationship between authority and territory” (Hirst and Thompson, 1996a: 171). In this respect, James Anderson talks of how the emergence of modern state sovereignty, understood as “absolute and undivided authority within a precisely delimited territory” (Anderson, J., 1996: 141), removed or displaces a complex set of overlapping sovereignties, that were “typically constituted [as] nested hierarchies (for example, parish, bishopric, archbishopric, ... papacy; manor, lordship, barony, duchy, kingdom, ... Holy Roman Empire), and people were members of higher level collectivities not directly but only by virtue of their membership of lower level bodies” (Anderson, J., 1996: 141). Over time, as Michael Mann notes, “only the state is inherently centralised over delimited territory over which it has authoritative power” (Mann, 1984: 198; see also Giddens, 1985). This is not to say that violations of the territorial principle have not occurred. Krasner presents a strong case for considering the Westphalian model of state autonomy, based on the principle of territoriality, to be nothing “more than a reference point or convention; it has never been some deeply confining structure from which actors could not escape” (Krasner, 1995: 115). Indeed, “violations of the principle of autonomy, in which an external actor is able to exercise some authoritative control within the territory of the state, have been more frequent than those of territoriality” (Krasner, 1995: 116).

However, whatever the objections raised over the degree to which the principle of territorial sovereignty has been respected in practice throughout the modern era, it is undeniable that the modern state and the principle of sovereignty are based at least at the normative level on the ‘isomorphism’ of state-sovereignty-territory (Appadurai, 1996a). This is also true, although to a lesser extent, of political autonomy. Thus, to the isomorphic equation of state-sovereignty-territory, nationalism seeks to add ‘nation”; as Gellner points out, nationalism is “a theory of political legitimacy, which requires that ethnic boundaries should not cut across political ones” (Gellner, 1983: 1), although he fails to develop on the consequences of his argument.

Beyond the exercise of political power, the identification of the homeland is vital for nationalists in that it is the basis for the realisation of material projects. Thus,
“the land and its political framework constitute a foundation and an arena without which the nationalist dream must remain a mere blueprint, but whose acquisition allows the nationalist to translate his utopia into practical realities. The ‘land’ allows him to realise his goals of sovereignty, fraternity, identity and regeneration - in practical works of construction. It is after all, ‘the land’ that can be renewed, regenerated, rebuilt, and through the act of rebuilding, people can be changed, their outlook revolutionised, their capacities enlarged” (Williams and Smith, 1983: 510).

Given the importance of territory for nationalists’ programmes, for nations seeking to either consolidate a pre-existing state, as might be the case of France and England, or to claim their own state or political autonomy for the first time, an inescapable task for nationalists is to identify the specific territory that it wishes to control. This is not always an easy task, and the make-up of such territory will depend on the criteria applied. Herb outlines three main kinds of criteria: social - common attributes such as language; historical - traditional occupancy; and natural - the existence of ‘natural borders, such as rivers, mountains, and so forth. However, all of such criteria are undoubtedly problematic: social indicators are notoriously difficult to define due to the existence of geographically ‘mixed communities’; historical occupancy may be discontinuous, generating conflicting claims over the same territory; natural frontiers are, alas, social constructs - a river may be seen as a boundary, but also as the lifeblood of a whole valley and the communities that inhabit it (Herb 1999: 19-20). Catalonia, in this respect, enjoys relatively long-established, administratively and politically recognised borders, in the shape of the ‘Principality’, the core territory. However, there does exist a wider territorial definition of the Catalan nation, the Països Catalans, that combines historical and linguistic criteria, and today includes Rousillon (ceded to France by Spain with the Treaty of the Pyrenees in 1649), the communities of Valencia, the Balearic Islands, a border strip of Aragon, and even part of Sardinia. Mainstream Catalan nationalism centres its claim for political autonomy on the Principality, although the Països Catalans are still considered an important framework for Catalan interests.

White (2000).
However, nationalist movements do not only occupy or seek to occupy a given territory but rather they attach identity to it, in order to “create geographically bounded homelands within which the national group claim sovereignty” (Kaplan and Herb, 1998: 2-3. See also Williams and Smith, 1983). In other words, “territory becomes for nationalists a space to which identity is attached by a distinctive group who hold or covet that territory and who desire to have full (as is feasible in any given moment) control over it for the group’s benefit” (Kaplan and Herb, 1998: 3). Thus, the nationalist project of attaching identity to the territory leads to the creation of a very special kind of territory, the national homeland. Before looking at how and why territories become ‘nationalised’, it is perhaps a good moment to first make clearer what we mean by territory.

**Territory and territoriality**

The term ‘territory’ is frequently used in a very loose sense, often interchangeably with other terms that seek to describe spatial categories such as place, area or region. However, as Sack (1986) argues, territory is a special kind of place, differentiated from ordinary places, areas or regions. The latter may be circumscribed by geographers in space or on a map, denoting, for example where industry is concentrated or where certain kinds of agricultural activities take place. However, “such delimitations become territories only when its boundaries are used to affect behaviour by controlling access, for example to resources or power” (Sack, 1986: 19). Thus “unlike ordinary places, [territories] require a constant effort to establish and maintain. They are the results of strategies to affect, influence and control people, phenomena and relationships” (Sack, 1986: 19). In this respect, Sack talks of territoriality, namely “the attempts by an individual or groups (x) to influence, affect or control objects, people and relationships by delimiting and asserting control over a geographic area. This will be called territory” (Sack, 1986: 19).

While Sack’s ground-breaking study, *Human Territoriality* (Sack, 1986), perhaps surprisingly, does not explicitly analyse the state as the maximum expression of territoriality, and only briefly mentions nationalism, his theoretical insights into territoriality provide the intellectual instruments for challenging the predominant view that the ‘territorial instinct’ is somehow in-born in humans, a socio-biologically
determined impulse that leads us inevitably to the conclusion that it is ‘natural’ for humans to wish to control territory, and that it is equally ‘natural’ for humans to develop emotional ties with such a territory. The consequences for many disciplines of the social sciences of the socio-biological territorial instinct have been to view territorial conflict as somehow inevitable, leaving aside the analysis of why and how particular territories have come into being as they have. Once we challenge such thinking, we can begin to analyse why and how territories come into being and continue to exist, and why and how people develop a sense of belonging to a given territory. Indeed, historically, Billig remarks that a sense of belonging to a territorial nation, or country, “does not seem to have been typical in pre-modern Europe” (Billig, 1995: 74). Once we make the claim that belonging to a homeland, and especially a national homeland is not an in-bred, biologically-determined need, then we can start to deconstruct the way people are said to belong to a certain territory, and analyse why and how identities (national in the present case) are constructed and reconstructed in terms of the territory.

**Territory and place**

The final point here centres on the relation between the national territory or homeland and the individual localities or places that constitute it. An interesting starting point is Benedict Anderson’s remark, already quoted above, that “nations are abstract communities, imagined rather than falsely invented”, since “all communities larger than the primordial villages of face-to-face contact (and perhaps even there) are imagined” (Anderson, B., 1983: 15). Anderson seeks to explore the particular kind of imagination that emerged to permit ‘national imagination’ and “what is it that makes the shrunken imagining of recent history (scarcely more than two centuries) generate such colossal sacrifices” (Anderson, B., 1983: 16). As already mentioned, Anderson’s theory rests on how such imaginings are cultural, ignoring the element of territorial imagination which I propose to be the key element on which national identity is based. However, for the present work, Anderson’s face-to-face village provides an excellent starting point from which to construct a theoretically informed approach to nationalism and its construction.

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2 For an excellent review of competing theories of human territoriality, see Storey (2001).
of the nation, namely how the former joins individual places together to become part of the national territory.

‘Deconstructing’ Anderson’s phrase, two points can be made: firstly, face-to-face relations are seen as primordial, belonging to a bygone era, as opposed to the modern, abstract solidarity of the nation; secondly, no attempt is made at a spatial level to explain why and how nationalism might seek to unite place as individual contexts for social relations.

While the national homeland is a special kind of place, John Agnew in *Place and Politics* (1987) begins from the premise “that territorial states [and national homelands] are made out of places” (1987:1). Building on the structurationist school of social theory developed by scholars such as Foucault (1980), Giddens (1979), and Pred (1983; 1984), Agnew offers powerful arguments for taking place more seriously “as the structuring or mediating context for social relations” (Agnew, 1987: 70), in contrast to mainstream social science, for which places are only studies in order to explain local and regional deviations from the ‘national’ norm.

In this respect, Agnew highlights three dimensions of place, two being ‘objective, and the other ‘subjective’. The first dimension to be taken into account is Giddens’ concept of ‘locale’ that is “the physical settings in which social relations are constituted” (Agnew, 1987: 26). But Agnew goes on to argue that ‘locale’, in the sense that Giddens uses, is just one dimension of place, in that

“the face-to-face society of the locale in which action is embedded is in turn embedded within a wider territorial society [...] Therefore, and this point is played down by Giddens, place is not just locale, as a setting for activity and social interaction, but also location. The reproduction and transformation of social relations must take place somewhere [...] [Locales] are located according to the demands of a spatially extensive division of labor (sic) and global system of material production and distribution” (Agnew, 1987: 27).

However, beyond what might be considered two ‘objective’ dimensions of place, locale and location, Agnew proposes a third dimension, more subjective, which he calls a ‘sense of place’, in which the combination of the other two dimensions may produce over time an identification with a particular place by an individual. Thus, “to the extent that places are similar in these respects, interconnected and contiguous one
can refer to a ‘region’ of places (Cox, 1969b). In that situation the sense of place can be projected onto the region or a ‘nation’ and give rise to regionalism or nationalism. The sense of place need not be restricted to the scale of the locality” (Agnew, 1987: 28). Thus, returning to Benedict Anderson’s statement, if we are able to overcome the hegemony of Enlightenment-inspired social-sciences, place as a meaningful social category need not be relegated to traditional, premodern society. Nationalism may be conceptualised as territorial in that it constructs the nation by projecting a sense of place onto a series of individual localities and in this sense the nation is not so much abstract in the merely cultural sense but in the territorial sense.

A similar point is made by Paasi when he says that when “local discourse ‘stretches’ itself to other spatial scales, for instance through regionalistic and nationalistic argumentation [...] it is a linguistic act, but also crucially a political act” (Paasi, 1995: 11). Thus nationalism, for Paasi, emerges as a means through which nation-state territories are produced and reproduced by somehow amalgamating individual places into a national territory. “All in all, nationalism is primarily a territorial form of ideology and one part of the hierarchical structure of regional consciousness, it can aim at ‘circumscribing’ and signifying territories in space, at creating feelings of belonging and of producing and reproducing social order” (Paasi: 1995: 53).

Having briefly discussed the concepts of territory and territoriality, we are now in a position to offer a fuller understanding of nationalism. Nationalism is an ideological movement that claims or possesses territory. Such claims over territory are not, as nationalists themselves may argue, the reflection of any natural sense of belonging to the territory in question, but rather they can be understood as a means by which nationalists exercise a strategy of territoriality in order to control the resources and population of the territory in question. In terms of our understanding of the concept of territory, it is a special bounded place, which must be produced and reproduced constantly, and over which nationalists seek to instil a common ‘sense of place’ in order to create the unified national homeland.
National Identity and Territory

Up to this point, I have talked in general terms about why and how nationalism might be considered to be territorial, in that it makes claims over territory and does so in a special way by attaching identity, national identity, to territory in such a way as to create the national territory. In this respect, I wish to argue that nationalism creates such a national territory by ‘grounding’ national identity in the territory itself, to the extent that the nation becomes inextricably linked to the national territory; in other words, national identity becomes understood in territorial terms. Consequently, control in the name of the nation over a given territory is justified by linking the way in which the nation is defined - national identity - to the territory in question, the national homeland.

While most studies recognise to a greater or lesser degree the importance of territory for the nation, it is more often than not seen as somehow complimentary to other elements such as a common culture, language, history and so forth. However, such elements of national identity can only be understood in territorial terms, since nationalism seeks to ‘ground’ other elements of national identity in the territory that is claimed or already occupied in the name of the nation. This is precisely the point that Billig (1995) makes when he claims that there is no gap between a people (nation) and their country (national homeland), while the historian Maine goes even further in affirming that “England was once the country in which Englishmen lived. Englishmen are now the people who inhabit England” (Maine, quoted in Knight, 1982: 517). This implies that belonging to the nation comes to be defined in terms of the national territory: as the national territory becomes the source of national identity for nationalists, so it becomes reified and emerges as an independent source of national identity. Thus in order to become a member of the nation, one must adopt the cultural practices that nationalists derive from the national territory that they themselves have constructed. The Catalan language, for example, is the language of the Catalan people, not because it is the mother tongue of the majority of Catalans – this is beside the point – but because Catalonia is a Catalan-speaking land. If one is to belong to Catalonia, and consequently to the Catalan nation, one must demonstrate it by speaking the language of Catalonia. Only then can one be considered to be truly Catalan.

The overall aim of nationalists is to construct a unified national homeland. Consequently, “nationalism is two-faced with respect to space [...] Looking inward, it seeks to unify the nation and its constituent territory; looking outward, it tends to divide
one nation from another” (J. Anderson, 1988: 24). The process of internal unification takes place at both the symbolic and the material level in order to overcome allegiances to the local and sub-national levels in general. Local identities, for example are absorbed to become national ones, with certain local identities emphasised over others.

**Territorial dimensions of ‘we’ and ‘the other’**

This next section seeks to identify the way in which nationalists seek to incorporate the national identity into the framework of the territory that is claimed or controlled in the name if the nation. In this respect, we may talk about the way in which the concepts of ‘we’ and ‘the other’, have been constructed spatially. Over recent decades, many new developments in theorising the phenomenon of nationalism have emerged that seek to place it within the context of the construction of the dichotomy of ‘we’ against ‘the other’, and how this might be related to forms of oppression such as imperialism, racism and sexism (Herb, 1999: 15). However, the territorial dimension of the dichotomy of the national ‘we’ against the national ‘other’ has not, in general, been analysed. Paasi proposes that “a spatial dimension is usually inherent in definitions of ‘the other’, in the fact that ‘the other’ typically lives somewhere else, there” (Paasi, 1995: 14). Thus the dichotomy of ‘we/here’ against ‘the other/there’ emerges. In this respect, Paasi proposes a heuristic framework which allows us to analyse the discourses that construction of various territorial identities in relation to various social distinctions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Here</th>
<th>There</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>We</strong></td>
<td>Integration within a territory</td>
<td>Integration over boundaries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The Other</strong></td>
<td>Distinction within a territory</td>
<td>Distinction between us and the other</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Paasi, 1995: 14

Thus, in the case of nationalism, the ideal state of affairs is the coincidence of ‘we’ and ‘here’, where ‘we’ is the nation and ‘here’ is the national territory, spatially differentiated from ‘the other’ who is ‘there’. When parts of the nation, lie beyond set boundaries, nationalists seek to integrate them by removing the boundaries between ‘here’ and ‘there’ as, for example, in Irish claims over the British province of Northern Ireland, or Basque nationalist claims for the uniting of Basques within the spatial
context of *Euskal Herria*, portrayed as the natural Basque homeland, which today extends beyond the borders of the Autonomous Community of the Basque Country, to Navarre and even includes part of French territory. The final important discourse in this framework arises when ‘the other’ is here amongst ‘us’, as might be the case of refugees or immigrants from other places. In this case, even though ‘the other’ may be a long-term resident – generations may have passed – if they have been unwilling or unable to accept the way in which nationalists interpret the relationship between the nation and the national homeland, they will always remain ‘the other’. In as much as we may talk of ‘civic’ and ‘ethnic’ nationalisms, the former are said to refer to elements of national identity that can be assumed by ‘the other’, so that she may become one of ‘us’. In the case of language-based national identities, when one takes up residence in the national homeland, one is expected to learn the national language in order to belong to the national homeland. ‘Ethnic’ nationalisms make it more difficult if not impossible for the ‘other’ to become one of ‘us’, since national identity rests on biological features such as the colour of the skin, and thus, try as the immigrant might, her integration is doomed to failure.

Overall, almost all nationalisms, consciously or not, contain an ethnic element due to their reliance on historic occupation and the symbolic imagery that has been created. The reliance of many nationalist movements on the figure of the peasant as typifying traditional national values promotes such exclusion, in that in the case of Western European nationalist movements, the peasant is white, excluding immigrants from many post-colonial settings from access to the national identity in question. As Rose notes,

“The Black Environment Network has pointed out that the number of black people who are members of organizations such as the National Trust, Rambler's Association or Youth Hostel Association are very small. They suggest that one reason for this may be that the vision of Englishness which rural images of England convey is a white Englishness. The English sense of place discourages black membership or rural organizations because the countryside is not seen as an appropriate location for black people” (Rose, 1995: 116).

But what exactly is the relationship between nationalism and territory? How does the nation come to be defined in territorial terms? I wish to argue that the nation
can be seen as being linked to territory in two major ways. On the one hand, physical or ‘objective’ features of the land are directly incorporated into national identity, while on the other, at a more symbolic level, nationalist interpretation of the land leads to the fusion of territory and other elements of national identity such as culture, language, common myths and history.

‘Objective’ elements of national territorial identity

Turning to the objective elements, Williams and Smith note that the concept of habitat and location have played an important part in framing national identity. As such, the physical characteristics of the land, its climate, geographical or geostrategic position, its shape and so forth are in many ways said to affect the character of the people. In terms of the importance of landscape, human geographers have long been aware of its importance in the construction of national identity (Lassere, 1993). “Explicit or implicit in every people’s favoured heritage are geographical traits felt integral to national identity. European talismans of space and place are age-old; nationalism intensifies landscape feeling” (Lowenthal, 1994:17). This can be seen in a number of cases such as Ireland, Spain, Switzerland, England and the United States of America. In the case of Ireland, it was the West of Ireland that became the symbol of the whole of Ireland in the late nineteenth century for many Irish nationalist writers, “[b]ecause of what nationalist writers saw as the closeness of the people of the West to the wild landscape, Westerners came to embody all the virtues of Irishness. They were steadfast, dignified and strong, their relationship to the land a source of stability and calm determination” (Rose, 1995: 91). In the case of Spain, for example, Castilians, perched upon their 3,000 feet-high plateau, sun-baked in summer, frozen in winter, isolated from Europe, are said to be of a dry temperament, inward-looking and unreceptive to outside influences. In contrast, Catalonia, with its mountains and coastline, its benign Mediterranean climate, its coastal location and strategic position as ‘terra de pas’, ‘land of passing through’, are all said to have forged a more open, innovative character of its people, more receptive to outside influences, ideas, people and goods (Vicens Vives, 1962).

For the Swiss, the key to their independence has been the frugal, communitarian, alpine life, while “mountain fastness safeguards Basque purity from degenerate Castile,
buttressing Basque egalitarian faith against the cosmopolitan nomads – bastardized Celts, decadent Latins, corrupted Moors – of the rest of Spain” (Lowenthal, 1994:17). Continuing within Europe, the case of English nationalism is one of the clearest examples of the way in which, in the absence of other potent symbols of national identity, the strength of the relationship between national identity and landscape is especially strong: “this geographical icon has a profoundly English cast. Nowhere else is landscape so freighted as legacy. Nowhere else does the very term suggest not just scenery and genres de vie, but quintessential national virtues” (Lowenthal, 1994: 20). Lowenthal goes on to explain how four special traits link the English landscape with the ‘national ethos’ and its heritage role: insularity, artifice, stability and order. Thus, in nationalist discourse, insularity has protected the English from the (European) continent, from “rabid dogs and dictators alike” (Tebbit quoted in Lowenthal, 1994: 22), while artifice and order emphasise the ideal of stewardship, of taming the natural, wild landscape to produce a very specific English landscape marked by human intervention. It is precisely human intervention that provides stability, in that efforts are constantly made to preserve the traces of human intervention, one which is full of hedgerows and country cottages, thus provides historical continuity with an imagined, idealised past.

If national territory has come to reflect and at the same time largely define the English national identity due to centuries of close contact and even guardianship of the land, in the case of the ‘New World’ it has been the virgin character of the land that has figured largely in the construction of national identity. In the case of the United States, for example, “the taming of the American west means that not just the ‘pioneers’ heading westwards but also the landscapes through which they travelled assumed significance in the nation-building project” (Storey, 2001: 79). The vast wilderness of the North American landmass, in contrast to cramped, decadent Europe means freedom, optimism even exuberance for the American people. In similar way, on gaining internal political autonomy from the British government in 1867, the new ‘national’ Canadian government soon faced the difficult task of constructing a national identity for the colonisers. In the absence of a historically-based cultural identity (the ‘barbaric’ indigenous cultures obviously did not count), the government soon became aware of the important role that nature could play in the newly-emerging national identity (Lasserre, 1993). As such it was the vast, cold, desolate wilderness of the North that emerged as a key scenario for the development of Canadian national identity (Lasserre, 1993: 56).
This idea that a given community has evolved due to its close relation with a given environment may give rise to “the idea that specific communities thrive best in given habitats [...] and hence to the more modern notion of the ‘soil’ as the true root and foundation of healthy family life and communal wellbeing” (Williams and Smith, 1983: 504). Thus, in many nationalist movements the idea of back to the soil is a strong one contrasted against the ‘corruption and luxury of the city life’. This romantic notion was not only present in German volkish nationalism of the nineteenth century, but in the majority. Thus Gruffudd’s (1995) account of the development of Welsh nationalism in the second quarter of the twentieth century provides a particularly graphic account of the way in which mainstream Welsh nationalism maintained a romantic, rural, ‘back-to-the-soil’ conception of the Welsh nation. In the same way, folklore traditions are prized by many nationalist movements as somehow confirming the links with the soil.

The geostrategic position of the national homeland is also an important feature of nationalist discourse. We have seen how insularity sets England apart from Continental Europe, justifying Euroscepticism and the special relationship with the United States, due to England’s and Britain’s (for most English nationalists the difference is redundant) position as a ‘bridge’ between the two continents. Paasi (1995) pursues this question when discussing representations of territory in the process of Finnish nation building, and in particular, the role of the boundary with what is now Russia. The symbolic construction and representation of this boundary and of Finnish national territory as a while has been deeply influenced by the changing international geopolitical context. Thus, during the Cold War, Finland for many came to be seen as a ‘buffer state’ between East and West, a vision that has now begun to change with the end of the Cold War and Finland’s full integration into the ‘West’, through its entry, for example, into the EU and NATO.

‘Subjective’ elements of national territorial identity

At more subjective level, nationalism interprets national territory in such a way as to fuse the national homeland with other elements of national identity such as founding myths, common history and a shared culture, and thus territory becomes inextricably linked with the other core claims of nationalism that we saw in the previous chapter. In terms of claiming a glorious, distant past for the nation, “associations with
the past are central to nationalism’s territoriality, for territory is the receptacle of the past in the present. The nation’s unique history is embodied in the nation’s unique piece of territory - its ‘homeland’[...] The time has passed but the space is still there” (J. Anderson, 1988: 24). In terms of myths and history, monasteries, fields and even trees become sites of national importance, where battles took place, ancient monarchs were crowned, or even where God revealed himself to a chosen people. Thus, “quite plain places like the Rútlí, Runnymede, Thingvellir, or Forge Valley become national sites and even architecturally impressive ruins and cities like Delphi, Jerusalem, Pagan and Kyoto are filled with holy memories and charged with collective emotions that far surpass their actual role in history” (Williams and Smith, 1983: 509). In this way, territory enables nationalism to be Janus-faced over time, in that it provides the physical and symbolic setting for nationalists to be able to simultaneously project the nation both backwards and forwards over time. The ancient ties between the ‘people’ and the land are stressed, whether occupation has been continuous or not, and thus in many cases rural features are often given pride of place in the construction of national identities precisely because, according to nationalists, they provide evidence of this historical link with the national territory. Such continuity might be related back to Smith’s idea of the strength of those nationalist movements who are able to build on pre-modern ethnic ties, although in this case, the emphasis would shift away from linguistic and other cultural elements, to territory. James Anderson points out that the success of the political doctrine of nationalism, in terms of its ability to generate national sentiment, is related precisely to the idea of linking continuity over time to physically existing landscapes: “nationalism’s traditional face provides reassurance; and the idea of continuity with a known and familiar past, presented as unique and indestructible, is perhaps especially important in situations of rapid social change” (Anderson, J., 1988: 24).

For those national identities that contain an element of language, the aim of nationalists is to embed the language in the national territory and demonstrate that it is part of the ancient legacy that the homeland has given to past and present generations. Thus, nationalist seek to stress the unity of the language over the national territory, a process undoubtedly helped by the needs of industrialised society for a common standardised language to allow the kind of social and geographical mobility that industrialisation demanded. As a means of fusing language and territory, Williams,
commenting on the way in which Welsh national identity came to be fused with the national territory through the actions of nationalists, says that for the nationalists,

“[t]he interpenetration of land and language is not a natural process. It is an experimental act which reproduces itself daily in people’s souls and therefore collectively is witnessed in society’s commonplace acts: in the naming of mountains and vales, rivers and villages. Language is the key to meaning and identity” (Williams, 1988: 216).

The importance of this process for certain nationalist movements, can be seen in the case of the following words of Welsh nationalist, Jones: “in this marriage and, as its foundations ... we see People, as it were, taking hold of their land and partnering it into the texture of their lives through the intercession of language. They would, as it were, see and handle and love the earth through the mirror of their language” (Jones quoted in Williams, 1988: 216).

In the process of linguistic standardisation, some areas of the national territory may take on special importance as they have somehow been unpolluted by outside threats and come to be portrayed by nationalists as the cradle of the national language. Gruffudd talks of how one of the “dominant themes of Plaid Cymru’s philosophy, namely the intimate relation between a people and its land” (Gruffudd, 1995: 224), the party presented its new symbol in 1933 which in the form of three triangles represented the mountains. “Welcoming the symbol, the party secretary commented: ‘The mountains! The perpetual witness of our history, and the unchanging background of our language: we can express it in symbolic form - therefore the sign....the TRIBAN’” (Gruffudd, 1995: 224). In the case of Catalan linguistic standardisation, the chief ideologist of the process, Pompeu i Fabra based the new standardised language on the eastern dialects, free as they were felt to be from the influence of Castilian in the south and west. As we shall see, the geography of Catalan national identity has been very much influenced by this process.

For the present, we may say that nationalism makes a series of claims in the name of the nation, one of which is the claim to control a demarcated space or territory. The control over the territory and thus of the resources and population therein is justified by defining the nation in terms of the territory itself. Nationalists seek to fuse
national identity with the national territory to the extent that it is the national homeland that appears as the source of the national identity. Through this process of fusion, the national territory becomes the very source of national identity, to the extent that in the daily language of nationalism, nation and national homeland come to mean the same.

Nationalism, Territory and Ideology

Having outlined the terms on which nationalists seek to fuse national identity and national territory in order to create a unified national homeland, I now wish to discuss, at a more theoretical level, this process of fusion, and in particular, the way in which it reflects wider relations of power within the society in question.

We have already seen that there is nothing ‘natural’ about territory itself or people’s feeling of belonging to the national homeland, as such, “in the case of territories and regions, our understanding of the present must thus be based on their ‘becoming’ rather than on their ‘being’” (Paasi, 1995: 31). In other words, the national territory must be produced and reproduced on a daily basis if the identification of the inhabitants with the national territory is to occur, as opposed to with other spatial scales. In this respect, Paasi introduces the idea of national socialisation, which “forms part of a broader political socialization which refers to the ways society transmits its political culture from generation to generation” (Paasi, 1995: 54). Within this wider process, ‘national socialisation’ may be understood as the means by which “historically contingent forms of territorial identities, symbols and ideologies are instilled into the social and individual consciousness” (Paasi, 1995: 55). The terms in which socialisation takes place depend, in turn, on the nature of power relations within society and thus we must introduce the Gramscian (1971) concept of ideological hegemony. “Whereas domination is usually directly expressed in political forms [...] hegemony refers to the power of dominant groups to persuade subordinate groups to accept their moral, political and cultural values as the ‘natural order’” (Paasi, 1995: 30).

However, hegemony, by its very nature is never complete, it is always challenged ideologically by subordinate groups in society “in their spatially and temporally contextualized struggle against the social order as there are the dominant groups in their defence of the status quo” (Paasi, 1995: 29). This ideological character
of national socialisation in turn raises two sets of issues: firstly, the hegemony of dominant groups within ‘established nations’ means that way in which such nations are reproduced territorially goes unnoticed, and becomes the natural state of affairs. This is what Michael Billig (1995) refers to as ‘banal nationalism’; while secondly, the national identity that is the result of the process of national territorial socialisation’ will reflect power relations within the ‘national’ society and between one nation and another. Let us now turn to these two points.

**Banal nationalism**

The idea that nationalism must be understood in the context of ideological hegemony brings us back to Michael Billig’s concept of ‘banal nationalism’ that was discussed in the previous chapter. Billig argues that the semantic difference between the daily reproduction of established Western nations and more explicit nationalist mobilisation of social groups that seek to alter the national territorial status quo, is precisely a semantic difference and not a conceptual one. Both are examples of nationalism, but the ideological hegemony of the ‘established nations’ in the West means that while ‘nationalism’ comes to refer to the periphery and ‘ethic-cleansing Serbs’, the “ideological habits by which ‘our’ nations are reproduced as nations, and [which] are unnamed and, thereby unnoticed” (Billig, 1995: 77). However, “for such daily reproduction to occur, one might hypothesize that a whole complex of beliefs, assumptions, habits, representations and practices must also be reproduced. Moreover, this complex must be reproduced in a banally mundane way, for the world of nations is the everyday world the familiar terrain of contemporary times” (Billig, 1995: 6). Thus ‘banal nationalism’ as a means of producing and reproducing the nation uses the “stodgy government documents of [...] prosaic politicians” (Billig, 1995: 77), as part of a whole series of hegemonic discourses and practices of institutions and in society as a whole that speak unproblematically of the nation, and thus perpetuate its very hegemony. The result is that “the nation becomes inhabited, and, thereby, inhibited. In this sense, the term ‘imagined community’ may be misleading. The community and its place are not so much imagined, but there absence becomes unimaginable” (Billig, 1995: 77).
In contrast, ‘semantic nationalisms’, that is those social movements that challenge the territorial status quo, must make more explicit national claims. Without the ideological hegemony of ‘established nations’, and in many ways without the instruments of the state to perpetuate such hegemony, they are much more reliant on cultural, social, economic and political initiatives, from ‘civil society’, such as the “epic ballads of national poets” (Billig, 1995: 77), that seek to create the imagined homeland.

**Places and power**

The process of the fusion of national identity and territory, given that unity must be achieved out of necessarily diverse, place-based identities, means that certain places take on special meaning within the national homeland and national identity. This emphasis on certain places, such as those considered to be the ‘heartland’ of the nation, reflect power relations *within* the population of the national territory. English nationalism in the 19th century sought, successfully, to portray southern, rural England as the national heartland, the essence of Englishness, at the same time that London, and the South in general, came to form the centre of social, political, and economic power, not merely with regards to the rest of England, but over the whole of the British Empire. At the same time, however, representations of these particular places also reflected social and economic dominance of one class over another. Rose (1995) comments on how Gainsborough’s painting, Mr and Mrs Andrews not only became popular as a means of portraying the rural idyll of the Home Counties, but also as a means of reinforcing a particular kind of property relation, and the domination the land-owning classes:

“[t]he absence of the people who work in the field is noticeable, for example. Indeed, this is a painting which celebrates not the working of the land, but its ownership. Ownership of the land is celebrated in the substantiality of the oil paints used to represent it, and in the vista opening up beyond Mr and Mrs Andrews which echoes in visual form the freedom to move over property which only landowners could enjoy” (Rose, 1995: 110).
Relations of power may also be seen in the way in which certain places within the national territory take on added importance because they contrast starkly with perceived external threats to the nationalist project: “the idea that identity and place are connected because people feel they belong to a place is certainly not the only connection between identity and place, however. People also establish their sense of place and of who they are by contrasting themselves with somewhere they feel is very different from them” (Rose, 1995: 92). Thus, rural Wales, particularly the North and East became particularly important for the nationalist Plaid Cymru, in that it was perceived as the bastion against the related processes of Anglicisation, urbanisation and industrialisation of the South and East, all of which were considered threats to the Welsh identity. In the case of Irish nationalism from the nineteenth century, it was the West of Ireland that was portrayed as representing true ‘Irishness’ in contrast to the predominant territorial imaginations of English nationalism – the gentle rolling countryside of the ‘home’ countries (i.e. Southeast England), and also because the rugged, wild landscape of the West of Ireland was said to produce a national character that was in deep contrast with the English stereotype of the Irish nation (Rose, 1995: 91). The case of landscape representation in Anglo- and French Canada is also interesting, in that while the former, as we have seen, produced a particular vision of the Canadian landscape, with the North being chosen precisely because of the contrast with England, then landscape representations in Quebecois nationalism sought “an inhabited landscape [...] there is no apparent quest among Quebecois painters, unlike with Anglophone painters, to discover identity within these vast unspoilt spaces: rather they sought to represent Nature, as whole, humanised, modified, and civilised by a Culture” (Lasserre, 1993: 62). In the case of Catalonia, we shall see how not only was the rural hinterland promoted as the essence of the Catalan nation in contrast to the ‘impure’ ‘polluted’ urban environments, but that this was a conscious process designed by certain sectors of the urban middle class to assure the support of the rural elites for the construction of an industrialised society.

Overall, the concept of ideological hegemony, exercised through the process of national territorial socialisation allows us to analyse a wide range of instruments that nationalists use in the process of the production and reproduction of the nation in terms of the national homeland. Both ideas provide the theoretical foundations from which we may go beyond the study of the explicit claims of nationalist ideologists and political
entrepreneurs to analyse the daily political, cultural, economic and social practices that, consciously or not, reproduce the nation and its homeland. The final part of this chapter seeks to analyse the range of instruments used by nationalists, both of established nations and nations without states, such as Catalonia, in this process.

The Instruments of National Territorial Socialisation

Since the emergence of nationalism in the 19th century, the instruments available for the production and reproduction of the nation have changed greatly over time, and also vary according to whether we are talking of state-sponsored or non-state nationalisms. However, at least in the concrete settings of many current Western polyarchies, it would be erroneous to overstretch the dichotomy of non-state and state nationalism. Recent years have not only seen an explosion of non-state nationalisms, but also examples abound of political responses from the central state in order to accommodate political demands in the shape of administrative and/or political decentralisation or devolution. Thus, in the case of Spain, historic nations such as the Catalan, Basque and Galician, have all obtained their own political institutions and political powers of varying degrees over education, the right to set up their own ‘national’ public TV stations, etc. The result in the case of Spain, or at least in some parts of the state territory, is that ideological hegemony is very much ‘up for grabs’, it is in a constant state of flux, whereby ‘national poets’ coexist with in many cases the instruments of ‘banal nationalism’. Thus, here I shall merely outline some of the instruments that have traditionally been available to nationalist movements, while in the chapters on the process in Catalonia, a more detailed discussion of the instruments used by nationalists in the production and reproduction of the national homeland will be offered.

Geography as an academic discipline

The second half of the 19th century in what we now refer to as the West, witnessed profound changes in the way academic life was organised. New university faculties and departments opened, particularly in the social sciences such as sociology, political science and economics. As Agnew notes, these disciplines “had their origins in the practical interests of the state – respectively in social control, state management, and
the national accumulation of wealth” (Agnew, 1987: 74). At a time when the relation between existing states and their respective nations was presented as unproblematic, such disciplines were eminently national in their focus. The same can be said of geography, which emerged as a means of producing and reproducing national territory, distinguishing it from others, while at the same time subordinating when not ignoring regional geographies within the nation-state framework (Hooson, 1994). In addition, geographers played an important role on the expansion and consolidation of the colonialism of the Western powers: they provided information about potential or actual colonies while diffusing colonial conquests to the ‘proud’ nation, and within this overall context geographers played a key role in defining and giving “flesh to the emerging national identity of their country and its place in the world” (Hooson, 1994: 6).

With regards to the teaching of geography in schools, geography was one of the subjects introduced into all school curricula when compulsory schooling was established in late 19th-century Europe, precisely as a means of promoting a sense of national identity among citizens, since “the future citizen had to learn to link an abstract idea (the nation) with a concrete and tangible reality, that is, the physical and spatial setting of the nation” (Hooson, 1994: 7).

In response to the question as to why the subject of geography had such an important place in the new school curricula of many European and North American countries, Nogué i Font claims that the most important reason was “the consideration of geography by the established powers as a key element in the diffusion of national identity among the citizen body” (Nogué i Font, 1991: 80). The French geography textbook *Le Tour de France de Deux Enfants* became a best seller from its publication in 1877, with over eight million copies being sold, and was considered to be the means “through which millions of French children have learned to associate an abstract idea - the French nation - with a concrete, palpable reality - the territory controlled by the French state” (Nogué i Font, 1991: 81). This was felt necessary at a time when “the bourgeois Republic and its institutions were resisted by reactionary provincial forces until then” (Nogué i Font, 1991: 81). In this context, textbooks like *Le Tour de France de Deux Enfants* were felt “to be of the utmost importance to imbue future generations with a solid sense of France’s territorial possessions and history” (Johnston et al., 1988: 6). In the newly-unified Italy, a very similar geography textbook to France was used, whereby children were shown to be undertaking a *tour* (or *giro*, in this case) of the
country. Nogué quotes the following passage as paradigmatic of the fusion between geography and nationalism:

“Messina from the sea has the appearance of a great amphitheatre. The city has 100,000 inhabitants; it has long and beautiful avenues, is rich in monuments and its commerce is lively and dynamic. Messina is, in addition, a most patriotic city. It has always been present in all the national risings and in the wars for the independence of Italy” (Toti, quoted in Nogué i Font, 1991: 82).

In the US, geography very much took precedence over history in the school curricula in terms of the transmission of national values and the ‘expansionist ideals’ upon which the former were based, as the US pushed ever westwards at the expense of the indigenous population (Nogué i Font, 1991).

**Mapping**

Recent developments in such academic fields as social theory, the sociology of knowledge, discourse theory, (Harley, 1988), applied to the study of maps and mapping, have gone beyond traditional interpretation of maps as somehow reflections of ‘reality’, to interpret them in the context of the relations of power in which they were produced: “both in the selectivity of their content and in their signs and styles of representation maps are a way of conceiving, articulating, and structuring the human world which is biased towards, promoted by, and exerts influence upon particular sets of social relations” (Harley, 1988: 278). Given then the importance of territory, its symbolic construction and its territorial representation, it is of little surprise that maps and mapping have constituted an important element of nationalism.

Consequently, the growing importance given to the academic discipline of geography and the diffusion of national identity framed in geographic terms through textbooks was closely linked to the interest in mapping by states and nations. In terms of the successful realisation of state control over its territory and, in the case of European states at the turn of the last century, over empires, “maps [...] soon became crucial for the maintenance of state power – for its boundaries, its commerce, its
internal administration, its control over populations and its military strength” (Harley, 1989: 12).

However, at the same time the role of maps goes beyond the function of charting space with aim of state control. From the nineteenth century onwards, maps have played a vital role in the bonding of nation and territory and thus in the justification of state control over the territory in question. Maps create a visual image of the national territory, showing where the limits are. Maps are a powerful weapon in this respect in that they ensure that “people identify with a territory and that they do so as spontaneously as possible, [since] even the most illiterate citizen is capable of interpreting the binomial: map (cartografied homeland) equals nation” (Nogué i Font, 1991: 75). National territories soon took on recognisable shapes: France became known as the ‘Hexagon’ and Spain as the ‘Bull’s skin’. While they are essentially abstract representations, they are perceived to be “accurate and truthful representations of reality, [which] makes them powerful tools of persuasion” (Herb, 1999: 24).

However, it would perhaps be erroneous to think that mapping is, or has been, an exclusive instrument of state nationalism. In the case of Catalonia, we will see how the interest in mapping Catalonia coincided with the acceleration of industrialisation and the emergence of political nationalism. On the one hand, business interests emerged that demanded maps for the construction of railways, with such maps being produced by private agencies, while on the other, were maps produced and used by a key movement in Catalan nationalism and in others: the hiking movement.

The hiking movement

Hiking, which became popular in many European countries from the 19th century onwards, coinciding with urbanisation and industrialisation, must also be considered as a key activity for the spatial construction of the nation. Moranda talks of how, in Germany, “hiking brought Germans to the forests – a key component of a national symbolic landscape” (Moranda, 2000: 1), while “youth groups aligned with cultural nationalism would understand their activities as an attempt to reinvigorate the nation through nature excursions” (Moranda, 2000: 1). In this respect, the hiking movement in Germany helped to reproduce the mystification of the forests in the German national territorial imagination, begun by the tales of the Grimm brothers. Thus
“it was as though in the ‘old German forests’ the essential truths about German customs, laws and culture could be found – truths which might engender a deeper understanding of present-day Germany and might foster unity among the German people at a time when the German principalities were divided” (Harrison, quoted in Moranda, 2000: 5).

In the case of Catalonia, as we shall see, hiking clubs played a key role in the construction of a national landscape, this time with the mountains at the heart. However, beyond such considerations, the hiking movement, particularly in contexts of non-state nationalism, plays a key role in the claiming of territory in the name of the nation. All its four corners are explored, flags are placed at the summits of its highest peaks, maps are drawn, places are named, guide books are written, as are poems: to know the homeland is to love it and the nation. In the case of Catalonia, the hiking movement was very closely linked to one of the most important national poets of the late 19th century, Jacint Verdaguer, who as we shall see, was a key figure in the construction of the Catalan national territory at that time.

Landscape imagery and painters

We have already seen how important landscape imagery was for the creation of the Canadian national identity from the time of the country’s semi-independence from the United Kingdom in 1867. In his analysis, Lasserre (1993) not only outlines why landscape was important for national identity in Canada, but also discusses the specific measures taken by the government in this respect. Looking at the current success of landscape photography in Canada, Lasserre claims that such success has its origins in the work of a group of landscape painters of the early twentieth century, the Group of Seven who were well known not only for the artistic quality of their painting, but also for their “structured representation of territory and the nation” (Lassere, 1993: 51).

Thus, it was the governor general who founded the Royal Academy of Canadian Arts, whose first president was none other than the leading landscape painter, O’Brien, who soon set about commissioning a great number of new artists to paint the country, its landscapes and its vastness, so that the emerging Canadian nation might be able to comprehend and come into contact with, albeit at an abstract level, the national homeland. Osborne, quoting the catalogue of one of the collective exhibition of the Group of Seven, talks of the way in which they sought to offer “real ‘Art’ that ‘sincerely
interprets the spirit of a nation’s growth’, one of real value to the country’ (Osborne, 1988: 169). One of the members of the group, Lawren Harris, described the ‘Great North’ as “Virgin”, full of “living whiteness”, “loneliness” and replenishment, all of which provided a

“source of spiritual flow that will ever shed clarity into the growing race of America, and we Canadians being closest to this source seem destined to produce art somewhere different from our southern fellows - an art more spacious, of a greater living quiet, perhaps of a more certain conviction of eternal values. We were not placed between the Southern teeming of men and the ample replenishing North for nothing” (Harris, quoted in Osborne, 1988: 172).

This idea of the influence of nature on the Canadian people in general and on artists in particular, to some extent picks up on the “racist and environmentalist credos of Canadian chauvinists a generation earlier. For one of these, George R. Parkin, Canada’s national unity was favoured by a ‘northern climate’ which excluded the ‘negro’, the ‘Italian organgrinder’, and weaker races which would not fit in with ‘Anglo-Saxon institutions’, a climate which furthered ‘progress’, ‘democratic spirit’, and a ‘high and powerful form of civilization’” (Osborne, 1988: 171).

**Anthems, songs and poems**

Landscape images are also a particular feature of national anthems and popular patriotic songs such as those sung by the soldiers as they went off to war. In terms of the former, Storey mentions countries such as Chile, Austria, Bulgaria, Denmark, Mexico and the newly-independent Croatia. Some, such as the Danish national anthem, mention landscape features in quite general terms:

There is a lovely land
Whose charming woods of beeches
Grow near the Baltic strand, grow near the Baltic strand.
It waves from valley up to hill
Its name is olden Denmark
Or the Austrian:

Land of mountains, land of rivers,
Land of tillage, land of churches,
Land of iron, land of promise,
Motherland of valiant sons.

Other national anthems, mention quite specific places, such as Croatia’s, that makes specific references to the rivers that form the rather sensitive borders of the new republic:

Sava, Drava, keep on flowing,
Danube, do not lose your vigour,
Deep blue sea, go tell the whole world,
That a Croat loves his homeland.

In the case of popular marching songs, to Rose (1995: 107) it was no surprise that English soldiers sang about he glories of the English countryside as they marched off to war in 1939, given that English men and women, from the turn of the century, were increasingly asked to identify with the English countryside, through paintings, garden design, Country Life magazine and so forth. Thus:

There’ll always be an England
While there’s a country lane,
As long as there’s a cottage small
Beside a field of grain.

Not far removed from songs and anthems, is the work of poets and writers, who for Billig represent “a familiar figure in the early stages of movements to establish new nations” since the “mystic bond between people and place is a much repeated theme in their writings” (Billig, 1995: 77). Without going any further than the case at hand, Catalan nationalism, the work of immensely important poets for the nationalist cause,
such as Joan Maragall and Jacint Verdaguer, is full of explicit references to the Catalan homeland, a contribution which has guaranteed their place in the pantheon of Catalan writers.

By way of summary, we may say that the ‘age of nationalism’ in Europe and beyond coincided in many cases with the promotion of geography as a means of increasing and/or consolidating state power over national homelands and colonies, while providing an extremely useful tool for linking the nation to the homeland in question. In this respect, university departments, geographic and cartographic institutes, the teaching of geography in schools have all played a fundamental role in the nationalist project, in addition to cultural and literary expressions.

Conclusions

Overall, nationalism and territory are intimately linked in various ways. Firstly, and most obviously, is the most fundamental claim that nationalism makes on behalf of the nation, that is that the nation must have its own state or some form of political autonomy, both of which, despite the problems involved at a practical level, rely on fundamentally territorial notions of political power. Thus, nationalists seek to occupy and control a given territory, not as an end in itself, but rather as a means of controlling the population, relations and material resources therein; in Sack’s terminology, nationalism is an example of territoriality. However, nationalisms do not simply occupy or covet a given space, but attach identity to it, so that it becomes the national homeland; in other words, the way the nation is defined, national identity, is linked to the territory in question. In this respect, physical aspects of the landscape may be said to imbue the nation with special characteristics, whilst other elements of national identity such as historical feats, language and other cultural features are all linked to the national homeland to the point where the nation derives its identity from the national territory itself.

This process of fusion of nation and territory takes place through what might be considered as national territorial socialisation, whose overall aim is to produce and reproduce a unified nation and national territory that is clearly distinguishable from
other nations and their respective homelands. Thus the construction of ‘we’ and the ‘other’ come to be defined in the territorial terms of ‘here’ and ‘there’ respectively. The specific way in which this process of socialisation takes place reflects wider power relations within society. This may be seen in the way in which certain places take on a special significance within the national territory, in that they become the heartland of the nation, where the essential elements of the nation are to be found. Relations of power, expressed in terms of ideological hegemony may also be seen in the means that are used to produce and reproduce the nation and the homeland. Billig introduces the concept of ‘banal nationalism’ as a means of describing the daily practices used by the ‘established’ nations of the West, to the extent that they become invisible, unnoticed, which in turn has the effect that the objects of reproduction, the nation and its territory, become ‘normalised’, and their disappearance unthinkable. At the same time those social groups that challenge the national territorial status quo, that is the ‘normal’ state of affairs, are considered to be peripheral, threatening and associated with ethnic-cleansing Serbs, and other ‘extremists’.

What, then, do these points add up to in terms of an overall understanding of nationalism? It is not clear to what extent any single theory of nationalism can successfully explain why the phenomenon occurred and continues to occur across such a wide range of contexts in time and in space, and as such the current exercise seeks to avoid any ‘unity of explanation’ valid for all cases. In addition, the aim of the current exercise is more modest; to apply this understanding of nationalism to the case of Catalonia, where attention will focus on the way in which Catalan nationalism has attempted to define the nation in a definite territorial way. By analysing such a process over time, we can investigate the power relations within Catalan society that have led to the distinct territorial construction. However, having said this, a territorial understanding of nationalism may help us address certain questions as to why, at general level, national became and remains so popular, both among élites and among the population at large.

On the one hand, it might be ventured at this stage that nationalism, presented in this light, becomes highly attractive for elites wishing to control a given area and its population. As nationalists obtain the instruments of state power, the physical manifestations of such political power become what Sack calls ‘reified’; they become more visible and potentialities are made explicit and real. At the same time, Sack talks
of the way in which “territoriality can be used to displace attention from the relationship between the controller and the controlled to the territory, as when we say ‘its the law of the land’ or you may not do this here” (Sack, 1986: 33). The combination of both elements of territoriality, shared, according to Sack by both nationalism and the Church, gives rise to the mystical view of place or territory, whereby, in the case of nationalism “territory is a physical manifestation of the state’s authority, and yet allegiance to territory or homeland makes territory appear as a source of authority” (Sack, 1986: 38). Thus, a virtuous circle would seem to be established. The institutions of nationalism, as they exercise control over territory, reinforce the nationalist interpretation of such territory, which in turn legitimise their control over it and the population living therein.

On the other hand, in terms of the broad and deep acceptance of nationalism among the population at large, how does the idea of nationalism as territorial phenomenon contribute to our understanding of nationalism? We have seen that exclusive control over and the sense of belonging to a territory are not in-bred instincts in human beings. However, this is not to say that humans have lacked ties to the land that is occupied, nor revered individual places in the past, nor will they continue to do so in the future. Burial sites, shrines, mountains where the gods appeared, are examples of how certain places have taken on special significance for human beings throughout history. From essentially nomadic tribes, such as the American Plains Indians and the Australian Aborigines, to the settled ancient cultures of the Mediterranean basin, differing forms of attachment to land have been present as have different forms of territoriality (Tuan, 1977). However, nationalism is different, in that it emerges in the context of modern-state territoriality, which leads it to forge a very special kind of bond between the people the homeland over which claims are made. Thus, however much the nation might be ‘invented’ or ‘constructed’, the national homeland provides a sense of continuity in that it builds on the existing pre-national foundations that only the land and its special places can provide.
CHAPTER 3
NATIONALISM AND GLOBALISATION I: TOWARDS DETERRITORIALISATION

Introduction

At a reasonably abstract level, the previous chapter sought to argue that nationalism as a political ideology, movement and even sentiment is territorial in two basic ways: one the one hand, nationalism is an example of territoriality in that it represents “the attempts by an individual or groups (x) to influence, affect or control objects, people and relationships by delimiting and asserting control over a geographic area. This will be called territory” (Sack, 1986: 19). In the case of nationalism, territoriality is exercised or sought to be exercised within the spatial context of the state or some form of regional political autonomy. On the other hand, nationalism may be considered to be territorial since nationalists justify such control by claiming that it is exercised in the name of the nation, which in turn is defined in terms of the very territory over which the control is exercised.

Despite the fact that state territoriality, particularly at a practical level, has been far from unproblematic, it has nevertheless provided the guiding principle for the way in which nationalism has operated over the past two centuries, creating an ‘isomorphism’ between nation, state, territory and sovereignty (Appadurai, 1996a). However, over recent decades, from approximately the 1970’s onwards, the phenomenon of globalisation is said to have radically altered, even mortally wounded this isomorphic relation, placing in question the viability of the nation-state and political mobilisation based upon the principle of territoriality, such as nationalism. In this respect, the current chapter seeks to analyse the relationship between globalisation and nationalism. However, before doing so, it is worthwhile, by way of introduction, to raise several points about the term globalisation and the debate surrounding it.

Firstly, the term globalisation has very much emerged in academic circles and beyond as the key means of capturing the series of societal changes at the beginning of the third millennium, although the widespread use of the term and the immense amount
of ink spilt over it are not entirely unproblematic. On the one hand, the rapidly-growing volume of literature to be found on the subject makes it virtually impossible for any one researcher to keep abreast of all new developments in the field, while on the other hand, and perhaps more importantly, the term has come to be used in so many different ways that there is the real danger that it will lose its significance and capacity to describe contemporary society in any meaningful way. Poppi sums up such an idea in a way that to a large extent could also be applied to nationalism itself: “in a sense the meaning of the concept is self-evident, in another, it is as vague and obscure as its reaches are wide and constantly shifting” (Poppi, 1997: 284). Within such a context, claims that point to a lack of serious theoretical and empirical studies of the phenomenon would appear to be largely justified (Held et al., 1998).

These problems have to some extent been accentuated by the tendency of certain accounts to reduce globalisation to signify the spread of Western liberal market capitalism across the globe, a process often presented as either a utopian or dystopian inevitability. This reductionism has meant that in some cases globalisation and not liberal market capitalism has become the target of fierce criticism, with certain ‘globalsceptic’ authors denying the existence of globalisation altogether (see for example Hirst, 1997; Hirst and Thompson, 1996a and 1996b). Fortunately, over recent years, fine empirically- and theoretically-informed works have been published that seek to avoid such reductionism, and that challenge much of the rhetoric and ‘hype’ surrounding the term. In this sense, it is perhaps significant that the ‘anti-globalisation movement’, as it first came to be known, protesting against what was considered to be the neo-liberal excesses of globalisation, has come to promote alternative forms of globalisation, and thus recognising that globalisation and neo-liberalism are not necessarily the same thing.

Finally, to an important extent, attempts to explain globalisation from academia have revealed certain ‘structural’ problems associated with the social sciences. In the first place, the spatial implications of globalisation have highlighted the need for more geographically-sensitive approaches in many of the social sciences'. Secondly, globalisation represents a most wide-ranging subject matter. On the one hand, little agreement exists on the dynamics behind the phenomenon, while on the other, the consequences are said to embrace all spheres of social activity. Within such a context,
calls have emerged for a greater degree of interdisciplinary research on the subject, if its complexity is to be understood\(^2\), and as such the present exercise seeks as much as possible to follow the needs of interdisciplinarity.

After this brief, yet necessary parenthesis, let us return to the question of how to understand the relationship between globalisation and nationalism. In this chapter it will be argued that globalisation may be considered as containing two key processes: deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation. “Deterritorialization”, Ó Tauthail proposes, “is the name given to the problematic of territory losing its significance and power in everyday life. Territory, the concept suggests, is no longer the stable and unquestioned actuality it once was. Rather than an assumed given, its position and status is now in question” (Ó Tuathail, 1999). It has come about, it is argued, “as a consequence of the technological, material and geopolitical transformations of the late twentieth century” (Ó Tuathail, 1999) which threatens to overcome the exercise of territorial political power and territorially-based identities. Nationalism, in this scenario is affected in two ways: on the one hand, as the territorial nature of state power is said to be fatally undermined by the processes contained within globalisation, the state becomes redundant and ceases to be a worthwhile goal of nationalism; on the other, it is argued that identities based in place, such as national identity, might also be considered difficult to sustain by the emergence of transnational and even ‘postnational’ identities, which are unconnected to any one place, such as national territory.

However, deterritorialisation must not be seen as an absolute process for two sets of reasons: firstly, at an empirical level, contrary to much of the rhetoric surrounding many versions of the deterritorialisation thesis, the case for a deterritorialised, ‘borderless’ world (Ohmae, 1990) must not be overstated, as the continued relevance of the nation state and of several place-based forms of political mobilisation, such as nationalism, testify. Secondly, while deterritorialisation may be considered to be an important part of globalisation, there are sound theoretical reasons


\(^2\) Indeed, the majority of studies on the subject of globalisation go beyond the boundaries (or whatever remains of them) of Parson’s semi-autonomous spheres of social activity, to include some mixture of cultural, political, economic, environmental, military etc. aspects of the phenomenon. Perhaps the most systematic, wide-ranging study of globalisation in both theoretical and empirical terms, *Global Transformations* is the fruit of the collaboration of a political theorist, David Held, an international
for arguing that territory can never be completely done away with, and that
deterritorialisation must necessarily be accompanied by the process of
reterritorialisation, whereby different spatial scales may retain or even increase their
importance as the context in which social relations take place. It is within this dual
dynamic of deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation that nationalism, as an example of
territorially-based political mobilisation, is not necessarily undermined, and can in fact
benefit and actively take part in broader societal shifts of which globalisation might be
considered to be an important part.

While Chapter 4 analyses the dynamics of reterritorialisation, the current chapter
seeks to analyse the relation between globalisation and nationalism within the context of
deterritorialisation. Attention will focus on two key aspects: the emergence of
deterritorialised global economic flows which, it will be argued, undermine key aspects
of state sovereignty, particularly those related to socio-economic regulation; and
secondly, the way in which territorial national identities may be said to be threatened by
the spread of Western culture and lifestyles, closely linked to the spread of Western
liberal market capitalism, and by the emergence of deterritorialised transnational
network identities associated with mass population movements such as diasporas.

**Deterritorialisation**

The concept of ‘deterritorialisation’ is present both implicitly and explicitly in a
wide range of economic, political and cultural accounts of globalisation, although it is
sometimes poorly conceptualised and falls victim to the more ‘extreme’ rhetoric
surrounding the phenomenon of globalisation. Deterritorialisation may be said to refer
to the process whereby power and meaning are increasingly disembedded from discrete
places, such as nation-state territories, and as such territory loses its hegemonic role as
the main organising principle of social, political, cultural, and economic life. More
specifically, deterritorialisation may be said to be the consequence of globalisation,
whereby an increasing number of economic, political, cultural, and military practices
are organised in transnational or even global networks due to technological, material
and geopolitical changes in the late twentieth century. As these networks increasingly

relations expert, Anthony McGrew, a social scientist, David Goldblatt, and an economist, Jonathan
overcome nation-state boundaries, so it becomes increasingly difficult to control or delimit territory in any meaningful way. As such, not only the concept of territory might be considered to be increasingly redundant, but also difference between geographic locations is undermined.

In the current exercise, attention will focus on two processes that are said to undermine the territorial basis of the key territorial institution, the nation-state: the emergence of a global flows of finance, goods and services, and transnational networks of people, such as migrants. This is not to say that there are no other aspects of globalisation that threaten the principle of territoriality and especially that of the nation-state. Michael Mann (1997), for example, in his analysis of the possible threats to the nation-state posed by globalisation, in addition to the capitalist threat, also talks of environmental limits, new social movements and a new transnational civil society, at the same time as post militarism and a new world order. Indeed, other accounts seek to challenge “the conventional view that recent trends in globalization have been led by economic, social and cultural processes, and offers a distinctly politicist and militarist historical explanation” (Shaw, 1997: 498). However, as I will attempt to show in the following analysis, it has been changes within the structural functioning of capitalism that have provided the main dynamic behind current globalisation; as Hirst and Thompson point out, “we believe that without the notion of a truly globalized economy many of the other consequences adduced in the domains of culture and politics would either cease to be sustainable or become less threatening” (Hirst and Thompson, 1996b: 3)³. Secondly, attention will also be focussed on the challenges to territorial identities such as national identities, both as a result of capitalist restructuring and also due to the emergence of transnational identities, often based around diasporas. Obviously, migration is not new, but unprecedented migratory flows and recent technological developments, such as television via satellite, mean that in Europe, for example, the emergence of networks of transnational or even postnational identities is seen a challenge to the viability of national identities.

³ Roland Robertson is one of the few to warn against overemphasis on economic factors behind globalisation (see Robertson and Lechner, 1985), and has written extensively on the subject, a surprise at first glance given his background in the sociology of religion. However, it is precisely in the expansion of religious practices that he sees one of the most important dynamics behind globalisation (see Robertson and Chirico, 1985).
Global Economic Deterritorialisation

From the basic premise that capitalism is inherently prone to crisis of overaccumulation, Harvey (1982, 1989) suggests that, as a means of overcoming or postponing such crises, the history of capitalism has been marked by “successive waves of time-space compression generated out of the pressures of capital accumulation with its perpetual search to annihilate space through time and reduce turn over time” (Harvey, 1989: 306-7). He forcefully argues that the last two decades have been witness to a particularly savage bout of time-space compression, as capitalism moved out of one regime of accumulation, Fordism-Keynesianism, to a new mode called flexible accumulation, itself the motor behind the broader societal shift from the condition of modernity to that of postmodernity. Time-space compression within the context of capitalist restructuring has led to the emergence of networks of production, distribution, marketing and consumption of goods and services that are to some extent disembedded from territory. Such control over space increasingly limits territorial attempts to regulate them from the nation-state. A key factor in the emergence of such global flows has been the development and application of information, transportation and communications technology, such as satellite systems, fibre-optic communications, containerised shipping and air transport, which have been reflected in the progressive reduction, not only in the time taken to travel from one place to another, but also in the cost of such mobility, as Table 3.1 illustrates:

Table 3.1 The reduction in transportation and communication costs, 1920-1990, at constant 1990 US$

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Sea freight</th>
<th>Air transport</th>
<th>Cross-Atlantic telephone call</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>244.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>188.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>53.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>45.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>31.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>4.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>3.32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Two areas are often cited that illustrate the way in which capitalism has been increasingly able to take advantage of such technological advances in order to overcome time-space barriers: on the one hand, increasingly integrated financial markets; and on the other, the timid emergence of a ‘global’ trading order in which transnational corporations (TNCs) are increasingly important actors as they attempt to achieve a global reach. The aim of the following part of the chapter is not to provide a comprehensive overview of the current state of economic globalisation and the debate surrounding it, since many rigorous attempts have already been made4. Rather, in what follows, key aspects of economic globalisation will be analysed from the perspective of deterritorialisation.

Global financial markets

In economic terms, one of the areas in which deterritorialisation is said to have emerged with greatest force over recent decades has been the seemingly unstoppable rise of tremendously powerful financial markets of global reach. The breakdown of the Bretton Woods System and the introduction of floating exchange rates, state-led deregulation, and the introduction of Information Technology (IT) and satellite communications have all led to important quantitative and qualitative changes in the way financial markets operate on a world scale (see, for example, Harvey, 1989; Swyngedouw, 1992).

Firstly, we may point to the way in which interconnected world money markets across various time zones, from Tokyo and Hong Kong to London, New York and Los Angeles, are able to function twenty-four hours per day, due to the introduction of satellite communications and informatics. This constant flux of finance in ever-open circuits is a qualitative advance in terms of market integration over space.

A further development has been the enormous increase in the turnover of financial markets such as those dealing in foreign exchange. The end of the Bretton Woods System of fixed exchange rates and the capital controls that accompanied it, has

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4 Accounts such as Harvey’s (1989) and Giddens’ (1990), which conceptualise globalisation as ‘time-space compression’ and ‘time-space distanciation’, respectively, incorporate globalisation into a broader analysis of contemporary social change, as does Castells in his acclaimed trilogy The Information Society (1996, 1997, 1998). Of recent general accounts, Held et al’s Global Transformations is perhaps the most thorough attempt not only to come to terms with the phenomenon, but also with the vast amount of perspectives and literature on the subject.
led to spectacular rises in the turnover of foreign exchange markets. While traditionally such markets have been dominated by the needs of the productive economy to finance imports and exports, one of the features of recent developments in foreign-exchange trading has been the enormous rise in speculative transactions, as part of a wider divorce between the ‘financial’ and the ‘productive economy’ (Drucker, 1997). These trends can be seen in Table 3.2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Foreign Exchange Turnover</th>
<th>World Exports</th>
<th>Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1:12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>75.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1:38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>190.0</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>1:61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>252.0</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>1:54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>297.5</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>1:60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>415.8</td>
<td>5.27</td>
<td>1:79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>357.5</td>
<td>5.94</td>
<td>1:60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Further developments in the emergence of globally-integrated financial markets include the rise of new financial instruments - many, although not all, eminently speculative in character - that at the same time are increasingly transnational. Thus, on the one hand, a series of derivative products emerged as late as the mid-1980’s, such as futures, options and swaps, whose current notional outstanding values is higher than world GDP (Held et. al, 1998: 208). On the other, the issue of international bonds, both public and private, have tripled between 1986 and 1996 (Strange, 1998a).

