Ph.D. Dissertation

SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN SUSTAINABILITY TRANSITIONS

Identity, Social Learning & Power in the Spanish and Turkish Water Domains

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Supervisor: Dr. Joan David Tàbara

Submitted for the degree of Ph.D. to the Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona – UAB Institut de Ciència i Tecnologia Ambientals - ICTA

Bellaterra, Barcelona
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To those

who struggle to create a fairer world

for all of its inhabitants
Abstract

Dominant economic growth and nation-state building practices are often based on detaching individuals from other individuals and communities from their natural environment in which their livelihoods used to be based. Water plays a key role in these development strategies as it is the case of the building of dams and large water transfer infrastructures. Social-ecological detachment allows on the one hand, to merge former communities into the abstract idea of national citizenship, while at the same time, has a disempowering effect on individuals who try to protect ‘their land’ and their identity in contrast to the national identity. In this comparative case study, I look at the conflicts and social-ecological detachment processes observed in two communities of Spain and Turkey, and in particular the social movements against the Itoiz Dam in Spain and the Ilısu Dam in the Turkish Kurdistan. These conflicts are representative in the ways water ‘policies’ become the arena for multiple identities and interests, such as the claims of the stateless nations of the Basques and the Kurds.

The anti-Itoiz Dam movement was integrated with the New Water Culture (NWC) movement which emerged as a response to the large scale threat posed by the Spanish National Hydrology Plan (NHP) 2001. Similarly, the anti-Ilısu Dam movement was integrated with the Turkish water movement which emerged as a social justice platform against the threats posed by the 5th World Water Forum (WWF) 2009 which took place in Turkey. On the one hand, through this multi-level alliance formation, these local movements helped to empower their own communities. But on the other hand, they also demonstrated the larger urban public (who, to a great extent, had already been socially and ecologically detached from their traditional lands) that this particular type of development was destructive, resulted in blatant cases of environmental injustice, and that other ways of development less destructive and fairer could be possible. On many grounds, these movements aspire to find ways of reattaching the detached individuals/people back to their communities and nature or, in other words, to reframe the cultural basis of what they see as an unfair growth development paradigm. New community and nature identities have been used to challenge such paradigm and to recreate a more holistic and inclusive social-ecological identity in which human-nature separation becomes increasingly questioned.

Empirical data has been gathered from in-depth interviews and focus group meetings held with key actors of these movements, participative-observation, and analysis of secondary sources. Results showed that one clear strategy apparent in both movements was to try to empower people through practices of multi-level networking and collaboration. This enhanced social learning in a way that they learnt not only about the problem they faced, but also on how to build new collective skills to challenge the dominant cultural paradigms which created those unsustainability problems in the first place.

Learning, then, in the face of these pro-growth nation-state building strategies, means not only protecting small communities from market forces and global environmental change, but also, in particular, learning to change this dominant cultural paradigm which sees the detachment of people from their communities and from their natural world a necessary condition of progress and development. In this way, new social movements, by aiming to reconstruct such social-ecological identities, may contribute to sustainability learning.

Key words: Basque Country, Environmental injustice, GAP, Itoiz Dam, Ilısu Dam, New Water Culture (NWC), Social learning, Social movements, Water identities, Turkish Kurdistan
Acknowledgements

During the evolution of this research, I have accumulated many debts, only a proportion of which I have space to acknowledge here. I owe a great deal to my thesis director, Dr. Joan David Tàbara, who guided me with his mind-opening questions and enlightening advice at all stages of this study. Without his help this work would not have been completed.

I owe special thanks to the MATISSE Project (2005-2008) team for letting me take part in some of their activities, benefiting from the inspiring discussions held at their regular meetings, and having access to their deliverables in the first three years of my studies. Through this knowledge network, I not only gathered both primary and secondary data for the empirical part of this study, but also adopted new approaches towards the subject of this research, such as in the case of the power and transition theory.

I would also take the opportunity to thank the Institute of Environmental Sciences and Technology (IEST) for having created such an inter-disciplinary and multi-cultural research environment where different perspectives are always encouraged. I am also happy to acknowledge my debt to Agència de Gestió d’Ajuts Universitaris i de Recerca (AGAUR) for their financial support during four years of my studies which made this research possible in the first place.

Without doubt, this study contains some errors, omissions and over-simplifications, for which I take absolute responsibility, as is customary, while hoping that rest of the material will be enough to stimulate some insights and new trains of thought into social movement studies.
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List of abbreviations and their definitions

ACA: Agència Catalana de l’Aigua [Catalan Water Agency]
Aedenat: Asociación Ecologista de Defensa de la Naturaleza [Ecologist Association for the Defence of Nature] (Spain)
AGAUR: Agència de Gestió d’Ajuts Universitaris i de Recerca [Agency for University Grants and Research]
AGUA Programme: Actuaciones para la Gestión y la Actuación del Agua [Initiative for Water Management and Utilisation] (Spain)
AKP: Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi [Justice and Development Party] (Turkey)
AIB: African Investment Bank
ANPED: Alliance Nordiques pour La Durabilité [The Northern Alliance for Sustainability]
ASALA: Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia
BEM: Basque Ecologist Movement
CCI: Coordinating Committee of Itoiz (Spain)
CHE: Confederación Hidrográfica de Ebro [The Ebro River Basin Authority] (Spain)
Çiftei-Sen: Çiftçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu [Confederation of Farmer Trade Unions] (Turkey)
COAGRET: Coordinadora de Afectados por Grandes Embalses y Trasvases [The Association of People Affected by Big Reservoirs] (Spain)
CODA: Coordinadora de Organizaciones de Defensa Ambiental [Confederation of Organisations for Environmental Protection] (Spain)
CoE: Committee of Experts
DDKO: Devrimci Doğu Kultur Ocakları [Revolutionary Eastern Cultural Hearths] Turkey
DGOH: Dirección General de Obras Hidráulicas [General Management of Hydraulic Works] (Spain)
DISK: Devrimci İşıçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu [Confederation of Revolutionary Trade Unions] (Turkey)
DPT: Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı [State Planning Organisation] (Turkey)
DRIFT: Dutch Research Institute for Transitions
DSİ: Devlet Su İşleri [State Hydraulic Works] (Turkey)
DSİP: Devrimci Sosyalist İşiçi Partisi [Revolutionary Socialist Workers Party] (Turkey)
DTP: Demokratik Toplum Partisi [Democratic Society Party] (Turkey)
EC: European Commission
ECA: Export Credit Agencies
ECA-Watch: Export Credit Agency Watch
ECC: Export Credit Campaign
EHPI: Emekçi Hareket Partisi [Workers’ Movement Party] (Turkey)
EIA: Environmental Impact Assessment
EIB: European Investment Bank
ETA: Euskadi Ta Askatasuna [Basque Country and Freedom] (Basque Country)
ETIC: Euphrates-Tigris Initiative for Cooperation
EU-WFD: The European Union Water Framework Directive
FERN: The Forest and the European Union Resource Network
FNCA: Fundación de Nueva Cultura del Agua [New Water Culture Foundation] (Spain)
GAL: Grupo Anti-terrorista de Liberación [The Antiterrorist Liberation Group] (Spain and France)
GAP: Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi [South-eastern Anatolia Project] (Turkey)
GCE: Global Climate Change
GEC: Global Environmental Change
GOLD Project: General Organization for Land Development Project (Syria)
HB: Herri Batasuna [People’s Unity] (Basque Country)
HBF: Heinrich Böll Foundation (Germany)
HISPAGUA: Sistema Español de Información sobre el Agua [Spanish Water Information System]
IEST: Institute of Environmental Sciences and Technology (Spain)
IFC: International Finance Corporation
IMF: International Monetary Fund
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Importance of the study
Research objectives and questions
Structure of the dissertation
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

Fresh water constitutes only 2.5% of the global water resources (See figure 1). This percentage shrinks as the contamination and depletion of this resource becomes more acute. Today, to the old challenges of contamination and depletion, new pressures such as the Global Climate Change (GEC) are added (UN-WWAP 2009).

Rapid population growth, expanding urbanisation, unsustainable economic practices and technologies come to mind at first hand as some of the most important driving forces of the global water challenge. Figure 2 shows the evolution of global water consumption and contamination for the period 1900-2025 according to main economic sectors; agriculture, urban, industry and reservoirs. When the impacts of unsustainable human practices on other resources such as land and cultural-natural heritage are taken into consideration in relation with the growing pressures on the world’s water resources, the global water challenge becomes more difficult to define and combat.

Source: UNEP (2007: 118)

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1 As cited in Paul Hawken’s Blessed Unrest. U. Utah Phillips (1935-2008) was an American storyteller, poet and a folksinger.
Therefore, explaining water unsustainability through the sole existence of these drivers would not only be an incomplete approach which would fail to address the roots of the water issue, but also increase its acuteness by delaying sound solutions which should be adopted urgently. As a result of this failing approach, today a large part of world populations are affected by depletion and contamination of water resources, and unequal access to them. What is striking is that these problems and conditions are likely to get worse in the near future.

Figure 2: Evolution of global water use by sector

In this study it is argued that sound solutions to the water challenge must be found in the governance domain. Water is much more than a mere natural resource. It has multiple uses and values which all need to be recognised, respected and made use of in governance processes. Governance practices that fail to do so help nothing but creating more environmental injustice. As a result of these unsustainable practices, problems related to water have accumulated, expanded to other domains and become a concern to a larger number of people from more diverse segments of society. Despite its overwhelming magnitude and the growing number of people concerned with it, the water issue still continues to be one of the biggest challenges that humanity faces. This study is, first of all, concerned with how this challenge can be addressed in the light of sustainability predicament.
As the global water problem becomes more acute, two main broad categories of responses to this challenge have been developed. On the one hand, the past century’s *technocratic* trend was based on the assumption that technological expertise is the key and only solution. On the other, the emerging *participative* approach highlights the importance of public participation, knowledge integration and social learning in improving current governance structures. Critics of the former (Swyngedouw 1999; Fischer 2000; Saurí & Del Moral 2001; Getsches 2003) understand that technocratic approaches have enlarged the magnitude of the water problem through creation of new externalities by shifting the costs and negative effects of these policies to other places with their peoples and domains, to other species, and to the future generations. Critics to the latter perspective (Guijt & Shah 1998; Cooke & Kothari 2001; Petkova et al. 2002) argue about the poor performance and effectiveness of public participation in times when urgent and cost-benefit solutions are needed.

It is a premise of this study that a shift from purely technocratic approaches towards more participative ones should take place in order to develop sound and long-lasting solutions to the global water challenge. Participative governance approaches allow more room for the adoption of multiple uses and values of water. Hegemony of one use and value over the others creates environmental injustice which explains a large portion of unsustainability. Therefore, involvement/participation of more diverse segments of public into governance processes so that other uses and values of water are represented and taken into consideration is a pre-condition in dealing with unsustainability.

What is needed even more is a meaningful public participation in which social learning takes place resulting in transition in both governance structures and empowerment of citizens as participants. With such participation, the hegemony of academic knowledge and technical expertise over people’s knowledge of the problem might diminish. The absence of this hegemony results in building conditions which favour the unification of two different but not opposing knowledge sources addressing different aspects of the same problem.
Examples from different parts of the world have shown that such learning environments are achievable within social movements. In this research, I look at two social movements in the water domain in Spain and Turkey; the anti-Itoiz Dam movement in the context of the New Water Culture (NWC) movement taking place at larger scale, and the anti-Ilısu Dam movement within the emerging water movement in Turkey.

These two cases are very representative in the ways they provide relevant lessons and insights of sustainable water governance from the perspectives of the power and transition, and the social learning theories. The NWC movement of Spain has influenced movements in other parts of the world, such as in the case of some South American countries. The roots of this movement go back to some local scaled social mobilisations such as the anti-Itoiz Dam movement. Similarly in Turkey, the collective response of some civil society organisations to the threat posed by the alliance between the global water, energy, construction and privatisation lobbies, and the current Turkish government, Justice and Development Party (AKP), for the occasion of the 5th World Water Forum held in Istanbul can be seen as the beginning of a new large water movement similar to that which emerged in Spain. Local social movements such as the anti-Ilısu Dam movement are part of this nation-wide social mobilisation. The Turkish water movement has built alliance with other international water movements among which there is the NWC from Spain and the South American countries. Examples of this were the Counter Water Forum and the Alternative Water Forum which were held by different but completing actors of the emerging water movement in Turkey. Indeed the two social water movements from Spain and Turkey intersected in the global arena through new and dynamic social mobilisation networks.

These networks have often been studied from resource mobilisation, power shift and transition perspectives. In this research, they are also explored within the framework of the social learning theory. Social mobilisation networks can be regarded as the architects of social learning. In this study, I am concerned not only
about social learning - that is how to acquire collective capacity to deal with a
general social problem - but also on the ways of developing skills to tackle
cultural and institutional obstacles to support sustainability transition.
Sustainability learning (Tàbara & Pahl-Wost 2007) takes place within social acts
and experiences in the context of social movements which create awareness about
social-ecological constraints and feedbacks.

Social organisation networks can empower communities affected by unsustainable
governance practices in multiple domains e.g. water, land, and cultural heritage by
creating multi-level alliances of action and social learning. This study explores
how social learning is both managed and stimulated by these social organisation
networks and unveil unsustainable governance practices. While doing so, it
analyses the local, national and global key actors in water movement networks;
the strategies used for (re)directing and accelerating social learning process for
empowering people, and the interactions between society and new collective
knowledge as its outcome; and the extent to which transition in water governance
has been achieved in the cases of Spain and Turkey.

**Importance of the study**

An increasing amount of research in sustainability studies are arguing that the
technocratic solutions have not only failed in resolving the water problems, but
also magnified their scale and intensity by shifting its costs and adverse effects to
other places, their inhabitants, other domains, and to future generations. At
present, innovative solutions are sought in how governance and policy domain can
be restructured together and not in counter position of technological innovations.
In parallel with that, the importance of raising awareness about unsustainable
practices is often pronounced.

However, it is often the case that societies with a large proportion of individuals
with higher level of awareness about the water problem cause at least as much
adverse impacts on natural resources—if not more—as the ones consisted of individuals with less knowledge of the problem. In fact when water footprint\(^2\) averages of countries are compared with each other, it is seen that developed countries have mostly higher averages than the others (See cartogram 1).  

Cartogram 1: Water footprint average of countries

![Cartogram 1: Water footprint average of countries](image)

Source: Hoekstra and Chapagain (2007: 41)

Therefore, expecting that the sole existence of awareness can solve these persistent problems is unfounded. Persistent problems are multi-faceted and complicated because they are results of collective unsustainable practices. Combating them entails an equally multi-faceted, complicated and collective form of learning. This is social learning which enables people to not only acquire knowledge of the problem but also develop collectively the skills to tackle cultural and institutional obstacles in front of transition towards sustainable governance. Social learning has been a growing topic during the last decade. It is often the case that societies with a large proportion of individuals that have higher degree of awareness of about water issues can generate empowerment, mobilisation and

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\(^2\) The water footprint is the extent of water use in relation to consumption of people. The water footprint of a country is defined as the volume of water needed for the production of the goods and services consumed by the inhabitants of the country. The global average is 1240 m\(^3\)/cap/yr. according to the calculations for the period 1997-2001 (Hoekstra & Chapagain 2007).
organisation to challenge unsustainable governance practices. However, how this happens remains largely unexplained.

Few studies explore social movements from the social learning theory perspective. The present research aims at filling this gap by investigating the two social movements originating from water problems in Spain and Turkey within the framework of social learning theory in parallel with resource mobilisation, and power and transition theories.

**Research objectives and questions**

The overall objective of this research is to explore the conditions and strategies for successful social movements which aim at changing unsustainable governance practices in the water domain, and provide feasible alternatives to these. For achieving this objective, the study tries to answer the following questions:

1. On social movements:

   - *What socio-ecological processes of change triggered the emergence of social movements in water domain in Spain and Turkey?*
   - *Which key actors have taken part in them?*
   - *What resource mobilisation strategies have been carried out?*

2. On identities and social learning as the process and outcome of social movements:

   - *What role have water identities played in social learning?*
   - *What role have human identities played in social learning?*
   - *How did social movement organisations integrate water identities with human identities?*
3. On opportunities brought by social learning to sustainability transition in the water domain:

- How do the NWC movement in Spain and water movement in Turkey frame the meaning of water sustainability?
- To what extend has the NWC movement had an impact on the national water policies and what specific implications exist of these?
- What are the opportunities in the Turkish water movement for transition in water governance?
- Where do the NWC in Spain, the Turkish water movement, and the European Union Water Framework Directive (EU-WFD) intersect?

Structure of the dissertation

The structure of this research is illustrated in Figure 3. The study starts by taking a general look over the current global water problem situation. Then, it reviews the theories that this study is based upon. In the following section the study looks at the national context of the two anti-dam movements in the cases of Itoiz and Ilısu. The research, then, compares the two local cases with empirical evidence derived from in-depth interviews and focus group meetings held with key actors in these movements, participant-observations carried out in the field, and analysis of secondary sources.

The discussion part of the study derives larger questions from the specific results gained from analysing the case studies in the previous stage. Finally, in the last section general and specific conclusions are drawn and presented.
The introduction chapter starts with the general problem situation and the overall objective of the study. This section includes also the research questions, structure and conceptual map of the research. The following chapter consists of methodology development, data collection, management and analysis for the purpose of answering the research questions of this study.

The theory chapter provides brief information about the theories and concepts used in this research such as globalism, nationalism, social movements, social learning, identity, power and transition, and water paradigms. The study goes on with the social and political context of Spain and Turkey. It adopts a historical analysis approach to the evolution of water policy and management in both countries. In the fifth chapter I move to the local context by exploring the social movements against the Itoiz Dam and the Ilısu Dam within their historical contexts, key actors, resource mobilisation strategies, and public participation issues. Following section brings in the results of this study. The comparative results are derived from in-depth interviews and focus group meetings held with
key actors in these movements, participant-observations carried out in the field, and analysis of secondary sources.

In the discussion chapter, the study explores the opportunities and possibilities for transition in the water domain at national scale in Spain and Turkey, and their extensions and interrelations at regional/global scales. In particular, it looks at the European interrelations of sustainable water care with an emphasis on where the Spanish and the Turkish water policies meet within the European Union Water Framework Directive (EU-WFD). Another discussion topic in this chapter is related to Turkey’s potential role in the Middle East region within the context of management of the Tigris-Euphrates Basin. The final chapter provides a set of conclusions derived from linking the theories with empirical part of the study.

Figure 4 provides a flow chart of the questions that the present research has attempted to address. The study starts with asking about what the current problem situation is. Then it looks at what type of responses are generated (or not) to this situation. Societies develop various responses to that some of which cause further increase in Global Environmental Change (GEC) while some others may be able to attenuate it.

Then, it asks about what is needed and therefore lacking for decreasing the negative impacts and externalities caused by the GEC. In this study social learning is promoted as an answer to that question. Social learning is accelerated and redirected by networks of social organisations in social movements. Therefore, exploring dynamics of social movements is not only important for understanding the social learning processes, but also answering what conditions are needed for successful social movements and social learning. Then, the research looks at opportunities of sustainability transition in governance structures brought by social learning within social movements.
Finally, within the transition process, societies redefine the existing problem situations in the light of new knowledge and understanding. At the same time, those empowered by the new knowledge and skills may create profound changes in institutional and cultural structures. With that, the loop of the conceptual flow of this study is closed.
CHAPTER II
METHODOLOGY

2.1. Methodology development
   Comparative case study

2.2. Data
   Data collection
   Data management
   Data analysis
CHAPTER II: METHODOLOGY

According to Corbetta (2003: 12) there are various modes of carrying out social research. The overall theory or the logic (rationale) of social research methods define, to a great extent, how it would be carried out. The nature of social research depends on its combination of responses to these three basic questions:

1. *The ontological question: Does social reality exist?* This is the question of “what” (regarding the nature and form of social reality) that asks if the social-ecological phenomenon is real and objective endowed with an autonomous existence outside the human mind and independent from interpretation given to it by the subject. In simpler words, a research starts by questioning what really exists and what does not through exploring what part of the perceived reality exists and what part is human invention.

2. *The epistemological question: Is it knowable?* This is the question of the relationship between the “who” and “what”, and the outcome of this relationship. This question relates to what particular perspective is used to frame and approach the object of the study.

3. *The methodological question: How can we acquire knowledge about it?* This is the question of “how” regarding the specific techniques and tools of studying the social reality and the relationship between the “who” and “what”.

To understand the methodology development in this research, there is a need to take a brief look at the overall paradigms that it is based on. The socio-ecological reality that is subject to this research is too complex and multi-dimensional to be explored through only one paradigm. I conducted this study through a combination of interpretivist, realist, and critical realist paradigms which are described briefly in table 1. Even though the borders between these paradigms seem clear, in real life context neither the social phenomena I look at, nor the
ways I interpret those phenomena have clear borders that separate them from each other. On the contrary, these paradigms intersect each other in many ways and contexts. I only aimed at demonstrating the mental models that helped me to explore the phenomena that this study is about. This table has no further purpose than providing the reader a very brief theoretical framework of the methodology that I followed during this research. The three paradigms (the positivist, the post-positivist, and the interpretivist) are summarised through the questions that are briefly described in the previous page.

**Table 1: Basic paradigms in social research**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ontology</th>
<th>Epistemology</th>
<th>Methodology</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>POSITIVIST</strong></td>
<td><strong>Naïve realism</strong></td>
<td><strong>Dualist &amp; objectivist; natural law</strong></td>
<td><strong>Experimental &amp; manipulative; analysis by variables</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>There exists an objective social reality that is external to humans and it can be knowable in its true essence.</td>
<td>The researcher and the object studied are independent entities; dualism- and the researcher can study the object without influencing it or being influenced by it - objectivity. Reality is independent of the observer. The researcher’s values cannot distort social reality or vice versa.</td>
<td>The researcher employs inductive procedures, whereby general formulations are derived from particular observations. The final goal is the mathematical formulation though not always attainable. The observer is detached from what is being observed while he/she can manipulate and control the variables.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>POST-POSITIVIST</strong></td>
<td><strong>Critical realism</strong></td>
<td><strong>Modified dualism-objectivity; multiplicity of theories for the same fact middle range, probabilistic and conjectural laws;</strong></td>
<td><strong>Modified experimental-manipulative; analysis by variables</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>There exists a social reality but it is only imperfectly and probabilistically knowable. Cause-effect relationships exist external to human mind but scientist must always question every scientific acquisition.</td>
<td>The objectivity is ideal but can only be achieved approximately. Dualism, in the sense of separation and non-interference between the observer and the observed, is not sustained.</td>
<td>Fundamentally inspired by a substantial detachment between the researcher and the object studied (experiments, observations, manipulation of variables, quantitative interviews, statistical analysis, etc.). Nevertheless, qualitative methods are admitted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>INTERPRETIVIST</strong></td>
<td><strong>Constructivism and Relativism (multiple realities)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Non-dualist and non-objective, interpretive science in search of meaning</strong></td>
<td><strong>Empathetic interaction between the researcher and the object studied; interpretation; observer-observed interaction; induction; qualitative techniques; analysis 'by cases'</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The knowable world is that of the meanings attributed by individuals. These meanings or mental constructions vary among individuals and cultures. A universal social reality valid for all, an absolute reality, does not exist. There are multiple realities and perspectives.</td>
<td>The separation between the researcher and the object of study tends to disappear. Social research is not an experimental science in search of law, but an interpretive one in search of meaning. Central categories consist of value, meaning and purpose. For exploring behaviour, it uses abstractions and generalisations.</td>
<td>The interaction between the researcher and the study object during the empirical phase of research constitutes the cognitive process. Since the aim is to understand the meanings that subjects attribute to their own actions, the research techniques are to be qualitative and subjective. Knowledge is obtained through a process of induction; it is ‘discovered in reality’ by the researcher without prejudices or preconceived theories.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Corbetta (2003: 14-25)
Even though humans are principally responsible for the social-ecological reality that this study investigates, the sole existence of interpretivist, constructivist and relativist paradigms would not only be insufficient but also fail to represent reality. In other words, unsustainability exists in our lives. Problems such as the water contamination and climate change are physical realities that affect all living beings of the world. For that reason, this study emerged from and is based principally on realist paradigm.

As the present research aims at exploring the roots of unsustainable water governance, at the methodology development stage it adopted mostly qualitative methods and techniques to acquire primary data. I used qualitative techniques such as in-depth interviewing, focus-group and participant-observation. However, this study cannot be described as entirely qualitative. In particular, in the pre-development phase I gathered useful information from numerous secondary data sources such as archives, pamphlets and manifestos of social movements, photographs, documentaries, expert reports, newspaper and scientific magazine articles, and books related to the cases of this research. These data sources contained various forms of information about the problem situation derived from both quantitative and qualitative modes of inquiry. All of them helped me, in particular ways and from different angles, to understand better the problem whose roots I attempted to explore.

Therefore, the fact that this research is mainly qualitative due to its exploratory and real-life context nature does not necessarily mean that it excludes or underestimates the importance of the secondary data and information acquired from quantitative researches. As Mason indicates (2002: 8) “Qualitative research should not be seen as a unified body of philosophy and practice, whose methods simply be combined unproblematically. Similarly, qualitative research should not be seen as necessarily in opposition to or antithetical to quantitative research”. As Sow and Anderson (1991) indicate “Social reality is too complex and multi-dimensional to be adequately grasped by any single method” (as cited in Snow & Trom: 150). Therefore, the exploration of such phenomenon should combine
multiple modes, strategies, and methods to complement and supplement one another’s weakness.

The flow chart illustrates also the stages before and after the methodology development and data (See figure 5). The methodology development, which is in line with research questions and theories, starts by the research strategy conducted in this work; the comparative case study. I provide general characteristics of the case study strategy. I, then, explain briefly the logic (rationale) for choosing this strategy, and why I particularly chose the anti-dam movements of Itoiz in Spain and Ilısu in Turkey.

Figure 5: Flow chart of the thesis dissertation

In the following section, I introduce brief information about data collection techniques (in-depth interviewing, focus group, and participant-observation) and the secondary data sources that I used; why I particularly chose those techniques; and how I applied them. Finally, I explain the data analysis strategies I developed and followed in this research.
2.1. Methodology development: Comparative case study

This research is conducted through case study strategy. Case study is preferred when a) the ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions are crucial to understand particular developments in a specific situation; b) the researcher has little or no control over these developments; c) the focus is on a phenomenon within some real-life context (Yin 1994). The main objectives of this study are to explore why the particular two social movements emerged, and how social movement networks managed social learning processes so that people are mobilised to challenge the existing unsustainable governance practices. All three conditions described in the definition above meet the features of this research.

The case study approach is particularly useful in exploring and understanding complex social phenomena. It allows the researcher to retain holistic and meaningful characteristics of real-life events e.g. the organisational and managerial processes in social movements and changes happening at multiple levels (ibid.). According to Marshal and Rossman (1989) human behaviour is significantly influenced by the setting in which it occurs; thus one must study that behaviour in situations. Therefore, research must be conducted in the setting where different contextual variables are operating. Human behaviour cannot be understood without grasping the framework within which subjects interpret their thoughts, feelings, and actions (ibid.).

Becker (1970: 64) also indicates that (as cited in Gerring 2007: 70-71):

To understand human behaviour, we must know how individuals and people perceive the situation, the obstacles they believed they have to face, and the alternatives they see opening up to them. We cannot understand the effects of the range of possibilities e.g. of delinquent subcultures, social norms and other explanations of behaviour which are commonly invoked, unless we consider them from the actor’s point of view.
According to Snow and Trom (2002: 147):

A case study strategy is the investigation and analysis of an instance or variant of some bounded social phenomenon that seeks to generate richly detailed accounts of realities. These thick elaborations of the phenomenon studied through often use the triangulation of multiple methods or procedures that include but are not limited to qualitative techniques.

The case study approach has some weaknesses like all the other others. Hamel (1993) points out that case study approach is criticised for its lack of representativeness of the case which is used as an observation object for the social phenomenon or issue constituting the object of study; and its frequent lack of rigor in the collection, construction, and analysis of the empirical materials. In particular, the second one is linked to the problem of bias introduced by the subjectivity of the researcher and the informants in the field from whom the researcher gets information about the case (Hamel 1993).

For attenuating the degree of lack of representativeness, the present study takes a look at two cases in stead of one: the anti-Itoiz Dam movement in Spain and the anti-Ilısu Dam movement in Turkey through comparative method. Della Porta (2002: 307) states that “comparative method expands the field of observation for the researcher in search of rules and general causes of social phenomena in question”.

According to Klandermans and Smith (2002: 9) there are three types of comparisons in social movement studies:

1. Comparison of movements which concerns the similarities and differences between participants in different movements;
2. Comparison of space in which same movement in different locations is examined;

3. Comparison of time in which emergence, expansion and contraction of movements are investigated in comparisons of time.

In this study, the phenomenon of anti-dam movement is investigated through comparison of space: Spain and Turkey. This type of comparison is useful when the overall aim is to reveal diverging political, economic, or socio-psychological dynamics of movement participation. When the impact of contextual variation on movements is investigated, this type of comparison becomes essential (ibid.).

For the purpose of minimising the frequent lack of rigor in the collection, construction, and analysis of the empirical materials, the case study research should be conducted so that it is (Snow & Trom 2002: 153-157):

1) *Open-ended and flexible*: The case study research should be open-ended and flexible in terms of both the design and execution of the research. There is a need to adapt the methodology to the exigencies of the field; emerging new data sources and data gathering opportunities as the study goes on.

2) *With multi-perspective*: A grounded understanding of the object of analysis, social movement in this case of this study, and its embedding context requires consideration of the array of different relevant actors such as supporters or protagonists, antagonists and bystanders or an audience.

3) *Longitudinal*: The case study should be conducted over a period of time. Longitudinality enhances the prospect of capturing and analyzing social processes as they emerge and evolve. This additionally, enables the researcher to understand more profoundly the mechanisms and interactions that affect the processes in question.
4) *Triangulated in terms of theory, methods and data* (Yin 2003: 98-99): If the case study derives data from multiple sources through multiple methods its reliability and validity increases. Supporting findings with multiple theories also has a similar impact on the reliability and validity of the study.

On the intervention of the researcher’s subjectivity, it must be noted that this is inevitable. This must be clearly stated in the study. The problem situation is perceived through the lens of sociological imagination (See figure 6). One of the ways to deal with subjectivity is to involve the experience of actors to the study. This would mean checking with stakeholders to see to what extent and at what points they agree with the researcher’s definition of the problem situation, results and conclusions (Hamel 1993: 42).

**Figure 6: Definition of the object of study**

![Diagram showing the relationship between sociological imagination, experience of actors, theory and method, object of study, subjectivity, explicit definition, and objectivity.](source: Adapted from Hamel (1993: 42))

The study becomes less subjective as the researcher includes theories and methodology to answer the research questions. The study would also be (re)constructed and be put into conceptual and operative terms resulting from
methodological tactics and concepts recommended for defining the object of the study. As indicated by Zonabend “the most rigorous objectivity is only possible through the most intrepid subjectivity” (as cited in Hamel 1993: 42-43).

2.1.1. Case selection

The anti-dam movements of Itoiz in Spain and Ilısu in Turkey were the two cases of this comparative research. In the case selection, three criteria played the most decisive role:

1. **Overall aim/questions of the research:** The overall aim of this research is to explore social movement processes, in particular why they emerged and how they were managed to facilitate social learning for challenging the existing water governance structures. It is argued in this study that social learning processes do not necessarily result in transitions in the targeted governance domains. Social learning is a process which should be managed carefully. Organisation networks in social movements play decisive roles in the management of social learning. These two cases offer a rich range of examples of the phenomena that address the original questions of this study.

2. **Easy access to cases:** The researcher’s home institution and her nationality made the access to social and informative networks of the movements taking place in these two countries easier and relatively less costly in both economic and time management terms. Besides, the researcher has reasonable understanding of the native languages (Spanish as the second language and Turkish as mother tongue) spoken in the two cases. By this way, barriers of language and culture were minimised.

3. **The particularity of the cases and their comparison:** The anti-Itoiz Dam movement in Spain and the anti-Ilısu Dam movement in Turkey are both very representative cases of the water struggles that transition in this
domain face. They both clearly demonstrate how social learning occurred and was managed by networks of organisations in social movements. The two cases share some attributes in common and can be accepted as variants of a larger and encompassing category of social movements that started as the defence of land and community, but much beyond that to embrace sustainability issues. In this research, they are examined in a comparative framework that allows for a more profound and nuanced assessment of variation among the both cases with respect to broader environmental justice movement and processes of social learning. This comparison provides a more textured, profound and detailed understanding of social learning within social movement processes.

To bring a more realist approach to this comparative case study, I also followed historical analysis strategy for establishing and determining the cause-effect relationship between events. This strategy constructs the background of these two cases. Secondary sources of historical data such as some speeches, pamphlets, manifestos, technical reports, government documents (archives and regulations), scientific magazine and newspaper articles, books, documentaries and other visual materials were used in the historical analysis of the cases. I provide a more detailed explanation of these secondary data sources in the following section.

2.2. Data

Yin (2003) classifies sources of data under six categories: documentation, archival records, interviews, direct observation, participant-observation, and physical artefacts. He concludes that since these sources all have their weaknesses and strengths, they should be combined in the most efficient and complementary way including as many types as possible.

In the primary data collection process, I used the in-depth interviewing technique ranging from semi-structured to unstructured conversational interviews. I also
followed focus group and participant-observation techniques. I gathered secondary data particularly in the pre-development stage of this study. The secondary data helped me:

- To develop a general definition of the problem situation;
- To clarify the overall aim of this study;
- To generate the research questions for the purposes of addressing more specifically the problem;
- To develop the methodology, meaning what type of data that I would seek for the purpose of answering the research questions of this study, whom to contact with to gather the primary data, and through which techniques and how I would gather the data;
- To make comparison with the primary data to raise the reliability and validity of this study;
- To complement, support and/or check the primary data.

In the data collection process first, the abstract research questions were converted into “natural language” (Hamel 1993) in forms of in-depth interview questions. Table 2 illustrates some of the interview questions used in the present dissertation according to which research objectives and questions they addressed. Sources of primary and secondary data used for answering the research questions are in the next column. The overall theories in which the research questions and the interpretation of data acquired are embedded are presented in the final column.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research objectives</th>
<th>Research questions</th>
<th>Some of the interview questions</th>
<th>Data</th>
<th>Theories</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Exploring Social movements** | What socio-ecological processes of change triggered the emergence of social movements in water domain in Spain and Turkey? | * Why did the movement start?  
* What was the main objective of the movement?  
* What have been the main difficulties?  
* What have been the main facilitators? | Interviewee answers, observation notes, archives, expert reports, newspaper and scientific articles, books, visual materials | Resource mobilisation theory, Power & transition theories |
| | Which key actors have taken part in them? | * With which organisations/platforms/movements has your platform/group/organisation built alliance? | Archives, expert reports, newspaper and scientific articles, books, visual materials | |
| | What resource mobilisation strategies have been carried out? | * How has the movement co-evolved and up-scaled with other networks and movements? | Interviewee answers, observation, scientific articles and books | Resource mobilisation theory |
| **Exploring Social learning** | What role have water identities played in social learning? | * How does your platform/group/organization identify water?  
* How does your platform/group/organization identify water problems? | Interviewee answers, scientific articles, declarations, pamphlets, demonstrations | Social learning theory |
| | What role have human identities played in social learning? | * How does your platform/group/organisation define social-environmental injustice aspect in the movement? | Scientific and newspaper articles, manifestos, declarations, pamphlets, demonstrations, interviewee answers | Social learning theory |
| | How did social movement organisations integrate emerging water identities with human identities? | * Have the definitions of water, water problem and socio-environmental injustice changed during the movement? If yes, how?  
* What new definitions emerged?  
* What role(s) did your platform/group/organisation play in the creation and the promotion of those new definitions? | Observation notes, scientific articles and books, interviewee answers | Social learning theory, Resource mobilisation theory |
<table>
<thead>
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<th>Research objectives</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Exploring the outcomes of social learning on governance structures: Transition in the water domain</td>
<td>How do the NWC movement in Spain and water movement in Turkey frame the meaning of water sustainability? To what extent has the NWC movement had an impact on the national water policies and what specific implications exist of these? What are the opportunities in the Turkish water movement for transition in water governance? Where do the NWC in Spain, the Turkish water movement, and the European Union Water Framework Directive (EU-WFD) intersect?</td>
<td>* How are the current water problems defined within the NWC movement in Spain? * How are the current water problems defined within the water movement in Turkey? * What has been the impact of the NWC movement on the AGUA Programme? * What problems exist in water governance in Spain? * How do you define the state of water resources, water problems, and dominant water regime in Turkey? * What does the 5th World Water Forum mean for Turkish water management and policy? What alliances does the Turkey (DSI; GAP-RD; and the current Turkish Government) expect to achieve through the 5th WWF? * What are the deficits in the current Turkish water governance? * To what extent can the Turkish water movement have an impact on national water governance? * What do the Spanish New Water Culture movement and the water movement in Turkey have in common? * What impact has the EU-WFD had on these movements? * What opportunities emerged from Turkey’s adaptation of the EU-WFD for the water movement in Turkey? * Can Turkey play a leading role in the sustainable governance of the Tigris-Euphrates basin in the Middle East? What are the opportunities and obstacles?</td>
<td>Interviewee answers, newspaper and scientific articles, books, expert reports</td>
<td>Water management paradigms, Power &amp; transition theory</td>
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<td>Water management paradigms, Social learning theory, Power &amp; transition theory</td>
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</table>
2.2.1. Data collection

Since the objective of the case study was to develop profound, detailed and holistic elaborations of selected cases, multiple methods and techniques were used for constructing the empirical ground of the study. In the primary data collection process, qualitative interviewing ranging from semi-structured to unstructured conversational in-depth interviews, focus group, and participant-observation techniques were conducted. For gathering supplementary secondary data, archives including printed and electronic documents, technical and official reports, social movement fliers, pamphlets and manifestos, newspaper and scientific magazine articles, books, documentaries and other visual materials were examined.

2.2.1.1. In-depth interviewing

In-depth interviewing is a qualitative method for collecting data by asking questions in a semi-structured or formal conversation (Merton et al. 1990). According to Corbetta (2003: 264) through qualitative interviews the researcher “strives for identifying with the subject studied and thereby to see the world through his/her eyes by grasping the subject’s perspective, understanding his/her mental categories, interpretations, perceptions, feelings and the motives underlying his/her actions”. An interview can be defined as a conversation with the following characteristics (ibid.):

- it is elicited and guided by interviewer;
- interviewees are selected on the basis of a data-gathering plan;
- it has a cognitive objective;
- it is based on a flexible, non-closed but structured pattern of possible answers.

The purpose of qualitative interviewing is to understand how the subjects studied frame the world, to learn their terminology and judgements, and to capture the
complexities of their individual perceptions and experiences. The fundamental principle of qualitative interviewing is to provide a framework within which respondents can express their own understandings in their own terms (ibid.: 265).

According to Corbetta (2003) if the goal is to grasp the subject’s perspectives, then it necessarily follows that the interview relationship must be a personal one; the data gathering tool must therefore be flexible enough to be adapted to the personalities of the different respondents. He indicates that the interviewees must be given “complete freedom of expression”, so that they bring out their own points of view using their own “mental categories and languages” (ibid. 265). “The quantitative approach, whose tool is close-answered questionnaire, forces the respondents to limit their answers. In this method, the interviewer’s ways of defining the issue at stake prevail over that of the interviewees. While in the qualitative approach the dominant voice is that of the respondent” (ibid).

According to Marshall and Rossman (1989: 102-103) strengths of interviewing are as follows:

- It is face to face encounter with informants;
- It obtains large amounts of expansive and contextual data quickly;
- It facilitates cooperation from research subject;
- It facilitates access for immediate follow-up data collection for clarification and omissions;
- It is useful for discovering complex interconnections in social relationships
- Data are collected in natural setting;
- It is good for obtaining data on non-verbal behaviour and communication;
- It facilitates analysis, validity checks, and triangulation;
- It facilitates discovery of nuances in culture;
- It provides background context for more focus on activities, behaviours, and events;
- It provides flexibility in the formulation of hypotheses;
• It is of great use for uncovering the subjective side, the “native’s perspective” of organisational processes.

The main weaknesses are as follows (Marshal & Rossman 1989: 104):

• Data are open to misinterpretation due to cultural differences;
• It is dependent upon the cooperation of a small group of key informants;
• It is difficult to replicate, procedures are not always explicit or are dependent upon researcher’s opportunity or characteristics;
• Data are often subject to observer effects; obtrusive and reactive;
• It is especially dependent on the honesty of the interviewees;
• It is highly dependent upon the researcher’s ability to be resourceful, systematic, and honest, to control bias.

To deal with some of the presented weaknesses above, the researcher can use different techniques such as:

• Combining the interviewing technique with participant observation in process of the primary data collection;
• Including more than one interviewee for the same interview question;
• Checking with interviewees the results of their interviews.

In total sixteen stakeholders were interviewed during the primary data collection process. Interviewees were chosen according to the importance of their roles in anti-dam movements and larger water social movements in Spain and Turkey. To address the main issues related to the cases and answer the research questions of this study, only key actors were contacted. The interviewees consisted of leaders of unions, confederations, scientific boards and foundations, academic experts that were at the same time activists in the related movements, experts working at municipalities, and coordinators and spokespersons of social movement platforms. It must be noted that apart from few occasions, these interviews were held in relatively long periods of time. With the vast majority of the interviewees I kept a
certain level of dialogue via e-mails, telephone calls, and face to face conversations. This is to say that I received consultation and guidance, on a frequent base, directly from the key actors of these movements.

My first contact with both the spokesperson and the coordinator of Keep Hasankeyf Alive Initiative started via e-mail in 16.03.2008. Since then I received consultation on the emerging developments in the anti-Ilısu Dam movement. In the period of 14-17.07.2008 I travelled to Diyarbakır, Batman and Hasankeyf. During the three days of my visit I discussed the Ilısu case from various angels with the coordinator of the Initiative to Keep Hasankeyf Alive and some other actors within the movement. I held in-depth interviews through mainly informal conversations with these key actors. The more structured conversations were mainly held with key agents at administrative positions such as the Diyarbakır and Hasankeyf municipalities. In the case of Itoiz, I carried out interviews with two members of the key activist group in the anti-Itoiz Dam movement, Solidari@s con Itoiz, through long semi-structured conversations that took place in 23-24.05.2008 and 29.05.2008 in Pamplona. I also carried out in-depth interviews with the coordinator and spokesperson of the Coordinating Committee of Itoiz (CCI) and an academic expert from the University of the Basque Country.

On the issue of the broader water movements taking place at national scale in two countries, I carried out several in-depth interviews with the SuPolitik members. This group was the pioneer of the large water social movement in Turkey and an important component of ‘No to Commercialisation of Water’ Platform. Since 21.05.2008 I met some members of this group on three occasions. This gave me a privileged standpoint from which I understood more profoundly the background and dynamics of the emerging water movement in Turkey in a longer time span. In each interview with the same key actors, I gathered not only new and important data on emerging developments from the first hand, but also witnessed the evolution in this group’s framing of the water problems in Turkey and the world.
My first in-depth interviews with the SuPolitik members took place when six activists came to Zaragoza for participating to the Water Expo in 28.07.2008. The in-depth interviews I carried out with them were through semi-structured conversations. While I kept on receiving consultation from this group via e-mails, I participated to the Counter Water Forum (18-21.03.2009) held by them as part of the ‘No to the Commercialisation of Water’ Platform for the occasion of the 5th World Water Forum (WWF) held in Istanbul. During the four days of this Forum I carried out interviews with not only them but also some other members of the Platform. The final session of interviews with this group took place in Barcelona (22-29.08.2009).

I also conducted in-depth interviews with actors from Catalan Network for a New Water Culture\(^3\) (XNCA). The primary data about the NWC movement in Spain mainly consisted of my participation to the 3rd stakeholder meeting held for gathering empirical data to the water case study of the MATISSE Project\(^4\). However, during my four years in Spain I attended to several conferences and meetings held by the NWC Foundation in Zaragoza and Tortosa in Spain, and Faro in Portugal about water issues in Spain and Iberian Peninsula. In these gatherings I had short conversations with a diverse range of stakeholders related to the research questions of this study. Even though these conversations do not fall into the category of in-depth interview, they must be mentioned because they equally helped me to understand the NWC movement in a more profound way.

In addition, I should note that the anti-Itoiz Dam movement is no longer as an active movement as it used to be since the Itoiz Dam was already built and has been in service since 2007, while the anti-Ilısu Dam movement is rapidly evolving. For this reason, it was easier for me, as a researcher, to reach more

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\(^3\) Xarxa per una Nova Cultura de l’Aigua

\(^4\) MATISSE (Methods and Tools for Integrated Sustainability Assessment) Project was supported by the Sixth Frame Work Programme of the European Union. The project with twenty two partners from different European countries lasted from 01.04.2005 to 31.03.2008. The consortium of the project was coordinated by Jan Rotmans and managed by Marjan Minesma at the Dutch Research Institute for Transitions (DRIFT) at Erasmus University Rotterdam. For more information [http://www.matisse-project.net](http://www.matisse-project.net)
actors that were willing to be interviewed in the Turkish case. This resulted in a larger accumulation of in-depth interviews related to the Turkish case than the Spanish one. However, as mentioned earlier I managed to balance this with the data and insight I derived from the short interviews I conducted with actors of the NWC movement and the focus group meeting held with key agents in the Ebro Basin. This stakeholder meeting was held as a part of the case study of the MATISSE Project. In the following section on focus group, the meeting is explained with more details.

In the majority of the in-dept interviews I held with key actors I took notes since they were mostly carried out in semi-structured or conversational mode. In few occasions in the Spanish case I recorded the conversations on tape during the interviews.

2.2.1.2. Focus group

According to Finch and Lewis (2003: 171):

Focus group is not a collection of individual interviews with comments directed solely through the researcher. This is more of a synergistic group interview. The group interaction is explicitly used for generating data and insight on particular issues. Spontaneity might rise from the strong social context. Participants reveal more of their own frame of reference on the research subject. In a sense, the group participants take over the role of the interviewer while the researcher takes the role of the listener.

The strengths of focus group technique are as follows:

- It is carried out as face to face encounter with informants;
- It obtains large amounts of expansive and contextual data quickly;
- It facilitates access for immediate follow-up data collection for clarification and omissions;
• It is useful for discovering group dynamics in a certain context when considered that people are often influenced by others;
• Data are collected more efficiently and faster than in the individual interviewing;
• It emphasizes participants’ world views, values and beliefs about the problem situation being discussed;
• It facilitates the researcher’s understanding of which issues are at the forefront and why they are so;
• It facilitates the researcher’s exploration of the difference between what is said and done in social context.

The main weaknesses of focus group technique are as follows:

• The researcher has little control over the data emerging from the discussion;
• The researcher acts as moderator with a role which is mostly keeping the participants focused on the topic;
• It requires a moderator with a certain level of knowledge about group dynamics to avoid biasing results. Moderator’s attitude can manipulate responses;
• The data produced might be difficult to assemble because each participant has different cultural background that affects the language he/she uses during the discussion;
• It might be non-representative due to too dominant or opinionative participants that do not allow others to participate fully.

To deal with some of the presented weaknesses above, the researcher might:

• Define well the participant profile and include people with a considerable level of understanding and experience of the subject discussed;
• Involve participants that do not know each other to avoid formation of small groups within the focus group;
• Be aware of group dynamics and prepare him/herself for potential problems that might arise during the discussion;
• Make sure that participants understand well what is required from them by defining the borders of expected discussion with an informative introduction at the beginning and well defined interview questions.

The focus group meeting I participated as an observer was held in 08.03.2007 in Tortosa as a part of the water case study of the MATISSE Project. The participants consisted of six stakeholders from the NWC Foundation\textsuperscript{5}, Plataforma per a la Defence de l’Ebre\textsuperscript{6} (PDE), the Spanish Rice Producers’ Association, the Institute of Agrofood Technology Research, and the Catalan Water Agency\textsuperscript{7} (ACA). The meeting started with an informative session that presented the model of Ebro Basin and virtual river trip facility developed within the MATISSE Project. After this, participants discussed the role of agents and the NWC movement in transition in the water domain.

I recorded the entire process with a tape recorder and took some extra notes for non-verbal behaviours that I observed within the group. I then wrote a brief report explaining the process. This report included the issues that were frequently expressed by the participants. They were defined as the highlights of the discussions. I also included some particular quotes that reflect various dimensions of the discussion. The meeting was observed by two other people including the moderator of the group. The final report named as the 3rd Stakeholder Meeting for MATISSE Project deliverable was a mixture of observation notes by three observes and was edited by the moderator.

2.2.1.3. Participant-observation

Participant-observation technique is different from simple observation. As an addition to all strengths of the interview technique, it allows a wide range of data

\textsuperscript{5} Fundación Nueva Culture del Agua
\textsuperscript{6} Platform for the Defence of Ebro
\textsuperscript{7} Agència Catalana de l’Aigua
and informants. This technique avoids sampling and on the contrary it allows the researcher to collect data on human behaviour and the entire environment it is embedded in. With this technique the researcher gathers data on non-verbal behaviour through direct involvement to the subject being studied in its cultural-natural settings.

Participant-observation is also defined as a strategy by Corbetta (2003: 236) in which the researcher enters:

- directly,
- for a relatively long period of time into a given social group,
- in its natural setting,
- establishing a relationship of personal interaction with its members,
- in order to describe their actions and understand their motivations, through a process of identification.

During this research, I carried out six site visits which played significant roles in my framing of the questions of this study, and also my ways of answering them. My first site visit in 14-17.03.2006 was to various locations in the Ebro river basin in Navarra and Aragon regions of Spain. Two of these locations were a dam flooded village called Ruesta and another named as Artieda de Aragon which was soon to be flooded. I talked to several inhabitants in both of these villages and got their opinions on the dam. After this field trip, I came to the conclusion that I had great interest in anti-dam movements and their role in social learning and empowerment to challenge unsustainable governance structures in the water domain.

The second and the third site visits took place in 23-24.05.2008 and 29.05.2008 to Pamplona which is the heart of the anti-Itoiz Dam movement. Apart from the four key interviewees, I conversed with various people who participated to and/or witnessed the anti-dam demonstrations in Pamplona. Even though these
conversations cannot be considered as consistent formal data, each of them raised a different issue related to the movement.

The fourth visit in 28.07.2008 was to Zaragoza for meeting six activists of Supolitik\(^8\) from Turkey who were participating to a water debate taking place within the Expo Zaragoza. I conversed with them about the emerging water movement in Turkey on the eve of the 5\(^{th}\) WWF. We also exchanged information on local social movements such as the anti-Ilısu Dam case. I observed the group dynamics within Supolitik members in terms of differences and similarities within the group; their general and individual approaches to the water problems, their definitions of the problem situation, their collaborations with other social organisations and movements else where, and their strategies for the future of the water movement in Turkey.

My fifth visit in 14-17.07.2008 was to Diyarbakır, Batman and Hasankeyf which are key locations in the anti-Ilısu Dam movement. While I carried out semi-structured interviews with some key actors in this movement, I conversed with some officials from Diyarbakır municipality which were also supporters of the Democratic Society Party (DTP), the first Kurdish party ever to have had members in the Turkish parliament. I talked to several inhabitants in Hasankeyf about the Ilısu Dam and the future that awaits the people of Hasankeyf. This trip enabled me to observe the movement in its social-ecological context. Very important note to be pointed out is that the anti-Ilısu Dam movement and its ethnic cover are extremely sensitive issues in Turkey. Due to this sensitivity, secondary data sources on the issue are very limited. Furthermore, most of what is available is highly bias and unreliable. Through this trip I overcame this barrier, to a great extent, and obtained data through first hand experience.

My last visit in 19-23.03.2009 was to Istanbul for the purpose of participating to two different water forums which were held by ‘No to Water Commercialisation’ Platform and ‘Do not Touch my Water’ Platform; the Counter Water Forum and

\(^8\) Water Politics
the Alternative Water Forum. A large number of experts and activists from all over the world participated to these two forums. I carried out interviews with key actors in the Turkish water movement but also participated to and observed the daily evaluation and strategy meetings of the Counter Water Forum during four days which enabled me to draw out significant insights related to the water movement in Turkey.

2.2.1.4. Secondary data

In secondary data gathering process, I used several data sources. I had access to most of these through internet from the official websites of the social movements, social organisations and platforms that are studied in this research. In particular, newspaper archives enabled me to see the evolution in media’s framing of the two social movements. These sources were also useful in the sense that they provided chronological information check. I also used other archives to obtain secondary data on the Kurdish and Basque identities, and their identity politics in historical context. I had access to them through libraries, official websites of institutes and organisations dealing with cultural and ethnic issues such as the Kurdish Human Rights Project (KHRP) and the Kurdish Institute of Paris (IKP).

Official websites of the social movements, organisations and platforms studied in this research were mainly useful for providing visual materials such as fliers and pamphlets of social movements, photographs and videos documenting the process of these social movements. These documents helped me to visualise and understand more realistically the subject of this study. In particular, in the anti-Itoiz Dam movement, these materials played a crucial role in reshaping my understanding of the case. As this movement is no longer as active as it used to be, I would not be able to gather primary visual data. At this stage some documentaries that I borrowed from the members of Solidari@s con Itoiz provided me visual data I needed for understanding the history of the anti-Itoiz movement. I gained access to more photos and videos from the official website of Solidari@s con Itoiz. In the case of Ilisu, I gathered most of the visual material
from the official websites of KHRP, IKP, Initiative to Keep Hasankeyf Alive, and ‘Stop Ilisu!’ Campaign.

I had access to numerous expert reports from the very same websites. These reports were mainly about the potential legal, socio-political, environmental and economic outcomes of the dam projects studied in this research. To avoid biases I also checked the official technical reports in electronic format which could be obtained from governmental websites such as the South-eastern Anatolia Project (GAP) and the Spanish Ministry of Environment (MMA).

One of the most useful and robust secondary data sources I used came from the NWC Foundation’s official website with its large selection of electronic documents available. These documents consisted of articles from newspapers and scientific journals, and books published or partially financed by the NWC Foundation related to large range of water issues and in particular the NWC movement. This electronic document supply provided me the most updated, reliable and relevant documents that could be found on the water issue in Spain.

Another source of secondary data was the MATISSE Project deliverables and reports which played a crucial role in my problem definition and framing as well as providing me with secondary data. I did not only obtained valuable updated data directly related to this research from this source, but also benefited from the new approaches developed during this project such as Integrated Sustainability Assessment (ISA) and transition theories.

2.2.2. Data management

The interviews held for answering the research questions of this study were either recorded on tape or documented through notes depending on the circumstances and conditions that the interviews were held under. Together with the observation notes derived from field trips and focus group meeting, they constituted a large amount of data.
At first stage of data management, I reorganised the primary data obtained from interviews, focus group meeting and participant-observations under a set of categories derived from the ten research questions of this study. Under each category common and/or frequent points indicated by the interviewees were selected and summarised for eliminating redundancy. By this way, the amount of data was reduced through exclusion of a considerable amount of repetitions.

At the end of this stage, some points indicated by the interviewees were opposing with the secondary data I acquired. Some others were different and at times opposing with the primary data I obtained from other interviewees and/or my observations and my knowledge of the problem. Some of these points made me look at the social phenomena of this study from different angles, re-question my knowledge, broaden my problem framing, and changed my expected results. The in-depth interview carried out with the coordinator of the CCI was representative for such situation. Thanks to this interview I learnt that there were all together fifty people that were directly affected by the Itoiz Dam. I had not known this information which was particularly significant from the perspective of resource mobilisation theory. This resulted in some modifications in some results of this comparative study.

Some other data made me see the problem situation from other perspectives. These were not necessarily disproving the expected results of this study. Rather, they raised more questions related to the social phenomena investigated in this research. I introduced them in the discussion chapter.

2.2.3. Data analysis

According to Jorgensen (1989) data analysis entails a breaking up, separating, or dissembling of research materials into pieces, parts, elements, or units. He states that the aim of this process is to assemble and reconstruct the data in meaningful or comprehensible fashion. Or in other words, as Jorgensen (1989) defines, this process consists of the construction of patterns, organisation of facts, and the
creation of theory. The role of the subsequent theory developed from the analysis of data is to arrange facts in the form of an explanation or interpretation (ibid.).

Figure 7 illustrates the data analysis phase of this study with its previous and following stages. The first stage is the methodology development in which the investigation modes and strategies, data collection techniques, primary and secondary data sources are planned in line with research objectives and the research questions of the present study. In the methodology development phase qualitative investigation mode and comparative case study strategy are presented. In this study the primary data collection techniques are decided as in-depth interviewing, focus group meeting, and participant-observation. The secondary data sources are set as manifestos, declarations, expert reports, archives, and articles from newspapers and scientific journals, books, documentaries, social movement fliers and pamphlets, photographs and other visual materials related to the subject of this study.

The second stage is the primary data collection in which in-depth interviews, focus group meeting and participant-observations were carried out. There are two points to be made at this stage. First, the interview questions are particularly emphasised with a thicker arrow in the figure due to their parallelism with the research questions of this study, and due to the fact that they were used in all three primary data collection techniques in this research. Second, even though secondary data collection was a very important part of the data collection process, it is not shown visually in the figure before the data analysis phase. The secondary data collection was a constant process that lasted through all the stages of this research including the pre-development phase. Due to the difficulty of illustrating that visually, I presented it only in the data analysis phase.

The third stage is data management in which the data obtained from the in-depth interviews, focus group meeting, and participant-observations carried out in this study are sifted, organised and summarised for avoiding redundancy.
Figure 7: Data collection, management and analysis

1. Methodology development
2. Primary data collection
   - Focus group notes
   - Answers of interviewees
   - Participant-observation notes
3. Data management (Sifting & Organizing)
4. Data analysis
   - Reduced & organised primary data
   - Theory
   - Secondary data
5. Theoretical generalization & synthesis

RESULTS

DISCUSSION

CONCLUSIONS
The fourth stage is data analysis in which the sifted and organised primary data, the secondary data, and the basic theories of the present study are examined all together. These three different sources of information are shown in the figure as three different sets that intersect. The part in which all three sets intersected represents the most concrete results of this study. It means that all three sources of information pointed to the same or similar results. In other words, the validity and reliability of the primary data were supported by both the secondary data and the theories that build the backbone of this research. These results constituted the basis for theoretical extension provided at the end of this study.

From the parts where only two sets intersected emerged some additional questions. The findings and questions in which the theory and the primary data did not overlap were explored in the discussion chapter of the dissertation. These findings were not necessarily excluded from conclusions. On the contrary, they have been used in reframing some of the research questions and theoretical refinement process.

This is not to say that it is almost certain to reach a conclusion just by seeing such intersection. An overlap of all the theory, primary data and secondary data does not necessarily mean higher reliability and validity of the results. New theories might emerge from lack of such intersections. After all, this figure is presented for illustrating in a more visual and comprehensive way the mental model behind the data analysis process of this study rather than providing a rigid tool for deciding which data are valid and reliable, and which ones are not.

The last stage is theoretical generalisation and synthesis in which results derived from data analysis and the questions raised from some of those results which were explored in the discussion chapter of this study were narrated as responses to the research questions in a broader and more general manner. Snow and Trom (2002: 164) identify theoretical generalisation as “process of extending existing theoretical formulations to new or different social categories, contexts, or processes, or even to other levels of theory”. Some case studies extend or
generalize from a case study of specific movement to the broader, more general category of social movements, as in the case of most analytic, rather than primarily descriptive, movement case studies”. Some others broaden the application of a theoretical principle or argument from one domain of analysis to another.
CHAPTER III  
THEORETHICAL FRAMEWORK

3.1. Nation-state and globalisation in the context of modernity
3.2. Social movements
3.3. Social learning
3.4. Identity
3.5. Culture
3.6. Power & transition theory
3.7. Approaches to water management
CHAPTER III: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This study compares two social movements which emerged from different social-ecological conditions. A theoretical framework is needed when such research is conducted. Theory, on the one hand, enables the researcher to see beyond surface of the problem being investigated. On the other hand, theory, on its own, limits what the researcher might see when he/she looks into the problem, as it focuses on selected aspects of the problem from particular perspectives based on particular assumptions. One way to deal with this limitedness is to involve in more theories so that more realistic conclusions can be derived. I made use of various theories when I carried out this research. This chapter consists of very brief information on the content of the theories I followed and their connection with the present research.

First, I provide information about the nation-state/globalism interactions in the context of modernity; the nation-state and its particular responses to the exogenous changes driven by modernity, in particular globalism. Since the study is about social movements, the second section takes a look at social mobilisations for making a change in the unjust and unsustainable governance structures and the cultural basis that create them in the first place. I, then, provide outlines of the social learning theory as an empowerment and mobilisation strategy. The following two sections are about the concept of identity in the context of human-nature relationship, and culture. These two concepts and their roles in social construction of reality need to be emphasised. The next section is about power and transition theory. If a transition towards sustainable governance and culture is to be achieved, the social-political dynamics behind transition should be understood well. Finally, I talk about two world-wide water paradigms, hydraulic paradigm and hydro-hegemony, as they maintain their dominance and adverse effects on water governance in both Spain and Turkey, and the emergence of participative approaches to water management as a response to those former paradigms.
3.1. Nation-state and globalisation in the context of modernity

Giddens (1991: 14-15) defines modernity as both “institutions and modes of behaviour established first of all in post-feudal Europe, but which in the 20th century increasingly have become world-historical in their impact”. According to him industrialism and capitalism are the two “axis of modernity” and are under the “supervisory control of subject populations” of the nation-state (ibid.).

Giddens (1991: 15) points at the nation-state as one of the most prominent and distinct social forms produced by modernity. He also adds that the society that modern sociology concentrates on is designated as the subject-matter of the nation-state and “this is usually a covert equation rather than an explicitly theorised one” (ibid.). Even though, nation-state has gained global character some human communities and even nations without modern states maintain their existence.

The nation-state contrasts fundamentally with the traditional order in many ways; one of which is its development as a part of a wider nation-state system (ibid.). According to Giddens, the literature of international relations sets an example to this, in which nation-states are often accepted and treated as agents or actors, rather than structures, which follow coordinated policies, set of rules and are reflexively monitored at a geopolitical scale. Giddens (1991: 16) further concludes that the overall feature of modernity is “the rise of organisation”.

In the simplest sense, ‘the rise of organisation’ can be viewed as a socio-political response to changes in conditions as social systems and practices have got more complicated and one group’s activity started to limit another’s. According to Greenfeld (2006: 69) nationalism is “a response of individuals affected by dysfunctions of the society of orders⁹ - the traditional structure modern society replaced – to the sense of disorder they created”. This was so in the Western world. Those affected individuals, as a result of their search for empowerment

⁹ The term ‘the society of orders’ is used by Greenfeld (2006: 72) as the feudal society.
against the oppressing groups and the cultural basis that created those groups in the first place, found the solution in a *greater organisation in a larger framework* such as the nation-state.

As Greenfeld (2006) indicates, neither nationalism, nor the particular form it took and the pace it developed was inevitable. Nationalism was just one of the many possible social responses, but particularly a contingent one. “Once chosen, nationalism accelerated the process of change, limited the possibilities of future development, and became a major factor in it. It thus both reflected and realised the grand transformation from the old to the new order by modernity” (ibid.: 69).

From organising in the form of the nation-state emerged and rose particular paradigms; the glorification of modernity as an opposition to the old customs and the sanctification of the nation through the creation and exclusion of others. Modernism and nationalism often hand-in-hand formed the two pillars of the nation-state as we know today.

Nation-state promotes modernity as an utter human ideal for its own nation. As the ‘modern’ is reconstructed over and over, the struggle for reaching that ideal does not cease. Modernity ideal fuels the nations each of which is in constant competition with the others. According to Smith (1998: 71) “the modern world is one of national competition and warfare; as a result, military factors and militarism assume an increasingly central role in the distribution of resources and the formation of political communities and identities”. The nation-state “(successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within given territory” according to Weber (as cited in Morris 1998: 43). Weber also indicates that “the right to use physical force is ascribed to other institutions or to individuals only to the extent to which state permits it. The state is considered as the sole source of the ‘right’ to use violence” (ibid.).
State justifies the acquisition of this super power through nationalism. The notion of nationalism is used in a large number of contexts. According to Smith (1991: 72) nationalism can signify:

1. The whole process of forming and maintaining nations or nation-states;

2. A consciousness of belonging to the nation, together with sentiments and aspirations for its security and prosperity;

3. A langue and symbolism of the nation and its role;

4. An ideology, including a cultural doctrine of the nations and national will and prescriptions for realisation of national aspirations and the national will.

Nationalism in this study is often used in its ideological context because the research takes a profound look on identity as an essential part of political discourse which redefines human-human and human-nature relations. However, national identity, as a dynamic concept, is also included in nationalism both as a social movement and a human phenomenon with socio-psychological dimension. As Gibernau and Hutchinson (2001: 4) indicate “Whereas national identity is perceived as problematic in many parts of the world, in established nation-states most citizens are unaware of how deeply routinized the national idea is in daily life”.

The roots of nationalism ideology on which the nation-state is constructed goes back to 18th century. Europe then consisted of multi-ethnic empires such as Austro-Hungarian, British, French, Ottoman, and Russian empires. These empires were ruled by kings or sultans through monarchy. Even though, these empires consisted of many ethnic groups, one group was often dominant in the empire state. Its language was used as the public administration language along with other regional and local languages or dialects. In these monarchs, ethnic, cultural
and lingual diversity of peoples were often managed through flexible administrational frameworks and laws. Regions, to a great extent, had their own governments and legislative structures, and were ruled by hereditary and religious leaders within the territorial borders of the empire state.