**Towards a global trading order**

The process of economic deterritorialisation is also reflected in the emergence for many of what can be described as an emerging ‘global’ trading order and of new ‘global’ economic actors, such as transnational corporations (TNCs), all of which represent a quantitative and qualitative shift from the previous international trading order.
Firstly, despite the complexity involved in comparing international trade statistics over time and the consequent methodological debate surrounding such calculations (see, for example, Amin, 1997; Van Bergeijk and Mensink, 1997), the present may be considered “unique in terms of the volume and the rate of growth of international trade, both in absolute terms as well as in relation to world output” (Ibañez, 1999: 44). According to the World Trade Organization (WTO), over recent decades, world trade in goods has consistently outgrown world output of goods, a tendency which has been accentuated in the latter half of the 1990’s. Between 1990 and 2000, world export of goods grew by a yearly average of 7%, while output grew on average by just 2.5% (WTO, 2002: 21).

In addition, Held et al. (1998: 163-182) show how the intensity of trade between countries has increased, while the same can be said of the extensity, as more and more countries become integrated within the emerging world trade order. Such growth, as Harvey suggests, can be explained within the context of capitalism’s need to overcome both temporal and spatial barriers if periodic crises of overaccumulation are to be postponed. However, institutional factors also play a major part in explaining the specific pattern of the growth of international trade. Many of the barriers to international trade that had been erected during the depression of the 1930’s were to some extent dismantled by the GATT agreements of 1944, which led to a major expansion of international trade, particularly between OECD countries. However, by the mid-1990’s, the GATT was replaced by a much more powerful institution, whose decisions are legally binding, the World Trade Organisation (WTO), that has not only been a key force in reducing barriers to trade between developed countries, including non-tariff barriers, but has also seen how an increasing number of countries have been incorporated that had previously remained outside the GATT regime, and as such can be considered part of the world trade regime. This process has, of course, been much favoured by the collapse of ‘real socialism’ in the former Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe, in that many of the countries involved have adopted, at least nominally, free market capitalism, and have consequently sought to be included in the trade regime overseen by the WTO. The process has been culminated recently with the admission of China.

In terms of the key actors in the process of the construction of the new ‘global’ trading order, “transnational corporations remain the key shapers and shakers of the international economy, and it is the ever more extensive and intensive integration of
their activities that is the primary dynamic of the globalization process” (Robins, 1991: 26), with the period since the 1970’s seeing foreign direct investment (FDI) by TNCs rise spectacularly, as has the proportion of world GDP that TNCs account for. This of course is not to say that until the 1970’s few if any firms existed with significant overseas interests; in a historical context, one must only look to the East India Company and its many colonial successors for examples of incipient TNCs. At the early part of the 20th century, oil companies emerged that possessed major production, distribution and sales networks throughout the world, in addition to exercising an oligopolistic hold on the world oil market. In the post-World War Two period, the Marshall Plan, and later the Korean and Vietnam wars were instrumental in paving the way for a massive expansion of American firms in Europe and beyond, with a similar process being later followed by many European and Asian firms.

However, within this historical context, FDI levels over the last two decades are significantly higher, as Table 3.3 shows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3.3 FDI Movements since 1982</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Value at current prices</strong> (Billions of dollars)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDI inflows</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDI outflows</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDI inward stock</td>
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<td>FDI outward stock</td>
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</table>

Source: UNCTAD (2002).

Much of the FDI reflects mergers and acquisitions of overseas companies, which together with joint ventures, strategic alliances (see, for example Cooke, 1993), underline the need for TNCs to become truly global in their reach as a means of ensuring economies of scope and scale as costs can be spread over a larger basis. As Robins points out, “it remains the case, more than ever, that size is power” (Robins, 1991: 26).

A further feature of the emerging ‘global’ trading order and the importance that TNCs play within it is the enormous increase of intra-firm trade over recent decades. According to UNCTAD, TNC “firms increasingly rely on sales from international production rather than on exports” (UNCTAD, 1997: 16). Between 1982 and 1994, the
sales of TNC affiliates increased at the annual rate of 8%, while over the same period TNC export volumes grew at less than 6% annually, reducing the proportion of total sales accounted for by affiliate exports from 31% to 28%. The report concludes that such figures:

“suggest that FDI has become somewhat more domestic-market orientated, which partly reflects that fact that it has flowed into the service sector. At the same time, the share of exports directed to affiliated firms (parent firms and other foreign affiliates) in total exports of foreign affiliates increased. Complex integration strategies pursued by TNCs and the proliferation and deepening of regional integration schemes have facilitated trade among affiliates of the same TNC system [...] All in all, around one-third of world trade takes place within transnational corporate networks” (UNCTAD 1997: 17-18).

At the same time, the increasingly global extension of TNC activity has been accompanied by profound changes in the way in which such companies are organised.

“‘Flexible transnationals’ [...] must now operate and compete in the world arena in terms of quality, efficiency, product variety, and close understanding of markets. And they must operate in all markets simultaneously, rather than sequentially. Global corporations are increasingly involved in time-based competition: they must shorten the innovation cycle; cut seconds from process time in the factory; accelerate distribution and consumption times” (Robins, 1991: 26).

The co-ordination and compression of such activity over space and time respectively has been made possible by the introduction of information and communication technology, which have increased transnational firms’ control over space as it is now possible for them to control in real time a whole range of operations and decision-making in many sites around the globe simultaneously. Thus “large multinational corporation like Texas Instruments to operate plants with simultaneous decision-making with respect to financial, market, input costs, quality control and labour process conditions in more than fifty different locations across the globe” (Dicken, 1986, quoted in Harvey, 1989: 293). Consequently, as TNCs are increasingly
forced to become more global in their outlook, as a means of ensuring achieving economies of scale and scope and of increasing market penetration, they take on a “genuine ‘equidistant of perspective’ whereby the difference between the domestic and the overseas effectively disappears in terms of production, distribution, marketing and sales (Ohmae, 1989: 135).

Overall, by way of summary, the basic premise offered here, very much inspired in Harvey’s reworking of historical materialism, is that while capitalism has always sought to overcome temporal and spatial barriers, the current wave of time-space compression, impelled by the need to overcome the rigidities of the Fordist-Keynesian regime of accumulation and its international character, and made possible by the application of information and communications technology, is historically novel in both its intensity and extensity, measured in quantitative and qualitative terms. In this respect, the arguments put forward here seek to disprove the thesis offered by ‘globalsceptics’ such as Hirst and Thompson (1996a, 1996b; and Hirst 1997), who propose that if the term ‘globalisation’ is to have any significance then it should refer to an “open and international economy with large and growing flows of trade and capital investments between countries” (Hirst and Thompson, 1996b: 48), and as such globalisation is not a novel phenomenon in historical terms.

Deterritorialisation and the Impact on Nation-State Autonomy

In the light of the characterisation offered here of certain trends within the world economy, can we interpret current world economic trends as leading inexorably to a single world economic order, in which highly mobile economic flows are essentially disembedded from territory and territorial, nation-state attempts to regulate them? Since the mid-1980’s, the view that highly mobile flows will force nation-states to embark on a policy-race to a neo-liberal bottom, whereby nation-states are forced to converge macro-economic policy around low wages, low taxes, low spending and low deficits in order to attract capital flows and investment, has become received wisdom in many accounts. Such accounts have emerged in the context of the neo-liberal political and intellectual hegemony of the 1980’s and 1990’s, with many accounts confusing description and analysis with prescription (Scott, 1997). However, the premise of the
policy race to the neo-liberal bottom is also accepted by many who regard such an outcome as essentially negative, but who nevertheless accept the basic premise that the nation-state is increasingly redundant against global economic flows (see, for example, Strange, 1998b; Harvey, 1989; Swyngedouw, 1992). However, a series of empirical and theoretical arguments can be offered, that heavily qualify the deterritorialisation argument, although it should be made clear that the tendency of deterritorialisation is nevertheless an important part of the globalisation process.

Thus, I wish to develop the following points:

• Firstly, the empirical evidence supporting the construction of truly global disembedded economic flows as an absolute and inevitable process is scarce. Rather, a careful analysis reveals a much more complex, less complete and more uneven situation in this respect.

• Secondly, analysing data from OECD countries, little evidence suggests that, despite globalisation, they have converged around low-tax, low-spending and low-deficit macroeconomic policy positions.

• Thirdly, combining theoretical and empirical arguments, it can be argued that continuing divergence is not the result of incomplete world economic integration, and as such a different understanding of the nature of mobile capital and investment flows and their relation with nation-state regulatory practice is required.

**Global economic integration: an empirical critique**

While certain consensus does exist on the extent to which financial markets have become tremendously powerful forces, compromising to a certain extent state sovereignty of at least some states in certain policy areas, the extent to which their emergence signifies that concepts such as political power have disappeared into the black hole of deterritorialised, global networks, is unclear. While authors such as Ó Tuathail are ready to admit that “all of the[se] developments were radically re-structuring scalar relations, power relationships and time-space logics conditioning the
geography and territoriality in the late twentieth century” (Ó Tuathail, 1999), commentators such as O’Brien go much further and claim that we were not so much witnessing a spatial restructuring, but rather the “end of geography”, that is “a state of economic development where geographical location no longer matters in finance, or matters much less than hitherto” (O’Brien, 1992: 1).

However, a series of arguments can be put forward to challenge such ‘liberal free-market utopianism’ (Gray, 1998), that accept that global financial market integration is underway, but that lead to the conclusion that the process is far from unstoppable, has a definite outcome, or that we are moving to the scenario of the ‘end of geography’. In the first place, major differences still exist between real rates of interest of countries across OECD countries, with such differences being larger still between the latter and less-developed countries. In a fully-integrated global market, such differences would be unsustainable in the medium- to long-run (The Economist, 20/9/1997). In addition, the rates of return on a wide variety of financial products still vary greatly, due, among other things to fluctuating exchange rates between different countries. In terms of the national rates of savings and rates of investment in, for example, the stock market, according to IMF figures, in 1995, 92% of US stock market shares were in the hands of US investors, with 96% the figure for Japan, 92% for the UK, and 89% for France (quoted in The Economist, 20/9/1997). In the process of financial market integration, geography still matters in that, while it is largely true that “many smaller states are at the mercy of world financial markets” (Ó Tuathail, 1999), it has been the leading Western states that have done most to deregulate financial markets’, and who still effectively set the rules for the world financial system through the operation of institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank. In addition, doubt must be cast on the extent to which we can talk of financial markets with a truly ‘global’ reach. Throughout the decade of the 1990’s, 80% of trading in foreign exchange took place in just eight countries (UK, USA, Switzerland, Singapore, Japan, Hong Kong, Germany, and France), with the City of London concentrating an average of 30% of the world total (BIS, 1998). Finally, according to authors such as Sassen (1991) and Thrift (1994) the emergence of a globally integrated financial system has meant that physical places such as the City of London, have not been rendered meaningless, rather the reverse, since as even O’Brien recognises, face-to-face contact, social interaction, and nationally-
regulated settings within which they take place all become key to the construction of globally integrated financial markets (ÓTuathail, 1999).

Similar empirical objections can be raised to the claims that we are now entering in a single global trading order. In the first place, while there does exist strong empirical evidence supporting a shift away from an international trading order in both qualitative and quantitative terms, the majority of world trade continues to take place within the ‘Triad’ of North America, Western Europe and the Far East (Ohmae, 1985), with large proportions of the planet and its population excluded. This is reflected also in the patterns of FDI over recent decade, with both inflows and outflows of FDI over the past 11 years being overwhelmingly concentrated within the developed capitalist world, a concentration that has fluctuated, and not been diminished over the time period studied. As an UNCTAD report concludes,

“[t]he world’s top 30 host countries account for 95 per cent of the world total FDI inflows and 90 per cent of stocks. The top 30 home countries account for around 99 per cent of outward FDI flows and stocks, mainly industrialised economies. About 90 of the world’s largest 100 non-financial TNCs in terms of foreign assets are headquartered in the Triad” (UNCTAD, 2002).

Secondly, while we have seen the extent to which TNCs increasingly seek to acquire a global presence, reflected, for example, in the enormous increase in recent decades of FDI and of joint ventures, cross-border mergers and strategic alliances, doubts may be cast on the extent to which all, or even the majority of TNCs can be considered to be in any meaningful way ‘global’. According to the same UNCTAD report, while firms such as Nestlé, ABB, Unilever and the majority of the largest oil companies had a large percentage of assets, sales and employment beyond their respective country of origin6, many others, including General Electric, Sony, General Motors, Ford and Aventis, can be considered to concentrate assets, sales and employment in their respective countries of origin. In addition, many TNCs may obtain a variety of competitive advantages from their country of origin, such as export or R&D

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5 Deregulation of financial markets began in the 1970’s in the US, spreading via the neoliberal revolution of Thatcher and Reagan to the City of London’s ‘Big Bang’ in 1986.

6 This is known as the TNI or ‘transnationality index’, which measures the ratio of foreign assets against total assets, foreign sales against total sales, and foreign employment against total employment.
subsidies, as well as political support in times of crisis, as recent events have shown in the Argentina, where the Spanish government has actively been involved to protect the interests of ‘Spanish’ TNCs such as Telefonica, Endesa, Repsol-YPF, BBVA and BSCH.

Much is also made of the ability and will of TNCs to rapidly delocalise investments in one location in the search for better returns in others. The ‘footloose’ TNC has been undoubtedly helped in this respect by the increasing use of subcontracting and other forms of outsourcing which effectively reduces the risk of making fixed investment in plant and machinery. However, once more this must be qualified. If the kind of investment made involves, for example, R&D, with the consequent need for trained personnel, the commitment made to such an investment site is likely to be medium- to long-term, and not short-term. Thus, those TNCs in industries with high degrees of innovation are unlikely to be as ‘footloose’ as those in low-tech manufacturing industries. However, even here, Allen notes that while some of Nike’s relations with subcontracted firms in South-East Asia “were brief, other links have been close and long term, in particular those with Taiwan and South Korea” (Allen, 1995: 91).

Overall, we have reached a point whereby claims about the inexorable rise of a truly global economic order must be doubted. However, as we have seen, nor is it the case of ‘business as usual’; increasingly integrated financial markets, perhaps more transnational than truly global in scope, have been constructed that are quantitatively and qualitatively different from anything that has gone before. In terms of trade, TNCs “play a much more central role in the operation of the world economy than in the past and they figure prominently in organising extensive and intensive transnational networks of co-ordinated production and distribution that are historically unique” (Held et al. 1998: 282).

The result is that the present-day economic order is characterised by “dense networks of regional and global economic relations which stretch beyond the control of any single state [...] extensive webs of transitional relations and instantaneous electronic communications [...]and] a vast array of international regimes and organisations which can limit the scope for action of the most powerful states” (Held, 1995: 20).
Persistent nation-state divergence

In terms of the supposed convergence of nation-state macroeconomic management around a neo-liberal race to the bottom, Garret (1998) has produced a most interesting empirical and theoretical critique of such predictions, based on the tradition of political economy in *International Organization* that arose in the 1970’s, which under the guidance of such reputed scholars as Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, began to analyse the undermining of the state-dominated realist paradigm, and looked to the increasing emergence of transnational relations, such as economic ones, that were beginning to question the state’s political and economic autonomy, if not its legal sovereignty (Garret, 1998: 795).

Thus, Garret begins by examining the empirical evidence from OECD countries for a convergence around the ‘neo-liberal race to the bottom’, whereby government spending, budget deficits and taxation, particularly applied to capital, are progressively diminished. Firstly then, official data suggests that between 1960 and the mid-1990’s, government spending basically doubled as a percentage of GDP in OECD countries, with significant differences persisting and even emerging between countries. Secondly, deficits actually rose over the period studied, although this cannot be blamed on a lowering of tax rates on capital, since “the overall trend in effective rates of capital taxation has been upward, quite strongly so” (Garret, 1998: 818). Again comparing trends across countries, there is little to suggest convergence on deficit stances or on capital taxation rates.

Of course, one answer to such lack of convergence might be the lack of market integration that was outlined in the first part of the critique of the deterritorialisation position. Thus it could be argued that when this process of integration is complete, as it inevitably will be, predictions about the neo-liberal race to the bottom will be fulfilled. However, once more empirical evidence casts doubt on such an hypothesis. Turning to

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7 Ohmae declares that “[t]he nation state has become unnatural, even dysfunctional unit for organizing human activity and managing economic endeavour in a borderless world. It represents no genuine, shared community of economic interests; it defines no meaningful flows of economic activities” (Ohmae: 1993: 78). It might perhaps retain certain Hobbesian functions of internal and external security, but control over commercial and financial flows, and thus over fiscal and monetary policies are an illusion against the capacity for correction of the markets. However, despite the evidence, this does not stop “old-fashioned bureaucrats from trying to hinder the natural development of a borderless world creating barriers and artificial controls over what should be the free flow of goods and money” (Ohmae: 1990: xii), although such attempts are doomed to failure.
the case of the United States, where there exists no effective barriers to the movement of capital across state lines, tax rates were in fact more divergent between the 50 states of the USA, than between the countries of the OECD. This would seem to suggest that even if it were possible to talk of a fully integrated global economy, nation-states would retain a certain degree of macro-economic management autonomy. The question is, why?

In terms of the transnationalisation of production, while conventional wisdom predicts that TNCs automatically search out the lowest cost production centres and thus seek countries with low-tax, low-spending regimes, decisions on FDI are much more complex. Firstly, Krugman (1996) highlights the importance of productivity in TNC calculations, as opposed to raw costs. Secondly, we have already seen how FDI decisions are increasingly aimed at gaining access to markets, especially in developed capitalist states, and as such location decisions go beyond criteria of costs of production. Even where TNCs decide to locate production facilities in lower-wage countries, Garret argues that this does not necessarily mean that business activity at ‘home’ is reduced, as there might be an increasing specialisation in key functions, such as R&D, in the country of origin. Overall, Garret concludes that decisions on location of production sights will be the fruit of cost benefit analyses, in which economies with high levels of government spending may benefit, if such spending is accompanied by high productivity rates, high human and capital stocks and political stability. Garret finds very little correlation between FDI outflows and government spending levels, budget deficit positions and capital taxation levels, suggesting that nation-state governments have more autonomy in this respect than is predicted by many.

In terms of the possible effects of more integrated financial markets on nation-state political and economic autonomy, Garret concludes that “there is no evidence that the financial markets attach interest premiums to the expansion of the public economy *per se*” (Garret, 1998: 823), as long as such expansion is financed by taxes and not by running a deficit, which would seem to increase the interest rates charged by the markets on loans to government, while provoking currency devaluations in the market. However, this must be qualified by evidence from two European countries: Belgium has financed public spending through debt to the extent that, in terms of GDP, Belgium has the highest ratio of public indebtedness to GDP among OECD countries. However, both the Belgium franc “has long been stably pegged against the deutsche mark, with very
small interest-rate differentials between the two countries” (Garret, 1998: 804). Similar conclusions can be reached in the case of Italy.

Thus, overall, Garret’s analysis on the possible ‘discipline’ that global capital mobility imposes on OECD countries’ monetary and fiscal autonomy leads to the conclusion that even if we allow for an important degree of world economic integration, losses in such autonomy have been and will continue to be rather less than ‘received wisdom’ predicts (see also Cable, 1994).

However, care must be taken not to fall into the ‘globalsceptic’, ‘business-as-usual’ trap. Firstly, the analysis is limited to the developed OECD countries that, while they are undoubtedly more ‘exposed’ to mobile capital flows, they tend to enjoy more market credibility than countries of the developing world. In the latter case, exposure to debt, world (Western) markets and multinationals, and the demands of Western-dominated institutions such as the WTO, the IMF and the World Bank are undoubtedly constraining factors. Returning to the OECD countries, Garret’s thesis is that ‘embedded liberalism’, nurtured under the Bretton Woods System is still very much alive and indeed should continue to be so. Inspired in Polanyi’s double movement, ‘embedded liberalism’ represents a compromise between trade liberalisation and domestic policies that “cushion market dislocation” (Garret, 1998: 796). This perspective “does not question the core proposition of trade theory that liberalization, in the long run, is good for all segments of society” (Garret, 1998: 796), although it does recognise that certain segments of society might suffer inequalities and dislocations. Thus, nation-state fiscal and monetary policy autonomy is understood within the limitations imposed by the logic of capital accumulation. No mention is made of the degree of nation-state autonomy to pursue alternative policies and strategies, and thus we must talk of a limited autonomy of nation-states.

By way of conclusion, let us agree with the idea that globalisation enhances the structural power of capitalism in that its dominance of space increasingly allows it to overcome certain aspects of territorial regulation. As such, the nation-state is undergoing a transformation, although at the present rate and direction of change, there is little to suggest that its disappearance is imminent.
Cultural Globalisation: Deterritorialisation as Convergence

There exists another way in which such accounts claim that deterritorialisation affects not only the nation-state, but all territorially-based political movements. In this sense, accounts such as Ohmae’s, that could be considered to be inspired in the paradigm of ‘global capital modernisation’, go beyond the strictly economic and politico-institutional spheres, and argue that as countries are increasingly absorbed into global market relations, so they embrace Western values and lifestyles or, put another way, possessive liberal individualism and its surrogate, consumer culture. This is the basis for many claims regarding the production and reproduction of identities in the ‘global era’. Several accounts argue that the intensification and extensification of economic exchange, based on the principles of Western market capitalism has been accompanied by the spread of Western cultural practices, icons, ideas and images, with the result that there is an increasing convergence throughout the world around an essentially deterritorialised Western culture (see, for example: de Sola Pool, 1990). As Anthony Smith points out, “these practices, ideas and images, disembedded from any context, are like currencies, interchangeable in the world market of consumer culture, with the result that the national state and national identities are by-passed and relativized” (Smith, 1995: 17).

According to Robins, “[t]his faith in the emergence of a ‘shared culture’ and a common ‘world awareness’ appears to be vindicated by the success of products like Dallas or Batman and by attractions like Disneyland. According to the president of the new Euro Disneyland, ‘Disney’s characters are universal’. ‘You try and convince an Italian child’, he challenges, ‘that Topolino – the Italian name for Mickey Mouse – is American’” (Robins, 1991: 29).

The emergence of such a ‘shared culture’, can be attributed to two sets of developments of how capitalism itself works. On the one hand, as we have already seen, TNCs are increasingly forced to standardise production and expand sales over ever-wider markets in their attempts to achieve economies of scope and scale. While this does not necessarily mean that there is an absolute tendency towards the production of totally standardised products throughout the world, product differentiation is said to be increasingly based not on geographic but on demographic segmentation, hence advertising agency Saatchi and Saatchi’s maxim “that there are more social difference
between mid-town Manhattan and the Bronx than between Manhattan and the 7th
Arrondissement of Paris” (quoted in Robins, 1991: 27). The implication here is that in
an increasingly ‘borderless world’, geography matters less and less.

On the other hand, the process of globalisation, corresponding as it does to
capitalism’s need for time-space compression, has been accompanied by the rise of
cultural service industries. Harvey highlights the way in which consumption of physical
goods has shifted into that of services “not only personal business, educational, and
health services, but also entertainments, spectacles, happenings, and distractions”
(Harvey, 1989: 285). The time spent in the consumption of such services is obviously
much less than the lifetime of a T-shirt or other durable good. As Harvey so succinctly
concludes:

“if there are limits to the accumulation and turnover of physical goods (even
counting the six thousand pairs of shoes of Imelda Marcos), then it makes sense
for capitalists to turn to the provision of very ephemeral services in consumption.
This quest may lie at the root of the rapid penetration.....of many sectors of
cultural production from the mid-1960s onwards” (Harvey, 1989: 285).

Thus, recent decades have witnessed the emergence of hugely important TNCs
such as AOL Time Warner, Rupert Murdoch’s News International, and the Sony
Corporation which not only produces electronic hardware, but also produces films and
other entertainment products. Taking advantage of new information and communication
technology, they have been increasingly able to reach out across the globe, overcoming
state boundaries, and offer cultural products via the Internet, or satellite and cable
television. As they do so, “the link between culture and territory becomes significantly
broken”, in that in the words of a CNN representative: “[t]here has been a cultural and
social revolution as a consequence of the globalisation of the economy. A blue-collar
worker in America is affected as much as a party boss in Moscow or an executive in
Tokyo [...] Our news is global news” (quoted in Robins, 1991: 29).

How then does the consumption of ‘global’ images, sounds, goods etc. produce
identity, an identity which can be thought of as competing with and even threatening
territorial national identities? In this sense, Tomlinson (1999), borrows Michael Billig’s
(1995) concept of ‘banal nationalism’ and applies it to our daily cultural experiences
embodied in ‘banal globalism’. While agreeing with Billig and Smith (see below) on the continuing importance of national identity, Tomlinson insists on the point that

“the more or less deliberate ideological promptings of banal nationalism compete on the same phenomenological terrain with a whole range of more random deterritorializing imagery. The embedded familiarity of the distant ‘alien’ cinematic landscapes and scenarios [...] is just as much part of the mundane mediated process of identity-formation as the rhetorical forms of address that bind identity to (national) identity. It is not as though these distanciated images act as a direct counterpoise to the processes Billig describes; but they clearly do have a significant role in the constitution of imagined belonging” (Tomlinson, 1999: 120).

Global cultural convergence questioned

Overall, we are without doubt witnessing a certain degree of convergence with regards to the production and consumption of popular culture, particularly Western popular culture as TNCs from the West take advantage of the possibilities that new technologies and deregulation offer for the diffusion of cultural products that reinforce the disembedding of culture from territory.

However, once more, care must be taken not to overstate the arguments. There exist a series of objections, at both the empirical and theoretical level, to the emergence of a global, homogenised and deterritorialized culture that replaces territorial ones. Indeed, numerous empirical studies point to a much more complex set of emerging cultural relations, than claims about a single, Western-inspired global culture might suggest.

As we saw in our discussion on the extent to which the new TNCs may be considered truly global corporations without specific ties to any one state or grouping of states, as in the case of European TNCs and the EU, doubts may be raised in this respect. Street, for example, is “suspicious of the extent to which we are now dealing with global industries. Rather, we are dealing multinational corporations who need to expand their market or their product base” (Street, 1997: 81). In this case, such expansion takes place from the West, particularly the USA, and thus it is not clear as to
what degree we are talking of genuinely global firms offering genuinely global products. Held et al. note that “the ownership of culture industry MNCs is overwhelmingly Western and within that predominantly American [...] Thus there is a flow of imagery, genre and content mainly from the USA and some Western cultures to other Western states and most of the developing world” (Held et al. 1998: 347).

Secondly, even if we accept the dominance of ‘global firms’ and the fact that “this kind of global production for local consumption has increased” (Held et al. 1998: 372), “corporations have had to adapt their structures and output to cater for the ingrained specificities of taste and interest in local markets and cultures” (Held et al. 1998: 372). A Financial Times (2002) report on the problems of North American TNCs of the food and beverage sector in India is particularly revealing. The increasingly ubiquitous presence of foreign retail brands might be considered as confirming the global cultural convergence thesis, particularly since it is a relatively new phenomenon dating back to the process of economic liberalisation ten years ago. However, appearances are deceptive. Recent years have seen many TNCs forced to leave the country, and others scrambling to enter in the black. Coca-Cola, for example, is only now about to break even after ten years in India and a $405 million write off. Apart from economic arguments, the main explanation is cultural difference. According to a senior PepsiCo executive “India doesn’t watch Hollywood films. It operates within its own cultural idiom, which is particularly resistant to western influence” (Financial Times, 2002). Thus after six years of market studies, McDonalds has had to “reinvent itself for the Indian palate” (Financial Times, 25/4/2002), while Kentucky Fried Chicken is about to abandon the country after failing in its strategy to give “Indian customers exactly what it offered to consumers elsewhere in the world” (Financial Times, 2002).

Thirdly, it is clear that the concentration on Western, and particularly American corporate dominance, often blinds us to the existence of other important sources of popular-culture production, such as Brazil and other Latin-American countries in terms of the production of television for the Portuguese and Spanish market respectively, and Bombay or ‘Bollywood’, which supplies a huge market for films, not only in India but also among diasporic communities, in the Middle-East and in the West.

Fourthly, the global culture argument, inspired as it is in liberal free-market ideology, tends to underestimate the extent to which the market for such products can be controlled and regulated. Reporters Sans Frontiers, for example, cite many cases of
strict government control and censorship of media expression in many countries, a practice that has been extended to the Internet itself (quoted in Street, 1997). The Chinese government has recently censured access to Google, Altavista, CNN and the BBC, while Yahoo has reached an agreement with the authorities, promising to eliminate links to pages such as to that of the Falung Gong religious sect. In Saudi Arabia, all servers are connected to a central one, controlled by the government that automatically filters out ‘undesirable’ websites (El País, 19/9/2002). In a more positive sense, supranational, national, regional, and even municipal levels of government may all have a strong influence over the “form and content of popular culture [...] through taxes, tax exemptions, subsidies, the granting of broadcast licences and other policies which might be used to stimulate ‘local’ production” (Malm and Wallis, 1993, quoted in Street, 1997: 81).

Finally, objections are raised as to the relationship between the presence of ‘global’ popular culture in the daily lives of people across the globe and the production and reproduction of identity. Anthony Smith, for example (see also Tomlinson, 1999; and Friedman, 1994), accepts that

“there is, after all, plenty of evidence of growing cultural and economic uniformity in all sorts of spheres and products. The advance of American mass culture, of the English language, of pop culture, of the visual mass media and computerised information technology clearly represent significant global cultural trends. These are, in all likelihood, here to stay, at least for some decades.” (Smith, 1995: 22)

However, he immediately goes on to beg the question “[b]ut what do they add up to? Can large numbers of men and women live by them as well as with them?” (Smith, 1995: 22). He answers this series of questions with a resounding ‘no’. The reasons revolve around the fact that globalised culture in historically shallow, it has no memory, it is value-neutral and traditionless. People need “irreplaceable culture values, and the particular symbols rituals, ideals and traditions of those who forged and participated in them - which is what many particular cultures of the past and present sought always to preserve” (Smith, 1995: 23).
Cultural Globalisation: Deterritorialisation as Heterogeneity

Within the deterritorialisation approach, a different version to global capitalist modernisation has emerged, which seeks to stress the importance of heterogeneity of cultural processes and identities under the conditions of globalisation, as opposed to the homogeneity that we discussed above.

It is argued that as global flows of goods, services, people, images and so forth erode the link between place and cultural identity, so there is an “intermingling of these disembedded cultural practices producing new, complex forms of culture” (Tomlinson, 1999: 141). Places are increasingly becoming melting pots, distilling a heady blend of hybrid cultural experiences, in which “Moroccan girls perform Thai boxing in Amsterdam, Asian rap sounds out in London, while bagels are made in Ireland and tacos come from China” (Nederveen Pieterse, 1995: 53 quoted in Tomlinson, 1999: 143). The idea of indigenised cultures emerging in post-imperial settings is a welcome corrective to the Western-centric nature of global capital modernisation theories, and also provide a powerful antidote to essentialist ideas that cultures can and should be somehow kept pure and untouched by the mongrelising effects of global flows.

In this respect, the work of Arjun Appadurai (1996) has centred on the way in which the disjunctions between various dimensions of global cultural flows, which he calls ethnoscapes, mediascapes, technoscapes, financescapes and ideoscapes, provide the background for the current crisis of the nation-state.

For Appadurai,

“there is an urgent need to focus on the cultural dynamics of what is now called deterritorialisation. This term applies not only to obvious examples such as transnational corporations and money markets but also to ethnic groups, sectarian movements, and political formations, which increasingly operate in ways that transcend specific territorial boundaries and identities” (Appadurai, 1996a: 49).

He starts from the premise that the nation-state has been, in historical terms at least, profoundly territorial. On the one hand, state sovereignty has been synonymous with territoriality, while the nation, from which the state seeks to derive its legitimacy, is defined in territorial terms, and, at the normative level, must coincide geographically
with the state. In this sense, attention is focused on how “the isomorphism of people, territory and legitimate sovereignty that constitutes the normative charter of the nation-state is under threat [in] the contemporary world” (Appadurai, 1996b: 43).

More specifically, in a world marked by deterritorialised global flows, or ‘-scapes’, that move easily “across state borders, there is very little that they [states] can realistically monopolize except the idea of territory as the crucial diacritic of sovereignty [...] Where states could once be seen as legitimate guarantors of the territorial organization of markets, livelihoods, identities, identities, and histories, they are now to a very large extent arbiters of various forms of global flow. So territorial integrity becomes crucial to state-sponsored ideas of sovereignty, which, on close inspection, may be in the interest of no other organization than the state apparatus itself” (Appadurai, 1996b: 49).

However, as the state, as an apparatus of control over a given territory is increasingly undermined, so is its ability to legitimate its actions in the name of a geographically coincident population, the nation. As global flows of people, such as “artists and writers, refugees and guest workers, scientists and scholars, health workers and development specialists, feminists and fundamentalists, transnational corporations and United Nation’s bureaucracies” (Appadurai 1996b: 49) increase and intensify, so people increasingly “identify with non-state actors and organizations, and various forms of diasporic or multilocal allegiance” (Appadurai, 1996b: 48-49). In a world dominated by deterritorialised global flows, from its dependence on territory, the state is ill-equipped to compete in the new global market place of identities, with the result that there is a profound disjuncture between the nation and the state.

But what are these new ‘translocal’ identities and affiliations like? “The emergent postnational geography will probably issue from a variety of translocal affiliations: some global or globalizing, as is the case of Islamic, Christian, and Hindu fundamentalisms; some continental, such as the emerging European Union and some racial and diasporic” (Appadurai, 1996b: 50).

Deterritorialisation, thus manifests itself in two ways: on the one hand, none of the new, translocal identities
“rely on the idea of separate and bounded territorial identities on which our current nation-state cartography relies. Rather, in these new cartographies, counterhistories and counteridentities are used to organize maps of allegiance and affiliation that are built around historical labor flows, emergent racial solidarities, and counternational cartographies [...] The most important feature of these emergent cartographies is that they do not appear to require horizontally arranged, contiguous, and mutually exclusive claims to territory” (Appadurai, 1996b: 50-51).

On the other, within the new networks of ‘translocal’ identities, places of importance may emerge, such as refugee camps, or cities with large populations of migrants. These ‘translocalities’ are “weakly associated with their national environments and are, rather, integrally involved with transnational allegiances and interests” (Appadurai, 1996b, 51-52), and thus such places and their inhabitants do not ‘naturally’ belong to the surrounding ‘national’ territory.

Overall, Appadurai’s attention focuses mainly on the emergence of deterritorialised, postnational identities and political movements. However, he does not ignore more ‘classical’ territorial nationalist movements or the discourse of territorial nationalism, although his treatment of them is very much open to question. He explicitly recognises that “the national imaginary has not given in readily to the emergence of nonnational, transnational or postnational markets for loyalty” (Appadurai, 1996b: 50), indeed makes the point that “new nationalisms, often tied up with ethnic separatism and state-level turbulence, are on the rise” (Appadurai, 1996b: 49). How then, does Appadurai make sense of this apparent paradox?

In the first place, he recognises the existence of many ‘traditional’ nationalist movements, such as the Basques, the Tamils, the Quebecois, the Serbs, all of which “seem determined to lock nationhood and statehood together under a single ethnic rubric” (Appadurai, 1996a: 165-166). However, these are somehow felt to be less “impressive” than “the many oppressed minorities who have suffered displacement and forced diaspora without articulating a strong wish for a nation-state of their own” (Appadurai, 1996a: 165).

This does not mean to say that such ‘impressive’ movements of diasporic and stateless peoples do not rely on the discourse of territorial nationalism, although it is
claimed that “images of homeland are only part of the rhetoric of popular sovereignty and do not necessarily reflect the bottom line” (Appadurai, 1996a: 161).

Similarly, in the case Serb and Palestinian national movements, Appadurai claims that neither territorial sovereignty or the recovery ancient symbolic places plays a large part in the basic motives or goals of such movements. In the case of the Serbs, more than any other factor, “they seem driven by motives of ethnic purification and genocide” (Appadurai, 1996: 164). Furthermore, it is argued that the use of territorial discourse by nationalist movements is due to the “poverty of their (and our) political languages rather than the hegemony of territorial nationalism” and, secondly, because “postnational or nonnational movements are forced by the very logic of actually existing nation-states to become antinational or antistate and thus to inspire the very state power that forces them to respond in the language of counternationalism” (Appadurai, 1996a: 164).

‘Postnational identities’?

In many respects, Appadurai answers many of the problems associated with the global capitalist modernity version of deterritorialisation. In the first place, Appadurai’s theory, while to some extent an attempt to rework historical materialism, avoids the economic determinism revealed by some authors such as Ohmae. Secondly, the focus on transnational and postnational diasporic identities and political movements that are mainly post-colonial or ‘Third World’ in their origins, avoids the undoubted Western-centric nature of other versions of deterritorialisation such as those reviewed above.

However, at both a general and specific level, this version of deterritorialisation as heterogeneity is not without its problems. Firstly, all such versions face the problems of power relations. Anthony Smith asks, rather rhetorically, whether “can a global culture avoid cultural imperialism? [...] Can we escape the specificity of a new imperialism, of a new Pax Americana o Japonica or European” (Smith, A., 1995: 18). His answer, predictably enough is that ‘no, we cannot’ since “the quest for a global culture and the ideal of cosmopolitanism are continually subverted by the realities of power politics and by the nature and features of culture” (Smith, A., 1995: 19).

Secondly, while transnational and postnational identities and social and political movements are indeed an important part of globalisation, it is perhaps unwise to dismiss
the relevance of their territorial counterparts as somehow ‘less impressive’. The same could be said of Appadurai’s insistence on explaining territorially based claims on the pre-existing territorial state system, or on an absence of a suitable vocabulary to express political demands in any thing else than the language of territoriality.

Thirdly, objections could also be raised on the extent to which diasporic identities and political movements are essentially deterritorialised, in the sense that they are somehow unrelated to the physical surroundings in which they find themselves. Of course, transnational diasporic networks form part of the experience of globalisation, helped as they are by contemporary developments in telecommunications, which allow, for example, for migrants to turn their satellite dishes to receive broadcasts from their ‘home’ countries. However, such claims undermine the extent to which places structure experiences, as leading social theorists such as Giddens, Foucault and Pred (see Chapter 2) have argued. Surely some attempt must be made to explain how pre-existing conditions, structures and institutions in specific places interact with diasporic cultures to produce different outcomes in terms of daily experiences, identities and political mobilisation.

Conclusions

Overall, within the current phase of time-space compression that has come to be known as globalisation, deterritorialisation must be considered one of the key elements. However, returning to Ó Tuathail’s point that we saw earlier, to understand deterritorialisation in isolation is to misunderstand the very nature of territory itself. While the nation-state as the prime example of territoriality in the contemporary world may indeed be under strain, this does not mean that territory as an organising principle of society has been somehow overcome. Many of the deterritorialisation accounts analysed above may be situated within the paradigm of ‘global capitalist modernisation’, in that they tend to stress the process whereby Western values and lifestyles increasingly spread throughout the globe with the expansion of market capitalism, helped by technological advances in communications technology. Such accounts have

“combined elements of many longstanding Western discourses (con)fused in a contradictory and unstable unity. For example, digital culture discourses combine
a strong humanistic inheritance emphasizing human freedom, liberation and
fulfilment; a capitalist discourse concerning the virtues of open and transparent
markets, and a discourse of technophilia which celebrates technological systems
as wondrous entities which enhance human capacities and capabilities” (Ó
Tuathail, 1999).

However, such a paradigm has been, and indeed must be questioned for a
number of reasons. Firstly, in the sense that deterritorialisation is driven by
 technological development and/or by the logic of market capitalism, there is a strong
element of teleological determinism. Technology is not necessarily an independent
variable for social change, in that by its very nature, it is the product of human
endeavour, and as such its development and application depends on outside agency. In
this respect, Castells (1996) discusses when and why certain areas ‘enjoyed’ an
Industrial Revolution before others (if they have experienced one at all), and highlights
“the territorial basis for the interaction of systems of technological discovery and
applications, namely in the synergetic properties of what is known in the literature as
“milieux of innovation” (Castells, 1996: 38). Within such milieux, it is the “specific
social conditions foster technological innovation that itself feeds into the path of
economic development and further innovation. Yet the reproduction of such conditions
is cultural and institutional as much as economic and technological” (Castells, 1996:
38).

In terms of the ‘natural’ tendency of the market to expand and overcome such
obstacles as ‘artificial’ state boundaries, such affirmations are based, at a theoretical and
substantive level, on a misunderstanding of the way markets work. Karl Polanyi has
become an author of reference for many (for example, Gray, 1998; Scott, 1997) in that
his work provides a profound critique of the claims that free markets are somehow
 spontaneous and can emerge and function without the basic institutions that ensure that
they are ‘free’ and guarantee social reproduction8. If, then, as Polanyi’s famous phrase
“Laissez faire was planned” (Polanyi (1944) is true, and given the historical precedents
then there are excellent reasons for believing it to be so, then we must look elsewhere, if

8 From a Marxist perspective, the regulation school, inspired in Gramsci (1071), has theorised about how
a given ‘regime of accumulation’, such as Fordism necessarily requires a ‘regime of regulation’, in this
case the Keynesian Welfare State in order to maintain its functioning in the medium- to long-term (see,
for example, Aglietta, 1979; Lipietz 1986; Boyer, 1986a and 1986b; and Harvey (1989).
we are to understand the dynamic behind contemporary globalisation. Overall, “end-of-
geo...
that globalisation brings with it, and of which nationalism is an example. The following chapter seeks to put forward a framework of analysis capable of that.

9 For a good overview on the debate surrounding postmodernism, see, for example, Kumar, (1995), Featherstone, (1988).
CHAPTER 4
NATIONALISM AND GLOBALISATION II:
RETERRITORIALISATION AND SPATIAL RECONFIGURATION

Introduction

The previous chapter sought to analyse the way in which deterritorialisation is an important process within globalisation, although it has been argued that there are sound empirical and theoretical reasons for not overstating the scope and scale of deterritorialisation, and as such it must be understood alongside reterritorialisation to the extent that they are ‘different sides of the same coin’. The current chapter thus seeks to introduce the concept of reterritorialisation into the analysis, to characterise the relationship between the two processes, and explain to how nationalism, as a territorial form of politics, relates to this twin dynamic.

The concept of deterritorialisation-reterritorialisation is an important one in many accounts that seek to offer an understanding of place-based politics in the age of globalisation, and, although the vocabulary used is often different, conceptually we appear to be talking of the same dynamic. Robins, for example, talks about globalisation as the “achievement of a new global-local nexus, about new and intricate relations between global space and local space” (Robins, 1991: 34-35). Similarly, Harvey opposes space and place, in which the former is increasingly dominated by capital flows, while the latter are examples of fixity and immobility. Bauman incorporates the idea of ‘restratification’, as part of the process of ‘glocalization’ (Roland Robertson’s apt term, exposing the unbreakable unity between ‘globalizing’ and ‘localizing’ pressures)” (Bauman, 1998: 69-70). Castells talks of the new ‘Information Age’ characterised by the struggle between the fixity of ‘spaces of places’ against the mobility of ‘spaces of flows’, or in terms of the ‘disjunction between the local and the global’ (Castells, 1997: 11. See also Ruggie, 1993). Thus, while expressed in different ways the dual dynamic of deterritorialisation-reterritorialisation is the key to many
accounts of globalisation, a most useful conceptualisation for the present exercise, if we bear in mind that nationalism is understood as being territorial. The question arises then, as to the nature of this dynamic and of how it relates to nationalism.

To answer the question, I propose to introduce the idea of ‘spatial reconfiguration’ whereby, under conditions of time-space compression, at the same time as deterritorialisation might be said to undermine the territorial bases of political mobilisation, and in particular those at the nation-state level, new spatial levels of politics emerge that follow complex, ever-changing cultural, political and economic geographies which may cease to coincide with either the nation-state or with each other. The point that I wish to make here is that ‘all is up for grabs’, as different territorial scales of governance seek to produce and reproduce territoriality in competition with other scales and against the process of deterritorialisation. Within Western Europe, for example, complex patterns of territoriality are emerging as, on the one hand, member states have ceded policy competences ‘upwards’ to supranational institutions such as the European Central Bank (ECB) and the European Commission, while at the same time, the sub-state level, which includes regions, nations without states (Catalonia, Scotland, Wales, for example) and major cities and metropolitan areas have all benefited from a progressive decentralisation of the nation-state, and, it is claimed, by certain aspects of EU integration itself.

This illustration raises an important point as to how we classify sub-state nationalist movements, such as those in Catalonia, Scotland and Wales. In recent years, many authors have preferred to include nations without states within the category of the region (see for example, Keating and Loughlin, 1996). Within the broader framework of the global political economy, the goal of sovereignty loses its salience, as opportunities open up for which independent statehood is not necessary. Others, such as Guibernau (1999), still prefer to differentiate between regions and nations without state, given the latter’s greater potential for political mobilisation around cultural identity, although like Keating and Loughlin, she regards sovereignty as an obsolete goal in the contemporary political and economic context. The point here is that however we decide to categorise nations without states, they feed off and feed into the logic of spatial reconfiguration that undermines the absolute territorial hegemony of the nation-state.

Given that Catalonia can be considered to be a nation without state, the first part of this chapter seeks to analyse the factors behind the rise of the sub-state level in Europe in general around the theme of changes in the economic paradigm and the breakdown of
post-war state territorial management. In addition, the possibility that the related process of European integration has also been a factor in the rise of the sub-state level will also be discussed.

However, all territorial levels of governance, from the supranational to the local, are all examples of places, albeit at different scales. Developing Harvey’s idea of the dichotomy of space versus place, whereby global flows increasingly move through space, and exercise increasing structural power over political movements that are increasingly forced to mobilise in place, then state nationalism, sub-state nationalism and regionalism must all come to terms with and eventually resist the threats presented by deterritorialisation. Thus, the second part of the chapter analyses the extent to which all political mobilisation based in place has a defensive element. In this context, contemporary sub-state nationalism lives a schizophrenic existence: on the one hand, it embraces globalisation and the territorial reconfiguration that forms a central part of it, while on the other, they recoil from it, and look to the past for inspiration and national unity. It is this apparent contradiction behind the words of Artur Mas, Catalan First Minister: “I read the Wall Street Journal and Avui\(^\d\)”.

**Reterritorialisation as Opportunity I: State Restructuring**

**The post-war settlement: Fordism-Keynesianism**

“A near-universal phenomenon [has occurred] over the last twenty years or so in the Western European state, namely the emergence of an intermediate level of government between the centre and the basic municipal or communal level” (Sharpe, 1993: 1). This Sharpe calls the ‘meso’ or middle level of government, and its emergence has been “one of the most important institutional changes in the modern Western state that has occurred over the past couple of decades” (Sharpe, 1993: 1). In Spain any attempt to understand the transition to parliamentary democracy must take in the development of the *Estado de las Autonomías*, a journey whose final destination, if one exists, appears to be some kind of asymmetrical federalism. In Italy, Putnam comments
that “in the early 1970’s the primary responsibility for addressing diverse problems of public health and safety, along with much else of common concern to ordinary Italians, was suddenly transferred from the national administration to a newly created set of elected regional governments” (Putnam, 1994: 4). In 1980, Belgium joined the then West Germany as a fully federal state within the EEC, and thus achieved a constitutional settlement to the seemingly irreconcilable difference between the two dominant communities. The first Mitterrand government in France began a process of decentralisation in 1986, thus rescuing a project which had led to the final political defeat of De Gaulle in 1969. Portugal has recently begun the process of decentralisation with the creation of regions, while the UK, after 18 years of the heady cocktail of dogmatic neo-liberalism and unionism has embarked upon the process of granting wide-ranging political autonomy to Scotland and, to a lesser degree, to Wales and Northern Ireland.

This phenomenon is impossible to understand outside the context of the restructuring of the nation-state in Western Europe, which in turn is impossible to understand without making reference to changes in the political economy of capitalism itself.

The process of state restructuring that has taken place in advanced capitalist democracies over recent decades must be situated within the historical context of the rise and consolidation of the nation-state in the West after World War Two. Indeed, “it was not the nineteenth century that saw the consolidation of the nation state in Western Europe, but rather in the thirty years that preceded the Second World War” (Keating, 1988: 11). O’Hueglin goes further: “the most obvious and triumphant victor arising from the ashes of two world wars fought in the name of national interests - once again was the territorial nation-state” (O’Hueglin, 1989: 209).

This rising importance of the nation-state in advanced capitalist democracies took the form of the policy instruments of the Welfare State, “under which collective bargaining and monopoly pricing were institutionalized, policy instruments were deployed to maintain and manage aggregate demand, and norms of mass consumption […] were generalized” (Peck and Tickell, 1994: 289). In this respect, it is argued that the importance of the state rested on its role as a means of correcting market dysfunction,

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1. *Avui* is a nationalist, Catalan-language newspaper with historically-close ties to the ruling CiU coalition in Catalonia.
and, above all of maintaining stable, increasing levels of internal demand, a vital consideration for a regime of accumulation, Fordism, which was based on mass production, consumption and productivity gains derived from economies of scale (see, for example, Aglietta, 1979; Boyer, 1986b). In general, although the ideological colours of the state governments throughout the West differed,

“What is remarkable is the way in which national governments of quite different ideological complexions [...] engineered both stable economic growth and rising material living standards through a mix of welfare statism, Keynesian economic management, and control over wage relations. Fordism depended, evidently, upon the nation state taking - much as Gramsci predicted - a very special role within the overall system of social regulation” (Harvey, 1989:137).

However, the type of interventionism undertaken was by no means uniform across the geographical spectrum, even though ‘Fordism’ as a regime is identifiable across a range of nation-states. Table 4.1 highlights the main variants of Fordism in Western Europe and the United States as they emerged in the post-war era:

### Table 4.1 Variants of Fordism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Fordist Regime</th>
<th>Characteristics of coupling</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>‘Classic Fordism’</td>
<td>Mass production and consumption underwritten by social democratic welfare state.</td>
<td>USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Flex Fordism’</td>
<td>Decentralized, federalized state. Close co-operation between financial and industrial capital, including facilitation of inter-firm co-operation.</td>
<td>West Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Blocked Fordism’</td>
<td>Inadequate integration of financial and productive capital at the level of the nation state. Archaic and obstructive character of working-class politics.</td>
<td>Great Britain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘State Fordism’</td>
<td>State plays leading role in creation of conditions of mass production, including state control of industry. <em>L'état entrepreneur.</em></td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Delayed Fordism’</td>
<td>Cheap Labour immediately adjacent to Fordist core. State intervention played key role in rapid industrialization in the 1960’s.</td>
<td>Spain, Italy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Peck and Tickell, 1994: 285-6

**Post-war territorial management**

Within this framework of state-centred regulation, regional economies underwent a profound transformation. According to Sabel (1994: 101-102) the
beginning of the industrialisation process at the end of the nineteenth century witnessed the emergence of specialised regional economies as “the natural unit of economic activity and analysis” which “were both flexible and specialised. They constantly varied their products to satisfy changing tastes and extend their markets by defining new wants”. The national economy *per se* did not really exist but was rather “the sum of its parts”, with national economic development “only marginally controlled by central political authorities”. Given the growth of centralised state intervention through Keynesian demand management, “by the 1960’s, the region had become at most a derivative category of analysis and a secondary locus of economic activity”, while “regional and local governments increasingly became subordinate agencies in the national social welfare administrations”.2

As part of this system of social regulation, central governments began to turn their attention to regional development policies in the form of grants, subsidies and transfer payments to encourage the formation of satellite economies in the ‘periphery’. “The experience of ever-increasing prosperity muted continuing grievances as to ethnic or regional self-determination” (O’Hueglin, 1989: 209), and the god of progress seemed to sacrifice on the altar of high modernity any possible dissent. It is not clear whether the motives for government intervention in the regions were based on the desire to ensure a more ‘equitable’ redistribution of income levels across the ‘national’ territory, or simply a way of trying to prevent the over-heating of high growth areas with the associated inflationary problems that that meant. It was not intended to be some form of embryonic regional government with popular participation, rather “its purpose was simply to make central planning more efficient and was thus an extension of the central state’s power and had no necessary connection with decentralization or popular participation” (Sharpe, 1993: 13).

However, the same author looks to the setting up of “jurisdictions of meso proportions” (Sharpe, 1993: 8), even without democratic participation and legitimacy as sowing the seeds that led to later pressure for the process of political decentralisation of the last twenty years. In what he calls “rational-functional motives” for the

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2 This account is by no means accepted by all. Firstly, authors such as Amin and Robins ask us to “consider the following description by Lovering of the local economy in Britain during the 1950’s and 1960’s when the consumer industries were taking off: ‘But the new industries still tended to be regionally bounded, as for example in the Manchester electrical engineering industry, the Bristol aircraft industry, the Sheffield steel industry or the London radio industry [...] As a result the British economy was
establishment of the meso level in post-war welfare states, Sharpe points to socio-economic changes at local level. On the one hand the demographic trend of suburbanization led, in many cases, to the redundancy of the old political jurisdictions, as new, metropolitan areas, for example, were created to embrace the new suburbs. On the other hand, he considers the functional changes that the new Welfare State meant. The services provided at local level began to outgrow the rationality of the traditional criterion of externality, and took on the functions such as health and other social services that required massive fixed investments. To justify such expenditure, large throughputs based on a large population were required, and thus, pressure was created for extra-local or meso level institutions to be set up to cover these new areas, although they were dependent on and answerable to the centre.

The breakdown of Fordism

The crisis of the Fordist-Keynesian mode of regulation of the 1970’s and 1980’s (Harvey, 1989) led central governments to abandon their commitment to social and territorial wealth redistribution. In the context of the emerging global economic order, Western nation-states increasingly renounced demand-management policies in favour of supply-side policies that sought to promote overall levels of competitiveness (Jessop, 1992), independently of the consequences for the territorial distribution of wealth. In terms of territorial management, the strategy of the carrot and stick was applied, whereby “the stick was a reduction of subsidies to distressed firms and social welfare and vocational benefits for displaced workers. The carrot was partial devolution of authority over vocational training, economic development, and social welfare programmes to local or regional authorities” (Sabel, 1994: 127).

Within this context, Keating talks of how “policies and institutions for governing regions [became] increasingly contested” (Keating, 1996: 24), as the impact of economic globalisation began to be felt. With the retreat of the state from territorial management, in many cases it was left to the individual regions to develop their own economic strategies in the face of the demands made by a globalising economy, and essentially a federation of distinctive regional economies’ ” (Lovering, 1988: 145-146, quoted in Amin
regionalist movements no longer framed their demands solely within the context of the nation-state: “the context for the new regionalism is not merely, as in the past, the nation state; it is the continental, and even global economy” (Keating, 1996: 25).

Thus, at the beginning of the 1980’s, changes at the level of political economy were undermining centralised, state territorial management, which, on the one hand exposed regional economies to the increasingly global competition for resources, whilst, on the other, enabling them to do so on their own terms. But what were these changes and how might they benefit regions and nation without states not only economically, but also in their attempts to produce and reproduce national identity?

Flexible specialisation, post-Fordism, and regional economies

Post-Fordist accounts, following on from the theories of specialised accumulation, seem to accept globalisation, and to some extent welcome its arrival in the sense that it provides regional economies with new possibilities not only for economic development but also for the construction of a socio-political framework more in tune with the demands of the citizens of the territory in question. Indeed post-Fordism celebrates “local revival, the cultivation of identity through attachment to place and to local cultures and traditions. It not merely picks out, but celebrates ethnic revival, the rise of peripheral nationalisms, the struggle to conserve local ways and local histories” (Kumar, 1995: 57). This account is by no means accepted by all, and indeed is heavily criticised, in part for its utopian tone, but given its focus on the role of the region in the process of globalisation, above all in the sphere of economic production, it is perhaps worthy of analysis.

Of the many contributions to this theoretical school, Piore and Sabel (Piore and Sabel 1983, 1984 and Sabel, 1994) have been especially active in promoting the model. The theoretical position taken by Piore and Sabel, and Scott and Storper (1987), for example, is based upon what many consider to be exciting new developments in what came to be called the Third Italy during the 1970’s and 1980’s. Studies began to emerge (see, for example, Becattini, 1978, Bellandi, 1989, and Brusco, 1986 and 1992,) from central and north-eastern Italy highlighting the setting up of an economy based on hi-
tech, flexible workshops and small firms. The regions comprising Tuscany, Umbria, the Marche, Emilia-Romagna, Veneto, Friuli, Trentino-Alto Adige (Kumar, 1995), each with its own specialisation, were given the name *Terza Italia* -Third Italy - as a means of distinguishing them from the traditional industrial areas of the North and the *Mezzogiorno*. This kind of specialised regional economies appeared to resemble the Marshallian industrial districts of the nineteenth century (Kumar, 1995: 38).

Flexibility was at the heart of this apparent resurgence, given the capacity of small firms to respond to the ever-faster changing dictates of the market. In addition, they were able to take advantage of the new, numerically controlled machine tools that avoided, to a certain extent, the need for enormous production runs. However, the story does not end there. As we have seen already, economies of scale (as opposed to scope) are still of considerable importance and thus for small firms to survive, co-operation and collaboration was very necessary to share the fixed costs of many activities and to compliment their own:

> “Firms had a low degree of vertical integration and depended on each other for a wide range of specialised activities. A dense system of subcontracting lay at the heart of the local economy. The ‘extraordinarily rich and complex relationship’ (Brusco 1989: 261) between clients [...] and subcontractors [...] kindled innovation and enhanced adaptability. [...] Collaboration went further. Firms passed on orders to each other and shared in the costs of expensive equipment. They pooled their resources to set up local associations of specialists for the collective provision of marketing, accounting and technical services” (Kumar, 1995: 39).

The growing importance of small and medium-sized firms in post-Fordist accounts is linked to parallel developments in the organisational patterns of many TNCs. Building, then, on Swyngedouw’s vision of new TNC locational strategy, Sabel (1994) shows how a whole new network of small- to medium-scale industrial concerns is created.

Turning first to TNC reorganisation, three factors are highlighted. In the first place, while overall strategic power is concentrated, operational decision-making is
decentralised to operating units whose degree of autonomy from strategic headquarters means that they come to resemble small to medium-sized firms. In the same process, central research facilities cease to grow in favour of R&D facilities created by the operational units themselves, who are thus in position to react quicker and more in tune with localised changes in tastes and fashions. The overall result for the TNC ‘parent’ is that it becomes a kind of holding company for a federation of small- to medium-sized firms. Secondly, within each operating unity, flexible methods are introduced to reduce the time between design, execution and production, with less job delimitation and a wider skill-base for the workers and management involved. Finally, and crucially for post-Fordists, a new kind of relation emerges between TNC filière and sub-contractors. As development costs of new products and processes rise due to shortening product cycles, operating units seek to share such costs with outside firms. This naturally changes the relation between operating unit and subcontractor in that closer, longer-run relations are developed in which co-operation and learning are key factors. At the same time, in such a paradigmatic case, corporations seek to avoid a relation of dependence with the subcontractors and thus insist that the subcontractor in question seeks other, outside customers and suppliers.

The third, and to some extent the most important area of change highlighted by post-Fordists is the role of local and regional political institutions in the development of endogenous growth strategies. “The failure of mass-production development strategies, combined with the welfare state’s repudiation of its guarantee of prosperity - often expressed as decentralisation of authority for creating jobs and caring for the unemployed - have forced local communities to discard one promising growth model after another” (Sabel, 1994: 127). Thus, after discarding various models, from municipal Keynesianism to growth poles⁴, the strategy of the carrot and stick was applied, where “the stick was a reduction of subsidies to distressed firms and social welfare and vocational benefits for displaced workers. The carrot was partial devolution of authority over vocational training, economic development, and social welfare programmes to local or regional authorities” (Sabel, 1994: 127).

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³ Harvey notes that “by 1983, for example, Fortune reported that ‘seventy-five per cent of all machine parts today are produced in batches of fifty or less’” (1989: 158).
⁴ In contrast, Jean-Pierre Gilly (1992) highlights the importance of growth poles in the European space industry, using Toulouse as a case study.
Such activity, in the new climate of entrepreneurial public institutions, is referred to by Newlands as the growth function (1995: 73-74). While neo-classical economic theory points to three legitimate roles for government: stabilisation, distribution and allocation, no prevision is made for government activity that raises the dynamic efficiency and technological capability of the economy. Market failures to ensure optimal dynamic efficiency are identified in three areas:

“risk aversion by lenders or industrialists may inhibit the pursuit of risky projects and so constrain technological innovation; imperfect information may prevent the identification of profitable market opportunities and thus restrict the rate of growth; and, the existence of externalities means that certain businesses will be under-provided by the private market” (Newlands, 1995: 73).

Given the possibilities for regional and local government supply-side intervention in the economy as a result of political decentralisation, regional and local authorities have increasingly taken steps to correct market dysfunctions. Regional development agencies, training and research facilities, and marketing agencies, are just some of the initiatives undertaken at the regional and local level to stimulate regional and local economic growth. Such measures are especially necessary in the type of economy which Sabel et al. refer to, given the predominance of small and medium firms whose access to risk capital and research and training facilities has always been difficult.

Post-Fordist theories of endogenous development and the resurgence of industrial districts are essentially based on networks of co-operation and collaboration between individual actors - small firms and TNC filières, semi-public development agencies etc., characterised, above all, by the sharing of resources and in particular information. In such a climate, for such actors to enter in these relations, Sabel et al. highlight the importance of trust. In order to generate multiple sources of trust, they make clear that social solidarity, based upon a series of factors, from shared professional experiences to shared ethnic and linguistic identities must be present. In the case of the Third Italy, a new kind of ‘social compromise’ based on the various local subcultures - Socialist and Communist in the central regions and Catholic in the north-east has been fostered (Kumar, 1995: 39).
Post-Fordist theories of regional development almost bring us full circle back to theories of regionalism. The important thing to note here is the positive role which place-based culture can have in generating public goods such as trust, considered a vital element in the new economic paradigm. However, cultural distinctiveness may also be useful as a “a resource, giving a region a specific niche in the international market place” (Keating, 1996: 32). This is, of course, particularly important at a time when regions and localities must increasingly compete for scarce resources such as inward investment, or to become important sites of tourist consumption. Harvey (1993), for example, notes that more often than not, local consensus is achieved between representatives of capital and labour, together with representatives of local and regional political institutions, interested in saving or creating jobs and businesses respectively. Thus, in many cases cross-class coalitions are established, allowing us to talk of local/regional mobilisation that may seek to highlight the unique advantages of investing in the particular place, that may go beyond the strictly economic factors to include other distinguishing local features such as distinct cultural identity. Thus, in this new scenario, communities that are relatively fixed in place seek to attract productive investments by presenting themselves as ‘business friendly’ environments, offering well-trained, well-disciplined workforces, local/regional institutional support, good physical infrastructures, and even pleasant places for top management to live. At the same time, places might also seek to become sites of consumption, to attract, for example tourists to ‘historic sites’, “cultural centres, a pleasing urban or regional landscape and the like” (Harvey, 1993: 8). In the context of cities,

“[w]hat has been called the ‘new urbanity’ is very much about enhancing the profile and image of places in a new global context. It is necessary to emphasise the national or regional distinctiveness of a location [...] In this process, local, regional, or national cultures and heritage will be exploited to enhance the distinctive qualities of a city or locality” (Robins, 1991: 38).

Overall, the way in which the central state has sought to control its territory, through territorial management, has been transformed greatly over recent decades, as changes in the economic paradigm are said to have generated pressures from ‘below’ and from within the central state itself to decentralise. This trend has not been uniform across all advanced capitalist states, nor has the outcome in terms of the degree of
political power that has actually been decentralised. In this respect, state traditions are key to understanding such variations. However, at a general level, and as a means of exploring the opportunities that are opening up for the sub-state level in general, we may talk of two opportunities for the sub-state level, as an example of place-based political mobilisation: firstly, it might be argued that changes in the economic paradigm, from an international to an increasingly transnational or even global economic order, and from the regime of accumulation of Fordism to flexible specialisation, could lead to a renaissance of regional and local economic structures and political mobilisation based around them. At the same time, as such places are increasingly ‘exposed’ to globalising economic flows such as mobile capital investment and tourist consumption, difference, based on local, regional or even national traditions and identities, becomes more, not less, salient. In order to meet the demands of the new economic paradigm, at the institutional level, the process of decentralisation of the majority of states in Western Europe has ensured that increasingly, the sub-state level has the formal policy instruments to attempt to meet these challenges. Both processes may be seen more clearly in the context of the integration process of EU, to which I now wish to turn.

**Reterritorialisation as Opportunity II: European Integration**

Spatial reconfiguration, then, as part of the wider dynamic of time-space compression can be attributed to the generalised process of economic, political and administrative decentralisation that has occurred over recent decades in advanced capitalist democracies of the West. This tendency, albeit uneven, has provided the sub-state level of government with increasing opportunities to mobilise around specific identities, particularly for nations without states. Within this context, spatial reconfiguration can also be used to describe the process of European integration, which accelerated from the early- to mid-1980’s onwards. The aim of what follows is not to enter into the very complex debate surrounding this process, but rather concentrate on the extent to which claims about how European integration can be said to have reinforced sub-state political mobilisation.

While the factors behind the relaunching of the EC in the early 1980’s are complex and various, “the general need for Europe to find ways out of its economic black hole was the most important incentive, one felt particularly strongly by big
business” (Ross, 1992: 56). The black hole in question seemed to consist of fears of an increasing lack of competitiveness, particularly in the hi-tech industries against competition from Japan and the Newly Industrialised Countries (NICs) of the Far East.

In this light, the Single European Act (SEA), which included the commitment for the establishment of the Single European Market (SEM), followed by the Treaty of Maastricht (1992), which paved the way for Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and the recent physical introduction of the Euro as legal tender in 12 of the 15 member states of the EU, can perhaps be regarded as the high points of the integration process based firmly on the logic of the free market. However, the integration process, characterised, *inter alia*, by the increasing policy responsibility of supranational institutions such as the Commission and the European Central Bank (ECB) has been accompanied, it is claimed, by the increasing importance of the regional level as political actors within the EU. Attention has been focussed on various aspects that have accompanied the integration process, such as radical changes in the structural funds, the setting up of the Committee of the Regions (CoR), the possibility for regional ministers to attend Council meetings, and the introduction of the principle of subsidiarity. In addition to ‘top-down’ initiatives, much attention has been paid to the increasing regional presence in Brussels of the regions, and the growing number of inter-regional associations.

In order to attempt to capture the significance of such tendencies, scholars have developed a variety of theoretical approaches, such as theories of ‘The Third Level’ (Hooghe, 1995), ‘Paradiplomacy’ (Hocking, 1999; Keating, 1999) ‘Multi-level Governance’ (Marks, 1993, 1997; Marks et al. 1996) and ‘European Domestic Policy’ (Jeffery, 1997b). All of these new theoretical approaches sought to go beyond the traditional debate between neofunctionalists and intergovernmentalists, and in order to characterise a more complex reality, in which the regional level of government was felt to be engaged in and to benefit from the process of European Union integration.

Let us now turn our attention to these windows of opportunities for the regional level and the interpretations made of them, from the perspective of the effect, not on the integration process *per se*, but on the extent to which regional governments have been able to mobilise support for the region in question and to be effectively empowered by the process.
Structural funds and the regions

In terms of structural funds, in the period from the mid 1970’s to the early 1980’s regional disparities in income, employment and productivity opened up, not only between regions of the same state, but between regions across Europe (Amin and Tomaney, 1995), as many regions on the periphery suffered the effects of the fiscal and monetary crisis of the Keynesian state. While these disparities subsequently stabilised, new fears emerged as to the effects of the SEM and then EMU. The Commission in general and its president, Jacques Delors in particular, were convinced that the Single Market would by no means inevitably lead to a widening of the gap between the rich ‘core’ regions and the poorer ‘peripheral’ ones. The gains to be made from the rationalisation of the European economy would be available to all, it was argued.

However, conscious of the fact that in the short to medium term, efforts would have to be made to ensure that ‘peripheral’ and lagging regions would not be left behind, in successive reforms from 1988, taking full advantage of the successful acceptance of the SEA, structural funds were radically transformed by a series of measures that with changing emphasis over time have remained the central pillars of structural funding until the present day. In quantitative terms, beginning with the ‘Delors 1’ budgetary package of 1988, the resources destined to structural funds have increased in both absolute and relative terms over time, with structural fund spending more than doubling since the 1989-1993 period, to the current levels of 30.4 billion euros.

Secondly, four guiding principles were introduced (Bache, 1998): firstly, the criteria of ‘concentration’ was applied, whereby objectives were drawn up to ensure funds were directed at the areas of most need. Of the original five objectives of 1988, three were regional; in 1993, a sixth objective was added that was also regional; finally, of the current, streamlined objectives, two out of the three are regional, as opposed to functional. Secondly, the commitment to pluriannual programming was undertaken, in which the vast majority of funds would be directed at programmes, as opposed to individual projects, over a period of five years. Thirdly, the principle of ‘additionality’ was established, that is the commitment by member states to match EU funding over and above what they would have other wise spent. Finally, comes the idea of ‘partnership’, which is generally seen as the most exciting innovation in terms of
regional participation in European policy-making (see, for example, Marks, 1993; Armstrong, 1995; and Bache, 1998).

The aim of the Commission was to create a truly European regional policy (Hooghe, 1995), not necessarily at the margin of the member states, but with the full collaboration of the regions in all phases of the policy process, from design through to implementation and monitoring (Bache, 1998: 75). Results in this respect have been rather mixed. Marks (1996), for example, notes that regional input has been generally weak except in the phases of implementation and monitoring of programmes, being left out of the more ‘prickly’ issues of finance and precisely which areas are to be covered. Differences also emerged between the levels of regional input into the policy process across different member states, with federalised systems such as the Belgian or German not surprisingly offering more opportunities for the regions than other, more unitary member states such as France, the UK and Greece. However, in several member states, regional participation in, or perhaps frustration with, the structural funds policy process has “contributed to existing pressures for regionalisation” (Bache, 1998: 100).

Thus, overall, we must avoid drawing hasty conclusions about the effects of structural funds and the increasing role of the regional level in the European Union polity, particularly in terms of the supposed relation between the regions and the European Commission against the member states. Nation-state traditions continue to matter, with, in this case, structural policy reforms leading to greater demands for regionalisation within member states, as opposed to within the EU as a whole.

Extra-state channels for regional engagement

With regards to other channels for regional ‘engagement’ (Jeffery, 1997b) with the EU, the Maastricht Treaty introduced a series of provisions which have generated great optimism among scholars in addition to many politicians at the regional level.

Article 146 of the treaty introduced the possibility for a regional minister to sit in the Council of Ministers, if the issue to be debated directly affected regional competences. Again, on paper at least, it has been an important development in that it questions the central state’s monopoly of ‘external’ representation, considered a central part of traditional ‘foreign’ policy (Jeffery, 1997b). However, for the moment, the measure has only benefited the federalised states of Germany, Austria and Belgium, and
given the heterogeneity of the regional level in general in the EU in terms of constitutional recognition and institutional capacities, its application to other member states will be restricted. In addition, it is the member state itself who has the capacity to veto the presence from ‘its’ regions in the Council, and even where it does accede, member states always attend those Council meetings where SNAs (sub-national authorities) are present (Jeffery, 1997b).

In spite of such restrictions, once more the central state’s monopoly of external representation has been breached in some states, which has led to pressure being exerted by the regions in others. In Spain, for example, the 1996 electoral pact between the Partido Popular (PP) and the Catalan nationalists Convergència i Unió (CiU), included the appointment of a regional ombudsman in the Spanish Permanent Representation in Brussels, although results up until now have proved disappointing.

The Maastricht Treaty also formalised subnational representation in the guise of the Committee of the Regions (CoR). The CoR was basically founded as a result of pressure from the German Länder and the Belgian regions, anxious to see their influence at national level reflected in a similar way on the institutional design of the EU. The Committee was composed of nominations from two distinct entities, the Assembly of European Regions (AER) and the Council for European Municipalities and Regions (CEMR). The fact that the CoR brought together both regions (AER) and municipalities (CEMR) has been a source of constant tension given “the major cleavage between regional and local authorities” (Hooghe, 1995: 183)5. In addition, it is the central state who decides the method of representation (Loughlin, 1997), which, given the absence in some cases of an elected regional tier of government, may mean that some delegates are non-elected officials. Finally, the CoR suffers from a position of institutional weakness, in that it is limited to a consultative role, and must share infrastructure and resources with the Economic and Social Committee (ESC). However, as Loughlin (1997) points out, pessimism from academic circles is not matched by that of policy practitioners, who point out their satisfaction with the functioning of the CoR,

5 Such tension has been personified in the struggle between two of Catalonia’s most prominent politicians. Jordi Pujol, president of the Generalitat de Catalunya and Pasqual Maragall, major of Barcelona, presided respectively the AER and the CEMR. When the CR was founded a major struggle ensued over who was to head the new EU entity. Finally, Jaques Blanc, president of Languedoc Roussillon and close collaborator of Pujol was elected on the condition that he would hand over power to Maragall. The ensuing hand-over was anything but smooth and highlighted the inevitable discrepancies.
while Jeffrey concedes that it has been “important in that it breached the established principles of representation in the EU by offering formal recognition of sub-national government” (Jeffrey, 1997: 206)

Beyond these formal opportunities that have emerged as a result of changes in decision-making processes and institutional architecture of the EU, the regions themselves have been active in engagement with and mobilising around such changes. Regional information offices (RIOs) have been established in Brussels, with their number growing exponentially since the mid-1980’s to the present figure of over 200 (Morata, 2004). Again, it is difficult to talk about a standard model, given the heterogeneity of the institutions that they represent, although it is perhaps more useful to see them, not as ‘lobbies’ but rather as channels of information. Indeed, in the 1980’s, for example, the establishment of such offices was cause for concern for many central governments’ permanent representation in Brussels, fearful as they were that this was merely an attempt to somehow by-pass the state and establish direct relations with certain European institutions such as the Commission. However, over time, such fears have been allayed, with a closer co-operation emerging between central state and regional representations in Brussels.

Finally, inter-regional associations have grown over time, both in terms of numbers and their overall importance in the process of European integration. The most established form of inter-regional associations are those bilateral and multilateral regional associations that share a common state border, with many founded in the 1960’s and 1970’s, such as the Upper Rhine Valley, established in 1971 between the Swiss cantons of Basel-Land and Basel-Stadt, the French department of Haut Rhin, and the German district of Südbaden, and that of SaarLorLux, founded in 1970 between the German land of Saarland, the French region of Lorraine, and, since 1971, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg (Weyand, 1997: 170-171). Significantly, since 1990, and coinciding with the construction of the Single market, the European Commission set up the INTERREG programme to support “cross border projects in infrastructure, environmental protection, and co-operation between firms and public utilities” (Weyand, 1997: 170). In addition, the Commission has also supported the setting up of EUOREGIOS, aimed at promoting co-operation between associations of local authorities. Multi-lateral fora, grouping together regions that do not necessarily share a

between interests that are often presented by their respective political representatives as being almost
common state border have also proliferated, such as the association of European Border Regions (AEBR), founded in 1970, to promote the exchange of information between “cross-border associations and to co-ordinate activities of common interest” (Weyard, 1997: 175); the Conference of Peripheral Maritime Regions, bringing together 70 EU regions; and group of Regions in Industrial Decline (RETI), which has perhaps been most active in representing the common interests of its members, particularly in the context of the reforms of structural policy in the late 1980’s (Weyand, 1997).

More specific inter-regional associations include, the Four Motors for Europe, a political initiative between Baden-Württemberg, Catalonia, Lombardy and Rhône-Alpes, which has sought “the benefits of synergy in economic co-operation, environmental protection and research and technology” (Weyand, 1997: 175), between four advanced regional economies that are considered the ‘motors’ of their respective state economies.

The questions arise as to how such associations can be characterised in terms of theory overall contribution to the process of European integration, and more specifically, as to their significance for the sub-state level as a means of ensuring a greater say in the integration process. In general, we might say that there is no single answers to such questions that is valid for all kinds of inter-regional associations. The ‘Four Motors’, for example, has generally fallen short of the objectives of translating closer co-operation between members into the construction of a ‘Europe of the Regions’, given the lack of permanent institutional structures and the fact that the agreements exclude ‘civil society’.

However, the AER, despite the structural problems associated with the heterogeneity of the regional actors involved, has “established itself as an authoritative political voice of the regions on a European level, and as the most comprehensive lobbying organisation for the cause of regionalism” (Weyand, 1997: 176). Perhaps most importantly, the activities of the AER has meant that the regional level as a whole within the institutional structures and the policy-making process of the EU has achieved recognition, which has been translated, inter alia, into the setting up of the CoR, which in some respects has questioned the continued existence of the AER. Other initiatives, such as those based on the INTERREG and EUREGIOS programmes, might be considered to be important in that they implicitly challenge the political geography of diametrically opposed.
the nation-state as the basic territorial building block of the EU. While the Single Market and Economic and Monetary Union have done much to bring down the economic boundaries between member states. Cross-border associations of regional and local authorities might be interpreted as creating new political geographies that undermine the political boundaries of the Member States. Such a process, if it occurs at all, is not likely to take place in the short term – nation-states will not surrender their current hegemony, nor will new territorial identities easily replace existing ones. As yet little evidence to support the idea that cross-border associations are replacing nation-state geographies, although the first steps to be taken reflect the changing geographies of the process of spatial reconfiguration inherent in the process of European integration.

Overall, perhaps the first and clearest affirmation that we can make in the light of the points discussed here, is that state traditions and current territorial arrangements still matter, although this does not mean that the EU nor the regions have not become increasingly important actors with the EU polity. Thus, as Jeffrey (1997b) suggests, rather than looking to the process of European integration as the direct cause of the increasing importance of the regional level, it is better to look at the way in which EU integration affects the regions, who then look to intra-state channels as the best way of making their voice heard, as opposed to somehow ‘by-passing’ the state. The concept of ‘European domestic policy’ has been developed by Jeffrey, based on the experience of the German Länder since the mid-1980’s. The arguments put forward by the German Länder, and followed more recently by the regional level in Belgium, Austria, Spain, Italy, and, to a lesser degree, France, are based on the idea that the integration process has meant the transfer from member states to the EU of many policies that internally are the competence of the regional level. “The central problem arising for SNAs (sub-national actors) from European integration has been the characteristic definition of European policy as an area of foreign policy” (Jeffrey, 1997b: 216), with foreign policy being a classic state monopoly. In this light, the Länder argued with some success that European policy matters, far from being foreign policy in the traditional sense, should be conceived as an extension of domestic policy, and hence the name, ‘European domestic policy’, to which the Länder should have access to the decision-making process. In the current debate about the future of the EU, despite the growing number of pessimistic voices, the trend outlined here is likely to continue. While the EU has made it clear that it does not wish to interfere in what it considers to be the internal territorial
organisation of the member states, as more and more decisions are taken at the European level, either by supranational or intergovernmental institutions, regional claims for a greater say over policies that increasingly affect them will not go away, and as such, if the current trend highlighted by Jeffrey continues, state decentralisation will continue to be a major aspect of political life over the coming years.

**Reterritorialisation as Threats**

Up until now, I have discussed how certain processes within the context of spatial reconfiguration offer opportunities for sub-state nationalism in Western Europe. On the one hand, many identify how the ‘meso’ level of government has taken on more policy powers as part of both the restructuring of the state and the consequent decentralisation of political and administrative powers and to the process of European Union integration. At the same time, cultural difference, far from being problematic, has emerged as an important factor, not only as a means of differentiating regions and localities from others in their attempts to attract investment and tourist flows, but also as a means of providing the necessary cohesion for public goods such as co-operation, based on trust, that is felt to be an important factor for success in the new emerging paradigm.

However, while spatial reconfiguration may provide a series of opportunities for territorial political movements, especially sub-state nationalism, we must not forget that this takes place in the midst of tensions associated with deterritorialisation. This is not to say that territorial politics become redundant - it might be argued that the reverse is true - , but rather that territorial politics which ultimately rely on place-bound identities, are in part defensive, even reactionary, in that place-bound identity emerges against and in opposition to the element of deterritorialisation that globalisation necessarily entails. In this second half of the chapter, I will seek to explain how regional opportunities have been accompanied by threats which to a large extent force place-based political movements to necessarily turn to resistance against globalisation. Thus, in the case of the European Union, I shall argue that while the process of integration has to some extent strengthened regionalism, it has also brought with it an undermining of territoriality in that structural power has shifted to global economic flows that
increasingly dominate space, since the very integration process has been market-led. Secondly, the political/economic paradigm of special flexibilisation, championing as it does the idea of a win-win situation for regions and localities, must be questioned, since once more it is based on an acceptance of increasingly domination of capital over space. Finally, drawing on the example of the London Docklands, the difficulties and contradiction involved in sustaining place-based identities under conditions of globalisation will be reviewed, at the same time as we shall see how and why they become more, not less in demand.

**Cohesion in the European Union?**

One of the major concerns, in public at least, of the European Commission has been to ensure that the process of European integration does not open up increasing socio-economic gaps between the regions of the EU. Thus,

“[i]n approaching the single market EU policy has been to try to create equality of opportunity to compete. Thus for less advantaged regions the approach has not been to try and even up incomes per head or social provision directly, as is done in all nation states and federal systems by transfers through the tax system and public expenditure, but to provide the infrastructure and human capital through training necessary for a region to compete” (Mayes, 1995: 5).

In this context, “the cohesion measures are a concession to interventionism within an overall framework of market-led routes to prosperity” (Amin and Tomaney, 1995: 32). More specifically, Jacques Delors “argued for greater policy emphasis on upgrading local entrepreneurship, training efforts, environmental improvements in urban areas and local initiatives which promote innovation [and thus] should seek to exploit product specialisation in market niches” (Amin and Tomaney, 1995: 20). At the same time improvements in transport and telecommunications networks coupled with the removal of non-tariff barriers (NTBs) would lead to decentralisation of economic activity. Such decentralization would go beyond the setting up of satellite economies of the 1960’s whereby capital investment from the core moved to the periphery to take advantage of labour and capital subsidies, with control and key functions such as R+D
remaining in the centre, along with profits. The basis of the argument seems to rest on the wisdom that capital will flow from the centre and finished goods and services of a high added value will flow from the periphery, if the logic of cohesion is to be followed.

Such wisdom is challenged from a variety of sources. The main thrust of such criticisms revolve around the assertion that such outflows of capital are not necessarily in the direction hoped for by the Commission. On the one hand, improved transport communication could well mean an opening up of peripheral markets to products and services produced in the core whose access had previously been made difficult. On the other, many economists now highlight the importance not just of economies of scale but also of the importance of the “‘learning’ nexus, which combines knowledge, information and innovation” (Amin and Tomaney, 1995: 32). Such factors are felt to be concentrated in the core regions of the EU, stretching from the South-East of England down to Northern Italy and are distinguished by “their monopoly over ideas, expertise, know-how and information circuits which drive the global industrial networks which they represent” (Amin and Tomaney 1995: 32). It is not immediately clear, how far these complex networks of interdependence can be transferred to, for example, regions which are either underdeveloped or suffer from continued dependence on declining industries. In such a scenario, leading industries situated in the core could be tempted to take advantage of cheap labour costs at the periphery, thus creating a vicious circle of dependent growth with the latter prey to rationalisation and competition from Eastern Europe and other ‘emerging’ economies, for example, where labour costs are less (Dunford and Kafkalis, 1992).

Very much related to this idea of the importance of the ‘learning nexus’ and the complex institutional arrangements needed to nurture its growth, is the difficulty involved in creating a “critical mass of small firms capable of supporting further entrepreneurship” (Amin and Tomaney, 1995: 31). While the Commission has sought to promote certain supply side factors such as training and physical infrastructure, as we have seen in the case of the ‘Third Italy’, much more is needed. Entrepreneurial tradition, a favourable social fabric and institutional flexibility are often lacking in the less-favoured regions.

In terms of the financial resources made available to promote cohesion within the EU, relative to previous amounts the regional policy reforms of 1988 and of 1993 laid a great deal more money on the table. However, as Armstrong points out
“there is [...] a negative aspect to the 1989 and 1993 reforms. As in previous reforms, no attempt is made to: (a) identify just how large the budget would have to be to have a significant effect on EC regional disparities; or (b) define an appropriate balance of EC and member-state government expenditures on regional policy. All that can be said is that existing levels of spending are almost certainly too low” (Armstrong, 1995: 50).

Indeed, as far back as the 1970’s “the Mcdougal report (1977) on the role of public finance under European integration argued that a federal Europe of disparities would need inter-regional transfers of around 20-25 per cent of GDP, while a looser federation would require expenditure of around 5-7 percent of EU GDP” (Amin and Tomaney, 1995: 20). Needless to say that in spite of the increase in structural funds expenditure in the period 1989-1993 it represented “0.24% of EU GDP and less than a quarter of the expected welfare gains of the SEM predicted by the Cecchini report’’ (Amin and Tomaney, 1995: 20).

Moving, then, onto the specific measures that first the SEM and later EMU involve, one particular threat to cohesion, at least in the short to medium term, comes from the opening up of public procurement, given that traditional industrial areas will be most affected by the liberalisation of public procurement (Quévit, 1992:62). Once more, while the welfare gains for the EU as a whole are to be expected as the costs of public procurement are reduced and/or a better quality of goods and services are produced, the gains are not necessarily felt in those areas, such as the ‘Objective 2’ regions that are involved in a process of catching up. In addition, public subsidies for such industries have been put under threat by the attempts by the Competition Directorate (DGIV) to ensure fair competition within the SEM. Such subsidies and direct transfer payments to the poorer regions have in any case been indirectly ‘squeezed’ by the requirements of the EMU for reductions in public budget deficits.

In terms of another of the EMU criteria, that of exchange rate stability, one potential means of ‘cushioning’ a process of economic restructuring (as long as it is accompanied by other measures aimed at ensuring that the process continues), exchange rate devaluation, has been ruled out. While not a panacea, nor a long-term policy option, currency devaluation, or at least interest rate flexibility is considered by some to be a viable policy (see, for example, Shepley and Wilmot, 1995 and Thygesen, 1988). Once
more the removal of such a possibility threatens those regions most likely to be effected by the process of economic restructuring that the SEM and EMU promises.

Of the policy measures that have accompanied the process of economic integration, competition and research, technology and development (RTD) policy stand out as well as (more indirectly) the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) as important factors in the debate over cohesion. With the relative decline (although not absolute) of EU budget funds dedicated to the CAP, it is foreseen that at least nominally there will be positive effects for cohesion within the EU, given the traditional CAP bias towards the agricultural model and products produced in the North of the EU (Shepley and Wilmott, 1995). Competition and RTD policy are, however, rather different cases. One of the implicit aims of the SEM was to promote the creation of European firms capable of facing up to the challenge of competition from US and Asian TNCs.\(^6\) Competition policy has thus been rather unrestrictive, in that a high threshold for Commission intervention in mergers and take-overs has been placed, favouring the concentration of capital around the largest firms. This would seem to work against cohesion in two ways: firstly, the largest European firms tend to be concentrated precisely in the core; and secondly, part of Commission strategy for the periphery has been to promote small businesses which have obvious difficulty against the sort of economies of scope and scale enjoyed by the largest firms in the core with free access to the markets at the periphery.

Research and Technology development policy has been similarly criticised given that EU grants for research in progress naturally tends to flow to those areas with a pre-existing R+D infrastructure- once more in the core regions. Thus, “in 1989 some 75 per cent of all R&D expenditure was concentrated in just three countries: Germany, France and the UK. Intranational differences were also pronounced: in 1982, 72 percent of Italian R&D expenditure was in the north-west with just 5 per cent in the south” (Dunford and Kafkalas, 1992: 19).

Overall, the process of European integration has highlighted the salience of the region as a political, economic, administrative and even cultural category of analysis.

\[^6\] The effectiveness of the SEM in this respect has been very much questioned by economists who claim that European TNC have looked to global alliances rather than to intra-European fusions, and that it has been precisely the non-European TNCs that have taken advantage of the Single Market (Ramsey, 1995).
However, while the market-led approach to integration that has underscored the integration process has undoubtedly benefited some regions, particularly those in the geographical ‘core’, the region in general has been disempowered by the increasing structural power that European integration grants to economic flows.

**Global versus local versus local**

Beyond the reservations about the European integration process, in a wider context, doubts may be raised over the ‘flexible specialisation’ paradigm, and in particular over the extent to which it might imply a win-win situation for regions and localities.

Firstly, it is not at all clear to what extent the “simple binary opposition between mass-production and flexibility underpinning the logic of economic transformation” (Amin and Robins, 1990: 13) accurately reflects either the previous reality, Fordism⁷, or the current one, characterised by ‘flexible specialisation’, and in which certain, albeit limited experiences have been inflated into a new economic paradigm of a global economy made up of flourishing regional economies. After the initial enthusiasm over the success of the Third Italy and other regions, studies began to reveal that even such success stories were not immune from price competition from other regions, as Cooke and Morgan (1995) show in the case of the problems faced by companies large (for example Porsche and Daimler Benz) and small in Baden-Württemberg.

In addition, while it is clear that some regions have indeed prospered, it is far from clear that all regions can be ‘winners’ at the same time, and as such regional and local prosperity under conditions of globalisation might be better considered as a zero-sum game in which they may resort to “beggar-thy-neighbour strategies” (Peck and Tickell, 1994: 281) in order to attract and retain investment. Indeed, rather than promoting difference,

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⁷ Jessop, among others, is rather sceptical about the extent to which Fordism, understood as a mode of production, regime of accumulation, regime of regulation and even a mode of societalization, existed outside certain sectors of the economy and outside of certain territorial limits. For example, in the paradigm industry of Fordism, automobiles, outside certain US and French manufacturers “several recent studies demonstrate how Fordist mass production has been blocked (in this sector) by such factors as skill structure, managerial capacities, market size, labour market conditions, and union organization” (Jessop, 1992: 54).
“what is striking about local strategies is just how unlocal they are. Workforce training, the erosion of social protection, the construction of science and business parks, the vigorous marketing of place and the ritual incantation of the virtues of international competitiveness and public-private partnership seem now to have become almost universal features of so-called ‘local’ strategies” (Peck and Tickell, 1994: 281).

In effect it is a question of asymmetry, local versus local versus global. Thus, many see the whole idea of regional economies based on flexible specialisation as the means by which capital avoids the rigidities of Fordism and secondly plays region off against region (see Swyngedouw, 1992; Harvey, 1989; and Dunford and Kafkalas 1992). Thus, in a world in which global spaces are dominated by the needs of capital accumulation,

“the global-local nexus does not create a privileged new role for the locality in the world economic arena. Of course local economies continue to matter [...] We should however, treat claims about new capacities for local autonomy and proactivity with scepticism. If it is, indeed, the case that localities do now increasingly bypass the national state to deal directly with global corporations, world bodies or foreign governments, they do not do so on equal terms. Whether it is to attract a new car factory or the Olympic games, they go as supplicants. And, even as supplicants, they go in competition with each other: cities and localities are now fiercely struggling against each other to attract footloose and predatory investors to their particular patch” (Robins, 1991: 36).

Defensive place-based identities and the ‘power of tradition’

In the first part of the current chapter, we have seen how under conditions of globalisation, places at different spatial scales might increasingly highlight their unique set of characteristics as a means of attracting capital investment and tourist flows, within the context of increased competition between places. In this respect, political mobilisation such as regionalism might embrace globalisation in that the spatial
reconfiguration that it necessarily implies, ‘delivers’ them from the constrictions of the nation-state and the international world order.

However, the way in which the locality or region in question seeks to negotiate connectivity to global capital investment flows is by no means entirely unproblematic: deindustrialisation may be resisted, campaigns may be organised against the decision to ‘disinvest’ or ‘delocalise’ a production facility, or differences may arise over the question of balancing the accommodation of global capital investment with the perceived needs, aspirations and desires of the community. Such struggles not only concern the material construction of place, but also involve questions of identity. In a region in industrial decline, resistance may be framed in terms of upholding the traditional industrial, working-class culture of the region, against those who look to the ‘opportunities’ of the post-industrial economy, and who consequently seek to minimise such traditions. A paradigmatic case in this sense which has received much academic attention has been the case of the development of the London Docklands from the late 1970’s to the early 1990’s (see for example, Brownill, 1990; Coupland, 1992; Keith and Pile, 1993; Massey, 1995; and Rose, 1995). Here, the construction of place-bound identities within the context of global capital restructuring has been contested and problematic. If we understand the planned development as part of the overall need for spatial restructuring within capitalism or ‘spatial fix’ (Swyngedouw, 1992), then the case emerges as an interesting example of how place-based identities emerge and are strengthened by interaction with global flows, in this case economic ones.

With the closure of London’s docks, the area which they occupied, the Docklands, was earmarked as the largest area for redevelopment in Europe at the time: twenty two square kilometres (Keith and Pile, 1993: 10). In the late 1970’s, political differences between local residents, political authorities and developers meant that plans for redevelopment had effectively stagnated. The deadlock was broken, however, with the election of Margaret Thatcher’s Tory government in 1979, which paved the way for the setting up of the London Docklands Development Corporation (LDDC), charged with the mission of developing the area for office space and luxury homes, and endowed with the legislative powers to override opposition, particularly that of local residents. However, over the years, residents’ resistance, archaeological discoveries and financial problems of the firms involved did allow some concessions to be won by the residents of the area.
Generally excluded from the decision-making process that would have a deep impact on their lives, local residents opposed many if not all of the aspects of the development plans, and the way in which the LDDC sought to justify such plans by presenting the area as attractive to potential wealthy residents and business investors. The residents claimed that the Docklands had traditionally been an integral part of the East End of London, and as East Enders ‘the land was their land’, over which they demanded a say. In turn, such claims rested on the premise that ‘local’ people had the right to maintain the local, East-End character of the place, due to the historical ties between people and place. But such an assertion is indeed problematic, in that the fight against global capitalist intrusion, with its tendency to alter places, may lead to the exclusion of others that are not traditionally identified with the area, such as immigrants, who might also suffer the consequences of the capitalist spatial restructuring. Indeed, this scenario eventually emerged in the case of the Docklands. By 1993, the local elections in one of the boroughs affected by redevelopment, Tower Hamlets, were marked by the issue of who could have access to the scarce supply of public housing in the area (Massey, 1995). In a different way, both the far-right British National Party (BNP) and the Liberal Democrats, both proposed that ‘real’ locals and those with historic roots in the area should have priority access to public housing, with the result that many Bangladeshi families that were relatively new to the area were effectively excluded. Thus, “the arguments for the local policy drew out, and were reinforced by, racism” (Massey, 1995: 47).

What emerges in the case of the Docklands, are the problems associated with attempts to construct a coherent, bounded and coherent identity over space and time in a world dominated not only by global investment flows, but also by global flows of migrants, images, and so forth. But these are not limited to local issues and local, place-based resistance movements. In many respects, all nationalist movements, for example, are problematic in the same way, in that all rely on the construction of a sense of place which is often in conflict with the flows of globalisation. More specifically, we can highlight two sets of interrelated problems: on the one hand, global flows would appear to undermine the construction of place-bound identities such as national identities; while on the other, concepts such as tradition, on which place-bound identities are necessarily constructed become most problematic in contemporary life.

In the first place, then, place-based identities rest on the territorial distinction between ‘we/here’ and ‘the other/there’, and are “constructed through the purification of
space, through the maintenance of territorial boundaries and frontiers” (Robins, 1991: 42). However, under conditions of time-space compression, these boundaries are increasingly difficult to maintain, space is more difficult to keep pure, as ‘we’ and ‘the other’ come into increasing contact. For Robins, this contact calls into question the very basis of personal and collective identities constructed around the ‘we’ versus ‘the other’ dichotomy. Thus, there emerges

“a new experience of orientation and disorientation, new senses of placed and placeless identity. The global-local nexus is associated with new relations between space and place, fixity and mobility, centre an periphery, ‘real’ and ‘virtual’ space, ‘inside’ and ‘outside’, frontier and territory. This, inevitably has implications for both individual and collective identities and for meaning and coherence of community” (Robins, 1991: 41).

Consequently, the search for such identities, whether jingoistic Little Englandism, or even more ‘progressive’ local or regional identities, are “about the maintenance of protective illusion, about the struggle for wholeness and coherence through continuity” (Robins, 1991: 41) at a time when continuity and coherence over space are increasingly difficult, if not impossible to maintain.

At a theoretic level, a further problematical area emerges for the construction of place-based identities in contemporary society, and concerns the very nature of tradition. As Harvey points out, “the assertion of any place-bound identity has to rest at some point on the motivational power of tradition” (Harvey, 1989: 303). Tradition, as Giddens tells us, is place-boundedness, juxtaposed to the defining dynamic of modernity, time-space distanciation\(^8\). While during ‘simple modernity’, consisting “roughly speaking the first century and a half or so of industrialization and modernity”

\(^8\) Time-space distanciation is “the means by which formerly separate and self-contained systems have come into contact with one another and become interdependent” (Leyshon, 1995: 19). The idea rests upon the notion that social life consists of two main types of social interaction: on the one hand, face-to-face contacts of daily life which normally occurs within a fairly narrow geographic ambit – the neighbourhood, workplace etc, and on the other, more distant interaction made increasingly possible by the technological advances in communications and transport. Indeed, Giddens notes that “if one wanted to take a technological fix upon the intensifying of globalization in recent years, it would be the point at which a global satellite communication system was first established [...] The advent of instantaneous global communication both altered the nature of local experience and served to establish novel institutions (such as 24 hour money markets)” (Giddens 1996: 367).
(Giddens, 1996: 368), tradition and modernity existed in a sort of ‘symbiosis’. However, with the shift to reflexive modernity the status of tradition has altered, although tradition itself has not come to end, through the process of reflexivity. In modern society, tradition as such cannot be justified in its own terms: “to sustain a practice in its own terms will not do” (Giddens, 1996: 368). The irony, if that is the word, of reflexive modernity is that tradition can only be justified “in the light of knowledge which is not itself authenticated by tradition” (Giddens, 1996: 368). This was the whole point of Enlightenment thought: it emerged as a challenge to tradition. Thus, he concludes that “justified tradition is tradition in sham clothing and receives its identity only from the reflexivity of the modern” (Giddens, 1990: 38). But far from disappearing “[r]ather, traditions in many circumstances become reinvigorated and actively defended. This is the very origin of fundamentalism, a phenomenon which does not have a long history. Fundamentalism can be defined as tradition defended in the traditional way – against the backdrop, however, of a globalizing cosmopolitan world which increasingly asks for reasons” (Giddens, 1996: 368). Thus, to the extent that nationalism relies on the notion of tradition, the logical consequence of Giddens argument is that nationalism must be considered to be a sort of fundamentalist movement.

In a similar vain, Harvey notes that ‘authenticity’ is a particularly modern preoccupation, since traditionally communities were much more rooted in place where they might have erected shrines and monuments, while it is only with modernity that the need for developing and cultivating a sense of place arises, and as such, it is only with industrial society that “museums and societies for the preservation of the past” (Harvey, 1993: 12) emerge. In other words, a sense of place and of past is a deliberate and conscious construction, but it is ultimately flawed, since it is “subverted by the market provision of constructed authenticity, invented traditions and a commercialised heritage culture. The final victory of modernity [...] is not the disappearance of the non-modern world, but its artificial preservation and reconstruction” (Harvey, 1993: 12). This tendency has been sharpened over recent decades with the shift from modernity to postmodernity, to the point where “[i]t is not hard to see how the crass and commercial

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9 The consequences of modernity for Giddens, which we are just realising now, is that to ‘know’ far, from dispensing doubt, only means that “we are abroad in a world which is thoroughly constituted through reflexively applied knowledge, but where at the same time we can never be sure that any given element of that knowledge will not be revised” (Giddens, 1996: 367).

10 For a critique of the juxtaposition of modernity and tradition, see Luke (1996).
side of post-modernism could play upon these sentiments and market the vernacular, simulate the authentic; and invent heritage, tradition and even commercialized roots” (Harvey, 1993: 14). Thus nationalism, in addition to being ‘fundamentalist’, would also appear to increasingly resort to the production and reproduction of a commodified national identity, which must be somehow ‘packaged’ for consumption.

However, such problems do not necessarily mean that national identity becomes less attractive and that nationalism loses its force. Harvey claims that nationalism is not only a reaction to the spatial consequences of economic restructuring associated with globalisation, but that there are also temporal factors that increase the attraction of nationalism. The compression of time that was highlighted earlier in production and consumption has led to authors such as Toffler (1970) and Jameson (1984, 1996) to highlight the “temporariness in the structure of both public and personal value systems” (Toffler, 1970, quoted in Harvey, 1989: 286). Permanence is replaced by ephemerality, all that is solid melts into air, so to speak. Amidst such disconcertion, in the realm of politics image-makers and the media assume a more powerful role in shaping political identities. One of the main goals of political spin doctors in such a scheme is to present an image of stability, of rock-like permanence against the waves of postmodern image bombardment. Thus, it is no surprise to read in Harvey’s account how nationalism once more comes to the fore, it is equated with “admiration for those charismatic and ‘protean’ individuals within their Nietszhian ‘will to power’. The revival of interest in basic institutions and the search for historical roots are all signs of a search for more secure moorings and longer-lasting values in a shifting world” (Harvey, 1989: 292). “Indeed, there are abundant signs that localism and nationalism have become stronger precisely because of the quest for the security that place always offers in the midst of all the shifting that flexible accumulation implies. The resurgence of geopolitics and of faith in charismatic politics [...] fits only too well with a world that is increasingly nourished intellectually and politically by a vast flux of ephemeral images” (Harvey, 1989: 306). Nationalism in this context is seen as a

“reaction that can best be summed up as the search for personal or collective identity, the search for secure moorings in a shifting world. Place identity, in this collage of superimposed spatial images that implode in (sic) upon us, becomes an important issue, because everyone occupies a space of individuation (a body, a room, a home, a shaping community, a nation), and how we individuate ourselves
shapes our identity” (Harvey, 1989: 302).

To sum up, the accounts discussed up until now in the present section establish the dichotomy between space and place, and between deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation. However, the nature of this ‘global-local nexus’ is not one of equals, but rather it is asymmetrical. At the same time, this structural inequality, far from heralding the end of place-based political mobilisation such as nationalism, may actually provoke it, as identities are increasingly questioned as people come into increasing contact with the ‘other’ and with the ephemeral consequences of time-space compression, which leads people to search for the secure moorings of coherent identities. However, such oppositional movements become a part of the very fragmentation which mobile capital and flexible accumulation can feed upon. “Regional resistances, the struggle for local autonomy, place-bound organisation, may be excellent bases for political action, but they cannot bear the burden of radical historical change alone (Harvey, 1989: 303), since “they are easily dominated by the power of capital to co-ordinate accumulation across universal fragmented space. Place-bound politics appears even though such a politics is doomed to failure” (Harvey, 1993: 24). Thus national identities, in this version, must be considered problematic in contemporary times, since, on the one hand, they are difficult to maintain, and on the other, political mobilisation based on such identities - nationalism, for example, is unable to fulfil its aim of resisting capitalist dominance.

Conclusions

The current chapter has sought to discuss what might be considered to be the opportunities and threats that globalisation presents for political mobilisation in places at varying spatial scales, from the local to the national level. More specifically, we have seen that while deterritorialisation must be considered to be an important part of globalisation, although care must be taken not to overstate the case, reterritorialisation is the other side of the same coin, in that both theoretically and empirically, place in general, and territory in particular, can never be totally overcome. Within this context, having discussed in the first part of this chapter the opportunities that reterritorialisation might represent for the regional scale of political space, such as nations-without-state,
of which Catalonia is just one example, the second part discusses in more detail how this process also involves threats.

Overall, the approach that authors such as Harvey and Robbins propose is most attractive for the study of place-based political mobilisation such as nationalism within the context of globalisation. Harvey’s account in particular enjoys a great degree of coherence in that the central dynamic behind globalisation is explained, in this case in terms of capitalism’s attempt to postpone the inevitable crisis of overaccumulation through time-space compression. Secondly, such accounts not only allow for place-based political mobilisation, but they also place it at the very heart of their analysis, and in this respect differ entirely from the accounts of globalisation as deterritorialisation discussed in the previous chapter. A further advantage here, is that the notion of identity is made problematic, particularly in Robbins’ account, whereby explicit mention is made of the difficulty, in both conceptual and practical terms, of maintaining and promoting bounded, coherent, place-based identities at a time when global flows threaten to deterritorialise the production of meaning in contemporary society. Against this threat, however, such identities actually become more attractive as moorings in the storm of ephemerality, and against which the ‘other’ can be identified, although political mobilisation based on such identities is ultimately doomed to failure since it is unable to bear the burden of historical change, effectively allowing capitalism to overcome resistance by the strategy of divide and rule.

Notwithstanding, this is not to say that such accounts are unproblematic. In the first place, even if we accept the argument that place-based mobilisation such as nationalism is circumscribed by the power of capital to dominate space, and as such is “unable to bear the burden of radical historical change”, perhaps we should enquire as to why nationalism has any obligation to bear such a burden. This is precisely the point that Tom Nairn (1995) so forcefully makes in his review of Eric Hobsbawn’s *Age of Extremes*, in which Hobsbawn laments the end of the ‘Golden Age’ of the 1950’s and 1960’s, now being replaced by political fragmentation along ethnic lines that not only leads to genocide such as in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, but also to a situation in which the new nation-states are “more dependent on the transnational entities which increasingly determine matters [...] The most convenient world for multinational giants is one populated by dwarf states or no states at all” (Hobsbawn, 1994, quoted in Nairn, 1995: 97). Nairn himself recognises that Hong Kong and Andorra may be convenient for multinational capital, but
“the more important question in a democratic world is - are they convenient and advantageous to the inhabitants of Hong Kong and Andorra? The reasons given by Corsicans, Shetlanders or Canary Islanders for wanting to emulate them may remain ‘unconvincing’ to all who have sunk back into their Douglas Hurd club armchairs - original designer, Prince Metternich. The more significant question is, surely, will they increasingly convince the growing mass of outlaws, rebels and nationalist ne’er-do-wells emerging from the new world disorder? An independent Wales? Quite out of the question - but Robin Hood would have loved it” (Nairn, 1995: 98).

This of course leads us into the second problem that accounts such Harvey’s raises, namely the idea that all forms of nationalism are necessarily reactionary fundamentalisms, undermined by the political economy of postmodernity that converts key elements of national identity into commodified kitsch to be bought and sold in the market place. The dangers of going too far in this direction can be seen in Zigmund Buaman’s (1998) account of globalisation, which rests upon the same local-global dichotomy as we have seen above, and which leads to a

“rebound in the redistribution of privileges and deprivations, of wealth and poverty, of resources and impotence, of power and powerlessness, of freedom and constraint. We witness today the process of a world-wide restratification, in the course of which a new socio-cultural hierarchy, a world-wide scale, is put together.[...] One would well be advised to speak of [it as] ‘globalization’ (Roland Robertson’s apt term, exposing the unbreakable unity between ‘globalizing’ and ‘localizing’ pressures) [...] and to define it mostly as the process of the concentration of capital, finance and all other resources of choice and effective action, but also – perhaps above all – of the concentration of freedom to move and to act” (Bauman, 1998: 69-70).

In such a scheme of things, being localised “is an uninvited and cruel fate” synonymous with “social deprivation and degradation”. In effect “localities are losing their generating and meaning-negotiating capacity and are increasingly dependent on sense-giving and interpreting actions which they don’t control” (Bauman, 1998: 69-70).
This would appear fertile ground for “neo-tribalisms” such as nationalism, which emerges as a backlash against all-conquering global forces and from which it tries to isolate the members of the community (see also Kaldor, 1996; and Hirst and Thompson, 1996, among others).

Nationalism, when presented in this light, has all the hallmarks of being of what one might call the Enlightenment prejudices frequently found in both mainstream liberal and Marxist analysis of the phenomenon. When not ignored, nationalism has been traditionally treated by mainstream social science, as atavistic, irrational, the result of an incomplete construction of the modern nation-state, or of the bourgeoisie-inspired false consciousness of the alienated masses (Kellas, 1993, and James, 1996). The above accounts only appear to prolong this moral condemnation of nationalism which does very little to help us analyse the phenomenon. In addition, they are based on only a partial understanding of nationalism; if we go back to the understanding of nationalism that I proposed in Chapter 2, whereby nationalism was described as an ideological and political movement, then we must also put forward reasons as to why elites might wish to invoke the nation at a time when nationalism is supposedly ‘doomed to failure’. This is not to say that no nationalist movement is reactionary, as the case of the ex-Yugoslavia, and more recently the rise of right-wing xenophobic nationalist political parties in Western Europe highlight. However, by far from all nationalist movements see themselves as reactionary, or the ‘politics of losers’, as the case of sub-state nationalist movements in Western Europe and North America might suggest.

So how might we conceptualise territory, territoriality and place-based political mobilisation under current conditions of time-space compression? This problematic is discussed by James Anderson (1996), who, building on the work of Hedley Bull (1977) and John Ruggie (1993), analyses the extent to which, under conditions of globalisation, understood as time-space compression, ‘new medieval and postmodern territorialities’ are emerging. With the transition to modernity “sovereignty over everything was bundled together in territorial states” (Anderson, J. 1996: 144)\(^\text{11}\), a process that has been reversed under conditions of time-space compression. In this respect, Ruggie (1993) talks of the way in which a non-territorial ‘space-of-flows’ exists alongside more

\(^\text{11}\) However, this ‘bundling together’ was never total, in that for the international system to work, “there had to be a partial unbundling for international political and social interaction to be possible” (Anderson, J. 1996: 145), reflected, for example in embassies, the continued existence of the Catholic Church, international networks and functional organisations.
 unconventional ‘space-of-places’, but Anderson argues that “it might be better still, however, to see them as interpenetrating, reshaping each other, or creating tensions and disjunctures between relative fluidity and fixity which stimulate further change” (Anderson, J. 1996: 145). Thus, we may talk of a ‘new medievalism’ (Bull, 1977), which, in the case of the European Union, “would not require anything as clear cut as the death of the state, or a federal Europe of states or regions” (Anderson, J. 1996: 145), but rather, authority of the state over its national citizens, and their primary loyalty to the state would increasingly be questioned, as overlapping authorities emerge at different spatial scales and with different functional roles.
PART TWO
CHAPTER 5
TERRITORY AND THE ORIGINS OF CATALAN NATIONALISM

Introduction

The second part of this thesis seeks to build on and to illustrate the arguments developed in the first part by analysing nationalism in Catalonia from a territorial perspective over time. While the remaining chapters seek to consider the process of national territorial production and reproduction and key debates surrounding the national homeland over recent decades, the current chapter analyses the process from a historical perspective. Catalan nationalism is not a new phenomenon: as a modern political movement in Catalonia, its roots can be traced back to the 19th century, as with so many other nationalist movements in Europe and beyond. These beginnings and subsequent developments have left an indelible mark on contemporary Catalan nationalism, even within the much-changed contemporary contexts of, for example, the successful implantation of liberal democracy, a decentralised Spanish state, el Estado de las Autonomías, and the related processes of European integration and globalisation. Thus, before analysing the territorial nature of contemporary Catalan nationalism, it is very much worthwhile investigating the roots of Catalan nationalism and its link, both implicit and explicit, with territory. Emphasis will be placed above all on analysing the process of the symbolic construction of the Catalan national homeland, before, more briefly, putting forward arguments as to why such a process took the form that it did and why it was so important in the early years of nationalism in Catalonia.

In order to do so, after discussing what might be considered to be the traditional shortcomings of many attempts to answer this and other related questions, I will go on to argue that while many authors have included many territorial elements in their analysis of Catalan nationalism, there has been a general failure to incorporate them into an overall territorial approach to the question. Building on such existing work, I will seek to argue that the 19th-century cultural revival in Catalonia, the Renaixença (rebirth), was not merely concerned with linguistic revival and the construction of a
modern literary language of prestige that would become the key element of national identity, but rather that its importance lay in its contribution to the symbolic construction of the Catalan national homeland, or pàtria, that was based on rural, tradition, conservative and religious values. In this respect, the incorporation of writers and activists based in and on the Bishopric of Vic in central Catalonia, were key.

Finally, building on the account of historian, Josep-Maria Fradera (1985, 1992), it will be argued that this process of national territorial construction can not only be understood in terms of class alliances between urban and rural elites, but also as a means of assuring the territorial unity of Catalonia within the context of the needs of the industrial capitalism.

Mainstream Approaches to Catalan Nationalism

From a general perspective, attempts to analyse and explain Catalan nationalism have met similar criticisms to more general attempts to explain nationalism as a whole. Borja de Riquer (2001), for example, situates the problems associated with studies on Catalan nationalism within the context of the general failure of Spanish historians “to explain to our fellow citizens in a thorough and understandable way, why in Spain there currently exist different feelings of [national] identity” (de Riquer, 2001: 13). Both de Riquer and Conversi (1997) note that the majority of publications on the question of Catalan nationalism are descriptive, ‘long on facts and short on theory’, which Anguera attributes to a tendency towards “a certain degree of theoretical autarchy, both voluntary and involuntary” (Anguera, 1994: 82), that has meant that the majority of works have avoided engaging with theories of nationalism, such as those developed by Hobsbawm, Gellner, Hroch and so forth.

How can such voluntary and involuntary theoretical autarchy be explained? Again, Anguera makes the interesting point that the reasons are to be found in the very political history of Spain in the 20th century. The long periods of dictatorship -Primo de Rivera’s from 1923 to 1930, and then Franco’s from 1939 to 1975 - enforced a strict isolation of Spanish social sciences from the main intellectual debates in the West, both

1 De Riquer (2001) remarks on the difficulty involved in applying general theories of nationalism to individual cases, but also highlights the problems in comparing nationalist movements within an apparently similar context, such as the Basque and the Catalan.
Marxist and liberal schools, while at the same time, the unitarian vision of Spain had no room for attempts to explain a phenomenon, ‘peripheral’ nationalism that did not officially exist. The democratic period, on the other hand, particularly since the death of Franco, has been marked by a certain euphoria, in which ‘peripheral’ nationalist movements, having played an important part in the political struggle against dictatorship, have been idealised in many accounts, to the extent that “rather than studies of nationalism, they have become part of the nationalist project that they wish to analyse” (Anguera, 1994: 83).

In terms of classifying general accounts of Catalan nationalism, perhaps the easiest dichotomy to introduce is that which we saw in Chapter 1, that is between perennialist and modernist accounts, whereby the former place Catalan nationalism within the context of the prior existence of the Catalan nation, dating back centuries, if not millennia, while the latter consider that the Catalan nation is distinctly modern, the product of nationalism itself.

**Perennialist accounts**

Perennialist accounts of the Catalan nation, while in general agreeing on the historical novelty of the form of political mobilisation that emerged in the 19th century, tend to see nationalism as the resurgence of a national consciousness that dates back over a millennium. In this respect, rather than justifying the antiquity of the Catalan nation per se, there is a definite tendency to confuse the origins and development of the ‘national’ territory, Catalonia, with those of the nation (see, for example, Prat de la Riba, 1978; Rovira i Virgili, 1983; Cucurull, 1981; Termes, 1984; Balcells, 1992). Thus, starting from “Catalunya’s official birthday as a nation, generally dated to 988 AD” (Castells, 1997: 43), such versions trace the rise of Catalonia and its ruling dynasty, the counts of Barcelona, its alliance with the crown of Aragon (1137), and its emergence as a major military and commercial power in the Eastern Mediterranean and beyond in the 13th and 14th centuries. The merger of the confederate Crown of Aragon with the Kingdom of Castile in the 15th century is generally perceived as the beginning of centuries of decline for the Catalan nation which would not be reversed until the national reawakening of the 19th century. Catalonia’s decline in the Mediterranean was
inversely mirrored by Castile’s discovery of the Americas in 1492, from which Catalonia was excluded, and as the former became increasingly hegemonic, the terms of the union of the crown, which included “the respect of language, customs and institutions, as well as the sharing of wealth” (Castells, 1997: 43), came under increasing pressure. Catalonia’s struggle to maintain its political autonomy and national personality led to the War of the Reapers, ending in 1640 with the loss of much of its independence and the cession of the Catalan Rosselló or Roussillon to the French crown with the signing of the Treaty of the Pyrenees\(^2\) in 1649. The final blow came with the War of Succession between 1705 and 1714\(^3\), in which having sided with the Hapsburgs against the Bourbons, Catalonia lost all hope of reasserting its right to self government as a distinct nation within Spain, with the subsequent Decree of the Nueva Planta (1716) abolishing Catalan political institutions, imposing Castilian law, followed by successive attacks on the public use of the Catalan language in favour of Castilian.

In this respect, Cucurull, while recognising the perennial nature of the Catalan nation, situates the emergence of Catalan nationalism somewhat before the 19\(^{th}\) century, whereby it is part of a popular reaction to Castilian oppression. Thus he asks:

“Did not Catalan nationalism […] emerge much earlier than we have believed up until now? And have not other elements such as the consciousness of enjoying collective privileges, that had to be maintained, the need to win back such common privileges and bring them up to date, whether or not they coincided with the interests of the bourgeoisie, influenced as much or even more in the origin and development (of Catalan nationalism) than the literary Renaixença or the preoccupations of the bourgeoisie concerning markets?” (Cucurull, 1975: 24).

Despite the Castilian-led oppression, the industriousness of the Catalans would soon lead to the kind of economic development that clearly differentiated it from the rural backwardness of Castile and the indolent, aristocratic nature of its elites\(^4\). Progress in agriculture, followed by the emergence of proto-industrialisation, led to full-blown

\(^2\) To commemorate the bravery of the Reapers, popular songs such as Els Segadors (The Reapers) emerged. However, it was not until 1887 that Els Segadors actually became the “official” Catalan national anthem.

\(^3\) The day in which Barcelona, and thus Catalonia fell to Castilian and French troops has become the National day or Diada, another national ‘tradition’ that begun in the late 19\(^{th}\) century.

\(^4\) For a classic text on the Catalan aptitude for business and commerce, see Pi i Sunyer (1983).
industrialisation in the 19th century, making Catalonia the only part of Spain with a solid industrial base until it was joined by the Basque Country (specifically, the province of Vizcaya) at the end of the century.

The tendency of socio-economic differentiation of Catalonia with respect to the rest of Spain was mirrored by a cultural revival, the Renaixença, which fully reawakened the Catalan national soul, and led to a political movement, loosely called Catalanism, which by the end of the century was overtly nationalist. Like Cucurull, for example, Termes rejects the bourgeois character of the nationalist movement in 19th-century Catalonia, an implicit rejection of accounts inspired in historical materialism (see below), that pointed to precisely the opposite, and of those accounts that point to the foundation of the conservative Lliga Regionalista, as the key moment for Catalan nationalism⁵. Instead, Termes claims that

“the popular, not bourgeois character of the revolts of 1835-1836 and of the series of popular risings of the period 1840-1843 that take place in Barcelona and that are clearly democratic and popular, has never been taken into account. They clearly represent the discontent of the Catalan lower classes against the dominance of the centralising Spanish bourgeoisie. It is evident that these risings prefigure Catalan anti-centralist ‘particularism’” (Termes, 1984: 119).

The beginning of the 20th century saw the consolidation of nationalist politics within Catalonia, with political demands partially met with the joining together of the four provincial Diputacions (Barcelona, Girona, Lleida and Tarragona), to form the Mancomunitat under the leadership of Prat de la Riba, which was suppressed by the dictatorship of General Primo de Rivera (1923-1930). The Second Republic saw Catalan nationalism move leftwards and the re-establishment of the institutions of self-government, before the Civil War led to Franco’s dictatorship and the liquidation of any ‘peripheral’ national expression, be it political or cultural. As opposition mounted to the Franco dictatorship in the 1960’s, in Catalonia, national, collective rights were absorbed into the demands of all democratic political forces, and the righting of past wrongs has

⁵ Termes comments that “there are works, above all that of Isidre Molas [1972], and secondly that of Borja de Riquer [1977] on the Lliga Regionalista that are undoubtedly important but [...] at the same time to some degree the most mistaken, since they centre precisely on the Catalan political party that was most closely related to the bourgeoisie” (Termes, 1984: 72).
consistently informed nationalist politics in Catalonia since the transition to liberal democracy after the death of Franco.

While perennialist accounts are a useful means of outlining the background against which Catalan nationalism emerges in the 19th century, and provide clues to the building blocks that would be used in the construction of the national identity, such accounts fail to come to terms with the essential modernity of the nation and nationalism, and thus fall into the trap of (con)fusing territory and nation. The history of Catalonia as a political and institutional territory is presented as the history of ‘Catalonia’, understood as the Catalan nation. In general, perennialist versions are usually the work of nationalists themselves, although as Castells’ version above bears witness, more generalist scholars are not always above falling into the perennialist ‘trap’.

Modernist accounts

While the accounts mentioned above recognise the essential modernity of Catalan nationalism, they all defend the idea that the Catalan nation predates such forms of political mobilisation. Since the 1960’s, often inspired in historical materialism, a number of accounts of Catalan nationalism have emerged that seek to cast doubt on such a hypothesis. In many ways, Pierre Vilar’s work on Catalonia and on Catalan nationalism has become a work of obligatory reference, not only for historical materialists, but for all historians that have sought to trace the roots of Catalan nationalism. His *Catalunya dins L’Espanya Moderna (Catalonia within Modern Spain)*, is based on a series of interrelated claims that situate the industrial bourgeoisie and their interests at the centre of the analysis. Thus, by the late 19th century, “the responsibility for ‘Catalanism’ essentially rests with the well-off bourgeoisie”, with the “labour movement between 1880-1917 constantly absent”, and “the middle classes and peasant farmers disorganised and [reduced to] a subordinate political role” (Vilar, 1979: 53). “The bourgeoisie of this period sought to control the institutions of the state and on seeing themselves refused control over the Spanish state, it falls back [...] on the demand for a politically autonomous regional organisation” (Vilar, 1979: 54). However, the underlying discontent of the Catalan bourgeoisie goes back to the period between
1820-1885, which he calls the ‘regionalist-protectionist’ era. During this time, the calls for protectionism by the industrialists found an enormous echo throughout Catalan society precisely because the emergence of modern industrial structures allowed it to penetrate both socially and geographically throughout Catalonia. Within this context, a “body of doctrine [is constructed] to make protectionism the common denominator of the political aspirations of all classes, if possible, or at least of the ruling classes in the whole of the Catalan region, where finally the issue becomes common both to traditionalists, from Balmes to Torras i Bages, and to left-wing or extreme left-wing ‘federalists’: Almirall6, Victor Balaguer or Pi i Maragall” (Vilar, 1979: 59). However, while rejecting “simplistic economism”, Vilar explains how the shift from the ‘regionalist-protectionist’ to the ‘bourgeois nationalist’ era comes about in the face of the increasing insecurity of the Catalan bourgeoisie in both economic and social terms, given the lack of sensitivity to their needs and aspirations on the part of the governing elites in Madrid.

This idea of frustration is the premise of Jordi Solé-Tura’s work, Catalanismo y Revolución Burguesa (1970), in which the “working hypothesis is that the history of Catalan nationalism, in its various phases, is the history of a frustrated bourgeois revolution” (Solé-Tura 1970: 14). From a more overtly Marxist perspective than Vilar (the introduction includes references to Marx, Gramsci and Poulantzas), Solé-Tura claims that “Catalan nationalism was born, developed and gave the best of itself in the period in which the capitalist mode of production sought to become hegemonic, without fully attaining it” (Solé-Tura, 1970: 18), a relative failure that was accompanied by a similar one with regards to the political and cultural institutions. However, “the history of Catalan nationalism cannot be reduced, as some authors do, to a manoeuvre over time of the Catalan bourgeoisie, to a simple act of Maquiavellian will that played on the enthusiasm of the Catalan people, that was easily manipulated.[...] No, the Catalan bourgeoisie did not attain exclusive hegemony over the political power of the Spanish state” (Solé-Tura, 1970: 18). It is precisely the failure in this respect, that turned the Catalan industrial bourgeoisie to nationalism as a means of establishing a power base in the ‘periphery’.

Overall then, despite the forebodings of authors such as Anguera, over recent

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6 Marfany (1996) not only underlines the nationalist character of Almirall’s doctrine (see below), but also
decades a certain amount of theoretically-informed accounts of the genesis and development of Catalan nationalism has emerged. Such literature has been recently enriched by the contributions of Borja de Riquer (2001) and Josep-Maria Fradera (1992), who offer distinct, yet to some extent complimentary accounts of Catalan nationalism in the 19th century, in that while the former concentrates on the external factors - the structures of the Spanish state - to explain the phenomenon, the latter looks to within Catalan society to explain why, when and how Catalan nationalism emerged and developed as it did. Here I will briefly present de Riquer’s most recent work, a series of essays published over various years, while Fradera’s account will form the basis of the final part of the chapter.

At a general level, de Riquer presents an explicitly modernist understanding of nationalism, and claims that the latter only emerges within the context of the liberal state, which in the case of Spain is dated to the 19th century, although it was the very “crisis of the penetration of the liberal state in Spain in the 19th century, which finally showed itself incapable of efficiently nationalising the Spaniards” (de Riquer, 2001: 19). The author explicitly rejects the thesis that nationalism in Catalonia and in the Basque Country only really gathered strength after the collapse of the remains of the Spanish empire in 1898, somehow taking advantage of and deepening the consequent crisis of the Spanish nation and state. Rather, for de Riquer, Catalan nationalism is the “logical outcome of a previous crisis that was caused by the uncomfortable situation in which many Catalans found themselves in relation to the state and nation that the most conservative liberals sought to impose during the 19th century” (de Riquer, 2001: 19). Such an uncomfortable situation can be ascribed to the content and form of the twin project of state and nation building in Spain in the 19th century.

In terms of the territorial articulation of the Spanish state, from the 1830’s onwards, the French unitarian, hierarchical model was chosen and put into practice by the introduction of the provinces (similar to the French departments) replacing the historic regional territorial divisions. Catalonia, for example, was divided up into four provinces: Barcelona, Girona, Lleida and Tarragona. However, the state was never equipped with the means, nor were political institutions or mechanisms put in place

its markedly anti-democratic nature.
7 For a more general overview of this problematic, beyond its implications for Catalonia, see Álvarez Junco (2001).
8 Government spending in Spain as a percentage of GDP was very much below the average of other European countries, meaning that it was “inactive in sectors as fundamental as public works, education
that were capable of implementing effective centralisation. Thus, the territorial administration of the state was understaffed, never fully professionalised, the victim of party interests and clientalism, and was more often than not subjected to the power of the military governors. This was especially so in Barcelona, where the 19th century was marked by a series of major conflicts that in many ways constituted the birth-pangs of the new bourgeois order, that were ‘resolved’ in the majority of cases by the intervention of the army.