The rising nationalism movement brought an end to most of those empires by the 19th century. The nation-state brought a more centralized and uniform administration structure. According to Gellner’s (1997: 52) definition “nationalism is a theory of political legitimacy, which requires that ethnic boundaries should not cut across political ones, and, in particular, that ethnic boundaries within a given state - a contingency already formally excluded by the principle in its general formulation - should not separate the power-holders from the rest”. With the nation-state, local and regional identities and administrative structures became subordinate to the dominant national identities and centralist governance structures.

As indicated by Smith (1998) at the outset, nationalism came out as an inclusive and liberating social movement in Europe. It was a grass-roots movement aiming at the acquisition of democratic rights for everyone. It attacked “feudal structures and practices, oppressive imperial tyrannies by proclaiming the sovereignty of the people and the right of all peoples to determine their own destinies, in states of their own, if that was what they desired. “During the 19th and even at the beginning of the 20th centuries, nationalism was the fuel for native elites to fight for overthrowing foreign imperial and colonial powers” (Smith 1998: 1-2). In parallel with Smith’s arguments on nationalism and democracy in Europe, Fukuyama also (1994: 23) concludes that “In Western Europe, nationalism played a vital role in liberating various countries from monarchical absolutism in the 18th and 19th centuries. The Frankfurt Parliament of 1848 was equally German-nationalist and democratic, just as democracy and French-nationalist ideas were very strongly associated during the French Revolution”.

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However, “already by the mid- to late 19th century, imperial and colonial rulers
had found ways to siphon off the force of nationalism from its democratic base;
the ‘official nationalisms’ of Tsarist Russia, Ottoman Turkey and Meiji Japan
revealed the malleability of national sentiments, traditions and myths and the
contortions of the single red line” (Smith 1998: 1-2).

The newly formed nation-states, in process of creating their nations, made use of a
uniform national culture through a single national identity. According to the
nationalist paradigm, population within territorial borders of a nation-state
constitutes a nation which was united by a common descent, language and culture.
If any of these elements were missing, the nation-state often tried to create it by
the promotion of a uniform national language and single national education
system consisting of a uniform curriculum and in particular one-sided national
history. Diversity of cultures and languages/dialects was often attacked and/or
assimilated through banning public use of different languages other than official
one(s).

Nationalism, as a state ideology, has been investigated from various stand points.
One of these is the comparison of ethnic/civic nationalism which was explored
largely by Greenfeld (1992) and Ignatieff (1994). Ethnic nationalism is defined as
being founded on the basis of common ethnicity. According to Guibernau and
Rex (1997: 5), “Ethnic nationalism believes nationality ‘to be inherent – one can
neither acquire it if one does not have it, nor change it if one does; it has nothing
to do with individual will, but constitutes a genetic characteristic”’. Civic
nationalism, on the other hand, is more open and flexible because it is established
on the basis of collectively constructed and shared political principles. “Civic
nationalism is identical with citizenship, and in this case nationality is at least in
principle open and voluntaristic, it can sometimes be acquired” (Guibernau & Rex
1997: 5). However, the border between the two notions is often blurred and what
seems like ethnic at first might be civic or vice versa.
On the issue of civic/ethnic nationalism, Llobera (2004: 83) points out that “Often, typologies have reflected a moral hierarchy, with one type of nationalism being morally acceptable and the other(s) unacceptable”. About the definitions of Greenfeld (1992) and Ignatieff (1994) on ethnic versus civic nationalism, Llobera (2004) indicates that the notion of ‘ethnic’ in the modern era is “not equivalent to inherited and genetic”. Besides, he states that the countries that are accepted as representatives of civic nationalism such as France, the UK and the USA “often fall foul of the rules of the game”. The integration of non-white peoples into civic nations has been slow and problematic, and the civic nations could not meet the ideals created by their own propagandists (Llobera 2004: 84).

Furthermore, there are countries such as Turkey where state nationalism does not fall into a category of this kind. Turkish state nationalism or Kemalist\(^{10}\) nationalism is peculiar in the way it redefines the Turkish identity and Turkishness. One of the most prominent phrases that summarises the Kemalist discourse is “Happy is he/she who calls him/herself a Turk\(^{11}\)”. This phrase promotes and glorifies the notion of Turkishness as a matter of individual choice or will, rather than a representation of any ethnic, linguistic or religion origin over which an individual has no choice or control. This is, without doubt, the most widely used phrase of Atatürk in any national context\(^{12}\). From this perspective, Kemalist nationalism, as the official state nationalism, is not based on ethnicity that was explored by Greenfeld (1992) and Ignatieff (1994). However, it gives no room to the individual in the way he/she identifies him/herself. According to Turkish nationalism, a citizen of Turkey is unconditionally a Turk. Other identities are renounced, considered as a threat and even an insult to the Turkish national identity and treated as crime in most cases. In this nationalism, the interests of the state which is built mainly on the notion of Turkishness are over the individuals and peoples of Turkey. An example to this is the Article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code which states “a person who explicitly insults being a Turk,

\(^{10}\) Mustafa Kemal Atatürk is the founder of the Turkish Republic. His definition of Turkish nationalism still constitutes the hardcore of the current state nationalism in Turkey.

\(^{11}\) Ne mutlu Türküm diyene!

\(^{12}\) This phrase is also the last line of the morning oath recited by students in all state primary schools in Turkey.
the Republic of Turkish Grand National Assembly, and penalty to be imposed shall be imprisonment for a term of six months to three years”. In short, the framework provided by the ethnic versus civic nationalism is, to a great extent, inert in exploring and understanding the Turkish nationalism and nation-state.

Regardless of which perspective we look at the state from, it is first about elaboration of the social division of labour (Gellner 1997). According to Gellner (1997: 54):

> Where there is no division of labour, one cannot begin to speak of state. But not any or every specialism makes a state: the state is the specialisation and concentration of order maintenance. The ‘state’ is that institution or set of institutions specifically concerned with the enforcement of order... The state exists where specialised order-enforcing agencies, such as police forces and courts, have separated out from the rest of social life.

Social division of labour emerged at the agrarian stage of humanity, but with the emergence of industrialisation it has got more intense and complicated. Industrialisation has brought with itself further “disembedding mechanisms” according to Giddens (1991: 18) which are named by him as ‘symbolic tokens’ and ‘expert systems’. To the former one, he gives money as an example. “[M]oney economy becomes vastly more sophisticated and abstract with the emergence and maturation of modernity. Money brackets time (because it is a means of credit) and space (since standardised value allows transactions between a multiplicity of individuals who never physically meet one another)” (Giddens 1991: 18). On the expert systems Giddens indicates that they deploy “modes of technical knowledge which have validity independent of the practitioners and clients who make use of them. Such systems penetrate virtually all aspects of social life in conditions of modernity – in respect of the food we eat, the medicines we take, the buildings we inhabit, the forms of transport we use and a multiplicity of other phenomena” (Giddens 1991: 18).
In the industrialisation process the nature of human labour went through a sharp change. Human labour which was largely territory-dependent and having local particularities, has lost those qualities. Furthermore, the relation of workers to their products changed drastically. Marx (1844) named this process as ‘alienation’. In the old system, workers were paid on the basis of the products they made. In the manufacturing system, the products of their labour no longer belong to them but to the property owners. In the modern system, the workers were paid an hourly/daily wage and they hardly had any connection with their finished products. With industrialisation human labour and worker was commoditised or, in other words, converted into a commodity to be bought and sold (ibid.).

Human labour and a large portion of human identity which was constructed on that particular human-labour relationship were separated from their territory through the ‘two disembedding mechanisms’ of modernity. As labour was commoditised and translated into monetary terms through ‘symbolic tokens’, the alienation took place not only of worker to his/her product, but also of worker to his/her livelihood. The institutionalisation of the wage-labour system disembedded the workers from their traditional social-ecological settings or territory, and often made them change their livelihoods on the basis of a mere job search. With the further development of ‘expert systems’ the alienation process gained a new momentum. The consequences of that have been even larger, complicated and difficult to read.

The impact of these two disembedding systems on the formation of modern society cannot be emphasised enough. According to Giddens (1991: 20) the two mechanisms of modernity “separate interaction from particularities of locales”. Within the modernity process the role of the local has shrunk significantly. In parallel to that, local values and identities gradually lost their long-held dominancy in modern societies. The nation-state has created more abstract identities (national identities) to unify larger human populations. In the creation of these new identities similar abstraction or disembedding mechanisms such as
promotion of nationalism and national identity against existing localism and local identities operated.

As Guibernau (2007: 21) argues:

> For centuries the life of individuals evolved around a small territory where family, work, and religious and administrative structures were concentrated. In turn, the individual’s identity was defined by the roles he/she played within that limited territory. … A great shift was required for people to conceive the nation as their home, since large sections of the population had never travelled around their own nation’s territory and could not imagine it as clearly bounded and distinct.

Guibernau (2007: 21) also indicates that even today, a considerable number of citizens in a nation-state do not have direct knowledge of large parts of their nation or country. They acquire more accurate sense of its territorial limits “through the media and education - two decisive elements that enable people to ‘imagine’ their nations as territorially bounded, distinct and sovereign” (ibid.). Education system and developments in information and communication technologies played a most decisive role in the creation of national identity and the nation.

According to Özkırımlı (2005: 32-33) the discourse of nationalism operates in four different ways:

1. Dividing the world into ‘us’ and ‘them’: it positions a homogenous and fixed identity on either side of the ‘us-them’ dichotomy. It is exclusive and has a tendency to perceive the world in terms of ‘friends’ and ‘enemies’.

2. Creating hegemony: it is about power and domination. It produces and legitimises its own hierarchies among actors. It authorises particular notions of nationalism against others, thereby conceals divisions and
differences within the nation. It produces dominant projects against the other forms of potential community.

3. Naturalising itself: national identity is seen as a system of absolute values which are values taken for granted, accepted as common sense and become hegemonic.

4. Operating through institutions: it is produced and imposed by a whole gamut of institutions. National identity is learnt and internalised in the social context. Furthermore, it is reproduced daily in countless ways to maintain its hegemonic situation.

In the globalising world, nation-state and nationalism discourse are being increasingly questioned, particularly in the ways they create environmental injustice. However, one should not underestimate the extent to which nationalism exists in our perception and understanding of the self and society. Özkırımlı (2005: 33) states that “the categories and presumptions of [the national] discourse are so deeply ingrained in our everyday language and academic theories that it is virtually impossible to cast them off”. And even more importantly, modernism, playing as an important role (if not more) as nationalism, still does not seem to receive as much criticism as does nationalism.

Even though the nation-state is still the prevailing form of human organisation, in the context of globalisation one question becomes clearer. Are we “witnessing the unfolding of a new historical epoch (one which is distinguished by a progressive globalisation of human relations and the emergence of the first truly ‘global historical civilisation’), or… the present phase of globalisation simply conceals a renewed strengthening of the existing structures of the Western modernity - capitalism, industrialism, and the modern nation-state (in its present form)”? (Hall 1996: 467)
Before attempting to bring in some insights to that question, one needs to take a look into the concept of globalisation which has been used in multiplicity of contexts and perspectives. Globalisation is a process whose roots can be found back in the late 15th century when imperial powers of Europe started overseas explorations. However, with the start of the post-World War II, globalisation gained a new momentum. The United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference named after the Bretton Woods Committee, which was held in 1944, can be accepted as the first steps into the modern globalisation process. One of the notions of this conference was to establish the international bodies to regulate international monetary and financial order in the post-World War II. This mission would be carried out by three international organisations: the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the World Trade Organisation (WTO). This would mean the end of economic nationalism. Even though states would maintain their sovereignty and national interests, they would no longer block trade or have influence over it. Free trade has been promoted through:

- Building free trade zones;
- Reduction or elimination of tariffs, capital controls, transportation costs, subsidies for local producers;
- Creation of subsidies for global corporations;
- Harmonisation of intellectual property laws across the states;
- Supra-national recognition of intellectual property restrictions.

However, the impacts of globalisation on all domains, not only economy, are interrelated and inseparable from each other. Globalisation has pushed against ecological limits, causing not only environmental degradation but also other forms of injustice at global scale related to unsustainable economic activities (Hettne 1996).

Another important driving force behind globalisation has been the developments in communication and information technologies. It is not a coincidence that the term globalisation firstly emerged in McLuhan’s (1962) *Global Village* which
emphasised the effects of new communication technologies over society. McLuhan argues that new communication technologies made the social, cultural, political and economic processes operate at global scale with a consequent reduction in the significance of other geographical scales such as national and local.

Ruggie (1993) also highlights the importance of communication technologies in globalisation. He associates globalisation with de-territorialisation, a term which has parallelism with Giddens’ disembedding or abstraction mechanisms, in which an increasing diversity of social activities occur independent of the geographical location of the participants via communication technologies. Ruggie (1993) states that territory, in its traditional sense of a geographically identifiable location, no longer constitutes the whole of social space where human activities take place. From this perspective, globalisation refers to the spread of new forms of non-territorial social activities

Globalisation has also been linked to the speed of human activity. De-territorialisation and interconnectedness are directly related to this speed. The developments in technologies of transportation, communication and information convert territorial boundaries into insignificant barriers in front of human activities. In the modern world, human experience is independent of the boundaries of territory or time. Rapid flows and movements of people, information, capital, and goods create the social structures of modernity.

McGrew (1996: 470) defines globalisation as the “multiplicity of linkages and interconnections” between the states and societies which make up the modern world system. It is a process in which events, decisions and activities in one part of the world can affect significantly individuals and societies in another part of the world. In parallel with McGrew, according to Lofdahl (2002:5), and Lechner and Boli (1998), the scope of globalism is growing and contracting according to the needs of the moment, but fundamentally the term implies the increased linkages across national boundaries, expansion of the international market economy, and a
complex and integrated world society. They claim that although globalism talks about an integrated world society, large portion of the integration seems to be happening in the economy domain. It is the growing trend of economic activities happening at the international level with increasing international trade and exchange of materials, goods, investment, labour, science, technology, and other services.

Even though, globalisation is mostly taken into account as an economic phenomenon, it has, according to Dicken (2007: 5) “political, cultural and social dimensions which are difficult to segregate. Indeed, the ‘economy’ itself is not some kind of isolated entity. Not only is it deeply embedded in social, cultural and political processes and institutions but also these are, themselves, often substantially imbued with economic values”. According to this pro-globalisation perspective, in this new world order nation-states would neither be important actors nor be significant economic units. “Consumer tastes and cultures are homogenised and satisfied through the provision of standardised global products created by global corporation with no allegiance to land or community” (Dicken 2007: 5).

Zarsky (1997) indicates that economic globalisation has changed the power balance between markets, national governments and international collective action. He argues that globalisation has magnified the market influence over economic, social, and environmental outcomes, and has minimised the degree of freedom and unilateral management capabilities of national governments, which obliges the states to cooperate both in the management of the global commons and the coordination of internal policies.

Back to the question on the nation-state versus globalisation, Held (2005: 243) states that “Even where sovereignty still appears intact, states do not retain sole command of what transpires within their own territorial boundaries because complex global systems, from the financial to the ecological, connect the faith of communities in one locale to the communities in distant regions of the world”.

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Tilly (1990) defines the interactions between nation-state and globalism as two important global counter-currents that have become clearer in the last decades. According to him:

First, independent statehood has been claimed with an increasing frequency by many populations that do not form distinct state, inhabitants of former colonies, and minorities in old established the Western states. Minorities that claim their own state have received sympathetic hearings from the third parties if not from the states governing their territory. Second, there is the counter movement by the powerful rivals to state: blocks of states such as NATO; world-wide networks of traders of expensive and illicit commodities such as drugs and arms; and financial organisations such as giant international oil companies that challenge their sovereignty. This means that states, as we know, might soon lose their incredible hegemony (ibid. 3-4).

On the other hand, Wolf (2001) argues that neither the state blocks nor the global market forces pose a threat to the state. He states that globalisation process is not a new phenomenon and in the last five centuries, through technological developments international integration has been largely achieved. He further claims that while some countries got weaker in this process, others with more advanced and internationally integrated economies increased their capacity to tax and distribute incomes, regulate their economy, monitor their citizens’ activities and got stronger than ever.

Administratively, nations today continue to be discrete units for the organisation of profit-making, resource extraction, and the perpetuation of unequal social relations. But they are also, within a world system in which enormous disparities in national power persist, structures that give some chance to local or indigenous peoples to draw boundary between what is theirs and what lies beyond, between what is open to the outside and what is sheltered from it. Nations are ‘manageable’ in both
directions. They allow the state to manage subalterns and the subalterns to petition the state, with a rhetoric of the ‘popular’ that appeals to a shared cultural identity (Brennan 2001: 83).

Hall (1996: 493) defines four dimensions of nation-state that enable it to maintain its powerful position in the face of globalisation: the state’s monopoly of military power; the potency of nationalism; the empowerment of states through international cooperation; and the myth of interdependence. He argues in parallel with Waltz (1979) that even though military power might seem as of less utility in an increasingly globalised world, possessing military power means the *usefulness of force* rather than use of it. “Thus, the fact that military force is used infrequently to sustain the global order is not an indictment of the declining relevance of military power (and by implication the nation-state), but, on the contrary, can be seen as evidence of its centrality to the contemporary global order” (Hall 1996: 493).

The second aspect of the nation-state is that it provides its citizens both individual and communal identity (ibid.). According to Canovan (1996) “The advantage that nations have over alternative sources of collective power is that they can lie dormant without being defunct. Nationhood, once established functions like a battery, a reservoir of power that can slumber for a long time and still be available for mobilisation. Furthermore, the power generated by nationhood is flexible and all-purpose” (as cited in Özkırımlı 2005: 43). Modelski (as cited in Hall 1996: 493-494) also comments that nationalisation is a more modern phenomenon than globalisation and it is, to a great extent, uncompleted project. “Nationalism along with the newly resurgent forms of ethnic nationalism are extremely powerful evidence that, even if the state is functionally redundant, culturally and psychologically it remains of critical significance in structuring the political and social organisation of humankind” (ibid.).

The third aspect of the nation-state is that while pursuing its interest through regional/global cooperation and collaboration, it also empowers itself (Hall 1996:
Hall underlines the arguments of Keohane (1984) and Gilpin (1984) on international organisations and structures not weakening the nation-state in any sense. In fact, according to Hall, international cooperation, as opposed to unilateral action, has allowed the nation-states to have larger and more effective control over their own national interests. “Within the context of a global economy, international coordination of exchange rates (for instance, the European Exchange Rate Mechanism) can enhance state autonomy rather than diminish it because it affords, through collective action, greater security and benefits than any corresponding attempts at unilateral action” (ibid.).

Hall (1996: 494-495) finally questions the myth of interdependence, whether globalisation creates interdependence or convergence among states. “While processes of globalisation may generate interdependencies between national communities, they can equally generate relationships of dependence and reinforce existing inequalities in the world system” (ibid.). From this angle, globalisation acts as a countervailing force against the poorer nations and favouring the rich ones, rather than weakening the nation-state.

Another significant dimension of nation-state is explored by Mann (1984). He points to the ‘infrastructural’ power of the modern state which has “much greater authority and reach than any despotic system which made more noise but affected less” (as cited in McCrone 1998: 177). In parallel with Mann’s argument, Warner (2008: 74) also indicates that the state can expand its control over its people through speeding up development such as the irrigation and hydro-power projects as means for pushing a land reform programme or overcoming entrenched feudal relations. State, donated with extraordinary power, can play off groups within society against each other such as divide-and-rule, or can patronise them by buying loyalty for favours (material incentives) (ibid.).

One important result of globalisation has been the growing environmental justice movement worldwide emerging as a response to adverse impacts of economic globalisation and nation-state practices. The global environmentalist movement
can be interpreted as the attempts of diverse actors to play a part both in engaging in politics with new forms of continental (e.g. the EU) and global governance by crossing the borders and former structures of the nation states, and establishing direct links with other regions. These movements can also be considered as social response to “arrogance and violence” (Modelski 1972: 49) of modernity fuelled by the nation-state. As Hall (1996: 469) states that “the primary institutions of western modernity - industrialisation, capitalism, and the nation-state- have acquired, throughout the 20th century, a truly global reach. But his has not been achieved without enormous human cost”.

Human cost is the direct and indirect result of the attack of global market economy hegemons on natural resources. Lofdahl (2002) points out that environmental degradation being experienced in different parts of the world ranging from Southeast Asia to Africa and Latin America seems to have great similarities independent from local and regional variations. He further concludes that although human activities have long caused environmental degradation, never before have such different regions mentioned above had suffered from such similar forms of environmental problems. This is the reflection of de-territorialisation and interconnectedness that globalisation has brought to the social-ecological problems.

The global environmental movement, which we see as the defence of local/regional in the global/universal context, is a social response to the aggression and hegemony of not only global market economy, but also the nation-state. With the rise of organisation, the environmental movement has increasingly been institutionalised, gained global character and now is probably “the largest movement in the world” (Hawken 2007) emerging form dissatisfaction with the notion of modernity and the nation-state.
3.2. Environmental movements

When asked if I am pessimistic or optimistic about the future, my answer is always the same: If you look at the science that describes what is happening on earth today and aren’t pessimistic, you don’t have the correct data. If you meet the people in this unnamed movement and aren’t optimistic, you haven’t got the heart.

Paul Hawken (2007: 4)

According to Blumer (1951: 199) social movements “can be viewed as collective enterprises seeking to establish a new order of life”. He states that social movements “have their inception in a condition of unrest, and derive their motive power on the one hand from dissatisfaction with the current form of life, and on the other hand, from wishes and hopes for a new system of living. The career of a social movement depicts the emergence of a new order of life” (ibid.). Eyerman and Jamison (1991: 4), on the other hand, see social movements as more of an “auto-reproduction of society” rather than empowerment against power groups. They define social movements as “temporary public spaces, as moments of collective creation that provide societies with ideas, identities, and even ideals” (ibid.).

Environmental problems increased and got complex in the last few decades. World’s natural resources are exploited to their limits while the renewable ones are exposed to growing contamination due to excessive global economic production. People, thanks to communication and information technologies, have increasingly become more aware of the environmental problems affecting both their environment and other places in the world. Starting from 1960s environmental movement gained a new momentum. Environmental movement, as well as other social movements taking place in other domains, has increasingly been institutionalised and adopted global empowerment strategies.

Significant changes took place also in our understanding of social movements. The movements of the 1960s in many parts of the world started a transition in the
generally accepted paradigms in the study of social movements. An important shift took place in the focus of study of social movements from *why social movements emerge in the first place* towards *how they are organised*. Many of these new perspectives have formed the resource mobilisation theory (McCarthy & Zald 1973, Obershall 1973; Tilly 1978; Jenkins 1983; McCammon & Campbell 2002; Van Dyke 2003).

Jenkins (1983: 528) draws out the following general outlines related to resource mobilisation theory:

1. Social movements are rational and adaptive responses of actors to the costs and benefits of different lines of action;

2. The basic goals of social movements are defined by conflicts of interests that are embedded in institutionalised power relations;

3. Because the grievances created by these conflicts of interests are ubiquitous, the emergence and development of social movements depend on changes in resources, group organisation and political opportunities for collective action;

4. Centralised and formally structured social movements are more effective at mobilising resources and tackling challenges than the decentralised and informal ones;

5. The success of the movement is, to a great extent, determined by strategic factors and political processes in which they become enmeshed.

Resource mobilisation analysts also argue that social movements are born from changes in resources and emerging opportunities. A change in the conditions of a group might cause reduction in the cost of mobilisation and improvement of the likelihood of success of a social movement. Emergence of opportunities and/or
even threats might play a significant role in launching a social movement, catalyzing resource mobilisation and generating actions (McCarthy & Zald 1973, 1977; Tilly 1978; Obershall 1978; Jenkins 1983; McCammon & Campbell 2002). Particularly in the case of aggrieved groups that identify themselves through their local and/or ethnic origins rather than administrative national identities, a change in socio-political conditions that enable resource gathering and mobilisation plays a vital role in the emergence and development of social movements.

McCarthy and Zald (1973) point at how social movements moved from decentralised informal communal structures towards centralised and formally ones managed by networks of social movement organisations. As Tilly (1978) also states this shift was inevitable due to the rise of industrial capitalism and the destruction of autonomy of small groups by the modern state. Networks of social movement organisations play a vital role in defending small communities’ interests on the national platform in which embracement and representation of larger number of citizens and making use of bureaucratic knowledge and structures are essential for empowerment and success.

According to Oberschall (1973: 102) social movement organisations form network of groups, associations and organisations “for the pursuit of collective goals” by acquiring resources, increasing the ability of affected individuals without voice to resist or challenge the “established and organised groups with a vested interest in maintaining the status quo”. These organisations also play important roles in (re)defining the problem at stake and adopting strategies for achieving their goals. Lofland (1996: 2-3) defines social movement organisations as “associations of persons making idealistic and moralistic claims about how human personal or group life ought to be organised that, at the time of their claims-making, are marginal to or excluded from mainstream society - the then dominant constructions of what is realistic, reasonable and moral”.

Social movement organisations make use of the knowledge of other parallel movements and organisations dealing with similar problems. Others’ failures and
success stories often act as important knowledge and strategy sources for emerging movements. Another result of this knowledge and capacity building strategy according to Klandermans (1992) is that the knowledge of success stories can instil hope for others in similar situations. The roles of these organisations in social movements cannot be limited, as in different contexts and times they adopt and invent different actions and strategies.

Social movements taking place in the environment domain are of particular importance since social movement organisations play a most important role in the way they attach local concerns to the national and global ones. Environmental problems often do not attract much public attention unless a sudden disaster takes place or a major threat occurs. And it is often the case that some communities, in particular the ones that are poor and/or dependent primarily on natural resources, are more vulnerable to such disasters and threats than others. Social movement organisations operating at national and global levels find resources for empowering and mobilising these directly affected people along with the others concerned with not only a disaster or threat in a particular place but also the general course of events in the social-ecological domain. Martínez-Alier (2002: 14) proposes that three clusters of environmental concern and activism are recognised in the current social movements:

1. The ‘cult of wilderness’, concerned with the preservation of wild Nature but without anything to say on industry and urbanisation, indifferent or opposed to economic growth, most worried by population growth, backed up scientifically by conservation biology;

2. The ‘gospel of eco-efficiency’, concerned with the sustainable management or ‘wise use’ of natural resources and with the control of pollution not only in industrial contexts but also in agriculture, fisheries and forestry, resting on a belief in new technologies and the ‘internalisation of externalities’ as instruments for ecological
modernisation, backed up by industrial ecology and environmental economics;

3. The environmental justice movement, popular environmentalism, the environmentalism of the poor, livelihood ecology, and liberation ecology, grown out of local, regional, national and global ecological distribution conflicts caused by economic growth and social inequalities. Examples are conflicts on water use, access to forests, the burdens of pollution and on ecologically unequal exchange, which are studied by political ecology.

Martínez-Alier (2008: 4) criticises particularly the prevailing assumption on environmental consciousness in the Western world; the alleged positive connection between environmental concern and post-materialist values through these words:

Sociologists, political scientists and economists ignored ‘the environmentalism of the poor’. It was forgotten by the two main currents of environmentalism: the ‘cult of the wilderness’ and the ‘gospel of eco-efficiency’…. [G]lobal environment and conservation movement (epitomised by the membership of IUCN13) excludes many organisations dedicated to environmental justice, including the US environmental justice movement, and many others across the world (for example OilWatch, Mines and Communities, the International Rivers Network, the Mangrove Action Project (MAP) and the World Forest Movement that uses the slogan ‘Tree plantations are not forests’. In India, Toxic Link denounces the exports of ships for dismantling in Alang on the coast of Gujarat, the export of electronic waste from rich to poor countries. The Via Campesina is a world network of peasant organisations which realise that modern agriculture is less energy-efficient than traditional peasant agriculture, uses more chemical

13 International Union for the Conservation of Nature
pollutants, simplifies biodiversity by placing little value on the many varieties of seeds that have co-evolved over thousands of years through peasant farming.

Martínez-Alier (2008: 4) concludes that the environmental justice movement should not be excluded from the other two movements because they “combine livelihood, social, economic and environmental issues, with emphasis on issues of extraction and pollution. They set their ‘moral economy’ in opposition to the logic of extraction of oil, minerals, wood or agrofuels at the ‘commodity frontiers’, defending biodiversity and their own livelihood”.

According to Dunlap and York (2008: 529) “Conventional wisdom has long held that widespread citizen concern for the environment quality is limited to wealthy nations. Both academics and policymakers assume that residents of poor nations are too preoccupied with satisfying their ‘material’ needs to support the ‘post-materialist’ value of environmental protection”. They state that citizen concern for the environment is “neither dependent on national affluence nor on affluence-based post-materialist values” (ibid.).

The environmentalism of the poor movement, which is mostly ignored and whose importance for the future of the global environmental movement is underestimated as indicted by Martínez-Alier, becomes evident in the defence of the local movements. In these movements, even though the name provokes local connotations, we see the convergence of local with national and global in the form of universal values, identities and ideals. The defence of the local movements concretise, to a large extent, what has been happening to us and our world.
The defence of the local: Anti-dam movements

I will never be able to walk in those fields where I passed my childhood, my youth and my entire life before they built the dam. I have the same nightmare over and over again. I see myself in the old house and the waters are rising. I cannot move and escape. The waters are covering everything and I wake up before I am drowned. Then I am relieved to have woken up until the final realisation that the nightmare has already become true.

A victim of Birecik Dam

It is essential to understand why dams are built in the first place when one intents to explore the meaning of anti-dam movements. Dams are not merely some infrastructures built for flood control, water supply, irrigation and energy production. Dams, like every artefact, are also a product of a certain paradigm and ideology. For that reason, the social-ecological conditions that create them and the evolution of social perception of dams within the last decades deserve some attention.

In the second half of the 20th century due to growing economic production and population, the number of dams rose sharply. According to the World Commission on Dams (WCD) (2000: 8), by the end of the 20th century there were “over forty-five thousand large dams in over 140 countries”. WCD (2000: xxviii) also argues that in many cases for the purpose of securing the benefits of dams “an unacceptable and often unnecessary price” was paid by resettled people, downstream communities, taxpayers and natural environment. These benefits are mostly related to economic development, production and industrialisation. The problems caused by large dams are as follows (ibid.):

- Environmental costs which are unanticipated and hard to mitigate: These hydraulic infrastructures create profound and irreversible environmental impacts such as extinction of species, loss of forest, wetlands and farmland. Around sixty percent of the world’s large rivers
are fragmented by dams and diversions. Large dams are responsible for the loss of aquatic biodiversity, upstream and downstream fisheries and the services of downstream floodplains, wetlands and adjacent marine ecosystems. Twenty percent of the land on earth which is irrigated by large dams is lost to salination and water logging. In addition to that, five percent of the world’s fresh water evaporates from reservoirs. Besides, dams emit greenhouse gases due to the rotting of flooded vegetation, soils and organic matter that enter the reservoir from river catchments. In some cases emissions from a reservoir can be equal or greater than those from a coal or gas–fired power station.

- Social costs which are largely ignored: All around the world forty to eighty million people had to flee from their lands due to large dam constructions and reservoirs. Resettlement of these people caused extreme economic hardship and community disintegration for them. Millions of people that live downstream of dams have also suffered from devastating impacts as a result of disease, altered river flow, and loss of natural resources such as fisheries. A large share of benefits go to the rich while the poor have to bear the costs most of the time receiving little or no compensation.

According to WCD (2000) in most of the cases, damming was not the only technology available for meeting human water and energy needs. There were cheaper, less destructive in both environmental and social terms, and more benign options as alternatives to them. However, large construction and energy companies often over-simplified the social-environmental costs of these hydraulic projects to make them more appealing and acceptable to official decision-making units of states (ibid.).

According to the WCD (2000):

Large dams have been a long-time favourite of politicians, government officials, dam building companies and development banks. They have provided opportunities for corruption and favouritism, and have skewed
decision-making away from cheaper and more effective technological options. Decision-making units (public sector) often tend to prefer nation scale dam projects that can be manipulated into a subject of *governmental success stories* rather than encouraging self-sufficient local scale energy and water projects.

Dams often create social injustice; increase the already existing power asymmetry between small communities and interest lobbies taking control of the life resources of these communities for more economic production. Anti-dam movements often emerge from social injustice issues rather then ecological concerns. Ecological aspects play secondary roles unless they are severe and a direct threat to human life. As indicated by Martínez-Alier (2008: 8) “in many conflicts of resource extraction or pollution, the local people (indigenous or not) are often on the side of conservation not so much because they are self-conscious environmentalists but because of their livelihood needs and their cultural values”.

The global anti-dam movement is the social response to the inefficiency of nation-state mechanisms in defending the rights of its citizens. As Barker and Soyez (1994) argue that many communities do no longer expect that their concerns and interests could be addressed and solved through the existing nation-state structures. This realisation has led communities whose resources and therefore their survival as a community are in danger to search for ways at international platforms. This way they believe they can deal with the powerful nation-state structures and global economy mechanisms.

Blench (2001: 2) indicates that “if concerns about indigenous peoples have been more visible in recent times, it is principally in relation to their opposition to infrastructure projects”. Anti-dam movements are the defence of the local movements. Barcena and Ibarra (2001: 3) define the defence of the local as “a movement of resistance by a community against the invasion of, or aggression against, its territory by external institutions or elites”. The local is often defined as the livelihood embracing all aspects of social and ecological life of a certain community.
According to Barcena and Ibarra (2001: 3):

The defence of the local occurs through the need of the individuals to build for themselves a space and to feel themselves linked to a shared territory in which they are recognised. That need generates the construction and corresponding sublimation of the space. The experience of being invaded from outside is felt as a threat directed against their vital interests and life world of these individuals.

“In confronting such an external imposition, there is the ‘we’ as the community which decides what is perceived and felt as its own. From this perspective, the defence of the local is not a form of ecologist movement. What is considered to be under attack is not Nature in abstract but a specific Nature that is moulded, used and linked to concrete human community” (ibid.).

In parallel to this argument, Çoban (2004: 440) also states that in the defence of the local movements there is “interconnectedness and symbiotic relationship between community and the material world”. According to him; communities’ demands, the threat they perceive, their philosophy, actors, their aims, targets, strategies and tactics are incorporated into political project for defending and sustaining the symbiotic relationship between the community and the environment. Çoban (2004) concludes that the defence of the land and the community does not develop solely around the idea of either save the environment or save the community but instead both embedded in each other. In short, community and the environment in these movements are not perceived as two different and independent domains.

In the defence of the local movement, the community at stake is empowered through learning about the roots of the problem that they face. However, beyond that, they learn about how they can develop skills and ways to tackle the power groups that aspire to take control of their livelihood and resources within it. It is the collective knowledge and capacity building that is called social learning that empowers them.
3.3. Social learning

Learning would be exceedingly laborious, not to mention hazardous, if people had to rely solely on the effects of their own actions to inform them what to do. Fortunately, most human behaviour is learned through observational modelling: from observing others one forms the idea of how new behaviours are performed, and on later occasions this coded information serves as guide for action.

*Albert Bandura (1977: 22)*

Learning is a cognitive process of acquiring skills and knowledge to adapt to the changing internal (regarding to bodily changes) and external conditions. Each research field approaches learning from different perspectives. In this research learning is seen as a communicative social process which takes place at an organisational level. The concept of social learning in this study is in line with the research carried out by the EU Project Harmonicop ([http://www.harmonicop.info](http://www.harmonicop.info)) which adopted the social learning theory of Bandura (1977) for sustainability studies, in particular in the context of water management domain.

According to Bandura (1977) most human behaviour is learnt observationally through modelling. As individuals observe others, they form an idea on how new behaviours are performed. For later occasions this coded information is saved and used in other occasions. The learner and the environment that he/she is part of are in continuous interaction. This interaction causes a series of changes on both the individual and his/her environment.

Bandura’s social learning theory aimed at exploring the cognitive processes taking place at an individual scale. Later on, the notion of social learning was redefined for exploring a type of learning taking place at a group level. Wenger’s (1988) “communities of practice” can be accepted as the first attempt to broaden the context of social learning. According to Wenger (1988: 4) as social beings “humans learn and know as a matter of participating in the pursuit of active
engagement (family, colleagues at work, political parties and hobby groups) in the world”. He claims that participation in this context is “being active participants in the practices of social communities and constructing identities in relation to these communities” (ibid.). This type of participation is defined by Wenger as a “kind of action and a form of belonging” which “shape not only what we do, but also who we are and how we interpret what we do” (ibid.).

According to Wenger, social groups engage in a process of collective learning in a shared domain of human endeavour. “Such interactions are influenced by and may change the social structure. Communities of practice require clear objectives and they continuously redefine themselves within the process of participation (e.g. membership, acting) and reification (e.g. forms, documents, and instruments)” (as cited in Pahl-Wostl et al. 2008b: 485).

During the 1980s and the 1990s, there was a significant rise in research related to participatory methods and approaches to learning in the context of agricultural development. In the 2000s, social learning has specifically been promoted for supporting participative planning in water management (Pahl-Wostl 2002; Pahl-Wostl et al. 2008a; Pahl-Wostl et al. 2008b; Tábara & Pahl-Wostl 2007; Woodhill 2004; Mostert et al. 2007), forest management (Buck etal. 2001), impact assessment (Webler et al. 1995; Saarikoski 2000; Haxeltine & Amundsen 2005), conservation planning and management (Schusler et al. 1995; Knight et al. 2006), and participatory rural research in Europe (Dougill et al. 2006) and in developing countries (Davidson-Hunt 2006; Rist et al. 2007; Muro & Jeffrey 2008).

According to Pahl-Wostl et al. (2008a: para. 3), “Social learning entails developing new relational capacities, both between social agents, in the form of learning how to collaborate and understand others’ roles and capacities differently, and also between social-ecological systems (sustainability learning)”. In other words, social learning is the process of development of capacities and “new types of knowledge to respond adequately to the changing dynamics of social-ecological systems in concrete contexts of action” (ibid.).
Pahl-Wostl et al. (2008b: 486) define social learning as an “iterative and ongoing process that comprises several loops and that enhances the flexibility of the socio-ecological system to respond to change”. In addition, according to Harmonicop (2005), social learning takes place in the context of certain socio-environmental conditions which shape communication and interaction among group members. These conditions define how a certain community perceives a problem, how it learns about that problem and develops collective skills and knowledge to solve it, and finally how all this process creates a social transformation.

In the process of social learning, a group of people or an organisation generate and develop collective skills and knowledge to challenge and/or even change the dominant governance structures and paradigms that they see responsible for creating those problems which affect their lives adversely.

Social learning in the defence of the local movements becomes evident through the emergence of new problem definitions and new identities related to community and its livelihood, and new promotions of human-human and human-nature relationships. In fact, in very many cases what is called as ‘new’ is rather reformulated in a larger framework rather than entirely new. This collective ‘new’ is the outcome of social learning.

In these new or reformulated identities, we see traces of collective questioning of the dominant paradigms and practices that the community sees as the basis of the problem that they are facing. These identities often are simple but equally universal and holistic. They are not stable but fluid. Therefore, there are more insights and lessons to be derived from them if one approaches them as mirrors of social learning process rather than as final products. They point to the direction of a shift taking place in collective mindset of a group of people, a community or an entire society.
3.4. Identity

The world is an intrinsically dynamic, interconnected web of relations in which there are no discrete entities and no absolute dividing lines between the living and the non-living, or the human and the non-human.

Robyn Eckersley (1992: 49)

According to Mead (1934) human’s perception of him/herself and the outer world go through a series of complicated interrelations between the self and the mind. He proposes that the self and the mind are products of a social process. Selfhood is the capacity of the minded-organism to be an object to it. One can take the role of another, see him/herself from that perspective and become an object to him/herself. Therefore, this self consciousness can occur only through a social process. On the definitive role of the social-natural environment on the self Friedman (1994: 117) also indicates that “self-definition does not occur in a vacuum, but in a world already defined”.

Mind or consciousness is the self’s internalisation of the social process of communication in which meaning emerges. In the human world, communication is carried out dominantly by language which is a set of vocal gestures that enables the self and the mind to emerge. The homogenous impact of language on humans is uncomparable with gestures or other communication ways. With the invention of alphabet, languages become even closer to being homogenous in the way they are interpreted by individuals.

How do humans perceive the cosmos and themselves? According to Weigert (2008: 238) five steps of perception of the natural environment might explain the construction of reality:

1. The ‘cosmic environment’ as all-encompassing physical world;
2. The ‘organismic environment’ selected by organism’s sensory and behavioural apparatus;

3. The ‘institutionalised environment’ constructed and rationalised by logics of social organisations;

4. The ‘encultured environment’ where the unquestioned worldviews encompass self, society and nature;

5. The ‘selfed environment’ where all these environments are reconstructed into meaningful wholes and identities.

Therefore, from this perspective it can be concluded that identifying is a way of making sense of the social-ecological environment that we perceive. This perception is limited and defined by a complex combination of organismic, institutional, encultured and selfed capabilities, and their interactions in a whole. Such complexity results in a large multiplicity in perceptions and identifications. Identities are fluid and they are reshaped over and over through individual/social inquiry and communication with others within changing context and time.

Identities hold a mirror to and explain a large portion of the human-human and the human-nature relationships. They are reflections of socially constructed multiple realities. Looking at their evolution is unconditional in exploring the human-human and the human-nature relationships. They are regenerated over and over and reflect how we perceive and make sense of the world around us. They explain, to a large extent, why we behave towards others and nature in the ways we do. Our social construction of reality through identities explains a large portion of our behaviours.

However, before looking into the evolution of identity, it might be useful to what Sen (2001) proposes about human identity to avoid, as much as one can, reductionism in exploring such a large and ambiguous concept. According to Sen (2001: 320) human identity has three notions: i) plural identity, ii) choice of
identity, and iii) beyond identity. He argues that people “invoke group identities of various kinds in many disparate contexts… There are many groups to which a person belongs, and the assumption of a unique identity helps to generate… imperialism of identity” (ibid.: 322). Sen also states that plural identities can be constitutive or non-competing, but sometimes “can compete with each other as an outcome of our attention and priorities… even competing identities need not demand that the one and only of the unique specifications can survive, vanquishing all the other alternatives” (ibid.). Sen (2002: 5) defends the multiplicity of human identities through these words: “The robbing of our plural identities not only reduces us, but also impoverishes the world”.

Sen’s words on multiple human identities can be translated into multiple dimensions of human identity. Identity has multiple dimensions due to multiplicity of ways of inquiry and making sense of (learning about) the cosmos and even the creations of mind. One way of identifying is identifying with; an internalisation of knowledge. This is one of the very many dimensions of learning in which the self builds a bond between him/herself and the other(s). The ‘others’ in this context is other than the self and they can be socially constructed, natural, or imaginary. A person in a particular time, place and situation can identify with being Kurdish, being a tree, or the wind, and being love itself. A person can develop an enormous capacity for identifying with multiple ‘others’.

This particular dimension of learning, by which is meant ‘identifying with’, is often emphasised in deep ecology. The general line of the deep ecologist arguments is that ‘identifying with’ “entails an expansion of the self to include other beings, so that ‘one's own self is no longer adequately delimited by the personal ego or the organism” (Næss 1989: 174). According to Næss, “because of an inescapable process of identification with others, with growing maturity the self is widened and deepened. We see ourselves in others” (as cited in Milton 2002: 75).

“Identity makes morality redundant because we care for ourselves, and whatever is a part of ourselves, by inclination, without the need for moral exhortation”
(ibid.). Because as Macy (1987: 20) indicates “Sermons seldom hinder us from pursuing our self-interest, so we need to be a little more enlightened about what our self-interest is. … [T]he trees in Amazon Basin; they are our external lungs. We are just beginning to wake up to that. We are gradually discovering that we are our world” (as cited in Miller 2003: 180).

“People’s ability to identify with non-human entities plays an important role in discourses about the protection of nature and natural things” (Milton 2002: 73-74). In fact, the redundancy of ethical discourse in environmental movement is expressed by many other scholars (Deval 1982; Sessions 1981; Fox 1995; Milton 2002). Sessions (1981: 5) argues that the search should be “not for environmental ethics” but for “environmental consciousness”. In other words, as Deval (1982) indicates “ecological consciousness precedes and pre-empts the search for an environmental ethic”.

According to Milton (2002: 76-77) human identification with nature has been studied and explored in at least four ways:

1. ‘It (the object identified with) is similar to me’: Næss (1995: 227) gives the following as an example to the way he identifies with nature:

I was looking through an old-fashioned microscope at the dramatic meeting of two drops of different chemicals. At that moment, a flea jumped from a lemming which was strolling along the table and landed in the middle of the acid chemicals. To save it was impossible. It took many minutes for the flea to die. Its movements were dreadfully expressive. Naturally, what I felt was a painful sense of compassion and empathy. But empathy was not basic, rather it was a process of identification: that ‘I saw myself in the flea’. If I had been alienated from the flea, nor seeing intuitively anything even resembling myself, the death struggle would have left me feeling indifferent. So there must be identification in order for
there to be compassion and, among humans, solidarity (as cited in Argyrou 2005: 55).

2. ‘It is me’: “All that is in my universe is not merely mine; it is me. And I shall defend myself” (Livingston 1990: 4, emphasis in original). In the words of Macy (1987: 20) “We are our world”.

3. ‘It is part of me’: Næss (1989: 164) states that “To distance oneself from nature and the ‘natural’ is to distance oneself from a part of that which the ‘I’ is built up of. Its ‘identity’, ‘what the individual I is’ and thereby sense of self and self-respect, are broken down” (as cited in Milton 2002: 91).

4. ‘I am part of it’: According to Seed (1985: 22) in order to “establish ecological identity we first need to understand intellectually that we are part of nature, that we have no independent existence, that we are part of all of the cycles of nature and that by disrupting and polluting these cycles we are destroying ourselves” (as cited in Wood 1988: 103).

On the ecological identity and consciousness, Fox (1984: 196) argues that:

[T]here is no firm ontological divide in the field of existence. In other words, the world simply is not divided up into independently existing subjects and objects, nor is there any bifurcation in reality between the human and non-human realms. Rather all entities are constituted by their relationships. To the extent that we perceive boundaries, we fall short of a deep ecological consciousness.

3.4.1. The evolution of human identity in the Western culture

Existential questions have troubled human mind since the beginning of history. Who are we? What is the meaning of life? What happens after death? Even though our knowledge of the world has increased, those questions still are, to a large extent, unanswered. This study is about the first question and is a tiny attempt to explore one side of the human riddle. Humanity’s search for self-
identity has not ceased and is not likely to do so as far as it exists, because the adventure of life is mostly about seeking, rather than the illusion of finding. As Andre Gide says “Believe those who are seeking the truth. Doubt those who find it”. The search for truth made us who we are now. In this section I provide a brief summary of human identity in the context of human-nature interaction.

Answers to those existential questions above have always been sought in nature. Exploring the depths of human being and the nature have been the two sides of the same coin. This search has provided us humans a growing amount of knowledge about themselves and life. As the knowledge of life became robust, we learnt to identify ourselves with larger amount of entities and phenomena. Our identity has become multi-faceted and complex.

In modern societies, human identity is based on the prevailing assumption that our differences from nature make us humans. In line with this assumption, our similarities with nature equally make us less human. This dualistic reasoning in the end places us humans at an opposing point with the non-human world as the others. Such human identity is about a self image which is defined and constructed on a rigid array of dualisms of subject-object dichotomy and human-nature antagonism (Fox 1995).

Greenway (1995) also argues that dualistic language is the reason behind human separation from nature. Not all the world languages have dualistic nature. However, many modern languages clearly reflect such dualism. Similarly, Cohen (1997) indicates that language disconnected from nature acts as a conceptual barrier between human and nature.

At hunter-gatherer stage of human history, belief systems such as animism and nature worship saw human as an inseparable part of nature. These belief systems showed a strong sense of human unity with nature. In animism humans look for and attribute spirit in the non-human living being, the non-living, and the natural phenomena. In their view, the borders between the human and the non-human and
between the living and the non-living were not as sharp and clear as in the later-coming monotheistic religions.

As the knowledge of domestication of animals and agriculture was acquired by the majority of human populations, nature gradually lost its mystery and enchantment. In his pioneering book in the field of eco-psychology *Nature and Madness* Sheppard (1982) defines this period as an era in which humans truncated their hunter-gatherer roots in nature and this was the beginning of human separation from nature.

With the expansion of agricultural settlements, hunter-gatherer societies have gradually become minorities in agrarian societies. Civilisations and states were formed. World religions emerged and became institutionalised within the states. Organisation of human societies went through major changes. New identities emerged as a result of these institutional and cultural changes. In these identities a privileged place in nature was claimed for humans. Quinn (1996) explains this transition period through the “totalitarian agriculture” paradigm. According to him this type of agriculture is based on an unquestioned world view that all natural resources, in particular food, on earth are entirely for humans but no other living being else. Such discourses became further institutionalised and embedded in culture with the help of the three monotheistic religions.

In the discourses of Judaeo-Christianity and Islam, the separation of humankind from the rest of nature became more apparent. Man, as the representative of humankind, was defined as the master of the world. In an era marked by wars and violence, human-nature relationship was defined by two possibilities for humans; to be a master or a slave.

Barry (2006: 33) explains the similarity between the three religions’ promoted human identities through their origins. According to him, these religions appeared in the same era which was marked by the knowledge and practice of agriculture that formed the first civilisations in cities and towns with political, economic,
military and religious power and organisations behind them. In the agricultural era, these religions functioned as the most powerful spiritual institutions in sending the masses to wars, making them establishing and constructing cities and countries, answering their questions on existence and giving them a spiritual reason for living.

The Christian Great Chain of Being (See figure 8) is one of the clearest illustrations of human-nature separation. On top of the chain appears God. Following him in hierarchical order are seraphim, cherubim, archangels, man, woman, and the rest of the non-human beings from animals to the non-living entities of the world. Man is positioned in between Nature and Heaven. According to this universal hierarchy man is also situated closer to Heaven than is woman. However in this particular illustration from Didacus Valades in Rhetorica Christiana (1579) humans are represented by the male alone.

Another interpretation of this illustration can be that God and Heaven are portrayed as man’s ideals and dreams. Man plays the role of God in his relationship with nature on earth. This illustration of hierarchy legitimises man’s supremacy over nature in the way it portrays nature as inferior to man.

Both Judaeo-Christian and Islamic discourses on human-nature relationship express clearly that the world with all of its natural resources including living beings are left to satisfy man’s needs and well-being. These religions have played a major role in developing and spreading the belief that “there is a clear and morally relevant dividing line between humankind and the rest of nature, that humankind is the only or principal source of value and meaning in the world, and that non-human nature is there for no other purpose but to serve humankind” (Eckersley 1992: 51).
Figure 8: Great Chain of Being

Source: Didacus Valades’ Rhetorica Christiana\textsuperscript{14} (1579) (Reproduced from Anthony Flechtner’s *Gender, Sex and Subordination in England, 1500-1800* (1995))

\textsuperscript{14} Retrieved from Stanford University Website [http://www.stanford.edu/class/engl174b/chain.html](http://www.stanford.edu/class/engl174b/chain.html)
Other religions such as Buddhism and Hinduism evolved differently from Judaeo-Christianity and Islam. These religions are built on the ideas of interconnectedness between the living beings and reincarnation in different life forms. Human is described as part of the inter-connected web of life rather than the centre of the Universe as portrayed in the three monotheistic religions.

Another dimension of human identity in Christianity is emphasised by Rousseau (1762) in his work *Social Contract*. He indicates that in Christianity man’s home is not the Earth. Therefore, man does what he has to do with a significant indifference to the success or failure, whether things go ill or well on it (ibid.). Very similarly in Islam, the earth and earthly life are seen as merely a testing ground for humans according to which God decides if they go to Hell or Heaven on the Doomsday. With the help of these religions, the idea that the Earth was inferior to Heaven was promoted world wide. In short, this discourse defined the overall meaning of nature or the Earth as God’s testing ground for sinful humans before they enter the eternal life.

During centuries, human identity maintained its central place in the Universe until two very important developments in Europe. First, with Copernicus it was understood that the Earth (man’s kingdom) was a tiny planet in one of the billions of star systems in the Universe. With the knowledge of the non-world-centred universe, human’s privileged position was shaken. Second, Darwin’s evolution theory redefined human identity through a theory based on genetical similarities with other species although it still situated humankind on the top of all living beings which is also illustrated in the Great Chain of Being. This was another significant shift from human *as an entirely different living-being* to human *as the most developed member of the animal kingdom*.

By the start of the industrial era in Europe and the Enlightenment movement, the privileged position of religion in governance structures was starting to be challenged. Tremendous changes were taking place in feudal societies in which the commons held no rights to land towards. This was a transition from feudal
society towards a commercial industrial society that would be based on property rights and liberalism (Barry 2007: 218)

Nature, God’s ‘free gift’ to humankind according to the religious discourse, was being redefined by some theorists such as Locke. According to Locke nature was a commodity to be owned as a private property to be sold and bought for the progress of humankind. In the liberalisation process in Europe, feudal obstacles behind development and progress were tackled by the land reform. Land was transformed into a commodity “by dissolving the cultural and social context within which it was embedded” (ibid.).

As Polanyi (1944) argues in the feudal society land used to mean identity and culture. Therefore, to build an entirely new society that would meet the requirements of market economy, humans had to be separated from land. Separation of workers from the environment of production (the nature) was the first condition of wage labour. This did not only separate the workers from their livelihoods but also isolated them from the commodity market and made them dependent on property owners (Davidson 2007: 322).

Marx (1844) defines this kind of labour as inhumane and de-humanising. His theories of human and nature are based on his definition of human as the producer. Marx believed that man’s significant difference from the non-human beings was his productive character. He defines human identity through endeavour for production and progressivism.

Darwin’s theory on notions of natural selection and survival of the fittest is another important phenomenon in the evolution of human identity in the Western thought. This theory has widely been used for understanding not only the natural systems but also the society. According to Darwin (1859) natural selection works solely by and for the good of each being, all corporeal and mental endowments will tend to progress towards perfection. In 1862, Marx, in a letter to Engels wrote (as cited in Marx and Engels Collected Works 1913: 380):
It is remarkable how Darwin rediscovers, among the beasts and plants, the society of England with its division of labour, competition, opening up of new markets, ‘inventions’ and the Malthusian ‘struggle for existence’. It is Hobbes’ bellum omnium contra omnes and is reminiscent of Hegel’s *Phenomenology*; in which civil society figures as an ‘intellectual animal kingdom’, whereas, in Darwin the animal kingdom figures as civil society.

Further look into Darwin’s work of *The Origin of the Species* (1859) demonstrates the strong influence of Christianity. In his work Darwin’s ‘progress towards perfection’ is explained through his particular expressions such as “the divine direction’ and ‘the purpose of evolution towards the better and the fitter’. “In one particular sense the more recent forms must, on my theory, be higher than the more ancients; for each new species is formed by having had some advantage in the struggle for life over other and preceding forms”. In his words such as ‘perfection’ and ‘higher forms’ one sees clear connections with the hierarchical approach to human-nature relationship promoted by the Great Chain of Being in Christianity.

In fact, Darwin’s theories related to human and nature built the strongest link between the old human-nature identities based on the Christian discourse and the new emerging ones based on progressivism in the new industrial society. Traces of social Darwinist theories that define human as *the fittest of the survival* are seen in writers such as Herbert Spencer and Madison Grant whose works advocated the elimination of unfit individuals and sterilisation of social failures -weaklings as would benefit the human race (Goatly 2006: 20).

In the 20th century, particularly in the second half, as globalisation of market economy process gained new momentum, human-nature separation moved to a further level. As Davidson (2007: 323) points out that “the global market serves to mask the origins of products, the manner in which they are produced, the impact

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15 The war against all
this product has on nature, and indeed the extent of our dependence upon nature as a whole”. Human generations lost contact with nature through abstracting mechanism of the urban life such as super-markets and shopping malls in which nature entities are converted into mere products.

On the role of growing urbanisation in human separation from nature Suzuki (1999: 13) indicates:

Our surroundings are dominated by one species -us- and the few plants and animals that we decided to share space with or cannot quite eliminate. In such an environment, it becomes easy to think we are special; that our creativity has enables us to escape the constraints of our biological nature. It is easy to forget that we remain absolutely dependent on air, water, soil, energy, and biodiversity for our survival and good health.

In the 21st century human-nature separation is still unshaken and continues to be forming the ground which most scientific theories are based on. One of the latest extensions of Darwin’s natural selection and survival of the fittest notions became apparent in the work of Dawkin’s *Selfish Gene* theory (1976). In his work, Dawkins explained human evolution with a gene-centred approach. According to him evolution is through competition and adaptation within the same population rather than collective well-being between populations.

However, Dicks (as cited in Goatly 2007: 131) opposes the view of the selfish gene theory. She indicates that if evolution was all about selfish genes, then the society would play no role in it. She further concludes that the survival of the fittest would mean survival of the fittest DNA according to this theory. This would mean that living-beings are “no more than vehicles to genes” which “are hitching a lift on the road to posterity” (ibid.).

Dicks also underlines the prevailing reductionist effect of selfish gene theory over the scientific view on evolution. She indicates that biologists have ridiculed the
idea that groups of organisms might gain a survival advantage over other groups because of some beneficial trait shared. “It is understood that evolution happens on a variety of levels. Natural selection might favour certain genes, but it can also favour particular societies. Provided a group of individuals can cooperate without any cheats trying to sneak an unfair advantage, then it may evolve as a single entity” (ibid.).

Another view was Margulis’ evolution theory in the 1960s which brought new trains of thought. According to Margulis, “mitochondria and chloroplasts are remnants of what had once been free-living bacteria” (as cited in Ryan 2002: 87). Margulis explains evolution as a process taking place through “double inheritance systems with cells inside cells. With this discovery, concept of symbiosis - meaning a metabolic interaction and dependency between different species- was born” (ibid.).

In fact, the roots of the symbiotic theory go back to late 19th century. Schneider (1897) (as cited in Ryan 2002: 51) notes that “all living organisms manifest a more or less intimate biological interdependence and relationship”. Schneider names it as “true symbiosis” and defines it as “physiological interaction between species whose intensity and intimacy might even go further into changing chemistry and the physical make up of both simbionts” (ibid.). Further on, such change might pass on as heredity and might cause evolutionary change (ibid.).

Similarly, Kropotkin in his book Mutual Aid: A factor of Evolution (1902) identifies human in context of its relationship with nature through these words:

In the animal world we have seen that the vast majority of species live in societies, and that they find in association the best arms for the struggle for life: understood, of course, in its wide Darwinian sense - not as a struggle for the sheer means of existence, but as a struggle against all natural conditions unfavourable to the species. The animal species, in which individual struggle has been reduced to its narrowest limits, and the practice of mutual aid has attained the greatest development, are
invariably the most numerous, the most prosperous, and the most open to further progress. The mutual protection which is obtained in this case, the possibility of attaining old age and of accumulating experience, the higher intellectual development, and the further growth of sociable habits, secure the maintenance of the species, its extension, and its further progressive evolution. The unsociable species, on the contrary, are doomed to decay (as cited in Todes 1987: 547-548).


Since the metaphor of clockwork mechanism of universe by Newton, scientists have developed a notion that by making fragments based analysis, nature and universe could be understood adding the pieces together like in a giant jigsaw puzzle. However, with the discoveries of quantum physics it is accepted that kind of reductionism would be completely insufficient in explaining the world. It is known that at the most fundamental level of subatomic particles, statistical probability does not function as a means to assume their precise location with certainty.

Now, evolution, by a growing number of scientists, is defined as symbiosis in which big and small, simple and complex organisms constantly reforms one complex complete life where there are systems in systems and *cells in cells*: with an absolute lack of hierarchy among living beings. This is completely an opposite theory to the dominant hierarchical human centred world view.

However, the pro-modernist human identities remain to be the pillars of human–nature separation and utilitarian approaches towards nature. These identities, on the one hand, help uncovering the unsustainable modernity discourse and existing cultural structures that generate them. On the other hand, they help the promotion and maintenance of dominant paradigm through unsustainability language.
3.4.2. The particularity of water identities

Water played the most crucial role in the development of civilisations. On the one hand, some researchers such as Westing (1986), Wolf (1998) and White (1998) state out that the history of social organisation around river basins and watersheds is humanity’s richest record of dialogue with nature. On the other hand, as Clarke (1991: 90-110) also points out water has been the source of conflicts for all times, both locally and nationally, as well as globally.

According to Wolf (1998: 61-62) only seven minor conflicts took place over trans-boundary waters and none of them resulted in war. In all these cases, armies backed down and the conflict was resolved by constructive means. Wolf underlines the fact that in the history of humanity, only one war was fought over water which took place between two Sumerian cities called Lagash and Umma in 2500 BC. He claims that as an opposition to widely accepted view, some over 3600 treaties were signed over different aspects of international waters and some around 150 agreements in the 20th century that deal directly with water.

Whether shown as a source of conflict or a cause for dialogue and collaboration, water has always been accepted as the most important nature entity in the organisation of human groups. Delli (1997:3) states that when the contribution of irrigation systems to the development of communities and the civilisation is taken into consideration it can be concluded that “indeed, water may actually be one of humanity's great learning grounds for building community”.

The importance of water in the survival and development of humankind is unquestionable. That is why this nature entity has a tremendous multiplicity of meanings and values for people. If one aspires to explore human-nature relationship and its consequences, taking a look at water and what it has meant for people is unavoidable.
A large part of what we perceive as water, similar to other entities and phenomena, is socially constructed. Nature identities, in particular the ones related to water, diversify according to time and space. The emergence of new identities or definitions proves the existence of social learning within a particular group or society. Identities may also foster and catalyze such social learning processes because an identity is a statement which clarifies and promotes a particular world view and paradigm. Identities facilitate communication which might lead up to social learning.

Growing specificity in science and the increasing access to information technologies resulted in accumulation of complex knowledge which is difficult to read. This builds a barrier in front of social learning in an era in which efficient and rapid responses should be adopted to anticipate to global changes. According to Giner & Tàbara (1999) such adaptation and anticipation can not be realised through the sole guidance of science. Furthermore, as Darier (1995: 155) states “Science – peculiar cultural artefact – is the result of social construction”. Science is not the truth itself but its interpretation by humans differing according to various contexts.

Therefore, along with science other non-rational but not irrational cultural devises are needed (Giner & Tàbara 1999) in order to communicate and apprehend such complexity and this is the case of ‘nature identities’. Nature identities help explaining complex web of relationships between society and nature systems. Metaphorical thinking and beliefs are undeniable side of human thinking and making sense of the world. After all, ration alone remains insufficient in an era marked by ‘divergent’ problems; which are formed out of the tensions between competing perspectives that can not be solved but can be transcended (Orr 2002: 1459).

According to Hornborg (1993: 131) the meaning emerges out of our engagement and identification with the world around us. Therefore, he concludes: “the quality of meaning and its ability to provide a secure sense of personal identity depend on
the kinds of reference points we use. Two kinds of reference points which guide
the construction of personal identity in the contemporary world: local which
consists of everyday personal relationships and immediate surroundings. Local
constructions of identity are grounded in “tangible reference points (specific
places, people, artefacts) from which they cannot be extricated”.

Among the multiplicity of water identities, the more profound and complete ones
often come from the communities that have different forms of engagement with it
other than its mere consumption. These identities promote water as a binding
element which is often considered to have meta-physical properties and a degree
of sacredness. These communities have diverse types of relationship with water.
Rather than an abstract identity, water is an unseparable element of culture and
land that culture is based on and largely defined by.

Related to this argument about human and nature identities, but on a more holistic
ground Strang (1997) states:

The attachment of specific groups to specific places is an immensely
powerful basis for identity, because it is both immortal and unique, based
on reproducing an ancestral past. The communal nature of this
identification with land creates an unparallel collective sense of
belonging. Thus, for Aboriginal people, who they are and where they are
‘from’ are not divisible (as cited in Milton 2002: 105-106).

Strang also points to the fact that what seems as separate to the modern society is
perceived as indivisible in some communities (ibid.). This is most probably
closely related to Gidden’s abstracting mechanisms which separate humans from
their livelihood and alienate them in the ways they define themselves and identify
with entities and values attached to those entities.
3.4.3. The multiple scales of human identity

Nation-state often follows an expansionist and occupying strategy driven by its pro-development ideology towards natural resources in its claimed territory and communities whose existence as a whole is dependent on those natural resources. According Blench (2001: 2) natural resource conflict often takes place this way:

The state arrogates the right to make natural resource management decisions against the wishes of a minority population; where projects are large scale they often require international finance; this then makes government vulnerable to an organised opposition which uses contacts with international NGOs to put pressure on the external institutions. Structurally, the local group is accessing global morality directly rather than addressing the state in the national arena, correctly perceiving that this would be a losing strategy.

Blench (2001: 1) states that “only when there is opposition to major infrastructure projects is notice taken, although this is a minor element in a broad process of mining natural resources and cultural assimilation”. In fact, such conflicts are also an identity conflict; in which traditional community identity moulded into livelihood seeks ways to empower itself against the expansionist national/global identity enforced by the nation-state. The relationship between the community at stake and its livelihood is based on sustaining that livelihood with its natural resources rather than exploiting it to its limits as promoted by the state and corporate powers. This fundamental difference between the nation-state and the community in their approaches to nature stems from how the livelihood and its social-ecological components are defined in the first place. In the case of a large dam project, how the state defines water is completely different from how community that primarily depends on that water does. For the nation-state water is an economic resource, while for the community, on the contrary, water is inseparable from its cultural and spatial context. For the community, water has many other values and it embraces every value that livelihood has.
Community identity is primarily embedded in livelihood. However, it is equally important to underline the fact that this local collective identity has regional, national and global dimensions. The same can be said for individual identity. On this issue, Milton (2002: 107) underlines the misleading consequences of local-global polarisation within the reference points for identity (See table 4). He gives identity at individual level based on local/global dichotomy provided by Hornborg (1993) as an example to this. Such comparison might be useful in the way it underlines some of the numerous differences between the indigenous and the urban communities’ identity references. However, the reality is, of course, much more complex than that. Milton argues that the global reference points are not necessarily more impoverished sources for identity formation than the local ones. It is a matter of how people chose to reformulate their identities to adapt and anticipate to the changing social-ecological conditions.

Table 3: Local and global reference points for identity

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<th>LOCAL/IRREPLACEABLE</th>
<th>GLOBAL/ABSTRACT</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SPACE</td>
<td>Specific community &amp; natural landscape</td>
<td>Mobility &amp; urbanism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RELATIONSHIP</td>
<td>Kin &amp; neighbours</td>
<td>Colleagues &amp; peers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OBJECTS</td>
<td>Handicrafts &amp; heirlooms</td>
<td>Consumption goods</td>
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In the face of threat, as the primary empowerment strategy, the community at stake uses particular abstract reference points at regional, national and global scales along with the local ones. Connecting abstract identity reference points with the local ones is of great importance in the politicisation of the community identity. In fact, these reference points are already linked and moulded in each other. However, they are remoulded deliberately with a different order in a different context as an empowerment strategy according to the emerging political opportunities. Social movement’s success is dependent on this particular
empowerment strategy. The community in question might include ethnic reference points in its reorganisation of identity against the nation-state.

On the issue of ethnic identity and its political rise Esman (1994:2) states:

What distinguishes the current era is not the existence of competitive ethnic solidarities but their global political salience. … [O]f the 180 territorial states that make up the political map of the contemporary world, more than 90 percent is multi-ethnic, containing two or more ethnic communities of significant size. These communities tend to be organised, legally or covertly, on behalf of their common interests. In multi-ethnic or multi-national federalised states such as India, Russia, Switzerland and Spain, they may exercise autonomous control over designated territories; in some states they compete for influence and attempt to impress their needs and preferences on the central government; in others they struggle for separation and independent statehood.

Okolie (2003: 69) indicates that before the formation of states and nations, people lived as relatively smaller autonomous societies in which they shared common values, sentiments, territories and history. With the creation of modern state, the incorporation of the people culturally diverse into a single society was made possible. However, the state was not always successful in wiping out their differences. Today, the ones that could not be culturally assimilated still exist and thrive (ibid.).

This is not to say that ethnic reference points are a must for the empowerment of community identity. In some cases, ethnical component of community identity might have been lost already or can be viewed as insignificant in the identity formation. However, if ethnic dimension exists, it functions as a most crucial component of a social movement.
Glaze and Moynihan (1975) underline the importance of ethnicity through these words:

Ethnicity has in fact the most potent mechanisms in modern society for mobilising sentiment in the pursuit of collective group interests and of concrete political ends. They insist that it has even come to challenge ‘the primacy for such mobilisation of class on the one hand and nation on the other’ – both of which have been presumed to be more in tune with organising interest and sentiment in modern society (as cited in Ringer & Lawless 2001: 62-63).

Ethnicity has strong connections with the global platforms based on social and environmental justice, and even nature conservation concerns. As Blench (2001: 1) points out “Ethnic diversity is strongly correlated with biological diversity at present, although this link is being eroded wherever indigenous peoples inhabit environments with high resource-values. Indigenous knowledge is being lost with this erosion”. These global platforms promote that a fair allocation of natural resources should be primarily for the benefits of local populations. They defend the ethnic diversity against the practices of the nation-state ideology which often undermines cultural diversity.
3.5. Culture

We simply cannot understand organisational phenomena without considering culture both as a cause and as a way of explaining such phenomena.

Edgar H. Schein (1985: 311)

As this research takes a look at the human-nature dichotomy or in more explicit terms; culture-nature relations, there is a need to provide a brief explanation of culture. Definitions and daily uses of this term are so diverse and ambiguous that the boundaries of what is meant by culture in this study should be defined. There is a large and growing amount of research in which scholars from different disciplines attempt to explore culture. Many of these works are concerned with explaining the notion of culture through modelling it. These models aim at making sense of how and why we behave the ways we do in the context of our relationship with cultural-natural world. However, neither these models nor rigid definitions of culture say much about what it really is. Culture does not have certain borders that distinguish it from nature. Culture and nature are in continuous interaction, affecting each other and evolving together. In fact we can define this iterative process as the essence of culture.

As indicated by Pahl-Wostl et al. (2008: 488) “Culture is a context dependent system with shared symbols and meanings, norms and expectations”. A bottom-up, inductive and context-based approach to culture can shed more light on this concept rather than adopting a universal deductive model of culture to be applied to all different social contexts and situations (ibid.).

Before presenting some of the outlines of the notion of culture in this study, there is a need to mention some definitions that underline its magnitude, the connections it has with nature, and the important roles it plays in human-human and human-nature interactions. According to Grudykunst and Ting-Toomey
(1988: 27) “Cultures link individuals to the ecological settings that they live in”. Pahl-Wostl et al. (2006), on the other hand, define culture as a coherent system of recognising, rationalising, evaluating, and prescribing. This definition underlines how culture affects every aspect of life. Evernder points at the control obsessed culture of the industrial societies as the roots of the environmental problems that we face today (as cited in Jensen 2004: 115). Evernder concludes that “As members of the twentieth century industrial societies, and as functionaries of technological thought, what we fear most is the loss of control (or at least the illusion of control)” (ibid.).

Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck (1961:11) propose some questions to explore culture which are as follows:

1. What is the character of innate human nature? (human-nature orientation);
2. What is the relation of human to nature and supernature? (nature-human orientation);
3. What is the temporal focus on human life? (time orientation);
4. What is the modality of human activity? (activity orientation);
5. What is the modality of human-human relations? (relational orientation).

Even though these questions are all complementary in the way they aspire to explore culture, the second one is more relevant for this research. Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck (1961:11) propose at least three briefly defined types of human-nature relationship for answering the question: What is the relation of human to nature and super nature? These are as follows:

- **Mastery over nature** in which all natural resources should be put to use for humans such as in the Western culture;
- **Harmony with nature** in which no distinction exists between human and nature such as in the Chinese tradition;
- **Subjugation to nature** in which nothing can be done to control nature such as the Native American culture.
The questions posed by Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck aim at addressing the complexity and interconnectedness of culture, instead of classifying it according to some rigid definitions. Rather than such fixed definitions based on certain cultural assumptions on culture, the cultural framework approach provides a more flexible understanding of this concept. “Cultural frameworks refer to more long-lasting enduring frames of collectives of social groups. What is important to point out is that cultural frames become manifest in norms, routines and social practices and more than simply cognitive structures, ideas and ideals” (Pahl-Wostl 2007: 488).

According to Tabara (2002: 73) cultural frameworks have four dimensions:

1. A perceptivity: Cultural frameworks select those elements of reality to which collective attention should be given. In this way, they emphasize what is important to observe, as well as what should be broadened, reduced, remembered or forgotten from public or individual consciences.

2. A rationality: Cultural frameworks provide a structure to evaluate what is logical and illogical, and simultaneously, they provide a system of meaning to interpret reality. In this way, a cultural framework makes it possible to explain by rational means the causes and the consequences of certain phenomena or processes.

3. A morality: They provide value judgements about what is morally right or wrong from a selected part of reality.

4. A prescriptivity: They prescribe, implicitly or explicitly, the desirable and undesirable aspects of possible courses of action, and at the same time they propose and put into prescriptions about how every situation should be handled.
In parallel with the dimensions proposed by Tàbara and Pahl-Wostl (2007), Pahl-Wostl et al. (2008: 488) indicate that cultural frameworks work for fulfilling four functions: i) uncovering or covering a given reality, ii) making sense of this reality, iii) providing value judgements, and iv) giving recommendations about how to deal with the given reality.

3.6. Power & transition theory

Weber (1946: 180) defines power as “the chance of a man or a number of men to realise their own will in a communal action even against the resistance of others who are participating the action”. According to Russell’s (1938: 36) classification power has three forms: power over other humans, power among the non-human living beings and power over non-livings. In the view of Russell, the difference between these mentioned power relations is in terms of what is being controlled or over what/who the power is.

Evernden (as cited in Jensen 2004: 115) also indicates that the modern conception of nature or achieving knowledge of nature is the root of our control obsession. The notions of knowledge and control have become subtly intermingled. He concludes that establishing larger control over nature is achieved through building knowledge about it. Evernden argues that this type of knowledge has an intention to build hegemony over the others whether other humans or the non-humans. It is not simply curiosity. Knowledge is transformed into power to either dominate or to resist to being dominated.

Laclau (2001) indicates that even though the existing power relations in the society are rearranged and reconstructed due to emerging attempts to challenge and change them, the power maintains its privileged place in the human organisation. Mills (1956: 171) proposes that “All politics is a struggle for power: the ultimate kind of power is violence” (as cited in Bell 2001: 52).
Mills also adds:

Surely in our time we need not argue that, in the last resort, coercion is the final form of power. But we are by no means constantly at the last resort. Authority (power justified by the beliefs of the voluntarily obedient) and manipulation (power wielded unbeknown to the powerless) must also be considered, along with coercion (as cited in Kreisberg 1992: 42).

At the group level, which transition studies mostly concentrate on, power is aspired by the aggrieved groups affected or limited by the practices of power groups whose hegemony is based on the dominant organisational system and culture. Empowerment of the aggrieved groups is a process dependent on very many conditions that are related to both them and the power groups. Empowerment is a purposive and goal-oriented project. It has its specific ideology to challenge, change and even overthrow the dominant system or the regime. Empowerment might cause transition or backlashes, but all transitions are a result of empowerment of the ones that are adversely affected by the existing system.

Research on transition diversified under different terms: technological revolutions (Perez 2003), regime change or transformation (Van de Poel 2003), socio-technical transition (Geels 2002, 2005; Berkhout et al. 2004), transition or system innovations (Elzen et al. 2004; Smiths & Kuhlman 2004; Geels 2005; Geels & Schot 2007) and transition management (Rotmans et al. 2001; Van der Brugge et al. 2005). The use of the transition concept in this research is in line with the research of Rotmans et al. (2000), Rotmans et al. (2004), Geels (2005), and Geels and Schot (2007).

Transition is a structural change in the way a societal system operates. A transition is a long-term process resulting from co-evolution and alliance of cultural, institutional, economical, ecological and technological developments at various levels (Geels & Schot 2007).
According to Geels and Schot (2007) transitions have three dimensions:

1. Multi-level actors and developments (who/what);
2. Interactions between these actors (how);
3. Timing of these interactions (when).

First, we start by taking a look at the question of who/what; multi-level actors and developments. “Transition actors are from different domains such as finance and capital (insurance firms and banks), supply chain (material, component and machine suppliers), research (university, research institutes, and R&D labs.), users, production (firms, engineers, and designers), public authority (supranational such as European Commission, WTO, GATT) and societal groups (environmental NGOs, media). These groups (re)create and maintain the socio-technical systems” (Geels 2005: 683). Each of them has its own distinctive features. They are interdependent and interacting with each other (ibid.).

Figure 9 illustrates the multi-level concept regarding the actors and developments in the transition process (Van der Brugge, Rotmans & Loorbach 2005). Developments take place at micro-level (niche-innovations), meso-level (socio-technical regimes), and macro-level (socio-technical landscape). The socio-technical regime (meso-level) is defined by shared cognitive routines in an engineering community. However, the socio-technical regime concept includes also a larger community including scientists, policy-makers, users and special-interest groups, and the alignment between their activities. The regime sooner or later “stabilises the existing trajectories through various ways: cognitive routines that make engineers blind to developments out of their focus, regulations and standards, adaptation of lifestyles to technical systems, sunk investments in machines, infrastructures and competencies” (Geels & Schot 2007: 399-400).
Technological niches constitute the *micro-level* where radical novelties emerge. These innovations are initially unstable socio-technical configurations that occur with low frequency. They are carried out by small networks of dedicated actors. The socio-technical landscape refers to the exogenous environment beyond the direct influence of niche and regime actors. Macro-economics, deep cultural patterns, macro-political developments constitute the socio-technical landscape and are the components of macro-level. Socio-technical landscapes are about technical, physical and material backdrop that sustains society. Factors that either almost do not change or change only slowly such as the climate; long-term changes such as the German industrialisation in the late 19th century; and rapid external shocks such as wars all can fit in a single landscape category. The common point in all of them is that they cannot be influenced by actors in the short term (Geels & Schot 2007). What makes a transition is that the developments from different domains at different levels positively reinforce each other (Rotmans et al. 2000).

Second, we explore the question of *how* by taking a brief look into interactions between multi-level actors and developments. Figure 10 illustrates the transition processes at multiple levels: (a) niche-innovations build up internal momentum through learning processes, improvements and support from powerful groups, (b) changes at the macro-level (socio-technical landscape) create pressure on the
existing regime, and (c) destabilisation of the regime opens windows of opportunity for niche-innovations.

The alignment of these processes enables the emergence of novelties in mainstream markets where they compete with the existing regime. Perception of niche actors and the size of support networks influenced by landscape and broader regime define the momentum of the niche-innovations.

**Figure 10: Multi-level perspective on transitions**

Third, we look at dimension of *timing* of interactions between different developments/actors at multi-levels. Different timings of multi-level interactions produce different outcomes. In particular, the timing of the landscape pressures on
the existing regime with regard to the niche-developments is of great importance. These pressures might push the regimes to open windows of opportunity for niche groups. However, depending on the level of development of niche groups, transition would follow different pathways. In particular, involvement of the powerful actors strengthens the probability of the emergence of niche-developments (Geels & Schot 2007: 405).

Geels and Schot (2007) developed four different pathways of transition: transformation, reconfiguration, technological substitution, and de-alignment/re-alignment. Also, a fifth proposition is made for demonstrating how transitions may start with one path and evolve into others (See table 4).

These pathways are not deterministic. The sequences of events presented in them neither follow each other automatically, nor have to be successful. Besides, a transition can start as one of the presented pathways and evolve into another within time. However, transition pathways provide a framework for understanding complex transition processes.

Niche-innovations have either a competitive or symbiotic relationships with the existing regime. In competitive relationships, niche-developments aim at a regime replacement. In symbiotic relationships, they aim at problem solving and improvements in the existing regime (Geels & Schot 2007: 406).
Table 4: Transition pathways

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Transition Pathway</th>
<th>Timing (When)</th>
<th>Main actors/developments (Who/What) &amp; Type of (inter)actions (How)</th>
<th>Key words</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transformation</td>
<td>Moderate landscape pressures (disruptive change) at a moment when niche innovations have not yet been sufficiently developed</td>
<td>External actors/developments (societal pressure groups &amp; social movements) voice criticism by translating landscape pressures and drawing attention to negative externalities which regime actors tend to neglect. Although not immediately, regime actors modify the direction of development paths and innovation activities. Social institutional dynamics and evolutionary dynamics reinforce each other. If the distance between the regime knowledge and the external knowledge is not too large, niche-innovations add to the regime without disrupting the basic regime architecture.</td>
<td>Outside pressure, institutional power struggles, negotiations, adjustment of regime rules</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>De-alignment/re-alignment</td>
<td>Large and sudden (divergent) landscape change causing major regime problems when niche innovations have not yet been sufficiently developed</td>
<td>Regime actors lose faith in the regime due to increasing internal problems (regime destruction, collapses, erodes, de-aligns) caused by avalanche landscape change. Such environment leads to de-alignment and erosion of the regime. If there is no niche development sufficiently developed, then there is no clear substitute. This opens a window of opportunities for the emergence of multiple niche innovations (carried out by outsiders or diversifying regime actors) that either co-exist or compete. Eventually one of them becomes dominant and forms the core for re-alignment of a new regime.</td>
<td>Erosion or collapse, multiple novelties, prolonged uncertainty and changing interpretations, new winner and re-stabilisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technological substitution</td>
<td>Large and sudden landscape pressures when niche innovations have been sufficiently developed</td>
<td>Radical innovations develop in niches but remain stuck due to stability and entrenched regime. Regime actors pay little attention to niche-innovations and believe that problems can be solved with incremental innovations. Without landscape pressure, the regime remains the same until a specific shock opens a technological substation pathway for niche-developments. They have already gathered internal momentum and taken the form of niche-accumulation. If the innovation replaces the old technology, this might lead to knock-on effects and wider regime changes.</td>
<td>Market competition and power struggles between the old and new firms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reconfiguration</td>
<td>Independent from the landscape pressures, when regime adopts niche-developments to solve local problems</td>
<td>Niche-innovations (aiming at improving the regime) are initially adopted as an add-on or component replacement in the system to solve local scaled problems. These adoptions are often driven by economic considerations, such as the improvement of performance, that do not need a change in the regime rules. These innovations might subsequently lead to changes in technology, user practices, perceptions and search heuristics. They trigger further adjustments in the basic architecture of the regime. A new regime grows out of an old one.</td>
<td>Cumulative component changes due to economic and functional reasons, followed by new combinations, changing interpretations &amp; new practices</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from Geels and Schot (2007: 414)
Transition is the process of change in the state of a system from a stage of dynamic equilibrium to another. This evolution is non-linear and influenced by a multitude of interlinked forces. Rotmans et al. (2001) explain this process through four different stages: predevelopment, take-off, acceleration, and stabilisation (See figure 11).

**Figure 11: Stages in a human system transition**

![Graph showing stages of transition](source: Rotmans et al. (2001))

In the predevelopment phase, there are no visible changes in the dominant regime and its power situation. After the take-off, a rapid societal change process starts and maintains until it reaches another situation where the speed of change decreases again. Transitions can be stimulated by endogenous or exogenous forces. However, usually they are the result of collaboration of agents which create ‘niches’ of regimes and alternative organisation patterns opposed to the dominant ones (Geels 2002; Van der Brugge et al. 2005).

This transition can be monitored and assessed by a set of system indicators. In the predevelopment phase, these indicators change only marginally. In the take-off and acceleration phases, the indicators change with an increasing speed. In the stabilisation phase, a new equilibrium is reached. Transition takes place at the micro level, meso level and macro level. Macro level is defined by changes in
macro economy, politics, population dynamics, natural environment, culture and
worldviews. Meso level is defined as regimes as patterns of institutions, rules and
norms of social and economic activities. Micro level is defined by the transition in
individual actors, alternative technologies and local practices (Geels 2002; Van
der Brugge et al. 2005).

In the predevelopment phase, the regime often seeks to keep its existing social
norms, beliefs and practices. When developments take place mostly at the micro
and macro levels, take-off phase starts. Changes at the macro level, such as
change in worldviews or macro policies, reinforce certain innovations at the micro
level such as policy or technology. During the interactions between the micro and
the macro level (the period between predevelopment and take-off), different
developments and perspectives come together to form a consistent and stronger
paradigm. This appears as a polarisation between the existing and the emerging
paradigm. At this point, the regime tries to integrate innovations to avoid or end
the polarisation at the micro level. This is a crucial period since the uncertainties
and risks of chaos are high. There is a need for feedbacks from the integration
practices and experiences at the micro level for the regime to maintain itself as it
is by then or to go into further innovations. The lack of such feedback can cause a
drawback or a lock-in situation. Then, the acceleration phase constitutes the
period in which the flow of capital, knowledge and technology is enabled until it
reaches the next stabilisation level, with another regime and a new understanding
of norms and common practices. The regime changes as a result self-evaluation in
response to pressure from the micro-level to the macro-level and pressure from
the macro-level to the micro-level. During the stabilisation period, the new regime
slows down the acceleration of changes triggered by pressures between micro and
macro levels by showing resistance to innovations and new developments (Geels
2002; Van der Brugge et al. 2005).

At the same time, transitions can fail or be successful. After the take-off such new
emerging regimes can overtake the old ones or not. Indeed even the whole system
if it does not adapt to the new situation and system conditions may eventually collapse (See figure 11).

**Figure 12: Possible pathways of transitions**

![Diagram showing possible pathways of transitions](image)

Source: Rotmans et al. 2001 and Rotmans (2005)

This is why transition management is of such importance in the acceleration phase. Transitions can be influenced by public policy and management in order to avoid system breakdown.
3.7. Approaches to water management: Water paradigms

The hydraulic paradigm, hydro-hegemony and participative water management are water paradigms which are observed in the two cases of this research. A paradigm is a conceptual framework or model of perceived reality from a viewpoint of a particular collective awareness. It is an overarching set of assumptions, concepts, values, principles, perspectives and practices that constitute a particular view of reality.

Cotgrove (1982: 27) points out that a dominant paradigm is “not in the statistical sense of being held by most people, but in the sense that it is the paradigm held by dominant groups in industrial societies; and in the sense that it serves to legitimise and justify the institutions and practices of a market economy…. it is the taken-for-granted common-sensical view which usually determines the outcome of debates on environmental issues” (as cited in Milbrath 1989: 117). According to Cotgrove (1982) a paradigm functions in accordance to its ideology. The struggle to expand and universalise a paradigm constitutes a large part of power struggle. The agents of each paradigm communicate with each other in a spirit of exasperation with mutual incomprehension (ibid.). Cotgrove states:

It is because protagonists of the debate approach issues from different cultural context, which generate different and conflicting implicit meanings, that there is mutual exasperation and charges and counter charges of irrationality and unreason. What is sensible from one point of view is nonsense from another. It is the implicit, self-evident, taken-for-granted character of paradigms which clogs the channels of communication (as cited in Milbrath 1989: 117).

Perlmutter and Trist (1986) argue that:

A paradigm expresses a self-consistent world view, a social construction of reality widely shared and taken for granted by the members of a
society, most of whom are aware only to a limited extent of the underlying logic, which is implicit rather than explicit in what they feel and think and in the courses of action they undertake. A paradigm provides, as it were, the medium in which they exist and tends to become explicit only when the need for a new overall perspective arises through increasing dysfunction in the prevailing paradigm (as cited in Milbrath 117).

Changing social-ecological conditions cause dysfunctions in the dominant paradigms. All prevailing paradigms come to an end in which they do not serve anymore. New paradigms emerge from new conditions. Conflict takes place between the old and the new paradigms. Milbrath (1989) provides the outlines of two major competing paradigms and their characteristic features in modern industrial societies (See table 5). The Dominant Social Paradigm (DSP) represents also the hydraulic paradigm and hydrohegemony, while the New Environmental Paradigm (NWP) represents participative approaches to water management.

These two conflicting paradigms show the unquestioned and self-evident assumptions related to social-ecological phenomena. These beliefs define, justify and legitimise the ways we:

- approach and relate to society and nature;
- construct our patterns of production and consumption;
- define problems stemming from these production and consumption patterns;
- create solutions to these problems.
Table 5: Contrast between competing paradigms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>New Environmental Paradigm (NWP)</th>
<th>Dominant Social Paradigm (DSP)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1. High valuation over nature</strong></td>
<td><strong>1. Lower valuation on nature</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nature for its own sake</td>
<td>use of nature to produce goods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>holistic-relationship between humans &amp; nature</td>
<td>human domination of nature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>environmental protection over economic growth</td>
<td>economic growth over environmental protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2. Generalised compassion toward</strong></td>
<td><strong>2. Compassion only for those near and dear</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>other species</td>
<td>exploitation of other species for human needs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>other peoples</td>
<td>lack of concern for other people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>future generations</td>
<td>concern for this generation only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3. Careful plans and actions to avoid risk</strong></td>
<td><strong>3. Risk acceptable for maximising wealth</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>science and technology not always good</td>
<td>science &amp; technology a great boon to humans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>halt to further development of nuclear power</td>
<td>swift development of nuclear power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>development and use of soft technology</td>
<td>emphasis on hard technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>government regulation to protect nature &amp; humans</td>
<td>de-emphasis on regulation-use of the market- individual responsibility for risk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>4. Limits to growth</strong></td>
<td><strong>4. No limits to growth</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>resources shortages</td>
<td>no resource shortages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>increased needs of an exploding population</td>
<td>no problem with population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>conservation</td>
<td>production and consumption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>5. Completely new society</strong></td>
<td><strong>5. Present society okay</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>serious damage by humans to nature &amp; themselves</td>
<td>no serious damage to nature by humans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>openness and participation</td>
<td>hierarchy and efficiency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>emphasis on public goods</td>
<td>emphasis on market</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cooperation</td>
<td>competition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>simple lifestyles</td>
<td>complex and fast lifestyles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>emphasis on worker satisfaction</td>
<td>emphasis on jobs for economic needs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>6. New politics</strong></td>
<td><strong>6. Old politics</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>consultation and participation</td>
<td>determination by experts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>emphasis on foresight and planning</td>
<td>emphasis on market control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>willingness to use direct action</td>
<td>opposition to direct action-use of normal channels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>new party structure along a new axis</td>
<td>left-right party axis - argument over ownership of means of production</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Milbrath (1989: 119)

In the water domain, conflict takes place between the old water paradigms namely hydraulic paradigm and hydro-hegemony, and the emerging participative approaches to water management. A result of this conflict is a shift from the old to the new paradigm. Hydraulic paradigm and hydro-hegemony are two dominant paradigms which are important for exploring and understanding the two case studies of this research.
3.7.1. Hydraulic paradigm

Hydraulic paradigm defines water as a mere resource which should be available to meet human needs and should not be subjected to restrictions. Therefore, it can be extracted, transported, and used like any other resource by means of water infrastructures and technologies as a main management strategy to cover water demand.

This management approach does not take into consideration the social and environmental aspects of water. Hydraulic paradigm reflects a reductionist understanding of water. It deals with water as if it were simple liquid. Water is not treated as a whole at river basin scale.

According to Saurí and Del Moral (2001: 353) the hydraulic paradigm represents a form of “state managerialism”. According to this paradigm, state’s mission of modernisation of the country is to be achieved through water infrastructures such as irrigation networks, canals and dams. It is so, particularly in developing countries where “water plays a strategic role for the reproduction of the state through social and ideological legitimisation” (ibid.).

“At the pinnacle of the state hydraulic paradigm stands the dam-as-icon” (Bakker 2003: 23). Dam is a symbol of state power and control. Adverse impacts of big hydraulic infrastructures are often eliminated and not taken into consideration. Once it is decided, they are realised at any environmental, social and even economic costs (ibid.).

Hydraulic paradigm water management does not allow much space for public participation. Decisions are taken in a top down manner by technocratic-bureaucratic organisations. Water resources are managed by centralist structures with nationalist concerns. This centralist approach does not permit much autonomy at local and regional levels. When a national interest is at stake, the local and the regional interests are to be sacrificed.
Natural phenomena such as drought can be explained in a reductionist way as “structural deficit between the water demand and water regulation capacity” (Del Moral & Giansante 2002: 93). Irregular or low precipitation can be defined with some terms such as ‘erratic’, ‘naturally unbalanced’ or even as ‘natural injustice’ at times. These terms and expressions appear most often in hydrology plans at national scale and hydraulic projects proposals which attempt to fix those so-called problematic natural phenomena.

One particular hydraulic paradigm which marked water development in many countries is the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) model. This water paradigm can be accepted as one of the pillars of the nation-state pro-development ideology. TVA was established in 1933 as a major experiment in large scale planning to trigger development in one of the most destitute regions of the United States. TVA model proposes “subordination of nature and humans to higher state ideals; progress and development” (Molle 2006: 8). The river basin is the planning unit for wider comprehensive regional development.

Scott (1998) indicates that TVA became the “grand-daddy of all regional development projects” in a few years (as cited in Molle 2006: 8). Molle states:

Its initial ideological underpinning… rested on the engineering ethos that scientific knowledge and systematic rational planning could radically change society if they could emancipate themselves from vested interests and politics. The TVA would not only attempt to ‘fully’ control the river system by a series of dams, thus providing protection from floods and producing hydropower but would also tackle poverty at the root by an ambitious range of activities including training, agricultural extension services, production of fertilizers, stimulation of local enterprises and welfare-oriented programmes on education, health and sanitation (ibid.: 8-9).
With its democratic ethos, TVA model was made “a new export commodity” in Cold War politics (ibid.). Molle (2006: 12) gives Truman’s (1949) *Inaugural Address* as an example to a call for this ethos: “We must embark on a bold new programme for making the benefits of our scientific advance and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas.”

Molle (2006: 12) also argues that “most third world elites were all too eager to accept the offer and to spread modernism and progress to their newly independent countries, while intensifying their legitimacy. Within a few years, plans for TVA-like river basin development plans mushroomed all around the world”.

The fashionable concepts of the TVA model such as integrated river basin development and development schemes were reflected and even fuelled by several international meetings such as the Panel of Experts on Integrated River Basin Development of 1958 and 1970, and Interregional Seminar on River Basin and Inter Basin Development in 1976. Instilling social and economic development through massive and coordinated public investment was attractive to the governments because it was part of nation building and embodied national pride and faith in modernism, while bringing legitimacy to the state. It also appealed to the donors and development banks, as well as to construction firms associated with them because river basin projects held the promise of concrete and large-scale changes, while minimising project management costs. They suited a developmental ethos based on capital and technological transfer (ibid.).

### 3.7.2. Hydro-hegemony

Hegemony is the power of control with different degrees ranging from hard power to soft power where the desired behaviour is so internalised that there is no need for enforcement. Soft power is applied through controlling ideas through propaganda and education. This enables the hegemon to persuade the non-
hegemon to accept not just his/her authority but also adopt and internalise his/her values and norms, impose his/her problem definition and solution over all others.

“Hydro-hegemony” (Zeitoun & Warner 2006) is about using water resources as control tool over the others. According to Zeitoun and Warner, hydro-hegemony has multiple levels: local, national, regional and even global. They define, in this power game, three types of social actors interacting: a) the state; b) power groups with a vested interest in capturing a water resource; and c) people such as the locals to be affected and environmental activists etc.

According to Warner (2008: 274) the state is often in competition with non-state actors, such as the paramilitary groups, warlords and private security services. To expand its control through development, the state can use “irrigation hydropower projects to push through a land reform. This way, it can entrench feudal relations. Hydraulic infrastructures bring water to clients but can also be taken at will. It is essentially a distribution and dependency strategy in which loyalty is bought for favours (material incentives) and the credibility of a threat depends on the perception of the availability to withhold the favour” (ibid.).

Warner (2008: 276) states that the hydraulic mission promises prosperity and for achieving this, the state would need to ensure full control of the territory. Development projects help the state to expand their control on the hinterlands. He adds that also other hegemons want to buy off discontent by offering incentives in the forms of loan or gift. However, there is a hidden motive in this calculated generosity. Offering cooperation and bearing gifts create obligation on the accepting party (ibid.)

Warner (2008: 277-278) points to “the growing hegemony of market-led developments on the world water resources”. In the 1990s, French, British and American water companies “expanded their ambitions by negotiating with developing countries” (ibid.). Hall indicates that “the expansion of the private water companies in the 1990s was supported by the World Bank and other
international institutions as part of policies to transform developing and transition countries into more market-oriented economies” (Hall 2005: 15). “They formed alliance with construction companies and investment banks secure their position in projects” (Warner 2008: 277). However, for “eliminating the risk factor they required the support of states and multilateral institutions. This established a successful alliance of fractions of international capital and states pursuing hegemony of the global market” (ibid.: 278).

According to Warner (2008) international organisations and multi-nationals act as trans-nationalised hegemonic actors on the natural resources of the developing world. They offer attractive discourses to these countries claiming that institutional reform will bring peace and prosperity to the privatising regions, if they go with the passive revolution towards the global model (ibid.).

3.7.3. Holistic and participative approaches to water management

Water problems of the modern world can not be solved through the sole guidance of hydraulic and technocratic understandings of water management. Water has multiple uses, meanings and values. It is not a mere chemical component. It is the total sum of the globe’s rivers, ground waters, seas, lakes, lagoons, all forms of precipitation, humidity, and a large percent of plants, animals, humans and other life forms. When water’s socially constructed meanings and values are added to such magnitude, the water issues become more complicated.

Despite this complexity and increasing awareness about it, modern water management still is very much driven by the hydraulic paradigm that sees water as a substance independent of its social-ecological context. About the reductionism in general Ravetz (2004: 350) indicates that it “assumes the complex systems to be capable of being taken apart, studied in their elements and then reassembled”. In water management, the reductionist approaches have not only failed in creating solutions but also added new problems to the existing ones.
Water problems cannot be solved without taking into people at the core of the solutions. People should be involved at every step of water management. Public participation is a two way communication and collaboration with the goal of achieving better and more acceptable decisions regarding water management. Public participation aims at preventing or minimising the disputes by creating a process for resolving issues before they become more complex and difficult.

According to Van Kerkhoff and Lebel (2006: 459) enhancing public participation has been touted as crucial for informed decision-making and taking action toward sustainability for several reasons:

- Gaining access to alternative, less easily available, sources of knowledge relevant to solving particular problems;
- Building support for decisions by addressing common problems and resolving disputes;
- Mobilising resources and share management responsibility for actions;
- Developing agency, organisation, or community capacity.

Van Kekhoff and Lebel (2006: 460) also indicate that “participatory approaches have challenged the dominance of natural sciences and economics as foundations for decision-making and have demonstrated that innovative relationships can generate innovative solutions to sustainability challenges”. The importance of public participation in governance has been increasingly pronounced since the 1970s.

Public participation is also defined in Stockholm Declaration (1972) Principle 1 as a fundamental human right to learn about environmental issues concerning people’s lives. Following that, Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration (1992) is about the importance of public participation and its notion:

Environmental issues are best handled with the participation of all concerned citizens, at the relevant level. At the national level, each individual shall have appropriate access to information concerning the
environment that is held by public authorities, including information on hazardous materials and activities in their communities, and the opportunity to participate in decision-making processes. States shall facilitate and encourage public awareness and participation by making information widely available. Effective access to justice and administrative proceedings, including redress and remedy, shall be provided.

The Aarhus Convention (1998), in particular Article 8, also aims at fostering public participation in the process of preparation by public authorities of executive regulations and other generally applicable legally binding rules that may cause significant environmental changes. In Article 9 the Convention promotes access to justice in three contexts:

- Reviewing procedures with respect to information requests;
- Reviewing procedures with respect to specific (project-type) decisions which are subject to public participation requirements;
- Challenging to breaches of environmental law in general. Thus the inclusion of an “access to justice” pillar not only underpins the first two pillars; it also points the way to empowering citizens and NGOs to assist in the enforcement of the law.

In the water management domain, attempts for an early unified protection of fresh water resources began with European Water Legislation (1975) which consisted of some standards for rivers and lakes used for drinking water. In 1980 binding quality targets for drinking water were defined. The main emission control element was the Dangerous Substances Directive. The need for developing more comprehensive European water legislation was already pronounced in 1988. These developments resulted in a publication and an entry that came into force in 22.11.2000 which is called Water Framework Directive (EU-WFD).
This Directive set the following key aims (EU-WFD 2000):

- Water management at basin level;
- Achieving ‘good status’ for all waters by a set deadline;
- Expanding the scope of water protection to all water, i.e. surface waters and groundwater;
- Combined approach of emission limit values and quality standards, getting the prices right;
- Fostering more citizen involvement;
- Streamlining legislation.

The EU-WFD has brought two crucial aspects for sustainable water management:

1. A holistic and trans-boundary approach towards rivers defining them as a whole body, rather than an administrative or political entity;

2. The promotion of participative approach to water management.

The EU-WFD emphasises the importance of the management of a whole river basin as an ecological, geographical and hydrological unit. It indicates that in an analysis and a plan of a river basin ecological protection, chemical protection, chemical status and quantity of groundwater and surface water and all other elements should be taken into consideration. The EU-WFD also promotes, in a river basin management, taking into consideration the socio-economic and biophysical characteristics of a river based on human activities.

That is why an economic analysis of water use in a river basin should be carried out from various institutional, social and cultural perspectives. Creating and maintaining sustainability in water domain requires such holistic approach. This also enables a discussion that includes communities to be affected by the decisions about the river basin management. The EU-WFD states that it is essential that all interested parties are fully involved in discussion, and take active roles in planning of the river basin management as members of a whole society which is the public participation.
The EU-WFD focuses on constructing ways for increasing the quality and quantity of public participation. There is great diversity of stakeholders with different interests in water in the river basins. Therefore, according to EU-WFD:

In order to form an applicable plan for river basins, all stakeholder opinions and interests should be defined for achieving the objectives of the EU-WFD. A common set of actions can only be defined by dialogue between a variety of stakeholders and their flexibility for compromising. As an addition to this, the implementation of the WFD depends very much on the acceptance from the public. Consulting public on the decisions regarding their own lives would create transparency that would make the steps to be faster and smoother (ibid.).

In addition, the EU-WFD has a particular approach to water that sees water as not a mere commercial product but as heritage which should be protected, defended and treated as such. However, the new EU water law also promotes the use of economic instruments to realise environmental objectives. Article 9 of the EU-WFD obliges the EU member states to ensure by 2010 that water-pricing policies recover the costs of water services and provide adequate incentives for the sustainable use of water resources to thereby contribute to the environmental objectives of this Directive (EU-WFD 2000).

According to United Nations Environment Programme - Division of Early Warning and Assessment (UNEP/DEWA) (2004) although water is recognised as a public good, in the last two decades water services have been under enormous pressures from privatisation and market liberalisation. In 1977 in the first major United Nations conference on water resources which was held in Argentina, it was stated that everyone has the right of access to drinking water in quantities and quality equal to their basic needs. This right was also re-mentioned in chapter 18 of the Agenda 21. However, some water companies all around the world took advantage of the fashion for privatisation which started in the 1990s. Today, about five percent of the global fresh water resources are privatised (UNEP/DEWA
2004). The water sector has enormous potential for the few multi-national corporations dominating the water market (ibid.).

Parallel to the global privatisation trends, in the International Conference on Water and the Environment (1992) known also as the Dublin Principles, water was defined as an economic entity. A similar concept was adopted at the 3rd World Water Forum (2000). This economic approach contradicts with other statements on water mentioned in the 4th P7 Summit Declaration (2000) that advocates the right of access to water since water is the basis of sustenance and life (UNEP/DEWA 2004).

A growing number of civil society organisations and peoples demand that access to drinking water should be recognised as a universal human right, in order to ensure that everyone can benefit from water resources. These social movements against water exploitation in the hands of private corporations aim for more participative governance of water.
CHAPTER IV
SPAIN & TURKEY IN NATIONAL CONTEXT

4.1. Spain
   Social and political context
   Evolution of water policy & management

4.2. Turkey
   Social and political context
   Evolution of water policy & management
CHAPTER IV: SPAIN AND TURKEY IN NATIONAL CONTEXT

Spain and Turkey are countries at the two ends of the Mediterranean. Recently, due to many factors related to global environmental change, water problems in both countries have become more acute. The traditional technocratic approaches dominant in both countries have only added to the water problem. As a result of this, now Spain is the country with the highest number of dams per capita in Europe, while Turkey follows right after it.

The Spanish New Water Culture (NWC) and the Turkish water movement emerged as a response to unsustainable governance practices regarding natural and cultural resources (e.g. land, energy, natural and historical heritage) as well as water. Both movements were born from large scale threats known as the National Hydrological Plan (NHP) 2001 of Spain and the 5th World Water Forum (WWF) held in Turkey. The threats were rapidly converted by some social movement organisations into opportunities for multi-level and multi-domain alliance formation aiming at changing unsustainable governance in water domain.

Furthermore, the Spanish NWC movement has influenced other transition movements in different parts of the world such as in the case of the NWC movement of the Latin American countries and the European Declaration for a New Water Culture. The water movement in Turkey represents a counter response to the alliance that was built between the global water privatisation lobby and the current government Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP) for the occasion of the 5th World Water Forum held in Istanbul in 16-22.03.2009. Successful local movements such as the anti-Ilısu Dam movement joined to this national scale mobilisation. The water movement in Turkey has built alliances with parallel movements from various parts of the world such as the NWC from Spain and the South American countries. This alliance is where the two movements from Spain and Turkey meet and a type of transnational social learning process is taking place between social movement organisations of the world.
In the first two sections, I provide brief information on the social and political contexts of Spain and Turkey. I, then, attempt to explore the evolution of water policy and management in the two countries in their historical contexts to understand the background of the social movements which took and are taking place at national scale in both countries.

4.1. Spain

Water issues form a significant portion of politics in Spain. The first river basin authority of the world - Confederación Hidrográfica de Ebro (CHE), meaning Ebro River Basin Authority - was established in 1926 in this country. At the beginning of the 20th century, similar to many other countries, rivers were of particular importance in terms of national economic development. Damming rivers was promoted as the key for regeneration of the country. During decades communities adversely affected by the direct and indirect impacts of these hydraulic infrastructures on their livelihoods could neither find the political means to be heard by authorities, nor be defined as victims of an environmental injustice and discrimination. In spite of some counter social mobilisations at local scale during long years, only in the last two decades different approaches regarding water management have gained gradually significant political power. Water politics has increasingly been an important part of political agenda. In the success of the current Spanish government, Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party16 (PSOE), the counter position they adopted against the National Hydrological Plan (NHP) 2001 with the growing social response to the threat posed by this plan, played a significant role. Taking a look at the history of Spanish water policy and governance does not only provide important insights and lessons about water sustainability, but also sheds light over the historical socio-political background of the New Water Culture (NWC) movement and the local social movements in it such as the anti-Itoiz Dam movement.

16 Partido Socialista Obrero Español
4.1.1. Social and political context

Spain is a western European country whose population is 46 million. The population growth rate is rather low (0.13 %) and a larger portion of the current birth rate rise is due to high birth rate among immigrants (INE 2008). Spain is divided into seventeen Autonomous Communities (See map 1). Ethnic groups in the country are as follows: Andalusians, Aragonese, Asturians, Basques, Cantabrians Castilians, Catalans, Leonese, Galicians, Valencians, and native Canarians. According to the 1978 Constitution, these groups are considered as peoples of Spain with their diverse culture, language, traditions and institutions.

Map 1: Autonomous Communities of Spain

Source: WIKIMEDIA (2009)
Spain is semi-arid. It is surrounded by the Mediterranean Sea in the east and the Atlantic Ocean in the west. This causes great variations in precipitation within its regions. While on the coasts of the Atlantic precipitation is high, in the inner regions and the Mediterranean coast it goes down to critical levels.

Spain has suffered from droughts in the recent years. The 2005 summer drought has been the worst during the last 60 years. This adds to the water scarcity problems in the country. Desertification level is at serious levels. 30% to 60% of its land faces a very high, high and medium risk of desertification. Fresh water resources in the country hardly meet the growing demand. According to the Global Resource Information Database (GRID) (2008) Spain is among the four most water stressed countries (Italy, Malta, Spain, and Cyprus) in Europe. Urban water consumption per capita in Spain is the highest among the other European countries.

Spanish economy has a large sector developed on agriculture. In line with that, the largest share in water use, seventy-five percent, belongs to the agriculture sector (INE 2008). Services and industry sectors constitute respectively fifteen and ten percent of the water use in the country (ibid.). In the period of 1996-2004 the domestic water use has grown thirty percent due to mainly tourism (HISPAGUA 2009). Extensive landscaping, swimming pools and golf courses are some of the typical tourist facilities that require large amount of water. The surface of a golf course is around one million cubic metres per year or the equivalent of the water consumption of a city of twelve million inhabitants (WWF 2004).

4.1.2. Evolution of water policy and management

In this section, I provide information about how the hydraulic water paradigm of Spain evolved into a more participative and integrated one. The local movements have played a significant role in this evolution. I, first, start with the beginning of the 20th century which was marked by the ‘regenerationism’ movement in water management in Spain, and go on exploring the extensions of this movement in the
following years of Francoism. Finally, I take a look at NWC movement which has evolved as a social response to the large scale threats posed by the NHP 2001; the last product of the Spanish hydraulic paradigm. This section also provides a brief outlook of the AGUA Programme developed as an alternative to the NHP 2001. The historical approach I follow in this section aims at explaining the socio-political background of the NWC movement and the anti-Itoiz Dam movement.

4.1.2.1. Regenerationism through rivers

By the end of the 19th century, Spain had already lost its last colonies. According to Saurí and Del Moral (2001: 355) “This aroused a deep sense of moral collapse requiring a drastic renovation for the Spanish identity”. Swyngedouw (1999) also indicates that faced with a mounting economic crisis, a growing social tension, a rising bourgeoisie and largely feudal social order, Spanish progressive cultural, professional and intellectual elites were in search for a way to revive or to regenerate the nation’s social and economic base. In the words Joaquín Costa (1975: 259), the one of main figures of the regenerationism movement, water policy had to become the expression of “all the economic policy that the nation must follow to redeem itself” (as cited in Saurí & Del Moral 2001: 355).

In the post-colonial era, Spanish economy was largely dependent on agriculture. The destiny of the national economy was left to precipitation of the country’s arid climate. Joaquín Costa and Macias Picavea who were the main figures in the preparation of the NHP 1902, proposed remedies based on irrigation to put an end to the precipitation dependent Spanish agriculture. “Costa dreamed of transforming a major part of the ‘dry’ Spain, predominantly cerealist, into a ‘green’ Spain, covered with fruit trees and furrowed by channels, where long caravans of agricultural products would arrive to the revitalised ports (Martínez-Baselga 1918 as cited in Torrecilla & Martínez-Gil 2005: 5). To him, water management was “a sublimation of the economic policy, through the agricultural policy” (Torrecilla & Martínez-Gil 2005: 5). With this plan Spain would revive its post-colonial economy and regenerate itself (Swyngedouw 1999).
The first three decades of the 20th century in the Spanish agriculture was shaped by the “regenerationism movement under the light of ideas of Costa” (Embid 2003: 400). The first autonomous river basin authority of the world, the Ebro Confederation, was also founded in this period. For this reason, Spain is accepted to be the first country in organising water management at a river basin level, while also involving in management the user participation (ibid.). Even in 1926, there were “confederaciones hidrograficas (water boards) which were public bodies initially charged with carrying out water works and later on management of water resources” (ibid.: 401).

According to Joaquín Costa, water in Spain was naturally distributed in an unbalanced way. This ‘natural error’ was the biggest obstacle in front of regenerating the Spanish economy. Therefore, it should be fixed. He proposed water transfers from the zones with abundance of water to the ones with water scarcity through canals and dams (Saurí & Del Moral 2001: 355). Costa declared the state as the responsible force for hydraulic constructions. Neither the big landowners who could rely on cheap labour, nor the small ones who were rather poor had the motivation or the resources to invest in more efficient technologies (ibid.). According to him “as the irrigation projects were beneficial to the whole country”, it was the state who had to plan and develop the construction of big dams and channels” (Fernandez-Clemente 2000 as cited in Torrecilla & Martínez-Gil 2005: 5).

Joaquín Costa proposed that the regenerationism movement should also be strengthened by social development projects (Torrecilla & Martínez-Gil 2005). He called for a land reform that would enable small landowners to be an alternative to big landowners. The Spanish agriculture should get over “the barrier created by the hegemony of big landowners and this would also mean education of small farmers at rural schools” (ibid.: 5).

The NHP 1933 of the Second Republic (1931-1936) also reflected Costa’s views on water such as ‘nature’s error’ in distribution of water. Nature and natural
hydrological regimes were seen as “hostile” and “wrong” (ibid.: 6). The water situation in Spain was defined as “natural injustice” (ibid.). This natural injustice was seen as responsible for creating social injustice, and water management should aim for correcting the naturally and spatially erratic distribution.

The Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) ended with the beginning of the dictatorship of Franco. During the four decades of Francoismo, the social dimension of regenerationism movement eroded rapidly. Regenerationism movement gained a largely technocratic character. In this period, according to Saurí & Del Moral (2001: 355), Spanish water policy became organised along three axes:

1. Water became an instrument of radical economic and spatial transformation. Through irrigation, vast dry lands would not only increase crop productivity but also the value of land.

2. The state would bear all costs of hydraulic infrastructure as well as taking responsibility for other aspects of rural development such as the creation of new settlements, and the provision of agricultural inputs and technological know how.

3. Ecological, the cultural, aesthetic and emotional dimensions of water would not be considered.

In the Francoist era, hydraulic paradigm grew fast. Franco’s government “soon started the transformation vast areas of dry land into irrigated crops, by means of large dams and irrigation channels. The incipient industrialisation of some areas demanded increasing amount of electricity, and some of the biggest dams were built for hydropower purposes” (Torrecilla & Martínez-Gil 2005: 6). With the construction of some 400 dams, Spain became one of those countries with the highest number of dams per capita in the world.
During this period, a rapid transition took place in river basin confederations. These confederations, which were originally locally managed, democratic, collective and participative, were abolished in 1942, and replaced by a technocratic-bureaucratic organisation whose only responsibility was to carry out national hydraulic works (Swyngedouw 1999). The river basin confederations became the technical organisations allocated by the State Hydraulic Works\textsuperscript{17} (DGOH). They were financed and directed by the nation-state. During the years of Francoismo, the DGOH became an extremely powerful state organ that had close associations with engineering offices, construction, cement, and electricity companies etc. (Swyngedouw 2007) who had direct interest in promoting more hydraulic constructions.

With the end of the dictatorship of Franco, Spanish democracy took a new route towards the European Union (EU). In this period, “the Spanish 1985 Water Act underlined the necessity of creating water plans on both on a basin and national level according to the needs of water concerned regions” (Saurí & Del Moral 2001: 356). It was “based on the ongoing hydraulic paradigm that sees hydraulic infrastructures as ‘power of man over nature’” (Torrecilla & Martínez-Gil 2005: 6). Torrecilla & Martínez-Gil (2005: 6-7) point at the expressions used in the 1985 Water Act; ‘unbalanced hydrological condition of Spain’, ‘deficitary and excedentary river basins’, and ‘general/national interest’ resembling Costa’s ideas.

**4.1.2.2. National Hydrological Plan (NHP) 2001**

The last NHP which was in line with the 1985 Water Act was approved officially in 2001. The NHP 2001 proposed an inter-basin water transfer of maximum of 1050 hm\textsuperscript{3}/yr from the lower Ebro River to the northern and southern Mediterranean coast of Spain. The NHP 2001 would allow the following maximum annual values to be transferred to different regions in Spain (See cartogram 2):

\textsuperscript{17} Central Dirección General de Obras Hidráulicas
• 190 hm³ to Catalonia in particular to the Province of Barcelona;
• 315 hm³ to Jucar in Valencia region;
• 450 hm³ to Segura in Murcia;
• 95 hm³ to Almeria.

Cartogram 2: Proposed water transfer in the NHP 2001

Source: Global Resource Information Database (GRID)

The NHP 2001 also included about 100 new dam constructions which would be constructed in the period of 2001-2008 for irrigating some 400 thousand ha land as well as water treatment plants, river canals and other infrastructures. The NHP 2001, immediately after its official declaration, started to receive a growing amount of criticism from large and diverse segments of society in Spain which later on were organised under the umbrella of the New Water Culture (NWC) movement.
### 4.1.2.3. The New Water Culture (NWC) movement

By the 1990s, a mounting number of hydraulic infrastructures on the rivers of Spain had already caused large social-ecological adverse impacts. Grievance of a growing number of dislocated people, increasing water pollution, shrinking wetlands and biodiversity resulted in the formation of numerous environmental justice organisations in Spain.

With the support of the Confederation of Organisations for Environmental Protection\(^1\) (CODA) and Greenpeace, the Association of People Affected by Big Reservoirs\(^2\) (COAGRET) was founded in 1995. COAGRET mobilised the communities directly or indirectly affected by dam constructions, some ecologist groups, and some academics to take an action against the cumulative social, cultural and ecological impacts of the hydraulic paradigm of the 20\(^{th}\) century.

This coalition led to a debate from which a series of alternative ideas for a better management of water were produced. These ideas and arguments were published under the title of the New Water Culture (NWC). With this publication, the NWC was pronounced for the first time. In 1998, after the 1\(^{st}\) Iberia Congress of Management and Planning of Waters in Zaragoza the necessity for a non-profit organisation to promote the New Water Culture was stated. This organisation would later be called as the NWC Foundation.

Local anti-dam movements in different parts of the country integrated with the NWC movement. The anti-Itoiz Dam movement was one of them. Among the other organisations that formed the NWC movement was the Platform for the Defence of the Mallos River basin established in Riglos in 1996. This platform was one of the many other social formations that stood against the activities of Hydrological Confederation of Ebro\(^3\) (CHE). They carried out activities to create

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\(^1\) Coordinadora de Organizaciones de Defensa Ambiental  
\(^2\) Coordinadora de Afectados por Grandes Embalses y Trasvases  
\(^3\) Confederación Hidrográfica del Ebro
social awareness about the threats of the NHP 2001 to the local economies and this area’s potential for eco-tourism.

The NWC movement came out as a response of a melange of organisations with both ecologist and justice concerns. The CODA, Greenpeace, the COAGRET and other interested agents such as farmers and others coming from academic circles were the key actors behind the NWC movement (Torrecilla & Martínez-Gil 2005).

The NWC movement forced the Spanish water management to be open to public debate and dialogue, hence allowing for a greater accountancy, transparency and democratisation of traditional expert assessments and decisions (Tàbara & Ilhan 2008). The NWC Foundation organised a number of congresses pointing to the need for a change in the Spanish water policy. The overall aim was the cancellation of the NHP 2001. The main conclusions of these congresses was that the NHP 2001 (ibid.):

- was a violation of spatial solidarity of regions;
- had no proposal on management of water demand;
- lacked environmental dimension;
- had no economic sense due to its speculative contradictory economic figures and numbers.

The NHP 2001 received the greatest opposition from scientists, locals and activists in the recent history of Spain because it would create environmental injustice within several regions in Spain. The Mediterranean coast, in particular the southern coast, was water thirsty due to rising demand from rapid urbanisation, intensive tourism and agriculture patterns.

The social response to the NHP 2001 was impressive not only at national but also at international scale. The Platform for the Defence of the Ebro\(^{21}\) (PDE) was

\(^{21}\) Plataforma en Defensa del Ebro in Spanish
formed for the organisation of the growing opposition to the NHP 2001 from diverse segments of society. Since the funds for the realisation of the NHP 2001 would come from the EU, the PDE built a Europe-based action plan to prevent the EU money from coming. In 2002, the PDE organised a protest action named as the Blue March which started from Spain and ended up in Brussels. The motto of the Blue March was ‘for a new culture of water’. As a result of this action, the EU funding was stopped due to the incompatibility of the NHP 2001 in terms of the EU Environmental legislation.

Photograph 1: The Blue March to Brussels

Meanwhile the potential social, economic and ecological adverse effects of the NHP 2001 were documented through tens of expert reports. Numerous demonstrations and meetings took place in large cities such as Zaragoza and Barcelona. The threat of the NHP 2001 was converted by the NWC movement into a political opportunity. The NWC movement became increasingly nation-wide and grassroots when it adopts the abolishment of this plan as its primary objective. The social and scientific debate around the NHP 2001 attracted large masses into the movement.
Finally, after two years of international campaigns, growing support from international media and demonstrations all over the country, the EU pulled off from supporting the NHP 2001. On the eve of the general elections in 2004, the NHP had already become an important part of the political debate distinguishing the rightwing and the leftwing politics. It became a subject of a deal between the politicians and the public. The PSOE under the leadership of Rodríguez Zapatero promised to abolish the NHP 2001 if they won the elections. With the victory of the PSOE, the new Spanish government cancelled the NHP of 2001.

Following the 2004 elections, the PSOE government developed an alternative plan regarding water governance and politics called the AGUA Programme\textsuperscript{22}. This Programme promoted the establishment of public water banks to function as responsible units for development and sustenance of rights of access to water. Its criteria included not only efficiency, but also equity and sustainability. The Programme emphasised the importance of ecosystem protection and restoration in river basins. Water demand management through a) the rehabilitation of water infrastructures, b) water treatment, and c) water reuse through desalination technology were the core elements of the AGUA Programme, where as in the NHP 2001 increasing the water supply was promoted as the only solution to the growing water demand.

4.1.2.4. The AGUA Programme

The NWC Foundation played a pioneering role in the establishment of a bridge between the Iberian Peninsula and other organisations operating in the EU and the rest of the world. This bridge linked diverse sources of sustainability knowledge derived from local/global and expert/non-expert domains (Tàbara & Ilhan 2008).

In particular, water demand management was seen as the core concept of the AGUA Programme. This concept was very much promoted by the NWC

\textsuperscript{22} Programa AGUA. AGUA stands for the initials of Actuaciones para la Gestión y la Actuación del Agua which means Initiative for Water Management and Utilisation. Agua also means water in the Spanish language.
Foundation. In addition, other values of water apart from the economic ones such as its cultural values were also mentioned and emphasised in the AGUA Programme. These water values were promoted in the process of NWC movement. The AGUA Programme was planned for the period of 2004-2008. Main themes were as follows (MMA 2009):

- Water is a human right and responsibility. All citizens should know how to participate actively in water management, and should demand that the public authorities do not abuse and degrade this public good.

- Water has economic, social and environmental value: All actions directed at water should take these three dimensions into account, as well as integrated management of water in each basin.

- Spain forms part of the EU which means it shares the responsibility of getting additional economic resources and is obliged to meet the European norms: in the case of water, the Water Framework Directive 2000/60, and all norms related to water quality and environmental care.

- Technological innovations permit greater water saving and more efficiency in water use: in greater guarantee in its availability and quality, and in preservation and restoration of aquatic ecosystems.

- Water is neither unlimited, nor access to it in adequate quality and quantity is free of charge. Water’s real costs should be taken into account, as well as its economic benefits that generate its use, minimum flow required for the maintenance of ecosystems in each basin should be respected.

The AGUA Programme had to be implemented in the period of 2004-2008 and its tasks were defined as follows (MMA 2009):
• Hydrographical Confederations had to be reformed through incorporation with Autonomous Communities in the process of decision-making and public control of water use and quality, and encouragement of all citizens in participating to water management.

• In each water basin a Public Water Bank which takes into consideration the historical water rights with equality, efficiency and sustainability criteria had to be established.

• Water tariffs had to be established according to the real costs of obtaining and treatment of water, modulated on the basis of economic benefit generated by water use according to the European normative.

• Actions for improvement of water management and quality had to be undertaken according to the existing needs and in particular to these applications:
  
  - Optimisation of the existing storage and distribution infrastructures (urban water storage infrastructures as well as irrigation);
  - Water treatment and reuse;
  - Desalination.

It was stated in the AGUA Programme that these provisioned actions are flexible and might be modified according to the needs and priorities of each basin.
4.2. Turkey

One-fifth of the total border length between Turkey and its neighbour countries is formed by rivers\textsuperscript{23}. International debates, agreements and regulations on the management of these trans-boundary rivers had a profound influence on the formation of Turkish water policy. In particular, the issue of managing the Tigris-Euphrates basin which includes the involvement of actors such as Syria and Iraq, and several international organisations as the third parties have influenced, to a great extent, water policy formation in Turkey.

As the hydraulic paradigm became the dominant form of water management in the Middle East region in the mid-20\textsuperscript{th} century, the confrontation between the riparian countries\textsuperscript{24} economic development interests has gained particular complexity. Water issues have always been seen as beyond water in this region. Thereby, much of the research related to water tend to focus on either its environmental-technical or political aspects. Only recently, very few studies looked at the Middle East’s fresh waters from the power and transition, resource mobilisation, and the social learning perspectives.

Turkey is an upstream country in the Euphrates-Tigris basin. It is a descendant of the Ottoman Empire who had been a supreme power in the Middle East for centuries. Therefore, the history of the Turkish water policy is a rich source of knowledge about water governance in a place where political turmoil has never been absent and always had direct and indirect connections with water issues. In addition, history of water management in Turkey in the context of the Middle East explains a large part of the socio-political background of both the emerging water movement in the country, and the anti-Ilisu Dam movement.

\textsuperscript{23} According to the Encyclopedia of Earth (2009), the 615 km between Turkey and its seven neighbor countries is formed by rivers; 238 km length with Bulgaria and Greece, 243 km with Armenia and Georgia, 76 km with Syria, and 58 km with Iraq and Iran.

\textsuperscript{24} Iraq and Syria
4.2.1. Social and political context

Turkey forms a bridge between Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. It is bounded on three sides by the Mediterranean Sea on the south, the Aegean Sea on the west and the Black Sea on the north (See map 2). It has the second highest population after Germany among the European countries. According to the Turkish Statistics Institution\(^{25}\) (TÜİK 2008), the population reached to 71.5 million in 2008 and is expected to be 100 million by 2030.

Map 2: Turkey, its neighbours, and the Euphrates-Tigris Basin

![Map 2](source: Encyclopaedia of Earth (2009))

Ethnic minorities’ total share in the country’s population is estimated to be around twenty percent. According to the Minority Rights Group (MRG) Report (2007) the following groups are among the large minorities in Turkey: Aleviis, Armenians, Assyrians, Caferis, Caucasians, Kurds, Jews, Laz, Roma, Rum Christians (Greek Orthodox), and Yezidis. Kurds are the largest ethnic group after Turks and Turkic groups. According to TÜİK (2008) 7.2 million Kurdish people live in the South-eastern region of Turkey. Among these minorities mentioned above only Armenians, Jews and Rum Christians which are religious minorities are officially recognised as minority in the Turkish constitution.

\(^{25}\) Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu
Turkey consists of seven geographical regions. It is a semi-arid country with great variations in precipitation within its regions. While precipitation on the coasts is high, it goes down to critical levels in the inner regions. Fresh water resources in Turkey hardly meet the growing demand. Water availability is 1652 m$^3$/year per capita. This figure is three quarters of the level, 2000 m$^3$/year per capita, indicated as threshold for water scarcity. According to State Hydraulic Works$^{26}$ (DSİ) (2009), water availability per capita in Turkey by 2030 is expected to be 1120 m$^3$/year per capita which is barely above the threshold, 1000 m$^3$/year per capita, indicated as water poverty (DSİ 2009).

Turkey’s economy is largely dominated by industry and services sectors. Turkey is also among the leading countries in agriculture in the world. The largest share in water use belongs to the agriculture sector with seventy-four percent of the total water use. The share of water use according to services and industry sectors are fifteen percent and eleven percent respectively. The industry water use is rapidly growing and expected to be twenty percent in 2030. Total water consumption in Turkey, which is around 40 billion m$^3$, constitutes almost one third of the total amount of available water in the country 112 billion m$^3$. The very same figure is expected to be the total water consumption in 2030 (DSİ 2009) which would mean that in two decades water use in Turkey would reach up to country’s fresh water limits.

One of the most important and growing social-ecological problems that Turkey has been facing is desertification. According the Ministry of Environment and Forestry$^{27}$ (OÇB) (2006: 24-25) desertification in Turkey is generally caused by “deforestation due to excessive grazing and forest fires; stubble burning; human induced destruction of the hydro-geological cycle; mis-management of agricultural land due to inappropriate/excessive irrigation; salination; increase of aridity and soil pollution; and erosion”.

$^{26}$ Devlet Su İşleri
$^{27}$ Orman ve Çevre Bakanlığı
Despite its growing water scarcity, having had the majority of its land in the Middle East region which suffers from a higher degree of fresh water scarcity, Turkey stands out as a relatively water rich country. Turkey is considered as water rich also as it is an upstream country in the case of the Tigris-Euphrates basin which is the largest in the entire Middle East region.

4.2.2. Evolution of water policy and management

Since the establishment of DSİ in 1954 water management in Turkey has been in the hands of engineers. Those engineers adopted a particular American water management approach known as the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) model that moves from a particular definition of socio-economic development. This development model did not take into account the social and environmental costs and externalities caused by mega water projects such as South-eastern Anatolia Project 28 (GAP). In a country where political turbulence has never been absent, these projects added to the already existing domestic and international political conflicts.

4.2.2.1. Turkish hydro-hegemony

International debate over the management of the Tigris-Euphrates river basin has played a particularly important role in the formation of Turkish water management institutions. These two rivers are born in Turkey, flow through Syria, Iraq and Iran 29 until they reach the Persian Gulf. The water dispute over this basin started as all three riparian countries had launched uncoordinated development projects in the 1960s such as the Keban, the Karakaya and the Atatürk Dams in Turkey, the Tabqa Dam in Syria and the Thartar Canal in Iraq (Kıbaroğlu 2007). These projects have been the biggest hydraulic infrastructures built in the Euphrates-Tigris basin and have put growing pressures on the two rivers (ibid.).

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28 Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi
29 Iran is geographically a riparian country but shares an insignificant portion of the Tigris-Euphrates basin. For this reason, Iraq and Syria are meant for riparian countries.
The two major global forces behind these projects were the expansion of the hydraulic paradigm in the developing world and the rise of nationalism in the riparian countries as they had recently become independent states (ibid.). According to Kibaroğlu (2007) the hydraulic mission together with nationalism launched a shift towards a type of national water management which has become a pre-requisite for satisfying the ambitious development plans for meeting the growing water demand from agriculture, industry and service sectors as well as growing population.

In 1954, the DSİ was established as the responsible unit for projecting, constructing and managing hydraulic infrastructures as well as building a national water policy. The official development model adopted by DSİ for realising its hydraulic mission was the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) model which “proposes subordination of nature and local communities to higher state ideals; progress and development” (Molle 2006: 9). The overall assumption lying underneath this development paradigm was that “scientific knowledge and systematic rational planning could create drastic changes in society if they could emancipate themselves from vested interests and politics” (ibid.). It was considered as the one and only way to tackle poverty at the root by an ambitious range of activities including training, agricultural extension services, production of fertilizers, stimulation of local enterprises and welfare-oriented programmes on education, health and sanitation (ibid.: 9-10).

According to the DSİ the main obstacle in front of converting Turkey into a rich and developed country is the lack of financial funds necessary for building dams for irrigation and hydroelectricity. Veysel Eroğlu, the former head of the DSİ, indicates the DSİ plans to multiply the hydro-electricity capacity of Turkey by five in five years and convert Turkey into a heaven for dam constructions.30

Ambitious goals of DSİ in the leadership of Veysel Eroğlu attracted a lot of media attention. Veysel Eroğlu was called as the one that broke the record of Süleyman Demirel, the former prime minister and head of the DSİ named as the ‘king of

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30 As cited in Aksiyon Magazine interview held with Veysel Eroğlu on 20.03.2006 in Ankara.
dams’, who signed forty dam projects during his leadership in the DSİ. The projects signed by Veysel Eroğlu during his 4.5 years in the DSİ mounted up to one hundred and nineteen.