The differences between a state apparatus dominated by the commercial and land-owning classes of Castile, reliant on the military, and the emerging industrial bourgeoisie in Catalonia, was progressively widened by the “officialisation of the essentialist, nostalgic, Catholic and Castilianised discourse of Spanish nationalism” (de Riquer, 2001: 94), which effectively marginalised the still-born “liberal patriotism, that was both civil and democratic” (de Riquer, 2001: 94), and that had timidly emerged in the first third of the 19th century as a reaction to successive French invasions.

Thus, the cultural revival of the Renaixença emerged at first as a “civic/cultural proposal against the triple threat of Carlistism, democratic radicalism and government authoritarianism, leading to the development of a Catalan provincialism, remarkably ambivalent and poorly defined, in which the will to integrate the Catalan homeland within the Spanish political nation can be perceived” (de Riquer, 2001: 86). However, the growing socio-economic and political differences between Catalonia and the rest of the Spanish state, together with the strengthening of the essentialist version of Spanish nationalism, particularly after the Sexenio Democrático (six-years of democracy) between 1868 and 1874, led to the construction of political Catalanism. For de Riquer, unlike Vilar et al. and, as we shall see, Fradera, the political movement was led, not by the industrial bourgeoisie who were still very much reliant on the Spanish and colonial markets, but by the lower and middle classes of a democratic tradition who had nothing to lose and everything to gain with a change of regime.

Consequently, by the time of the disasters in Cuba and the Philippines in 1898, Catalanism, as a political movement based on Catalan ‘national’ difference within the Spanish state was already established, although it was only after this time that it reached political maturity, being taken on board by some sectors of the Barcelona economic and public services in general” (de Riquer, 2001: 44). However, not all sectors were equally affected: the Catholic church, over the period 1850 to 1890 received five times more state funding than did public education, with a similar picture emerging for the law enforcement agencies.
elites, where it became the most important political force before spreading to the rest of Catalonia.

De Riquer’s account has the advantage of avoiding perennialism, which allows him to focus on the structures of the emerging liberal society that would lead to the birth of Catalan nationalism. It is precisely the more liberal structures of Catalan society that, on the one hand differentiate it from the rest of Spain, and, on the other, allow for the construction of a differentiated national identity in Catalonia. However, by concentrating on the structures of liberal society, and above all on the incapacity of the Spanish nation-state to articulate an ‘inclusive’ conception of the nation-state, de Riquer is perhaps unable to analyse the internal conflicts within Catalan society that led to Catalan nationalism and Catalan national identity taking the form that they eventually took. Thus, while he might be able to explain the construction of the Catalan nation contra Spain, he fails to explain why it was that certain sectors from within Catalonia might be attracted to constructing a homogeneous national identity within Catalonia. Nor, of course, is there any attempt to analyse such questions from a territorial approach.

The centrality of language

Having presented some of the most important accounts of the genesis and development of Catalan nationalism in the 19th century, one of the most important features that stands out is the absence of any attempt to incorporate a territorial understanding of nationalism into the respective versions. Consequently, two interrelated questions arise: why this might be so?; and what grounds might exist for constructing a territorial approach to the emergence of Catalan nationalism in the 19th century? Any attempt to answer such questions can only be considered an intellectual minefield, in that none of the scholars mentioned explicitly rejects such an approach, and thus any attempt to answer such a question must inevitably rest on interpretations.

At a general level, in Chapter 2, I have already pointed out the possible reasons why the social sciences in general, and accounts of nationalism in particular have stressed the dimension of time over that of space. Within the more specific context of accounts of Catalan nationalism, reticence to include an explicitly territorial analysis may also be influenced by the ambiguity of the nature of the process of territorial
construction. Firstly, particularly at the early stages of political mobilisation in the name of Catalonia in the 19th and early 20th centuries, no clear definition was made as to the nature of Catalan territory and thus as to the nature and extent of the political demands that could be derived from it with respect to the Spanish state. Thus, Catalonia was variously regarded as a ‘province’, a ‘region’, a ‘nation’ and a ‘nationality’. In many cases the term homeland or ‘pàtria’ was used to describe any one of such interpretations. In addition, the geographical extent of the Catalan homeland enjoys a similarly ambiguous tradition, due to the complex historical process of territorial construction. In pre-national times, from an early date (1137) Catalan territory came under the confederate Crown of Aragon, part of which, Valencia and the Balearic Islands were under direct Catalan political and cultural influence. In the work of Jacint Verdaguer, for example, the predominant vision of the Catalan homeland in the 19th century included this territorial extension, an idea that feeds into what might be considered to be one of the founding texts of Catalan nationalism, Prat de la Riba’s La Nacionalitat Catalana (1978), in which he talks of a ‘Greater Catalonia’, that included all Catalan-speaking lands within the national territory. This idea re-emerged in the 1960’s under the denomination of ‘Països Catalans’, which has played an interesting role in Catalan nationalism ever since (see Chapter 6). Thus it might be argued that the combination of all these factors undermines the importance of territory or reflects the absence of territory’s importance in Catalan nationalism, in that no coherent effort has been made to construct a definite territorial framework within which Catalan nationalism may operate.

Perhaps as a consequence, many contemporary accounts of the origins of Catalan nationalism reflect the importance that the nationalists themselves have traditionally given to the language as the key element in the ‘reawakening’ of the Catalan nation, and in particular to the importance of the cultural revival called the Renaixença. Many accounts of the Renaixença in 19th century Catalonia centre on its role in the ‘recovery’ of the national language, and the process by which it became a modern literary language and thus one of increasing social prestige. The reawakening of the language was fundamental to the reawakening of the Catalan national ‘spirit’ that would lead to consequent political mobilisation in the name of Catalonia. As Balcells notes,

“No-one doubts the role of the Renaixença, that is, of the reappearance of Catalan
as a literary language, in the construction of the environment in which Catalan nationalism was born. Political nations have previously been cultural nations, and Catalonia of the 19th century managed to convert its own language, which continued to be the language of the lower classes, into a modern literary language” (Balcells, 1992: 39).

What becomes clear from such accounts, is the way in which linguistic and cultural ‘rebirth’ is related to that of Catalan society as a whole. This is contrasted with the general ‘decline’ of Catalonia, from the Middle Ages until the end of the 18th century, a period in which Catalonia had effectively lost its independence and had seen the union of the crowns of Aragon and Castile. In the words of Rovira i Virgili, “[w]hile the free Catalonia of the national (sic) era had given to the culture of the world great names in science, and the arts, oppressed Catalonia, which was being turned into a dark province, was almost a desert in the field of l’esprit” (Rovira i Virgili, 1983: 19).

In the literary and cultural terrain, since the union of the crowns, Catalan was no longer the language of the court, while the Decree of the Nueva Planta in 1716 included the general prohibition of Catalan as a public language and the removal of the University of Barcelona to Cervera. The language received a further blow with the introduction in 1825 of a schools system in which the only language taught was Castilian. Thus, a parallel is drawn between the decadence of Catalonia as a political nation and of the decadence of Catalonia as a cultural and linguistic one.

However, by late 18th century, the process of proto-industrialisation led to the emergence of a self-confident bourgeoisie, whose cultural curiosity would lay the foundations for the Renaixença. From the beginnings it was inspired in the Romanticism that had emerged in Europe against the rationality of the Enlightenment-inspired French revolution and the very emergence of industrial society. In this light Romanticism would inspire the Renaixença throughout its cultural and political journey until its transformation at the end of the 19th century. Of great help in diffusing the Romantic ideas of Herder, were Ramon Martí d’Eixala and Xavier Llorens i Barba, professors in the ‘restored’ University of Barcelona in 1837 (Pi de Cabanyes, 1984).

In linguistic terms, while journals such as El Europeo (1820-1823) and El Vapor (1833-1836), were inspired in the ideals of Romanticism, for the moment Castilian dominated literary output, as Catalan was thought unfit for cultured expression. This perception was first challenged by the publication of Aribau’s La Pàtria in El Vapor, in
which homesick in Madrid, he laments his forced absence from the ‘Catalan homeland’, ‘la pàtria catalana’. However, the construction of a modern literary language in Catalonia was by no means an easy process: “the path, however, that went from the timid and ambiguous beginnings of the Renaixença to the full recovery of the literary language is long and full of contradictions. The very step from the perception of Catalan as a ‘mother tongue’ to one of Catalan as ‘the country’s own language’ takes place slowly”⁹ (Prats, 1997: 13). That it took place at all was in part due to the efforts of Joaquim Rubió i Ors, whose work, written often under the pseudonym of Lo Gaïter del Llobregat, the Piper of the Llobregat, was in Catalan as he attempted to promote his idea of Catalan literary independence from Castilian and Spain, based on his firm belief that the Catalan language could become one of ‘high culture’ and of prestige (Pi de Cabanyes, 1984: 33). But the context was still unfavourable: fellow Renaixença writer, Pau Piferrer would still scoff at his attempts in Catalan, while the first literary competition sponsored by the Acadèmia de Bones Lletres (the Academy of Arts), declared that “both Castilian and the provincial language [i.e. Catalan] [could] be used” (Pi de Cabanyes, 1984: 63). Despite Rubió i Ors’ desperation at the hurdles to be faced in the process of the construction of Catalan as a modern literary language of social prestige, “in the fifteen years between 1843 and 1858 a group of young romantics, Marian Aguiló, Antoni de Bofarull, Victor Balaguer, joined the task of [literary] recovery that the Romantic generation of Rubió, Cortada, Piferrer had begun. Inspired by an enormous enthusiasm, they managed to make reality the institutionalisation of Catalan culture and the consolidation of the literary Renaixença” (Pi de Cabanyes, 1984: 74).

The key moment would come with the founding of the Jocs Florals (Floral Games, a poetry contest) by the Barcelona City Council, whose first president, Milà i Fontanals, had been a key actor in bridging the gap between the two generations mentioned above. True to its Romantic origins, the Jocs Florals would be dominated by medieval themes of knights, damsels and glorious deeds; religion; the mythification of rural life; and, in its beginnings, Spanish patriotism (Fradera, 1992: 158). However, within the Renaixença, there existed particular problems for the construction of a modern literary Catalan, in that while the Romantic-inspired Renaixença, like so many

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⁹ The importance of these words must not be underestimated. As we shall see in Chapter 7, the whole process of contemporary ‘linguistic normalisation’ is premised on the idea of Catalan as Catalonia’s own language.
other literary movements of the time, was dominated by the themes of a glorious medieval past or an idealised rural world the corresponding literary models were either archaic or ‘popular’, none of which was particularly useful for the task at hand. While steps had been taken in this direction, with the contribution of Rubió i Ors being most noteworthy, it is only really with the emergence of Jacint Verdaguer that the gap is truly bridged between high and low culture, and between popular and archaic expression, which finally put Catalan literature on a par with its European counterparts.

“Verdaguer gives back, with his work, the confidence – not dead, but rather unborn – in a language that revealed with an unexpected splendour, all its virtues of expression. Father Cinto\(^{10}\) recovers a tradition and clothes it with the dignity that educated rhetoric demands. Towards the end of the 19\(^{th}\) century, the Catalans rediscover, admiringly, the possibilities of a language that maintains the most authentic sound of spoken Catalan, and that is able to be expressed with the richness, precision and grace that only seemed possible to find in foreign literatures that had experienced the normality of European cultural history” (Prats, 1997: 15-16).

The increasing ‘maturity’ of the Renaixença as a cultural movement, one of whose principle concerns, at least ostensibly, was the recovery of the ‘national’ language, was paralleled by the increasingly important place that the language assumed within the context of wider political mobilisation. A particularly good example of this is the Memorial de Greuges, otherwise known as the ‘Memorial in defence of the moral and material interests of Catalonia’, presented to the king, Alfonso XII in 1885 by leading business, religious, literary and political figures of Catalan society\(^{11}\). While attention was focussed on the specific issues of Catalan civil law and industrial protection, it was framed within a much less earthly, more spiritual context, in which the king is told of

\(^{10}\) ‘Cinto’ is a diminutive of Jacint (Verdaguer).

\(^{11}\) The commission that went to Madrid was presided over by “Marià Maspons, along with Valentí Almirall, Father Jacint Verdaguer, Frederic Soler, playwright Àngel Guimerá, Josep Pella i Forgas, Joan Permanyer, Father Jaume Collell (as we shall see a leading member, along with Verdaguer, of the vigatanisme movement), Benet Malvehí, Joan Antoni Sorribas, Josep Pujol and Ramón Torellò; Josep Ricat, marquis of Santa Isabel, was unable to be present due to illness” (Rovira i Virgili, 1983: 46)
“[a] rebirth that began timidly in the field of literature, finds the limits of the arts and speculative science narrow, aspires to have practical implications, and enters into the politico-social (sic) field. [...] However, as our first literary works, reduced to the modest insertion of Catalan poems in the public papers, have led us to possess poems and dramas that already form part of European literature, thus also our imperfect politico-social outline will perhaps be the forerunner of transcendental works, that are at the level of the jewels of our literature” (quoted in Prats, 1997: 13)

Overall, it is clear that with the *Renaixença*, the Catalan language undoubtedly became a modern literary language of prestige, overcoming the particular problems related to the development of linguistic models and the wider structural problems that had made Castilian the language of public intercourse of the Catalan elites. Thus from the *Renaixença* onwards, language has been increasingly singled out by nationalists as a key element in the definition of the Catalan nation.

**The Symbolic Construction of the Pàtria**

In Chapter 2, I argued that elements of national identity such as language cannot be understood without being ‘grounded’ in the territory over which nationalist claims are made. In this respect, I wish to offer an alternative reading of the *Renaixença*, whereby, beyond the development of Catalan as literary language of prestige, the *Renaixença* plays a key role in the symbolic construction of the Catalan national homeland or *pàtria*, from which consequent political claims are made. Indeed, Marfany (1995), discussing the different theorisation’s of the Catalan nation that emerged in the 19th century, whether racially- or linguistically-based, notes that they “either start from or end up at the land [...] It is land, in the end, that makes the nation” (Marfany, 1995: 202). The Catalan *pàtria* is “‘the piece of land that Nature has placed under the same sky and next to the same sea, that makes its sons speak the same language, that makes them live with the same customs and makes them work with the same energy’. There are Catalans, thus, because there is Catalonia, because there is a Catalan land; not vice-versa” (Bonaventura Riera quoted in Marfany, 1995: 202). Such assertions are entirely
in keeping with the arguments that I have put forward and developed throughout the current exercise, namely that the nation comes to be defined in terms of the national homeland and not vice versa.

The Romantic nature of the *Renaixença*, and the subsequent incorporation of *vigatanisme*, an ideological tendency based around the Bishopric of Vic in central Catalonia, constructed a ruralist, conservative and religious vision of the *pàtria* that was diametrically opposed to the socio-economic realities of industrialisation, urbanisation and capitalist exploitation. While the relatively progressive, federalist proposals of Valentí Almirall can be said to have been inspired in the *Renaixença*, I will focus mainly on conservative nationalism in Catalonia, in that on the one hand it emerged as the hegemonic force, at least in the early years of national mobilisation, while on the other, because such nationalism represented to a large extent the very values that had inspired the *Renaixença*. In this respect, the work of the *vigatans* is paradigmatic, in that they were active both culturally and politically, and thus provide a key link not only between town and country, but also between cultural and political nationalism.

**The Renaixença and the Pàtria**

Following the chronology of accounts of the *Renaixença*, we have already seen how Aribau’s *La Pàtria* takes pride of place as the first example of the poetic potential of Catalan. Ostensibly a poem dedicated to his superior at work, Gaspar Remisa\(^{12}\), on the occasion of his birthday, the poem transcended such noble sentiments and has given rise to myriad interpretations on its structure, content and even quality. Pi de Cabanyes is even capable of offering a Freudian interpretation that identifies “in the first three verses, [...] the complex – the loss of innocence, emotion, mother, language and homeland -, in the last three concern how to overcome the complex” (Pi de Cabanyes, 1984: 23). However, psychoanalytical considerations apart, there is an undoubtedly strong territorial element present. Firstly, the title *‘La Patria’*\(^{13}\), a theme that is a veritable leitmotiv throughout the *Renaixença* period, describes the geographical scale of his lament. Thus, the first verse is dedicated to his bidding “farewell” to the “hills”

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\(^{12}\) Bonaventura-Carles Aribau worked as an accountant in Madrid in the banking and commercial interests of Gaspar de Remisa.

\(^{13}\) *‘La Pàtria’* has also been interpreted as a play on *‘patròn’* (‘Boss’), thus situating the *patròn* in the centre of the eulogy.
and “mountains”, particularly “Old Montseny”, all of which form part of his “homeland”. In the second verse, the streams, so familiar are they, that they “sound like the voice of [his] mother or the cries of his son”. Aribau feels like a “tree [that has] migrated to lands afar/ whose fruits lose their taste and the flowers their smell”. “What worth is it that deceitful luck has brought/ me closer to the towers of Castile,/ if the song of the troubadour goes unheard by my ear/ nor awakes fond memories in my breast?” (Aribau, quoted in Pi de Cabanyes, 1984: 13-14).

Thus, while no doubt the timing of Aribau’s literary efforts were of importance in the development of the Catalan literature, coming as they did at a time when literary output in Catalonia was in Castilian, he nevertheless begins to outline some of the key themes of the Renaixença: love of the pàtria, whose natural beauty is praised and even personified, and the close relation that he establishes between the pàtria and the Catalan language: “Aribau identifies language and pàtria in a symbiosis that the Renaixença would only accentuate. If the pàtria is recovered in the heart, so is its language” (Pi de Cabanyes, 1984: 48).

While Aribau’s writing career would eventually end in ruin, another poet in Catalan, Joaquim Rubió i Ors, similarly dedicated a poem to the pàtria. “If with my simple songs, oh homeland of mine! / sacred land where my unadorned crib/ swayed to the sad sound of her ballads,/ a mother with love/ [...] From the ancient troubadours the silent lyre / I will take from their damp graves,/ and I shall evoke the genius who wanders through the tombstones” (quoted in Pi de Cabanyes, 1984: 58).

As Pi de Cabanyes highlights, “the poem does not limit itself to mystify the past with an incurable nostalgia, but rather, above all, seeks to project the past towards the future” (Pi de Cabanyes, 1984: 58). Such an aim is entirely consistent with the idea that was developed in Chapter 2, whereby nationalism is described as being Janus-faced over time, capable of looking forwards and backwards at once. However, what Pi de Cabanyes fails to mention is the key role that the national homeland plays in allowing such a movement through time to take place; it is the pàtria, Rubió i Ors’ ‘sacred earth’ that allows this and the consequent fusion of geography and history. Given that movement over time and space is personified by recovering songs in the language of the ‘ancient troubadours’, (i.e. Catalan), Rubió i Ors thus manages to establish a triple relation of geography, history and language.

Rubió i Ors’ contemporary, Pau Piferrer, sceptical of the literary possibilities of the Catalan language, nevertheless shares with Rubió i Ors “a strength of feeling for his
native land” (Pi de Cabanyes, 1984: 58), and in this sense they are defined as *Renai xença* writers, not due to their use of the same literary language, but to their vision of the homeland. Thus, Piferrer, declares:

“Oh Catalonia, shady country of dark bushes and thick woods, land of our fathers! What hand of man would suffice to break the filial bond that unites us to you? When old-age takes away from us what we soon learned to love [...] we will not be alone, we will be left with our constant friends: your rivers, your woods, your monuments. If the snow of the years must whiten our hair [...] oh let us be able then [...] to wander silently along the banks of the Llobregat [...] breathe the breeze of the mountains, even though its cold breathe freezes our wrinkled and gaunt face, to place our heads at the foot of the summits Montserrat, although alone and forgotten we might exhale there our last breathe” (quoted in Pi de Cabanyes, 1984: 65-66).

The anonymous ‘A. D.’, who Fradera identifies as Adolf Blanch, a person close to Piferrer, “encourages us to find once more the personality of the country in the contemplation of nature and of the ruins” (Fradera, 1992: 138). Thus:

“Journey, some will say, journey around Catalonia, and you will see the wise distribution that nature made of its gifts in this blessed country, you will find everything here, large rivers, high summits, picturesque valleys, arid plains, health-giving waters, mountains of salt, immense crypts, mountains split by volcanoes and waterfalls split by the mountains. True, very true is the advice [to journey], but without the contemplation of nature that infuses a tranquil pleasure, and is the same in all ages and for all people, there is something more in the country, there is a pleasure that is more alive still, an ardent pleasure that makes the blood boil, forget the future and transports the soul to the past” (quoted in Fradera, 1992: 137).

“Piferrer’s idea of situating the archaeological monument in the landscape could not be expressed with greater clarity. The function of the contemplation of this harmony between nature and history in the formation of patriotic sentiment, neither” (Fradera, 1992: 138). In the case of Piferrer, his own love of the past and of ‘unchanging’
natural beauty is juxtaposed to his rejection of contemporary life, particularly in Catalonia, whose modernity, industrialisation and urban life is rejected. Thus, elsewhere in Recuerdos, Piferrer speaks of the “difficult times that are upon us”, and laments the fact that sailors once “prayed in sight of Montserrat”, whereas now they fail to down oars and “laugh at the old captain, who, with his finger, points out to Montserrat” (quoted in Fradera, 1992: 135).

In turn, fellow literary pioneer, Manuel Milà i Fontanals, who, in 1844, was defending the preservation of the city walls of Barcelona would claim that “the venerable walls that seem to preserve mysterious relations with past generations and distance the spirit from the present sad reality, to transport it to a more ideal and heroic world” (quoted in Fradera, 1992: 140). In 1857, Victor Balaguer, would dedicate a poem to his literary mentor in very similar terms: “Oh! Who Like you/ the woods know you/ you understand the language of the furious torrents/ you understand the songs of the chattering birds/ and for you letters are the voices of the rivers”. The freedom of the countryside is contrasted with the city – “the pantheon of the living”. Thus he advises his friend to “flee”, to “leave the city [of Barcelona] that is no longer that of our grandparents [...] Let us go away to your Cerdanya” (quoted in Fradera, 1992: 138).

Overall, the Renaixença took the form of the mystification of the past, of nature and of the rural life in Catalonia that was felt to embody the very traditional values that industrialisation and urbanisation were destroying. From the 1840’s onwards, writers such as Victor Balaguer, Miguel Milà, Marià Aguiló and Pau Piferrer emerged, whose work “conceives medieval and popular literature, and Romanesque and Gothic Architecture as an escape from the present which could not be controlled and which instilled fear” (Fradera, 1992: 134). The literature of the Renaixença was institutionalised in the Jocs Florals (equivalent to the Welsh Eisteddfod), inaugurated in Barcelona in 1859. In terms of content, “it was works on the home or the Catalan mountains14, based on the primary identification between Catalonia and that of the traditional country life that marked the territorial expansion of the poetry of the Jocs” (Fradera, 1992: 163). Fradera argues that the ‘rediscovery’ of the Catalan language was the indirect result of this search for the safety of the past and of rural life, in that in both contexts it was the Catalan language, or certain forms of it, that was the means of

14 In the original Catalan, the word ‘muntanya’ – ‘mountain’ in the singular, is used, and would found its idiomatic equivalent in the English term ‘countryside’. 

153
communication. The insistence on an idyllic rural life and the ‘bon pagès’,
were not just about the juxtaposition of tradition against the destruction of modernity, but also permitted the 
Renaixença, understood as a proto-nationalist movement, to fuse elements of national identity, such as traditions, language and so forth with the homeland, the Catalan terra. After all, who is closer to the earth than the peasant-farmer?

This was no more evident than the spectacular apparition of Jacint Verdaguer, who in 1865, presented himself at the prize-giving ceremony of the Jocs Florals in country attire, completed with a barretina (a traditional floppy red cap worn by shepherds in Catalonia). Verdaguer, ‘the man of the earth’, ‘l’home de terra’, would do more than anyone else to promote such a vision from within the vigatanism movement. Indeed, “the Renaixença had already reserved a place for the muntanyesos in their symbolic world, with their idealisation of the rural world and bon ‘pagès’, so far from the reality of chronic violence which flooded the interior of the country in the middle of the 19th century” (Fradera, 1992: 166). It is in this context that we can understand the work of the vigatans, such as Verdaguer.

Vigatanisme

A key process in the development of the Renaixença as the hegemonic force in the construction the national culture in Catalonia was the incorporation of vigatanisme. Vigatanisme was an important cultural and intellectual school of thought, inspired by the works of Catholic philosopher Jaume Balmes (1810-1848), and stimulated by the educational institutions sponsored by the Bishopric of Vic in central Catalonia. In terms of its ideological content, vigatanisme was like many other traditionalist, conservative tendencies of the time, in that it extolled the virtues of country life, traditional social hierarchies, including the monarchy, and the centrality of the Catholic Church in all aspects of daily life. Consequently, it was opposed to the Spanish liberal state, though not necessarily to Spain itself, and to the modernisation of Catalan society, especially the processes of industrialisation, urbanisation, and materialism (see, for example, Torras i Bages, 1981).

Its influence was undoubtedly helped by the quality of the work of its most...
prominent writer, Father Jacint Verdaguer, and of Canon Jaume Collell, an activist, writer and editor of the widely-circulated newspaper, La Veu de Montserrat, (the ‘Voice of Montserrat’), that made it possible to reach out beyond the strictly local ambit to all of Catalonia and, most importantly, to Barcelona (Ramisa, 1985). At the time, Vic was widely considered to be the capital of rural Catalonia, la Catalunya muntanyesca, juxtaposed with the urban and coastal Catalonia, whose capital was Barcelona. From this position, undoubtedly helped by the influence of the Catholic church, vigatanisme emerged as the hegemonic traditionalist, ruralist ideology of the second half of the 19th century. While many Renaixença writers had already contributed to the territorial construction of the Catalan nation and national identity, it was the vigatans such as Verdaguer and Collell who played a key role in this process of national territorial construction.

Father Jacint Verdaguer

Of all literary contributions to vigatanisme and the overall territorial construction of the Catalan nation, the work of Jacint Verdaguer stands out. While in many ways, authors from within the Renaixença movement had prepared the groundwork for the fusion of nation and territory, with Verdaguer this process takes on its most eloquent and powerful expression, guided by a strong belief that it is God Himself who creates nations, and He alone is able to bring them down. Indeed, as Fradera points out “[o]nly a superficial reading of Verdaguer’s poetic works is sufficient for one to realise the importance of territory for the rural reality to which it is linked, in the construction of the most authentic characteristics of a people, above and beyond the political frontiers that have been imposed by history” (Fradera 1985: 38).

Thus, in the collection Pàtria (1964), Verdaguer brings together a series of poems with a strong territorial element. Lo Pi de les Tres Branques (the Pine of the Three Branches) talks of how Jaume I, “the Conqueror”, sitting beneath the tree, located in Campollong in the Pyrenean foothills, longs to reconquer the Catalan lands, down to Valencia, and across to Mallorca, from the Moorish invader. The tree to this day still stands and forms an important place of pilgrimage for current nationalists, thus of it.
fulfilling Jaume’s wish: “let us pray that this pine,/ be the sacred tree of the homeland” (Verdaguer, 1964: 412). In Davant d’un Mapa (Before a Map), dedicated to Marià Aguiló, Verdaguer begins by comparing “the queen or our hearts, the beloved Catalonia”, with an “eagle in flight”: the “Cap de Creus forms its enormous beak”, Tortosa “its immense tail”, while “the railways and harbour walls of Barcino”\(^\text{16}\), are its “two strong hands” (Verdaguer, 1964: 445-446). In this respect, the poem may be considered part of the broader nationalist goal of identifying the national homeland with a definite shape.

Of special significance is the poem dedicated to Barcelona in which no mention is made of the factories, the slums, or the proletariat, but rather, once more Verdaguer projects an idealised, mythical Barcelona as the site of innumerable heroic deeds of a whole host of Catalan heroes, dating back to Saint Jordi’s (Saint George) slaying of the dragon. All of this takes place against the background of the beautiful rivers, hills and mountains that surround the city and are present within it. To some extent, Verdaguer drinks from the inspiration of previous Renaixença authors in their compositions of the city, but in Verdaguer’s case, his own takes on special political significance when the Barcelona city council decided to publish 100,000 copies of the poem and distribute them to the schools of the city (Verdaguer, 1964: 457).

In general, the collection of poems, La Pàtria, mixes legend, myth and religion with a strong spatial element, both local and national. In addition to demarcating the limits of national territory and infusing such territory with the history of the Catalan people, Verdaguer establishes a clear hierarchy between individual places and the national homeland as a whole.

Of all Verdaguer’s work, however, it is perhaps his epic Canigó that represents the greatest contribution to the process of the territorial construction of national identity. It was not, however, his first attempt at epic poetry, since several years before Verdaguer had published L’Atlàntida, that versed over the lost city of Atlantis, whose existence and disappearance had taxed the minds of thinkers and writers since at least the times of Plato. In L’Atlàntida Verdaguer’s undoubted literary talent approached maturity, offering the Renaixença a clear demonstration of how to overcome the gap between popular and formal, ancient and modern literary expression in the Catalan

\(^{16}\) Barcino was the original Roman name given to the settlement of what would become Barcelona.
language. However, within the Renaixença movement and beyond, calls began to emerge for an epic poem that would sing the glories of the Catalan people and their homeland. Indeed, “Collell had already suggested the idea to Verdaguer that he write a poem about the Reconquest [against the Moors] in the years in which the latter exhausted himself working on L’Atlàntida” (Torrents, 1995: 283-4). Against this background, Canigó finally emerged in 1886, some six years after Verdaguer set to work on his most ambitious project.

At an overall level, Canigó is a mixture of local legends and myths of the mountain that had formed part of ‘Catalan’ territory until the Treaty of the Pyrenees in 1649 that saw it handed over to France. These tales are skilfully intertwined by the author with the Romantic historical version of the birth of Catalonia and the expulsion of the Moors. The main characters are the result of this mixture: Guifré de Cerdanya, is a Count who wages war against the Moors, and kills his nephew, the mythical Gentil, lover of the equally mythical Flordeneu, due to the latter’s betrayal of the homeland; Gentil’s father, Tallaferro, a warrior like his brother, is joined by the third brother, Oliba, the abbot bishop, who leaves Canigó to found the monastery of Ripoll, which, as we shall see, is of enormous importance in defining the kind of territorial identity of Catalonia that Verdaguer proposes in Canigó.

In Canigó, the territorial construction of Catalan national identity takes place on two levels: on the one hand, the geographical extent of the national homeland or pàtria is identified and its beauty praised, while on the other, a historical interpretation of the pàtria is introduced, based on the role of God and the Church, with the result that mystification of the national homeland gives way to the symbolisation of both history and geography.

Turning, then, to the first process, perhaps the most eloquent statement of the territorial intentions of Canigó is reflected in the dedication at the beginning to “the Catalans of France”, which thus establishes the belonging of Canigó to Catalan territory, as indeed it did for several centuries before being ceded to the French after the Catalan defeat in the War of the Reapers. From their mountain perch, Flordeneu and Gentil, in the fourth book Lo Pireneu, look out over “all the lands that my heart loves” (Verdaguer, 1997: 80). Thus, from the Pyrenean mountains of Minstrels, Puigmal, Noufonts, the Cadí range and Pedraforca, along with the woods, forests, waterfalls and mountain lakes can all be seen. The Pyrenean heights are like “a great tree whose powerful branches/ reaching out from Valencia to Roses, weaving together the hills and
peaks/ on which there hang, like everlasting flowers/ the white hamlets and villages /
and closer to the heavens, the hermitages/ that seem, up on high, to be their steps”
(Verdaguer, 1997: 80). In these lands, appear the towns of Olot, Vic, Girona and La Seu
de Urgell, as do the rivers Ter, Freser and Segre that flow across it. In this sense, the
extension of Catalan territory coincides with the medieval extension conquered by
Jaume I in medieval times, that today coincide with the Paísos Catalans. But Verdaguer
does not stop at merely pointing out such places, but running through this passage, and
many others of the work, are many geographical, geological and botanical references
that give account of the immense natural beauty of the Catalan lands. These references
are skilfully blended with local legends to create a highly mythical, idealised version of
national territory, whose Romantic roots can clearly be traced. In addition, the way in
which the Catalan homeland is said to sweep down from the mountains may be
interpreted as a means of establishing mountainous Catalonia, la Catalunya
muntanyenca, with Vic as its capital, as the spiritual reserve of Catalonia.

However, as important as the Romantic vision of the Catalan homeland might be, Canigó offers a second level of analysis which goes beyond the ‘mere’ recognition of the territorial extension and its natural harmony, to include a religious interpretation of its construction, entirely in keeping with Verdaguer’s own beliefs and those of his fellow vigatans. In this sense, we observe how geography and history are essentially fused, as the Catalan homeland becomes the stage on which the Christian (Re)conquest takes place against the Moorish invaders. Thus “in the second phase, the poem takes on an historic reach. The war of the Count and his family against the invaders would become a war of reconquest, of liberation and consequently of the constitution of a national homeland over a territory” (Torrents, 1995: 250). The expulsion of the Moors in symbolic-historical terms from Catalonia is fused with the mythical expulsion of the spirits from the mountain of Canigó, and thus Catalonia comes into being:

“Glory to the Lord! Now we have our homeland/ how tall it is, how strong its awakening/ behold how it rests on the Pyrenees/ its head in the sky, its feet in the sea/ [...] Oh homeland, victory gives you its wings/ like a sun of gold your star arises/ throw westwards the chariot of your glory/ arise, with God’s impulse, oh Catalonia, onwards/ Onwards, through the mountains, land and sea, do not stop/ the Pyrenees are already too small for your throne/ for being great today, you shall awake/ In the shadow of the cross” (Verdaguer, 1997: 234).
However, had Verdaguer stopped at this point, “Canigó would have remained an epic composition of adventures of war and love of spirits and knights” (Torrents, 1995: 250) in the geographical setting of the Pyrenees and the historical lands conquered by Jaume I in the distant, medieval past. However, as we saw in Chapter 2, while historic claims over a given territory is an important project in nationalist movements, such claims must be ‘stretched’ over time, not only to the present, but also to the future. Thus, Verdaguer converts Canigó into an “allegory of the origins of the Catalan nation projected on to the Renaixença of the Restoration period of the end of the 19th century, of whose literary ideals Verdaguer was the most noteworthy literary representative” (Torrents, 1995: 249).

In this respect, the figure of Oliba takes on capital importance, in that his appearance allows Verdaguer to move the geographical centre of the work to Ripoll, which, in the Romantic-inspired construction of Catalonia, had become the symbol of the origins of Catalonia, since it is here that the remains of the founders of the Catalan dynasty are kept. Thus, Canigó tells of how in atonement for the death of Gentil, Guifré orders the construction of the monastery of St Martí on the mountain of Canigó, whose ruins inspired Verdaguer to begin the epic, and more importantly from the point of view of the narrative, inspire the Count’s brother, Oliba, to construct a monastery at Ripoll. The symbolic importance of the monastery for Verdaguer and his peers was double, in that not only did it represent the resting place of the founding dynasty of Catalonia in Romantic historical versions, but was also the centre of a campaign, led by the Morgades, the Bishop of Vic, to have it recovered from state ownership for the See of Vic, after its destruction in 1835. On regaining the property of the monastery for the Bishopric in 1884, Verdaguer dedicated Book 11 to Morgades, establishing a clear parallel between the foundation of the monastery and of Catalonia nearly a thousand years before, and their reconstruction under Morgades, the Church and God at the end of the 19th century. In turn, Morgades would later recognise Verdaguer’s own contribution to the national reconstruction, crowning him with the laurels of Catalonia’s national poet.

However, true to the life of the turbulent priest, Verdaguer, having fallen foul of the Church and of Morgades, removed the dedication for the second edition of 1901, and added an epilogue, which far from having been written in the intervening years, had, in fact formed the basis of Verdaguer’s first approach to the Canigó, but had been removed when the work took on a different direction in terms of both narrative and
ideology. Whatever the personal reasons involved for the changes to the second edition, such changes might be interpreted as strengthening the relation established between the nation, its homeland and God, in that the eternity of all three are reinforced. Thus, while *Los Dos Campanars (The Two Bell Towers)*, gives an account of how the monasteries of Canigó had long since fallen into ruins, the message in clear: “What one century constructs, another brings it down to the earth/ but the monument of God always remains:/ and the storm, driven snow, hatred and war/ will not bring Canigó to earth/ nor tear down the lofty Pyrenees” (Verdaguer, 1997: 243).

Thus the relation between God, homeland and mountain emerges yet stronger, and thus Catalonia’s past present and future, like the homeland itself, will not depend on the longevity of man-made monuments such Ripoll, but on God and his eternal creations, the mountains. In the words of Prats, “[t]he pàtria - Catalonia, in this case - is an absolute concept in function of which history unfolds and which finds its clearest identification in the solidity of the most elemental geology, not subject like the works of man - history - to changes and destruction” (Prats, 1997: 25).

Overall, Canigó bears witness to a double process, whereby on the one hand both history and territory cease to become merely mystic to become symbolic, while on the other, Verdaguer fuses history and geography in such a way as to present the history of the Catalan nation as the history of the national territory, all of which develop under the protection of God, from whom their own perenniality is derived.

The themes laid out in Canigó, in which they perhaps find their highest literary expression, given the ideological importance of the epic for Catalanism of the time (and perhaps ever since), are similarly expressed in Verdaguer’s poetic works written before, during and after Canigó itself. Of particular importance in this respect are the poems dedicated to the mountain of Montserrat and its monastery, that reinforce the relationship between God, mountain, homeland and eternity.

*Viralolai* was composed in the context of the millennium celebrations of Montserrat (see below), in which the poem became a key instrument in the popularisation of Montserrat as a national symbol. The poem’s opening and closing chorus makes clear the role that the sacred site had for the Catalan land: “Rose of April, *Morena* of the mountains,/ star of Montserrat:/ light up the Catalan land,/ guide us to heaven”. The final verse, and one that has produced the widest echo, declares, “With your name our history begins/ and Montserrat is our Sinai:/ being for all the steps of
glory/ these rocky slopes covered with rosemary” (Verdaguer, 1966: 111-112).
Elsewhere, in *A Montserrat, Himne del Milenari* (To Montserrat, Hymn to the
Millennium), the opening chorus exhorts: “let us go up, sons of Mary/ let us go up to
Montserrat,/ a thousand years ago that it came out/ the Sun of the principality”

Throughout the poems dedicated to Montserrat, Verdaguer constructs a
symbolic, spiritual vision of the homeland, created and guarded over by the ‘Mother of
God’. However, the significance of Verdaguer’s poems can only be understood if we
analyse the wider context in which the mountain of Montserrat, its monastery and its
‘brown’ virgin, *la Moreneta*17 came to the centre of Catalan national geography. In
order to do so, going beyond Verdaguer’s own work, we must analyse the work of
Jaume Collell, another key member of *vigatanisme*.

*Canon Jaume Collell*

Collell, a *vigatà* priest like Verdaguer, is an interesting and important figure for
the current exercise, in that he provides a crucial link between the latter’s literary
activity and the ‘real’ world, due to his more active role in the definition of *vigatanisme*,
particularly through the pages of the newspaper, *La Veu de Montserrat*.

As a young man, Collell would soon be deeply influenced by the Romantic
*Renaixença*; indeed, in 1868, Collell “temporarily suspended his ecclesiastical career
and decided to study Philosophy and Arts at the University of Barcelona, where he met
the ‘wise masters’ Milà i Fontanals, Duran i Bas and Marià Aguiló, in addition to Mañé
i Flaquer, the editor of the conservative *Diario de Barcelona*” (Ramisa, 1985: 65). Thus
it is no surprise to see in his early writings a strong sense of shared values with the
Romantic *Renaixença*: “Instead of countryside, there come steam chimneys, and you
will find that, without holidays, without having to go to mass, and other devotions that
take up so many hours, industry would work a great deal more and business would be
done!” (Collell, quoted in Fradera, 1985: 37).

Elsewhere, Collell once more displays his preference for the location of the
Catalan national identity:

17 ‘La Morena’ refers to the ‘Brown Virgin of Montserrat’, a wooden sculpture representing the Virgin.
“Now, gentlemen, search for the national soul of Catalonia, search for it in the great cities and in the industrial towns that are more invalidated than rural towns and villages by the uniform effects of cosmopolitanism; and you shall find it made ugly, deformed, impossible to recognise, shouting in the bull rings, dirtying itself in the casinos and clubs, and in the singing cafés laughing like a shameless prostitute. Leaving for the countryside in search of the rural villages, now perverted by the propaganda of dissolute ideas, turned sceptical by the bad examples of corrupting politics and an immoral administration, and left for dead by the brutalities of caciquisme; you shall find the national soul agonising, asleep and moribund” (quoted in Fradera, 1985: 33).

However, it was during the millennium celebrations of Montserrat in 1880 that Collell would play a most important role in the definition of the precise location of the religious and national shrines of the Catalan homeland, something that he would repeat several years later when the Bishop of Vic, Morgades put him in charge of the restoration of the monastery of Ripoll. Like the history and the fate of the latter, Montserrat’s would be intimately linked with those of Catalonia itself. Thus, the origins of Montserrat as a religious site were tied in with the founding myths of Catalonia, such as Oliba and Guifré el Pelós, the Count of Barcelona, who donated the property of the majority of the mountain to the church, after the rout of the Moors from the mountain (Castellar-Gassol, 2001). From such beginnings, the historian and monk of Montserrat, Celrià Baraut comments how

“in the year 1493, the pope, Alexander VI, in response to the petition of King Ferdinand II of Catalonia-Aragon, annexed the monastery to the congregation of San Benito de Valladolid (Castile), separating it from the congregation of Tarragona (Catalonia), to which it had belonged since the 13th century. This period, which lasted until 1835, was characterised by a situation of permanent conflict, motivated by the external, politically-inspired intervention in the life of the monastery and the difficult co-habitation between monks of the crown of Castile and those of the crown of Catalonia-Aragon” (Baraut quoted in Castellar-
Similarly, the 19th century witnessed a parallel fate for both Montserrat and Catalonia itself. Thus, both suffered great material and moral damage at the hands of the invading French army, as they did with the ‘popular’ riots of 1835, in which Montserrat, like the monastery of Ripoll, suffered further, almost definitive damage. Finally, in the same year, “monastic life was completely suppressed in the Spanish state and civil law, even after the Concordat of 1851 between Isabel II and the Holy See, opposed its re-establishment” (Massot i Muntaner, 1979: 10). It was the activity of Father Miquel Muntades, who against all odds, would re-establish monastic life with the tacit consent of Isabel II, which would pave the way for its subsequent complete integration into the complex network of religious and national symbolism that vigatans such as Collell and Verdaguer were developing.

In 1879, Verdaguer, Collell and Sardà i Salvany, a priest from the more fundamentalist wing of the Catalan church, met with abbot Muntadas “to prepare the millennium celebrations, the commemoration of the supposed millennium of the miraculous finding of the Mother of God” (Massot i Muntaner, 1979: 34). Such attempts were not merely a spontaneous act of good will of the priests involved, but rather can be interpreted as part of a longer-term project to convert Montserrat into “the most complete symbolic representation of Catholic Catalanism” (Fradera, 1985: 40).

In this respect, ten years before, Collell had already given notice of the importance of Montserrat for Catholic Catalanism when he presented his poem on Montserrat at the Jocs Florals. Thus, like so often in Verdaguer, Collell declares how, from Montserrat, he is able to see “the Urgell”, “Segarra”, “the fields of Tarragona”, “the mountains of the Pyrenees” and “Montseny”, and even “Barcelona”. In another verse, he seems to reply to Pferrer’s lament over the sailors who no longer paid their respects to the Virgin of Montserrat as they passed by: “And the good farmer who returns to his farmhouse in the evening/ and the sailor when dawn shows him the immense sea/ out of love for their land, take off their berratines/ and to the ‘Morena’ they send their greetings” (quoted in Fradera, 1985: 41).

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18 For good measure, Castellar-Gassol adds that “of the 23 abbots that were in charge of Montserrat in the 18th century, only 9 were Catalan, a most odd situation. As odd as if the Greek monastery of Mount Athos had been ruled by the Turks, or as if the Polish of Czentochowa had been by the Russians” (Castellar-Gassol, 2001: 110). Stranger still, perhaps is the comparison between two monasteries of the same state and of the same religion, and monasteries of different states, and more importantly, different religions.
In his role as journalist and editor of the *Veu de Montserrat*, he expressed himself in the following terms:

“Montserrat is the heart of Catalonia. The holy faith has made a marvellous temple of it and the love of the homeland has made it a symbol of its greatness. Montserrat is the eternal monument of the Catalan *patrícia*. [...] Montserrat will remain upright for ever, like the giant obelisk where the generations have recorded the legend of Catalonia” (quoted in Massot i Muntaner, 1979: 36)

After the millennium festivities, a year later it was proposed to the Pope, that the Mother of God of Montserrat be given the title of Patron Saint of Catalonia. In this respect, the patronage of the ‘*Moreneta de Montserrat*’ was not sought for the ecclesiastical province of Catalonia, nor for the sum of its four earthly provinces, but rather for the Catalan national homeland itself (Fradera, 1985).

Collell would also organise a homage of Catalan poets to the Virgin to which, among others, Manuel Milà i Fontanals, Joaquim Rubió i Ors, Marià Aguiló i Fuster and, of course, Jacint Verdaguer were all invited. “These multitudinous festivities contributed to increase the devotion of the Catalans to the *Moreneta*, and to strengthen the symbiosis between Montserrat and the spirit of Catalonia” (Massot i Muntaner, 1979: 80). Such was the place that Montserrat began to occupy in the religious geography of Catalanism that by the early 20th century, for the Bishop of Vic, Torras i Bages, “Montserrat had become the parish of all the Catalan people” (Massot i Muntaner, 1979: 80). Indeed, Torres i Bages’ famous phrase ‘Catalonia will be Christian, or it will not be’ is engraved on the facade of the monastery. The spirit of Torras i Bages may be seen in the announcement of the Celebration of the *Pàtria*, which declared:

“Catalonia, called by the worthy Catholic Youth of Barcelona, has just solemnly celebrated in the ancient monastery of Ripoll, culture of our nationality, the festival of the Faith; there, they have sung with all their might and enthusiasm of the faith in that cross that was the foundation of their civilisation and as such of their patriotic social demands; and Catalonia, called also by the same worthy Catholic Youth, prepares to celebrate on the 14th of September in this our Monastery of Montserrat the festival of the *Pàtria*, remembering that if it was
great and powerful, and that if it preserves still a civilisation worthy of the peoples that make it up, it is because it is Christian, it is because of the love of the Holy Cross [...] In no other place could Catalonia sing of the glories of the Pàtria, glories owed to the Cross of Christ, in no other place, outside Ripoll, but in the holy mountain, in the heart of our land, here where our beloved Patron has her throne” (Revista Montserratina VII, 1913: 65, quoted in Massot i Muntaner, 1979: 86).

Through the work of people such as Canon Collell, the monastery of Montserrat is not only physically restored but also comes to symbolise the spiritual centre of Catalonia. Significantly, over time Montserrat’s status as the heart of the Catalan homeland has become increasingly unrivalled, in part due to its role in the opposition to the Franco regime. In 1947, on the pretext of celebrating the ‘Crowning of the Mother of God’, with the help of the abbot, Aureli M. Escarré, an attempt was made at reconciling the two sides of the Civil War and “very timidly, to try to recover some of the most basic and innocent symbols of Catalaness, such as the permission to publicise religious acts in the Catalan language” (Castellar-Gassol, 2001: 113). Indeed, things went further, as in the presence of 75,000 people (a good number of Francoist spies among them), a giant senyera, or Catalan flag was unfurled from the monastery.

Several years later, in 1963, the same abbot, Escarré was forced into exile when he denounced the Franco regime to Le Monde, for its lack of adhesion to basic Christian principles, such as forgiveness, and for the suppression of Catalan national rights. The abbey would also play a key role in maintaining the Catalan language, given that it became one of the few, if not the only centre where publications were permitted in Catalan. Thus it is of little surprise that as the anti-Franco movement gathered strength in Catalonia, based on demands for individual and national freedoms, Montserrat should play host to meetings of activists, with one such meeting ending in a police siege (Castellar-Gassol, 2001: 114). Having been married there by abbot Escarré (Wirth, 1981), Jordi Pujol, along with other leading lights of the pro-Catalan movement would found Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya, one half of the CiU coalition, at the monastery in 1974 (see Chapter 7).
The Political Significance of the *Renaixença* and *Vigatanisme*

The above analysis has sought to analyse the *Renaixença*, and in particular the contribution made by *vigatanisme* to it, not so much in terms of how the Catalan language emerges as literary language of prestige, adapted to the requirements of modern society, but rather from the point of view of the symbolic production of national territory. On the one hand, elements of national territory such as the language are linked very closely to the *pàtria* itself, to the point of becoming Catalonia’s ‘own’ language, while on the other, the vision of the national homeland that the *vigatans* do so much to promote, is clearly rooted in rural Catalonia, whose traditional conservatism was felt to make it the spiritual heartland of the nation. As part of the same process, I have argued that religious sites, such as the monastery of Ripoll, and above all that of Montserrat, perched on God’s mountain, symbolise both continuity over time, and the intrinsically religious character of the homeland and thus of the Catalan nation itself.

However, if the *Renaixença* in general and *vigatanisme* in particular are to be interpreted in this light, an attempt must be made to demonstrate the relationship between what might be considered to be a cultural phenomenon and subsequent nationalist political mobilisation. At a substantive level, Fradera is in no doubt when he states that:

“A vision of Catalonia, impregnated with rural values and with the notion of community tied to a territory and a specific physical environment: this has been the most substantial contribution of *vigatanisme* to the complex of formulations, and key ideas, that formed part of the ideological heritage of Catalan Conservatism and that would deeply mark its evolution up until today” (Fradera, 1985: 37).

More specifically, Ramisa charts the increasingly close contacts between the *vigatans* and the emerging nationalist movement in Barcelona:

“the *vigatans* came into contact with the political organisations of Barcelona – the Centre Escolar Catalanista, Lliga de Catalunya, Unió Catalanista and, even, Almirall’s Centre Català - from their very beginning. In addition they would participate in their actions: the Memorial de Greuges, the campaign against the
‘uniformist’ Civil Code and the assemblies of the Unió Catalanista. The relation is sufficiently close to make the most conspicuous representative of vigatanisme, Collell, to decide to abandon the city of Vic, as Narcis Verdaguer had done before him, to found together La Veu de Catalunya in Barcelona” (Ramisa, 1985: 168-169).

However, if the case is to be made that the political significance of vigatanisme rests on its ability to offer a specific interpretation of the Catalan national homeland, “impregnated with rural values and with the notion of community tied to a territory and a specific physical environment” (Fradera, 1985: 37), then the question arises as to why would a basically urban, industrial bourgeoisie seek to mobilise politically around a basically rural, traditional vision of Catalonia?

This is precisely the question that Josep-Maria Fradera addresses in his account La Cultura Nacional en una Societat Dividida (1992)19, which, together with his interpretation of vigatanisme (1985), in many ways provide key answers to such questions. In this respect, he offers an account of the genesis of Catalan nationalism in the 19th century that focuses almost entirely on the internal factors that led to the emergence of Catalan nationalism. For Fradera, it is the endemic conflictive nature of Catalan society and the social and political weakness of the industrial bourgeoisie that is behind the construction of what he calls the ‘national culture’ in Catalonia. While not explicitly territorial in his approach, Fradera nevertheless introduces important elements that, I will argue, can be used to construct precisely such an interpretation.

In many respects, Fradera is a clear exception to the rule of empiricism and theoretical autarchy, in that not only does he engage at both a theoretical and empirical level with important theories of nationalism, such as those of Hobsbawm, Hroch, Gellner and Benedict Anderson, but he also theorises on the nature of the relation between culture and politics, inspired in Raymond Williams’ Cultural Studies approach. Thus, he is able to present a most convincing case for the bourgeois nature of Catalan nationalism; for the relation between cultural and political nationalism; and for why the emerging ‘national’ culture of the Renaixença was not a mirror image of liberal-bourgeois values, without questioning his main thesis on the bourgeois nature of Catalan nationalism.

19 This work has been described as “one of the most innovative, documented and provocative
Fradera’s starting premise is that nationalism emerges in the context of modern political institutions, which in turn can only be understood within the process of industrialisation and the emergence of bourgeois society. For Fradera, nationalism must be analysed within the context of the substitution of the traditional structures of domination with those of the industrial bourgeoisie. Thus the construction of a national culture, which at least nominally seeks to integrate all social classes, as occurred in Catalonia in the 19th century, emerges as a means of hierarchically integrating the lower classes into the national community and thus formalises and legitimises the structures of bourgeois dominance. From this theoretical starting point, Fradera insists on the need to focus on the role of the bourgeoisie in the construction of the national culture, and explicitly rejects that it was somehow the result of a long popular tradition as authors such as Termes and Cucurull have maintained, and thus states that “the idea of nationalism in the 19th century, and within it the hypothetical popular patriotism, is not, strictly speaking, a question of continuity and tradition, [with] the point of discontinuity having been the establishment of liberal politics and the public sphere” (Fradera, 1992: 17). As such, we must avoid the temptation of opposing an artificial, manufactured Catalanism of the bourgeoisie and the ‘real’ patriotism of the popular urban and rural classes, who somehow unconsciously embody the Volkgeist (Fradera, 1992: 13). Of course, he does admit that in 19th-century Catalonia, labourers, craftsmen, farm workers, small holders and so forth all spoke some form of Catalan, and were Catalan by birth, but unlike Termes, seriously doubts whether this ‘objective’ fact explains their potential political mobilisation. In this respect, Fradera uses Hobsbawm’s idea that the popular classes were the bearers of an ‘ethnic stock’ which was used and manipulated by the bourgeoisie in the construction of national identity. However, he does warn against going too far in this direction, since it “suffers from a notable underestimation of the complicated dialectic between the upper and the lower classes in the formation of the structures of nationalism, of structures which, unlike other social realities, are, by definition, the expression of class domination at the same time as being important means of class integration (Fradera, 1992: 14). It is precisely this complex dialectic which allows Fradera to address the apparent paradox of “why is it a powerful ruling class in the mid 19th century [...] particularly in economic terms, demonstrated political and cultural attitudes so far removed from those of the bourgeois conquerant” (Fradera,
The answer to the paradox, according to Fradera, revolves around the “complex combination of industrialism and anti-industrialism in function of the twin necessity of the industrial bourgeoisie to develop, on the one hand the structure of industrial capitalism, and on the other to secure the necessary social stability during an epoch of such evident upheaval in Catalan society” (Fradera, 1992: 10). But such necessities must be set against the context of the delicate foundations of bourgeois power in Catalonia. The reforms of the liberal state in Spain, together with the associated processes of industrialisation and urbanisation within Catalonia, had opened up serious conflicts with several sectors of society: the rural population, the industrial proletariat and conservative sectors of urban society such as the clerical hierarchy. At the same time, the Catalan bourgeoisie was unable to rely on a supportive, powerful, modernised state to ensure relatively peaceful management of such conflicts, since, as we have already seen in the account of Borja de Riquer, on the one hand, the Spanish state was dominated by land-owning and commercial interests, unsympathetic to the problems of an emerging industrial society, and on the other, the inherent weaknesses of the state apparatus meant that the use of force was often the only way in which the state would intervene in the management of class conflicts.

In this light, the construction of a national culture that emerges with the Renaixença a literary movement which in many accounts is attributed to the (re)awakening of a distinctly Catalan literature that would lead from what was considered to be an incipient cultural nationalism to a political one. For Fradera, the Renaixença represents a means of “securing internal order by opening up a means of assimilation for the urban artisan class and the rural world, the ally par excellence of the industrial bourgeoisie against the urban masses” (Fradera, 1985: 24). Thus, while in economic terms, we may speak of a liberal bourgeoisie, paradoxically in social terms, stress had to be placed on the values of tradition and conservatism. In this light, the Renaixença was of such importance to the construction of national identity in Catalan that it took the form of the mystification of the past and of the rural life that was felt to embody the very traditional values that industrialisation and urbanisation were destroying. A key process in the development of the Renaixença as the hegemonic force in the construction of the ‘national culture’ in Catalonia was the incorporation of vigatanisme.

Overall, Fradera’s analysis of the construction of national culture in Catalonia
offers a series of theoretically-informed answers to the key questions as to why and how Catalan nationalism emerged with such force when it did. The basic category of analysis employed is that of social class: the construction of national culture takes place against the background of the alliance between the urban bourgeoisie and key sectors of rural, conservative society, against the threat that working-class revolt represented for the interests of industrial capitalism. While broadly agreeing with such an account, in which a conscious effort is made to theorise the role of culture in the process of nationalist political mobilisation, there is a sense in which the reliance on social class as the basic category of analysis relegates territory and place to a subsidiary role. Such emphasis tends to obviate the territorial threats to the rise of industrial capitalism, and consequently fails to explain why territorial unity, based on a particular vision of the Catalan homeland, became such an important element for Catalan nationalism. In this respect, I wish to situate the *Renaixença* and *vigatanisme* within the context of nationalism’s objective of territorial unification, through the symbolic construction of the national homeland itself, at a time when Catalonia was undergoing a profound change in the geography of economic, political and cultural power.

**The changing geography of 19th-century Catalonia**

In general terms, it was the process of industrialisation that would change the face of Catalonia, in that it would go hand in hand with the process of urbanisation, whereby the rural population from the rest of Catalonia would be ‘sucked in’ to the industrial centres, principally, but not exclusively, Barcelona and the surrounding industrial towns. However, industrialisation and urbanisation can only be fully understood if we take into account changes in agriculture, and in particular of changes in property relations, and consequent increases in overall production and in yields. In the 1830’s, state legislation passed by Mendizabal and later by Madoz (Carr, 1990) had the effect of taking land out of the hands of the church and traditional aristocracy, where it had suffered lack of capital investment and a general lack of productivity, and selling it on to a more capitalist-minded aristocracy, commercial and incipient industrial classes. The introduction of capitalist property relations into agriculture meant that production became increasingly orientated towards the market. Consequently, throughout the 19th century, Catalan agriculture underwent a series of radical changes,
including an increased specialisation (mainly vines for wheat), an increased extensification in terms if hectares under production, and an increase in intensification due to the introduction of new production methods.

While Catalan agriculture underwent a series of profound changes in the 19th century, it was the industrialisation of Catalonia (or certain parts of it) that really changed the face of Catalonia, clearly differentiating it, as de Riquer explains, from the rest of Spain. Indeed, until the end of the century, it was the only industrialised area of Spain until the Basque province of Vizcaya underwent a similar process. While the latter was based on heavy industry such as iron, steel and shipbuilding, in the case of Catalonia the textile industry dominated, especially the cotton sector.

To talk of the cotton industry in Catalonia is almost to talk of industrialisation itself, since if by the mid-19th century Catalan industry represented forty percent of total Spanish industrial output, then cotton represented sixty percent of the Catalan figure. A key turning point in the development of the industry was the decade of the 1840’s, during which time the modernised, mechanised, large-scale production of cotton textile emerged. Building on the proto-industrialisation of the late 18th century, after recovering from series of crises, by the mid-19th century, the cotton industry had undergone full scale industrialisation. While at first dependent on British

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20 Termes declares that “the advances made by Catalan agriculture in the second half of the 19th century were mainly due to the growing of the vines” (Termes, 1999: 99). This was mainly due to the outbreak of phylloxera that had all but destroyed French vines from 1865 onwards, leaving the market open for Catalan products. As Vivens Vives puts it “during the 15 years that the invasion of phylloxera lasted in France, a flood of gold spread through the Catalan countryside of Catalonia (Vicens Vives, 1961: 66). However, the euphoria did not last as, rather predictably, the disease began to cross the Pyrenees in 1879, despite the frequent warnings against such an eventuality. “By 1895 Catalan vines had been totally ruined: phylloxera had destroyed 116,000 hectares of vines in the province of Barcelona, 119 in Lleida, 111,000 in Tarragona and 39,000 in Girona. [...] The losses must not be considered as a crisis, but rather as a veritable catastrophe” (Termes, 1999: 100). From the early 1890’s, relatively successful attempts were made to replant vines, although, following the French replanting process, American roots were used, to which European species were grafted on. However, the new vines required more attention and were less productive, making vine-growing less attractive to farmers, and even less if one takes into account the drop of prices. To this we must add the generalised loss of confidence in vines, perhaps as a result of an over-reaction to the euphoria of the pre-phylloxera era, and thus led to a reduction of production and of the number of hectares given over to vines, which in turn led to the depopulation of certain vine-intensive areas such as the Penedès and the Priorat, with the latter losing a quarter of its population by 1890 (Vicens Vives, 1961: 67).

21 Attempts at industrial diversification into heavy industry were made in Catalonia, but were ultimately undermined by the absence of such key raw materials such as iron ore and coal (Carr, 1990; Termes, 1999).

22 In the 1770’s, “cotton production absorbed surplus labour from the hinterland, leading to a shortage of domestic servants and farm labourers” (Carr, 1990: 31), while two decades later, Catalonia had the largest concentration of dyers and weavers outside Lancashire (Carr, 1990: 30-31).
coal, by the 1870’s Catalan textile industrialists increasingly turned to water power, first direct (i.e. hydraulic), and then to indirect power of hydroelectricity. With such changes, the geography of the cotton industry also changed, with production increasingly taking place next to the rivers of the interior to take advantage of water power. “In 1861, at the end of the steam age, in the districts of the coast and the Vallès (the valley area inland from Barcelona), some 53.2% of all spinning and 67.4% of all weaving took place; by 1932, after 70 years of the dominance of the turbine (first hydraulic and then hydroelectric), the percentages were down to 26.2% (half) and 44.4% (two thirds)” (Termes, 1999: 112), while the river basins of the Ter and Llobregat doubled their production.

While the wool industry in absolute terms was unable to compete with the sheer size of the cotton industry, its rise in relative terms in the second half of the 19th century was perhaps even more spectacular than that of cotton. The progress made was largely based on the application of steam power that would lead to the concentration of activity in large factories in the province of Barcelona, and in particular in the towns of Sabadell and Terrassa. Such a shift took place at the expense of the semi-domestic wool industry that had been established not only in the smaller towns and rural areas of Catalonia, but also in the whole of Spain. Before the process of mechanisation began in earnest, in 1856, when two thirds of spinning and almost all of weaving was manual, 36% of spinning and 28% of weaving of the total for the whole of Spain, were located in the province of Barcelona. By 1900, when almost all spinning and over half of weaving was mechanical, these figures had jumped to 53.4% and 47.4% respectively (Termes, 1999: 116). At the same time, a similar tendency of concentration occurred in the case of Sabadell and Terrassa, where the majority of the Catalan wool industry came to be concentrated, taking advantage of the excellent conditions for wool production, such as the availability of water, proximity to the port of Barcelona from which coal could be easily transported, a business-minded bourgeoisie, and access to an ‘overpopulated’ rural hinterland that would provide cheap labour.

Over the 19th century the Catalan population continued the trend of growth that had begun in the two previous centuries. This growth rate, well above the average for Spain as a whole, meant that between 1797 and 1900, the Catalan population went from
7.8% of the total for Spain to 10.6%. In terms of the geographical distribution of the population, the increase was generalised, with no district losing population over the period. However, the overall picture that emerges is one of a high density of the population along the coastal strip, particularly in and around Barcelona, and of the area immediately behind the coast, with the density gradually decreasing as one goes inland towards the mountains.

Within this scenario, perhaps the most important trend, not surprising in the context of industrialisation, is that of urbanisation, and in particular the increasing dominance of Barcelona and its surrounding towns that would be incorporated into the city in the second half of the 19th century. Over this time period, the population of the city quintupled, and it went from representing 10% of the Catalan population in 1787, to over 25% in 1900, with the trend becoming even more accentuated to the point where today approximately half the population of Catalonia lives in and around Barcelona. However, the process of urbanisation was by no means restricted to Barcelona and its surroundings. Fontana (1998: 371) notes that other towns and cities of over 10,000 inhabitants, spread throughout Catalonia actually grew at a faster rate than the capital, Barcelona.

Table 5.1 Proportion of the inhabitants of Catalonia living in localities of:

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<th>1787</th>
<th>1877</th>
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<tr>
<td>over 10,000 inhabitants</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>33.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>between 2,000 and 10,000 inhabitants</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>22.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>under 2,000</td>
<td>62.4</td>
<td>43.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>100</td>
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The changes in agricultural production, related to industrialisation and

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23 The causes of this growth, according to Vicens Vives (1961) are a high birth rate in the first half of the century that meant that the population as a whole became younger, followed by a reduction in the birth rate which was more than compensated for by a reduction in the number of deaths in the second half of the 19th century, which lead to a ageing of the population. These figures are perhaps all the more striking if we put them against the background of almost constant conflict and war, disease and emigration (Fontana, 1998). In contrast, the population growth of the twentieth century has been almost exclusively based on immigration from other parts of Spain: in the late 19th century from regions of the former Crown of Aragon, then from Murcia, and finally the majority of immigrants came from the poor rural South, particularly from Andalucia in the central decades of the 20th century.
urbanisation produced a tendency towards territorial integration, with the city Barcelona occupying a primordial place. Such integration was reflected by “the famous Catalan industrial corridors [that] emerged; powerful arteries of economic traffic in Catalonia, whose heart was the port of Barcelona” (Vivens Vives, 1961: 97). For Fontana, the period “came to mean the consolidation of the internal market, due to the development of an internal network that connected Barcelona with towns and cities of between ten and thirty thousand inhabitants” (Fontana, 1998: 401). These developments had only been possible due to the construction of a road and rail network, that had overcome an appalling communications deficit within Catalonia for centuries. At the beginning of the 19th century, there were only three official routes controlled (rather than maintained) by the state: Barcelona - Lleida - Madrid; Barcelona - Girona - France; and Barcelona - Tarragona – Valencia (Fontana, 1998). The total absence of state support, wars, and French occupation meant that until the 1840’s the only improvements to roads were made by town councils, such as Manresa, which constructed a road linking the town to the Barcelona - Madrid road, and Vilanova i la Geltru, that did likewise to the Barcelona - Valencia road. However, it was only with the consolidation of the liberal state that political initiatives were taken and financed accordingly, when the four Catalan provincial councils, or Diputacions, put their efforts together to construct a parallel roads network that went to complete the articulation of the Catalan internal market” (Fontana, 1998: 402), with Barcelona and its port at the centre.

A similar story occurred with the railways. Spain’s first railway line was constructed between Barcelona and the coastal textile town of Mataró in 1848, although the lack of state funding meant that any developments would have to come from private initiative and thus be subject to the ups and downs of economic cycles.

Overall, the process of industrialisation can be seen as the major catalyst behind the spectacular changes that occurred in Catalonia throughout the 19th century. By the end of the century, urbanisation and the construction of an integrated market for agricultural and industrial products within Catalonia emerges as a key tendency. The shifting geography of political, economic, social and cultural power that such changes brought with them was by no means uncontested. Indeed, a series of armed conflicts were present throughout the 19th century that threatened the very territorial integrity upon which the internal market was constructed. Thus,

“[t]here were very few places within Europe, in which the conflict between town
and country was as dramatic as they were in Catalonia of the riots and the civil war. Having said this, however, I believe that what really distinguished the Catalan case, in historical terms, was the continuity without solution of the enormous tensions caused by the liberal revolution, with the imposition of new property relations and of new forms of land use and of public goods, and those derived from the large-scale process of industrialisation in a context that was far from favourable” (Fradera, 1992: 118).

The interior of Catalonia, its towns and especially the countryside were dangerous places for the most part of the 19th century, as a series of revolts that in some cases led to full-scale war succeeded in questioning state control over its own territory. In terms of the latter, chronologically we may speak of the War of Discontents (1826-1827), followed by the Carlist wars of 1833-1840, 1846-1849 (also known as the War of the Matiners), and finally that of 1873-1874. All such conflicts were ostensibly fought in the name of absolutism against the new liberal state and the introduction of capitalism that, as we have seen above, change class relations and the geography of power in Catalonia. For a large part of the 19th century, the exercise of state sovereignty over Catalan territory and other areas of Spain, particularly the Basque Country and Navarre, was seriously questioned.

In the first rising, the War of Discontents (1826-7), important towns in the Catalan hinterland such as Manresa, Vic, Cervera, Berga, Valls and Reus had been taken, and the rebels felt so safe that they began to develop a framework for the organisation of the territory that they occupied, that is most of inland Catalonia (Fontana, 1998: 224). This was possible due to an estimated 20,000 to 30,000 men under arms, who were almost all from the same inland areas.

In the following conflict, the first Carlist War, by 1837 in many ways Carlism had reached its golden era in Catalonia, controlling large parts of the western half, where a parallel administration was set up, which included its own postal service, coinage and even a university. The Carlist ‘peace’ was eventually undermined by internal discrepancies between radicals and the more moderates, and after the surrender of Carlist forces in the Basque country in the summer of 1839, the Carlist forces in Catalonia (or what remained of them) negotiated safe passage to France the following summer.

Over thirty years later, Montemolinos’ son, Carlos, Duke of Madrid, prepared
for an armed invasion of the Basque country, that was to fail disastrously, and the movement “was only kept alive as a fighting creed by the raids of undisciplined bands of Catalonia and Aragon” (Carr, 1990: 339). In Catalonia, however, the Carlists maintained their lack of discipline and lack of co-ordination and “gained some striking local successes, but [...] never looked like a national movement, living on the country, holding third-rate towns to ransom, the more territory they occupied, the less popular they became; an erosion of local support kept it at the level of political brigandage” (Carr, 1990: 340). In the end, it would peter out, as the restoration, guided by Cánovas, was able to attract much conservative support, disenchanted with Carlist failure to impose its values militarily or through court politics.

While it would be a simplification to portray the Carlist wars in Catalonia and beyond as a simple town versus country conflicts \(^\text{24}\), in many ways the territorial form that they took – the rural hinterland and certain country towns versus the coast and other industrialising areas - , meant that they had clear territorial consequences. Whilst the ‘factory-burning Carlists’ controlled or threatened large parts of the Catalan hinterland and communications with the rest of Spain, the economic and political power of the industrial bourgeoisie would be seriously undermined. The construction of a symbolic Catalan pàtria might be considered as the means by which the kind of territorial integration that was so lacking, yet so necessary in 19th century Catalonia could be achieved. Indeed, the vigatans

\(^{24}\) While Carr declares that “the deepest current in Carlism [was] the hatred of the country for the town, the mountain for the plain [...] outside the north, Carlism only took root in the backwood, primitive society of the mountains of Aragon and Catalonia” (Carr, 1990: 186), Fontana invites us to go beyond the simple juxtaposition of town and country, in offering an analysis that centres on “a certain rural and urban world in decline against another that has managed to overcome the crisis better and that follows the path of capitalist development” (Fontana, 1998: 225). The latter consisted of the industrial bourgeoisie, who were “most unlikely [...] as a class to have embraced Carlism” (Fontana, 1998: 271), since, “although the liberalism of the Barcelona bourgeoisie was conditioned by the dangers of dogmatic liberal free trade, the Catalan industrial class was resolutely liberal; the alternatives were factory-burning Carlists or the erratic favours of an absolute monarchy (Carr, 1990: 205), in addition to the industrial proletariat who “while not agreeing with the rules of the game that bourgeoisie sought to impose, thought that their own progress went hand in hand with the economic development based on industrialisation” (Fontana, 1998: 271). Many landowners also sided with the liberals, on the basis of the relative benefits of the new property relations that successive liberal governments had introduced, at the expense of peasants and the church. The former, in addition to many peasants and small holders, included several sectors who looked favourably on a return to the old, pre-liberal order, such as part of the clergy, old-fashioned bureaucrats, tradesmen whose skills had been outdated by industry, lawyers, and minor nobility who were unwilling or unable to take advantage of the emerging capitalist order. In some towns of the interior, such as Cervera, Vic, Solsona and Berga “such people might even have been in the majority” (Fontana, 1998: 271).
“incorporate, above all, a notion of territory, as a framework that shapes the community and acts as the latter’s common denominator through the centuries, beyond changing political circumstances. Years later, this vision would become a key instrument in the hands of the ruling classes to integrate the country within a single polity, to give it a unifying and totalising direction. However, when this occurs, *vigatanisme* as such had been absorbed into the framework of wider political traditions” (Fradera: 1985: 38).

In this respect, the trajectory of the *vigatans* is most instructive. In the first part of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century, Balmes had failed to convince large sectors of rural society and indeed the church, to ‘build bridges’ with the emerging liberal, industrialising world, and thus the ‘mountains’ of Catalonia turned to Carlism “with the ideological organisational and financial help of the church” (Fradera, 1985: 28).

The success of *vigatanisme* in terms of its integration into and influence over the development of conservative Catalanism, is reflected in the way in which it emerged at time when Carlism had proved itself incapable of imposing militarily the conservative, traditionalist values on both Catalan and Spanish society. With the modernisation of Catalan society and the growing hegemony of the Barcelona industrial bourgeoisie, “what differentiated *vigatanisme* from other traditionalist ideologies is that it is able to break with Carlism without substantially changing its ideological premises, and thus as it adapted to new circumstances, it became a key ideological tendency that represented important sectors of the population” (Fradera, 1985: 30). Thus *vigatanisme* not only emerges as an expression of a class alliance between rural and urban elites against working-class protest, but also as a means of symbolically uniting Catalonia territorially, in the context of industrialisation, urbanisation and the resistance of many areas of the hinterland to such processes.

**Conclusions**

By way of conclusion, this chapter has sought to offer an alternative interpretation of the cultural *Renaixença* and its relation with the emerging nationalist movement. The *Renaixença*, and within it, *vigatanisme*, do not simply contribute to the
‘recovery’ of Catalan as a language of literary prestige, but rather they make a decisive contribution to the process of national territorial construction. On the one hand, the language comes to be considered the language of the homeland itself, the source of national identity, while, on the other, they provide a conservative traditionalist interpretation of the national homeland, one of whose consequences is that it is precisely the rural hinterland that emerges as the spiritual reserve of the country, the ‘real’ Catalonia, in opposition to urban Catalonia, the industrialisation of which was considered to represent a threat for the true essence of Catalonia. At the same time, the national homeland, the pàtria, takes on a religious significance, recovering its Christian roots from the days of the foundation of Catalonia at the end of the first millennium. As part of this process, sacred sites, particularly the mountain and monastery of Montserrat, become the spiritual and geographic centre of the national homeland under God. In this respect, Catalan nationalism emerges as a means of uniting rural and urban elites, not only against working-class unrest, but also against the territorial threat posed by Carlism. Such an interpretation not only allows us to consider the cultural movements of the Renaixença and vigatanisme as part of the wider national movement, but also as an essential part of the process of the territorial production and reproduction of the nation.
CHAPTER 6
PAST AND PRESENT: THE CONTINUITY OF TERRITORIAL THEMES IN CATALAN NATIONALISM

Introduction

Territory, as I have argued throughout this exercise, is fundamental for all nationalist movements, since at a material level it forms the spatial context for the development of nationalist projects. In order to legitimise nationalist claims over territory, the nation comes to be defined in territorial terms, that is the national homeland. While Chapters 7 and 8 analyse the role that territory plays in contemporary Catalan nationalism, the current chapter focuses on some of the key issues and processes that emerge out of the territorial construction of the Catalan nation in the 19th century. In this respect, we may highlight the way in which the duality between the rural and urban Catalonia that *vigatanisme* does so much to construct, has remained an important issue for Catalan nationalism since that time. Very much related to this issue is that of the territorial division of Catalonia into *comarques* or districts, a traditional territorial division that Catalan nationalists have vindicated against the provinces that the liberal reforms of the Spanish state imposed in the 19th century, and have been considered as a threat to the Catalan *pàtria* ever since. The third debate to be analysed concerns the degree of ambiguity that arises concerning the extent of the Catalan national homeland. As we have seen, 19th-century Catalan nationalism in many ways made claims not only over the Principality itself, but also over other historic territories that Prat de la Riba (1978) called ‘Greater Catalonia’. The debate, which continues to the present day, reflects the centrality of territory for nationalism, in that despite the fact that the territories of what is now called the *Països Catalans* might be said to share linguistic, cultural and historical elements of national identity, the failure to articulate these in terms of a unified national territory has meant that a wider ‘pan-Catalan’ nationalism has failed to capture the imagination of the inhabitants of the territories in question.

Finally, attention will turn to continuing efforts to produce and reproduce the
nation territorially in circumstances that have often proved to be hostile. Outside the relatively brief periods of Catalan political autonomy, principally during the Second Republic, Catalan nationalism has suffered the repression of two dictatorships, that of Primo de Rivera between 1923 and 1930, and that of Franco between 1939 and 1975. In such circumstances, attempts to produce and reproduce the nation territorially have had to rely on often semi-clandestine initiatives from civil society, with two of the most important for the present exercise being the mapping of the nation and the hiking movement

**Town versus Country**

In the previous chapter, we saw how the integration of *vigatanisme* into the Barcelona-based nationalist movement brought with it a social and territorial alliance that was necessary for continued advances of industrial capitalism. The price, if that is the word, was that the construction of the unified national identity would have to incorporate, at least symbolically, the conservative values of the rural hinterland that *vigatanisme* had taken such pains to construct. Thus, while Barcelona had passed from the place of Gothic splendour and the home of the Counts, to one of industrial squalor and proletarian unrest, the geographic centre of the nation would have to shift precisely to this rural hinterland, which became the site of the essence of the Catalan nation. The construction of the duality between rural and urban Catalonia has marked Catalan nationalism ever since.

However, the symbolic construction of the opposition between city and countryside takes place against a background of the increasing material, political and physical disappearance of difference between the two spaces, which would soon allow Marx and Engels to pronounce that “the bourgeoisie has submitted the countryside to the dominance of the city” (Marx and Engels quoted in Nel-lo, 2001: 17). However, given the terms of the symbolic integration of national territory, this duality in an ideological sense became more necessary than ever. Speaking of contemporary geographies, Nel-lo concludes that the culmination of these interrelated processes of dedifferentiation means that “the old duality city – countryside becomes, thus, relegated to the interesting, but difficult-to-measure ambit of the construction of *l’esprit*: the perceptions of landscapes, the lived space or social representation” (Nel-lo, 2001: 22).
In this respect, from the beginning, even within conservative Catalanism, a debate emerged as to the role of urban places, and in particular of Barcelona, within Catalonia. Conservative regionalist, Duran i Bas argued that:

“good sense with its sound base also predicts that Barcelona will find the path to its enlargement. Its inclinations and history are telling the Catalan people that it was born for industry; and good sense says that every industrious country needs a great centre, because without it, the spacious atmosphere which science and artists need for their genesis and development is lacking, and because separated from the sciences and artists a forward-looking industry is impossible to conceive. It [good sense] also indicates that a great centre surrounded by industrial establishments is a great perennial market that multiplies one hundred fold the circulation of products and in which auxiliary capital are supplied in a thousand forms and under a thousand conditions” (Duran i Bas quoted in Nadal, 1987: 107).

In order to achieve such a great centre for the industrial prosperity of Catalonia, Duran i Bas argued that the city walls must come down, and the surrounding towns would have to be absorbed into the new Barcelona. In many ways, Duran i Bas was heir to a tradition within Catalan thought that would go back to Antoni de Capmany, who decades earlier had praised Barcelona and cities in general, not only as the creators of wealth, but also as a source of political rights (see Lluch, Ernest, 1997). However the early Renaixença writers abhorred the ‘new’ city of Barcelona and encouraged all to ‘flee’ to the countryside, the seat of all traditional, everlasting values and a reflection of God’s creation. Thus it is no surprise that Torras i Bages would highlight this and explicitly reject urban life and its associated values such as materialism: “The materialism of the era has created the great centres, where the most noble sentiments, healthy ideas, simple traditions and the necessary restraint all die; and suck the life out of the regions leaving it anaemic. The same great political centres signify materialism” (Torras i Bages, 1981: 106). Instead, basing his arguments on the God-given nature of the region, he argues that the region must be organically based on the municipality and comarca, without which all society is impossible, and that the latter must be drawn up not according to the criteria of the materialism, but according to tradition.

From the 1920’s the industrialisation of Barcelona and the surrounding areas also began to attract migrants from all parts of rural Spain, particularly the South: at
first from Murcia, attracted by the work surrounding the Universal Exhibition of 1929, followed by the mass immigration in the post-war period, principally from Andalucia and Extremadura who arrived to work in the factories of the post-war industrial growth (see Chapter 7). As the city and its ‘industrial belt’ grew, so would the opposition between it and the rest of Catalonia grow in the mind’s eye of many nationalist ideologists. As Grau and Nel-lo point out,

“in any case, the growing asymmetry in the evolution of Barcelona and of Catalonia at the beginning of the 20th century and, above all, the conflictive nature of the industrial city had a powerful influence of the conceptualisation and analysis of theorists of the Catalan territory, of the Catalan nation. The fear of revolutionary subversion lies behind many of these contributions, above all in the key period between the Setmana Tràgica (Tragic Week) of 19091 and the outbreak of the Civil War in 1936. Concepts such as ‘macrocephaly’, imbalance and even ‘duality’2 began to emerge as the leitmotiv of the relation between Barcelona and Catalonia, complemented by an explicit xenophobia that [...] denounced the irresponsibility of the working call masses made up of immigrants from rural Iberia” (Grau and Nel-lo, 1997: 22).

Thus, while the context of the debate had changed, the line of thought that dates back from the Romantic Renaixença would continue to reaffirm the hinterland as the geographic heartland of the Catalan nation.

In what many years after its publication in 1936 would become a ‘classic’, Josep Vandellòs’ Catalunya, Poble Decadent, discusses the reasons for the demographic decadence of Catalonia, and points to the low birth rate of the autochthonous population as the prime cause. On one level, he explores a series of material factors that have influenced the low birth rates, such as the reduction in the number of marriages, the increase in the age of persons entering into marriage, and an overall reduction in the number of births per marriage (Vandellòs, 1985: 104). However, Vandellòs claims that

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1 In a wave of working-class protest in Barcelona, “[f]orty-two convents and churches were damaged: nuns were ‘liberated’ [...] ; corpses were exhumed for signs of torture, and, as in 1936, enthusiasts masqueraded in pillaged vestments” (Carr, 1990: 484).

2 In a subsequent publication, Nel-lo (2001) includes a more systematic use of these terms, in which he amplifies their scope and creates a dialectical relationship: thus, he opposes ‘equilibrium – disequilibrium’, ‘deconcentration – concentration’, ‘integration - duality’, ‘polycephaly – macrocephaly’,
we must look beyond material causes to those of a “moral order, principally the slackening of religious belief, and the increasing selfishness of the current generation” (Vandellòs, 1985: 124), and thus in many ways echoes Torras i Bages’ denouncement of materialism. Again, like the latter, the cause for this is spatial, since

“all the causes that have been analysed are magnified by the undisputedly important fact that is the origin of the demographic decadence of Catalonia. I am referring to the macrocephaly that our country is suffering, to the monstrous head with regards to the body that holds it up. Barcelona is the crucible in which our racial virtues are dissolved, and in which the different Hispanic peoples of the Mediterranean coast are mixed or who are seen as a solution. [...] We cannot deny the evidence, that is that Catalonia is too small for Barcelona [...] If Barcelona had to limit itself to being the capital of the Catalan territory, it would have to undergo an important reduction” (Vandellòs, 1985: 126-127).

Josep Iglésies, a key figure in nationalist geography, maintained a similar line of thought throughout his long academic career, and “used with great conviction and vigour the organicist metaphor of the macrocephaly to denounce the demographic dangers that [...] concentrated growth brought” (Nel-lo, 2001: 71). In 1984, towards the end of his academic life, Iglésies would describe Barcelona as “a giant octopus that permanently stretches out its long tentacles to the surrounding comarques, it strangles them, like the feet of a monstrous spider, and making them its own, it absorbs them” (Iglésies, 1984, quoted in Nel-lo, 2001: 71). Elsewhere, in a posthumous publication, the same author concludes that “Barcelona, let us repeat it, is slipping through our hands. A Catalonia untied from Spain could not retain it [...] it is the price that we must pay for the grandeur and greatness of Barcelona that Barcelona is cut away from out spiritual aspirations” (Iglésies, 1995, quoted in Nel-lo, 2001: 71).

Such sentiments and expressions are found elsewhere in Catalan nationalism, such as Gaziel, who, writing in the 1920s, warned that “[b]eware Catalans! Barcelona is, for all Catalonia, a veritable danger! [...] The city of tentacles, the excessive head of Catalonia, Barcelona, tends fatally to suck almost the Catalan spirituality, leaving the...
rest of our land desolate and barren” (Gaziel, quoted in Nel-lo, 2001: 56). Elsewhere, the title of the publication, Les Viles Espirituals, is explained:

“Barcelona has grown excessively, at the cost of all Catalonia; let us return, thus, to all Catalonia what is left, what is sick and what is deformed in the disproportionate capital. Let us extinguish the great fire. Let us once more light the old fires, harmoniously spread across all the land. Let us return to the primordial fountains: every stream to its bed, every water to its god, each drop to its canteen. If, contrary to the Spenglerian prediction, there is still to be a saviour for our culture, without doubt that the formula must be this one: flee from the city and its tentacles, and take up the healthy return to the spiritual towns” (Gaziel, quoted in Nel-lo, 2001: 62)

Thus, while the excessive ruralism of the Renaixença and of vigatanisme had given way to perhaps a more pragmatic acceptance of the importance of towns, the towns that represented the national essence were the traditional, market towns and cities of the interior, such as Vic, the home of the rural middle classes and their values. Sixty years after the publication of Gaziel’s text, Max Cahner declares himself a follower of such sentiments, favouring the promotion of small and medium-sized towns and cities as a counterweight to Barcelona, that are “in the words of Gaziel, the Weimar of Catalonia” (Cahner, 1986:25). Again, such arguments are based on a territorial vision of Catalonia which situated the essence of the nation outside the metropolitan area of Barcelona.

Overall, the duality between town and country, metropolis and rural town forms a long and wide tradition in Catalan nationalist thought from the 19th century to this very day. Current nationalist politics in Catalonia is very much influenced by this issue as I shall hope to demonstrate in the following chapter. However, before so doing, it would perhaps be erroneous to think that while such ideological positions might be hegemonic within mainstream Catalan nationalism, there has been no intellectual response from nationalists and non-nationalists alike.

To some extent building on previous regional planning initiatives of the Mancomunitat of the four Catalan provinces, in 1932, the Generalitat presented the “Pla de Destrubució en Zones del Territori Català”, written by the architect brothers Nicolau
Maria and Santiago Rubió i Tuduri, which was a regional planning initiative that sought to organise economic, social and cultural activities in zones across Catalonia. In many ways it would overcome the duality of town versus countryside, although at a symbolic level, the premise that the rural hinterland somehow represented the true Catalonia still persisted, reflecting, perhaps, the middle-class fears of an excessive concentration of the working classes in the city and its surrounding area. “For this reason, the idea of ‘limiting Barcelona’ is one of the guiding principles of the plan. ‘It is not Barcelona that interests us, but rather all Catalonia’, a ‘Catalonia seen as an enormous future city’ [...] which means necessarily the limitation of Barcelona and at the same time ‘the mobilisation of the reserves of catalanitat that exist in the country and, in general, outside Barcelona” (Casassas i Simó, 1977b: 216-217). In a similar light, Pau Vila, for example, would also proclaim his adhesion to the idea of Catalonia as a ‘city of cities’:

“The sociologists of the plains, unfamiliar with the reality of the mountains, some time ago embarked on a construction gasetillesca\(^3\) the work of the return to the countryside. It was like wishing that the rivers ran upstream. What must be done is to keep in the mountains those that are still there. In order to do so it is necessary for villages and towns to be reconnected and that through the new communications, modern comforts reach the countryside. All Catalonia should be a city (Pau Vila, quoted in Nel-lo, 2001: 63).

At a material, as opposed to a symbolic level, towards the end of the 20th century the differentiation between urban and rural Catalonia is effectively overcome. Casassas i Simó declares that “[w]e must oppose, since it is contrary to Catalan unity, the vision or idea of the metropolitan area of Barcelona. It must be affirmed that the metropolitan area of Barcelona is the whole of Catalan territory. [...] we must accept, if we wish to follow the course of history, the new tendencies of social life to an urbanised, industrialised Catalonia [...] it is the Catalonia-city, of which Barcelona is a neighbourhood” (Casassas i Simó, 1977b: 45). In a more recent context, Nel-lo writes that “the evolution of the process of urbanisation over recent decades has turned Catalonia into a single urban system, [that is] increasingly integrated” (Nel-lo, 2001: 84).

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\(^{3}\) I.e. in the fashion of Ortega y Gasset
The fact that this symbolic opposition between rural Catalonia and urban Catalonia remains strong, particularly in conservative Catalanism, testifies to the deep-rootedness of the vision of the Catalan homeland that the Renaixença and vigatanisme did so much to develop in the 19th century. How and why contemporary political discourse in Catalonia perpetuates such duality will be one of the questions analysed in the final two chapters.

**Territorial Divisions: the comarques**

“There is no doubt that since the decree of the Nueva Planta, in Catalonia, great efforts have been made in order to obtain two things: the recognition of Catalan national unity, and the right of the Catalans to organise their territory in the way in which they feel most convenient” (Casassas i Simó, 1977a: 16). Such claims take us back to the idea developed in Chapter 2, where I outlined the way in which nationalism is Janus-faced, not only over time, but also over space. In other words, as nationalism seeks to justify its claims over a differentiated national territory, then it seeks to unite such a territory internally. At the same time, internal territorial divisions are aimed at integrating local identities hierarchically within the territorial abstraction of the national territory. Questions of control, integration and so forth must be balanced against the need for local-level identities to maintain their existence within the national hierarchical framework. In this sense, writing in the context of the re-introduction of the comarques in 1987, nationalist politician and intellectual Max Cahner warns that “if each comarca had a small parliament and a president, it would lead to a serious problem for a policy of national reconstruction, because local issues would acquire an excessive political protagonism” (Cahner, 1986: 20-21). In addition, the criteria used to subdivide the national territory will depend in part on the way in which the national territory is conceived, which in turn will depend on the relations of power within society.

Within this context, it is of little surprise that not only did the Renaixença seek to construct, at a symbolic level, a unified homeland, but it was also accompanied by an increasing preoccupation with the way Catalan territory was organised internally (Casassas i Simó, 1977a: 17). One of the major grievances formulated by the emerging nationalist movement concerned the province, the territorial unit imposed by the
centralising, liberal government under Javier de Burgos in 1833, which divided Catalonia into four provinces: Barcelona, Girona, Lleida and Tarragona, that not only ended the existence of Catalonia as an administrative and legal territorial reality, but also meant the end of the traditional territorial unit of the comarca.

The first proposals regarding the ‘comarcalisation’ of Catalonia in the latter half of the 19th century have been described as “asymptotic”, due to their lack of conceptual and terminological precision (Casassas i Simó, 1977a: 16). From the first attempt by Bertrán i Soler, in 1847, which includes, in addition to references to the comarques, “quite a number of territorial units of a feudal character, in addition to physical areas with widely differing surface areas” (Nadal, 1987: 133), over time more ‘systematic’ approaches emerged, increasingly based on environmental or natural factors, such as botanist Antoni Cebrià Costa i Cuixart (Introducción a la Flora de Cataluña, 1864), and even ethnic and psychological ones, such as Josep Pella i Forgas (Historia del Ampurdán, Estudio de la civilización en las comarcas del noroeste de Cataluña, 1883)4.

In addition to such ethnic and geographical criteria, other ‘naturalist’ studies would appear, based, for example, on hydrography and orography, such as Esteve Sunyol, and Aulèstia i Pijoan, who divided up Catalonia, including the part under French ‘administration’, into 31 comarques, based on river basins (Nadal, 1987: 138).

In general, from such early studies, several points can be made: firstly, they are generally made from a ruralist point of view, obviating the urbanisation of the country. This is of little surprise if we also note that the vast majority “participated more or less directly in regionalist politics with traditionalist tendencies” (Nadal, 1987: 145). In addition, most studies were made using a positivist methodology based on observation. This not only ensured that many of such contributions were made by the hiking movement, but also assured a means of opposing the increasing influence of evolutionary theories, perceived as a great threat to conservative and traditionalist thought (Nadal, 1987).

The first political expression of attempts to introduce the comarques as the basic

4 The following quotation gives some idea of the introduction of racial theories that spread across many academic disciplines of late 19th-century Europe: “This leads me to address the intellectual aptitudes that distinguish the Catalans according to comarques. All of them raised men dedicated to different branches of knowledge; but it may be observed that the greatest number of and the most famous idealists, theologists, mystics and poets, had for their cradle the central and primitive districts: Lacetania and Ausetania [...] Neither poetry or abstract philosophy shone in the rest of the comarques of Catalonia; time ago, the skills of observation, typical of young races, produced in the fields of Tarragona, Lérida, Urgel and in the Ampurdán, doctors, chemists, botanists wise in the study of Nature, and historians, reformers
form of internal territorial division in Catalonia (in addition to municipalities), were the *Bases de Manresa* of 1892 or the ‘Bases for a Catalan Regional Constitution’ that reflect the conclusions of the first assembly of the Unió Catalanista. Under the presidency of Domènech i Muntaner, and with Prat de la Riba as secretary, Article 5 established that “the territorial division over which the hierarchic tradition of governmental powers is to be developed will be based on the natural *comarca* and the municipality” (quoted in Carreras i Verdaguer, 1986: 29).

However, such proposals would have to wait until the Second Republic to come into force, and then they were to some degree changed by the more systematic, conceptually clearer contributions to the *comarca* debate, that emerged with the introduction of the French regional school of geography and the “more rational and scientific formulation of political nationalism” (Casassas i Simó, 1977a: 18).

In 1931, the Republic confirmed its desire to maintain the provinces as a means of organising its administration, although the new Catalan Statute of Autonomy did allow for the establishment of a parallel territorial division within Catalonia. In October of 1931, a committee was named, with Pau Vidal i Dinares and Antoni Rovira i Virgili among its key members. Finally, two proposals would come to light: one involving municipalities, 28 ‘demarcations’, and the Generalitat completing the hierarchy; and a second, that included municipalities, 38 *comarques*, 9 *vegueries* or regions, followed by the Generalitat (Lluch and Nel-lo, 1984: XXI). In the end, the latter proposal was presented in 1933, although the plan was not implemented until three years later, when the outbreak of war and the collapse of the central state made it imperative for Catalonia to have a territorial division respected by all political actors, such as political parties, trade unions and other groups, that effectively shared power with the state. In terms of the criteria used for the new division,

“[i]n establishing the new territories, the main considerations were physical relief, the effectiveness of the communications network, and the territorial attraction of

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5 The Unió Catalanista was itself the result of the adhesion to the Lliga de Catalunya of “associations and newspapers from outside Barcelona, [which] facilitated the realisation of the goal […] to bring together in a superior organism the diverse Catalanist entities of our (sic) *comarques*” (Rovira i Virgili, 1983: 56). For a fuller analysis of the *Bases*, see, for example, Pérez Fransech, 1992; and Termes and Colomines, 1992.

6 The remaining members of the committee were: Antoni Bergós i Massó, Pere Blasi i Maranges, Antoni Esteve i Subirana, Manuel Galés i Martínez, Josep Iglésies i Fort, Miquel Santaló i Pavorell, Felip Solé i
each area’s market [...] Popular sentiment had to be respected as much as possible, provided that it did not produce excessive territorial partitioning [...] Due to the work of Vila, the public became sharply aware that the Catalan territory should be politically and administratively restructured with the highest regard for those territorial units with a natural and/or historical character that were the *comarques*” (García-Ramon and Nogué Font, 1994: 204).

**Map 6.1 The 1936 Comarcal Division**


With the occupation of Catalonia completed in February of 1939, the provinces were re-established, the *comarques* abolished, and many members of the committee that eight years before had been charged with the task of drawing them up silenced, exiled or imprisoned. The Generalitat in exile, hopeful that the Allied victory of the Axis powers would mean a similar fate for Franco, set up another committee to research the *comarca* territorial division, under the responsibility of Antoni Rovira i Virgili, the conclusions of which were similar to the *comarques* of 1936, with only minor changes.

Olivé (Lluch and Nel·lo, 1984: XX).
However, such plans for an early re-introduction were soon shelved when it became apparent that Franco’s position would be consolidated by the Cold War struggle against international communism. Overall, “between 1939 and 1959, academic reflection on the territorial division of Catalonia was proscribed and silenced. And if scientific reflection was impeded, what would have happened to demands for a democratic territorial division?” (Lluch and Nel-lo, 1984: XXVII). However, with the help of the French Institute, given the historic links between French regional geography and its Catalan equivalent, two former members of the committee on the comarques, Josep Iglésies i Fort and Pere Blasi i Maranges, both produced new proposals, with the former changing little the design of 1936, while the latter, based more on natural criteria, did differ more extensively (Lluch and Nel-lo, 1984: XXVII).

The progressive opening up of the regime after the 1950’s did lead to renewed interest in the issue of the comarques in Catalonia. Beyond academic fields, maps showing the comarques began to be published (see below), while financial institutions began to publish economic studies based on the comarques out of their desire “to become better informed of the territory in which they operated (or in which they sought to penetrate) or to demonstrate their ties with the comarca” (Lluch and Nel-lo, 1984: XXVIII). In terms of the official, institutional use of the comarca as a meaningful unit of territory, the symbolic, historical importance of the comarca for Catalan nationalism meant that its use by the Franco regime would always be limited, although the concept of the comarca of Barcelona was used in the 1950’s as a metropolitan planning region, while plans were proposed to use the comarques as a territorial administrative district between the municipal and provincial level. While the initiative would go no further than the planning stage, in the four provinces of Catalonia, it is interesting to note that the comarques of 1936 would have served as the basis for such a new territorial division (Lluch and Nel-lo, 1984: XXX).

Throughout the 1960’s, as opposition grew to the regime, in Catalonia “it coincided with the need for a thorough reform of territorial management” (Lluch and Nel-lo, 1984: XLV), which necessarily included a return to the comarques. Thus, the Assemblea de Catalunya, a united, pro-Catalan platform that grouped together many opposition groups to the Franco dictatorship, was organised along comarca lines, as was the newly-formed, but still illegal Unió de Pagesos, the Small Farmers’ Union, “rooted

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7 The bank co-founded by Jordi Pujol, La Banca Catalana, is particularly significant in this respect (López
to the earth by definition” (Lluch and Nel-lo, 1984: XLV). Parallel to, and to some extent taking advantage of the impulse of the Assemblea, the Congrès de Cultura Catalana was founded in 1975, and by 1977 its various committees had laid the foundations for many consequent debates and lines of actions of the emerging democratic Catalonia. Among the issues addressed, was that of ‘Territorial Management’, in which as part of the ‘Preamble’ to the ‘Resolutions’, they seek to “encourage the publication and re-edition of works and studies of our historic heritage such as ‘La Divisió Territorial de Catalunya’ of the Department of Economy of the (Republican) Generalitat” (Congrès de Cultura Catalana, 1977: 379). In the ‘Resolutions’ proper, the first paragraph begins thus: “The particular organisation of space is a cultural fact that must be taken into account; the comarca is our specific form, even though it only had an administrative life in the Principality of Catalonia (sic), and during the short period of 1936-1939” (Congrès de Cultura Catalana, 1977: 383). When talking of possible ‘Solutions’ to ‘Territorial Imbalances’, the document insists on the “need to institutionalise the comarca and, in any case, consider a level above that of the comarca as an intermediate link to the nation (sic) level. In the Principality of Catalonia this step must include the return to functioning of the Territorial Division of the Generalitat of 26th of August, 1936, as a previous step to the resolution that historic problems [...] and present ones [...] make necessary” (Congrès de Cultura Catalana, 1977: 391).

In this context of national vindication of the comarca, Article 5.1 of the Statute of Catalan Autonomy, passed in 1979 and in effect from January, 1980, states that “the Generalitat de Catalunya will structure its territorial organisation in municipalities and comarques”

8 Although like in 1936, the comarques would have to co-habit with the central state territorial division, the province.

Colás and Nadal Tersa, 1996).

The Catalan Statute of Autonomy can be consulted at the website:
http://www.gencat.es/catalunya/estatut2.htm

This contradiction can be seen in Article 2, which states that “the territory of Catalonia as an autonomous community is that of the comarques of the provinces of Barcelona, Girona, Lleida and Tarragona, at the moment in which the present Statute is promulgated”, while Article 5.4, ensured the uneasy cohabitation between comarca and province, central state and Generalitat when it declares “That which is established in the preceding sections will be understood in such a way as to avoid all prejudice for the organisation of the province as a local entity and as a territorial division for the implementation of the activities of the State, in conformity with the provisions of Articles 137 and 141 of the Constitution”.

191
While the newly-elected Generalitat (between 1977 and 1980, the provisional Generalitat had been headed by the previously-exiled Josep Tarredellas) would use the territorial structure of the *comarques* for the planning and provision of certain services such as education and health (Lluch and Nel•lo, 1984: LVII), the continuing existence of the provinces meant that even the Generalitat relied on the provincial structure to organise its own territorial delegations. However, despite the contradictions and evident political, institutional and constitutional problems that the forced cohabitation of the *comarca* and the province meant for Catalonia, from 1977 onwards, a great many studies, proposals, critiques circulated though Catalonia on the issue of the *comarca*, reflecting the importance of the issue for the groups and individuals that had fought against Franco’s regime in the name of Catalonia.

Max Cahner, for example, would write in 1986, the year before the passing of the new law of territorial division that established the *comarques*, that “there is a popular conscience of territorial identities that is the origin of traditional demands for *comarques*” (Cahner, 1986: 19). Consequently, he proposes the abolition of the provinces, the avoidance of any regionalisation within Catalonia, and like so many other conservative nationalists, he talks of the need to counterbalance the political, cultural, economic weight of Barcelona, not by a policy of back-to-roots essentialism, but rather by promoting the role of the small- and medium-sized cities that must “serve Barcelona as the image and point of reference for the objective of cultural and linguistic normalisation and national integration” (Cahner, 1986: 26).

Ostensibly from a very different viewpoint, Tulla (1986) presents a strong criticism for the contemporary vision of the *comarques*, for being too technically defined, and for having to co-exist with the provinces. In addition, he criticises the current lack of debate, and the way in which “reformist nationalism defends the *comarques* due to the electoral possibilities that they give in areas with a small working-class base” (Tulla, 1986: 121). Instead he proposes that the lines be redrawn and that the *comarques* become spaces to overcome territorial imbalances, to facilitate the political mobilisation of the people who live and work there. “Thus, a defence must be made of territorial units with the maximum degree of competencies that favour grass-roots control over municipal and ‘supramunicipal’ entities” (Tulla, 1986: 121).

Perhaps a more ‘revolutionary’ set of proposals, at least in terms of the consequences for territorial management, were those put forward by Lluís Casassas and Joaquim Clusa in 1981, which were “[i]nfluenced by the British local government
reform, especially the Radcliffe-Maud report of 1974, [and] it offers a critical revision of the 1936 division, emphasising the changes in the urban system that have taken place since then” (Carreras i Verdaguer, 1986: 35). Recognising that the ‘reality’ of the comarques affected but a small proportion of the Catalan population, they proposed instead that the country be divided into 127 ‘municipalities’, or large municipalities that would be capable of guaranteeing democratic participation, the continued relevance of the municipal level itself, while simplifying territorial management without opening up a democratic deficit (Casassas i Simó, 1986).

The contributions and proposals outlined briefly here not only reflected an abstract, intellectual debate concerning the comarques, but such a debate also took place within the context of the promise by the Generalitat to introduce a new territorial division, based on the comarques, but in substitution of the provisional, non-institutionalised use of the division of 1936.

There were many arguments in favour of a new division of Catalonia into comarques with respect to 1936, but also, many in favour of maintaining the status quo, an option that broadly speaking would win the day. In terms of the former, the division of 1936 had not been without controversy, added to the fact that, with just three years of active life (in some places less), the plan might have been considered as having little tradition. The second argument against the old division was the undoubted economic and demographic changes that had affected Catalonia over the intervening years and that had accelerated the process of population concentration in urban conurbations, particularly on or near the coast. In this respect, the growth of the city of Barcelona and its surrounding towns and cities called for, in the minds of many, a new solution to the existing Corporació Metropolitana de Barcelona (CMB), set up in 1974, different to a comarcal one (Mir, Solé Vilanova, Virós et al, 1994: 38).

However, the legislation establishing the new division of Catalonia into comarques, Llei 6/1987 of 4th of April 1987 (Diari Oficial de la Generalitat de Catalunya, 1987), would pay scant heed to such arguments, in that instead of making wholesale changes to the existing map, it was very much repeated with only minor changes, with three new comarques added (see Map 6.2). Among other reasons cited is that despite the relatively short life-span if the previous, 1936 plan, “during the Franco era, it had gained important social and cultural support, to the extent that at the beginning of the 1980’s many citizens felt identified with the comarca” (Mir, Solé Vilanova, Virós et al, 1994: 38). In addition, despite the need to rethink the CMB in
terms of its extension, functions and functioning, “the re-establishment of the comarques would be the pretext for the suppression of the CMB\(^{10}\)” (Mir, Solé Vilanova, Virós et al, 1994: 38). The abolition of the CMB took place in the context of a party political confrontation between CiU, whose support base, in general was non-metropolitan, and the that of the Socialist Party, with strong support in Barcelona and its metropolitan area, which also feeds into a confrontation at a more symbolic level over the threat posed by Barcelona to the essence of Catalonia, located in the hinterland\(^{11}\).

**Map 6.2 The 1987 Comarcal Division**

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\(^{10}\) The CMB was replaced by a several comarques, with a series of specialised functional bodies such as the Metropolitan Transport Body, the Metropolitan Water Services Body, taking over the provision of key services (Borja, J, 1991).

\(^{11}\) As Mir, Solé Vilanova et al. comment, “for various reasons, the development of the metropolitan Administration would become extremely polarised, to the extent that it moved to the centre of the political debate on the territorial organisation of Catalonia [...] That debate, particularly on the part of the two main political parties, was profoundly sterile, given that it failed to address the problems of the administration of the metropolitan area of Barcelona and meant that the issue of the comarca was relegated to the background” (Mir, Solé Vilanova, Virós et al, 1994: 29-30).
Since the division into *comarques* of 1987, the debate on the territorial division of Catalonia has not ceased, although in general no great political decisions have been taken on the subject. In April, 2000 the Generalitat set up a commission to reopen the debate, not just on the *comarques*, but also the size of the municipalities, the metropolitan area of Barcelona, and the possible regionalisation of the country. The Commission, led by a former leading member of Pujol’s Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya, Miquel Roca, was presented to the Generalitat in January of 2001 (Roca, 2002), since which time, very little, if all has been mentioned on the subject.

Overall, the debate surrounding the territorial division of Catalonia into *comarques* goes beyond the merely ‘technical’ debate of regional planning. At the heart of the debate, we find premises that are closely related to symbolic constructions of the *pàtria*. On the one hand, the rejection of the provinces in favour of the *comarca* concerns the issue of national control over territory: provinces form a hierarchical chain with the central state located in Madrid, at the top, while the *comarca* establishes a similar relation between Catalonia and Barcelona. On the other hand, the kind of territorial division that Catalan nationalism supported, was rooted in the essentialist past in that the *comarca* was considered a *de facto* natural and historical entity, independent of the existence or not of the *comarca* as an administrative division. This of course continued the tradition of the 19th century vision of the national territory. Consequently, the duality between the rural Catalonia of the *comarques* and Barcelona would be established and perpetuated to the extent that it remains a key part of nationalist discourse in Catalonia.

**The Extent of the National Homeland: *Els Països Catalans***

The limits of the national territory are, of course, a *sine qua non* of any nationalist movement, if it is to establish claims over and control a given territory. Borders may be sited according to historical, cultural or ‘ethnic’, and ‘natural’ criteria such as mountains ranges, rivers and so forth (Herb, 1999: 21). However, in as much as the nation and the national territory are necessarily constructions, however much they might be seen to rely on proto-national foundations, the borders of the national
homeland will also reflect a previous process of construction. Within the same nationalist movement, according to the criteria used to define the nation, different geographical limits might be placed on the national territory. Differing conceptions of the extent of national territory with respect to other nations may ultimately give rise to conflict between nations, such as those conflicts that have accompanied the break up of Yugoslavia over recent decades. Such competing definitions of what constitutes the extent of the homeland of the Catalan people have been present in Catalan nationalism for well over a century, and it is to this that I now wish to turn.

During the 1960’s and 1970’s, as the ‘Catalanist’ opposition to Franco’s regime gathered strength, the issue of what the Catalan patria might be considered to include moved rapidly up the political agenda. ‘Catalanist’ groups on both right and left of the political spectrum increasingly structured their political discourse within the territorial framework of what came to be known as the Països Catalans (the Catalan Countries). Based on a mixture of historical, cultural and linguistic criteria, today the Països Catalans are said to include Andorra, La Catalunya del Nord (the Catalan territories ceded to France by the Treaty of the Pyrenees of 1659, mainly Rosselló or Roussillon), Catalonia ‘proper’ - the Principality -, the País Valencià, and the Balearic Islands, in addition to the Franja de Ponent (the strip of land, currently in Aragon, bordering on Catalonia). Approximately coinciding with the conquests made by the Count of Barcelona, Jaume I, in the 13th century, today they are generally considered to be the Catalan-speaking territories, although today, at least at an institutional level, beyond certain acts of collaboration in cultural and educational fields, political demands for (re)unification of the Països Catalans are mainly limited to more ‘radical’ pro-independence groups. However, during the transition to democracy following the death of Franco, the spectre of federation between the communities making up the Països Catalans was such that the Constitution of 1978 explicitly ruled out the possibility of federation between any of the regions that would be created as a result of the Constitution.

In terms of the origins of the term, Joan Fuster, the Valencian writer and thinker who from the 1960’s onwards has perhaps done more than anyone else to promote debate in the issue, highlights that the first use of the term Països Catalans, or, to be more correct, païses catalanes (i.e. in lower case and in Castilian), can be found in the
writings of Benvingut Oliver’s *Historia del Derecho en Cataluña, Mallorca* y Valencia. *Código de las Costumbres de Tortosa*, published in Madrid in 1876 (Fuster 1978). Within what he called the “Spanish nation”, Oliver highlights the:

“community of habits, customs, legislation and traditions between the inhabitants of the territories known with the ancient names of the Principality of Catalonia and the Kingdoms of Mallorca and Valencia, that still maintain the same language of origin or of birth, to which we designate with the most common and appropriate name, the ‘Catalan language’ [...] This fact, that, if we are not the first to discover, then no-one up until know has proclaimed it, throws unexpected light on our history and on the true character of the peoples that can be said to be of the Catalan language, which in our eyes appear to be part of a whole, as members of a nationality” (Oliver, quoted in Fuster, 1978: 55).

Of course, as Fuster points out, the apparent terminological confusion between ‘nation’ and ‘nationality’ was by no means limited to Oliver, as can be seen from the writings of important figures in the construction of Catalanist doctrine such as Valentí Almirall, Enric Prat de la Riba (Marfany, 1996) and Torras i Bages, to name but three. Indeed, the ambiguity persists today in that the Spanish Constitution of 1978 makes it clear in Article 2 that Spain is a nation of nationalities. Oliver continues: “all those peoples, that as an exterior and indelible sign use the same language to express their sentiments and their ideas, from the Pyrenees to the river Segura, and in the Mediterranean Islands formed and constituted the true nationality” (Oliver, quoted in Fuster, 1978: 55).

Thus, Oliver emerges as one of the first theorists of a territorial Catalan language community, that in many ways was based upon the linguistic revival that the *Renaixença* had promoted, not only in Catalonia, where it was undoubtedly strongest, but also alongside similar cultural ‘reawakenings’ in Valencia and Mallorca. In terms of the former, we have already seen how the work of Verdaguer played a key role in attempting to define not only the ‘meaning’ of the Catalan homeland, but also its

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12 After the conquest by Jaume I, the name given was the ‘Kingdom of Mallorca’. Currently, the name has been changed to the more inclusive ‘Balearic Islands’.
13 Article 2 states that “The Constitution is based on the indissoluble unity of the Spanish nation, common and indivisible homeland of all Spaniards, and recognises and guarantees the right of autonomy for the nationalities and regions that compose it and the solidarity between them”.

197
extension, an extension which included the historic territories controlled by Catalonia in the Middle Ages.

**Map 6.3 Els Països Catalans**


Verdaguer’s own vision of the Catalan pàtria was undoubtedly conceived on the basis of its (re?)Christianisation with the expulsion of the Moors, hence the multiple references to Jaume I, the Conqueror. However, as with many other aspects of the
Renaixença, Verdaguer’s works would find a direct translation into the emerging Catalanist doctrine. In this respect, Prat de la Riba’s concept of ‘Greater Catalonia’ (Prat de la Riba, 1978), is perhaps a key moment, since he begins by referring to the conquest of Jaume I, which provided the basis for the union of the Principality of Catalonia with Valencia and Mallorca. However,

“unfortunately, the union of the Principality with the realm of Aragon, meant that the name of the Aragones region emerged, and Aragon became the name of the great Mediterranean confederation. Indeed, it was not only then that that the name of Catalonia became one of the past, but rather it came to take on provincial overtones, and referred only to the principality, however much the inhabitants of Valencia and Mallorca were, and said they were, equally Catalan” (Prat de la Riba, 1978: 146).

The federation of Catalonia, Valencia and Mallorca would suffer, according to Prat, with the union with Castile in that “it found itself cut up, divided, lacking national sentiments and unitarian institutions to reflect them” (Prat de la Riba, 1978: 146). However, he also claimed that such feelings had begun to awaken, to the extent that he could talk of “nationalism, the affirmation of the Catalan personality, that does not end at the borders of our old province, but rather extends down to the lands of the palm trees of Murcia and, crossing the sea, flourishes in the islands of Mallorca [...] We are all one, we are all Catalans. The differences that separate us, are accidental differences, regional differences that appear in all nationalities” (Prat de la Riba, 1978: 146).

Prat’s ideas would find continuity in those of theorist and historian of Catalanism, Antoni Rovira i Virgili, who takes great pains to stress that the movement, both cultural and political, was by no means limited to the Principality, but rather that Valencians and Mallorcans also played an important role in the national reawakening (Rovira i Virgili, 1978).

While Colomer notes that this territorial conception of ‘Greater Catalonia’ had been maintained in the post-war period by “small groups of nationalists - of mainly Catholic inspiration - that sought to maintain the orthodoxy of Prat’s ideas” (Colomer, 1986: 162), the issue would resurface, timidly at first, with historian Jaume Vicens Vives (1960; 1962), who in many ways opened the doors to scholars such as Joan Fuster to bring the concept into the debate over the Catalan nationalism in the 1960’s
and 1970’s. In an article written shortly before his death, Vicens Vives would declare that “I am convinced that it is impossible to understand the dynamic of any of the basic parts of catalanitat without a previous definition of the evolution of the whole, and that also the Principality, Mallorca and Valencia form a historic, homogeneous world, with a single basic experience and the same structural development in economic, social and mental terms” (Vicens Vives, 1960: 7). As such, excusing the fact that he himself had concentrated on the Principality, he effectively “demanded it of us Valencians and Mallorcans – Catalans who had grown and flourished beyond the strict limits of the Catalan Principality by the expansion of our ancestors:- he demanded from us a complimentary contribution with his invitation” (Fuster, 1977: 21). Thus, Fuster would set about writing such a contribution to what for him was the Valencian part of the wider story of the Països Catalans, to which Vicens Vives had alluded to in his work on Catalonia. Indeed, the title of Fuster’s work Nosaltres Els Valencians (We the Valencians), was a direct reference to Vicens Vives’ work Notícia de Catalunya, which the latter had thought of calling Nosaltres Els Catalans.

Beyond the explicit aim of ‘getting to know ourselves’ in the same non-essentialist way that Vicens Vives had approached the case of Catalonia, Fuster would embark upon the task of situating the País Valencià within the ‘national’ ambit of the Països Catalans. While claiming to be against nationalism per se, it would perhaps be fairer to say that Fuster’s work was inspired by a rejection of the unitarian Spanish nationalism that he felt had done so much harm to the community of Valencia over recent centuries, to the extent that a posthumous collection of his contributions to the debate on the Països Catalans, was titled Contra el Nacionalisme Espanyol (Against Spanish Nationalism) (Fuster, 1994). As such, as a means of ‘defence’ Fuster would turn to another nation, the Catalan one, embodied territorially in the Països Catalans and made up of different regions: Rosselló, the Principality of Catalonia, Mallorca, and Valencia. In terms of common national traits of identity, like Oliver, Fuster would point to history – the lands ‘united’ by Jaume I - ; to some extent ethnicity, given that the conquered lands were mainly repopulated by Catalans from the Principality; and perhaps most importantly, was the language that the new colonisers brought with them, and the consequent construction of a literary tradition that especially in the late Middle Ages was a factor of unity. While recognising subsequent regional differences between the component parts of the nation that had emerged over time, there is no doubt in Fuster’s mind that the Països Catalans have presented, and will continue to do so, the
same national community.

However, this does not mean that he was in any way blinded to the problems of recreating an effective unified territorial nation and national sentiment after centuries of effective political separation, and in this respect his doubts have weighed heavily on almost all subsequent debate on the issue. Such doubts have centred on the ‘question of names’ (Fuster, 1962), in that while he was convinced as to the utility of the term ‘Països Catalans’, it was not clear to him, nor to anyone else since, how to define and denominate the nation that was to be derived from such a territorial construction. If, on the one hand, those of the Principality were to be called Catalans, those of Valencia, Valencians, etc., then there is an obvious problem of the absence of a unifying term that every nation must seek to have. On the other hand, the use of the term ‘Catalans’ would run the risk of confusing the identity of the Principality with that of the rest, while creating a hierarchical integration, with the former at the head, followed by the Valencians, Mallorcans, Rossellons, Andorrans. With the exception of the latter, this is effectively the history of the Països Catalans, in that historically, they owe their inception precisely to the outward expansion of the Catalans from the Principality. The integration of the ‘kingdoms’ of Valencia and Mallorca, as they would be known, was essentially on these terms, but subsequent political developments, from the incorporation of the Catalan-Aragon confederation into Spain onwards, meant that no common territorial identity, beyond that of the Principality, would emerge that might later serve as the basis for a common national identity that would fuse the nation to the territory. In the case of the Principality of Catalonia in the 19th century I have argued that this process, carried out by the Renaixença was key to forming the subsequent national identity, proving that language per se is not enough. The same, then can be inferred from Fuster’s attempts to ‘solve’ the problem of the Països Catalans, in that he himself was unable to do so, as have been all other theorists of the ‘pan-Catalan’ nation since.

However, despite Fuster’s own lack of theoretical and practical success, the idea of the Països Catalans, would slowly take root. In 1967, Josep Melià would undertake a similar task to Fuster in ‘getting to know’ the Mallorcans, although he “highlighted the convenience of consolidating the differentiated elements of each one of them [Catalonia, Valencia, Mallorca, Rosselló], and above all to seek autonomous political formulae, and did not use the term Països Catalans” (Colomer, 1986: 169). Within Catalonia itself, the concept of the Països Catalans would not really fully appear on the
political agenda until 1976, after Franco’s death, when a series of debates and proposals meant that the issue would take on a certain degree of importance, particularly for the nationalist left.

In this respect, conferences were organised such as the *Trobades de Ciències Humanes i Socials dels Països Catalans*, significantly in non-metropolitan Perpignan in 1976 and Mallorca in 1978, in addition to the publication of special numbers of journals such as *Presència, Quaderns d’Alliberament, Taula de Canvi* and *Nous Horitzons* (Colomer, 1986: 171). Perhaps the most interesting publication was the *Debat sobre els Països Catalans* (Romeu Jover, 1977) which published not only the papers presented at a conference of the same name held in Barcelona in October of 1976, but also included communications from the leading Catalan parties on their position regarding the question.

Presenting the contributions, Romeu Jover notes that the debate was polarised along two overlapping dimensions: on the one hand, between those who conceived the *Països Catalans* as a national entity, and those who, while recognising the linguistic and cultural community as the product of a shared history, denied the existence of the *Països Catalans* as a national phenomenon (Romeu Jover, 1977: 10-11); and, on the other, between those who considered that the structure of the Spanish state must be taken advantage of and reformed democratically, and those who considered it to be bourgeois in nature, to be replaced by a truly socialist society along authentically national lines (Romeu Jover, 1977: 11-12);

Of the more enthusiastic supporters of the notion of the *Països Catalans* was Max Cahner, who claimed that the “*Països Catalans* are a territorial and human entity of Southern Europe with markedly national characteristics, based on linguistic, historical and cultural factors” (Cahner, 1977: 127). In general, his paper seeks to justify the existence of the *Països Catalans* in historical, linguistic, and even geographical terms, and in his enthusiasm he would appear to fall into the trap of a certain degree of essentialism. In discussing, for example, the existence of ‘natural’ boundaries, he notes how the Treaty of the Pyrenees in 1659 inflicted a “serious mutilation” (Cahner, 1977: 132) on the national territory of the *Països Catalans*, while the natural frontiers of the nation would be threatened “by Franco’s attempts to group together provinces from within and beyond the *Països Catalans*, in order to break the national unity” (Cahner, 1977: 134-5).

Underlying his national historical and geographical understanding of the *Països
Catalans would appear to be the factor of language, in that he concedes that in general the Països Catalans could be considered to be those territories where the Catalan language is spoken, although he does point out that only really Andorra and the Balearic Islands are totally Catalan speaking, since Catalonia has the Occitan-speaking Val d’Aran, in ‘French’ Catalonia there is likewise an Occitan-speaking part, while the País Valenciá has Castilian-speaking areas in the west and south that were incorporated into it in the 19th century.

While the theoretical, normative and substantive objections to ascribing to a given territory a fixed language will be discussed in the next chapter, Cahner’s essentialism fails to allow for change over time. At one time in history, no doubt the inhabitants of extensive areas of the Països Catalans would undoubtedly have been Catalan speaking, but both before and since, changes have emerged as population shifts, for example, have brought migrants from the rest of Castilian-speaking Spain. At what point in history, does a ‘place’ come to speak a given language? The nationalist answer is bound up with the existence of the nation, which in turn is invariably projected back over centuries if not millennia. However, as I have argued throughout this work, the nation is inevitably a modern construct as is its ‘relation’ to any given territory. As such, doubt must be cast on Cahner’s arguments, if nothing else for such a partial use of history and geography, and for infusing territory with essentially human characteristics, the power of speech, and making it not only the expression of the nation (reification), but also the source of authority - Catalan is spoken here - (displacement).

The contributions, on the other hand, by authors such as Fontana (1977), Ribó (1977) and Carreras, Giral et al. (1977), are rather more circumspect when affirming the existence of a national territorial entity called the Països Catalans. In this respect, Fontana reflects the opinion of many when he says that “the existence of a common history, culture and language are perhaps necessary conditions but not sufficient [for the construction of a shared national sentiment] as is demonstrated by the fact that up until now they have not been sufficient for the awakening of a collective consciousness on the scale of the Països Catalans” (Fontana, 1977: 54). In terms of a political programme capable of overcoming the socio-economic consequences of differentiated political development over history, Carreras, Giral et al, talk of the need to find the means

“to address linguistic and cultural policies, and also [...] democratic, trade-union and socialist strategies. The implantation of the means to articulate [such policies
and strategies] must naturally take into account the differences and free will of each of the countries, but will also have to set up a process in order to democratically unify characteristics. It must always be taken into account, that any advance, if it is to be irreversible, must be based on the rootedness of the national conscience in each one of the countries” (Carreras, Giral et al, 1977: 109).

Similarly, Ribó highlights the lack of a national conscience in the Països Catalans, and as such is sceptical about using them as a framework for unified political action, although recognises that the debate must remain open (Ribó, 1977).

The reluctance, then, of many of the participants in the debate on the existence of the Països Catalans as a unified national framework, reflects many of the problems that Fuster himself encountered and was unable to resolve. On the one hand, the theoretical problems involved in deriving a common name for the national people of the Països Catalans reflect a general lack of national consciousness of the population at large. This latter difficulty undoubtedly influenced the positions taken by many of the political parties from Catalonia who were invited to submit their positions for publication (see Romeu Jover, 1977: 377-417). However, as was noted in the introduction, the issue of some kind of federation between the ‘regions’ of the Països Catalans within Spanish territory was of sufficient relevance for the Constitution of 1978 to explicitly forbid such unions.

Since the transition period to parliamentary democracy, the issue of the Països Catalans, at an institutional level at least, has moved down the political agenda. In this light, within the framework of a conference organised to celebrate the 20th anniversary of the 1976 Debat del Països Catalans mentioned above14, Carles Carreras i Verdaguer (1999) (one of the original contributors to the 1976 debate - see Carreras i Verdaguer, 1977), reflects back on the lack of success of the project for the construction of the Països Catalans, in that “the political variable of the Països Catalans has not reached a high level of democratic acceptance in any of the different territories involved” (Carreras i Verdaguer 1999: 18) especially in Valencia, where the notion has met with a

14 In addition, the occasion was used to celebrate the publication of the Geografia General dels Països Catalans in seven volumes by the nationalist publishers Enciclopèdia Catalana, a publishing house that had been set up in the 1960’s by, among others, Jordi Pujol.
strong degree of rejection\(^{15}\). In trying to explain why this might be so, he cites two sets of causes: theoretical and substantive. In terms of the former, Carreras notes that while the progressive democratic opposition to the Franco regime and its possible continuation sought an alternative territorial framework, there existed a “relative theoretical and conceptual poverty of the debate which made it more visceral than political” and as such, almost twenty years after Fuster’s first major contribution, the debate at a theoretical level remained, and remains unsolved. With regards to more substantive factors, a series of mainly external changes occurred that made the framework of the *Països Catalans* has lost its attractiveness: the Spanish Constitution of 1978, for example, led to the setting up of the *Estado de las Autonomías*, which essentially institutionalised the fragmentation of the *Països Catalans*, and even more so when we consider its prohibition of federations of any new regions; the Spanish state, with its entry into the EC would begin a task of modernisation, while the European framework would make *de jure* new national territorial entities most problematic, although it does facilitate the creation of *de facto* ones, with the introduction of the Euroregions, such as the one currently formed by Catalonia and the French regions of Languedoc-Roussillon and Midi-Pyrénées; finally, in 1993, Andorra would become a sovereign independent country in its own right, removing the bases of pan-national demands from that country (Carreras i Verdaguer, 1999).