Turkish water paradigm is very much shaped by the international debate over its rivers - particularly the Tigris and the Euphrates. The issue of control over these trans-boundary rivers marked the dominant water paradigm in Turkey named by Zeitoun and Warner (2006) as “hydro-hegemony”.

Turkish hydro-hegemony has inter-related domestic and regional dimensions. On the domestic front, the South-eastern region of Turkey - where these rivers pass - has been a stage for a long going dispute between the Turkish army and the Kurdish separatists. Since 1984, there has been an actual war between the two fronts.

On the international platform, Turkish water policy aimed at “not wasting a drop of national hydrologic treasure” (DSİ 2006). Attempts to made maximum use of this ‘national treasure’ became concrete in large scale development projects whose most representative example is the South-eastern Anatolia Project31 (GAP). Turkey’s attempt to control these trans-boundary rivers caused much political tension with its downstream neighbours; Syria and Iraq. In such tense times, Syria played its Kurdish trump card32 by moving Kurds to the Turkish border (Warner 2008). Even though, such developments increased political tension in the past, since 2005 the two countries have been in search for a more long-termed solution through dialogue.

4.2.2.2. The South-eastern Anatolia Project (GAP)

The history of GAP goes back to the 1960s. GAP was originally designed as a regional hydraulic plan consisting of twenty-two dams on the Euphrates-Tigris

31 Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi
32 For more information on the Kurdish issue see the section on the water dispute on the Euprates-Tigris basin on page 155.
Basin for the irrigation of 1.76 million ha of land in the South-eastern Anatolia Region of Turkey (See cartogram 3) and nineteen hydro-electricity power plants.

At first, the project provoked increasing anxiety among the riparian countries. When completed, the nineteen large dams on the Euphrates-Tigris River Basin would contain a large portion of water flow that Syria and Iraq depend on. These two riparian countries claimed that the GAP would act as the Turkish State’s control instrument over the downstream countries of the Middle East where water scarcity is already a severe problem and foster the power asymmetry between the upstream and the downstream countries.

**Cartogram 3: Turkey and the South-eastern Anatolia region**

The GAP also received much social opposition at the domestic level from the Kurdish front. Despite the official propaganda for the GAP such as its potential for creating job opportunities for locals and bringing socio-economic development into the region which in the end would solve the on-going conflict between the Turkish military forces and the Kurdish separatists, the opposition has grown.
during the following years. Syria and Iraq supported the Kurdish argument that saw GAP as an essential component of the Turkish state’s control strategy over the Kurdish population in the GAP region.

Officially, GAP aimed at solving the conflict between the Turkish army and the Kurdish separatists through economic stability and development. According to Zeitoun and Warner (2006: 279) GAP can be considered as domestic resource colonisation and a civilising mission for the least developed region of Turkey. The project was shown as the magic tool kit for bringing wealth and prosperity to an economically backward region. However, it had another hidden objective; integrating the Kurds into the Turkish socio-economic fabric by a Fordist regional development strategy (the carrot) rather then the force (the stick) (Zeitoun & Warner 2006: 279).

Over the years, the GAP went through significant changes. First, in 1986, it was transformed into a regional development project by the State Planning Organisation33 (DPT). The overall aim of the project was to transform the GAP region into an export centre of agricultural production of Turkey. Second, in 2000, the GAP went through additional modifications in line with the changes in global thinking about the notion of development (Kibaroğlu 2007). The objectives and aims were redefined according to the new global definitions of ‘sustainable development’. However, the core aim of the project was kept as increasing the overall productivity and the welfare of locals through utilisation of natural resources in the most efficient way possible.

The renewed overall objectives of the GAP are as follows (GAP 2008):

- Developing economic structures in the GAP region through raising income level for the purpose of covering interregional imbalance;
- Increasing the rural employment and productivity;
- Increasing the capacity of industrialisation in big cities of the GAP region;
- Creating incentives for economic growth, social stability and exporting.

33 Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı
The GAP went through a significant shift from being a project primarily designed for meeting the demands of national development towards being a regional development project. This shift was a reply to two parallel and inter-related developments taking place at the domestic front (the South-eastern region of Turkey) and the international platform (the Middle East). In the view of the Kurds, the GAP was the violation of the rights of Kurdish communities in the GAP region. To the downstream countries, Iraq and Syria, it was a control toolkit of the Turkish state. From the alliance of Syria-Iraq and the Kurdish Diaspora in Europe, emerged a long campaign against the GAP. These developments resulted in the World Bank’s rejection of economic support for the Project.

However, the growing hegemony of market-led development has brought new opportunities for the GAP. “Although water management was traditionally a local, regional or at best a national concern, in the 1990s, some large French, British and American water companies extended their limits worldwide and negotiated contracts in developing countries” (Warner 2008: 277-278). These companies formed successful alliances with construction companies and investment banks to avoid business risks (international capital alliance) and states following the hegemony of the global market economy (ibid.).

Turkey would not be able to finance the GAP through national resources. So it went with the global flow and liberalised its water sector in the 1990s. This development opened its water resources to the water, energy and dam construction sector giants of the world. As Syria and Iraq have become closer to the West and the global market economy through governmental changes by the beginning of the 21st century, they have gradually become more cooperative with Turkey in the management of the Euphrates-Tigris basin34 (ibid.).

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34 The conflict between the three riparian countries Turkey, Iraq and Syria changed towards conciliation after 1998. Turkey and Syria built technical cooperation on water management and training and expertise exercise of 2002. In 2005 Euphrates-Tigris Initiative for Cooperation (ETIC) was established. Very recently, the three riparian countries have been holding negotiations of a joint water institute.
4.2.2.3. The evolution of the water dispute in the Tigris-Euphrates basin

The Euphrates River originates from the mountains in the north-eastern of Turkey. The river flows to the Syria and joins by the Sajur and Balikh Rivers before entering Iraq at Al’Qa’em. It finally joins the Tigris River in the south of Iraq to form the Shatt Al-Arab River, which drains into the Persian Gulf (See map 3).

Map 3: Euphrates-Tigris Basin

There is even dispute over its length and how much of it falls in each riparian country. The most recent figures are from the Iraqi Government. According to them the length of the Euphrates is 2,940 km, with 40% of it being in Turkey, 20.5% in Syria and 39.5% in Iraq. Even though more than two thirds of its drainage area lies outside Turkey, 93% of the water in the river originates in
Turkey. The drainage area of the Euphrates is widely accepted as 444000 km$^2$. However, as with the length of the river flowing through each country, there is a great controversy over the share of each country in the basin (KHRP 2002: 13). Some authorities put the Turkish share as 28%, with Syria as 17%, Iraq as 40% and Saudi Arabia as 15%. Others apportion the relative shares according to the length of the river in each country (ibid.: 13-14).

The Tigris River is 1840 km long. It originates in Turkey and flows through the southeast for about 400 km. Then it forms the border with Syria for 40 km. Finally it goes down to Iraq where it joins the Euphrates in southern Iraq. As with the Euphrates, there is controversy over the river’s length, its drainage area and each country’s share of the river. According to Iraqi government figures the drainage area is 235000 km$^2$. 45% of this is in Iraq. Figures produced by the geographer Hillel put Iraq’s share of the basin at 78%, Turkey’s share at 20% and Syria’s at 2% (ibid.: 14).

The Euphrates-Tigris basin (known also as Mesopotamia meaning land between rivers in Greek) has witnessed many civilisations. That is why it is also called as the ‘cradle of civilisations’. The first civilisations; the Sumerians, Acadians, Babylonians and Assyrian were formed on these soils. First known irrigation canals, dams and aqueducts were built on the Euphrates-Tigris basin. Heavy irrigation and agricultural use of land brought the problem of high level of salinity in soil. Civilisations were destroyed due to this problem.

Even though, the management of the Euphrates-Tigris basin has a history as old as the history of humankind, this study takes a look at the developments starting by the mid-20th century. Until then, water treaties and agreements held between the riparian countries - Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Iran - were mainly concerned with the issue of demarcation of borders between new countries established after the World War I and the demise of the Ottoman Empire.
The international political debate on the Tigris and Euphrates rivers has marked the water management and policy in Turkey. In Turkey, like in the rest of the Middle East where water resources are not abundant, water politics has always been directly and indirectly linked to security issues. Besides, the water dispute has a domestic side as in the case of the conflict between the Turkish arm forces and the Kurdish rebels. This domestic conflict has international links. The Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK) and its condemnation of the GAP projects should be understood as well as the international dispute over the management of the Tigris-Euphrates before exploring the water movement in Turkey.

**International water dispute: Turkey, Syria, and Iraq**

*Neither Syria nor Iraq can lay claim to Turkey’s rivers any more than Ankara could claim their oil. This is a matter of sovereignty. These water resources are Turkey’s; the oil resources are theirs. We do not say we share their petrol reserves, and they cannot share our water resources.*

*Süleyman Demirel*³⁵

In the first half of the 20th century, among the seven treaties held between the riparian countries only the Treaty of Friendship and Good Neighbourly Relations between Iraq and Turkey was directly related to the flow regulation of the Tigris and the Euphrates Rivers and their tributaries (See appendix C). This protocol provided a framework for the two riparian countries, Syria and Iraq, to deal with their respective interests within the basin system beyond political borders and emphasised the importance of flood control systems for Iraq over the two rivers while providing benefits of water storage to Turkey.

The international water dispute in the Middle East started in 1960s as the riparian countries launched uncoordinated development projects such as the Keban, the

³⁵ As cited in Dolatyar and Gray (2000: 148) Sülayman Demirel was a former Prime Minister of Turkey and a former head of the DSI.
Karakaya and the Atatürk Dams in Turkey, the Tabqa Dam in Syria and the Thartar Canal in Iraq. These projects are the biggest hydraulic infrastructures built in the Euphrates-Tigris basin and create growing pressures on the two rivers. Beyond the construction of these large infrastructures were the expansion of the *hydraulic paradigm* in the developing world, and the rise of nationalism in the riparian countries as they recently became independent states. The hydraulic mission together with nationalism launched a shift towards a national water management which became a prerequisite for satisfying the ambitious development plans for meeting the growing water demand from agriculture, industry and service sectors as well as growing population (Kibaroğlu 2007).

In 1964, Turkey completed the Keban Dam project on the Euphrates. A year after that, it presented the project to Syria and Iraq in a meeting held in Baghdad. In this meeting Syria declared that after the completion of the project, the flow to Syria and Iraq would be insufficient for their economic development. This was the beginning of the dispute over the Tigris and Euphrates rivers (Gruen 2000).

Two other dam constructions within the GAP known as the Karakaya Dam (1975) and the Atatürk Dam (1980) followed that. Turkey asked for the World Bank funding for constructing the Karakaya Dam. In the technical report of the World Bank it was stated that Turkey should maintain an average flow of 500 m$^3$/seconds to Syria for its power generation, irrigation and future growth requirements. Turkey agreed upon this term which is known as the Rule of 500. As Syria and Iraq raised objections to this term, the World Bank pulled out from the project.

By 1987, the Karakaya Dam was completed and opened to service while the construction of the Atatürk Dam had been going on for seven years. The same year, Turkey and Syria signed the Protocol of Economic Cooperation. According to this protocol, Turkey would provide Syria a minimum flow of 500 m$^3$/seconds monthly as it was formulated by the World Bank before. Syria, in return, would cooperate with Turkey on the issue of border security regarding the Kurdish separatists in training camps located on its lands.
In 1990, Turkey temporarily intervened in the Euphrates flow to fill the Atatürk Dam. This caused a diplomatic crisis and resulted in protests from Syria and Iraq. In 1992, the Atatürk Dam started to produce electricity. The same year, Syria launched a diplomatic campaign in the Arab League to put pressure on Turkey and urge the Arab League members not to finance the GAP projects in the Euphrates-Tigris basin. Meanwhile, Syria went on permitting various military groups against the Turkish state to operate from its lands and the Syrian-controlled Beqaa Valley in Lebanon. Among these groups were the Turkish Dev-Sol meaning the Revolutionary Leftists, Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA), and, most significantly, the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK) (Grüen 2000).

Syria had failed in fulfilling the condition on cooperating with Turkey on the issue of border security. These issues came to international political agenda once more in a meeting held in 1993 between Süleyman Demirel, the prime minister of Turkey, and Hafiz Assad, the Syrian president. However, this did not change Syria’s policy. The PKK and its leader Abdullah Öcalan went on operating from Syria until Syria expelled the PKK leader from the country in 1998 (ibid.).

In 1996, another crisis occurred between the three countries over another dam project36 within the GAP. Syria and Iraq sent official notes to the Turkish authorities indicating that the dam would affect both the quantity and the quality of the water flow to Syria and Iraq (Kibaroğlu 2007).

Bağış (1997: 577) points to the fact that during the years of diplomatic meetings held between the riparian countries, particularly Syria’s legal position on water rights regarding the Euphrates-Tigris basin provoked “mistrust among the Turkish officials”. Syria is both an upper and lower riparian country in terms of its hydro-political relationship with Turkey. The Orontes River is born in Lebanon, runs mainly through Syrian territory along 120 km and reaches the Mediterranean Sea from the Hatay province (88 km) in Turkey. As Bağış (1997: 578) indicates Syria

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36 The Birecik Dam
has long refused to consider this river to be international. He also gives the case of the Yarmouk River as another example for the Syrian water policy. This river is born in Syria and goes down through Jordan and Israel, a series of Syrian dams significantly decreased the water flow that two riparian countries get (ibid.).

Turkey carried the case of the Orontes River to the regular technical committee meetings held between the riparian countries on various occasions “claiming that if the Euphrates and the Tigris were to be considered as international rivers, the same rule should have applied to the Orontes” (Bilen 1996: 104). Syrian response to this claim was that “they did not officially recognise the Hatay Province of Turkey and, therefore, they would not bring the Orontes issue to the table to discuss with the Turkish authorities” (ibid.).

In the shadow of hot debates going on between two countries, Syria went on either directly or indirectly supporting the PKK training camps and troops till 1998. In 1998, the Turkish officials declared that they would take military measures unless Syria stops supporting the PKK militants. After two months, Syria and Turkey signed the Adana Security Agreement. The PKK leader, Abdullah Öcalan, was expelled from Syria. The year 1998 has been the start of a new era between the riparian countries. Since then, between the three countries a number of new initiatives have been taken. Some of these are as follows (Kıbaroğlu 2007: 161-162):

- In 2001, Syria and Turkey agreed on a cooperation protocol for the Turkish GAP and the Syrian General Organization for Land Development (GOLD) Project. As a result, Joint Communiqué was signed between the GOLD and the GAP. The overall aim of the agreement is to develop sustainable utilisation of land and water resources in the Euphrates-Tigris basin.
• In 2002, the Turkish GAP and the Syrian GOLD project administrations established technical cooperation in which Turkey and Syria shared a Training and Expertise exercise.

• In the period of 2003-2004, two framework cooperation agreements on health and agriculture respectively were signed between Turkey and Syria.

• In 2004, the leaders of the two countries paid various visits to each other. The president Bashir Assad was assured to make further use of the Tigris waters.

• In 2005, a group of experts and professionals from Turkey, Syria and Iraq formed the Euphrates-Tigris Initiative for Cooperation (ETIC). The initiative aims at promoting cooperation for technical, social and economic development within the basin system. It also includes a group of scholars and professionals from the three countries. There is a growing willingness to cooperate between the riparian countries (Warner 2008).

• The three riparian countries declared their willingness to the establishment of a Joint Water Institute in March 2008. In May, the water resources minister of Iraq visited Turkish and Syrian officials to meet about resumption of tri-lateral talks and agree on increases of upstream flow in to the Euprates-Tigris basin. Latif Rasheed, the Minister of Water of Iraq, told Veysel Eroğlu, the Minister of Environment and Forestry of Turkey that they wanted the Ilısu Dam, an integral project of the GAP, to be started as soon as possible (Warner 2008).

The global scale developments in the last decade regarding the issue of dialogue between the three riparian countries needs to be considered. As Warner (2008: 277-278) indicates water management was once a local, regional or at best a national concern but recently has become a supra-national issue with a strong private corporate component. This trend started to appear by the 1990s when
some French, British and American water companies extended their limits world-wide and negotiated contracts in developing countries. Warner (2008: 284) points to the alliance formation between water and construction companies, and investment banks to avoid business risks (international capital alliance) and states following the hegemony of the global market economy. According to Warner (2008: 284):

The new hegemonic discourse is all about *benefit sharing*. This is a radical change of scene in which the collective power (positive sum) is exercised instead of distributive (and divisive) power. The fact that the 5th WWF was held in Istanbul in March 2009 as well as many other international conferences can be seen as a strong indicator of the fact that the international community has accepted Turkey’s position as a ‘Middle Power’.

The Middle East leaders all operate within the limits of the possible in the power-political arena which still favours Turkish leadership in the region (ibid.). A decade ago Turkey was reluctant to take part in the peace building process and bring water issue into peace negotiations. It did not consider itself as part of the Middle East region (Denk 1997: 57). However, with the 1998 Adana Security Agreement signed between riparian countries, Turkish political discourse has adopted a more leading role in the region (ibid.).

**Internal water dispute: Turkish state and PKK**

One of the main targets of PKK’s violent actions was the GAP with its infrastructures. The Kurdish movement in Turkey driven by the PKK defined the GAP projects as the part of the new assimilation strategies of the Turkish state over the Kurdish population in Turkey. Zeitoun and Warner (2006: 279) indicate that the GAP was an “internal (resource) colonisation and a civilising mission for the hinterlands would bring wealth and prosperity to an economically backward region, and integrate the Kurds into the Turkish socio-economic fabric by a
Fordist regional development strategy; (the carrot) rather then the force (the stick)”. Being against the GAP became an important dynamic of the Kurdish movement and identity formation.

PKK’s argument over the GAP was proved on many occasions such as in the High Council for Combating Terror\(^\text{37}\) (TMYK) meeting held on the 23rd of February 2007. The current Minister of Forestry and Environment (OÇB) Veysel Eroğlu indicated that the Ilısu Dam (one of the pillar projects of the GAP) would flood an area of ten thousand hectares which also included the most important PKK hiding zone. He claimed that the Ilısu Dam would limit, to a great extent, the mobility and shelter of the PKK militants. As the Dam would be completed, around a thousand caves that the PKK uses for hiding and shelter would be under waters. Besides, the Turkish Armed Force\(^\text{38}\) (TSK) has been taking military measures to maintain the security of the Dam and the tunnels\(^\text{39}\).

In the last decades, Kurdish movement has increasingly expressed itself through social mobilisation based on cultural-ecological heritage concerns. Undoubtedly, the intensity of the negative social, economic and ecological consequences of the GAP played a significant role in raising social awareness on the water problem and its particular connections with the Kurdish problem. However, even more important than that was the global water and energy companies’ growing interest on Turkish water resources, in particular the management of the Euphrates and the Tigris rivers. This interest became more concrete as global conferences and forums such as the 5\(^{\text{th}}\) WWF were held in Turkey in 2009. Kurdish people have been aware of the importance of their natural resources and the management of them. With the rise of the environmental justice movement world wide, this awareness has led the Kurdish movement to include environmental concerns in their political discourse.

\(^{37}\) Terörle Mücadele Yüksek Kurulu

\(^{38}\) Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri

4.2.2.4. The 5th World Water Forum (WWF) & emerging opportunities for water movement in Turkey

The water domain in Turkey has been witnessing a battle between the two major groups of actors. The first group consists of the water, energy, and construction lobbies with the support of global organisations and think-tanks that promote privatisation through events such as the World Water Forum (WWF). The second group consists of the NGOs, civil society organisations, and academic groups that oppose a number of existing governance practices ranging from privatisation of natural resources to commoditisation of water. This section is about these groups and how they define global water problems.

The World Water Council (WWC) and the World Water Forum (WWF)

Since 1997, the World Water Council (WWC) has organised five forums. These forums were organised every three years and were held in Marrakech (Morocco), The Hague (the Netherlands), Kyoto, Shiga and Osaka (Japan), Mexico City (Mexico) and in Istanbul (Turkey). From its agenda to its delegates, speakers and institutions, the World Water Forum (WWF) is run according to the framework established by the WWC and the World Bank (Pigeon et al. 2009).

The WWC is a private think-tank established in France in 1996 with the initiative of water multi-national corporations and various international bodies such as the World Bank, the International Water Association (IWA), the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN), the Water Supply and Sanitation Collaborative Council (WSSCC), the United Nations Development Project (UNDP), and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO). One of its principle goals is to develop a common strategic vision on integrated water resources management. This water governance approach is known for along time as the trademark of the “French Water Ecole” and adopted by the two biggest French water multinationals in the world Veolia and Suez (ibid.). International financial institutions within the WWC such as the
World Bank and its agencies, the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and the Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility (PPIAF) are also supportive of this écologie, strongly promoting private sector involvement to water services (ibid.).

The general profile of the WWC members is the multi-national water and energy corporations, and investment banks such as the European Investment Bank (EIB), the African Investment Bank (AIB), Lyonnaise des Eaux, Pricewaterhouse Coopers, Suez Environment, and AREVA. “These organisations control more than seventy-five percent of the WWF coordinator positions. In the politically sensitive topics of finance and ‘public versus private’ themes in the water sector, the hegemony of the WWC members is even more notable” (Pigeon et al. 2009: 2).

Turkish companies and associations constitute over thirteen percent of the WWC members most of which are construction companies. Among the other WWC members from Turkey are some key organisations in water governance such as the GAP Regional Development Administration, DSİ, the Istanbul Municipality Waterworks40 (İSKİ) and the Turkish Water Foundation (TWF).

However, there is a growing social movement at global scale against the WWF and its agenda which is, to a great extent, defined by the privatisation lobbies and multi-nationals. The previous World Water Forums faced opposition from civil society groups who consider them as an illegitimate and flawed platform for discussing solutions to global water problems (Pigeon et al. 2009). As a response to this growing counter response within years, the WWC developed a strategy to increase its legitimacy through enlarging and diversifying its membership beyond its initial founders, a strategy frequently used by corporate lobby groups to have their massages delivered through other vehicles than themselves (ibid.). This network includes academic and professional institutions such as the UNESCO Institute for Water Education (UNESCO-IHE) and the IWA financially supported

40 İstanbul Su ve Kanalizasyon İşleri
by Suez\textsuperscript{41}. Much of the work maintaining the network is carried out by a lobby group called Aquafed which was established in 2005 by Suez and Veolia (ibid.).

According to Gökdemir (2007, August) the 1981 Law of İSKİ explains why Istanbul was chosen as the venue of the 5th WWF. With this law, the management of water resources and services was left to private firms and municipalities could acquire debt from foreign companies with permission from the Turkish Ministry of Finance. In the following years, the municipalities within the İSKİ asked, with an increasing frequency, for credits from International Finance Markets and the World Bank, and have become more dependent on these organisations and their conditions (ibid.). Finally, as seen in the 8th National Development Plan (2001-2005) Turkey opened its public sectors and national resources to privatisation and multi-nationals.

Within the GAP, there still are many projects to be carried out. What makes Turkey even more attractive to the global water and energy companies is the rapid privatisation process that awaits the Turkish water resources (Pigeon et al. 2009). Water sector in Turkey is still one of the few natural resources that have not been yet entirely privatised and for the occasion of the 5th WWF global water and energy companies met with Turkish state officials to build alliance to facilitate the on-going privatisation process related to Turkish water resources (ibid.). The promotion of Turkey as a water rich country that can play a stabilising role in the Middle East should be evaluated in the light of these developments.

Since the 1\textsuperscript{st} WWF held in Morocco all water forums have created their counter responses. In line with that, two forums took place in Turkey; the Counter Water Forum and the Alternative Water Forum held by two different groups of NGOs and other social organisations. In the preparations of the Counter and the

\textsuperscript{41} For more details on the issue see article “Controlling the agenda at WWF - the multinationals’ network” by Martin Pigeon, David Hall, Emanuele Lobina, Phillip Terhorst, & Emma Lui available from: http://www.waterjustice.org/uploads/attachments/wwf5-controlling-the-agenda-at-wwf.pdf
Alternative Water Forums, the demonstrations and the declaration against the 4th WWF 2006 in Mexico has had great influence.

The Counter Water Forum & ‘No to Commercialisation of Water’ Platform

A counter platform was quickly established in 2008 as a response to the 5th WWF. One of the pioneering groups behind this social response was SuPolitik which consisted of concerned intellectuals, academics and activists. In the view of the SuPolitik group, the 5th WWF would be used by the current AKP government for forming further alliance with global water hegemons and privatisation lobbies so that they could multiply the number of hydraulic infrastructures and facilitate the privatisation of water resources in Turkey. This platform became nation-wide as the Union Chambers of Turkish Engineers and Architects (TMMOB), the Confederation of Revolutionary Trade Unions (DİSK), the Confederation of Public Employees Trade Unions (KESK), the Turkish Medical Association (TTB), the Confederation of Farmer Trade Unions (Çiftci-Sen), ‘No to GMOs’ Platform and numerous other foundations, organisations, confederations and platforms were involved in. They named themselves as the ‘No to Water Commercialisation’ Platform and planned a counter water forum which would be held at the same time with the 5th WWF.

The Platform organised regulated meetings. The global trends in water management, the WWF, the role water can play in creating social awareness about privatisation of public services and natural resources, and its consequences were discussed in these meetings. These meetings often took place within the circles of trade unions, chamber associations and academia. The Platform saw the 5th WWF 2009 as an opportunity for the anti-commercialisation of water movement to get out of the circle of academia and trade unions, reach wider audience and transform into a grass root movement. The Platform also organised protests
against the 5th WWF mainly under the umbrella of TMMOB in various cities in Turkey. One of their largest protests took place in Istanbul in which slogans such as “Water is a right, it cannot be sold!” and “Water is life. Our lives are not for sale!” were used (See photograph 2).

Photograph 2: The Counter Water Forum speakers

The Platform organised the Counter Water Forum held in the period of 15-22.03.2009. The Forum started with a public meeting and went on with a press release. Twenty-four workshops were held on the following water issues:

- access to water and its commoditisation,
- trans-boundary waters: problems and solutions,
- the impacts of water transfers on basins,
- water and energy,
- agriculture, forestry and water,
- food and water,
- water for all living beings,
- use of water resources and labour,
- water struggles and experiences,
- water and art.

Some of the other facilities carried out within the Forum in the following days were concerts, films and documentaries, and an exhibition in which caricatures and other forms of visual arts related to water theme were presented. The Forum ended with a strategy meeting among the members of the Platform and a post-press statement.

In the final declaration of the Counter Water Forum (See Appendix D), multiple values of water such as its historical and cultural values for people and other living beings were pronounced. The hegemony of water’s economic value over others was concluded to be the basis of the problems related to water. The Platform defined water as ‘life itself’. Therefore, in their view water commercialisation was unacceptable not only for humans, but also for the entire non-human beings. According to the Platform, in a hypothetical situation in which exploitation does not exist, developments in science and technology would be employed for the benefit of all humankind, not for the benefit of privileged groups. They further proposed that the same rule would apply to the land, food, labour as well as water, meaning that all production must solely focus on public welfare. Particularly, with this statement they underline the importance of coordination and continuity within different domains and sectors.

**The Alternative Water Forum ‘Another Water Management is Possible’ Campaign**

With the declaration of the 5th WWF, another social gathering took place in Turkey against the 5th WWF. This was the ‘Another Water Management is Possible’ Campaign signed by thirty-four organisations and NGOs, majority of them being environmentalist from Turkey and other countries such as Germany in case of the Heinrich Böll Foundation (HBF). Initiative to Keep Hasankeyf Alive was the core component of this campaign. Besides, the Campaign was supported by four political parties Democratic Society Party (DTP), Revolutionary

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47 Demokratik Toplum Partisi
Socialist Workers Party\textsuperscript{48} (DSİP), Workers’ Movement Party\textsuperscript{49} (EHP), and the Green Party.

Photograph 3: The Alternative Water Forum speakers

The Campaign organised the Alternative Water Forum held in Istanbul in the period of 20-22.03.2009. The Forum started with the speech of Maude Barlow, a UN Expert on the Water Issues. The Alternative Forum was an international gathering in terms of its topics, workshops and participants. The topics that were discussed in the Alternative Forum were as follows:

- ecologic water management,
- ecologic destruction in Turkey,
- hegemony, war and water politics,
- hydro-hegemony, dams and sustainability,
- dams and cultural heritage,
- anti-dam struggle
- global climate change and water politics,
- water poisoned by nationalism,
- water as a human right,

\textsuperscript{48} Devrimci Sosyalist İşçi Partisi
\textsuperscript{49} Emekçi Hareket Partisi
- water as a common good and water management,
- agriculture and water politics,
- health, right to live and water,
- water, food, and economic crisis,
- water and women.

The final declaration of the Alternative Water Forum (See Appendix E), which is in line with the declaration that delegitimised the 4th WWF held in Mexico, called the UN and member states to accept their duty, as the legitimate global convener of multilateral forums, and to formally commit to hosting a water forum that is accountable to the global community. It was stated that the 5th WWF should be the last corporate-controlled water forum and instead a legitimate, accountable, transparent, and a democratic water forum should be launched.

The Alternative Water Forum Declaration described water as the basic element of all life on the planet and as a fundamental and inalienable human right. It was stated in this declaration that not only the present but also future generations’ right to water should be guaranteed. Rejection of all forms of privatisation of water was emphasised and it was declared that the management and control of water must be public, social, cooperative, participatory, equitable, and not for profit. The declaration also pointed out that the dominant economic and financial model was promoting privatisation, commercialisation and corporatisation of public water and sanitation services as the only solution to the water problems. According to the declaration, such a remedy was part of the problem, not the solution, which would be destructive and non-participatory and whose cost would be paid by the poor but nobody else. In the declaration it was concluded that water problems could be solved only through water justice.

The Counter and the Alternative water forums held by two different platforms in Turkey point to various findings some of which are as follows:

1. From the two forums two distinctive water identities emerged. The first came from the ‘No to Commercialisation of Water’ Platform which saw
“Water is life itself” promoting that it should be kept out of economy cycle. According to the participants of this forum, water had multiple values and uses which could not be reduced to a sole human right. The other definition of water was made by the Alternative Water Forum participants. They defined water as human right, and underlined the importance of equal access to it and water justice in their final declaration.

2. Two platforms differed in the ways they proposed solutions for the global water problem. One of the most important outcomes of the Counter Water Forum was the promotion of the idea of excluding water from the economy cycle. During this forum water was analysed within the context of history of commoditisation of nature entities and water in particular. In the conclusions of this forum, it was indicated that the separation of human from nature formed the basis of many current problems related to water. The Alternative Water Forum, on the other hand, underlined the urgent need for developing an anti-privatisation approach to the global water problem. In this forum it was promoted that the solution was the state’s obligation to replace water back in the public sector.

3. Another difference between the two forums was the Counter Water Forum’s very clear “anti-capitalist” line. In this forum it was claimed that the water problem could not be sought solution within bodies such as the UN and the WWC as they were part of the problem. On the other hand, the Alternative Water Forum stayed away from such terminology due to the collective decision taken by the global resource mobilisation organisations behind it such as the Public Service International (PSI). As these organisations saw water problems as a result of the privateers and the whole process of privatisation, the solutions should be sought in the pro-public policies. In addition in their view as “Marxist terminology would be completely ignored and the message would be delegitimised as ideological
and irrelevant\textsuperscript{50}, anti-capitalist terminology should be avoided in the public discourse of the Alternative Water Forum.

4. Both forums pointed to the growing hegemony of the global market economy over communities with water resources and their livelihoods. In the view of the Counter Water Forum, the global organisations such as the UN and the WWC are the imperialist structures of the world. Therefore, the Platform sees these organisations as part of the global water problem and claims that the solution should be looked for outside these bodies and that a new political discourse on water should be established. In the Alternative Water Forum held by the ‘Another Water Management is Possible’ Campaign it was indicated that the UN should intervene into the solution. The Alternative Water Forum argues that “the world needs the launch of a legitimate, accountable, transparent, democratic forum on water emerging from within the UN processes supported by its member states\textsuperscript{51}”.

In addition, the Counter Water Forum reflected the Turkish left-wing perspective, while the Alternative Water Forum served more as an international platform for the gathering of global NGOs, international activists, and local scaled movement leaders. The Counter Water Forum, defining itself as anti-capitalist, attracted Turkish participants from the left camp, while the Alternative Water Forum attracted mainly international visitors and students.

Public participation to both forums was limited in comparison with the 5\textsuperscript{th} WWF. As the state officials declared the two forums as insignificant, anti-developmental, and marginal, the two water forums did not benefit much from media coverage which resulted in less public participation to them.

\textsuperscript{50} Quoted from the e-mail writings between Gaye Yılmaz, an activist of SuPolitik who worked as one of the coordinators of the Counter Water Forum, and David Boys who was the coordinator of the Public Service International (PSI) on the issue of preparations of the Counter Water Forum. As a result of difference between the PSI and the ‘No to Commercialisation of Water’ Platform over in the issue of political framing of the water problems, PSI and some other organisations decided to take part in the Alternative Water Forum.

\textsuperscript{51} As cited in the Alternative Water Forum Declaration (See Appendix E)
CHAPTER V
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF SOCIO-ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENTS AGAINST THE ITOIZ & THE ILISU DAMS

5.1. The anti-Itoiz Dam movement
The evolution of the anti-Itoiz Dam movement
The Basque nationalism & identity

5.2. The anti-Ilisu Dam movement
The evolution of the anti-Ilisu Dam movement
The Kurdish nationalism & identity

5.3. RESULTS
CHAPTER V: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AGAINST THE ITOIZ & THE ILISU DAMS

What make the social movements against the Itoiz and the Ilısu Dams particularly interesting are the ways the Basque and the Kurdish identities were employed in the formation of social mobilisation. In the human-nature relationship context, the ethnic identity aspect - which might explain also a large part of human identity - has been integrated with the livelihood and in particular certain entities of that livelihood, such as water.

Even though, the socio-ecological conditions of the two communities show differences, such as the population of the directly affected people and their socio-economical situations, anti-developmentalist and anti-Spanish state discourses which explain an important part of the Itoiz case, and the anti-GAP and anti-Turkish state discourses which are strongly present in the Ilısu case have significant parallelism. In each of these communities, a large portion of ethnic identity is based on the contrariety tradition against the regime, or in other words against “a pro-development nation-state which is also an oppressor of nations or communities without a state” (Barcena et al. 1997: 313). Therefore, these communities see and evaluate these large scale hydraulic projects of the pro-development nation-state as an aggression and threat towards their livelihoods which they perceive as an inseparable part of their identity and collective existence.

In both cases, the secrecy around these large projects, and the weak and manipulated public consultation over the real objectives of these projects strengthened the long-held distrust towards nation-state. One result of this was the integration of the past and the present counter nation-state discourses in the environmental justice context. Another result was that during this social learning process, these discourses sunk deeper into the Basque and Kurdish identities.
Exploring how these movements made use of the ethnic and livelihood identities answers some of the research questions of this study. In that exploration of the ‘how’, the ways of social learning, social mobilisation and transition towards sustainability are hidden. Therefore, in this chapter apart from the evolution of the two local movements in historical context, I provide a brief look over the politicisation of the Basque and the Kurdish identities, and the effects of those identities in the social movements against the Itoiz and the Ilısu Dams.

5.1. The anti-Itoiz Dam movement

Against the illogicalness that this project posed and the magnitude of our solidarity, we could not stop them from building this dam. But we have achieved something which was beyond our imagination then\textsuperscript{52}.

\textit{Patxi Gorraiz}

The anti-Itoiz Dam movement is one of the most popular environmental movements in the history of Spain. A significant part of this popularity can be explained with the activist group Solidari@s con Itoiz\textsuperscript{53} who carried out numerous visually striking and provocative protest actions that attracted large public attention. This is the story of how the grievance of a small community of the Irati Valley became a concern of the Spanish regions and nationalities. The Itoiz Dam was built despite all the social opposition and started to function in 2007 but the anti-Itoiz Dam movement is still considered to be one of the most successful anti-dam movements in Spain in the way it triggered a social learning process which did not only empower a particular community but also helped the empowerment of larger segments of Spanish society by setting an example to environmental justice movements and starting a nation-wide social debate over unsustainable water governance practices.

\textsuperscript{52} Quoted from an interview held with Patxi Gorraiz, the spokesman of the Coordinating Committee of Itoiz (CCI), in Pamplona/Navarra 29.05.2008. Here he refers to the contribution of the anti-Itoiz Dam movement to the Spanish New Water Culture movement.

\textsuperscript{53} The Ones in Solidarity with Itoiz.
5.1.1. The evolution of the anti-Itoiz Dam movement

In the mid-1970s, the Navarra government had made several attempts to build a large reservoir in Irunberri, in the Navarra region of Spain. However, the large number of local communities that would be directly affected and their strong opposition made the government to delay the project for some years. In 1985 the government came back with a similar project at a smaller scale, but this time it would be built in the Itoiz village and would flood the Irati Valley.

The Itoiz Dam was primarily planned for irrigation purposes in the areas next to Itoiz village downwards to the southern end of the Navarra region. This goal required of an additional water transfer project called the Navarra Canal. The water captured in the Itoiz reservoir would be allocated through this canal along 177 km towards the southern Navarra. According to the official accounts, the Irati Valley was chosen simply because of its unique high capacity for capturing water with minimum amount of required land.

However, these accounts received much scepticism from the local communities. According to the local communities, the low population of the Irati Valley would avoid a similar social opposition like the one that occurred in the past. There were only around fifty permanent inhabitants in the villages in the planned reservoir area and most of them were old people. Furthermore, the official claim was contested because of the following reasons:

1. In the reservoir area there were three nature reserves and two special protection zones for birds which were being visited by a large number of people for recreational purposes and that would be affected by the hydraulic infrastructures.

2. The reservoir would also flood four small energy stations located in the area. These energy stations were already producing seventy percent of the electricity production that would be produced by the Itoiz
project. Therefore, from the energy perspective the project would be economically unreasonable. In addition, the Navarra Canal project which would be an integral part of the Itoiz Dam would raise the costs.

3. With the approval of the National Hydrology Plan (NHP) 2001, there had been greater vested interests in building the Itoiz Dam and the Navarra Canal (e.g. water transfer from the Itoiz reservoir through the Navarra Canal to not only the southern Navarra region but also to the other regions in Spain). It was only by then, when the link between the Itoiz Dam and the inter-regional water transfer through canals proposed by the NHP 2001 became clear. By that time, the construction of the dam was almost completed.

After the official approval of the project in 1987, representatives of the affected villages and some local groups formed the Coordinating Committee of Itoiz (CCI). Patxi Gorraiz, the spokesman and coordinator of the CCI, and an inhabitant of one of the villages in the Irati Valley to be flooded, explained the objective of the CCI as “nothing else but to win against the Itoiz Dam”. As Barcena (1999: 145) also indicates that the anti-Itoiz Dam movement was from the beginning to the end the defence of the land and community.

The CCI received some financial support from the ecologist groups in the Basque Environmental Movement (BEM) although it depended mostly on its members and its own activities to raise funding. By 1999, it had around nine hundred members; a figure that exceeded the members of the Ecologists in Action (Barcena et al. 2000: 27). The CCI also built multi-level alliance with larger environmental organisations operating at national scale such as the Confederation of Organisations for Environmental Protection (CODA), Ecologist Association for the Defence of Nature (Aedenat), along with international resource mobilisation organisations such as Greenpeace, the International Union for the

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54 Quoted from an interview held with Patxi Gorraiz in Pamplona/Navarra 29.05.2008.
55 Coordinadora de Organizaciones de Defensa Ambiental
56 Asociación Ecologista de Defensa de la Naturaleza
Conservation of Nature (IUCN) and the Northern Alliance for Sustainability\textsuperscript{57} (ANPED) (Barcena 1999: 145).

Meanwhile, the CCI’s attempts to build dialogue with the Navarra and the Spanish government went on although they never succeeded. This uncooperative response of the both governments shaped and oriented, to a great extent, the identity and strategy formation of the movement. In the views of the CCI, the rather authoritarian government structures obliged the movement to become more radical (Barcena et al. 2000, April). In addition, regarding the Basque political context, “the tense relations with the Navarra population and its institutions made the Itoiz coordinator to manage the movement with more distance to the organisations following the Basque nationalist principles” (ibid.: 21). According to Barcena et al. (2000, April: 21):

> On the one hand, Navarra region, as an autonomous community juridically distinctive from the Basque region, has been historically accepted to form part of the Basque country by the Basque nationalists. On the other hand, some people in Navarra do perceive the Basques as such. Therefore, while the CCI did not refuse the support of the BEM, it could not show much enthusiasm about its presence because of this reason.

In 1993, the construction of the dam started under the protection of security forces. During years, the CCI published a considerable number of reports, leaflets and declarations, and organised numerous press conferences and meetings for informing wider public about the adverse social, economic and environmental impacts of the project. Reports were published on the economic infeasibility of the dam (Arrojo & Bernal 1997), the seismic movements and potential dangers induced by the construction (Casas & Rebollo 2001, Casas 2005; Garcia 2005)

\textsuperscript{57}Alliance Nordiques pour la Durabilité
and on some already existing but hidden reports\textsuperscript{58} by official authorities to create public awareness of the problem.

\textbf{Photograph 4: Itoiz Reservoir completed (2008)}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.6\textwidth]{images/itoiz_reservoir.jpg}
\caption{Itoiz Reservoir completed (2008)}
\end{figure}

On a number of occasions the Itoiz project was taken to Court because it was violating three national laws: the National Water Law (1985), the Hydraulic Public Domain Law (1985), and the Law of Public Administration of Water and Hydrologic Planning (1988). In 1995, the case was taken to the European Commission (EC) regarding the flooding of the two specific protection zones for birds. As a result of this, the European Commission (EC) asked the Spanish authorities to carry out a more updated research of Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) for the planned infrastructure. In the same year, the National Court issued a sentence that the Itoiz project was illegal because it was violating the environmental legislation and lacked sufficient economic justification. In 1997, the Supreme Court passed a sentence on creating protection band for natural reserves in Itoiz which raised the costs of the project and made it economically even more unreasonable.

\textsuperscript{58} In a 1975 report by the Spanish Ministry of Environment and the Ministry of Public Works the authorities had already been warned about the risky geological conditions of the Itoiz area.
\textsuperscript{59} Available from \url{http://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Archivo:Itoizko_urtegia_.Nafarroa.jpg}
Despite the court sentences, the dam construction went on at full speed. According to the CCI, this showed the complex network of corruption between some public administration officials, and construction and water companies. The corruption dimension of the Itoiz Dam project marked the demonstration held in Pamplona in 1993 where three thousand people attended with the slogans of *Itoiz dam; why, what for, and for whom?*  

In 1995, some young activists formed a group named as Solidari@s con Itoiz. According to them, “the inefficiency of the court sentences in stopping the construction of the dam” was the main motive behind the formation of this group. Their strategy was to carry out direct actions and demonstrations with the purpose of denouncing the irrationality and illegality of the Itoiz Dam project. They acted as a completing element of the anti-Itoiz Dam movement along with the CCI, in the way that they protested through civil disobedience and direct action. This group consisted of activists from other campaigns and social movements including anti-militarists, squatters, anti-developmentalistis and others. They defined themselves as “radical in content and transparent in form” (Barcena et al. 2000, April: 14).  

Solidari@s con Itoiz developed a wide range of actions to attract wider public attention to the social debate evolving around the Itoiz project. They built barricades against the construction machinery, cut the steel cables for the transport system for the construction of the Itoiz Dam, and carried out various non-violent protests at key locations such as the Navarra government building in Pamplona. In particular, the direct action that took place on the 6th of April in 1996 triggered an intense debate in not only the Basque community but also among the key actors of the movement. Eight activists cut the cables of a concrete mixer system in the construction site of the Itoiz Dam. The action was recorded, in their view, to...  

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60 The Spanish newspaper Diario 16 documented that LA IN, one of the three main construction companies to build the Itoiz Dam, paid the Navarra president 300,000 pesetas for the concession.  
61 *Itoiz, Por qué? Para qué? Para quién?*  
62 Quoted from the interviews carried out with activists of Solidari@s con Itoiz in Pamplona in 21-22 May 2008.
ensure transparency. As a result of this action, the activists were arrested and sent to jail while the construction had to stop for eleven months.

Solidari@s con Itoiz also carried out some initiatives such as the European tour called ‘Stop Itoiz!’ which lasted eight months. Meanwhile, they gave numerous interviews, organised informational events and visually striking protest actions that captured enormous media attention in the countries they went through. These protest actions were carried out in European Parliament in Strasbourg (October 1999); the Millennium Wheel in London (October 1999); the Hague Tribunal (November 1999); Brandenburg Gate in Berlin (January 2000); the Basilica of Saint Peter’s in Rome (February 2000); and the 2nd World Water Forum (WWF) in The Hague (March 2000).

**Photograph 5: SOS Itoiz! Protest by Solidari@s con Itoiz (Vatican Dome)**

In 2001, the CCI organised a meeting under the name “Stop Itoiz for security” to which fifteen thousand people attended. The same year construction of the Navarra Canal was begun. The following year, the evacuation and demolition of the village buildings started. During this period, the activists of Solidari@s con

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63 Available from [http://www.sindominio.net/sositoiz/marcos/conjunto_cas.htm](http://www.sindominio.net/sositoiz/marcos/conjunto_cas.htm)
Itoiz chained themselves to the houses to be demolished. They struggled for ten days and recorded this process. In 2003, the dam was completed and a year later the stream started to fill the Irati reservoir. The Itoiz Dam started to operate in 2007.

Photograph 6: Demolishing starts in Itoiz

Until now, the CCI and Solidari@s con Itoiz activists have continued with the organisation of meetings on the security problems posed by the Itoiz Dam. Both the CCI and the Solidari@s con Itoiz indicate that even though the seismic movements and the cracks in the Itoiz Dam are at a worrying level, the Navarra government still continue with ignoring the dialogue offers of the CCI.

5.1.2. The Basque nationalism and identity

Social movements are born from particular socially constructed realities and problem definitions in the face of social-ecological changes. Hence, the anti-Itoiz Dam movement cannot be considered as separate from its people, its culture and land. In exploring the particular ways that the Basque people identify themselves,

64 Available from http://www.sindominio.net/sositoiz/marcos/conjunto_cas.htm
a large portion of the research questions of this study can begin to be answered. What conditions triggered the anti-Itoiz Dam movement? Who took part in it? How did the social movement evolve and what identities emerged in this process?

5.1.2.1. The evolution of the Basque nationalism

The Basque Country - Euskal Herria - is situated in the north of Spain along the Bay of Biscay, and the Western Pyrenees of Southern France (See cartogram 4). Its population is around three million with the majority, which is over 2.5 million, living in the Autonomous Communities of the Basque and Navarra regions of Spain. The rest of the Basque community lives in the French part.

Cartogram 4: The Basque Country

Source: Muro (2008: xxvi)
The Basques are considered as the only remaining non-Indo-European speaking people in Western Europe (Davis 1997: 63). In fact, as stated by Totoricagüena (2004: 20) “Despite five centuries of speculation by linguists and philologists concerning possible relationships between Basque and other languages, no studies have indicated a conclusive relationship between Basque and any other language”. Davis (1997) indicates that the ancient Roman historians were the first to document the existence of this unique people who spoke a language which could not be understood by their neighbours. The Romans called the Basques as the ‘Vascones’ which meant the mountain people (ibid.). Most studies on the historical roots of the Basque people are mostly related to the Basque language Euskera.

“Like other nationalist movements, Basque nationalism was in its origins a phenomenon closely linked to modern, urban, bourgeois, industrial society” (Mees 2003: 9). However, even centuries before then, Basque people had lived within great monarchs with a different status than others. As indicated by Davis (1997: 64) “the Basque Provinces had a significant degree of political, social and economic autonomy, which meant in return for their allegiance to the French and Iberian monarchs, the Basque self-governance was protected by a series of customary laws known as the fueros”. “The fueros insured that the Basques would maintain a measure of independence through their own provincial parliaments, courts, militias and other political institutions” (ibid.). Guibernau (2000: 57) states that even though most of the fueros were codified during the 17th and 18th century, some of them even date back to the 7th century. “These were embodied ‘rights’ of the people, rather than concessions granted to them. Throughout their history, the Basques have defended the fueros, ensuring their autonomous status within the Spanish state” (emphasis added, ibid.).

However, following the French Revolution (1789), and “the Carlist Wars in Spain (1823-39) (1872-76), liberal regimes rescinded the rights guaranteed under the fueros and brought an end to the long history of Basque autonomy” (Davis 1997: 64). In the 19th century, while centralisation, nationalism and the liberal ideology
were conquering the majority of the European countries, they did not develop in Spain with the same speed and intensity. Spain had been weakened from liberation wars going on in its few colonies left, and was in the middle of a severe financial crisis. In Spain “the liberal bourgeoisie, in other cases the promoter of state and nation-building, was fragile and instead of constituting a ‘national class’, it was territorially fragmented” (Mees 2003: 7). In addition, as Muro (2008: 25) states, “the main hurdle for Spain had been to control all these widely scattered territories at a time when slow communications made long-distance government practically impossible”. Spain was left behind regarding its modernisation attempts to adapt to the drastic social, political and economic changes taking place in Europe. Mees (2001) points out that the lack of financial resources, poor investment in education and military system did not help either. Education was left to the Catholic Church which had hardly any interest in promoting “liberal principles and loyalty to state” (ibid: 801). Besides, the Spanish army which once used to be one of the strongest in Europe, consisted of citizens most of whom were too poor and could not find any other jobs (ibid.).

About the Spanish state Mees (2003: 7) argues:

Until the 1898 there was no external enemy and there were no national symbols to create and represent the imaginary community of the Spanish nation. In other words, in liberal Spain it was not, as nationalists frequently argued, the aggressive imperialist attitude of Spanish nationalism but its weakness which permitted the durability of regional and local particularisms.

By the end of the 19th century when Spain had lost its last colony Cuba, as a response to the rise of nationalism in Europe, regionalist movements and platforms had already been emerging in Spain among which were the Regionalist League and Catalan Solidarity. According to Boyd (1997: 302) in Spain “a weak oligarchic state, a fragmented and inadequate system of mass schooling and a

65 Territories in the West Indies, Cuba, Florida, Mexico, Central America, much of South America, and the Philippines
divided political class produced a situation in which national history and identity were contested by groups seeking to capture and strengthen the state. These groups ranged from “civic nationalists” who had the goal to create “a juridical nation whose citizens shared common rights, freedoms, and responsibilities” to “counter-revolutionary, authoritarian nationalists for whom religious and national identity were synonymous and whose vision of national identity was a shield against political and cultural modernisation” (ibid.).

However, in “a weak state with a strong periphery” (Mees 2003: 5) there were already Catalan and Basque nationalist political organisations which were “challenging the unitary nationalism” promoted by these groups (Boyd 1997: 302). The sense of separate identity in these organisations was “based on a distinct linguistic, cultural, and historical tradition” (ibid.). According to Boyd (1997: 302) the growing strength of these nationalist movements “measured the incapacity of the Spanish state to develop mechanisms of political, economic, and cultural integration”. However, these organisations still received little public attention. They were mostly supported by the regional intelligentsia with some political ideas based on de-centralisation and anti-liberalism (Mees 2001).

The Spanish state’s response to this chaotic period was an intensified homogenisation policy. However, the Basque Provinces still managed to keep their fueros till 1876. According to Mees (2001: 802), in particular the fueros helped the traditional agrarian Basque elites to maintain their privileged political influence over the emerging commercial and industrial bourgeoisie. The abolishment of fueros under the governance of Cánovas del Castillo provoked great dissatisfaction among the Basque communities, which would be one of the most important driving forces of the popular Fuerismo movement (ibid.).

The Fuerismo movement strengthened the Basque nationalism, went beyond the Basque intelligentsia and evolved into a political movement with a concrete programme and a cultural renaissance (ibid.). Despite the fact that many Basque Provinces shared the common language Euskera, they were rather separate with
little sense of unity. Until the fueros were abolished, there was little sign of a single united Basque community. Fuerismo, to a great extent, mobilised the Basque society to define what the Basque nation was and had to be. Diverse segments of the rural Basque population were involved through the oral literature of Basque poets and intellectuals reframing and reconstructing issues related to loss of fueros, interference of the foreign customs and behaviours through immigrant workers coming to the Basque Country (ibid).

Meanwhile, the Basque country, in particular the province of Bizkaia, was going through a rapid industrialisation process. The industry in this province was based on iron exportation to Britain for industrial processing. In a short time, ironworking sector in the town developed and some modern blast furnaces were built. This resulted in a more advanced mining industry which needed a growing human labour. As this could not be met within the Basque population, the Basque country received a large number of immigrants from different regions of Spain. One result of this was anxiety in the Basque community which saw this rapid migration as a threat to the native Basque community, culture and language. In addition, due to miserable working and living conditions, Bizkaia was going through a process of rapid environmental degradation. The town had the highest mortality rate in Europe (Schrijver 2006).

By the late 19th century in Europe socialist and anarchist ideologies and political movements were emerging. Meanwhile, local reflections of these large scale developments were starting to appear in Bizkaia. As Mees (2003: 8) argues “the public space for relatively moderate ideologies like those of Fuerismo or even Carlismo was getting narrower and narrower, opening doors to radical thinking and movements such as nationalism or socialism”.

Under these circumstances in 1892, Sabino Arana published his first book called ‘Bizkaia for its independence’ which claimed full independence for the Basque people. He was the first political figure in the Basque history that referred to the symbols and ideas of the Basque identity. He wrote the Basque anthem and
designed the national flag for the whole Basque Country defining its borders through ‘4+3=1 formula’\textsuperscript{66}. Later on, Sabino Arana established the Basque Nationalist Party\textsuperscript{67} (PNV) in 1894. Early Basque nationalism was built on conservative ideas as a response to the rapid industrialisation and the Castilian speaking workers coming from different regions of Spain to Basque Country (Schrijver 2006). However, starting from 1904 when it started to build its local cells, “PNV became one of the most modern political parties of Spain, breaking with the traditional and still predominant politics of notables and building of a democratic internal structure based on the principles of elective bottom-top democracy” (Mees 2003: 13).

By the beginning of the 20th century, the Basque economy which had been based on steel and shipbuilding industry was already well developed and thriving. As Castells and Jauregui (1996) indicate large sums of capital were accumulated and distributed to the nearby territories. The Basque Country played a leading role in the industrialisation and development of Spain. This also explains, to a large extent, Sabino Arana’s nationalism which is defined by Mees (2003: 10) as “initially quite similar to what Charles Tilly calls ‘reactive collective actions’ ‘against someone [big business; socialism; and the Spanish state] who had unjustly deprived, or tried to deprive, a local population of a precious resource [its independence, customs, morale, religion, and its language]’”.

About the developments in the aftermath of the establishment of the PVN, Mees (2003: 13) states:

The first official programme of the PNV, passed by the party’s National Assembly in 1906, remained valid until post-Francoist times. Its principal achievement was its ambiguity, since it formulated the recovery of the fueros as the party’s supreme political aim, without specifying if this

\textsuperscript{66} This formula refers to four Spanish provinces namely Bizkaia, Gipuzkoa, Alava and Navarra and three French provinces: Labourd, Basse-Navarre, and Soule forming one united Basque Country.

\textsuperscript{67} Partido Nacionalista Vasco
meant independence or autonomy. Ever since then, both tendencies have co-existed within the PNV.

According to Muro (2008: 69) until the dictatorship of Miguel Primo de Rivera (1923) “the PVN established itself as a major Basque nationalist force with a presence in all spheres of life”. Mees (2003: 14) also indicates that the change of the party’s official name from Partido Nacionalista Vasco into Comunión Nacionalista Vasca (Basque Nationalist Community) in 1913 was the consequence of aspiration for going “beyond the limits of party politics, which due to corruption and electoral manipulation had a very bad reputation in Restoration Spain”. “Step by step, this community was built as a broad network of formal and informal organisations and initiatives covering not only the area of politics, but also those of culture and leisure” (ibid.).

Until the coup d'état of general Miguel Primo de Rivera, regionalist ideas had been flourishing in Spain. The Rivera regime oppressed both the Basque and the Catalan nationalist movements. They were declared illegal, while some regionalists were forced into hidden actions, some others either left the country or disappeared. After the fall of the Rivera regime in 1930, the Catalan and the Basque nationalist movements regained their strength. In the negotiations of the constitution of the Second Republic, Catalan regionalists and the Basque republicans managed to push through the inclusion of regional autonomy statutes (Schrijver 2006). In this period, the Basque nationalism went through a significant shift. The components of “conservatism and Catholicism based on nostalgic and romantic cultural ‘renaissances’ of the 19th century” were largely abandoned and moved towards leftism (ibid.: 94). The leftist regionalism was perceived as a “threatening mixture” to the rightwing Spanish nationalists (ibid.: 95).

Mees (2003: 15) argues that the success of the Basque nationalism is attributed to “the invention and celebration of a huge symbolic microcosm that facilitated the shape and the consolidation of nationalist identity, the differentiation from other
out-groups and the internal cohesion of the movement”. In Arana’s political discourse, “the obscure reality of the present was constructed with the Golden Age when fueros were still the shield protecting Basque freedom and granting the people’s happiness” (ibid). In the view of Arana and his followers, the fueros were “a highly mythologized totem, which had to be reconquered, if the misery of everyday life was to be overcome” (ibid.: 15-16).

During the Spanish civil war (1933-1939), the Basque nationalists and leftists in Bizkaia and Gipuzkoa sided with the Spanish republicans against General Franco. However, many provinces in the Navarra region supported his insurgent forces. In 1937, the troops of the new Basque Autonomous Government surrendered to Franco's fascist Italian allies in Santoña.

The new dictatorial regime of Franco sought ways to create a monolithic nation-state in Spain. All Basque expressions were repressed and banned through brusque laws against all minorities. Some nationalist leaders were executed. The Basque nation received a systematic attack at its culture and language (Schrijver 2006). Bizkaia and Gipuzkoa were declared as ‘traitor provinces’ by General Franco. Basque Provinces lost their autonomy with the exception of only Navarra and Álava which were given the privilege to keep its small local police force and limited tax prerogatives (ibid.).

In the words of Guibernau (2000: 58):

The Francoists imposed a narrow image of Spain emphasising national unity and condemned all forms of cultural or political diversity. This variant of state nationalism was a reaction to modern ideologies, especially socialism and anarchism, which were held to threaten traditional socio-political structures. As such, Francoism imposed a form of nationalism that was conservative, Catholic, centralist and Castilian as

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68 The Basque Golden Age is explored in a more detailed way in the following section; the Basque identity.
69 Provincias traídas
a brake of the modernisation begun in the early decades of the century by the Republic.


The Franco regime was characterised by its determination to exterminate regional differences and identities through brutal suppression. Franco not only forbade the Basque language but also actively attempted to erase it. The only Basque university was closed. The libraries of Basque social and cultural organisations were seized and the books burned. Teaching, publication and broadcasting in Basque language, and even daily use of language in the street was prohibited. The Basques even had to adopt new Spanish names (emphasis added).

This authoritarian centralisation and suppression not only failed to eradicate the linguistic and cultural diversity of Spain, but also ironically helped to provoke an opposite response and led to the revitalisation and the spread of ethnic nationalism (ibid.). For Basque nationalism, Francoist era meant “exile and clandestine struggle” (Mees 2003: 20). Between the mid-1950s and 1960s, the Spanish state began to lose partly its strict attitude somewhat, and this allowed for resurgent interest in the Basque culture. “After the Law of General Education (1968) the teaching of the Basque language was legalised which to a great extent triggered a tremendous interest and participation to the Basque cultural activities” (Watson 1996: 26).

The defeat of fascism and the victory of Allies at the end of the World War II, turned depression - which started with the victory of General Franco in 1939 - into euphoria for the Basque nation (Mees 2003). During the war, the Basque government had organised a broad network of espionage for providing political and military information for the British and American governments (ibid.). It was highly assumed that “Franco would be expelled by the western democracies, just like the other fascist regimes in Europe” (ibid.: 22). However, by the beginning of
the Cold War, it was understood that “in the new international context of bloc-confrontation, the most dangerous enemy of western democracy was no longer fascism, but communism” (ibid.). In this period the international image of Franco transformed from a fascist leader to a “freedom fighter against communism” (ibid.).

In such political despair, the Basque nationalists’ supported the so-called monarchical solution to overthrow Franco regime promoted by the socialist leader Indalecio Prieto which resulted in a pact between the Spanish socialists and the Confederation of Monarchical Forces (1948) (ibid.). However, this soon turned out to be a fruitless attempt as it was impossible to unite such opposing forces; socialists and monarchists (ibid.). As a result of this political failure and the brutal Francoist repression, the Basque nationalism was in a deep crisis. One consequence of this crisis was the growing unrest among the Basque underground young nationalists who were “increasingly uneasy with what they considered the deplorable passivity of the exiled nationalists, whose only contribution to the anti-Francoist struggle was apparently the publication of bombastic communiqués” (ibid.: 24).

5.1.2.2. ETA and the armed separatist action

During the 1960s and 1970s the Basque Provinces went through a second wave of heavy industrialisation - similar to the one in the late 19th century - which brought “class conflict, massive immigration, the marginalisation of the Basque culture, - especially the Basque language, the introduction of new values and ideas through TV and tourism, political repression and the increasing erosion of the traditional values and channels of socialisation - were all factors contributed to turning pillars of Basque society upside down” (Mees 2003: 24). “The answer to this deep crisis of Basque society was in the form of a new cycle of mobilisation, encouraged by a timid political liberalisation of the regime and the demonstrator-effect of other popular movements on the international scene (anti-colonialism, civil rights, Cuba, anti-Vietnam war, and so on)” (ibid.: 25). According to Mees (2003) the
emergence of radical Basque nationalism was only one of these movements within the large landscape developments. As a response to these, a clandestine organisation called *Ekin* meaning “to do” was formed by a small group of Basque students aiming at studying the Basque language and history. In 1959, they formed a new separatist organisation called the Basque Country and Freedom (ETA).

ETA organised some non-violent actions with graffiti of the Basque flag and slogans. Starting from 1961, they gradually adopted more violent actions targeting public administration buildings. The decisive step was taken when ETA attempted to derail some trains carrying Fascist veterans to an anniversary of the coup of Franco. In the words of Schrijver (2006: 30):

> So careful were they to avoid injury that none of the trains was in fact derailed, but the police once again swooped, arresting and torturing over a hundred Basques, most of whom were sent to prison for anything up to twenty years. Finally, deciding that nothing could be achieved by passive resistance, ETA therefore decided, in 1962, to turn instead to armed resistance.

In opposition to both Franco and earlier Basque movements, ETA embraced a left-wing discourse (ibid.). The book of Federico Krutwig, one of the most prominent ideologists of ETA, *Vasconia*, represented the first differentiation of the new Basque nationalism from the old one (Mees 2003). In his work, Krutwig made a comparison of the Basque Country with a third world colony. Mees (2003: 27) indicates that once Vasconia was published, “there was no remaining possibility of reconciliation between ETA and the traditional mainstream nationalists in exile”. The exiled Basque nationalists’ incapability of providing satisfactory answers to the oppression that the Basques faced in their own country resulted in “a shift from the exterior to interior in the activity of Basque nationalism” (ibid.).

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70 Euskadi Ta Askatasuna
“ETA’s ideology was a combination of Basque traditional nationalism and Marxism with influences from Third world revolutionary struggles” (Muro 2008: 113). In its 5th Assembly (1966-1967), ETA formulated a socialist and anti-colonialist response based on struggle on four fronts: economic, cultural, political and military (ibid.). However, the military struggle gradually gained more importance. In 1968, ETA established a new faction to carry out an armed struggle for independence. They used tactics such as robbery, direct attacks, car bombings, shells, anonymous threats, extortion or blackmail, and kidnapping.

ETA has influenced very much the discourse about the social, cultural, political ideology and the language defence movement in the Basque Country against the Spanish domination. According to Muro (2008: 113) during Francoism, “ETA was widely perceived as as a group of young idealists who were morally justified in using violent methods against an oppressive regime. ETA became a symbol of resistance against the excesses of the dictatorship. Not only the Basques but also the Spanish left-wing and liberal circles, in particular the Communist Party of Spain (PCE), were sympathetic to ETA’s struggle” (ibid.).

On the emergence and rise of ETA Pérez-Agote (1999: 59) argues that as “Francoism prevented the expression and reproduction of the Basque language, culture, and nationalist ideology in the public sphere (the political arena, the educational system, the mass media)”, its reproduction was taking place in “private circles of social life: family and friends, the microsocial facets of the Catholic Church, and the framework of seemingly apolitical associations (but ones that concealed a broad range of nationalist political socialisation)”. The “identification with the violence of ETA” emerged from these circles (ibid.). “ETA was the most visible part of the response of the first nationalist generation of the postwar period, which, in general, became radicalised in nationalist and ideological terms with respect to its parental generation” (ibid.).
However, it should be noted that the Basque political spectrum has been extremely diverse ranging from nationalists such as the Basque Nationalist Party\(^{71}\) (PNV) which is the largest and the oldest Basque party with rightwing moderate nationalist policy that aims for greater autonomy for the Basque region to Herri Batasuna\(^{72}\) (HB) which was outlawed in 2003 after a court ruling declaring proven that the party had been financially supporting the ETA with public money. Apart from numerous parties originated in the Basque Country, there are the Spanish political parties; the Socialist Party of the Basque Country – Basque Country Left (PSE-EE) as the federation of the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party\(^{73}\) (PSOE) in the Basque country, the rightwing conservative Popular Party\(^{74}\) (PP) and the Progress and Democracy Union\(^{75}\) (UPyD) with anti-ETA discourse.

With the end of Franco regime in 1975, the new Spanish government established a new constitution. According to the 1978 Constitution, the Basque Autonomous Community would be provided with the union of three provinces: Álava, Bizkaia and Gipuzkoa. Navarra would be made a separate autonomous region. Between 1979 and 1983, the Basque Autonomous Community gained some limited self-governance under the regime of autonomy. The Autonomous Community could have its parliament, police, education system and control over taxation.

As Muro indicates (2008: 113) “when the Spanish transition to democracy got under way after the death of General Franco in 1975 most observers hoped that ETA would recognise the new political situation and would disband”. However, ETA continued with carrying out some violent actions for the complete independence of the Basque state. In the view of ETA, as the Spanish government never delivered all the promised powers proposed in the agreement, they could continue with armed action. Besides, radical Basque nationalists claimed that the

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\(^{71}\) Euzko Alderdi Jeltzalea in the Basque language meaning the Basque Party of the Friends of God and Old Laws (Fueros) and Partido Nacional Vasco in Spanish meaning the Basque Nationalist Party.

\(^{72}\) Unity of people

\(^{73}\) Partido Socialista Obrero Español

\(^{74}\) Partido Popular

\(^{75}\) Unión Progreso y Democracia
so-called transition to democracy in Spain was the “democratisation of fascism” (ibid.).

According to Muro (2008: 140-141):

ETA responded to the new political system by taking up new organisational strategies. From the 1970s onward, radical Basque nationalism expanded from an underground violent organisation to an anti-systemic network of political and social organisations covering youth, student and trade unions, ecology, feminism, foreign affairs, education, media, prisoners and so on. The principal organisation was ETA which acted as the symbolic leader and source of inspiration for all tactical and strategic actions. The greatest achievement of the Basque Movement of National Liberation\textsuperscript{76} (MLNV) was the creation of a self-contained ‘nationalist community’ with its own myths, symbols, narratives, and spaces for socialisation where members could carry out their ordinary life without the interference of outside discourses and propaganda. This self-sufficient micro-society provided the necessary conditions for the social reproduction of their radical messages, discourses, and war memories.

The establishment of Socialist Patriotic Coordinator Committee\textsuperscript{77} (KAS) in 1975 as a unit to coordinate activities and protests the court martial of two ETA members was of particular importance in this period. Only a year later KAS became the “top decision-making organisation of the MLNV” (ibid. 127). It defined five political conditions needed for ETA to stop violent action (ibid.):

1. An amnesty for all Basque political prisoners;
2. The legalisation of all parties;
3. The withdrawal of the Spanish Security Forces from the Basque Country;
4. The improvement of social conditions for the workers and masses;

\textsuperscript{76} Movimiento de Liberacion Nacional Vasco
\textsuperscript{77} Koordinatzaile Abertzale Sozialista
5. The approval of a Statue of Autonomy that recognised the right to self-determination, established Euskara as the main language, gave the Basque government control of the Army, and allowed the Basque people to decide its own future.

Until 1983, ETA could operate from its bases located in France. In the same year, the Anti-terrorist Liberation Group (GAL) was established to limit the activities of ETA as a result of France and Spanish collaboration. The GAL has functioned as a paramilitary group supported by state forces to carry out extra-judicial assassinations. It has been claimed to be responsible for the deaths of dozens of suspected ETA activists.

In the mid-1980s the Spanish authorities made some attempts to win over ETA through fighting its support network. According to Muro (2008: 147) the three anti-ETA pacts\textsuperscript{78} signed in the period between 1987 and 1988 “galvanised a cross-party consensus regarding the strength of democratic institutions, the illegitimate use of violence to reach political aims and the urgent need for ETA to disband if certain conditions were given”. Meanwhile, in the period of 1986-1989, three rounds of negotiation, known as the Algiers negotiations, were held between ETA and the Spanish state. The negotiations failed. For Spanish delegates, a permanent ceasefire was an essential requirement to start any sort of negotiations (Muro 2008: 147). However, for ETA the complete cessation of the group’s violent activities could only come at the end of the process, not a prerequisite” (ibid.). Besides, many MLNV organisations indicated in an editorial of JoTaKe that “there were two kinds of violence: the one that denied the rights of the Basque people, therefore ‘offensive’ and the other, a ‘defensive response’ which defended those rights” (ibid. 151).

\textsuperscript{78} Madrid Agreement on Terrorism signed on 5 November 1987 in the Spanish Parliament, the Pact for the Normalisation and Pacification of Euskadi signed by all Basque political parties with seats in the regional parliament except Herri Batasuna on 12 January 1988, and the Agreement for Peace and Tolerance signed in Pamplona in October 1988.
ETA’s military decline started after 1992, “as result of anti-ETA pacts, the failed Algiers negotiations, the increasing Spanish-French cooperation and the crucial arrest of its leadership in Bidart” (ibid.: 153). After that, the HB adopted a more distinctive approach towards ETA arguing that “secession of the Basque nation could not be achieved solely by the actions of the military vanguard and it was necessary for the whole community to be involved” (ibid.). In 1998, ETA announced a cease-fire to facilitate talks between the HB and the Spanish government. However, not much progress had been achieved by the end of a fourteen months period. Taking this as a justification to their decision, ETA announced that they would go back to armed struggle.

On the 29th of February 2004, the Spanish police found a large amount of explosives and arrested two ETA activists. On the 11th of March 2004, in the Madrid bombings, the worst terrorist attack in the history of Spain, 191 people died and almost 2000 wounded. The Conservative Spanish government, Partido Popular (PP), officials immediately claimed that ETA was behind these attacks. 130 non-military ETA members, including the leader Mikel Albuzi, were arrested. However, the 2004 Madrid bombings were attributed to Muslim radicals. The Spanish government declared a national mourning in which thousands of people participated to spontaneous anti-terror rallies all over the country. Despite rapidly being the claim of responsibility by the Islamists, the Spanish Conservative government of originally called for nation-wide anti-ETA demonstrations.

Another dialogue period was launched in 2005 which resulted in a permanent ceasefire (2006) that lasted about 15 months. Since then, there have been some other terrorist attacks which intensified the polarisation between the Spanish government and the ETA. Furthermore, in the March 2009 elections, despite the fact that PNV got more votes, a coalition of socialist and conservative Spanish parties elected as the President of the Basque Government a socialist leader, Patxi López, thus excluding all nationalists from both the right and the left-wing from representation in the Basque Parliament. This has increased the intensity of the political situation in the country generating new grounds for conflict.
5.1.2.3. The Basque identity

Much of the debate over identity tends to focus on its origins through primordial versus situational explanations. In fact, the concept of identity is so complex and multi-faceted that “its origins should not be viewed as the only way to further our knowledge about ethnicity and nationalism” (Davis 1997). About ethnic identity Williams (1994: 57) also indicates that “the repetitive arguments between the advocates of primordial and situational or instrumental conceptions of ethnicity can and should be superseded. Ethnies are both primordial and circumstantial - in different ways under different conditions”.

On identity Keating (1993: 204) argues that:

Neither national nor ethnic identity is a natural or inherent characteristic of human communities. Rather, they are constructed in specific places in a process of historical development according to the needs of leading political forces. This is not to say that national or ethnic identity can be created at will. There need to be tangible makers of community identity which can be pressed to the service of the national project. These may be linguistic, racial, geographical, institutional, economic or social. There is also usually a common history, though this, itself, is frequently a fabrication.

Muro (2008: 20) points out that during the 19th century “most European states indulged in the fabrication of traditions and recording of their ‘national memory’”. The French historian Ernest Renan was the first to pay attention to the relationship between the nation and its past (ibid.). According to Renan two things which he saw as one in fact, constitute the nation (as cited in Muro 2008: 19):

One lies in the past, one in the present. One is the possession in common of a rich legacy of memories; the other is present-day consent, the desire
to live together, the will to perpetuate the value of the heritage that one has received in an undivided form.

Muro (2008) states that emergence of counter-discourses was inevitable during the process of the collective memory building of the nation. These “marginalised memories” or in other words “more stories left behind” as Renan indicates “would become aware of their origins, their defeats and the injustices they had suffered” (ibid.: 20). In the words of Muro (2008: 20):

The 20th century offers ample evidence for this pluralisation of narratives of resistance. Entire social groups first challenged and then gained admission to national memories: from women, Jews, homosexuals, workers, and exiles to indigenous communities and various ethnic groups. All these collectives had a common grievance: they did not appear in the so-called official histories, and they wanted their lost past to be restored and preserved.

Muro (2008: 21) argues that at the core of the nationalist discourses lies “a mythical idea of a glorious past” which is “a mixture of history and legend”; the Golden Age. Smith (as cited in Muro 2008: 21) indicates that Golden Age is very often a reaction of a particular community to “a definite political or military threat from outside”. The Iberian Peninsula’s federations of territories were united by religion and Hispanic monarchy based on pact between diverse realms. According to Muro (2008) when the centralisation project was intended to be carried out by the Hapsburg Monarchy through the unification of legal codes, taxation and army, the Hispanic conglomerate began to show some cracks in the early 17th century. In other words to deal with the critical state of the royal finances, “it was necessary to set up a unitary fiscal-military state that could extract substantial resources from society, centralise them and create permanent armed forces under direct control of the Monarch” (ibid.: 26). Muro also states that with the end of Spain’s hegemonic empire in the early 18th century, possibilities for many Basques to climb the social ladder through the foral identity disappeared. Some elites of the
Basque community started to define a Golden Age in contrast to Spain’s decline (ibid.). Muro (2008) indicates that the Basque Golden Age which explains, to a great extent, the pre-modern Basque identity has three domains: religious, social and political (See figure 13).

**Figure 13: The basque Golden Age**

![Diagram of the Basque Golden Age domains](source: Muro (2008: 28)

Muro (2008) defines the religious dimension of the Basque Golden Age as based on the idea of the ‘chosen people’. This was not unique to the Basque society and could be found in other cultures such as the Jews. The Basques as the chosen people were apparent in the 16th century writers such as Juan Martínez de Zaldívia who “considered the Basques to be one of the ten lost tribes of Israel” (ibid.: 29) and Esteban de Garibay who worked on the antiquity of the Euskara and claimed that it was “a pre-Babel language spoken in God’s Paradise” (ibid.: 30).

On the society dimension Muro (2008) argues that the doctrine of ‘universal nobility’ (hidalguía colectiva) constituted one of the most influential aspects of the pre-modern Basque identity. This notion provided the Basque communities “social prestige and important finacial and legal advantages, particularly the exemption from payment of tax to the Crown” (ibid. 31). In an era in which the Spanish Empire’s troops were struggling to keep its overseas colonies together, such an exemption from taxes through fueros would create additional financial
strains on the state (ibid.). The argument that all Basques were noble was used as a defence against the increasingly bureaucratic state which was in the promotion of unifying the separate kingdoms and starting a universal tax system. This defence became clearer in the arguments of Andres de Poza which were based on the assumption that “Basques’ historical rights” were sacred and their universal nobility was “derived from the mere state of being a native of the land” (emphasis added, ibid. 32). The universal nobility was also defended at the beginning of the 19th century by Francisco Aranguren and Domingo Lerín against Spanish Don Juan Antonio Llorente who argued that the Basques had never had an independent kingdom and that they had been “Romanised, invaded and had historical links with Castile” (ibid.: 33). With the invasion of Spain (1808) by Napoleon Bonaparte and the absolutist regime (1814-1833) of Ferdinand VII, the revolt against the French boosted the Spanish nationalism which set aside the debate over fueros for some decades.

According Muro (2008: 34), the political dimension of the Basque pre-modern identity refers to “the fueros as symbols of ancient political independence and the principle of pre-modern egalitarianism”, both of which were developed fully by Larramendi (1690-1766) from Gipuzkoa. Larramendi, who is accepted as the forerunner of Basque nationalism, wrote two major books; one about the Guipuzkoa (1754) and the other (1756-1758) about fueros. In the former, he argued that the Basques descended directly from Tubal and were pure and of noble blood who never mixed with others whose proof could be seen in the Basque language (ibid.). In the latter, Larramendi set the decadent present “in contradiction to the glorious past” and aimed at pointing to the consequences of slowly eroding fueros, which started with moving the borders between Castile and the Basque maritime ports (1717), for the future of Basque people.

Muro (2008: 37) argues that the Basque Golden Age, which is significant in the way it persists and resonates in successive generations, is:
A mixture of historical facts and legendary elaboration, the myth encapsulated perceptions, memories and commonly held beliefs about the origins and defining characteristics of the Basque people (chosen people, divine language, universal nobility, purity of blood, collective nobility, etc.)… The constitutive elements of the myth portrayed an epoch characterised by great prosperity and happiness where Basques were virtuous, pure, and authentic. As an evolving literary tradition, it was highly significant because it became a pre-modern vehicle of ethnic identity for Basque reading elites and a symbolic framework [whose core function] was to contrast the contemporary situation (usually characterised by decline) with an epic past time of splendour.

One of the earliest universal definitions of the Basque identity was made by Humboldt who visited the Basque country at the beginning of the 19th century and decided to make further research in the origins of the Basque language. Humboldt (1801) defines the Basque community as “the surviving remnants of an ancient civilisation” (as cited in Noci 1999, February: 4). Noci (1999) indicates that many more definitions mainly derived from travel books of the 19th and 20th century related to the Basque culture were based on the general acceptance that the Basque community were loyal to their territory, language, and old customs in times of great social-political transitions.

The Basque conservationist perspective becomes clearer in their preservation of the Basque language. Noci (1999: 6) indicates that the Basque language was considered as the ‘language of the mountains’ while French and Spanish were seen as ‘prestige languages’. He states that priests and nationalists never tried to put the Basque language at school, in the army, or at work in the cities. This was all done in the name of keeping it as pure as it could be in idyllic reservations (ibid.). Defending the language and its symbolic value has been an important part of the Basque nationalist movement. This tendency became even more concrete as the Basque Provinces started to receive a wave of immigrants from different parts of Spain to work in iron ores and steel industry.
The economic boom by the late 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century, first in the town of Bizkaia and then spreading to the other Basque towns, made a radical change on the fabric of what had been seen as the traditional Basque life. In particular, Bilbao had become a modern city and the industrial base of Spain. In parallel with that, a new Basque urban middle class was born. According to Watson (1996) even though they were Basque, some of them tended to associate the Basque culture with regressive and anti-modern values. Some key components of the Basque culture received serious attacks from this rapidly changing society (ibid.). Language, in particular became the core value to be preserved from the erosion of the old Basque social order (ibid.).

In this era of rapid industrialisation, urban expansion and massive immigration, the transition from agrarian to the industrial society uprooted local elites while traditional social life went through erosion. In the words of Muro (2008: 39):

> The urban lower middle classes of Bilbao, still in the shock because of the loss of fueros (1876), felt under pressure from the process of modernisation, and, unable to benefit from industrial development, faced the prospect of proletarianisation… Some traditionalists consciously took refuge in the foralist literary works that praised a harmonious vision of a pre-industrial and rural Basque Country.

The nationalism of Sabino Arana, the father of modern Basque nationalism, was effectively based on the articulation of these feelings of nostalgia for disappearing old order and advocation of regenerating the Basque culture through sovereign statehood (ibid.). His ideas on Basque history were heavily influenced by the writings of “foralists, a group of romantics who praised Basque history, myths and traditions” (Muro 2005: 577). To Arana, the evils of industrialisation, such as the decline of Catholism and use of Euskara, “coincided with the arrival of outsiders” (Muro 2008: 40). According to Arana segregation was the only way to heal and protect the Basques from what he saw as the erosion of the Basque culture.
Castells and Jauregui (1996) argue that much of the Basque culture was and, to a certain extent, still is based on pastoral and rural discourses against the modern urban global culture and industrialisation. In their view, Basque nationalism is also built on the radical contrast between the Spanish and the Basque, seeing the two as naturally antagonistic, in particular the idea of the Basque Country as antithetical to Spain. According to the nationalist argument the Basque Country is occupied by Spain; therefore, the Basque nationalism is not only an anti-system political movement, but also anti-Spain (ibid.).

The idea of Spanish invasion of the Basque land became more concrete during the Franco regime, as all different languages and cultural expressions apart from the dominant ones promoted by the Francoists were banned in Spain. This oppression led the Basque nationalist politicians and intellectuals to reframe the Basque identity and nationalism over the old nationalistic ideas of Arana and anti-Francoism. ETA adopted the myths of the Basque Golden Age from the ideas of Arana which are summarised by Jauregui (1981 as cited in Muro 2005: 580) as: a) that in the remote past all Basques were equal and noble (universal nobility); b) that Basques had eternally been independent (and that fueros were an expression of that political independence); and c) that the Basque nation had been occupied by two different states, the Spanish and the French. However, ETA differed from the traditional traits of PNV in the way: a) it declares itself secular; b) it adopted gradually Marxist ideas into its political corpus; and b) it broke up with the idea of the Basque language and race as the essential elements of Basqueness adopting the “will” as an important element instead (ibid.).

However, despite ETA’s underestimation of its importance at the beginning, Euskara started to recover in the 1960s. The language for nationalist discourse, was once more the symbolic element of collective Basque identity (Tejerina 1996). This symbolic importance pushed Euskara to “a more prominent position

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79 Break up with Catholism
in schools, homes and social spheres” (ibid.: 236). Tejerina (1996: 236) argues that:

On the death Franco and subsequent disappearance of direct repression, nationalist discourse and its symbols dominated Basque society. One of the objectives was to extend the usage of the language, then only spoken by 20 percent of the population. A great majority of the Basque people supported this drive... The symbolic character of the language and the predominance of nationalist discourse explain the intensification of the recuperation process over the two decades.

According to Pérez-Agote (1999: 59) “throughout the 1960s, the two social processes of confrontation (the violence between the state and ETA) and reinforcement (ETA’s violence and collective support of it) increased the pressure within the Basque intersubjective framework, which, under the Franco regime, had been reduced to silence”. In the 1970s, the collective discontent became increasingly expressed in public spheres. Pérez-Agote (1999: 59-60) argues that:

After 1970, the cuadrillas (groups of friends) and the memberships of some associations were taken to the streets during the crucial dramatic moments of social life (political protests, funerals of ETA activists, etc.). The occupation of the streets, in spite of its intermittent character, supposes the emergence and display of Basque symbology: nationalism and other symbols of difference became public. There was a process in which public expression increasingly was given to a consciousness that heretofore had been guarded in private. In general, Basque nationalism came to enjoy dominance of the streets, and other public spaces, that was disproportionate to its electoral strength.

According to Pérez-Agote (1999: 59) the politicisation of collective life, occupation of the streets, and the violence of ETA, which he defines as the “solidly interlocked three elements”, confront “state violence”. Pérez-Agote further argues that “this complex social dynamic culminated in the first years of
post-Francoism, creating difficulties for the political rationalisation and normalisation of Basque society in this period of political reform” (ibid.). Thereby, at the beginning of the post-Francoism in the mid-1970s, it was “difficult to insulate politics from collective street life in order to situate it in a different social sphere, i.e., where the representatives of the people (the professional politicians) act (representation as both political delegation and in the theatrical sense)” (ibid.). “This constitution of politics into a differentiated social sphere” was, after all, the Western political model to which “Spanish society adjusted by means of the so-called political reform or democratisation of Spain” (ibid. 60).

Pérez-Agote (1999: 60) states that another consequence of this new way was a “reduction of the political pressure on society in general”. According to him, a shift was taking place in the social attitudes toward political violence as a result of this. In his words (1999: 60-61):

A progressive splintering occurred within the Basque political continuum that was, and is, configured by the existence of a social mechanism that we might call reason-sentiment ambivalence. That is, within the nationalist world, a person who was politically opposed in principal to ETA’s tactics could nevertheless, and because of his/her personal experience under Francoism, harbour positive affective feelings towards the violence. The superposition of disparate political discourses would progressively force social actors to chose between them, i.e., to support or oppose the violence.

In particular in the 1980s, issues affecting the Basque youth such as the refusal to do military service, unemployment, drugs, the squatter movement and Basque radical rock were highly debated by the nationalist radical organisations such as Jarrai (Muro 2008). In 1990s Jarrai, which was established in 1979 as a youth organisation of the MLNV, had become the main actor of what came to be known
as “kale borroka” (street fight) and “provided the MNLV with new recruits” (ibid.: 132).

Jarrai (1986) defined it self as:

a youth political organisation which considers that Basque youth, on top of the problems it already has, belongs to an oppressed and occupied nation, Euskal Herria; and we are also part of the popular sections of society which led by the Basque working class are called to change the current situation until we eliminate this oppression (as cited in Muro 2008: 132).

The most important issue in the 1980s was Spain’s controversial NATO membership (1981) which was opposed by Jarrai. Another important issue in which Jarrai was very active was the Basque environmentalist movement, such as the protest actions against the Lemoiz nuclear power station. Barcena et al. (2000, April: 1) state that “Basque ecologism from its very outset has had direct and contentious relationship with” the MNLV, “within which a part of ecologist movement was integrated and which has contributed the greatest support and resources, as well as motives for divergence and splits”. Demonstrations, rallies and refusals to pay electricity bills were organised for the abolishment of the Lemoiz nuclear station construction (Muro 2008). ETA sabotaged the building works in 246 actions and killed five people involved in the project which resulted in the government’s withdrawal from the project (ibid.).

ETA and Jarrai were also active in the actions carried out against the Leizaran highway project during the period of 1990-1992 which was rejected by the government. “Both Lemoiz and Leizaran came to be remembered as great victories for the MLNV and for ETA” (Muro 2008: 133). Since the mid-1970s environmental mobilisations and policy have had a high profile in the mass media and have been influential on the Basque political agenda (Barcena et al. 2000, April).
5.1.3. The Basque Ecologist Movement (BEM)

The roots of the environmental movement in the Basque Country goes back to the heavy industrialisation process in the 1960s and 1970s in which the ecological deficit was intense particularly in the provinces of Bizkaia and Gipuzkoa (Barcena & Ibarra 2001). “The increasing unemployment and dismantling of industries followed this period and marked the 1980s” (Barcena & Ibarra 2001: 4). In the words of Barcena and Ibarra (2001: 4):

At the end of this traumatic and pessimistic decade, the leading classes in Basque politics and economy offered public opinion the choice of taking the road of Maastricht and the European Union, of becoming first class citizens of Europe, or continuing in a state of underdevelopment. In the shadow of this rhetorical choice, a host of infrastructural and public works projects emerged (the Bilbao metro and the High Speed Trains, museums and congress centres, new roads and motorways, reservoirs and canals, industrial superports and recreational harbours, new thermic power stations and re-gasification plants…).

The political elites promoted these developments as the necessity and consequence of the Basque integration to the European and global competitiveness. However, by the Basque Ecologist Movement (BEM) they were perceived as a mortgage for the short-term future development of the Basque Country (ibid.). For an important part of the Basque society, these mega infrastructures became the representation of local, national, social, environmental and cultural disarticulation (ibid.).

The BEM emerged from the rejection of and confrontation to the construction of the Lemoiz nuclear power station at the end of the 1970s. This movement and its demands were ignored entirely by the Spanish and Basque political institutions. Since it was a massive scale project and a great diversity of interests were at stake, negotiations would be impossible in a period of crisis and political change. As
Barcena and Ibarra (2001) indicate, with the death of Franco (1975) the Francoist institutions had lost their authority and the new autonomous ones were weak. The political turmoil triggered by the Lemoiz nuclear station became a “testing ground” for these conflicting interests (ibid.: 3). In this political context, “the Basques created another option for themselves; to reject the nuclear power station” (ibid.). The slogan of the BEM was ‘Euskadi or Lemoiz’ which forced the Basques to make a choice between the old Francoist governance practices or the “self-determination” (ibid.). As a result of a long-held campaign of civil disobedience and numerous sabotage actions targeting the Administration and the company responsible for the construction of the Lemoiz nuclear power plant, together with ETA’s armed actions, the construction was abolished. Not only Lemoiz but also the other five nuclear stations proposed to be built in Euskal Herria by the Madrid government were rejected. During this time the BEM gained nation-wide popularity (Barcena et al. 2000, April).

On the political ground of the BEM at its emergence phase Barcena et al. (2000, April: 3-4) state:

In Euskal Herria it was the anti-Francoist neighbourhood movement that provoked debate and organised mobilisations in favour of decent living conditions for the Basque working class (Erandio-Gas, Dow Chemical-Leioa, Barakaldo-Sefanitro…). These mobilisations spread throughout the territory and even came to include the defence of natural spaces (Belagoa Gorbea, Urdaibai, Txingudi…). It was the direct relationship existing between the first Anti-nuclear Committees and the Associations of Neighbours and Families, promoted by the anti-Francoist left that explains why from their origin until the early 1980s the Committees did not accept the word ‘ecologist’. This arose from their distrust towards those conservationist or less politicised options that did not adopt a clear position against nuclear energy (Barcena et al. 1995: 25). The public discourse of the BEM at the outset was openly anti-capitalist and, besides
questioning the civil application of nuclear energy, it also questioned the
model of society that nuclear energy implied (emphasis added).

Barcena et al. (2000, April) define the BEM through three axes of public environmental discourse from its emergence to current times: 1) the nationalist, 2) the localist and 3) the anti-developmentalist discourses. The nationalist discourse has several different propositions which promote (ibid.: 15):

a) Inserting ecologist discourse within a determinate nationalist political strategy;
b) Connecting the ecologist discourse with a generic defence of the territory defined within the boundaries of the Basque nation;
c) Wanting to maintain and build environmentalist organisations that differentiated from Spanish and French organisations, in so far as there is an affirmation of the existence of a differentiated national community;
d) Responding to the discursive defence of a distinct style (certain attitudes inherited from the culture and the praxis of radical nationalism) that frame and orientate relations with the political institutions.

In particular, the Basque left-wing nationalism has been the central political referent of the BEM, which has founded its complex socio-political framework both as a channel to make its demands heard and a foundation for eliciting support for ecologist mobilisation (ibid.). However, starting from the 1990s, BEM has moved its emphasis from the national scale to the local one. It has adopted a more localist framing strategy of the defence of the land which is articulated against the industrial aggression and macro projects that destroy both the environment and the harmony of Basque communities (Barcena & Ibarra 2001: 190).

The localist discourse of the BEM underlines the fact that social mobilisations regarding environmental concerns often start from local conflicts and
environmental aggression. Larger environmental movements emerge from “the stabilisation and amplification of protests in the face of local conflicts” (Barcena et al. 2000, April: 18). Similarly, the ecologist movements and demands are usually a process of generalisation from the local. Today, such generalisation hardly ever occurs or does so in a weak way (ibid.). This means according to Barcena et al. (2000, April: 18-19):

1) The national actors have lost their leading role in social mobilisations emerging from local conflicts. These conflicts are often managed by local groups and organisations.

2) Local movements are community-based environmental movements that react against an aggression on what they perceive to be their common living space. These movements are driven by networks that are flexible and heterogeneous in their interests for defending the land. Therefore, they are capable of integrating with the global discourse and use of multi-level resource mobilisation.

3) In local movements a specific conflict takes place between two opposing philosophies on human-nature relations which can be described as “we” that decides on what is close and felt by the community to be its own. From the political opportunity structure, this means that what frames and shapes the process is the local political context; the specific form in which decisions are taken in a specific territory.

4) Localist movements follow a discourse based on these three elements: an “egoistic NIMBY\textsuperscript{80} culture”; democratic citizenship, and an idealisation of what is one’s own, of nature as a space for the recognition of identity.

\textsuperscript{80} Abbrevation for ‘Not in My Back Yard’ which is used for describing local community opposition to a new development in their vicinity as these might cause adverse social-ecological impacts on the community and its livelihood. Residents prefer new developments to be elsewhere.
According to Pérez-Agote (1999) of the five relevant politico-administrative levels of government in the Basque country (municipal, provincial, and the Basque governmental as internal, and Spanish national and the European Union as external), the so-called Basque public opinion has an evident skewing in favour of local controls. Indeed, the closer to home, the more popular the level of government (ibid.: 58). Pérez-Agote (1999: 58-59) argues that even though the Basque nationalist politicians seem as they put great emphasis on European ties “as a possibility for effecting suprastate institutionalisation that would accommodate direct political relations with Europe while circumventing Madrid”, they are aware of the fact that, at least for the time being “Europe is a union of states not one of ethnies”. “Therefore, the Basques, for the time being, do not place their trust in that political structure” (ibid.: 59).

The anti-developmentist discourse has been strongly present in the BEM. This can also be understood as “ecologism of contrariety”, one that rejects and confronts a particular dominant form of development promoted by the larger politico-economic system (Barcena et al. 2000, April: 24). This has given rise to a political culture of environmentalist conflict “which, in a manifestive way, confronts institutional values (growth, competitiveness, new image renewal, technological change and representative democracy) with those defended by the BEM (sustainability, equity, health, clean production, participatory democracy)” (ibid.).

That is why in the discourse of BEM threat to nature is not treated solely as an ecological concern. On the contrary, it is evaluated within the framework of political ecology which, in the words of Barcena et al. (1997: 300), aims at developing “constructive relationship between people and nature”. From the localist discourse of the BEM, a problem or a conflict is dealt with problem-based approach which is more down to earth, flexible, and responsive (ibid.). This approach is expressed as the defence of the land in which land means all social and natural systems operating on it.
The localist and the anti-developmentalist discourses of BEM emerged, to a great extent, from the reformulation of the Basque identity and nationalism within the MLNV in the new environmental context which started to have political importance in the Basque country after the death of Franco. On the conjunction of the Basque ecologism and nationalism Barcena et al. (1997: 306) argue that as the moderate Basque nationalism “opted for a pro-development model”, the BEM “looked for an alliance with left-wing nationalism” whose choice “has been to cooperate within its ideological framework certain cultural references and particular demands which come from progressive camp (socialism, defence of the workers’ movement, new social movements and so on)”. The BEM’s alliance formation with the MLNV was mainly due to the social networks and the alternative discoursive resources offered by the left-wing nationalism (ibid.).

BEM explains a large portion of how the anti-Itoiz Dam movement emerged and developed. This grass-roots mobilisation was coordinated from the beginning to the end by a local platform, the Coordinating Committee of Itoiz (CCI) which on a number of occasions declared their aim as to defend the Irati Valley and its people against the Itoiz Dam. However, it established multi-scale alliance with organisations such as COAGRET operating at national scale and parallel movements such as the BEM being influential at regional scale. With the involvement of the Solidari@s con Itoiz in 1995, the anti-developmentalist discourse of this movement became more apparent. What is more important than all is that this local movement established its link with important references - the most important of them being the Basque identity – through the BEM which resulted in political empowerment of not only the community of the Irati Valley but also others that suffer from injust and unsustainable governance practices in the Basque Country and Spain by setting an example to them. In the words of Barcena et al. (1997: 306):

The lack of a resolution to the national conflict in Euskadi means that ecologists and left-nationalist organisations take part in united action and with harmonised discourses because of the accumulative resonance
which they bring to each other. The confluent relationship between the [Basque] nationalist and ecologist discourses has amplified the mobilising capacity and the reach of the discourse of both these social actors.

5.2. The anti-İlîsu Dam movement

_We do not have luxury here but we are not hungry either. Besides we live in the most beautiful place on earth. I wouldn’t go anywhere else even if they paid me millions._

_An inhabitant of Hasankeyf_

The anti-İlîsu Dam movement emerged, in the first place, as a social injustice platform built on primarily the Kurdish problem in the context of Turkey. This movement focused on an international campaign targeting attention of the public and the decision-making units of particular European countries through protest actions so that the multi-nationals that were responsible for the construction of the Dam and the European Credit Agencies that would financially support those firms in these countries would withdraw from the İlîsu Dam project. The campaign became successful in 2001 and became internationally recognised in the global environmental justice platform. However, when the project re-emerged in 2004, it was increasingly understood that without a grassroots movement, the threat that the İlîsu Dam project posed would only be delayed, not eradicated.

What makes the Anti-İlîsu Dam movement a particularly interesting case in Turkey is the way it utilised the Kurdish cultural symbols such as the town of Hasankeyf for starting a regional scale mobilisation and the way it built multi-level alliances with global scale organisations to convert Hasankeyf from an important symbol for the Kurds to a symbol of world heritage. For the first time in Turkey, a local social movement has received such international recognition and
support. In this way, the anti-Ilısu Dam movement sets an example for parallel movements taking place in not other domains and parts of Turkey, but also the Middle East countries such as Syria and Iraq which both have large Kurdish population and share the Euphrates-Tigris Basin with Turkey.

5.2.1. The evolution of the anti-Ilısu Dam movement

The Ilısu Dam project is one of the pillar projects of the regional scale South-eastern Anatolia Project(GAP) which was mentioned for the first time in the 1960s. Although it has been over four decades since the Ilısu Dam was planned, until the late 1990s no serious step was taken to construct it. The main reason behind the delay was economic. The long-held armed dispute since 1984 between the Turkish army and the Kurdish guerrillas taking place in the south-eastern region of Turkey where the Ilısu Dam was projected had not only drained the national financial resources, but also created economic instability in this region which discouraged economic investment. In addition, within years the regional scale GAP had received much criticism at international platforms which resulted in significant delays. These delays also raised the cost of the projects within the GAP.

As Turkey did not have the economic means to construct the Ilısu Dam, it was decided in 1997 that it would be built by the interested European companies. Since the area that the Ilısu Reservoir was planned was a war zone, great risks were at stake. This economical and political instability would be taken care of by the Export Credit Agencies (ECA).

Shortly after the official announcement of the Ilısu Dam, some town councils, NGOs and Diyarbakır branch of the Union Chambers of Turkish Engineers and Architects (TMMOB) came together to establish the Initiative to Keep

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81 Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi
82 The Swiss Sulzer Hydro (the main contractor), Swiss ABB, and British Balfour Beatty were among these companies.
83 Türk Mimar ve Mühendis Odaları Birliği
Hasankeyf Alive. The initiative built alliance at the international level with the Kurdish Human Rights Project (KHRP), Rivernet, International Rivers, Friends of the Earth and Export Credit Campaign (ECC). The platform focused on Hasankeyf; one of the many towns by the Tigris River, which was located in the flood zone of the planned Ilisu Reservoir.

Photograph 7: Hasankeyf and the Tigris River

Apart from being an important cross point of ancient trade roads (e.g. the Silk Road) and some ancient water routes, the town of Hasankeyf had always been an important symbol of the Kurdish culture. However, with the threat of the Ilisu Dam, this historical town has transformed into the symbol of the anti-Ilisu Dam movement.

The recent history of Hasankeyf holds a mirror to a half century-old debate over the Ilisu Dam project and the two phases of de-territorialisation of the community living in this town. First, inhabitants of Hasankeyf who had been living for generations in the human made caves carved into the rocks on which the town was built were resettled by force (1966). The caves were evacuated following a top-down decision of the Turkish President Cevdet Sunay who was on a field trip in Hasankeyf. On seeing that people were living in caves, he ordered to the officials: “How can our citizens live in caves in modern times? Build immediately decent houses for these poor people!” Living in caves was considered then as the failure
of the Turkish state in combating poverty. According to officials, for fulfilling the requirements of the Ministry of Public Works and Settlement’s legislation and in the name of *improving the quality of human life*, the construction of the forty m² government houses started. During the construction of these buildings, many historical structures in Hasankeyf were destroyed under the heavy bulldozers.

*Photograph 8: The human-made caves of Hasankeyf*

When the construction was completed, people refused to live in these buildings. Even a gendarme station which operated during decades was built in order to force people to live in these new houses. Locals of Hasankeyf did not want to live in these buildings because these were poorly isolated and were cold in winter while hot in summer. The old caves, on the contrary, were naturally better isolated. During decades, some locals went back to their old caves but the gendarmes enforced them to leave the caves and go back to government houses. The locals were not given the right to choose where they would take shelter.

Second, the area was declared as a first grade archaeological protection zone (1978) by the Turkish Ministry of Culture. However, quite ironically this helped nothing but inviting uncontrolled excavations and looting of the historical artefacts due to lack of protection measures. This decision made possible only a certain type of tourism in which construction of new infrastructures and the use of old caves for accommodating tourists were strictly prohibited and the economic
activities were limited to either running a restaurant or a souvenir shop in the
town. With this decision the locals of Hasankeyf became, to a great extent, unable
to control their own activities in their livelihood. They were not given the right to
choose the economic activity that they would make living of.

In addition, as a result of the decades-old rumours related to the Ilısu reservoir and
that it would flood the town of Hasankeyf with some other towns along the Tigris
River, the people of Hasankeyf were forced to accept what was being imposed
upon them by the Turkish state; that this town did not belong to them but the
Turkish state. Until 1997, when the project was officially pronounced for the first
time, people of Hasankeyf went on living “in the shadow of rumours” as the
mayor of Hasankeyf, Adbulvahap Kusen\textsuperscript{84} indicates.

The Initiative to Keep Hasankeyf Alive was established after the official
declaration. The Initiative focused primarily on the economic aspect of the Ilısu
Dam project. Since the realisation of the project depended entirely on foreign
investment, the initiative planned an international campaign aiming at attracting
attention of the public and decision-making units of the contractor countries. As a
result of an international anti-dam campaign that lasted for two years, all
contractors withdrew from the Ilısu Dam project by 2001.

However, the victory did not last long. In 2004, the project re-emerged with new
contractors from Austria, Germany and Switzerland. Even further, a symbolic
ground breaking ceremony took place in 2006. Since then, only twelve gendarme
stations have been built in the Ilısu village in which the dam would be
constructed.

With the past knowledge of the first campaign, the Initiative to Keep Hasankeyf
Alive started the second anti-dam campaign to be carried out primarily in the
current contractor countries. They built alliance with some NGOs operating in
these countries namely World Economy, Ecology and Development (WEED)
\footnote{Quoted from an interview held with Abdulvahap Kusen in his office in Hasankeyf Municipality in 07.07.2008}
from Germany, Berne Declaration from Switzerland and the Austrian ECA-Watch, and three other organisations; the Forest & the European Union Resource Network (FERN), Cornerhouse, and the KHRP.

The focus of the campaign was the legal and ethical aspects of the proposed dam project. The project did not meet the 153 requirements which were obligatory to be officially started. According to the Committee on Culture, Science and Education (CCSE) (2006: 4-5) the requirements about income restoration, counter-risk measures, improvement plans and impoverishment of fifty-five thousand people to be affected by the project were not addressed. Even after two years in 2008 there was no significant progress regarding these requirements. In the Joint Call to Halt İlısu Dam (2008) which the Initiative to Keep Hasankeyf Alive sent to the decision-making units in the contractor countries, it was indicated that a project like this would never been accepted in any EU country. Corrupted network of interests between multi-nationals, ECAs and governments were underlined in the Joint Call.

The case of İlısu was also taken to the National Court by various groups, as Hasankeyf was a historical protection zone declared by the Ministry of Culture. Flooding this town would mean ignoring the decisions of Turkey’s own ministry. The project was also brought into the European Court of Human Rights. The case was investigated through various angles such as the illegal applications during the process of competitive bidding which informed only three companies. This was also against the Public Tender Law of Turkey (Çal 2008).

The international organisation ECA-Watch played a significant role in exposing the illegality of the İlısu Dam project. The project was lacking all legal requirements but was not rejected yet. This was indicated to be so thanks to the ECAs. According to Norlen et al. (2002) ECAs lack sufficient environmental and social policies, and do not adhere to internationally accepted standards and guidelines for dam development. Norlen et al. (2002) argue that ECAs finance such dam projects which have no resettlement plans and are based on
environmental assessment violating cultural and natural heritage. In their view these organisations “lack transparency and contempt for the affected communities”, “spread corruption in the developing countries”, “adding to a crushing debt for developing countries”, and taking no responsibility leaving the “political and financial costs of project failures to respective country’s national treasure rather than themselves and their corporate clients” (ibid.1-3). They operate under no common environmental standards which results in certain ECAs’ profiting by financing destructive dam projects which others refuse to accept (ibid.). The lack of coordination among them results in environmental and social “race to the bottom” (ibid. 3).

Meanwhile, the Initiative to Keep Hasankeyf Alive published some technical informative and fact-finding reports on the socio-ecological impacts of the Ilısu Dam project. Ercan Ayboğa, the spokesman of the Initiative, indicates that the reason behind preparing and publishing these reports was that official reports did not reflect the real situation. Locals were afraid of expressing their real opinions to the officials. He also argues that the public opinion about the project changed drastically in the very recent years and this was not reflected in the old reports. When the Ilısu Dam project was officially declared in 1997, the majority was in favour of it because they had no hope in winning against the state and were expecting reasonable compensation. However, as they witnessed social-ecological impacts of other dam projects in the GAP area such as in the case of the Birecik Dam, they gradually changed opinion.

On the 15th of April 2008, a consultation meeting took place for the public hearing on resettlement in Hasankeyf which was organised by the Hasankeyf district administrator, the State Hydraulic Works (DSİ) deputy general director and the expropriation – the head of the DSİ and the representatives of the Housing

85 Quoted from an online interview held with him in 20.03.2008. 
86 The Birecik Dam - another project of GAP - was completed in 2000. As most of the inhabitants of the flooded areas did not have title to land, they received no compensation. Eighteen villages were evacuated by military force, and some villages were even misinformed about the inundation levels. Some other villages submerged partially without any warning. The ones that received compensation were given new houses in bad conditions in the slums of the outskirts of the city (Ronayne 2005, February: 27).
Development Administration of Turkey\(^{87}\) (TOKİ). In the meeting it was announced that the people of Hasankeyf who choose to move to the new resettlement site after the Ilısu Dam is completed should pay 73,000 YTL\(^{88}\) (currently around 36,000 euro) which would be set off against the amount that the family would get for their house in Hasankeyf as compensation. People would then have to start paying the amount that remains after five years in a period of fifteen years. The Major of Hasankeyf who also attended the meeting indicated that the price of the houses in Hasankeyf was estimated to be between only 20,000 and 30,000 YTL as they were old and had not been restored in the past due to official prohibition because Hasankeyf was protected as a first degree archaeological site (Hasankeyf Initiative 2008: 1-2).

This would mean that the people of Hasankeyf would be in debt to the state if they choose to move to the resettlement site. As the compensation money which consists of the price of their current houses in Hasankeyf would be less than the price of the new houses of resettlement site, they would have to pay back the rest in twenty years.

The Initiative to Keep Hasankeyf Alive, in the second anti-dam campaign, also organised protest actions, demonstrations and informative meetings nation-wide. Concerts, excursions to Hasankeyf and tree planting festivals were some of these activities. One interesting protest was when around hundred inhabitants of the Hasankeyf town went to Ankara, the capital of Turkey, in 4.03.2008 to apply for a symbolic political asylum at the embassies of three contractor countries: Austria, Germany and Switzerland. These protesters, in their letters written to the ambassadors of the three countries, indicated that if the Dam was built, their families would have no place to live. Under these circumstances, they should be given the right to immigrate to those countries which were principally responsible for the construction of the Ilısu Dam.

\(^{87}\) Türkiye Toplu Konut İdaresi Başkanlığı

\(^{88}\) Yeni Türk Lirası (New Turkish Lira)
On the 10th of December 2008 in Vienna, in the leadership of the ECA-Watch, fifty activists of ‘Stop Ilisu!’ campaign occupied the Kontrollbank which was the main financial supporter of the Ilısu Dam project (See photograph 9). Following this event, the ECAs in the Ilısu Dam project, Euler Hermes Kreditversicherung from Germany, Kontrollbank of Austria and Swiss Schweizerische Exportrisikoversicherung, gave the Turkish officials 180 days to submit evidence that they were complying with the 153 requirements on environmental protection, resettlement of villages, protection of cultural heritage, and resource management with neighbouring states.

Photograph 9: “Stop Ilisu!” protest held in Vienna

As Turkey did not fulfil these requirements, the three ECAs indicated in a joint press release issued in 07.07.2009 that they withdrew from the project. Shortly after, in another joint press release90 issued on the same day, the three banks91 financing the Ilısu Dam project also stated - in line with the decision of the ECAs

89 Available from http://m-h-s.org/ilisu/front_content.php?idcat=156
90 Available from website of the BankTrack http://www.banktrack.org/show/news/european_banks_withdraw_from_ilisu_dam_project_in_turkey
91 Société Générale, UniCredit, and DekaBank
- that the export credit granted by the three banks for the construction of the Ilısu Dam would no longer be available.

This was the second victory of the Initiative to Keep Hasankeyf Alive. This also meant that Turkey would have to finance the proposed project with internal sources. Following these developments, the Minister of Forestry and Environment (OÇB), Veysel Eroğlu, on a number of platforms, declared that the government had the power and the money to construct the dam. He also indicated that the construction would start by October or November 2009.

Since the 5th WWF held in Istanbul in March 2009, several demonstrations and meetings took place in different parts of Turkey for protesting both the Ilısu Dam and the other dam constructions all over the country (See photograph 10). Some of these dams are already completed while some such as the Ilısu Dam are at the beginning stage.

Photograph 10: Demonstration in Hasankeyf (17.10.2009)

Now, it is crucial for the anti-Ilısu Dam movement to integrate with other parallel movements at national scale for forming a nation-wide grassroots movement to challenge the unsustainable Turkish water paradigm and its practices which
became clear in Veysel Eroğlu’s words\textsuperscript{92}: “We do not need their money. We will construct this dam at any cost”.

5.2.2. The Kurdish nationalism and identity in Turkey

The water problems in the GAP region in Turkey cannot be explored without understanding the socio-political conditions that created them in the first place. The Kurdish problem and the Turkish state’s approach to this issue influenced, to a great extent, the particular style of Turkish water management. In addition, international actors such as Syria and Iraq with whom Turkey shares the Euphrates-Tigris basin played significant roles in Turkish framing of the water problems in the GAP area. It is also equally true that the GAP dams and hydroelectric infrastructures have had a large impact on the Kurdish society. However, the Kurdish response to this mega project came decades later. The anti-Ilısu Dam movement cannot be understood without understanding the people who form this movement. After all, the destiny of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers became the destiny of the inhabitants of the GAP region; in particular the Kurdish community. Answering how the Kurdish identity was politicised within the broad Kurdish nationalism movement explains how the anti-Ilısu Dam movement emerged and developed, and what future awaits this movement in the aftermath of the European contractors’ withdrawal of the project.

5.2.2.1. Turkish Kurdistan and the Kurdish nationalism

The Kurds live on a territory named as Kurdistan which expands to the lands of Iran, Iraq, Syria, Turkey and some parts of Armenia (See map 4). In its history, Kurdistan has never gained political recognition as an independent country even through it has existed through centuries in the Middle East region.

The Kurds speak a language known as Kurdish which can be categorised within three main dialect groups: Kurmanji spoken mainly in Turkey, Zaza spoken mostly in Iraq, and Gurani which is more common in Iran. These linguistic differences limited communication within the Kurdish tribes in the past and prevented, to some extent, them from acting as a single nation. Most Kurds today speak the official languages of the countries they live in. This linguistic diversity results in, as Laçiner and Bal (2004) indicate, particular difficulty in making a clear statement with reference to the Kurdish issues, since one does not talk about one particular and unique people, but a combination of tribes with different perceptions and demands. Therefore, the Kurds refer to a large community of communities that represents a great diversity (ibid.).

This diversity increases as the Kurdish Diaspora in Europe is taken into consideration. According to the Kurdish Institute of Paris\textsuperscript{93} (IKP) (2009) the Kurdish Diaspora consists of over a million Kurds living in Europe. The majority lives in the Western countries such as the UK, Germany, Austria and the

\textsuperscript{93} Institut Kurde de Paris
Netherlands. The Kurds of Turkey that immigrated to Austria, Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK in the 1960s with the Turks was the first large Kurdish group that went to Europe. Later on, in the 1980s and 1990s, with the social and political turmoil in the Middle East, new waves of Kurdish refugees from Iran and Iraq arrived in Europe.

Due to the stateless condition, there are differing figures about the Kurdish population. Estimations over the Kurdish population living in the Middle East vary between sixteen to twenty-five million. The Kurds living in Turkey constitute not only the second biggest ethnic group after the Turks in this country, but also more than half of the Kurds living in the entire Middle East. Even though, the Kurdish population in Turkey is concentrated in the South-eastern region, with the increasing urbanisation and migration from the East to the West, many Kurds live also in large cities of Turkey.

Kurdish history is complicated and international actors played important roles in it due to their own interests in the Middle East region. The first known civilisations and three world religions were born in these lands. The historical dimension also makes the Kurdish issue a particularly difficult case to understand. In this study, Kurdish history is explored through the Kurds’ relationship with the Turkish state, first as the Ottoman Empire, and currently as the Turkish Republic.

The relationship between the Kurds and the Turkish state started in 1513-1514 when the Ottoman Sultan Selim sent his troops to the Safavid Empire in Persia. The Kurdish communities from the Sunni and Shafi sect of Islam which were oppressed by the Safavid state fought along with the Ottoman army and then failed under the Ottoman rule (Tan 2009: 74). During the years of the rule of Sultan Selim (1512-1520), these Kurdish communities had a large degree of autonomy. The Ottoman Empire did not intervene with their governance and internal affairs. However, the Kurds paid tax to the Ottoman Empire. They were also obliged to join the Ottoman army in case there was a war (ibid.: 79).
Even though, there had been some Ottoman intervention to the internal Kurdish affairs and some minor conflicts between the Ottomans and the Kurds, the Kurdish governments and emirates maintained their autonomy till the beginning of the 19th century. It was then when the centralisation policy of the Ottoman Sultan Mahmud II started. Mahmud II adopted this policy as a response to the socio-political developments in the aftermath of the French Revolution (1789); the rise of nationalism and nation-state in Europe. The Ottoman Empire which used to span three continents was in a deep crisis having difficulty in ruling its diverse subjects. During the rule of Mahmud II (1808-1839) the traditional Ottoman governance structures started to go through significant changes in the name of modernisation. In 1826, the Anatolian part of the Ottoman Empire was divided into four large states and the governance of these new states was left to the Ottoman pashas.

In a period of such transition, the strongest emirate in Kurdistan was the Botan Emirate under the rule of Bedirhan who had kept good relations with the Ottoman Empire and even fought within the Ottoman army in 1839 for defeating the Governor of Egypt which led a rebellion against the Empire. As the Ottoman forces lost this battle, Bedirhan as well lost a large number of his soldiers. After this serious defeat, the Ottoman Empire did not interfere with and even supported Bedirhan although he had become the strongest ruler in Kurdistan by 1846. According to Kültürel Çoğulcu Gündem94 (KÇG) (2007) it was an Ottoman strategy to keep a strong figure as responsible for the governance of Kurdistan in times of political turmoil in the eastern Empire.

In 1839, with the declaration of the Tanzimat95 reforms the Ottoman governance structures went through even more radical changes towards centralisation. Before these reforms, large part of public services used to be carried out by local groups, religious communities and foundations. The Tanzimat reformists decided to include these services within the responsibilities of the central government structures. This way they aspired for the construction of stronger centralist

94 Cultural Plurality Initiative
95 The term Tanzimat means reform or regulation.
governance. For example, while the security of some important roads used to be maintained by particular nearby villages, after these reforms this mission was shifted to the new centralist government security forces. Similarly, the task of collecting taxes which used to be carried out by local structures was given to Ottoman government officials (KÇG 2007).

Due to these reforms, the Kurdish governments and emirates had to go through serious changes. Social response to these changes emerged in the form of rebellions and uprisings. The land reform done in this period was, in many respects, the main reason for the Kurdish revolts. These revolts were organised by some Kurdish landowners that were forced to leave their lands to the Ottoman Treasury and were given, in return, salary and a governmental position defined by the Ottoman state.

Meanwhile, both the Kurds and the Ottoman government were watching with growing scepticism the support of imperialist powers of Europe for nationalist movements among the non-Muslim subjects of the Ottoman Empire, in particular the missionary actions of the West in Armenia. At the peak of such political tension between the Kurds and the non-Muslims in the eastern Ottoman Empire, the soldiers of Emir Bedirhan attacked the non-Muslim Nasturi community and carried out a number of massacres (1843-1844). In fact, the Ottomans even turned a blind eye to these massacres. Emir Bedirhan was already becoming dangerously powerful in Kurdistan and causing trouble to the Ottoman Empire related to the governance of Midyat. At the same time, the British and the French wanted to punish Bedirhan for the Nasturi massacres. The Ottoman government decided to exile Bedirhan to Istanbul where he would be away from Kurdistan and under the control of the Ottoman government. This way the Ottomans got the Western support and limited largely the Kurdish autonomy (KÇG 2007).

According to the Ottoman Declaration of the 14.12.184796 (Bilir 2004) Diyarbakır, Van, Muş, Hakkari, Cizre, Botan and Mardin towns would be merged

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96 This declaration was published in Takvim-i Vekâyi Gazetesi in 14.12.1847 and was translated from Ottoman language to Turkish by Sezen Bilir.
and form a single Kurdistan state. The Governor of this new state was decided as the former Mosul governor Esad Pasha. Even though the Ottomans aspired to create centralist control over the Kurds through the Tanzimat reforms, they failed largely. The governors appointed by the Empire did not recognise the specific problems and the cultural structures of the Kurdish communities as well as the former Kurdish leaders. That was why they could neither govern the Kurdistan state nor were accepted as important figures in the views of the Kurdish people. In this period, the lack of authority grew and the religious leaders (sheiks) gained an increasing power within the Kurdish society. In addition, in Tanzimat period, with the Ottoman Land Registration Law, the lands in Kurdistan were given for the first time an official title deed. The strong sheiks used their power to get these titles for only themselves. As a result of this they gained even a stronger status.

The Revolt of Sheik Ubeydullah (1880-1882) emerged from such conditions. The Ottomans, with the support of Russia and the UK, repressed this revolt. Sheik Ubeydullah was exiled and sent to Istanbul as was Emir Bedirhan. In this period the Ottoman Empire was being ruled by Sultan Abdul Hamid II (1876-1909) who was following a Pan-Islamist policy due to the rise of nationalist movements among the Christian subjects of the Ottoman Empire (Akpınar et al. 2006). This Pan-Islamist policy was aiming for keeping Albanians in the Balkans, the Kurds in the East and the Arabs in the south all together in the axis of Islam (ibid). Sultan Abdul Hamid saw the Kurds as the trump card against the Armenian threat. He aimed at integrating the Kurds into the Ottoman state. In the views of the Kurdish communities at that time, it was widely assumed that the imperialist powers of Europe would establish an Armenian state and would make the Kurdish lands part of this state. This assumption was definitive in the Ottoman-Kurdish alliance. Within the Hamidiye Alayları which were formed in 1891 many Kurdish tribe leaders and prominent figures were given ranks, medals and rewards. As a result of this Kurdish-Ottoman alliance, Abdul Hamid was even named as ‘Bave Kurdan’ which means the father of Kurds. This alliance was maintained even until the establishment of the new Turkish Republic in 1923.

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97 The troops of Hamid (Sultan Abdul Hamid)
However, the Kurds living in exile in Istanbul were against Sultan Abdul Hamid. As a result of the Ottoman tradition of keeping the Kurdish leaders under control in Istanbul after the Kurdish revolts in the 19th century, there was a considerably strong Kurdish Diaspora in Istanbul. When limited communication technologies in that particular period are taken into account, the Diaspora had little connection with the actual Kurdistan and its grassroots movements. The Kurdish Diaspora in Istanbul adopted a late-coming nationalism ideology. The first Kurdish awakening emerged from studies on the Kurdish language, literature, culture and history. The legal Kurdish foundations such as Kürdistan Azm-i Kavi Cemiyeti98 (1900), Kürt Teavün ve Terakki Cemiyeti99 (1908), Kürt Neşr-i Maarif Cemiyeti100 (1910), Hêvi Kürt Talebe Cemiyeti101 (1912) and Kürdistan Muhibban Cemiyeti102 (1912) in Istanbul, and Osmanlı Kürt İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti103 (1908) in Diyarbakır (Amed) were founded in this period. Kurdistan newspaper of Cairo was first published in 1898 by Bedirhanis104 in this period.

According to KÇG (2007), as a counter effect of the Pan-Islamist line of Sultan Abdül Hamid, the Kurdish intellectuals adopted a discourse based on nationalism. This discourse focused on the importance of Kurdish education, development of the Kurdish language, literature and publishing, the solidarity and the unity of the Kurdish communities.

By the beginning of the 20th century, the Ottomans had already lost the vast majority of their territory in the Balkans and the Middle East due to liberation wars. The Empire was economically and politically weak. Following the World War I what was left from the old Ottoman territory was divided between the colonial powers of Europe. The increasing weakness of the Ottoman Empire created some political opportunities for the Kurdish community. In major Kurdish cities, cultural committees were being established. With the British support

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98 Komeleya Hevldana Bihêz
99 Komeleya Alîkarî û Pêşveçûna Kurd (Society for Mutual Aid and Progress of Kurdistan)
100 Komeleya Belavkirina Zanînê ya Kurd (Society for the Propagation of Kurdish Education)
101 Kürt Hope Student Organisation – the first legal Kurdish student organisation
102 Komeleya Hezkerên Kurdistanê (Society for the Friends of Kurdistan)
103 The Ottoman Kurdish Committee of Union and Progress
104 The followers of Emir Bedirhan
promising an independent Kurdish state, the Kurdish political mobilisation was taking a new turn.

With the breakthrough of the Young Turk revolution in 1908, many Kurdish intellectuals looked at these liberal movements and constitutional reforms as the most efficient way to gaining new rights (Barkey & Fuller 1998). Kurdish national activities were spreading not only in Istanbul but also in the large Kurdish cities such as Diyarbakır. Osmanlı Kürt İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti (1908) was the first Kurdish nationalist organisation established in Kurdistan. At this stage, the Kurdish public opinion was divided into two. On the one side was the Kurdish elite supporting constitutionalism which would mean gaining new rights as part of the Ottoman Empire, while on the other side were the Kurdish sheiks with anti-regime thesis supporting a separate Kurdish state (ibid.).

During the World War I, many Kurds fought alongside the Ottoman forces. Eskander (2000: 139) points out that before the World War I, the British Empire used to see the Ottoman Empire as a bulwark against Russian expansionism. The war made a change in Britain’s Middle Eastern policy in response to Turkey’s entry into the war as an ally to Germany. As a result of dividing the Ottoman territory, southern Kurdistan fell into French and British spheres of political influence. “Russia’s withdrawal from the war following its Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 created a profound British interest to build British control in the Southern Kurdistan” (ibid.). With the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in 1918, and the Sevres Treaty of 1920, the Kurds arrived at a turning point in their history. As the Ottoman territory was divided between the colonial powers of Europe, the Sevres Treaty\textsuperscript{105} envisaged interim autonomy for the predominantly Kurdish areas of Turkey with a view to full independence if the inhabitants of these areas wanted this (Barkey & Fuller 1998).

However, a Turkish independence army in the leadership of Mustafa Kemal revolted in 1919 against the Ottoman sultan and the European countries

\textsuperscript{105} See Eskander 2000 for more information.
occupying the Turkish territory. Mustafa Kemal saw the alliance with Kurds against the enemy as the key in this war (Yeğen 2007: 126). Mustafa Kemal’s declaration on i) the equality of the Turks and the Kurds, ii) the commonality of the independence struggle against the imperialists, and iii) the brotherhood of the two peoples received sympathy from the majority of the Kurds (ibid.). This declaration was underlining the “unified Islamic Community” and asking for the Kurdish support promising them a future Turkish-Kurdish common multi-ethnic state (ibid.).

Immediately before the foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923, it was announced that the new Republic would recognise ethnic and cultural rights of the Kurds. In the first article of Anadolu ve Rumeli Müdafâ-i Hukuk Cemiyeti\(^\text{106}\), which ruled the Turkish Independence War (1919-1922), it was stated that all Muslim groups of the Ottoman territory were genuine brothers who were full of feelings of respect for and devotion to each other (Yeğen 2007: 126). They were and should be respectful to each other’s social and ethnic norms and local conditions. The same willingness for the recognition of ethnic minority rights was expressed by the founder of the Turkish Republic Mustafa Kemal Atatürk through these words (ibid.):

> Various Muslim elements living in the country… are genuine brothers who respect each other’s ethnic, local, and moral norms [laws]… Kurds, Turks, Lazs, Circassians, all these Muslim elements living within national borders have shared interests.

Similarly in the Amasya Protocol signed in 1919, the Turks and Kurds were recognised as the two major Muslim communities of the Ottoman territory (Yeğen 2007: 127). Defining Kurds as an inseparable element of the Ottoman nation, the protocol was declaring that the ethnic and social rights of Kurds would be recognised. However, with the establishment of the new Turkish Republic in 1923, Turkish nationalism began to deny recognising the assumed cultural rights

\(^{106}\) Societies for the Defence of Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia
of not only the Kurds but also other peoples. In the words of Yeğen (2007: 127): “The ethnic minorities including the Kurds were invited to become Turks and the Kurds felt betrayed” (ibid.).

Yavuz (2001: 7) also argues that the new Turkish Republic promoted a homogenous secular nationalism as the only way for building a strong nation. In the wind of secularism, the Turkish state abolished the Caliphate in 1924. Many other modernisation reforms followed that; particularly the ones targeting the nomadic and tribal social structure of the Kurdish community. These top-down centralisation and secularisation reforms caused great frustration among the Kurds and incited the Sheikh Said rebellion of 1925, which was put down by the Turkish state. The overall aim of the revolt was to preserve the “religio-tribal structure of the Kurdish region” (ibid.). The religious leaders built alliance with other Islamist networks and adopted further Islamist discourses to mobilise a larger number of people, particularly the other anti-secularist Islamic groups such as the Sunni Turks (ibid.)

Yavuz (2001: 8) indicates that after this revolt, Turkish state became more aware of the Kurdish disappointment and extremely cautious about Kurdish activities. This awareness resulted in Turkey’s increased suppression over the Kurds. In 1927, a group of Kurdish tribal leaders and intellectuals formed the Kurdish National League as a response to these developments. This organisation provoked another revolt known as Ararat which lasted a year (1930-1931). The Turkish army had difficulty in putting it down at its early stages (ibid.). For the establishment of law and order, under the 1934 Law it organised a selective deportation and exiled some Kurdish tribe leaders to western Turkey (ibid).

These assimilation policies triggered a new revolt (1937-1938) in the town of Dersim107 located in the eastern Turkey which was and still is inhabited mainly by the Kurds from the Alevi sect of Islam. The Turkish state’s response to this revolt

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107 Dersim is the original Kurdish name for Tunceli Province.
was harsh. The name ‘Dersim’ was cleared off and the town was renamed as Tunceli (Bois 1966).

The Kurdish revolts against the Turkish Republic helped, to a large extent, to form the modern Kurdish identity, while at the same time, had great influence on the Kurdish image in the view of the Turkish state. Kurds were defined as “tribal, religiously fanatic, economically backward, and most important of all, a threat to the national integrity of the Turkish Republic” (Yavuz 2001: 8). In parallel with that, “the Kemalist\textsuperscript{108} strategy regarding the Kurdish issue evolved as a result of these rebellions” (ibid.). Yavuz (2001: 8) concludes that by defining “the Kurdish tribal culture as reactionary, backward and dangerous, Turkish state redefined itself as modern, secular and progressive”.

When the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) of Iraq was founded in 1946 under the leadership of Mustafa Barzani, the seeds of the Kurdish struggle in Turkey were being planted. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, the Kurds in Turkey started to protest the “systematic denial of Kurdish ethnic identity” (Barkey & Fuller 1998: 15). This social movement was quickly suppressed by the Turkish state.

In the following decade, the Kurdish movement grew despite the fact that Turkey intensified its repression. Barkey and Fuller (1998: 15) summarise the social-political conditions at national scale behind the Kurdish movement in the 1970s through these words:

\begin{quote}
Turkish Workers’ Party\textsuperscript{109} (TİP) which became enmeshed in the ‘Eastern Problem’ and was euphemistically known by then, had to openly suggest in 1970 that there was an ethnic problem in Turkey. However, this analysis was heavily laden with class and leftist terminology. In the turbulent times of the 1960s in Turkey which was going through a left-
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{108} Kemalism is the official ideology of the Turkish state according to which the definition of the Turk is independent from race, religion or language. Peoples of Turkey are called Turks and they have equal rights.

\textsuperscript{109} Türkiye İşçi Partisi
wing mobilisation period, many politically active Kurds sought political national rights within the Turkish left groups. It was assumed that the Kurds, as the inhabitants of the most underdeveloped regions of Turkey would benefit from the liberation of the Turkish people from capitalism and imperialism. The frustration with the Turkish leftism’s reluctance in involving in the ‘Kurdish Problem’ pushed the Kurds to create explicitly Kurdish left-wing groups, in particular, among the university youth.

Even though in 1965, a Kurdish nationalist organisation parallel to the KDP of Iraq was established in Turkey, the Kurdish movement remained heavily leftist (ibid.). Among the most important organisations of those times was the Revolutionary Eastern Cultural Hearths\textsuperscript{110} (DDKO) formed in 1969. Two years after its establishment, it was closed due to the 1971 military coup. Although it was active during only two years, the DDKO has been the nucleus of many other Kurdish groups to be established in the following years; one of which was the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) (ibid.: 15-16).

5.2.2.2. PKK and the armed struggle

Kurdistan Workers Party\textsuperscript{111} (PKK) was established in 1974 under the leadership of Abdullah Öcalan. The ideology of PKK consisted of “a mixture of communist (Marxist-Leninist) and nationalist ideas for an independent Kurdistan” in the south-eastern and eastern regions of Turkey (Barkey & Fuller 2008: 15-16). In 1984, the PKK launched an armed struggle against the Turkish security forces and authorities. Their first attack was against a Turkish military post. Following this event the PKK was declared as a separatist terrorist organisation by the Turkish authorities (Lyon & Uçarer 2001). PKK, at the same time, organised actions that targeted the Kurdish landlords (Barkey & Fuller 1998). Tribal structure of the Kurdish society and the heavy impact of religion were attacked in the framework of their Marxist-Leninist ideology.