Despite the overall lack of success in creating a new, national political framework of the *Països Catalans*, this does not mean that there has been a complete absence of cultural, linguistic and political initiatives. In terms of the former, for example, the governments of Catalonia and Balearic Islands, in collaboration with the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, created in 2002 the Institut Ramon Llull with the objective of promoting the “Catalan culture and language [...] beyond its area of linguistic influence, while respecting the contributions of all the lands that share it” (Institut Ramon Llull, 2003). In addition, the university network Institut Joan Lluís

\(^{15}\) This is not to say that in Valencia the issue has not been an important one. Pons i Ràfols (1996) for example, makes a five-way division of Valencian society on the issue. At one extreme, he places the pro-Catalan Valencians who, insisting on the linguistic unity of Valencian and Catalan, seek national unity within the framework of the *Països Catalans*. Secondly, are those who accept linguistic unity but instead of deriving national demands at the level of the *Països Catalans*, do so within the framework of Valencia itself. Thirdly, come those who support an anti-Catalan Valencianism, that is they propose linguistic secession, based on the rejection of political unity with Catalonia. Then come conservative sectors of society and Castilian-speaking immigrants from other parts of Spain who are overtly pro-Castilian, perhaps allowing for a certain degree of Valencian regionalism. Finally, and with a “tendency to be manipulated” come the silent masses, who over recent years have tended to favour the fourth position, if
Vives was set up in 1994 between 13 universities (it has subsequently been expanded to 18), to “open up a means of collaboration between academic institutions with historical, cultural and linguistic ties, rooted in the same geographical ambit” (Institut Joan Lluís Vives, 2003).

Beyond a host of other cultural and linguistic activities and relations from civil society, of a more overtly political nature, pro-independence political parties and movements, from the historic Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya, currently the third force in the Catalan parliament, to more ‘radical’ groups such as the Moviment per la Terra, all use the territorial ambit of the Països Catalans to varying degrees as the national ambit.

Overall, the question of whether or not the Països Catalans form a true national ambit raises questions about nations and nationalist movements that, in this case, nationalists themselves have been unable to answer satisfactorily, belying Carreras, Giral et al claim that “The Països Catalans raise the same problems as any other nation” (Carreras, Giral et al, 1977: 109). On the one hand, we are faced with a ‘nation’ with deep, shared historical, linguistic, cultural, and even ‘ethnic’ ties, and yet, on the other, unlike many other nationalist movements, political mobilisation in the name of the Països Catalans, has, beyond the fringes, been muted, while unable to offer a term that might describe the national population that inhabits the national territory. Significantly, this ‘question of names’ was still being debated by the third Congrés de Cultura Catalana in 1999-2000 (Congrés de Cultura Catalana, 2000: 55-61), within the terms that Fuster had opened the debate four decades ago. There are, of course, a wide range of historical reasons for this, not least those concerning the territorial ‘fragmentation’ that the Països have been subjected to over time. But beyond such

not the third.

16 Esquerra Republicana, for example, defines the Catalan nation in the following terms “The Catalan people, formed historically on both sides of the eastern Pyrenees in the 9th and 10th centuries (A.D.), extended along the Mediterranean coast of the Iberian Peninsula and the Balearic Islands and Pitiüses during the 11th, 12th and 13th centuries, and developed within this geographical framework until today, constitutes by nature, conscience and will the Catalan nation. The Catalan nation had been divided in different territories for reasons of political expediency: la Catalunya del Nord, in the French state; the Principality of Catalonia with the Franja de Ponent, the País Valencià, and the Balearic Islands and Pitiüses in the Spanish state, and Andorra which has its own state. This carving up, the result of more than 300 years of oppression by the states of Spain and France has meant that the different territories have lived in ignorance of each other or, in the worst of cases, ignoring their own identity. With the identity of Andorra, which now has its own state, the attainment of the independence of the Catalan Nation (sic) within a United Europe (sic) constitutes an objective that we cannot renounce” (Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya, 2003)
questions, the lack of such common terminology is closely related to the lack of any kind of majoritarian national feeling at the scale of the Països Catalans, which in itself reveals the importance of territory in the construction of the nation. Deprived, voluntarily or not, of a common territory over which to seek control and thus to project identity, the fusion of identity and territory, so fundamental to nationalism, has failed to take place. Nor is it likely to, as the political elites in all the ‘regions’ of the Països Catalans have shown little or no interest in creating a single political territory, and thus the need for a single, national identity is obviated. Consequently, without a unified national territory, the existence of supposedly common identity traits are not enough per se for a sufficiently cohesive national identity to emerge.

The Graphic Representation of the Pàtria: maps and mapping

The issues discussed so far in this chapter are dependent on a process of symbolic construction, which in the case of ‘national’ Catalonia of the 19th century, can be traced back to the Renaixença. In many ways, territorial constructions are closely related to a specific form of geographic imagery: the map. We have already seen in Chapter 2 how to a large degree recent developments in the fields of social theory, the sociology of knowledge, discourse theory, for example, (Harley, 1988), applied to the study of maps and mapping, have gone beyond traditional interpretation of maps as somehow reflections of ‘reality’, to interpret them in the context of the relations of power in which they were produced. Given then the importance of territory, its symbolic construction and representation, it is of little surprise that maps and mapping have constituted an important element of nationalism.

In the case of Catalonia, “a nation that has not yet become a state, but that has lived through periods of differing intensity of cultural, social, and political and economic demands, [it] has in its (sic) map a most important symbolic image of internal and external affirmation” (Montaner, 1999: 61). Indeed, in many ways, the history of cartography in Catalonia reflects wider historical trends not only within Catalonia, but in the Spanish state as a whole. Thus, in the first place, picking up Borja de Riquer’s argument of the incomplete process of nation and state building in Spain, a process
dominated by a centralist, unitarian vision, the ‘national’ map of Spain, beginning with the sheet of Madrid in 1875, would not be completed until 1945 with the publication of the last sheet, corresponding to the Catalan district of the Alt Empordà where it meets the French border. Once more, a lack of planning, resources, coupled with a unitarian vision of Spain, impeded the development of an important instrument of nationalist symbolism (Montaner, 1999: 70). In addition, we must also bear in mind the lack of the necessity of accurate maps due to the absence of wide-scale industrialisation throughout most of Spain. Once more, industrialisation in Catalonia, the major socio-economic differentiating factor with respect to the rest of Spain, required accurate, topographic maps for the construction, for example, of the railway system. That such needs, like in so many other policy areas, were not met by the state, meant that Catalan industrialists had to rely on private initiative, all of which produced rather uneven results in terms of the extension and of quality.

At the same time as the needs of industry demanded maps of Catalonia, so the incipient nationalist movement in Catalonia would turn to the potential of maps to represent the homeland, reinforcing the process of symbolic construction. Thus,

“[i]f the nation-state used the ‘national’ map as a justification of political power, in Catalonia, the inexistence of such political power favoured the use of the map as a symbol of demands. The ideals of the Renaixença would give to the map of Catalonia the importance that the graphic image of the country over which the claims were being made deserved. The materialisation of this concept was translated into the publication of maps of Catalonia that were, in general, very poor in terms of geographic information but with a high degree of ideology” (Montaner, 1999: 67).

In this respect, we might return to Verdaguer’s poem *Davant d’un Mapa*, and the subsequent ideological and political use of maps as part of electoral propaganda in 1901 of the Lliga de Catalunya, which

“concerned a map of Catalonia in Catalan, that included a division into comarques - the debate on the comarques had just begun - drawn very roughly. Surrounding it, against a background of the quatre barres (the four bars of the Catalan flag), there are the portraits of 56 leading Catalans together with the four candidates
from the Lliga at the provincial elections of 1901. The symbolism of the map is clear, in that in addition to the map itself, the *comarques*, the language, the background of the flag, and the election of several important personalities of Catalan culture all come together” (Montaner, 1999: 68).

Thus, the symbolic and material needs of Catalan nationalism meant that when the Mancomunitat of the four provincial Diputacions came into being in 1914, interestingly, “one of the first objectives to be proclaimed was the production of a *Geographic Map of Catalonia*, that is a ‘national’ map of Catalonia itself” (Montaner, 1999: 71). Thus the newly-formed Mancomunitat would establish the Servei Geogràfic with the responsibility for beginning the process of producing a ‘national’ map of Catalonia. After the abolition of the Mancomunitat during the dictatorship of General Primo de Rivera (1923-1930), the Servei would find continuity in the Diputació de Barcelona, until the establishment of the Republican Generalitat in 1931 allowed it to return to the ‘national’ administration.

However, the lack of funding suffered by all administrations in Spain, and especially those conceived in a parallel manner, or even contrary to the central state, meant that the first sheet would not be published until 1922, while the final one would have to wait until Franco’s uprising had actually triumphed in 1939, to see the light of day. Suprisingly, the toponyms in the Catalan language were permitted to be published, although the exceptional character of the gesture was confirmed with the stamp of the authorities confirming “toponyms in Catalan authorised” (Montaner, 1999: 74).

Given the obvious importance of cartography to nationalists, both Spanish and Catalan, it is of little surprise that “during the Franco period, it became an almost subversive image, as is demonstrated by the fact that maps of Catalonia were published by Catalanist associations in exile” (Montaner, 1999: 68). Attempts to publish maps and atlases within Catalonia, in the Catalan language and/or showing the 1936 division of Catalonia into *comarques*, as opposed to provinces, was punishable by imprisonment. Lluch and Nel-lo, for example, note how the map *Països Catalans. Divisió Comarcal* was published in 1951, with the omission of the name of the press that published it: “[t]he omission of the printers, given the evident impossibility that the map could be authorised for publication, in the first edition and in subsequent ones, and the nature of the map led to the editor being put on trial, several years later in 1968, and sentenced to three months in prison” (Lluch and Nel-lo, 1984: XXXV).
The *comarques* would also appear in the new hiking maps published by the specialised publisher, Alpina, founded in Granollers in 1946, as they would in the first volume of the *Geogràfia de Catalunya*, published in the beginning of the 1960’s, and towards the end of the same decade in the *Mapa de las Provincies i Comarques Catalanies*, whose publication would be delayed for three years while the *comarques* of the *Franja d’Aragó* (Strip of Aragon) and those of *Rosselló*, were eliminated (Lluch and Nello, 1984: XXXV).

The efforts of civil society to maintain the image of the Catalan homeland alive during the Franco era would soon find its institutional response, with the full re-establishment of the Generalitat in 1980, just two years later the Institut Cartogràfic de Catalunya was set up, whose importance is summed up in the following way:

“To have available a mapping service of quality, able to represent with the maximum precision and detail the territory of the country is fundamental […] In the light of this necessity of national interest, and with the desire that Catalonia have available an organisation at its disposal to act as the only entity responsible for a correct cartographic representation of the territory, in 1982, the Generalitat created the ICC” (Institut Cartogràfic de Catalunya, 2003).

The activities of the ICC have been broad in a functional sense, producing a range of maps, aerial and satellite images etc., whose common denominator is, naturally enough, the Catalan territory. In terms of the geographic ambit, they go from the municipal level, the *comarcal* level, Catalonia itself, and, interestingly, the *Països Catalans*, of which in 1996, a seven volume atlas was produced, *Geografia General dels Països Catalans*, edited by the nationalist publisher Enciclopèdia Catalana.

**The Hiking Movement**

In Chapter 2, we have seen, at a general level, the reasons why hiking became such an important instrument for nationalism in that in many respects nationalists operate under the banner of ‘to know one’s country is to love it’. Of course, the knowledge that they gathered and subsequently diffused, like all knowledge, far from being purely ‘objective’, reflected wider relations of power in society, and in particular
a nationalist understanding of society. As such, the hiking movement in Catalonia, through its multiple activities, would play an important role in defining the national territory: through the scope of its activities, it would mark out the limits of the pàtria; physical features such as the mountains would be claimed in the name of the nation by placing the national flag at the summit; and efforts were made to fuse culture and territory through the activities of the various sections of the new hiking clubs.

The origins of the hiking movement in Catalonia are very much related to the Renaixença, in that “[i]n a natural way, the investigation into the origins, the personality and the necessity to establish an inventory of the country, led the men of the Renaixença to hiking” (Casassas i Simó, 1977a: 16). Indeed

“[i]f the Renaixença had not had hiking, which with its scientific nature took it beyond the mere literary field and imbued it with a positive feeling for the land, it would have been reduced to a simple and ephemeral poetic expression [and thus] hiking opened up to the Catalans the desire to know and study Catalonia’s own territory and thus a true culture of autochthonous feeling would emerge” (Iglésies, 1964: 24).

“[T]his autochthonous feeling is precisely what has made hiking one of the key axes around which national demands within our collective life revolve” (Triadu, 1996; see also Rovira i Virgili, 1983: 74). Thus, under the auspices of the Renaixença-inspired Catalanist movement, in 1876 the first hiking club, the Associació Catalanista d’Excursions Científiques, was founded, significantly in Barcelona, followed two years later by the Associació d’Excursions Catalana, both of which would amalgamate in 1891 to form the Centre Excursionista de Catalunya, which is “still alive today and loyal to its original ideals” (García-Ramon and Nogué Font, 1994: 202). The ideals of the Centre are summed up in the motto ‘Patria, libertas, fides’, under the patronage of Sant Jordi (Saint George), who is also the patron saint of Catalonia (and England). From Barcelona, the hiking movement would spread slowly out around Catalonia, although in many ways the CEC has remained perhaps the most emblematic and representative of the movement, and above all, as we shall see, the most important for Catalan nationalism as a whole.

Early hikers would include Jacint Verdaguer, a key figure in that “all the Renaixença culminated with this poet-geographer, who, at the same time, let us not
forget, was a ‘lyrical’ hiker” (Iglésies, 1964: 24). In addition to dedicating poems to the hiking movement, such as l’Heura,

“[o]nce Verdaguer had emerged, perhaps the Renaixença could leave behind the Jocs Florals [...] The timing offers a curious coincidence. The Jocs confirmed the genius of Jacint Verdaguer in 1877, and in that same year the first hiking club was founded that would provide the necessary extension of the principles of the Renaixença that up until then had been limited to poetry” (Iglésies, 1964: 24).

In effect, “hiking had become the vehicle of the Renaixença” in that while “the Jocs Florals saved the language, hiking created a culture” (Iglésies, 1964: 24), a culture with deep roots in the emerging national territory that the hiking movement would play such an important role in constructing. Several years later, at the turn of the century, nationalist poet, Joan Maragall, would claim that:

“our hiking movement is neither a sport nor pleasure nor work: it is love, and not merely an abstract love for nature as a whole, but for our nature; it is difficult to love the world if one does not start by loving the land in which one has been raised; within the love for the pàtria is contained the live (sic) love for the entire world and who on behalf of the latter abhors the former he or she has none of them. Our love for nature lives through the love for Catalan nature; Catalonia is for us the summary of the world. Hence we can proudly say that the soul of our hiking movement is the love for Catalonia (Maragall, quoted in García-Ramon and Nogué Font, 1994: 202).

Not only was the Catalan soul rooted in the soil of the pàtria, but it was from the pàtria that the Catalan ‘race’ would take its form. “To demonstrate the existence of a Catalan race in possession of distinctive features determined by the earth, from which they were directly derived, was rather problematic. From the top of Puigsacalm, the problem disappears and the proposition is manifest before one’s very eyes in all its powerful clarity” (Marfany, 1995: 301-302). Thus, for an early hiker, “coloured in the sun, our land is exuberant with boiling sap, vigorously shadowed, comparable in all with its sons, of fibrous muscles, forceful language, of factions perhaps more hard than expressive. The independence of our character becomes clear with the indomitable
contrasts of our land” (quoted in Marfany, 1995: 302).

In terms of early membership, at the time of the formation of the CEC, “practically all the Catalan professional bourgeoisie belonged. Indeed, not only all those who were involved with Catalanism were members, but also practically all artists, writers, journalists and other intellectuals of the country, and a good number of politicians and leading men of society17” (Marfany, 1995: 297). This was not to say that all members were active hikers, Marfany rather mischievously says that the majority “has never climbed a mountain in their lives, if it wasn’t Montserrat and in a horse-drawn cart” (Marfany, 1995: 296). So what was the attraction of the hiking clubs for such important figures of Catalan society?

On one level, despite the formal prohibition of the discussion of politics and religion, in addition to the importance of the hiking activities for the nationalist project, the Centre, from the beginning, would insist on the use of the Catalan language, ensuring that like involvement in the Floral Games, membership would become a patriotic act. On another level, the CEC organised a whole series of parallel activities and sections that sought to reinforce the fusion of culture and territory. For example, the folklore section created a children’s choir so that “popular songs that had been collected from around the country could be heard” (CEC, 1996: 58), while the sections dedicated to architecture, archaeology and history would see the CEC involved in the reconstruction of monasteries and would later play a central role in organising the celebrations of the 75th anniversary of the restoration of the monastery of Ripoll. In addition, the photographic section would continue the tradition of the work of the Renaixença by building up and exhibiting a collection of photographs of monumental crosses of Catalonia.

This accumulation of nationalist knowledge enabled the CEC to promote Catalan university studies that, given the lack of official sanctioning, ran parallel to the established state-organised university, and centred on archaeology, history, literature, geography and geology. The CEC’s links with the Catalan language were reinforced with its role in organising the First International Congress of the Catalan Language, in addition to its important contribution to one of the most important recurrent territorial

17 In this category, the same author mentions Joan Mañé i Flaquer, Teodor Baró, Josep Cusachs, Agapit Vallmitjana, Antoni Elias de Molins, Francesc de P. Rius i Taulet, Josep M. Vallès i Ribot, Eusebi Güell, Antoni Rubió i Lluch, Manuel Duran i Bas, the Marquis of Dou, Ramon Sanllehy, Marian Aguiló, Joan B. Parés, Pere Negre, Manuel Girona, and Lluís i Enric Sagnier (Marfany, 1995: 297).
themes of nationalism in Catalonia, the *comarca* debate.

While the pre-eminence of the CEC as the ‘national’ hiking club par excellence is undoubted\(^{18}\), it is not to say that other clubs would not be founded. In 1885, the Associació Excursionista Ileridense was founded in Lleida “which must be considered as the first independent association from the *comarques* dedicated to hiking” (Iglésies, 1964: 369), followed by other clubs in such important towns as Reus (1901) Manresa (1904), Sabadell (1908), Terrassa (1911), and Vic (1912). However, there existed a fundamental difference between the Barcelona-based clubs such as the CEC and those from the *comarques*, a difference based on the national spatial hierarchy with Barcelona at its head. While the CEC had come into being as a means of getting to know Catalonia, and documenting its natural beauties and man-made monuments, the clubs of the *comarques* took on the same role but at the more modest scale of their own *comarca*. As Iglésies sums up:

“we would have clubs in Barcelona of a general (sic) reach and others located in the secondary cities or little capitals of the *comarques* that, imitating the lighthouse of Barcelona and receiving their impulse from it, would, in turn, seek to have influence over their own districts like secondary lighthouses, until the entire country came under the influence of cultural expansion that hiking represented” (Iglésies, 1964: 372).

With the end of the Civil War, the hiking movement in Catalonia found itself in a situation of disarray. Many members had either died or were in exile; mountaineering equipment had been requisitioned by the armed forces; and the end of the freedom of association gave the Franco regime considerable power to curtail the social and cultural activities of many clubs, while putting an end to many others, with the overall numbers going from over 300 in 1936 to just 56 in 1957 (Iglésies, 1965: 8). But not all was lost, neither in quantitative nor qualitative terms. On the one hand despite the drastic reduction in the number of clubs, membership boomed, going from between 3,000 and 4,000 in 1936 to 23,180 registered members in 1960 (Iglésies, 1965: 8)\(^{19}\). On the other,

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\(^{18}\) In the *Enciclopèdia de l’Excursionisme* (Dalmau, 1964), over half of its more than 700 pages are dedicated to the CEC, with approximately 120 pages dedicated to other Barcelona-based clubs, while the history of the clubs of the *comarques* takes up a mere 150.

\(^{19}\) Despite the increase demand, of 478 applications to form new clubs, the Franco regime approved just one (Iglésies, 1965: 8).
despite the repression of the Franco regime, cultural activities would once more play an important part in the movement’s programme, and courses were run on subjects from geographical and geological illustration, the perfection of grammar, and on folklore and traditional songs as part of the overall “fidelity to the manifestations of the land” (Iglésies, 1965: 11). In addition, the repression did not prevent hikers - illegally - from continuing to vindicate Catalonia by placing flags on the mountain summits of Catalonia, nor other, more legal activities, such as contributing to the fabrication and siting of a new statue of the Virgin of Montserrat on one of the rocky peaks of the mountain, Cavall Bernat (CEC, 1996: 174-5).

As the regime relaxed somewhat its repressive nature in the 1960’s, the CEC would play an important part in attempting to recover the cultural ‘normality’ of before the Civil War. The bulletin of the club, Muntanya, would by the late 1960’s once more be published in Catalan, as would other publications of the club, such as guide books, programmes and so forth. In 1968, the Centre was closely involved in the centenary of the birth of Pompeu Fabra, a key figure in the codification of the Catalan language, and, what is more, “an illustrious member of the Centre” (CEC, 1996: 272).

In what might be considered to be the most recent era in the life of the hiking movement in Catalonia, and in particular that of the CEC, the period begins with the death of Franco and the opening up of a new space for the promotion of Catalan culture, although any initiatives in this respect would have to take place against a background of the four decades of imposed ‘Castilianisation’. In general, the trajectory of the CEC, and indeed of all Catalan hiking clubs over the period has been marked by two major factors: on the one hand, the coming of the mass ‘leisure society’ in which more and more people have had access to leisure time and space and which has produced a wide-ranging offer of leisure activities beyond the ambit of hiking clubs; and secondly, and perhaps more interestingly for the present case, has been the institutionalisation of nationalism in Catalonia, in that the nationalist-controlled Generalitat has, in many ways, taken on board many of the nation-building initiatives that during the Franco era had to be carried out by civil society. In this respect, the CEC, has maintained an active role in nationalist politics, particularly in the period of the transition to democracy, although to some extent much of its activity has been aimed at recognising its historic role in the history of Catalan nationalism. In addition, the CEC has played an increasingly important part in promoting environmental awareness, not just among its own members, but in conjunction with environmental groups, even campaigning against
political decisions felt to be harmful to the environment.

Beyond mountaineering achievements both within Catalonia and abroad, the CEC has played an important institutional role both during the transition period to parliamentary democracy, and since. Over the period of 1976-1977, it would take part in the debates and the drawing up of resolutions of Congrés de Cultura Catalana, while faithful to its tradition of support for the Catalan language, it supported the manifesto in favour of the Catalan language, culture and nation promoted by the delegation of Girona of the nationalist organisation, Òmnium Cultural in 1980, and participated in the campaign of the Generalitat from 1982 onwards of the ‘linguistic normalisation’. At the same time, it continued to pay homage, every year, in the act of renewal of the Flame of the Catalan Language at Montserrat. In 1988, it also participated in the millennium celebrations of Catalonia, a thousand years after “Borrell II, count of Barcelona, of Girona and Osona, and of Urgell had broken the feudal bonds that linked these territories with the Frank King Hug Capet” (CEC, 1996: 354). In 1992, it took part in the celebrations of the centenary of the Bases de Manresa, as part of which, a new document was drawn up which articulated “the aspirations of the people of Catalonia to reach their own full sovereignty with the spirit of solidarity and co-operation with all nations of the world” (CEC, 1996: 367).

The hiking movement, then, since the emergence of Catalanism has played a key role at almost all levels of territorial nationalist activity. In the first place, the extent of its activities establishes claims over the national territory in a very special way in that the national territory and its mountains are physically conquered in the name of the nation. Secondly, the hiking movement also proved an excellent vehicle for the fusion of the nation and the territory over which political claims are made. The CEC and other clubs have been involved, through their social and cultural activities, in promoting elements of national identity - the language, for example -, and providing them with a spatial framework, the national territory, within which to operate. Thirdly, the hiking movement has reflected and perpetuated the spatial integration of places within the national territory within the hierarchy headed by the capital, Barcelona. In this respect,

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20 In 1985 Catalan mountaineers conquered Everest in 1985, placing a Catalan flag on its summit that had been given to them personally by Jordi Pujol. On establishing radio contact with base camp, the Catalan national anthem was duly played, and a telegram was sent to the expedition’s sponsors, the savings bank, Caixa de Catalunya, declaring that “Catalonia is on the roof of the world” (CEC, 1996: 340).
Iglésies’ conclusion that the Barcelona clubs represent the general, national aspirations, while those of the *comarques* are limited to their more immediate spatial ambit are indicative. Fourthly, the very way in which the national homeland is constructed at a symbolic level reflects by the hiking movement provides a direct continuation of the 19th vision constructed by the *Renaixença*, whereby the rurality of the Catalan nation is emphasised, as is the importance of the religious-mountainous places for nationalist iconography.

**Conclusions**

By way of overall conclusions, by exploring key debates and movements within Catalan nationalism since the 19th century, I have sought to argue that territory has continued to play a fundamental role in nationalist mobilisation within Catalonia, even during the decades of Francoist repression. Attempts to define the extent of the nation either physically through hiking, or more academically through the debate concerning the ‘national’ nature of the *Països Catalans* have been constant. The latter also highlights the importance of territory in the construction of a unified national project, in that in the case of the *Països Catalans*, the inability, for various historical reasons, to claim a unified territory, has made the construction of a corresponding national identity difficult, if not to say impossible. The existence of common linguistic, cultural, historical and even ‘ethnic’ elements is not enough in this case to create a sense of belonging to the territory in question.

A third theme running through many of the questions analysed in the chapter, is the terms on which the national territorial integration takes place. From the debate on the *comarques*, the duality between town and countryside and the structure of the hiking movement, it becomes clear that national territorial integration had to take place under the increasing hegemony of Barcelona itself, although this has obviously provoked opposition. The hiking movement, for example, in addition to differentiating between the ‘national’ clubs of the capital, and the ‘comarcal’ clubs of the rest of the country reaffirms such hegemony, while their attempts to convert ‘local’ cultural expressions into ‘national’ ones, may also be understood in the same light.

Finally, as the debates concerning the *comarques* and the relation between
Barcelona and the rest of the country show, at a symbolic level, the Renai\'\-xen\'a-inspired vision of Catalonia, whose essentialist heart was said to be in the rural hinterland has continued to be an important part of the process of national territorial integration, counteracting, to some extent, the material hegemony of Barcelona.

Much of the discussion conducted up until now has concerned nationalist mobilisation from civil society itself, and not always in explicitly political terms. The aim of the next two chapters is to discuss how in current Catalan nationalist politics, territory continues to be the foundations against which many aspects must be understood, and it is to this that we now turn.
CHAPTER 7
TERRITORIAL ELEMENTS OF PUJOLISM IN CONTEMPORARY CATALAN POLITICS

Introduction

The previous chapter has discussed at a general level a variety of long-standing issues that reflect the continuing importance of territory for nationalism in Catalonia. Against this background, the current chapter seeks to refine the object of analysis by focusing on a particular set of ideological tenets within contemporary Catalan nationalism, Pujolism, understood as the political thought and praxis that has emerged around the figure of Jordi Pujol. The importance of Pujolism within Catalan nationalism should not be underestimated: on the one hand, Pujol himself has been president of the Generalitat for six consecutive terms since the first democratic elections to the newly-restored Catalan Parlament in 1980, while on the other, he has clearly dominated the party that he did so much to create, Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya (CDC), since the 1970’s. In the words of one commentator,

“given the absolute identification between Convergència and Jordi Pujol, in the sense that it is impossible to imagine the party without thinking, above all, of Jordi Pujol and his pre-eminent position within the party that has proved to be an efficient ornament of his personality, it has been very easy for the close and confusing link to be established between Pujol, the Generalitat and Catalonia” (Lorés, 1985: 73).

This is corroborated by Caminal i Badia, who states that in terms of the party, CDC, since its foundation it has been a “political organisation based around and in support of a leadership that transcends it, that gives it a sense of history and clothes it in a personal ideology. Within CDC, everyone is Pujolist’, even those who are not” (Caminal i Badia, 2001: 131).
In this context, having briefly discussed Pujol’s political career, particularly in its formative years, and the emergence of Pujol’s political doctrine, I will discuss Pujolism from the perspective of territorial nationalism at two basic levels. Firstly, I will analyse the way in which territorial premises have informed the process of the production and reproduction of the nation by Pujolism. This may be most clearly seen in the case of immigration, which has challenged and continues to challenge the way in which nationalism perceives the relationship between nation and national homeland, and in the issue of the Catalan language, which from the Renaixença onwards, has been identified by Catalan nationalism as the defining element of the nation. However, I will argue that while this may be the case, the key role given to language in defining the nation can only be understood by discussing the way in which language and territory have been related, to the extent that the current process of linguistic normalisation is justified on the grounds that Catalan is Catalonia’s ‘own language’.

Secondly, I will analyse the way in which Pujolism projects a very specific vision of the national homeland, one which is essentially rooted in the rural hinterland, in turn portrayed as the spiritual heartland of the Catalan nation. In addition, attention will be paid to the emphasis that Jordi Pujol himself has placed on developing a personal relationship with the spiritual heartland of Catalonia, to the extent that his political and personal figure might almost be seen to represent the ‘home de terra’, or ‘man of the land’, in a similar way to Jacint Verdaguer in the 19th century.

The Political Career of Jordi Pujol: from Torras i Bages to the Generalitat

In 2003 Jordi Pujol prepares to step down as president of the Generalitat at the next elections in the autumn, after occupying the post since 1980. Over this period, CiU, the electoral coalition formed by CDC and Unió Democràtica de Catalunya (UDC), has been by far the most important political force in autonomic elections, in which it has always won more seats than any other rival. From the surprise victory in 1980, although far short of an absolute majority, CiU went on to obtain absolute majorities in 1984, 1988 and 1992. Even though in 1995 the absolute majority was lost, the actual number of votes rose by more than 100,000, while CiU was eventually forced to come to an understanding with the PP that allowed the former to govern alone as part of the price
that the PP in Madrid was forced to pay for CiU’s support of the first Aznar government.

CiU’s rise to power in Catalonia coincided with the collapse of the moderate, state-wide rival, Unión de Centro Democrático (Union of the Democratic Centre (UCD)), and an overall shift in the political climate away from the more radical nationalist positions held by Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (Republican Left of Catalonia (ERC)). In addition, the Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya (Party of Catalan Socialists (PSC)) was very much constrained in Catalonia by the fact that the state-wide Partido Socialista Obrero Español (Spanish Socialists Workers Party (PSOE)) soon became the dominant party in Madrid, and by the association in the minds of many voters in the regional elections of the PSC with specific classes – working class immigrants - , and specific places - the metropolitan area of Barcelona (see below). Since that time, CiU, with Pujol at the fore, has been very successful in projecting the political image as the defenders of Catalonia against successive central governments, while Pujol and all of the governments that he has presided have maintained high levels of popularity ratings due to their perceived efficient administration.

In order to arrive at such lofty political heights, Jordi Pujol has been aptly described as a long-distance runner (Wirth, 1981), in that his dedication to nationalist reconstruction goes back to well before the death of Franco. Born in Barcelona in 1930 into a lower-middle class Catalan family, Pujol would study in the city’s German Institute, before going on to study medicine at Barcelona University. While he would never practice (except his experience in prison), his degree would help him in his later job in the pharmaceutical company that his father would help to found in the early 1950’s.

While at university, Jordi Pujol entered into contact with the necessarily-clandestine Torras i Bages group, which, as its name suggests, sought to ensure a certain continuity of the bishop’s Catholic Catalanism. In addition to discussion, members of the group would participate in certain anti-Franco activities, such as painting graffiti on the walls of the university or publishing pamphlets denouncing the regime. Having retired from the group, Pujol began to deepen his faith to the extent that he would be close to joining the Opus Dei, although in 1954 he would form part of the newly formed group Christ Catalonia (CC), under the influence of the abbot of Montserrat, Aureli Escarré (Colomer, 1986: 180) and other Catalanist priests. While clearly not an explicitly political group, despite its religious inspiration, CC would have to remain
clandestine, above all due to its pro-Catalan nature, providing “a place of debate to attempt to influence civil and theological issues, where leaders of Catalanist Catholic groups came together” (Lorés, 1985: 14). Without doubt, the debates of the CC and in particular the doctrinal leadership of Raimon Galí would not only leave a lasting mark on Jordi Pujol, helping to formulate his own adaptation of Catholic Catalanism, but also on an important sector of the Barcelona middle-classes that have formed the bed-rock support of Pujol and his party over more recent decades.

However, by 1957, Pujol, a more practical man, clashed with Galí, and reduced his commitments to the group, until in 1960 he would sever all ties with the CC. During this period, he nevertheless maintained certain contacts with pro-Catalan, anti-Franco groups, again of a Catholic persuasion, to the extent that on the occasion of Franco’s visit to the city of Barcelona in 1960, to celebrate, inter alia, the 50th anniversary of the death of Catalan national poet, Joan Maragall, Pujol would be involved in incidents that would see him condemned to seven years of prison1.

On his eventual release from prison, and having spent six months in internal exile in Girona, by the summer of 1963 Pujol would be able to return to Barcelona and take up again his project aimed at the construction of Catalonia, a patriotic, practical programme, in which he dedicated his time, money and energies to the construction of what he felt would be key institutions in any process of Catalan national recovery. Thus, along with his father and other collaborators, Pujol founded the Banca Catalana, as the first step on the way to giving the Catalan national economy the resources to permit a certain degree of financial independence from Spain. In addition to the Banca Catalana, which would serve to subsidise many publications in Catalan concerning Catalan culture, Pujol would also play a key role in the launching of the Catalan Encyclopaedia, La Gran Enciclopèdia Catalana, that by the early 1970’s had published various volumes, despite financial problems and disputes with staff (see Wirth, 1981: 152-158). In addition, mention must also be made of educational initiatives, such as his role in the founding of the Rosa Sensat group, which sought to renew teaching methods in

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1 The ‘events of the Palau’ for which Pujol was court-martialled, refer to the singing of the Catalan national anthem Cant de la Senyera (Hymn to the Senyera, the Catalan national flag), as a homage to Joan Maragall in the presence of Franco. Despite efforts of the organisers and of the security forces to avoid the anthem in the Franco’s presence, Catalan nationalists close to Pujol, who was not physically present but was considered to be the instigator of the events, unfurled a giant Catalan flag and managed to persuade many of those present to stand up and sing the Catalan national anthem. Soon after, despite his absence during the act, Pujol was arrested and subsequently imprisoned. For a more complete version of the event, Jordi Pujol’s participation, and its political and penal consequences, see Crexell (1982).
Catalonia, and in many ways sought to provide a line of continuity with the teaching methods developed under the Republican Generalitat that were subsequently prohibited by the Franco regime.

During all of this time since his release from prison and internal exile, Pujol had not joined any political party or been involved in any explicitly-political group or activities. However, he had maintained contact with many like-minded Catalanists, and so, in 1974, with the Franco regime agonising, Pujol decided that it was time to give what he would call the ‘container’ to the ‘contents’ of the national identity (Colomer, 1986; Lorés, 1985). Consequently, he called a meeting at Montserrat, a place which “had served so well, and still does, the cause of Catalonia” (Manent, 1984: 105) to form a political party, and thus CDC emerged in 1974 out of the merger of several nationalist, centre, even social democratic political groups opposed to Francoism. In Pujol’s own words,

“[a]t that I came into contact with a series of people to create a kind of political convergence at the centre, centre-left, in order to act in social terms on the middle strata that go from certain sectors of the working classes of the country to the petty bourgeoisie and the middle classes, and I do this with democratic and Christian social-democratic people, with liberal sectors, nationalist sectors, libertarian sectors etc., seeking to construct a great political conglomeration” (quoted in Wirth, 1981: 185).

Those present included: those close to Pujol himself, many of which would form El Grup d’Acció al Servei de Catalunya, (Action Group at the Service of Catalonia); independents such as Miquel Roca i Junyent, who for many years would be Pujol’s ‘number two’; representatives of UDC itself, which split with CDC in 1976 to later return in 1978 as a partner in the CiU coalition; and representatives of Catholic workers’ groups (Manent, 1984: 105). From the beginning, the figure of Jordi Pujol emerged as the driving force of the party, and CDC very much reflected his desire to create a modern, moderate, nationalist political option, all of which make CDC different from both traditional Catalan nationalist movements and also other political parties with longer political traditions, such as its coalition partner UDC (Baras and Matas, 1998: 162).
Pujolism

While many works exist on the persona of Jordi Pujol, ranging from what can only be described as hagiography to more critical versions (see, for example, Wirth, 1981; Porcel, 1977; Ferrer, Galí et al., 1984; and Antich, 1994) the majority fail to provide an extensive and intensive analysis of his political thought and its development. This is partly due to the general portrayal of Pujol as a ‘man of action’ rather than a theorist of nationalism, who through his active contribution to the national reconstruction of Catalonia in the 1950’s and 1960’s did more than anyone to lay the foundations for subsequent national political mobilisation in which he himself has played such a fundamental role from the late 1970’s until the present day. In addition, an analysis of Pujol’s own reflections on the nature of Catalonia and on the process of national reconstruction are in many ways a-theoretical, in that they obviate to a large degree the kind of doctrinal discussions that important figures in 19th-century Catalanism, from Almirall, Torras i Bages to Prat de la Riba, did undertake.

However, it would be erroneous to take Pujol’s reflections and actions merely at face value; underlying them are a series of doctrinal premises that although Pujol himself would do little to elaborate on, are nevertheless present. Thus it is to these doctrinal premises that I now wish to turn, and that have been studied by, among others, Josep-Maria Colomer (1986), Jaume Lorés (1985) 2, and, more recently Miquel Caminal i Badia (2001). It becomes immediately clear that any attempt to understand the doctrine underlying Jordi Pujol’s political activity must begin with an analysis of not only Galí’s direct contribution, but of the overall development of Catalanist Catholic thought of the post-war era, given its direct influence on the thought of Pujol and the development of Pujolism.

The post-war period, in Catalonia would witness a great deal of soul-searching on the part of Catalan Catholicism. On the one hand, many Catholics linked to the Christian-democrat UDC had actually fought on the side of the Republic to defend Catalonia against the rising of Franco. However, the later years of the Republic had been the scenario for a great deal of anti-clericalism on the part of many Marxist and anarchist political groups and trade unions, giving rise to direct attacks on Church

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2 Lorés’ account has the added advantage that the author formed part of CC along with Pujol, Galí and
property and on its members. In addition, the Spanish Catholic Church had adhered to Franco’s uprising in what would become known as the ‘Crusade’, this time not against the Moorish invaders, but against the Marxism and separatism.

Within this context, many of those Catalan Catholics who had remained loyal to the Republic began a process of reflection on the reasons for a defeat that was felt to have done so much harm to Catalonia. From within Catalonia, the Front Universitari de Catalunya emerged as a group of students close to Christian-democratic positions, among which Josep Benet would play an important role. From exile in Mexico, intellectuals such as Joan Salés and Raimon Galí himself defined their positions on the reasons for Catalonia’s defeat and its fate from the pages of the journal Quaderns de l’Exili. In many ways, both groups would coincide on many points: firstly, they both laid the blame on the defeat of Catalonia in the lack of national spiritual cohesion that had given rise to ‘petty’ disputes between Right and Left; secondly, both agreed on the continuing importance of Torras i Bages’ religious conception of the Catalan essence, and on Prat de la Riba’s political articulation of the Catalan nation. In general, both sought to reconstruct a Catalonia based on a Catalan nation defined religiously and ‘ethnically’, whose essential nature elevated it above the material bases and the population (Colomer, 1986: 181-182). Overall, “all these ideological elements: spiritualist nationalism, Catholic neo-traditionalism, the affirmation of the natural medieval nations against the idea of the modern state” (Colomer, 1986: 184), would form the background against which the CC, under the ideological direction of Raimon Galí, set the political agenda of Catholic Catalanism that so influenced Jordi Pujol.

By the mid-1950’s, Galí sought to develop a profound critique of traditional Catholic Catalanism and of the social, economic, cultural and political context in which it had operated since the times of Torras i Bages. It was precisely this critique that distanced Galí not only from ‘active’ politics but also from the Christian democrats of the UDC (Lorés, 1985: 15). A key moment of change in Galí’s thought came on his return to Catalonia, when he “found in the writings of French Catholic nationalism, Charles Péguy, a source of inspiration for the identification of the pàtria with certain values and spiritual virtues” (Colomer, 1986: 184). Such inspiration was clearly reflected in the publication of the clandestine Problemes de la nostra generació, problemes del nostre temps (1955), which would become the foundational text of the others.
CC group. In the text, Galí highlighted the extent to which ‘mental disorientation’ and ‘spiritual resignation’ had been, more than anything else, the main factors in the defeat in the Civil War. While Galí’s doctrine was of a clearly Catholic inspiration, it was to some extent revolutionary in that Catalonia’s problems were “ascribed not to its distancing from the doctrine of the Church, as Torras i Bages had diagnosed, but rather from the degeneration of fundamental virtues” (Lorés, 1985: 17). In the context of the ever-changing reality that had affected Catalonia, particularly since the 19th century, Galí proposed virtue and not orthodoxy, a position that allowed him to criticise not only current Catalan society and the excessive ‘pragmatism’ of the bourgeoisie in the face of Francoism, but also all bourgeois Catalanist movements from the Liga onwards for their creation of a breach between discourse and action, between, on the one hand, materialism, culturalism, intellectualism, and, on the other, the moral compromise with the nurturing of the virtues of Catalonia (Lorés, 1985).

In the light of this diagnosis, Galí

“defended the full taking on of responsibilities, the acceptance of risk as a basic element of life, the will to serve and the sense of hierarchy, the spirit of solidarity and the sense of community, and the idea that man owes himself to something greater than himself, and that this something is not an ideology nor ‘personality’, but rather basic values that in the case of the CC were God, the land - that is, Catalonia - and the men of Catalonia” (Wirth, 1981: 67, n.).

In many ways, Pujol accepted the legacy of Péguy and Saint Exupéry that had so inspired Galí, although there exist reasonable doubts as to the extent to which the acceptance at a doctrinal level would inform meaningful political action. Within this context, Jordi Pujol adapted Galí’s influence to his own personal beliefs, needs and interests, and to the changing background that would emerge at the beginning of the 1960’s. Various themes run through Pujol’s early writings that would form the nucleus of his political doctrine that has remained more or less unchanged since the late 1950’s, early 1960’s.

Firstly, Pujol himself placed a great deal of emphasis on the spiritual element of the nation and of the need for spiritual renewal of the national leaders. Referring to Saint-Exupéry, Pujol says that “the primary objective of our mobilisation (which bears repeating) is spiritual and seeks that mental and spiritual health [...] and that collective
mystique that forms the backbone of peoples” (Pujol, 1979: 46). It was precisely because of the abandonment of this spirituality by the Catalan population in general and by the elites in particular that meant that “we were badly prepared in spiritual terms for the decisive years of the Republic and of the War. We arrived at that point without consistence, without solidity and without spiritual energy. The consequences were 1936 and defeat” (Pujol, 1979: 37-38).

In addition to this stress on national spirituality, mental strength and the importance of leadership of a minority élite, all of which can be traced, through Galí, to authors such as Saint-Exupéry and Péguy, Pujol highlights the necessity for the new generations, of which he himself formed a prominent part, to take up the spiritual challenge that the previous ones had renounced. Thus,

“our generation has found itself before a people that has been defeated, and materially in ruins. [However] from time to time there is a generation that plays an especially important role, people who run up the flag when a building has been roofed, or that add a tower to make the facade more dignified, or that reinforce the foundations. Our generation shall have to be one of those that stands out […] The seriousness of our times demands this of us” (Pujol, 1979: 39).

In addition to this rather abstract spiritualist mysticism, inspired in the writings of “Charles Péguy, transmitted above all through Galí (and on occasions amplified by that of Bergson or that of Saint-Exupéry)” (Colomer, 1986: 186), Pujol would stress, like Torras i Bages and Cardó before him, the Christian roots of Catalonia and the importance of Christian values in any process of national construction. Thus the centrality of family, pàtria, the Catalan people under God is a positive leitmotiv in these foundational texts of Pujolism.

Another key dimension of his thought is the duality between content and container, with the content representing the nation and the container those structures needed to protect it from the external elements. The content of the Catalan nation, in addition to being a “fact of mentality, of language, of sentiment […] is an historical fact, a fact of spiritual ethnicity […] it is a fact of will” (Pujol, 1979: 40-41), Pujol’s own conception of the nation is based on the traditional Catholic ideas of the family, the pàtria, and God (Pujol, 1978), which brings him back to the inspiration of Catholic traditionalists such as Torras i Bages. For Pujol, like all nationalists, the national
essence precedes the existence of a national container; it is the nation that leads to nationalism and not vice-versa. Thus, “a people is a form – a natural and independent form that precedes political and social powers – of human group” (Pujol, 1976: 109).

However, is the content on its own enough?

“What happens when a people does not have a form, when it is exposed, without any cover, to all the winds, to all the influences, to all the adversaries? When another (people) can get inside and say and do as it pleases? The result is that the people become the victim of doubt [...] Doubt rots [...] These are the dangers” (Pujol, 1979: 37-38).

As such he outlines a series of institutions that are necessary for the conservation of the content of the people: its own schools and universities, administration and economic elites, church, political parties, communitarian trade unions, and in general the institutional structures that produce and sustain such collective actors (Pujol, 1979: 63-99).

It is perhaps the nature of the relation between the national content and container that is at the heart of the consequent ambiguity of Pujol’s nationalism at both a doctrinal and practical level. His stress on content and his interpretation of it as being essentialist, traditionalist and spiritualist has been greatly influenced by the thought of Torras i Bages, who proposed a medieval, pre-modern vision of Catalonia, that by its very nature was hostile to the modern liberal Spanish state, but that failed to propose modern political structures of its own for Catalonia. In this sense, like the majority of conservative Catalanist political doctrine and praxis, Pujolism has never been able to formulate a coherent position of Catalonia’s role within the Spanish state, or Catalonia’s relation to the Spanish nation. Even now, while Pujol declares himself to be nationalist, as does the party he represents, he has never really proposed an overall reform of the territorial structures of the Spanish state, not even when the nationalist coalition CiU held the balance of power in the Spanish parliament between 1993 and 1996 with the last Socialist government of Felipe González, and the first People’s Party government of José-Maria Aznar.

In terms of the distinctions between Galí’s doctrinal positions and Pujol’s own, two very much interrelated dimensions can be highlighted. On the one hand, Galí, while
not against political action *per se* was more concerned with constructing a doctrinal, spiritual critique of Catholic Catalanism, from Torras i Bages onwards, and thus to refound a new tradition capable of overcoming the problems that led to the Civil War (Lorés, 1985). Within this light, the CC was to be a forum in which such a doctrine was to be formulated by an elite group, and thus necessarily limited in its numbers and political pretensions. Pujol’s own vision, which would be translated into the project of ‘*fer pats*’ or ‘*construir Catalunya*’, was much more active and dynamic, with the explicit objective of mass mobilisation. In 1965, Pujol would declare that the act of national construction must not be “the result of an exercise of mental gymnastics, nor the fruit of a generous and rapidly-beating heart. It must be a programme in which, even though it may come from a position of relative unawareness, thousands, if not hundreds of thousands of Catalans are prepared to join” (Pujol, 1976: 176-177).

The contrast between the two men’s articulation of political doctrine into action underlies the basic doctrinal differences. While Galí sought to produce a radical Catholic critique of bourgeois Catalanism, Pujol and the support base that grew up around Pujolism would be far less demanding, remaining faithful in many ways to the centrality of the Church for Catalanism, as can be perceived in their adhesion to the ideas of Torras i Bages and Prat de la Riba (Lorés, 1985). What Lorés refers to the Catholic enlightenment of the 1960’s, that in turn informed the middle-class support base of Pujolism, was based on “misunderstood fragments of Péguy and Saint Euxpery”, and while preaching the need for daring and innovation, never questioned the religious base of ‘Catalan man’, as Galí himself had done. Thus,

“*current* Pujolism does not put forward Galí’s idea of a cultural and ethical revolution. [...] Catalan man, the basis of new Catalanism, that for Galí was a most difficult thing to find, for Pujol was easy, in that he lowered the ethical and cultural demands of his new Catalanism [...] What Pujol has conserved of Galí’s are remnants of his language and above all the inflation of ethical and voluntarist terms” (Lorés, 1985: 19).

The success of Pujolism in this sense was based on its continuity with Torras i Bages and *vigatanisme*, and thus was able to confront Spanish Catholicism of the Franco regime, without losing the religious essence of the conservative Catalanism. “Over the years, [*vigatanisme*] has come to form a decisive part of the basic ideological
terrain of Convergència, even though it is often presented in a secularised way” (Lorés, 1985: 19).

Thus Pujolism, as a ‘pre-political’ doctrine, gained widespread appeal among many middle-class Catholic Catalans in the 1960’s, who sought refuge from what was considered to be the hostile attitude of the Spanish Catholic Church, closely linked to Franco’s regime, and from the emerging Marxist-inspired movements of national liberation that had begun to play an important role in working-class and student opposition to the Franco regime. Pujol was able to vindicate innovation against the factors that had led to the Civil war, and against Spanish national Catholicism, while maintaining the doctrinal link with the Catalan Catholic tradition of Torras i Bages and the vigatans.

In terms of the translation of Pujolism into party politics and in particular into the defining element of the party ideology, Caminal i Badia concludes that CDC is a “party of the mobile centre”, “oscillating between centre-left and centre-right”, and hence, the lack of any ideological label, such as ‘Liberal’, ‘Conservative’ or even ‘Social Democratic’ (Caminal i Badia, 2001: 127, 128). The key to understanding CDC and Pujolism in this respect, is the emphasis on ‘Convergència’ (‘convergence’), in that beyond strictly left-right ideological lines, from the beginning Pujol had made it clear that the defining element of the party was its role at the centre of convergence of differing ideological positions, around the basic tenets of democracy and nationalism. Given the strength of the left in the transition period, Pujolism and CDC embraced social democratic ideas of the Welfare State, placing itself between the more radical, almost ‘revolutionary’ left, and the conservatism of many of those who had been associated with the Franco regime. Over time, as the general political scenario not only within Catalonia and Spain, but also within the West in general shifted right, so too has Pujolism, although the more extreme neo-liberal positions have been avoided.

With regards to the extent and the nature of the nationalist element of CDC, while on the one hand Pujol and his party have sought to be the point of national(ist) convergence within Catalonia, on the other, such convergence has been conditioned by CDC’s role as the “convergence between the governing of the autonomy of Catalonia and the governability of a modern, democratic Spain” (Caminal i Badia, 2001: 140), in the sense that it became clear that Catalan autonomy was based on the laying of sound democratic foundations of the Spanish state in general. Within this context, while defending the Spanish Constitution of 1978 and the Catalan Statute of Autonomy of
1979 as a great leap forward for Catalonia itself, they are not considered as a closed chapter, but rather the basis for the further development of Catalan self-government, although such claims have, in general been “‘possibilist’, gradualist and pragmatic” by nature (Caminal i Badia, 2001: 138). It is precisely this pragmatism and sense of institutional responsibility that has seen CDC shift from a party very much linked to the nationalist movement from within civil society, the very scenario for so much of Jordi Pujol’s own (pre)political activity of the 1950’s and 1960’s, to one more closely characterised as a professional electoral party, aimed at obtaining institutional power in the interests of Catalonia (Caminal i Badia, 2001: 130).

Pujolism and Territory

Having outlined the development of Pujolism and the way in which it maintains a certain continuity with *vigatanisme*, the next question to be addressed, and indeed the most important one, is the extent to which Pujolism can be considered to be territorial. In other words, what are the territorial premises that underlie it? and in what way does it construct a specific territorial vision of Catalonia and the Catalan nation?

To a large extent, the answers to such questions are by no means unproblematic. As we have seen with Sack’s observation about the ‘magical mystery’ form of territoriality that nationalism makes use of, the link between territory and nation is often not made explicit, and as such the theoretical problem of ascribing national personality to a territory, which in turn becomes the basis for the nation, is obviated by nationalists. However, despite such difficulties, I wish to argue that Pujolism can be considered territorial in different ways. Firstly, at a general doctrinal level, it becomes clear in his writings that his understanding of the nation relies to a great extent on its ‘grounding’ in national territory itself. The territorial nature of his understanding of the Catalan nation is reflected in Pujol’s thinking on the question of immigration, which ‘concentrates the minds’ of nationalists, in that it brings into sharper relief the way in which the nation is perceived. Secondly in this respect, the Catalan language, as a key element of national identity, has been the object of a policy process that has sought to ‘normalise’ the Catalan language in Catalonia, the justification for which is essentially territorial. Finally, Pujol’s written work and political action and the way they have been portrayed have contributed to establishing his figure as the representation of the essential link
between the Catalan nation and the national territory.

At the first, more general level, we have already seen the importance in Pujolism of the elements of spirituality and mystique for the nation. However, both concepts are grounded in a definite territorial setting, the national homeland, without which a nation is unable to live out its true destiny. In this respect, the case of Israel is most instructive, in that Pujol displays his admiration for Israel in terms of its economic, social and democratic achievements, although “Israel is all of this, but none of this explains Israel. Israel is only explained by a mystic fact, a fact of will and feeling, by a fact of national affirmation” (Pujol, 1979: 159). However, this spiritual, not material element of the Israeli nation could only be ‘sited’ in a particular place and nowhere else. Pujol notes how the Israeli people were offered a ‘national’ territory in Uganda by the British government, yet this offer was turned down in favour of the struggle for the recovery of the Israeli national homeland in what was then Palestine. He quotes the first Israeli president, Weiszman, when he says “only the land of Israel was capable of giving us the mystique and the energy without which our struggle from the beginning would have been lost. Only Israel, only the land whose name the Jews years have pronounced every night for 2000 with reverence” (Pujol, 1979: 160). Pujol thus defends the nation of Israel saying that it is precisely the spiritualism and mystique of the nation and its relationship with the national territory that allowed them to construct such a successful national project. Indeed, he attacks Marxism’s historic failure to come to terms with nationalism, and in particular the Stalinist tradition within Marxism that sought to ‘demystify’ the relation between the nation and its homeland.

The importance of the pátria for any nation is also underlined in Pujol’s discussion of the Greek national struggle against the Ottoman Empire, in which, once more, religion, nation and homeland are intimately related. Thus, for Pujol,

“the full splendour of the national homeland is almost only valued when one is without it. Hence the Greek homeland is especially beautiful in the heart of Anatolia, in Saint George, the town of the pope, Photis, or in Licovrisí. Only there, under the oppressing gaze of the aga, everything takes on its full meaning, both national and religious, that culmination of marvellous, granite-like faith. Christ is reborn, the ancients, the pátria will also be reborn” (Pujol, 1978: 100).
The destiny of the Greeks becomes almost indistinguishable for Pujol from the
destiny of the homeland, that consequently becomes the focus of almost religious
worship. Lamenting the lack of help from the West for the Greeks, he asks “[c]an the
world afford to let a small unfortunate people die, that, at the same time, clings firmly to
the ideals of freedom, justice and the love of the land, that land that [...] makes men
what they are” (Pujol, 1978: 100).

**Immigration and territory**

Beyond such general considerations, the territorial premises of Pujolism are
reflected in his thought and later policy actions on the subject of immigration in
Catalonia. At a general level, immigration challenges the nationalist construction of
territory in that ‘the other’ is ‘here’ in the national homeland, a situation which might
threaten the nationalist interpretation of the homeland as the source of the national
identity itself. In Catalonia, the question has been of special importance since the mass
immigration from rural southern Spain in the decades of the 1950’s, 1960’s and 1970’s,
during which time the population of Catalonia doubled. According to the municipal
census of 1975, 48% of the population over the age of twenty was born outside
Catalonia. These figures were especially high in the industrial belt of Barcelona: in
Cornellà del Llobregat, such immigrants represented 85% of the population; in Santa
Coloma de Gramanet 84%, in el Prat del Llobregat 84%, in Hospitalet del Llobregat
77%, in Terrassa 67%, in Sabadell 75%, in Badalona 69%, in Mataró 67%, in Barcelona
itself 66%, and in Manresa 48%. In other major cities, the phenomenon of immigration
was also felt: in Tarragona 62% of the population over the age of twenty was of
immigrant origin, in Reus 54%, in Lleida 49%, and in Girona 43% (Santamaría, 1999:
14-15).

Since the mid-1990’s, immigration from outside Spain and particularly from
non-EU countries has arrived in Catalonia. While immigration from EU countries has
remained relatively stable, non-EU immigration has risen sharply to the point where
non-Spanish immigrants represent 5.4% of the current Catalan population of just over 6
million. Currently, the most numerous groups are Moroccans (104,410), Ecuadorians
(21,082), followed by Peruvians (15,573) and Chinese (15,115). Overall, since 1996,
the non-Spanish immigrant population of Catalonia has risen by 274% (Avui, 15/2/03).
**Table 7.1 Non-Spanish Immigration in Catalonia (1996-2002)**

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<tr>
<td><strong>Total Population</strong></td>
<td>6,059</td>
<td>6,090</td>
<td>6,147</td>
<td>6,147</td>
<td>6,207</td>
<td>6,240</td>
<td>6,350</td>
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<td>(thousands)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total number of immigrants in</strong></td>
<td>114.3</td>
<td>124.5</td>
<td>148.8</td>
<td>183.7</td>
<td>214.9</td>
<td>280.2</td>
<td>341.7</td>
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<td>(thousands)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Percentage of immigrants in</strong></td>
<td>1.88</td>
<td>2.05</td>
<td>2.42</td>
<td>2.99</td>
<td>3.46</td>
<td>4.49</td>
<td>5.38</td>
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<tr>
<td>total population</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total EU immigrants</strong></td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>37.9</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>46.2</td>
<td>51.5</td>
<td>89.7</td>
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<td>(thousands)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total of non-EU immigrants</strong></td>
<td>78.9</td>
<td>92.1</td>
<td>110.9</td>
<td>139.3</td>
<td>168.8</td>
<td>228.6</td>
<td>251.9</td>
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Source: Ministerio de Interior, various years (1996-2001); *Avui*, 15/2/03.

(*) 2000, 2001, 2002 figures are for the European Economic Area, and include the EU and Iceland, Liechtenstein, Switzerland and Norway.

At a collective level, then, we have already seen how Pujol defines the Catalan nation as an essentially spiritual collectivity based on the family, the homeland and God. However, beyond what are inevitably abstractions, the question of individual belonging to the national group and the recognition of that belonging became increasingly important from the late 1950’s onwards. While recognising that being Catalan may take on many forms, Pujol states “the definition that I most like is that which says ‘a Catalan is any man who lives and works in Catalonia and who with his work, with his effort, helps to make [i.e. construct] Catalonia. One thing must be added: and that he makes Catalonia his home, that is, that one way or another he incorporates himself into it, he feels identified with it, he gives himself to it, he is not hostile to it’” (Pujol, 1976: 69-70). Elsewhere, he claims that “the immigrant [...] is a Catalan from the moment that he comes to Catalonia to live, to work and to love it” (Pujol, 1976: 69-70), thus being Catalan is synonymous with belonging to Catalonia itself, to the homeland. The ‘love for Catalonia’, for Pujol, must be reflected in the “pride of being Catalan, that is, being convinced that being Catalan is something worthwhile, and that Catalonia as a whole is worthwhile” (Pujol, 1976: 71). But perhaps above all, in order to display one’s fidelity to Catalonia and thus the will to be Catalan, the language is a key element: “it is a fact that for Catalonia and its affirmation as a people, the language is of
the highest importance. There are some who go as far as to claim that Catalonia is the Catalan language, and although they may be going too far, it is undeniable that it is a basic and decisive element” (Pujol, 1976: 82). Consequently,

“language is a decisive factor in the integration of immigrants in Catalonia. It is the most definitive. A man (sic) who speaks Catalan and who speaks Catalan with his children, is already Catalan through and through\(^3\). The language is [...] the surest and most common way to demonstrate our adhesion – more or less conscious, but real – and our fidelity to Catalonia” (Pujol, 1976: 83).

While the role of the language in the territorial construction of national identity will be considered in more detail below, for the present it can be said that it becomes clear that underlying all cultural manifestations of the nation is Catalonia itself, the national homeland. One belongs to Catalonia by demonstrating adherence to cultural practices that nationalists believe that the national homeland possesses above and beyond the changing patterns of occupation by people of different ethnic, cultural and linguistic origins. This is at the heart of all nationalist construction of identity: national identity concerns belonging to the homeland over which political claims are made, and belonging is demonstrated by the use of cultural practices, such as the language, that are ‘grounded’ by nationalists in the homeland itself.

From such premises, the incorporation of immigrants into the national group is necessarily assimilationist, as can be seen not only in the doctrinal development of Pujolism since the early 1960’s but also the policy orientation of the governments of the Generalitat over which Pujol has presided. Having said this, it would be unfair to portray Pujolism as some form of extreme far-right anti-immigration political doctrine. The title of his collection of essays on the subject, *La Immigració, problema i esperança de Catalunya* (*Immigration, problem and hope for Catalonia*), displays the duality or ambivalence of Pujol’s thought on the issue. On the one hand, Pujol defends Catalonia’s traditional role as a receiver of immigration due to its geographical situation as a ‘*terra de pas*’, a ‘land of transit’. Thus Catalonia “has received Castilian immigrants since the Middle Ages, it has received great numbers of French in the 16th

\(^3\) The original phrases in Catalan, “català de soca i arrel”, literally “Catalan of stump and roots”, is an eloquent reflection of the way in which the Catalan language lends itself to the establishment of close ties between the members of the national community and the homeland.
In the 16th and 17th centuries, many peoples of Europe, in one moment or another, have passed through Catalonia, *terra de pas*, a country linking the [Iberian] peninsula and the rest of Europe, a natural gate of entry” (Pujol, 1976: 104-105). In addition to Catalonia’s long tradition as a host-country to immigration, Pujol also recognises that within the model of economic development followed by Catalonia, immigration has been necessary as a source of labour to allow industrial growth.

However, the ‘problem’ that immigration raised for Catalonia, in addition to the threat that any mass migratory movement poses for national territorial unity, was considered to be specific to the circumstances in which the immigration flows of the 1950’s, 1960’s and 1970’s took place. In this respect, immigration took place in Catalonia against the background of

“a serious deficit in terms of the economic and political capacity [...] to resolve the social problems that immigration raises: [...] schools, housing, health, illiteracy, public transport. [...] Without sufficient resources and without adequate planning – and these elements are not available without political power – how can social policy be developed to address the heavy demands made on a country like Catalonia?” (Pujol, 1976: 28).

In addition to the lack of socio-economic and political infrastructure in Catalonia to incorporate immigrants into society, Pujol also highlighted the nature of the immigrants themselves, which he divided into two basic categories: “those who come with the mentality of an owner, of the man who comes to take possession of something that he considers as his: they are – speaking in general terms – the bureaucrats, military officers, many of the professional class, all of those who possess a pure Castilian mentality, central Castilian” (Pujol, 1976: 118). In contrast to this numerically small, yet powerful group of immigrants, come the majority, who, poor, come to seek a better life. However, such an immigrant is “very much incomplete. He is someone who for hundreds of years has gone hungry and has lived in a state of ignorance and in cultural, mental and spiritual misery. He is a man without roots, incapable of having a wider sense of community” (Pujol, 1976: 120).

The result of such immigration and of Catalonia’s socio-economic and cultural incapacity to absorb it satisfactorily is the “destruction of the sense of community, and of the rupture of the intimate collective unity [...] it is the destruction of the common
mentality, of that which is capable of binding men together who would otherwise be strangers” (Pujol, 1976: 62). This in turn, was linked to the danger that Catalonia itself would become ‘denaturalised’ and consequently ‘denationalised’, and that the Catalans “could become a minority in our own home” (Pujol, 1980: 218).

It is within this context, that Pujol explains his own position and subsequently that which has informed both his political party’s, CDC, and the Generalitat’s approach to the terms on which immigrants are to be incorporated into Catalan society. On the one hand, from the 1950’s onwards Pujol has always rejected the idea of two ‘juxtaposed’ communities of Castilians and Catalans, on the grounds that it would be to the detriment of both communities, that it was a “conservative” approach, unable to respond to the demands of the current circumstances, and that it was “of an evidently anti-Catalan inspiration” (Pujol, 1976: 34). While this is not elaborated on, if we ourselves understand nationalism and national identity in a territorial way, then the meaning becomes clear. It is anti-Catalan in that the explicit acceptance of ‘the other’ in the national territory, that is ‘here’, undermines claims for national territorial unity. This is not to say that in practice there has not been a certain tendency towards the creation of ghettos. Pujol himself notes how in 1976, in the towns and cities that make up the industrial belt of Barcelona, such as l’Hospitalet de Llobregat, Santa Coloma, Sant Adrià, Cornellà, the old town-centres (i.e. traditionally ‘Catalan’) have been unable to create the conditions for the cohesive incorporation of immigrants into Catalonia (Pujol, 1976). Consequently, as we shall see, such places do not occupy a prominent position in the spatial hierarchy of places within the national territory, but this is not to say that nationalists must renounce their incorporation into the national territory.

On the other hand, the diametrically opposing option, assimilation, is likewise rejected. Assimilation is understood as “the total acceptance, without any contribution or involvement by the immigrants in the culture and of a way of life of the society that receives them” (Pujol, 1976: 33-4). Instead then, he prefers integration “that is a process or interrelation, a play of mutual influences that has a fundamental objective: the creation of a single reality. Of a single reality that is the result of this play of mutual influence. In the process of integration, the newly-arrived elements have a role to play” (Pujol, 1976: 34; see also Pujol, 1980)4.

Thus at first glance, it might appear that Pujol rejects more traditional,

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4 For a theoretically-informed analysis of competing interpretations of ‘integration’, ‘assimilation’ and
conservative approaches to immigration that either call for separation or total absorption. However, the language used to some extent hides a more assimilationist position with respect to immigration that is based in turn on territorial premises. Thus, immediately after offering what he calls his ‘innovations’ on integration, he goes on to warn against the dangers of a melting-pot society, “one that represents a pot-pourri mixture, something ill-defined, unconnected, something, shall we say, that has not yet gelled” (Pujol, 1980: 218). Given the fact that “everyone needs a collectivity of people in which to develop personally” (Pujol, 1980: 218), he highlights the “permanent fact and the essential nucleus of integration, without which Catalonia will lose its continuity and coherence”, and may even “cease to be a people” (Pujol, 1976: 34). Thus, “the guarantee of success [of continuity as a nation] is that we are grafted onto a reality of sufficient importance, and the only thing of sufficient importance, with historical roots, with roots that have taken deep into men that have come from abroad, is the Catalan root” (Pujol, 1980: 219). Such roots are basically traditional: “there are certain elements present in the traditional Catalan origins that we will have to count on at least for many years” (Pujol, 1980: 219). Overall, Colomer concludes that “Pujol conceived Catalonia as something opposed to an idea of mixture, as a reality already formed in its substance, based on the past, on a mentality and on traditional values, to which it was necessary, as such, to incorporate oneself” (Colomer, 1986: 160).

The appeal to an essential, permanent spirit as the base around which all integration must take place is justified on two main grounds: at a normative level, such a nucleus, and by extension the Catalan people, should continue to exist, despite the threat of ‘denaturalisation’ and ‘denationalisation’; and secondly, such a nucleus assures the personal development of individuals within a cohesive and cohesioned society. However, beyond such spiritual essentialism, there is a way in which the assimilation of immigrants is justified on territorial grounds. As I have argued throughout this work, nationalism seeks to define the nation in terms of the national territory, to the extent that it is the national territory that effectively nationalises the population that inhabits it. The essentialist and perennialist construction by nationalists of the national territory effectively ‘grounds’ the national identity in an unchanging reality, justifying the adaptation of immigrants, in this case, to the ‘national reality’. ‘Integration’, as Pujol defines it, would necessarily undermine the essentialist, perennialist construction of the

‘multiculturalism’, see Solé et al., (2002).
national territory by nationalists themselves, and thus national identity would lose its moorings.

This line of reasoning becomes apparent in the way in which Pujol would share many of the arguments developed by Francesc Candel in two publications, which Pujol himself praised and incorporated into his own series of texts on the issue of immigration (see Pujol, 1976). Candel’s arguments, and the importance of territory for them can be summed up in the following passage:

“During the war, the residents of La Torrasa put up a sign saying ‘Catalonia ends here. Murcia begins here’. You may see how categorically and how convincingly – convincingly? – provinces and regions [...] are partitioned, delimited, extended or reduced, [...] done or undone [...] These good fellows were Murcian and were defending their ground, by George! I wonder what goes to make them up: men or the land? If it is men, then these ‘flamencs’ from Torrasa were right; if it is the land, then they were not. Maybe we should consider it as the coming together of both elements. Maybe not. Spain, full of Frenchmen, would be Spain? In spite of everything I believe so. As such these simple folk from Torrasa were not right. That was Catalonia, whatever they might say. Men acclimatise. The land is imperturbable. Men love the land where they live” (Candel quoted in Pujol, 1976: 131).

Should we be in any doubt, Pujol reaffirms such a vision, making a direct reference to Candel, when he proclaimed that the “Catalan nation was based on the right of the land, on the force of the land, and on the hope that the land, as Candel always said, ends up on top, ends up imposing its constants” (Pujol, 1980: 221). Again, this brings us back to our original point on Pujol’s definition of ‘who is a Catalan’, with which this section began. To belong to the land, and therefore to the nation, one must demonstrate that one loves it. To love it is to adapt oneself to the traditions, culture, language and so forth of the land, of Catalonia. It is Catalonia that defines the Catalans and not vice-versa.

Over time, Pujol’s position with respect to immigration has developed little with the changes in the nature of immigration in Catalonia itself. While from a pragmatic

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5 Candel’s text appears in Catalan, although the sign was written in Spanish and reproduced in Spanish in
point of view immigration is accepted as part and parcel of the contemporary world, this acceptance is qualified by what are essentially the territorial premises of his political ideas.

In 2001, the Generalitat de Catalunya inaugurated an itinerant exhibition, ‘Tierra de Acogida’, ‘Land of Welcome’, that has sought to portray a more positive image of Catalonia in the rest of Spain and in particular to highlight its role as a ‘welcome society’. Within this context, Pujol gave a speech in which not only did he reiterate his ideas on immigration that he developed up to forty years ago, but also the language. Thus, after praising the contribution of immigrants to Catalan society, and highlighting Catalonia’s traditional role as a host society to immigration, Pujol returned to the idea of the necessity for integration of different people within a unitary structure. Thus

“a fruit tree can receive grafts, and in many cases it is good for it to receive them, and some of the best fruit that we have today are the result of grafts. But it must be made clear that the trunk must exist. Without it there is no possibility of a graft. There must be a trunk, roots, sap, [...] And thus, in both in social and national terms, no-one could be integrated, no-one could be taken in, if the country did not exist.

Thus, all those that demand that we have the capacity to integrate, must admit that we must strengthen the trunk. The trunk changes over time, [...] but in any case a historic continuity, what we might call the central chord of history and of what it brings it in terms of values, identity, references etc., must evidently be maintained” (Pujol, 2001).

For Pujol, then, it is clear that the metaphor of the trunk and the grafts, not only refers to the process of integration of immigrants from the rest of Spain, but that it also serves as a means of coming to terms with the new multi-cultural immigration that has arrived in Catalonia in recent years, if “we are to avoid being dissolved into an indefinite mass, both ourselves and those who come from abroad” (Pujol, 2001).

The territorial premises of Pujol’s arguments and their consequences for the model of the ‘integration’ of immigrants into Catalan society, not only remain largely unchanged, but are explicitly revealed in the following quote that forms part of another

Candel’s text.
speech regarding the challenges of integration: “Let us not fool ourselves. This forms part of human nature: defending one’s territory. Every animal species defends its territory and the human race too” (Pujol, 2000: 18). He goes on to illustrate the point in his characteristic, down-to-earth style: “[w]hen, one day, people realise that they can no longer walk to the village square with the same tranquillity as before because others have occupied it, because there are a lot of them or because they have no job and they are there all day - and it is not their fault, of course -, then they lose control of the square” (Pujol, 2000: 20).

To summarise, this section has sought to analyse the territorial premises that inform Pujolism as a nationalist doctrine, without which we would be unable to fully understand Pujolism’s conception of the nation and national identity. Other elements, normally placed at the same level or even above the national territory in the hierarchy of identity, are derived from the homeland. Nationalists invest the homeland with the power to produce national identity, and consequently linguistic and cultural practices exist as a means of proving that one belongs and/or that one wants to belong. The consequences for the incorporation of immigrants, ‘the other’, into the national community, ‘we’, and the national territory, ‘here’, must necessarily take place along assimilationist grounds, since they must adapt themselves to the national homeland, and not vice-versa. The next section seeks to analyse in a more detailed fashion how the issue of language reflects such territorial premises.

**Pujolism and language**

We have already seen the pre-eminence of the Catalan language in the definition of the nation for Jordi Pujol in the 1970’s. Time has not diminished this claim, and might in fact have strengthened it. Speaking in 1995, Pujol argued that for a people, language is “a fundamental sign of identity, a determining element of its personality, a means of defining and, at the same time, of creating and developing the [nation’s] own mentality and consciousness” (Pujol, 1995: 6). In the particular case of Catalonia, he claimed, “[f]or Catalonia, the language, the Catalan language, is a basic element of our identity, of our being as a people [...] Catalan is the nerve of our nation. [...] As
president of Catalonia, while not alone, I have, nevertheless, the highest responsibility for the defence and strengthening of the personality of our people, of the health of Catalan” (Pujol, 1995: 5). The importance of the Catalan language to the political project of Pujolism, reflects an historical continuity with Prat de la Riba’s (1978) doctrine, in turn inspired in the ideas of German Romantics such as Fichter and Herder.

Given the importance of the Catalan language and the strong institutional position occupied by Pujolism over the last 20 years, I now wish to examine how the importance of the language has been promoted institutionally by the government of the Generalitat through the process of ‘linguistic normalisation’, based on the rights recognised by the constitutional frameworks of the Spanish Constitution of 1978, the Catalan Statute of Autonomy of 1979, and a series of legislation that has placed the language question at the very heart of nationalist politics in Catalonia over the last two decades or so. Having outlined such a process, attention will turn to offering a critique of the territorial premises on which ‘linguistic normalisation’ in Catalonia ultimately rests.

The Catalan language and its speakers have suffered a centuries-long tradition of persecution and repression by the Spanish state, during which time systematic attempts have been made to impose ‘national’ unity against a context of heterogeneous and even multi-national reality in Spain. The Franco dictatorship was particularly severe in this respect, banning the public use of Catalan, and as such, the transition to democracy in Catalonia became inextricably linked with the granting of political autonomy based on explicit recognition of cultural (especially linguistic) and historical difference. Article 3 of the Spanish Constitution states that “Castilian is the official Spanish language of the state. All Spaniards have the duty to know it and the right to use it”. However, at the same time, “[t]he other languages of Spain will also be official in the respective autonomous communities, in accordance with their Statutes. The richness of the linguistic modalities of Spain is a cultural patrimony which will be the object of special respect and protection”. Article 3 of the Preamble to the Catalan Statute of Autonomy reflects the centrality of the Catalan language, when it states that:

“Catalonia’s own language is Catalan. The Catalan language is the official one of Catalonia, as is Castilian, official in all of the Spanish state. The Generalitat will guarantee the normal and official use of both languages, and will take the necessary measures to ensure the knowledge of both and will create the conditions
that allow full equality in terms of rights and duties of the citizens of Catalonia”.

In the light of this basic legal framework and the political desire, not just of Pujolism, but also across the Catalan mainstream political spectrum to guarantee the future of the Catalan language as the main reference point of Catalan cultural differentiation with respect to the rest of the Spanish state, in his investiture speech to the Catalan parliament in April of 1980, Pujol would reiterate his stance: “We are a people in danger of denationalisation and also of internal, deep and radical rupture […] Thus, one of the fundamental objectives of the programme of this government that I have the honour of presenting to the Parlament, will be the normalisation of the Catalan language”. Pujol went on to outline the need for Catalan to have a strong presence in the ambits of the administration and public services, education, and culture and the media, with the overall “objective [being] to ensure that in Catalonia, the own language and culture of the country are Catalan” (quoted in Santamaría, 1999: 39-40).

Consequently, work would soon begin on the process of ‘linguistic normalisation’, which would produce its first legislative fruits when, on the 6th of April, 1983 the regional minister of Culture, Max Cahner, presented before the Parliament of Catalonia the Law of Linguistic Normalisation (LLN) where it was passed unanimously. The LLN consists of an introduction, a preliminary section, five sections, and some additional, provisional and final regulations. The preliminary section deals with the goals of the law: to support and promote the use of Catalan, to put into effect the official use of Catalan in order to normalise its use in all mass media, and to guarantee the extension of people’s knowledge about the Catalan language. This section also refers to the right of all Catalans have to express themselves in Catalan in all fields. The first section of the law deals with the preferential use that Catalan must have in the administration. The second section, the most controversial one, regulates the use of Catalan in education. It specifies that Catalan children must be able to correctly use both official languages when they finish their basic studies. Catalan will be considered the common language to be used in teaching at all levels. The third section of the law regulates the promotion of Catalan in the media, allowing a policy of subsidies to the press, the theatre, the cinema, the publishing world, etc. depending on the language used, only if these measures are applied “with objective criteria and without discrimination”. The fourth section refers to the institutional help that the policy of normalisation has to obtain from the organs of the Generalitat and local authorities.
These measures include the compulsory knowledge of Catalan by civil servants, the creation of official centres for the normalisation and the promotion of the use of Catalan in all public spheres by the administration. Finally, the fifth section deals with Aranès and plans a specific application of the law in the Val d’Aran, where the use of the local language in education and the administration will be guaranteed.

By the mid-1990’s there existed the feeling, particularly within nationalist sectors, that the 1983 LLN had been surpassed by social changes and that a new law would have to be drawn up capable of ensuring the future of the Catalan language and consequently, according to the reasoning of nationalists such as Pujol, of the Catalan nation itself. After months of protracted negotiations, not only between the various political parties represented in the Catalan Parliament, but also with associations and interest groups from Catalan civil society, on the 30th of December, 1997, the new Law of Linguistic Policy (LLP) (1/1998) was passed in parliament, with votes in favour of CiU, PSC, the eco-socialist group Iniciativa per Catalunya (IC), the Partit per la Independència (PI), the abstention of the Partit del Comunistes de Catalunya (PCC), with ERC voting against along with the PP, although for very different reasons. The new law, not only sought to redress past wrongs, but also to face the challenges of globalization. The preamble makes this very clear:

“The Catalan language[...] has been harmed by certain events in the history of Catalonia, which have led it to a precarious situation. This situation has come about due to such factors as the political persecution that it has received and the legal imposition of Castilian for over two and a half centuries; the political and socio-economic conditions in which demographic changes have taken place over recent decades; and, in addition, the fact that it is language of a restricted ambit, similar to other official languages in Europe, particularly in the contemporary world in which communications, information and cultural industries tend towards globalisation”.

Consequently, in many ways the new LLP deepened the legal framework in areas such as the use of Catalan in and by the various public administrations in Catalonia, including the justice system that was still heavily dominated by Castilian,

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and in the field of obligatory education. However, in the socio-economic and cultural fields, perceived to be the scenarios in which globalisation might most affect the Catalan language, a series of new, controversial measures were taken. Thus, the new law (section 5) sought to ensure the presence of Catalan within public and private enterprises and in their relations with the general public. For example, since the passing of the LLP, the Generalitat has signed 14 agreements with major firms in Catalonia, including private utilities, to bill clients in Catalan in the absence of explicit demands for bills in Castilian (Santamaría, 1999: 95). The issue of labelling of products in Catalan was also raised, albeit timidly due to the existing European legislation of the question, while publicity, such as shop signs was also legislated for, with a transition period being agreed for shops to ensure that signs be at least in Catalan.

In terms of the production of cultural goods, the LLP for the first time introduced the concept of quotas for radio and television broadcasters in Catalonia, whose concession depends on the Generalitat, and, perhaps more problematically, for the showing of films produced outside Catalonia. In this respect, the LLP seeks to implement a quota of 50% of all subtitled or dubbed films to be in Catalan, as opposed to Castilian, although this has been undermined on the one hand by legal challenges to the decree that set up a system of fines for the failure to comply with the Law, and, on the other, the attitude of the ‘Hollywood Majors’, reticent to bow to pressures from such ‘minority’ languages, despite pledges by the Generalitat to cover the costs of subtitling and dubbing.

While the overall aim of the current section is not to provide an exhaustive analysis of all elements of linguistic policy in Catalonia since 1980, but rather to develop a critique of the territorial premises of the process of linguistic normalisation, it is nevertheless worthwhile noting some of the positive consequences of the policy of linguistic normalisation of the various governments headed by Jordi Pujol.

In terms of the overall proficiency of the population of Catalonia in the Catalan language, measured by the ‘coefficient of competence’, that is the coefficient that represents people’s ability to understand, speak, read and write in Catalan, since 1986, the overall figure has increased from 0.62, to 0.67 in 1991, and to 0.72 in 1996 (Farràs i Farràs et al. 2000). Geographically, the most notable increases took place in and around Barcelona and other major cities that had absorbed a considerable number of Castilian speaking immigrants between the 1950’s and 1970s, and where mainly second-
generation immigrants were schooled in Catalan for the first time.\footnote{The ‘coefficient of competence’ rose most in the \emph{comarca} of the Baix Llobregat, 15 points, followed by that of the Vallès Occidental and the Tarragonès, each rising 14 points compared between 1986 and 1996 (Farràs i Farràs et al. 2000).}

In terms of age, the results of schooling in Catalan are reflected in the fact that the most significant increase in proficiency in the Catalan language came about among the younger sections of the population who had enjoyed the benefits of schooling in the Catalan language since the implementation of the LLN\footnote{According to survey data of the Department of Culture, comprehension among the age group of 5 to 24 year olds exceeds 98\%, higher than any other age group, followed by the group comprised of ages between 25 years old and 44 years old, in which 96\% understand Catalan. The percentage of those able to speak Catalan (90\%) is highest between those in the age group between 10 and 24 years old, while the same age group once more obtains the highest percentage (90\%) of those able to read in Catalan. In terms of the ability to write in Catalan, the same age group once more exceeds all others, with 87\% of the sample able to write in Catalan (Departament de Cultura, 2001).}. The success of the policy in improving proficiency in Catalan is also reflected in the positive evaluation expressed towards the policy in surveys conducted by the Department of Culture of the Generalitat, whereby in the period between 1999 and 2001, the policy was the best considered of all the policies implemented by the Generalitat\footnote{The survey, comprised of a sample of 800 people between February 1999 and November 2000, and 1400 in July and December 2001, gave an average score of 6.58 to the language policy, compared to an average of 6.21 for the government of the Generalitat as a whole (Departament de Cultura, 2001).}.

The above data reflect the importance of the process of linguistic normalisation applied to the ambit of obligatory education. Traditionally, education has always been a key instrument for national socialisation, due to its obligatory nature and the fact that those ‘submitted’ to the process of socialisation are of an age when the process is considered to be more effective than in later life. In the context of Catalonia, the education process has been at the heart of the policy of linguistic normalisation, and also the focus of a great deal of controversy.

The LLN of 1983 was ambiguous on the matter of education, which meant that over time different interpretations were made that reflected shifts in policy. Article 14.1 states that “Catalan, as Catalonia’s own language, is also that of teaching at all levels of education”. Article 20 continues in the same line, stating that “centres of education must make the Catalan language the vehicle of normal expression”, while Article 14.5 insists that “the administration must take the necessary measures so that the Catalan language be increasingly used as pupils become increasingly proficient in it”. However, to some extent, the LLN also introduces a certain degree of counterbalance, insisting on the aim
of bilingualism. Thus Article 14.2 states that “children have the right to receive primary education in the language that they normally use, be it Catalan or Castilian, while Article 14.3 adds that “the Catalan language and the Castilian language must be taught obligatorily at all levels and degrees of non-university education”. Finally, Article 14.4 seeks to guarantee that “all children of Catalonia, whatever their habitual language at the beginning of schooling, must be able to use both Catalan and Castilian normally and correctly at the end of their basic education”

This ambivalence of the LLN meant that for most of the decade of the 1980’s, the implementation of the policy was flexible. Avoiding the separation of pupils into different schools according to language, (LLN, Article 14.5 a)) children could opt for Castilian or Catalan as the main languages of teaching with specific classes dedicated to the other. In the industrial belt around Barcelona, this meant that many schools were dominated by the Castilian language, the mother tongue of the majority of pupils (Santamaría, 1999: 48-49).

However, towards the end of the decade, a process of linguistic immersion was begun, whereby those schools with 70% of Castilian-speaking pupils that explicitly asked to be included in the programme (with the support of the parents) implemented linguistic immersion (Catalan as the vehicular language for all schooling) for children between the ages of 3 and 7 years old. By 1992, 55,000 pupils from 800 schools, a third of the total, had undergone such a process (Santamaría, 1999: 57). On the 9th of March 1992, the Framework-Decree 75.1992, taking advantage of the new state-wide legislation on education, the Law of General Organisation of the Education System (LOGSE) of 1990, insisted on the idea that Catalan, as Catalonia’s own language, should also be that of education (Article 3.1), and as such emphasises a specific interpretation of the LLN, which meant the effective ending of the ‘twin-track’ schooling in both Catalan and Castilian. In order to guarantee the fulfilment of the obligation laid out in the LLN for the means to be made available for those pupils who wished to receive at least a part of their education in Castilian, the policy of individualised attention was implemented, that essentially separated such children from the rest of their classmates, a measure considered by many to be discriminatory (see, for example, Santamaría, 1999; and Branchadell, 1997).

Overall, in the ambit of primary and secondary education, there has been a definite shift away from the equal treatment of Castilian and Catalan in the schooling process, to one in which the Catalan language and those whose mother tongue it is are
granted special rights. From the perspective of basic rights, how might such a situation be justified?

Branchadell (1997) considers that such preferential treatment, creating formal, procedural inequality, may be justified in terms of the notion of positive discrimination, that is to redress the negative discrimination that the Catalan language and its speakers have suffered historically at the hands of the Spanish state, particularly in the two periods of dictatorship in the twentieth century. Indeed, such a position is clearly expressed in a policy document, of the Directorate General of Linguistic Policy of the Generalitat:

“Until the situation of Catalan is not comparable with that of Castilian, a linguistic policy of equalisation must be adopted, giving preferential treatment to Catalan, since to apply an equal treatment to both languages without having overcome the initial inequality would consummate the disadvantaged position of Catalonia’s own language” (quoted in Bardanchell, 1997: 120).

Such a position, implies that the policy of linguistic normalisation might be referred to as a process whereby an “abnormal situation is returned to normality” (Strubell i Trueta, 1981: 17), which in this case, seeks to redress a situation created by previous discrimination. As such, it may be inferred that such preferential treatment will be of a temporary nature, ending when the objective of equality is reached (Branchadell, 1997: 119). Of course, the concept of normality is problematic: on the one hand, what it might mean in a given context ultimately depends on the relations of power within society, while on the other, at a more practical level, how might normality be returned to, when, during the period of discrimination, mass immigration has meant that almost half the current population has a different mother tongue to the Catalan language? Despite such problems, Branchadell claims that, at least in the 1980’s, “it might have seemed that linguistic immersion constituted a temporary policy of inequality in favour of Catalan with the objective of equality. In other words, it might have seemed that once equality had been achieved, linguistic immersion would be abandoned, at least as a normal technique of schooling” (Branchadell, 1997: 119). However, the same author goes on to add that by the end of the 1980’s,

“the objective of normalisation would no longer be to situate the two languages on
an equal plane, but rather make Catalan, a Catalonia’s own language, the ‘normal’
language of the country. If the key word of the first vision of the objective of
linguistic normalisation was ‘redress’ or ‘equality’, in the second vision, the key
word is ‘hegemony’ or, at the very least, ‘priority’” (Branchadell, 1997: 121).

Overall, the changes in the implementation of the process of linguistic
normalisation in the field of education reflected a wider shift in policy to promote the
Catalan language as the ‘normal’ language of social communication within Catalan
territory. According to Ginebra, in 1990 the erstwhile director general of linguistic
policy of the Generalitat, “referred to the objective that the Catalan language should
once more predominate in all ambits of our society, leaving aside expressions referring
to the achievement of equality between the two official languages” (Ginebra, 1992: 21).
The Generalitat’s green paper for the reform of the LLN in 1993, once more placed
emphasis on the status of the Catalan language as Catalonia’s ‘own’, demanding that
Catalan be the dominant language of public affairs (Branchadell, 1997: 125-126).

This new direction in linguistic policy has received the support of all political
parties in Catalonia, with the exception of the PP, and among nationalist academic
circles, although, as we shall see, this does not mean that political, academic and even
legal challenges have not been brought against this interpretation of ‘linguistic
normalisation’. The question thus arises as to how might such a vision of linguistic
normalisation be justified?

A leading nationalist socio-linguist, Miquel Strubell i Trueta raises the question
as to “[w]hat is normality in a cultural context?” In the case of countries such as
Switzerland, Canada or Belgium he claims that “we must consider that the principle of
territoriality must be applied at the official level. That means that if, in a region, the
own, historic language has always been language ‘X’, then it should be the official
language, the only official one, in the local and regional administration, in education,
and in the media of communication, such as the daily press, the radio and TV that
operate in the region” (Strubell i Trueta, 1981: 15). In this sense, normality is achieved
when all dealings with the administration are in the “country’s own language”, when
“literary output and publishing are in the country’s own language”, when “except some
space dedicated to immigrants from other languages, the television and press are in the
own language”, when trade and commerce within, in this case, Catalonia, are in the
“country’s own language” (Strubell i Trueta, 1981: 15). Naturally, in the case of the
existence of immigration from other regions of the same state with different languages, “this does not bring a change to this officiality - the newcomers must learn the territorial language [of the place of residence] - there is no other” (Strubell i Trueta, 1981: 15-16). At the same time, he argues that Castilian has never been Catalonia’s own language, and that it has only been through the cultural oppression of the Spanish state and the ‘floods’ of immigration, particularly in the metropolitan Barcelona, that the Catalan language has been threatened. Consequently, “we must demand what is just, that which corresponds to the language of the territory for over a thousand years” (Strubell i Trueta, 1981: 21), which, *inter alia*, includes the ending of the co-officiality of Castilian and the promotion of the exclusive use of Catalan. Overall, Strubell i Trueta ultimately makes the case for the coincidence of the official status of the Catalan language and its status as Catalonia’s own language, based on the territorial principle.

While mainstream Catalan nationalism, with Pujolism at its centre, has always been reticent to challenge the constitutional order, and has accepted the co-officiality of Castilian, the essence of Strubell i Trueta’s position has informed much of the consensus across many social sectors over language policy in Catalonia. This position finds its justification in the juxtaposition of territorial collective language rights associated with Catalan and individual linguistic rights associated with the official nature of Castilian in Catalonia. This distinction was developed for the first time by the forerunner of IC, the communist PSUC in 1977. In a paper presented by Francesc Vallverdú at a conference on linguistic policy in 1977, he first outlines the importance of the Catalan language in the national project: “[t]hrough the language, national identity is established, belonging to a differentiated culture is expressed”. He goes on talk of “a democratic co-officiality in the following terms: a conditioned officiality for the Catalan language (territorial linguistic rights) combined with a regime of co-officiality for Castilian (personal linguistic rights)” (quoted in Santamaría, 1999: 25). In many ways this posture was taken up by the socio-linguist, Albert Bastardes: “the concept of ‘own language’ must be made effective as opposed to that of ‘official language’. The former should be interpreted as a ‘territorial language’ and thus fundamental and pre-eminent, while the latter refers to purely individual rights” (quoted in Branchadell, 1997: 126).

From within the Generalitat, the sub-director of linguistic policy until 1996 would write that “society must function in the territorial language [...] in that each [linguistic] community sees the territorial primacy of its own language respected in
public use”, while elsewhere he called for “an interpretation of the dual officiality that respects the primacy of the territorial language” (quoted in Branchadell, 1997: 126).

From a liberal perspective, Branchadell concludes that the “connection between the notion of own language and the idea of normalisation is not direct, rather it is made via another notion, that of collective rights: from the status of own language that is exclusively attributed to Catalan, the existence of a collective right of Catalan speakers is derived, a right considered a priority against the individual rights of the Castilian-speaking population of Catalonia” (Branchadell, 1997: 128).

However, if our analysis rests on the dichotomy of collective and individual language rights, we are in danger of losing sight of where such rights might be derived from. In this particular case, as I have argued throughout this chapter, the Catalan language and its speakers are granted privileges over their Castilian counterparts because of the ‘principle of territoriality’, in other words, precisely because of the nationalists’ claim that Catalan is the historic territorial language of Catalonia. However, such territorial premises are problematic in two ways: firstly, the notion of a territory having its own language is questionable in general; and secondly, the way in which a language might be considered a territory’s ‘own’ one may also be controversial and difficult to establish ‘objectively’.

Turning to the first question, the problem resides in the idea that a given territory can have its own language. In the words of Colin Baker: “Do languages belong to regions and territories and not to the speakers of those languages or to groups of those languages wherever they may be found?” (quoted in Branchadell, 1997: 141). In terms of political opposition to the idea of Catalonia’s own language, Aleix Vidal-Quadras, leader of the PP in Catalonia in the first half of the 1990’s, expressed the idea in similar terms: “I would like to make clear a conceptual issue: languages do not belong to territories, but rather to people. One can never say that a language belongs to a territory because languages are not physical characteristics but rather codes of communication between people” (quoted in Branchadell, 1997: 140).

Indeed, during one of the legal challenges to the policy of linguistic immersion in Catalonia, a group of parents stated that “[t]erritories do not have a language of their own, people do, and we have the right to an education for our children in our ‘own
language [Castilian]” (quoted in Barrera-González, 1995: 88). In the terms of the analysis that has been presented throughout this thesis, a national territory can only have its ‘own language’ as the result of a specific process of national territorial socialisation, such as that that begun in Catalonia with the Renaixença and that has effectively continued until the present day.

Secondly, even if we admit the questionable idea that a territory can have its ‘own language’, how might the process by which the language becomes the territory’s ‘own’ be justified? One of the principle arguments put forward by linguistic nationalists in Catalonia is that Catalan originates in Catalonia and as such it must be considered as Catalonia’s ‘own’, to the exclusion of others, particularly Castilian. As one Catalan linguistic nationalist explained: “Catalan is the language which is derived, in Catalonia, directly from Latin. Castilian is not derived from Latin at the same time as Catalan in the same territory. Castilian was born in another geographic space and has lived a different history” (Espinàs, quoted in Branchadell, 1997: 144).

Such an assertion in deeply problematic in a number of ways. Firstly, nationalists could no longer claim that Catalan is the ‘own language’ of the Paísos Catalans, given that it was the Catalan conquerors that brought the language with them around the 13th century. Indeed, nor could French be considered Quebec’s own language for similar reasons. A further deduction from this claim is that given that only the original language can be considered as the ‘own language’ of the national territory in question, then each territory must necessarily have only one ‘own language’, its original one. Consequently, some national territories would currently be without an ‘own language’, or would have to adopt a different one than that spoken by the vast majority of the population, such as would be the case in the USA. Finally, and mirroring more general nationalist discourse such as that of Pujolism analysed above, Espinàs maintains that “even if only a thousand people spoke it”, Catalan would continue to be Catalonia’s own language (quoted in Branchadell, 1997: 146). From a democratic and even practical perspective, how could a process of linguistic normalisation, based on the primacy of Catalan over Castilian, be justified and implemented, when the object of normalisation is spoken by a mere 0.01665% of the population? This is precisely what nationalists leaders such as Pujol fear when they talk of the denationalisation of the country and the need to promote the Catalan language as a means of maintaining the nation alive.

As a means of avoiding the problems associated with such extremes, while
maintaining the idea that a territory can have its ‘own language or languages’ Marí (1995) introduces the idea of degrees of historicity for languages, going from an absolute of the territory’s ‘original language’, as Catalan nationalists argue, to more qualified arguments concerning ‘relative historicity’ of the relation between language and territory. In the case of Catalonia, the Catalan language would be the language of maximum, original historicity, but that this might not preclude the idea that Castilian too, might be considered Catalonia’s own language, given the ‘relative historicity’ of the presence of Castilian, however minoritarian, since late medieval times. But from a nationalist point of view, Castilian cannot be considered to be Catalonia’s ‘own language’, since that would accept the presence of ‘the other’ ‘here’ in ‘our’ national territory, calling into question the territorially-derived construction of the juxtaposition between ‘we’ and ‘the other’, and thus of the nation’s relation with the national territory itself. This is the main consequence of the territorial principle when applied to the national language.

Jordi Pujol, ‘Home de la Terra’

Having discussed the territorial premises that inform Pujolism, and in particular how such premises inform the way that Pujolism conceives of the nation, the next section seeks to go beyond ‘content’, to concentrate on the ‘form’ of Pujolism and the way in which Jordi Pujol himself is portrayed and portrays himself as a man closely linked to the Catalan homeland itself.

Perhaps the first thing to discuss is the explicit nature of the relationship between Pujol and the Catalan pàtria that emerges. In an interview published on this very question, (Tort i Donada and Tobaruela i Martínez, 2000), Pujol declares that “I have never hidden the fact that I love this country, in all senses. I love Catalonia. I love it physically and even sensually. I have had this feeling since I was a child” (Tort i Donada and Tobaruela i Martínez, 2000: 27). In his 1981 biography of Pujol, Wirth notes that “he goes into raptures when Catalonia enters into the conversation. He loves it in a sensual, almost carnal way, as one of his friends has explained. The Pàtria [sic] comes before everything else. As he told Marta [his wife] before being married: there will be times when the Pàtria will come before the family” (Wirth, 1981: 34). This idea
of *pàtria* before family is confirmed in the same publication by Pujol’s wife, Marta Ferrusola: “the day that we got engaged to be married [...] Jordi said to me that I would have to accept that the *Pàtria* would have to come before the family sometimes. And, of course, it has done on various occasions” (Wirth, 1981: 51). Thus, from the beginning, there appears a clear attempt to portray Pujol as sacrificing himself and his family for the greater good of Catalonia, and specifically the homeland. This is largely consistent with the ideas of leadership that Pujol developed within the context of the CC group, and more specifically with Pujol’s interpretation of the writings of Péguy and Saint Exupéry (Pujol, 1978).

How then does Pujol develop his love for the *pàtria*? Again, this is made most explicit in the construction of his persona, in that it is his farming roots that have ensured his attachment to the homeland. He claims to be “the son of a farmer, of farming family from Premià de Dalt” (Tort i Donada and Tobaruela i Martínez, 2000: 27). Actually born in Barcelona, Pujol would attend school while his father worked his way up the hierarchy of the financial sector until becoming a stockbroker. However, Pujol’s own memories of his childhood and those accounts of it written by those close to him, tend to gloss over his urban childhood and centre on his farming roots and his happy days of village life in Premià.

This insistence on such roots allows him to situate himself within the tradition of his ‘master’ Péguy and of Torras i Bages himself. Thus, “Péguy was never a farmer, but he was from farming stock. More precisely from humble farming stock, and was proud of it (almost as much, let it be said, as our great bishop Torras i Bages). His work is full of farming resonances, and in his character, one may also distinguish the peculiarities of good farming roots” (Pujol, 1978: 122).

Among Pujol’s childhood memories, he recounts how one day, he came across his grandfather, barefoot, trousers rolled up, dirty from the day’s work on the land, making his way towards the pool to wash himself, for the “farmers of that *comarca* are clean people” (Pujol, 1978: 115-116). However, the young Pujol was not alone, he was with his friends from Barcelona,

“from the city, more from the city than he [Pujol] was and looked down upon farmers […] it wasn’t their fault, but rather the environment’s in which they grew up. But, it is the case that they were from the city and looked down upon farmers, and did not know that there new friend was, deep down, ‘a village boy’. I could
have said [to my grandfather] ‘Hello’ or ‘Good evening’, [...] but considered it to be an act of cowardice, and even a betrayal of my ancestry. So I said, almost whistling, ‘Good evening to you, grandpa’, even though it was an effort to do so” (Pujol, 1978: 116; see also Wirth, 1981: 40).

Thus, the anecdote serves to situate Pujol very definitely on the rural side of the duality that runs through much of Catalan nationalist thought between the town and the countryside. Indeed, Pujol’s own farming roots in the soil itself are emphasised in the following story of his planting potatoes. Having carefully dug and fertilised the ground, made the furrows and planted the potatoes, Pujol, the budding farmer, would wait patiently, entranced by the emergence of sprouting potato plants.

“I was happy with that patch of potatoes. The crop was abundant, and, what is more, a spring crop; at grandpa’s house, that year the first new potatoes were mine. But the crop could have been bad. However, I was prepared for a smaller crop; after all I was not such a good farmer as grandpa; I was prepared for a late crop; but I was not prepared for no crop at all. Only a heavy shower of hail, that is, only the hand of God would have been accepted [...] And in that case, knowing that God does spite men, I would have planted once more, planted to harvest” (Pujol, 1978: 116-117).

In this case, however, the story can be interpreted not just in the light of the construction of Pujol as man with deep rural roots. It inserts itself within the biblical tradition of the sower and the reaper, and the idea that, ultimately, ‘God will provide’. Thus elsewhere, Pujol talks of how, as he writes, names come to his head on the importance of sowing and reaping.

“When during all this time, each year in the autumn, good farmers, your father and mine, the fathers of our friends, always the same ones, carefully prepare the earth and sow. That is what saves all. They could become soldiers [...] but good farmers like to plough the earth well and sow; each year, at the same time, they do the same thing with the same determination: and that stands everything; they stand everything, they preserve everything, they serve all that can be saved; it is due to them that all is not yet dead, and God will one day bless the harvests” (Pujol,
The harvests, beyond material crops, become the nation itself, the fruit of God’s earth, which ‘farmers’ such as Pujol must plough, sow and reap, if the nation is to come to fruition.

Returning to his childhood, Jordi Pujol formed his idea of Catalonia, of the pàtria, during one summer holiday, recovering from the flu, when he began to read Sentiment de la Pàtria (Feeling of the Homeland) by Joan Maragall, Elogi de Catalunya (In Praise of Catalonia) by Vallès i Pujals (Wirth, 1981: 51). Later, he would add l’Album Meravella, (Album of Marvels) edited by Pere Pujol [...] subtitled Llibre de les belleses naturals i artistiques de Catalunya (Book of the natural beauties of Catalonia) “[which] helped me to discover the country; in other words realise that beyond the limits of my childhood there were people and landscapes that constituted the character of the nation” (Tort i Donada and Tobaruela i Martínez, 2000: 27). Later he talks of the influence that Verdaguer’s works, Atlàntida and Canigó would have on him and his love of the country, which would grow as Pujol expanded his geographic horizons.

While such horizons in his childhood would be defined by Barcelona and the villages surrounding Premià in the comarca of the Maresme, at the age of twelve he accompanied his grandfather to the market in Granollers, a town in the Vallès, the comarca behind the coastal hills. Then he would go further afield, hiking to Pedraforca, to Matagalls and to Tagamanent, “the mountain which is currently the sentimental and political sanctuary of Pujol and the Pujolistes” (Wirth, 1981: 58). Pujol himself explains how in 1941, with an uncle (who had just come out of prison) and a friend of his uncle - both ex-members of the Premià hiking clubs and “real nationalists” – they set out to climb the mountain. At the summit, before the Civil War, there had been two key symbols of conservative Catalanism, a church and a couple of farmsteads. However, on arriving at the summit, they were all profoundly affected to find the buildings in ruins, destroyed by the bombings of the War. “A strange feeling of desolation dominated the atmosphere ‘This has been a disaster. It will take us many years to reconstruct it all’, they commented” (Tort i Donada and Tobaruela i Martínez, 2000: 27). Elsewhere, commenting on the same event, Pujol mentions how this feeling of destruction and desolation “extended to all Catalonia the impression of defeat, despair and destruction that Tagamanent produced for them” (Pujol, 1979: 27). For the eleven year-old Pujol, “the scene touched my heart, it affected me greatly. Who knows, perhaps it was the
beginning of one of my strongest-felt personal objectives: reconstruct Catalonia” (Tort i Donada and Tobaruela i Martínez, 2000: 27). Thus the symbolism is clear, the farmhouses and the church, the bastions of Catalaness for Pujol and the ideological tradition that he represented, had been destroyed. The national reconstruction that Pujol decided at such a tender age to embark upon was crystallised in the symbols of Catalan defeat and destruction that they found at the summit of Tagamanent. In this sense, Tagamanent takes on the symbolic importance of the monasteries of Montserrat and Ripoll, both of which symbolised the wider reawakening of Catalonia under God in the 19th century, after the destruction of war.

Over time he would deepen his knowledge of Catalonia:

“I stepped foot for the first time in the Val d’Aran in 1948; I entered by the pass of the Bonaigua. The first time that I went to Lleida was in 1955, to Tortosa in 1956 […], for questions of politics. In the decade of the 1950’s I toured Catalonia extensively. It was the era of the Catalan Catholic groups, at the beginning of what could be described as my political activism. At the time I was looking for people who identified with a pro-Catalan sentiment” (Tort i Donada and Tobaruela i Martínez, 2000: 27).

Again, this picks up on earlier portrayals of Pujol’s activities in the comarques. Wirth explains how “they took advantage of weekends, Saturdays and Sundays to tour the comarques looking for people who wanted to participate in favour of Catalonia, particularly in the cultural field. ‘And [according to his wife] when our first son was born, Jordi, my husband and I would put him in a carrycot in the back of the car, a Renault 4/4, and did more kilometres’” (Wirth, 1981: 51). This version is corroborated by Galí himself when he explains that “[a]s always, president Pujol set the example and took charge of the groups in the comarques, which over time would become the organisational structure for the nationalist movement. Meanwhile with his 4/4 he launched himself into the job with the efficiency that characterises him when he has a clear idea of things and is in contact with reality” (Galí, 1984: 62).

Reflecting on the nature of childhood memories, in which he doubts whether such memories necessarily corresponded strictly with reality, he concludes that despite the fact that the world of his own childhood, rapidly heading to war, was, perhaps a “sick world”, nevertheless it was “one capable of forging whole men and not “divided”,

257
“rootless ones” (Pujol, 1978: 162). Such a world left an indelible mark on Pujol, it made him a “man, not an intellectual, and a man of the people and not one without roots, a fighter and not a pampered boy; only because as a small child I was witness to the tenacity of the farmers and of the dedication and honesty of the artisans” (Pujol, 1978: 162). As such,

“now as a father, and thus responsible for two children, and responsible also, in as much as it is my responsibility, for my people, I have to seek out for my children and for the children of my people places where the fullness of the authentic world are preserved, where new forms of authenticity have not sprouted, since only by being submerged in such environments our children may acquire the form and contents of a man” (Pujol, 1978: 162).

But where is this world still to be found? It is to be found, according to Pujol, in the “hidden farmhouses, the coastal villages and even in some areas of Barcelona,” which provided not only links with the past, but also that would be “necessary to find once more the future” (Pujol, 1978: 163). This ‘authenticity’, that gives spiritual meaning to man’s life within the national community is also to be found in a specific class, the “Catalan middle class, and especially in the middle stratum of the middle class” (Pujol, 1978: 164). But above all,

“we must fiercely defend our homes and create in them the condition of a ‘dense’ and fruitful life, and establish a network from home to home, family to family, until we are strong enough to reject, aggressively, to destroy the artificial and hybrid world, the divided world, the world of appearances [...] the world of sterility and of mediocrity that whether we like it or not, they are trying to impose upon us” (Pujol, 1978: 164).

Thus, the conservative, middle-class themes of family, home, tradition and authenticity, are contextualised nationally and geographically within ‘real’ Catalonia of the villages and small towns. More metaphorically, the stress on the rural world, allows him to introduce, at a more or less explicit level, the idea of God and pàtria, from which the nation necessarily draws its lifeblood. In order to do so, the work of the sower, of the reaper, and by extension of national leaders such as Pujol himself, is key.
Such themes have continued to be reflected in Pujol’s political activity as president of the Generalitat, and in the way in which he has been continued to be portrayed. In an interview given in 1999, the following was put to Pujol: “One of your facets, as a politician, that often calls the attention of the observer, is that territory, as a generic concept, is a component that is very often present in your discourse. Everyone is aware, on the other hand, that you possess a profound knowledge of the geographic reality of the country” (Tort i Donada and Tobaruela i Martínez, 2000: 26). Naturally, Pujol was quick to seize on the opportunity to reaffirm one of the fundamentals of his political projection: “First of all, I should tell you that the territorial question, the question related to the implantation of man over the territory, has always interested me. Throughout my time at the head of the Generalitat, when taking decisions, I have never lost sight of the territorial reality of the country” (Pujol, quoted in Tort i Donada and Tobaruela i Martínez, 2000: 26).

Having explained, once more, how he has been in love with the pàtria from an early age, Pujol’s understanding of the ‘territorial reality’ emerges. Unsurprisingly in the light of what we have seen so far, Pujol explains how, on his frequent visits around the country, he often uses a helicopter, which allows him to reach places, particularly in the sparsely-populated areas of the Pyrenees, that would be otherwise inaccessible. Thus he explains with great detail, how he recalls visiting such and such a village, how he talked to farmers and the elderly of the villages. No mention is made, for example, of visits to towns and cities, particularly the (post)-industrialised ones of the metropolitan Catalonia, simply because for Pujol, in the symbolic construction of Catalonia that he maintains, such places do not represent the ‘real’ Catalonia.

Overall, in many ways, the biographical details of Pujol help to construct an image of himself as a man in close contact with the very soil of the national homeland, and thus with a specific part of that homeland, that is the ‘authentic’, semi-rural homeland of his childhood, which, as a national leader, he feels duty bound to preserve not only for his own children, but also for those of the nation. But it is not simply a question of landscape. Pujol’s world is one of traditional values, of homes, and families, of farmers and artisans, all of which form part of Pujol’s ‘essential’ Catalonia that must be nurtured for Catalonia to survive as a nation. The recurrence of rural themes also allow the use of Biblical metaphors which stress the influence of God over the homeland, and the role of the farmer, the nationalist leader in cultivating God’s earth, that is the nation itself.
Conclusions

The current chapter has sought to analyse the most important political phenomenon of Catalonia in recent decades: Pujolism. Having traced its development and situated it within the tradition of post-war Catholic Catalanism that in some ways may be traced back to the doctrine of Torras i Bages, the remainder of the chapter has centred on two key territorial aspects of Pujolism. Firstly, by discussing the premises that underlie Pujol’s conception of the Catalan nation and national identity, I have argued that they are territorial in that, according to Pujol, it is the national territory itself that comes to define the nation that inhabits it. As a result, immigration must be effectively assimilated, immigrants must adopt the customs, traditions and cultural practices of the ‘autochthonous’ population if they are to be considered part of the nation. In this light, such customs and cultural practices may be considered as instrumental, in the sense that they are a means of displaying one’s belonging to the national homeland itself, and thus to the nation. In the specific case of the Catalan language as the key defining element of the Catalan nation, Pujolism and Catalan nationalism generally, have justified the process of linguistic normalisation, understood not in the sense of positive discrimination to redress past discrimination and to place Catalan on an equal footing with Castilian, but rather as a means of converting Catalan into the ‘normal’ language of the country, by claiming that the Catalan language is Catalonia’s ‘own language’. From this claim, a series of collective territorial rights are derived that, according to nationalist thought, are placed above individual linguistic rights of Castilian speakers, since while the two languages are co-official, only Catalan is considered to be the ‘own’ one of the national territory. Overall, despite the conceptual, normative and practical problems involved with such a series of claims, what emerges is nationalism’s dependence on territory as the means of defining the nation.

The second area of concern of this chapter has been to discuss the way in what way Pujolism has contributed to the construction of a very definite interpretation of the national homeland. In general, such an interpretation of the national homeland is based on a rural, pre- or proto-industrial Catalonia, implicitly free of immigration and the class struggles associated with the related process of industrialisation and urbanisation. Such an interpretation has informed and been projected by Pujol himself, not only in his speeches and writings, but also in the way in which he has laid special emphasis on
presenting himself as a man closely in touch with this vision of Catalonia, and thus, according to such logic, with the nation itself.

A final comment could be made here regarding the way in which Pujolism’s emphasis on rural Catalonia has been reflected more concrete political terms. Electorally, CiU, and other nationalist parties such as ERC, have consistently enjoyed higher levels of support in rural areas than in urban ones, with the reverse being true of the other main party in Catalonia, the socialist PSC, which has failed over time to develop a concept of Catalonia-city that was less dominated by Barcelona (Lorés, 1985). In the elections to the Catalan parliament, CiU, and other nationalist parties such as ERC, have consistently enjoyed higher levels of support in rural areas than in urban ones, with the reverse being true of the other main party in Catalonia, the socialist PSC. In addition, a recent study, entitled *La Societat Xarxa a Catalunya (The Network Society in Catalonia)*, directed by Manuel Castells, found that

“[f]rom the point of view of the territorial ambit, we see that in rural areas, there is a [identity] practice10 well above that of urban areas. In fact, the practice decreases as the size of the municipalities increases until reaching Barcelona, where it increases once more, although it reaches levels well below rural areas. In fact, Barcelona has a percentage of identity practice (22.3%) that is very similar to that of the Catalan population (23.7%)” (Castells et al., 2002: 400).

However, it can be argued that the relationship between Pujolism and rural Catalonia has changed over the last two to three decades. When in 1983 the newly-elected mayor of Vic, Ramon Montaña, representing the nationalist coalition, CiU, declared that “Vic is the capital of Catalan Catalonia” (quoted in Macià, 1998: 23), “[t]he mission of Vic becomes clearly defined: to be the guiding light of the rural vision that Convergència, unaccustomed to governing the Generalitat, cultivated in the first years of government” (Macià, 1998: 32)11. But since then,

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10 Such practice has been defined in the following way: “[w]e have constructed this variable of identity practice with the variable of linguistic practices and that of communicative practices, referring to the television. We wanted to go beyond the language, although we have had to use it as an important element, but not so much to measure knowledge of it, but rather its use in contexts and practices where will is the determining factor, where the key is not a subjective feeling or a theoretical identification, but rather a clearly-defined practice, a given choice. We do not, therefore, analyse linguistic practices, but rather the contexts of will” (Castells et al., 2002: 378-379).

11 Vic was especially important at that time since a year earlier, at state level, the PSOE had swept to
“[t]his theorisation of the role of the hinterland began to change from the moment in which the government of the Generalitat could count on its own media. The power of Convergència evolved from a rural to a urban base, and the *comarcalista* discourse of the earlier times dissolved like sugar in the noise of Barcelona, as the party discovered and connected with real centres of power of the country, on both banks of the Ebro.

“Rural Catalonia, in the political sense, [...] would be converted by the cameras of TV3 into a picturesque and folkloric territory, interesting for Sunday outings and the perfect scenario for picking wild mushrooms [...] this contrivance, the ideal reconstruction of rustic Catalonia through TV3, would provide enough work to fill a whole book” (Macià, 1998: 32-33).

In this light, the aim of the next chapter is to analyse the way in which the nationalist governments of CiU in Catalonia have used Catalan TV to promote such a vision of rural Catalonia, and to examine such a process within the context of the broader societal changes associated with time-space compression that were discussed in Chapter 3 and 4.
CHAPTER 8
TERRITORIAL REPRODUCTION THROUGH THE MEDIA

Introduction

In the previous chapter we saw how Macià claims that after ‘conquering’ Barcelona, Pujolism would become increasingly associated with the urban Catalonia that it had traditionally spurned. However, as late as 2000, the environment minister of the Generalitat, Felip Puig, would make what might seem a surprising statement. Speaking of the rural areas of Catalonia that constitute 80% of the national territory and are home to 20% of the Catalan population, Puig claimed that: “as one more member of a nationalist government, I must tell you that I restate the importance of these areas, [and] the importance of our natural heritage for the strengthening of the national identity of the country”. Such a claim, met with “ironic laughter” from the other parties represented in the Environment Commission of the Catalan parliament (El País, 17/2/2000), is nevertheless considered to be a widespread feeling within the party and “for the youngest generation of Convergència, an ideological axiom” (Mayayo, 2000: 25).

In this respect, CiU continues to position itself within the tradition of Catalan nationalism that has promoted rural Catalonia as the spiritual reserve of the country, in opposition to urban Catalonia and the concept of ‘Catalonia-city’, historically associated with more progressive ideological positions both within Catalan nationalism and beyond. However, Puig’s continuing belief in this specific geography of the nation not only comes up against the conceptual and substantive problems of maintaining the divide between rural and urban Catalonia, but also against the socio-economic reality of rural Catalonia itself. In addition to the mass immigration that arrived in Catalan cities to fuel the industrial growth of the period between the 1950’s and the 1970’s, many
‘internal’ immigrants from rural Catalonia arrived there too\(^1\), a process which reflected the progressive depopulation of rural Catalonia. Secondly in this respect, the proportion of the population employed in agriculture declined heavily throughout the 20\(^{th}\) century, going from 53\% in 1900 to a figure of just 3.2\% in 1996, well below the Spanish average, approximately 10\%, to become one of the lowest figures in Europe (Mayayo, 2000: 27). The same author also details the transformation of the agricultural sector from a situation dominated by traditional, family-owned farms to the current one in which many farmers have become employees of large, often foreign-owned firms, involved in the task, for example, of the fattening of pigs to be exported live back to their country of ‘origin’, especially the Netherlands, where stricter environmental restrictions concerning slurry means that places such as Catalonia effectively practice environmental dumping (Mayayo, 2000).

Thus, if the traditional, rural Catalonia that CiU still appears to believe in is on the point of extinction (if, that is, it ever existed) then why does CiU still promote it as the bastion of the Catalan nation?; how does it go about it?; and, what are the consequences of such a vision for Catalan nationalism and national identity as a whole? At one level, the answer to the first question remains the same as I have argued throughout this research work. If, at an overall level, nationalism seeks to bind nation and national territory, then for the kind of traditional, conservative nationalist project that Pujolism represents, the rural hinterland emerges as the area that most faithfully represents the spiritual heartland of the nation since it is precisely here that the national traditions are said to have their deepest roots, in contrast to the urban areas in which, \textit{inter alia}, immigration threatens, and has threatened, to challenge the essentialist equation of one nation one homeland. In the light of current globalisation, immigrant flows pose similar problems to Catalan nationalism as immigration from the rest of Spain has done for the last 40 years or so, and as such the continued championing of rural Catalonia as the bulwark against such threats can be seen as coherent.

In order to answer the second question, the chapter seeks to analyse current attempts by the nationalist government of the Generalitat de Catalunya to produce and reproduce the national territory under conditions of time-space compression. Attention

\(^{1}\) Mayayo states that “between 1960 and 175, 15\% of the Catalan population, some 750,000 people changed their residence within Catalonia. In these golden years for the urban-industrial model, the depopulation of the mountains to the plains and coast, and of the small villages to the cities accelerated” (Mayayo, 2000: 27).
will centre on the role of the principal publicly-owned Catalan TV station, TV3, and in particular on a series of programmes which, I will argue, might be considered to be a key part in this process of national territorial socialisation. Specifically, I shall analyse the content of the daily weather forecast, *El Temps*, and *De Vacances*, a series of programmes broadcast every summer that offer suggestions on how to spend one’s holiday’s, such as walks, historical and culinary visits throughout Catalonia and the wider territorial framework of the *Països Catalans*.

The final part of the chapter seeks to place national territorial socialisation in Catalonia within a series of wider social trends, and to discuss how it might be characterised as a consequence.

**Television and National Territorial Socialisation**

Before analysing in more depth the above points, I first wish to offer a brief introduction to the setting up and subsequent development of the Catalan Corporation of Radio and TV (CCRTV). During the Franco regime, television broadcasting was subject to a rigid state monopoly, the contents of which were very much in line with the conservative, traditionalist, unitarian vision of Spain that the regime sought to impose at all costs. During the transition period, the second state channel, from the studios in Barcelona, certain broadcasts were emitted in Catalan, such as news and cultural programmes. However, it became clear in the negotiations surrounding the Catalan Statute of Autonomy that any democratically-elected Generalitat would seek to promote its own media. Reflecting this, Article 16.3 of the Statute states that “the Generalitat can regulate, create and maintain its own television, radio, press, and in general all those media for social communication [necessary] to accomplish its objectives”. Such objectives were specified by the CCRTV, in that the “principal aim of the group and its parts is to make a decisive contribution to the linguistic and cultural normalisation of Catalonia” (Corporació Catalana de Ràdio i Televisió, 2003). Rather more forcefully, Santamaría claims that

“TV3 not only contributes to shore up the nation, but also to construct the myths and symbols of nationalism and to socialise them as those of all Catalonia. TV3 is more than a television station, since it not only aspires to entertain or inform, but
also to nationalise [...] Thus if the objective is to construct the Països Catalans, the weather maps will reflect these territories; if Catalan must be the only language of the country, the soap operas show a country in which - ignoring the socio-linguistic reality - no-one speaks Castilian” (Santamaría, 1999: 50-51).

As such, in 1983 the foundations were laid for the new Catalan TV studios in Sant Joan Despí, on the outskirts of Barcelona, while the Catalan parliament passed the law allowing for the creation of the Catalan Corporation of Radio and TV (CCRTV). Several months later, the Spanish parliament passed the corresponding law at central-state level, to regulate the existence of the ‘autonomous’ (i.e. regional) television stations. TV-3, the first Catalan television channel, started a trial period of broadcast on the 10th of December 1983, and regular broadcasting began on the 16th of January 1984. In 1988, the CCRTV created a new autonomous channel, Canal 33, basically cultural in content and exclusively in Catalan, which began a trial period on the 10th of September 1988, and a year later regular broadcasting was a reality. Parallel to the television broadcasts, the CCRTV also began opening radio stations such as Catalunya Radio (news and light entertainment) in 1983, RAC 105 (popular music), in 1984, and in 1987, Catalunya Música (classical) Catalunya Informació, Catalunya Cultura and so forth. In terms of its territorial organisation and reach, while at first the television broadcasts were limited to Catalonia, by 1985 TV3 would reach most of the Països Catalans (Andorra, French Catalonia and Valencia). 1989 TV3 opened delegations in Tarragona, Girona and Lleida, while in the same year the news programme from the comarques, Telenotícies Comarques began being broadcast, coinciding with the decentralisation of the news services. A similar process took place for Catalunya Ràdio, with special treatment given to the Aranès speaking community of the Val d’Aran allowing for the broadcast of TV news in that language the same year.

But beyond institutional questions, in the context of the current research exercise, a series of programmes stand out that go beyond the ‘mere’ aims of ‘cultural and linguistic normalisation’, since I wish to argue that they also contribute to the territorial construction of Catalonia, and thus form an important part of the process of national territorial socialisation.
Weather forecasting (El Temps) on Catalan television has become quite a media phenomenon, with audience ratings situating it amongst the most popular programmes offered by TV3. However, commercial questions aside, the immediate aim here is to analyse how weather forecasting on the Catalan television might be considered to play an important role in the production and reproduction of the national territory, or, in Paasi’s terminology the ‘national territorial socialisation’. Before looking at how and on what terms such processes have taken place, it is perhaps worthwhile to briefly look at the history of weather forecasting in Catalonia, since it can be argued that its importance for nationalism has meant that it has been an important part of the Catalan national project and a sensitive issue historically in the relations between Catalonia and Spain.

The 19th century saw the construction of different weather station throughout Catalonia, such as those of Barcelona and the Ebro, although it was not until 1921 that the Mancomunitat of the four Catalan provinces established the Servei Meteorològic de Catalunya (The Meteorological Service of Catalonia (SMC)), which would depend scientifically on the Insitut d’Estudis Catalans. From this moment on, the SMC began to offer daily weather forecasts of the whole of Catalonia in Barcelona and throughout Catalonia via the Mancomunitat’s telephone network. However, like so many other Catalan institutional initiatives, the end of the Civil War and the victory of Franco meant that the SMC was abolished and its archives and libraries requisitioned.

Consequently, it would not be until the restoration of parliamentary democracy after Franco’s death that ‘normality’ would be re-established. Indeed, Article 9.15 of the Catalan Statue of Autonomy explicitly claims exclusive competence for the Generalitat in the field of weather services, although it was not until 1996 that a Servei de Meteorologia was created, dependent on the Department of the Environment, while the SMC was created with its own legal status in 2001.

At one level, weather forecasting is undoubtedly of material interest in that accurate forecasts are important for a whole range of agricultural, industrial, construction and even leisure activities. Consequently, since the 19th century it has been a function of the state, and as such, it is of little surprise that the weather service has been a bone of contention that has reflected the history of relations between the Spanish state and the Catalan autonomous political institutions. However, there is the sense that weather forecasting plays an important role in the nationalist construction of nation and
territory. We have already seen, for example, how maps and mapping play a key part in
the process of national territorial socialisation, in that through maps, the nation comes to
recognise itself and identify with the national homeland through its graphic
representation in the form of the map. The weather map is possibly the most frequently-
viewed map that the majority of the population sees, and as such must be considered as
an important instrument in the production and reproduction of the national territory in
these terms of recognition and identification. In addition, the map of the national
territory itself is not only a very graphic way of establishing the opposition between
‘we’/’here’ and ‘the other’/’there’, but also there is the sense that the weather map
contributes on a daily basis to the constant process of national territorial production and
reproduction in that it shows individual places within a very definite territorial
framework, the national territory, and thus individual places are incorporated into the
symbolic national territorial hierarchy.

In order to determine more precisely the role that *El Temps* might be considered
to play in the production and reproduction of national territory, I wish to present an
analysis of *El Temps*, based on a study of the evening version (9.30pm-9.35pm) over a
two-month period beginning on February 4th, 2003. Such a period of time is considered
long enough to overcome the possible distortions of temporary meteorological
phenomena, such as floods, heavy snowfalls and so forth. The aim of the study was
twofold: firstly, through the use of maps, I have attempted to analyse how Catalonia
might be conceived in relation to other spatial scales such as the rest of Spain or
Europe; secondly, by studying the kinds of individual places mentioned and featured in
the programme, I wish to argue that there emerges a very definite vision of Catalonia,
which can be said to reflect the importance for Pujolism of rural Catalonia.

In terms of the first point, then, the main focus of attention is undoubtedly on
Catalonia itself, often referred to, significantly, as the ‘Principality’, a term that, as we
have seen elsewhere, takes us back to medieval times. A detailed review is offered of
the day’s weather in Catalonia (Frame 1 and 2), along with a similarly-detailed forecast
for the following day (Frame 3). However, as the frames below demonstrate, Catalonia,
the ‘Principality’, is not the only spatial scale to feature on the programme, since the
*Països Catalans* are also featured, albeit in less detail. Thus, a forecast for the following
day’s weather is offered (Frame 4), in addition to a medium-range forecast for the next
four days (Frame 7). Finally, a forecast is presented of the ‘European continent’ which
includes the ‘Iberian peninsula’. The term ‘Spain’ was only mentioned once during the
two-month study, and almost invariably the forecast for the ‘European continent’ did
not begin with or feature in any special way the ‘Iberian peninsula’. Interestingly, in
terms of the relation between the weather map and political events, during the invasion
of Iraq by Anglo-American forces, the map of the ‘European continent’ was amplified
to take in North Africa and the Middle-East (Frame 6).
With regards to the mention of individual places of the ‘Principality’ and of the 
Països Catalans, the study recorded all mentions made, dividing such mentions into 
three basic categories²:

- ‘fixed camera’, whereby using live pictures from a fixed camera, El Temps informs 
us of the meteorological situation of a given place, in addition to adding information 
such as current temperature, humidity and atmospheric pressure;
- ‘written mention’ in which through the use of lists, we are informed of the day’s 
rainfall, hours of sunshine, maximum and minimum temperatures and so forth;
- ‘verbal mention’, that is similar to a written one, but instead of forming part of a list, 
the place in question is mentioned verbally.

² For a complete list of all the localities mentioned in these ways, see Annex 1.
The question arises as to what kind of patterns might we expect to emerge of the places that are mentioned or shown during the course of the programme. On the one hand, one might expect such an ‘informative’ programme to seek as its primary objective, to inform the maximum number of people as possible as to how weather patterns have affected them and how they might do so in the foreseeable future. Geographically, in the case of Catalonia, this would have the consequence of concentrating attention on urban places, particularly in the metropolitan area of Barcelona and the surrounding towns and cities where over half the Catalan population lives and works.

However, a close look at the results of the study of *El Temps* reveals that this population criterion was not necessarily followed. In terms of the use of the ‘fixed camera’, Barcelona, as one might expect, was the most-mentioned place, featuring 26 times over a period of two months, and accumulating 13 written mentions, and 9 verbal ones. Barcelona was followed by the three other provincial capitals, Girona (12, 12, 6 respectively), Tarragona (9, 12, 4) and Lleida (6, 6, 12). The remainder of the fixed cameras featured were situated throughout Catalonia, and were even to be found in the Balearic Islands (Palma de Mallorca) and the País Valencià (Benicàssim). Within Catalonia, the criterion used for displaying the cameras does not appear to have been based on the factor of population, since in addition to the above-mentioned locations, the majority of cameras are either situated in small- to medium-sized towns, and in mountainous areas such as ski resorts. The overall pattern appears to suggest the importance of a ‘territorial coverage’ as opposed to one of the population in general. A similar trend appears when we study the other kinds of mention. Significantly, industrial towns around Barcelona, such as l’Hospitalet del Llobregat, Cornellà, Badalona and Santa Coloma de Gramanet whose combined population adds up to over 430,000 are not mentioned once. Of course, it might be argued that such ‘omissions’ correspond to the meteorological similarity between such places. Even if this were the case, the same could not be said of Terrassa and Sabadell, whose weather patterns are quite distinct from coastal Barcelona’s. With a combined population approaching 360,000, the two cities, formerly at the centre of the Catalan textile industry, were mentioned just seven times during the 60-day period. Such an ‘anti-urban’ tendency can be seen in overall terms by looking at the maps below.

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3 The maps are based on data extracted from *El Temps*, and were elaborated by Ligit, UAB (2003)
Map 8.1

*EL TEMPS*: Places featured in Catalonia (all mentions)
Map 8.2

EL TEMPS: Places featured in Paísos Catalans (all mentions)
In the light of these tendencies, can *El Temps* be regarded as part of a deliberate process of national territorial socialisation or are the contents of the programme merely the result of chance, of changing weather patterns whose maximum meteorological consequences just happen to fall on the more sparsely-populated rural areas? Indeed, this latter hypothesis seems to be the one that informs much of the information given by the programme, in that outside the principal political capitals of Barcelona, Girona, Lleida and Tarragona, there is a clear tendency to include absolute maximum and minimum temperatures, for example, regardless of where they might have been registered. Of course, whether this forms part of a deliberate policy or not is open to question. However, given the very clear spatial consequences of the criteria used, it would be most difficult to argue that the programme makers were unaware of this tendency, however ‘innocent’ it might be regarded.

To sum up, in as much as national territory is the result of a process of ‘becoming’, rather than ‘being’ (Pred, 1984), the weather programmes of Catalan television must be considered part of the process of national territorial socialisation, in that one the one hand it seeks to differentiate Catalan territory from other spatial scales – Spain, Europe – while at the same time it also aims to unite the national homeland internally. In this respect, the objective of including the widest possible range of geographic locations within Catalonia can be interpreted as forming part of the nationalist objective of making claims over all the national territory, while at the same time incorporating such individual localities within the national territorial hierarchy. This has the added consequence of ensuring that rural areas receive a disproportionate amount of attention, in terms of population, compared with urban areas, a tendency that clearly reflects the desire of the nationalist government to portray rural Catalonia and the values that it represents, as the heart of the Catalan nation.

*De Vacances (On Holiday)*

*De Vacances (On Holiday)*, is a series of programmes broadcast after the midday and evening news of the first Catalan TV channel, TV3, since 1999, with the overall aim of offering a series of suggestions for days out in Catalonia and the *Països Catalans* in general during the summer holiday period. I wish to argue that by offering a closer analysis of the various programmes, we can discover how they might be
considered to form part of a process of national territorial socialisation, whereby the nation and the national territory are closely related, to the extent that such a relation is presented as the ‘natural’ state of affairs. On the one hand, the national homeland, perhaps ambiguously defined as Catalonia and/or the Països Catalans, forms the spatial setting for all the programmes offered. To differing degrees and in differing ways, the various programmes highlight the national homeland’s natural beauty, introduce us to the native fauna and flora, and perhaps more importantly, invite the viewer to learn about the history, traditions, customs associated not only with the people but also with the homeland itself, and specific places within it. In order to offer a more in-depth analysis, let us turn to the individual programmes that have gone to make up De Vacances.

*Rutes a Peu (Walks)*

*Rutes a Peu*, which ran for three years between 1999 and 2001, offered a series of walking excursions, with the aim not only of offering an “invitation to walk for the pleasure of a day in the fresh air”, but also of “presenting to the public different natural environments”\(^4\). In terms of the overall geographical distribution of the excursions, the majority are in the Principality of Catalonia, with the rest spread evenly throughout the rest of the Països Catalans.

In addition to such considerations, mention must be made of the kind of locations chosen. On the one hand, none are urban, which is understandable given the tendency to leave the cities in the hot summer months. On the other, an explicit attempt is made to avoid the more ‘touristy’ areas, despite the fact that many of the excursions proposed pass close to such places. On one visit to the area surrounding Benidorm, the explicit aim is to offer an alternative image of Benidorm, different to the usual one of “extensive beaches of the coast of Alicante full of huge apartment buildings” (*El Sender Amagat de la Serra de Bèrnia*)\(^5\). The same can be said of the visits to the Costa Brava and to the Balearic Islands, where a whole series of depictions are offered that have little to do with the hundreds of thousands of tourists and the infrastructure created

\(^{4}\) All quotations regarding the programmes featured are from the website: [http://www.tvcatalunya.com/devacances](http://www.tvcatalunya.com/devacances) (see Annex 2).
around them. As a result, the very nature of the excursions leads us to admire the landscape and get to know the flora and fauna of the areas covered, from the “rocky [...] unspoilt” coast of l’Ametlla de Mar, (*Ruta Camí de Ronda de l’Ametlla de Mar*), the “privileged natural beauty” of the Ebro Delta (*Ruta La Natura privilegiada del Delta de l’Ebre*), to the spectacular Pyrenean mountains.

However, beyond the natural features of the places visited, what emerges from the programmes is the way in which such places, rural places, become the spatial context in which elements of national identity are presented. In terms of the ‘defining’ moments or periods of Catalan history, we are invited to view the castle of Mequinensa that was built to mark the frontier with the Moorish empire, Al-Andalus (*Ruta de Sant Jaume*); to walk the paths that grew up after the Christian reconquest of the area in which the Cistercian monasteries of Poblet, Santes Creus and Vallbona de les Monges (*Ruta del Císter*) were constructed; to inspect the remains of a castle destroyed in the War of the Reapers; the site of uprisings against the French by Catalans who had seen their territory be ceded to France after the signing of the Treaty of the Pyrenees in 1669 (*Ruta Prats de Mollo*); the location of one of the most ferocious struggles of the Battle of the Ebro in the Spanish Civil War which would lead to the fall of Catalonia and the subsequent end of the Second Republic (*Ruta de la Pau*).

In addition to combining national history and territory, the *Rutes a Peu* also highlight the importance of religion in their interpretation of the national homeland. Thus churches, hermitages, particularly Romanesque ones, feature in many of the walks, reflecting not only the important architectural heritage but also the period of their construction, given that it coincided with the ‘reconquest’ of the Catalan lands from the Moors, and thus we go back in time and space to the founding moments of Catalonia itself.

However, while the beauty of the national homeland, its history and religion, have all played an important part in the way that it is symbolically produced and reproduced, perhaps the most important theme running through the series is the portrayal of individual places, previously identified as forming part of the national homeland, as the spatial contexts for a whole range of traditions, customs and ways of life, that are opposed to and threatened by modern, contemporary society.

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5 All references, unless otherwise stated, given in parenthesis are the titles of individual episodes of the programmes reviewed and are put into a full list in Annex 2.
In some cases, the paths chosen for the excursions are the living proofs of the traditional ways of life themselves. Thus, in the case of the county of Lluçanès, in the comarca of Osona, where the transhumancia route traditionally used to take the sheep up to the high summer pastures in and back down to the plains in winter. Now roads and houses have been built ever stretches of the route, with the sheep, if they are moved at all, transported in lorries. However, efforts are being made to recover the route, not for the sheep per se, but as a means of rediscovering traditional ways of life and the “historic memory of a territory” (Ruta Els Antics Camins Ramaders del Lluçanés). A similar story emerges with the Camí de Cavalls in Menorca, a narrow path that used to circle the entire island and was used by farmers and villagers as a means of communication. Now, however, it is impossible to walk the entire path, since holiday homes have been built on parts of it, and elsewhere landowners have blocked off access. Currently, efforts are being made to reopen the pathway, since it is a “path that is history, that is culture and popular tradition” (Ruta Camí de Cavalls). In the case of the mountains of Montsant, “we won’t be the first to reach these peaks. Many shepherds and charcoal burners did it long ago. And the monks of Scala Dei” (Ruta els Graus de Montsant), while in the Pyrenean valley of la Cerdenya, “the Pyrenees are full of ancient ways and paths. Since time immemorial, they have been used by muleteers and shepherds. And they have served to bring villages and outlying farms together, to go to the village fête, to mass or to the slaughtering of pigs” (Ruta Cerdanya: els Poblets del Solell).

A frequent technique used to bring the past alive and provide continuity is the appearance of elder members of the community who can still recall the ‘old days’, and thus are living proof of the great transformation of recent times. In l’Ametlla de Mar, the oldest fishermen remember how they used the natural harbour, as people had done since Roman times, until the construction of the new one, and how they would work hard fishing, with age-old techniques, unlike now, when the fishermen have motor boats, radars, and machines to haul in the nets (Ruta Camí de Ronda de l’Ametlla de Mar). In Ivars d’Urgell, the elders of the community still remember the lake near the village and the ways of life that surrounded it before it was drained in 1945. They explain how at one farmhouse, one could eat the best stewed eels of all the lake, and how they would fish for their daily meals. Fortunately, in terms of the recovery of the past, the local mayor has initiated a plan to refill the lake so that the young may see how it looked before (Ruta l’estany dessecat d’Ivars d’Urgell). On another excursion to the
Serra de Castelltallat, the programme visits the farmers in their farmhouses who talk of how going to the local spring was a “custom here in the mountains. Before all these bars and restaurants of today, we would all meet at the spring [...] and make a rice dish and drink sparkling wine with the family, neighbours and hunters” (Ruta la Serra de Castelltallat). In the case of the Estanys de Salses in French Catalonia, despite the railways lines, motorways and housing developments, parts of the shore “retain most of their primitive aspect: vegetation accustomed to the fresh water from the streams that flow into the lake and to the sea-water that enters”. However, local fishermen lament the increasing salinity of the waters over recent years that has meant that fishing there “is not what it use to be [...] Fewer and fewer people become fishermen. The traditional sailing boats, the ‘Catalanes’, have been replaced long ago by motor boats” (Ruta els Estanys de Salses). In the fields of Montfalcó Murullat, old farmers talk of how most of the farmhouses and the farms have been abandoned now, and with them the making of the wine, and the sowing and harvesting of the crops. In the village, there appears an elderly man who still makes the traditional espadrilles, and thus continues a family activity after three generations and 115 years. However, the business is no longer profitable, nor is any youngster interested in carrying it on, and thus the man realises that some day, perhaps soon, he will make the last espadrille (Ruta Conreus de Montfalcó Murullat).

**Paisatges de la Cuina (Cookery Landscapes)**

A further example of the way in which the nation and the national territory are produced and reproduced can be found in the series *Paisatges de la Cuina (Cookery Landscapes)*. According to the producers, the programme involves a “tour of the food of different places: their products, their culinary customs, their gastronomy and, where available, their creative cuisine. More than a gastronomic tour, this series provides a closer look at people’s lives through their relation to food”. Thus, in many ways, food might be seen as a pretext, in that through food we get closer to people’s lives. However, we might interpret the programmes’ portrayal of food, and especially local food as providing a direct link between people and their natural surroundings, and in particular the soil.
In terms of the content of the programme, we might divide it up into two broad categories: on the one hand, producers and harvesters, that is those who are involved in the production of the primary resources, and, on the other, those who process the produce for subsequent sale and those who are directly involved in its cooking. Thus, throughout the editions of the programmes, we are invited to speak with fishermen and farmers; cheese-makers, bakers, meat and sausage-curers; and cooks, ranging from the most sophisticated (Carme Ruscadella, two Michelin stars), to women who vindicate traditional, home-made food, and the fishermen themselves who not only catch the fish, but in days gone by would cook it on the boat. From a detailed analysis of the content of the programmes, between 2000 and 2002, various recurrent themes emerge.

Firstly and perhaps most obviously in the current context is the place-based nature of the produce and its elaboration. In other words, all the produce is local, and the elaboration of it takes place in the same spatial context or very close to it. Thus, potatoes are from the Solsonès, and form the basis of the traditional cuisine there (el Solsonès, trumfos i trufes); calçots (a unique cross between a leek and an onion) are from the Alt Camp, and are served barbecued together with a special sauce, romesco, made from the local olive oil and other products of the area (l’Alt Camp, terra de calçots i bon oli); the unique flavours of turnips and coliflowers of la Cerdanya produce special dishes served in the comarca (Baix Cerdanya, Naps i Cols); thyme soup is made in the mountains of Montseny from the herbs collected there (Montseny, sopa de farigola); while the best sobrassada (a kind of paté) is made from the islands own breed of pig (Ensaïmada i Llampugues).

However, as we saw in Chapter 4, the resort to place-based identities implies tradition, in that it is only with the modern age and particularly over recent years that ‘time-space distanciation’ has meant that place-boundedness has been seriously questioned (Giddens, 1990). Thus, in the case of the sophisticated cuisine of Carme Ruscadella, it is “creative without losing the references to traditional, home cookery” (La Cuina del Maresme); in the island of Mallorca, the “tradition of making these pastries [ensaïmades] is still very much alive (Ensaïmades i Llampugues); on the plain of Vic, a farmer sows a traditional variety of potato as his grandfather before him had done (La Cuina de la Plana); a restaurateur in Girona declares that “here in Girona, we make traditional food, the traditional homespun Catalan cuisine” (Girona, capital gastronómica); the comarca of the Bergudà, “in terms of its cuisine, has been like an island where dishes have remained unaltered over time” (El Bergudà); and in the
comarca of la Selva, the programme visits a group of 80 women from the village of Sils who have joined together to vindicate traditional Catalan cuisine of the area, with some even being invited to Madrid to display their art (La Selva, les dones de Sils).

However, there is a sense in which all this place-bound tradition is under threat from modernity. In the Maresme, the long and rich agricultural heritage is considered under threat by “industrialisation and the eruption of mass tourism”, although it still resists (La cuina del Maresme); in Mallorca, the agricultural markets are disappearing, although a few still remain, particularly in those areas away from the tourist ‘invasion’ (Mallorca, el pes de la historia); elsewhere, traditional trades are being lost, such as bee keepers (Terra de Clotxa i Vi) and rice growers (El Delta del Ebre); traditional dishes are disappearing in the plains of Tarragona, although “in some paces they can still be found” (“Potaco i Mandongo”); while the fishermen’s tradition of eating on board is rapidly becoming an exercise in nostalgia (Vinarós, son del port).

Viatges per la Història (Journeys through History)

In Chapter 2, we saw how nationalism is essentially retrospective in that it projects back over time the existence of the nation, to the extent that the antiquity of the nation is one of the ‘core claims’ of nationalism. At the same time, Hobsbawm reminds us of the dangers of believing nationalist historiography, in that it is the job of nationalist historians to ‘get things wrong’. Thus, the nation is constructed out of a series of ‘invented’ myths and traditions which seek to establish the antiquity of the nation over time. However, we must not only consider the antiquity of the nation, but also that of the national territory itself, since it is the existence of the national homeland that makes the nation what it is. Thus, given the extent of the efforts to fuse nation and national territory, it should be no surprise to us that in the particular case of Catalonia, nationalists emphasise the antiquity of the national territory itself. The nationalist construction of the homeland in historical terms is not, as we have seen, a once-and-for-all task, it must be produced and reproduced constantly as the setting for heroic national deeds, painful defeats, and more mundane ‘national’ traditions and lifestyles, to the extent that the national homeland and the individual local contexts contained hierarchically within it bring the nation’s long history to life.
These themes, combining national historical time and space, can be seen in the series *Viatges per la Història, Journeys through History*, another series of programmes broadcast within the *De Vacances* space, in which the presenter, Carles Solà “travels through the history of Catalonia visiting the remains and monuments of each area, from the Palaeolithic, half a million years ago, to the beginning of the 20th century”, with the aim of “getting to know our (sic) history”.

In terms of the content of the episodes, given the aim of exploring the national history, beyond the programmes dedicated to pre-historic and ancient times, great attention is paid to the years surrounding what is considered to be the foundation of Catalonia (*Castells de la Frontera* and *El Romanic*) to the glories of the medieval period (*Jaume I El Conqueridor, l’Expansió pel Mediterrani*), the ‘decline’ of Catalonia associated with the War of the Reapers and the War of Succession, followed by the recovery, initiated in the field of agriculture, developed by the process of industrialisation and culminated by the cultural expressions of the ‘Splendour of Modernism’. Apart from anecdotes of pirates and bandits, no mention is made of the long history of conflict within Catalonia, for example the Carlist uprisings of the 19th century, nor the Civil War of the 20th. All the enemies are portrayed as coming from outside the national homeland, the Castilians and the French, with the Catalan national homeland itself coming into being with the expulsion of the ‘other’, the Moors, from the 9th century AD onwards.

However, in addition to the perpetuation of what might be considered to be a rather ‘standard’ version of national history, I wish to argue that the programme contributes to the process of retrospective territorial nationalism, since Catalonia, the national homeland, is projected onto even the remotest past, hundreds and even thousands of years before it became a recognisable political and administrative territory from the 12th century onwards, and many more years before it became the ‘national’ homeland.

Chronologically, then, going back to Palaeolithic times, “the first human steps in our country go back [...] half a million years”, while “changes in the climate had a strong influence on the features of the Earth, and in many ways on the expansion of the first human beings over our territory”* (Fa Mig Milió d’Anys). Later, “2,500 years ago, Greek sailors [...] arrived in the bay of Roses to found a colony there. That is how

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*The italics are my own.*
Emporion was born: the first Greek city of Catalonia” (Grècia a Catalunya). With the later arrival of the Roman conquerors of Catalonia, the Iberian tribes were displaced, thus “the Romans almost never had to use towers to conquer the villages of the Iberians. Citadells like that of Calafell, and villages such as that of Ullastret were abandoned as the Romanisation of the country proceeded” (Els Ibers). In another episode, we are told how the “Roman armies entered Catalonia in 218 BC” (Roma a Catalunya). The arrival of further invaders, the Moors, meant that “over a thousand years ago, the border between Islam and the Christian world was established in Catalonia” (Castells de Frontera).

In the programmes dedicated to the period that coincides with the establishment and consolidation of Catalonia as a political territory, the programme changes emphasis to offer a nationalist interpretation of the territory. Thus, one episode explains how in Arles del Tec, in French Catalonia, “the first abbey was founded in Catalonia after the invasions of the moors. With the advance of the Catalan counts over the territory, monasteries and churches were founded that left an indelible mark on the history of Catalonia” (El Romànic). Among such monasteries to be founded in ‘Catalonia’ were, of course those of Sant Miquel de Cuixà, in Conflent in French Catalonia, and that of Ripoll, founded by Guifré el Pelós, and whose superior was the abbot Oliba of Verdaguer’s Canigó. By the 11th century, “the Jews arrived in our country” (Els Calls Jeues), while the expansion of Catalonia, begun by Jaume I, meant that “during two centuries, the 14th and 15th, the Mediterranean spoke Catalan”, including the islands of Sicily, Sardinia, and even as far as Greece itself. The programme makes a visit to l’Alguer, on the island of Sardinia, where Catalan is still spoken today. Of course, up until 1714, “its ‘Catalaness’ was a normal ‘Catalaness’. That is to say that the ‘Catalaness’ of l’Alguer was the same as that of Reus, the same as that of Tarragona, the same as that of Girona”. Despite centuries of no longer belonging to the Catalan empire, the people of ‘Alguer still speak Catalan, and thus “each year there are Catalans who find l’Alguer once more, and discover that more than five-hundred kilometres from home there is a Catalan land, with a people that does not wish to lose the identity that has defined them for over 600 years” (L’Expansió pel Mediterrani). Once more, confusion emerges between the nation and the national territory, in that towns and cities of Catalonia are themselves considered to be bastions of ‘Catalaness’, while the people of l’Alguer spoke and continue to speak Catalan because they are from part of the Catalan lands.
A similar confusion is employed in the programme’s explanation of the war of the Reapers and the War of Succession. Thus “Catalonia entered a war that would last nine years and that ended with the signing of the Treaty of the Pyrenees, by virtue of which France annexed the Catalan lands of Rosselló, Conflent, Vallespir and a part of Cerdanya” (De la Guerra dels segadors al tractat dels Pirineus). However, it was not until the 19th century that “Catalonia of the North’ would become French, at least administratively, because sentiments are something very different” (De la Guerra dels Segadors al Tractat dels Pirineus). Less than a century later, in the War of Succession, Catalonia took the side of Charles of Austria, because it believed that he would respect its laws. But the war went badly for Catalonia [...] This defeat meant the loss of political sovereignty for Catalonia” (1714. El Decret de la Nova Planta).

In the remaining programmes in the series that analyse the socio-economic history, from the agricultural revolution of the 18th century, to the industrialisation and related questions in the 19th and early-20th century (L’Expansió del Camp Català, (The Growth of Catalan Agriculture), Beceroles de la Indústria (Birth of Industry), L’Industrialització (Industrialisation), L’Electrificació del País, (The Electrification of the Country)), several points can be made. Firstly, there is a definite rural bias, in that the editions dedicated to the process of industrialisation all concentrate on how it occurred and affected rural areas. Secondly, while some mention is made of the hardships involved in the process of industrialisation, in general they are not explained to any great degree, nor, consequently are the conflicts generated that marked Catalan history throughout the 19th and 20th century.

In order to summarise this analysis of the El Temps and De Vacances, the following points can be made. Firstly, in all of the programmes studied, the national territory is the protagonist and, in the case of the weather forecast, it is repeatedly represented graphically in the form of maps. However, it might be argued that the inclusion of the spatial setting of the Països Catalans to some extent reflects the ambiguous nature of national territorial claims, since while the ‘Principality’ of Catalonia is the principal focus of attention, the exact relation between the ‘Principality’ and the rest of the Països Catalans is not made explicit. It is difficult to say whether this ambiguity is part of a conscious effort to include all of the Països Catalans within the national homeland, or whether it forms part of an attempt to emphasise the historicity of Catalonia by evoking the past – medieval times – when such territories formed part of
the same confederate crown. The second point to be made at this stage, particularly in the case of programmes broadcast within the space *De Vacances*, is the stress laid on defining the nation in terms of the national homeland. Thus elements of national identity – history, culture, language, customs and traditions – are all framed within the spatial context of the national homeland itself, and in particular with rural Catalonia, portrayed as somehow closer to the land and thus to the values and characteristics that the land itself bestows upon the population. Thirdly, in the case of *El Temps*, the emphasis on the territorial consequences of the meteorological phenomena explained, as opposed to the effects for the population, is consistent with the process of ‘displacement’ that Sack attributes to nationalist territoriality. Thus the national territory itself not only becomes the source of national identity, but also the source of authority – one must obey the ‘law of the land’. Finally, and in a parallel fashion to the process of ‘displacement’, we witness a process of ‘reification’ whereby rural Catalonia is portrayed as the spiritual heartland of the nation precisely because it represents better than anywhere else, the values that nationalists claim that the territory itself possesses. Overall, we see once more how important territory is to nationalism, and in particular the latter’s interest in conceiving of the relationship between national and national homeland as unproblematic and ‘natural’.

Towards a Postmodern National Identity?

The preceding analysis has outlined the way in which, at one level, the programmes featured seek to contribute to the process of national territorial socialisation, in that the ultimate aim is not merely to reproduce the nation, but rather to relate the way in which the nation is thought of to the national territory itself. In this respect, the programmes featured can be considered to be part of a long tradition of national territorial socialisation dating back in the case of Catalonia over a century and a half. Thus, having explained the reasons behind the production of such programmes, I now wish to analyse certain questions related to their consumption by the broader public, since one thing is to argue, however convincingly, that the programmes featured by TV3 form part of a clear strategy of national territorial socialisation, promoted by the
nationalist government, and another is that they are interpreted in this way, even subconsciously, by those who watch them.

Perhaps the first thing that we may say at this juncture is that, in quantitative terms, both programmes can be considered a success: in the period studied (February and March, 2003), *El Temps* achieved an average share of 30%, making it one of the most watched programmes on Catalan television; *De Vacances* has also proved most popular, again with an average audience share of over 30% in the summers of 1999, 2000, and 2001. But how do we explain such popularity?

Building on the analysis developed in Chapter 4, I wish to argue that any attempt to explain the consumption of such programmes must take place within the context of the increasing salience of place-based identities that ultimately rest on the power of tradition. Having explained how Catalan nationalism seeks to take advantage of this tendency, I will go on to analyse the specific problems involved with political mobilisation based on such identities.

In Chapter 4, I argued that while deterritorialisation is an inherent part of the current wave of time-space compression that is referred to as globalisation, it cannot be understood without the necessarily-related process of reterritorialisation, the other side of the same coin. In this respect, place in general and political mobilisation around place-based identities have become more, not less salient. At one level, I argued that political mobilisation around place-based identities below the level of the nation-state might become more salient due to changes in the dominant economic paradigm and to shifting patterns of political territoriality, such as European integration, for example, is accompanied by opportunities for sub-state political mobilisation. In order to attract investment and tourist flows, for example, many localities and regions have embarked on a process of highlighting the economic, political and cultural factors that might differentiate them from competing regions and localities.

However, we also saw that the construction and reconstruction of place-based identities under conditions of time-space compression is by no means unproblematic. At a general level, it was noted how Harvey (1989) argues how the inherent tendency within capitalism to reduce turnover times of the production, distribution, marketing and consumption of goods and services, and to annihilate space through time lead to the

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7 The figures for *El Temps* have been very kindly provided by Joan Botella, member of the Consell Audiovisual de Catalunya, while my thanks also go to Mónica Huguet, presenter of *De Vacances* for the corresponding figures.
search for stability in a sea of ephemerality and for place-based identities as “secure moorings in a shifting world” (Harvey, 1989: 302). The case of the Docklands highlighted the contested nature of production of identities, whereby attempted to make the area more ‘attractive’ to transnational investment flows led to the fanning of the embers of ‘resistance’ identities, which in turn excluded other ethnic and national groups, whose belonging to the area came to be questioned.

In this respect, I wish to put forward the argument that to a large degree, we can understand the consumption of such programmes in the light of time-space compression, and more specifically as part of the shift for “search for moorings” at a time of uncertainty. But how might we characterise such a search? What does it involve? At a general level, we might talk of nostalgia, the importance of history, tradition, authenticity, which not only rest on the temporal dimension (the past), but are also, as Giddens points out, place-based, since tradition, history and authenticity predate modernity and the time-space distanciation that it necessarily involves. Indeed, “the assertion of any place-bound identity has to rest at some point on the motivational power of tradition” (Harvey, 1989: 303). In more specific terms, we may highlight the emergence and development of heritage culture in much of the advanced capitalist West, which in many ways can be seen in the proliferation of museums, that not only deal with high culture, but also centre on the importance of “local history, of local production, of how things once upon a time were made, sold, consumed, and integrated into a long-lost and often romanticized daily life (one from which all trace of oppressive social relations may be expunged)” (Harvey, 1989: 303. See also, for example, Hewison, 1987; Urry, 1990; and Boswell and Evans, 1999). In the case of the UK, for example, Urry notes how “there are now at least 41 heritage centres [...] [and] 464 museums possessing industrial material and 817 with collections relating to rural history. The director of the Science Museum has said of the growth in heritage that: ‘You can’t project that sort of rate of growth much further before the whole country becomes one big open air museum, and you must join it as you get off at Heathrow’” (Urry, 1990: 104).

If current time-space compression can said to be a major factor in the search for the past, which in turn is place specific, then it can also be said to promote more directly the salience of place. This has been especially apparent in the ambit of the production and consumption of food. Ready availability of food produce and styles of cuisine is said to be a prime example of deterritorialisation in that it “undermines the close
More specifically, in terms of deterritorialisation, we may talk of how “today the year-round availability of imported fresh foods (along with the increasing use of processed foods) dissolves what might be seen as a positive, particular connection between diet and locality determined precisely by restriction - by the limits of availability of local produce” (Tomlinson, 1999: 123). Thus, while we may eat ‘local’ strawberries, for example, over certain months of the summer, for the rest of the year we may continue to consume strawberries imported from all over the world, ignoring seasonality and effectively undermining the relationship between diet and locality and also, potentially, between place and belonging: “[a]nd so the rhythms, anticipations and differentiations of a ‘food calendar’ of summer abundance, provision for winter shortages, Harvest Festivals, Christmas and Easter specialities, that contribute to a sharp particular sense of local culture, are at risk of disappearance” (Tomlinson, 1999: 124). In addition, Harvey argues that the new culinary experience, whereby the “whole world’s cuisine is now assembled in one place” (1989: 300), means that we increasingly experience the world’s geography “vicariously”, in that we might be everywhere and anywhere at any one time.

However, deterritorialisation is necessarily accompanied by reterritorialisation, which, in the case of the consumption of food produce has seen a tendency towards a ‘return’ to traditional, local produce and gastronomic styles. According to a report by consultants Yankelovich, based on a survey of 8,000 people in 13 EU countries, a new kind of European consumer is emerging that, at one level, can be described as ‘urban-provincial’, in that while resident in the city, he/she aspires to enjoy the ‘open air’ of rural life. Similarly, there exists a parallel tendency in consumption, in that while accepting global brands, the new European consumer, given his/her emphasis on ‘rootedness’, seeks out products with a ‘local flavour’ (La Vanguardia, 18/8/2002).

At the same time, since the late 1980’s, the European Union has promoted a series of certification processes that not only seek to recognise the quality of the produce in question, but also its specific geographic origin and traditional nature. In this respect, we can highlight the Designation of Protected Origin (DPO), the Protected Geographical Indication (PGI), and the Geographic Designation (GD)8.

8 According to EU legislation the DOP is “the geographic designation of a region or locality used to describe an agricultural product or foodstuff as originating in that region, specific place or country, the quality or characteristics of which are essentially or exclusively due to a particular geographic environment with its inherent natural and human factors. The production, processing and preparation of the product must take place in the defined geographic area” (R(CEE) 2081/1992). “The PGI of an agro-
The search for security through place-based authenticity and tradition is also reflected in certain aspects of what Urry refers to as postmodern tourism. In particular, emphasis is placed on a romantic view of the countryside and of country life, that is not only translated into visits to rural museums and heritage centres, but also in “the increasing attraction of both visiting the countryside and protecting it” (Urry, 1990: 96). In this respect, Thrift highlights the emergence new traditionalist magazines, such as Country Living, and Country Homes (Thrift, 1989: 26), a phenomenon accompanied by the “enormous rise in the membership of the organisations concerned with protecting the countryside and facilitating access” (Urry, 1990: 96). Here, we might also add the increasing importance of rural tourism, a form of leisure activity that might be considered to combine many, if not all of the elements of the search for secure moorings that we have seen here. Thus, not only is one in contact with ‘traditional’ forms of life, one actually can form part of it. According to one owner of an establishment for rural tourism, it “favours contact between the citizen [i.e. tourist] and the rural population, and becomes a good way of really getting to know the customs of the territory” (Duocastella i Selvas, 2000: 12).

It is within this context, that the contents of many of the programmes that I have analysed here begin to take on meaning. For example, we have seen how in Rutes a Peu many individual programmes seek an idealised Catalan past that is either extinct or gravely threatened by the excesses of modernity: mass tourism, transport infrastructures, changing patterns of occupation, mechanisation, immigration and so forth. Paisatges de Cuina is also premised on the idea that traditional placed-based food, its production, elaboration and consumption, is somehow better, more authentic than contemporary culinary tendencies, while Viatges per la Història, promotes the consumption of an often romanticised history that makes very little mention of the immense hardship of daily life for the immense majority of the population engaged in agriculture and industry in the 18th, 19th and 20th century.

food product is the geographic definition of a region or specific place used to describe an agricultural product or foodstuff that originates from that region, specific place, or country, and which possesses a specific quality, reputation or other characteristics attributable to that geographical origin, and whose production and/or transformation and/or processing and/or preparation takes place in the defined geographical area” (R(CEE) 2081/1992). The GD is an EU recognition for “those spirit drinks produced in the geographic area which gives them their name and from which they obtain their defining character and qualities” (R(CEE) 1576/1989).
In the wider context of Catalan society, these tendencies that the programmes seek to appeal to are becoming increasingly important. Thus, in terms of “museum culture” in Catalonia, the overall number of museums has increased from 307 to 363 over the period 1998-2001, an increase of over 18%, while the number of visits to museums between 1994 and 2001 has more than doubled, going from 6,442,261 visits at the beginning of the period to over 13,000,000 in 2001 (Departament de Cultura, 2002).

In Catalonia, as in many other countries, the government of the Generalitat has been quick to see Catalan food products recognised within the categories established by the EU that seek to guarantee the origins, quality and authenticity of a wide range of food produce. Since the passing of the EU legislation of DOP recognising the certification process, in Catalonia, four products have been recognised by the EU (almonds from Reus, cheese from the Alt Urgell and the Cerdanya, olive oil from the Garrigues, and olive oil from Siurana). Meanwhile, three further products have been approved by the Generalitat and are awaiting EU approval: butter from the Alt Urgell and the Cerdanya, olive oil from the Baix Ebre - Montsià, and olive oil from the Terra Alta. Secondly, in the categories of geographically specific produce is the Protected Geographical Indication, currently, five Catalan food products have been recognised by the Commission as meeting the eligibility criteria for the IGP with five more awaiting approval. Finally, one Catalan product, Ratafia Catalana (a walnut liqueur), is recognised as having the Geographic Designation (Departament d’Agricultura, Pesca i Ramaderia, 2002).

Another area of analysis that is directly related with the content of the television programmes studied here, is the increased contact with the natural environment, reflected in changing patterns of tourist consumption. In the case of Catalonia, mass tourism has formed a vital part of the economy since the 1960’s. By 2001, tourism generated for the Catalan economy €12 billion, 9.9% of the total Catalan GDP, and thus representing the most important industry of the country. Of a total of over 2,000,000 beds, over 80% are concentrated on the coast, particularly in the tourist areas par excellence, the Costa Brava, and the Costa Daurada (Departament de Treball, Indústria, Comerç i Turisme, 2002). However, over recent years, from within the industry and the regional government, the model of mass tourism has been questioned, with arguments claiming that the model has reached its limit and that a new model must be found that not only guarantees environmental sustainability, but that is also able to face the
challenges of shifting patterns in demand. While still in its infancy in Catalonia, representing just 0.3% of the total number of beds available in 2001, nevertheless, the figures have grown spectacularly in recent years. In 1990, there were just 109 rural tourism establishments offering a total of less than 1000 beds, while in 2001 the figures had risen to 820 and 6,800 respectively. Not surprisingly, almost half of the growth came from the Pyrenean and pre-Pyrenean part of Catalonia, namely the mountainous hinterland (Departament de Treball, Indústria, Comerç i Turisme, 2002).

Another related aspect is the increasing levels of environmental concerns and the response of public and private authorities. According to data from the register of environmental groups in Catalonia, including some from the rest of the Paísos Catalans, of a total of 167 groups, just 17 existed before 1980, with 56 being created during the following decade, 80 groups were established in the 1990s with 10 being founded since 2000. In terms of the response of the authorities, a similar pattern emerges, in that of 18 legally-protected areas currently existing in Catalonia, just two predate the decade of the 1980’s (Gurri i Serra, 1998).

In addition, La Caixa de Catalunya, the second largest savings bank in Catalonia, has established the Fundació Paisatge i Territori, to protect natural landscapes by buying them and turning them into protected areas managed by conservationist groups. As part of the programmes that savings banks are obliged by law to carry out, La Caixa de Catalunya has earmarked an annual budget €3 million to the project, and by 2000, its land acquisitions represented 0.48% of the total of Catalan territory (Gurri i Serra, 1998).

In the light of these general tendencies, within which the consumption of and popularity of the De Vacances and El Temps take on meaning, it might be argued that under conditions of time-space compression, nationalism is strengthened for two reasons. Firstly, as tradition becomes increasingly important, nationalism is able to take advantage in the sense that one of its key characteristics is that it relies on tradition and history in order to present the nation as an essentially ancient (or at least very old) category. At the same time, nationalism is a form of place-based political mobilisation, and thus national identity, defined as it is in terms of the national territory, is likewise a place-based form of identity. Thus, in as much as tradition is ultimately place-based, the way in which nationalism constructs national identity can be said to become
increasingly attractive under conditions of time-space compression and the insecurity that this phenomenon produces.

Secondly, a further tendency of contemporary society is the increasing importance of culture. In this respect, one of the most interesting feature of Harvey’s account (1989) is that it not only explains how time-space compression is an inherent feature of capitalism, but also that the current wave of time-space compression has led to a shift from modern to postmodern society. It is argued that the semi-autonomous sphere of culture has suffered a “dissolution”, but rather than disappearing, it is to be “imagined in terms of an explosion: a prodigious expansion of culture throughout the social realm, to the point at which everything in our social - from economic value and state power to practices and to the very structure of the psyche itself - can be said to have become cultural in some original and yet untheorized sense” (Jameson, 1996: ix-x). In as much as the nation is a cultural-territorial construction, the increased emphasis on cultural consumption in general might be seen to strengthen nationalism in that part of such consumption, at least in the case of Catalonia, is of nationalised, territorial culture.

Consequently, according to the arguments presented so far, we might conclude that time-space compression might actually lead to the strengthening of nationalism, since it is a form of political mobilisation that ultimately rests on place and tradition. However, it would be mistaken to overlook other important tendencies of contemporary society that might undermine the capacity for political mobilisation of nationalism.

Firstly in this respect, it is not necessarily the case that the national territorial scale takes precedence over others, such as the local or comarcal spatial scale. In a context of spatial reconfiguration, the ability to socialise the population territorially is a most important asset, since different territorial scales of governance might be seen as entering into continuous competition to control territory and to secure the identification of the population resident therein. In the case of Catalan nationalism, we can thus understand the importance of the ‘national’ television, in that it not only seeks to produce and reproduce a differentiated territorial identity vis à vis the rest of Spain, but also seeks to incorporate local-level identities within Catalonia into the national territorial hierarchy.

Secondly, in Chapter 1, it was noted that one of the ‘core claims’ of nationalism is that collective loyalty is owed above all to the nation itself; indeed, as Benedict Anderson (1983) only the nation has been capable of generating the sacrifice of millions
of human lives through the wars waged in its name. However, it might be argued that the nation’s claim over primary loyalty is undermined in two ways. Firstly, is the idea that tradition, history and authenticity are most problematic in contemporary society. Harvey himself points to the difficulty in maintaining tradition, understood as historical continuity, in the midst of postmodern ephemerality:

“The irony is that tradition is now often preserved by being commodified and marketed as such. The search for roots ends up at worst being produced and marketed as an image, as a simulacrum or pastiche (imitation communities constructed to evoke images of some folkish past, the fabric of traditional working-class communities being taken over by an urban gentry) [...] The problem is that none of these are immune from tampering or downright faking for present purposes” (Harvey, 1989: 303).

In a similar way, Urry, argues that “the protection of the past conceals the destruction of the present. There is an absolute distinction between authentic history (continuing and therefore dangerous) and heritage (past, dead and safe). The latter, in short conceals social and spatial inequalities, masks a shallow commercialism and consumerism. [...] Heritage is bogus history” (Urry, 1990: 110). In addition, Giddens talks of how tradition has been undermined by one of the consequences of modernity, reflexivity, whereby tradition itself is now justified in terms of the rational thought to which it stands in opposition. Thus, in as much as we are increasingly faced with a whole range of life-style options – food, leisure activities and so forth – the national, traditional option is just one consumption choice. Overall, the extent to which nationalism increasingly rests on either ‘bogus’ heritage or reflexive consumption choices, could be interpreted as undermining the power of nationalism, particularly its ability to lay claims to men and women’s primary sense of loyalty and belonging.

**Conclusions**

While Chapter 7 analysed, among other things, the symbolic and material importance of rural Catalonia, the current chapter has sought to analyse the role of rural Catalonia in the contemporary process of national territorial, of which certain television
programmes can be considered to form part. Both *El Temps* and *De Vacances* contribute to such a process in that they not only emphasise, very graphically in the case of the former, the spatial extent of the national homeland in relation to others, but also the relation between the nation and the homeland itself. In this respect, once more it is rural Catalonia that emerges as the spiritual centre of the country, in that it is there where the traditions are presented as having the deepest roots historically and physically. However, I have also argued that the relative popularity of such programmes should not be directly related to their nationalist content. Rather, building on the arguments put forward in Chapter 3 and 4, it seems preferable to understand the consumption of such programmes within the context of contemporary time-space compression and the broader shift towards postmodernity. In this respect, nationalism and national identity might be seen as increasingly attractive since they appeal to the search for security - place-based tradition and authenticity - in times of postmodern ephemerality. However, it is not entirely evident that nationalism and national identity remain unchanged, indeed in as much as national identity practices become increasingly commodified, then we might ask whether this is sufficient to continue to generate the feelings of belonging and loyalty that nationalism has traditionally been able to.
CONCLUSIONS

Overall, throughout this dissertation, I have sought to answer three basic questions: in what way is nationalism territorial?; how and why does the construction of territorial national identity favour certain places over others?; and how might nationalism, as an example of place-based political mobilisation be characterised in the contemporary setting of time-space compression?

In response to such questions, in Part One, I developed a series of claims at a general level concerning the territorial nature of nationalism and how it might have changed over time, especially in the light of current developments related to time-space compression. Thus, I argued, in the first place, that nationalism is territorial in that it makes claims over a specific territory, since the nature of the political power that nationalists seek to exercise, whether in the form of a state or political autonomy, is premised on territory. However, nationalism not only seeks to control a given territory, but rather it justifies its claims by identifying the nation in terms of the very territory over which those claims are made, and thus the national territory comes to define the nation. The process by which this comes about might be referred to as national territorial socialisation, or the territorial production and reproduction of the nation.

Within this process, given that the national territory or homeland is essentially an abstraction of individual places and identities, then certain places will become more important than others, in that the ‘heart of the nation’ is sited geographically and symbolically. Where this might be ultimately depends on the relations of power within the nation in question, and between the latter and other nations.

Finally, I argued that under contemporary time-space compression, to the extent that nationalism is a form of place-based political mobilisation, grounded in turn on a place-based form of identity, then deterritorialisation might be considered to undermine the relationship between nation and homeland, although the accompanying process of reterritorialisation does not necessarily mean that nationalism is set to disappear, but rather the opposite: some forms of place based-mobilisation in general might become more salient as they take advantage of the opportunities of the spatial reconfiguration
that time-space compression implies, although such political mobilisation is forced to rely on place-based tradition, that itself is increasingly hard to maintain.

To what extent do such claims help us understand nationalism in Catalonia since its emergence in the 19th century? By way of conclusion, I wish to highlight four major areas of concern that have emerged in this dissertation.

A first concern relates to the way in which the *Renaixença* and within it, *vigatanisme*, can be interpreted as an important part of the process of national territorial socialisation, rather than as a means of transforming Catalan into a modern literary language of prestige that *subsequently* prompted nationalist political mobilisation based on linguistic difference, as many accounts hold. Consequently, the Catalan *pàtria* becomes “‘the piece of land that Nature has placed under the same sky and next to the same sea, that makes its sons speak the same language, that makes them live with the same customs and makes them work with the same energy’. There are Catalans, thus, because there is Catalonia, because there is a Catalan land; not vice-versa” (Bonaventura Riera quoted in Marfany, 1995: 202). This relationship between the nation and the national territory was constructed in a number of ways. Firstly, *vigantanisme* produced a profoundly religious interpretation of the national homeland and, consequently, of the nation, to the extent that Bishop Torres i Bages would claim that ‘Catalonia will be Christian, or it will not be [i.e. exist]’. Through the epics and poems of Jacint Verdaguer, and the activism of other *vigatans*, such as Collell, God’s presence is intimately linked with the birth of Catalonia, while the mountains and their monasteries, particularly Montserrat, came to symbolise the relationship between God’s eternal presence and Catalonia, providing important historical continuity between the past, present and future.

The *Renaixença* and *vigatanisme* also made an important contribution to grounding the language, as the most important symbol of national identity, in the national homeland, to the extent that Catalan came to be interpreted as Catalonia’s ‘own language’. The recurrent themes concerning different aspects of the *pàtria* as a source of literary inspiration, meant that language and territory would come to be (con)fused. The importance of this process should not be underestimated. Since the re-establishment of the Generalitat de Catalunya, the question of how to promote the Catalan language has been one of the key areas of nationalist concern. In the wake of large-scale immigration from the rest of Spain between the 1950’s and the 1970’s to fuel industrial
growth, the fact that many such immigrants lacked access to education in Catalan, meant that the democratic institutions embarked on a policy of linguistic normalisation. If the decade of the 1980’s saw a policy of positive discrimination in favour of Catalan, based on the goal of achieving equality for Catalan and Castilian and their respective speakers, the 1990’s have seen a policy shift. Recent years have seen ‘normalisation’ come to be interpreted by successive nationalist governments, broadly supported by the political elites, as the means by which the Catalan language becomes the dominant language of daily life in Catalonia, in such spheres as education, public administration, the media, culture and so forth. This is justified on the explicitly territorial premise that Catalan is the language of the Catalan territory, it is Catalonia’s ‘own language’.

The implications of this premise in terms of Catalan national identity, centre on the idea that the national language, as the strongest element of Catalan national identity, becomes a means of affirming one’s belonging to the national homeland. Consequently, for immigrants in Catalonia, for them to become Catalan, they must speak the language since, as Jordi Pujol states, “[t]he language is [...] the surest and most common way to demonstrate our adhesion – more or less conscious, but real – and our fidelity to Catalonia” (Pujol, 1976: 83).

However, the construction of national identity in these terms is problematic at both a theoretical and a more practical level. Firstly, the idea that a territory can have its ‘own language’ must be questioned, since ultimately it is the people, not the plains and the mountains that speak. Secondly, even if we allow for such an affirmation, the concept of ‘own language’ is difficult to define, since which criteria do we use to decide when a language becomes a territory’s ‘own’? Over space, for example, if ‘own’ is understood in this case as originating in Catalonia, then nationalist claims regarding the presence of the Catalan language in the other Països Catalans are undermined, since Catalan was brought with the Catalan conquerors in the Middle Ages. Over time, even if we ignore the historical presence of languages such as Greek and Latin, Castilian has been present in a limited way, since approximately the 15th century, while currently it is the mother tongue of up to 40% of the Catalan population. However, recognising this duality is most problematic for nationalism, since nationalism seeks internal unity, in that ‘we’ the nation should coincide with ‘here’ the national territory. If the Catalan language is considered to be the principle way of demonstrating one’s belonging to the homeland, then recognising another language would undermine the relationship
between nation and national homeland, and consequently, the legitimacy of nationalist claims over the homeland.

The second major concern of this dissertation has been to analyse the geography of national identity in the case of Catalonia. Again, from the origins of Catalan nationalism to the present day, I have argued that important tendencies within Catalan nationalism have consistently sought to situate the symbolic heartland of Catalonia in the rural hinterland, where traditional, conservative values are opposed to the ‘contamination’ of Barcelona. In this respect, once more the writers and activists associated with the Romantic Renaixença and vigatanisme take great pains to portray rural Catalonia as pure and wholesome in contrast to the cosmopolitan, materialist urban Catalonia, and especially Barcelona, that had undergone dramatic changes associated with industrialisation and urbanisation, which over time would attract non-Catalan immigration. The question consequently arose as to why an economically powerful urban bourgeoisie should construct a vision of the Catalan homeland based on rural Catalonia.

In many ways coinciding with Fradera (1992), I have argued that within the context of a state that was unsympathetic to the changing socio-economic reality of Catalonia, the eruption of industrial capitalism led to violent conflict, both rural and urban, that threatened the power of the emerging industrial bourgeoisie and the construction of a single market for industrial and agricultural goods. In this respect, the Renaixença and vigatanisme emerge as a means of not only building alliances between urban and rural elites against the industrial proletariat, but also as a means of overcoming Carlist threats to the territorial integrity of the emerging Catalán single market. In ideological terms, vigatanisme never broke with Carlism, but the latter’s failure to construct a viable alternative to modern, industrial society meant that vigatanisme’s significance rested on its ability to build bridges between the supporters of Carlism, mainly but not exclusively located in the interior of Catalonia, and the urban elites. Significantly, as Carlism was extinguished as a military threat, vigatanisme was essentially absorbed by the Barcelona political and economic elites. In this respect, Catalan nationalism can be understood as the means by which the urban, industrial classes sought to lay the foundations for its economic and political power over the rest of Catalonia. The price to pay was that culturally, the Catalan nation would have to have
its symbolic roots in the landscape and values of rural Catalonia, which the *Renaixença* and *vigatanisme* did so much to promote.

This opposition between rural and urban Catalonia has been a constant within Catalan nationalism ever since, despite, or perhaps because of the erosion of the material bases of such a differentiation. By the middle of the 19th century, the walls of many cities in Catalonia and in Europe were being torn down, eliminating not only the physical boundaries between town and country, but also political, legal and economic ones. Currently, we have arrived at the point whereby Catalonia can be considered to form part of a single urban system (Nel·lo, 2001). However, the lack of material bases for the urban-rural dichotomy has not ended the reliance of conservative Catalan nationalism on the rural hinterland as the spiritual reserve of the nation. Throughout his political career, Jordi Pujol has not only maintained such a tradition, but has placed special emphasis on portraying himself as a man very much in touch with rural Catalonia. The traditional reliance of Pujolism on the rural hinterland reflects, in part, the influence of conservative Catalan nationalist thought on Pujol’s own, which may be traced back to Torres i Bages himself. At the same time, the reliance on rural areas is important for nationalism in general, in that it reinforces the link between the nation and the national territory. Firstly, in physical terms, the rural community is closest of all to the national soil, and thus comes to be considered as more authentically national than those living in urban areas. Secondly, the rural community provides another form of demonstrating the continuity of the relationship between nation and national territory over time, since they are perceived as living proof of the nation’s bond with the homeland. As such, it is not difficult to understand why nationalists often promote the idea of ‘back to the land’ as a means of national reaffirmation.

A third area of concern relates to one problematic feature of the relationship between Catalan nationalism and the national homeland. We have seen how seen throughout this dissertation how nationalists ultimately derive the way that the nation is defined from the national territory itself, which in turn justifies nationalists’ claims over the national territory. In order to do so, such a territory must be clearly defined, a condition that Catalan nationalism does not always fulfil, since one of the ambiguities of Catalan nationalism has been its lack of clear definition regarding the extent of the Catalan homeland, and consequently of its relationship with the Catalan nation. While generally speaking, Catalonia, the Principality, has been the spatial framework for
Catalan nationalist claims, the wider Països Catalans have also featured. In Canigó, for example, Jacint Verdaguer revives the medieval extent of the pàtria, to include places in Valencia and the Balearic Islands. At the level of political doctrine, in the late 19th-century, the term ‘païses catalanes’ is coined for the first time, while Prat de la Riba, undoubtedly one of the most important contributors to the consolidation of Catalan nationalist doctrine, talks of Greater Catalonia. In the 1960’s, attempts were made to revive the pan-Catalan nation identified with the Països Catalans. In effect, it has been argued that, objectively, few problems arise in considering the Països Catalans a single nation: they enjoy a shared history, language and even ethnicity, since the territories conquered by the Catalans from the Moors were repopulated with ‘Catalans’ from the Principality. However, the ‘question of names’ arises, concerning what to call the nation identified with the Països Catalans, a problem which is reflected in the general lack of support for nationalism defined in these spatial terms. A territorial approach to nationalism, national identity and the nation, is able to come to terms with the question, since in this case, historically the territories of the Països Catalans have never formed part of what might be considered to be a unified national territory. As such, when Catalan nationalism emerges in the 19th century, it is faced with a paradox: on the one hand, claims regarding the political control of territory centre on the Principality of Catalonia, while on the other, it is precisely nationalism’s reluctance to make explicit the territorial premises of which such claims on behalf of the nation that leads to the (re)emergence of the spatial framework of the Països Catalans, since it is precisely those elements of national identity that are highlighted – language, history, and even ethnicity – that are shared by many in the Països Catalans. Thus the ‘problem of names’ ultimately reflects territorial disunity and thus undermines nationalist claims over wider the framework of the Països Catalans.

The final point to be made concerns the relationship between Catalan nationalism and contemporary time-space compression, often referred to as globalisation. On the one hand, without doubt, Catalan nationalism can be considered to have exploited the windows of opportunity that the process of spatial reconfiguration, an inherent part of globalisation, has provided. For example, Catalan nationalism has been an important actor in the process of political decentralisation within the Spanish state since the death of Franco, obtaining high degrees of political autonomy. At the same time, Catalonia has been one of the most active regions in terms of promoting a
Europe of regions and non-state nations within the context of European integration. However, on the other hand, it would perhaps be a mistake to ignore other key processes bound up with globalisation that can be considered to undermine political mobilisation around place-based identities, such as nationalism. In this respect, Catalan nationalism is not alone in seeking to establish a special kind of relationship between the national territory and the nation, whereby ideally, ‘we’ the nation should coincide with ‘here’ the national territory, while ‘the other’ should be ‘there’, that is outside ‘our’ national territory. It is in this way that the nation comes to be defined in terms of the national territory itself. In general, globalisation is said to challenge nationalist attempts to ‘purify space’ (Robins, 1991) in this way, since the emergence of global flows of people, images, goods and so forth erodes the nature of the relationship between the national territory and the nation, and thus the former’s capacity to ultimately define the latter. In the specific case of Catalonia, the ‘threat’ posed by globalisation for the most important element of national identity, the language, is specifically recognised by the Linguistic Law of 1998. Indeed, the reluctance of the Hollywood ‘majors’ to comply with parts of the law, preferring to provide copies of films dubbed into Castilian as opposed to Catalan, might be regarded as a prime example of the threats that globalisation presents. However, it is perhaps immigration that has done most to question the territorial basis of nationalism in Catalonia, precisely because ‘the other’ is ‘here’ amongst ‘us’, making it increasingly difficult to sustain nationalist claims made in the name of the nation, which in turn is defined in function of territory. In this respect, current patterns of immigration, mainly from non-EU countries, pose similar problems for Catalan nationalism as immigration from the rest of Spain did from the 1950’s onwards, and indeed, nationalist political discourse on the issue has remained largely unchanged over time, since the challenge remains the same. The presence of immigration has obliged nationalists in Catalonia to redouble its efforts to define the nation in territorial terms, as we have seen in the case of linguistic policy from the early 1990’s onwards, whereby the promotion of the Catalan language is justified by the claim that Catalan is Catalonia’s own language. Over time, as Catalonia is likely to be increasingly drawn into global flows, including migratory ones, this tendency is likely to continue: nationalism in Catalonia is likely to place more, not less emphasis on the territorial nature of the nation, and in particular on the historical nature of the relationship between nation and homeland.
A further consequence of time-space compression for Catalan nationalism concerns the latter’s insistence (or at least more conservative nationalism) on the importance of traditional, rural Catalonia as the spiritual heartland of the nation. On the one hand, it might be argued that postmodern ephemerality actually favours nationalist political mobilisation, since in the personal and collective search for ‘secure moorings’, the category of the nation becomes increasingly attractive precisely because it ultimately relies on place-based tradition. However, as I argued in Chapter 8, tradition is increasingly difficult to sustain, since it is ever more commodified, and comes to be consumed as heritage culture, rural tourism, or traditional cuisine. Under such conditions, nationalism increasingly comes up against a paradox, whereby on the one hand it becomes more attractive, while on the other, the territorial premises on which it is based are increasingly difficult to sustain. In this respect we might consider nationalism as part of a more complex relationship between place and space, deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation, which increasingly shapes the world in which we live.
## ANNEX I
### PLACES MENTIONED IN *EL TEMPS*

**Catalonia**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Locality (Municipality)</th>
<th>Comarca</th>
<th>Fixed camara</th>
<th>Written mention</th>
<th>Verbal mention</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adrall (Ribera d’Urgellet)</td>
<td>Alt Urgell</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Aitona</td>
<td>Segrià</td>
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<tr>
<td>Alcanar</td>
<td>Montsià</td>
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<tr>
<td>Alcarràs</td>
<td>Segrià</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Alt Camp</td>
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<tr>
<td>Alcover</td>
<td>Alt Camp</td>
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<tr>
<td>Alcover</td>
<td>Alt Camp</td>
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<td>Montsià</td>
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<td>Anglès</td>
<td>Selva</td>
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<td>Maresme</td>
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### Balearic Islands

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### País Valencià

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ANNEX II
PROGRAMMES FEATURED ON DE VACANCES

Rutes a peu 1999
La regió de les agulles de Montserrat
El camí de ronda del Moianès
Massís del Montgrí
La serralada del Montsià
Camins de bandolers de les Guilleries
La ruta del carrilet de la Vall Fosca
Les "banquetes" del canal d'Urgell
Les cingles de Siurana


Rutes a peu 2000
Camí de ronda de l'Ametlla de Mar
Gisclareny
Parc natural aiguamolls del Fondo
Les balmes de Llaës
L'estany dessecat d'Ivars d'Urgell
Castelltallat
Utxesa
Aigües termals del Vallespir
Els graus de Montsant
Cerdanya
L'illa de l'Aire (Menorca)
El Salí de Cambrils
Els alzinars de Rocacorba

**Rates a peu 2001**

Camins d'abast de la vall del Lord
Les pedres escrites de la vall de Galba
El GR del Vallès i del Maresme
Camins de mar de Formentera
la ruta de la Pau (Serra de Pàndols)
Les carrerades de rodes
El racó d'Ademús
Els conreus de Montfalcó murallat
Les roques del Masmut
Eivissa: caminant per l'illa dels pins
El sender amagat de la Serra de Bèrnia
La ruta del Císter: senders de pedra i silenci
Els estanys dels meners (Ransol, Andorra)
Els antics camins ramaders del Lluçànes

El Camí St. Jaume: de Montmaneu a Mequinensa
La Vall d'Eina pel camí de Núria
Les escales del barranc de Biniaraix (Mallorca)
Els engorjats de Sant Aniol d’Aguja
La Serra del Cis (Baixa Ribagorça aragonesa)
El Port de Vielha- La Vall d’Aran
Cami de ronda de Tamariu
Les gorges de Galamús (Fenolleda-Catalunya Nord)
Les places de carboners del Montseny (Vall de Sant Marçal)
El desert de les palmes (Castelló)


**Paisatges de cuina 2000**

La cuina del Maresme
“Potaco i Mandongo”
Mallorca, el pes de la història
Mallorca, ensaimades i llampugues
La Plana de Vic
Terra Alta: Terra de clotxa i vi
La Baixa Segarra: La vall del riu Corb

Arròs i anguila a l'Albufera
El Penedès
Girona
El Serrallo
El Baix Llobregat
El Delta de l'Ebre
El Berguedà

**Paisatges de cuina 2001**

La Segarra, del verd al daurat
El Garraf, records de gustos i olors
Moianés, dels pous de glaç a l'ecologisme
Menorca, de portes endins
Menorca, de tramuntana a migjorn
Priorat, raïm i arengada
Montseny, sopa de farigola
Tarragonès, terra de romescus
Alta Cerdanya, el pes de la cuina francesa

Baixa Cerdanya, naps i cols
Eivissa, la tradició rural
El Segríà, cargols a l'horta
La plana del Roselló, Boles de picolat
La costa vermella, anxoves i vi de Banyuls
Vallès Oriental, l'Escaxarrutat
Formentera, Xereques i vi pagès
A l'Alt Urgell, trumfós amb fredolics
Alt Empordà, terra de tramuntana
Tortosa, en el penúltim tram del riu


**Paisatges de cuina 2002**

El Solsonès, trumfós i trufes
L'Empordanet, costa de garoines
Morella i Els Ports, de flaons i cecines
L'Alta Anora, la memòria del cuiner
Les Garrigues, la cultura de l'oli
Cellers de Barcelona, garrafes i vermuts
L'Alt Camp, terra de calçots i bon oli
La Selva, les dones de Sils
La Selva, de la tradició a la moda

Pla d'Urgell, cassola i lifara
El Bages, el gust del secà
Manresa, pesca salada
Conca de Barberà, la bota del vinagre
País del cava, macabeu, xarel·lo i parellada
Banyoles, l'estany dolç
Vinaròs, els sons del port
Lluçanes, quan les faves es mengen amb tavella
Vallès Occidental, amanida de conceptes


**Viatges per la història 2000**

Fa mig milió d'anys
La revolució neolítica
Grècia a Catalunya
Els iberis
Tarraco
L'Al-Andalus
Castells de frontera
El romànic
Jaume I
Els calls jueus

L'expansió per la Mediterrània
Pirates a la vista
Nyerros i Cadells (bandolers)
El Tractat dels Pirineus
1714: El decret de Nova Planta
L'expansió agrària
Les beceroles de la indústria
La industrialització
El Modernisme
L'electrificació de Catalunya


311