\textsuperscript{110} Devrimci Doğu Kültür Ocakları
\textsuperscript{111} Partîya Karkeren Kurdistan
As the PKK started to attract the attention of the Turkish security forces, its leader Abdullah Öcalan was forced to flee to Syria and then to Lebanon. Meanwhile many of the PKK supporters and members were put into prison by the military regime in Turkey that took over after the 1980 military coup. The regime indiscriminately repressed all different political organisations in the south-eastern and eastern provinces (ibid.). “This period resembled the harsh policies of the 1930s that banned the use of the Kurdish language. In Lebanon and Syria PKK recruits got their first training. The PKK also established close links with some Palestinian groups and Syrian intelligence” (ibid.).

Barkey and Fuller (1998: 23) also argue that:

Pan-Kurdish aspirations were very clear in the PKK. The goal was also to change the feudal structure of the Kurdish society through a political-social revolution. Within the framework of its early Marxist-Leninist identity, the PKK adopted the generally left-wing anti-imperialist rhetoric of the period to oppose imperialism including the Turkish imperialism in Turkish Kurdistan… [T]he fight against imperialism was to fight for saving Kurdistan’s natural resources from exploitation.

As an outcome of the Adana Security Agreement signed between Syria and Turkey in 1998, the PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan was expelled from Syria. After four months of search for political asylum in Europe, in 1999 Abdullah Öcalan was captured in Kenya and put into prison in Turkey. Although he was sentenced to death penalty (1999), as death penalty was abolished in Turkey in 2002, his sentence was committed to life-long imprisonment. Following after his imprisonment, the PKK went through a gradual shift from political violence to more cooperative and peaceful ground.

Since the PKK leader was put into prison, the Kurdish movement adopted new concepts developed by him: “ecologist society”, “democratic republic”, and “Kurdish confederation without state”. Çakır (2008, October 22) argues that
Abdullah Öcalan wants to be listened by the Turkish state and in particular by the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK). With the end of Cold War era, the PKK had abolished its Marxist-Leninist ideology to be able to be heard by the Western counties. After being imprisoned, Abdullah Öcalan came to the conclusion that there would not be a solution to the Kurdish problem by excluding the Turkish state. He even stated that PKK was not aiming for an independent Kurdish state separate from Turkey (Çakır 2008, October 22).

However, the Kurdish movement and even the PKK are not driven solely by Abdullah Öcalan. According to Sosyal Sorunları Araştırmaları ve Çözüm Derneği (SORAR) (2007) PKK has three axes and its new policy takes shape along those axes which are as follows:

1) Brussels, in particular the Kurdish Diaspora in relationship with the PKK;
2) Kandil Mountain, where the managerial board of the PKK operates from;
3) İmralı Island, including not only the PKK leader but also some deep state components that intersect with Öcalan on the Kemalist ground.

In the words of Marcus (2007: 305):

The PKK’s fight, whether one thinks good or bad, put the Kurdish problem on the agenda. It gave the Kurds define themselves as Kurds” are symbols for the Kurds. With the PKK, the Kurdish issue came to the agenda of the Turkey and the world. It resulted in making the Kurds express themselves within the Kurdish identity and converted it into a matter of honour.

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112 Foundation of Investigation and Analysis of Social Problems
113 İmralı is the Turkish island where the PKK leader Öcalan has been imprisoned since 1999.
5.2.2.3. Kurdish identity

According to Yavuz (2001: 3) “there are major tribal, linguistic, religious, alphabetical, and regional fissures within the Kurdish identity”. Yavuz (2001: 3-4) explains these differences through two main factors:

1. **The tribal structures** that were based on local and tightly knit rural communities under a tribal or religious leader. The tribal structure played a dual role: it prevented the formation of a Kurdish unity by keeping them fragmented, and preserved a heightened Kurdish particularism vis-à-vis the Turks, Persians and Arabs. Tribal structure, constituted the core depository of Kurdish identity, facilitated mobilisation against centralising governments, and also prevented the formation of a modern conception of nationalism until the mid-twentieth century. In other words, allegiances among the Kurdish tribes are more fluid, but division itself is the constant feature. The Turkish state pursued three competing policies: a) a policy of assimilation by breaking down the tribal structure, which usually resulted in an armed rebellion; b) a policy of co-optation of tribal leaders with the purpose of controlling these unruly regions; and c) a policy of ‘divide and rule’ using one tribe against another.

2. **Geography** at the crossroads of the Persian, Arab, and Turkish worlds. Border characteristics allowed the Kurdish tribes a high degree of autonomy. There was loose connection among the Kurdish tribes and between the centre and the sub-regional system of this borderland between the Persian and the Ottoman Empires. Most of the Kurds live in extremely rugged, mountainous terrain and this, in turn, separates each community from the other and also from the Arabs, Persians and Turks.

In line with Yavuz’s arguments, Barkey and Fuller (1998) also point out that in the past these mountainous regions disabled the Kurds from establishing a strong centralist Kurdish state. The nomadic Kurdish culture also strengthened the divergence of several Kurdish dialects, many of which are not comprehensible
between them today (ibid.). Barkey and Fuller (1998) also argue that the lack of common Kurdish dialect limited communication among the Kurds. In their view having had their territory divided between Persian and Ottoman Empires during the last five centuries and following that being portioned between the four modern states; Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria by the last century also prevented the Kurds from developing a more comprehensive single national vision. Living in primarily the mountainous regions of larger empires, such as the Persian, the Arab Abbasid Caliphate in Baghdad, or the Ottoman isolated the Kurds from imperial centres and slowed their development (ibid.).

The Kurds define themselves as stateless people living between and across states. According to Barkey and Fuller (1998) this statelessness provided the Kurds with a variety of perspectives, political views and several allies which enabled them to develop collaborative skills and strategies to build alliance when they needed it.

In the formation of Kurdish identity the Tanzimat Reforms, as indicated in the previous sections which refer to a series of modernisation attempts carried out by the Ottoman Empire in the 19th century played a decisive role. Although ethnic identities had hardly had any political significance in the Ottoman Empire, the opposite could be said for religious identity. In order to adapt to the developments regarding the rise of nationalism and centralisation in Europe in the 19th century, the Ottoman Empire attempted to centralise its governance structures to build greater state control. According to Yavuz (2001) these modernisation attempts were perceived by the Kurdish community as a complete attack to the tribal and nomadic Kurdish culture. Some Kurdish tribes saw it as threat to their feudal tyranny over locals. This explains why at first, Kurdish identity had evolved within the Islamic framework rather than ethnic one.

Starting with the Republic, the Turkish state aspired to strengthen the newly formed national identity by trying to eliminate the Islamic influence coming from its Ottoman legacy. Nationalism and secularism were accepted as the two core principles of the modernisation strategy according to the state ideology; namely Kemalism. The Kemalist discourse did not mention ‘race’ as a constituting
element of Turkishness. Contrary to that, it promoted the civic Turkishness. As stated in the 1924 Constitution (as cited in Yavuz 2001: 9) “Without religious and ethnic difference, every individual of the people of Turkey who is a citizen is regarded as Turk”. There was a clear parallelism with the legacy of the Ottoman Empire in which anyone that had Ottoman citizenship was considered as an Ottoman (ibid.). With the 1961 Constitution, the term ‘people of Turkey’ which existed in the former Constitution was replaced by ‘every citizen is accepted as Turk regardless of ethnic and religious identity’ (ibid.). This gradual ethicising of the Turk became more apparent in the 1982 Constitution. Under article 66 of the 1982 Constitution, it is stated that everyone who is related to the Turkish Republic through citizenship is named as Turk (ibid.).

However, there was something deeply contradictory in Turkish nationalism. While denying the existence of some ethnic minorities in the country such as the Alevi, Assyrians, Caferis, Caucasians, Kurds, Laz and Yezidis (MRG 2007), it recognised officially only the non-Muslim minorities which are Greeks, Jews and Armenians. According to Yavuz (2001) this ideology which was based on Turkification of all citizens, on the one hand, used Islam to unify the diverse ethno-linguistic groups. On the other hand, it promoted Kemalism with its principle of secularisation as an opposition to Islam.

Aslan (2007) points to the utilisation of language in Turkification strategy, which aimed at banning all languages apart from Turkish for public use. One of the further applications of the Turkification strategy was prohibiting citizens from giving their children non-Turkish names. Citizens with non-Turkish names even had to change those names with the Turkish ones. The same rule applied to the traditional Kurdish names of some towns and villages. The town of Dersim being renamed as Tunceli was only one of numerous examples of the Turkification policy in the early years of the new Republic.

One point to be noted related to the Turkification strategy is that “the official Turkification policies were supported, recreated, and implemented by a large
social network composed of those who considered themselves the missionaries of the new Turkish state” (Aslan 2007: 245). These people consisted of writers, teachers, doctors and other professionals, and students who had the vision of a modern, secular and independent Turkey. According to Aslan (2007: 246) they considered themselves as the elite of Turkey whose mission was to guide their ignorant citizens. These people often worked very hard with great personal sacrifice for achieving these ideals. One of these attempts to broaden the use of Turkish language for the creation of a homogeneous Turkish nation state was a campaign called “Citizen, Speak Turkish!” , which aimed at putting pressure on non-Turkish speaker citizens to speak Turkish in public

According to İçduygu et al. (1999) the more Turkey denied the Kurdish identity, the more anti-Turkish and ethnicity-oriented became the Kurdish movement in the leadership of PKK. Large exogenous developments such as the growing ethnic nationalism worldwide within last three decades influenced the Kurdish identity and nationalism in Turkey. With the formation of PKK, Kurdish identity was begun to be politicised and reframed on a more ethnic nationalist ground than on a tribal and religious one like it used to be in the past (ibid.).

Beşikçi (1991) argues that Kurdistan has been treated as a colony of the four states of the Middle East; Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Iran. In his view the Kurdish elites “collaborated with these colonial powers” and “exploited together” the natural resources of Kurdistan (ibid.: 63). Beşikçi gives GAP as an example to this argument claiming that its primary objective is to assimilate the Kurdish identity and culture. Defining Kurdistan as colonised is equally clear in the arguments of the PKK and Abdullah Öcalan.

In the discourse of the Kurdish nationalism in Turkey, Kurds are described as the local peoples of Kurdistan in contrast with the idea that sees the Turks as from Middle Asia in their origins. Even though this discourse has helped legitimising the argument of ‘Kurdistan as colony’, one has to see it also as a counter strategy of the official Turkishness defined through its connection with Middle Asia. The
roots of this definition go back to the Pan-Turkist aspirations in the aftermath of
the rise of nationalism in Europe.

In the last decade, Turkey’s on-going debate over the EU membership put the
country at the very centre of international attention on behalf of violation of
human rights, in particular the Kurdish rights as they are the largest ethnic
minority in Turkey. This can also be explained through the up-scaling Kurdish
Diaspora in the Western Europe which opened window of political opportunities
for the Kurds of the Middle East. Thanks to Kurdish Diaspora in Europe, Kurdish
people who have been living within four states, speaking different dialects of
Kurdish as well as different official languages of those countries, for the first
time, starting to develop an ethnic identity at a larger scale based on more
universal issues. It is highly likely that those “fissures within the Kurdish identity”
in the words of Yavuz (2001) due to geographical, linguistic and cultural
differences can be overcome and even converted into diversity and richness of the
Kurdish culture in the modern politicisation of the Kurdish identity.

5.2.3. Kurdish Diaspora in Europe

Disadvantaged groups oppressed by the political regime in their homeland often
have no other option but to immigrate to other countries, particularly if “they lack
viable avenues for dissent in their country” (Lyon & Uçarer 2001: 297). The
destination of immigration is often defined by the political opportunities awaiting
them in the host countries (ibid.). These “external kin-groups can be mobilised
around claims for increased political access based on distinct identities” (ibid.).
With the help of advanced communication networks, international demands for
labour supplies and free movement of people, social mobilisation is easily
transferred from one country to another and the homeland (ibid.).

Kurds have been migrating to Western Europe for over a century, however this
immigration has intensified since the 1960s (Meho & Maclaughlin 2001).
According to the Kurdish Institute of Paris (IKP) (2009) Kurds from Turkey
started to immigrate to Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxemburg, the Netherlands and Switzerland as workers under inter-governmental contracts in the 1960s. Following the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979 and the Army coup d’état in Turkey in 1980, and the Saddam Hussein regime’s campaign Al-Anfal against the Iraqi Kurds, successive waves of Kurdish political refugees migrated to Western Europe (ibid.). Finally, as a result of forced evacuation of Kurdish villages in Turkey in 1992 and the internal conflicts among the Kurds in Iraq in 1994, more Kurds moved to some European countries (ibid.). The estimated census of the Kurdish Diaspora in Europe (IKP 2009) is presented in table 6.

Table 6: Kurdish population in Europe

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Estimated population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>600,000 - 650,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>100,000 - 120,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Netherlands</td>
<td>70,000 - 80,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>60,000 - 70,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>50,000 - 60,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>50,000 - 60,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>25,000 - 30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>20,000 - 25,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>20,000 - 25,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>8,000 - 10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>4,000 - 5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>3,000 - 4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>2,000 - 3,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: IKP (2009)

According to IKP (2009) it is estimated that in total over a million Kurds live in Europe (See table 6). Nearly eighty-five percent of the Kurdish people in western Europe come from Turkey. The Iraqi Kurds form the second largest group. Kurds living in Germany constitutes the largest portion. As result of this large number, the Kurdish Diaspora in Germany played particularly an important role in the internationalisation of the Kurdish problem.

Lyon and Uçarer (2001: 931) explain why the Kurdish Diaspora in Germany evolved to be more influential than the others:

They were the first group of immigrants from Turkey. As early immigrants, their rights were limited. However, after the recruitment halt in 1973 as a result of slow economy and the oil crisis, Kurds that could
no longer be recruited as workers, had an option to apply for political asylum in Germany. That way the Kurdish asylum seekers soon constituted ninety percent of asylum applications lodged by Turkish nationals. Germany attracted many of the Kurdish asylum seekers also because of the generous social security benefits that it provided. When compared with other countries that received the Kurds as immigrants such as France and Italy, Germany became a superior destination for the emerging Kurdish Diaspora. The Kurdish Diaspora reached a political status that could force the German government to put pressure on Turkey on its assimilation acts over the Kurdish society. This resource mobilisation happened as a result of the activities of the Kurdish cultural organisations that were established in Germany during the 1980s and 1990s. They even established close ties with PKK in Germany.

As Meho and Maglaughlin (2001: 23-24) state “even though the most Kurds who migrated from Turkey did not know any other language than Turkish and were reluctant to involve in politics, the 1980 coup d’état in Turkey changed that”. As a result of this development and its aftermath, many politicised young Kurds arrived at Western European counties as asylum seekers (ibid.). As the PKK launched an armed struggle with the Turkish state in 1984, self and ethnic awareness among the Kurdish Diaspora gained a new momentum.

Kurdish nation became highly politicised in this period. According to Wahlbeck (1998, July: 10) “Political activism through Kurdish cultural associations in exile is directly and indirectly linked to political parties in homeland”. While this often causes internal fragmentation among the groups, at the same time creates solidarity within the Kurds sharing the same political beliefs, because the Kurdish Diaspora also serves as a (re)producer of identity in the fragmented lives of the Kurdish refugees (ibid.). “The exodus of the Kurds, their collective memory of their original homeland, the alienation and discrimination they experienced in Europe, their wish to return to Kurdistan, their collective commitment to the restoration of their homeland and their trans-national social networks, are the
features of the diasporic relations displayed by the Kurdish refugees in Europe”
(ibid.)

Meho and Maglaughlin (2001: 24) explain the success of the Kurdish Diaspora with the way it internationalises the Kurdish problem through “raising large sums of money in Europe to financially support military and non-military Kurdish activities in Turkey, as well PKK and its support organisations’ continued efforts to publish a wide range of journals and magazines in Kurdish, Turkish and the major European languages to voice its struggle against Turkey”. However, even more importantly according to Meho and Maclaughlin (2001: 24) “the cultural activities of the Kurdish intellectuals in Europe” play a most definitive role in creating awareness about the Kurdish problem with a long-term political impact. The number of meetings, activities, writings, books and journals in Kurdish increased and Kurdish cultural institutes were founded in many European countries such as the Kurdish Institute of Brussels (IKB) which was founded in 1978 and the IKP in Paris in 1983.

Above all, the impact of Kurdish TV channels on the reformation of the Kurdish ethnic consciousness has been massive. According to Ryan (2006, March) the launching of the first Kurdish satellite TV channel, Med TV, opened a new site of conflict between the Kurds and the Middle Eastern states that rule over Kurdistan. After more than 30 years of military engagement between the Kurdish people and Iraq, Iran and Turkey, signals from the sky changed the theatre of war in favour of the Kurds (ibid.). “Transcending the international borders which since 1918 have divided the land in which Kurds live, the channel allowed the Kurds, for the first time in their history, to establish a powerful mode of communication among themselves, and undermine the state-centred geopolitical order that has been reduced them to the status of helpless minorities” (Ryan 2006, March: 45)

Ryan adds that for the first time in their divided history, the Kurds can now see their own lives, their own reality, reflected on TV screens across the world. “Iranian Kurds can speak to Turkish Kurds in phone-ins, and Iraqi Kurds can see
how fellow Kurds live in Europe. For a few hours every night, the world’s largest stateless nation has a home” (ibid.).

5.3. COMPARATIVE RESULTS

In this section the results obtained from a) the in-depth interviews held with key actors of the two social movements in Spain and Turkey, b) the focus group meeting held in Tortosa, and c) the participant-observations carried out during the field trips to Pamplona, Bilbao, Barcelona, Ankara, Diyarbakır, Batman, Hasankeyf and, in particular, Istanbul for the occasion of the water forums (the Counter Water Forum and the Alternative Water Forum), and d) secondary information resources are presented according to the research questions of this study. Therefore, the results are grouped under three categories 1) social movements: why, who, and how; 2) social learning through identities; and 3) sustainable water care: Spain; Turkey, and the EU.

5.3.1. Social movements: Why, who, and how?

The table 7 provides very brief features of the Anti-Itoiz Dam and the Anti-Ilısu Dam movements to provide the reader a quick outlook. The first question that this comparative case study attempted to answer was why water movements in Spain and Turkey emerged in the first place; in more specific terms what socio-ecological conditions triggered them. When the Itoiz and Ilısu Dams were officially announced, the directly affected communities had two choices in front of them: either to accept the consequences of these constructions or to struggle against them. However, the sole existence of threat in these cases has almost been a null element in explaining why these social movements emerged in the first place. Threat issue was rather a precondition than a reason.

In parallel with that, the size of the directly affected population did not play a significant role in public attention drawn by these movements. The Itoiz Dam would directly affect the lives of some fifty people altogether. Even though this
was a small number, the movement against the Itoiz Dam had a large impact at both regional and national scales. 20,000 people were on the streets of Pamplona to protest the Itoiz Dam. In the Ilısu case the population of the directly affected would exceed some fifty-five thousand people. However, such a large number, after eight years, has not yet attracted deserved public attention at national scale.

Table 7: A brief comparison of the anti-dam movements of Itoiz and Ilısu

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Directly affected</th>
<th>Anti-Itoiz Dam Movement</th>
<th>Anti-Ilısu Dam Movement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Identity</td>
<td>50 people</td>
<td>55,000 people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The state of</td>
<td>Mainly Basque</td>
<td>Mainly Kurdish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the dam project</td>
<td>Done, filled with water and in service.</td>
<td>No construction apart from 12 genderma stations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Key organisations

| Itoiz Coordinating Committee (ICC) & Solidari@s con Itoiz; Confederation of Organisations for Environmental Protection (CODA); Ecologist Association for the Defence of Nature (Aedenat); Greenpeace; International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN); and the Northern Alliance for Sustainability (ANPED) | Keep Hasankeyf Alive Initiative; Kurdish Human Rights Project (KHRP); Rivernet; International Rivers; Friends of the Earth; Export Credit Campaign (ECC); World Economy, Ecology and Development (WEED); Berne Declaration; ECA-Watch, The Forest & the European Union Resource Network (FERN); and Corner house |

Emerging definitions

| Land and people are inseparable | Land, river, cultural heritage and people are inseparable |

Movement type

| Defence of the land and community | Defence of the land cultural heritage |

Official water regime

| National treasure that should be used for the entire nation (NHP 2001) through canals | National treasure that should not be wasted and a control tool over riparian and the Kurdish guerrillas |

State’s strategy against the movement

| Calling opponents of the dam as terrorist allies | Calling opponents of the dam as terrorist allies |

Counter-strategy of the movement

| Seeking support from national platforms | Seeking support from international platforms |

The answer to why these movements emerged in the first place and how they had different impact and resonance in the wider public should be looked for neither in the magnitude of the thread or the size of the population directly affected. The emergence, development and consolidation of conflict are not directly or proportionally correlated to the number of people affected, as this depends on the existing governance structures and political identity of the community in question. Today all around the world there are numerous success stories of social mobilisations based on socio-environmental concerns such as the anti-dam
movements. The knowledge of these movements instilled hope in both communities. Such knowledge is acquired only within the social movements and now through global networking. Therefore, what was particularly poignant in the two cases was the emergence of a rapid multi-scale and multi-domain alliance formation to (re)build a new framework for problem definition, objective formation, and strategy building.

When compared with the Kurds, the Basques have not suffered the degree of economic deprivation, exploitation or collective political oppression that the Kurds have had. The fact that radical faction of the separatist Basque movement uses means of violence may have lessened a broad international attention and the support that the Kurds had. While the PKK had similar impacts, the intellectual networking of the Kurdish Diaspora such as the Kurdish Human Rights Project built successful collaboration with human rights organisations world wide and added a legal human dimension separate from the PKK to the Kurdish struggle. This has created a growing international pressure on Turkey for the recognition of cultural demands of the Kurds. Turkey’s globally recognised records on Kurdish human right violations has often been played as a trump card by the opponents of Turkey in the long going EU accession debates.

When this international pressure started on Turkey, the Kurdish movement had already been driven by one actor; PKK. The uniformity of the Kurdish movement in Turkey provided itself a privileged political position in which it did not have to conciliate with the Turkish state. Even when channels of negotiation with the official figures opened, the Kurdish activists were reluctant to conciliate. The Kurdish activists’ unwillingness to compromise empowered the hardliners within the Turkish state elite, who perceived the cultural demands of the movement as inseparable from its challenge to the legitimacy of the state boundaries (Aslan 2007, August).
Similar to the Basque case during the Franco dictatorship, the Kurdish language too was banned during decades in Turkey and Syria. In 2006, the Turkish government decided to allow broadcasting in Kurdish language and regional organisations to run Kurdish language courses. During the Franco dictatorship in Spain the Basques had suffered from similar policies. This has had traumatic cultural and personal impacts but also helped creating solidarity within society in both communities.

In both the Basque and the Kurdish cases, a single way of development was intended to be applied over the communities and their territories. Such a monolithic conceptualisation of development debilitated cultural diversity of both Spain and Turkey. These projects had not taken into account the socio-cultural local context and thus caused a growing resistance among these communities. In the Kurdish movement in Turkey in particular PKK converted the projects of GAP into symbols of the authoritarian Turkish nationalism. These symbols represented the threat posed by the Turkish nation-state to the survival of the Kurdish community. In the Basque movement similarly, the hydraulic infrastructures realised with a top down manner in great secrecy have been symbols of threat to Basque identity.

In the Ilısu case, the changes in the socio-political conditions of the Kurdish society have opened them a large array of opportunities. Starting from 1991, the ban on the use of Kurdish language in broadcasting, public places, government offices, and in educational institutions has gradually been lifted with new laws and regulations. The Kurdish Diaspora in Europe has been institutionalised in countries such as Germany, France and England. The Kurdish problem has increasingly been recognised at the international platform. Turkey has had to face an increasing amount of criticism regarding the ways it deals with the Kurdish problem from various international authorities in various occasions such as its negotiation regarding the EU membership. Kurdish political empowerment has been definitive in the success of the anti-Ilısu Dam movement. In particular, in its
first phase it was almost entirely a social injustice story framed by the Kurdish perspective.

In the Itoiz case, the turmoil taking place in the political and governance structures starting with the end of Franco dictatorship (1975) in the Basque Country was converted into an opportunity for the long-going oppressed Basque movement. The BEM emerged around this period as a response to the Lemoiz nuclear power station. It rapidly became popular by a large portion of the society. The anti-Itoiz dam movement, although taking place in the Navarra Autonomous Community, is considered by the Basque separatists as part of the larger Euskal Herria and has been influenced from the three axis of the BEM: nationalism, localism and anti-developmentalism. The movement emerged as a story of defending the Irati Valley and its people with a localist profile. It kept a certain distance with the Basque nationalist discourse, but it was the political activism within the left-wing Basque nationalist discourse that became one of its most important triggers.

Back in the Kurdish case, the GAP dams for half a century have also caused much political debate between upstream Turkey, and downstream Iraq and Syria. The water conflict between the three countries in the Middle East has attracted many scholars of political studies. The topic has maintained its attraction and became one of the most debated and investigated issues in the Middle East context. This created further alliance options for the Kurdish movement to foster its anti-GAP argument. By the Kurdish intelligentsia and separatists the mega project was defined as an ethnic cleansing tool of the Turkish state. The anti-Ilısu Dam movement has based its problem definition on these already developed arguments. However, different from the local anti-dam movements, in the emergence of the NWC and the Turkish water movements larger threats posed by the NHP 2001 in Spain and the 5th WWF in Turkey played a most significant role. The existence of these threats has created equally large movements as a response in terms of both number and diversity of participants. These threats also have provided unique
opportunities for small scale movements to build further alliances with national and global organisations from a large array of domains.

An activist of the ‘No to Commercialisation of Water’ Platform indicates that the occasion of the 5th WWF has not only helped the creation of a sense of solidarity among organisations from different domains against the threat posed by the Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) plans to privatise the water sector in Turkey, but also opened a learning process in a new context - water and its governance - among the Turkish civil society groups. In the regular meetings held with these groups, many key actors indicated that before these meetings they had never taken water problem as a primary concern. This learning process has been mutual between the SuPolitik activists and other civil society organisations from the beginning to the end.

An activist of the ‘No to Commercialisation of Water’ Platform also adds that in the preparation of the Counter Water Forum, the knowledge of Mexican social mobilisation against the 4th WWF was influential. However, she emphasised that their platform had neither repeated what they did, nor followed their agenda. The Mexican movement gave them a reason to believe that a counter movement could be launched in Turkey which was facing the same threat as Mexico did.

The second question that this research attempted to find an answer is which key actors have taken part in water social movements in Spain and Turkey. In the anti-Itoiz Dam movement the Coordinating Committee of Itoiz (CCI) and Solidari@s con Itoiz were among the two most important actors. First, the CCI acted as a common platform for all social groups involved in the movement as well as the scientific and legal board. Then Solidari@s con Itoiz that consisted of young activists came to the arena and carried out international activities as well as local and national scale ones. The key actors of the anti-Itoiz Dam movement ranged from the directly affected locals to the regional and national civil society organisations such as Ecologists in Action, COAGRET, CODA, and Aedenat. In addition, Greenpeace, the International Union for the Conservation of Nature
(IUCN) and the Northern Alliance for Sustainability (ANPED) have been among the few but powerful international resource mobilisation organisations in the social network of the movement.

In the anti-İlîsu Dam movement, numerous town councils to be affected by the İlîsu Dam, some NGOs and Diyarbakır branch of Association of Turkish Architects and Engineers (TMMOB) established the Initiative to Keep Hasankeyf Alive. At the international level Kurdish Human Rights Project (KHRP), Rivernet, International Rivers, Friends of the Earth, and Export Credit Campaign (ECC) were the main actors that supported this movement. In particular, KHRP acted as the scientific and legal board of the movement. For the occasion of the Alternative Water Forum held as a response to the 5th WWF in Istanbul, the movement built alliance with environmental justice groups operating at national level, some of which are Environmental Platform of Turkey114 (TÜÇEP), SODEV Social Democracy Foundation115 (SODEV) and Green Steps Environmental Education Foundation116 (YAÇED).

When the key actors in the anti-İlîsu Dam movement are grouped according to scales (local, national and global) they operate at, it is seen that national actors played less significant roles compared to the local and global ones. In parallel with that, when the two movements are compared in this respect the anti-İlîsu Dam movement is much more of a result of an alliance formation between the local and global, while in the Itoiz case local and national actors marked the movement. This difference is due to many factors such as the growing Kurdish political movement in Europe. This is analysed with more details in the following paragraphs regarding the research mobilisation strategies. Naturally, socio-political conditions have affected whom to be key actors and how those actors (re)defined the problem situation, (re)set the objectives and (re)directed social learning process within the movement.

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114 Türkiye Çevre Platformu
115 Sosyal Demokrasi Vakfı
116 Yeşil Adımlar Çevre Eğitimi Derneği
The interviews held with key actors point that in the Ilısu case the rising Kurdish movement was definitive in deciding whom to be the key actors, what the problem was, and which resource mobilisation strategies were to be followed. The Ilısu Dam would flood some cultural heritage zones mainly inhabited by the Kurds such as the famous town of Hasankeyf. This town was set as the cover story of the threat posed by the Ilısu Dam and the Initiative to Keep Hasankeyf Alive was born as a response to that threat. The key actors such as the town councils and international actors such as the KHRP defined the problem as defence of the cultural heritage of the Kurds. Social injustice aspect was related to the long-going Kurdish problem. The uncooperative attitude of the Turkish state in negotiating with the movement actors has also been decisive in defining the profile of the key actors. In addition, the movement was largely ignored at national level by significant portion of the civil society groups. This also blocked, to a great extent, alliance at national level. However, the Kurdish Diaspora in Europe opened another window of opportunities for the movement.

In the Itoiz case, different from the Ilısu case, the key actors were mainly concerned with environmental problems. While Coordinating Committee of Itoiz (CCI) kept a distance with the Basque nationalist discourse, it built alliances with ecologist organisations operating at both regional such as the Basque Ecologist Movement, and national scale in Spain. Contrary to the Ilısu case, the Itoiz movement avoided the direct use of ethnicity. However, the movement was a collective action of a mixture of diverse groups ranging from direct action activist such as the Solidari@s con Itoiz to organisations carrying out a scientific/legal battle. Through the involvement of the BEM the ethnic aspects were indirectly but strongly employed in this movement.

The Itoiz Coordinator, Patxi Gorraiz, indicates that they always kept themselves away from involving in organisations and actors that were directly linked to the Basque nationalist discourse. For this reason, the CCI deliberately chose some well known scientists and researchers from outside the Basque Country and Navarra such as Pedro Arrojo and Antonio Casas to carry out investigation and
write scientific reports on the adverse impacts of the Itoiz dam. According to him, this was done so for combating the bias and creating reliability among both the Navarra state officials to be able build dialogue with them and the Navarra people to get support from a larger portion of society. That is why the key actors network in the Itoiz movement was a mixture of alliance between the local and regional/national rather than international.

However, by 2000, as a result of inefficiency of the legal battle, the Solidari@s con Itoiz organised an international campaign. The European tour which lasted almost a year can was the most important attempt to build the international link which was weaker compared to the Ilısu case.

In an interview held with the president of Save Munzur Council on the issue of local movements in Turkey, in particular the Ilısu case, the president stated that the agenda of the Anti-Ilısu Dam movement was largely, if not entirely, framed by the international social mobilisation organisations rather than the local platform. He also indicated that from this perspective, it seemed like the anti-Ilısu Dam movement was not a grassroots movement. According to him, rather than having built alliance with the international, it had the characteristics of an internationally driven local movement.

In the interviews held with the key actors of the larger scale water movement in Turkey, similar ideas were pointed out on the alliance of the local and the international in the context of anti-Ilısu Dam movement. The general view presented in these interviews on the issue of key actors was that the Anti-Ilısu Dam movement was speaking through the same voice of the international social movement organisations. According to this view, local particularities of the Ilısu case were excluded from the movement as a result of ‘cultural imperialism impact’ of the international movement organisations involved in this movement.

\[117\] Munzur movement is an anti-dam movement taking place in another Turkish region densely by Kurdish people.
However, one has to understand that at the local level the freedom of association is a very new term for the locals of Hasankeyf and the other zones to be flooded by the Ilısu Reservoir. As Ercan Ayboğa, the coordinator of the Initiative to Keep Hasankeyf Alive explains, the local communities have been oppressed for decades through ban on public use of Kurdish language and other cultural expressions. Expecting a rapidly evolving grassroots anti-dam movement under these conditions would be highly unrealistic. He goes on by saying that people are just beginning to understand the real consequences of the Ilısu Dam. Only about ten years ago, when the Dam was officially approved the majority of these people were indifferent about the dam, thinking that they would never win against the state. Some also expected to get compensation at least. Ercan Ayboğa also indicates that this perception largely changed in the last few years. Now, according him, apart from some land owners, the majority of the population is against the construction of the dam.

The general assumption among the ‘No to Commercialisation of Water’ Platform activists was that the Ilısu movement was avoiding alliance formation with national actors. The president of the Chamber of Environmental Engineers Istanbul Branch claimed that the anti-Ilısu Dam movement even created a false polarisation between the ‘No to Commercialisation of Water’ Platform and themselves. According to her, the Platform was treated by the Ilısu movement actors as if it were a Turkish nationalist and an anti-Kurdish initiative even though this was not really so. In line with that argument, the president of the Confederation of Farmer Trade Unions added that in fact the anti-Ilısu Dam movement distanced itself from the Turkish left which has a clear anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist discourse as the international allies of the Ilısu movement were from the mainstream environmentalist line.

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118 It must be pointed out that the trade unions in Turkey are traditionally leftist organisations. During decades the vast majority of these organisations evaluated the Kurdish problem within the leftist framework (mainly Marxist-Leninist). As the PKK and therefore a large portion of the Kurdish movement abandoned the Marxist-Leninist perspective and adopted more mainstream strategies, the discursive gap between the leftist trade unions and the Kurdish movement has grown.
However, the Alternative Water Forum held by the Initiative to Keep Hasankeyf Alive has opened a window of opportunities for the anti-Ilısu Dam movement to build alliance with similar anti-dam movements taking place in different parts of Turkey some of which are the Allianoi, Munzur, and Çoruh movements. On the 6th of June 2009, for the first time in Turkey, people from all over the country gathered for a meeting protesting the dams. The anti-Ilısu Dam movement has recently been more focused on building alliance with national actors.

The third question that this research investigated is what resource mobilisation strategies have been carried out in water social movements in Spain and Turkey. Within the last few decades, global organisations operating on social justice, human rights, cultural heritage, and environment domains have been providing ideological and material resources to local mobilisations and movements in terms of (re)framing the problem situation, (re)directing the social learning and knowledge on the problem, and helping them to build alliances with actors working at multiple levels to provide them with financial and institutional support. Without multi-scale alliances, neither the severity of the problem nor the magnitude of the human population to be directly affected by these dam projects would play a very significant role in triggering social mobilisation.

The two movements followed both different and similar strategies at their problem definitions, alliance formations, and mobilisations of people. At the problem definition stage in the Itoiz case, the movement was from the beginning to the end the defence of the land and community. The dam was denounced to be irrational since it would not only flood some small towns but also three existing energy plants, important nature reserves, and bird protection zones, as well as the high risks, economic and environmental costs it would cause. There had been a previous attempt to build a similar dam in another place in Navarra region and strong social opposition had put an end to that project. According to the coordinator of the CCI Patxi Gorraiz, the Irati Valley was chosen for the Itoiz Dam due to its small population. The main motive was the assumption that this small community would cause no trouble for the officials.
In the Ilısu case at the problem definition stage, regional (Kurdish) and international actors were involved from the beginning. For years, the locals were not even informed that their livelihood was included in the project. The vast majority of them became increasingly aware of it as the movement emerged and developed. As mentioned earlier by Ercan Ayboğa, most of these people held indifferent opinions towards the proposed Ilısu Dam believing that there was nothing they could do against it and that they would receive reasonable amount of money as compensation for their houses and lands. Within years as negative examples such as the Birecik Dam came out, they have gradually understood that they would be worse off if the dam was built. The movement, under conditions of such poverty, could not emerge as an anti-developmentalist struggle. It would need a start point that would embrace fifty-five thousand people against a discriminative practice embodied as the Ilısu Dam. As Weigert (2008) also points out even in the international platform there was no way of challenging the development discourse by environmental arguments. This, on its own, would have little impact on the targeted international audiences. Therefore, ethnicity and cultural heritage issues were taken as the core dimensions of the movement.

There is a long-held conflict between Turkish state and the Kurds. All completed projects of the GAP zone had received criticisms. These criticisms mainly were related to Turkish state’s use of these projects to gain physical control over the armed Kurdish separatists and to assimilate the Kurdish communities. This claim had already been translated into the international conflict between Turkey, Syria and Syrian over the management of the Euphrates-Tigris River basin. Turkey had been accused of using the waters of these two rivers as control toolkit over the downstream countries in the Middle East. In short, the starting point and the problem definition of the anti-Ilısu Dam movement had already been defined before it was born. The past social knowledge of the problem was employed in the formation of the emerging new problem. Purely ecological concerns would not have much significance for the Kurdish movement. Only the environmental injustice that the Ilısu Dam would cause could attract a larger number of people to the movement.
In the Itoiz case, anti-developmentalist and localist discourses were dominant. Direct involvement of the ethnic issue would marginalise the movement and make CCI’s dialogue attempts with the Navarra public administration impossible. Even though accepted historically and culturally as part of the Basque Country, Navarra region is now a different autonomous country which is seen as an important part of the current terrorist problem of ETA. Sole Basque influence would raise doubts in some sectors of Navarra community and its institutions as it might be considered as intervention to the sovereignty of the Autonomous Navarra Country. For that reason the movement’s alliance formation with the Basque nationalist groups were always within limits. The emphasis was rather on scientific, ecologist and legal claims rather than political and ideological ones. On the issue of multi-level organisations, as the Basque problem never received at the international level the support that Kurdish movement has, the Itoiz movement adopted a strategy based on building dialogue with the Navarra and Spanish authorities rather than international partners.

Alliance formation was formulised according to the existing socio-political structures. In the Itoiz case, the BEM, with its localist and anti-developmentalist discourses, was already an embracing and powerful movement. The CCI received financial support from some organisations within the BEM for carrying out investigation about the Itoiz Dam by well-known scientists and institutions in Spain, and for publishing reports. Further alliance was formed with the environmentalist organisations operating at national level in Spain. Behind the formation of such alliance was the need for emphasizing the reliability and objectivity of the movement according to Patxi Gorraiz.

In the Ilısu case, in the alliance formation followed a completely different route. The alliance was formed, on a large extent, between the local and the international. It should be noted that the local scale in this context also includes the regional as the Diyarbakır and Batman Municipalities have been largely involved in the movement. Several dialogue attempts of the Initiative to Keep Hasankeyf Alive were rejected by the Turkish state authorities. The overall
argument behind this rejection was that the Turkish state would not sit at the same
table with the enemies of the state (PKK in this context) or their supporters.

This is one of the most frequently used official arguments used by the Turkish authorities regarding the Kurdish problem. Such attitude blocked communication and led the actors of this movement to search trans-national platforms where they would be listened. Very similarly, in the Itoiz case, against all the dialogue attempts made by the CCI, neither the Navarra nor the Spanish authorities accepted in a single occasion to meet with them.

The lack of dialogue and transparency stemming from the Navarra and Spanish governments’ uncooperative attitude justified the raising suspicions over the real motivation of the Itoiz project. In the following years, when the Navarra Canal was announced as an integral part of the Itoiz Dam, concerns about blatant signs of corruption and secrecy around the project grew. At this stage, it was understood that the Itoiz Dam project would change the lives of not only few people but also the ones in the entire region. And with declaration of the NHP 2001 and interregional water transfer from the Ebro River to other regions of Spain, the scale of movement and diversity of actors involved in it grew significantly. It was understood that the Itoiz Dam was just the top of the iceberg.

The scope of the problem had shown that larger interests were at stake. Under these circumstances there was no way to build dialogue with the Spanish state. This led the anti-Itoiz dam movement to look for a trans-national platform to be listened to. In 2000 Solidari@s con Itoiz organised the European Tour where they reached the European audience through protest actions and interviews. This was the most important step in the internationalisation of the movement.

With the past experiences derived from other GAP projects, the anti-İlîsu Dam movement, from the beginning and rapidly, started the process of alliance formation with international organisations. The project would be financed entirely by some European companies and ECAs. It was a well managed coincidence that
the Kurdish Diaspora in the contractor countries was already strongly institutionalised. Alliance formation with the KHRP in England and the other international organisations in the justice and human right networks that KPHR was a part of resulted in successful protest campaigns targeting European media and decision-making units. Twice in eight years time (2001, 2009) the project was rejected on the international platforms.

At the social mobilisation stage, strategies followed by the two movements show similarities. Even though they were born from different socio-ecological conditions, there are similarities in the way they were culturally and physically oppressed during years by nation-states. The ban on the use of their own languages, their other particular cultural expressions has created some similar impacts over their political identities. In historical context as the oppression has gradually lost its intensity in both cases, they have found some opportunities for revitalising their collective identities and their cultures in a political empowerment process within the defence of the local and the environmental justice movements.

In both movements, struggle on scientific and legal ground was carried out by a local platform (the Coordinating Committee of Itoiz in the Itoiz case and the Initiative to Keep Hasankeyf Alive in the Ilısu case). Symbolic protests, collections of signatures and petitions, resolutions, public letters, leaflets, printed informative materials, fact-finding reports, support concerts, and press conferences have been common forms of protest in both cases.

On the other hand, with the involvement of the Solidari@s con Itoiz, the Itoiz case differed from the Ilısu case. Solidari@s con Itoiz carried out civil disobedience and direct non-violent actions to attract maximum public attention in shortest time to involve a larger number of people into the hydraulic paradigm debate. In interviews done with the activists of this group, they all indicated that apart from informative purposes, they aimed at creating public debate that would make
people reflect together, communicate with each other and realise the weakness of
the oppressive and dominant system\footnote{The action carried out by the Solidari@s con Itoiz in their European Tour during the World Water Forum in Hague Netherlands is a perfect example of this kind of action aiming at the social reflection and debate on the system’s vulnerability. As they indicate “couple of hippies dropping clothes and throwing stink bombs made everything went out of control in less then a few minutes in a building protected by hundreds of policemen and security guards”.} in front of public power.

Social reality is multi-faceted. In the negotiations with the decision-makers, claims and targeted audiences for dialogue in the context of social mobilisation need to be simplified. As Burns and LeMoyne (2001) point out prioritising social issues defines the success of the movement. In the Ilısu case, as the target was the decision-making units in the contractor countries, the overall strategy followed was the prioritisation of the violation of human rights in the ethnicity context so that they would pull out from the project.

However, this strategy also resulted in a number of criticisms and declarations\footnote{One of these events was the Governor of Mardin’s Press Release in 2007 which accused the Initiative to Keep Hasankeyf Alive for helping the PKK realising their objectives that consisted of destroying the projects that will bring socio-economic development to the South-eastern region of Turkey.} given by the Turkish state authorities in which the activists of the Initiative to Keep Hasankeyf Alive were defined as being “allies with terrorists”. Abdülvaahap Kusen, the former mayor of Hasankeyf points to the same problematic attitude through these words:

\begin{center}
People are labelled as traitors if they are against the dam. We just want to keep our town Hasankeyf alive. We have nothing to do with terroristic ideas or methods. If you think different from them, that makes you a terrorist in their eyes\footnote{In an interview held with him at his office in Hasankeyf on the 7th of July 2008}. 
\end{center}

A similar claim was present in the way CCI defined the anti-Itoiz Dam movement as nothing else but the defence of the Irati Valley and its community. Until the end of the movement, CCI stayed loyal to this definition in its legal and scientific struggle with the authorities. The main driver behind this loyalty can be explained
by staying apart from being identified with the ETA and the terrorist movement. Inevitably, diverse groups expanded the borders of the movement to anti-developmental inistalist grounds in which they say ‘no’ to not only the Itoiz Dam but also all dams. In the interviews held with some Solidari@s con Itoiz activists it was indicated that even though there were different voices among the group, the majority was against all dams.

Most importantly of all, the debate around the Itoiz and Ilısu Dams has uncovered the complex networks of interests between public sector and the private enterprise in both cases. What Solidari@s con Itoiz did was to unveil this story of corruption to public attention through striking, visual and symbolic protest actions which would attract the attention of wider public. They stated that maximum participation and support in minimum amount of time was decisive in the success of a movement. In their view it was so because the decisions were and had to be taken rapidly, many parties were involved, and the risk of chaos was always present.

5.3.2. Social learning and identity

The fourth research question that this study attempted to answer is what role water identities have played in social learning in water movements in Spain and Turkey. In social movements, social learning process is (re)directed towards constructing a common set of goals and developing new capacities to attain them. In the interviews and conversations held with key actors, participatory observations, and secondary information derived from printed (pamphlets, meetings declarations, etc.) and electronic documents (including documentaries and web pages), it was made evident that in the social learning processes which were triggered and developed within the anti-Itoiz and anti-Ilısu Dam movements, some new water identities were defined regarding human-nature relationship. In particular, we see the recreation and use of these new identities in larger scale water movements in Spain and Turkey.
These identities have played very important roles in creating awareness about the problem and political empowerment of the communities at stake. In these definitions it becomes clear that water, as all natural resources, has socially constructed meanings derived from the type of interactions we have with them. The results of this research show that small rural communities do not often perceive their water as a separate entity from river, land and even themselves. Water as a utilitarian commodity is more a social product of urban culture. This becomes evident as we take a closer look at rural communities in the cases of Itoiz and Ilısu, and their relationships with water which perceive it as more a part of their own identity and preserve its livelihood value.

In particular, the Itoiz case was, from the beginning to the end, the defence of the land and its community. In the defence of those entities, water as part of land and community (and land as part of community) was already and naturally included. With a more specific expression, the anti-Itoiz movement was the defence of the Irati Valley - as an integrated socio-ecological system with its living and non-living beings - and its people. In fact, a further result is that this social movement was born against the dominant water regime’s perception of water as separate resource which can be converted into commodity.

Similar perceptions become evident in the Ilısu case. The anti-İlıs Dam movement emerged as a response to perceived environmental injustice. Water has been the least mentioned aspect in this story. For the locals water is the Tigris River which forms the Mesopotamia. Mesopotamia is a living Kurdish myth that links them to their history. The appearance of Hasankeyf as a cover story in this movements is neither by chance, nor a mere result of carefully studied resource mobilisation strategy. What Hasankeyf means for the entire Kurdish society explains why the movement in the first place started under the name the Initiative to Keep Hasankeyf Alive. Water is Hasankeyf with its steep rocks, Tigris River, people and other living-beings in it, and its climate. Water means to these people Hasankeyf, a link with their history, its ancient structures and relics of the
previous civilisations. Water is also their future, in the form of Hasankeyf, which they will leave to the next generations.

In these movements one can see that the borders between the entities of natural and social systems blur and in fact that they never have existed for some communities. When exogenous socio-economic developments create pressures on their livelihoods, these people struggle as if defending their territory is a matter of life or death. In these resistances against the globalisation of resource appropriation regimes, we see that another way of living is possible.

In larger social movements such as the ones regarding water governance, urban communities relate themselves to these communities and what is happening to them. Through the stories of these people, they might better understand the meanings of abstract concepts such as socio-ecological justice and build emotional ties with them. In that way, local movements provide large scale mobilisations a degree of concretisation and emotional background whose presence is vital for the emergence and development of social movements.

What is clear is that emotional link is not separate from rational action. These are not opposing concepts, rather complementary in the way we perceive and make sense of the world we live in. Emotional link is the bond between the self and portion of the outer world perceived as part of self. In the cases of Itoiz and Ilısu, the degree to which we feel that Irati Valley and Hasankeyf are a part of ourselves, or in more concrete terms: our identity, explains the degree of the importance these places have for not only these people but also the responsible global culture. Naturally, defending the Irati Valley or the town of Hasankeyf for their inhabitants and some others that already built emotional links with these places (in terms of their symbolic interpretations of the Valley and the town) became defending something that is an important part of them.

In the final days just before the demolishing of the old cottage houses in the Itoiz and the other villages to be flooded, Solidari@s con Itoiz chained themselves to
these houses. They put their lives at risk even though they were not inhabitants of these villages. For them the Valley was part of the way they described themselves and their identity. When the eight activists of Solidari@s con Itoiz were cutting the steel cables of the Itoiz Dam construction, they took the risk of being imprisoned. They did not participate to these actions to sacrifice themselves, on the contrary, to struggle for things that they perceived as part of their identity and meaningful existence.

Through media channels and/or direct participation, nonlocals (the ones that are not directly affected) learn about these people and their stories. They may then question these unsustainable practices and their consequences on these peoples. Thus the actors of these social movements trigger a social learning process through their actions and stories. In such learning process new water identities have increasingly been of use for the following reasons:

- They help to reflect the current developments, pathways and trends;
- They create new venues for debate;
- They simplify and translate the complexity of the problem situation;
- They help the formation of emotional links as well as the rational ones with the problem situation (personal internalisation of the problem);
- They accelerate communication, understanding and socialisation among diverse interested parties.

Because of these, water identities led larger segments of society into social debate and mobilised them to take action in a relatively shorter time. Some of the many theoretical recourses and claims that characterise these new water identities in the large scale movement in water domain in Spain and Turkey are as follows:

- “Rivers without dams, living villages”¹²² (In the context of the anti-Itoiz Dam movement: Irati River without Itoiz Dam).

¹²² The slogan of the Press release of COAGRET (22.02.2000): Protesters of big dam projects chained themselves to the building of the Ministry of Environment in Madrid asking for a new understanding of water management which would respect the rights of all people.
• “Water is life”. (The NWC movement of Spain)
• “A new water culture should be developed”. (The NWC movement)
• “Water has multiple values all of which should be treated with respect”. (The NWC movement)
• “Water itself is a living being. It cannot be considered as an object. It has a life cycle and this should be taken into consideration in all decision-making steps regarding water use”. (The Counter Water Forum held in Turkey)
• “Water is beyond human right. Water right is an anthropocentric term that is open to abuse. Water is a life source which should be appreciated, not a mere resource”. (The Counter Water Forum)
• “Water is life and it cannot be bought or sold”. (The Counter Water Forum)
• “Water should not be a control toolkit of state. Instead, it should be a peacemaking strategy”. (The Alternative Water Forum held in Turkey)
• “Water for all. Another water management is possible”. (The Alternative Water Forum)

The fifth question that this comparative case study endeavoured to answer is what role local/ethnic identities played in social learning. The Basque identity is known for to be loyal to its old customs (traditional), its land (localist) and rural values (anti-developmentalist). In the Basque Ecologist Movement (BEM) there is an emphasis to the “harmonious Basque community” with a reference to the pastoral dimension of the Basque culture. According to Barcena et al. (2000, April), the loyalty to land becomes particularly evident in the Basque passion for mountains as mountaineering is considered as a national sport. Although heavily industrialised now, the importance of land for the Basque culture is expressed through BEM’s localist and anti-developmentalist discourses embedded in particular form of left-wing Basque nationalism and identity.

http://www.rivernet.org/prs00_04.htm#25.02.00
Similarly, in the Kurdish culture mountains have special importance. Animal husbandry and shepherding have been largely associated with the Kurdish culture. Kurdish settlements have been mostly in mountainous zones of the four countries Kurdistan is located in: Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria. Kurds used to be rural and nomadic people living in tribal structures. Although not powerful as they used to be, the tribal connections are still very important for the Kurds in the modern world. Few land owners own the land with workers that have no right to it. Loyalty to land that is seen in the Basque culture takes the form of ‘loyalty to tribe’ in Kurdish society.

Both cultures have long been related to local and anti-developmentalist values. There is parallelism between how the two ethnic identities (as opposed to single national identity promoted by the state) form a large portion of contrariety identity which has played an undeniably important role at problem definition, alliance formation and social mobilisation in the anti-Itoiz Dam movement (local scale) and the BEM (regional scale), and in the anti-Ilısu Dam movement and the broad Kurdish movement. This contrariety has been expressed in the Basque case as anti-Spanish and anti-Francoist, while in the Kurdish case as anti-Turkish and anti-GAP.

In the BEM, the anti-Spanish dimension of the Basque identity is often employed along with the anti-developmentalist discourse as the development projects were carried out by Spanish public administration units. With autonomy of the Basque country, even though the Spanish factor was minimised the anti-developmentalist discourse has remained. Similarly, in the Kurdish case the GAP projects have been seen as a part of the control and assimilation strategy of the Turkish state over the Kurds. Anti-Turkish dimension has been put into practice through anti-GAP movements.

The sixth question that this research investigated is how did the social movement organisations integrate emerging water identities and national identities? The integration of cultural artefacts is a difficult subject when it comes to analyse
social learning derived from the social mobilisation process. New social-ecological identities help developing new social organisation network skills, to a certain extent, to accelerate and (re)direct social learning. In both cases, we see that in dealing with this complex and multi-faceted process with multiple actors, the emerging water identities and water problem (re)definitions have been merged with the already existing political human identities.

Then, what poses a threat to the bio-physical space is considered as a direct threat to the human community. Dichotomies of human and non-human become less apparent. In the definitions such as “Water itself is a living being. It can not be considered as an object. It has a life cycle.” we see the disappearance of the borders between the living and the non-living. Through animating water; defining it as living entity, they situate it at a closer to place to human which is also a part of the living world.

We see further convergence between human and water identities through definitions such as “Water is life”. Water here is then defined as a larger entity than human itself which embraces human identity. These identities clearly problematise the human-nature dichotomies and are innovative attempts to integrate humans with nature.

In these conflicts people mobilise and struggle for what they believe to be a part of themselves. When they struggle for keeping Hasankeyf alive, they believe Hasankeyf to be a living being and an important part of what makes them part of a larger cultural-natural entity. At this point, it does not matter if Hasankeyf is really important for the Kurdish culture or not. What matters the most is that it has already been a symbol of the defence of the Kurdish culture, humanity’s cultural heritage, the Tigris River, local communities facing danger of extinction and many other causes depending on the individual and communal interpretations of them.
In the defence of the Irati River, the Irati Valley embraces water, people, mountains and many other entities that are interpreted as important for self and community identity. The destiny of the Irati Valley becomes the destiny of its people, just as keeping Hasankeyf alive means the preserving the Kurdish culture.

5.3.3. Opportunities for sustainable water care: Spain, Turkey and the EU

The seventh question that this comparative study attempted to answer is how do the NWC movement in Spain and water movement in Turkey frame the meaning of water sustainability? From the NWC movement a considerable number of rhetoric recourses that relate to these new integrated social-ecological water identities have emerged. These identities appeared in many books’ titles and publications such as:

- “A river is much more than a H2O channel” (FNCA123 2009, para. 3).
- The title of another book published by NWC Foundation called “Clean waters, clean hands”,
- Even in the AGUA Programme expressions such as “Water that includes not only rivers and aquifers but, complete hydro-cycles including marine phase”124, take place.

In the MATISSE Project stakeholder workshop held in Tortosa on the 7th of March 2007, the stakeholders indicated that the NWC movement started a social debate among a large array of actors in Spain on the past and current ways to deal with water problems and its interactions with extensions on other domains such as the energy and agriculture (Tàbara 2007, March). It did so through the most profound way: by reconsidering first the existing definitions and conceptions of water and of the water problems (ibid.). The NWC movement argued that water

123 Fundacion Nueva Cultura del Agua [New Water Culture Foundation]
124 Quoted from the AGUA Programme in the website of Spanish Ministry of Environment. For further information see http://www.mma.es/secciones/agua/programa/masagua.htm
problems stem from the unsustainability of the dominant culture in the institutions of Spain (ibid).

With the NWC for the first time culture, including society and its institutions, was put at the forefront of the water problems in Spain. Multiple uses, values and users of water have been defined and it is concluded that none of these values, uses and users should have any forms of hegemony over the others. They should be treated in an egalitarian manner that would foster diversity.

According to the interviews held with the activists of the water movement in Turkey, water should be seen as a part a global social-ecological network which consists of totality of rivers, lagoons, seas, underground waters, hydro cycle and all living beings depending on them. They promote that water should be taken as a cultural and social entity as well as a physical one. They also claim that use of water belongs to not only humans but also the rest of living beings. This promotes the idea that the water flow is necessary for also preserving ecosystems.

The water activists in Turkey also point at the sharp separation between human and nature as one of the main reasons of many current problems related to water. In their view, against this hegemonic relationship with nature, an anti-hegemonic language should be developed. They claim that the history of commoditization of nature and in particular water went through these steps: a) turning nature into an object, b) then into a commodity, and c) finally cultural and institutional legitimisation of selling and buying it. According to them, water should be excluded from ‘the economy cycle’ because economic production recognises no limits. They explain the threat to water through these words\(^{125}\):

\begin{quote}
When water is commoditised, it will be a subject to excessive production due to inclusion of new water companies and economic competition between them. This creates more intense and diverse pressures on water resources. Then access to water would be gradually more costly and
\end{quote}

\(^{125}\) Quoted from Gaye Yılmaz during the Counter Water Forum in 20.03.2009.
difficult. In its extraction and allocation, more capital would be needed. This causes an increase in its cost and therefore price. The concept of fair water price which is promoted by the UN and many of the water legislations worldwide such high price for water is false and part of the global water problem. As we see in the case of India, in some states the price of clean water has already exceeded the price of milk. This indirectly means that the poor will have decreasing access to water while the rich still can afford it.

The water activists in Turkey indicate that there is not a ‘one and only’ solution for water problems, referring to the fair water pricing, which can be applied to the global society. Through the monopoly of big water companies, world water resources are taken from the hands of communities and converted into a commodity to be sold to the ones that can afford it. For that reason, in their view implementations of fair water pricing might help nothing but increasing the existing gap in access to water between the poor and the rich.

Some water activists in Turkey also state that there is a growing cultural hegemony of some global NGOs that deal with environmental justice issues. They claimed these NGOs and think-tanks try to influence and even condition the agenda of the water movements and local mobilisations. Their discourse on water and water governance, which adopts a mainstream line of the weak sustainability, limits the democratic space available for the participation of particular water perceptions. They further conclude that due to this local agendas are replaced with the global ones.

The eighth question that this research investigated is to what extend has the NWC movement had an impact on the national water policies and what specific implications exist of these? The NWC movement has had a notable impact on the development of the AGUA Programme. The main strategies pointed out in the AGUA Programme are a) the promotion of the rehabilitation of old water infrastructures, b) the development of water demand management, and c) the
maximisation of the re-use of water through water treatment implantations to reduce the pressure on the rivers’ society and ecosystems, and the use of desalination.

Water demand management is not an entirely new concept but the NWC took it as the core of its claims. Similarly, water re-use for reducing pressures on freshwater resources to protect ecosystems was an important idea based on water demand management. These two strategies were influenced from the NWC movement and its key concepts as water from a perspective which included all living beings as well as humans. As the ecosystems would be protected this way, multiple values of water (recreational, religious, esthetical etc.) needed to be considered with respect as well as its economic value.

However, according to some critics the use of desalination due to its high energy and environmental costs, such as the contamination of marine ecosystems, has posed a certain degree of contradiction with water demand management. Through desalination water supply can be increased and even promoted (Von Medeazza 2004). Ironically, these new desalination plants were promoted for preventing large water transfers. They might create additional problems in other domains as well as in the water domain such as the increase in energy use which already poses an overwhelming problem and the increase in marine ecosystem contamination whose further impacts would be hazardous. This leads into the question that we need to take a multi-domain integrated perspective in which the NWC movement moves towards a “New Sustainability Culture” (Tàbara 2002, April).

In the focus group workshop held in Tortosa for the MATISSE Project, the stakeholders indicated that sustaining the existence of delta ecosystems is not about maintaining the minimum water flow in the rivers. However, it is often considered so within the framework of the weak sustainability. Minimum water flow on its own is a questionable concept since optimal water flow would be a
more sustainable approach if sound solutions to ecosystem degradation are sought.

The ninth question that this study attempted to answer is what are the opportunities in the Turkish water movement for transition in water governance? The ‘No to Commercialisation of Water’ Platform was established for forming a collective response of mainly trade unions with leftwing political view among which are TMMOB, DISK, KESK, TTB and Çifçi-Sen, and other civil society organisations concerned with the water issue. Water problem was reframed from mainly a leftwing perspective. The overall strategy to tackle the global water problem was defined as moving away from ‘false concepts’, in their views, such as ‘fair pricing of water’ towards equal access to water which would mean looking for profound and non-economy-oriented solutions that would exclude water from the ‘economy cycle’.

Another strategy proposed for dealing with water problems in Turkey was defined as the promotion of anti-privatisation in water sector. Even though, water is managed by almost the public sector, with the threat of the 5th WWF held in Istanbul in 2009 public suspicion has grown. The 5th WWF gave the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government a great opportunity to form further alliance with water, energy and construction multi-national corporations and privatisation lobbies from various domains and places. The fact that a large part of the public sector has been privatised in the last decade, leads intellectuals to have growing concerns regarding the water governance in Turkey.

During the 5th WWF, the two opposing voices with AKP government were the Counter Water Forum held by the ‘No to Commercialisation of Water’ Platform and the Alternative Water Platform held by Heinrich Böll Foundation (HBF) and the Initiative to Keep Hasankeyf Alive as the host organisation. However, the water movement in Turkey is very much at a pre-development stage. Interviews held with key actors point out that the movement is ignored deliberately by the big
media groups. They can only be heard by the public through leftwing alternative media canals that broadcast locally.

The tenth question that this study sought an answer was where do the NWC in Spain, the Turkish water movement, and the European Union Water Framework Directive (EU-WFD) intersect? Since it entered into force in 2000, the EU-WFD has played an important role in the EU countries’ water legislations and policies. The Directive requires the ‘good status’ of all inland and coastal waters by 2015 in the EU member countries and the candidate countries such as Turkey. It promotes Integrated River Basin Management (IRBM) and the integration between economic sectors, rural development, nature conservation and forestry programmes. In addition, it encourages collaboration between the EU countries particularly for the management of trans-boundary waters. Another equally important promotion of the EU-WFD is the public participation at all phases of water management (EU-WFD 2006).

In the Spanish case interviews held with water activists made it clear that the NWC movement was triggered more from internal forces rather than the external ones such as the legislative developments at the EU level at its time. The NWC movement’s discourse aimed for more profound changes in unsustainable cultural and institutional structures. The NWC movement has also had some influence at the EU level (e.g. the European Declaration for a New Water Culture) and at the global scale such as in the case of some Latin American countries some of which are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Paraguay and Uruguay. The NWC movement has utilised the existing cultural resources within the country not only to mobilise the society for creating sound changes in the unsustainable water governance structures, but also to build further alliance with larger exogenous developments such as the EU-WFD in that process.

In Turkey, the water movement emerged from the need to create a collective response to some of the large landscape changes such as a) Turkey’s long-held EU membership process, in particular the EU transition regulations; b) the
nationwide social debate evolving around these developments; c) some other parallel top-down regulations regarding the privatisation of public sectors as a result of treaties signed with the World Bank and the IMF, and d) increasing impacts of drought and erosion together with Global Climate Change agenda. Social debate over these issues has created much polarisation within the country between the liberal discourse adopted by a number of different groups ranging from some moderate Islamists to liberals, and the nationalist scepticism discourse endorsed by a wide platform of ideas ranging from ultra rightwing to the radical leftwing. Even though it is impossible to summarise the entire water movement in Turkey under one general discourse, it might be concluded that the strongest political discourse comes from the ‘No to Commercialisation of Water’ Platform. The overall anti-commercialist discourse in the Turkish water movement sees, to some extent, the EU influence in general and the EU-WFD in particular as intervention in Turkey’s internal affairs and attempt to create influence and control over Turkey’s natural resource management. However, it must be further explained that this discourse is opposite the nationalist concerns related to water governance in Turkey, but on the contrary problematising the Turkish state’s existing water governance regime and its practical results while promoting increasing involvement of people into water governance.

In the early interviews held with the key actors of the ‘No to Commercialisation of Water’ Platform it was indicated that the threat to equal access to water was the primary concern. In particular, the overall concern was the new developments in water governance proposed by the current AKP government regarding the privatisation of water resources. In about a year later, new problem definitions and perspectives related to water governance resembling deep ecologist perspectives emerged from the Counter Water Forum held by the same actors. In their discourse they promote a fair human-nature relationship in the context of water. Through the promotion of such human-nature relationship, they problematise weak sustainability strategies such as effective water pricing promoted in the EU regulations on water management. In this way, they aim at creating more holistic,
profound, and long-term solutions to the water problems than the ones proposed by the EU-WFD.

From a larger angle, the NWC of Spain, the water movement in Turkey and the EU-WFD intersect and differ in some ways. Similarities become clearer in the ways the NWC and Turkish water movement (re)define water and (re)frame water problems. Both movements take a profound look into the water issue pointing at society and its institutions as the roots of the water problems. The NWC moves from the need for a new water culture while the water movement in Turkey emphasises the need for a new language that would no longer be hegemonic in the way it describes human-human and human-nature relationships. With their radical but not marginal discourse, these interviewees define their movements as more sustainable and fairer in the ways they define water and framing of water problems than the principles of the EU-WFD.

The interviewees in Spain claim that water quality is the primary concern in the EU-WFD. As a further step into water sustainability, the NWC has also drawn a larger portion of attention to the optimum water quantity for sustaining river basin ecosystems. However, no interviewee denies the institutional and legislative support that the EU-WFD has brought to the water governance in Spain in the way it promotes IRBM, good ecological status of water bodies and public participation.

On the issue of the EU-WFD, the Turkish interviewees are more critical than the ones in Spain. Some criticisms are based on the following three main assumptions:

1. The EU-WFD is another top-down EU regulation that Turkey has been obliged to adopt. Therefore, it cannot and does not address fully the particular water problems in Turkey.
2. The EU-WFD and parallel legislations are part of cultural imperialism strategy of the global imperial powers. They market their problem definitions and remedies to other countries such as Turkey.

3. The EU-WFD has the hidden agenda of the West to obtain more information on other countries’ and Turkey’s water resources and water governance structures and therefore to gain increasing control over them.

However, all interviewees accept the important role that EU-WFD has played in Turkey in promoting the holistic approach to rivers. Another positive reaction about the EU-WFD mentioned by some of the interviewees is that the debate over sustainable water governance in Turkey when this regional legislation came to the Turkish agenda. This started for the first time a water-centred social debate and leaning platform in Turkey.
CHAPTER VI
DISCUSSION: EXPLORING THE POSSIBILITIES FOR TRANSITION IN THE WATER DOMAIN

6.2. Turkey’s potential role in the management of the Tigris-Euphrates basin in the Middle East context
CHAPTER VI: DISCUSSION: EXPLORING THE POSSIBILITIES FOR TRANSITION IN THE WATER DOMAIN

Large portions of the current societies and their institutions have many difficulties in understanding their adverse impacts on social-ecological systems. The global urban society often believes that their links with nature are very weak, whereas in fact such connections and interdependencies have become greater than ever. These beliefs are fostered by the particular understanding of the meaning of economic growth. Growth for the sake of growth appears to be the dominant development paradigm in modern society.

Economic growth is turned into an ideology and has been adopted by the vast majority of the countries in the world. The pro-development ideology through growth has become so dominant that societies which could not adapt to changes coming along with this ideology, such as the native peoples of the Americas, Australia and New Zealand, were either destroyed or assimilated.

Economic growth, whose scale is magnified by globalisation process, has caused irreversible impacts on communities and their livelihoods all around the world. In particular fresh water resources and the local communities that are primarily dependent on them to maintain their life as a whole have been facing enormous challenges. In most cases, these communities are the victims of such economic growth paradigm that accepts growth as “an honorific word in modern society” Milbrath (1989: 9). According to Milbrath:

We are told constantly that we should be growing in economic output, in population, in prestige, in strength, in stature, in complexity. Growth is associated with development, health, and progress. Non-growth is associated with decline, illness, and lack of progress. Progress, defined as growth, is believed to be inevitable and good (ibid.).
Dams are particular miraculous tools of this economic growth paradigm. Since the mid-20th century, they have been promoted for being able to create regional development and jobs and to foster industry. In many occasions, a river without a dam was seen as ‘waste of resource’. The environmental injustice they caused was either ignored or seen as a ‘price to pay for development’ since it was local small communities who took larger share of this injustice. Many of their rights were denied in the name of ‘guarding the benefits of the majority’. While in fact it was just guarding the interests of few privileged corporate groups.

These communities were either forced to leave their lands, or were divested of their historical rights to manage the natural resources in their own livelihoods. In return of such dramatic changes in their live styles, they were given no choice but to accept insignificant compensations. As cost-benefit analysis of large projects covers mostly about flows of costs and benefits/values, not of intrinsic non-commercial values, some people without property rights on saleable assets did not receive compensation. Besides, is there a possible way to calculate the economic value of a livelihood? Which values are to be included and which are not in this calculation? How can common properties such a river, a mountain, bio-community of a livelihood be compensated? As Funtowicz & Ravetz (1994) ask, “what is the worth of a songbird?”

In half a century, many of the world’s fresh water resources reached a point where they are used to their limits. In some cases, these limits are exceeded through water and hydroelectricity transfers from different regions where natural resources are still plenty. The water scarcity problem of a particular area is transferred into another one through merely technological and short-term solutions. Such actions resulted in the creation of additional environmental injustice stories in which resources of small communities are under increasing menace from the multi-national companies and the corporativist collaboration of the state and the global market economy.
In this respect, Warner (2008: 277-278) explains the role the hegemony of global market economy plays in the water domain through these words:

Water companies extended their ambiets in the 1990s and negotiated contracts in developing countries, forming alliances with construction companies and investment banks to secure different permutations of Build, Operate, Transfer (BOT) or continued management of dam, hydropower plants and water supply and sanitation schemes. But given the risky nature of such investments, they require the backing of states and multilateral institutions… [T]his constitutes a successful alliance of ‘fractions of international capital’ and states pursuing domination of the world market.

However, economic globalisation has also created its counter movement. According to Hawken (2007) there are between one million to two million environmental, social injustice and indigenous peoples’ rights organisations all around the globe. This movement is tentatively emerging as a global humanitarian movement arising from the bottom up, and, in fact, it is “the largest social movement throughout human history” (ibid.: 4).

The opponents of global market hegemony over natural resources have gained power over the last two decades. The mid 1980s can be accepted as the start of an anti-dam movement at a global scale. Organisations such as International Rivers Network established in 1985 are pioneers of this movement. This movement has consisted of collaboration between environmental and human rights based organisations at local, regional and global scales. As well as the expansion of modern information technologies all around the world and the democratisation of regimes, the rise of the environmentalist movement has helped to a great extent the success of the anti-dam movement (McCully 1996).

According to WCD (2000) about only a decade ago, large dams were seen by the majority as a symbol and myth of progress and development. With the expanding
anti-dam movement worldwide, this image has been changing. Now within the environmental justice movement, to a growing number of people, the meaning of dams is increasingly being questioned. With the knowledge of local social mobilisations, the adverse impacts of these infrastructures become visible in the form of the destruction of nature and local communities primarily dependent on it. These movements expose the corrupted network of interests within public sector and corporate powers.

The global anti-dam movement, a specific form of environmental justice movement, aims at not only the abolishment of dam constructions, but also uncovering the cultural and institutional basis that create these projects and promote them as indispensable part of the modernity and development. The global actors and networks of the environmental justice platform aim at creating a degree of awareness among the actors of this movement, the local communities facing the threat of hydraulic infrastructures and their consequences, and the wider public, by uncovering the complicated interest networks between the nation-state policies and the multi-nationals. In other words, they do not only politically empower the affected communities, but also encourage larger segments of society to participate to such social learning.

During this research which aimed at exploring the environmental justice movements and in particular the anti-dam movements, I came across other questions many of which were provoked by people I interviewed and conversed with regarding the water issue. This study made me understand once more how influential the large scale changes are over the very many phenomena taking place at local and national scales. In this chapter, I provide some of my thoughts under two titles which emerged in the process of this study. This chapter is about large scale developments and their impacts in the water domain. However, in most of the cases, water is much more than water itself. In fact this precious nature resource dominates every domain and realm of our lives, connect them to each other. That makes the role of water particularly difficult but equally essential to understand in the sustainability studies.

The European Union Water Framework Directive (EU-WFD) entered into force in 2000. The three crucial dimensions of water governance promoted in the WFD were:

1. The achievement of good ecological status of waters within the EU region;
2. Full recovery cost of investments in water infrastructures;
3. Public participation to water management.

The impact of the EU-WFD over Spanish water policy cannot be denied. However, “the break down of a consensus of century-old mode of thinking, planning and executing water policies” (Garrido & Llamas 2009: 130) in Spain had started before this regional water legislation. “Until 1994, when the first attempt to pass the Law of National Hydrological Plan (NHP) failed, civil engineers had provided the intellectual leadership and technical capacity to design and execute water plans” (ibid.). According to Garrido and Llamas (2009: 131), since the beginning of the 21\textsuperscript{st} century, many other sources of knowledge, professional and scientific disciplines became increasingly influential in the most controversial discussions on water. In particular, hydro-geologists, agronomists, chemists, ecologists, economists and other social scientists gained a wider attention and recognition, and increasingly filled professional positions in river basin agencies and management positions in the environmental departments of both regional and national governments (ibid.).

In the view of Garrido and Llamas (2009: 132) the consequences of involving diverse professions into the water governance cannot sufficiently be stressed. They argue that:

In the past, due to the hegemony of civil engineers, the greatest emphasis used to be given on water supplies. With the enforcement of the EU-WFD, the water quality and ecological status of river systems gained
prevalence. Large bio-physical pressures such as droughts, floods, ecosystem destruction and water pollution changed the general public view over water management and pushed a social response against the discourse of many politicians.

According to Garrido & Llamas (2009: 132) when EU-WFD entered into force in 2000, the debate over the NHP 2001 resulted in another very important breakdown of consensus in the water domain:

In this case, regional disputes over trans-boundary rivers became explicit and turned into political ammunition. Although the management of inter-community water resources is, according to the Spanish Constitution, a national jurisdiction, some Autonomous Communities claimed area-of-origin rights in order to question the grand Ebro transfer scheme.

The debate over the NHP 2001 involved nine different Autonomous Communities of Spain in case of the Ebro River. As diverse interests were at stake, the debate grew and the consensus on ‘national interests at first at any cost’ was abandoned to a large extent. As Garrido & Llamas (2009: 133) argue, the regions that would benefit from the inter-regional water transfer from the Ebro River proposed that inter-community basins should be taken into consideration within the framework of the national jurisdiction. They also claimed that inter-basin water transfers were strategy projects for the whole country. Even though the NHP 2001 was partially abandoned soon after the PSOE came to power in the 2004 elections, the conflicts subsided but did not disappear (ibid.).

In 2007, the national government dropped the plans to change its current Water Law in order to fully adapt it to the requirements of the EU-WFD. The reason behind this decision was the lack of consensus on its content. In particular, the regional authorities’ claims on competency and rights over water resources with the reluctance of the water user organisations (irrigation user associations, hydroelectricity producers etc.) to the implementation of the EU-WFD principles
on water cost recovery and water pricing to encourage water saving, efficient water use and river basin protection (ibid.).

According to Garrido & Llamas (2009: 133) it is still too soon to ascertain the impacts of this process of devolution. However, they state that this might mean that in inter-community basins the central government’s role is diminished. A shift from national scale towards regional scale has been taking place in the Spanish water policy which would mean that the Autonomous Communities of Spain will most probably develop their own legislative initiatives regarding the water governance (ibid.).

The EU-WFD’s most prominent effect on the water Spanish hydraulic paradigm can be explained with the legislative support it gave to the NWC movement (ibid.). This gave the movement a new momentum and an impetus. Even though the NWC movement was aiming for more profound changes targeting the cultural barriers to sustainable governance as well as institutional ones, it was at the same time trying to adopt some of the notions that were already promoted by the EU-WFD. Among these were the public participation and Integrated River Basin Management (IRBM).

In the Turkish case, social response to the EU-WFD adaptation regulations has been quite different from the one in Spain. This difference can to a certain extent be explained by the collective perception of the West in Turkey and Turkish problematisation of its relations with the West. According to Yılmaz (2006) Turkey’s sceptical relationship with the West is heavily rooted in two traumatic past experiences: the Tanzimat reforms whose impacts were largely explored in the previous chapter, and the Sèvres Treaty. Yılmaz indicates that even though Turkey-Europe relationships have changed over time, these collective memories have not gone through re-evaluation afterwards and they persisted to be the most prominent part of the anti-West discourse of the Turkish nationalism. Yılmaz (2006: 4) underlines the fact that “memory is not always what we remember as autonomous subjects but what we are reminded of by those in positions of
authority, using the ideology-producing and ideology-disseminating institutions (schools, museums, textbooks, the media, cinema, literature, and so on) at their disposal”.

The term Tanzimat\textsuperscript{126} refers to a series of modernisation attempts carried out by the Ottoman Empire starting from 1839. These reforms aimed at giving modern citizenship rights to the Ottoman subjects regardless of their ethnic and religious differences, and adopting a Western state model that is based on ‘rule of law’. These reforms were later on developed to provide particular rights to the non-Muslim subjects of the Ottoman Empire. Among these rights, some were related to freedom of prayer, establishment of religious educational institutions, entering into the military service, and equal taxation as the other Ottoman subjects. The overall “expectation behind these reforms was to regain the allegiance of the Christian Ottoman subjects, mainly Greeks and Armenians, and controlling the separatist tendencies in these subjects which were often encouraged by the British and the Russian Empires” (ibid.: 5). The start of the Tanzimat period coincided with the start of the decline of the Ottoman Empire. This era was the emergence of many nationalist liberation movements of the non-Turkic and non-Muslim subjects of the Ottoman Empire. In the end, the Ottoman territory which used to be on three continents, Africa, Asia and Europe, shrank to Anatolia. According to Yılmaz (2006: 6) the Turkish state and nation derived two lessons from this experience which build the pillars of the Tanzimat syndrome:

1. Giving freedom and rights to people do not create loyalty to the state; on the contrary, this encourages and supports them to develop separatist plans and actions against the state.

2. The real motivation behind Europe’s demands for human rights was to divide the Turkish nation and weaken the Turkish state.

\textsuperscript{126} For more information see Turkish Kurdistan and the Kurdish nationalism in Chapter V.
Yılmaz (2006: 6) argues that the combination of these two lessons, which are deeply present in the collective memory of the Turkish state and society, forms the main axis of the contemporary Turkish nationalism and its particular isolationism.

The Sèvres syndrome is related to final defeat of Ottoman Empire and the establishment of the Turkish Republic in the following years. By the end of the World War I, the Ottoman Empire was defeated. The Ottoman officials signed a treaty conditioning unconditional surrender to the Allied powers leaving whatever was left from the Ottoman territory to them. These lands, mainly Anatolia, were divided between the Allied powers. As a response to that, an armed resistance movement emerged from Anatolia in 1919 and rapidly became nation-wide. This Liberation War lasted until 1922 and resulted in victory.

According to Yılmaz (2006: 12) the two doctrines developed from this were ‘isolationism’ and ‘westernisation or modernisation without the West’. In this respect, according to Park (2005: 13) this syndrome “grew out of a 1920 Great Power plan (never realised) to dismember Turkey in the aftermath of the Ottoman Empire’s collapse. A feature of this complex is that many Turks genuinely believe conspiracy theories in which the US and the EU are trying to weaken Turkey both through partition (e.g., the creation of a Kurdish state) and through instigating sufficient domestic political turmoil to ensure that the country remains weak”. Jung & Piccolo (2001: 117) also add that “the West’s support for political solutions, such as the official recognition of Kurdish cultural and linguistic rights, is perceived as part of a devious agenda aimed at undermining the integrity and sovereignty of the Turkish state”.

During the years of the newly established Turkish Republic, relations with the international organisations such as the NATO, the IMF and the World Bank went on creating considerable disappointment and scepticism related to the West. Finally, Turkey’s long-going membership bid negotiations with the EU have only
added to this social-political tension. The scepticism over Turkey’s benefits from future EU membership got stronger in larger segments of Turkish society.

Some of the harmonisation laws of the EU caused deep and parallel traumas in the Turkish public. In particular, the developments following after the imprisonment of the PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan in 1999, is a representative case in the way it demonstrates how the Turkish society with its institutions went on perceiving and identifying the West in the same framework after a century. When the PKK leader was captured in exile in Kenya and was sent to Turkey, it was not even questioned whether he would be sentenced to capital punishment. At the end of the trial, Abdullah Öcalan was sentenced to death and the Supreme Court of Appeals ratified the sentence. However, the very same year, Turkey’s membership negotiations started. In line with the EU harmonisation laws Turkey abolished capital punishment in 2002 and Abdullah Öcalan’s death sentence was converted to life imprisonment. This provoked nation-wide disappointment as Öcalan had been the official symbol of terrorism and high treason for many in Turkey. The old conspiracy theories based on long-held assumptions about the West’s aspiration of creating a weaker Turkey and attack on Turkish sovereignty were once more operating.

Turkey’s EU membership bid negotiations continued in this tense social-political ambience. The EU harmonisation laws and regulations were mostly perceived as the West’s intervention to Turkish sovereignty. The EU-WFD has had its share from this scepticism. It has received criticisms from various segments of the society. These criticisms are often based on the following collective assumptions parallel to the ones of the Sevres syndrome:

a) The EU has vested interests in Turkey’s natural resources, in particular water, and aspires to build control over Turkish water management by involving these resources in its regional data base and integrated river basin management network.
b) The EU does not want an economically strong Turkey. Therefore, it tries to hinder Turkish socio-economic development by spreading environmentalist and conservationist discourses.

c) The EU harmonisation laws are the West’s cultural imperialism strategies to market their bias problem definitions, solutions and tools to developing countries to create more dependencies.

This is not the place to judge whether these assumptions are based on a certain level of reality or not, but to underline the fact that the psychosis behind these assumptions is still as vivid and influential as in the past. From those traumatic past experiences a particular social reality has been regenerated over and over in time. In each context these creations sunk deeper into the cultural and institutional structures in Turkey. That explains, to a great extent, why it is not surprising to hear “phrases like ‘a new Sevres’ and ‘Crusader mentality’ abound in the popular media” which spread “an image of Turkey under permanent threat” (Wintle 2008: 18).

In this psychosis, the overall political identity in Turkey has played a significant role. Turkish perception of the West, in particular Europe, according to Wintle (2008), shows a great degree of marginalisation but less variety. Ideological polarisation within the Turkish society seems to explain a large portion of this type of marginalisation. As indicated by Wintle (2008), another Turkish view equally significant as the nationalist isolation discourse sees Europe as an example for Turkey to emulate, if Turkey were to become a strong country as well as modern. In particular, the secularist Turks from upper and middle classes define secularism closely and directly associated with ‘a Turkey that turns its face to the West’. Even though it might sound contradictory at first, in the Turkish state ideology namely Kemalism, modernity, civilisation, and the West are used almost as if they were synonymous.
Yılmaz (2006) gives the early westernisation policy of the Turkish republic as an example to this. This policy was based on a strategy aiming at creating modernisation with isolation from the West because the West was seen as a source of threat to the existence of Turkish culture. The overall pro-development discourse in Turkey can be summarised with one phrase: “We should adopt the science and technology of the West, but keep on protecting our national and cultural values”. This phrase resonates through generations in the Turkish curriculum shaping, to a great extent, Turkish perception of the West.

According to Akçam (2004: 33) starting with the Tanzimat reforms “the various reform initiatives that have been introduced by the Ottoman-Turkish rulers since then until today did not derive from deeply held belief in such reforms. Rather, the rulers were more or less forced to introduce them as an outcome of external pressures that resulted from the process of developing relations with Europe”.

The political situation in Turkey has allowed for only certain modes of change and reforms in which ‘imported measures from the West’ were often applied in a top-down manner. During decades, the Turkish policy and institutions went through drastic changes that took place over short periods of time. In most cases, before institutionally and socially understood, they were already abolished for the new ones. Uncoordinated changes most of which simply consisted of ‘following the Western experience’ have resulted in the accumulation of social frustration with the West while at the same time some groups benefited from this.

In this respect, Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association (TÜSİAD\(^\text{127}\)) (2008: 198) indicate that the most persistent problems in Turkish water governance stem from “following the Western experience without taking into account the national and local context”. In the view of TÜSİAD, the turmoil of authorisation and responsibilities of different institutions, and the lack of coordination and cooperation between them in Turkey are, to a great extent, a result of following the West instead of formulating its own solutions. It is often

\(^{127}\) Türk Sanayicileri ve İşadamları Derneği
the case that many institutional changes take place in an uncoordinated manner at a fast pace (mostly as fast and unevaluated responses to the changing exogenous conditions). In some cases, responsibilities and tasks carried out by certain institutions go through changes. Some of these organisations are converted into sub-units of larger organisations. In some other cases they are abolished and new ones are founded. These changes do not only create great confusion and dissatisfaction among state officials working in these institutions, but also limits the capacity and knowledge building in these organisations.

Many factors operate behind this particular political identity which adopts the Western formula without questioning and applying it in a top-down manner. During centuries the peoples of Turkey could not express their views, values, and problems related to governance of their own cultural-natural heritage. When they did, they were often oppressed through assimilative and/or violent methods. Only by the beginning of the 21st century, in line with Turkey’s EU integration regulations on the human rights, discriminated and oppressed groups were given a certain degree of political incentives and opportunities. In fact, even though some portions of society face more intense discrimination, the space for public involvement in decision-making is extremely limited for the vast majority of people in Turkey. The oppressed groups with stronger political identity such as the Kurds started to challenge the Turkish unitarian nationalistic paradigm which does not permit different voices to be represented.

About the EU-WFD and the Turkish water policy, Turkey’s largest union confederation, the Union Chambers of Turkish Engineers and Architects (TMMOB) argues that Turkey has a different position than the founder countries of the EU. According to TMMOB (2006: 189):

These countries had already completed the development and utilisation stage of the water resources in their territory. As they approach the limits of these resources, efficient utilisation through demand management and overcoming adverse environmental impacts have become obligatory.
Turkey, on the contrary, is at the previous stage and it has not yet fully
developed the utilisation of its water resources. Therefore, the EU-WFD
does not address and promote solutions to the particular problems of
water management in Turkey.

This argument has its roots back in State Hydraulic Works’ (DSİ) response to the
Final Report of the World Commission on Dams (2000). In this declaration, DSİ
listed a set of objections to the points made in this report. In particular, the
following paragraph is significant in the way it resembles some core assumptions
of the Sevres complex (DSİ 2001, para. 3):

This is the important message and what is equally important is the
timing of the message. The message comes after the completion of the
development of water resources of the developed countries and while the
under-developing countries start to do something.

A similar discourse is prominent in TÜSİAD. This organisation is one of the most
influential associations in Turkish politics. In their latest report about water
management in Turkey, TÜSİAD (2008: 201) point out that “Turkey’s large fresh
water potential is waiting to be developed”. Following this statement, they refer to
the differences between the EU member states, in particular the founder countries,
which they call as the Northern countries, and Turkey in terms of their socio-
economical and environmental conditions. Based on this difference they promote
a water policy developed for the particular needs of Turkey, rather than following
the EU-WFD (ibid.).

The public sector organ DSİ is a highly technocratic institution with a particularly
ambitious nationalistic discourse. It is the representative of the Turkish state and
therefore puts *national interest at any cost* before the others. TMMOB, as the
largest professional association in the country comes from the leftist tradition.

TÜSİAD is mostly associated with its neo-liberal political line. The parallelism between the arguments of these three distinctive influential organisations from completely different political traditions is noticeable. To what extent can this be explained by the Sevres syndrome? Is the counter response to the EU-WFD a new form of West scepticism? The complex and multi-faceted nature of the social reality in Turkey creates many answers to these questions varying on the axis of ideology.

As EU-WFD promotes public participation into water governance processes, it intersects with and completes the reforms related to human rights, in particular the rights of the discriminated groups in Turkey. Public participation allows the representation of communities adversely affected by unsustainable water governance practices. This way the dominant hydraulic paradigm that puts national development and interest before even human rights might be questioned and challenged.

Finally, in the Turkish case the EU-WFD entered into the Turkish policy arena at a different stage than that of Spain. The water movement in Turkey can be considered to be at a pre-development phase. The scepticism over the Turkey-EU relations still stands as an obstacle in front of social appropriation of this regional water legislation. However, the EU-WFD’s particular focus on public participation might bring out opportunities for transition in water management in Turkey. In particular, the GAP projects and the affected communities would benefit more from the implementation of the EU-WFD laws in terms of public participation aspect. The EU harmonisation laws related to human rights might operate together with the EU-WFD laws on public participation.

Despite such scepticism, can this piece of regional legislation be considered as a limiting factor to social learning about water problems in Turkey? Or, on the contrary, does it help opening new modes of social debate focused on water and therefore help facilitating a level of social learning? The answers to those questions are to be developed within the future of Turkish water movement. In a
country where ideological polarisation and distrust recreate artificial borders among its own peoples and stand as the biggest barrier in front of communication and social learning, an open water debate might attenuate that polarisation.

6.2. Turkey’s potential and tailored role in the management of the Tigris-Euphrates basin in the Middle East context

The roots of Turkey’s significant role in the Middle East go back to the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman Empire was not only the authority figure in the Middle East for centuries but also held the Caliphate of Islam (1517-1924). Shortly after the formation of the new Turkish Republic (1923), Turkey dismembered this political and religious status. However, socio-economically it still is considered to be the most stabilised and developed country in the Middle East region.

In addition, Turkey has a privileged geo-political position in terms of its water resources. The two great rivers of Mesopotamia are born in Turkey and flow down to the South through the entire Middle East region. There is a natural power asymmetry in the favour of Turkey as it is an upstream country of the two most important rivers in the Middle East. Due to its geo-political advantage, historical leader role coming from the Ottoman times and its relatively higher socio-economic conditions, Turkey stands out from the others with its leadership potential in the Middle East.

Furthermore, Turkey has a significant relevance for other countries following similar political transition pathways within the region, including those of Islamic tradition in the Middle-East. Social movements occurring in Turkey would not only be able to stop the more short-term unsustainable development trends, but most importantly, they might contribute to creating an alternative political culture and informational landscape which integrates sustainability transitional aspects in their existing governance structures.
On the one hand, macro developments such as Turkey’s on-going membership negotiations with the EU, its increasing geo-political importance in the Middle East, and the global water hegemons’ interest in Turkish water resources, have created pressures on the water regime. On the other hand, these developments together with others have opened windows of opportunities for the emergence of some niche-developments that have been building alliance with others to affect in return the Turkish water regime.

*Relevant landscape developments*

Turkey is situated, in a unique way, between the West and the East. Since the end of the Cold War, the potential role that it can play as a security actor in the Middle East has been increasingly discussed. Even though it is too early to draw conclusions in a region like the Middle East where political turmoil and conflicts are never absent, Turkey is perceived to be different from the other countries in the region. Among the Middle Eastern countries, it is the richest in terms of its water resources. However, when water consumption per capita is taken into consideration Turkey is not on top of the list. This is explained by the rapidly growing population and the fact that only thirty percent of the water resources in the country have yet been utilised. After all, as the Tigris and the Euphrates, the two largest rivers that feed the entire Middle East region, are born in this country,

As Turkey is an up-stream country of the Euphrates-Tigris basin, its national water policy has direct connections with the security issues within the Middle East context. In particular, environmental phenomena such as the Global Climate Change and its exacerbating impact on water scarcity in the Middle East gives Turkey a special responsibility in terms of management of its trans-boundary water resources.

In addition, according to (Gözen 2006: 7), “the 11th of September 2001 terrorist attack in the US and the Neo-conservatism trend in EU foreign policy which came as a response to that made Turkey an important actor in the international political
arena”. The EU started to define Turkey as an actor of strategic importance in the Islamic world. The results of the 2002 national elections added to this assumption as the Justice and Development Party (AKP) with Islamic discourse came to power (ibid.) and still is the government in Turkey.

Another important development taking place in global politics arena is the growing trend of defining water as “the new object of war” after petrol. Water’s strategic importance has been pronounced with an increasing frequency in the last decades. According to Karakılçık (2008) the US and the G7 countries, create the justified ground for sharing and controlling world water resources through creating an international agenda on water as a war subject in the name of helping conflict resolution as third parties. In this respect, Öziş (2001) underlines the shift in the UN’s definition of the trans-boundary river management. Starting from 1997, trans-boundary river term is replaced with international rivers. Öziş indicates that this change was a result of the promotion of internationalisation/globalisation of the river basin management. He claims that opening trans-boundary river management to the third parties would create additional problems to this already problematic domain. In line with this argument, the National Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association129 (USİAD) (2007) proposes that the following framework should be considered when water issues in the Middle East context is explored (USİAD 2007: 35):

As sixty percent of the world’s petrol comes from the Middle East region, it is difficult to develop and follow an independent regional cooperation policy. For this reason, even though, the water problems of the Middle East are a regional issue, they have always attracted attention of international actors. The remedies are not to be sought in the involvement and guidance of the international power groups but technical and political cooperation within regional actors.

129 Ulusal Sanayici ve İş Adamları Derneği
Turkey attracts the attention of the global water hegemons: multi-nationals from water, energy and instruction domains. The 5th World Water Forum held in March 2009 in Turkey provided a platform for the global lobby of water, energy and construction sectors that have an increasing interest in building alliance with the Turkish government who is willing to cooperate with them over the issue of further development of water resources in the country.

The State Hydraulic Works (DSİ) is one of the top institutions in decision-making process in the water domain in Turkey. According to DSİ (2009: 46) despite the widespread perception that Turkey is a water rich country, “it is neither rich in water resources, nor the richest country in the Middle East region”. Given its growing population, rapid urbanisation and industrialisation, Turkey is expected to become a water stressed country by 2030 (ibid.). DSİ points out that the water use per capita in Turkey is far below the average of the European countries. Besides, Turkey uses only thirty percent of its water resource potential. DSİ concludes that Turkey needs to continue to develop its fresh water resources in order to assure its social-economic development and meet the demands of its growing and modernising population.

As globalisation gained a new momentum with the start of the post-Cold War period, social movements from wide range of platforms, such as justice, human rights and environmental, have gained increasingly global character. These movements often operate in line with each other and can create significant pressures on the unfair and unsustainable governance structures. New developments regarding the water domain in Turkey has been watched cautiously by the international organisations of environmental justice, human rights and cultural/natural heritage conservation issues. These organisations propose alternative solutions to water-related problems. They make use of the global gatherings such the World Water Forum (WWF) to attract public attention to the problems posed by the pro-developmental governance practices. In this respect, the 5th WWF opened a social debate focused on water issues in Turkey. Various social organisations dealing with water-related problems stemming from
unsustainable practices of the current water regime in Turkey came together to create two platforms: the ‘No to Commercialisation of Water’ Platform and the ‘Another Water Management is Possible’ Campaign which in different but completing ways attempt to reframe the actual meaning of water, water management and problems, as well as the cultural basis that creat problems related to its management.

Socio-technical regime: Turkish water management

DSİ and the Administration of the South-eastern Anatolian Project (GAP) played key roles in the organisation of the 5th WWF in Istanbul. These institutions are key members of the World Water Council (WWC) which organises the WWF. Within the Turkish water regime as well as in the World Water Council there are actors from different political traditions. However, it is the lobby of privatisation of water resources that defines the agenda of the World Water Forum.

The larger portion of criticisms that Turkish water regime receives, comes from the human rights domain. Environmental injustice created by the GAP projects since the mid 1960s is the core of these criticisms. Turkey’s record in human rights is internationally recognised. The GAP projects have long caused a number of disputes and crisis between Turkey and the riparian countries as well. The co-evolvement of the international and internal criticisms brought in some political opportunities to some niche developments in Turkey such as the anti-İhsu Dam movement.

However, globalisation of market-led economy creates growing pressures on governments and national water regimes through natural resources management liberalisation lobbies who dominate global organisations such as the WWC. These lobbies’ latest interest is the Turkish water resources. As the current government’s water policy is already in line with the ideas and policies promoted by them, important decisions are taken without any public consultation and participation.
Water and energy sectors in Turkey have an undeniable corruption aspect that favours foreign investment and reduce state control over national resources. Since 1980s these privileged foreign investors have gained an increasing portion of constructions on national resources (ATO 2001, January). In addition, the inconsistent water policy in Turkey, the dependence on foreign investment, and the inefficiency of environmental laws intensified the international pressures on Turkish water resources. According to Minibaş (2007, October) Turkey is being converted into a foreign investment oasis for the global water corporate.

All these points should be considered when one intends to explore the potential role Turkey can play in the Middle East. In the first place, it should be understand whether this is a tailored role for Turkey defined by the global water hegemons for their own interests. Or have the conditions evolved naturally in favour of Turkey and the water hegemons want to make best use of this? In fact, one has to answer in the first place to what extent is this role tailored and to what extend it is a result of social-ecological changes?

In regards to the Middle East issue and water’s potential role in eradicating the political turmoil in this region, Turkish problem definition is of vital importance for the sustainable governance of the Tigris-Euphrates basin. Scepticism and distrust shape a large portion of the Turkish foreign policy. However, these tendencies are not unique to Turkey. In fact, they are the most important components of the Middle East socio-political reality. This region has hosted many conflicts and wars in most of which distrust has played a leading role. Therefore, one should not underestimate the importance of distrust and scepticism in this region.

In the last decade, several developments such as the establishment of the Joint Syria-Iraq Water Committee; the Syrian deportation of the PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan; the Cooperation Protocol signed between Turkey and Syria over the Turkish GAP and the Syrian GOLD projects; the overthrow of the Saddam regime in Iraq; the governmental change in Syria; the establishment of the Euphrates-
Tigris Initiative for Cooperation (ETIC); and the negotiations over establishment of the Joint Water Institute between the riparian countries have attenuated, to a great extent, the long-held political friction between Turkey, Syria and Iraq. Do these recent developments point to an increasing understanding and cooperation between the three riparian countries? In the Middle East where “distrust is the law and the dependency is a phobia” (Denk 1997: 3), such a conclusion would be incomplete merely by looking at these events. What these developments point at might rather be related to the power of the growing hegemony of market-led developments over the states. This hegemony has opened new doors to big and controversial projects such as the GAP and the GOLD through cooperative initiatives under the umbrella of win-win economy scenarios.

The questions should be reformulated, if sound solutions are sought. Is it the physical water scarcity or more the lack of trust between the parties that have caused crisis over water between Turkey, Syria and Iraq? Finding an honest answer to that question requires a continuous dialogue between the three countries in the long-term. This is of course not to say that third parties should be avoided. On the contrary, in a globalising world, any political attempt excluding large landscape developments would sooner or later fail. However, the steps should be taken with great caution in this region, in which each country has a unique and vivid historical psychosis related to their experience with the West. The institutions of the West, whether governmental or non-governmental and regardless of their discourse, are often perceived under the umbrella of the West. Thereby, the West’s growing attention in the Middle East’ water issue and its emerging arguments related to management of the Tigris-Euphrates basin are received with great scepticism in these countries whose praxis is explored in the context of Turkey in this study. And, it would be insufficient to explain this sceptic tendency merely with Turkey’s interest in maintaining its privileged position as an upstream country. Governance structures in Turkey, Syria and Iraq and their compatibility with each other should be studied well. An analysis that does not take these into account helps nothing but adding to political polarisation and friction already present in this region.
Will the embracing nature of water be sufficient in building peace and understanding between Turkey, Syria and Iraq? How realistic is it to raise hopes on water as a cooperation facilitator in the absence of trust within these countries? What ever the answers are to those questions, one thing is almost certain. It is the peoples of these three countries that can make a change in the unsustainable practices of water governance. In this respect, the Turkish water movement might set an example to the peoples of Iraq and Syria.

However, as Akçam (2004: 9) argues:

Democracy in the Middle East has its challenges, owing to the mutual suspicions of the various ethnic groups in the region, which arose during the conflicts and massacres that occurred as part of the transition from Empire to nation-states. Each ethnic group today views the others from the perspective of that period. Without addressing the past problems between different groups, establishment of a secure and stable future would be very difficult in the region.
CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSIONS
CHAPTER VII: CONCLUSIONS

To the modern society, ‘human separation from nature’ becomes *visibly problematic* when communities with “direct dependence on natural resources outside the market” (Martínez-Alier 2008, September: 5) are forced to such detachment by the nation-state policies and corporate action aiming at taking control, in a very destructive way, of local natural resources. In the face of such a large threat, local communities often develop a counter strategy of re-attaching themselves even with stronger bonds than ever to the natural resources that are planned to be taken away from them. In the process of developing such counter response, the creation of new identities as social learning tools and outcomes is inevitable. These new identities focus on threats to the whole livelihoods rather than solely on ethnicity or natural objects. They demonstrate that in such places and some communities, nature entities such as water and land cannot be separated from the cultural context and that doing so is mostly an intentional abstraction project with very clear interests, winners and losers. On the contrary, they can be better understood as inseparable part of the community, ways of living and development. In fact, such struggles help the modern society to question the actual meaning of development and its current notion, which is based on ‘separating nature from culture’ and people from places, rather than on ‘finding common links and reuniting them’.

These conflicts cannot be interpreted as focusing only on the mere use of a particular resource. On the contrary, they represent a larger scale tension between two opposing world views: on the one hand the pro-development paradigm based on *exploitation of natural resources* and on the other, the local paradigm being conceived as the protection of the basis for local livelihoods. In this dissertation I have argued that the actions of these movements may not only result in the political empowerment of small communities, but also may go beyond that. These movements have become key agents in helping the modern society to reframe the current highly destructive human-nature relationships by focusing and redefining ‘development’ from a completely different angle: one that stresses the place and
community orientation in which quality of life and welfare is no longer measured in economic terms but upon other criteria. Indeed, ‘the defence of the land’ conflicts may be part of a larger sustainability transition and learning process in which many different social movements have now become part of a global network. Such movements have become a central part in the new re-unification of social-ecological identities while at the same time contributing decisively to new forms of power re-structuring.

The anti-Itoiz Dam and the anti-İlusu Dam movements emerged from local scale justice platforms whose primary concerns were about human rights instead of the abstract concept of ‘nature’. In the discourses of such movements nature is not defined as a separate and abstract concept but mostly as ‘livelihood’ which embraces the whole community and its cultural environment. In other words, nature exists for these communities as ‘within the local community’, part of ‘livelihood’, ‘land’ and ‘community identity’, and not outside of these. Development projects that intend to break such way of understanding of individual and collective social-ecological relationships are thus thought to put ‘the local’ at risk. They would destroy such unity and would be perceived by the community as a direct attack to their own particular existence. In many cases, the conflicts between local communities and the nation-state policies often have historical roots, and are not solely driven by developments goals. In the cases of Itoiz and İlusu, the two communities have a long-held culture of seeing the injustices they have suffered on many grounds from the ethnic perspective. Ethnic consciousness cannot only contribute to empowerment of small communities and provide them with a particular understanding of what is happening to them, but also help them to connect with what is happening elsewhere, bringing their concern from the local to the larger scales.

In the case of İlusu in Turkey, the empowerment of the Kurdish identity at the European level thanks to the Kurdish Diaspora has brought new political opportunities to the stateless Kurdish communities. In line with this global scale political empowerment, the anti-İlusu Dam movement emerged (1999) as ‘another
injustice story’ about the Turkish state’s long-held assimilation policy against the Kurds. The overall aim was to increase the existing international pressure on Turkey regarding its violation of human rights. In the beginning, the building of the movement’s alliance was also coherent with this strategy, including both local and global actors while, to a great extent, excluding more close to ‘regime actors’ operating at national scale. This was also the movement’s counter response to the Turkish state who on all occasions, refused to build dialogue with the actors of the movement.

In the case of Itoiz, and regarding the use of ethnic consciousness as an empowerment strategy, one could not find links or new political opportunities created at large scale, as seen in the Kurdish case, particularly at the time this movement emerged in the first place (1987). Grievance resulting from what was perceived as unsustainable mis-governance practices was being increasingly organised in Spain within a new framework provided by the environmental justice movement. The anti-Itoiz Dam movement was parallel to the growing environmental justice movement and started to build links in the following years with the New Water Culture (NWC) movement. This also helped the movement to deal with the Spanish and Navarra authorities. In the aftermath of the central authoritarian regime of Franco, the movement deliberately avoided the ethnicity aspect in its discourse. This is not to say that ethnic consciousness did not play a significant role in the emergence and the development of the movement. On the contrary, ethnicity played a most decisive role as it was already moulded deeply in the Basque Ecologist Movement (BEM) which was behind the anti-Itoiz Dam movement from the beginning to the end. This was a particular ethnic consciousness unique to the Basque case which might be understood better in the way Barcena et al. (1997: 307) define the BEM as the intersection of the leftist Basque nationalism with environmentalism. “[T]he proposals of Basque ecologism penetrate the leftist nationalist movement, and in turn come to form a distinguishing mark of that movement’s identity” (ibid.).
The use of ethnic consciousness might open a window of opportunities for small communities to empower themselves on many grounds and achieve collective goals that may not be achieved otherwise. One way is through a strong Diaspora forming pressure networks operating on larger than the national one. In the modern world which is characterised with increasing interdependency between states, such large scale pressure networks can no longer be ignored by the national state governments. Using a transition language, one can say that such global networks are now part of the ‘landscape’, while national state governments form part of the more regressive and increasingly eroded ‘regimes’ against which multiple local movements or ‘niches’ now fight. A Diaspora such as the Kurdish one can also play an important role in the resource mobilisation for its small communities, particularly in the ways it can bridge the local to the global networks and providing them not only with actual human or material resources but also with a broader framing of the problem. Therefore, the role of the Kurdish Diaspora in the emergence of the anti-Ilısu Dam movement cannot be emphasized enough, particularly when the lack of conditions for building political identity at local level until the late 20th century is taken into consideration.

In the Itoiz case, such political identity is moulded into the Basque identity as seen in the BEM and the anti-Itoiz Dam movement. It is present at local scale as strong as at regional one and is an endogenous dynamic of the community and the Basque nation. The two cases of this study demonstrate that ethnic consciousness can operate as a strong dynamic in the political empowerment of the communities facing a large threat resulting from unsustainable development practices carried out by the nation-states and corporate powers.

However, once the two movements emerged in the first place, the sole use of ethnic consciousness - that is, focusing only on national and cultural aspects - as a political empowerment strategy would not be sufficient. It would also be problematic, and in the long term would exclude them from building new alliances and opportunities with other movements. In contrast, the environmental justice movement would provide them with a more holistic discourse and action
space which combines, in the words of Martínez-Alier (2008, September: 4), “livelihood, social, economic and environmental issues”. Thanks to such new framing of environmental justice platforms, the small communities have become increasingly aware of the global scope of the phenomenon which they are part of; and that they receive a larger share of the heavy social-ecological burdens of destructive development practices.

Actors participating in the two ‘defence of the local’ conflicts built alliances with organisations and networks operating at multiple scales and in multiple domains which mainly fall now under the umbrella of environmental justice movement. In the Itoiz case, the Coordinating Committee of Itoiz (CCI) - as the local platform - built alliance with organisations operating at national scale such as Confederation of Organisations for Environmental Protection\(^{130}\) (CODA), Ecologist Association for the Defence of Nature\(^{131}\) (Aedenat), along with international resource mobilisation organisations such as Greenpeace, the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) and the Northern Alliance for Sustainability\(^{132}\) (ANPED). In the Ilısu case, the Initiative to Keep Hasankeyf Alive - the main platform of the anti-Ilısu Dam movement - has formed alliance mostly with global actors such as the Kurdish Human Rights Project (KHRP), Rivernet, International Rivers, Friends of the Earth, Export Credit Campaign (ECC), World Economy, Ecology and Development (WEED), Berne Declaration, ECA-Watch, the Forest & the European Union Resource Network (FERN) and Cornerhouse. From multi-level perspective of the transition theory, the alliance formations in both cases have significant differences. The former was a mélange of the local/regional and national while the latter consisted of mainly local/regional and international actors. In the Itoiz case, due to strong political identity at local/regional scale, global actors did not have a very significant role in the movement even though the Spanish and Navarra administrative authorities refused, on many grounds, to build dialogue with people from this movement. The strong influence of the global in the Ilısu case can mainly be explained by: a) the uncommunicative and sceptical

\(^{130}\) Coordinadora de Organizaciones de Defensa Ambiental

\(^{131}\) Asociación Ecologistas de Defensa de la Naturaleza

\(^{132}\) Alliance Nordiques pour la Durabilité
attitude of the Turkish national authorities towards this movement; b) the political strength of the Kurdish Diaspora in Europe; and c) socio-political opportunities emerging from the democratisation process in Turkey, mainly as a result of the international attention on Turkey’s internal and external political affairs within the EU membership negotiations.

Another difference between the two movements lies in the moods they developed their strategies for resource mobilisation. While in the Itoiz case about only fifty people would be directly affected by the proposed dam, in the Ilısu case the livelihoods of fifty-five thousand people are at stake. Few years after the start of the anti-Itoiz Dam movement, twenty thousand people were on the streets of Pamplona to protest the Itoiz dam. Ironically, in the Ilısu case after ten years of political struggle, the developments regarding the lives of fifty-five thousand affected people have not yet attracted nation-wide public attention. The contrasts in the effects and public attention received by the two movements can be explained by three main factors: a) how these local movements emerged in the first place, b) how multi-scale alliances have been formed so that the concern of these communities become a concern to a wider public; and c) degree of access to media for such movements which is limited in Turkey. In other words, the degree of public support for these movements at national scale were defined by the different strategies developed within a different context of the political identities and the existing governance and communication structures, rather than the real ‘magnitude of grievance’.

Within multi-scale alliances, the national scale plays a key role in constraining or enhancing the further development of such movements. If a local movement is not carried to the national level, where the more ‘regime’ decisions and actions are taken, it is not able to become a concern to a wider public. National actors may impede local movements not be able to operate in this larger framework and contribute to the re-structuring of the existing power arrangements. They may also constrain activities which question the culture as the basis of such destructive nation-state building development strategies which create a threat for their local
particular communities. In the case of Ilısu, during the period of eight years, the proposed dam project was rejected twice (2001 and 2009) by the European companies, banks and credit agencies that would take part in its construction. However, the former head of the State Hydraulic Works (DSI) and the current Minister of Forestry and Environment, Veysel Eroğlu, stated on a number of occasions that the Ilısu Dam would be constructed at any cost despite any obstacle. There is not a wider public support to this movement yet and until such support is achieved at national scale, perhaps with the help of international alliances, the future of the local communities in the Ilısu case will remain to be unclear. In the case of Itoiz, as the movement integrated with the emerging nationwide environmental justice movement it helped achieving - as Patxi Gorraiz the coordinator of the Anti-Itoiz Dam movement indicated - something that was ‘beyond imagination’ then; the ending of the NHP 2001 and a start of a possible transition from dominant hydraulic paradigm towards policy practices close to the New Water Culture (NWC) philosophy.

As the NWC movement in Spain and the Turkish water movement became stronger, more diverse segments of society from multiple domains besides water got involved. Both of these large movements emerged as counter responses to the threats posed by the National Hydrology Plan (NHP) 2001 of Spain which promoted a large inter-basin water transfer, and the 5th World Water Forum (WWF) held in Istanbul which served as a platform for the current Justice and Development Party (AKP) in its attempts to build global alliance with corporate powers and privatisation lobbies to give speed to the privatisation of its own water resources. However, these movements also aim at challenging and changing the institutional and cultural basis of such unsustainable plans and actions.

In the case of Ilısu, the movement’s search for national scale allies became clear only during the preparations of the Alternative Water Forum. This forum was a counter response to the 5th WWF and was held by the Initiative to Keep Hasankeyf Alive, as the local platform of the anti-Ilısu Dam movement. One

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133 Quoted from an interview in Ekonomik Ayrıntı 01.07.2009
134 Quoted from an interview held with Patxi Gorraiz in Pamplona/Navarra 29.05.2008.
significant outcome of this forum for the anti-İlîsu Dam movement was a further alliance with other anti-dam movements in Turkey whose latest example was the organisation of the first nation-wide anti-dam demonstration in Turkey (6.06.2009).

This is coherent with the core ideas of transition mobilisation, given that changes in the core regime structures can only be achieved from articulating demands from multiple types of sources and actors. In particular, the cases of this study demonstrate that empowerment within social movements of this kind was achieved through at least two dimensions:

1. Vertical alliance formation within actors operating at multiple levels.
2. Horizontal alliance formation in which actors from more diverse segments of society with different interests are involved.

If a comparison is made between the defence of the local movements and national scale ones, it becomes clear that in local movements vertical alliance is more decisive in the success or the failure than is horizontal alliance. In other words, in the defence of the local movements political empowerment is more dependent on multi-level alliances. Rootes (1999: 290) also indicates that “the success of local campaigns depends increasingly on the actions of non-local actors, and solutions even to local environmental problems demand transnational organisations”. For the nation-wide movements, on the other hand, horizontal alliance is crucial if the existing unsustainable structures are aimed at being challenged and changed.

In the İlîsu case, the involvement of international actors was very clearly needed, since the actors of this movement were accused of being ‘allies with terrorists’ by state authorities on a number of occasions. As a result of such attacks, these claims were taken to the international platforms as a part of a counter strategy based on internationalisation of the problem. This strategy worked well because the İlîsu Dam would be constructed by some European firms, and financed by European Banks and Credit Agencies. The Kurdish Diaspora network in these
particular countries was already strong and brought together social justice and human right networks to attract the media attention for the purpose of creating pressure on decision-making units of these countries. In the Itoiz case, even though similar accusations were strongly present, the internationalisation strategy was not as stressed as in the Ilisu case, because the main decision-making units were the Navarra and the Spanish governments. Mainly through the European Tour organised by the activist group Solidari@s con Itoiz was the Itoiz case carried to the international scale. This group’s civil disobedience and direct non-violent actions aimed primarily at triggering and accelerating public debate over the corruption and the weakness of administrative structures.

The ‘allies with terrorists’ claim is often used by the nation-state regime actors when there is a conflict between the local/regional and national interests, and the local community or a nation resists to give up its rights. In fact, through this claim the nation-state identifies the resisting community/nation as the ‘others’ or ‘non-citizens’ in its territory who refuses its authority. The Itoiz case is particularly significant from this perspective that despite the small size of the directly affected community and the lack of strong global actors behind it, the movement went on with increasing support from many platforms and wider public. In the view of the state, it would not give in to some fifty people as this would be a ‘mockery’ of its authority. It was perceived by the supporters of the movement as the state’s attempt to build control over the resisting community whom it regarded as ‘threatening its authority’. For that reason, such conflicts are also - if not more - conflicts between identities. On the one hand these local movements question the ‘national identity’, while at the same time proposing alternative ones, and on the other hand, they also try to rebuild meaning and citizenry on another type of development which conflicts with market-oriented policies which the nation-state depends.

One of the lessons learnt in this study is that large infrastructures, particularly dams within regional/national development projects are built for at least two main steps: to build control over people who live dependent on natural resources and
then to build control over those natural resources. The latter is carried out through
the flow of capital and technology. The former is achieved through the process of
imposing new forms of market-oriented lifestyles that result in the detachment of
people from their livelihoods. And by doing so, they i) alienate people from the
management of natural resources while at the same time isolating and separating
the natural resource from its local community, which is probably the only people
that would protect them from ‘development invasion’, and/or ii) transform
‘communities’ into (rather abstract) ‘national citizens’. In the Ilisu case, the
recent history of Hasankeyf is a representative case for this kind of double process
of natural/social detachment and national citizen/market-oriented individual. First,
the locals were forced in 1967 to evacuate the caves that they had been living for
thousands of years to live in the government-made houses. Second, with the
declaration of the area as a fist grade archaeological protection zone by the
Turkish Ministry of Culture in 1978, the economic activities of the locals of
Hasankeyf were limited strictly as they were not permitted to build any new
infrastructure and make changes in the existing ones. These two top-down
decisions were the first two phases of a ‘separate and control’ project.

In the ‘defence of the local’ movements, as a collective response to this type of
coercive detachment processes, the community links more to the livelihood with
whom it identifies. A community whose existence as a whole is dependent
primarily on the natural resources in its livelihood is a community that identifies
primarily with that livelihood. This form of identity is not independent from time
and space. It is moulded into the particularity of the locale. This explains to a
great extent the uniqueness and diversity of the community identities. National
identity, on the other hand, is a dominant single form which is under the
protection of and is promoted by the nation-state. It is about what a nation should
be as much as what it actually is. Therefore, one could say that in both countries
the building of national identity is still an unfulfilled project which explains many
of the responses of both the local and the national state agents on the use of
natural resources. And it is a particularly expansionist and competitive *modus
operandi* one not only between nations, but also within its own peoples.
In these movements, the identity conflict is present also on other grounds. Water is of particular importance in the ways it uncovers these identities conflicts which place regarding what is considered as part of the human and nature realms. In the view of the pro-developmental nation-state, water is largely treated independently from its space and time, and thus mostly as a commercial asset. Such way of understanding water deliberately excludes the social-ecological context which water is embedded. But ironically, it is only through reconstructing such an identity, not as a local or social-ecological element needed for the development of life, but mostly as a resource that belongs to the nation-state, it tries to legitimise its policies and to build control over water. In other words, the state makes use of the similar ‘detachment mechanisms’ that the market creates, and applies them over local communities - such as in the case of Hasankeyf - for building control on water. According to this pro-development and the national-state building paradigms, water in one river is no different from water in another river within the same state. Therefore, it can be transferred through canals from one place to another, in the same way that people from a community can be transferred to a resettlement zone. However, or at least the studied communities; on the other hand, perceive water as an inseparable part of their livelihood and meaning. To them, water has other values than a mere economic resource which can be transformed into a commodity. Identities attributed to water by the community tend not only be completely different from the dominant one promoted by the nation-states, but also radically in conflict with them as they start from opposing development paradigms and worldviews.

Thus, the building of nation-state policies make use of the similar kinds of abstraction and detachment mechanisms for transforming communities and their livelihoods from locally based to large–market oriented. In turn, and as a response to usually quite aggressive policies, traditional livelihoods and lifestyles are often defended in the very same way and with the same intensity. Or else, new social movements try to rebuild new communities where such structures and identities had long disappeared. Actions of the activist group such as Solidari@s con Itoiz are representative of wider responses that link local environment and community
life. These activists chained themselves to the houses in the villages that had to be flooded just before their demolishment. These actions demonstrate what people might be willing to do when a particular long-standing relationship with a ‘natural object’ such as heritage landscape they indentify themselves with so much is under threat. While none of these activists were part of the community directly affected, they perceived the Irati Valley as part of themselves and found it a deep meaning to defend its existence as much of themselves.

It may well be the case that through the reframing effects of these movements on a basic resource such as water, people become increasingly aware of how artificial are the ‘borders that modern societies draw between the social and ecological systems’ or in the words of Latour (1993: 59) how modernity premise based on the assumption that “there is no common measure between the world of subjects and the world of objects” is a false one, and in fact they have never existed for some communities. Thanks to these movements, people might be able to realise that there are alternative ways to establish relationships with nature other than one promoted by pro-growth the nation-state policies. These movements might also help enabling people to build new emotional links with these communities and landscapes as well as rational ones. In analysing such cases, one finds that rationality and emotion become two complementary dimensions, never exclusive, of a complex process in which social learning takes place. Emotions provide the necessary bond between the self and the portion of the outer world perceived as part of self. This is an internalisation process which defines a large part of one’s relationship with society and nature, a process which takes place through (re)creation of natural-social identities.

In parallel with these arguments, the anti-Itoiz Dam and the anti-Ilisu Dam movements contributed to a) collective awareness raising about the multiple identities of water, b) problem redefinition of the existing hegemony of economic value and use of water over alternative ones, and c) collective capacity building to develop new ways to question this nation-state hegemony over the local. By dealing both with culture and power, and by introducing new ways of framing
both knowledge and action at different levels, they formed an important part of
the wider process of “sustainability learning” (Tabara & Pahl-Wostl 2007). In this
sustainability learning process new identities, as both outcomes and triggers of
such learning, have increasingly been used because identities: a) simplified the
complexity of water issues at stake; b) helped the formation of emotional links;
not rational, but not irrational either (Giner & Tabara 2001); c) developed rational
arguments about the problem situation (personification and internalisation of the
problem); d) contributed to the personification and internalisation of the problem;
e) accelerated communication and understanding among different people, thus
enhancing debate on water issues; and f) delivered, in the case of Itoiz and Spain,
an exemplary case about ‘what not to do’ which could be used by the NWC
movement to inform changes in the existing policy regime.

With the help of these new identities, the borders between human and nature
realms have become increasing questioned, and the need for the unification of
them in a more meaningful whole has been emphasised. Moving from this
perspective, it is not a mere coincidence that the heart of the anti-Ilısu Dam
movement was a town, namely Hasankeyf, not a part of that town such as its river,
or its people. Hasankeyf was even more than the unification of culture and nature
in a particular form. It was the collective symbolic interpretation of that ‘whole’
through out history. As the construction of the Ilısu Dam was approved officially,
it converted rapidly into the symbol of the anti-Ilısu Dam movement. The general
line of the story was that Hasankeyf would be flooded and eradicated as if it had
never existed. This has been interpreted as the last phase of the Turkish state’s
ethnic and cultural cleansing plan on the Kurds. This was when and how the
future of Hasankeyf became the future of the Kurds. Similarly, in the Itoiz case
the defence of the local was first of all the defence of the Irati Valley. The valley
became the symbolic interpretation of land, water and community, and even
provided meaning and sense for collective action.

What a larger scale movement such as the NWC movement provide for a local
scale movement such as the anti-Itoiz Dam movement is a broad platform where it
could integrate their claims with other social mobilisations taking place at multiple scales and domains. However, the consequences of this integration for the two movements are not limited with political empowerment through multi-scale alliances. In fact, the consequences may go far beyond that which means that social learning can occur within the context of formation of social movement networks such as in the two cases of this study. Therefore, on the one hand, the local movements exemplify, test, and put into context the broad definitions and arguments related to the unsustainable governance of the cultural-natural heritage. On the other hand, the broad environmental justice movement (re)locates the local contexts and situates them within broader-global problem definitions. In this way, the two levels - the local and the global - operate in different but completing domains for (re)directing and accelerating an iterative social learning process and (re)generating sustainability knowledge. This becomes evident in the Itoiz case in which the motto of ‘Irati Valley without dam’ had a parallel echo in the claim of ‘Rivers without dams’ of the NWC movement. Albeit for a short period, the future of a small community became the concern of the society at large.

The new water identities that emerged from the NWC and the Turkish water movements shed light on the dimensions which influence social learning of these movements. Some claims that emerged from the Turkish water movement define water problems as “a concern not only to humans but also to all living beings”. In another discourse, water is defined as “a living being which cannot be considered as an object but an entity with a life cycle”. Some other claims from these movements define water as ‘life itself’. In the totality of these framings, one sees the beginning of a disappearance of the dichotomies of human-nature and living-non-living. In the Turkish water movement the definition of water as ‘a human right’ is criticised, pointing out that such anthropogenic statements justify and promote a ‘hegemonic relationship with nature’. It is proposed that another language which would be less anthropocentric should be developed to create sound solutions to the water problems. The NWC movement similarly took a deeper look into the society as the roots of water problems and underlined how the

135 Quoted from the debate held during the Counter Water Forum held in Istanbul 2009.
culture constituted the basis of those problems in the first place. They proposed that “a new water culture should be developed”.

This possible evolution in the collective mind may be understood as a learning effect of increasing representation of multiple perspectives. The NWC movement started from multi-level and multi-domain actors and platforms which resulted in the creation of a social learning platform where some boundaries between the expert and non-expert knowledge, and the theory and practice were overcome and integrated. The NWC movement demonstrates a possible beginning of a shift from singularity towards plurality of representations of peoples and their livelihoods. In the perspective of water sustainability within the NWC movement, water is described as an entity with “multiple values all of which should be treated with respect”. ‘Multiple values’ in this expression represent also to the multiple peoples which create this value plurality.

One of the most visible outcomes of the NWC movement was the AGUA Programme; a framework for water management developed in contraposition of the NHP 2001. One strategy promoted by the AGUA Programme was ‘water demand management’ which was to be achieved, among other ways; through the re-use of water with the rehabilitation of old water infrastructures and the promotion of alternative ones. In the adoption of ‘water demand management’, notion close to Integrated River Basin Management ideas, one sees an increasing understanding of ‘limits to growth’ and ‘interconnectedness’. Another new notion in the AGUA Programme was the ‘minimum water flow for ecosystems’. This notion, to a great extent, represented a beginning of a possible shift in both culture and nature realms: a) from anthropocentric understanding of rivers towards a more holistic through considering the needs of non-human beings as well as humans, and b) from a uniform understanding of society and culture towards a more holistic and at the same time more diverse one in which there is a growing understanding and acceptation that there are many communities that are primarily dependent on local ecosystem - such as delta communities - and these
communities have the right to maintain their culture and collective identity as much as the urban society does.

The NWC movement made use of the existing cultural resources at hand to mobilise the society to create sound specific changes in the unsustainable water governance structures. However, at the same time it tried to build further connection with larger exogenous developments such as the enforcement of the EU-WFD during that process. Even though the role of the EU-WFD in the success of the NWC movement is undeniable, this movement was triggered by internal forces rather than the external ones such as the legislative developments at the EU level at its time. The NWC movement developed a political overarching discourse that in many respects was ahead of the EU-WFD. And in this way, the NWC movement also had a significant influence at the EU level (e.g. the European Declaration for a New Water Culture) as well as in the Latin American countries. In the case of Turkey, even though it is impossible to summarise the entire water movement in Turkey under one single discourse, it might be concluded that the strongest current which characterises it has to do with the anti-commercialist strand that falls on the leftwing ideology. Remarkably, from the anti-commercialist perspective, to some extent, the EU-WFD is perceived as top-down legislation. Another criticism is that the EU-WFD is a legislative framework that addresses specifically the water problems of northern Europe but not the specifics of a complex, diverse, and mostly arid country such as Turkey.

The Spanish and the Turkish water movements in Turkey intersect in the ways they base their discourse on their radical but not marginal attitude, in their way of framing water and water problems. Both movements claimed that this way of understanding human-water relationships was more sustainable than the ones provided by the EU-WFD. However, the role that the EU-WFD played in promoting Integrated River Basin Management (IRBM), water quality, namely good ecological status of water bodies, and public participation is undeniable. Despite criticisms from various platforms for being incomplete and mainstream,
The EU-WFD brought institutional and legislative changes to support a more sustainable water governance.

In sum, the pro-developmental policies created and promoted by the nation-state and corporate power groups are based on a particular cultural paradigm which understands the separation of community from its livelihood and the separation of individual from its community as a pre-condition for modernisation and economic development. Such understanding of development cause local conflicts. Thanks to the environmental justice platforms, the local communities at stake find the ground for building alliance with multi-level actors; a process which results in their political empowerment. However, at the same time these movements, through their struggle for the land and community life, show the wider public that this particular modernity paradigm is built on ‘separate and rule’ strategy targeting not only nature entities, but also communities and humans. This becomes particularly evident in new identities emerging from these movements in which defending the land becomes defending its people for a holistic cause, and in which the borders between human-human and human-nature are considered not only as false, but also as a part of an intentionally designed pro-development project. In fact, through such movements the wider public increasingly question what modernity and development actually mean, and become gradually aware of the consequences of these paradigms on not only other people and nature, but also themselves and the future generations; an awareness which may result in civic action aiming at changing those development paradigms as the basis of the existing injustice relationships regarding themselves, other people, and non-human beings.
References


Öziş, Ü. (2001, December). *İnşaat Mühendisleri Odası Su Çalıştayı* [TMMOB – Chamber of Civil Engineers Water Workshop]. Ankara: TMMOB.


www.ewaonline.de/journal/2005_07.pdf


**Videos**

Solidari@s con Itoiz - Corte de los cables [DVD]. Solidari@s con Itoiz, editors; Lurre eta Askatasuna, producer; 1996. One DVD: 25.52 min., sound, colour. Language: Spanish and Basque.

S.O.S. Itoitz - European Tour [DVD]. Solidari@s con Itoiz, editors; Lurre eta Askatasuna, producer; 2000. One DVD: 47.47 min, sound, colour. Language: Spanish and Basque.

Herriak Bizirik. Pantano Itoiz [DVD]. Solidari@s con Itoiz, editors; Global Chaos Production, producer; 2003. Language: Spanish and Basque with subtitles in English. One DVD: 60 min., sound, colour. Available also from [http://www.fel-web.org](http://www.fel-web.org)

Itoiz Hustu Arte - Till Itoiz is Empty [DVD]. Solidari@s con Itoiz, editor; Eguzki Bideoak, producer; 2008.06.08. One DVD: 50.58 min., sound, colour. Language: Spanish and Basque.


**Appendix A: In-depth interview questions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>In-depth interviews about the cases of Itoiz and Ilısu (Case study)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Place</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Interviewer</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Interviewees</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Some of the questions**

1. How did the movement start?

2. What was the main objective of the movement?

3. What were the main difficulties?

4. What were the main facilitators?

5. With which organisations did your platform/group/organisation cooperate with?

6. How did the movement co-evolve and up-scale with other networks and movements?

7. How did your platform/group/organisation identify water?

8. How did your platform/group/organisation identify water problem?

9. What ways did your platform/group/organisation use to mobilise people into the movement?

10. Did the definitions of water, water problem and socio-environmental injustice evolve during the movement? If yes, how?

11. What new definitions emerged?

12. What role(s) did your platform/group/organisation play in the emerging new definitions?
| **Place** | Ankara, Barcelona, Istanbul, and Zaragoza |
| **Date** | 20-22.03.2009, 11.04.2009 and 22-29.03.2009 |
| **Interviewer** | Akgün İlhan |
| **Interviewees** | Activists from ‘No to Water Commercialization’ Platform, SuPolitik Working Group, various trade unions, an expert on Turkish water policy and South-eastern Anatolia Project (GAP), the president of Munzur Council Scientific Board and the president of Save Munzur |

**Questions**

1. How are the current water problems defined in the overall discourse of the anti-commercialisation of water movement?

2. How would you define Turkey in terms of its water resources and its water regime?

3. What does the 5th WWF mean for Turkish water management and policy?

4. What alliances does the Turkey (DSİ, GAP-RD, and the current Turkish government) expect to build with the 5th WWF?

5. What are the deficits of the current Turkish water governance?

6. To what extent can the Turkish water movement have an impact on the Turkish water governance?

7. What impact has the EU-WFD had on the Turkish water management?

8. What opportunities emerged for the water movement from Turkey’s adoption of the EU-WFD?

9. Can Turkey play a leading role in sustainable governance of the Tigris-Euphrates basin in the Middle East? What are the opportunities and limitations?
## Appendix B: List of interviewees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Social organization</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Additional notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abdullah Aysu</td>
<td>President of the Confederation of Farmer Trade Unions</td>
<td>22.03.2009</td>
<td>Istanbul</td>
<td>Conversational interview</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdülvahap Kusen</td>
<td>Mayor of Hasankeyf</td>
<td>17.07.2008</td>
<td>Hasankeyf</td>
<td>Semi-structured in-depth interview</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annelies Broekman</td>
<td>XNCA (Network for a New Water Culture) Catalunya</td>
<td>05.10.2009</td>
<td>Barcelona</td>
<td>Conversational interview</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beyza Ustün</td>
<td>Academic &amp; activist of ‘No to Commercialization of Water’ Platform</td>
<td>28.07.2008</td>
<td>Zaragoza</td>
<td>Conversational interview</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>19-21.03.2009</td>
<td>Barcelona</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>22-29.08.2009</td>
<td>Istanbul</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Celia</td>
<td>Solidari@s con Itoiz activist</td>
<td>23-24.05.2008</td>
<td>Pamplona</td>
<td>Conversational interview</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>29.05.2008</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuma Çiçek</td>
<td>International relations expert at Diyarbakır Municipality</td>
<td>15-17.05.2008</td>
<td>Diyarbakır</td>
<td>Conversational interview</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diren Özkân</td>
<td>Coordinator of Initiative to Keep Hasankeyf Alive, Diyarbakır</td>
<td>14-17.07.2008</td>
<td>Diyarbakır</td>
<td>Conversational interview</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>20-22.03.2009</td>
<td>Batman</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>22.03.2009</td>
<td>Istanbul</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eylem Tuncaelli</td>
<td>President of the Chamber of Environmental Engineers Istanbul Branch</td>
<td>20.03.2009</td>
<td>Istanbul</td>
<td>Conversational interview</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaye Yılmaz</td>
<td>United Metal Worker’s Union international relations expert and ‘No to Commercialization of Water’ Platform activist</td>
<td>28.07.2008</td>
<td>Zaragoza</td>
<td>Conversational interview</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>19-22.03.2009</td>
<td>Barcelona</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>15.04.2009</td>
<td>Istanbul</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hasan Şen</td>
<td>President of Save Munzur Council</td>
<td>20.03.2009</td>
<td>Istanbul</td>
<td>Conversational interview</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ilyas Yılmazer</td>
<td>President of the Munzur Council Scientific Board</td>
<td>11.04.2009</td>
<td>Ankara</td>
<td>Semi-structured in-depth interview</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>İhaki Barcena</td>
<td>Academic expert (University of the Basque Country) and Ecologists in Action activist</td>
<td>23.05.2008</td>
<td>Bilbao</td>
<td>Semi-structured in-depth interview</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kike</td>
<td>Solidarios con Itoiz activist</td>
<td>24.05.2008</td>
<td>Pamplona</td>
<td>Semi-structured in-depth interview</td>
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<tr>
<td>Patxi Gorraiz</td>
<td>Coordinator of the Itoiz Coordinating Committee (ICC)</td>
<td>29.05.2008</td>
<td>Pamplona</td>
<td>Semi-structured in-depth interview</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selim Yılmaz</td>
<td>‘No to Commercialization of Water’ Platform activist</td>
<td>28.07.2008</td>
<td>Zaragoza</td>
<td>Conversational interview</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>19-22.03.2009</td>
<td>Barcelona</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>20.03.2009</td>
<td>Istanbul</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
**Appendix C: Chronology of water disputes & treaties between Turkey, Syria and Iraq**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Countries involved</th>
<th>Treaties &amp; relevant events</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1913</td>
<td>UK, Iran, Russia &amp; the Ottoman Empire</td>
<td>Regulation of the Shatt-al-Arab</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>Turkey &amp; France</td>
<td>The French-Turkish Convention of 1921 over the demarcation of the Kuveik River</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>Turkey &amp; France</td>
<td>Lausanne Peace Treaty (Article 109) water use in the Euphrates River</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926-1929</td>
<td>Turkey &amp; France</td>
<td>The French-Turkish Conventions of 1926 and 1929 on water use in the Euphrates River</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>Turkey &amp; France</td>
<td>The Protocol of 1930 on the issue of the final demarcation of the Turco-Syrian border on the Tigris River</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>Turkey &amp; Iraq</td>
<td>Treaty of Friendship and Good Neighbourly Relations between Iraq and Turkey flow regulation of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers and their tributaries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>Turkey &amp; Syria</td>
<td>Filling of the Tabqa Dam in Syria and Keban Dam in Turkey started.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Turkey &amp; Iraq</td>
<td>Iraq claimed a fall in flow in Euphrates (from 920 m³/sec to 197 m³/sec) calling for an Arab League intervention.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>Turkey &amp; Iraq</td>
<td>Turkey and Iraq established the Joint Technical Committee (JTC) for the exchange of technical information on Tigris-Euphrates basin.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>Turkey, Iraq &amp; Syria</td>
<td>Syria joined the JTC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>Turkey &amp; Syria</td>
<td>Turkey and Syria signed the Protocol of Economic Cooperation. This Protocol secured for Syria a minimum amount of flow in the Euphrates in exchange for Syria cooperation on border security.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Iraq &amp; Syria</td>
<td>Iraq and Syria signed the treaty that gave Syria the 42% and Iraq the 58 % of the flow in the Euphrates under any condition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>Syria launched a diplomatic campaign to the force Arab League members to stop financing the GAP projects.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Countries involved</td>
<td>Treaties &amp; relevant events</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Turkey &amp; Syria</td>
<td>Bilateral talks between the Prime Ministers of Turkey and Syria in which they agreed to resolve the Euphrates water allocation problem by the end of 1993.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Turkey, Iraq &amp; Syria</td>
<td>Joint Syria-Iraq water coordination committee on fair distribution of the Euphrates and Tigris waters between Turkey, Syria and Iraq.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Turkey &amp; Syria</td>
<td>Turkish officials claimed that they would launch a military action against Syria if it does not halt harbouring Kurdish rebels (PKK). Two months later Turkey and Syria signed Adana Agreement according to which Syria agreed to ban Kurdish rebels.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Turkey &amp; Syria</td>
<td>Abdullah Öcalan the leader of the PKK was caught in Kenya and was sent to Turkey for trial.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Turkey &amp; Syria</td>
<td>Talks to establish water sharing between Syria and Iraq were held and the need to carry out negotiations with Turkey was stated. Finally, Syria and Turkey agreed on a cooperation protocol for Turkish GAP (South-eastern Anatolia Project) and Syrian GOLD General Organization for Land Development Project.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Turkey &amp; Syria</td>
<td>The Turkish GAP and the Syrian GOLD project administrations established technical cooperation in which Turkey and Syria shared a Training and Expertise exercise.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Turkey, Iraq &amp; Syria</td>
<td>After the overthrow of the Saddam regime in Iraq, new leadership stated intentions to reach agreement with Turkey and Syria on the issue of allocation of the Tigris and Euphrates.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Turkey &amp; Syria</td>
<td>After the U.S president started in Syria, the leaders of the two countries paid various visits to each other. Syria was assured to make further use of the Tigris waters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Turkey, Iraq &amp; Syria</td>
<td>A group of experts and professionals from Turkey, Syria and Iraq formed the Euphrates-Tigris Initiative for Cooperation (ETIC).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Turkey, Iraq &amp; Syria</td>
<td>The co-riparian countries declared their willingness to the establishment of a Joint Water Institute in March 2008. In May, Iraq’s water resources minister visited Turkish and Syrian officials to meet about resumption of tri-lateral talks and agree on increases of upstream flow in to the Euphrates and Tigris rivers.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix D: The Counter Water Forum Declaration

ISTANBUL DECLARATION AGAINST THE 5TH WORLD WATER FORUM

15-22 March 2009/ Istanbul

We, No to the Commercialization of Water Platform, in opposition to the 5th World Water Forum (16-22 March, Istanbul) and its collaborators in Turkey and throughout the world, have organized demonstrations, press releases, various workshops on the issue of water and meetings of broad participation, announce that:

Starting from April 2008, during our Counter Forum activities based on social utility, we have acted with the belief that defending water against commercialization, which poses a threat towards all peoples and living creatures, is only possible through an organized struggle. Therefore, we acknowledge as our priority the necessity to incorporate society’s broadest sections into this struggle. From the beginning onwards, this struggle does not only consist of preparations against the 5th World Forum or of activities organized as part of the counter forum. We anticipate that our struggle will carry on until our forests, land, labour and water have become free.

We declare our solution offers to all the organizations who struggle against the commercialization of water in Turkey and throughout the world, and with whom, at the end of our counter forum activities, we have reached a consensus regarding the problems we face.

1. Our opposition is not solely directed towards the World Water Council or the World Water Forum. We declare to the whole world that we consider the United Nations as part of the problem, not as part of the solution, due to the fact that it is the first international institution that defines water as a commercial good (commodity) and that it undertakes the sponsorship of the World Water Council since its foundation. We, trade unions and trade organizations, revolutionary configurations, labour parties, environment and culture associations from Turkey, believe that it is not possible for the states that are identified to be anti-democratic when considered individually, to act “democratically” when clustered together under the umbrella of the UN.

2. The reason that institutions of the capitalist system like World Water Council, OECD and World Bank are lately putting forward “public-private partnership” as a strategy, is in our view nothing else than the aim to create blurriness in the mind of to people regarding the process of commoditisation of water. Therefore, the truth that the word “public” is trying to conceal should be examined correctly. As we can see, not only in Turkey, but also in many examples throughout the world, water resources and services may well be commercialized with the hand of the “public”. Moreover, the legal regulations that ensure water to become a good bought and sold on the market are carried out by the states themselves. In the present conditions, where multi-national corporations and the World Water Council repeat that the ownership of water resources should be kept in the hands of the state, but insistently emphasize that it is an inevitable necessity that the value of water is determined by the market, to argue for what is public is to approve the commoditisation of water. Furthermore, due to the fact that the capitalist system in which clean water is rapidly polluted and consumed, would still be going on, even if the ownership of water distribution and resources stays in the hands of the states, demands confined exclusively to the advocacy of public ownership of water conveyance and distribution, cannot block the accelerating destruction of water’s natural cycle and the eco-system. With this strategy it is anticipated that public water businesses who are experienced in marketing
Another concern that ensued from the workshops held during 17-18 March, are propositions oriented towards bargaining with the capitalist system, such as the selling of water for its cost price. When the problem is handled from a universal perspective, it is known to everyone that there are countries and regions that are rich in water resources and there are those that are poor in water resources. Since it is evident that as the distance between human settlements and water resources increases, capital investments will increase and costs will amount to astronomic levels, and that it is highly contestable even for the peoples of water rich and developed countries to approve of such arguments, it is possible to predict that such propositions will make the water struggles regress.

We, 'No to the Commercialization of Water' Platform, believe that instead of considering the attempt to “determine the value of water through market mechanisms” which the World Water Council insistently emphasizes, as a mere technical detail, it must be analyzed in terms of the repercussions it has for the people and the eco-system. In exactly the same way as it is with all other commodities, it is necessary to have a quantifiable and storable water supply and a water extraction and conveyance process in which capital and labour is both included. This also means that groundwater is removed in excessive amounts and collected above ground, the eco-system balance is destroyed by building countless dams on rivers, unemployment and poverty reach even more unbearable dimensions while physical labour exploitation in water and related production processes increases, and the world is confronted with rapid desertification. This process, which will make clean water even scarcer gradually, will make water prices reach astronomic levels due to the unavoidable rise of capital investments, and the working classes’ impoverishment and their difficulty to access water will become even more inevitable.

As a compulsory requirement of the commoditisation of water and a means to increase exploitation and profits in the capitalist-imperialist system, the building of dams that do not take into consideration the natural cycle of water, the entirety of the eco-system, the vital importance of freely flowing rivers for natural life and agriculture and the availability of water to all creatures, is not a solution to the problems of water provision and sustainability. It is also apparent that such attempts increase the water shortage and the destruction of the quality of water even more.

It is clear that despite the discourse of institutions such as the World Water Council and the UN, which try to acquire legitimacy for the commoditisation of water by pleading for “obtainment of water by the ones who do not have access to it”, the transformation of water into a commercial good will not be a solution for the 1 billion people throughout the world that do not have access to water. Because the ones who do not have access to water, are in fact the most poor sections who do not have the means to buy even food. It would not be wrong to predict that these groups, who make up the lower layers of the labouring peoples, will this time not be able to have access to water due to the lack of money, once the commoditisation of water has been achieved. Therefore, we believe that it is our indispensable duty to expose at all times, the unreal stories of the ones who advocate the commoditisation of water under the false pretext of providing water to the peoples of the world.

The most condemned domain by the World Water Forum and its sponsors is conventional agriculture due to its increasing consumption of clean water resources. The proposed solution however, is the transition to industrial agriculture. The spread of industrial agriculture through the process of “green revolution” has not been able to eliminate hunger completely and has caused a set of environmental problems. In order to increase the efficiency in agriculture, the quality of food and to create a healthier environment, agricultural models that are friendly to nature have to be preferred.

It is evident that in the whole world, as is the case in Palestine, water is gradually being used as a strategic weapon. However, water crossing borders can only be managed correctly with the cooperation and solidarity of the people at both sides of the border. The participation of international institutions in the management of water in such localities can only bear the signs of commercial and imperialistic hegemony.
7. We, ‘No to the Commercialization of Water’ Platform, know that water is a necessity not only for humans but also for other creatures, that water being a component of nature is the protector of the organic and inorganic systems, and that water itself is a living thing. Thus, water being an inseparable part of life; we do not accept its commercialization.

In the light of the above evaluations, No to the Commercialization of Water Platform’s struggle to overcome the increasing shortage of clean water in the world and to prevent the commoditisation of water, has the following short term goals:

- Openly discussing the necessity and the benefits of the construction of all kinds of water structures, evaluating the viewpoints of the people who will be effected as a majority opinion, evaluating the environmental, cultural and social effects, the planning of water structures not according to the benefit of the capitalist construction and finance sectors, but according to the sustainability of all life and nature, and determining locations according to these criteria,
- In order to provide water to the ones who don’t have access and to provide domestic water free of charge, water must be sold for the market price to firms that produce commodities and at least half of the water needed by industry, must be provided from their own waste water treatment facilities,
- Providing cost-free water for irrigation, to those who engage in subsistence farming,
- Re-evaluating the efficiency of agricultural production, according to its contribution to human health,
- Overcoming capitalist farming and large landownership in agriculture, and improving overhauled conventional techniques that will protect water and soil,
- Abolishing the capitalist pressures (construction and rent) on water basins completely, hence preventing the pressures to increase efficiency and that of water shortage,
- Protecting water basins in their entirety and unconditionally by committee’s set up by the local people, and not according to short, middle, long distance protection zones,
- Cancelling laws and allowances already given that permit mining in water basins,
- Preventing industry from illicitly removing underground and surface water, overseeing that waste water is purified before being reused, and not allowing the usage of water from fossil aquifers,
- Protecting wetland systems and basins according to ‘sustainability of the natural equilibrium’ and not according to ‘sustainable development’ strategies,
- Protecting and improving pasture and forest areas,
- Preventing water basins being polluted by agricultural activities, industrial and domestic wastes,
- Prohibiting production with seeds genetically altered, which pose a threat to bio-diversity in our country and the whole world,
- Giving weight to local varieties that are better adapted to their surroundings and consume less water and nutrients, instead of hybrid seeds produced by corporations that do not pay any attention to geographical circumstances,
- Intervening in every kind of initiative that destroys the historical, cultural and natural fabric and compels people to migration, due to the interference in rivers through dam construction and hydroelectric plants,
- Cutting off the usage of fossil fuels in energy production and transferring to renewable energy production, particularly wind and sun energy,
- Producing energy in localities that are in need, instead of producing it from long distances, and do planning according to renewability of recourses, not according to the increase in energy requirement of capitalist production,
- Closely monitoring probable policies and scenario’s related to water sharing on the local level,
- Ensuring the participation of people in the process of legislation related to water,
- Embarking upon the effort to cancel the legal regulations that give permission to water companies in Italy, India and Turkey to establish their own private security organs,
• Implementing policies, which enable producers to have a say in the management of water and land,
• Creating work environments in which employees of water services and related jobs can work under full social security, freely and with humanely wages,
• Developing strategies that will help labour movements to internalize the struggle, creating a strong social opposition,
• Ensuring that everyone has equal and free access to potable, clean water,
• Since the increase in productivity of water resources in any country will restrict the access to water of neighbouring countries and their labourers, thereby decreasing the purchasing power of wages, instead of engaging in efforts to “increase productivity”, the collective organization of labourers of neighbouring countries should be aimed for,
• Reaching a consensus on the necessity to urgently create national and international networks in order to broadcast to the whole world the policies and practices of corporations and states regarding water and to interchange information about the experiences of struggle in the countries, regions and localities that are exposed to similar enforcements,
• Monitoring international struggles, sharing experiences of local resistance and struggle in the process of the commercialization of water, transforming these experiences into a unity of resistance at common grounds, in short ensuring that through international knowledge sharing the peoples of the world can act collectively,
• In collectivizing demands related to the water struggle across the world, it is important to act according to the benefit of local communities of the world who are living in the most difficult circumstances and to ensure their demands become a world demand,
• Taking into account all local, historical, and cultural differences while building organization and solidarity networks across the globe,
• Taking a collective stand with the peoples of the world in order to delete immediately the clauses regarding the commercialization and commoditisation of water from the loan agreements between governments and international loan associations, especially the World Bank, and to ensure that it will not be recommended again,
• Contributing as artists to the organized struggle by creating, publishing and displaying works in favour of water rights, democracy and labour rights.

In the long run:

Our determination to actualize our shared opinions will give strength to the systematic and organized struggle of No to the Commercialization of Water Platform. We believe that no economic value is more important than the history and cultural heritage of people and natural life and its equilibrium. Water is life itself. The commercialization of water is not only unacceptable for humans but also for all of nature and other living creatures. We stand for only the use value of water and its utilization in the production of products that only have a use value. We concretize our demand for a free world without exploitation, in which developments in science and technology are employed for the benefit of humankind. Shortly, we claim the use value of our land, bread, labour and WATER, meaning that all production must solely focus on public welfare. Once again we plead that the people will struggle together against the games of commercialization of water the World Water Council and their collaborators play in Turkey, and against the intentions of the 5th World Water Forum.
Appendix E: The Alternative Water Forum Declaration

Alternative Water Forum – Istanbul Declaration

Istanbul, March 22, 2009

After Mexico City 2006, which was an important milestone of the continuous work of the global movement for water justice, we have now gathered in Istanbul to mobilize against the 5th World Water Forum. We are here to delegitimize this false, corporate driven World Water Forum and to give voice to the positive agenda of the global water justice movements!

Given that we are in Turkey, we cannot ignore that this country provides a powerful example of the devastating impacts of destructive water management policies. The Turkish government has pushed for the privatization of both water services, watersheds and has plans to dam every river in the country. Four specific cases of destructive and risky dams in Turkey, include the Ilisu, Yusufeli, Munzur and Yortani dams. For ten years, affected people have intensively opposed these projects, in particular, the Ilisu dam which is part of a larger irrigation and energy production project known as the South East Anatolia Projects, or GAP. The Ilisu dam – one of the most criticized dam projects worldwide – is particularly complex and troubling because of its implications on international policy in the Middle East. The dam is situated in the Kurdish-settled region where there are ongoing human rights violations related to the unsolved Kurdish question. The Turkish government is using GAP to negatively impact the livelihood of the Kurdish people and to suppress their cultural and political rights.

We, as a movement, are here to offer solutions to the water crisis, and to demand that the UN General Assembly organize the next global forum on water. The participation of important United Nations officials and representatives in our meeting is evidence that something has changed. There is a tangible and symbolic shift of legitimacy: from the official Forum organized by private interests and by the World Water Council to the Peoples Water Forum, organized by global civil society including, farmers, indigenous peoples, activists, social movements, trade unions, non-governmental organizations and networks that struggle throughout the world in the defence of water and territory and for the commons.

We call on the United Nations and its member states to accept its obligation, as the legitimate global convener of multilateral forums, and to formally commit to hosting a forum on water that is linked to state obligations and is accountable to the global community. We call upon all organizations and governments at this 5th World Water Forum, to commit to making it the last corporate-controlled water forum. The world needs the launch of a legitimate, accountable, transparent, democratic forum on water emerging from within the UN processes supported by its member states.

Confirming once again the illegitimacy of the World Water Forum, we denounce the Ministerial Statement because it does not recognize water as a universal human right nor exclude it from global trade agreements. In addition the draft resolution ignores the failure of privatization to guarantee the access to water for all, and does not take into account those positive recommendations proposed by the insufficient European Parliamentary Resolution. Finally, the statement promotes the use of water to produce energy from hydroelectric dams and the increased production of fuel from crops, both of which lead to further inequity and injustice.

We reaffirm and strengthen all the principles and commitments expressed in the 2006 Mexico City declaration: we uphold water as the basic element of all life on the planet, as a fundamental and inalienable human right; we insist that solidarity between present and future generations should be guaranteed; we reject all forms of privatization and declare that the management and control of water must be public, social, cooperative, participatory, equitable, and not for profit; we call for
the democratic and sustainable management of ecosystems and to preserve the integrity of the water cycle through the protection and proper management of watersheds and environment.

We oppose the dominant economic and financial model that prescribes the privatization, commercialization and corporatization of public water and sanitation services. We will counter this type of destructive and non-participatory public sector reform, having seen the outcomes for poor people as a result of rigid cost-recovery practices and the use of pre-paid meters.

Since 2006, in Mexico, the global water justice movement has continued to challenge corporate control of water for profit. Some of our achievements include: reclaiming public utilities that had been privatized; fostering and implementing public – public partnerships; forcing the bottled water industry into a loss of revenue; and coming together in collective simultaneous activities during Blue October and the Global Action Week. We celebrate our achievements highlighted by the recognition of the human right to water in several constitutions and laws.

At the same time we need to address the economic and ecological crises. We will not pay for your crisis! We will not rescue this flawed and unsustainable model, which has transformed: unaccountable private spending into enormous public debt, which has transformed water and the commons into merchandise, which has transformed the whole of Nature into a preserve of raw materials and into an open-air dump.

The basic interdependence between water and climate change is recognized by the scientific community and is underlined also by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Therefore, we must not accept responses to climate chaos in the energy sector that follow the same logic that caused the crisis in the first place. This is a logic that jeopardizes the quantity and quality of water and of life that is based on dams, nuclear power plants, and agro-fuel plantations. In December 2009, we will bring our concerns and proposals to the United Nations Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen.

Further, the dominant model of intensive industrial agriculture, contaminates and destroys water resources, impoverishes agricultural soils, and devastates food sovereignty. This has enormous impact on lives and public health. From the fruitful experience of the Belem World Social Forum, we are committed to strengthening the strategic alliance between water movements and those for land, food and climate.

We also commit to continue building networks and new social alliances, and to involve both local authorities and Parliamentarians who are determined to defend water as a common good and to reaffirm the right to fresh water for all human beings and nature. We are also encouraging all public water utilities to get together, establishing national associations and regional networks.

We celebrate our achievements and we look forward for our continued collaboration across countries and continents!
Appendix F. Culture as trigger for sustainability transition in the water domain: the case of the Spanish water policy and the Ebro river basin

Culture as trigger for sustainability transition in the water domain: the case of the Spanish water policy and the Ebro river basin

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Abstract There is a mounting body of literature dealing generally with the dynamics of transitions of human systems towards sustainability and specifically with the different stages and processes of transitions. However, the question of why transition processes occur in the first place remains largely unexplained. This paper explores the concept of transition triggers, such as culture or material resource scarcity, and provides a theoretical framework to explain the emergence of a transition and its relation to recent developments in Spanish water policy. We adapt the general framework provided by current transition theory and gather empirical evidence and insights from processes occurring within the Spanish policy context and the Ebro river basin in particular. Our results show that the sole existence of biophysical limits to water use or development cannot explain the start of a possible sustainability transition in this domain in Spain. Changes in the existing water policies in the direction of sustainability were not ignited by people directly affected by water scarcities but by a coalition of sensitive agents, mostly from academia, NGOs and local constituencies, who managed to articulate new identities, integrate multiple sources of policy relevant knowledge, and develop new values under the umbrella of the new water culture movement.

Keywords Culture · Sustainability · Transition modelling · Triggers · The new water culture (NWC) movement · Spain and the Ebro river basin

Introduction
Understanding and redirecting the complex dynamics of global change and adapting human systems to sustainability goals constitute some of the most urgent tasks of our times. In the face of this overwhelming challenge, one possible reaction is to believe that such dynamics are so complex and so intractable that nothing can be done to steer them towards a particular or collectively desired pathway. Another possible reaction is that it is pointless to aim at translating such complexity in a manner that it is comprehensible and tractable by the relevant agents in an engaging and transformative mode. However, preventing some of the most harmful and negative effects provoked by the unsustainability of our development is largely dependent on providing a satisfactory, comprehensive, and coherent interpretation of the factors, agents, and constraints involved in the making of our social and ecological fabric, e.g., in the form of a model or a powerful narrative. This paper briefly addresses these questions for the case of water use and policy, and focuses on the role of culture within the Spanish policy context and the Ebro river basin. By doing so, it aims at gaining insights for the development of new methods and tools for the integrated sustainability assessment (ISA) of water. In particular, through ISA (Weaver and Rotmans 2006) we seek to explore alternative paradigms and pathways applicable to understand and support transitions towards sustainability in the water policy domain.

The EU project methods and tools for integrated sustainability assessment (MATISSE http://www.matisse-project.net) aims at examining and developing tools and methods to explore alternative policy paradigms capable of supporting transition processes towards sustainability. The core methodology of the MATISSE project is based on a cyclical participatory four-stage process of scoping,
envisioning, experimenting and learning, which is used
heuristically to reframe development issues, explore pos-
ible opportunities and pathways for more sustainable
development and improve implementation prospects
through multi-level, agent-based analyses and assessments
(Weaver and Rotmans 2006). From an ISA perspective, we
consider that the dynamics of sustainability occur over
different scales in time, space, and functions, and that the
interactions between both collective and individual agents
are the key influences on the dynamics of the system. Within
the MATISSE project, a case study was carried out with a
focus on the Ebro river basin. Our approach focused on the
relationships between agents and their behaviours regarding
the use of stocks and flows of water and natural resources.
Our general perspective and the development of new
methods and tools for ISA are founded on agent-based
assessment. Interviews and focus groups were carried out to
understand the interests, motives and values that drive
agents’ behaviours and how behaviours are related to the use
and management of water. These were then used to help
socio-ecological interactions at river basin scale through
computer and gaming modelling tools, which are used as
heuristic devices for reflexive learning (further details on
the tools and models, Tábara and Pahl-Weingart 2007; Tábara et
al. 2006; and for the research process, Tábara et al. 2008 in
press). Within this broader case study, this paper emphasises
the role played in transition by the production and use of
cultural artefacts, such as worldviews, values, and beliefs
and new identities of key players, in bringing about tran-
sitional changes in policies and power structures with regard
to water management and the Ebro river basin. The study
of the new water culture (NWC) movement provides a
good example of articulation of such cultural constructs and
helps us to understand the role of cultural triggers in sus-
tainability adaptation as well as the relationships between
culture, transitions and agency.

Our research is based on consultation with local agents
as well as on the extensive analysis of documents and
secondary sources of information. In particular a total of 24
stakeholders were consulted in three focus groups from
November 2005 to March 2007, which added to the fre-
quent formal and informal interactions stakeholders from
the Spanish water policy agencies and the Ebro river basin.

With regard to meetings, the methodology used aimed
at following the process of Integrated Assessment focus
groups (IA-FGs, Kasemir et al. 2005; Haze et al. 2006).
This methodology intends to integrate insights from sci-
ence, policy making and the public to help framing in a
socially and ecologically robust way the nature of the uns-
sustainability problems of the system of reference at stake.

The first meeting was held at the premises of the Ebro river
basin authority (CHIE, Confederación Hidrográfica del
Ebro) in November 2005 with nine stakeholders, three
researchers and one organisation assistant. The second
meeting was held at the premises of the NWC Foundation
in March 2006 with nine stakeholders and three research-
ers; and the third meeting was held at the premises of the
NWC Foundation in March 2007 and had six stakeholders
and six researchers (for a detailed account on the research
process followed see Tábara et al. 2008 in press).

The paper is structured as follows. First, we introduce
briefly the concept of transition and look at some of its
origins in the early interpretations of systems theory applied
to human-environment interactions in the 1970s. Our use
of the concept is in line with the work now being carried out
within the EU project MATISSE and mostly follows and
adapts the general framework provided by authors such as
Jan Rotmans (Rotmans et al. 2001, Rotmans 2005) and
Geels (2002, 2005; Geels and Schot 2007). Second, our
discussion focuses on the triggers of transition, mostly by
assuming that two main broad classes of causes may ignite a
transition in the first place: biophysical triggers or socio-
cultural ones. Third, we explore the historical water policy
context in Spain and gather empirical evidence from Spain
and in particular from the Ebro river basin to see whether
physical scarcity or socio-cultural processes have been the
most determinant factors influencing the beginning of a
transition within the Spanish water use and policy. Our
analysis focuses on the role played by the NWC movement
which managed to mobilize crucial cultural resources, to
create new identities among different constituencies (and
also between previously conflicting interests), and to pre-
vent some of the most widely perceived unsustainable
outcomes of the previous national water plan. Next, we
provide a theoretical framework aimed at interpreting the
different agents and elements that have interacted in such
situation. In the discussion, we look at the issues of col-
laboration and coalition formation as a basis for the sus-
tainability transitions, assessing the potentials and the
limitations of such structural change for the case of Spain
and the Ebro river basin. Our conclusion focuses on the
question whether biophysical resource pressures are suf-

cient to trigger a transition in this domain and on the role
played by agency in consciously reshaping and recon-
structing those cultural artefacts in a social learning mode.

Transition theory

Transition theory is becoming one of the most relevant
approaches to understand and support the management of
societal adaptation to sustainability at different levels (e.g.,
see O’Riordan and Voisey 1998). Some of the ideas
coming from this perspective have their origin in the early
systems interpretations of social development, which can
be found in the work of authors such as Kenneth Boulding
(1975) or Erich Jantsch (1975). According to Jantsch, human societies go through a consecutive series of stages that comprise radical organisational changes or mutations that relate to the capacity of these systems to produce entropy that is, to introduce energy and systemic change in an innovative and self-creating way. Dissipative structures, such as human systems, go through different stages of order through fluctuation, from a given stage of complexity to another with a higher level of complexity and capacity to produce entropy (Figs. 1, 2).

More recently, and according to a general framework provided by Jan Rotmans, Frank Geels and others (Rotmans 2005; Rotmans et al. 2001; Geels 2005, 2002; Geels and Schot 2007) the concept of transition has been reinterpreted. In general terms a transition can be understood as the process of change of a system from one stage of dynamic equilibrium to another. Although such a pattern of evolution is non-linear and influenced by a multitude of interlinked forces, according to Rotmans (2005) four different stages can be identified in a transition: (1) predevelopment, (2) take-off, (3) acceleration, and (4) stabilisation (Fig. 3). In the predevelopment stage, the existing regimes and power status quo do not visibly change, while after the take-off a quick process of societal change starts until another situation is reached in which the speed of change and innovation decreases again. Transitions are stimulated either by endogenous or exogenous forces, but are usually the result of coalition forces between agents, which create “niches” of regimes and organisation patterns that are alternative to those currently dominant and which are able finally to overthrow the dominant regime. Transition can be monitored and assessed by a set of system indicators. In the predevelopment phase, these indicators change only marginally. In the take-off and acceleration phase, the indicators change with increasing speed. In the stabilisation phase, a new equilibrium is reached. Transition takes place at the micro-level, meso-level and macro-level. The macro-level is defined by changes in the macro economy, politics, population dynamics, natural environment, culture and worldviews. The meso-level is defined by changes of patterns of institutions, rules and norms of social and economic activities. At the micro-level changes involving individual actors, alternative technologies and local practices are distinguished (Geels 2002; Van der Brugge et. al. 2005).

Hence, in the predevelopment phase, the regime often seeks to maintain the existing social norms, beliefs and practices. The take-off phase starts when developments take place mostly at the micro- and macro-level. Changes at the macro-level, such as change in worldviews or macro policies reinforce certain innovations at the micro-level such as policy or technology. During the interactions between the micro- and the macro-level (the period between pre-development and take-off), different developments and perspectives take place in parallel and unite to form a consistent and stronger emerging paradigm. This appears as a polarization between the existing and the emerging paradigm. At this point, the regime tries to integrate innovations to avoid or end the polarization at the micro-level. This is a crucial period since the uncertainties and risks of chaos are high. There is a need for feedbacks from the integration practices and experiences at the micro-level for the regime to maintain itself or to go into further
innovations. The lack of such feedback can cause a drawback or a lock-in situation. Then, the acceleration phase constitutes the period in which enabling flows of capital; knowledge and technology are provided increasingly, providing for the next level—of stabilization—to be reached, with another regime and a new understanding of norms and common practices. The regime changes as a result of self-evaluation in response to pressures from the micro-level on the macro-level and pressure from the macro-level on the micro-level. During the stabilization period, the new regime slows down the acceleration of changes triggered by pressures between micro- and macro-levels by showing resistance to competing innovations and developments (Geels 2002; Van der Brugg 2005).

Transitions can fail or succeed. After the take-off phase, emerging regimes can either overtake the old ones or not. In the case that the whole system is not capable of adapting to the changing external conditions e.g., by replacing the dominant regime by a new one, or by obtaining inputs from another system, the system may finally collapse (for the limits of general theories on social change see Boudon 1986). In the past, transitions have occurred, for instance, with the end of the ancient regime, the emergence of the industrial society or more recently, with the democratization of Eastern Europe. In the same guise, at present we are witnessing large-scale transformations that can be understood as transitions in societies such as China or India, while in others like in some African countries, attempts to reach stabilization seem to fail. This is why a key assumption of transition management is that transitions can be influenced by public policy and management in order to avoid system breakdown (Fig. 3).

In short, one of the underlying ideas of transitions is that the management of societal change towards a new situation, which can be identified and understood as better adapted to the external conditions and to the needs and goals of those who constitute that society, cannot be achieved by chance or by attempting to do everything at the same time. Specific tools and methods e.g., aimed at providing focused learning experiments, as well as collective visions, and networks of action need to be developed (Rotmans 2006). Such new tools may be used to transfer knowledge and influence the policy and power structure processes at the multiple levels of action. Lessons may be drawn from actions taken by niche agents, who may possibly succeed in replacing the dominant regime.

Biophysical versus cultural triggers in sustainability transition

In this paper, we understand culture as the dynamic and historical ensemble of socially constructed symbols, beliefs and values, as well as capacities for perception and awareness that agents of a given community use to convey sense to their actions. These constructs include identities, language, manners, traditions, and implicit norms, ideals, and day-to-day expectations. Culture provides individuals not only with meaning and cosmic order but also with capacities for reflectivity about their own realities. Cultural systems are always limited systems, insofar as rationalities and values are limited to contextual situations, knowledge and experiences. Culture can be understood as a completely independent and autonomous system influencing social structures, power regimes and individual practices; or as the opposite, as a dependent system of the latter. In this paper, we understand that culture is both: to some extent, external to agents’ behaviours and social structures, but which at the same time and as a system of references which can partly be modulated in an active and conscious way by particular agents and organisations (For a discussion on the notion of culture in resource management and its role in social learning, see Pahl-Wostl et al. 2007). However, the purpose of this paper is neither trying to provide a “correct” definition of culture, nor to argue whether culture is in harmony, independent or in conflict with nature. Our aim is rather more limited to define culture in a way, which is operational enough as to make it possible to understand how our theoretical framework has been used for the analysis of the possible recent transition in the water management in Spain.

Although there is a considerable amount of literature focusing on the dynamics of transition and in particular, on the different stages and processes of transition, not much empirical research has been carried out to answer the questions about why and how such transitions occur in the first place. There are two main extreme interpretations: realist and social-constructionist (Fig. 4). These provide completely different responses to these questions. A typical ecological realist view would propose that it is the increase in natural scarcity that creates the necessary thrust for change and innovation while those defending the autonomy of culture in social evolution would take the biophysical constraints as irrelevant.

From a realist point of view, the need for cultural innovation, social learning and structural change increases as the system, or parts of it, approach a threshold of
maximum growth in which some of its activities can no longer be carried out. In this interpretation, biophysical constraints will trigger a transition. Also, a given resource threshold may affect different agents and activities in different ways and therefore, agents involved in some activities may be "forced" to innovate and start a transition faster than others. For instance, farmers are key agents in the structure and dynamics of the water system. In the absence of institutional constraints that prevent change for other reasons, it makes sense to expect that innovation will take place in this sector more quickly than in others. "Protected" agents—that is, those which behaviours are not really affected by changes in the external conditions due to particular institutional arrangements or because their dominant position in the existing regime—may be less motivated to change their practices. The same may be true for those who still are too small in size or too far away from meeting the threshold. Then according to this perspective, the growth and "speed" of the system (e.g., speed defined by the rate of growth, quantified either in monetary or physical terms) are crucial for the underlying transition dynamics. In the model developed within the water case study of MAITISSE, called the World Cellular Model, growth can be easily conceptualised by the amount of water resources used by the different agents of reference. This includes also the water stocks and flows that return to the rest of the system and that can potentially be used by other agents (for further details Tiabara et al. 2006; Tiabara and Pahl-Wostl 2007).

Figure 5 provides a simplified illustration of the role of biophysical thresholds in social adaptation following a realist approach. The system, or parts of it, can either adapt or fail whenever any (or potentially several different) thresholds in the availability of natural resources are encountered. Before threshold 1, there is no real need for structural or systemic innovation and the system can continue growing and acting as before, or else can avoid the threshold, for example by reducing its size or changing the number and/or type of activities it carries out. It can also keep its size in line within its maximum threshold in a new equilibrium situation. However, between thresholds 1 and 2 the need for innovation increases; some of the activities and the regime rules of the old system survive, but others disappear along with some of the agents who had been active in those activities. At threshold 3, most of the dominant structure and activities that defined but also constrained the development and growth of the old system have been replaced, hence allowing the system to surpass the old thresholds, and a new stabilisation stage emerges. The different pathways may also be influenced by different policy interventions, oriented towards one or the other direction. In the case of processes occurring in water-use and policy in Spain, measures aimed at continuing with the dominant regime may correspond to the "old water culture", while the "New Water Culture" policies can be understood as directed to avoid and reduce the size and proximity of the system to the existing thresholds.

This notwithstanding, thresholds relating to the use of natural resources by humans are always relational; that is, they depend on a multitude of cultural, organisational and technological factors which may have little correlation with absolute and physical resource scarcity. This does not mean that physical scarcity is only a social construct, but that those "objective" thresholds can be "put away" (temporarily or rather permanently) by technological and organisational innovation, hence allowing greater availability of natural resources or reducing the need for the use of such resources in absolute terms. From a realist perspective, in the absence of major technological shifts and breakthroughs, continued growth of the system cannot be sustained in the long term and therefore a new take-off situation is not really feasible, unless directed to reduce the size and the impact derived from human activities on the biophysical system. Social constructivists, on the other hand, would think that culture, human ingenuity and knowledge will possibly be able to overcome all biophysical constraints thus allowing humans systems to expand infinitely.

Culture is arguably the most important mediating mechanism that links us not only with other human beings, but also with the rest of nature of which we are part and within which we live. Different cultures may respond to different cultural motives that drive their actions in distinctive ways. For instance, and following Douglas and Wildasly (1982) and Thompson et al. (1990), hierarchical cultures may react rapidly to a lack of order, communitarian cultures to a perceived unfairness, while individualist cultures may respond to a threat to their freedom. More particularly, three types of cultural visions on the relationship between the humans and nature can be
distinguished. First, the “mastery over nature”, where all natural resources should be put into use for humans; second “harmony with nature” in which no real distinction between humans and nature can be made; and third, the “subjugation to nature” where people perceive that nothing can be done to control nature. In other words, different cultures pose different concerns to their cultural communities, and in this way the contextual conditions may threaten or satisfy such concerns that may or may not motivate action (see also Hoekstra 1998).

In addition, culture may also make a transition occur faster or slower. On the one hand, some cultures may facilitate the acceleration of change and innovation by providing a set of flexible norms and rules to their regimes to ensure a more adaptive setting for agents’ behaviours. On the other hand, this greater flexibility does not guarantee automatically that sustainability goals may be incorporated in the transition. Indeed, a society can accelerate towards system breakdown if the necessary corrective institutions are not put in place in time.

New water culture movement in Spain. Understanding the role of culture in the transition for sustainability in the water domain

A brief account of the evolution of Spanish water policy

The policy debate on what to do with water resources in Spain has historically been influenced by the strong differences in the temporal and spatial distribution of the availability of water resources in the country. In Spain, precipitation shows a high inter-annual and intra-annual variability and it tends to decrease from the humid North-West (around 1,200 mm per year) to the arid South-East (300 mm or less). This results in water resources that, albeit comparable to European average quantities are highly unreliable. Only 8% of total water resources are available naturally at any moment with this figure decreasing to a mere 0.5% in the driest Mediterranean basins. For this reason, river flow regulation through the construction of dams and reservoirs has been a cornerstone of Spanish water policy since the early twentieth century to the point that today Spain is one of the countries in the world with the largest number of reservoirs per million people. The large amount of dams in Spain are the consequence of a “hydraulic paradigm” which conceived water resource management in terms of maximization of water supply and creation of irrigation fields. Water management has traditionally been linked to agrarian policy, which was seen (and to some extent partly still is in some ground) as a good economic policy practice.

By the end of the nineteenth century, a policy movement known as “regeneracionismo” intended to boost economic activity by a focus on building large hydrologic infrastructures and supporting land use transformation. This was linked to the fact that Spain had lost the greater part of its former colonies in Latin America and therefore, its domestic economy was largely dependent on its own agriculture. With the 1902 Plan of the Hydraulic Works by Joaquín Costa and Macías Picavea, the dream of changing the misery and the destiny of the precipitation-dependent Spanish agriculture was prevalent within this movement which marked the first three decades of the twentieth century (Swyngedouw 1999).

Costa described the water situation of Spain as naturally distributed in an unbalanced way and proposed the redistribution of water from zones of abundance to those of deficit through systems of dams and canals. He declared the state to be responsible for hydraulic constructions since “neither the big landowners nor the small ones had the motivation or the resources to invest in more efficient technologies” (Sauri and del Moral 2004). This started a period during which, through construction of many dams and canals and through water transfers, the amount of irrigated land in the country more than doubled. For Costa, the major motivation behind this movement was a land reform that enabled small landowners to be an alternative to big landowners, who had dominated Spanish agriculture up until that time. This economic development was strengthened by social development as well through education of the small farmers at schools opened in rural areas (Torrecillas and Martinez-Gil 2005). The first autonomous river basin authority of the world, the Ebro Confederation, was also founded in this period. However, the movement could not reach the level of impact that it proposed and resulted in social conflicts and polarization within society (Swyngedouw 2005).

During the first years of the Second Republic (1931–1936), the 1933 Plan of Hydraulic Works was developed by Manuel Lorenzo Pardo, whose personal mission was to work against the unequal access to water between the Spanish river basins, seen as a kind of “natural injustice” to the Spanish people. State intervention then was seen as a way to correct spatially this “mistake” in the distribution of water. To some extent, in its early stage the “regeneracionismo” could be seen as a transitional niche aimed at reforming the existing regime. As a result of the new policies growing number of small landowners were empowered and emerged in places that were dominated by large landowners. However, and given a period of conflicts and polarization, which included the Spanish civil war (1936–1939) and the beginning of a period of four decades under the dictatorship of Franco, the regeneracionismo movement started to evolve into a one-dimensional
technological approach, with the progressive social components of it being eroded rapidly. Further, the new movement was not really capable of changing the existing regime but on the contrary it helped to sustain the new authoritarian emerging state. As a matter of fact, "irrigation was envisaged as the means to create an expanding class of small farmers without jeopardizing the interests of large landowners who were among the main supporters of the military revolt of 1936" (Saurí and Del Moral 2001). It was precisely during the dictatorship that the hydraulic paradigm grew even faster with the construction of some 400 dams leaving the country with the one of the highest number of dams per capita in the world. During this period, river basin confederations that had been founded on local and regional principles and which were originally locally managed and participative, were gradually replaced by a more centralist national vision. They were abolished in 1942 and replaced by technocratic-bureaucratic organisations responsible for carrying out hydraulic works under a nation-building perspective (Swaynedowe 2005). Thus, the river basin confederations became technical organisations allocated by central Dirección General de Obras Hidráulicas (DGÖH), which are now financed and directed by the central Spanish Administration. During this time, the DGOF became an extremely powerful state agency, which had close associations with engineering, construction, cement, and electricity companies (Swaynedowe 2005), all directly interested in increasing the number of hydraulic infrastructures. Dams were the symbol of the demonstration of the power and the progress of national technology and of public funding, for the progress of Spanish agriculture and industry (Torrecilla and Martinez-Gil 2005; Getches 2003).

With the end of the Franco dictatorship, Spanish democracy emerged and took a new route towards the European Union. The Spanish Water Act of 1985 focused on the need to create water plans on national and local level with the Ministry of Public Works collaborating with other ministerial bodies according to the needs of the concerned regions (Saurí and del Moral 2001). However, the 1985 Act did not go further than repeating the old hydraulic paradigm. Again, expressions such as "hydrologic unbalanced condition" of the country, distinguishing between "deficit" and "surplus" river basins, or the recourse to the "general" and "national interest" for the purpose of justifying once more the construction of more dams and river diversions were used (Torrecilla and Martinez-Gil 2005; see also Embid 2002). The role of large irrigator farmers in liaison with the existing river basin authorities had been crucial in defending the old water paradigm and becoming a major resistance to change (Llamas 2003). Once again, the existing water regime remained mostly intact.

The emergence of the NWG movement

The National Hydrological Plan (NHP) of 1993, prepared in line with the philosophy the 1985 Act, proposed to divert more rivers and the construction of more dams. For decades, a growing concern was trickling down by local populations including many people that had to flee their flooded towns. Some local NGOs and regional authorities increasingly began to question the adequacy of those policies and of the hydraulic paradigm in general both socially and in environmental terms. In 1995, the association of people affected by big reservoirs (COAGRET) was founded with the support of two environmental associations, the confederation of organisations for environmental protection (CODA) and Greenpeace. COAGRET managed to unite concerned citizens affected directly or indirectly by the construction of dams, together with a number of diverse environmental associations and experts in water and land use management. The outcome of those discussions and of the alternative ideas that came out aimed at modifying the existing water management regime and was published under the motto of "the New Water Culture". That was the first time this phrase was used.¹

The association of people affected by big reservoirs gave mounting courage and voice to those threatened by the new hydraulic constructions as proposed by the National Water Plan of 1993. Among the new civic organisations that started during that time, a new platform was established in 1996 to defend the Mallos river basin in the town of Riglos; against the proposal of the Confederación Hidrográfica del Ebro (Ebro river basin authority). This platform highlighted the great potential of the area for eco-tourism and was the basis for a protest in 1997 in the small village of Aragon of Beceite, again, to protect the village and the other villages around against the machines sent by the Hydraulic Confederation of Ebro. The concept of the NWG and the new identities that were emerging around it began to gain increasing attention and to have significant impact across different sectors of society.

By 1998 the debates of the first Iberian congress of management and planning of waters held in Zaragoza made

¹ According to one of our consulted stakeholders who participated actively in the making of the NWG movement, three main periods can be distinguished in the articulation of such movement. The first, almost at the end of the dictatorship was characterised by some failed attempts to carry out some water transfers in the Ebro river basin and spans from 1975 to 1985. The second period, from 1985 to 1995 entails the formalisation of the movement in a more decisive and effective way. The third, from 1995 to the present, has been characterized by an increasing role in policy making and the need to develop specific proposals and alternatives to the previous dominant water practices. However, we understand that the transition may have started when such coalition of groups was actually articulated in a more formal and extensive way.
clear the need for a more professional non-profit organisation that would deal with water policy issues in a scientific manner and at the same time would support public debate beyond the academic circles. This organisation would be called "the New Water Culture Foundation" and organised a couple of congresses aimed at redirecting change in the Spanish water policy with special emphasis on the NHP that proposed some 120 dams and diversions from the Ebro river to southern parts of Spain. The conclusion was that the NHP was actually violating the spatial solidarity between Spanish regions, had no solid proposals on water demand management, omitted a rigorous assessment of environmental impacts, and did not make economic sense due to its speculative contradictory economic figures and numbers.

In the year 2000, the Platform for the defence of the River Ebro was formed against the NHP and its negative impacts that this federation of organisations foresaw on the Autonomous Communities of the river basin. Since one-third of the financial support for the NHP was expected to be provided by the EU, the Platform decided to try to cut this support by convincing the EU that the Project would be disastrous both from a socio-economic and from an environmental point of view. National Water Plan was approved in July 2001 and planned to divert of the Ebro river and to build pipes to transport water through 900 km of pipes. In 2002, the Platform organized an international demonstration from Spain to Brussels called the Blue March. At the end of two intense years of international campaigns that gained notoriety from international media and managed to organise large demonstrations all over the country, the EU decided to withdraw its financial support for the NHP in 2004. Shortly after, the new Spanish government which came into office declared their intention to withdraw the plan, although only the most controversial parts of it, which related to the building of dams and water transfers, such as the one on the Ebro river basin. In June 2004 the NWP was derogated and the new government responsible for this decision stated that a multiple matrix of economic, social, and ecological costs and benefits had been taken into account. As alternative, a new plan called AGUA (Actuaciones para la Gestión y la Utilización del Agua—interventions for water management and use) was approved, emphasizing the increase of water re-use, modernization of irrigated areas, desalination, and the beginning of the implementation of demand management policies. AGUA is now being implemented and has entailed the end of some of the previous plans for building some of the larger new dams and water transfers. It also planned to build desalination plants that would reduce the need of water from the Ebro river basin in 145 Hm³ of water per year and with a total of 621 Hm³ of water in the whole country. It was also argued that the new plan would need less energy, provide more water at better prices, would help to prevent the erosion and degradation of the Ebro delta, considered as one of the most important biodiversity and RAMSAR areas of the Mediterranean.

Using the theoretical framework provided by the transition theory as depicted in Fig. 3 we can say that the predevelopment stage comprises a period that includes the late nineteenth century and the whole twentieth century. Such period is characterised by a particular policy conception, which regards water mostly as a resource for growth that needs to be brought to production by any possible means available. However, in Spain, at the end of the twentieth century, new cultural conceptions started to take shape and question some of the conceptions, taken for granted, about water mainly or only as an economic resource. The new policy oriented discourses shift the language from the need to manage "water" to the need to "manage rivers and landscapes". Such cultural shift is epitomised by one of the most popular motto used in demonstrations against the NWP in the Ebro river basin: "The river is life".

The take-off stage may have started when new social movements such as COAGRET, the platform of the defence of the Ebro and then the NWC foundation were founded. These organisations managed to create new identities that helped to mobilize social resources of many kinds. Now, the "New Water Culture" was developing a language and specific proposals on its own, based on managing demand, working at river basin level, encouraging public participation and de-centralisation, avoiding inter-basin water transfers, focusing on river restoration, and promoting saving and reutilisation of water together with alternative technologies of water (including desalination), as well as of delivering economic responsibilities. But most importantly, it was its focus on public education and awareness, civic science and research, as well as communication and agent engagement that distinguished their proposals. Such language, in which different sectors of society could mirror their own demands, could clearly be opposed to that of the "Old Water Culture", still obsessed to carry on with the goal of providing more water supply and building more water infrastructure as a response to economic demands and corporate interests. Whereas the "Old Water Culture" was still preoccupied to use and understand water as a key component that would serve to
the aims of nation-state building, mostly following an agrarian and rural philosophy that was also gaining support from local regime supporters in the tourism sector, the NWC worked in a completely different string. Indeed, the NWC movement contributed to increase the complexity of the landscape that would conform the agents’ and possible users of water—including the environment itself—and made possible the emergence and popularisation on new discourses and cultural frameworks such that of sustainability within the water domain (see Pahl-Wostl et al. 2007, Tábbara and Pahl-Wostl 2007). The NWC movement called for accountability and participation in a policy area previously dominated solely by expert and bureaucratic decisions—or as the NWC denounced, also by corruption. However, as we can see in this research, the reason why those movements appeared in the first place was not directly related to water or resource scarcity. It was the perception of the socio-economic injustices and of the possible impacts on the environment in rural communities which together with an empowering narrative provided by academics and intellectually concerned people triggered the need to form a large coalition of groups to challenge the existing resource science and policy paradigm. To some extent, the NWC movement was ahead of some of the ideas and developments that were to come into legislation with the EU Water Framework Directive (Directive 2000/60/CE) and its transposition to the Spanish legislation in 2003 also managed to influence some of their neighbouring countries by promoting the European Declaration for a NWC*.

An interpretative framework

The main goal of this paper is to provide a theoretical framework aimed at helping the interpretation of the complexity of agents’ strategies and of the structural factors influencing a societal transition toward more sustainable pathways of development, using the Spanish and the Ebro river basin contexts as illustrations. Figure 6 provides such a framework. It suggests that for a successful transition to start occurring, agents need to operate at the three levels of action: by promoting new ethos and individual water practices, by creating new institutional arrangements in market, political and knowledge institutions, and at the same time, by articulating changes and mobilising resources at the macro cultural level. It is precisely at the level of culture where the main thrust for mobilisation occurs, and not in the level of resource constraints, given that, as it is often the case, those who suffer

Fig. 6 Transition agents operate at different levels of action

the main resource constraint are not empowered enough as to provoke decisive change at the institutional level where main structural decisions are taken.

Our model underlines the importance of particular institutional developments that are needed to happen at the meso level so as to make effective cultural transitions that may be taking place both at the macro and at the individual level. The NWC movement was eventually able to influence some policy instance that in turn created new business and market opportunities in the development of water technologies, mainly desalination. But at the same time, while the NWC movement can be understood, using the transition language, as a “niche” development, on the other hand, we find some key “regime agents” which operate at the policy meso level within the Spanish water which still constrains the possible transition in this domain: the powerful “Confederaciones Hidrográficas” (River basin authorities). No substantial change in this domain can be done without a deep transformation in such institutions, many of which still retain many of inertias and managerial styles of the past. Critics about the NWC movement now argue that while their activities managed to stop some of the worst possible outcomes of the business-as-usual water resource policies, it did not managed to provoke a deep transformation of those river basin authorities, thus limiting the scope and effect of the transition.

Reality, of course, is always far more complex. The aim of modelling transition processes is to help providing a coherent, knowledge-rich, but also simplified and policy-relevant narrative about the multiple factors that possibly intervene in the making of large scale societal and technological changes. Modelling can also help exploring and specify possible futures that, for reasons of precaution, possible outcomes cannot be waited to happen to start assessing their adequacy. These respond not only to different causes but also produce different or opposed effects at different spatial and temporal scales. The different results of agents’ activities are not necessarily interlinked.

* See http://www.unizar.es/facsa/uewtr/index2.php?x=1&licencia=es for the content, process and history of this declaration.
or in modulation with those occurring at the meso or macro levels.\(^5\)

Looking more closely at a particular location like the Ebro river basin and in particular the delta area, one could observe that it was the “threat” posed in 2001 by the NWP which helped to consolidate new cultural and local identities, such as the one around “Plataforma por la Defensa del Ebro”, which gathered previously opposing interests. Where some tourism and urban developers had before labelled environmental activists as “Taliban fundamentalists”, the socially constructed threat to their ambitions, desires or lifestyles of a disappearing river—whether it was real or not—made possible the articulation of a network of collaboration between them which, otherwise would have been unlikely to have emerged. In this sense, while the “realism” of the biophysical threat was also mediated by culture and in particular by the media (Tilbury et al. 2004; Paul-Woilt et al. 2007) and “scientists in action” (Latour 1987), it is also true that the real threshold of not having enough water for some existing activities was never met. Indeed, the transfers of water, as proposed by the NWP, never materialized, and therefore, one can say that the organisational and innovation changes that are resulted at the local level in the water domain possibly responded to factors other than biophysical scarcity. An interplay of social forces and coalitions working at different levels, with a prominent role played by the use of cultural mechanisms, identity formation and unification, first sparked off the necessary awareness, strength, and motivation to start the possible Spanish water transition.

The analysis of stakeholders’ interviews and workshops held in the Ebro river basin together with the examination of the historical trends of the Spanish case made clear that advances in the direction of sustainability entail the articulation of processes that can yield opportunities and resources for empowerment and coordination between different concerned agents working at different scales and domains. When asked about the reasons of current persistent problems in the Ebro river basin, our stakeholders argued that unsustainability results from the failure of agents to collaborate together for the development of means to achieve a common goal. In a fragmented context in which actors pursue their interests and benefits in an uncoordinated, exploitative and shortsighted manner, sustainability is simply not possible. To a large extent, the NWC movement managed to overcome some of the main difficulties related to the lack of cooperation and finally influence some very concrete policy processes that were going to yield very unsustainable results. This suggest that take-off stage had already been reached although, at the same time we are aware that its ultimate success will depend on building stronger coalitions and institutions that include other innovative niches of action in other domains (e.g., a “New Energy Culture” movement, which also claims to be gaining public recognition).

**Discussion**

The ecological realism approach to transition triggers alone seems insufficient to explain satisfactorily the reasons why transitions started, at least for the case of the management of water resources in Spain. This, however, does not mean that natural scarcities may not play any role at all in stimulating a need for innovation and change, but that the actual innovation and change of a transition is often ignited, driven, and mediated by agents other than those who suffer directly from such biophysical constraints. It is culture, understood as a sensitive, meaningful and active articulation of understandings and awareness of the world around us (and beyond), which creates in some agents the thrust and the urge for collective transformation and cooperation. For the case of the Spanish water policy context, concerned experts, environmentalists and local communities were connected and empowered through the articulation of new cultural strategies and identities bounded under the umbrella of the NWC movement. Such cultural mobilisation can be seen as the main trigger for sustainability in the recent water policymaking style in Spain. The NWC movement contributed to stop some proposals of the previous regime that were most widely regarded as unsustainable, such as the large scale water transfers from the Ebro to the South for intensive agriculture and large-scale beach tourism developments. The importance of culture was indeed acknowledged by the members of the movement as a key instrumental component that had to be addressed for the success of their claims. The NWC movement, consciously or not, realised that it had to direct its actions to the three levels in which transitions in our interpretative framework seem to occur: the micro-level individuals and groups, the meso-level institutions, and the macro-level—in which culture operates.

Our exploration of the Spanish case revealed that one of the origins of the NWC movement can be found in the network of action created by the CODA, Greenpeace, the COAGRET and other interested agents, such as farmers and
others coming from academic circles. The NWC Foundation appeared at the time the first Iberian congress on water management and planning was organised in 1998 in Zaragoza. Since then, the number of activities and assessments carried out so far by this movement has been enormous, with a peak of visibility with the withdrawal of the articles of the old NHP of 2001 (see Biswas and Tortajada 2003; Howitt 2003; Arrojo 2003; Estevan and Pint 2006). An open strategy of this movement has been to make water management and planning open to public debate and dialogue, hence allowing for a greater accountability, transparency and democratization of expert assessments and decisions. Lessons gained from the relative success of agents in the water domain in Spain are being used to increase the chances of successful transition in other policy domains. Just to give an example, the European NWC declaration was signed in 2005 and it is also now increasing receiving attention in many expert and policy circles not only in Europe but also in Latin America (FNCA 2005). Some environmental groups now also use reference to the need to develop a “New Energy Culture” to cope with mounting energy constraints and also climate change.

As argued by Sabatier (1988), policy change can be understood as a learning process result of actions taken by advocacy coalitions. These may come from a variety of positions such as officials, interest group leaders or researchers who share a common belief system, e.g., a set of normative beliefs, problem perception, core values, causal assumptions and a common strategy envisaging innovations over a given period of time. In this way, the advocacy coalition of CODA, Greenpeace, COAGRETS and other NGOs resulted in proposing an alternative strategy against the current one of that time which was known as the NHP and which later became the currently approved water plan AGUA. In particular, the programme AGUA proposes the establishment of public water banks to become responsible entities of developing and maintaining historical rights to water through criteria not only of efficiency but also of equity and sustainability. AGUA also aims at contributing to the protection and restoration of riverine ecosystems and in terms of pricing it emphasizes water tariffs according to real costs for obtaining and treating water. Whereas the previous NHP had its focus on water supply, AGUA proposed measures of demand management through optimisation of infrastructures, water treatment, reuse of water, and desalination. In all these reframing processes, the NWC Foundation played a pivotal role in becoming a bridge organism between Iberian Peninsula and other groups operating in the EU and elsewhere. To a large extent, the movement’s success in this process can be seen as that of being capable of uniting diverse sources of knowledge for sustainability (local/global, expert/non-expert) to affect a particular policy domain.

Our research is based on insights from a variety of different analytical perspectives, mostly cultural analysis, structural social science, modelling and environmental sociology. Our findings question some of the widespread taken for granted assumptions present in current discourses about environmental change. Mainly that biophysical disasters are needed to start learning how to live sustainably or that communities which suffer from resource constraints will simply, because of that, learn to manage to overcome and change their vulnerable situations without first carrying out a conscious mobilization of new cultural resources. In the case of Spain and the Ebro river basin in particular, we understood the opposite: it was first a shift in culture and perceptions, and not resource scarcity that triggered the transition process.

Thus, a central goal of this paper has been to underline the role of culture in transitions and in particular with regard to the use of water resources. In our case, modelling has been used to simplify the representation of the dynamics cultural forms and the influence of agents in producing changes in it and in turn, within the policy making process. The present research helped researchers to understand in a theoretical and empirical way interactions and to support other modelling efforts within the EU MATISSE project. If modelling is to be used to support a transition in this domain, it is clear that changing the course of events can only be done through a process of social learning and awareness of the social-ecological system. As we move towards a more integrative river basin management, a better understanding and communication of the influence of cultural perceptions, values and beliefs becomes more relevant. Models can play a role in that. However, most current models tend to focus only on biophysical changes (or take into account only some standard economic trends) and take for granted the influence of cultural constructs. In our context, two ideal types of cultures, the one represented by the “New Water Culture” and the other by the “Old Water Culture” appear to yield very different results in terms of sustainability.

Conclusion

Our analysis of the Spanish case and in particular of the Ebro river basin casts serious doubts on the widespread realist assumption that societal transition towards more adaptive patterns of organisation are triggered by biophysical pressures. In our particular research context, people directly affected by the diminishing availability of water were not the main agents in charge of carrying out the actions that managed stop and reorient some of the most unsustainable practices that were present in the former National Water Plan. Rather, this change was triggered
by a coalition of intellectual and middle class people, mostly from academia, with the support of a number of diverse regional and local groups, who managed to articulate and integrate new identities and new values and to coalesce expert and non-expert knowledge under the NWC movement.

The key role of culture has often been neglected in literature dealing with transitions. Culture has usually been understood as part of the “exogenous landscape” that is external to regimes’ transformations and agents’ behaviours. In contrast, in this paper, we have understood culture and particular cultural change as part of the conscious production of agents resulting from the awareness of the limits and potentialities of their own culture in the processes of social change. In our case study, individuals and groups created and recreated new cultural artefacts and identities and then used them instrumentally to influence and modify existing power arrangements and policies.

Within the Spanish context, the content, meaning and uses of culture changed because of agents’ collaborative activities, in what can be seen as an endogenous process of social learning (Pahl-Wostl et al. 2007) or more broadly, as a process of sustainability learning in which agents become aware of the social-ecological system dynamics and learn to anticipate and adapt their behaviours accordingly (Tilburg and Pahl-Wostl 2007). This dynamic understanding of “culture” entails that culture existed insofar as it became action carried out by specific agents in their particular contexts. In the Spanish case, the consciousness among agents of the constraining and enabling capacities of culture to mobilise collective resources was key to their success.

Noteworthy, the NWC movement was not only oriented to mobilise existing cultural resources within Spain but also worked to connect to gain support from external forces and developments, such as the European Water Framework Directive implementation, which somewhat backed up many of their arguments and actions. However, whereas it is likely that without the parallel legislative developments occurring at the EU level the final success of the movement would have been limited in the long term, it cannot be said that the NWC movement was very much influenced by such external context. Both its origins and the strategies developed were mostly an endogenous development.

Finally, and as word of caution, while we believe that culture played a most decisive role in triggering resources and resource transition the Spanish context, one should also be aware that the recreation of cultural artefacts alone may not be enough to ensure sustainability in the long term. Some critics of the NWC now argue that such movement was only able to readdress some of the worst outcomes of the business-as-usual water policies and only with regard to some particular aspects of it. But the NWC has not able to develop the necessary encompassing changes in power structures, particularly at the meso level that would make to ensure that the new cultural and policy paradigms developed are to be implemented across the Spanish dominant regimes and institutions in the years to come. Other policy and institutional changes, besides cultural changes and mobilisations, are also required.

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4 For a critical account, and the real difficulties to do so, see the documentary A Contracorriente by Pons et al (2006).
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About the author

Akgün İlhan (1973) was born in Mersin, Turkey. She holds a BSc degree in Landscape Architecture from Ankara University (1996), a M.Sc. in Curriculum and Instruction from Hacettepe University (2001), and a M.Sc. in Environmental Sciences from Lund University (2005) with the Swedish Institute Grant. She got a study grant from the University of Oslo (2004) to participate to a short-term course on Energy, Environment, and Sustainable Development at Center for Development and the Environment (SUM). Since 2005, she is a PhD student at the Institute of Environmental Sciences and Technology (IEST) in Autonomous University of Barcelona with the AGAUR Grant. She started her professional career with Feza Gürsey Science Centre as a guide and science teacher for children, and went on working in several positions in the field of education including teaching and curriculum designing during eight years. She also worked as an intern in UNESCO Division of Water Sciences in Paris and carried out a research on public participation in river basin management under the supervision of Mike Bonnell. That was when she developed a growing interest in public participation and water management.

Some publications and conference papers she participated to are as follows:


