Ideas, Interests and the Limits of Collective Foreign Policy Output: 
The Case of the European Union Non-Proliferation Policy

Doctoral Dissertation

by

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For my ‘PhD Widow’

roses are red,
violets are blue
i’m so glad
i found a sugar-mama like you

you pay all our bills
you buy me nice things
you put up with my diet
of pizza, ramen and wings

i bet you didn’t think
when we first infatuated
you’d have to wait years
for me to be graduated

so thank you for dating this geek
i love you to pieces
one day you’ll see
to you I’ll dedicate my thesis

“Piled Higher and Deeper” by Jorge Cham
www.phdcomics.com
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<td>ACRS</td>
<td>Arms Control and Regional Security Working Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAFA</td>
<td>German Federal Office of Economics and Export Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BMENAI</td>
<td>Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BTWC</td>
<td>Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBRN</td>
<td>Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>CODUN</td>
<td>Working Party on Global Disarmament and Arms Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONOC</td>
<td>Working Group on Non-Proliferation of Chemical and Biological Weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONOP</td>
<td>Working Party on Non-Proliferation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONUC</td>
<td>Working Groups on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons</td>
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<tr>
<td>COREPER</td>
<td>Committee of Permanent Representatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPE</td>
<td>Civilian Power Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>CTBT</td>
<td>Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTBTO</td>
<td>Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTR</td>
<td>Cooperative Threat Reduction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CWC</td>
<td>Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DG</td>
<td>Directorate General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DG-E</td>
<td>Directorate General for External and Politico-Military Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E3</td>
<td>Germany, France and the United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Communities</td>
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<tr>
<td>EMP</td>
<td>Euro-Mediterranean Partnership</td>
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<tr>
<td>ENP</td>
<td>European Neighbourhood Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>EPC</td>
<td>European Political Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>ESDP</td>
<td>European Security and Defence Policy</td>
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<td>ESS</td>
<td>European Security Strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU/E3+3</td>
<td>The High Representative for the CFSP/Germany, France and the United Kingdom + China, Russia and the United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EURATOM</td>
<td>European Atomic Energy Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUROSTAT</td>
<td>Statistical Office of the European Communities</td>
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<tr>
<td>EXBS</td>
<td>Export Control and Related Border Security</td>
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<tr>
<td>HCOC</td>
<td>Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation</td>
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<tr>
<td>HEU</td>
<td>Highly Enriched Uranium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAEA</td>
<td>International Atomic Energy Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGC</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Conference</td>
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<tr>
<td>IR</td>
<td>International Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISTC</td>
<td>International Science and Technology Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KEDO</td>
<td>Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization</td>
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LEU  Low-Enriched Uranium
MEP  Member of the European Parliament
MEPI  Middle East Partnership Initiative
MTCR  Missile Technology Control Regime
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NPT  Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NSG  Nuclear Suppliers Group
OJEC/EU  Official Journal of the European Communities/European Union
OPCW  Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
OPEC  Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
OSCE  Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PSC  Political and Security Committee
PSI  Proliferation Security Initiative
RELEX  External Relations
SALW  Small Arms and Light Weapons
SIPRI  Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SitCen  Situation Centre
STCU  Science and Technology Center in Ukraine
TACIS  Technical Aid to the Commonwealth of Independent States
TEU  Treaty on European Union
UN  United Nations
UNGA  United Nations General Assembly
UNMOVIC  United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission
UNSC  United Nations Security Council
UNSCOM  United Nations Special Commission
WEU  Western European Union
WMD  Weapons of Mass Destruction
INTRODUCTION

The most astonishing fact about the European Union (EU) and its emerging policy against the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) is that it exists at all. Although since the Treaties of Rome (1958) one of the European Communities, the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), has been dedicated to nuclear energy issues, nuclear weapons, and in fact all types of WMD, have always formed part of the carefully protected nucleus of national security policies. Nevertheless, the origins of an embryonic European non-proliferation policy can be traced back already to 1981, when the first Working Party on Nuclear Non-Proliferation was created in the framework of the European Political Cooperation (EPC), the intergovernmental foreign policy mechanism of the then Member States of the European Communities (EC). The Working Party was the starting point for a growing institutionalization of WMD issues as part of the EPC and, after the Maastricht Treaty (1993), of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). With the time this led to an increasing number of common European foreign policy actions in the field of WMD proliferation. The post-Cold War world of the 1990s saw, therefore, a significant intensification of the EU non-proliferation policies. Major milestones include the regulation of dual-use items export controls within the EU, the implementation of non-proliferation and disarmament assistance measures in the former Soviet Union and the coordination of the positions of the EU Member States.

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2 When the general institutional framework of the European non-proliferation policy is addressed, the term ‘European Communities’ (EC) – also commonly known simply as ‘European Community’ – is used for the historical period before the 1993 Maastricht Treaty and the term European Union (EU) for the period afterwards.
3 Dual-use items can be used for both civilian and military purposes.
Introduction

during the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

After the terrorist attacks of 9/11 the EU non-proliferation was streamlined and took from day to day a more coherent form. The next major event that pushed forward the EU non-proliferation policy was the US-led war against Iraq, which was – at least originally – a drastic non-proliferation measure, i.e. a measure to stop and dismantle the alleged Iraqi WMD programme. This war deeply divided not only the United States and certain European countries but also the EU Member States themselves. Amid this confrontation, Anna Lindh, the late Swedish Foreign Minister, proposed to review the common European non-proliferation policy and slowly the EU’s WMD strategy took form. In October 2003, the EU underpinned these developments institutionally and appointed Annalisa Giannella as a so-called Personal Representative for non-proliferation of WMD. Moreover, the Office of the Personal Representative for non-proliferation was established, which has coordinated all aspects of the EU’s non-proliferation policy ever since, including export controls and the non-proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW). Eventually, the EU crossed the Rubicon in non-proliferation affairs during the December 2003 Brussels European Council, when it adopted the EU Strategy against Proliferation of WMD. In the words of Pullinger and Quille, “The decision of member states to use the EU as a framework for tackling their common concerns across a range of issues on the proliferation of weapons and materials of mass destruction is viewed as something of a historical breakthrough” (Pullinger and Quille, 2003). It has been even interpreted as a clear sign of an “emerging European strategic personality” (Spear, 2003).

However, despite the rapid development of a common European non-proliferation policy during the last three decades, the European Union is far from
being a coherent and forceful actor in this field. Its policy output pattern is inconsistent and sketchy. Whereas in some cases it is a fairly cohesive and powerful actor in its own right, in others it is merely a deeply divided international organization incapable of independent action. For example during the nuclear stand-off with Iran after 2002/2003 the EU has demonstrated that it is able to act decisively in a crucial non-proliferation crisis. Yet, at the same time it was unable to find any significant common position regarding the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, whose principal aim at the time was the dismantlement of the alleged Iraqi WMD programme. Similarly, during the 1995 NPT Review Conference a united EU made a significant contribution to the largely successful outcome of the conference, including the indefinite extension of the NPT, whereas only ten years later a divided EU was not able to prevent the outright failure of the 2005 NPT Review Conference. Numerous other examples can be found, even within the broader field of European foreign and security policy. Enlargement, for instance, is widely regarded as a successful policy that has reformed and stabilized former Communist Central and Eastern European countries in the wake of the end of the Cold War. Yet, conflict management in the same area, particularly in the former Yugoslavia, has seen most of the time a divided and weak EU.

Such strikingly different and incoherent common policy output presents International Relations (IR) scholars with a formidable problem: It is necessary to explain simultaneously policy output and the lack thereof by the same actor in similar circumstances. In other words, why are EU Member States able to work together in some situations but not in others? Usually, the views of the EU as a foreign policy actor can be roughly divided between sceptics and optimists: The former doubt that the EU can be to any significant degree an actor in foreign and security affairs, whereas the latter regard the EU as some kind of emerging power in its own right.
Yet, few recognize that – paradoxically – both sceptics and optimists can be right to a certain extent. Both can point to clear examples that underpin their views, e.g. weak policy output towards Iraq and strong policy output towards Iran. The challenge is to make sense of this policy output variation by the EU. More precisely, the problem is to find out when, how and why states act collectively in matters of foreign and security policy. Clearly, there are limits between what a groups of states as a collective actor can and cannot do. At first sight, however, these limits of collective action in international affairs are far from obvious.

1. State-of-the-Art of European Non-Proliferation Research

As a common European non-proliferation policy has gradually taken shape over the last three decades, pundits have become increasingly interested in its development. Several academic papers and articles provide now useful, though slightly outdated overviews of the EU’s non-proliferation policy (Bailes, 2007; Kelle, 2005; Meier and Quille, 2005; Müller, 2007; Portela, 2003; Schröder, 2006; Tertrais, 2005). In general, the growing body of literature that exists in this field is to large extent empirical research with a clear policy orientation. This has certainly to do with its origin, namely think tanks such as the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) or the European Union Institute for Security Studies in Paris. These institutes provide the bulk of the existing European non-proliferation research, often in cooperation with EU institutions. Academic research in a strict sense is rather rare and is mainly found in specialized peer-reviewed journals such the European Foreign Affairs Review (Álvarez-Verdugo, 2006; Bailes, 2007) or European Security (Rynning, 2007; Sauer, 2008).
Already from the very beginning scholars have been interested in the emerging European non-proliferation policy. Therefore, both the 1980s and 1990s are surprisingly well researched periods of European non-proliferation policy. Most of the work was done by Harald Müller and his numerous collaborators in two pan-European projects: *New Approaches to Nonproliferation: A European Approach* and *Building Blocks for a European Nonproliferation Policy* at the Centre for European Policy Studies in Brussels and, in particular, at the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt. The first study, conducted by a panel of European experts, was the first comprehensive statement on (Western) European non-proliferation policy (Holst et al., 1985). The study had a sister project in the United States and ultimately the US and European reports were published together (*Blocking the Spread of Nuclear Weapons: American and European Perspectives*, 1986). Further on, numerous key publications emerged out of these projects. They provide invaluable insights into the early institutional and political development of a European non-proliferation policy in a broad sense (Müller, 1994; Müller, 1987, 1989, 1993, 1996). However, most of the works have still a strong and sometimes exclusive focus on national policies, showing the central importance of the EU Member States in this policy field (see, in particular, Müller, 1991, 1998). Today the two pan-European research projects do not exist anymore. Yet, the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt and, particularly, Harald Müller continue carrying out research on European non-proliferation policy (Müller, 2007; Portela, 2003).

The Swedish arms control think tank SIPRI is the other leading European research institute in the area of European non-proliferation policy. SIPRI has extensive programmes in the fields of arms control and WMD proliferation, some of which also deal with EU issues. In 2005 it published its main publication in the area
of EU non-proliferation policies: an interim report of a pilot project on European Community instruments in the area of WMD non-proliferation and disarmament (SIPRI, 2005), which contains a wide array of recommendations for future action. Apart from the main report it consists of ten background papers ranging from a European WMD threat assessment to financial support to specialized institutions supporting arms control and disarmament. These are classical policy papers analyzing what has been done and what should be done in a certain area. Their main objective is to provide the Commission, which initiated the pilot project at the petition of the European Parliament, a convenient tool to promote its non-proliferation efforts.

The European Union Institute for Security Studies, as the EU’s (and previously as the Western European Union (WEU)’s) official think tank, has taken a keen interest in European non-proliferation matters. In its flagship publication series, the Chaillot Papers, at least ten issues deal with various non-proliferation topics, including multilateral treaty negotiations, Iran, Russia, nuclear terrorism, homeland security and, in general, European non-proliferation developments (see Chaillot Papers 24, 37, 58, 61, 66, 69, 77, 89, 93 and 110). Although all of these works are useful sources of information, they are again largely policy oriented research papers without direct relation to academic research. The same is true for the numerous publications of the Policy Department of the Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union in the European Parliament (Pullinger et al., 2007; Quille, 2005a). The European Parliament works also closely with the International Security Information Service, Europe, a think tank in Brussels. Several relevant policy briefs have been published by its collaborators, especially in its European Security Review (Grip, 2009; Pullinger, 2006; Quille, 2005b; Wulf, 2006), e.g. on the European Non-Proliferation Strategy or North Korea.
At research centres in France and the UK – the EU’s only nuclear powers – scholars have also a special interest in non-proliferation issues. However, most attention is paid to national nuclear policies and wider global issues and not to the EU non-proliferation policies *per se*. ⁴ Nevertheless, exceptions exist, including some works by Tertrais, Bailes, Cornish or Howlett’s classical book on the EURATOM safeguards. On the other side of the Atlantic EU non-proliferation policy as a research topic is virtually non-existent.⁵ Even if EU-related analyses are published, they are usually carried out by European researchers (Mallard, 2008; Meier, 2005a; Meier and Quille, 2005; Spear, 2003). American debates on proliferation and WMDs, in particular nuclear weapons, are very much US centred and have a much stronger politico-military element than in Europe. Historically, deterrence theory played a dominant role, even in IR in general.⁶ Other popular issues have been arms control, especially between the world’s nuclear powers.⁷ Current debates have focused on topics such as counter-proliferation, pre-emptive action and the Nuclear Posture Reviews (Bunn and Chyba, 2006). Regarding the case studies of the dissertation – Iran, the European neighbourhood region and international non-proliferation institutions (see below) – the situation is slightly different, as these are areas of global concern and attract worldwide research interests. Yet, as will be shown in the corresponding chapters further on, EU specific academic research is still not abundant.

In general, research on the EU non-proliferation policy in a strict sense is increasing but it is still relatively isolated. Most relevant works are mainly policy

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⁴ This is actually the case in the large majority of literature on proliferation, also in European non-nuclear-weapon states such as Spain. See, for example, Marrero Rocha, 2004; Salazar Serantes, 2004.
⁵ Europe is dealt with mainly in the context of NATO and missile defence.
⁶ For a collection of various authors, see Vasquez, 1990: 294-322.
⁷ For a brief overview, see Lieber, 2001: 119-141.
oriented and deal with one of these four themes: the EU non-proliferation strategy, institutions, means and specific policies, e.g. towards Iran. Academic, i.e. theory based research, is still very rare. The few exceptions that exist are mainly institutionalist accounts of how the European non-proliferation policy has developed in the first place (Müller and Dassenn, 1997; Rosa, 2001; Smith, 2004b). That is, they try to explain how and why an EU non-proliferation policy has evolved. Although this internal perspective on the inner working of the EU is relevant for this dissertation – as will be shown further on – the main focus here is somehow different: It is more an inside-out perspective on the EU’s interaction with the outside world, in particular on how (and why) the EU produces policy output towards others. Yet, in this regard, no theory based study has been carried out. Even theory based works in the relevant fields of IR, Non-Proliferation Studies or even European Foreign Policy neglect to a large extent the EU and its non-proliferation policy. The EU non-proliferation is, thus, both an under-researched and under-theorized topic. In short, up to the present day no comprehensive, theoretically based study on the EU as an actor in the field of non-proliferation has been published.

There exists, therefore, a deficiency in the current literature on EU non-proliferation policies. Consequently, a dissertation in this area is desirable in order to complement existing analyses and to clarify theoretically how the EU actually acts in the field of non-proliferation. The added value would be to combine in a single framework the research on usually separate, but academically equally important study objects, in particular IR and European Foreign Policy theory, on the one hand, and studies of the EU non-proliferation policy on the other. Moreover, the EU non-proliferation policy is still a relatively new and growing research topic that requires permanent attention from scholars, especially for the period after 9/11. Both
academically and politically it is crucial to provide on time research on an important and rapidly evolving issue in international security.

2. In Search of Concepts and Theories

The EU and its foreign policy do not only stand out because of their extraordinary complexity, but also because of their permanently evolving nature. These characteristics have virtually made it impossible to develop a single coherent theoretical framework for EU foreign policy. Still today, in the words of Tonra and Christiansen, “[t]he European Union’s foreign policy is an ongoing puzzle” (Tonra and Christiansen, 2004: 1). Moreover, it is not even possible to locate the study of EU foreign policy within a single academic discipline, with most analysts agreeing with Smith that “…the study of policy lies somewhat uneasily between European integration and international relations…” (Smith, 2006: 322). Not surprisingly, the theoretical approaches to EU foreign policy have been very diverse, ranging from the dominant IR macro theories – neorealism, neoinstitutionalism and constructivism – to middle-range theories such as external governance approaches or neofunctionalism in European integration theory. The fundamental challenge, above all for the classical state-centric theories, has been the – in EU parlance – *sui generis* nature of the EU, i.e. the EU is neither a state nor a traditional international organization. It is rather an international entity with state-like characteristics (Hill, 1993: 309).

Independently of the explicit or implicit theoretical frameworks adopted in the analysis of the *sui generis* EU and its foreign policy, in particular CFSP, the dominant

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8 For critical overviews, see Andreatta, 2005; Rosamond, 2000.
9 For a more in-depth discussion, see White, 2001: 27-46.
Introduction

approaches so far can be divided in at least two types: First, an ‘inside approach,’ which focuses on decision-making and policy-making within CFSP; and secondly, the ‘inside-out’ approaches, which look at what the EU has done in a specific functional or geographic field (see also Tonra and Christiansen, 2004: 3-4). The present study forms part of the ‘inside-out’ approaches and is, thus, located in the mainstream of CFSP analysis. The crucial assumption behind the inside-out approach is that the EU is an actor in international affairs. Although this assumption might be, at first sight, self-evident, the question of ‘actorness’ and the related concept of EU ‘presence’ in international affairs has led to lively debates indeed.\(^\text{10}\) In perhaps the most widely accepted definition of ‘actorness,’ Bretherton and Vogler argue that the EU is an actor ‘under construction’ and that its ‘actorness’ can be interpreted as a “…complex set of interacting processes, based on the notions of presence, opportunity and capability, that combine in varying ways to shape the Union’s external activities” (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006: 24). In this regard, ‘opportunity’ refers to the “external environment of ideas and events” (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006: 24) that influence in one way or another the EU’s actions. For instance, the end of the Cold War changed in a fundamental way the external environment of the EU’s activity and allowed (as well as compelled) the EU to develop new forms of external action (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006: 24-27). ‘Presence’ conceptualizes the (usually unintended) external influence and impact the EU has simply because of its existence (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006: 27-29). This notion becomes clear, for example, in the European Security Strategy (ESS): “As a union of 25 states with over 450 million people producing a quarter of the world’s Gross National Product (GNP), and with a wide

\(^{10}\) For studies that try to synthesise the debates on ‘actorness’ and ‘presence,’ see, for example, Barbé, 2000a; Ginsberg, 2001: 45-48; Hill, 1993.
range of instruments at its disposal, the European Union is inevitably a global player” \( (\textit{European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a Better World}, \ 2003: \ 1) \). ‘Capability,’ finally, concerns the EU’s internal aspects that allow the EU to be active beyond its borders, i.e. the EU must be able to set priorities and it must have adequate policy instruments available (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006: 29-35). Although it might be argued to which extent the EU possesses ‘capability,’ EU capability for external action as such, for example through the numerous CFSP instruments, is difficult to deny.\(^{11}\) From the ‘actorness’ definition of Bretherton and Vogler it is, in fact, possible to conclude that the EU is an actor in international affairs and in recent years the EU’s actorness, at least in many areas of foreign policy, has become a generally accepted fact, as Sjursen points out:

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\text{In the past decade the view of the European Union (EU) as a relevant and important international actor has gained increasing acceptance. The EU is the world’s largest trading power as well as a major donor of humanitarian assistance and development aid. This, together with the fact that it is gradually building capabilities in security and defence, does indeed make it difficult to neglect the EU’s international role.} \\
\text{(Sjursen, 2006b: 169)}
\]

Assuming that the EU is an international actor, how is it possible to explain the policy output of this – admittedly – peculiar actor? How can we approach in particular the problem of the varying degrees of European foreign policy output? As has been pointed out already, there exists no generally accepted theory of European foreign and security policy that could serve as a framework for this study. It is, therefore, necessary to look for an alternative theoretical framework that has the potential to explain European foreign policy output. Two criteria are essential: First, the framework must be an ‘inside-out’ approach. This excludes already large parts of

\(^{11}\) For an introduction to European foreign policy, including its evolution and instruments, see Smith, 2003a: 1-68.
the traditional integration theories, in particular neofunctionalist and governance theories. Although they may have explanatory power for minor issues in this dissertation, e.g. the neofunctionalists’ idea of ‘spill-over effects’ in the development of a European non-proliferation policy, they are not particularly apt to explain policy output in international affairs.

The second criterion is that it has to explain varying policy output by an international organization. This is especially problematic for the different strands of (neo) realism and (neo) liberalism, the dominant theories during large parts of the second half of the 20th century. First of all, for these classical IR theories states are the dominant actors in an anarchic world. For foreign and security policy output by an international organization such as the EU there is little room in their theories. According to Finnemore, “Most international relations theories are strongly state-centric. International organizations may mediate state interaction by providing rules of the game, supplying information, monitoring behaviour, or creating transparency; ultimately, however, they are understood to be creations of states and servants of state interests. According them more autonomous and causal status, particularly as shapers of actors or interests, would violate the fundamental structure of neorealist and neoliberal theories.” (Finnemore, 1996: 13). In other words, international organizations are ultimately creations in the interest of member states. Therefore, both (neo) realists and (neo) liberals point out that in European foreign and security policies all decisions have to be taken by consensus, i.e. each Member State has virtually a veto power over the decisions taken by the EU. Consequently, they argue that the clashing national interests of now 27 Member States make it extremely

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12 For a collection of key articles in European integration, see Nelsen and Stubb, 2003.
13 For an overview, see Baldwin, 1993.
difficult to find consensus in the framework of CFSP, especially regarding issues of ‘high politics’ that belong to the fiercely guarded nucleus of national foreign and security policies (Gordon, 1997/98). As Hoffmann argued some years ago, “...a Europe of 20 or 25 members is going to find it even more difficult than a Europe of 15 nations to agree on a common diplomacy and defence” (Hoffmann, 2000: 196). In other words, conflicting national interests prevent substantial foreign policy output at the European level. At the same time, the argument goes, the EU lacks the institutional mechanisms and foreign policy capabilities of nation states, e.g. an own diplomatic service, a European army or a common intelligence service, to act forcefully in international affairs (Hill, 1993; Hoffmann, 2000).

However, there is a fundamental flaw in the argument of these sceptics: Whereas clashing national interests and the lack of capabilities may help explaining why the EU is incapable to produce substantial outputs in some areas, it leaves little room to explain the substantial output that actually exists in other areas of ‘high politics.’ How is it possible, for example, that EU Member States have reached consensus during the ongoing Iranian nuclear crisis but failed to do so during the 2002-2003 Iraq crisis? And why did the EU have sufficient capabilities to act in the case of Iran but not Iraq? Furthermore, in contrast to (neo) realist and (neo) liberal predictions, the more states have joined the EU, the more output has been produced in the European non-proliferation policy: 18 of the 24 Joint Actions in the field of non-proliferation have been adopted after the 2004 big bang enlargement. The conclusion must be that the EU has capabilities to act forcefully in international affairs and its actions are not necessarily blocked by clashing national interests of its Member States (see Smith, 2005c).
Still, (neo) realists or (neo) liberals may suggest three alternative explanations that may explain not only the EU’s weak but also its strong policy output. The first one is the idea of a hegemon dominating EU policy-making. From this perspective strong EU policy output reflects the national interests of the hegemon, whereas weak output is the result of the hegemon’s lack of interest (Crawford, 2007). The problems is, however, that it is not clear which state has the power to function as a hegemon in matters of non-proliferation in a group of 27 states: Is it France, the UK or even Germany? The second alternative explanation requires some sort of overarching interest that welds together the EU Member States. But as will be discussed in the following chapter the post-Cold War world is largely free of such overarching interests that might induce common European action in certain situations. The last alternative is that some sort of common European interests exist that lead to common European policy output (see Ginsberg, 2001: 31-32). This is certainly a plausible possibility. But why should there be a thing such as common European interests? After all, for (neo) liberals and above all (neo) realists interests are essentially individual properties of nation states.

This question leads directly to the last remaining IR theory: constructivism.\(^\text{14}\) Common to all the different strands of constructivism is, *inter alia*, that it expounds the problems of the concept of ‘national interests’ that is so important in the other theories. The key problem of ‘national interests’ is that traditional explanations usually assume them to be pre-given: “Aspirations to develop a generalizable theory of international politics modeled on theories in the natural sciences and economics

\(^{14}\) In an encyclopaedic article on security cooperation more in general, Müller reaches similar conclusions, when he argues that “…constructivism, with its emphasis on ideas and the cultural grounding of behavior, its treatment of the interplay between material and ideational factors and between structure and agency, may be best fitted to explain security cooperation” (Müller, 2002: 385). Müller’s article provides also a good overview of the different theoretical approaches to cooperation among states in the field of security.
have led most international relations scholars in the United States since the 1960s to assume rather than problematize state interests” (Finnemore, 1996: 1). However, as Katzenstein argues, “State interests do not exist to be ‘discovered’ by self-interested, rational actors. Interests are constructed through a process of social interaction” (Katzenstein, 1996a: 2). In this dissertation it will be argued that it are ideas that underpin interests and play, thus, a crucial role in their construction (see Wendt, 1999: 92-138. In this regard, the dissertation can draw on a wide variety of literature on ideas in foreign policy, which has developed in the wake of the “constructivist turn in international relations theory” (Checkel, 1998) after the end of the Cold War.

Following Goldstein and Keohane, ideas can be defined preliminarily as normative and causal beliefs, although in the idea literature many, and sometimes contradictory, concepts are associated with ideas such as norms, identity or culture. Normative, or in the words of Keohane and Goldstein, ‘principled’ beliefs “…[consist] of normative ideas that specify criteria for distinguishing right from wrong and just from unjust” (Goldstein and Keohane, 1993a: 9), whereas causal beliefs “…are beliefs about cause-effect relationships…” (Goldstein and Keohane, 1993a: 10). Both, normative and causal beliefs strongly influence how certain situations are interpreted, which in turn influences the interests and choice of measures and means to deal with these situations.

In the European Union there exist of course a number of competing ideas about foreign policy. And as in the case of ‘national interests,’ a central authority that might decide on conflicts between ideas is missing. In the words of Zielonka, “Various schools of thought about security and international relations compete with

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15 Goldstein and Keohane include also a third concept, namely worldviews, which “…include views about cosmology, ontology as well as about ethics” (Goldstein and Keohane, 1993a: 8). However, it is assumed that worldviews as defined by Goldstein and Keohane do not vary across the EU.
each other causing conceptual confusion and political chaos” (Zielonka, 1998: 122). However, as will be argued in this dissertation, ideas are different from interests in important ways: First, the number of ideas that exist in the EU is more limited than the 27 national interests. It will be argued that certain types of foreign policy ideas can be even formed into what will be called idea complexes, i.e. a group of usually connected ideas about different aspects of foreign policy or international affairs. For example, the idea that international relations are determined by the hard power of nation states is linked to the idea that military means are the most important foreign policy instrument. In this sense, idea complexes are similar to schools of thought in the academic realm. Secondly, ideas are more apt for compromises and thus consensus, as they are not as fixed and rigid as interests. Thirdly, ideas can function as unifying concepts or ‘focal point’ that soften the differences between competing idea complexes and make common policy output possible. Finally, the institutionalization of the EU’s foreign and security policy has created such a profound integration of the different European actors that they are compelled into searching for short-term resolutions of their idea conflicts. This can lead to important agreements, and therefore foreign policy outputs, but also to important disagreements.

3. Study Purpose and Research Question

The main purpose of the present study is to shed light on the research problem outlined at the beginning by using an idea based theoretical approach to foreign policy. Thus, theoretically the overall objective is to understand better the relation between ideas and the different degrees of collective action by groups of states in matters of ‘high politics.’ The dissertation is particularly interested in finding possible
limits within which international organizations such as the EU are able to produce significant foreign and security policy output. It is, thus, located in the mainstream of current EU foreign policy research (see Smith, 2007: 3-5). Empirically, the aim is to demonstrate in the case of the EU non-proliferation policy how foreign policy ideas actually influence interests, the use of capabilities and, ultimately, varying policy outputs. At the end, the research presented here shall be one of the first comprehensive and theoretically based studies of European non-proliferation policy. It shall, therefore, be a timely contribution to a hitherto little explored field in the study of the European Union that rises rapidly both on the academic and the political agenda in Europe. At a more general level, the dissertation aims not only at explaining the functioning of the EU non-proliferation policy in particular but also of the EU foreign and security policy in general. As the non-proliferation policy is a comprehensive policy that includes virtually all levels and dimensions of the EU foreign policy apparatus it is a particularly useful study object to draw conclusions for the EU foreign and security policy more in general. Moreover, by using an innovative adaption of the existing theoretical IR literature on ideas in foreign policy, the dissertation serves even a wider purpose: contributing to the explanation of collective action by groups of states in matters of ‘high politics’ such as non-proliferation.

However, it is indispensable to keep the dissertation within manageable limits. The non-proliferation of WMD even by a relatively new actor such as the European Union is a very extensive topic that cannot be dealt with in full in a single study. The dissertation concentrates, therefore, on specific aspects that appear to be particularly promising: First, although chemical and biological weapons are taken into consideration, most attention is paid to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Due to their controversial political nature and importance for national security policy, nuclear
proliferation is considered a 'hard case' for the dominant (rationalist) approaches to IR, especially (neo) realism. Consequently, the successful examination of ideas in matters of nuclear non-proliferation challenges these dominant approaches of International Relations on their home turf. Above all, it opens up the possibility that idea based theories of the EU as a nuclear non-proliferation actor are not easily dismissed as special cases that are only applicable to fields where the (supposed) 'national interests' of the EU Member States are not directly affected. This would be the case if the dissertation would focus mainly on chemical and biological weapons, as a strong consensus exists between EU Member States – and actually between most states in the international system – that these weapons can neither be possessed nor used. Secondly, the dissertation distinguishes strictly between policy output and policy outcome. As has been made clear already, the focus here is on outputs, i.e. any action, activity or measure by an actor. Policy outcome, i.e. the effects of policy output, is only secondary. In a nutshell, the dissertation is interested in collective actions of EU Member States, not their effectiveness. Thirdly, the dissertation does not analyze in detail EU non-proliferation policies since their very beginning. 30 years of policy output are simply not a feasible object in a doctoral dissertation. Although the EU non-proliferation policy in its entirety will be addressed, the main emphasis lies rather on the period between 9/11 and 2009, in particular on the five years between the adoption of the 2003 EU Strategy against the Proliferation of WMD – the EU’s key document in matters of proliferation – and the end of the research for the dissertation in early 2009. This is clearly the Union’s most active time in the field of non-proliferation. It also coincides with the period of validity of the latest EU reform treaty, the 2001 Nice Treaty. It entered into force in early 2003 and
will be superseded in late 2009 by the Lisbon Treaty – coincidentally in both cases thanks to an Irish ‘yes’ in a second referendum.

In order to operationalize the study purposes, it is not only necessary to limit the extent of the research but also to define a concrete research question, which can guide the remaining parts of dissertation. The overall research purpose can be synthesized in the following way:

- How do ideas affect collective foreign policy output, in particular by the EU in the field of non-proliferation?

In short, the dependent variables (the *explanans*) are the EU policy output and its limits and the independent variables (the *explananda*) are foreign policy ideas.

### 4. Methodology

Ideas in foreign policy and international relations, the crucial element of the dissertation, are not easily quantifiable variables. Due to their intangible nature scholars hardly use quantitative methods to analyse them. They require rather intensive qualitative research, the most common and frequently used methodology in IR (Bennett and Elman, 2008: 499). This kind of research encompasses typically the analysis and systematic interpretation of written, numerical and oral records. Qualitative research looks essentially at what is being communicated, either in written

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16 Research method manuals are abundant in social sciences and political science, though surprisingly not in the sub-field of IR. See, for example, Buttolph Johnson and Reynolds, 2005. For a particularly student-friendly, though more basic introduction, see Pierce, 2008. For an overview of methods in IR, see Reus-Smit and Snidal, 2008: 423-536.

17 Specific idea related methodologies, e.g. the congruence method or process tracing, are dealt with in the following chapter.
form or orally. This includes the examination of how something is communicated and to whom. It also examines the context of communication, i.e. the relation with the material world, for example the correlation between communication and action. This methodology is particularly useful to filter the key elements of foreign policy ideas in the European Union, especially in the field of non-proliferation of WMD, as ideas find usually their expression in communication. In a next step dominant ideas can be identified and categorized in accordance with the existing secondary literature in International Relations.

However, qualitative research designs are not unproblematic. First of all, they lack the scientific precision of quantitative or game theoretic approaches. Secondly, their study materials and, thus, their research results are not necessarily reliable, as communications per se are not true, valid or accurate. How do we know, for instance, that the ideas that can be found in a document really reflect ideas that are actually hold? Thirdly, interpretative methods are particularly prone to (normative) bias by the researcher.

Although these criticisms cannot be easily discussed away, a rigorous (qualitative) research design assures that their effects are sufficiently minimized. It is, therefore, necessary to outline clearly how and for which purpose research has been carried out, including its strengths and weaknesses. There must be an evident link between study object, method and research objective. Furthermore, qualitative research has to be based on a large amount of varied data. The more and the more varied the written and oral records are the more accurate are the research results. For the present study, for example, more than 1100 written documents from different institutions have been analyzed, consulted or taken into consideration. Finally, researchers have to be aware of the biases inherent in contemporary IR research. For
instance, studying EU foreign and security policy is already a bias in itself, as this assumes that the EU is a worthwhile study object in matters of foreign and security policy (whereas many IR scholars believe that the EU itself is a negligible actor in foreign and security policy). Such consciousness helps taking a position that is as neutral as possible in order to reduce the effects of biases in the research. Overall, qualitative research designs can be as rigorous and accurate as any other methodology. In fact, in certain circumstances like idea based analyses it is even more useful and usually the default option of most scholars interested in such analyses. As has been pointed out already, the standard elements of qualitative research designs are the examination and interpretation of documents, numerical records and interviews.

The written record that has been analyzed during the research can be subdivided into three broad categories: (a) official documents, (b) informal documents and (c) other material. Official documents include a wide range of written material adopted officially by an institution or organism: first, reports or memos; secondly, formal strategic documents, for example the EU Strategy against Proliferation of WMD the European Security Strategy or Commission communications; and thirdly, legal documents, which are usually published in the Official Journal of the European Union, e.g. the Treaties of the European Union and the European Communities, agreements between the EU and third countries, EU Joint Actions or Common Positions. Reports and memos are particularly apt for qualitative research as they contain usually a large amount of information. In this regard, the most important documents have been the Annual Reports from the Council to the European

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18 Documentary evidence is only referenced if specifically cited, especially major documents such as strategies or annual reports or United Nations Security Council Resolutions. Treaties are not referenced at all. A complete list of all documents used in the dissertation can be found on the attached DVD. Whenever possible, links to internet locations are included.
Parliament on the main aspects and basic choices of CFSP,\(^\text{19}\) which have been published since 1999, and the progress reports of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of WMD,\(^\text{20}\) of which usually two reports per year have been elaborated since 2004. It should be critically pointed out, however, that many useful documents are not available. According to a senior source in the Council only about 10% of all existing EU documents in the field of non-proliferation are open to the public.\(^\text{21}\) This is particularly true for the minutes of working party meetings and other gatherings where important issues are discussed in-depth. Although in principle it is possible to request the access to secret documents, often the documents are not known at all, which is why it is virtually impossible to request them. Even if access is granted, as in some instances in the case of this dissertation, the available information is not a breakthrough. Especially meeting minutes are written in such a way that they can only be understood completely by those who attended the meeting. Moreover, sensitive document parts are frequently blackened.\(^\text{22}\) Although it is understandable that the sensitivity of non-proliferation issues makes a certain degree of secrecy necessary, it is certainly a constraint for non-proliferation research.

Informal documents comprise all type of political statements not adopted officially by an institution or organism. They are usually attributable to a certain politician or official, in particular political proposals, working and policy papers and, above all, speeches. Most of these documents used in the dissertation come from key personnel in European foreign and security policy such as Javier Solana, the High Representative, Annalisa Giannella, the Personal Representative for non-proliferation,  

\(^{19}\) This includes the sometimes separately published lists of CFSP Instruments (Legislative Acts, Declarations, Demarches, Heads of Mission Reports and Political Dialogue meetings).

\(^{20}\) This includes the sometimes separately published updated lists of priorities.

\(^{21}\) Interview, Council of the European Union, January 2009.

\(^{22}\) Interviews, Council of the European Union, December 2008 and January 2009.
Benita Ferrero-Waldner, the Commissioner for External Relations and several national foreign ministers. Similarly, the third category of written records – other material – is mainly related to important personalities in the European foreign policy apparatus. It are basically written records not published by an official institution or organism. Typical examples include newspaper interviews, analyses of political leaders (Vennesson, 2007) or monographs, e.g. *The Breaking of Nations* by the Director of the Directorate General for External and Politico-Military Affairs (DG-E) of the Council of the European Union (Cooper, 2003).

Numerical records, for their part, refer primarily to publicly available statistics of an official organism such as the Statistical Office of the European Communities (EUROSTAT) or to statistics that can be elaborated according to the information provided in official documents. The elaboration or interpretation of statistical material has required occasionally the use of relatively simple quantitative methods such as percentage calculation or the analysis of voting behaviour in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA).\(^{23}\)

The analysis and interpretation of the different types of written and numerical records has been complemented by interviews, i.e. oral records. The interview type that has been used during the research is mainly the ‘elite interview.’ According to Buttolph Johnson and Reynolds, “[e]lite interviewing is the process of interviewing respondents in a nonstandardized, individualized manner.” (Buttolph Johnson and Reynolds, 2005: 271).\(^{24}\) As its name says already, it focuses exclusively on the political elite, i.e. “…those with close proximity to power or policymaking” (Lilleker, 2007).

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\(^{23}\) For a more in-depth discussion of methodologies for the analysis of EU Member State coordination at the United Nations, see Kissack, 2007.

\(^{24}\) Most introductions to methodology provide chapters on elite interviews. However, given its importance for political scientists, it is surprising that no extensive literature specialized in elite interviewing exists. Useful exceptions are Goldstein, 2002; Lilleker, 2003; Richards, 1996.
2003: 207). Usually, face-to-face interviews of varied length (from half an hour to two hours) have been conducted, in particular in Brussels, Madrid, New York and California. However, in some instances phone interviews have been the better option, as it has been impossible to travel to all places. Interview partners have been contacted by phone in Copenhagen, Dublin, Luxembourg, Karlsruhe and Washington, DC. In very few cases, interview partners preferred to answer my questions by email, e.g. due to illness on the day of the interview. In order to structure and guide the interviews better, the semi-structured or focused interview sub-type has been chosen in all cases. In other words, the interviews have been guided by a pre-prepared interview protocol, which includes the major themes and questions to be raised during the interview. Due to the sensitivity of the research topic all interviews have been only on background or non-attributable. This means that in contrast to off the record interviews, the information obtained can be used in the dissertation, though without identifying the identity of its source. Moreover, no recording devices have been used. Only notes have been taken during the interviews.

In order to obtain balanced and, above all, reliable interview results, interviews have been conducted in the three major EU institutions (the Council, the Commission and the Parliament) as well as in national diplomatic services of EU Member States and important third countries. In the Council – the main institution for my research – the interviews have focused on the Office of the Personal Representative for non-proliferation of WMD, although other departments such as the legal service have also been relevant. In the case of the Commission, interview partners have included several officials in the Directorate General (DG) for External

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25 The identification of potential interview partners has been relatively easy as the websites of the European institutions and national diplomatic services provide usually detailed information on their officials. Following practical tips available in the literature, most interviewees have been contacted by email, though a few have been contacted also by phone.
Introduction

Relations (RELEX) and in DG Energy and Transport. Furthermore, several interviews have been carried out with Members of the European Parliament (MEPs). The focus has been naturally on Members of the Foreign Affairs Committee and its Subcommittee on Security and Defence. The intention has been to interview parliamentarians from the major political currents (conservative, socialist, liberal, green and communist), though the main criteria has been the parliamentarian's interest in arms control. Furthermore, I have used my contacts as a former Robert Schuman stagiaire in the Secretariat of the Foreign Affairs Committee to be able to conduct interviews with relevant civil servants in the Parliament. Finally, my interviews in the European institutions have been flanked by interviews in the diplomatic services of EU Member States and third countries.

In general, elite interviewing has had several objectives (see Richards, 1996: 200) for the present dissertation:

- To corroborate the information in written records, thus helping with their interpretation;

- To obtain direct access to the ideas and ways of thinking of policy-makers;

- To obtain relevant practical information that is difficult to obtain from written materials, e.g. regarding the complex institutional structure of the EU in the field of non-proliferation.

Most of the time these aims have been achieved. The large majority of interviewees took their time to give me frank and straightforward answers to my questions. Many interviewees put me also in contact with other relevant civil servants or politicians. This turned out to be the most successful strategy to get interview appointments.
However, it has been necessary to deal with several critical issues: First, many potential interviewees have not been readily available. Of the 119 officials that have been contacted 50 have not answered at all, nine rejected to be interviewed, 17 referred me to a colleague and only 43 offered me an interview.\footnote{In total 276 emails have been sent and a 181 have been received.} It should be pointed out that some officials have been contacted up to three times. Excuses have been varied – ranging from the sensitivity of the information to fears of espionage. Referrals to the Office of the Personal Representative for non-proliferation in the Council Secretariat has also been a convenient ‘pretext’ to avoid interviews. Secondly, timing has been an important issue, as interviews have to coincide both with the own research progress and the least busy time of officials. The first interviews were conducted in June 2006, at the beginning of the research endeavour, to get familiarized directly with the research topic. The second major round of interviews was conducted towards the end of the research, in December 2008 and January 2009, i.e. when sufficient knowledge of the research topic had been acquired to carry out meaningful interviews. Finally, the reliability and validity of the obtained information have been constantly a matter of concern.

One strategy to deal with these issues has been to conduct interviews with particularly senior officials and politicians, who appear to be in crucial positions. Each interviewee has been asked to provide names of key persons in the field of European non-proliferation policy. So with the time a relatively coherent picture of the most important interviewees has emerged. Moreover, the method of ‘triangulation’ has been applied (Davies, 2001). That is, interviews have been used to get three or more different perspectives of the same issue. As in navigation, this method helps to get a clearer point of a central point, especially if it is complemented
by alternative methods such as document analysis. Consequently, different types of perspectives have been chosen for the interviews: First, officials and politicians in the three main institutions of the EU – Council, Commission and Parliament – have been interviewed. This has been particularly successful, as it has been possible to conduct interviews with almost all of the most important individuals for EU non-proliferation policies in the three institutions. Secondly, it has been tried to include perspectives from all EU Member States and crucial third countries. This has been modestly successful: Only twelve Member States have not been represented in my interview sample in any way.\(^27\) Furthermore, a limited number of third country representatives have been interviewed, most notably from the United States and Syria. Moreover, it has been possible to attend small meetings with representatives from EU Member States and third countries such as Iran, where research relevant questions were asked.

Most importantly, however, the different interviews represent all important types of states in matters of non-proliferation, i.e. nuclear-weapon states, members of the North Atlantic Pact Organization (NATO) with nuclear weapons on their territory, NATO members and neutral states with a strong non-proliferation agenda. On the negative side, it should be highlighted, however, that there is a slight national bias towards Spain and Germany, where the best interviews have been conducted. There is clearly an increased willingness to grant interviews, if there exists some kind of national connection with the researchers.

Apart from the more general qualitative research design, the present research project applies also ‘comparative case study methods,’ which have become part of the generally accepted methodology in social sciences (George and Bennett, 2005). The

\(^{27}\) Austria, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.
The aim of using case studies is to ‘test’ a previously developed theoretical framework and to keep the dissertation within manageable limits. The case study selection follows certain criteria, in particular relevance, variety and feasibility. In other words, the case studies have to be relevant for the research topic, they should not focus on a single issue and their analysis should be feasible, i.e. sufficient research material should be available. The case studies selected for this study are Iran and Iraq, the Eastern and Southern neighbourhood and different international non-proliferation institutions. They are particularly representative for the EU non-proliferation policy after 2001: They include cases of varying degrees of policy output – from strong to virtually non-existent; they address different problems and issues; they allow analysing distinct types of measures, e.g. sanctions or multilateral negotiations; and they represent different levels of analysis: the state, regional and global level.

5. Terminology

The European Union and the academic community surrounding it have been particularly apt at creating a specific jargon that is sometimes difficult to decipher even for well informed laypersons. In a study with the Union at its centre it is, therefore, crucial to clarify and ‘translate’ key terms, even though an in-depth debate of these often controversial terms is not possible within the confines of the present dissertation. Already the very term **European foreign and security policy** – or simply European foreign policy – needs clarification. Traditionally, foreign policy is only a governmental policy of a nation state. It refers to the relations states maintain with the outside world, in particular with other states. This can take many forms: from cooperation in matters of environmental protection, international trade and
development aid to classical diplomatic relations, sanctions and even war. Security issues are closely related to foreign policy. Often security in one form or another is the aim of foreign policy. This dissertation itself is agnostic about the actual meaning of security, because – as will become clear in the following chapters – it is interested in the effects of different security interpretations by international actors. There is, therefore, no need to define it more precisely. Suffices it to point out that today a wide range of security perceptions exist, which transcend the traditional focus on ‘national security’ as interests in the increase of the power status of a nation state and its survival in the international system. Security is, thus, a term that is not only used in the politico-military sense, but also regarding the economy, the society or the environment. Accordingly, different descriptions of security are currently in use, e.g. national security, European security, interdependent security or human security.  

The big question is if an international organization like the EU can have a foreign and security policy? After all, the EU does not possess any of the powerful foreign and security policy institutions of nation states such as a foreign ministry, an intelligence service, an army or even a central authority. It is neither a sovereign entity nor can it act in areas of ‘high politics’ independently of its Member States. However, there is a tendency among EU Member States to work towards a common foreign policy and to act collectively in international affairs. According to Hill, “…even in national capitals we can observe a conscious aspiration to achieve a common European foreign policy, across a wide range of substantive activity, involving bilateral and multilateral relations with third party states and organizations in the international system” (Hill, 2004: 145).

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28 For an in-depth analysis of the debates about security and the different existing concepts of security, see Barbé, 1995: 25-45; Barbé and Perni, 2001.
Although this brief discussion does not allow a more in-depth examination of the different arguments involved,\textsuperscript{29} it allows drawing up at least a working definition of European foreign and security policy: It refers, first of all, to the political and security-related relations between the EU and the outside world and not to relations between EU Member States. Basically any output based on common objectives and produced through institutions at the European level, e.g. the Council or the Commission, can be called European foreign and security policy. In contrast to other definitions that emphasize the EU’s “…capacity to make and implement policies abroad that promote the domestic values, interests and policies of the European Union” (Smith, 2002: 8), this definition is more activity oriented. The crucial issue is that something common that affects the outside world in political or security terms is implemented through EU institutions. In reality, of course, such a foreign policy is not necessarily coherent or consistent. It involves many actors and takes part at multiple levels, e.g. the Community level, especially in the field of trade relations.\textsuperscript{30} The Member State level or the level of the CFSP. Although this makes European foreign and security policy very complex – even confusing – from an analytical point of view, in matters of non-proliferation it is possible to focus to a large extent, though not exclusively, on one key level, namely the CFSP, the so-called ‘second pillar’ of the European Union.\textsuperscript{31}

The 1993 Treaty on European Union (TEU) created CFSP as the successor of the EPC.\textsuperscript{32} It was subsequently reformed in the Treaty of Amsterdam (1999) and later

\textsuperscript{29} For an overview of the debate, see Smith, 2002: 1-33; White, 2001: 27-46.
\textsuperscript{30} The restriction that applies in this case is that trade relations belong to the realm of European foreign and security policy if they have political or security related implications. See Smith, 2003a: 2.
\textsuperscript{31} The first pillar is formed by the European Community and its Community policies. The third pillar consists of parts of the EU policies in the field of justice and home affairs.
\textsuperscript{32} For a more detailed analysis of EPC and its influence on the development of CFSP, see Barbé, 2000b: 108-111.
in the Treaty of Nice (2003). Today CFSP and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), its offspring in military affairs, are the backbone of EU foreign policy. As Figure 1 shows, the institutional set-up is mainly based on the Council: The major guiding principles of CFSP are adopted by the European Council, whereas the day-to-day decisions are taken by the General Affairs and External Relations Council under a the Presidency of one of the Member States. In this respect, the Council counts with the support of the Secretary General/High Representative, the Council Secretariat, the Committee of the Member States’ Permanent Representatives (COREPER II) and the Political and Security Committee (PSC), a preparatory body that meets at ambassadorial level. The Secretary General of the Council and High Representative for CFSP is probably the most visible CFSP actor. The post is occupied by Javier Solana, the former Secretary General of NATO and Foreign Minister of Spain. In certain concrete geographical or functional areas such as non-proliferation, he also counts with Personal or Special Representatives. The High Representative is supported in his work relating to CFSP by the Policy Unit, which basically functions as his personal cabinet, and the Situation Centre, which is the Council’s intelligence hub. The Commission’s role in CFSP is largely limited to its co-right of initiative, though it conducts its own ‘foreign policy’ often referred to as ‘external relations.’ The European Parliament, finally, is mainly an advisory body in matters of CFSP.

33 The main unit is DG-E.
34 The PSC also directs and receives support from the CFSP Working Groups, the RELEX Counsellors and the national European correspondents based in the Member States’ capitals.
35 The Commission has five DGs with responsibilities in the EU’s external relations: DG RELEX (headed by Benita Ferrero-Waldner), DG Trade, DG Enlargement, DG Development and DG Humanitarian Aid. Furthermore, the Commission counts with over 100 Delegations abroad and numerous specialised units such as the Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management Unit.
Proliferation and WMD, for their part, are fairly clear terms. First of all, the concept of WMD encompasses a wide range of weapon types, all of which have in common that they cause – if used – indiscriminate mass casualties. Typically, they include different variations of nuclear arms (A-bombs, H-bombs\(^\text{36}\)), chemical weapons such as mustard gas or sarin and biological weapons, e.g. certain types of viruses or bacteria. The effectiveness of these weapons is, however, limited without the adequate means of delivery and usually these means, in particular ballistic missiles, are also included in the definition of WMD, although in a strict sense they are not weapons. Traditionally, most attention has been paid to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, since they are by far the most deadly and powerful type of WMD.

\(^{36}\) Sometimes radiological weapons (‘dirty bombs’) are included as a separate category.
In general, (nuclear) proliferation is divided into vertical and horizontal proliferation, whereby the former refers to the build-up and improvement of an existing nuclear weapons arsenal in a certain country and the latter refers to the spread of states and non-state actors such as terrorist networks with nuclear weapon capabilities.\textsuperscript{37} During the last 60 years vertical proliferation has been decreasing while horizontal proliferation has been increasing. Nevertheless, acquiring a nuclear weapon, even a basic A-bomb of the type used by the United States in Hiroshima, is a very complex and, above all, very costly process. For non-state actors such as terrorist groups it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to obtain a nuclear weapon without at least the tacit support of a state actor (Koldobskij, 2003).\textsuperscript{38} Apart from the necessary technical know-how, the major obstacle in the construction of a nuclear weapon is the difficulty to acquire the necessary large amounts of weapon-grade (fissile) material, in particular enriched uranium and plutonium.

**Dissertation Outline**

As can be easily deduced from the previous sections, the dissertation structure is basically twofold: The first part deals with theory, whereas the second part presents the empirical research results. Each part consists of three chapters. The ultimate goal of the first part is to provide a comprehensive theoretical framework for the potential impact of ideas on collective policy output in fields of ‘high politics,’ in particular the non-proliferation of WMD in the framework of the European Union. The first chapter analyzes the role of ideas in international politics more in general. It deals with the

\textsuperscript{37} Subsequently, the term proliferation will refer to horizontal proliferation only.

\textsuperscript{38} It is, however, questionable if any nuclear power is prepared to provide a terrorist network, or in fact any other state, with ready-to-use nuclear weapons (Müller, 2003b).
major theoretical issues related to ideas in foreign policy such as key assumptions, working definitions and factors influencing the impact of ideas. Ultimately, a general model is drawn up that shows how ideas function regarding collective policy output of a group of states in the realm of ‘national security.’ In the second chapter, I apply this general model to the specific case of European Union foreign and security policy. Through an analysis of relevant debates, e.g. about a European strategic culture or the civilian power Europe (CPE) concept, it is shown that in this particular case foreign policy ideas can be clustered into four dominant Weberian ideal type idea complexes: ‘national Europe,’ ‘integrationist Europe,’ ‘cosmopolitan Europe’ and ‘multilateral Europe.’ The chapter argues in particular that EU foreign and security policy is the result of consensus between this limited number of competing idea complexes, which makes consensus much more likely, though it leaves also room for substantial dissonance. As is demonstrated by means of a new model, the key issue is that consensus between different idea complexes is only possible within certain limits. The model allows also developing more precise hypotheses about the effects of ideas on collective policy output. They are tested in the second part of the dissertation. Before, however, the third chapter completes the theoretical part. The aim of this chapter is to show how in the absence of a central authority as in nation states the EU is able in certain situations to produce collective policy output in spite of the four competing idea complexes. In other words, what keeps the EU together? In a sense, the argument is that the Union has developed powerful institutional mechanisms ranging from formal institutions to norms and habits that keep the whole EU foreign policy construct together and help finding compromises between idea complexes. Consequently, the chapter includes an empirical part that outlines the development of the EU’s specific institutional set-up in the field of non-proliferation of WMD.
Based on the theoretical framework of the first part, the second part of the dissertation dedicates one chapter to each of the three case studies identified previously. Its aim is to analyse empirically how ideas affect European policy output in different circumstances. The fourth chapter analyzes two – from a material point of view – similar situations: the 2002/2003 crisis about an alleged Iraqi WMD programme and the Iranian nuclear stand-off after 2002. It demonstrates how competing idea complexes led in one case to forceful collective foreign policy output by the EU and in the other to outright dissonance. Specific attention is paid to the empirical examination of European security perceptions since 2001 in both Iraq and Iran, the means that have been applied successively and the impact of US policies and their relation with the idea complexes. Like this, the chapter shows how in one case the competing idea complexes could be reconciled whereas in the other not. Similarly, the fifth chapter argues that ideas explain the varying EU non-proliferation policy in the neighbourhood. In this chapter, I examine the congruence between the possible consensus among the four competing idea complexes and actual policy output. The conclusions highlight how compromises between competing idea complexes have led to non-proliferation efforts in the neighbourhood that occupy the middle ground between forceful actions aimed at the most problematic cases and a neighbourhood policy without any non-proliferation element. The sixth and final chapter analyzes in how far new ideas can function as ‘focal points.’ In this regard, the EU’s idea of ‘effective multilateralism’ is at the centre stage. I argue that in the area of EU policies towards international non-proliferation institutions such as the NPT or the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) ‘focal points’ may provide cohesion, coherence and legitimacy. The empirical study shows, however, that in many instances the three functions of ‘focal points’ lead only to weak or even superficial
consensus that can easily break again, in particular regarding the rights and obligations of Member States, the use of force and transatlantic relations.

Ultimately, I conclude with a set of answers to the research question and with a synthesis of the research results regarding the study purposes. The conclusions address in particular the question if the research hypotheses developed in chapter 2 can be confirmed in the light of the research findings or if they have to be modified or even rejected. Finally, they examine the dissertation’s theoretical implications for European foreign policy and IR, its practical lessons for the functioning of European foreign policy and its need for future research.
PART I: THEORY
CHAPTER 1 Theoretical Framework: Ideas and Cooperation

Since the end of the Cold War, research on ideational factors in international politics has become an increasingly influential part of mainstream IR theory (Finnemore, 1996: 372; Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998; Jackson, 1990; Philpott, 2001; Schmidt, 2008), International Political Economy (Blyth, 2002; Campbell, 2004; Goldstein, 1993; Hall, 1989; Sikkink, 1991; Woods, 1995) and related fields such as foreign policy analysis (Checkel, 1997a; Cummings, 2003; Drezner, 2000; Goldstein and Keohane, 1993b; Marks, 1997; Thorun, 2009), security studies (Katzenstein, 1996b; Kier, 1997; Shafer, 1988; Tannenwald, 2007) and European integration. Up to the present day, ideational scholarship has gained significant ground and is – as a forthcoming comprehensive book shows – “…alive and well in political science, sociology, and political economy” (Blyth, 2007: Abstract).\(^\text{39}\) Especially the development of constructivism with its explicitly sociological dimension has promoted strongly the focus on the role of ideas. Few authors doubt today that ideas have at least some explanatory power in international politics. However, idea based approaches suffer from an overarching problem: lack of coherence. Apart from the general consensus that ideas matter in one way or another, ideational factors are a source of substantial disagreements among IR scholars. Most notably, no generally accepted working definitions of ideas or ideational factors such as culture, norms, values, identity or ideology have been established. Consequently, the basis for

\(^{39}\) Daniel Béland and Robert Cox plan to publish in 2009 an edited book entitled *Ideas and Politics in Social Science Research*. Blyth’s paper is a chapter in the book. Furthermore, Andreas Gofas and Colin Hay are about to publish *The Role of Ideas in Political Analysis: A Portrait of Contemporary Debates*. By the time of writing both books were still in print.
comparative studies has been very thin. Secondly, it is not clear from the available literature if, when and where ideas matter. Distinct research traditions have provided different and sometimes incompatible answers. Thirdly, it is far from obvious how ideas work in international politics: Which are, for example, the causal mechanisms between ideas and policy outcomes? In short, idea based research is a highly contested field of investigation.

Based on the existing literature, the aim of this chapter is to examine more closely the role of ideas in international politics in order to establish a general theoretical research framework for the study of EU foreign and security policies (chapter 2). It will outline in particular the key assumptions of ideational research, including a working definition of ideas as an independent variable (section 1); it will demonstrate under which conditions ideas have explicatory power (section 2); and it will develop a model of how ideas work in international politics, especially regarding cooperation among states (section 3). Hence, all key issues of the existing idea based literature will be covered. At the same time, it will also pay substantial attention to two factors that to a large extent have been neglected so far. First, collective action of states: Most studies on ideas are state-centric and try to explain in how far ideas affect the behaviour of individual states, whereas ideas as facilitating or hampering factors for international cooperation have attracted less systematic attention. This is particularly true for collective action of groups of states. Secondly, though few exceptions exist (Katzenstein, 1996b; Kier, 1997; Shafer, 1988; Tannenwald, 2007), issues belonging to the realm of ‘national security’ have not attracted much attention in the idea based literature. ‘High politics’ are still dominated by different strands of realism. However, engaging (neo) realists on their home turf can be an especially

40 On state centrism in constructivism, see Wendt, 1999: 8-10.
powerful way to demonstrate the usefulness and validity of an idea based approach.\footnote{Interestingly, the concept of “high politics” (Hoffmann, 1966: 874) was introduced into IR by Hoffmann trying to demonstrate in an intergovernmental critique of neofunctionalist theories of European integration that there existed outside the realm of economic integration a sphere of ‘high politics’ that was integration resistant (Hoffmann, 1966: 882). In a sense, this dissertation is a rebuttal of Hoffmann’s original realist prediction that sustained collective action in ‘high politics’ is not possible.}

In sum, the ultimate goal of this chapter is to provide a comprehensive theoretical framework for the potential impact of ideas on collective action in fields of ‘high politics.’

1. Assumptions and Definitions in Comparative Perspective

As part of the “constructivist turn” (Checkel, 1998) in IR in the early 1990s, there has been a more specific “ideational turn” (Blyth, 1997) ranging from political science over IR to International Political Economy. However, ideational scholarship is nothing completely new. As Jacobsen points out, the current interest in ideas is a “revival” of previous research periods concerned with ideational factors (Jacobsen, 1995; see also Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998). In fact, ideas in various forms have played important roles for (political) philosophers since ancient times. Even at the outset of the modern social sciences, ideational factors were taken very seriously. Most notably, Max Weber explains in his seminal work on the Protestant work ethic how religious norms and values facilitated the development of capitalism (Weber, [1904/05, 1920] 2000). It was also Max Weber, who introduced ideas as a variable into social science more specifically. In an often cited quotation, he argued that “…very frequently the ‘world images’ that have been created by ideas have, like switchmen, determined the tracks along which action has been pushed by the dynamic of interest” (Weber, 1958: 280). It comes, therefore, as no surprise that in the early
days of IR ideational factors formed an integral part of the emerging discipline. This is certainly the case of idealists in the interwar period, but also of classical realism. As a recent analysis shows, Hans Morgenthau, the main representative of classical realism, stressed in certain aspects the importance of ideas in his research (Williams, 2004). Likewise, Arnold Wolfers, in his analysis of the goals of foreign policy, conceded that “…if one fails to inquire why actors choose their goals, one is forced to operate in an atmosphere of such abstraction that nothing is revealed but the barest skeleton of the real world of international politics” (Wolfers, 1962: 70). E.H. Carr, for his part, saw a notable role for ‘morality’ in international relations: “It is through this process of give-and-take, of willingness not to insist on all the prerogatives of power, that morality finds its surest foothold in international (…) politics” (Carr, [1939, 1946] 1956: 168; see also Barbé, 2004b).

However, in the wake of the ensuing Cold War bipolarity rationalist approaches such as behaviourism, in which there was only limited space for ideational factors, became dominant in IR. Further on, neorealism and, to a lesser extent, neoliberalism – the dominant paradigms in IR since the early 1980s – have seen ideas as negligible factors and focused instead on pre-given, largely material national interests as the prime driver in international politics. The choice of the day was rational choice based on a material ontology. However, the lack of an actual breakthrough in explaining and predicting outcomes in international politics, in particular the inability of all major IR schools to foresee such a dramatic shift in international relations as the sudden end of the Cold War, led to the revival of idea based approaches. Although non-rationalist IR research outside of neorealism and

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42 The standard work of neorealism is: Waltz, 1979. For a good overview in comparison with neoliberalism, see Baldwin, 1993.
43 Not surprisingly, studies on the end of the Cold War play a crucial role in the emerging ideas
neoliberalism existed in niches most of the time, most notably in cognitive psychological approaches to nuclear deterrence and in the “belief systems” approaches (Holsti and Rosenau, 1984; Little and Smith, 1988), it was only in the late 1980s and early 1990s that ideational research began to regain a dominant position. Both Haas and Adler’s works on epistemic communities (Adler and Haas, 1992) and Sikkink’s and Goldstein and Keohane’s analyses of ideas per se were in this regard significant breakthroughs.

Assumptions

The development of ideational scholarship in contrast to rationalist approaches was noted early on. In his 1988 lecture at the Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Keohane moaned for example the divide between what he called “rationalistic” and “reflectivist” approaches to international institutions (Keohane, 1989). However, the development of IR later on has shown that there is not necessarily a clear-cut division between rationalist and constructivist approaches to international relations. There exists rather a continuum between material based rationalist research on one side and ‘thick,’ postmodern constructivism on the other. Along this continuum different positions regarding the role of ideas in international politics exist (see Figure 2).

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44 For the internal debate in deterrence theory, see issue 41.2 of *World Politics*, in particular Jervis, 1989; Lebow and Stein, 1989.

45 ‘Reflectivist’ has been substituted by ‘constructivist’ as the generally accepted term for this approach. The denomination ‘constructivism’ was originally from Onuf and was subsequently used by Wendt (see Onuf, 1989), though the origins can be traced back to the field of sociology (Berger and Luckmann, 1966). As in the case of other approaches to IR such as realism or institutionalism, the borders of constructivism have never been clearly established. It is necessary to distinguish between at least two strands within constructivism: ‘thick’ and ‘thin’ constructivism. See Wendt, 1999. In a similar fashion, Jacobsen distinguishes between ‘conventional’ and ‘critical’ constructivism (Jacobsen, 2003).

Figure 2 Ideas on the Rationalist-Constructivist Continuum

In total, there are at least four: (a) For material based rationalists ideas do not matter at all. Ideas are seen as consequences or posterior rationalizations of already existing material factors. If at all, they are instruments in the interests of politicians (Shepsle, 1985: 233-235). Shepsle has introduced in this regard the frequently used concept of ideas as “hooks on which politicians hang their objectives and by which they further their interests” (Shepsle, 1985: 233). Ideas are, thus, merely instrumental. In IR, this view is particularly dominant in (neo) realism. Mearsheimer argues, for instance, that “[b]ehind closed doors (…) the elites who make national security policy speak mostly the language of power, not that of principle, and the United States acts in the international system according to the dictates of realist logic” (Mearsheimer, 2001: 25). (b) Some (neo) realists and (neo) liberals, however, concede that ideas can have a limited explanatory role in IR, specifically in the form of intervening variables (Desch, 1998). There has even been the intent to integrate ideas as complementary factors in rationalist, game-theoretic approaches (Weingast, 1995). The clearest example of this school of thinking is, however, regime theory. According to one of the standard works on the subject, “International regimes are defined as principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area… [R]egimes have been conceptualized as intervening
variables between basic causal factors on the one hand and outcomes and behavior on the other” (Krasner, 1983: 1). (c) The third group of scholars, consisting mainly of “new institutionalists” (Hall and Taylor, 1996), some (neo) liberals and ‘thin’ constructivists, argues that ideas are independent variables in their own right, which can explain under certain conditions policy outcomes. For instance, Goldstein and Keohane postulate that “[a]s social scientists we are interested in using empirical evidence to evaluate the hypothesis that ideas are often important determinants of government policy” (Goldstein and Keohane, 1993a: 3). (d) The final position regarding ideas in international politics is the postmodern or ‘thick’ constructivist view. These approaches reject completely the rationalism or rationalist bias of the three previous positions. From their point of view, ideas cannot be seen as factors in causal mechanisms. Ideas are rather “…elements of constitutive practices and relations…” (Laffey and Weldes, 1997: 195). Like this, they are intrinsically intertwined with other phenomena such as interests. In the words of Laffey and Weldes, “Seeing ‘ideas’ as part of a broader set of linguistic and symbolic practices allows us to rethink ‘ideas’ as intersubjectively constituted forms of social action” (Laffey and Weldes, 1997: 209).

In practice, many non-theoretical studies of issues of international relations or foreign policy are underpinned – usually unconsciously – by positions (b) or (c), i.e. a mixture of ideational and material factors. This applies also to the present study. On the rationalist-constructivist continuum it tends in particular towards position (c), which means that ideational factors are seen as one kind of independent variable. However, as it pretends to be more explicitly theoretical, it is necessary to distinguish this position more clearly from positions (a), (b) and (d) by highlighting both

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47 Hall and Taylor distinguish between ‘historical,’ ‘rational choice’ and ‘sociological institutionalism.’
similarities and differences. Regarding (a) and (b), the approach of the present study shares the assumption of both (neo) realists and (neo) liberals that policies are made by rational actors, though rationality is merely seen as “…an internally consistent pattern of reasoning” (Adler and Haas, 1992: 370). There is even the possibility that in extreme situations, in which external threats endanger the very survival of a state, ideational factors do have little if no explanatory power. In such cases, policy is driven by the ultimate, pre-given interest of rational actors in national security, i.e. national survival. However, in the post-Cold War world such straightforward cases are increasingly rare if not non-existent, especially for the European Union. Although the international system remains anarchic as (neo) realists and (neo) liberals assume, imminent threats to survival are largely absent. There are no states or group of states that are able or willing to threaten Western Europe in the same way arguably Nazi Germany at the dawn of World War II or the Soviet Union during the Cold War did.

Security issues today are fuzzy and include a diffuse array of risks ranging from global warming to proliferation of WMD. ‘Security’ and ‘threats’ are increasingly seen in terms of ‘risks,’ implying that there exist mainly potential threats that have to be managed in order to avoid actual threats. In the words of Rasmussen, one of the representatives of the emerging risk management literature, “A risk is a scenario followed by a policy proposal for how to prevent this scenario from becoming real. However, such a policy proposal does not aim to achieve perfect security (Rasmussen, 2006: 2). In other words, today’s security environment is not

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48 To be fair with Waltz and neorealism, it should be pointed out that Waltz does not pretend to explain all state behaviour. He does not even exclude ideational factors such as ideology as explanatory factors. He rather argues that the power structures are the most important factors in the long term. They explain, in his words “…a small number of big and important things” (Waltz, 1986: 329). See also Wendt, 1999: 235-238.

49 Rasmussen applies Ulrich Beck’s well-known sociological concept of ‘Risikogesellschaft’ (risk society) to the field of international security and strategy. A key aspect of the risk society concept is
characterized by clear-cut threats under anarchy, but by uncertainty and complexity – a vision that pervades many EU documents on security policy. Benita Ferrero-Waldner, the European Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy, argues, for example, that “[t]he end of the cold war meant the end of a terrible era of cataclysmic threats and pointless confrontation. But it was also the end of the era of certainty and predictability. Today the threats we face are different” (Ferrero-Waldner, 2007b: 2). In such a world, even rational actors cannot have unequivocal ‘national interests’ guiding their actions. 

Moreover, actors are unable to fully grasp the different implications of an issue. Human beings simply lack the intellectual capacity to process all the information in an uncertain and complex world (Woods, 1995: 172) – if it is available at all (Goldstein, 1993: 10). Even if they were able to, their reactions can easily have unintended consequences, as ‘thick’ constructivists argue (Blyth, 2007). That is, actors cannot be certain about the long-term outcomes of their or others’ actions. Therefore, actors have to decide with only very limited information which issue is in their interest and how to address it. Although they will do this rationally, their decisions are likely based on ideational factors such as norms or values, as they help reducing uncertainty and complexity. Consequently, this study does not share in most cases the assumption that actors’ interests – the driving force behind their actions –

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50 Interestingly, already classical realists saw the problem of the definition of ‘the’ national interest in uncertain circumstances. According to Wolfers, “…in the absence of a clear-cut national emergency, the question of priority arises with respect to possession and milieu goals or to direct and indirect national goals. Such controversy reflects differences in value patterns as well in estimates of what the situation requires. Nowhere more than here does it become evident how little guidance policy-makers can gain simply from being referred to the ‘national interest’” (Wolfers, 1962: 78). 

51 Thus, the ‘risks’ mentioned above are not predictable or calculable in a scientific way, as we cannot see the ‘probability generators’ (Blyth, 2007).
are pre-given and stable. As will be shown more in detail further on, interests are the result of ideational factors. They are not exogenously given, but endogenously constructed.

However, this study does not go as far as defending position (4), which basically argues that ideas cannot be treated as “objects” (Laffey and Weldes, 1997: 194) with an own independent explanatory power. Linear causal mechanisms between ideas, interests and policy outcomes are alien to this kind of thinking (Blyth, 2007). Ideas and interests are rather interconnected parts of the same social structure (Jacobsen, 2003). Although this study agrees that in real life ideational factors and interests cannot be separated indeed, analytically it can be useful to regard ideas as independent variables (Sikkink, 1991: 6). This is particularly the case if a study wants to analyze phenomena such as why states act in certain situations collectively. This does not mean that the causal relations between ideas, interests and policy outcomes are permanent, since the outcomes feed back again into the ideas, thus leading with the time to different outcomes. Yet, causal mechanisms still exist. For ‘thick constructivist,’ however, this is basically the wrong research approach (Blyth, 1997: 246). It simply does not make sense for them to look for causal relationships in a world that is socially constructed.

Another difference is the importance of the material world. For ‘thick constructivists’ material factors do not have meaning without social interaction. Material factors are just there. For example, nuclear bombs – the ultimate weapon of any state – do not pose a threat per se. It is through the interaction with the states that possess them that they can become a threat or not: Whereas the European Union sees the state with the smallest nuclear capability – North Korea – as a major threat to its security, the state with the largest nuclear arsenal – the United States – is seen as an
ally. Although this study accepts such reasoning, in line with rationalist thinking it
assumes, however, that material factors can still be important in their own right.\textsuperscript{52} For
instance, the Taliban insurgency in Pakistan is ultimately more dangerous than in
Afghanistan, because Pakistani nuclear weapons may fall into the hands of the
insurgents. There exists, thus substantial ontological and epistemological gaps
between this study and ‘thick’ constructivism.

In sum, in contrast to either rationalist or ‘thick’ constructivist approaches the
present ‘ideas as independent variables’ approach is based on five key assumptions:
(1) Actors are rational; (2) imminent threats to survival are today largely absent; (3)
the post-Cold War world is dominated by complexity and uncertainty; (4)
analytically, ideational factors can be treated as different from interests within a
causal relationship, though they are intrinsically linked; and (5) the material world can
have explanatory power independent of ideational factors. This leads to an approach
that bridges rationalism and constructivism by giving under the present conditions of
the international system great, though not exclusive importance to ideational factors
as explanatory variables. As other works on ideas, it occupies the “middle ground”
(Adler and Haas, 1992; Checkel, 1997a).

**Definitions**

In order to turn ideational factors into operational independent variables it is
necessary to define them more precisely. So far they have been treated in a negative
sense, i.e. as non-material factors. This is also the lowest common denominator IR
scholars can agree on. In the literature, ideational factors include such diverse

\textsuperscript{52} See in this regard also Wendt’s ‘rump materialisms’ (Wendt, 1999: 109-113 and 130-135).
elements as culture, norms, values, beliefs, identity or ideology. As each scholar deals with these elements in different ways, generally accepted definitions are virtually non-existent. Often definitions are even overlapping or contradictory. According to one of the seminal works on norms in international relations, “… one analyst’s norm might be another’s institution and a third scholar’s identity” (Finnemore, 1996: 16). Therefore, the definitions of ideational factors in this study focus on the most useful approach for the study of ideas as independent variables. In this regard, the best starting point is the definition offered by Goldstein and Keohane. They provide a helpful taxonomy of ideas distinguishing between “world views” defined as “conceptions of possibility” (Goldstein and Keohane, 1993a: 8), “principled beliefs” and “causal beliefs” (see introduction).\(^5^3\)

First of all, this taxonomy helps to distinguish between ideas at what can be called a fixed level and a malleable level. Although Goldstein and Keohane do not elaborate this issue, a key difference between worldviews on the one hand and principled and causal beliefs on the other is that the former is much more stable than the latter. They are rarely contested, as they include the most basic forms of ideas that change very slowly – usually over decades or even centuries. As will be shown in the following sections, common worldviews can have in this form significant impact on state behaviour, not least on cooperation with other states.

Yet, common worldviews should not be confused with common culture. Culture is generally considered to be a broader concept consisting of numerous other

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\(^5^3\) George, in one of his studies on political leaders (George, 1969: 199), distinguished already between ‘philosophical beliefs’ and ‘instrumental beliefs.’ Although they are in some aspects similar to Goldstein and Keohane’s belief types, they lack the important normative element. Today, several authors use at least partly Goldstein and Keohane’s taxonomy, though usually in a modified form. Tannenwald, for example, distinguishes between ideologies/shared belief systems, normative beliefs, cause-effect beliefs and policy description (Tannenwald, 2005: 15). Woods, for her part, distinguishes between “‘principled beliefs,’ ‘theories,’ and ‘world views’” (Woods, 1995: 162).
ideational factors such as norms, values, rules or identity. According to Katzenstein, culture “...is a broad label that denotes collective models of nation-state authority or identity, carried by custom or law. Culture refers to both a set of evaluative standards (such as norms and values) and a set of cognitive standards (such as rules and models) that define what social actors exist in a system, how they operate, and how they relate to one another” (Katzenstein, 1996a: 6). As will be discussed briefly in the next chapter, the European foreign and security policy is (still) too undeveloped to be guided by a common culture. Even identity – in the sense of “basic character of states” (Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein, 1996: 33) and norms – defined as “collective expectations about proper behavior for a given identity” (Katzenstein, 1996a: 5, see also Finnemore, 1996: 22) – are hardly applicable in the case of the EU as a single, state-like polity.

However, identities, norms and the related concepts of ‘value,’ i.e. “...notions laden with an absolute (i.e. non-instrumental) positive significance for the overall order and meaning we try to give to our world” (Lucarelli, 2006: 10) and ‘principles,’ which “...translate values into general ‘constitutional’ standards for policy action” (Lucarelli, 2006: 10) are important in the framework of the malleable ideas, i.e. ideas that can be flexibly adapted in relation to specific situations and that consist basically of principled and causal beliefs. Identities, norms, values and principles are a key source of principled beliefs, which help to interpret a specific situation in moral terms

54 ‘Culture’ is virtually an own area of investigation that cannot be discussed more in detail here. Obviously, definitions are very varied, though they usually encompass some form of ‘ideas,’ ‘value,’ ‘rules’ or ‘meaning.’ See Hudson, 1997: 2-15. For further discussions and definitions of ‘culture’ in IR, see Chay, 1990. On security culture in the EU and its role for identity formation, see Gariup, 2009.
55 It is important to distinguish between this kind of ‘political identity’ in contrast to ‘cultural identity.’ See Lucarelli, 2006: 11-13.
56 Especially ‘identity’ is, as in the case of ‘culture,’ the topic of an own stream in IR. Again it is not possible to analyse all related issues in the limited framework of this dissertation. For (re)definitions of culture, identity and their relationship in IR, see Lapid, 1996
of good/bad and just/unjust. They can also be called “normative ideas,” as they determine what ‘ought to be’ (Schmidt, 2008: 307-308). Beliefs in certain causal relationships, on the contrary, define ‘what is.’ They help to see the world in practical terms of working/not working. In a nutshell, principled and causal beliefs are the ultimate guides in a world dominated by complexity and uncertainty. They help to take clear decisions in otherwise incomprehensible situations.

In practice, however, principled and practical beliefs are difficult to separate. For instance, the generally held belief that the proliferation of nuclear weapons is bad is based both on a principled belief – possessing weapons with the potential to kill thousands of innocent people in an instant is morally wrong – and a causal belief – proliferation by one state leads to a chain reaction of proliferation which will ultimately destabilize the international system. In her monograph on ideas, Goldstein concedes that “[b]ecause causal beliefs may be associated with deeply entrenched normative beliefs, they usually reflect underlying values” (Goldstein, 1993: 11). Schmidt argues that both normative and cognitive ideas are active at the different levels of policy ideas consisting of policy solutions, more general programmes that underpin policy ideas and worldviews (Schmidt, 2008: 306). Frequently, different normative and causal beliefs are seen as forming interconnected “belief systems” (Little and Smith, 1988) or ‘social representations,’ defined as “…shared images and concepts through which we, as individuals, organize our world” (Mérand, 2006: 131). This mix of principled and causal beliefs is hardly surprising, because as the

57 The distinction between good/bad and just/unjust takes always the point of view of the belief holder. In other words, beliefs are not necessarily good or just from today’s perspective. For example, slavery was seen as good and/or just in many societies during millennia.
58 Schmidt calls these beliefs “cognitive ideas” (Schmidt, 2008: 307-308).
59 In her monograph on ideas, Goldstein concedes that “[b]ecause causal beliefs may be associated with deeply entrenched normative beliefs, they usually reflect underlying values.” See Goldstein, 1993: 11.
60 Following Woods, this study considers the term ‘ideology’ too problematic to be used in IR research,
term ‘belief’ already suggests they are ultimately located in and processed through the heads of individuals such as policy-makers or senior bureaucrats.

However, as all approaches that treat ideas as independent variables, ideas are not analyzed here from a cognitive psychological point of view, since the dissertation is not concerned with how certain beliefs are established in relation to a however defined objective reality. The aim is rather to show how ideas shared by a group of people – usually a polity’s policy-makers in a certain issue-area – affect when and how states act collectively in ‘high politics.’

2. The Power of Ideas in Context

The most formidable challenge to an approach based on ideas as independent variables is to demonstrate that ideas matter at all (Yee, 1996). Why is it not sufficient to focus on other, interest-driven and material based factors? How do we know that ideas have actually explanatory power? As Kowert and Legro point out, “One can almost always identify, post hoc, a norm to explain a given behavior” (Kowert and Legro, 1996: 486). Even if certain ideas are identifiable as potential factors, actors may merely use ideas to rationalize their strategies anchored in material interests (Parsons, 2002: 49). In this regard, the key methodological problem is that it is not possible to either see or touch ideas, i.e. they are not quantifiable in the same way as material factors are, e.g. the number of tanks or nuclear weapons per state. Nor can ideas be causes in the same way as physical objects such as a hammer that hits a nail.

Because “[m]odern uses of ‘ideology’ invariably imply partisanship, bias, propaganda, oversimplification, and so forth” (Woods, 1995: 163). In practice, however, ‘ideology’ research deals with ideas in a similar way as many works cited here. See Cassels, 1996.

Cognitive psychology has also been interested in questions of state behaviour. However, its main focus is on the relation between ideas or ‘images’ and reality, especially in the form of ‘perceptions’ and ‘misperceptions’ of reality. See, for example, Jervis, 1976: 13-31.
Ideas are rather “reasons for action” (see Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 890, fn 14). Thus, it is impossible to offer the ultimate proof that ideas matter.\(^\text{62}\) Not surprisingly, “…scholars often disagree about what counts as an adequate test, or evidence, of the role of ideas” (Tannenwald, 2005: 13). Postmodern scholars even see the search for a role of ideas in cause-effect relationships in a positivist sense as a futile enterprise, arguing that it is better to focus on Verstehen (understanding) than on explaining.\(^\text{63}\) However, Tannenwald shows that sufficient test methods based on what she calls ‘soft positivism’ (Tannenwald, 2005: 13) and constructivism have been developed in ideational literature to show the direct influence of ideas.\(^\text{64}\) She mentions in total seven tests, all of which fall within the category of qualitative research that has been discussed already in the introduction.\(^\text{65}\)

However, it is neither practical nor useful to apply all test methods in a single study. Thus, only the three most suitable methods for the research purpose here have been chosen. They are all well established and widely known in ideational research. The first two are variants of the classical “null hypothesis,” which requires determining if it is sufficient to explain a certain output or outcome without using ideational factors (Goldstein and Keohane, 1993a: 6).\(^\text{66}\) Particularly promising is Parson’s method to find situations with actors “in the same objective position” (Parsons, 2002: 52). According to Parsons, “Given solid evidence of differing preferences, and careful verification that they face identical objective constraints, this control for objective causes is as free from bias as qualitative observation can be”

\(^{62}\) It is also difficult to provide definite evidence for the effects of material factors. But this falls already outside of the framework of this study.
\(^{63}\) For the difference between Verstehen and explaining in IR, see Hollis and Smith, 1990.
\(^{64}\) For an in-depth discussion on positivism in constructivist research, see Wendt, 1999: 47-91.
\(^{65}\) In limited circumstances, when detailed information about decision-makers is available, e.g. their educational background, it might be also helpful to add quantitative methods (Chwieroth, 2007).
\(^{66}\) For a critique of the ‘null hypothesis’ approach, see Woods, 1995: 166.
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(Parsons, 2002: 52). In such situations, it must be ideational factors that explain policy variation, as the material factors do not change. Consequently, ideas have what Kier calls “causal autonomy” (Kier, 1997: 146-148). This method will be particularly important in the case study of the EU Iraq and Iran policies, where in two very similar situations EU policy output has been substantially different. The second test related to the “null hypothesis” is to examine if policy outputs correspond directly to material interests such as security or economic concerns (Tannenwald, 2005: 28). If this is not the case, policy outputs are likely the result of ideational factors. In this sense, it is similar to George’s ‘congruence’ method (George and Bennett, 2005: 181-204), which looks for consistency between policy decisions and ideas of policy-makers. If there exists ‘congruence,’ there is at least an indication of a causal link, though correlation is no proof for causation. This method will be particularly important in the chapter on the EU non-proliferation policy in the neighbourhood. The third method is ‘process tracing,’ which has been developed by George to show the ‘causal nexus’ between beliefs and policies. According to this method, the scholar traces the ideas that influence policy output during the different steps of a policy process (George, 1979: 113-119; George and Bennett, 2005). It will play a dominant role in the analysis of the concept of ‘effective multilateralism’ in the European non-proliferation strategy.

67 This method has the additional advantage of providing an answer for the “‘how much?’ problem” (Parsons, 2002: 48) of ideas, namely how much ideas matter in a situation of equal objective circumstances. In such a context the variation between different possible outcomes of distinct strategies by two actors shows the impact range of ideas (Parsons, 2002: 52). However, it does not solve the wider issue of weighting ideational against material factors.

68 An additional test is to take into consideration the material resources of actors. If the ideas of the most powerful actors dominate consistently, material factors may have a larger explanatory role than ideas. See Tannenwald, 2005: 27. However, this test is largely mitigated by the veto power of even the smallest Member States in EU decision-making processes and by the large variety of Member State capabilities.

69 For a critique of George’s methods, see Yee, 1996: 76-82.
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The Level of Analysis

To show that ideas have explanatory power does not automatically reveal where, when and how they wield their power. In fact, the location of the power of ideas, its context and its causal mechanisms are three hotly debated issues that affect the very fundamentals of the IR discipline. The first issue – the location of ideas – concerns directly Singer’s classical “level-of-analysis-problem” (Singer, 1961). That is, which should be the adequate unit of analysis in idea based research? Is it the individual, a certain group, the nation state or the international system? At its heart, ideas are obviously held by human beings. Thus, Goldstein and Keohane’s basic definition of ideas is “beliefs held by individuals” (Goldstein and Keohane, 1993a: 3). Yee is even more specific when he argues that ideas are “…mental events that entail thought” (Yee, 1996: 69). This is also the bottom line of the so-called belief system literature, which focuses its attention on the belief systems held by key policy-makers such as foreign ministers, prime ministers and presidents.\(^\text{70}\)

However, already the belief system literature has realized that it is useful to go beyond the individual and focus on larger groups. Holsti and Rosenau’s study on the impact of the American war in Vietnam on the belief systems of the American leadership is a key example in this regard (Holsti and Rosenau, 1984). Little and Smith, for their part, have introduced the concept of group belief systems (see Little and Smith, 1988: 30-32 and 40-41), which covers the ideas of larger units such as the Islamic belief system. As they point out, a key problem of belief systems held by individuals is the role they play in larger groups. On the one hand, individuals may be forced to act in accordance with the dominant belief systems in a group, even if it contradicts their personal belief systems. For example, diplomats often have to defend

\(^\text{70}\) For an overview of the belief system approach, see Little and Smith, 1988.
the actions of their government or foreign service, even though they do not agree with them. On the other hand, the very belief systems individuals have may change through their membership in a certain group. It comes, therefore, as no surprise that the notion of ideas as “shared beliefs” (Goldstein and Keohane, 1993a: 7; see also Thorun, 2009: 22) has been a dominant feature of the idea approach, though this study prefers the more specific term ‘collective ideas,’ as it emphasizes that ideas can exist at the collective level, even though it is not shared by individuals.\footnote{For a similar argument regarding norms, see Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein, 1996: 54, fn 69. See also Wendt, 1999: 141 and 157-165.}

In principle, any group, e.g. bureaucracies, governments, national states or even the international community, can hold collective ideas. Ideally, an idea based approach adopts a multilevel perspective, analyzing important stakeholders at the sub-state, state and international level. For practical reasons, however, idea based studies in international affairs narrow often their focus on elites, in particular foreign policy elites such as government officials, diplomats or think tank members (Checkel, 1997a; Thorun, 2009). Given the topic of the present study, the emphasis is primarily on elites at the European level, i.e. officials of national (foreign) ministries and European institutions, who work on topics of European foreign and security policy. For the sake of parsimony the Union is analyzed as a single-level polity and not as a multilevel system with national and transnational pressure groups, Member States’ bureaucracies and European and international institutions. It is assumed that different ideas or idea complexes coexist at the European level independently of the question where these ideas are ultimately anchored. Even though Member States’ national foreign policy bureaucracies are most likely important stakeholders in this regard (Béland, 2009: 710-712), it is only of secondary importance which Member States
hold which ideas and why. Some Member States may have fairly stable foreign policy ideas, e.g. Germany, whereas others, for instance some of the new Member States in Central and Eastern Europe, might have different ideas over time. However, as will be argued in the following chapter, in the long-term there are permanently only four idea complexes regarding foreign policy in the European Union. As in European foreign and security policy each Member State has a veto power, it is not crucial to know when which Member State or which institution holds one of these four idea complexes. In short, the unit of analysis of the present study is the European Union as such. That is, collective action by the European Union is determined by the relationships between different idea complexes at the European level.

**Spatial Circumstances**

As critical as the unit of analysis is the context of ideas, in particular the spatial circumstances. As Kowert and Legro note, “Norms do not float ‘freely,’ unencumbered by any physical reality. They are attached to real physical environments and are promoted by real human agents (though norms, of course, are not themselves material)” (Kowert and Legro, 1996: 490). In this regard, the institutionalization of ideas at the elite level is particularly important. Already early ideational scholars have realized that “ideas embedded in institutions” can be very powerful (Sikkink, 1991: 22-25 and 248-251; Adler and Haas, 1992: 384; Goldstein and Keohane, 1993a: 20-24; Woods, 1995: 168), both as a force of constraint and opportunity (Béland, 2009: 708). At the most general level, it is through institutions that ideas get their power. The way certain ideas get empowered depends to a large

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72 Second image analysis is likely to be the most useful way to explain national foreign policy ideas.
extent on the institutional structure. Drezner shows, for instance, decisive differences between idea-promoting agencies insulated from and embedded in larger bureaucracies (Drezner, 2000). Likewise, Checkel argues that ideas emerge and evolve differently in centralized than in decentralized states (Checkel, 1997a: 11-12). Although in this regard most scholars put emphasis on domestic structures in nation states (Checkel, 1997b; Risse-Kappen, 1994), institutional structures are also important at higher levels, especially in such a highly institutionalized setting as the European Union. The Union’s peculiar institutional set-up in foreign and security policy, particularly Member States’ veto powers and, thus, the lack of what has been called “…institutional arrangements for authoritative decision making” (Goldstein and Keohane, 1993a: 13), are key issues for how ideas work at the European level and will be dealt with in greater detail in the third chapter.\(^7^3\)

Furthermore, ideas are not only embedded in institutions, they are also related to the larger international structure. This structure has usually two aspects: a social one and a material one (Kowert and Legro, 1996: 459). The material structure refers to the material capabilities of polities’ and their distribution in the international system. A powerful actor, for example, might be more successful in diffusing its ideas, because it is able to establish the necessary infrastructure such as international TV channels, trade representations or embassies. The social structure, on the other hand, can be described as an “…international structure, not of power, but of meaning and social value” (Finnemore, 1996: 2). Similar to material factors, this social structure can put limits on the ideas held at the European level, especially regarding generally accepted international norms such as national sovereignty.

\(^7^3\) On ideas and the fragmentation of political power, e.g. through multiple veto powers, see Béland, 2009: 709.
The relation between the ideational and material world is obviously a big and complex issue, though a combination of the two is increasingly accepted in IR (Sørensen, 2008). As the previously mentioned tests suggest, this study takes into consideration both ideational and material factors. Often the two are intimately intertwined. For example, ideas may give meaning to material capabilities, e.g. when Iran’s nuclear programme is considered to be a threat in large part of the world, whereas the huge US nuclear arsenal is not. At the same time, the increasing communication of ideas between actors depends to a large extent on physical capabilities such as telephones, computers or broadband connections. However, priority is given to circumstances, where ideas prevail as the dominant independent variable.

**Temporal Circumstances**

Apart from the spatial circumstances, there are also temporal circumstances that might influence ideational factors. As has been already pointed out in section 1, ideas are particularly important in periods of high uncertainty. Most idea scholars share Goldstein’s original hypothesis that increasing uncertainty increases the role of ideas (Goldstein, 1993: 254). The question is, however, when such periods of uncertainty exist. In his analysis of the end of the Cold War, Checkel argues that ideas are crucial in circumstances of transformation, i.e. high uncertainty, when specific idea promoters in the form of so-called “policy entrepreneurs” (Checkel, 1997a: 8-11), “norm entrepreneurs” (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 986-901) or “ideational entrepreneurs” (Drezner, 2000) can use ‘windows of opportunity’ to promote

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successfully their new ideas (Checkel, 1997a). Similarly, Haas and Adler argue that in moments of crisis political leaders may rely particularly on the expertise of epistemic communities that can provide them with new ideas for new, unforeseen circumstances (Adler and Haas, 1992: 380). Other authors point to different kinds of international, regional or domestic crises such as global economic crises or the end of the Cold War, when previously established ideas are questioned, discredited and delegitimized (Culpepper, 2008; Goldstein, 1993: 12; Goldstein and Keohane, 1993a: 16).

Though the discredit of existing ideas depends to some extent on the applied yardsticks (Sikkink, 1991: 247), i.e. the success or failure of an idea depends partly on interpretation, crises are generally accepted as catalysts of ideas. This can also be seen in the history of the CFSP. As Barbé points out, major reforms of CFSP structures and capabilities has been the result of important failures of the EU in international crises (Barbé, 2000b, 2004a): the establishment of the CFSP as a successor of the EPC followed the 1990-1991 Gulf War and the wars of secession in the former Yugoslavia; the foreign policy changes in the Amsterdam Treaty were a result of the failures during the war in Bosnia; and the reforms of the Nice Treaty had its origins in the European shortcomings during the Kosovo crisis in 1998/1999. As will be shown in chapter 3, the terrorist attacks of 9/11 in New York and Washington, DC, had also a catalytic effect on the development of a common European non-proliferation policy.

However, in contrast to several authors who emphasis the exceptional character of periods of crisis and high uncertainty and, thus, focus on ‘windows of opportunity’ (Checkel, 1997a; Goldstein, 1993), the European Union is largely a space where uncertainty is virtually permanent. It is frequently described as a ‘moving

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75 As Haas and Adler note, this does not mean that ideas are disposed of. They are “…merely shelved for future reference” (Adler and Haas, 1992: 372).
target,’ i.e. as a continuously changing polity. For both academics and policy-makers, it is far from clear what the EU is and how it will develop in the future. If one adds the overall uncertainty of the post-Cold War international system in terms of security (see section 1), it becomes clear that the European foreign and security policy is a field that is most of the time prone to be affected by ideas.

This argument is substantiated by the analysis of the so-called ‘life cycle’ of ideas. Finnemore and Sikkink developed originally the notion of ‘life cycles’ in relation with norms (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 895-905). They basically argue that norms are not just out there, but that they pass through three stages: First, during ‘norm emergence,’ norm entrepreneurs promote new ideas, which are adopted in a second step, when a critical mass of actors lead to a tipping point that makes new ideas acceptable (‘norm cascade’). The third and final step consists of the internalization of new norms. Following Finnemore and Sikkink, Tannenwald has developed a refined version of the life cycle for ideas that consists of four steps (Tannenwald, 2005: 30-33). She distinguished between the origins of ideas, their transmission, the reception of ideas and their implementation. During each phase different processes and mechanisms are at work, which will be discussed in section 3. The crucial issue regarding the EU is that in the field of foreign and security policy many ideas have never passed through all four stages. That is, rarely have ideas been internalized and implemented at the European level. Most of the time, ideas are somewhere between transmission, reception and implementation, i.e. they are in a permanent state of flux. This means that whenever the EU wants to become active in international affairs it has to find consensus between different ideas. Thus, ideas and the competition between them are likely to play continuously a significant role in foreign and security policies at the European level.
3. Ideas and Collective Action

So far this chapter has dealt with some key assumptions about ideas, their definition, if they have explanatory power, where they are located and under which circumstances they are likely to have power. The final question that needs to be addressed in idea based research is the question how ideas work. Which are the processes and mechanisms behind ideas? A possible first step is to look at what happens in each of the four stages of Tannenwald’s life cycle of ideas (see section 2). In the first stage (origins of ideas), she emphasizes learning processes and the effects of experience. If the experience with a certain idea has been negative several times, it is likely that actors look for more convincing ideas (Tannenwald, 2005: 31). In their analysis of the origins of norms, Kowert and Legro provide an even more detailed explication. They distinguish between three mutually enforcing processes that can lead to new ideas: ecological processes between actors and their environment, e.g. external crises can bring about new ideas; social processes between actors such as the diffusion of ideas from one actor to another; and internal processes within a certain actor, which basically focus on actors’ psychological needs (Kowert and Legro, 1996: 469-483).

The second stage (idea transmission) is dominated by different types of norm promoters, e.g. idea entrepreneurs, epistemic communities, institutions at different levels or transnational networks. For example, epistemic communities can have a huge impact by framing, defining and setting standards regarding a certain issue.

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76 The main problem of the otherwise very helpful and often underrated belief system approach is the lack of explanations of possible (causal) mechanisms of the functioning of ideas. Although some belief system scholars recognize that elites “...whose beliefs about the international system and the United States’s proper role within it are likely to play an important role in shaping and constraining American foreign policy” (Holsti and Rosenau, 1984: 20), they focus their attention on which kind of beliefs individuals hold and not on the ideas’ effects.

77 On learning, see Adler and Haas, 1992: 385-387.
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(Adler and Haas, 1992: 375-378). However, not only the elites, but also the general public play a role in the transmission of ideas. Schmidt, who emphasizes the role of discourses in promoting ideas, distinguishes explicitly between coordinative discourses between elites seeking “…to coordinate agreement among themselves on policy ideas…” and “communicative discourses” between elites and the wider public in order to gain general acceptance of ideas (Schmidt, 2008: 310). In contrast to other authors such as Culpepper or Finnemore and Sikkink, who emphasize in this phase the persuasion of norm entrepreneurs acting out of commitment or altruism (Culpepper, 2008; Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998), Tannenwald shows that the transmission of ideas can be based on a wide variety of processes, including rational ‘choice,’ emulation, socialization or even coercion (Tannenwald, 2005). The EU, for instance, presents itself as an example of regional integration. If another region follows the EU’s example (or ‘emulates’ the EU), the European ideas of integration have been emulated. It is important to highlight that at this stage both new and existing ideas have to compete with each other.

During the next stage (reception of ideas) ideas are either internalized or accepted rhetorically. The difference between the two is the degree of acceptance. In the former case it is much higher than in the latter. Ideas are firmly embedded in institutions and their use becomes virtually a habit. The processes by which ideas are accepted are varied and can include rhetorical entrapment, persuasion or institutionalization. The reasons why certain ideas get accepted depend on a wide range of influences such as the power, social status or legitimacy of the idea promoter and the idea recipient, the impact of existing ideas or even material factors (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 904-905; Tannenwald, 2005: 32). The final stage

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78 On epistemic communities in the context of arms control, see Adler, 1992.
(implementation of ideas) refers to the actual use in policy-making of ideas that are internalized or at least generally accepted (Tannenwald, 2005: 33). In short, during the life cycle of ideas various processes and mechanisms help to reach the final stage and, thus, to become influential factors in policy-making. In the case of the EU, however, the competition between different ideas and idea complexes is particularly strong and pervades the various stages of the life cycle.

**Ideas between Agents and Structures**

The next step in the analysis of the causal mechanisms and processes of ideas is to examine their effects in policy-making. In general, ideas can structure and influence policy choices and decision-making. Checkel, for example, sees the role of ideas as “organizing politics and shaping public policy” (Checkel, 1997a: 5). However, this is still very vague. It is more precise to distinguish between at least three types of effects of ideas: causal, constitutive and regulative effects. The distinction between constitutive and regulative effects is usually made in the context of rules and norms (Dessler, 1989: 454-455; Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 891). In the words of Katzenstein, “In some situations norms operate like rules that define the identity of an actor, thus having ‘constitutive effects’ that specify what actions will cause relevant others to recognize a particular identity. In other situations norms operate as standards that specify the proper enactment of an already defined identity. In such instances norms have ‘regulative’ effects…” (Katzenstein, 1996a: 5). The same notion of constitutive and regulative effects can also be applied to ideas more in general. As Béland points out, ideas can contribute, for example, to the construction of issues and problems (Béland, 2009: 704-705). They can also define an actor, for instance, the idea of the European Union as a civilian power Europe defines the Union as a specific
kind of international actor. Thus, ideas can have constitutive effects. In other instances, ideas may define with which instruments an actor addresses a certain problem – a regulative effect. For example, the idea of a civilian power Europe may limit the EU’s foreign policy instruments to non-military means.

Finally, ideas can also have causal effects in the sense of explaining cause-effect relationships. In this regard, one of the classical problems of idea based research is the question if ideas cause change or continuity (Kowert and Legro, 1996: 488-490). For example, in the 1980s ideas about counter-insurgency endured in the United States even though they had been proven wrong (Shafer, 1988: 44-45 and 280). On the contrary, in the literature on the end of the Cold War ideas figure prominently as the factors that caused change. Likewise, Béland argues that ideas can both legitimize or challenge existing institutions and policies (Béland, 2009: 705). Up to the present day, no satisfactory explanations about when ideas lead to either change or continuity have been found. It might depend, for example, on the status of ideas within the life cycle: Internalized ideas tend to promote continuity, whereas emerging ideas can provoke change.

The causal, constitutive and regulative effects of ideas hide another, for the present analysis even more important feature of how ideas work in policy-making: From an actor’s point of view they can be either ‘active’ or ‘passive.’ ‘Active’ means that actors can use ideas consciously. They can even manipulate and change them (Kowert and Legro, 1996: 492). In fact, ideas can be “powerful ideological weapons” (Béland, 2009: 705). This becomes particularly clear in the concept of ideas as “focal points’ around which the behavior of actors converges” (Garrett and Weingast, 1993: 79).

However, it is a controversially discussed topic in IR if ideas can have both causal and constitutive effects. For an in-depth discussion, see Tannenwald, 2005: 33-41.
176), especially in the form of “constructed focal points” (Garrett and Weingast, 1993: 176). That is, actors can create actively common ideas to create unity among otherwise divided actors. As will be shown in the following chapters, this is a particularly important effect of ideas in the context of the CFSP. ‘Passive,’ on the other hand, means that ideas can have effects that are not consciously sought by actors. This kind of effect goes back to Max Weber’s original notion of ideas acting as ‘switchmen’ (see section 1). It has been refined by Goldstein and Keohane in their study on ideas on the different pathways ideas can take. Their first one is ideas serving as ‘road maps.’

Ideas serve the purpose of guiding behavior under conditions of uncertainty by stipulating causal patterns or by providing compelling ethical or moral motivations for action. Ideas can be broad or narrow; they can stipulate what is right and wrong, provide new social visions, or merely suggest what economic policy will steer a nation toward increased wealth. (Goldstein and Keohane, 1993a: 16).

In the traditional debate about the role of actors and structures in international relations such an approach occupies the middle ground between agent- and structure centric approaches (Dessler, 1989: 443; Wendt, 1987). To a certain extent it accepts the “two truisms about social life” that underpin the agent-structure problem: “1) human beings and their organization are purposeful actors whose actions help reproduce or transform the society in which they live; and 2) society is made up of social relationships, which structure the interactions between these purposeful actors” (Wendt, 1987: 337-338). On the one hand, different actors such as European institutions or national bureaucracies are recognized as active carriers of ideas, e.g. the other two pathways are ‘focal points’ and ‘institutionalization.’ See Goldstein and Keohane, 1993a: 17-24.

Similarly, Parsons argues that ideas have causal effects “…as interpretations or ‘filters’ of the objective environment” (Parsons, 2002: 49).
when ideas are used as focal points. On the other hand, the competing idea complexes at the European level form a (regional) social structure that provides the EU as such with understanding of what is important, valuable, effective or legitimate, i.e. they are ‘road maps.’

**Models**

Traditional (neo) realist and (neo) liberal explanations of state reactions to an international crisis take usually the form of: A given issue \( X \) is (1) interpreted applying pre-given national interests that (2) lead to certain preferences. Finally (3) the most effective response \( y \) is chosen to achieve a state’s objectives and to serve the national interest. As has been made clear already, the key problem of this approach is the ‘black box’ around ‘national interests,’ i.e. that national interests and preferences are given exogenously.

![Figure 3 Classical Model of National Responses to an International Issue](source: Own elaboration.)

But how does a state know which its interests and preferences are? Where do a state’s interests and preferences come from? As Finnemore points out, “Interests are not just ‘out there’ waiting to be discovered; they are constructed through social interaction” (Finnemore, 1996: 2). In other words, it is necessary to open the ‘black box’ around ‘national interests.’

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82 The agent-structure problem is discussed in detail by Finnemore, 1996: 14-22.
83 For an analysis of the black box problem in neorealism and neoliberalism, see Powell, 1994.
Theoretical Framework

box’ and look at how interests and preferences are formed endogenously. In this regard, a crucial role is played by the role of ideas in the form domestic and international norms, identities and beliefs. As Figure 4 shows, ideas affect (1) if an issue$_x$ comes up and how it is interpreted, (2) how national interests and preferences are formed regarding the issue and (3) which response$_y$, in particular which means, are chosen. Finally, (4) the responses and their outcomes affect again the ideas recursively; that is they either reproduce or reconstitute the ideas.$^{84}$ What is not clear from such a state-centric model is how collective action of states regarding an international issue works. Looking at Figure 4, the question is where collective action starts. In classical (neo) liberal and (neo) realist thinking collective action starts after process (2); that is once national preferences regarding an issue$_x$ have been formed nation states decide if it is in their interests to respond collectively to the issue$_x$ or not.

Figure 4 Constructivist Model of National Responses to an International Issue

However, in such a highly institutionalized context as the European Union it is unlikely that states form their own preferences independently. The Member States

$^{84}$ Figure 4 is an extremely simplified model. For a more detailed version, see Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein, 1996: 52-53 and Kowert and Legro, 1996: 462-468.
interact intensively on a daily basis on all international issues. Thus, Member States do not have the freedom to construct their interests and preferences independently in their national capitals. In other words, collective action begins already well before interest and preference formation, namely prior to process (1) in Figure 4. This means that the EU’s collective actions start at the level of ideas.

Figure 5 is a refined model that takes the problem of collective action in the context of the EU into consideration. The main difference to Figure 4 is that several idea complexes consisting mainly of normative and causal beliefs interact and compete with each other. Depending on these interacting and competing ideas, an issue\(x\) is either collectively recognized as such (3) or not (1). Thus, it becomes clear how ideas, or in this case better the consensus or compromise between competing ideas, provides ‘road maps’ for collective action or inaction. In case (1), there will be no collective preferences and obviously no response, though the lack of collective action feeds back again into the interacting and competing ideas (2). That is, if there is no response to an issue\(x\), actors’ ideas of the EU as a collective actor in foreign affairs are affected, either as a reinforcement or a challenge to existing ideas. The same occurs if there is a collective response\(y\) (7). In order to reach such a response or common output,\(^{85}\) common preferences have to be formed (4) that are sufficiently strong to sustain agreement on common action, in particular on which kind of common action (5). However, it is also possible that no common agreement on the kind of response regarding issue\(x\) can be found (6). In such a case, there will be no collective action. In general, the key variables are the interacting and competing ideas, mainly in the form of normative and causal beliefs.

\(^{85}\) There is a notable difference between ideas affecting output and outcome of collective action. Output merely refers to the ability to carry out collective action, whereas outcome concerns the results of collective action. The models that will be developed below deal only with outputs and not outcomes. See Ginsberg, 2001: 10-12. See also Carlsnaes, 2004: 502.
In contrast to state-centric approaches (Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein, 1996; Kowert and Legro, 1996), identities play in this model only a very indirect role, most notably through the influence of Member States’ national identities on their normative beliefs. Yet, directly at the European level, which Figure 5 represents, identities do (still) not play a major role. Likewise, domestic and international norms, another major ideational factor in idea based research, takes a backseat at the European level. They work principally through the interacting and competing ideas in the form of normative and causal beliefs. In principle, this model should have two more dimensions, a domestic and an international one, as its normative and causal beliefs interact recursively with national identities and domestic and international

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86 However, repeated recursive feedback processes (2) and (7) could lead with the time to a more stable common identity at the European level, e.g. through a European security culture, in which common understandings on key foreign policy issues such as the use of force exist.
norms (Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein, 1996; Kowert and Legro, 1996). However, parsimony requires to focus the model on the key variables.

It should be re-emphasized that in the case of collective actions of states ideas function in international crises under very specific conditions that have to be taken into consideration before developing a model of ideas in collective policy-making. Collective action, both inside and outside the EU, means that no common authority exists that can decide for the whole group. All group members have a veto power over common decisions. Consequently, different ideas and idea complexes compete at the group level. Such competition is a normal and probably enduring feature of the international system. According to Finnemore, “Tensions and contradictions among normative principles in international life mean that there is no set of ideal political and economic arrangements toward which we are all converging. There is no stable equilibrium, no end of history” (Finnemore, 1996: 135). It will be argued that in the case of the European Union four distinct idea complexes compete. As long as there are no unexpected major shifts at the domestic level of certain Member States or at the international level such as a major war, these idea complexes can be assumed to be relatively stable in the mid-term.

However, they have not reached the final stage of the life cycle of ideas, that is, they have not been internalized and institutionalized at the European level (see above). What keeps them together in the absence of a common authority is the context of a larger normative and institutional structure. This structure consists basically of three elements: (a) the Member States’ worldviews, which are relatively similar; (b) 

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87 Philpott argues that the roles of ideas are stronger than both ‘switchmen’ and ‘focal points.’ They can either convert people to new identities or ‘coax’ leaders to pursue new courses (Philpott, 2001: 46-72). However, his analysis focuses on long-term changes in conceptions of ‘sovereignty.’ It is questionable if his argument is also valuable for the short-term effects of normative and causal beliefs.

88 In the long term, the recursive feedback processes can bring about changes in the idea complexes (see previous footnote). However, it is not the aim here to establish an eternally valid model.
European norms and habits in the field of foreign and security policy, i.e. the ‘do’s’ and ‘don’ts;’ and (c) the formal and informal institutions, in which Member States interact, e.g. informal gatherings, working groups or the General and External Affairs Councils (see chapter 3). However, in contrast to nation state based models, the structure is no equivalent to a government, which can resolve authoritatively the conflicts between competing ideas. One way to overcome this problem is to create a focal point that works like a lens that can bundle the different ideas towards an issue. As the focal point and other ways to resolve the lack of generally accepted authority in the EU will be dealt with more in detail further on, suffices it here to point out that focal points help to facilitate collective action.

Conclusion

The aim of this chapter has been to clarify crucial issues regarding ideas in international politics and to set the theoretical framework for a more in-depth analysis of the role of ideas in collective action in European foreign and security policy. In a first step it has defined ideas as collective beliefs of rational actors in an environment dominated by uncertainty, complexity and the absence of direct threats to survival. In such circumstances ideas are particularly influential as they provide actors with much needed guidance to cope with an uncertain and complex world. Of particular importance are so-called normative ideas about what ought to be and causal ideas about what is. In a second step, the questions when and where ideas are particularly powerful have been answered. It has been argued that today’s European foreign and security policy is particularly prone to be affected by ideas as it is characterized permanently by uncertainty about its nature and complexity of its institutional set-up:
“From the end of the Cold War, European construction has been in a state of permanent uncertainty…” (Barbé, 1997b: 129). Thus, the main level of analysis of the remaining chapters will be the European Union as such.

Finally, the causal mechanisms and processes of ideas in policy-making have been examined. Ideas can have causal, constitutive and regulative effects. More important is, however, that actors can either use ideas actively, e.g. by constructing so-called focal points for common actions, or ideas influence actors in the form of ‘road maps’ that provide guidance and direction. This has ultimately led to a model of how idea complexes, interests and preferences, the use of means and policy outputs are (recursively) linked. The model shows three major roles of ideas in relation with collective action of states in international crises: They can facilitate, restrict or direct collective action. However, it is silent on the exact nature of the interacting and competing ideas and the conditions of collective (in)action, i.e. when and where consensus between these ideas is possible.
CHAPTER 2  Ideas and Output Variation: Explaining the Limits of European Foreign and Security Policy

The European Union has been a prime target of idea based research. As a relatively new and constantly evolving actor in the international system, it has been considered to be a particularly useful object to study the effects of ideas. Basically all possible facets of ideas in the EU are covered by the existing literature, e.g. ideas as defined in this study, worldviews, social representations, strategic/security cultures, values, roles or identities. ‘Europeanization’ has even become an EU-specific concept of ideational research. Most of this literature is crucial to develop the abstract models of the previous chapter into concrete models to explain the role of ideas in collective action by the European Union. The specific goal of this chapter is threefold: First, it will scrutinize the different ideas that exist on European foreign and security policy. It will revisit in particular the debates about a European strategic culture and the civilian power Europe concept (section 1). Secondly, based on the analysis of relevant documents, it will develop the four Weberian ideal types of idea complexes of European foreign policy ideas that have been mentioned already several times (section 2). Finally, it will develop a specific model to demonstrate the limits of the possible consensus between the different idea complexes and, thus, ultimately of EU foreign policy output. This will lead to five, theory based hypotheses about European foreign and security policy (section 3).
1. Ideas in European Foreign and Security Policy

Explicit idea based research rose to prominence in EU studies outside of EU foreign and security policy, most notably in integration studies (Jachtenfuchs, Diez and Jung, 1998; Parsons, 2000, 2003), law (Kostakopoulou, 2005) and economic and monetary integration (Jabko, 2006; McNamara, 1999; Quaglia, 2004). In general, these studies have shown how ideas have facilitated different aspects of the European integration process. Some have also developed important concepts that will be revisited in this study further on, e.g. ‘strategic constructivism’ (Jabko, 2006). In EU foreign and security policy, ideational research began with the literature on ‘Europeanization’ of the national foreign policies of EU Member States. Although the concept itself is debated, “[t]he term often refers to the political and policy changes caused by the impact of membership in the European Union on the member states” (Wong, 2005: 135). There is, however, an important (though not necessarily exclusionary) difference between the ‘Europeanization’ literature and the approach taken in this study: The former tries to explain or understand how the socialization between EU Member States at the European level leads to increasingly ‘European’ national foreign policies, whereas the latter explores how (still) different foreign policy ideas affect the foreign policy output of the European Union as such.

Recent research on the ‘roles’ of the EU in foreign policy is also linked to ideational research (Elgström and Smith, 2006b). After all, roles, defined as “…patterns of expected or appropriate behaviour” (Elgström and Smith, 2006a: 5),

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89 For an overview of ‘Europeanization’ in foreign policy, see Wong, 2005.
90 For an example of the possible combination of idea based and Europeanization literature, see Torreblanca, 2001.
91 For the sake of parsimony, national foreign policies have been bracketed in the present study. Analytically it is sufficient to focus on four competing idea complexes instead. This does not mean, however, that analyses of national foreign policies may lead to additional useful insights.
can be seen as a specific type of idea. In fact, when Elgström and Smith argue that “…actors behave in the way they believe is expected from them in a particular situation or context” (Elgström and Smith, 2006a: 5), it becomes clear that ‘roles’ fit easily into the definition of normative beliefs. The ‘role’ approach even recognizes the possibility of conflict between different ‘roles’ (Aggestam, 2006: 22-25). However, it does not consider role conflict to be a central element of EU foreign policy in the same way as the competing idea complexes in the present study.

Likewise, research on the values and principles of European foreign policy (Lucarelli and Manners, 2006) lacks the systematic analysis of the conflict and competition between different values and principles and their impact on EU foreign policy output. It is rather concerned with the impact of value- and principle based foreign policy on the formation of a common identity (see, especially, Lucarelli, 2006: 14). They are, thus, linked to another important approach to EU foreign and security policy, namely that of identity formation.

**European Strategic Cultures and the Lack of Identity**

As has been already argued in the previous chapter, identity is (currently) not a crucial variable to explain EU foreign policy output, as a European foreign policy identity simply does not exist apart from commonly shared basic worldviews (see below). In fact, most of the identity research in the field of European foreign and security policy recognizes that no state-like common foreign policy identity exists in the EU. According to Johansson-Nogués, “There are (…) considerable areas of fuzziness in the EU’s foreign policy identity. There are indications that there is a gap between EU

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92 However, studies on European identity affirm that the EU has at least some kind of international or collective identity. See Johansson-Nogués, 2008; Whitman, 1998.
identitarian projection and its foreign policy output which contributes to the notion of an ideational utopia” (Johansson-Nogués, 2008). Likewise, Gowan argues that the EU has “multiple strategic identities” (Gowan, 2007). This does not exclude that the EU is in the process of getting an own identity in the long-term (Anderson, 2008; Lucarelli, 2006) – the model in Figure 5 allows such a possibility – or that the EU has some kind of “collective identity” (Johansson-Nogués, 2008). However, for the purpose of the present study it is crucial that “…collectively held identity may be interpreted in different ways by different members of the collective” (Johansson-Nogués, 2008: 35-36). It is the conflict between competing normative and causal ideas about foreign policy that ultimately define EU foreign policy output and not identity formation or “collective identity.” Therefore, it is not necessary to enter the debate on how to identify best the EU as an international actor (Manners and Whitman, 1998). Rather, the debate about Europe as a “civilian power” (Duchêne, 1972), “normative power” (Manners, 2002) or “ethical power” (Aggestam, 2008) is reinterpreted as a manifestation of the competing ideas in European foreign policy.

It is, thus, a good indicator of the different foreign policy idea complexes that may exist in the EU.

Such a reinterpretation is justified in view of the other idea based research on European foreign and security policy. Although the approaches are different and include such concepts as discourse (Croft, 2000; Howorth, 2004), ‘mental models’ (Malici, 2008), ‘social representations’ (Mérand, 2006), strategic culture (Meyer, 2006) and worldviews (Vennesson, 2007), they all agree to a lesser or larger degree that at present there exist contending ideas (however defined) in EU foreign and security policy.  

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93 Another question that cannot be dealt with more in detail is in how far EU Member States are part of different “collective identities,” e.g. as members of the UN Security Council or NATO.

94 See also Roger’s argument of a shift from a civilian power approach to a global power approach in European foreign and security policy (Rogers, 2009).
security policy, both at the elite level and among the general public (Foucault, Irondelle and Mérand, 2009; Schoen, 2008). This literature provides a rich theoretical (especially Malici, 2008; Mérand, 2006; Meyer, 2006; Vennesson, 2007) and, in particular, empirical starting point to analyse the idea complexes in European foreign and security policy.

For several years, the dominant discussion among pundits has been about the question of a common European strategic or, as some prefer, security culture. At heart, this debate is about the existence or non-existence of a common understanding about the use of force in the European Union. 95 Not surprisingly, it is closely linked to idea based approaches: “…the notion of strategic culture is increasingly invoked as shorthand to highlight that national security and defence policies rest on deep-seated norms, beliefs and ideas about the appropriate use of force” (Meyer, 2005: 523). 96 In general, it is accepted that the EU does not possess at present an established common strategic culture (Howorth, 2002; Toje, 2005: 122). The debate is rather about in how far the different European strategic cultures are converging.

In spite of the generally favourable reviews of the 2003 European Security Strategy, the sceptics see “considerable heterogeneity” (Hyde-Price, 2004: 324) with little prospect for convergence and, thus, for a functional European strategy with military implications (Freedman, 2004; Hyde-Price, 2004). Heisbourg even argues that “the EU cannot have a proper security strategy as long as decisions on the use of force rest in the hands of its member governments” (Heisbourg, 2004: 28). The optimists object that there are signs of an “evolving European security culture”

95 In a recent publication on European security culture with a strong focus on language and discourse, Gariup goes already one step further: She analyzes the coherence between European security discourses and action. However, she does not elaborate on potentially competing or contradictory discourses. See Gariup, 2009.
96 For a more precise definition of strategic culture, see Cornish and Edwards, 2001: 587; Meyer, 2005: 528-529.
Ideas and Output Variation

(Edwards, 2006: 8), which is in the process of being developed through processes of socialization and institutionalization within the framework of ESDP and CFSP, even after the 2004 big bang enlargement (Cornish and Edwards, 2001; Edwards, 2006; on the growing institutionalization of ESDP, see also Bonvicini and Regelsberger, 2007). Rynning sees also the basis for common European strategic culture in the intra-European consensus regarding classical liberal values such as democracy and the rule of law and the rules and norms of the United Nations, though it is not clear if this is sufficient in the long-term (Rynning, 2003). The most ambitious and detailed work on strategic convergence within the EU goes so far as to argue “…that national strategic cultures in Europe, although still distinct, have converged substantially since the fall of the Berlin Wall, thereby creating the ideational and normative space for the emergence of a European strategic culture (Meyer, 2006: 1-2). Meyer shows how the EU has developed through processes of changing threat perceptions, mediatized crisis learning and social influence of institutions such as the PSC limited to moderate converging strategic thinking regarding different aspects of the use of force (Meyer, 2006).

However, the EU’s strategic convergence – if it exists – is not sufficient to explain diverging policy outputs in EU foreign and security policy. Although as in the case of identity (see above) long-term strategic convergence is a possibility and may contribute to stronger EU coherence, in the short- and medium-term EU foreign policy action is still dominated by competing ideas (or strategic cultures) and the compromises between them. Howorth emphasizes, for example, the differences and competition between French, British and German discourses (or the absence thereof) during the development of ESDP (Howorth, 2004). Likewise, Croft shows how originally four and later two different ideas about NATO, the Organization for
Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the EU and Great Powers have shaped the debate about the future of the security architecture in Europe after the Cold War (Croft, 2000). Mérand, for his part, shows how Member States’ different ‘social representations’ that underpin preferences during negotiations have resulted in a peculiar development and design of ESDP (Mérand, 2006). In this regard, he puts emphasis on what has been called “constructive ambiguity” (Heisbourg, 2000: 5): “An interesting aspect of ESDP is that although all EU governments (with the exception of Denmark) support the project, and probably genuinely so, they implicitly disagree on what it means. For the French, ESDP must lead to European defence; for the Germans, it serves to further European integration; for the British, it must remain a policy” (Mérand, 2006: 136). That is, the EU can find compromises between different ideas in the short-term, even though in the long-term they disagree on the larger implications.

In sum, European strategic convergence or identity formation are (still) not sufficiently strong to account for EU foreign and security policy output. They are, therefore, not useful to explain varying degrees of policy output.

**Revisiting the Civilian Power Europe Debate**

Given the lack of strategic coherence and identity in EU foreign policy, it comes as no surprise that the definition of the EU as international actor has been a highly controversial topic. Since the establishment of EPC in 1970, the EC and later the EU as international actors have been described and categorized in numerous ways. Recent examples include the terms “empire” (Zielonka, 2008), “security regime” (Charillon, 2005) or “structural foreign policy” (Keukeleire, 2003), which try to describe the peculiar foreign policy of the EU as a non-state, but state-like international actor.
The dominant current has been, however, the idea that the EC/EU is some kind of ‘civilian power.’\textsuperscript{97} This concept has also led to numerous derivate forms such as civil, civilizing, transformative, normative or ethical power (see Sjursen, 2006b: 169-171).\textsuperscript{98} Recently, the most dominant ones have been ‘transformative power’ (Leonard, 2005b) and, above all, ‘normative power’ Europe (Manners, 2002; Scheipers and Sicurelli, 2007; \textit{Journal of European Public Policy} 13.2):\textsuperscript{99} The former refers to the capacity of the EU to transform both political regimes and societies of third countries, whereas the latter refers to the EU’s “…ability to shape conceptions of ‘normal’ in international relations” (Manners, 2002: 239) through the diffusion of EU norms (Manners, 2002: 244-245). At the other end of the spectrum, however, the EU has been also described as an emerging military actor or even a ‘superpower’ that sees the EU in terms of an emerging great power – that is the antipode of civilian power Europe.\textsuperscript{100} In a nutshell, there has existed for a long time a dichotomy between the idea that the EC/EU is or should be some kind of civilian power and the assumption that the EU is becoming or should become a military power in its own right.\textsuperscript{101}

Most studies on the EU as an international actor have taken sides in the debate trying to characterize the Union in a specific way. Some have even been implicitly or

\textsuperscript{97} For an overview, see Orbie, 2006.

\textsuperscript{98} The different civilian power concepts are naturally an object of debate. Bono and Maull discuss, for instance, the dangers and advantages of the ‘civilizing’ effects of the EU as an international actor (Bono, 2006; Maull, 2006). Another important, though slightly underdeveloped, debate concerns the nature of ‘power’ in the civilian power concept (Smith, 2006: 327). Whereas some reject the whole notion of the EU being a power – Maull, for example, suggest to use the term ‘force’ instead (Maull, 2005: 778) and applies the civilian power concept only to nation states (Maull, 1990) – others try to define ‘power’ in novel ways (Adler and Crawford, 2004: 8-13; Whitman, 2006b: 7-8).

\textsuperscript{99} There is a debate about in how far normative power Europe and civilian power Europe are actually different. See Diez, 2005; Manners, 2006b. For the purpose here, however, this debate is not relevant. Nor is it crucial to discuss if there are possibly other ‘normative powers’ in the international system, e.g. the United States.

\textsuperscript{100} The ‘superpower’ characterization has been surprisingly popular in the United States. See, for example, Schnabel, 2005. It goes back to Galtung’s critique of the EC as a superpower in the making (Galtung, 1973).

\textsuperscript{101} Gnesotto, then the director of the European Union Institute for Security Studies, invented the not particularly telling term “sui generis power” to bridge the two ideas (Gnesotto, 2004: 1). The term has not become generally accepted.
explicitly normative in their endeavour, i.e. they both described and prescribed the foreign policy characteristics of the EU (see Nicolaïdis and Howse, 2002: 770; Smith, 2006: 324). In the present study, these approaches are considered to be largely futile, as the very heterogeneity of the EU as an international actor is seen as a key characteristic of European foreign and security policy. There is no definite characterization of the EU as an international actor. That is, the debate between civilian and military power Europe is rather a manifestation of the competing (ideal-type) ideas behind European foreign and security policy. In the words of Nicolaïdis and Howse, “…'what' is being projected [by the EU] is not the EU as is but an ‘EU-topia.’ And that utopia itself is necessarily a contested one, and not everyone’s vision of the EU’s future” (Nicolaïdis and Howse, 2002: 769).

The concept of civilian power emerged for the first time at the beginning of superpower détente at the beginning of the 1970s, when Duchêne introduced the concept. He argued that although it is unlikely that Europe becomes a major military power (in the form of a ‘nuclear European federation’), it can have substantial influence as a civilian power in a world, in which “[l]acking military power is not the handicap it once was” (Duchêne, 1972: 47). In 1982, and with the emerging second Cold War as a background, Bull launched the first major critique of the CPE concept arguing that the CPE model was a contradiction in terms, since “…the power or influence exerted by the European Community (EC) and other such civilian actors was conditional upon a strategic environment provided by the military

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102 For clear examples of the normative use of the normative and civilian power Europe concepts, see Manners, 2006a; Zielonka, 2009.
103 Consequently, the question how non-EU Member States see the European Union in international affairs is of only secondary importance, though it should be pointed out that even from an outsider’s perspective the EU does not possess clear foreign policy characteristics (see Chaban, Elgström and Holland, 2006).
104 Interestingly, he refrained later from using the concept. See, for example, Duchêne, 2002-2003.
105 Originally, Europe was, therefore, seen as a ‘civilian power by default,’ i.e. it was a civilian power because it did not have military means at its disposal. See Smith, 2000: 14.
power of states, which they did not control” (Bull, 1982: 151). Amid emerging strategic differences between Europe and the US and a continuing Soviet threat to Western Europe, Bull advocated an own Europeanist strategic policy as opposed to the traditional Atlanticist or neutralist policies (Bull, 1982: 151-164). He envisaged, in particular, a kind of Western European military alliance with home-grown European nuclear weapons, improved conventional forces and West Germany, France and Britain as key players. Although Bull as a representative of the English School tradition in International Relations clearly excluded the possibility that Europe as such might be an actor in international affairs (Bull, 1982: 151), his contribution is generally seen as the first manifestation of the military power Europe idea as opposed to the CPE concept.

The ensuing debate has mainly focused on the EU’s growing military capabilities and its impact on the CPE concept. This debate has its origins in the TEU, which established not only CFSP but foresaw also the “eventual” (in the Maastricht version) and now “progressive framing of a common defence policy, which might lead to a common defence” (Articles 2 and 17).\textsuperscript{106} The main question has been in this regard if it is possible eventually to reconcile CFSP and a common defence policy with the CPE concept or if the EU turns into a more traditional military power (Lodge, 1993).\textsuperscript{107} From a practical point of view, the question did not become acute immediately, because the EU did not cross the Rubicon in foreign and security policy

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{106} For an overview of defence and security issues in European integration and the complex relations between the EU, WEU and NATO during the 1990s, see Barbé, 1995, 2002; González Bondia, 2000: 129-155.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{107} Previous events such as the establishment of the Franco-German brigade or the reviving of the WEU obviously influenced the debate on CPE (Lodge, 1993: 230-231), but it was in the TEU that the idea of an eventual common defence entered a Treaty, thus opening up for the first time the possibility of an unequivocal EU military dimension.}
before the 1998 Franco-British Saint-Malo Summit.\textsuperscript{108} Since the summit, however, European defence has leapt forward: Five years later, in 2003, the EU was able to carry out its first military mission in 2003, even though it had not met its original ‘headline goals’ for military capacities.\textsuperscript{109} Moreover, as Giegerich and Wallace point out, “[a]t the same time that EU governments were slipping past the headline goals target, they were sustaining 50,000-60,000 troops on operations outside their common boundaries, in more than 20 countries in southeast Europe, Afghanistan and Central Asia, Iraq and the Gulf, and Africa” (Giegerich and Wallace, 2004: 164). In 2004, the EU Member States adopted the new Headline Goal 2010, which focuses on the development of EU rapid response elements based primarily on the battlegroups concept (see Headline Goal 2010, 2004). In sum, the EU has developed and will further develop clear military capacities.

Despite these developments, the debate on CPE has not disappeared, even though some have predicted its imminent demise (Smith, 2000; Treacher, 2004; Wagner, 2006) or have argued that the EU became something in-between a civilian and military power (Diedrichs, Herolf and Klein, 2005; Smith, 2005b). An analysis of the dominant discourses in EU documents reveals that the EU’s “[m]ilitary means are embedded in a civilian power context” (Larsen, 2002: 297). Likewise, analysts have maintained up to the present day that the CPE concept is still valid: “Civilian forms of power have largely been retained, and arguably strengthened in Europe, and remain the hallmark of the European international identity beyond the continent” (Whitman, 2005).

\textsuperscript{108} For an in-depth analysis of the reasons why after 1998 the EU became more active in military issues, see Hoffmann, 2000: 60-65; Treacher, 2004. For a more critical account of why the EU has acquired, especially after 2001, military capacities, see Manners, 2006c: 188-193. Manners emphasises in particular the role of 9/11, 11-M, a Brussels based transnational policy ‘network’ and the European ‘military-industrial simplex.’

\textsuperscript{109} Operation Concordia in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and operation Artemis in the Eastern Congo.
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2006a: 114; see Börzel and Risse, 2007; Stavridis, 2001; Telò, 2006; Whitman, 2006a; Zielonka, 2009). Moreover, the similar, though not identical notions of a normative or ethical power Europe have underlined the continuing potency of the concept.\footnote{Manners considers the normative power Europe concept to be distinct from both civilian and military power Europe (see, in particular, Manners’ diagram in Manners, 2006d). Similarly, ‘ethical power Europe’ is seen as transcending normative and civilian power concepts, as it focuses on what the EU does and not what it is (Aggestam, 2008: 3-4). However, for reasons of simplicity, both concepts are dealt with here as part of a larger group of similar, civilian based concepts.}

Increasingly, however, the CPE concepts are questioned not because of the EU’s military means (which can or cannot be reconciled with the idea of a civilian power), but because of the notion of the EU being a ‘force for good,’ which underlies the different CPE models.\footnote{See in this regard also Diez’s call for more reflexivity in the debate about normative power Europe (Diez, 2005).} Implicitly, most supporters of civilian or normative power notions suggest that the EU acts in accordance with certain generally accepted civilian, normative or ethical principles and not like a traditional military or great power. Yet, being a civilian, normative or ethical power is not necessarily the same as being a ‘force for good’ (Hettne and Söderbaum, 2005; Hyde-Price, 2006; Merlingen, 2007; Smith, 2005b): First, civilian means, e.g. sanctions, can have severe consequences for the affected population. Second, normative principles such as freedom of speech need not be shared by people outside of Europe, as the Muslim protests about the caricatures of Mohamed in a Danish newspaper have shown (Fattah, 2006). Especially in the Middle East, the EU has had a particularly hard time as a normative power (Harpaz, 2007; Pace, 2007). Third, different normative concepts and ethical principles can be contradictory and, thus, not consistently applied (Sjursen, 2006a). Empirical studies of the European human rights policies (Lerch and Schwellnus, 2006; Youngs, 2004), the neighbourhood policy (Barbé and Johansson-
Nogués, 2008) as well as the energy policy (Wood, 2009) have shown that the EU is not always a ‘force for good’ and acts under certain circumstances out of security-driven concerns. Both ‘idealism’ and ‘power’ are part of the EU’s strategic outlook (Haine, 2004).

2. Competing Idea Complexes in European Foreign and Security Policy

The contested CPE concept demonstrates how the European foreign and security policy is contested in itself. The logical consequence is that there must exist different groups with distinct ideas of the policy.\(^\text{112}\) Already early on, scholars have distinguished between various perspectives on key issues in foreign policy, usually associating certain EU Member States with them. Barbé, for instance, offers a classical analysis of three big cleavages in European foreign policy: on European construction (federalisers Vs. intergovernmentalists); on European defence (Atlanticists Vs. Europeanists); and on the somehow oddly named ‘world-views,’ i.e. cleavages between small and big or southern and northern Member States (Barbé, 1997b: 130, 136-138, 144). In other words, she argues that there are different ideas about how the European foreign policy should be run – either federally or intergovernmentally; about the relation with the United States as either an essential partner or a competitor; and about the interests in foreign policy. Similarly, Zielonka argues that also in the specific field of EU non-proliferation policies there exists

\(^{112}\) Malici’s ‘mental model’ approach argues basically the same, though he looks at the beliefs of individual leaders, who are divided into different types. The dissertation does not share his overly focus on cognitive psychological approaches, but his study provides important empirical insights (see Malici, 2008).
different ways of strategic thinking: “…the search for the most suitable strategy also evokes controversies and shows distinct traces of Hobbesian, Grotian, and Kantian thinking, not to mention the usual dissent of post-modernists and romantics.” (Zielonka, 1998: 121). Regarding the increasingly prominent issue of the use of force by the EU, Meyer distinguishes between tendencies towards three different models: On the hand, ‘Helvetian Europe’ restricts the use of force and puts it under close domestic and international control (Meyer, 2006: 29). On the other hand, ‘Global Power Europe’ entails “…accepting the legitimacy of military interventions not only for humanitarian but also for realpolitik reasons, a higher tolerance for risks, lower thresholds for the authorization of force, and a higher acceptance of working with highly activist countries…” (Meyer, 2006: 29). ‘Humanitarian Power Europe,’ finally, occupies the middle ground between them (Meyer, 2006: 30).¹¹³

Such categorizations are similar to the belief system literature, which differentiates between different schools of thought on international relations and foreign policy. In their seminal work on the American foreign policy leadership after the Vietnam War, Holsti and Rosenau distinguish, for example, between three distinct belief systems: ‘Cold War internationalism,’ ‘Post-Cold War internationalism’ and semi-isolationism. Each group shares common views regarding the nature of the international system, world order priorities, the primary threats to the United States and other issues (Holsti and Rosenau, 1984: 108-133). The different groups form naturally Weberian ideal-types, as few individuals, bureaucracies or states fit neatly into one of the categorizations. However, ideal-types offer a useful approach to filter the different idea complexes that exist in a certain area.

¹¹³ Compare also Orbie’s ‘pluralist conceptions of Europe’s world role:’ Orbie, 2008: 4-12.
How could such an ideal-type categorization look like in European foreign and security policy? In one attempt, Foucault, Irondelle and Mérand have developed four ideal-types based on the beliefs on soft vs. hard security, on the one hand, and on inward vs. outward looking roles of the EU in the world, on the other. They distinguish between ‘Peace,’ ‘Defence,’ ‘Humanitarian Power’ and ‘Global Power.’ In contrast to the present study, however, they apply their models to public opinion (Foucault, Irondelle and Mérand, 2009: 5-7). Nevertheless it is a good starting point to develop a typology of ideal-type idea complexes of elites in European foreign and security policy. The ambition is to provide a more precise categorization that captures both worldviews and normative and causal beliefs.

Worldviews are the most basic forms of beliefs. Few differences exist between the EU Member States. All are children of the Enlightenment and support liberal democracy, peace and international law. According to the Lisbon Treaty, “The Union's action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law” (Art 10 A (1)). One might add even more general common worldviews on rationality, positivism, state sovereignty and integration. Given the case study of this dissertation, the general belief in horizontal WMD proliferation as something bad should be included, too. To a certain extent, it

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114 Based on Eurobarometer data they show that 44% support ‘Global Europe,’ 31% ‘Defence’ and slightly over 10% ‘Peace’ and ‘Humanitarian Power.’

115 Debates on the positive aspects of proliferation are largely confined to the academic world. Waltz, one of the most prominent International Relations scholars, argues for instance that nuclear proliferation can be a stabilizing factor in the international system. See Sagan, 1995. For his argument
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are these worldviews that keep the EU together. Yet, these worldviews are hardly different from those of other liberal democracies such as Canada, Switzerland or even the United States. Most Canadians, Swiss or Americans would fully support the worldviews outlined above. Thus, they are not useful to differentiate between different idea complexes in European foreign and security policy.

However, if one analyses carefully the differences that have come up in the literature, e.g. in Vennesson’s ‘worldview’ project (Vennesson, 2007: 4, 7, 10), there emerge two areas where worldviews in Europe may not coincide: the nature of the international system and the role of states or the EU in international politics. Regarding the international system, there exists a basic difference between those who see it at the end of the day as power based and those who consider it to be cooperation based. Power based ideas can be loosely identified with realism in IR theory: Power is the most important variable in international affairs. Cooperation based ideas, on the contrary, focus on classical liberal paradigms, e.g. interdependence and absolute gains. Similar differences can be found in the role of states or the EU in international politics: On the one hand, realist-inspired ideas portray the role of states as absolute. States are seen as the fundamental and most important entity in international politics. On the other hand, liberal ideas see only a relative importance of the state in international affairs. According to these ideas, the power and influence of states is impaired by supranational, international and transnational entities. Especially the European Union is regarded as an important independent actor in its own right. Put in

regarding Iran, see Sagan, Waltz and Betts, 2007. For a journalistic version of his arguments, see Tepperman, 2009.

116 In accordance with the definition provided in the previous chapter, worldviews are seen here as more basic and general than the ‘worldviews’ analyzed in Vennesson’s project on the ‘worldviews’ of European leaders such as Javier Solana (Barros-Garcia, 2007), Robert Cooper (Foley, 2007), Benita Ferrero-Waldner (Portela, 2007a), Peter Mandelson (Triscritti, 2007) and Joseph Borg (Coutto, 2007). In the way he uses the so-called operational code approach, his ‘worldviews’ are more similar to the belief systems of Holsti, Rosenau and others. In particular, he does not establish a direct link between ‘worldviews’ and policy output. Nevertheless, the studies of his project provide rich empirical material.
a matrix, the two sets of worldviews lead to four overlapping groups of ideas (see Table 1). According to its dominant characteristic each group or quadrant is named differently: Quadrant I is ‘national Europe,’ quadrant II is ‘integrationist Europe,’ quadrant III is ‘cosmopolitan Europe’ and quadrant IV is ‘multilateral Europe.’

Table 1  Idea Complexes in European Foreign and Security Policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>States’ Role</th>
<th>International System</th>
<th>Cooperation based</th>
<th>Power based</th>
<th>Normative &amp; Causal Beliefs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Absolute</td>
<td>I National</td>
<td>Interdependent</td>
<td>Interdependent</td>
<td>IV Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>II European</td>
<td>Human</td>
<td>Use of force</td>
<td>Means</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Bilateralism</td>
<td>Mean State Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>III European</td>
<td>Persuasion</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IV Multilateral</td>
<td>Cosmopolitan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own elaboration.

Legend:
Dark grey: Worldviews
Light grey: Normative and causal beliefs
Quadrant I: National Europe
Quadrant II: Integrationist Europe
Quadrant III: Cosmopolitan Europe
Quadrant IV: Multilateral Europe

In order to further clarify between the four ideal-type idea complexes, each quadrant is subdivided into three types of normative and causal beliefs: on security, means and the relations with other actors in the international system. This trichotomy is quite common in foreign policy analysis, as it addresses the essential features of foreign policy: the goals and objectives, the application of instruments to achieve these goals and objectives and the interaction with others. The last issue – relations with other actors – covers also the relation with the most powerful single actor in the
international system, the United States. At this point, however, it is concerned only with the form of state relations, e.g. bi- or multilateralism, and not with the type of relations with the United States. That is, it is not specific about issues such as balancing, bandwagoning, adapting or resisting the United States, though these issues will be revisited in the empirical part.\footnote{The last issue – relations with other actors – covers also indirectly the question of polarity, i.e. whether the international system is uni- or multipolar. But it is not a crucial issue for the different idea complexes, as for some, in particular ‘cosmopolitan Europe,’ polarity is an alien concept.}

By integrating normative and causal beliefs into the different worldviews on the international system and the role of states and other actors there are in total twelve sub-categorization based on the question which type of security, means and relations with other states are believed to be justified, desirable, useful or practicable. The sub-categorizations are not necessarily exclusive. For example, ‘national Europe’ does not exclude the application of multilateralism under certain circumstances. Rather, the sub-categorizations represent the most typical characteristic of an idea complex. Furthermore, they are not directly attributable to a particular actor. Although it will become clear that ‘national Europe’ is strong in France and the UK, ‘integrationist Europe’ in the Council of the European Union, ‘cosmopolitan Europe’ in the Commission and some northern Member States and ‘multilateral Europe’ in Germany and smaller Member States, the aim is not to assign certain idea complexes to certain entities (which might also change their ideas over time). Irrespective of the question if this is possible at all, it is certainly not feasible within the limits of this dissertation. As has been made clear earlier (see chapter 1), the focus is here on the European level. Independent of the carriers of the idea complexes, it is assumed that the four

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\footnotetext{117}{The last issue – relations with other actors – covers also indirectly the question of polarity, i.e. whether the international system is uni- or multipolar. But it is not a crucial issue for the different idea complexes, as for some, in particular ‘cosmopolitan Europe,’ polarity is an alien concept.}
ideal-type idea complexes as outlined above are a constant feature of European foreign and security policy.\textsuperscript{118}

\textbf{National Europe}

France, of course, intends to retain her capacity to act alone if her own interests and bilateral commitments so demand. (Chirac, 2002: 16)

Theoretically, the ‘national Europe’ idea complex is close to realist interpretations of European foreign and security policy (Hyde-Price, 2006: 220-223).\textsuperscript{119} According to this kind of thinking, security rests with the nation state. At heart, it is the most reliable security provider in an anarchic self-help system (Waltz, 1979).

Consequently, those who hold such ideas rely ultimately on the nation state, even though international cooperation is not excluded \textit{per se}. This becomes particularly clear in the quote by Jacques Chirac, then the President of the French Republic, at the beginning of the section. In order to guarantee the security and independence of the nation state ‘national Europe’ thinking allows all kind of useful means, including the unilateral use of force. Nuclear weapons, which remain firmly in the hands of France and the UK, the EU’s only nuclear powers, show how ‘national Europe’ ideas

\textsuperscript{118} It should be also pointed out that the sources that substantiate these categorizations cannot easily put into one of the four ideal-type idea complexes (after all that is why they are called ideal-type). Especially European sources are characterized by a large degree of eclecticism. Javier Solana, the High Representative, beliefs, for example, that “…his foremost role is to build consensus among EU member states” (Barros-Garcia, 2007: 10). Therefore, he tries to a certain extent to reconcile the different foreign policy ideas in Europe and uses ideas from all four ideal-type complexes. The same effect occurs in the case of Benita Ferrero-Waldner, the External Relations Commissioner. Another typical example is this article written by a Commission official: Keane, 2006. Likewise, consensus based documents such as the ESS are compromises between different ideal-type ideas. In his analysis of the different interpretations of the ESS, Whitman distinguishes between at least three big viewpoints – the realist, pragmatist and humanist one (Whitman, 2006b: 11-14). Consequently, all these sources can be used to back up the characterizations of different ideal-type idea complexes.

\textsuperscript{119} Ideas in this idea complex are not necessarily coherent or conclusive from a rigorous theoretical point of view. Interestingly, even realist theory is seen today by some as a “philosophical disposition or tradition of analysis” rather than a coherent IR theory (Donnelly, 2002: 194). See also Legro and Moravcsik, 1999.
function in practice. Most notably, the French White Paper on defence states that: “La dissuasion nucléaire demeure un fondement essentiel de la stratégie de la France. Elle est la garantie ultime de la sécurité et de l’indépendance nationale” (Défense et Sécurité nationale: Le Livre Blanc, 2008: 69). Similarly, the UK’s idea of a “minimum nuclear deterrent” is seen as the last-resort defence of ‘national security’ (see The Future of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent: Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for Defence and the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs by Command of Her Majesty, 2006).

Furthermore, ad hoc bilateral relations are the preferred mode of cooperation with other states in the international system, especially in the form of coalitions (see Ministry of Defence, 2003). If states cooperate or compete, in particular with the United States, depends on multiple factors such as the belief in uni- or multipolarity. Multilateral cooperation with other states in security and defence, especially in the framework of the European Union, can take three forms: First, cooperation can have power maximizing effects for the nation state, in particular relative to competitors (‘relative gains’). In this sense, the EU is a power maximizer of its Member States. Thus, it is merely a vehicle of the interests of its members (Hyde-Price, 2006: 220). Secondly, as Arnold Wolfers argued, great powers pursue both possession and milieu goals; that is “…a nation is aiming at the enhancement or the preservation of one or more of the things to which it attaches value” and at “… shaping conditions beyond their national boundaries” (Wolfers, 1962: 73-74). From a realist point of view, the milieu goals are best pursued through (though not by) the European Union (Hyde-Price, 2006: 222). Thirdly, apart from security concerns states have so-called ‘second-order concerns’ based on values and principles such as human rights or democracy, which can be addressed within the framework of an international organization such as
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the EU. However, “…member states will only allow the EU to act as the repository for shared ethical concerns as long as this does not conflict with their core national interests” (Hyde-Price, 2006: 223).

**Integrationist Europe**

For the postmodern state there is, therefore, a difficulty. It needs to get used to the idea of double standards. Among themselves, the postmodern states operate on the basis of laws and open co-operative security. But when dealing with more old-fashioned kinds of state outside the postmodern limits, Europeans need to revert to the rougher methods of an earlier era – force, pre-emptive attack, deception, whatever is necessary for those who still live in the nineteenth-century world of every state for itself. In the jungle, one must use the laws of the jungle. (Cooper, 2003: 61-62)

The main focus of the ‘integrationist Europe’ idea complex is the European Union itself. It is seen as an increasingly integrating polity, as exemplified by Joschka Fischer’s vision of a ‘European federation’ (Fischer, 2000). Already today it is considered to be an autonomous polity with own interests, values and policies. Javier Solana, the High Representative, has not become tired of proclaiming an “EU philosophy” (Solana, 2005a: 3), “European approaches to international relations” (Solana, 2008: 1) or “common European interests” (Solana, 2008: 2) that are more than simply the sum of national philosophies, approaches and interests. He even believes that “… there is a core set of values, convictions, and experiences that together form a composite European identity” (Solana, 2006: 5).

As the quote by Robert Cooper, the influential British diplomat and director of DG-E of the Council of the European Union, suggests, from the perspective of ‘integrationist Europe’ the EU is confronted outside its postmodern space of peace and prosperity with a dangerous world of old-fashioned modern and pre-modern states that do not play by the rules of postmodernism. Although the ‘integrationist Europe’ idea complex is not necessarily based on the specific ideas of Robert Cooper,
this characteristic of a Europe surrounded by threats and security challenges pervades many strategic documents of the EU: Most notably, the ESS states that “Europe faces new threats which are more diverse, less visible and less predictable” (*European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a Better World*, 2003: 3). In a similar fashion, the strategic armaments document declares that “…the prognosis is for tensions and strong migratory pressures in the regions around Europe, at a time when Europe is becoming increasingly dependent on the rest of the world, especially for energy.” (European Defence Agency, 2007: 308-309). Therefore, the argument goes, Europe has to use coercion, including military force under certain conditions, to defend itself. Not surprisingly, Javier Solana’s vision of the international system has been aptly described as “Defensive Realism” (Barros-García, 2007: 8). Although by definition unilateral use of force is excluded – the EU as a single polity does not possess military means – it is clear that as in the case of ‘national Europe’ the international system is seen in terms of power and coercion. This kind of thinking can even be found in the Commission. Benita Ferrero-Waldner, the External Relations Commissioner, argues that “…soft power alone is insufficient to deal with the threats we face. I have spoken elsewhere about smart power – an amalgam of soft and hard power. That requires beefing up the EU’s military and crisis management functions” (Ferrero-Waldner, 2009b: 4). Even if the use of force is not necessary, the EU’s external relations are seen at least partly in terms of defence and power: “…we defend Europe’s interests, be in bilaterally in trade relations with China, on energy issues with Russia or on the multilateral level” (Ferrero-Waldner, 2007c: 3).

**Cosmopolitan Europe**

The EU has a clear interest in promoting global governance as a means of achieving the core of objectives of sustainable development, security, peace and equity,
objectives no territorial actor can secure alone. Positive transnational cooperation is possible and the EU should show a willingness to experiment in order to improve it. The external aspects must be key in any EU deliberations on governance. (White Paper on Governance Working Group N° 5, 2001: 3)

The ‘cosmopolitan Europe’ idea complex is the direct opposite of ‘national Europe.’ Among the four idea complexes identified here, they form the two most opposed positions. ‘Cosmopolitan European’ ideas reject the centrality of the nation state or even of a state-like EU as in the ideas of ‘integrationist Europe.’ It puts rather the individual at the centre of its attention. Its idea of security can be described, therefore, with the concept of ‘human security, defined by the European Human Security Doctrine as “individual freedom from basic insecurities” (Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, 2006: 330). However, it is a particularly comprehensive idea of human security, because it includes explicitly both freedom from fear and freedom from want.\textsuperscript{120} In the words of Benita Ferrero-Waldner, “…we focus on the holistic concept of human security. By promoting human rights and democracy, fighting poverty, confronting the illicit spread of small arms and light weapons and encouraging economic development we are tackling inequalities and potential environmental, migration and conflict threats” (Ferrero-Waldner, 2006: 3). Not surprisingly, some authors argue that human security may serve as the basis of a ‘post-national strategic culture’ in the EU (Haaland Matlary, 2006). The best way to achieve comprehensive human security is in cooperation with and not in opposition to others. Human security cannot be imposed. Thus, ‘cosmopolitan Europe’ has a clear

\textsuperscript{120} The European Human Security Doctrine is particularly concerned with the conditions of possible military measures in favour of human security and in particular freedom from fear. It outlines several principles for military action, the necessary civil-military capabilities and the legal and institutional framework (Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, 2006). However, two of the authors of the Doctrine point out that it occupies the middle ground between more extreme positions (Glasius and Kaldor, 2006: 17). Therefore, it is not a representation of “cosmopolitan Europe.”
preference for ‘persuasion’ in contrast to coercive measures, above all unilateral use of force.

Overall, international relations are ultimately based on the individual and persuasion as the dominant form of interaction and can, thus, be called ‘cosmopolitan.’ The term ‘cosmopolitan Europe’ is inspired by a recent article by Manners, in which he argues that “[t]he ethics of the EU’s normative power are located in the ability to normalize a more, just cosmopolitan world. (...) [A] more just, cosmopolitan world would be one in which communitarian, social rights of the self accommodate cosmopolitan, individual rights of others; where local politics and global politics commune” (Manners, 2008: 47). He points out that the Lisbon Treaty is about to constitutionalize nine key normative principles of the EU, which are easily identifiable with the ideas of ‘cosmopolitan Europe: sustainable peace, social freedom, consensual democracy, associative human rights, supranational rule of law, inclusive equality, social solidarity, sustainable development and good governance (Manners, 2008: 48-55). ‘Cosmopolitan Europe’ is probably strongest in the Commission, as a recent study of the images of the EU as an international actor held by Commission diplomats shows: “…the most emphasized aspect of the Union action in the world is the special status attributed to its international trade. […]International trade is portrayed as a vehicle of higher values. Indeed, the Union attaches to the pursuit of international trade some substantive values related to its multilateral vocation, support of common rules and, above all, to the fight against poverty” (Carta, 2008: 480-481). However, even in the Commission different political preferences and

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121 On cosmopolitanism in IR, see Thomas, 2005.
122 It should be pointed out, however, that cosmopolitan ideas entered the debate on normative power Europe in a previous article by Sjursen (see Sjursen, 2006a).
images of the EU co-exist. ‘Cosmopolitan Europe’ is not the dominant idea complex in European foreign and security policy.

**Multilateral Europe**

The chief determinants of future security policy development are not military, but social, economic, ecological and cultural conditions, which can be influenced only through multinational cooperation. It is therefore not possible to guarantee security by going it alone, or with armed forces only. What is called for, rather, is an all-embracing approach that can only be developed in networked security structures based on a comprehensive national and global security rationale. (Federal Ministry of Defence, 2006: 22)

As this quote about the German concept of ‘networked security’ (vernetzte Sicherheit) shows, the ‘multilateral Europe’ idea complex combines elements of both ‘national Europe’ and ‘cosmopolitan Europe.’ It is often associated with CFSP as such. It might be even the most typical idea complex in European foreign and security policy. However, as will be argued in the following section, it is not a generally accepted European idea complex. It is rather a typical compromise between the two most opposing idea complexes: ‘national Europe’ and ‘cosmopolitan Europe.’ On the hand, nation states are still seen as the crucial actors in the international system in general and in European foreign and security policy in particular. On the other hand, however, nation states have become increasingly interdependent, particularly in terms of security. In the words of Benita Ferrero-Waldner, “States, individuals and companies are more and more integrated. The challenges we face – economic integration and migration, energy security and climate change, humanitarian crises, failing states and terrorism – are interdependent” (Ferrero-Waldner, 2007c: 2). Consequently, states seek multilateral cooperation with other states to solve common problems. This is a

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123 In this sense, ‘interdependent security’ is quite similar to the concept of ‘comprehensive security’ as described by Barbé and Perni, 2001: 25-27.
point that has been also made clear by Javier Solana: “The point is not that we have abolished national interests in the European Union. Rather, the point is that we agree that the best way to safeguard these interests is by working together. Moreover, working together helps to create and identify common European interests” (Solana, 2008: 1).

Regarding the possible means, ‘multilateral Europe’ allows many possibilities, though it might be best described as pressure, especially in the form of multilateral negotiations and conflict prevention. In this sense it is closer to ‘cosmopolitan Europe.’ But at its fringes it also allows also more coercive measures such as sanctions or the strictly multilateral use of force, above all as peacekeeping. An illustrative example of this kind of coercive measures is given in the 2006 White Paper on German security policy: “The Bundeswehr promotes European and global stability through its contributions towards multinational preventive security and the strengthening of international security organisations. It is a key instrument of a comprehensive, multilateral conflict prevention and crisis management policy” (Federal Ministry of Defence, 2006: 53).

3. Ideational Balancing and the Limits of European Foreign and Security Policy

Even though the EU has established numerous common foreign policy institutions – from the High Representative for the CFSP to the Political and Security Committee – it is certainly not possible to discuss away the essentially intergovernmental institutional architecture of the CFSP. In other words, consensus among EU Member
States is a pre-requisite for common European foreign and security policy output. European diplomats are very aware of this: “…no hay que llevarse a engaño. Hacer que la Unión Europea tenga una política exterior y de seguridad va a seguir siendo un proceso largo y complejo. Son 27 Estados. Con 27 historias, geografías y sensibilidades diferentes. El consenso sigue en la base de cualquier acción” (Solana, 2007b: 4-5). According to the argument presented here, however, it is not necessary to find consensus among all the national interests of the states that form the EU to get common foreign policy outputs. Rather, consensus is only required among the four idea complexes of European foreign policy: ‘national,’ ‘integrationist,’ ‘cosmopolitan’ and ‘multilateral Europe.’ As the worldviews regarding states’ roles and the international system are assumed to be relatively stable, though not particularly precise, the consensus finding takes place mainly at the level of the more malleable normative and causal beliefs regarding (a) security perception, (b) use of means and (c) relations with other actors in the international system.

One possible solution of the conflict between idea complexes is the ‘victory’ of the most convincing ideas in a ‘battle of ideas.’ This is the essence of the previously presented argument of Croft, who basically claimed that the post-Cold War debate on the most suitable security architecture for Europe was reduced from original four ideas to finally two ‘victorious’ ideas (Croft, 2000). However, the ‘victory’ of a certain idea is in European foreign and security policy rather the exception than the rule. In a consensus based polity, it is more typical to find some kind of compromise. One of the best ways to achieve compromise is to be ambiguous, thus allowing distinct persons or entities to interpret differently a certain issue or policy. In fact, ‘constructive ambiguity’ has been a recurring feature of European foreign and
security policy (Haine, 2004; Howorth, 2004). Yet, as most authors acknowledge, ambiguity has its limits.

The third – and arguably the most typical – form of dealing with different idea complexes is balancing. According to Barbé, who has worked on the balancing between Northern EU Member States’ focus on the vicinity in the East and the Southerners’ emphasis on the Union’s relations with the Mediterranean region, balancing is a typical feature of the European Union: “…the life of the EU has been a history of balancing small and large countries, rich and poor countries, supranationalism and intergovernmentalism, and European aims and national priorities. Therefore, balancing Eastern and Mediterranean policies is a progressive step in the process of the European construction…” (Barbé, 1997a: 4). Such balancing between ideas or idea complexes can be called ‘ideational balancing.’ Although in practice it is substantially different from traditional balance-of-power theory, \(^{124}\) in practice they share one key assumption: Balancing occurs in anarchic systems, in which no final arbiter exists. \(^{125}\) As the European foreign and security policy is consensus based, it is obviously anarchic in the sense that no institution can decide on the conflicts between the different idea complexes. Therefore, a ‘balance of ideas’ is necessary to achieve common foreign policy output at the European level.

Rhetorically, balancing is relatively easy as different idea complexes can often be combined in apparently non-contradictory ways. A typical example is the ESS. Its subtitle “A Secure Europe, in a better world” (European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a Better World, 2003) balances ideas of ‘integrationist Europe’ (“A secure Europe”) against ideas of ‘cosmopolitan Europe’ (“in a better world”). However, in

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124 For a classical interpretation, see Waltz, 1979: 116-123. Traditional balance-of-power theory is, however, a highly contested field, even among realists.
125 In a similar fashion, Wendt talks of the ‘distribution of ideas’ instead of neorealists’ distribution of power as the most important factor in international relations (Wendt, 1999: 96).
reality “A secure Europe” requires often different priorities and means than “a better world.” One field where this comes to the fore is the so-called “security and development nexus” (Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy: Providing Security in a Changing World, 2008: 8): Is security a prerequisite for development or does development lead to security? The EU’s traditional answer has been both/and instead of either/or: “The role [the EU] has to play is that of a power resolutely doing battle against all violence, all terror and all fanaticism, but which also does not turn a blind eye to the world’s heartrending injustices” (European Council Laeken, 2002: 114). In other words, the EU usually balances different (and not necessarily compatible) ideas.

In terms of policy output, this means that if action is taken according to the preferences and priorities of one idea complex, it has to be balanced with activities based on other idea complexes. In the field of non-proliferation, for example, WMDs are a major issue for ‘national’ and ‘integrationist Europe,’ as they can affect the stability or even the very survival of the EU and its Member States, whereas small arms and light weapons are seen as only a minor problem. For ‘multilateral’ and, in particular, ‘cosmopolitan Europe,’ however, SALW are the more pressing issue, as each year hundreds of thousands of people are killed by these weapons in developing countries. As both idea complexes coexist they have to be balanced, as in this talk by Javier Solana: “When we talk about non-proliferation we mostly mean WMD. But for many African and Asian leaders the most urgent proliferation problem is that of small arms and light weapons.” (Solana, 2007a). Consequently, the EU established first an Office of the Personal Representative of the High Representative for non-proliferation with responsibilities in the area of WMD and added later the fight against SALW (see next chapter).
However, ideational balancing does not mean that anything goes as long as different idea complexes are alternately balanced. Normative and causal beliefs may be malleable, thus allowing balancing, but they cannot be stretched to extremes. As in the case of the balance of power, which does not allow one state to become the dominant power, ideational balancing does not permit ideas of one idea complex to dominate those of the others. Moreover, balancing is not always an option, especially if the EU has to react to a specific international crisis – the main focus of this study. That is, there are limits to consensus in EU foreign and security policy. This consensus can be found somewhere in-between the two most opposing idea complexes: ‘national’ and ‘cosmopolitan Europe.’ The normative and causal beliefs of these two idea complexes regarding security perception, the use of means and state relations form virtually end poles of a continuum of conceivable ideas.

As the Figure 6 shows, each group of normative and causal belief can be imagined as an axis along which different positions exist: The x-axis shows how security can be perceived in a given international crisis; the y-axis represents the use of different means; and the z-axis represents the relation with other actors in the international system, in particular the United States. Each axis has two ends of opposing extreme positions, formed by the ideal-type normative and causal beliefs of ‘national’ and ‘cosmopolitan Europe.’ Security perception lies between ‘national security’ in the classical sense of narrowly defined interests in the increase of the power status of a nation state and, on the other hand, human security. In practice, most of the time the actual security perception lies somewhere between the two extremes and come often close to those of ‘integrationist Europe’ or ‘multilateral Europe.’ The underlying security concept is particularly important for which kind of goals and measures are implemented in a certain international crisis. The ends of the
y-axis show the two most radical forms of measures that can be taken: unilateral military force by a nation state and multilateral persuasion. Between these two sets of measures different types of actions are thinkable, e.g. coercive measures such as sanctions or conditionality. The z-axis, finally, displays the degree of state relations Member States want to pursue: At one end, there are the bilateralists that prefer direct state-to-state relations, whereas at the other end, ‘cosmopolitan Europe’ advocates individual based relations transcending state relations. Once more, many intermediate forms of international relationships are possible along this axis.

**Figure 6** Key Axes along which European Foreign Policy Decisions Are Taken

Source: Own elaboration.

Legend:
x-axis: security perception
y-axis: use of means
z-axis: state relations
If the three axes are put into a three-dimensional chart, the result is a new model of how normative and causal beliefs are linked and interact at the European level (see Figure 6). As has been mentioned already, most of the EU’s foreign policy activity is a result of consensus decisions based on ideas along the three axes. The ideational space in which European foreign policy takes place can be imagined as a flexible sphere that connects the border points between possible and impossible compromises on the three axes (one in each direction). The point where all three axes meet would be the ideal-type consensus that would allow permanent foreign policy output (see Figure 6). In practice, however, the EU and its Member States have to react to constantly changing foreign policy challenges. Thus, new consensus has to be found permanently within the limits of the sphere. Depending on the issue at stake the consensus can move to a certain extent towards one or another extreme. However, if some Member States push too much towards one of the extremes or towards opposing extremes simultaneously, the result will be dissonance among EU Member States and, thus, the failure to produce significant foreign policy output.

The model is useful to develop this study’s first hypotheses about European foreign and security policy:

**Hypothesis** $H_{1a}$: The more certain Member States push their policy positions towards one of the extreme normative and causal beliefs regarding security perception, use of means or international relations, the unlikelier it is that consensus for common foreign policy output can be found.

**Hypothesis** $H_{1b}$: On the contrary, the more they are willing to move towards the centre, the more compromise is likely.
So-called focal points (see previous chapter) can facilitate consensus regarding controversial and complex issues. In the model above the ‘focal points’ of the previous chapter function as magnets that pull the different normative and causal beliefs towards the centre and, thus, prevent the centrifugal forces of opposing ideas to make potential consensus impossible. The second hypothesis is thus:

**Hypothesis H2**: So-called focal points enhance the EU’s possibility to produce common foreign and security policy output.

Focal points must be sufficiently specific to be meaningful at all, but ambiguous enough to not alienate actors with different ideas. Focal points are usually centred around the most moderate idea complex – ‘multilateral Europe’ – which is located somewhere between ‘national’ and ‘cosmopolitan Europe.’ Its security perception is still state-centred, but puts emphasis on the interdependence of security issues; depending on the situation it permits, on the hand, limited use of force and coercion, especially in the form of peacekeeping and sanctions, and on the other hand, persuasion, e.g. human rights dialogues; finally, its focus on state-centred multilateralism combines elements of both bilateralism and cosmopolitanism. Not surprisingly, as will be shown in chapter 6, a typical example of a focal point is the term ‘Effective Multilateralism.’ However, focal points are not a panacea for common action. As the analysis of the EU’s Iraq policy will show (chapter 4), EU Member States can easily fail to agree on truly common policies. The EU’s foreign policy record is still very mixed. Even with focal points, common foreign and security

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126 Interestingly, it could be even argued that ESDP in itself is a focal point for the larger European integration process due to its potential for nation- and integration-building (see Anderson, 2008).
Ideas and Output Variation

policy output is not possible outside certain limits. As the model above shows, compromises between different European idea complexes, and ultimately European interests and policies, lie within the more moderate spectrum of international politics. Consequently, the third hypothesis is:

**Hypothesis H₃**: If the EU produces common foreign and security policy output, it is likely to be moderate in form.

The most typical EU foreign policy activities are diplomacy, conditionality, sanctions and peacekeeping. Forceful military actions are not conceivable as consensus based European foreign and security policies. Likewise, it is very unlikely that the EU becomes a pure postmodern power that changes the world for the good through persuasion and its own attractiveness. In short, common European foreign and security policy cannot tend towards extreme positions in the foreseeable future. It remains always within certain limits.

There are and will be areas in international affairs, where the EU’s moderate, consensus based policies constitute a forceful way of dealing with certain issues. Enlargement is probably the most typical example, but so may be the EU’s Iran policy. At the same time, however, Iraq-style divisions continue to be a possibility in the EU’s foreign and security policy. There is no guarantee that the EU Member States always find consensus between the four idea complexes in all international crisis. In some instances the EU may be a forceful international actor, whereas in others it is not more than a deeply divided international organization. In short, the EU’s foreign policy is and will remain extremely varied depending on the issues at stake. The fourth hypothesis is therefore:
**Hypothesis H**: Output variation is a permanent feature of European foreign and security policy.

Finally, using key assumptions of the previous chapter, it is also possible to deduct from the first four EU-specific hypotheses about the limits and variation of European foreign and security policy a fifth, more generic hypothesis about the role of ideas and idea complexes in collective action in international crises:

**Hypothesis H_{5a}**: The more diverse ideas are in an institutionalized, but anarchic system of states, the less likely common foreign and security policy output is.

As common action is consensus based, a large number of ideas automatically complicates compromises between rational actors. Given the absence of imminent security threats, on the one hand, and the ubiquity of uncertainty, on the other, differing ideas are a likely characteristic in foreign and security policy. However, there may be fewer differing idea complexes than states. Normative and causal ideas are also malleable and may lead to common or at least overlapping interests and preferences and, thus, to common foreign policy output. Therefore, it should be pointed out that the opposite of hypothesis H_{5a} is also true:

**Hypothesis H_{5b}**: Common ideas or overlapping idea complexes facilitate the development of common interests and, ultimately, collective action of groups of states in international crises.
In this regard, collective worldviews are a crucial basis, whereas collective normative and causal beliefs are important for producing common foreign and security policy output.

In total, five hypothesis have been established. All are a logical result of the theoretical assumptions and models that have been developed successively and are conceptually interlinked. The hypotheses will play a crucial part in the empirical studies on Iran, the neighbourhood region and international non-proliferation institutions. Special attention will be paid to their viability in light of empirical evidence. They will be revisited in the conclusions, where they are either confirmed, adapted or discarded according to the available results of the empirical studies.

Conclusion

The European Union is far from being a single coherent international actor with a clear common identity and strategic culture. Its description in the literature ranges from superpower over empire to normative power. However, it should not be seen as a playing field of 27 opposing national interests either. This would turn common European foreign and security policy into an outright failure. There is, however, a middle way: EU foreign and security policy is the result of consensus between a limited number of competing idea complexes, which makes consensus much more likely, though it leaves also room for substantial dissonance. Based on the analysis of European worldviews and normative and causal beliefs, this chapter has identified in total four idea complexes: ‘national Europe,’ ‘integrationist Europe,’ ‘cosmopolitan Europe’ and ‘multilateral Europe.’ As the worldviews of the idea complexes are assumed to be relatively stable, the most important ideas for collective action in
international crises are normative and causal beliefs about security, foreign policy means and relations with other actors. The key issue is that consensus between the different ideas is only possible within certain limits. Thus, common European foreign and security policy varies starkly between forceful action within and inaction outside these limits.

These assumptions about the EU’s limits and output variation in foreign and security policy have been, finally, used as the basis of the five hypotheses that will tested in the empirical part of the dissertation. Before it is possible to move on to the empirical part, however, one crucial question remains: What does the four idea complexes keep together? After all, there is no compellable reason why Member States of the European Union should try continuously to find consensus between their competing ideas. In other words, four idea complexes may simply lead to no common foreign and security policy output at all. There are numerous state groupings with arguably a limited number of competing idea complexes that do not have anything similar to the EU’s CFSP, e.g. the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. The short answer is that institutions provide the necessary framework.
CHAPTER 3 Ideas and Institutions in the European Non-Proliferation Policy

The increasing institutionalization of a common European foreign and security policy during the last few decades is the precondition for consensual policy output in spite of competing idea complexes in foreign policy. Without institutions in the form of bureaucracies, laws or customs diverging ideas would simply lead to no policy output at all.\(^\text{127}\) As an early institutionalist argued, “Institutions are the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction” (North, 1990: 3). Usually, nation states possess powerful institutional mechanisms to deal with conflicts between diverging foreign policy ideas and the different interests and preferences they produce. For instance, trench wars between the US State and Defense Departments about objectives and adequate measures in foreign and security affairs are quite frequent, but the White House has the competence to resolve the conflicts by deciding ultimately about ends and means. The EU lacks clearly this kind of authority of nation states: “In America, the president can and does impose unified national perspectives if required, and policy disagreements thus take place within a hierarchical framework of authority, no matter how dense the criss-crossing policy networks and informal coalitions. In the EU, there are only networks and coalitions; so there is an abundance of ‘governance,’ but very little real authority” (Maull, 2005: 792).

\(^\text{127}\) Originally, institutions were seen mainly as formal organizations such as the United Nations. Institutionalists, however, have broadened the concept to what are called in this dissertation ‘ideas.’ This shows essentially how ideas can have regulative effects. For a brief discussion of definitions, see Thelen and Steinmo, 1992: 2-3.
Nevertheless, the EU is able to resolve conflicts between ideas and produce foreign policy output. The aim of this chapter is to show how this can be. In the first section, I will argue that the EU has developed powerful institutional mechanisms that keep the whole EU foreign policy construct together and help finding compromises between idea complexes. In the second section, I will examine how the EU has developed institutionally in the specific field of non-proliferation of WMD. Finally, I will outline the institutional set-up of the EU non-proliferation policy, in particular the relevant policy organs and instruments.

1. The Role of Institutions

What keeps 27 nation states with – as we have seen – different foreign policy ideas together so that they are able to produce collective foreign policy output? As has been argued already, it are ultimately institutions that make EU Member States to search consensus despite different ideas about how to conduct foreign policy. However, institutions are not just there. They have their origins and have developed over time. Unfortunately, within the confines of this dissertation it is not possible to examine why these institutions emerged in the first place – though idea entrepreneurs certainly played a key role.\(^\text{128}\) Yet, suffices it to point out that there must be something on which institutions and cooperation within the context of the EU are based. Smith calls it “general propensities for co-operation” (Smith, 2004b: 743). I argue that the best

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\(^{128}\) In general, the development of European institutions is a hotly debated issue among and between different schools of thought. For an overview, see Vanhoonacker, 2005. She distinguishes specifically between intergovernmentalists, historical institutionalists, multi-governance approaches and sociological institutionalists (or social constructivists). On a limited scale, this dissertation will refer to neo-functionalists’ spill-over effects (Schmitter, 1969), idea entrepreneurs (see previous chapters) and historical institutionalists’ path dependency, i.e. the establishment of institutions in the context of Intergovernmental Conferences can have unintended consequences (Pierson, 1996). See also Smith, 2004a: 17-36.
description of the basis of institutions and cooperation in the EU are common worldviews derived from a shared history. Key events in this regard are the Peace of Westphalia, which established the idea of a world divided into sovereign states, the Enlightenment and the development of liberal ideas such as democracy and the First and Second World War, which showed quite plainly the terrible consequences of unbound competition between states. Especially the latter established the idea that state cooperation is something inherently good. Other fundamental ideas include a sense of being European – in contrast to African or Asian – or the rejection of slavery and torture as something normal. Today all these ideas are not questioned in a significant way. On the contrary, it is sometimes difficult to recognize them, as they are so entrenched in people’s mind that they appear to be matters of fact. In other words, they form common European worldviews. And it are these worldviews that underpin cooperation within the EU and its institutionalization.

As institutions and institutionalization have been analysed already in-depth in the literature on the EU (Glarbo, 1999; Smith, 2004a) and the EU non-proliferation policy (Müller and Dassen, 1997; Rosa, 2001), the main focus here is on the link between institutions and ideas, in particular the institutional mechanisms that keep diverging ideas together and promote consensus between them. The main reference, in this regard, is Smith’s already seminal work on institutionalization processes in the framework of the EPC and later the CFSP (Smith, 2004a, 2004b, 2004c). Based on historical and institutionalist premises, Smith’s “…fundamental argument is that there is a two-way relationship between institutional development and changes in state behavior, which profoundly influences international cooperation” (Smith, 2004a: 11).

129 It is often forgotten that they were generally accepted during centuries if not millennia in many societies around the globe.
In a nutshell, Smith is interested in institutionalization and the facilitation of collective action in the intergovernmental structures of the European Union. Thus, his institutional analysis helps to explain why competing foreign policy ideas do not end up in division but in compromises.\footnote{This dissertation goes one step further: It addresses the question when, where and how collective action occurs. The approaches are, therefore, compatible.}

Smith explains in-depth how cooperation-facilitating institutions have developed since the 1970s in the context of the EPC and CFSP and have facilitated increasingly substantial common European foreign policy output (Smith, 2004a: 63-206). He distinguishes in particular between five stages: intergovernmental forum (1970), information-sharing (1973), norms (1981), organizations (1986-1991) and governance (1993-present). Each stage is different in terms of the degree of institutionalization with ‘intergovernmental forum’ being the lowest form of institutionalization. For the analysis of the EU non-proliferation policy, which unfolded mainly in the aftermath of the end of the Cold War, the main period is the one described as ‘governance’ (Smith, 2004a: 176-206). In this stage, authority in the form of a centralized leadership is still absent, yet “[g]overnance can be broadly defined as the authority to make, implement, and enforce rules in a specified policy domain” (Smith, 2004c: 743). In other words, the process of institutionalization has led to at least some degree of authority over collective foreign policy output by the EU. As Smith and others (Bauer and Remacle, 2004) point out, a specific characteristic of this governance is its multi-level nature: “Multi-level governance refers to the sharing of this authority across an institutionalized, hierarchically structured set of actors with varying degrees of unity/coherence, commitment to EU norms, and power resources” (Smith, 2004c: 743). These actors can be different
European or national organisms such as the Council of the European Union, Council working groups, the EU Presidency or national foreign ministries. In this regard, it can be useful to distinguish between unitary actors such national ministries, Council organs or Commission DGs and common decision-making bodies, specifically the Council working groups, the PSC, COREPER II, the General and External Affairs Council and the European Council. In a sense, the former have to find consensus so that the latter can decide on policy output. Together, they form a governance system. However, such a “multi-level system” (Bauer and Remacle, 2004: 124) is extremely complex, which makes it particularly difficult to represent graphically. This chapter proposes to imagine the multi-level EU foreign policy decision-making system as a tripartite web, as in Figure 7.

**Figure 7 EU Decision-Making Institutions as a Tripartite Web of Actors**

Source: Own elaboration.
The web as such represents the common-decision making bodies – from the working groups to the European Council. It consists of different axes that structure and keep the web together. This shows how authority is actually shared in EU foreign policy. Most notably, it highlights the hierarchical structure of European foreign policy-making through its three different parts: The main axes are essential for the cohesion of the web. They usually consists of the national ministries of the ‘big 3’ Member States – France, Germany and the UK – and Council organs, e.g. the EU Presidency or DG-E. These are the most powerful organisms in terms of bureaucratic capacity and diplomatic, political and economic relations and involvements outside the EU. The inner ring consists of what might be called the national ministries of the ‘runner-up 3’ – Italy, Poland and Spain – smaller Council organs such as the Situation Centre (SitCen) and the Commission DGs. The outer ring is occupied by smaller Member States and the European Parliament. Depending on the issue the actual composition of the axes and rings can vary. But the more centric an organism is located the more important it is for the stability of European foreign policy-making and, thus, for common foreign policy output. In the final section, the relevant actors in the field of non-proliferation will be presented.

But why does this web not disintegrate? What is the glue that makes the web’s axes stick together? The first type of glue is the establishment of formal organisms established in the Treaties, e.g. the PSC and the Council. In fact the web itself represents these organisms. For EU Member States it is legally binding to participate in them. Moreover, there are legal obligations that make EU Member States work together. Article 11.2 of the TEU stipulates, for instance, that “[t]he Member States shall support the Union's external and security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity.” Apart from this rather obvious
in institutionalization of cooperation there are at least five other institutions that facilitate collective action at the EU level: political will, the so-called coordination reflex, elite socialization, informal rules, norms and habits and a certain degree of leadership in the form of directoires.

Political will means first of all that actors are willing to seek compromises and to cooperate. In Smith’s ‘governance’ stage of EU foreign policy integration, this political will has become institutionalized as what has become known as the coordination reflex. According to Glarbo, “the co-ordination reflex dictates policy proposals originating in single states or in subgroups of states to be aired with political co-operation partners before an ensuing unilateral/bilateral action is implemented” (Glarbo, 1999: 644). This coordination reflex has led to habitual intra-European consultations on virtual any important foreign policy decision (Glarbo, 1999: 643-645; Smith, 2004b: 107-108). Although this reflex does not guarantee that compromises are easily found, it has a crucial consequence for the role of ideas in EU foreign policy-making: The process from ideas to interest and preference formation does not take place at the national level. Rather, interests are formed by interacting at the European level, most notably in common bodies such as working groups. This means that EU Member States do not participate in EU decision-making bodies with fixed or static interests. They rather arrive at the negotiating table(s) with certain normative and causal ideas of how to deal with a certain international issue. Consequently, EU decision-making is not based on trade-offs between now 27 static national interests – which would automatically lead to the lowest common denominator – but on compromises between the four, malleable idea complexes outlined in the previous chapter (see Mérand, 2006; Smith, 2004b: 101-102). This does not mean that the coordination reflex exists all the time. Intergovernmental
Conferences (IGCs),\textsuperscript{131} for example, might be a good example of negotiations between actors with pre-established interests and preferences, which is why liberal intergovernmentalists (Moravcsik, 1998) focus on these types of events. In the daily practice, however, the coordination reflex has become an increasingly common principle of EU of EU foreign policy-making.\textsuperscript{132}

Apart from the habitual coordination reflex and the legal obligations, there exists a whole bunch of informal customs, written norms, outright rules and formal laws that are important for the facilitation of common EU decision-making. Over time, many informal customs have developed into norms, rules or even laws (Smith, 2004a: 117-144). Typical examples include the confidentiality of the shared information or decision-making by consensus. An important result of this kind of institutionalization is that “…participants in EU foreign policy do not always resort to the lowest common denominator position, as inter-governmental theories often suggest, but tend toward compromise and a media position in the hopes of reaching a decision” (Smith, 2004c: 745). This underlines that institutions facilitate the compromise between idea complexes.

Furthermore, habits, norms, rules and laws increase the cohesion of the actors involved. At the individual level, elites, in particular diplomats and European officials, have been socialized in the sense that “…intersubjectively shared understandings of political co-operation supply codes to be drawn upon by diplomats when conducting common foreign policy” (Glarbo, 1999: 646). As will be shown in the case of the EU non-proliferation policy, these socialization processes are particular strong in small epistemic communities. The overall result of elite

\textsuperscript{131} During IGCs EU Member States negotiate EU related Treaties.
\textsuperscript{132} Smith points out, for instance, that the number of internal COREU (Correspondence Européenne system) communications between EU Member States rose from 4800 on average in 1970s to almost 13,000 in 1994 (Smith, 2004a: 101).
socialization follows three different logics, all of which play a fundamental role for the cohesion of EU foreign policy actors: “…EU foreign policy élites have become far more familiar with each other’s thinking regarding foreign policy (socialization logic), they have learned to value EU foreign policy as a way to enhance their own foreign policy capabilities (functional logic), and they have learned to believe the EU is an acceptable arena in which to take foreign policy decisions (appropriateness logic)” (Smith, 2004c: 746).

Finally, this dissertation argues (in contrast to Smith) that under certain circumstance EU actors have also accepted the necessity of small group leadership. As the directoire literature demonstrates, in many occasions a limited number of Member States have actually taken up a leadership role during international crises, e.g. in Iran (Gegout, 2002; Hill, 2006a). This allows to a limited degree the imposition of the foreign policy positions of the main axes of the EU foreign policy web. In fact, in interviews conducted for this dissertation several representatives conceded that they largely follow common EU policies in the field of non-proliferation. One diplomat even declined to be interviewed arguing that his country does not pursue specific national policies in this area. In general, only the ‘runner-up 3’ prevent a stronger institutionalization of the directoire (see also the next chapter on Iran).

All in all, formal organisms and laws, political will, the coordination reflex, habits, norms and rules, socialization and limited leadership have created such a profound integration of the EU’s different actors that even without a centralized authority they are compelled to seek at least short-term, but authoritative resolutions of their idea conflicts. Thus, the definition of common European interests and

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133 Smith’s argument draws mainly on North, 1990 and March and Olsen, 1989.
134 Confidential e-mail communication, December 2008.
preferences and ultimately common foreign policy output are frequently possible. In the words of Smith, “In general, the EU foreign policy system is oriented towards consensus-building, problem-solving and the creation of common understandings, interests or reference points, which then form the basis for common positions or joint actions” (Smith, 2004b: 107).

2. Historical Development

The specific institutional set-up that has developed in the EU non-proliferation policy is historically part of the institutionalization processes of the EPC and later the CFSP. In many respects, EPC and CFSP institutions are identical with EU non-proliferation institutions, though certain idiosyncrasies exist. Before I will deal with the specific institutional set-up of the EU non-proliferation policy, I will outline how it has evolved over time. This will show how European non-proliferation institutions developed from its humble beginnings in the 1980s into a relatively stable framework that can function despite diverging normative and causal ideas in this field. As almost any historical development, it can be divided into different phases. From today’s point of view, at least three major periods are discernable. They roughly coincide with the three previous decades: The origins of a still very fragile and weak policy in the 1980s; the emergence of an increasingly recognizable common policy after the end of the Cold War; and the development of the current policy in the framework of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of WMD in the aftermath of 9/11.
Proliferation and non-proliferation issues were already present at the very foundation of the European integration project. The 1952 European Defence Community Treaty foresaw a European Defence Commissariat with competencies, inter alia, in the field of nuclear technologies with military implication for the defence of Europe. After the rejection of the Treaty in the French Assembly, nuclear issues were finally included in the emerging structure of common European institutions in the 1957 Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, one of the so-called Rome Treaties. The main objective of the Treaty is the development of common European nuclear energy projects under the auspices of the Commission. In principle this includes dual-use technologies such as uranium enrichment. It also comprises provisions for the EURATOM ownership of nuclear materials in the Community. In terms of (non-)proliferation, two aspects stick out: First, although non-proliferation is not specifically mentioned as such, non-proliferation measures are part of the EURATOM Treaty, in particular in the form of safeguard mechanisms to prevent the diversion of nuclear material for military purposes. These measures are principally internal, i.e. they are aimed at the prevention of nuclear proliferation by individual Member States, above all Germany. Secondly, eventual proliferation at the European level is not excluded. On the contrary, a European nuclear option is kept open.

Both the 1980s and 1990s are surprisingly well researched periods of European non-proliferation policy. Most of the work was done by Müller and his numerous collaborators in two pan-European projects: New Approaches to Nonproliferation: A European Approach and Building Blocks for a European Nonproliferation Policy at the Centre for European Policy Studies in Brussels and at the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt. The first study, conducted by a panel of European experts, was the first comprehensive statement on (Western) European non-proliferation policy (Holst et al., 1985). The study had a sister project in the United States and ultimately the US and European reports were published together (Blocking the Spread of Nuclear Weapons: American and European Perspectives, 1986). Key publications for this dissertation include: Müller, 1994; Müller, 1987, 1989, 1993, 1996. Most of the works have a strong focus on national policies, showing the importance of the EU Member States. See, in particular, Müller, 1991, 1998.

For an overview of non-proliferation relevant provisions in the EURATOM Treaty, see Goens, 1987: 40-44.
Germany and Italy, for example, ratified the NPT under the condition of a European option (Grand, 2000: 8). Moreover, prior to the entry into force of the EURATOM Treaty in 1958, Germany and Italy signed secret bilateral cooperation agreements on nuclear cooperation in the military field with France (Mallard, 2008: 464).

In practice, however, the role of the European Communities in most areas with (non-) proliferation implications was limited. Most notably, uranium enrichment programmes were carried out outside of the EURATOM framework. According to Müller, “At the end of the sixties, (…) of the initial idea of internal proliferation control, only the safeguards system worked reasonably, but not in the military sector in France” (Müller, 1992: 191). Yet, even EURATOM’s involvement in the safeguard business is a long and complicated history (Howlett, 1990). Especially the negotiations of safeguard agreements with the IAEA in the early 1970s was difficult (Howlett, 1990: 149-160), laying bare underlying tensions between regional and global safeguard systems (Howlett, 1990: 214-230).

It was not until the 1980s that the European Community made the first steps towards a common external non-proliferation policy. Most notably, in 1981 a Working Party on Non-Proliferation was established in the framework of the EPC. To large extent, this Working Party was the result of external inducements: First, at the end of the 1970s the US government imposed unilaterally new nuclear policies that affected commercial nuclear interests in Europe. Secondly, several EC Member States adopted with other nuclear supplier states the so-called London Guidelines (also known as Nuclear Supplier Guidelines), which had direct effects on intra-EC nuclear trade. Thirdly, the Commission (with the partial support of the European Court of Justice) fought for more authority in the field of nuclear trade, especially regarding
the adherence to the 1979 International Convention for the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials.\textsuperscript{137}

These three developments put the Member States into a dilemma: On the one hand, it became necessary to coordinate to some extent European non-proliferation policies; on the other hand, they did not want to concede the necessary competence to the supranational Commission. The resolution of this dilemma was the establishment of a Working Party in the intergovernmental EPC in 1981. It was the first time that explicit security issues were institutionalized in the framework of the EPC. Not surprisingly, the Working Party is a highly secretive body. Publicly available information is hardly more extensive than the response of the EC’s Foreign Ministers to the first Parliament question on the Working Party:

\begin{quote}

The Working Party on Non-Proliferation has exchanged view on the general policy of the Ten on Non-Proliferation and analyzed the policy of other countries thereon. It has also discussed developments in those specialized international organizations which deal with specific aspects related to non-proliferation. Like the other Working Parties, the Working Party on Non-Proliferation acts under the authority of the Political Committee which gives it its instructions and to which it is answerable. \\
\textit{(Written Question No 1881/81 by Mr Van Miert, 1982)}\textsuperscript{138}

The establishment of the Working Party allowed for the first common, albeit very limited European policy output in the field of (external) non-proliferation. Most notably, in 1983 the EC issued a joint statement in the UNGA on the annual report of the IAEA Secretary General.\textsuperscript{139} In the course of the 1980s the cooperation in the framework of the Working Party was intensified as a consequence of the nuclear

\textsuperscript{137} EURATOM signed the Convention already on 13 June 1980, but it was only ratified on 6 September 1991. See Commission Treaties Office Database: \url{http://ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/prepareCreateTreatiesWorkspace/treatiesGeneralData.do?step=0&redirect=true&treatyId=499}. EURATOM ratified also the 2005 amendments. All relevant documents are available on the attached DVD.

\textsuperscript{138} See also Written Question No 1494/83 by Mrs Ien van de Heuvel (S-NL), 1984 and Goens, 1987: 44-45.

\textsuperscript{139} The statement is reprinted in Goens, 1987: 38.
accident in Chernobyl, political changes in France and Germany and the 1986 Single European Act, which formalized the EPC working group system and led to the establishment of an additional Working Group on Biological and Chemical Weapons: “By 1986/87, the agenda of the EPC Working Group contained, on a routine basis, mutual exchange of information on the status of threshold countries, a review of events and forthcoming meetings within the IAEA, and, case-wise, the buying activities of threshold countries and the risks implied by ongoing nuclear trade” (Müller, 1992: 198). As a consequence, several common non-proliferation related actions can be found during the 1980s. These developments culminated in 1990 in the so-called Dublin Declaration, the first high-level document on nuclear non-proliferation by the twelve EC Heads of State and Government.

Apart from EURATOM and the EPC Working Party, the only European institutions with interest in non-proliferation issues during the 1980s was the European Parliament. Although its powers were at best limited in the field of non-proliferation, it was surprisingly active from its inception as a directly elected EC institution. Apart from (written) questions of individual MEPs, it adopted several non-proliferation related resolutions in the 1980s. The first one can be found already in 1982. In general, the European Parliament was much more explicit and took clear positions on several controversial issues at the time (see also Goens, 1987: 45-46): It called for a common European non-proliferation policy (European Parliament, 1985a), backed talks on a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (European Parliament, 1985b) and supported talks on a Chemical Weapons Convention (European Parliament, 1989). It even conducted its own investigation in European nuclear exports in the wake of the ‘transnuclear scandal’ (Müller, 1992: 199).
Post-Cold War: The Emergence of a Common Non-Proliferation Policy

The 1990s saw a gradual intensification of European non-proliferation policies. Several factors can explain this development (Portela, 2003: 2-6): First, the end of the Cold War was a window of opportunity for worldwide non-proliferation efforts. Furthermore, the end of the bipolar rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union opened possibilities for new actors in the field of (non-) proliferation. Secondly, the Persian Gulf War (1990-1991) revealed how Iraq could develop a clandestine WMD programme without detection from outside, thus laying bare the flaws of the international non-proliferation system at the time. This led to new efforts to improve international non-proliferation mechanisms. Thirdly, in 1991 France announced its accession to the NPT. As France was the last EC Member State to join the Treaty (1992), an important stumbling block to common European actions in the area of multilateral non-proliferation policy was removed. Fourthly, there had been a proliferation of working groups in the area of non-proliferation. Apart from the Working Groups on Nuclear Non-Proliferation (CONUC) and Non-Proliferation of Chemical and Biological Weapons (CONOC), there existed already early on another Working Group on disarmament issues in the context of the United Nations (CODUN). In 1995, the non-proliferation working groups were consolidated: CONOC and CONUC were merged into a new Working Group called the ‘Non-Proliferation Working Group’ (CONOP), though an internal division between nuclear and chemical and biological weapons remained. CONOP has been ever since the key working party in the field of non-proliferation. CODUN was basically retained, though its meeting frequency was increased so that it could also deal with chemical and biological weapon issues. The changes took effect at the beginning of 1996 (Council of the European Union, 1995a). Apart from CONOP and CODUN three
other proliferation relevant working groups, were established. Most notably, the \textit{(ad hoc)} Working Party on Dual-Use Goods was also active in the area of WMD. Furthermore, the \textit{ad hoc} Working Party on a European Armaments Policy and the Working Group on Conventional Arms Exports dealt with proliferation issues in the field of conventional weapons (\textit{Written Question E-4063/96 by Peter Crampton (PSE) to the Council}, 1997).\footnote{140 The fifth and final factor that influenced the intensification of EU non-proliferation policies in the 1990s was the development of the CFSP and its institutional set-up. As has been outlined already in the introduction of the dissertation, the Treaty of Maastricht (1993) and the reform treaties of Amsterdam (1999) and to a lesser extent Nice (2003) provided an extensive institutional framework for closer cooperation in foreign and security affairs, including non-proliferation of WMD. In sum, by the early 1990s external conditions and institutional structures permitted the EU’s first steps as an actor in the field of non-proliferation. Pundits already asked if there was something that could be called ‘European non-proliferation policy’ (Labbé, 1997).}

In general, all European institutions strengthened their non-proliferation policies. The European Councils began to include non-proliferation issues in its Presidency Statements, establishing thus a basic European consensus on non-proliferation issues, most notably regarding international non-proliferation institutions.\footnote{141 Typical examples are the Copenhagen (1993), Corfu (1994), Cannes (1995) and Madrid (1995) European Councils. The Presidency Statements are available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=343&lang=en and on the attached DVD.} The Council of the European Union started to use the new instruments at its disposal, in particular Joint Actions, Common Positions and Declarations. The European Parliament, for its part, intensified the use its measures, e.g. resolutions and...\footnote{140 It should be pointed out that the two \textit{ad hoc} Working Parties were active both in areas of competence of the CFSP and the EC.
written and oral questions. It did not refrain from addressing even hot topics such as North Korea or Iraq. Towards the end of the millennium the EU had addressed in one way or another virtually all non-proliferation issues minus nuclear disarmament.

A major success story was the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference.\textsuperscript{142} Thanks to the EU’s first Joint Action in the field of non-proliferation (Council of the European Union, 1995b),\textsuperscript{143} the Union was able to leave the dissonance of previous review conferences behind and to emerge as a fairly coherent actor on the scene. This allowed the EU to make a significant contribution to the success of the Review Conference, most notably to indefinite extension of the NPT. Although the Union’s cohesion and coherence was far from perfect, it contributed in a similar fashion to the negotiation of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), a verification protocol of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (CWC) and an (ultimately unsuccessful) compliance protocol for the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (BTWC). Already in the early 1990s, i.e. in the wake of the uncovered Iraqi WMD programme, the EU supported the reform of the Nuclear Supplier Guidelines and the IAEA safeguard system. These multilateral initiatives will be revisited in chapter 6.

Apart from the cases of Iran, Iraq and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, which will also be revisited in the following chapters, the EU became active in the 1990s in the fields of dual-use items, in Russia, in North Korea and in South Asia (Pakistan and India). The dual-use legislation can be interpreted as a result of spill-

\textsuperscript{142} For more in-depth discussions of the role of the EU, see Grand, 2000; Labbé, 1997; Michel and Müller, 1996; Müller and Dassen, 1997; Rosa, 2005.

\textsuperscript{143} The Commission contributed a more technical Communication on Treaty relevant EURATOM activities. See Commission of the European Communities, 1995.
over effects (Rosa, 2001: 57). With a new impulse for the development of the single market in the wake of the Single European Act, the principle of free movement of goods within the European Community required Europe-wide legislation of items that can have perfectly legitimate civilian application, but can also be used for military purposes, i.e. dual-use items. Although Member States, in particular Germany, had a strong impact on the development of dual-use legislation (Crawford, 2007: 143-173), the Commission achieved substantial influence for the Community. The result was a complex and not always efficient inter-pillar legislation that regulated from 1994 onwards the EU’s dual use exports (Council of the European Union, 1994; see also Michel and Müller, 1996: 33-34; Rosa, 2005: 457-461). It has also been a continuous source of controversy between the Commission, the Member States and European exporters, including a 1995 European Court of Justice judgement largely in favour of the Commission. The main source of conflict is a deep-going disagreement about dual-use items: Whereas the Commission interprets dual-use items as a trade issue, the Council sees it mainly as a security issue. Not surprisingly, the ideational balancing has been arduous over time. Up to the present day, it has been amended, modified and overhauled numerous times. The first major overhaul led to a new regulation in 2000 (Council of the European Union, 2000). Afterwards, peer-reviews, external impact assessments and other reviews led finally to a third regulation in 2009, which currently forms the basis of the EU dual-use export control regime (Council of the European Union, 2009a). Although the EU dual-use export control regime is largely considered to be an internal EU affair and is, therefore, not analyzed

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144 Interestingly, the Bulletin of the European Union lists dual-use issues sometimes under the heading ‘Common Commercial Policy’ and sometimes under ‘CFSP.’
145 Dual-use items export control documents consists of literally hundreds of pages of highly technical content. All relevant Regulations, Decisions, Joint Action and Declarations between 1992 and 2009 are available on the attached DVD.
146 For an overview, see http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/sectoral/industry/dualuse/index_en.htm.
In the present dissertation, the issue will revisited in chapter 5 in the context of outreach programmes to improve export controls in third countries.\textsuperscript{147}

In terms of geographical non-proliferation efforts, Russia and to a lesser extent Ukraine have been the EU’s principal targets. Already in 1992, that is before the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty, the European Community established together with the United States and Japan a so-called Science Centre to employ former Soviet WMD scientists in civilian programmes (Council of the European Union, 1992).\textsuperscript{148} Moreover, the Union supported firmly the ratification of the NPT by Ukraine as a non-nuclear-weapon state, i.e. under the condition that it renounces the Soviet nuclear weapons stationed on its territory. Most notably, however, the EU has implemented numerous projects to reduce the danger from former Soviet WMDs, so-called Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) programmes. A European milestone in this regard was the Council Joint Action establishing a EU cooperation programme for non-proliferation and disarmament in Russia (Council of the European Union, 1999).\textsuperscript{149} The CTR programmes will be dealt with more in detail in chapter 5.

As in the case of Russia and Ukraine, North Korea was already on the European non-proliferation radar early on. In the wake of the 1993-1994 nuclear crisis with North Korea,\textsuperscript{150} the EU adopted a Joint Action to support financially the Korean...

\textsuperscript{147} For an overview of recent activities, see Organ, 2008; Raca, 2009.

\textsuperscript{148} It should be pointed out, however, that the Bulletin of the EU lists texts related to the Science Centre under the category 'Research and Technology' or under country-specific categories, but not under the heading 'CFSP.'

\textsuperscript{149} The Joint Action was implemented, updated or renewed by Joint Actions or Council Decisions five times, the last time in 2007. All documents are available on the attached DVD. For in-depth analyses and overviews of European CTR projects in Russia, see Anthony, 2004; Anthony, Fedchenko and Wetter, 2005; Caravelli, 2008; Höhl, Müller and Schaper, 2003.

\textsuperscript{150} In 1993, North Korea announced its unilateral withdrawal from the NPT over disagreements with IAEA inspections. The United States began to negotiate an agreement with North Korea to prevent the development of nuclear warheads by Pyongyang. However, the agreement did not last for long. In 2003, the so-called six-party talks including North and South Korea, the United States, China, Russia and Japan were initiated to convince North Korea to renounce nuclear weapons. Once more, no viable agreement could be found. Today, North Korea is considered to be a non-member of the NPT – though legally this is not completely clear – and it is believed to possess a few small nuclear warheads. For an...
Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), which was part of the (temporary) solution of the crisis (Council of the European Union, 1996a). On 19 September 1997, EURATOM signed an Agreement to join KEDO and its executive board consisting at the time of South Korea, Japan and the United States (Rosa, 2005: 461-464). In general, the EU involvement in North Korea has been substantial in quantitative terms. Qualitatively, however, the Union’s activity has been limited. Apart from being an executive board member of KEDO and supporting the organization financially, it has only implemented the 2006 international sanctions against the North Korean regime and issued a few declarations on certain events such as the nuclear tests by North Korea. Yet, the implementation of the sanctions against North Korea were even delayed due to petty quarrels between Member States: Spain vetoed the list of the national implementation authorities after the UK had included a British office in Gibraltar, which Spain claims to be part of its national territory (Ramírez, 2007). Not surprisingly, the EU North Korea policy has been criticized as being weak and reactive (Grand, 2000: 25-26; Labbé, 1997: 313-316; Wulf, 2006).

The European reactions to the nuclear tests in India and Pakistan in 1998 – another major non-proliferation crisis in the 1990s – is an even clearer example how difficult it has been to arrive in some instances at common policies (Grand, 2000: 28; Portela, 2003: 15-16). The EU’s non-proliferation policies in South Asia are best described as a typical example of what has been called weak and slow ‘declaratory

overview of the North Korea case, see http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/NK/index.html.

151 The aim of KEDO is to provide North Korea with sustainable energy supplies, in particular in the form of light-water reactors. It still exists today, though all activities have been suspended since 2006.
152 The agreement with KEDO has been renewed successively.
153 This includes one Joint Action, four Common Positions, one Regulation, 16 Council Conclusions, Declarations and Statement as well as the 2000 European Union Lines of Action towards North Korea. All documents are available on the attached DVD.
Nevertheless, the 1990s saw an emerging institutionalization of an increasingly common European non-proliferation policy. This formed the groundwork for the developments in the next decade.

**Post-9/11: The Institutionalization of the European Non-Proliferation Policy**

Institutionally, the EU non-proliferation policy has made a quantum leap in the new millennium: First, it codified the pillars of its non-proliferation policy in what ultimately became the EU Strategy against Proliferation of WMD. Secondly, the position of Personal Representative of the High Representative for non-proliferation was created, including an own support office within the Secretariat of the Council of the European Union. Although these two developments did not come out of the blue and were firmly based on the policy that had developed over the previous two decades, they had important repercussions for the EU non-proliferation policy in the 2000s. Most notably, they created a relatively stable framework for policy output. This helped consolidating and, further on, strengthening the European non-proliferation policy. Given the volatile situation in matters of ‘high politics’ in the wake of the terrorist attacks in the United States on 9/11, the invasion of Afghanistan and the European and transatlantic schisms on the war against Iraq in 2003, this achievement should not be underestimated.

It were specifically the events on 9/11 and the divisions over Iraq that triggered the reinforcement of the institutionalization of the EU non-proliferation policy (Ahlström, 2005: 29-34). 9/11 demonstrated that terrorist organizations were capable and willing to commit mass impact attacks. Consequently, the EU became...
concerned about the use of WMD by non-state actors. Already during the Belgian presidency at the end of 2001, Council Conclusions were adopted that addressed the terrorist threat in the context of the EU non-proliferation policies (General Affairs and External Relations Council, 2001: III-IV). Based on these Conclusions, a list of concrete measures was adopted in April 2002 that already resembled the 2003 Non-Proliferation Strategy (General Affairs and External Relations Council, 2002: II-VI). One year later – in the aftermath of the crisis over Iraq – the late Swedish Foreign Minister Anna Lindh took the initiative to publish with her Greek counterpart, who was then holding the EU Presidency, an article proposing a common EU non-proliferation strategy. The aim of their initiative became already clear in the heading of their article: “How we can avoid a new Iraq” (quoted in Ahlström, 2005: 33). Only four days later the Council instructed Javier Solana to develop an EU strategy document (General Affairs and External Relations Council, 2003a: 19). In parallel, Javier Solana and his small team developed a European Security Strategy, which was first presented at the Thessaloniki European Council in June 2003 and was then refined in research conferences and discussions with Member States and the Commission until December 2003.  

In June 2003, the Council endorsed the so-called ‘Basic principles for an EU strategy against proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction’ as a living document and approved an ‘Action plan for the implementation of the basic principles’ (General Affairs and External Relations Council, 2003b: 9), while the European Council in Thessaloniki adopted the corresponding Declaration (Thessaloniki European Council, 2003: 37-39). Two further Council Conclusions followed – including a Progress  

155 In fact, in a phone interview in March 2009, a senior Belgian diplomat stressed the role of Belgium in the development of the EU non-proliferation strategy.  
156 For an in-depth analysis of the evolution of the ESS, see Bailes, 2005.
Report on the Action Plan – until the Council recommended the adoption of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in December 2003 (Brussels European Council, 2003: 22; General Affairs and External Relations Council, 2003c: 12). In the following years the Council has published bi-annual Progress Reports and has updated regularly the EU’s priorities. Five years after the adoption of the Non-Proliferation Strategy, in 2008, the EU adopted the so-called New Lines for Action, the most current EU strategic document in the field of non-proliferation (Council of the European Union, 2008a).

In general, the EU’s strategic documents have put the EU non-proliferation policy within a certain framework. As can be expected from the existence of competing foreign policy ideas in the EU, the documents are a mix of different objectives and means: “…the WMD Strategy and the statements and declarations which precede it suggest that the NBCR [nuclear, biological, chemical and radiological] proliferation threat to the EU is regarded as complex and multi-faceted, with different aspects of the threat requiring different levels and styles of response” (Cornish and Anthony, 2005: 6-7). Nevertheless, they help to focus the EU on certain key areas and establish the current common European consensus in matters of non-proliferation, both in terms of objectives and means to be taken. The Non-Proliferation Strategy – the main document – consists essentially of three parts: The first one defines in how far WMD proliferation is a threat or risk; the second one outlines the three ways to counter these threats and risks (strengthening multilateral non-proliferation institutions, establishing a stable international and regional environment and cooperation with other countries and organizations); the final part

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157 All documents are available on the attached DVD.
158 Although some experts expected a new security strategy at the same time (Valasek, 2007/2008), the Council agreed only on an implementation report.
comprises a long list of potential, though not necessarily specific, actions. As will be shown in chapter 6, the key concept of the Strategy is ‘effective multilateralism.’

As can be expected, the increased institutionalization strengthened and expanded the non-proliferation policy output of the 1990s. Most of this output has been outlined already in the previous section (regarding dual-use item export controls, Russia, North Korea and South Asia) or will be analyzed in the following chapters (regarding Iran and Iraq, the Euro-Mediterranean region and multilateral institutions). Furthermore, the EU has intensified bilateral consultations with what it calls ‘strategic partners,’ in particular the United States, Canada, China and to a lesser extent Japan, India, South Africa and others. Usually this takes the form of discussions of non-proliferation issues during bilateral meetings. In some instance, ‘Joint Statements’ or ‘Joint Declarations’ were adopted with partner countries, e.g. with the United States or China. These documents identify usually common interests and concerns and propose stronger cooperation. At the end of 2008, the Council adopted also a draft Code of Conduct for outer space activities, which serves as a basis for consultations with partner countries and includes a commitment to relevant international treaties – from the 1963 Treaty banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water to the 2002 Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missiles Proliferation – as well as transparency and confidence-building measures (Council of the European Union, 2008c). It is still to be seen what will be the long-term implications of this Code of Conduct. It shows, however, that the EU tries to become

\[159\] The New Lines of Action do not change substantially the first two parts of the Strategy. They merely complement the third part with new potential measures. 

\[160\] The other concepts are – as in the case of the ESS – regional stability and cooperation with key partners. The EU’s strategic non-proliferation documents, in particular the Strategy, have been already analyzed extensively, including comparisons with the corresponding US strategies. See Müller, 2003a, 2007; Santos Vara, 2004; Schröder, 2006; Spear, 2003.

\[161\] Some examples are available on the attached DVD. EU-US cooperation will be discussed more in detail in the following chapters.
a more proactive force in matters of non-proliferation, advancing into previously unexplored areas.

Internally, the EU has expanded its common policies in the field of civil protection against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) agents and their use by terrorist organization. The trigger was clearly the terrorist attack of 9/11. Already in 2001 and early 2002, the Commission surged ahead with a Communication, a Programme and an Expert Group report on the preparedness for attacks with chemical and biological weapons, in particular regarding health security. This was followed by an inventory of European civil protection measures against CBRN agents elaborated by both the Council and the Commission.\textsuperscript{162} At the end of 2002, the Council and the Commission adopted a programme to improve EU cooperation for preventing and limiting the consequences of CBRN terrorist threats. In the wake of the terrorist attacks in Madrid and London in 2004, the Council issued specific recommendations and adopted a revised CBRN programme, the so-called EU Solidarity Programme.\textsuperscript{163} In 2007, the Commission presented a Green Paper specifically on bio-preparedness, which contains recommendations in the field of biological agents. The most recent step in the field of CBRN security in Europe is the 2009 Commission Action Plan, which will be implemented in the years to come. In the framework of the Council, the European Defence Agency organized also a CBRN agents exercise with around 100 national experts. Furthermore, several EU Member States have launched recently a Biological Detection Identification Monitoring Equipment Development and Enhancement Programme to protect European military personnel. The specific EU CBRN programmes are reinforced by two Council

\textsuperscript{162} The inventory was updated in 2008.
\textsuperscript{163} The Programmes were followed by annual implementation reports. In 2004, the EU Institute for Security Studies published also a report with recommendations. See Lindstrom, 2004.
Decisions in the field of civil protection, one establishing a Community mechanism to facilitate reinforced cooperation (2001/792/EC, Euratom) and the other establishing a Civil Protection Financial Instrument (2007/162/EC, Euratom).\footnote{All key documents are available on the attached DVD.}

Finally, it should be mentioned that small arms and light weapons were integrated into the EU non-proliferation policy.\footnote{For an early overview, see United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 2005. See also the websites of the Council (http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=1124&lang=en) and the Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/cfsp/salw/index_en.htm).} In 2005, a specific SALW non-proliferation strategy was adopted and the Office of the Personal Representative for non-proliferation became also responsible for SALW issues, though staff members are mainly dedicated to WMD issues. As has been argued already in the previous chapter, this can be interpreted as a concrete case of ideational balancing between the different European idea complexes. However, it should be pointed out that this balancing act is still not generally accepted. In fact, it has led to institutional in-fighting between the Council and the Commission, which believes that SALW are its field of competency as part of its development policy. The conflict even reached the European Court of Justice, which annulled a CFSP Joint Action against the spread of SALW arguing that it fell under Community development cooperation policy (European Court of Justice, 2008).

All in all, the EU has strengthened substantially the institutional framework of its non-proliferation policy since 9/11 and is today active in most non-proliferation relevant fields. However, few exceptions remain: First, there exists still disagreement on nuclear disarmament. Although French and British nuclear weapons are not a taboo at the EU level, the EU does not have any say in this area. Ideas of a ‘European deterrent,’ especially in the form of the French dissuasion concertée have not had any impact in practice (Tertrais, 1999: 55-73). Consequently, it is difficult for EU
Member States to stay united, if nuclear weapons are involved. According to Meier and Quille “…there is a real danger that the EU will devolve from being a constructive force in the NPT to being simply a microcosm of global divisions on nonproliferation and disarmament between nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states” (Meier and Quille, 2005). Moreover, the recent, mainly US based drive for global nuclear disarmament (‘global zero’) is largely a non-issue in the EU, though Javier Solana has become recently much more outspoken (see, for example, Solana, 2009: 2). Secondly, NATO nuclear policy, and in particular the stationing of US nuclear weapons in certain EU Member States, does not form part of the EU agenda either. Thirdly, missile defence – as exemplified by the plans of the previous US administration to establish parts of its missile defence system in Poland and the Czech Republic – is seen by the participating EU Member States as strictly national issues. Not surprisingly, many commentators are still very critical of the EU non-proliferation policy (Bailes, 2007; Kamp, 2006; Meier, 2005a).

3. Institutional Set-Up

During the last three decades the EU has evolved substantially in the field of non-proliferation. Today it possesses an elaborate institutional set-up that has the capacity to keep European actors together in spite of competing ideas about foreign and security policy. Apart from the more general CFSP habits, norms and rules outlined in the first section, the EU has developed a specific organizational structure (section 1). This facilitates under certain circumstances European consensus-building and the

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166 For a recent overview, see Franceschini, 2008.
167 For the current debate, see Tertrais, 2008.
establishment of common interests and preferences. Moreover, common European non-proliferation instruments have been established (section 2), which allow ultimately to turn common interests and preferences into actual policy output.

**Institutions**\(^{169}\)

In recent years, the EU’s institutional architecture has become so interdependent and complex that a wiring diagram would be more confusing than helpful. Therefore, this dissertation distinguishes merely between national, European and common organisms and outlines their connections. National bodies are located in each Member State, whereas European and common organisms are mainly based in Brussels. The distinction between European and common bodies is that the former consists only of EU officials, whereas the latter is composed of national representatives.

To a large extent, the EU non-proliferation policy is still capital based, i.e. national experts and representatives from the Member State capitals play a pivotal role. In general, EU Member States have powerful institutions in the field of non-proliferation. National differences are, however, substantial. Although in all Member States mainly foreign ministries are responsible for non-proliferation policies at the EU level, institutional capabilities vary substantially. Whereas in smaller Member States non-proliferation policies are largely one-person affairs, bigger Member States can afford special non-proliferation departments with 20 or more full time staff dedicated to questions of non-proliferation.\(^{170}\) Depending on the three big dichotomies

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\(^{169}\) If not otherwise indicated, the information provided in this section is derived from personal and phone interviews with officials of EU institutions and with diplomats from numerous Member States between December 2008 and January 2009.

\(^{170}\) Personal and phone interviews with Member State diplomats, December 2008-June 2009.
in the EU’s nuclear policies – nuclear-weapon state vs. non-nuclear-weapon state,\textsuperscript{171} NATO vs. non-NATO member and supporter vs. opponent of nuclear energy – other ministries or entities may be involved in non-proliferation affairs, e.g. ministries of defence or trade or nuclear energy commissions.\textsuperscript{172} Furthermore, non-proliferation policies in the field of biological and chemical weapons include due the dual-use character of many of the relevant products trade ministries and research communities.

Finally, the Permanent Representations of Member States in Brussels are an important nexus between national institutions and the EU, though only the larger Member States employ non-proliferation specialists at their Representations.

The major European institutions in the field of non-proliferation are located in the Secretariat of the Council and the Commission. In the Council, the key bodies are the Office of the Personal Representative, DG-E and SitCen. The Office of the Personal Representative is located in Brussels in the Justus Lipsius Building. For administrative purposes it is part of DG-E. In practice, however, it is attached to and works directly for the High Representative. It consists of 17 full-time staff members: seven support staff, eight administrators, one coordinator and the Personal Representative. The coordinator is also the Personal Representative’s deputy and runs the office on a day-to-day basis, while the Personal Representative herself travels frequently. Each administrator is responsible for a certain area of the EU non-proliferation policy, e.g. dual-use items or nuclear weapons, though the responsibilities have changed slightly over time. Furthermore, two liaising officers –

\textsuperscript{171} NATO members with nuclear weapons deployed on their territory may even form an additional category.

\textsuperscript{172} It should be also pointed out that the important dichotomies, in particular between nuclear-weapon states (France and the UK) and anti-nuclear-weapon states (Ireland and Sweden) are likely to remain. Both France and the UK have taken controversial steps to modernize their nuclear arsenals and update their nuclear doctrines (Cowell, 2007; Klein, 2006; Pullinger, 2006; Yost, 2006). For overviews of the British and French nuclear arsenals, see Norris and Kristensen, 2005, 2008.
one in New York and one in Geneva – cooperate with the Office. The size of the Office is comparable with the non-proliferation departments in the big Member States. It is, therefore, an important institutional player. Policy-wise it is responsible for the implementation of the EU WMD and SALW Strategies, meaning that the corresponding Joint Actions or the Strategy Progress Reports originate from the Office.

DG-E as such is only in certain circumstances involved in non-proliferation issues. Most notably, during the negotiations with Iran, Robert Cooper, the director of DG-E, participates in the discussions at the level of (national) Political Directors. The other non-proliferation relevant entity in the Council Secretariat is SitCen, which is an intelligence unit that uses information provided by national intelligence agencies to offer analyses to relevant EU bodies. Due to its work, little information is in the public domain. According to the answer to a written question of a Member of the British Parliament, “The EU Joint Situation Centre (SitCen) monitors and assesses events and situations worldwide on a 24-hour basis with a focus on potential crisis regions, terrorism and WMD-proliferation. The SitCen also provides support to the EU High Representative, Special Representatives and other senior officials, as well as for EU crisis management operations” (Clarke, 2005). Officials of the Office of the Personal Representative emphasize, however, that SitCen only provides information and is not involved in policy-making. Finally, the High Representative himself has been an important advocate of non-proliferation and he has been personally involved in important non-proliferation issues, most notably the development of the EU Non-Proliferation Strategy and the negotiations with Iran.

The Commission is involved in the EU non-proliferation policy with a clutter of different entities located in different cities. Bailes criticizes that “[w]ithin the
Commission itself there are risks of schizophrenia because different bits of very relevant expertise and money (e.g. on nuclear safety, bio-safety/public health, export control, border control and enlargement) are situated in different Directorates-General, none of which wants to be subordinated to ‘pure’ arms control policy made in RELEX…” (Bailes, 2007: 3). In total, at least four DGs and the Joint Research Centre are involved in non-proliferation issues: DG RELEX in the field of CTR and outreach programmes, DG Trade in the area of dual-use item export controls, DG Health regarding the preparedness for attacks with CB weapons, DG Energy with its EURATOM unit in the area of nuclear security and safeguards and the Joint Research Centre, in particular its Institute for Transuranium Elements, in the area of safeguard implementation, nuclear forensics and specific cooperation projects with third countries. The first two are located in Brussels, DG Health and EURATOM in Luxembourg and the Institute for Transuranium Elements in Karlsruhe.

For this dissertation, the most important unit is RELEX.DDG1.A.4, as it coordinates all external non-proliferation policies.\(^\text{173}\) It is, however, a relatively small unit in terms of non-proliferation, as only two officials are dedicated full-time to non-proliferation issues.\(^\text{174}\) Other units are substantially larger – EURATOM, for example, employs 170 officials in the area of safeguards. Yet, they are mainly concerned with internal non-proliferation issues. Since 2007, the Commission officials meet roughly once per month with its counterparts in the Council in the framework of the WMD Monitoring Centre. Despite the misleading name, the centre is not an actual institution

\(^{173}\) For recent official overviews of the non-proliferation activities of the other DGs, see Commission of the European Communities, 2008a, 2009a.

\(^{174}\) Interestingly, the two officials are experts from national ministries from the UK and France, showing how large Member States try to put their own staff into European organisms. Originally, German and French national experts formed also part of the Office of the Personal Representative, though the Office Coordinator has stopped this practice.
but a coordination mechanism.\textsuperscript{175} Most interviewees claimed that the Centre has become a useful means to streamline EU non-proliferation policy between different institutions, though in the Commission there were also more critical voices.

Other European institutions that have at least a minimal say or interest in matters of non-proliferation are the European Parliament and the European Court of Justice. As we have seen already, the Court of Justice has some very limited powers related to the control of dual-use items within the EU and the non-proliferation of SALW as long as it does not fall under the CFSP.\textsuperscript{176} The European Parliament has had a keen interest in non-proliferation affairs since 1979. It has adopted numerous resolutions and asked countless oral and written questions. Non-proliferation issues are mainly discussed in the Foreign Affairs Committee and its Sub-Committee on Security and Defence. Usually a core group of roughly half a dozen MEPs is continuously dedicated to non-proliferation issues, though ‘cycles of interest’ have existed over time, especially regarding special cases such as North Korea and Iran. The direct influence of the Parliament on the EU non-proliferation policy is rather limited. It performs basically two roles: First, it scrutinizes EU policies and lobbies on behalf of issues important for MEPs. In this regard, the Parliament has improved its relations with the Personal Representative, who was originally very reluctant to appear before the Parliament. Secondly, through the control of the budget – including the budget of the Personal Representative and of the Commission’s Stability Instrument – it can have at least some influence on decisions made in the EU non-proliferation policy.

\textsuperscript{175} The Office of the Personal Representative has received even requests to ‘visit’ the Centre.
\textsuperscript{176} The CFSP does not form part of the area of competency of the Court of Justice.
The main common bodies involved in non-proliferation are the European Council, the General Affairs and External Relations Council, COREPER II, the PSC and, above all, the Working Groups. Except for the Working Groups, non-proliferation is only one part of their daily workload. Generally, no non-proliferation specialists are represented in these bodies. The PSC – that consists like the COREPER II of ambassadorial level representatives from the Member States – deals with non-proliferation issues in the context of its contribution to the definition of CFSP policies. COREPER II, the Council and the European Council are principally the bodies were major decisions are prepared and/or taken. It was for example the European Council that ultimately adopted the EU Non-Proliferation Strategy. The Council and the PSC are the bodies were most of the confidential information is presented, e.g. developments in the negotiations between the EU and Iran. But in-depth discussions of non-proliferation issues are, if at all, rare. These take mainly place in the Working Groups, in particular in CONOP and CODUN, but also in the Working Group on conventional weapons and the Dual-Use Working Group. In some instances non-proliferation issues form also part of the discussions in regional Working Groups, e.g. in COMEM (Middle East) in the case of Iran.

The Working Groups are composed of experts from the national foreign ministries as well as a Commission representative. Their work is supported by the staff of the Office of the Personal Representative. The little information that exists about the mandate of the working groups is reproduced once more in the answer to a written question of a MEP.\(^\text{177}\)

\(^{177}\) Formally, the COREPER II provides guidance and supervises the working groups.

\(^{178}\) The working groups’ minutes are not public.
Each Working Group meets, as a minimum, three times per Presidency. Additional meetings are scheduled according to need either in Brussels or in the margins of sessions of international disarmament fora. Work in these meetings is prepared or finalized by frequent written communications through the Cortesey system, notably regarding decisions on demarches, Union statements in international fora, or Union declarations. The Troikas of the CFSP Working Groups also hold regular meetings with the associated countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the associated country Cyprus, with the EFTA [European Free Trade Association] countries members of the EEA [European Economic Area] (Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway) and with the USA…

The Working Group on Global Disarmament and Arms Control deals with disarmament issues handled in multilateral fora, such as the UN First Committee, the Conference on Disarmament and the UN Disarmament Commission. Significant elements in its current work programme include the implementation of the joint action on anti-personnel landmines adopted by the Council on 1 October 1996, preparation for the imminent entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention, work towards the establishment of a verification Protocol for the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) following the 4th BTWC Review Conference, the follow-up to the completion last year of negotiations on a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the forthcoming review of the UN Register of Conventional Arms and issues related to the Conference on Disarmament.

The Working Group on Non-Proliferation deals with issues related to the non-proliferation of biological, chemical and nuclear weapons. Such issues include EU coordination in relation to the implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the work of international organizations and export control regimes such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Australia Group and the Nuclear Suppliers' Group (NSG). Other issues on which the Group has recently focused have included EU participation in the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organisation (KEDO). The future work programme will also cover preparation for the NPT Review Conference which is scheduled to take place in the year 2000 and meetings of the Preparatory Committee of that Conference.

(Written Question E-4063/96 by Peter Crampton (PSE) to the Council, 1997)

As already early analyses of the EU non-proliferation policy have shown, the Working Groups are key institutions were national diplomats are ‘socialized’ into a European context and where consensus between different points of view can be found (Müller, 1992: 205-206). Together with the Office of the Personal Representative, DG RELEX in the Commission and maybe a few MEPs they may even form the nucleus of an emerging ‘epistemic community’ for EU non-proliferation policies (see also Müller and Dassen, 1997: 68-69).
**Instruments**

Formally, the TEU provides three instruments in the context of the CFSP: Common Strategies, Joint Actions and Common Positions. Both Joint Actions and Common Positions have been used extensively in the field of non-proliferation, whereas Common Strategies can be considered a hollow instrument, not only in the context of non-proliferation but in the CFSP in general.\(^\text{179}\) In this context, it should be pointed out that the Non-Proliferation Strategy is not a Common Strategy. It is rather “…a political declaration with an informal character” (Álvarez-Verdugo, 2006: 434). Furthermore, the EU has used in its non-proliferation policy instruments from the Treaty of the European Communities, in particular Decisions and Regulations, which are technically different from CFSP instruments. However, this rather legal categorization of EU instruments is not particularly helpful in the analysis of a concrete policy. It is more practical to distinguish between instruments from a functional perspective.

As can be seen in Table 2, functionally EU non-proliferation instruments can be divided into four types – persuasion, pressure, coercion and force – and several concrete instruments belonging to one of these types.\(^\text{180}\) The typology depends on how influence is wielded: Persuasion is based on the pure force of the argument. Others basically ‘learn from’ or become convinced of certain ideas or policy positions. In this sense, pressure is not substantially different form persuasion, though as the name already implies ‘learning’ or ‘becoming convinced’ of something is not

\(^\text{179}\) Although several Common Strategies have been adopted, e.g. regarding Ukraine or the Mediterranean, Member States have refrained from taking advantage of them, i.e. adopting all decisions based on the Strategies with qualified majority voting as foreseen in the TEU. Member States have been clearly unwilling to give up formally its veto power in matters of foreign and security policy (Interview with Council official, Brussels, January 2009).

\(^\text{180}\) The typology is influenced by Wendt’s differentiation between force, price and legitimacy as reasons for states to comply with international norms. See Wendt, 1999: 246-312.
Ideas and Institutions

completely voluntary and entails negative or positive incentives. Coercion, for its part, does not depend on learning or convincing at all. Ideas or policy positions are adopted because the alternative would be too costly, e.g. through the imposition of sanctions. Force, finally, refers to the use of military means to achieve certain objectives. In contrast to all other types of instruments, the use of force does not depend on the (voluntary, pressured or coerced) collaboration of the target entity, though deterrence without actually applying force might be a special case of coercion.

Table 2 The Non-Proliferation Instruments of the European Union and Its Member States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types</th>
<th>Instruments</th>
<th>Persuasion</th>
<th>Pressure</th>
<th>Coercion</th>
<th>Force*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persuasion</td>
<td>Political Dialogue</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Applied:</td>
<td>Demarches</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pressure</td>
<td>Declarations</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Applied:</td>
<td>Export Control</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coercion</td>
<td>Conditionality</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Applied:</td>
<td>Diplomatic Sanctions</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Force*</td>
<td>Interception of Shipments</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Applied:</td>
<td>Compliance Enforcement</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Elimination of WMD</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Missile Defence</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Deterrence</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Source: Own elaboration from EU documents. Instrumental analysis based on Miralles Solé, 2004: 41-64.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Most of the instruments in Table 2 are rather self-explaining and will be revisited in the following chapters. Yet, some require further clarification, especially in the categories of ‘persuasion’ and ‘pressure:’ *Demarches* are usually secret communications between two polities on a certain subject. The difference between

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181 For an alternative categorization, see Sauer, 2004.
outreach projects and project funding is that the implementation of projects is directly done by the EU in the former case, whereas in the latter it is done by intermediary institutions such as the IAEA. The category indirect measures summarizes all instruments that are not directly related to non-proliferation but that can have a long-term impact on non-proliferation policy. In this context, the EU Non-Proliferation Strategy points out specifically that “…the EU will continue to address the root causes of instability including through pursuing and enhancing its efforts in the areas of political conflicts, development assistance, reduction of poverty and promotion of human rights” (Council of the European Union, 2003d: 5). Security assurances can be either negative or positive: The EU is usually able to provide only negative security assurance, i.e. to guarantee not to attack another polity, as in the case of the proposals made to Iran. Positive security assurances, i.e. to guarantee the security of another polity with own military forces, is outside the EU’s capacity. Declarations are included in the ‘Pressure’ category, because they include usually an element of ‘name and shame’ with the aim to put pressure on other entities. Export controls pressure other polities, because they decide to where and to where not certain elements can be exported. Missions to verify the compliance with certain treaty obligations are only a hypothetical EU instrument outside the boundaries of the Union, as they are usually carried out by specialized international organizations such as the IAEA. Inside the EU, however, EURATOM has the competency to inspect nuclear installations.

The instruments in the categories ‘force’ and ‘coercion’ are at first sight more straightforward. However, two instruments have attracted substantial attention from analysts: conditionality, a typical EU instrument, and the use of force. Conditionality, originally related to human rights and democracy issues (Smith, 1998), was introduced in the non-proliferation policy through the so-called non-proliferation
clause that has to be included in all new mixed agreements between the EU and third countries (Council of the European Union, 2003e). So far, it has been included in nearly 100 agreements (Council of the European Union, 2009b: 6). This clause foresees that in case a third country does not fulfil the obligations it entails, the EU can, as a last resort, suspend the whole agreement with the third country.

Conditionality in the non-proliferation clause applies, however, principally to third countries’ “...existing obligations under international disarmament and non-proliferation treaties and agreements [my emphasis]” (Council of the European Union, 2003e: 4). The more ambitious elements of the non-proliferation clause – the ratification of non-proliferation treaties to which a third country is not party and the setting up of sophisticated export and transit regulations – do not represent ‘essential elements.’ In short, clear benchmarks are missing. It is not clear under which circumstances political conditionality would be applied. Only in cases of very serious violations of the non-proliferation clause – for example, if a terrorist group carries out an attack with chemical weapons from a third country – would an agreement be automatically suspended. Legal experts criticize that in any case clear legal procedures for the application of political conditionality are missing (Santos Vara, 2004: 555).

The use of force is the other problematic instrument. In the Non-Proliferation Strategy, EU Member States have agreed that the use of force is a last resort option under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (Council of the European Union, 2003d: 5). In this regard, the EU is still far from being ‘Americanized’ (see Sauer, 2004). However, as in the case of conditionality, the concrete conditions are not clear, in particular

\[^{182}\text{Mixed agreements are concluded in areas of shared responsibility between Member States and the European Community. Community-only agreements cannot include the non-proliferation clause for legal reasons. See Council of the European Union, 2009b: 2-3. }\]

\[^{183}\text{Interview with Council official, Brussels, June 2006. }\]
regarding the role of the United Nations. As Álvarez-Verdugo points out, “the [Non-Proliferation] Strategy merely assigns the Security Council a central role, not the primary competence as stipulated in Article 24 of the UN Charter” (Álvarez-Verdugo, 2006: 424; see also (Portela, 2003: 26-29). Javier Solana himself supported as NATO Secretary-General the Alliance’s intervention in Kosovo in 1999 without a clear UN Security Council (UNSC) mandate (Barros-García, 2007: 7). And according to Foley, “Cooper [the Council’s Director-General for Foreign Affairs] rejects those who he says imply that ‘multilateralism’ means that ‘everything we do must be through the UN’” (Foley, 2007: 9). This indicates that the consensus on the use of force as a non-proliferation measure under Chapter VII is particularly weak. Although in the near future it is unlikely that the EU applies actually means that fall within the purely military realm – after all the Member States do not possess the necessary capabilities (Tertrais, 2003: 54-55) – the Union can still become divided over the use of force by others, as the Iraq case has shown.

In general, the case of the EU’s non-proliferation instruments reveals a balancing act between the four different European idea complexes, in particular between ‘national’ and ‘integrationist Europe’ on the one hand and ‘multilateral’ and ‘cosmopolitan Europe’ on the other: The persuasive instruments, in particular the indirect measures that link non-proliferation with poverty reduction and human rights promotion are a clear concession to the latter. On the contrary, the coercive measures and, in particular, the possibility of using force reflects the views of the former.
Conclusion

This chapter has shown that in the absence of a central authority as in nation states the institutionalization of CFSP and, in particular, of the EU non-proliferation policy is crucial to keep the different European actors with their competing foreign policy ideas together. Institutions in the form of formal entities, legal rules and ideational elements such as norms and habits are in fact a precondition for finding common interests and producing policy output.

Although nuclear issues within Europe were already present at the very foundation of today’s European Union in the form EURATOM, it was mainly the establishment of the first Non-Proliferation Working Group in the EPC in 1981 that led to an increasing institutionalization of *external* European non-proliferation policies. During the last three decades this institutionalization has increased significantly: In the 1980s, the collaboration in the Working Group led already to first common steps in international fora. It was, however, the post-Cold War world of the 1990s that saw a quantitative and qualitative improvement of the EU non-proliferation policy. Since France joined the NPT in 1991/1992, all EC/EU Member States have become members of all relevant international non-proliferation regimes. Consequently, the EU has become a relatively stable supporter of multilateral institutions, most notably during the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. Moreover, the newly born EU with its numerous CFSP institutions made at least tentative contributions to most major international non-proliferation issues possible. In the wake of 9/11 and the divisions over the Iraq war, the EU has taken further steps to consolidate its non-proliferation policy: First, it has codified and, thus, strengthened the basic principles, objectives and means of its emerging non-proliferation policy in the 2003 Non-Proliferation Strategy and other related documents. Secondly, it has
established the Office of the Personal Representative for non-proliferation in the Secretariat of the Council, which has become an important institutional centre for the EU non-proliferation policy.

Today an extensive formal institutional set-up provides cohesion for the different European actors involved in matters of non-proliferation. Apart from the Office of the Personal Representative, key institutions are the decision-making bodies of the Council, in particular the General Affairs and External Relations Council, the relevant Working Groups, several Commission DGs, above all DG RELEX and to a lesser extent the European Parliament. Furthermore, the EU possesses a broad array of non-proliferation instruments ranging from persuasion over pressure and coercion to the potential use of force.

Although the EU possesses today substantial institutional and instrumental capacities, institutions and instruments alone cannot explicate policy output and much less output variation. They can explain why there is something called an EU non-proliferation policy, i.e. why EU Member States stick together in spite of their differences. More precisely, institutions make EU Member States search permanently for consensus between their different foreign policy ideas. But once the external dimension of the non-proliferation policy, i.e. between the EU as a whole and the outside world, has to be explained – as in the following empirical case studies – institutions and instruments are rather weak independent variables. They may account for certain aspects of policy output, e.g. the generally slow reaction time to international crises – due to complex decision-making processes – or stronger military engagements – due the lack of the necessary instruments. Yet, in general policy output is not an adequate object of institutionalization approaches. As has been pointed out already in the introduction, the EU possesses today the institutional and
instrumental capacities to act forcefully in international affairs. The question is why it uses them in some instances whereas in others it does not. In this regard, the key variables appear to be rather the competing idea complexes outlined in the previous chapter. In how far this is empirically tenable will be examined in part II.
PART II: CASE STUDIES
CHAPTER 4 Showing the Limits of European Foreign
and Security Policy: A Comparison between the
European Iran and Iraq Policies

Before 2003, both Iraq and Iran confronted the European Union with two comparable foreign policy challenges: alleged WMD programmes in the Middle East, one of the most volatile regions in the world, and a belligerent attitude by the US administration towards both countries. However, despite the similarities, EU policies have developed very differently in the two cases: During the 2002-2003 Iraq crisis, EU policies were dominated by empty declarations based on the smallest common denominator between the EU Member States, whereas in Iran the Union has become an influential independent actor. How is it possible to explain these radically different policy outcomes in similar circumstances? Why can the EU be in one case a fairly coherent international actor in its own right, whereas in the other it is merely a deeply divided international organization?

Although in recent years both the Iraq and the Iran case have featured prominently in studies of European foreign and security policies, the literature deals generally only with one of the two cases. For example, the EU’s lack of consensus in 2002 and 2003 regarding the US-led invasion of Iraq – one of the most prominent international crises in years – has provoked numerous studies on its causes and consequences (Crowe, 2003; Grigorescu, 2008; Hill, 2004; Menon, 2004; Ortega, 2002; Puetter and Wiener, 2007). Likewise, the EU’s diplomatic activity after the discovery of clandestine nuclear activity in Iran in 2002-2003 has led to an impressive number of publications on the form and the strengths and weaknesses of the European
approach towards Iran (Denza, 2005; Dryburgh, 2008; Everts, 2004a; Harnisch, 2007, 2008; Kile, 2005b; Kupchan, 2006; Leonard, 2005a; Posch, 2006; Sauer, 2007, 2008).\footnote{Yet, even though both the Iraq and Iran crises occurred roughly around the same time, few direct comparisons between the EU Iraq and Iran policies exist.\footnote{A few pundits highlight that Iran has become a prominent “test” for the viability of a common European foreign and security policy after the EU’s failure in Iraq (Everts, 2004a; Kile, 2005a; Kupchan, 2006; Leonard, 2005a; Quille and Keane, 2005), but they do not compare EU Iraq and Iran policies. One expert even warns that “…analogies with the Iraq crisis can be misleading” (Everts, 2004a: 3). However, a comparison between successful and failed attempts of European foreign policy output in relatively similar circumstances allows highlighting the limits within which the EU can find consensus and carry out forceful policies – as in Iran – and the cases in which the Union is likely to fail as an independent actor – as in Iraq.} In accordance with the ‘null hypothesis’ method outlined in chapter 1, this chapter will examine first if it is possible to explain the output variation in the Iran and Iraq cases with a classical material based approach that takes into consideration the competing national interests of Member States and how they can be reconciled at the European level. It argues that such an analysis is not convincing, even though foreign and security policies belong to the realm of intergovernmentalism (section 1). It will demonstrate that from a material point of view the EU was in 2002 and 2003 in two objectively extremely similar situations. Therefore, ideas have likely played a

\footnote{For a comprehensive analysis of the Iranian issue and different aspects of the Iranian nuclear programme, including decision-making procedures, negotiating strategies and international responses, see Chubin, 2006. See also Martín Muñoz, 2008.\footnote{For a game-theoretic approach, see Goldthau, 2008.}}\footnote{The reader should note again that the dissertation distinguishes between ‘outputs’ and ‘outcomes.’ The former refers to the establishment of policies and policy actions, whereas the latter concerns the results of these policies and policy actions. As the Iran case shows, strong output does not necessarily lead to strong outcomes.}
decisive role in the variation of foreign policy output in Iran and Iraq. Section 2 will show, in particular, how a limited number of ideas, namely the four competing idea complexes developed in chapter 2, led to consensus in one case, but to dissonance in another. In this regard it focuses on the three principal normative and causal ideas in foreign policy: (a) the perception of security; (b) the principal means, e.g. persuasion, pressure, coercion or force; and (c) the relation with other actors in the international system, in particular with the United States. Thus, I will analyze empirically how European security perceptions have developed since 2001 in both Iraq and Iran, the means that have been applied successively and the impact of US policies. Finally, I will outline in the conclusions the limits of European foreign and security policy and the roles of ideas in the case of Iran and Iraq.

1. Explaining Output Variation? European Interests in Iran and Iran

The similarities between the Iraq crisis and the Iranian nuclear crisis are striking:¹⁸⁷ First, both occurred roughly around the same time. As Table 3 shows, it was in 2002 that evidence of alleged WMD programmes in both countries surfaced. Although the wider public focused on the evidence from Iraq, Iran was from the pure perspective of the danger of WMD proliferation an equally worrisome country. Even intelligence estimates on the two sides of the Atlantic did not show substantial differences in both cases. According to Tertrais, “As in the case of Iraq in 2002-03, from a technical point

of view, U.S. and European intelligence assessments do not radically differ [in Iran]” (Tertrais, 2006: 26). Secondly, both crises occurred in the same geopolitical region, i.e. the Middle East. In fact, Iraq and Iran share an almost 1,500 km long land border. Between 1980 and 1988 they even fought a costly and largely inconclusive war. It should be also pointed out that both countries were non-democratic regimes in 2002, though Iraq was a more classical leader based dictatorship, whereas Iran is a theocracy with some pluralistic elements. Thirdly, their relations with Western countries were in 2002 problematic at best. From a European perspective, the formal relationship with the two countries was comparable: Both Iran and Iraq were countries outside of the EU’s neighbourhood, its immediate sphere of influence. They did not form part of the emerging European Neighbourhood Policy, the EU’s main instrument to deal with countries in its periphery, or any other regional policy such as the Barcelona Process. Moreover, at the time when both the Iraq and Iran crises broke out (2002-2003) no special agreements existed to regulate the relations with the EU, e.g. a Trade and Cooperation Agreement. Finally, after the terrorist attacks of 9/11 both Iraq and Iran were a special concern of the Bush administration in Washington. In January 2002, President Bush included both in the so-called ‘axis of evil.’ It is, therefore, fair to say that US policies aimed at regime change in the two countries.

However, as the EU policy output was substantially different in the two cases, there must have been important differences. A glance at Table 3 reveals two obvious differences that are often highlighted in classical analyses: First, the US policy was substantially different in the two cases. For reasons that cannot be explored within the limits of this dissertation, the US administration at the time chose to pursue a hard-line policy towards Iraq, but not Iran.
### Table 3  Key Developments in Iraq, Iran and the European Union in 2002 and 2003

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month/Year</th>
<th>Iraq</th>
<th>Iran</th>
<th>European Union</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January 2002</td>
<td>President Bush includes Iraq in ’axis of evil’</td>
<td>President Bush includes Iran in ’axis of evil’</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 2002</td>
<td>Claims about alleged WMD programme resurface in United States</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2002</td>
<td>President Bush travels to Europe and warns of threats from Iraq</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2002</td>
<td></td>
<td>EU Council of Ministers adopts negotiation directives for Trade and Cooperation Agreement</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 2002</td>
<td></td>
<td>Information on alleged nuclear weapons programme leaked</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 2002</td>
<td>United States adopts National Security Strategy, including ’pre-emptive strikes’</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 2002</td>
<td>US Congress authorizes use of force against Iraq</td>
<td></td>
<td>Ireland ratifies Nice Treaty in 2nd referendum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 2002</td>
<td>UNSC Resolution 1441; UN weapon inspectors return after four years: Several of its reports are not conclusive</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 2002</td>
<td>EU launches Trade and Cooperation Agreement negotiations with Iran</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 2003</td>
<td>’Letter of Eight’ in support of firm action against Iraq</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 2003</td>
<td>“Vilnius Letter”; Second Iraq Resolution fails in UNSC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2003</td>
<td>Azores summit between the United States, UK, Spain and Portugal; US-led invasion of Iraq</td>
<td>IAEA confirms undeclared nuclear activity</td>
<td>Anna Lindh initiative for a common EU non-proliferation policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 2003</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>EU non-proliferation initiative launched</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2003</td>
<td>Official end of invasion; begin of insurgency</td>
<td>Alleged Iranian proposal of secret deal with United States</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2003</td>
<td>UN nuclear inspectors return</td>
<td></td>
<td>Thessaloniki European Council: Drafts of EU Non-Proliferation Strategy and ESS presented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 2003</td>
<td></td>
<td>IAEA Board ultimatum to Iran to provide full information by end of October</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 2003</td>
<td>Iraq Survey Group Interim Progress Report: No evidence of actual WMD programmes</td>
<td>E3 in Iran: Tehran Agreement</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 2003</td>
<td></td>
<td>Solana joins E3</td>
<td>EU Non-Proliferation Strategy and ESS published</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own elaboration.

Secondly, this policy led ultimately to the invasion of Iraq by the United States and its allies in March and April 2003. The EU’s nuclear negotiations with Iran, however, began in earnest only in October 2003, that is over five months after the official end of the invasion of Iraq, when the foreign ministers of France, Germany and the UK – the so-called E3 – travelled to Tehran. These two specific differences
are certainly important factors that are a first hint at why EU foreign policy output was so different in Iran and Iraq. The question is, however, why they can account for EU foreign policy variation. The first difference hints at European differences regarding US policies, whereas the second difference suggest some kind of European learning process between the invasion of Iraq and the beginning of the EU negotiations with Iran. Yet, it is not clear if the differences are ultimately based on the material interests of EU Member States or ideational factors. The ‘null hypothesis’ approach suggests to analyse first the former.

The most important national interest is usually ‘national security’ in the sense of survival. Technically, however, there existed no proven differences between the actual danger from Iranian and Iraqi WMD programmes in 2002.\(^{188}\) Especially the capacity of both countries to attack Europe with missiles was low (Smith, 2003b). Therefore, from an objective position, ‘national security’ issues did not make a difference in Iraq and Iran.\(^{189}\) Yet, there might be the possibility that other national interests, especially economic and commercial interests played a crucial role. For example, strong common commercial interests might have led to a common approach to Iran, whereas competing national commercial interests might have provoked different national policies in Iraq. However, this was not the case.

In general, the economic relations have been strongest in both cases regarding crude oil imports. Overall, Iran has been the EU’s 5\(^{th}\) most significant oil importer between 2000-2006. However, only a total average share of 6.2% of all the crude oil

\(^{188}\) What policy-makers believed is, of course, another matter and will be dealt with in the next chapter.\(^{189}\) For detailed assessments of Iraq’s and Iran’s nuclear, chemical, biological and ballistic programmes, including historical overviews and highly technical descriptions, see Chipman, 2002; International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2005. It has to be pointed out that no WMDs were found in Iraq after the invasion. The so-called ‘Duelfer Report’ concluded that with few exceptions most pre-invasion WMD claims were not accurate. See Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD, 2004. For a critical reassessment of the IISS Strategic Dossier on Iraq, see Ekeus, 2004. Compare also the reports of the Congressional Research Service on Iraq shortly before the invasion and its counterpart on Iran in 2004 and 2009 (Copson and Gallis, 2003; Katzman, 2003, 2004, 2009).
imports into the EU came actually from Iran (European Commission, 2009). Moreover, as Table 4 shows, merely ten out of currently 27 Member States have had significant crude oil imports from Iran. Even though the ranking in terms of total volume of crude oil imports slightly changes, it is clear that only a small number of Member States have oil-related interests in Iran. In global perspective, even fewer Member States play a key role in terms of crude oil imports between 2001 and 2007: In a 2005 ranking of the top Iranian crude oil export destinations five EU Member States are listed among the top 10, but the four top ranking countries – Japan, China, India and South Korea – import substantially more crude oil than any of the European countries (Energy Information Administration, 2009). It should be pointed out in particular that the principal European negotiators with Iran – France, Germany and the UK – have imported, if at all, a negligible small amount of crude oil from Iran.

### Table 4 Crude Oil Imports from Iran as Percentage of Total Crude Oil Imports of EU Member States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EU Member State</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>26.80%</td>
<td>13.07%</td>
<td>20.11%</td>
<td>30.49%</td>
<td>26.45%</td>
<td>26.51%</td>
<td>29.00%</td>
<td>24.63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>8.16%</td>
<td>6.84%</td>
<td>11.94%</td>
<td>12.10%</td>
<td>12.69%</td>
<td>14.03%</td>
<td>11.00%</td>
<td>10.97%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>11.47%</td>
<td>10.34%</td>
<td>10.80%</td>
<td>10.24%</td>
<td>10.02%</td>
<td>10.31%</td>
<td>10.00%</td>
<td>10.45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>15.37%</td>
<td>10.57%</td>
<td>15.37%</td>
<td>8.16%</td>
<td>2.80%</td>
<td>1.46%</td>
<td>2.00%</td>
<td>7.96%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>7.09%</td>
<td>5.67%</td>
<td>7.35%</td>
<td>5.83%</td>
<td>8.18%</td>
<td>8.48%</td>
<td>8.00%</td>
<td>7.23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>4.20%</td>
<td>4.80%</td>
<td>6.81%</td>
<td>7.49%</td>
<td>8.15%</td>
<td>8.40%</td>
<td>8.00%</td>
<td>6.81%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>3.56%</td>
<td>6.55%</td>
<td>1.94%</td>
<td>3.63%</td>
<td>2.61%</td>
<td>5.75%</td>
<td>6.00%</td>
<td>4.29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherland s</td>
<td>1.90%</td>
<td>2.73%</td>
<td>4.03%</td>
<td>4.17%</td>
<td>3.65%</td>
<td>3.96%</td>
<td>1.00%</td>
<td>3.06%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.18%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>2.86%</td>
<td>6.48%</td>
<td>4.05%</td>
<td>7.00%</td>
<td>2.94%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>0.24%</td>
<td>0.06%</td>
<td>0.02%</td>
<td>0.37%</td>
<td>0.42%</td>
<td>0.15%</td>
<td>0.21%</td>
<td>0.21%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own calculations based on statistical information provided by EUROSTAT.

Note: Most Member States not mentioned in the table have no oil imports from Iran (most notably the UK). In the case of a few small Member States no data is available, but it is not expected that this has significant consequences for the overall results.
Interestingly, the list of Member States with substantial oil imports from Iraq between 2001 and 2007 is almost the same as in the case of Iran (see Table 5). Although the ranking itself is different and the total volume of crude oil imports from Iraq has been even lower than in the case of Iran, Table 5 shows that the significance of crude oil imports from Iraq have been consistently low in all Member States. From a global point of view, the main importers are located in North America, in particular in the United States (OPEC, 2004, 2008).

Table 5  Crude Oil Imports from Iraq as Percentage of Total Crude Oil Imports of EU Member States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EU MEMBER STATE</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>4.31%</td>
<td>3.03%</td>
<td>3.76%</td>
<td>3.98%</td>
<td>6.14%</td>
<td>7.27%</td>
<td>9.00%</td>
<td><strong>5.36%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>10.77%</td>
<td>12.18%</td>
<td>2.08%</td>
<td>2.57%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>1.76%</td>
<td>7.00%</td>
<td><strong>5.19%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>4.44%</td>
<td>4.08%</td>
<td>2.63%</td>
<td>8.66%</td>
<td>4.83%</td>
<td>5.38%</td>
<td>6.00%</td>
<td><strong>5.15%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>2.07%</td>
<td>3.05%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>3.16%</td>
<td>7.16%</td>
<td>6.06%</td>
<td>4.00%</td>
<td><strong>3.64%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>7.76%</td>
<td>6.13%</td>
<td>2.28%</td>
<td>1.89%</td>
<td>1.24%</td>
<td>3.16%</td>
<td>3.00%</td>
<td><strong>3.63%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>6.21%</td>
<td>5.53%</td>
<td>0.94%</td>
<td>1.79%</td>
<td>1.71%</td>
<td>4.25%</td>
<td>4.00%</td>
<td><strong>3.49%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>6.49%</td>
<td>4.50%</td>
<td>1.20%</td>
<td>1.18%</td>
<td>0.56%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>1.00%</td>
<td><strong>2.13%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>2.92%</td>
<td>1.88%</td>
<td>2.38%</td>
<td>0.42%</td>
<td>0.67%</td>
<td>0.38%</td>
<td>1.00%</td>
<td><strong>1.38%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>0.02%</td>
<td>0.04%</td>
<td>0.03%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.05%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td><strong>0.02%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own calculations based on statistical information provided by EUROSTAT.

Note: Most Member States not mentioned in the table have no oil imports from Iran (most notably the UK). In the case of a few small Member States no data is available, but it is not expected that this has significant consequences for the overall results.

It should be also noted that no meaningful anomalies have been found in the development of crude oil imports from Iraq and Iran between 2001 and 2007. Most notably, there are no decisive differences in crude oil imports before and after the Iraq invasion between supporters and opponents of the invasion. Although French crude

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190 In 2002, i.e. at the beginning of the Iran and Iraq crises, Iraq was the EU’s 9th and Iran its 5th most important crude oil provider with 3.18% and 5.24% share respectively of all oil imports into the EU. See Commission of the European Communities, 2003a.
oil imports from Iraq are almost four percent points lower in 2004 than in 2002 and Spanish imports are over four percent points higher, it would be an exaggeration to attribute European support or opposition to the Iraq war to oil interests. The fluctuations that have just been mentioned can be easily made up with imports from other countries. This does not exclude that oil companies from countries that supported the invasion were in a privileged position to gain lucrative oil contracts in Iraq. But the point is that these contracts were not sufficiently big enough to determine government policies regarding the invasion. As Howorth rightly points out, commercial interests of the opponents of the Iraq invasion – in particular of France – should have led to support of the war, though it did not (Howorth, 2006: 56).

The overall picture in terms of exports to Iran and Iraq is very similar to the case of oil imports. The list of the European main exporting countries includes – with the exception of the UK and Finland – the same countries. Yet, the exports to these countries have been generally even smaller than the crude oil imports. Moreover, the exports represent only a small share of EU Member States’ overall exports. Even for the top European export nation in the period between 2001 and 2007 – Germany – Iran and Iraq are not crucial partner countries. In the most recent ranking, Iran and Iraq were respectively Germany’s 42nd and 87th most important export partner (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2009).

Finally, specific domestic national interests, e.g. in the form of influential Iraqi or Iranian diasporas, could have made a difference in specific EU Member States regarding their Iran or Iraq policies. However, no specific analysis has been found that reveals strong domestic interests in Member States’ Iraq and Iran policies in 2002 and 2003. Some hint at the German general elections in 2003, when the then German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder used successfully his opposition to the Iraq invasion in
his electoral campaign. However, his opposition to American ‘adventurism’ is older than the electoral campaigns and reflects his personal beliefs (Malici, 2008: 137; Timmins, 2006: 62-65). Moreover, opposition to the invasion of Iraq pervaded all of German society and all major parties. In fact, there was no debate about the substance of the decision not to support the American invasion of Iraq (Müller, 2006: 266).

In sum, objective national interests of EU Member States in Iran and Iraq in 2002 and 2003 were low and, above all, did not vary substantially between the two cases. This was not only the case in the realm of security but also in the economic and domestic fields. Thus, it is very difficult to explain EU output variation in Iran and Iraq with different national interests. In other words, the ‘null hypothesis,’ i.e. that factors different from ideas can account for the EU’s output variation, has been voided. Moreover, Iran and Iraq itself are comparable countries in terms of form of government, geopolitical location and relations with Europe and North America. Therefore, it is fair to conclude that EU Member States were objectively in the same position regarding Iran and Iraq in 2002 and 2003. Consequently, ideas must have played a crucial role in the EU’s Iran and Iraq policies.

2. Ideas and Consensus

In an ideational analysis of the European Iraq and Iran policies, the four European idea complexes – ‘national,’ ‘integrationist,’ ‘cosmopolitan’ and ‘multilateral Europe’ – are the self-evident starting point. The aim is to analyse how these two idea complexes competed regarding Iraq and Iran and with which results. The focus is on the normative and causal beliefs of the idea complexes, i.e. security perceptions, use
of means and relations with other actors, above all with the United States, the dominant actor.

**Security Perception**

The key issue in both the Iraq and Iran crisis is the development of clandestine WMD programmes. Since there exists a strong consensus among most states that the horizontal proliferation of WMD is actually highly undesirable, all EU Member States agree that it has been necessary to prevent Iraq and Iran from developing own WMD capabilities. In both cases, suspicions about hidden WMD programmes can be traced back to the 1980s, though Iraq was originally the larger concern, as Allied Forces discovered clandestine Iraqi WMD programmes in the wake of the 1990-1991 Gulf War. But concerns about Iran developing WMD are hardly new either (Bowen and Kidd, 2004). Already in the early 1990s MEPs discussed with Council and Commission representatives the danger of the alleged acquisition of WMD by Iran (*Debates of the European Parliament*, 1993). In 2001, well before the discovery of concrete evidence of a hidden Iranian nuclear programme, the Commission even talked in an astonishingly blunt way about “Iran’s intention to develop weapons of mass destruction…” (Commission of the European Communities, 2001: 8).

However, since 1991 the international community has never been able to find a ‘smoking gun’ as the ultimate proof of existing clandestine weapon programmes in both Iran and Iraq. As a consequence, in both cases the international (and European) actions to prevent the alleged WMD programmes have been for some observers in a

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191 However, in 1997, when the EU broke off the critical dialogue with Iran, it issued a statement that urged Iran to abide by its commitments under international non-proliferation agreements and to ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention. Yet, until very recently, the EU has refrained from issuing declarations or statements regarding the Iranian nuclear programme. All Iran statements and declarations are available on the attached DVD.
grey legal area. The key issue during the 2002-2003 Iraq crisis was the kind of actions the international community could take against Saddam Hussein’s delaying tactics regarding international weapon inspections. The Iran case has been even trickier: In principle, its nuclear activity so far is legal under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. In fact, several EU Member States, most notably France, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK are engaged in the same type of nuclear activity on their national territories. The problem is rather that it has not declared all activities to the IAEA and has not been able to show the peaceful purpose of its nuclear programme, thus raising suspicion among Western governments (Fitzpatrick, 2006; IAEA Board of Governors, 2003). It comes, therefore, as no surprise that the EU sees the need to justify regularly its case: “The EU does not question the right of Iran to the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in conformity with its obligations under the NPT, a right which we have consistently reaffirmed. The dispute is about Iran’s failure to build the necessary confidence as to the exclusively peaceful nature of its programme.” (General Affairs and External Relations Council, 2006a: 13). A senior E3 diplomat even complained that the EU has not been able to transmit sufficiently the potential danger of the Iranian programme. So given all these substantial similarities, where is it possible to find the differences that may explain the distinct EU foreign policy output in Iran and Iraq?

One key issue is how Member States and their governments perceived security in the two cases. Before the 2003 invasion, Iraq became clearly a major threat in the eyes of several EU Member States. The now infamous ‘September Dossier,’ one of the key documents that justified Britain’s participation in the invasion of Iraq, saw for

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192 In particular, uranium enrichment and uranium conversion. For more detailed information on these processes and the involvement of EU Member States, see Country Nuclear Fuel Cycle Profiles, 2005.
193 Interview, Brussels, January 2009.
example a “current and serious threat to the UK national interest” (*Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Assessment of the British Government*, 2002: 3). Tony Blair, then Britain’s Prime Minister, reaffirmed that he is “…in no doubt that the threat is serious and current, that [Saddam] has made progress on WMD, and that he has to be stopped” (*Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Assessment of the British Government*, 2002: 3). In the so-called, ‘Letter of Eight,’ an article in the London Times and other newspapers, Blair and his European supporters reiterated basically this assessment: “The Iraqi regime and its weapons of mass destruction represent a clear threat to world security. …[W]e sent a clear, firm and unequivocal message that we would rid the world of the danger posed by Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction” (Aznar et al., 2003). The ‘Vilnius Group’ issued shortly afterwards an even blunter statement, in which the foreign ministers of several Central and East European countries declared that they “…are prepared to contribute to an international coalition to enforce its provisions and the disarmament of Iraq” (*Statement of the Vilnius Group Countries*, 2003).

To a certain extent, the increasing threat perception is also reflected in EU documents, thus showing in how far EU Member States very actually willing to compromise: While already several previous EU declarations and statements had condemned in harsh words the behaviour of the Iraqi regime regarding the international inspections of its alleged WMD programmes, the last EU demarche before the US-led invasion of Iraq was the most hawkish statement so far: “Time is
A Comparison between the European Iran and Iraq Policies

running out. UNSCR [United Nations Security Council Resolution] 1441 gave Iraq a final opportunity to disarm peacefully. If it does not take this chance it will carry the responsibility for all the consequences” (Presidency of the European Union, 2003). But this was the maximum consensus all Member States could agree on. At heart, some Member States, particularly Germany, did not share Britain’s and other’s perception of an immediate and urgent threat to ‘national security’ (Coicaud, 2006; Malici, 2008: 112-136; Martinez, 2006). They rather believed that in spite of Saddam Hussein’s delaying tactics there was still sufficient time for further multilateral inspections to determine if Iraq was pursuing a clandestine WMD programme or not. In short, Member States pushed towards different extremes on the security perception continuum.

The bitter disagreement was confined, however, to the realm of security, especially concerning the threat posed by Iraq, and did not last for long. Once the invasion altered completely the security environment, the EU was able to find consensus again. In fact, already on the very day of the start of the invasion of Iraq, the European Council in Brussels adopted in its Presidency Conclusions the core elements of the EU’s post-invasion Iraq policy (Brussels European Council, 2003). It even called for “…a comprehensive, coherent and effective multilateral policy of the international community to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction” (Brussels European Council, 2003: 33).

In the case of Iran, the security perception has been radically different. In general, no Member State has perceived the Iranian nuclear programme as an

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198 The Conclusions were published five days after the official end of the invasion, on 5 May 2003. The only other official EU Iraq-related document published during the invasion is: Commission of the European Communities, 2003a.

199 The following analysis is based on the analysis of recurring themes in Council Conclusions, Presidency Conclusions, statements and/or speeches by Javier Solana and national representatives. Due
immediate threat to national security. They rather shared the general intelligence assessment that it was a serious concern. In a paper of the European Union Institute for Security Studies, Christoph Bertram, an influential German security expert, remarked pointedly that “[o]nly one thing is clear: The present state of development does not pose any clear or immediate danger. Should Iran end up actually or putatively possessing a nuclear bomb, that would be highly undesirable but it would not plunge us into a nuclear war, nor would it be a strategic calamity for Europe and America, for the region or for the world” (Bertram, 2008: 11). In contrast to Iraq, up to the present day, no contrary standpoint has been voiced by European government officials or diplomats, neither in public nor in private interviews for this dissertation. Consequently, security perceptions have never been pushed to the extreme as in Iraq. On the contrary, the first time the Iranian nuclear programme was mentioned in EU Council Conclusions the Union merely stated that “[t]he nature of some aspects of Iran’s programme raises serious concerns…” (General Affairs and External Relations Council, 2003b: 24).

Security has been basically seen in terms of regional stability, with a special focus on the danger of a domino effect of nuclear proliferation (Russell, 2008), and in terms of the stability of the global non-proliferation order. In the words of Javier

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200 Personal or phone interviews with EU and Member States officials in Brussels, Copenhagen, Dublin, Madrid and Washington, DC, December 2008-June 2009.
Solana, the High Representative, “Even if Iranian intentions are peaceful, it would be
dangerous for others even to suspect Iran of having a nuclear weapons programme.
That alone could trigger a nuclear arms race. More nuclear weapons in this volatile
region is the last thing we want. At this point the whole of the NPT regime would be
more or less in tatters” (Solana, 2005b: 5).\(^{201}\) Until 2007-2008 the EU even avoided to
use in their official documents on Iran the terms ‘threat’ or ‘WMD.’ The Iran problem
was rather presented as a matter of confidence regarding almost purely technical
issues such as uranium conversion or enrichment that came up after 2002 (Fitzpatrick,
2006; IAEA Board of Governors, 2003).\(^{202}\) Only since 2007, when a controversial
internal EU document concluded that Iran would be able to develop an atomic bomb
(Dombey and Schmid, 2007), has the EU’s interpretation of the Iranian nuclear
programme become more outspoken. For example, the 2008 review report of the
European Security Strategy argued that the “Development of a nuclear military
capability would be a threat to EU security that cannot be accepted” (Report on the
World, 2008: 7). However, such narrow threat based statements are usually balanced
by much more moderate views that do not focus on national or EU security, as in the
case of the review report: “The Iranian nuclear programme has significantly
advanced, representing a danger for stability in the region and for the whole non-
proliferation system” (Report on the Implementation of the European Security

\(^{201}\) In total, 30 Iran-related speeches and statement by Javier Solana have been analyzed. They are
attached DVD.

\(^{202}\) A senior E3 diplomat even complained that the EU has not been able to transmit sufficiently the
potential danger of the Iranian programme (Interview, Brussels, January 2009).
In contrast to Iraq, the EU has also favoured a much more comprehensive approach in its relations with Iran, taking into consideration “…terrorism, Iran's approach to the Middle East peace process, regional issues as well as respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms” (General Affairs and External Relations Council, 2006b: 10). Even though the nuclear issue has become the EU’s top priority, other issues, especially human rights, have remained on the agenda, though mainly in the backseat (Youngs, 2006: 67-92). In interviews very few European diplomats were willing to admit that the nuclear issue was a top priority. Most preferred to argue that the nuclear problems, human rights, terrorism and regional stability are four equally important, interconnected issues.

Figure 8 Number of Council Conclusions, European Council Presidency Conclusions and Presidency Declarations per Year


203 Personal or phone interviews with EU and Member States officials in Brussels, Copenhagen, Dublin, Madrid and Washington, DC, December 2008-June 2009.
The analysis of Council Conclusions, Presidency Conclusions and Presidency Declarations between 2001 and 2008 shows that even though human rights and other issues were clearly subordinated during the main period of nuclear negotiations with Iran between 2002 and 2007, once the negotiations entered into a cul-de-sac in 2007, these issues became again a top priority of EU statements, especially in the form of Presidency Declarations (see Figure 8).

The EU’s comprehensive approach is also reflected in the agreements the EU has signed with Iran in Tehran (2003) and Paris (2004) and, particularly, in the proposals for long-term agreements the EU presented to Iran in 2005 and together with China, Russia and the United States in 2006 and 2008. These agreements include such diverse issues as unilateral security assurances by France and the UK, nuclear fuel assurances, support for Iran’s civilian nuclear energy sector, cooperation in areas of mutual concern such as drug trafficking, commercial, technological and scientific cooperation or support for Iran’s accession to the World Trade Organization.\(^\text{204}\)

Finally, the EU’s more balanced security perception regarding Iran is reflected in the emphasis on international cooperation and on a common European approach. The EU has made a huge effort to work in accordance with relevant international institutions, most notably the UN Security Council and the IAEA, the UN’s nuclear watchdog (see Douste-Blazy et al., 2005). Already at the very beginning of the Iranian nuclear crisis, when an Iranian opposition group published evidence of a clandestine

\(^{204}\) See Elements of a proposal to Iran as approved on 1 June 2006 at the meeting in Vienna of China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, the Unites States of America and the European Union, 2006; Proposal to Iran by China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, the United States of America and the European Union Presented to the Iranian authorities on 14 June 2008 Teheran, 2008; International Atomic Energy Agency, 2003, 2004, 2005.
nuclear programme in August 2002 (Sauer, 2007), the EU had waited almost a year for the first investigation report by the IAEA before it started to act.\footnote{Up to the present day the IAEA has published 25 reports and has adopted nine resolutions on Iran’s nuclear programme. All documents are available at: http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaIran/index.shtml and on the attached DVD. For an overview of the IAEA’s role in the Iranian nuclear crisis, see Gröning and Rudischhauser, 2007.}

In sum, in the case of Iran the EU’s security perception has been significantly more moderate than in the case of Iraq and emphasized intra-European and international cooperation, especially in 2002 and 2003. No member has pushed an extreme, threat based ‘national security’ interpretation of the Iranian nuclear programme, as Britain and the other European supporters of the US-led invasion of Iraq did. Thus, more balanced security perceptions have helped to maintain European unity in Iran, whereas the EU’s ability to find consensus concerning Iraq was stretched too far by the extreme ‘national security’ perceptions of some Member States that were not shared under the given circumstances by other, more reluctant Member States.

**Use of Means**

How can the EU react to problems such as the alleged Iraqi and Iranian WMD programmes? The options are diverse, ranging from dialogue over negotiations, positive and negative incentives and sanctions to military means. The obvious difference between Iraq and Iran is that in the former case some EU Member States decided to participate in military actions whereas in the latter the military option has come up only as a hypothetical possibility. In short, in Iraq the options were pushed to one extreme, i.e. invasion without a clear multilateral endorsement, thus laying bare the deep divisions that exist in the EU regarding military means and causing the EU’s
division. In Iran, on the other hand, the EU’s measures have remained within the limits of generally acceptable means supported by the United Nations. But why was there a military option in the case of Iraq but not in the case of Iran? The short answer is path dependency. Between 1990 and 2002-2003 the international community and, in particular, the EU dealt with both cases in radically different ways: Whereas Iraq policies were largely confrontation based, Iran policies were based to a large extent on dialogue and cooperation. Consequently, it was much more likely that the relations with Iraq would end up in war and the relations with Iran in negotiations.

The confrontation with Iraq started with the 1990 Gulf War and the dismantling of Iraq’s WMD programmes by the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM). The lack of cooperation of the Iraqi regime with UNSCOM led finally the United States and the UK to the conclusion that it was necessary to bomb suspected WMD installations in Iraq. However, the ensuing military measures – the 1998 Operation Desert Fox – led to deep divisions among UNSC members and, even more importantly, to frictions among EU members (see Weller, 1999-2000). In other words, the disagreements about Operation Desert Fox were the prelude of the disagreements about Operation Iraqi Freedom, i.e. the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Although EU Member States supported countless UNSC Resolutions against Iraq and agreed on coercive measures such as sanctions or a new UN inspection commission (UNMOVIC) after Operation Dessert Fox, unilateral military measures were clearly outside the limits of European consensus.

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206 UNSCOM was replaced in 1999 by the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC). UNMOVIC was finally dissolved in 2007. For more information, see http://www.un.org/Depts/unscom/ and http://www.unmovic.org/.

207 The adoption of sanctions by the EU is a complicated process as it usually affects competencies of the Commission, the Council and the Member States (see Portela, 2007b). In the case of Iraq, 13 Regulations and five Common Decisions were adopted over the years. They are available at: http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/cfsp/sanctions/measures.htm#Iraq and on the attached DVD.
This is underlined by the EU’s strong action in Iraq once the military option was off the table and the EU could become active where one of its main strengths lies: post-conflict reconstruction (Commission of the European Communities, 2004a, 2006b). In fact, the Commission’s central strategic documents on EU-Iraq relations after the invasion reads almost as any other Commission Communication on a conflict-ridden country. They stress good governance, including democracy and the rule of law, a functioning market economy and peaceful relations with neighbouring countries (Commission of the European Communities, 2004a, 2006b). At the Madrid Donor Conference for Iraq in October 2003, the EU and its Member States pledged more than 1.25 billion Euro in reconstruction aid (Commission of the European Communities, 2004a: 3). Between 2003 and 2005, the European Commission alone committed 418.5 million Euros in reconstruction assistance plus 100 million Euros through the European Community Humanitarian Office as humanitarian aid (European Community, 2005). Between 2003 and 2007 the EU was the third largest single donor, with 829 million Euros committed to the reconstruction of Iraq. In 2004, the Council floated already ideas about Iraq as a target of new measures under the 2003 EU Strategy against proliferation of WMD (Council of the European Union, 2004b: 42). In 2005, the EU signed a Declaration on Political Dialogue with Iraq, dispatched a rule of law mission (EUJUST LEX) and the Commission opened its first

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208 EU measures include substantial humanitarian and reconstruction aid, a rule of law mission (EUJUST LEX), the opening of a Commission Delegation and the negotiation of a Trade and Cooperation Agreement.

In Iran, the EU’s dialogue policy can be traced back to the 1992 Edinburgh European Council, which established the “critical dialogue” with Iran (European Council in Edinburgh, 1992). Although the European approach differed radically from the American policy aimed at the international isolation of Iran, the EU maintained almost continuously its dialogue with Iran. It focused largely on human rights and terrorism.\textsuperscript{212} After the 1997 Mykonos trial\textsuperscript{213} led to the end of the critical dialogue, the election of the reformer Mohammad Khatami as President of Iran, improved again EU-Iran relations and the Union resumed its talks with Iran in 1998, now in the form of the so-called comprehensive dialogue that also included discussions on WMD issues.\textsuperscript{214} In 2002, after the re-election of Khatami, the EU initiated a formal human rights dialogue with Iran and the negotiation of a Trade and Cooperation Agreement and a Political Dialogue Agreement (Martínez Carbonell, 2004). Thus, once evidence of clandestine Iranian nuclear activity appeared in August 2002, the EU had established already a “tangled web of negotiations” (Posch, 2006) with Iran. It is, therefore, hardly surprising that the E3 and later the EU/E3 and EU/E3+3\textsuperscript{215} have focused their efforts regarding Iran’s nuclear programme on dialogue and
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negotiations: Javier Solana, who has become the chief negotiator with Iran, has held up to the present day countless meetings with his Iranian counterparts.\(^{216}\)

Even though the Trade and Cooperation Agreement and Political Dialogue Agreement negotiations were suspended in 2005\(^ {217}\) and Iran has refused to participate in the comprehensive as well as the human rights dialogue since 2003 and 2004 respectively, contacts between Iran and the EU have never broken off completely. Apart from Javier Solana’s negotiations, it has maintained at least limited (and often indirect) cooperation in the fields of anti-drug-trafficking, support for Afghan refugees and higher education (Erasmus Mundus programme).\(^ {218}\) Moreover, various types of European documents, e.g. Council or Presidency Conclusions, reaffirm regularly the EU’s continued support for a diplomatic solution of the Iranian nuclear problem.

However, given Iran’s reluctant cooperation with the EU on the nuclear issue, a pure persuasion based approach was not sustainable. Once Iran resumed under its new President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad uranium conversion in August 2005 – a violation of the terms of the 2004 Paris Agreement – the EU/E3 started to work towards the adoption of coercive measures against Iran. It managed to involve China, Russia and the United States, the three non-European permanent UNSC members, and in February 2006, the IAEA Board of Governors sent finally the Iran case to the UNSC, thus opening the door for several Resolutions calling for sanctions on Iran.

\(^{216}\) Apart from long-term agreements with Iran, Solana offered different incentives to entice Iran. In 2007, the EU proposed the ‘suspension for suspension’ option, i.e. the parallel suspension of international sanctions and uranium enrichment in Iran. In 2008, the Union went even one step further making the ‘freeze for freeze’ offer. That is, the EU would maintain the present sanctions and Iran its existing level of enrichment activities but without increasing them.

\(^{217}\) The negotiations were also on hold between the Tehran Agreement (October 2003) and the Paris Agreement (November 2004).

\(^{218}\) The EU is also a firm supporter of the IAEA, which has carried out so far 74 (active or completed) technical cooperation projects in Iran in the field nuclear energy. See http://www-tc.iaea.org/tcweb/projectinfo/default.asp.
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(Resolutions 1737, 1747 and 1803). The EU has implemented slightly tighter sanctions than those of the UNSC Resolutions, thus demonstrating the EU’s ability to implement coercive measures. Yet, at the same time, it has maintained its willingness to negotiate with Iran: This has become known as the dual-track approach, i.e. the EU imposes sanctions but is also open for dialogue. According to the French foreign minister, “... sanctions are above all a diplomatic instrument intended to persuade the Iranian authorities to abide by their international obligations” (Interview with Bernard Kouchner, 2008).

The only problematic issue so far has been the use of military force against Iranian nuclear installations. In this regard, the use of unilateral military force by EU Member States has never been an issue, as they basically lack the necessary capabilities. However, the EU’s support of possible US or Israeli airstrikes might be highly controversial. After all, attacks against Iran have been seriously discussed by the current US administration (Sagan, 2006). When Javier Solana was asked by one of the readers of the BBC World Service (Persian service) how the EU would react to US military actions against Iran, he answered evasively: “The EU supports international legality. Iran must comply with its obligations in order to contribute to regional stability. Dialogue remains at the core of the process” (Solana, 2004). However, despite French saber rattling in 2007 (Sciolino, 2007), the military option is so far off the table. Even the militarily most capable EU Member States puts its weight behind the EU’s dual-track approach: “The UK Government has repeatedly made clear that it is pursuing a diplomatic solution 100%, which it believes can achieve the necessary results” (British Embassy in Tehran, 2008).

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219 Sanctions include mainly travel restrictions for certain Iranian officials, financial restrictions and a ban on Iranian arms exports. The EU has adopted so far six Regulations, two Decisions and four Common Positions on Iran sanctions. They are available at: http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/cfsp/sanctions/measures.htm#Iran and on the attached DVD.
But what happens if it does not achieve the desired results? A now infamous gaffe by the then French President Jacques Chirac suggests that there exist among European policy-makers alternatives to military strikes. He told reporters of the New York Times “…that if Iran had one or two nuclear weapons, it would not pose a big danger, and that if Iran were to launch a nuclear weapon against a country like Israel, it would lead to the immediate destruction of Tehran” (Sciolino and Bennhold, 2007: A1). In short, the alternative is the containment of Iran. However, Europe’s reaction if the US or Israel do not accept containment as a viable option and decide to strike against Iran is still far from clear. As a senior advisor to Javier Solana wrote in 2004, “…a decision to bomb Iran would have enormous consequences for Britain and the rest of Europe. It would be Europe’s moment of truth: split again or stay united” (Everts, 2004a: 36).

In conclusion, the main difference between the EU Iran and Iraq policies in terms of means was the use of unilateral military force. Although the EU is able to implement coercive measures such as sanctions, it is virtually impossible to find consensus on such an extreme measure as the invasion of a country. Due to the long lasting confrontations with Iraq, it was much more likely that the EU was forced to choose to participate in military actions than in the case of Iran, where dialogue based approaches have dominated.

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220 Although Jacques Chirac retracted the remarks shortly after the interview, the interview itself was tape-recorded and on-the-record.
221 This view was largely shared in interviews with European officials in Brussels in December 2008 and January 2009.
Transatlantic Relations

In most analyses, the relation with other actors in the case of Iran and Iraq focuses on the transatlantic relationship. Although this relationship is crucial indeed, a broader, though equally important aspect is usually not taken into consideration: the type of state relations EU Member States sought in the two crises. In the case of Iraq, there was a clear tendency towards bilateralism. Neither the supporters nor the opponents of the invasion of Iraq made a serious effort to establish a common EU position (Howorth, 2006: 57-58). The supporters preferred ad hoc relations with the United States, as exemplified by the Azores Islands summit between the United States, Britain, Spain and Portugal shortly before the war, whereas the opponents forged stronger relations between them, in particular between France, Germany and Russia. Both tried to use the larger multilateral framework of the United Nations and, in particular, of the United Nations Security Council to gather support for their positions. But ultimately the irreconcilability of their positions led to the deadlock of the UN and, thus, of a multilateral approach. In other words, bilateralism trumped Europeanism, multilateralism and, of course, cosmopolitanism, which played only a very marginal role in the form of preoccupations about Iraqi civilian causalities during a possible invasion.

In Iran, the situation was very different. Admittedly, there might have been a learning effect between the invasion of Iraq and the first trip of the E3 to Tehran. In the words of Delpech, Europeans “...sought to restore the unity they had lost during the Iraq crisis” (Delpech, 2006). They had a particular desire to show that they could deal together with a non-proliferation problem (Delpech, 2006: 27-29). Moreover, the entry into force of the Nice Treaty in January 2003 and, above all, the development of a European non-proliferation strategy after April 2003 certainly facilitated these
developments. However, the learning effect from the Iraq experience is not in itself a cause of greater EU harmony in Iran, but rather a catalyst of underlying normative and causal beliefs. It is hardly credible to argue that after the breakdown of EU unity during the Iraq crisis, EU Member States ‘suddenly’ discovered the advantages of a common European approach. Rather, in the case of Iran, Member States were willing to reconcile their differing ideas on state relations.

First of all, EU Member States stressed the common European dimension of the Iran policy. Although the initial trilateral E3 directoire consisting of France, Germany and the United Kingdom was highly controversial and never got an explicit endorsement by the Council,\textsuperscript{222} the EU was able to find a common format that was acceptable to all Member States: Through the inclusion of the High Representative the new EU/E3 format got the necessary link with the rest of the EU Member States to establish a common European Iran policy.\textsuperscript{223} At the same time, the E3 themselves emphasized the European dimension of their efforts. Already the first E3 mission to Tehran in 2003, which was basically a spontaneous trip by three national Foreign Ministers without any EU endorsement, was for Jack Straw, then the British foreign secretary, “…consistent with the common approach to Iran agreed by several European Councils” (Straw, 2003b) and “a demonstrable example of how [British] membership of the EU enhances [Britain’s] standing in the world” (Straw, 2003a). Furthermore, as has been pointed out already, the EU/E3 embedded their policies firmly within the framework of multilateral institutions, in particular of the UNSC and

\textsuperscript{222} Council Conclusions spoke for the first time of the activity of France, Germany and the United Kingdom in late 2004, i.e. almost one year after the first E3 mission to Tehran. However, the term E3 or EU/E3 has never been used in Council or Presidency Conclusions. These terms are only used in reports or internal documents.

\textsuperscript{223} Personal or phone interviews with EU and Member States officials in Brussels, Copenhagen, Dublin, Madrid and Washington, DC, December 2008-June 2009. Only the Italians were not completely satisfied with the new format, but they were able to gain ‘privileged information exchange’ (Interview with E3 official, Brussels, January 2009).
the Board of Governors of the IAEA. \textsuperscript{224} Even concerns of cosmopolitan normative and causal beliefs were taken into account, especially in the form of the human rights dialogue with Iran (see above). Thus, the relations with other actors were fundamentally different in the case of Iran: They effectively balanced bilateralism (as exemplified by the E3), Europeanism (in the form of the EU/E3), multilateralism (concerning the UNSC and the IAEA) and cosmopolitanism (in regard to human rights promotion).

The transatlantic relations, however, was a special case that requires a separate analysis. The United States had a conflict-laden relation with Iran and Iraq many years before 2002. Iraq had been a source of conflict at least since the 1990 Gulf War. The problems with Iran can be traced back to the 1979 Islamic Revolution and the 1979-1981 hostage crisis, when the United States cut off its diplomatic relations with Iran. When George W. Bush became President the US belligerent attitude towards the two countries intensified further. In the 2002 State of the Union address they were named (together with North Korea) as members of the so-called “axis of evil” ("Bush State of the Union Address," 2002). Regime change was the open aim of US policies in both countries. As the doctrine of ‘pre-emptive action’ showed (\textit{The National Security Strategy of the United States of America}, 2002), the United States was also prepared to use military force against both countries. From mid-2002 on, the Bush administration worked clearly towards the invasion of Iraq, whereas Iran has been regularly threatened with airstrikes against nuclear installations by US officials.

\textsuperscript{224} The Iran issue has also been discussed regularly in meetings with other actors such as South Africa or the Gulf Cooperation Council. Meeting documents are available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=343&lang=en and on the attached DVD.
However, there existed a significant difference: The US actually decided to invade Iraq, whereas it refused to engage further with Iran.\textsuperscript{225} Thus, the EU Member States had to choose if they should follow US policies in Iraq, but not in Iran. On the contrary, in the case of Iran, Europeans got the opportunity to pursue their own policies (Harnisch, 2007; Kupchan, 2006). As a consequence, in Iran Europeans were not confronted with one of the most controversial questions in European foreign and security policy, namely if the EU should or should not follow the lead of the only remaining superpower in the world (Crowe, 2003: 535). In Iraq, however, this question led to deep divisions among European states. As Menon argues, “The build-up to the war in Iraq revealed increasingly apparent and bitter divisions between the European states. At the heart of these disputes were opposing conceptions of the appropriate relationship for Europe to maintain with the United States” (Menon, 2004: 638).

The 2002-2003 Iraq crisis was ultimately divisive because EU Member States, in particular the ‘big 3,’ chose to push their Iraq policies towards opposing extremes: Germany and France openly disagreed with the United States, whereas Britain fully supported the US-led invasion. In IR terms, Germany and France tried to balance the United States, whereas Britain was bandwagoning. It is not clear why these countries chose to push their Iraq policies towards these two extremes – the individual leaders, Jacques Chirac, Tony Blair and Gerhard Schröder (Groom and Morphet, 2006; Hill, 2004; Hollis, 2006; Howorth, 2006; Peterson, 2004; Timmins, 2006), and the US administration’s heavy pressure (Everts, 2004a: 36) certainly played a decisive role – but it made an EU-wide consensus impossible. This does not mean, however, that

\textsuperscript{225} In 2003, Iran offered to negotiate directly with the United States. But the US administration rejected the proposal. See Sauer, 2008.
consensus would have been impossible. After all, in practical terms, the support of the invasion of Iraq was also significant from those states that opposed the war, in particular Germany, which allowed the coalition forces to use its airspace and military bases and met its NATO obligations. In fact, Germany’s support was more important for the war efforts than that of smaller EU Member or Candidate States that to a lesser or larger degree supported the United States (Grigorescu, 2008; Peterson, 2004).

In the case of Iran, the EU and the United States were already at odds well before 2002. While Europe pursued its dialogues with Iran, the United States implemented an aggressive sanctions policy that also targeted European companies doing business in Iran (Pollack, 2006; Reissner, 2000). However, Iraq-style divisions between EU Member States over US leadership were virtually impossible, as America refused to lead on Iran. Ironically, it was the United States that suffered from internal divisions over European leadership. For a long time, the US administration was deeply divided between the supporters of a stronger US involvement in the EU/E3 approach and those advocating unilateral military strikes against Iran (Kubbig, 2008). These divisions were reflected in the almost ‘EU-ish’ compromise formula regarding the US approach towards Iran: “All options are on the table” (Kubbig, 2008). Although it was at first sight shorthand for the threat of military actions, a closer look reveals that the US administration was too divided to actually decide which option it should pursue. In short, the United States was not able to implement a coherent Iran policy. In common EU-US Declarations on Iran, the texts resembled largely the moderate European positions at the time without significant American input.226

Since 2005, the US administration has become more supportive of European efforts. And in 2007, when the US National Intelligence Estimate on Iran concluded

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226 See, for example, Council of the European Union, 2004a.
“...that in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons programme” (Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2007), the American military option was finally taken off the table, at least momentarily. However, in line with the 2006 National Security Strategy, which states that America “may face no greater challenge from a single country than from Iran” (The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 2006), the United States has also tried to push the EU towards more forceful actions, in particular tougher sanctions. Moreover, the United States has refused to support European negotiations with a crucial offer of security guarantees for Iran (Leonard, 2005a). Yet, this dissonance between the two sides of the Atlantic have not affected in any significant way intra-European unity.227

In short, if the EU is forced to choose between following or balancing US leadership in international crises, it is very likely that Member States push into different directions, thus causing a rift within the EU – as in the case of Iraq. However, without divisive US leadership as in the case of Iran, disagreements on the adequate transatlantic relationship do not play a major role.

Conclusion

Iran and Iraq are two paradigmatic cases of European foreign and security policy. They show how in similar circumstances the European Union can become either a powerful actor in its own right – as during the Iranian nuclear crisis – or an insignificant foreign policy dwarf – as during the 2002-2003 Iraq crisis. Such radically different foreign policy results poses a serious challenge to existing concepts

227 It is still not clear how the new Obama administration in the White House will deal with Iran, though it will certainly try to engage directly with Iran (see Katzman, 2009). This can have unprecedented consequences for EU policies.
of European foreign and security policy, as it is necessary to explain simultaneously significant foreign policy output and the lack thereof. Based on the theoretical framework developed in part I, the key argument of this chapter is that in objectively similar situations, the EU does not have to reconcile the opposing national interests of its Member States, but merely four different idea complexes and their normative and causal beliefs along three main axes: security perception, use of means and relations with other actors, especially the United States. In other words, although the EU’s CFSP is an intergovernmental policy, foreign policy output requires only consensus along three core axes of foreign policy thinking and not between 15 or now 27 national interests. As long as Member States do not push extreme positions in the three main themes, forceful, though still measured EU foreign policy output is likely.

The empirical part of the chapter has shown that in the case of Iraq some Member States pushed too far towards opposing positions in the three core themes: Whereas some believed that the Iraq case was an immediate threat to ‘national security’ that required swift unilateral military action under the leadership of the United States, others saw it merely as a serious concern that required further international inspections and opposed the use of force by the United States and its allies. Moreover, both supporters and opponents of the invasion of Iraq preferred bilateral relations with other actors. Consequently, EU unity during the 2002-2003 Iraq crisis effectively broke down. In the case of Iran, Member States have refrained from pursuing extreme positions as in Iraq: The security perceptions have been balanced between threat based and more comprehensive security interpretations that also take into consideration other aspects such as human rights or regional and global stability. At the same time, unilateral military action has not formed part of the options of the EU Member States. The EU’s measures have been rather a mix of
persuasive means such as dialogue and coercive power, particularly in the form of sanctions. Moreover, all EU activity has been firmly embedded in a framework that has combined bilateral, Europeanist, multilateral and even cosmopolitan elements. Finally, since the United States has not implemented an active Iran policy of its own, the EU and its Member States have not been confronted with a possibly divisive US leadership. In short, in the case of Iran EU foreign policy has been balanced between ‘national,’ ‘integrationist,’ ‘cosmopolitan’ and ‘multilateral Europe.’

Comparing the EU foreign and security policy outputs in Iran and Iraq, finally, allows drawing a relatively clear picture of the limits within which the EU can find foreign policy consensus during international crises: First, if security is perceived without very obvious reasons in terms of immediate threats the EU reaches its limits for consensus. Likewise, if a clear problem such as the clandestine Iranian nuclear activities had been defined by some in very elusive security terms, consensus would have been difficult as well. Secondly, as both the Iraq and Iran case have shown, the EU is able to agree on coercive measures. Military force, however, is much more problematic, especially if it is not based on a clear multilateral mandate, though it is not an absolute taboo topic, as the numerous EU military missions in recent years have demonstrated. At the same time, pure persuasion in the form of dialogue, the other extreme option to act in an international crisis, is only a possibility if the EU does not have to deal with a concrete security problem such as the Iranian nuclear programme. Thirdly, whenever the EU has to find consensus concerning US leadership, both uncritical bandwagoning as well as open opposition are outside the limits of a common European foreign and security policy. In general, these limits are broader than sceptics may concede, but more narrow than EU enthusiasts might
believe. In the future, we may expect more measured EU foreign policy outputs as in Iran, but also occasional disagreements over more extreme policy options as in Iraq.
CHAPTER 5 Occupying the Middle Ground: European
Non-Proliferation Policies in the Southern and Eastern Neighbourhood

Strategically, the European Union prioritizes its neighbourhood. The ESS sees the EU’s neighbourhood – consisting of the Mediterranean area, the Caucasus and Eastern Europe – as its geographical main target, while the Non-Proliferation Strategy puts particular emphasis on the Mediterranean region. The overall objective is summarized as “Building Security in our Neighbourhood” (*European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a Better World*, 2003). However, having a strategy and objectives does not lead necessarily to coherently strong policy output.

There exist, of course, a strong European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) comprising all neighbouring countries as well as the Mediterranean and Eastern Partnership as multilateral frameworks for the EU policies in the Southern and Eastern neighbourhood respectively. Yet, specific non-proliferation policies are far from being as dominant as their importance in the ESS and Non-Proliferation Strategy might suggest. In fact, as will be shown in this chapter, the European non-proliferation policies in the neighbourhood are very uneven and vary between

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228 The EU’s neighbourhood refers here primarily to the ten Mediterranean countries (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Syria and Tunisia), the three Eastern European countries (Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine) and the three Southern Caucasus countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia) that form officially part of the so-called European Neighbourhood Policy, a Commission-based framework policy for the EU’s bilateral relations with direct neighbours (for critical overviews see Barbé, 2005a; Smith, 2005a). Russia, one of the EU’s neighbouring countries that does not form part of the European Neighbourhood Policy, is taken partly into considerations as it is an important recipient of EU non-proliferation support (see Anthony, Fedchenko and Wetter, 2005). However, a specific analysis of the Russian case would go beyond the scope this chapter.
European Non-Proliferation Policies in the Southern and Eastern Neighbourhood

countries and regions (see Barbé et al., 2009: 841-843). How is it possible to explain this output variation regarding one of the EU’s major strategic regions?

The classical approach is to analyse the security interests of the EU – both in terms of threats from WMDs in the neighbourhood and in terms of broader security concerns – and their relation with policy output. Is it possible that weak policies reflect low security interests, whereas more substantial output reflects strong security interests? In the first section, I will use such an approach to reveal possible European security interests. Based on this analysis, I will demonstrate in the second section that security interests play merely a subordinate role in the EU non-proliferation policy in the neighbourhood. In fact, the correlation between policy output and security interests is weak. Consequently, the ‘null hypothesis’ does not work. In other words, ideas may play a crucial role in the EU non-proliferation policy in the neighbourhood. In this regard, I will examine how the four competing idea complexes relate to the EU’s non-proliferation policy output in the neighbourhood – both rhetorically and in practice. I will argue that there exists strong congruence between the possible consensus among the four competing idea complexes and actual policy output. The conclusions will finally outline how the EU’s competing idea complexes lead to non-proliferation efforts in the neighbourhood that occupy the middle ground between forceful actions aimed at the most problematic cases and a neighbourhood policy without any non-proliferation element at all.
1. Security Interests: The Driving Force of Non-Proliferation Policies?

The neighbourhood of the EU is an extremely heterogeneous area with different political, social, economic and cultural conditions. Likewise, in the field of non-proliferation the neighbourhood is far from being a homogeneous block. On the contrary, each neighbouring country presents specific non-proliferation risks, though certain common patterns are discernable. This is the case in both classical threat based and more comprehensive analyses of proliferation issues in the neighbourhood.

The Absence of Imminent Threats

Classical military threat assessments take into consideration both the WMD capabilities of certain actors as well as the actual intentions to use them against Europe (Dokos, 2000; Müller, 2003b; Núñez Villaverde and Hageraats, 2005, 2007; Núñez Villaverde, Hageraats and Valente, 2006; Tertrais, 2003). Although in some cases concrete capabilities and the intentions linked with them are far from clear-cut, open sources allow drawing up a relatively accurate picture of capabilities and intentions in the neighbourhood (see Table 6 and Table 7). Israel is certainly by far the most capable of all neighbouring countries, in particular due its nuclear arsenal, which is usually believed to include between 100 and 200 nuclear warheads (Boniface, 2000: 173). The other regional actors with significant WMD programmes are two of Israel’s direct neighbours, Syria and Egypt. These two

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229 Israel follows a strategy of ambiguity. This means that it neither confirms nor negates the existence of its nuclear weapons. For more information on the Israeli nuclear programme, see Cohen, 1998.
230 For a detailed analysis of WMD capacities in the Mediterranean, see Cordesman, 2005; Dokos, 2000; Ferreira Pinto, 2001; Müller, 2003b.
countries have capabilities in the area of chemical weapons. Egypt is even believed to have actually used these weapons during its intervention in the civil war in Yemen in the 1960s (Müller, 2003b: 57).

Table 6 Nuclear Capabilities in the EU Neighbourhood

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REGION</th>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>Nuclear Capabilities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mediterranean Region</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>[1 Research reactor under construction]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>Research; 2 Research reactors operational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>[1 Research reactor planned]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>Dismantling [before: Research]; 1 Research reactor operational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Research; 2 Research reactors operational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>Deployed; 1 Research reactor operational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>Research; 1 Research reactor operational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>[1 Research reactor planned]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Europe</td>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>[former Soviet weapons transferred to Russia]; [1 Research reactor decommissioned]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>15 nuclear power reactors; 2 nuclear power reactors under construction; 1 Research reactor operational; 2 Research reactors shut down</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>[1 Research reactor shut down]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>1 Nuclear power reactor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Deployed = Nuclear weapons integrated in military forces and ready for use in the event of conflict.  
Stockpiled = Produced significant quantity of nuclear weapons, but these are not stored in close proximity to military units that would employ them.  
Production capability = Able to produce significant quantity of fissile nuclear material, but not known to have done so.  
Development = Engaged in laboratory- or pilot-scale activities to develop production capability for fissile material.  
Research = Engaged in dual-use research with peaceful civilian applications, but that can also be used to build technical capacity and/or infrastructure necessary for nuclear development and production.  
Dismantling = Removing nuclear weapons from deployment to storage areas and destroying agents and munitions.  
? = Published assessments are uncertain or conflicting reports raise questions about a state’s capabilities.

Sources: Cordesman, 2005; James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies; International Atomic Energy Agency; and Nuclear Threat Initiative.

Note: The Palestinian Authority is not included in the Table.
### Table 7 Chemical and Biological Capabilities in the EU Neighbourhood

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REGION</th>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>Chemical and Biological Capabilities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Chemical weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Biological weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediterranean Region</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td></td>
<td>Development?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td></td>
<td>[Research reactor planned]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td></td>
<td>Dismantling [before: Deployed; used in 1987]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td></td>
<td>Stockpiled [used in 1963-67]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td></td>
<td>Production Capability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td></td>
<td>Development?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td></td>
<td>Dismantling [before: Development?]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td></td>
<td>Stockpiled [used in 1963-67]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td></td>
<td>Production Capability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td></td>
<td>Deployed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td></td>
<td>Development?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Europe</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td></td>
<td>[former Soviet weapons transferred to Russia]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td></td>
<td>[alleged former Soviet facilities dismantled]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Deployed = Chemical or biological weapons integrated in military forces and ready for use in the event of conflict.
Stockpiled = Produced significant quantity of chemical or biological weapons, but these are not stored in close proximity to military units that would employ them.
Production capability = Able to produce significant quantity of chemical or biological agents, but not known to have done so.
Development = Engaged in laboratory- or pilot-scale activities to develop production capability for chemical or biological agents.
Research = Engaged in dual-use research with peaceful civilian applications, but that can also be used to build technical capacity and/or infrastructure.
Dismantling = Removing chemical or biological weapons from deployment to storage areas and destroying agents and munitions.
? = Published assessments are uncertain or conflicting reports raise questions about a state's capabilities.

**Sources:** Cordesman, 2005; James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies; and Nuclear Threat Initiative.

**Note:** The Palestinian Authority is not included in the Table.

In the Maghreb countries, in contrast, WMD play a much smaller role: Whereas Tunisia and Morocco are not knowingly engaged in any kind of WMD programmes whatsoever, Algeria is only engaged in research that can contribute to a WMD programme but is not directly related to the development of such weapons. Libya has been traditionally a major concern due to its substantial WMD
programmes, in particular in relation with chemical weapons. In 1987, it became one of the few countries worldwide that used chemical weapons – during its military intervention in Chad. Moreover, in 1986 Libya fired (unsuccessfully) missiles at European territory – the NATO base on the Italian island of Lampedusa in the South of Sicily. However, after its heydays as the villain on the international scene in the 1980s, Quadhafi has finally decided to dismantle all WMD capabilities.  

In the Eastern neighbourhood, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia and Ukraine have substantial civilian or dual-use nuclear capabilities, which are basically remnants of the Soviet era. Ukraine possessed also substantial nuclear, chemical and biological WMD capabilities at the beginning of its independence from the Soviet Union. However, all weapons were transferred to the Russian Federation, though many employees of the former WMD programmes remained in Ukraine (see Presidency of the European Union, 1996). The same scenario unfolded in the case of Belarus (nuclear weapons) and Georgia (biological dual-use capabilities).

Although the 2004 enlargement has brought the EU much closer to those neighbouring states with WMD capabilities, the risk of the EU to be attacked with WMD is still very low, since only the fringes of the EU (Cyprus, Crete and Malta) are potentially vulnerable to a WMD attack with ballistic missiles from the neighbourhood, though Israel is an exception. As Tertrais points out, “When it comes to capabilities, no regional actor having a nuclear programme (except Israel) is yet capable, at least as far as known capabilities are concerned, of posing a ballistic missile threat to European Union member states” (Tertrais, 2003: 49). Likewise, Zanders argues that “[t]he chances that EU member states might be attacked by

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231 As recent research shows, the dismantlement of Libya’s WMD programmes is hardly the direct result of EU or US non-proliferation efforts (Bahgat, 2008; Blanchard, 2008; Sánchez Mateos, 2005; Zoubir, 2006), although the American and European participation in the international isolation of Libya may not be neglected entirely.
another state with CBW [chemical and biological weapons] are remote” (Zanders, 2003: 80). Even attacks on European economic interests such as oil and gas flows or on European expatriate communities, diplomatic personnel or military forces deployed in the region, are rather remote direct threats. Moreover, it is unlikely that regional non-state actors, in particular terrorist organization, possess or are going to possess WMD or ballistic missiles. The production of WMD, especially of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, is simply too time-consuming and cost-intensive to be a feasible option for them. At the same time, states that make a huge effort to obtain WMD are unlikely to hand over the control over these weapons to unpredictable terrorist networks (Müller, 2003b: 44-52; Núñez Villaverde, Hageraats and Valente, 2006).

The key factors behind the lack of WMD threats from the neighbourhood are, however, the intentions of the states possessing these weapons. In the words of Tertrais, “When it comes to intentions, no country in the region is known to want to attack Europe as such” (Tertrais, 2003: 49). Israel, the only Mediterranean country with a clear capacity to launch a massive WMD attack against Europe, is arguably the country with least intentions to actually do it. Israel has good and in some cases even excellent relations with the Member States of the EU. Their WMD must be seen exclusively in the context of the regional Arab-Israeli conflict: For Israel, WMD form the last line of defence if confronted with a massive attack by neighbouring Arab states (Boniface, 2000: 173-176; Heller, 2000: 162-163). Equally, in the case of Syria and Egypt their WMD capabilities and programmes are much more a legacy of the Arab-Israeli conflict and, to a lower extent, of inter-Arab rivalry than of some kind of anti-European strategy or as a deterrent against the nuclear weapons of France and the United Kingdom. In military terms, it can be said that neither Israel nor those Arab
countries with WMD capabilities have securitized the EU or its Member States that possess nuclear weapons. Rather, the proliferation of WMD in the Mediterranean has been the result of regional securitization processes within the Middle East (see Baumgart and Müller, 2004-2005: 48-49). In short, the EU is not directly threatened by WMDs from the neighbourhood.\textsuperscript{232}

\textit{European Proliferation Concerns}

The absence of direct military threats to the EU does not mean that security interests are automatically non-existent as well. Security interests can be more indirect. Most notably, WMD capabilities and/or interest in further proliferation cause independently of the actual intentions behind them structural instability, both at the regional and global level: First of all, they undermine the international stabilization efforts by curbing proliferation through international institutions. In this regard, the EU faces also what Cornish and Anthony have called a “reputational threat” (Cornish and Anthony, 2005: 7), i.e. damage to its reputation as a champion of multilateral non-proliferation efforts. Secondly, they lead to suspicion among neighbouring countries and, possibly, to a regional arms race. This is particularly problematic in the Middle East, where the Arab-Israeli conflict and the competition between Sunni and Shia

\textsuperscript{232} It should be pointed out, however, that this security situation may easily change in the future. In this regard, three different scenarios are plausible: First, if Turkey joins one day the Union, its Eastern borders will bring the EU much closer to nuclear hotspots such as Iran, thus creating a “new ‘nuclear frontier’ for Europe” (Tertrais, 2003: 50) and altering substantially the security calculations in the EU. Secondly, the development by, for example, Syria of new, more far-reaching ballistic missiles, which have the capacity to attack the European heartland, could radically change the European threat assessment of WMD in the Mediterranean. Thirdly, revolutionary regime changes in Syria or Egypt, bringing to power Hamas-style organisations, may turn former pro-Western or at least largely neutral countries into fiercely anti-Western and even anti-European bulwarks which could reorientate their WMD capabilities against European countries. But still today these possibilities are quite remote and direct WMD threats from the Mediterranean will remain for the time being rather indirect.
Muslims have created a very volatile security situation. Another major concern is criminal activity. As the extensive illicit proliferation network by A. Q. Khan, the ‘father’ of the Pakistani nuclear bomb, shows, renegade elements in national WMD programmes can sell WMD capable materials and know-how to other states or even non-state actors (Mian, 2007). Most of the neighbouring states are relatively poor, where criminal energy may find a particularly fertile breeding ground. For example, in the countries that belonged to the former Soviet Union many scientists and engineers became unemployed, when the Soviet WMD programmes ended. Furthermore, WMD relevant materials or information may be stolen from inadequately guarded WMD facilities. Finally, there is the concern about accidents due to negligence, deficient equipment or inadequate storage of WMD or dual-use items. The worst-case scenario is obviously the accidental use of WMD. That this is not an unimaginable scenario is shown by the recent accidental transportation of nuclear warheads by the United States Air Force across America (Spiegel, 2007). Less frightening, but still serious possibilities include accidents with radiological or toxic elements.

Given these indirect security concerns in (potential) WMD capabilities in the neighbourhood, the control of these capabilities become a strong security interest. In this regard, two areas appear to be pivotal from a European perspective: states’ integration in the international non-proliferation institutions and their cooperation with the EU in international fora. Accordingly, the neighbourhood countries can be

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233 Since 2006 Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Jordan as well as the six member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council have announced their interest in nuclear energy and have signed corresponding cooperation agreements. This ‘nuclear renaissance’ is usually seen as a strategically motivated reaction to the Iranian nuclear programme, thus highlighting the dangers of a nuclear arms race in the Middle East (see Fitzpatrick, 2008; Thränert, 2009). For an alternative explanation emphasizing energy interests, see Luciani, 2009.

234 This criterion focuses basically on the voting behaviour in the United Nations General Assembly.
divided into three groups of concern: (a) states that have or are believed to develop WMD, that have ratified only very few major non-proliferation agreements and that have a bad cooperation record with the EU; (b) states that cooperate only occasionally with the EU, that have ratified few treaties and/or have dual-use capabilities; and (c) states that do not possess any relevant capabilities, that have ratified almost all relevant agreements and that cooperate well with the Union. Thus, for the EU, group (a) is of high concern, group (b) of medium concern and group (c) of low concern.

Table 8 Ratification of Non-Proliferation Agreements in the EU Neighbourhood

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REGION</th>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>Ratification of Six Major Non-Proliferation Agreements*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mediterranean</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Europe</td>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>EU</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>America</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own elaboration.

*According to the Common Position on the universalisation of multilateral agreements Council of the European Union, 2003c, the major non-proliferation agreements are: (1) the BTWC; (2) the CTBT; (3) the CWC; (4) the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC); (5) the NPT; and (6) the Additional Safeguard Protocols with the IAEA.

The voting behaviour in the United Nations Security Council is not relevant, as the very few neighbouring countries that have sat on the Security Council since the end of the Cold War have generally voted with the EU Member States in the Security Council (in matters of non-proliferation).
As a first glance at Table 6, Table 7 and Table 8 as well as at Figure 9 reveals, Egypt, Israel and Syria belong to group (a). Apart from their WMD capabilities as discussed previously, they have a very low degree of integration in the international non-proliferation institutions. Egypt and Syria are non-nuclear-weapon state members of the NPT, but otherwise none of the major non-proliferation treaties have been ratified by any of the three countries. Furthermore, they rarely vote with the EU in the UNGA on non-proliferation issues: Since 1990 the coincidence between their votes and the EU majority has been consistently less than 50%.

Group (b) consists of Algeria, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, the Lebanon, Libya and Ukraine. As has been mentioned already, the Eastern neighbouring countries possess substantial civilian or dual-use capabilities and are, therefore, a concern for Europe. However, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia and Ukraine have ratified all or almost all relevant non-proliferation agreements and – with the exception of Belarus, which often aligns itself with Russia – have voted in over 60% of the UNGA resolutions with the EU majority. In the case of the Southern neighbours, Algeria is believed to be engaged in low-key research related to nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and has ratified – as the Lebanon – only few agreements. Libya is a special case: Although in 2003 the regime in Tripoli announced the dismantlement of all its WMD activities and joined all relevant non-proliferation agreements, it has still not regained the trust of the European Union. Furthermore, the voting record of Libya as well as of Algeria and the Lebanon is from an EU perspective rather weak.

235 Libya possessed chemical weapons. However, its nuclear and biological weapons programmes were less advanced than feared in the United States and Europe.
Finally, group (c) is formed by Azerbaijan, Jordan, Moldova, Morocco and Tunisia. These countries have virtually no WMD-related activities going on and have ratified all or the large majority of relevant non-proliferation agreements. Especially Azerbaijan and Jordan have ratified all agreements and are no proliferation concern. However, the voting behaviour of these countries – except for Moldova – do not reflect EU preferences, though given their performance in the other criteria, this is does not cause major problems.

Note: The Palestinian Authority is not included in the Figure. Only recorded votes on resolutions are analyzed. The majority of resolutions are adopted without a vote.

Source: Own elaboration based on voting records provided by the United Nations Bibliographic Information Service (http://www.un.org/Depts/dhl/unbisnet/index.html#voterecords).

236 The raw data, calculations and final data can be found in a Microsoft Excel file called “Data Voting UNGA” on the attached DVD. The non-machine-readable raw data was extracted using the ITPilot of the Denodo Platform, an information integration software. I would like to thank Justo Hidalgo and Denodo Technologies for their invaluable support.
In sum, the EU’s neighbourhood does not present a direct WMD threat to the EU. However, the majority of countries are of high or medium concern because they possess WMD or dual-use items, have not ratified all the relevant non-proliferation agreements and/or do not cooperate fully with the EU in international fora. The most problematic states are concentrated in the heartland of the Arab-Israeli conflict, whereas the Maghreb, Eastern Europe and, in particular, the Caucasus is of less concern. What is the EU’s likely reaction to these different proliferation concerns in its neighbourhood? If security interests are the dominant driving force of EU policies, one would expect particularly vigorous activity in the countries of high concern, whereas the countries of medium and low concern receive less attention. If they are not, policy outputs may vary depending on other factors.

2. Explaining Moderate Policies

The analysis of this section will demonstrate that security interests are not the dominant driving force behind EU non-proliferation policies in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean. In contrast to what security interests would predict, the EU non-proliferation policies in the neighbourhood have not focused on the countries of high concern – neither rhetorically nor in practice. They rather reflect in terms of security perception, use of means and state relations the consensus between the four idea complexes in European foreign and security policy. In fact, they are balanced policies occupying the middle ground between the normative and causal ideas on security, means and state relations of ‘national,’ ‘integrationist,’ ‘cosmopolitan’ and ‘multilateral Europe.’
Security Perceptions

As the countries of major concern are located within the Euro-Mediterranean area, an examination of European security perceptions has to start there. Potentially, security interests are particularly strong in this area. A first approximation to EU non-proliferation policies in the Mediterranean through an analysis of the major Mediterranean strategic documents – the Barcelona Declaration (1995), the Common Strategy on the Mediterranean and the EU Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East – reveals that non-proliferation has indeed played a role in Euro-Mediterranean relations right from the beginning of the Barcelona Process, also known as the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP). The 1995 Barcelona Declaration, the founding document of the process, already establishes within its so-called political and security partnership the overall objective that “[t]he parties shall pursue a mutually and effectively verifiable Middle East Zone free of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, chemical and biological, and their delivery systems” (Euro-Mediterranean Conference, 1995). The Declaration took up, thus, decades-old calls for a Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone in the Middle East. The idea of such a zone goes back to a 1974 proposal by the Shah of Iran to establish a Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone in the Middle East. 16 years later, the Egyptian President Mubarak proposed to extent this zone to a WMD Free Zone. The UN General Assembly has supported unanimously, i.e. with the support of the United States and EU Member States, such a zone from the beginning. At the 1995 NPT Review Conference, i.e. in the same year as the Barcelona Conference, calls for a Nuclear-
Weapons-Free Zone in the Middle East were also on the agenda. Apart from the issue of a WMD Free Zone, the Barcelona Declaration urges also the adherence to and compliance with international and regional non-proliferation institutions and lists practical steps to prevent WMD proliferation. The 2000 Common Strategy and the 2004 Security Partnership document reiterate basically the major themes established by the Barcelona Declaration (European Council, 2000, 2004). In fact, the establishment of a WMD-free Zone in the Middle East and the adherence of all Mediterranean partner countries to the existing non-proliferation instruments can been seen as the two overarching objectives of the EU’s non-proliferation policy in the Mediterranean area.

Although at first these documents suggest strong European security interests in non-proliferation in the Mediterranean area, in practice the EU’s overarching objectives are hollow long-term aims without clear policy objectives. For example, the aim of a WMD-free Zone in the Middle East is shared in principle among all important actors, including the United States (Falkenrath, 1997; Feldman, 1997; Spear, 1997). The crux is rather its implementation, in particular its timing. Whereas Israel – the only de facto nuclear-weapon state in the Middle East – wants to establish such a zone after a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace settlement that includes Israel’s right to existence, Arab states, above all Egypt and Syria, see such a zone as a precondition of a comprehensive peace agreement. And on this practical issue, the EU’s strategic documents are silent. Not surprisingly, WMD and non-proliferation aspects are conspicuously absent from any major policy document of the Barcelona

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240 For a chronological overview of the issue of a Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone in the Middle East, see Núñez Villaverde and Hageraats, 2005: 58. For a literature review, see Prawitz, 2008.
241 Compare, for example, the following two articles: El-Sayed Selim, 2000; Heller, 2000. It should be pointed out, however, that Algeria and Libya have ratified the Treaty of Pelindaba, which establishes an African Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons once the Treaty enters into force.
Process such as the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements between the EU and Mediterranean third countries (with the exception of Syria, see below), the Regional Strategy Paper (2002-2006), the Regional Indicative Programmes (2002-2004/2005-2006) and the Commission’s Country Strategy Papers (2002-2006). Furthermore, during the regularly held Euro-Mediterranean Conferences non-proliferation and WMD matters have virtually not played any role. Even the Valencia Action Plan, which was adopted by Euro-Mediterranean foreign ministers in 2002 (Vth Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Foreign Ministers, 2002) in order to revive the Barcelona Process, does not contain any concrete proposals in relation with WMD and non-proliferation.

The development of the ENP from 2002 on has not radically changed this overall picture: Political proposals related to the Wider Europe initiative (Patten and Solana, 2002; Prodi, 2002), which later became the ENP, and early strategy documents such as the Commission’s Wider Europe Communication do not mention the issue of WMD proliferation at all (Commission of the European Communities, 2003b). It was only after the development of the fully-fledged EU Strategy against the Proliferation of WMD at the end of 2003 that non-proliferation issues have been included in the ENP agenda. They play, however, largely a minor role and are only mentioned in the context of political dialogue between the EU and partner countries, for example in the Commission’s ENP Strategy Paper (Commission of the European Communities, 2004b). In the 2007 Communication on a strong ENP non-

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242 The Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements, the Regional Strategy Paper, the Regional Indicative Programmes and the Country Strategy Papers can be found on the Commission’s EMP website: [http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/euromed/docs/index_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/euromed/docs/index_en.htm) and on the attached DVD.

243 It must be pointed out, however, that the Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Peace and Stability, which has never been adopted due to the Middle East conflict (Barbé, forthcoming), actually includes a chapter on non-proliferation of WMD.

244 For a more detailed analysis of the complex relationship between the Mediterranean Partnership and the new ENP, see Del Sarto and Schumacher, 2005; Johansson-Nogués, 2004b.
proliferation, references do not exist at all (Commission of the European Communities, 2007).

Furthermore, the individual Country Reports, which were drawn up by the Commission as a first step of the ENP process, hardly mention non-proliferation. On the contrary, they lack any kind of comprehensive and coherent review of WMD and non-proliferation issues such as an overview of countries’ adherence to relevant non-proliferation institutions, an analysis of national export controls mechanisms or a list of possible fields of cooperation. The first five Country Reports, which were published by the Commission in May 2004 for those Mediterranean third countries that had by the time a Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreement in force (Israel, the Palestinian Authority, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia), include hardly, if at all, the issue of non-proliferation.\textsuperscript{245} Generally, it takes the form of a vague statement about a country’s adherence to one or two non-proliferation institutions within the chapter on regional and global stability. Likewise, the Country Reports for Egypt and Lebanon, which were published one year later, scarcely comment on non-proliferation issues, although the statements are this time slightly more detailed. Yet, in the latest Progress Report of the ENP non-proliferation plays virtually no role anymore, even in the individual country reviews (Commission of the European Communities, 2009b).\textsuperscript{246}

In contrast to US documents, which single out clearly individual countries as proliferation concerns, most notably (pre-invasion) Iraq, Iran, Syria and – before the dismantlement of its WMD programmes – Libya (\textit{The National Security Strategy of the United States of America}, 2002; \textit{National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass

\textsuperscript{245} All Country Reports are available at: \url{http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/documents_en.htm} and on the attached DVD.

\textsuperscript{246} All ENP documents are available at: \url{http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/documents_en.htm} and on the attached DVD. All country-specific documents are available at: \url{http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/countries/index_en.htm}.
European Non-Proliferation Policies in the Southern and Eastern Neighbourhood


The analysis of the framework and policy documents of the countries of medium and low concern reveal very similar results as in the case of the countries of high concern: This is obviously the case in the other Mediterranean partner countries, but also in the Eastern neighbourhood: The Partnership and Cooperation Agreements in the East and the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements in the South, the EU’s framework agreements with its neighbouring countries, barely mention non-proliferation issues. For example, the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements with Armenia and Moldova mention only the concern of “redeployment” of former Soviet

247 Belarus and Libya have not signed framework agreements with the EU.
WMD scientists (*Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States and the Republic of Moldova, 1998; Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one Part, and the Republic of Armenia, of the other Part, 1999*). Likewise, the European Council Common Strategy on Ukraine goes barely beyond set phrases on strengthening cooperation in the field of export controls and non-proliferation (*European Council, 1999*). ENP documents, for their part (see above), including the Country Reports, and more recent country-specific documents, in particular the Country Strategy Papers 2007-2013 and the National Indicative Programmes 2007-2010, contain very few non-proliferation issues. Even the Strategy Paper 2007-2011 and the Indicative Programme 2007-2008 of the newly established Stability Instrument, which deals specifically with non-proliferation issues, include almost no concrete reference to countries of medium or low concern. The only exceptions are the ENP Action Plans, which include the so-called non-proliferation clause, a non-proliferation measure that is discussed below.\(^{248}\) It is unlikely that the recently launched Eastern Partnership will change this situation. All documents that have been published so far on the Partnership basically do not mention non-proliferation issues.\(^{249}\) Only a Commission Staff Working Paper refers briefly to export control and non-proliferation issues (*Commission of the European Communities, 2008c*).

How is it possible to explain this lack of reference to non-proliferation in all documents related to the EU’s neighbourhood? First of all, it shows that classical security interests in non-proliferation play, if at all, a very minor role. The EU’s

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\(^{248}\) Algeria, Belarus and Libya have not signed ENP Action Plans with the EU. All other Action Plans are available at: [http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/documents_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/documents_en.htm) and on the attached DVD.

\(^{249}\) They can be found at [http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/eastern/docs/index_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/eastern/docs/index_en.htm) and on the attached DVD.
neighbourhood policies are not driven by non-proliferation concerns. In fact, the
difference between countries of low, medium and high concern in the analyzed
documents is minimal. The alternative explanation is that there exists a consensus on
leaving out substantial non-proliferation issues out of the neighbourhood and
partnership policies. How can this be? A second look at the analyzed documents
reveals that they are dominated by security perceptions that can be loosely identified
with ‘multilateral’ and ‘cosmopolitan Europe.’ On the hand, they emphasize the
interdependence of security, in particular in areas such as energy and migration. The
Commission Communication on strengthening the ENP points out, for instance, that
“[f]rozen conflicts’ and recent events in the Middle East and Southern Caucasus
remind us that the conditions for peaceful coexistence remain to be established, both
between some of our neighbours and with other key countries. These are not only our
neighbours’ problems. They risk producing major spill-overs for the EU, such as
illegal immigration, unreliable energy supplies, environmental degradation and
terrorism” (Commission of the European Communities, 2006a: 2). Thus,
interdependence in areas of ‘low politics’ is one dominant trait of neighbourhood
documents. On the other hand, there are also clear elements based on notions of
human security, especially in areas of good governance, human rights or poverty
eradication in the neighbourhood. A typical example in this regard is the
Commission’s Strategy Paper on the ENP: “The privileged relationship with
neighbours will build on mutual commitment to common values principally within the
fields of the rule of law, good governance, the respect for human rights, including
minority rights, the promotion of good neighbourly relations, and the principles of
market economy and sustainable development” (Commission of the European
Communities, 2004b: 3). In short, security perceptions in the EU’s neighbourhood policies oscillate between human and interdependent security conceptions.

It comes, therefore, as no surprise that supporters of these two security perceptions do not want to water down neighbourhood policy documents with security ideas from ‘national’ or ‘integrationist Europe.’ Yet, this would happen, if issues of non-proliferation of WMD were strong within neighbourhood policies: First, proliferation concerns are prone to be interpreted in terms of national or European security, as WMDs can affect the very survival of Member States or the EU. Secondly, as has been outlined in chapter 3, EU non-proliferation policies are dominated by the Council and Member States, where ideas of national or European security are particularly dominant. Consequently, supporters of ‘multilateral’ or ‘cosmopolitan Europe’ have made an effort to keep neighbourhood and non-proliferation policies apart. In interviews, Commission officials responsible for neighbourhood policies paid only lip-service to non-proliferation issues. They made clear that non-proliferation issues are mainly dealt with by the Council or a separate non-proliferation unit in the Commission, which is – as chapter 3 shows – dominated by so-called ‘national experts,’ who are not particularly familiar with neighbourhood policies.250 In fact, the new European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, which substituted in 2006 all previously existing financial instruments for dealing with the Southern and Eastern neighbourhood, does not deal with issues non-proliferation of WMD at all.251 It is the Instrument for Stability that addresses them.

This separation of neighbourhood and non-proliferation policies is something holders of ‘national’ and ‘integrationist Europe’ idea complexes can easily support.

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251 See, for example, the project descriptions on the info websites of the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument for the Mediterranean (http://www.enpi-info.eu/indexmed.php) and the Eastern Partnership (http://www.enpi-info.eu/index.php).
As long as there is not an all-encompassing threat to survival, they also prefer to maintain a separate non-proliferation policy, where their notions of national or European security can be stronger than in the framework of the neighbourhood policies that are dominated by notions of human and interdependent security. Especially certain Member States and the Council are wary of conceding too much influence in the field of non-proliferation to Commission policies that are difficult to control.\textsuperscript{252} They are particularly eager to assure that neighbourhood policies do not contain any provisions that may limit the ‘national security’ policies of Member States in the field of non-proliferation. Most notably, the EU supports a WMD-free Middle East and not a WMD-free Mediterranean. The European nuclear powers, in particular France, clearly want to avoid that a WMD-Free Zone affects their own nuclear arsenals.\textsuperscript{253}

Institutionally, Member States and the Council have been very reluctant to mingle their non-proliferation policies with the Commission’s neighbourhood policy. In fact, non-proliferation experts in the Council and in non-proliferation departments in Member States are only marginally involved in the ENP. In the Office of the Personal Representative of the High Representative for non-proliferation issues, for instance, no one is responsible for neighbourhood issues as such. Consequently, the Council officials were not particularly well acquainted with neighbourhood policies in a strict sense in interviews.\textsuperscript{254} Likewise, Member States officials in non-proliferation departments do not deal specifically with neighbourhood policies.\textsuperscript{255} In short, supporters of national or European security are like the followers of ideas of human

\textsuperscript{252} Interestingly, in Council documents on the ENP non-proliferation issues are barely mentioned. See, for example, General Affairs and External Relations Council, 2007.

\textsuperscript{253} On Europe and a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Middle East, see Bailes, 2008.

\textsuperscript{254} Interviews with Council officials in Brussels, June 2006, December 2008 and January 2009.

\textsuperscript{255} Personal and phone interviews with Member State officials in Brussels, Copenhagen, Dublin and Madrid between December 2008 and June 2009.
and interdependent security content with a low profile of non-proliferation in the European neighbourhood policy towards the South and East. Consequently, non-proliferation issues play only a minor role in neighbourhood policy documents.

**Use of Means**

Given the lack of a clear non-proliferation profile in the various neighbourhood policies, it is hardly surprising that few non-proliferation means have been used so far, in particular in countries of high concern.\(^{256}\) So far, the EU’s activity in these countries can be best described as low-key political dialogue, which has found its expression in three forms.\(^{257}\) First, the EU sends regularly declarations and demarches in relation with non-proliferation agreements, mainly the CWC and BTWC;\(^{258}\) secondly, the EU raises the issue of non-proliferation during consultations or discussions, for example in the framework of the EU-Israel or the EU-Egypt Association Council Sub-Committees on Political Affairs\(^{259}\) or during a visit of the Personal Representative for non-proliferation in Egypt at the beginning of 2008.\(^{260}\) Thirdly, the EU has organized workshops on multilateral non-proliferation agreements, where representatives of Egypt, Israel and/or Syria participated, e.g. a

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\(^{256}\) The EU is, of course, aware of these shortcomings. According to Annalisa Giannella, Javier Solana’s Personal Representative for non-proliferation, “An area, which is perhaps not as developed as the other element of the Partnership, is the Security Dimension, the so-called 1st basket of the Partnership” (Giannella, 2006a: 8).

\(^{257}\) If not otherwise noted, all information in this section is based on the eleven Progress Reports of the European WMD Strategy, which are available at: [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=718&lang=en#Bookmark4](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=718&lang=en#Bookmark4) and on the attached DVD.

\(^{258}\) By definition the content of demarches is not public. The declarations can be found at: [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/App/newsroom/loadbook.aspx?BID=73&LANG=1&cmsid=359](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/App/newsroom/loadbook.aspx?BID=73&LANG=1&cmsid=359) and on the attached DVD.

\(^{259}\) The EU-Syria Association Committee has not been established yet. According to the Subcommittee regulations non-proliferation matters are discussed, but the minutes are not public. See EU-Egypt Association Council, 2008; EU-Israel Association Council, 2005.

\(^{260}\) If not indicated otherwise, the information on EU actions is based on the Council’s Six-monthly Progress Reports of the EU Non-proliferation Strategy. They are available at: [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.asp?id=718&lang=en&mode=g#Bookmark4](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.asp?id=718&lang=en&mode=g#Bookmark4).
workshop on the CWC in Cyprus in 2005 or an export control workshop with Israel organized by the UK. In June 2008, the EU also organized with the EU Institute for Security Studies a seminar on Middle East Security and WMD.

However, the planned regular meetings and seminars on disarmament and non-proliferation in the Middle East and the Mediterranean as confidence building measures, for which the EU has foreseen 100,000 Euro from the CFSP budget between 2005 and 2008, have not materialized despite strong European lobbying. Likewise, the idea of establishing a cooperative mechanism in the form of a network of points of contact on non-proliferation issues has failed so far. An ad hoc meeting of senior governmental and non-governmental experts on non-proliferation, which was seen as a starting point and which was formalized during the Euro-Mediterranean foreign minister meetings in Dublin (May 2004), the Hague (November 2004) and Luxembourg (May 2005), has basically led into a cul-de-sac. In short, the revival of confidence-building arms control talks similar to the 1992-1995 Arms Control and Regional Security Working Group (ACRS) in the framework of the Madrid Middle East peace process has not materialized.

Up to the present day, the most dramatic measure has been the inclusion of non-proliferation clauses in major agreements between the EU and Egypt, Israel and Syria (see Table 9). In the case of Syria the clause has been included in the Association Agreement (European Commission, 2004), whereas Egypt and Israel signed ENP Action Plans – the backbone of the ENP – with the clause. However, in all three cases significant drawbacks exist: First of all, the agreement with Syria has

\[ \text{261} \] The corresponding Presidency Conclusions are available on the attached DVD.

\[ \text{262} \] For an overview of ACRS and track two initiatives concerning non-proliferation in the Mediterranean, see Jones, 2008; Landau, 2008.

\[ \text{263} \] As the Association Agreement with Syria is not in force, no Action Plan has been signed with this country.
neither been signed nor ratified, although for reasons not related to the non-proliferation clause. Yet, this means that the non-proliferation clause, which includes a clear, even though weak element of political conditionality in relation with Syria’s non-proliferation obligations, is not in force. The problem of the ENP Action Plans is that the non-proliferation clause is, especially in the case of Israel, a watered-down version of the original and does not include political conditionality or at least clear benchmarks. Moreover, most of the Action Plan provisions, e.g. the improvement of export, transit and border controls, have not been tackled. Only Egypt has benefited from nuclear security assistance in the framework of Joint Action 2005/574/CFSP, specifically concerning the physical protection of nuclear materials and other radioactive materials in use, storage and transport and of nuclear facilities.

Table 9 The Application of the EU ‘Non-Proliferation Clause’ in the EU Neighbourhood

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REGION</th>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>EU ‘non-proliferation clause’ included in agreements with third countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mediterranean Region</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>Action Plan adopted with references to non-proliferation measures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>No agreement signed that could potentially include the non-proliferation clause</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>Action Plan adopted with references to non-proliferation measures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>No agreement signed that could potentially include the non-proliferation clause**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>No agreement signed that could potentially include the non-proliferation clause</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>Action Plan adopted with references to non-proliferation measures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Action Plan adopted with references to non-proliferation measures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>Association Agreement concluded with the non-proliferation clause***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>Action Plan adopted with references to non-proliferation measures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Europe</td>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>Action Plan adopted with references to non-proliferation measures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>Action Plan adopted with references to non-proliferation measures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>Action Plan adopted with references to non-proliferation measures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>No agreement signed that could potentially include the non-proliferation clause</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>Action Plan adopted with references to non-proliferation measures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Action Plan adopted with references to non-proliferation measures***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** New agreements with non-proliferation clause are being negotiated.
*** Agreement neither signed nor ratified.

Source: European Commission.

Note: The Palestinian Authority is not included in the Table.
In the case of the countries of medium concern, Action Plans are similarly weak in terms of non-proliferation. Most notably, although they contain a modified version of the non-proliferation clause, they do not establish clear political conditionality.\textsuperscript{264} Nevertheless, the EU’s activity in the countries of medium concern has been substantially stronger, in particular in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus. The main focus has been on so-called CTR programmes to assist the states of the former Soviet Union in controlling, protecting or even eliminating WMD and WMD-related material and expertise. The origin of CTR is the ‘Nunn-Lugar legislation’ (named after its sponsors, Senators Sam Nunn (Democrat-Georgia) and Richard Lugar (Republican-Indiana)) of 1991, which implemented for the first time CTR programmes in the field of nuclear weapons. From the very beginning both European states, especially Sweden, and the EU itself were involved in similar efforts, in particular in the area of nuclear safety through the Technical Aid to the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS) programme (Anthony, 2004). The Western CTR efforts received a new impulse in 2002, when the G8 launched the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction at their summit in Kananaskis, Canada. In line with the G8 members, the European Commission pledged to commit one billion Euro to the Global Partnership (see Butler, 2002).\textsuperscript{265} 

Even though most activity by both the United States and the EU has been focused on the Russian Federation, where the largest part of the former Soviet WMD programmes is located, already early projects focused on other states of the former

\textsuperscript{264} But it should be pointed out that the EU is negotiating a New Enhanced Agreement with Ukraine, which will include the non-proliferation clause, and that the draft mandate for the negotiations of a framework agreement with Libya clearly refers to the WMD clause.

Soviet Union. In this regard, the major contribution have been the so-called ‘science centres,’ namely the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC) in Moscow and the Science and Technology Center in Ukraine (STCU).\textsuperscript{266} Technically speaking, the science centres are international organizations consisting of the donor entities and the recipient countries. Both the ISTC and the STCU include neighbourhood countries of medium concern: Belarus, Armenia and Georgia in the case of the ISTC and Georgia and Ukraine in the case of the STCU. The main objective of the centres is the prevention of the proliferation of WMD-related expertise, i.e. that former Soviet WMD scientists offer their knowledge to rogue states. They try to achieve this aim mainly by providing grants to former WMD scientists to participate in alternative science projects. They have also assumed other functions, e.g. assisting scientists with patent applications. A review of the science centres’ work in 2005 shows, that 75,000 former Soviet scientists and engineers have been supported and that each year over 4,000 research projects are funded (Boureston and Nikitin, 2005). The European Commission supports the centres with approximately 25 million Euros a year. Despite remaining deficiencies, e.g. the clear identification of former Soviet WMD scientists, the centres are an example of successful EU-neighbourhood cooperation in the field of non-proliferation (Boureston and Nikitin, 2005). However, the centres have never been expanded to countries such as Egypt or Libya, although this idea was once floated by the 2004 updated list of priorities of the EU Non-Proliferation Strategy (Council of the European Union, 2004b; see also (Meier, 2005c).

Apart from the science centres, the EU has also supported other CTR activities, in particular in the area of export controls (Bauer, 2005) and, to a much

\textsuperscript{266} Their websites are available at: \url{http://www.istc.ru/} and \url{http://www.stcu.int/}. The highly technical EU/EC/EURATOM legislation related to the Science Centers – including Council and Commission Regulations and Decisions as well as the statutes of the Centers – can be found on the attached DVD.
lesser extent, in the field of border security management assistance, where most activity has focused on the issue of migration (Anthony et al., 2005). The CTR support is given in three ways: First, the Commission’s Joint Research Centre, which provides technical and scientific support to EU policies, has supported the science centres and cooperates with neighbouring countries in non-proliferation relevant research. According to the 2008 Six-monthly Progress Report, “For the period 2005-2010, the Joint Research Centre (JRC) support to the TACIS programme has been estimated to 30 million EUR and concerns 14 project,” (Council of the European Union, 2008d) of which two are in Ukraine and two in Armenia.267 The Institute for Transuranium Elements of the Joint Research Centre is particularly active in the area of combating illicit trafficking and cooperates with two countries of medium concern, Georgia and Ukraine (European Commission, 2008).

Secondly, EU Member States have cooperated with specific neighbouring countries in the area of export controls, e.g. Romania and Moldova; the UK, Italy and Libya; or Poland and Ukraine (Bauer, 2005). Thirdly, the Commission finances the so-called Pilot Projects 2005 and 2006 with 1.5 million Euro each.268 These projects, which are carried out by the German Federal Office of Economics and Export Control (BAFA), aim at improving export controls, particularly of dual-use items, in third countries (Federal Office of Economics and Export Control: BAFA, 2006). Among the countries of medium concern, Ukraine has taken part from the very beginning, whereas Georgia and Azerbaijan have become eligible recently.269 The project itself includes basically reviews of existing laws in third countries and training of export

267 In the framework of the Stability Instrument another five million Euro have been pledged. See European Commission, No date-c.
268 In the framework of the Stability Instrument another five million Euro have been pledged. See European Commission, No date-c.
269 For more information, see BAFA’s website: http://www.eu-outreach.info/eu_outreach/en/ukraine/index.html.
control personnel (Wessel, 2007). The new Stability Instrument, which was established in 2006 to finance specifically the Commission’s foreign and security policies, will basically continue all this activity, whereby the main focus remains on the science centres, which will receive around 40% of the Stability Instrument budget foreseen for non-proliferation measures (European Commission, No date-b).

Finally, the Council has adopted several Joint Actions that address specific non-proliferation issues in neighbouring countries of medium concern. The most prominent examples are the four Joint Actions supporting nuclear security. These Joint Actions include different projects such as the “Strengthening of States’ Capabilities for Detection and Response to Illicit Trafficking” or “Legislative Assistance for the Implementation of States’ Obligations under IAEA Safeguards Agreements and the Additional Protocols.” All countries of medium concern participate in at least one of these projects; Algeria and Armenia even in four. Furthermore, in the framework of the Joint Action in support of the CWC the EU organized a seminar in Algiers in June 2007 and in the framework of the Joint Action in support of the UNSC Resolution 1540 in Jordan. Recently, the EU has also adopted a Joint Action in the area of bio-safety and bio-security, which foresees awareness raising, training and networking activities in, *inter alia*, Eastern European countries that have ratified or are in the process of ratifying the BTWC. Furthermore, it has received a request from Ukraine in the area of physical protection of bio-laboratories.

The countries of low concern participate in most of the measures already mentioned in the case of the countries of medium concern: Azerbaijan and Moldova take part in Joint Research Centre/Institute for Transuranium Elements projects for

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270 The Joint Actions are available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.asp?id=718&lang=en&mode=g#Bookmark5 and on the attached DVD.
combating illicit nuclear trafficking and nuclear forensic capabilities. Both countries also joined the STCU in Kiev (in 2002 and 2004 respectively). Their scientist cooperate now fully in projects sponsored by the science centre. Morocco, for its part, is one of only ten participants in BAFA’s 2006 Pilot Project on export control of dual-use goods. Recently, Tunisia and Azerbaijan have become eligible as well. Furthermore, Morocco as well as Azerbaijan, Moldova, Jordan and Tunisia have received assistance in at least one of the three projects of the EU’s Joint Actions in support of the IAEA. It should be pointed out, however, that there exists a slight bias in favour of measures in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus, but taking into consideration the EU’s lack of involvement in Mediterranean countries of high concern (see above) the EU’s activity in Jordan, Tunisia and, in particular, in Morocco is still noteworthy.

How is it possible to explain the varying use of means in countries of high, medium and low concern? Once more, security interests are not dominant, as the EU’s main activity is concentrated in countries of medium and low concern and not – as security interests would predict – in countries of high concern. The explanation can be rather found in the compromises between the four different European idea complexes. Regarding use of means, compromise means that the EU refrains from more extreme forms of measures belonging to the realm of either force or mere persuasion. In fact, the use of military force to combat WMD proliferation in the neighbourhood has been blanked out completely, even if advocated or used by others. The US non-proliferation focus, for example, was much more on coercion and military solutions to proliferation problems (‘counter-proliferation’), especially during
the administration of George W. Bush (Müller and Schaper, 2004). Israel even launched an attack on a Syrian nuclear installation it believed to be used in the development of nuclear weapons (Sanger and Mazzetti, 2007). The European Union, however, has refrained from endorsing (or condemning) the use of such means. For reasons that will be discussed in the next section on state relations, the supporters of the ideas of ‘national’ or ‘integrationist Europe’ have seen no need to extend the EU’s coercive measures beyond the integration of non-proliferation clauses in agreements with third parties. At the same time, pure persuasion has not dominated either.

The Union’s means have been rather a balanced mix of moderate means such as limited coercion, traditional diplomacy and persuasion, which can be supported from the perspective of all idea complexes. These methods, however, especially the latter two, work only well in countries that are open to cooperation. As the countries of medium and low concern are substantially more inclined to cooperate with the EU, it is in these countries that the Union has been most active, thus explaining the difference in policy output between countries of high and countries of medium and low concern.

An important clue about a country’s willingness to cooperate with the EU is its view of the Union: The more Europeanist it is, the more cooperation can be expected. Interestingly, Eastern neighbours such as Ukraine or Georgia, where the EU is particularly active, have a clear European vocation. This congruence between European orientation and willingness to cooperate with the EU can be also demonstrated empirically: The regions with the most active EU non-proliferation

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policy coincide most with the EU majority vote in the UNGA and vice versa (see Figure 10).

**Figure 10** Voting Congruence with the EU Majority by Neighbouring Region at the UN General Assembly in the Field of Non-Proliferation (50th-63rd Session, 1995-2009)\(^{272}\)

![Graph showing voting congruence](image)

Source: Own elaboration based on voting records provided by the United Nations Bibliographic Information Service (http://www.un.org/Depts/dhl/unbisnet/index.html#voterecords).

Note: The Palestinian Authority is not included in the Figure. Only recorded votes on resolutions are analyzed. The majority of resolutions are adopted without a vote.

On the other hand, countries with few EU non-proliferation policies, i.e. particularly countries of high concern, coincide rarely with the EU in UNGA votes. Moreover, the opinions of these countries of the EU in foreign and security affairs is very low, especially in Israel (Harpaz, 2007). As a consequence, EU-Israel cooperation in the field of non-proliferation has been very weak. This shows that the EU foreign and security policy can suffer from what might be called the problem of

\(^{272}\) The raw data, calculations and final data can be found in a Microsoft Excel file called “Data Voting UNGA” on the attached DVD. The non-machine-readable raw data was extracted using the ITPilot of the Denodo Platform, an information integration software. I would like to thank Justo Hidalgo and Denodo Technologies for their invaluable support.
double compromise. That is, it is not only important that the EU finds suitable compromises between the ideas that underpin its foreign and security policies but also between the EU’s internal consensus and the normative and causal beliefs behind third countries’ foreign policies.

**Relations with Other Actors**

How beliefs about state relations influences EU non-proliferation policy output in the neighbourhood – both rhetorically and in practice – can be best seen in the countries of medium concern in Eastern Europe and in the states of high concern, especially Egypt and Israel. In both instances, transatlantic relations play a crucial role. The origin of Europe’s CTR programmes lies in the United States, where the idea of securing and/or eliminating hazardous WMDs surfaced in the aftermath of the end of the Cold War (see above). Ever since, the United States has been the driving force behind these efforts. For example, during the 2002 Kananaskis G8 summit the United States alone pledged ten billion dollars of support for CTR programmes – that is about ten times more than the European Commission (see Butler, 2002). Furthermore, the United States has a substantially bigger programme in the field of export and border controls, the so-called Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) programme. According to its mandate, it “is a U.S. Government interagency program, managed by the Department of State's Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, designed to help prevent proliferation of WMD, their missile delivery systems, conventional weapons and related items by assisting foreign governments to establish and implement effective export control systems that meet international standards” (Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance Program, 2008). It is a massive programme that has financed since its beginning in
1998 relevant bilateral and regional projects worth nearly $400 million. In total, four ministries are involved in its execution: the Departments of State, Commerce, Energy and Homeland Security. Its main activities are training workshops, the provision of equipment and international conferences and seminars. The main focus has been on Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Thus, it becomes obvious that the United States has exercised a clear leadership role in non-proliferation policies in Eastern Europe.

However, this leadership role has been much more moderate and cooperative than for example in Iraq. The successive US administrations have made an effort to integrate partners such as Canada, Japan, European countries and later the European Union. As the second largest donor of non-proliferation programmes in Eastern Europe, the EU is a particularly respected partner of the United States. In interviews with US and European officials, it is this cooperation and coordination that is frequently highlighted as the main area of EU-US collaboration in non-proliferation. Such collaboration can be easily supported by basically all ideas on state relations in the EU: Bilateralists, who emphasize the importance of the transatlantic relationship, are supportive because of US leadership; Europeanists like the respect the EU gets from the United States in this field; and multilateralists are content with the multilateral approach to CTR. Even cosmopolitan elements can be found, e.g. in the Science Centers’ encouragement of people-to-people contacts between former Soviet and Western scientists. Therefore, the EU as a whole has eagerly followed US leadership in CTR in Eastern Europe, thus explaining the EU’s particularly strong policy output in this region.

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The Mediterranean neighbourhood, however, is another story. In this area a clear, cooperative US leadership has been largely missing. Most US attention has been given to countries outside the limits of the EU’s Mediterranean policies, in particular to countries of the ‘Broader Middle East,’ e.g. Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan or Pakistan. CTR programmes, for their part, are mostly located in the former Soviet Union. In the EXBS programme, only a limited number of projects have been carried out in the Euro-Mediterranean area, e.g. the supply of advanced x-ray screening systems to customs and border police officers in Jordan or a US-Morocco Transhipment Conference in May 2008 in Tangier. Given this lack of US leadership in the EU’s Southern neighbourhood, bilateralists have had no incentive to emulate US policies like in Eastern Europe. Europeanist ideas, for their part, are difficult to reconcile with the US sanction policies against suspected proliferators in the Mediterranean region, in particular Syria and Libya. Although both the United States and the EU have imposed economic sanctions in the two cases, US sanctions have been substantially stricter. This was particularly problematic in the case of Libya, where the EU and the United States had serious disagreements over the application of US sanctions, especially concerning the 1996 Iran and Libya Sanctions Act, which also targeted European companies doing business in Libya. Multilateralist ideas were at odds with the United States during much of the administration of George W. Bush, as it conducted virtually no persuasive policies aimed at the

274 For a summary, see http://exportcontrol.org/library/conferences/2516/04_U.S._Export_Control_Cooperation_and_Outreach_The_EXBS_Pr.pdf.
275 For an overview of current US legislation, see Office of Foreign Assets Control, 2006, 2009a, 2009b. For an overview of European legislation, see http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/cfsp/sanctions/measures.htm#Libya and http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/cfsp/sanctions/measures.htm#Syria. For European protective measures against US sanctions, see http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/cfsp/sanctions/measures.htm#USA. All documents are also available on the attached DVD.
ratification or the strengthening of non-proliferation institutions and agreements. On the contrary, the United States itself was particularly hostile towards international non-proliferation agreements and failed to ratify two that are seen as crucial by the EU: the Additional Protocol to safeguards agreements with the IAEA and the CTBT. Finally, cosmopolitan ideas were difficult to reconcile with the US plans during George W. Bush’s second Presidency to emulate in the wake of the Iraq war the already existing Barcelona Process and the ENP. The newly introduced policies, first the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) and then – in official cooperation with the G8 and the EU – the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative (BMENAI), can be seen from a cosmopolitan perspective as competition of already existing policies in the field of good governance and human rights, in particular when these policies lack adequate funding and duplicate European efforts as in the case of the MEPI and the BMENAI. In short, US leadership in the Mediterranean region has been weak and divisive. This explains at least partially the low non-proliferation policy output by the EU in this region, in particular regarding the countries of high concern.

More important is, however, that two of the countries of high concerns – Israel and Egypt – are important bilateral allies of both the United States and the EU, e.g. as commercial partners or in the fight against Islamist terrorism. Therefore, ideas of ‘national’ or ‘integrationist Europe,’ which might be the strongest in favour of forceful non-proliferation policies, tend towards bilateral concessions to Egyptian and

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276 See [http://bmena.state.gov](http://bmena.state.gov); Sharp, 2005a, 2005b. For a critical evaluation, see Cofman Wittes, 2004; International Crisis Group, 2004; Ottaway, 2004. Non-proliferation issues were not included in the MEPI and the BMENAI.

277 It comes, therefore, as no surprise that the only studies that have dealt at least partially with transatlantic relations in the field of non-proliferation in the Mediterranean highlight particularly the necessity to establish a common transatlantic approach (Chubin, Hoffman and Rosenau, 2004; Daalder, Gnesotto and Gordon, 2006; Everts, 2004b).
Israeli interests and sensibilities in matters of non-proliferation. Within this context, multilateralist ideas are probably the most supporting ideas for European non-proliferation policies in Egypt and Israel, as both countries have the worst ratification record of international non-proliferation agreements in the whole European neighbourhood (see Table 8). Not surprisingly, the most important EU non-proliferation policy in the two countries is the inclusion of an albeit watered down version of the non-proliferation clause in their ENP Action Plans.\(^{278}\) Stronger output, however, has not been possible against ideas of ‘national’ or ‘integrationist Europe.’ Ideas of ‘cosmopolitan Europe,’ for their part, can easily support such a low profile in matters of non-proliferation, as they focus on more comprehensive issues such as good governance or the Middle East Peace Process in general. Consequently, EU non-proliferation policies towards countries of high concern in the neighbourhood has been rather weak.

**Conclusion**

The empirical analysis of the EU non-proliferation policy in its neighbourhood has led to two key findings: First, non-proliferation issue play only a very minor role in European documents related to its Southern and Eastern neighbourhood. Secondly, the EU’s policy output in the neighbouring countries varies substantially from one country to another. For the purpose of this chapter the neighbouring countries have been divided into three groups according to the WMD or dual-use capabilities they have, the number of non-proliferation agreements they have ratified and the degree to

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\(^{278}\) In this regard, it must be pointed out that the non-proliferation provisions were a major obstacle for the conclusion of the ENP Action Plan with Israel (Interviews with EU officials, Brussels, June 2006; Diab, 2004-2005).
which they cooperate with the EU in international fora: first, countries of high concern (Egypt, Israel and Syria); secondly, countries of medium concern (Algeria, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Lebanon, Libya and Ukraine); and, thirdly, countries of low concern (Azerbaijan, Jordan, Moldova, Morocco and Tunisia). Whereas output in the countries of medium and low proliferation concern, especially in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus, has been significant, they have been almost negligible in the countries of high concern in the Middle East. In the former, the EU has implemented in cooperation with the neighbouring countries numerous non-proliferation measures such as special projects for former WMD scientists, the enhancement of export controls or the improvement of nuclear safety. In the latter, most EU activity has been focused on low-profile political dialogue and the inclusion of the non-proliferation clause in bilateral agreements.

The inconsistency of the EU’s non-proliferation policy in its neighbourhood as well as the lack of substantial references to non-proliferation in neighbourhood documents cannot be explained with the traditional variable of security interests, as the necessary correlation is missing. There exists, however, substantial congruence between compromises between the four competing European idea complexes and non-proliferation policies in the Southern and Eastern neighbourhood. The low profile of non-proliferation issues in documents can be interpreted as the result of ideational balancing between the security perceptions of ‘multilateral’ and ‘cosmopolitan Europe,’ which are particularly strong in documents in the Commission driven neighbourhood and partnership policies, and security perceptions of ‘national’ and ‘integrationist Europe,’ which are stronger in Council based documents outside of the neighbourhood policies: On the one hand, supporters of ‘multilateral’ or ‘cosmopolitan Europe’ are eager to maintain the dominance of their approaches to
security in the neighbourhood policies. On the other hand, the backers of ideas of ‘national’ or ‘integrationist Europe’ are reluctant to include non-proliferation issues – a key element in their security thinking – into hard to control Commission documents.

The varying policy output in countries of high, medium and low concern is the result of consensus (or lack thereof) between the different European ideas on the use of means and state relations. In Eastern Europe, where the majority of countries of medium and low concern is located, cooperative partner countries and a measured US leadership have facilitated a European consensus on moderate measures such as support for export controls or nuclear safety. In the Southern neighbourhood, especially in the countries of high concern, reluctant partner countries, the lack of cooperative US leadership and the missing willingness by some EU Member States to get involved more forcefully with partner countries have led to a very low degree of policy output in matters of non-proliferation. The EU has mainly agreed on low-profile measures in the area of political dialogue and political conditionality. In sum, compromises between the different European idea complexes have led ultimately to very moderate non-proliferation policies in the Southern and Eastern neighbourhood. Thus, the EU has occupied as so often the middle ground between forceful and coherent policies and not doing anything at all.
“Effective multilateralism is the cornerstone of the European strategy for combating proliferation of WMD,” argues the European Union in its key document in the area of non-proliferation, the 2003 EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. As in the case of the European Security Strategy, ‘effective multilateralism’ plays indeed a crucial role in the conceptualization of the EU’s non-proliferation policy and the measures that have been taken by the Union. At first sight, this concept basically implies two sets of measures: first, the “...the need to build capable and efficient international institutions and regimes” (Ortega, 2007: 43; see also Laatikainen and Smith, 2006) and, secondly, “enforceable multilateralism” (Biscop and Drieskens, 2006: 273), i.e. the enforcement of multilateral obligations by third countries. Based on such a broad definition, large parts of the measures the EU has adopted since its non-proliferation policy took off in the aftermath of the end of the Cold War fall within the category of ‘effective multilateralism.’

However, once one goes beyond scratching the surface of what the EU means with ‘effective multilateralism,’ the concept becomes increasingly ambiguous, especially in the field of non-proliferation. In interviews for this dissertation, no common definition has emerged.\(^{279}\) Most notably, the EU does not specify its position on key questions related to ‘effective multilateralism,’ in particular its relation with

\(^{279}\) Personal and phone interviews with EU and Member State officials in Brussels, Copenhagen, Dublin and Madrid between December 2008 and June 2009. It should be also pointed out that the concept ‘effective multilateralism’ has no legal force whatsoever.
other forms of organizing the EU’s relations with third countries, e.g. bilateralism, the use of force and the rights and obligations of its Member States. For example, is multilateralism always more effective than bilateralism? Does the enforcement of multilateral obligations include military operations without a clear UN Security Council mandate? Or does the strengthening of international treaties include Britain’s and France’s commitment to nuclear disarmament, as outlined in Article VI of the major international non-proliferation treaty, the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty? In short, as will be demonstrated in this chapter, the EU has not been able to provide clear and coherent answers to numerous more concrete questions regarding ‘effective multilateralism,’ neither in the ESS nor in the Non-Proliferation Strategy.

As the literature suggests, the main reason for these shortcomings is the lack of a more profound consensus on what actually constitutes multilateralism among the EU and its Member States (Cameron, 2004; Gowan, 2008; Jørgensen, 2006b; Krause, 2004). In the words of Krause, “…the European perception of multilateralism is not uniform, but rather, there are many differing forms and rationales behind [the] more general approval of it” (Krause, 2004: 48). However, why did the EU still chose ‘effective multilateralism’ as its key strategic concept, even though it is not able to provide an adequate common meaning? In other words, what is the purpose of the concept? Based on theoretical ideas developed by ‘strategic constructivism’ (Jabko, 2006), I will argue in this chapter that despite its ambiguity (or precisely because of it) the concept has been used as a so-called focal point. It fulfils in particular three major functions for the EU: First, it creates internal cohesion by forming a common concept for EU foreign and security policy and by providing a common image of the EU to the outside world – traditionally the main role of a focal point; secondly, it gives the EU as an international actor strategic coherence in the form of means and objectives
without alienating major players in the EU’s foreign and security policy; and thirdly, it gives legitimacy to the EU’s activity in international affairs.

The structure of the chapter is basically threefold: First, I will analyze the development of the concept of ‘effective multilateralism’ in the context of the European foreign and security policy. Special attention will be paid to the reasons for the choice of this particular concept. Afterwards, I will turn to the different positions on multilateralism within Europe and their relation with the EU’s ‘effective multilateralism,’ both in the light of primary documents and secondary literature. Thirdly, I will examine in how far the EU has fulfilled the functions of ‘effective multilateralism’ – cohesion, coherence and legitimacy building – in the area of international non-proliferation institutions. I will pay special attention to the key treaties and organizations in the field of non-proliferation, in particular the IAEA and the NPT, the CTBT and the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), the CWC and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the BTWC and the HCOC. To a lesser extent I will also analyse regimes such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). The

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280 On coherence and consistency, see Nuttall, 2005. In the English language, ‘coherence’ and ‘consistency’ are virtually synonyms, though some authors try to differentiate between them.

281 In this dissertation there is no need to discuss the different forms of international institutions such as treaties, formal organizations or regimes. Suffices it to point out that they are all related to rules, norms and procedures and are, thus, particularly useful in an idea based study. For discussions, see Jørgensen, 2008: 6-8; Jørgensen, Oberthür and Shahin, 2007: 3-4. It should be also highlighted that this chapter deals not with the mutual impact of international institutions and the EU in a strict sense, though it is certainly a promising way of investigation (Jørgensen, 2008; see also Rosa, 2001). The aim is rather to examine in how far the concept ‘effective multilateralism’ facilitates EU foreign policy output regarding international non-proliferation institutions.

282 In order to maintain this chapter within manageable limits, other organizations are not examined here, most notably the ISTC and ISTU, which have been analyzed in the previous chapter, KEDO (see chapter 3 for a brief introduction), the CPPNM (see chapter 3 for a brief introduction). The still to be negotiated Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty is also left out here, though the EU strongly supports such a Treaty (see Giannella, 2006b).

283 The Proliferation Security Initiative, “a collective effort to strengthen the political commitment, practical capacities, and legal authorities necessary to stop, search, and, if necessary, seize vessels and aircraft believed to be transporting…” WMDs or related materials (Byers, 2004: 528) is not taken into consideration, as the EU is still not a full participant (Giannella, 2009). It supports, however, the
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analysis shall finally convey a thorough understanding of the concept 'effective multilateralism' in the context of the EU's policy on non-proliferation institutions.

1. The Choice of ‘Effective Multilateralism’ in European Foreign and Security Policy

The concept of ‘effective multilateralism’ became a key element of the European foreign policy discourse in 2003, when it emerged as a central concept of the ESS, the Non-Proliferation Strategy and the first Commission Communication on EU-UN relations. Ever since, ‘effective multilateralism’ has become the defining concept of European foreign and security policy. Although it cannot be found in any of the Treaties, key ideas of ‘effective multilateralism’ have even become part of the Lisbon Treaty, e.g. the promotion of “multilateral solutions to common problems” and “an international system based on stronger multilateral cooperation and good global governance” (Art. 10 A).

This strong preference for multilateralism in the EU is generally explained as a result of Europe’s particular post-World War II history, during which multilateral negotiations and the construction of multilateral institutions have been a major component of the foreign policies of (Western) European states (Cameron, 2004; Groom, 2006; Kelle, 2005). Furthermore, Europe can be seen historically as “a positive force in the United Nations” (Fassbender, 2004), the main multilateral institutions. Some also emphasize that it was (Western European) multilateralism that has ultimately prevailed over its Eastern alternatives after the end of the Cold War initiative (Council of the European Union, 2004c).
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(Morgan, 1993). Today multilateralism can be seen from this point of view as the natural default option in European foreign and security policy.

However, the historical tendency towards multilateralism still does not explain sufficiently why the specific term ‘effective multilateralism’ emerged at a specific point of time and why the EU fails to provide a more concrete definition of multilateralism. In other words, the adoption of ‘effective multilateralism’ as a key strategic concept for the European foreign and security policy is not necessarily the inevitable result of a long evolutionary process. The adoption of the concept suggests rather that it is the result of certain concrete intentions by European policy-makers. Interestingly, Javier Solana, the High Representative for CFSP, tends to use before 2003 expressions such as “genuine and comprehensive multilateralism” (Solana, 2002b) or “constructive multilateralism” (Solana, 2002a) and not ‘effective multilateralism.’ Moreover, although ‘effective multilateralism’ certainly did not appear out of the blue – ‘multilateralism’ *per se* had formed part of the European foreign policy discourse in the years before – the term ‘effective multilateralism’ emerged only as a key concept during the drafting procedure of the ESS and the Non-Proliferation Strategy.²⁸⁴ It became even more prominent during the process: Whereas in the Thessaloniki Draft of the ESS one of the two strategic objectives is called merely “Strengthening the international order” (Solana, 2003: 8), the final version uses the heading “An international order based on effective multilateralism” (*European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a Better World*, 2003: 9). The same occurs in the case of the Non-Proliferation Strategy: Whereas the Strategy’s forerunners – the Basic Principles and the Action Plan (Council of the European

²⁸⁴ The drafting procedure of the ESS is already well documented. See Bailes, 2005.
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Union, 2003a, 2003b) – do not use even once the term ‘effective multilateralism,’ the Strategy itself refers prominently to the concept.

This is not to say that multilateralism did not play a role in European strategic thinking before the ESS and the Non-Proliferation Strategy. In fact, there are numerous internal, and external factors that may explain the EU’s preference for multilateralism.285 Yet, the point I want to make is that ‘effective multilateralism’ was deliberately chosen as a strategic concept to act as a focal point and to fulfil certain functions. The fact that there is a general preference for multilateralism among European policy-makers and citizens in general certainly contributed to the selection of multilateralism,286 but due to the contested meaning of multilateralism it is questionable that it emerged inevitably as a common European strategic concept. Yet, it was this very contested meaning of multilateralism that made it useful for the adoption by policy-makers: As ‘strategic constructivism,’ an approach developed by Jabko regarding market ideas and the establishment of the internal market of the EU, argues, actors can use the diffuse meaning of ideas for political strategy: “We should expect actors to creatively exploit the polyvalence of ideas and the institutional tensions that these ideas create in pursuit of complex and multiple goals” (Jabko, 2006: 40).287 In other words, the ambiguous meaning of multilateralism allowed European policy-makers to develop ‘effective multilateralism’ as a common concept to achieve certain objectives.

In order to delineate these objectives, it is necessary to focus first of all on the international context of the ESS and the Non-Proliferation Strategy, the documents

285 Jørgensen mentions, inter alia, the role of interest groups, the EU’s desire to export its own model of governance, military weakness, or the policies of third states, in particular the United States (Jørgensen, 2006a).
286 In contrast to the United States, it is a concept that is not challenged per se by important strands of foreign policy thinking.
287 Jabko developed also his own ideas regarding ‘effective multilateralism’ (Jabko, Unpublished).
that established the concept. One issue is particularly relevant: Since the days of the Presidency of Bill Clinton, the United States has become increasingly selective regarding multilateral treaties and organizations, provoking a perceived “crisis of multilateralism” (Newman, 2007). Consequently, the EU’s ‘effective multilateralism’ can be seen as a reaction towards increasing US unilateralism. De Vasconcelos, currently the director of the EU Institute for Security Studies, maintains, for instance, that “[a]s defined by the European Union, effective multilateralism is very much a response to the unilateralist posture of the Bush administration and the reaffirmation, albeit in a less favourable environment, that it is possible to find in the UN the legitimacy and the capacity to deal with international security and other global issues” (Vasconcelos, 2008: 26). However, to interpret the concept of ‘effective multilateralism’ in the ESS and the Non-Proliferation Strategy as merely a European reaction to US unilateralism would be over-simplistic. More importantly, the Iraq War highlighted major deficiencies within the EU itself: First, the EU was deeply divided between supporters and opponents of the invasion in Iraq. Secondly, it showed that the EU lacked a clear strategic concept, especially in the field of non-proliferation. Most notably, it was unclear what the means and ends of European policies should be. Thirdly, the EU could not claim international legitimacy for its (in)action. Thus, European foreign policy-makers were confronted in 2003 with a triple challenge: internal division, strategic incoherence and lack of legitimacy. In order to revive the momentum of European foreign and security policy it was necessary to provide a common framework for the different European views on foreign and security policy.

288 For a neoconservative critique of European multilateralism aimed at a multipolar order and the containment of US power (in contrast to traditional US multilateralism based on the equality of sovereign states), see Van Oudenaren, 2005.
289 In several interviews in Brussels in December 2008 and January 2009, European officials argued basically the same.
to overcome these shortcomings. And a suitable concept to fulfil this function was ‘effective multilateralism.’

2. European Ideas of Multilateralism

Krause identifies three different interpretations of multilateralism in the EU, each one loosely identified with the Union’s three major powers: Great Britain, France and Germany (Krause, 2004). Although these views contain central elements of the divisions in Europe regarding multilateralism, they might not fully grasp all dimensions. A look at the secondary literature provides first clues about an alternative approach: the divisions within the literature itself. Already at the end of the Cold War – when multilateralism became a prominent research topic – Keohane complained that “[w]hen a scholar refers to multilateralism, it is not immediately clear what phenomena are to be described and explained” (Keohane, 1990: 731; see also Van Oudenaren, 2003). This has hardly changed 18 years later.

Basically, there is a division between minimalist and maximalist interpretations (Corbetta and Dixon, 2004). The minimalist tradition goes back to Keohane who argues that “[m]ultilateralism can be defined as the practice of co-ordinating national policies in groups of three or more states, through ad hoc arrangements or by means of institutions” (Keohane, 1990: 731). From this perspective multilateralism can be differentiated from unilateralism and bilateralism mainly through the number of state actors and can take many forms, including alliances such as NATO (Corbetta and Dixon, 2004). The states themselves retain a

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290 For a critique of these two still very state-centric and western-centric approaches, see the United Nations University inspired normative literature on ‘new multilateralism,’ which takes into account civil society or views on multilateralism in the global South (Cox, 1997; Schechter, 1999).
high degree of national sovereignty when they act multilaterally and choose multilateralism for their foreign policies among different options.

The maximalist interpretation of multilateralism has its origins in the work of Ruggie, for whom “…multilateralism is an institutional form that coordinates relations among three or more states on the basis of generalized principles of conduct…” [my emphasis], e.g. diffuse reciprocity (Ruggie, 1993: 11). This tradition has in common that it emphasizes the importance of certain principles that govern multilateral interaction. The ability of states to pursue only its own national interests is diminished. Increasingly, this form of multilateralism is seen within the context of the debate on global governance (Forman and Segaar, 2006). In its most extreme form, this kind of multilateralism literature merges with the literature on global governance. Sven Biscop argues, for instance, that “[e]ffective multilateralism can best be understood as an effective system of global governance…” (Biscop, 2004: 27; see also Ortega, 2007: 114).

At a more abstract level, the minimalist and maximalist traditions can be distinguished depending on the form of multilateralism. It is possible to differentiate in particular between normative and functional multilateralism. Normative multilateralism implies that multilateral activity is not only a policy choice but the result of a normative preference for multilateralism. Multilateralism is generally seen as the superior form of interacting with other entities in the international system. In the words of Benita Ferrero-Waldner, “Multilateralism is the only effective approach (...) for a whole host of issues which affect the future of our planet” (Ferrero-Waldner, 2009a: 2). In a sense, it is rather a belief or ideology (Caporaso, 1993). Although it is

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291 Keohane argues that Ruggie’s concept is better described as ‘supralateralism’ (Keohane, 1990: 732, fn 2).
globalist in outlook, i.e. the United Nations is the principal framework for multilateral activity, it favours also the maintenance of multilateral principles over universality at any cost. In other words, the willingness to limit multilateralism by making compromises with a few reluctant states, in particular the United States, is low. On the contrary, functional multilateralism regards multilateralism merely as a foreign policy tool (Martin, 1993). It assumes that actors can choose between unilateralism, bilateralism and multilateralism, both at the regional and global level. Ultimately, multilateralism is seen as a self-interested option of states (or other actors such as the EU). De Vasconcelos argues, for instance, that “[i]n a global system shaped by norms and rules, the Union can play a major role in pursuing its own interests and by doing so avoid a power based system where it could aspire to little more than a complementary role to that of the United States” (Vasconcelos, 2008: 18). Thus, the sovereignty of the individual actors involved in instrumental multilateralism is limited only minimally (Plattner, 2005). Even more, the inclusion of key states (read the United States) is indispensable for the proper working of multilateralism. From this perspective, multilateralism can be also “dysfunctional,” i.e. “forms of international cooperation and organization that affect the decision-making calculus of states (…) but are at best suboptimal and at worst counter-productive from the perspective of international order... (Van Oudenaren, 2003: 39). For functional multilateralists, multilateralism is, therefore a legitimate option, if it is effective, whereas for normative multilateralism, it is effective, because it is the most legitimate way of dealing with international problems.

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292 Goldgeier and Weber argue, for example, that the offer of membership in an international organization can be a useful tool to effect change, e.g. in the case of Ukraine or Iran (Goldgeier and Weber, 2005/2006).
In the case of the EU, however, it is not sufficient to distinguish only between normative and functional multilateralism to grasp the different positions regarding multilateralism. Rather, a second dimension has to be introduced, namely the role of the EU as an independent actor in its own right. In this regard, the question is whether directly the EU or its Member States are the main vehicle for the implementation of multilateralism.

Put in a matrix, these two dimensions allow differentiating between four different European perspectives on multilateralism, which roughly coincide with the four idea complexes developed in this dissertation (see Table 1): ‘national Europe,’ ‘integrationist Europe,’ ‘cosmopolitan Europe’ and ‘multilateral Europe.’ As can be seen in Table 10, ‘national’ and ‘integrationist Europe,’ on the one hand, and ‘cosmopolitan’ and ‘multilateral Europe,’ on the other, are separated by the importance they give to the EU as an international actor in its own right. At the same time, ‘cosmopolitan’ and ‘multilateral Europe’ share a preference for normative multilateralism, while ‘national’ and ‘integrationist Europe’ have in common the functional use of multilateralism. Apart from these differences, the four idea complexes can be also distinguished by looking into other dimensions that might be significant for the analysis of ‘effective multilateralism’ and that have been outlined already, most notably the use of force. Among the supporters of functional multilateralism use of force is a necessity. Robert Cooper, the Council’s Director of DG-E, argues, for example, that “…multilateralism, if it is to be effective, needs to be backed by strength, including armed strength” (Cooper, 2003). For normative multilateralists, however, the use of force is, if it at all, a peripheral ‘last resort’ instrument that can be used only under strict multilateral supervision: “Primär geht es
(...) um den Einsatz friedlicher Mittel, eine humanitäre militärische Intervention kann immer nur ‘last resort’ sein” (Ferrero-Waldner, 2007a: 4).

### Table 10 European Ideas of Multilateralism

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>INDEPENDENCE OF EU</th>
<th>FUNCTIONAL</th>
<th>NORMATIVE</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>National Europe</td>
<td>Multilateral Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Integrationist Europe</td>
<td>Cosmopolitan Europe</td>
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Source: Own elaboration.

The four different views on multilateralism in the EU are an enduring feature of European foreign and security policy. In order to establish the basis for collective action under such a condition, a common security culture would be necessary, which would make the EU distinctive in regard to other actors and which would give it a certain purpose. In the absence of a truly common security culture (see chapter 2), a focal point can be created around a unifying concept, which is sufficiently concrete to allow the identification with it, but which is sufficiently broad to avoid the alienation of key actors.\(^{293}\) In European economic integration this focal point has been the principle of mutual recognition, i.e. “goods and services that may be legally be sold in one country should have unrestricted access to other markets” (Garrett and Weingast, 1993: 189). In European foreign and security policy, it is the concept ‘effective multilateralism.’ Similar to the flag in the ‘rallying around the flag’ phenomenon, it is a common idea that forms the glue between disparate parts.

\(^{293}\) This can be but is not necessarily part of a process of identity formation at the European level. For multilateralism and identity formation in the EU, see Jørgensen, 2006b.
In research interviews for this dissertation, all European officials embraced wholeheartedly the concept of ‘effective multilateralism’ and maintained that there is a common understanding within the EU of what it means. Interestingly, though, no one was able to provide a substantive definition, thus showing how ambiguity can lead to unity.\footnote{Personals and phone interviews with EU and Member State officials in Brussels, Copenhagen, Dublin and Madrid between December 2008 and June 2009.} As Bailes argues in the case of the ESS, “In political terms, [the ESS] could only achieve its unity-building aim by staying broad-brush enough for all the EU members to read their favourite agendas into it, leaving them room to assert their special interests during the follow-up” (Bailes, 2005: 14). The same could be said of the Non-Proliferation Strategy. In both the ESS and the Non-Proliferation Strategy ‘effective multilateralism’ plays a crucial role, as it allows unifying the different European views on multilateralism under a single umbrella.

Above all, the drafters of the Strategies have found in the very term ‘effective multilateralism’ a suitable compromise between normative and functional multilateralism. If pure normative multilateralism had prevailed in the ESS and the Non-Proliferation Strategy – as some argue – ‘effective multilateralism’ would be a pleonasm, as from this perspective multilateralism is ultimately always the most effective way of dealing with international issues. But still, the supporters of normative multilateralism can accept the expression ‘effective multilateralism’ as a truism. In this sense, one EU report claims that “[t]he EU is committed to the multilateral treaty system, which provides the legal and normative basis for all non-proliferation efforts” (Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1540 (2004), 2004: 5). For the supporters of functional multilateralism, on the other hand, ‘effective multilateralism’ is everything but a truism. Yet, they can interpret
‘effective multilateralism’ as the support of multilateralism whenever it can be effective. Not surprisingly, in the same report as quoted a few lines above, the EU qualifies its commitment to multilateralism, thus balancing normative and functional multilateralism: “If the multilateral treaty regime is to remain credible it must be made more effective” (Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1540 (2004), 2004: 5). Consequently, an expression such as ‘effective multilateralism’ is an acceptable strategic concept for all the different ideas that exist in European foreign and security policy regarding multilateralism (Jabko, Unpublished).

In sum, a consensus has emerged in the EU that sees ‘effective multilateralism’ as a core principle of its common foreign and security policy. This consensus is further fostered by European policy-makers in the Council, the Commission and the Parliament, who mention assiduously ‘effective multilateralism’ in almost any relevant external policy document. Moreover, in interviews or speeches they tend to emphasize multilateralism as the single most important characteristic of the EU in international affairs. For Javier Solana, for example, multilateralism forms a central element of the “EU philosophy” (Solana, 2005a: 3).

3. The Squaring of the Circle: The Functions of ‘Effective Multilateralism’ in the European Non-Proliferation Policy

Although the EU is active in various areas of non-proliferation, including the implementation of CTR programmes in the former Soviet Union or the EU/E3 negotiations with Iran (see previous chapters), the EU remains deeply divided over many issues, not least in the area of international non-proliferation institutions. None
the less, as will be demonstrated further on, the EU has found under the umbrella ‘effective multilateralism’ a mix of ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ consensuses between the backers of different views on what constitutes effective multilateral policies. In this regard, ‘strong consensus’ means profound agreement on a certain issue, whereas ‘weak consensus’ refers to superficial compromises that can be easily rejected. Both types of consensus can be found regarding the EU policies towards international non-proliferation institutions. However, it is not clear in how far the circle has been squared sufficiently to actually fulfil the three functions of ‘effective multilateralism’ as a focal point – internal cohesion, strategic coherence and legitimacy – in the EU’s non-proliferation policy.

**Cohesion**

In practical terms, the cohesive effects of ‘effective multilateralism’ manifest itself in the adhesion to and representation in multilateral institutions of EU Member States. In the field of WMD non-proliferation a strong consensus has emerged on the key elements that constitute the international non-proliferation institutions. As the *Common Position on the universalisation and reinforcement of multilateral agreements in the field of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and means of delivery* (Council of the European Union, 2003c) outlines, these elements are: the NPT and the corresponding Safeguard Agreements and Additional Protocols, the CWC, the BTWC, the CTBT and the HCOC. This includes also the corresponding international organizations – the IAEA in the case of the NPT, the OPCW in the case of the CWC and the CTBTO – and relevant informal multilateral arrangements in the

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295 The six-monthly progress reports of the Non-Proliferation Strategy provide a detailed summary of the EU’s activity.
field of export controls, most notably the NSG and the Australia Group (in the area of chemical and biological weapons). All 27 EU Member States are members of all these multilateral treaties, organizations and informal arrangements. This is a notable demonstration of the commitment of the EU as a whole to multilateral non-proliferation treaties, which only 20 years ago would have been unimaginable. Spain and France, for example, joined the NPT only in 1987 and 1992 respectively. In short, all EU Member States have become firmly committed to multilateral non-proliferation institutions. In other words, ‘effective multilateralism’ forms a strong basis for intra-European cohesion.

However, beyond the more general commitment to non-proliferation institutions, the consensus between EU Member States is much weaker, especially concerning the rights and obligations of the Member States. First of all, there exist significant differences between Member States in key organisms of the non-proliferation institutions. Most notably, the NPT discriminates between France and the UK as nuclear weapons states and the other EU Member States as non-nuclear-weapons states. As nuclear-weapons states, France and the UK are also subject to Article VI, which foresees their eventual nuclear disarmament. However, this particular treaty obligation is rarely mentioned at the European level and plans for the renewal of the nuclear weapons systems in these countries make clear that disarmament is not an issue for them (Pullinger, 2006). Most EU documents refer to disarmament, if at all, in a very vague manner.

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296 The reasons why Spain and France joined so late are debated. For an analysis of the adhesion of France, see Jabko and Weber, 1998. For the Spanish case, see Saba, 1989.
### Table 11  EU Member States on the IAEA Board of Governors, 2002-2009

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**M:** Member (EU Member State)  
**m:** Member (EU Candidate)

*Source:* Own elaboration based on the following IAEA General Conference documents: GC(46)/DEC/10, GC(47)/DEC/9, GC(48)/DEC/8, GC(49)/6, GC(49)/22, GC(50)/5, GC(50)/24, GC(51)/6, GC(51)/26, GC(52)/8, GC(52)/23. The documents are available at: [http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/](http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/) and on the on the attached DVD.

As Table 11 and Table 12 show, the discriminatory and uneven representation of EU Member States can be also found in the key organs of the two most influential institutions in the field of non-proliferation, the IAEA Board of Governors, the main decision body of the IAEA, and the UN Security Council. Between 2002 and 2009...
only a few Member States have had the opportunity to be active involved in these organs. The 35-member strong IAEA Board of Governors, for instance, has never had more than eleven and in recent years only eight EU Member States at any given time. This includes the three quasi-permanent members Germany, France and the United Kingdom and before 2007 the EU candidate countries. In the crucial period of the 2002-2003 crisis in Iran, for instance, the EU Member States on the Board were only Germany, France, the UK, the Netherlands, Spain, Denmark and, as a candidate country, the Czech Republic. Likewise, the 15-member strong Security Council has never had – apart from the two permanent members France and the United Kingdom – more than three additional EU Member States. In 2002-2003, i.e. during the Iraq crisis, the EU members were France, the UK, Ireland, Germany, Spain and, as a candidate country, Bulgaria. Since 2001, only 13 out of the current 27 Member States have been UNSC members, two of which were still not in the EU when they sat on the Security Council. This means that European positions in Vienna and New York have been actively coordinated only between a reduced number of EU Member States. Most Member States have been formally informed about what has been going on, most notably during the weekly Article-19 meetings in New York, but have not been directly involved in policy decisions.

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297 As Security Council membership is based on regional representation, in theory, there can be up to six EU Member States on the Security Council: the two permanent members (France and the UK), two elected members from the so-called Western European and Others Group, one from the Eastern European Group and – oddly enough – Cyprus as a representative of the Asian Group.


299 As Hill points out, France and the UK still dominate European UNSC affairs (see Hill, 2006b).

300 Article 19 of the Treaty of the European Union requires the EU Member States on the Security Council to inform the other Member States about its activity. For a more in-depth analysis of EU representation at the UN, see Farrell, 2006.

301 Phone interview with official from one of the two European permanent Security Council members, February 2009.
Table 12  EU Member States on the UN Security Council, 2001-2009

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P: Permanent Member  
M: Elected Member (EU Member State)  
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Source: Own elaboration based on the UN Security Council membership search engine at http://www.un.org/sc/members.asp.

Furthermore, it should be pointed out that it are principally the Member States that are active in non-proliferation institutions and not European institutions. For example, the Personal Representative for non-proliferation of WMD, who was appointed by the High Representative in the wake of the Non-Proliferation Strategy, has no representational functions in the institutions. Only the European Commission
has a limited role in relation with the EURATOM Treaty and its competencies in external trade: First, the so-called Safeguard Agreements and Additional Protocols were signed between the IAEA, EURATOM and the EU Member States. According to these agreements, both the Commission, which is responsible *inter alia* for the civil nuclear material control system within the EU, and the IAEA carry out relevant inspections on EU territory. Furthermore, the Commission cooperates with the IAEA in fields such as information exchange, common use of equipment, training or research (European Commission, 2005). However, historically the cooperation between EURATOM and the IAEA have been far from harmonious, as their competencies, e.g. in the area of nuclear safeguards, can overlap and/or diverge (Gmelin, 2007). EURATOM is also at odds with Member States and the Council over its status at the IAEA. In 2006, the Commission lamented explicitly “...an obvious disparity between the competences of the Community and the status which the Community is accorded in the IAEA, which impedes the effective exercise of such competences” (Commission of the European Communities, 2006c: 4-5). Currently, there exist a representation in Vienna under DG RELEX and occasional EURATOM delegations. Yet, the representation issue has not been solved to the satisfaction of EURATOM. Moreover, certain Central and Eastern European Member States have been reluctant to implement the common safeguard agreements, either for administrative or political reasons.

Secondly, the Commission is represented in the informal export control organisms, the NSG (as observer) and the Australia Group (as full participant). This

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302 Due to special competencies of the Commission regarding inspections of civil nuclear installations in France and the UK, separate agreements were signed with France, the UK, and non-nuclear-weapons EU Member States.

303 Phone interview with EURATOM official, Luxembourg, January 2009.

304 Phone interview with EURATOM official, Luxembourg, January 2009.
has mainly to do with the dual-use character of nuclear, chemical or biological items. In other words, proliferation-sensitive goods can be traded as harmless civil merchandise. Interestingly, it is the Commission’s DG Trade, not DG RELEX, that is involved in the regulation of these products. However, the Member States have never sought an exclusive role for the Commission. On the contrary, after the adhesion of twelve new Member States after 2004/2007, the EU has pushed for the inclusion of all 27 Member States instead of a single seat for the Commission. In fact, the Council and certain Member States are not particularly happy about the Commission’s full participation in the Australia Group.305 There have been even instances of open competition between the Commission and Member States in Australia Group meetings. For example, once the Commission representative reprimanded an EU Member State arguing that its position violated EU law.306

In sum, despite the EU Member States’ general adherence to all relevant institutions – a sign of the power of normative multilateralism – Member States are very reluctant to give up its rights and privileges in favour of the EU institutions or, at least, nominal equality between EU Member States – an indication of the influence of functional multilateralism. In other words, in the field of non-proliferation there exists a strong basis for multilateralism as a cohesive element of EU foreign policy, but Member States maintain sufficient influence to weaken this cohesion.

**Coherence**

Apart from its potential for increased cohesion, ‘effective multilateralism’ serves also as a framework that provides strategic coherence. At the most basic level, it helps to

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305 According to a Council official, the Commission used favourable circumstances to push through full membership (Interview, Brussels, December 2008).
306 Interview with EU official, Brussels, December 2008.
muster EU support for the major multilateral non-proliferation agreements. This is hardly surprising, since all EU Member States are also members of all these agreements. As the relevant Council and Presidency Declarations demonstrate, the EU has continuously supported the NPT, the BTWC, the CWC, the CTBT and the HCOC. Especially regarding the latter three, Council declarations, Presidency declarations and Presidency statements have been particularly coherent and substantive.\textsuperscript{307} In 1996, two declarations backed unequivocally the adoption of the then controversial text of the CTBT in the framework of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva and hailed it as an important step towards nuclear disarmament as required under Article VI of the NPT (Council of the European Union, 1996b). In 1999, the European Council expressed openly its regret about the rejection of the CTBT in the US Senate (European Council Tampere, 1999). Likewise, the EU has supported strongly the negotiations and universalization of the HCOC with Council conclusions, declarations, a Common Position (2001/567/CFSP) and a Joint Action providing 55,000 Euro of financial aid. The entry into force of the CWC in 1997 as well as its tenth anniversary in 2007 were also welcomed with substantive supportive declarations. As will be shown further on, the NPT and BTWC have been more problematic. However, even regarding these treaties the EU has issued several declarations, statements and conclusions, in particular on verification (BTWC) and universality, i.e. the adhesion of new Treaty members (NPT).\textsuperscript{308} It has been also possible to agree on Common Positions for the large majority of review

\textsuperscript{307} All declarations and statements (six on the NPT, five on the CTBT, four on the BTWC and the HCOC and three on the CWC) are available at: \url{http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_applications/applications/search/newsSearch.asp?lang=EN&cm.sid=377} and on the attached DVD.

\textsuperscript{308} The documents (six on the NPT and five on the BTWC) are available at: \url{http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_applications/applications/search/newsSearch.asp?lang=EN&cm.sid=377} and on the attached DVD.
conferences since the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty (1993), which established the instrument of Common Position (see Table 13). This included the controversial negotiation of a binding BTWC protocol in the area of compliance and verification (see below). Even during the 1995 NPT Review Conference, when the EU actions were not coordinated by a Common Position, the Union played a largely constructive and successful role (Grand, 2000; Meier, 2005b: 9).

Table 13 Common Positions Regarding Review Conferences of Major Non-Proliferation Agreements, 1993-2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Treaty (entry into force)</th>
<th>Conference</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Common Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6th Review Conference</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>98/289/CFSP (2nd Preparatory Committee) 2000/297/CFSP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7th Review Conference</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>2005/329/PESC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BTWC (1975)</td>
<td>4th Review Conference</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>96/408/CFSP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5th Review Conference</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6th Review Conference</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>2006/242/CFSP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2nd Review Conference</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>2007/469/CFSP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTBT*</td>
<td>1st Article XIV Conference</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>1999/533/CFSP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2nd Article XIV Conference</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>2001/286/CFSP***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3rd Article XIV Conference</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>2003/567/CFSP***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4th Article XIV Conference</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5th Article XIV Conference</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own elaboration based on documents from the Council of the European Union. All documents are available on the attached DVD.

* Treaty not in force. Treaty text was adopted in 1996. Since then, conferences have been organized on the basis of Article XIV of the Treaty to promote its entry into force.

** Between the 4th and 5th Review Conference two Common Positions regarding the important Ad-Hoc Group on a legally binding BTWC Protocol were adopted (98/197/CFSP and 1999/346/CFSP).

*** Council Decision.

In general, two specific objectives have emerged regarding international non-proliferation institutions: (a) the universality of all relevant treaties and organizations and (b) the effective verification of the compliance with the treaty obligations. In fact, for Annalisa Giannella this is the essence of ‘effective multilateralism:’ “For us,
effective multilateralism in the area of WMD means to: - Widen the membership to multilateral non-proliferation and disarmament instruments; - Enhance the efficiency of these instruments by ensuring that they are fully implemented at national level” (Giannella, 2008: 4). In comparison with the administration of George W. Bush, which did not seek universality and did not belief in the possibility to verify effectively the compliance with the BTWC and the CTBT, such clear objectives contribute certainly to the strategic coherence of the EU.\textsuperscript{309}

The analysis of the EU’s Joint Actions in support of international non-proliferation institutions – the backbone of the EU activity in this field – reveals that since 2003 basically all EU actions have been related to universality, verification or both. As Table 14 shows, the bulk of support has gone to the IAEA and highly technical nuclear security and verification projects, which basically deal with the (verifiable) security of nuclear or radioactive material, e.g. during storage or transportation, and the prevention of trafficking of nuclear material. These projects have received more financing than all other Joint Actions together. Furthermore, the EU has promised to support the potential development of an IAEA fuel bank with 25 million Euro (Council of the European Union, 2008b). Such a fuel bank, which is still in the fledgling stages, would produce under the supervision of the IAEA nuclear fuel and would provide guaranteed nuclear supplies to any country wishing to run nuclear power plants. Like this, countries with civilian nuclear programmes do not need to develop their own nuclear fuel cycle, thus avoiding that they acquire the knowledge to produce also fuel for nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{310}

\textsuperscript{309} The new administration under Obama tries, however, to push the CTBT ratification through the Senate (Pincus, 2009). The EU has welcomed this fact as a promising sign for the entry into force of the CTBT (General Affairs and External Relations Council, 2009: 11-12).

\textsuperscript{310} Nuclear weapons work with highly enriched uranium (HEU), whereas nuclear power plants run on low enriched uranium (LEU). The process to produce both LEU and HEU is, however, essentially the
The Joint Actions related to the CWC, the BTWC and CTBT are more limited, but still significant. The CTBT Joint Actions have supported a few very technical projects to enhance the verification capabilities in the framework of the CTBT, e.g. radio-xenon measurements and data analysis to support the CTBTO in implementing the noble gas verification regime. The CWC and BTWC Joint Actions, for their part, have mainly financed workshops, conferences and assistance visits to either persuade partner countries to ratify the conventions, thus contributing to their universalization, or to improve the national implementation of the convention, in particular in countries with few own resources. In addition, the EU has adopted two Council Decisions with similar projects to support the CWC (2009/569/CFSP) and the HCOC (2008/974/CFSP). These decisions are funded with 2,110,000 and 1,015,000 Euro respectively. In total, the CTBT, CWC and BTWC have received roughly the same amount of money.

The least financed projects have been the workshops in support of UNSC Resolution 1540 to prevent the acquisition of WMDs by terrorist organizations. But the EU has gone to great length to emphasize their internal measures in accordance with UNSC Resolution 1540. Most notably, it has submitted to the so-called 1540 Committee, which supervises all matters related to the Resolution, a European Union report on the implementation of UNSC Resolution 1540 (Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1540 (2004), 2004).

It just takes longer to produce HEU. Therefore, knowledge of the complete nuclear fuel cycle allows producing both LEU and HEU.

The so-called EU Action Plan on biological and toxin weapons (complementary to the BTWC Joint Actions) refers to intra-EU measures and is not dealt with here (see Council of the European Union, 2006).

It should be also pointed out that before the adoption of the WMD Strategy, the EU had implemented a minor Joint Action in support of the NSG (97/288/CFSP). All Joint Actions are available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm and on the attached DVD.

The Report deals mainly with intra-EU measures and is, therefore, not analyzed more in detail. See also Council of the European Union, 2004d.
In general, the Joint Actions and Decisions show how the EU has found under the umbrella of ‘effective multilateralism’ a relatively strong consensus regarding the universalization and verification of key agreements in the field of WMD non-proliferation.

Table 14 Council Joint Actions in Support of Multilateral Non-Proliferation Institutions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Joint Action</th>
<th>Implementing Entity</th>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Duration (in months)</th>
<th>Budget (in Euro)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2004/495/CFSP</td>
<td>IAEA</td>
<td>Nuclear Security Programme</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3,329,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005/574/CFSP</td>
<td>IAEA</td>
<td>Nuclear security and verification</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3,914,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006/418/CFSP</td>
<td>IAEA</td>
<td>Nuclear security and verification</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6,995,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007/753/CFSP</td>
<td>IAEA</td>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1,780,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008/314/CFSP</td>
<td>IAEA</td>
<td>Nuclear security and verification</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>7,703,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<p>| | | | | |</p>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2004/797/CFSP</td>
<td>OPCW</td>
<td>CWC</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1,841,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005/913/CFSP</td>
<td>OPCW</td>
<td>CWC</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1,697,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007/185/CFSP</td>
<td>OPCW</td>
<td>CWC</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1,700,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5,238,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006/243/CFSP</td>
<td>CTBTO</td>
<td>Verification (CTBT)</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1,133,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007/468/CFSP</td>
<td>CTBTO</td>
<td>Verification (CTBT)</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1,670,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008/588/CFSP</td>
<td>CTBTO</td>
<td>Verification (CTBT)</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>2,316,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5,119,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006/184/CFSP</td>
<td>Bioweapons Prevention Project</td>
<td>BTWC</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>867,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008/858/CFSP</td>
<td>UNODA</td>
<td>BTWC</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>1,400,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008/307/CFSP</td>
<td>WHO</td>
<td>Bio-safety and -security (BTWC)</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>2,105,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4,372,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006/419/CFSP</td>
<td>UN Secretariat (DDA)</td>
<td>Implementation UNSC 1540</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>195,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008/368/CFSP</td>
<td>UN Secretariat (ODA)</td>
<td>Implementation UNSC 1540</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>475,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>670,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own elaboration based on documents from the Council of the European Union. All Joint Actions are available on the attached DVD.

Both universality and effective verification are once more compromises between normative and functional multilateralism. Universality is largely a concept of
normative multilateralism, as it calls for the global adhesion to non-proliferation institutions, though without compromising institution structures to accommodate more reluctant states. For functional multilateralists, on the other hand, universality is mainly a principle that in practical terms is not a necessity for the effective working of non-proliferation institutions (Van Oudenaren, 2003). Why should, for example, a state-like Tuvalu join the CWC? Yet, at the same time, the term universality is also acceptable for supporters of functional multilateralism, as in practice it avoids mentioning (and, thus, putting pressure on) non-member states of non-proliferation institutions such as the USA or Israel and allows dealing with them on a selective basis. Effective verification, for its part, is basically an objective for functional multilateralists, as for them multilateralism is only effective if compliance is verifiable. But normative multilateralists can also agree easily on the necessity of verification mechanisms, since it further strengthens multilateral institutions and does not question the inherent value of multilateralism.

This consensus on universality and verification under the umbrella of ‘effective multilateralism’ is further strengthened through the way the EU Joint Actions are implemented. All Joint Actions have in common that their implementation has been outsourced to international organizations (and in one case to a NGO). This is a compromise all the different European views regarding multilateralism can live with (see Table 10): Supporters of a low international profile of the EU like that the Joint Actions have not led to the development or use of own institutional mechanisms and expertise to carry them out, e.g. in EURATOM; at the same time, however, the EU still remains in control through the financing and, in

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314 According to the information provided in a recent EU document, virtually all states that have benefited from EU actions and ratified international agreements are non critical states like Tuvalu. See Council of the European Union, 2009b: 7-9.
particular, the detailed outline of the projects in the Joint Actions. Functional multilateralists, for their part, support the concrete ad hoc projects to strengthen verification mechanisms, whereas normative multilateralists endorse the general commitment to multilateral institutions and the universality of non-proliferation treaties. Although these compromises have led to criticisms from a practical point of view, especially the ad hoc nature of financing and the strong control exercised by the EU (Anthony, 2005), all in all, the Joint Actions with their focus on universalization and verification form the core of what the EU can do in matters of non-proliferation using the strategic concept of ‘effective multilateralism.’

However, outside of the consensus on universality and verification in a strict sense, the EU’s strategic coherence is far from assured. This can be seen already in the voting behaviour of EU Member States in the UN General Assembly. Although relevant studies have discovered a substantial increase in the general voting cohesion among EU Member States, including after several enlargement rounds (Adriaenssens, 2008; Johansson-Nogués, 2004a; Luif, 2003), this development has not occurred in the case of WMD, non-proliferation and disarmament (see Figure 11). On average, in only slightly more than 50% of the corresponding UNGA Resolutions have EU Member States reached voting consensus. Furthermore, no clear indication exist that voting coherence will increase in the near future.

Another instance where ‘effective multilateralism’ fails to provide strategic coherence is the conflict between Member States in review conferences of major international non-proliferation treaties, most notably in the 2005 Review Conference of the NPT, which is largely considered to have been an outright failure. Although the Council adopted a detailed Common Position outlining 43 concrete steps before (2005/329/PESC) and numerous working papers and statements were presented by the
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Figure 11  EU Voting Coherence at the UN General Assembly in the Field of Non-Proliferation (50th-63rd Session, 1995-2009)  

* Without counting the cases of no vote cast.  

Note: Only recorded votes are analyzed. The majority of resolutions are adopted without a vote.  

EU as a whole during the conference (especially through the country holding the EU Presidency), the European divisions between nuclear-weapons and non- (or anti-) nuclear-weapons states in the EU came to the fore: France supported positions similar to the United States, whereas Sweden and Ireland participated in the New Agenda Coalition, which consists of a number of anti-nuclear-weapons states. According to

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315 The raw data, calculations and final data can be found in a Microsoft Excel file called “Data Voting UNGA” on the attached DVD. The non-machine-readable raw data was extracted using the ITPilot of the Denodo Platform, an information integration software. I would like to thank Justo Hidalgo and Denodo Technologies for their invaluable support.

316 States can choose between ‘Yes,’ ‘No,’ ‘Abstention,’ and not casting a vote at all. In the latter case the reasons are not always political. Most notably, in the 51st Session of the General Assembly, Greek diplomats were apparently on a strike, which is why Greece did not vote in any of the relevant resolutions, thus impeding EU consensus. Therefore, the Greek non-votes in the 51st Session are usually not taken into consideration, when the EU consensus in the General Assembly is calculated (see Luif, 2003: 25).

317 The New Agenda Coalition consists of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden.
Müller, “Rather than steadily promoting the reasonable positions encapsulated in the Common Position, member states went astray along national lines” (Müller, 2005b: 43). In a sense, “[i]nner-EU discussions had become a mere reflection of global divisions on nuclear arms reductions and foreshadowed the split that eventually led to the collapse of the Review Conference” (Meier, 2005b: 12).

The EU’s lack of strategic coherence is also reflected outside the framework of multilateral institutions. For example, putting pressure on major powers to join certain non-proliferation treaties is a complicated issue. Most notably, three nuclear-weapons states – India, Israel and Pakistan – are not members of the NPT and five nuclear-weapons states (China, India, Israel, Pakistan and the USA) have not ratified the CTBT, which weakens substantially the nuclear non-proliferation regime. However, EU Member States are unable to find a common way for dealing with these states. For example, the workshops, seminars and conferences that are organized in support of the CTBT do not focus specifically on the nuclear-weapons states, even though their ratification is essential for the CTBT to become effective. Usually, the dialogue with these countries focuses on uncontroversial issues in the field of non-proliferation or avoids at least any type of confrontation. Most notably, the EU’s current negotiations with India for a new trade and investment agreement, a major framework agreement, omits the non-proliferation clause, which in principle should be included in all major agreements between the EU and third parties (Grip, 2009).

Although Annalisa Giannella, the Personal Representative for non-proliferation, warned in the European Parliament about a dangerous precedent of double standards

318 However, Meier points out correctly that there are probably few things a united Europe could have done to avoid the failure of the Conference. Other delegations, in particular Egypt, Iran and the United States were not willing to participate constructively (see Potter, 2005).

319 The status of North Korea is not clear, though from a practical point of view it is currently not a NPT member.
and tried to win the Parliament’s support for the inclusion of the clause in the new EU-India agreement, several Member States as well as the Commission worried about negative consequences for the commercial relations with India and gave in to Indian pressure.  

A special case is the EU’s support of a controversial agreement between India and the United States on civilian nuclear cooperation (see Rynning, 2007: 275-276). India has been excluded from civilian nuclear cooperation with most countries since its first nuclear test explosion in 1974, because it has never ratified the NPT and developed nuclear weapons outside the Treaty. The US-India agreement allows now opening up the trade of nuclear goods with India in turn for safeguard inspections by the IAEA of India’s civil nuclear installations. However, India can keep its nuclear weapons arsenal under the agreement and its military installations are exempt from IAEA inspections. In other words, India is welcomed back into the ‘nuclear club’ as a de facto nuclear-weapon state. Yet, this undermines the NPT, which recognizes only five nuclear-weapon states (China, France, Russia, the United States and the UK), and may encourage other states to develop their own nuclear weapons outside of the NPT, thus undermining the international non-proliferation regime and the principle of ‘effective multilateralism.’ Nevertheless, all 27 Member States did not oppose the agreement, when they had the opportunity: As members of the NSG – a group of states that establishes binding guidelines for nuclear exports and nuclear related exports – they had to approve the agreement (Müller and Rauch, 2007: 17-18). Yet, despite the headache it caused in several EU capitals, no EU Member State opposed it. The paradoxical result is that the EU acted coherently in a multilateral

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321 For an overview of the issues involved from a US perspective, see Kerr, 2008.
322 Personal and phone interviews with Member State officials, December 2008-June 2009.
non-proliferation institution, though it undermined the international non-proliferation regime.

**Legitimacy**

Many key actors in European foreign and security policy emphasize the link between multilateralism and legitimacy, most notably Javier Solana (Barros-García, 2007) and Benita Ferrero-Waldner (Portela, 2007a). This is hardly something new. In the 1960s, for example, Inis L. Claude introduced the concept of “collective legitimation” of state actions as a specific function of the United Nations (Claude, 1966). Legitimacy, however, is a complex and difficult topic. Keohane has published recently a paper with useful clarifications for the purpose of this chapter (Keohane, 2006). First, he distinguishes between normative and sociological concepts of legitimacy: “Normatively, an institution is legitimate when its practices meet a set of standards that have been stated and defended,” whereas “[i]n the sociological sense, legitimacy is a matter of fact. An institution is legitimate when it is accepted as appropriate, and worthy of being obeyed, by relevant audiences” (Keohane, 2006: 57). Secondly, in reference to Scharpf’s ‘legitimizing beliefs,’ he argues that conventionally two types of sources for organizational legitimacy exist, namely output and input legitimacy (Keohane, 2006: 58). In the words of Scharpf, “Input-oriented democratic thought emphasizes ‘government by the people.’ Political choices are legitimate if and because they reflect the ‘will of the people’ – that is, if they can be derived from the authentic preferences of the members of a community. By contrast, the output perspective emphasizes ‘government for the people.’ Here, political choices are legitimate if and because they effectively promote the common welfare of the constituency in question” (Scharpf, 1999: 6).
Applied to the concepts of normative and functional multilateralism, the former tends towards the normative concept of legitimacy and stresses input legitimacy, whereas the latter sees legitimacy as a sociological concept and emphasizes output legitimacy. In other words, multilateralism can be either legitimate because of how outputs are produced or because of the effective output of desirable results such as security. At a more general level, in the case of normative multilateralism, legitimacy precedes effectiveness, while it is the other way round in the case of functional multilateralism. These different perceptions can be found in the opinions of key policy-makers in the EU: Javier Solana, for instance, “…is of the idea that only multilateral agreed decisions would be effective because solely multilateral decisions are perceived as legitimate worldwide” (Barros-García, 2007: 6). In contrast, Robert Cooper argues that “[f]or the moment the United Nations remains the primary source of legitimacy in international affairs (…) This need not always be the case. At a certain point, if the failures of the UN system – for example, the failure to agree on necessary action in the Security Council – appear to threaten people’s security, they will look elsewhere for legitimacy” (Cooper, 2003: 167-168). However, since the concept ‘effective multilateralism’ allows both interpretations of legitimacy, it is suitable for both normative and functional multilateralists. In short, for functional multilateralists, only ‘effective multilateralism’ is legitimate, whereas for normative multilateralists, multilateralism is effective because it is a legitimate form of dealing with certain international issues (see also Pélopidas, 2008: 184).

In practice, the consensus on the general legitimacy of multilateral actions is relatively strong, because alternative sources of legitimacy are scarce. As Keohane concludes, “…contemporary multilateral institutions such as the United Nations are contingently legitimate, relative to the currently available alternatives, which are quite
unattractive” (Keohane, 2006: 75). Therefore, policies under the umbrella of ‘effective multilateralism’ are generally believed to be legitimate. However, in this regard it is necessary to distinguish between the ‘external’ and ‘internal’ legitimacy of ‘effective multilateralism,’ which means the relation between the legitimacy as perceived by non-EU (external) states and their citizens and by EU (internal) Member States and their citizens. As Javier Solana points out, for the EU both types of legitimacy are important: “A key benefit of acting multilaterally is legitimacy, which in turns enhances effectiveness. Once again, this means bringing in new centres of power. But legitimacy also means bringing our publics along. If decisions are increasingly taken at the international level, people have to see these as legitimate” (Solana, 2007a). However, Javier Solana does not mention that the relation between external and internal legitimacy is often conflict-laden. In short, what is legitimate or legitimacy-increasing for the EU may not be so for others. Regarding non-proliferation institutions, conflicts have come to the fore especially in relation with two actors, the United States and Iran, though differences exist also with other actors such as Brazil, Japan and India (Pélopidas, 2008).

In the United States, the support for multilateralism is more functional than in the EU, where a peculiar compromise between normative and functional multilateralism can be found. Multilateralism in the United States is also confronted with numerous domestic and institutional obstacles – from powerful interest groups to the military (Tepperman, 2004). Especially during the last years of the Clinton administration and the administration of George W. Bush multilateral non-proliferation institutions suffered in the wake of the US turn to unilateral ‘counter-proliferation.’ The most prominent examples are the non-ratification of the CTBT in 1999 by the US Senate and the unilateral annulment of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile
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Treaty with Russia (Pélopidas, 2008: 191-197). In a sense, multilateralism was reduced to “...a recognition that their counter-proliferation measures also need to be guaranteed by partners” (Pélopidas, 2008: 192). Nevertheless, multilateralism *per se* is an important policy option for American administrations, as the recent election of President Obama shows, who openly supported multilateral institutions during his campaign.

As most European policy-makers are aware of the importance of the United States for the functioning of multilateralism, they are eager to strengthen the American voices in favour of multilateralism and to increase the legitimacy of the concept in the USA. In this regard, ‘effective multilateralism’ has played an important role in accommodating the most legitimate form of multilateralism in the United States: functional multilateralism. ‘Effective multilateralism’ is indeed similar to terms used in the US political discourse: “Interestingly, the ‘effective multilateralism’ of the ESS seems to carry much the same meaning as ‘assertive multilateralism,’ which was a key term during President Clinton’s first two years in office (1993-1995)” (Toje, 2005: 130). It resembles also the concept of “efficient multilateralism” (Tepperman, 2004) as used by Wesley Clark, the former Supreme Allied Commander Europe of NATO, during the race for the Democratic presidential nomination in 2003/2004.

In practice, however, it has been difficult to find compromises that are legitimate or legitimacy-increasing from the perspective of functional multilateralism in America and from the perspective of normative-functional multilateralism on the other side of the Atlantic. In the case of non-proliferation institutions, an illustrative example is the verification problem in the case of the BTWC. This Treaty does not provide adequate means of verification of compliance with the treaty provisions – at
least from the perspective of the EU. Therefore, believing that its actions are perceived generally as increasing the legitimacy of the BTWC, the EU supported the negotiation of a multilateral verification mechanism protocol in the so-called Ad-Hoc Group, which was established in 1994. The US government, however, put the protocol effectively on ice in 2001 arguing that it is more effective to improve national export controls (Fehl, 2008; Jasper, 2004; Zanders, 2006). In other words, the EU and a state outside the Union did not agree on which actions increase the legitimacy of multilateral institutions and are, thus, legitimate themselves.

Another, more prominent example where the EU disagrees with a third country is Iran’s uranium enrichment programme. Article IV of the NPT grants the “inalienable right” to develop in each member country the complete nuclear fuel cycle. According to Müller, “All NPT parties, including Iran, have this right” (Müller, 2005a: 59). The Islamic Republic sees, therefore, its nuclear programme as a legitimate option under the NPT. The EU argues, however, that Article IV refers only to civil nuclear activities and that the circumstances of Iran’s nuclear programme suggest that it serves primarily military purposes and is, thus, not legitimate. Consequently, it are the EU’s UNSC approved sanctions in defence of the NPT that are legitimate. In short, there exists a profound conflict about the legitimacy of certain actions in the multilateral non-proliferation system between the EU and a third country.

Conclusion

Multilateralism is often seen as the natural and inevitable foreign policy option of the EU. However, despite the general acceptance of multilateralism in Europe, many
different views on multilateralism exist. In total, four different perspectives on multilateralism have been identified, which correspond roughly with the four European idea complexes outlined in earlier chapters. They can be distinguished by applying two criteria: their adherence to either normative or functional multilateralism and the degree of independence they assign to the EU as an international actor in multilateral affairs.

In order to overcome the differences between competing visions of multilateralism, European foreign-policy makers have used the positive connotations of multilateralism to create with the term ‘effective multilateralism’ a strategic concept that can unite the different European actors under a single umbrella. In short, they have created the concept of ‘effective multilateralism’ as a focal point. It has been argued that this focal point has been suitable to establish consensus concerning various divisive issues. It has provided, in particular, a common concept for the EU in international affairs, it has clarified the EU’s strategy in multilateral affairs and – with qualification – it has enhanced the Union’s legitimacy. It has served, therefore, three purposes that have become particularly urgent for European policy-makers in the aftermath of the 2003 Iraq War: internal cohesion in the EU, strategic coherence in terms of ends and means and internal and external legitimacy. Consequently, ‘effective multilateralism’ is a framework for what Laatikainen and Smith call “internal effectiveness” and not “external effectiveness” (Laatikainen and Smith, 2006). In other words, ‘effective multilateralism’ has served primarily the purpose of output production by the EU and not outcome enhancement of EU actions.

However, the empirical study of ‘effective multilateralism’ in the case of multilateral non-proliferation institutions shows that in practice the three functions of the concept are not always easy to achieve. The main problem is that the consensus
the EU establishes is in many cases weak. This means that the consensus is only superficial and any new event can break again this consensus. The weakest consensuses are related to the rights and obligations of Member States, in particular France and the UK, the two nuclear-weapons states, to the use of force and to transatlantic relations. It comes, therefore, as no surprise that the Iraq war – the use of force by an Anglo-American coalition against a presumed Iraqi WMD programme – was so divisive for the EU. As a consequence, the EU’s activity regarding non-proliferation institutions avoids any divisive projects and focuses on areas where a strong consensus exists, most notably measures to improve the universality and verification of relevant non-proliferation treaties, export controls and the coordination of EU Member States in non-proliferation institutions. This means, however, that the EU is mainly active where internal consensus is easily achieved, not where external demands are most pressing. For example, the EU’s reaction towards the US-India nuclear deal has been, if at all, very limited.

What does this mean for the EU as an international actor in its own right? As long as the EU can focus on the (numerous) tasks on which strong consensus exists, the EU is an important actor in its own right. But when issues arise where only a weak consensus has been established, the EU becomes easily a deeply divided organization. The EU is in this sense more than a traditional international organization, because it has the capacity for strong consensus among its Member States. But this strong consensus is not broad enough to turn the EU into a state-like polity. In the field of non-proliferation, the Union is rather a harmonized plural actor with a strong core of activity, but with a weak shell. This is certainly not enough to be a strong strategic actor in its own right.
CONCLUSIONS

Over the last three decades the European Union and its Member States have developed a common policy in the field of non-proliferation of WMD, which forms today one of the core policies in the CFSP. As the dissertation has shown, the policy has evolved from a relatively weak coordination mechanism between Member States into an extensive field of activity by the Union. Numerous EU organisms deal with different aspects of non-proliferation – not only the Council’s Office of the Personal Representative for non-proliferation but also Commission DGs and even committee’s of the European Parliament. Moreover, the EU has a wide variety of instruments at its disposal, ranging from political dialogue over sanctions to – potentially – the use of military force. The 2003 Strategy against Proliferation of WMD provides the whole EU non-proliferation policy a certain degree of strategic coherence and consistency. In short, the European Union has acquired capabilities that have allowed it to become an international actor in matters of non-proliferation of WMD.

However, the policy output of the EU in this field is very sketchy. As the case studies on the European policies towards Iran, Iraq, the Southern and Eastern border countries and international non-proliferation institutions have shown, the degree of policy output varies substantially depending on the issue, in particular between 9/11 and 2009, the period under consideration here. In some areas it has been particularly active collectively, whereas in others it has been unable to emerge as a common actor. Sceptics of a common EU foreign and security policy have been certainly right, when they have pointed out the numerous failures of the Union to act collectively in important international crises, above all regarding the Anglo-American invasion of Iraq in 2002/2003. Yet, so have been the optimists, who have correctly highlighted the
many instances of strong EU policy output, e.g. in Iran or regarding certain international non-proliferation institutions. In other words, paradoxically the EU is both a strong international actor in its own right in some instances and merely an incoherent international organization in others.

The solution of this apparent paradox has been the main purpose of this dissertation. Classical theories are usually able to solve only one part of the conundrum: (Neo) realists point, for example, to incompatible national interests of Member States, thus explaining the failure of common European policy output as in Iraq. But they have difficulties to understand substantial output as in Iran. Likewise, integration related theories such as institutionalism can account for strong EU activity by emphasizing the role of common European institutions, yet it is not clear how such theories can explain satisfactorily the lack of common EU policy output. Nevertheless, in this dissertation, the classical theories are not completely discarded. It shares with sceptics such as (neo) realists and (neo) liberals the assumption that the EU non-proliferation policy is by and large an intergovernmental policy that requires the consensus between all Member States. However, it does not assume that this means automatically consensus between 27 different national interests. Rather, it opens up the ‘black box’ of national interests showing that behind them there is only a limited number of competing, but malleable ideas about what foreign policy is, how it works and which objectives it should have. This makes it much more likely that compromises for collective action can be found, though it leaves sufficient space for possible disagreements. At the same, the dissertation has argued that the growing institutionalization of EU foreign and security policy is a necessary condition for keeping the EU and its foreign and security policy together and facilitating compromises despite competing ideas about foreign policy. Yet, it has not gone so far
as arguing that institutionalization is a direct producer of more EU policy output *per se* – as many optimists suggest. In a nutshell, drawing on the increasing literature on ideas in the foreign policy of states, the case has been made in the present dissertation for a significant role of ideas as independent variables that explain why collective EU policy outputs differ substantially from case to case.

### 1. Research Results

In the first part of the dissertation a specific theoretical framework has been developed that allows finding answers to the central research question: How do ideas affect collective foreign policy output, in particular by the EU in the field of non-proliferation? As foreign policy ideas have been identified as the potential independent variable, the dissertation has examined first of all their characteristics. They have been defined as collective beliefs that help international actors to make sense of the world around them and guide them in their actions, especially in circumstances of high uncertainty, complexity and the absence of direct threats to survival – as in the post-Cold War world. The most important types of beliefs are normative ideas that offer an understanding of what should be and causal ideas that help explaining why certain things happen. The key point is that these ideas precede interests. That is, national interests – traditionally the crucial independent variables in IR – are not fixed or pre-given. They are permanently developed on the basis of normative and causal ideas whenever a certain international issue arises.

Based on these theoretical assumptions, two concrete models have been elaborated that show the impact of foreign policy ideas on collective action of states in general and of the European Union in particular. The first model essentially shows
that consensus for collective action is in the majority of cases not the result of classical negotiation situations where nation states arrive with pre-defined interests at the negotiating table trying to hammer out some kind of lowest common denominator compromise. Rather, it shows that in institutionalized settings such as the EU debates begin at the level of ideas, i.e. without outspoken interests. At this level, compromise and, thus, the development of common interests and, ultimately, collective foreign policy output is much more likely, as there are generally only a few competing foreign policy ideas that are, moreover, more malleable than interests. At the same time, the model allows also the active use of ideas to construct so-called ‘focal points’ that facilitate consensus between diverging foreign policy ideas.

The second model shows how radicalized interpretations of foreign policy ideas lead to dissonance, whereas less strict interpretations make consensus possible. The three key areas in this regard are (a) the way security is identified in a certain situation – is it national, European, multilateral or human security? (b) the type of means that are taken into consideration – is it persuasion, pressure, coercion or the use of force? And (c) the relation with the United States and other actors in the international system – can it be best described as bilateralism, multilateralism, Europeanism or cosmopolitanism? These three areas have been used to characterize four so-called idea complexes, which subsume a set of similar normative and causal ideas: ‘national Europe,’ ‘integrationist Europe,’ ‘cosmopolitan Europe’ and ‘multilateral Europe.’ It has been argued that European foreign and security policy output depends essentially on consensus between these four competing idea complexes. As has been demonstrated in the first two case studies – Iraq/Iran and the Eastern and Southern neighbourhood – interests in the classical sense of narrow interests in the political and economic power of nation states have played virtually no
role at all, even though foreign and security policies in the EU belong to the realm of intergovernmentalism.

The second part of the dissertation has dealt with several empirical case studies based on the theoretical framework of part I. These studies have led to a diverse array of specific research results. They are presented here in three sections: first, regarding the accuracy of the hypotheses formulated in part I; secondly, concerning ideas, idea complexes and foreign policy; and finally, in regard to the possible limits of European foreign policy output.

**Hypotheses**

In total, five hypotheses about the precise role of competing idea complexes for collective foreign policy output by the EU have been deduced from the theoretical framework. In this section, each hypothesis will be examined individually in the light of the empirical research results in the second part of the dissertation. The question is if the hypotheses have been refuted, partly confirmed or completely confirmed by the empirical evidence.

**Hypothesis H₁a:** The more certain Member States push their policy positions towards one of the extreme normative and causal beliefs regarding security perception, use of means or international relations, the unlikelier it is that consensus for common foreign policy output can be found.

**Hypothesis H₁b:** On the contrary, the more they are willing to move towards the centre, the more compromise is likely.
Both hypothesis \( H_{1a} \) and \( H_{1b} \) have been confirmed by the case studies. The cases of the EU policies towards Iraq and the Euro-Mediterranean region have shown that diverging foreign policy ideas make it virtually impossible to agree on forceful action within the EU. Iraq has been certainly the clearest and also most well-known example: In the run-up to the Anglo-American invasion in 2003, EU Member States – big and small ones, old and new ones as well left- and right wing governed ones – approached the Iraq issue very differently: Some saw it as an issue of national security, whereas others were much more sceptical about the immediacy of an Iraqi WMD threat. Consequently, the proposed means reached from the support of the use of military force to the call for more multilateral inspections of alleged Iraqi WMD installations. Finally, dominant and uncompromising US leadership caused diverging reactions among EU Member States: Some emphasized the need for transatlantic solidarity even in difficult times, while others openly opposed the United States. In the case of Iraq the diverging dynamics of foreign policy ideas were further aggravated by interest formation at the national level. This means that EU Member States did interact with each other on the basis of predefined interests and preferences and not of relatively malleable foreign policy ideas. Consequently, common foreign policy action was particularly difficult to achieve. The overall result was the lack of common foreign policy output by the EU.

Similarly, the EU’s lack of actions towards the most problematic Mediterranean neighbouring countries in terms of WMD proliferation is largely the result of disagreement between the competing European idea complexes: First, there is no agreement on the degree of security threat of WMD proliferation in these states. For example, for many officials in EU Member States and EU institutions it is not clear if WMD proliferation is really a dominant security concern. Secondly, the EU as
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a whole cannot agree on what constitutes adequate measures: Should proliferation concerns dealt with only indirectly, e.g. through the use of non-proliferation clauses, or should the EU be more active, including the official embracement of the use of military means such as by Israel against Syrian nuclear installations? Thirdly, the lack of clear US leadership in matters of non-proliferation in the Euro-Mediterranean region – combined with its unquestioned support for Israel – has led to diverging European reactions.

The validity of hypothesis \( H_{1b} \) has been shown by the case studies on Iran and CTR programmes in Eastern Europe. In both cases there has been agreement on how to interpret the issues in terms of security, on how to deal with them and how to interact with the United States and other international actors. For the Member States, the Iranian nuclear programme and the decaying former Soviet WMD programmes have been serious security issues, though an extreme ‘national security’ interpretation has been avoided. Likewise, human security has only played a subordinate role. Security has been rather perceived through the lenses of European and multilateral security. That is, it has been viewed as a common issue that requires collective actions. Furthermore, controversial military means or an overly focus on elusive political dialogue have not been dominant in the considerations of EU Member States. The emphasis has been placed on concrete disarmament measures in Eastern Europe and on pressure and coercion in the form of declarations, negotiations and sanctions in the case of Iran. Finally, US policies in the two areas have not been controversial, though for radically different reasons: In Iran, the United States has been virtually absent as a direct player until very recently. Although the US non-policy towards Iran might have been problematic in terms of effectiveness (see below), it has been beneficial in terms of EU-wide coherence, as EU Member States have not been forced
to react to potentially controversial US policy moves. In the case of the CTR programmes in the former Soviet Union, the US role has been very different: Since the early 1990s, it has played a largely constructive and cooperative role that has willingly incorporated other actors in its efforts. This moderate US leadership has been instrumental for the lack of disagreement among EU Member States. The overall consequence has been relatively forceful policy output by the EU towards both Iran and Eastern Europe.

However, the research in this dissertation suggests at least three caveats: First, as the dissertation has gone to great length to argue the importance of institutions for common European foreign policy output, it should be highlighted that neither the success stories of Iran nor CTR programmes in Eastern Europe would have been possible without the existence of strong institutions in the form of habits, legal rules and formal entities such as the Commission. These institutions are responsible for keeping the EU together in spite of diverging ideas about foreign and security policy. As the EU lacks the central authority of a government as in a nation state, they are a precondition for common policy output. Typical institutions include the habit of policy coordination among EU Member States, the responsibilities under the EU Treaties, common entities such as the Council and the occasional leadership by certain institutional arrangements, e.g. the E3 in the case of Iran. Secondly, the lack of policy output is not necessarily the result of disagreement. On the contrary, EU Member States could agree in certain situations that no common action is the better option to deal with a certain issue. Although the dissertation has not found unambiguous evidence, the implicit acceptance of an Israeli nuclear arsenal or the non-involvement in the nuclear negotiations with North Korea may be cases, where EU Member States actually agree on being inactive. Thirdly, policy output is not the
same as policy outcome. Although the CTR programmes in Eastern Europe have shown that common action can be successful – a large amount of biological, chemical and nuclear weapons or weapon-related installations have been dismantled – the case of Iran shows that even seven years of sustained common policy output does not lead automatically to viable solutions of the Iranian nuclear problem. In fact, the EU’s policy outcome is much sketchier than its policy output. Only six years ago, Portela argued that “[t]he EU is still ineffective as a non-proliferation actor” (Portela, 2003: 21). Although more recent assessments are substantially more positive (Müller, 2007: 190-194), policy outcome has to be viewed much more suspiciously and may not be confused with policy output.

**Hypothesis H2:** So-called focal points enhance the EU’s possibility to produce common foreign and security policy output.

‘Focal points’ are strategic concepts that unite with the help of positive connotations different ideas under a single umbrella. In terms of collective action, they can have three effects: They can increase the internal cohesion within a group of state, they can improve strategic coherence and they can improve the legitimacy of collective actors. European policy-makers have tried to create such a ‘focal point’ with the concept of ‘effective multilateralism,’ which subsumes essentially the different European ideas of multilateralism. All the different European idea complexes can identify themselves with it. In practice, this has had positive effects for collective policy output by the EU. Most notably, the support for multilateral non-proliferation institutions, e.g. the IAEA and the NPT, the CTBTO and the CTBT or the OPCW and the CWC, has become a mainstay of EU activity in the field of non-
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proliferation. Especially the universalization of multilateral agreements and their effective verification are cornerstones of the common EU non-proliferation policy. In this sense, ‘effective multilateralism’ has increased the cohesion among EU Member States, it has clarified the EU’s strategic objectives and it has increased the legitimacy of the EU among other international actors, especially when the US administration under George W. Bush belittled the importance of multilateral institutions.

None the less, the effects of ‘focal points’ are limited. The consensus they foster is usually weak and superficial. Therefore, numerous examples of internal division, strategic incoherence and illegitimacy can be found regarding international institutions. For example, the crucial 2005 NPT Review Conference suffered from a deeply divided EU. Likewise, membership in multilateral institutions is still national and highly unequal, especially in the UNSC and the IAEA Board of Governors, where some Member States have more privileges than others. Furthermore, the strategic coherence provided by ‘effective multilateralism’ goes barely beyond the issues of universalization and effective verification of non-proliferation agreements. Although the concept is mentioned in almost all important strategic documents of the EU, its meaning is in many areas rather hollow. For instance, in the context of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership there has been no evidence of an effect on stronger non-proliferation policies. It is also disputable if it has improved the EU’s legitimacy with key actors, e.g. Iran. A special case is the EU endorsement of the US-India nuclear deal in the framework of the NSG. Although this constituted a notable demonstration of EU unity on a controversial topic, it is questionable if it has served the principle of multilateralism and has, thus, been inspired by the concept of ‘effective multilateralism.’ It rather shows that there are also other, easily overlooked factors that may explain collective European policy output. In this case, it was certainly
easier to simply agree on an already pre-given US policy than to initiate and implement an own common counter-policy.

**Hypothesis H₃**: If the EU produces common foreign and security policy output, it is likely to be moderate in form.

All case studies of EU policy output in the field of non-proliferation have been moderate in the sense that the EU has never focused exclusively on either persuasion or military force, the most extreme forms of foreign policy output: Iran, the neighbourhood, including the Mediterranean region, and multilateral non-proliferation institutions have seen a mixture of EU measures belonging to the categories of persuasion, pressure and coercion. In all cases ideational balancing between different European idea complexes have led to such moderate, i.e. ‘balanced,’ policy measures. However, there have been substantial differences between the different case studies in the sense that in some cases, e.g. Iran, ‘moderate policy output’ have constituted virtually the strongest measures feasible, whereas in other cases, e.g. the Euro-Mediterranean region, ‘moderate policy output’ have merely reflected the minimum consensus among EU Member States. Therefore, hypothesis H₃ should be refined in future studies in order to differentiate between these two different types of ‘moderate policy output.’

**Hypothesis H₄**: Output variation is a permanent feature of European foreign and security policy.
As can be expected in a group of states without a central authority, the EU non-proliferation policy output has varied significantly from case to case. For instance, there have been big differences between the EU Iraq and Iran policies, between the non-proliferation measures in different neighbourhood countries or between the EU’s role in the 1995, 2000 and 2005 NPT Review Conferences. However, the number of case studies has been too small to confirm this more general hypothesis about EU foreign and security policy.

**Hypothesis H\textsubscript{5a}:** The more diverse ideas are in an institutionalized, but anarchic system of states, the less likely common foreign and security policy output is.

**Hypothesis H\textsubscript{5b}:** Common ideas or overlapping idea complexes facilitate the development of common interests and, ultimately, collective action of groups of states in international crises.

The case studies have not led to any evidence that may contradict these hypotheses. In fact, it has been argued that the limited number of only four European idea complexes has facilitated substantially EU wide consensus and, thus, collective policy output by the EU. However, as in the case of hypothesis H\textsubscript{4}, substantially more research is necessary to confirm such general hypotheses. Their theoretical issues will be analyzed more in detail in the following section on the theoretical implication of the research results.
Ideas, Idea Complexes and Collective Action

All in all, the specific conclusions about the adequacy of the five hypotheses of the dissertation lead to more general overall conclusions about the impact of foreign policy ideas, in particular of competing idea complexes, on collective European action in the area of non-proliferation and foreign and security policies in general. In total, seven key conclusions can be established:

- Under certain circumstances, in particular in situations of uncertainty, ideas and idea complexes have substantially more explanatory power than the classical factor of national interests.
- In the EU different ideas about foreign and security policy coexist. They can be grouped into four ideal-type idea complexes called ‘national Europe,’ ‘integrationist Europe,’ ‘cosmopolitan Europe’ and ‘multilateral Europe.’
- It is the consensus between competing ideas and idea complexes that makes collective action in matters of foreign and security policy by highly institutionalized groups of states such as the EU possible.
- The limited number of relatively malleable foreign policy ideas within the EU makes consensus for relatively forceful policy output likely. The competition between them leaves, however, substantial room for disagreement. Ideas and idea complexes can, therefore, explain the Union’s strong output variation between different fields of activity.
- The need for striking a balance between competing ideas and idea complexes explains the frequently moderate policy output by the EU.
- ‘Focal points’ may foster to a limited extent the consensus between different foreign policy ideas within the EU.
Common institutions, both formal and informal, are instrumental for keeping EU Member States together, even though their ideas about foreign policy diverge. The institutionalization of European foreign and security policy has created such a profound integration of the different actors that they are compelled into searching for short-term resolutions of their idea conflicts.

So far, the research conclusions have looked exclusively at the EU and its relations with the outside world in a strict sense. After all, this is the general topic of the dissertation. However, at least in one of the already painstakingly analyzed normative and causal beliefs of the EU a reciprocal element can be found: the relation with other actors in the international system, in particular with the United States. Reciprocity means that it is not only important through which prism the EU and its Member States interpret international relations. As we have seen, they can be viewed from bilateral, multilateral, Europeanist and cosmopolitan perspectives. Rather, other actors can influence with their own behaviour how the EU and its Member States approach their relations with other international actors. Even more, they can have an impact on actual collective action by the EU.

This is particularly true for the United States, the most important single actor in the international system. Although US influence on European foreign and security policy has not been a special point of attention of this study, the empirical research suggests that there are at least three ways in which the United States can have an impact on the development of European foreign and security policies: First, the United States can promote European foreign and security policy. This happens whenever the US government exercises moderate leadership that tries to include key allies. In such cases EU Member States do not have to choose between radical forms
of interstate relations such as bandwagoning, on the one hand, or counter-balancing, on the other. A good example in this regard is the US leadership of CTR programmes in the former Soviet Union. Secondly, the United States can effectively block collective action by the European Union. As the case of the American invasion in Iraq has shown, dominant US leadership that does not take the sensibilities of traditional allies and international organizations into consideration can be easily divisive in Europe. In such cases, EU governments are forced to choose between more radical options of transatlantic relations. The odds are that at least some of them end up at opposing ends, thus making collective European action impossible. Thirdly, US policies (or non-policies) can weaken the collective action by the European Union. This occurs whenever the EU is able to achieve common policy output that is not fully supported by corresponding US policies. Arguably, this happened in the case of Iran, above all before 2006. During that time the US refusal to engage with Iran at all, the threats of use of force against Iranian nuclear installations by members of the US administration and radical demands complicated substantially the EU negotiations with the regime in Tehran.\textsuperscript{323}

\textbf{The Limits of European Foreign and Security Policy}

Finally, the overall research results allow drawing up at least tentatively some general conclusions about the limits of the EU foreign and security policy. In other words, consensus in the EU on collective action is only possible, if certain red lines are not crossed. These red lines can be found around three main axes of foreign policy thinking: security perception, use of means and relations with other states. First, the

\textsuperscript{323} Although this issue cannot be dealt with here in detail, it should be pointed out that the United States essentially demanded as a precondition for negotiations what should have been the subject of negotiations, namely the suspension of uranium enrichment.
interpretation of security in a given situation may not tend towards the extreme form of narrow military security of the EU and/or its Member States. Unless the circumstances are very obvious, e.g. a state threatens the EU with attacking it with nuclear warheads, it is very unlikely that all Member States follow such a security perception. Likewise, the focus on human security might be appreciated by most EU Member States, but only in very rare situations human security as such can be the driving force behind collective action of the EU. It is much more likely that security perceptions are found between the extremes of military and human security. Secondly, the use of means range officially from persuasion over pressure and coercion to the use of military force. However, as the table about the use of non-proliferation instruments in chapter 3 shows, military means have been barely used. In practice, their use constitutes a red line that is very difficult to cross, e.g. with an unequivocal UNSC mandate under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The most powerful instruments readily available for collective action by the EU belong to ‘pressure’ and ‘coercion,’ in particular conditionality and sanctions. Persuasion is also used for collective action, though mainly as low-cost, first-resort measures. It is very unlikely that all EU Member States rely on persuasive means during a crisis that is considered to be important. Thirdly, multilateralism is virtually the default option for the EU’s relation with other actors. It is a relatively flexible way to organize international relations and leaves open different interpretations. Bilateralism and cosmopolitanism are in the area of state relations clearly red lines. It would be very surprising if collective action by the EU would move any time soon into one of these two directions. In sum, the limits of collective action in international affairs turn the EU into a moderate force that is more powerful than sceptics may concede, but less than optimists admit.
2. Theoretical Implications

In her 2007 Anna Lindh award lecture about future research agendas on European foreign and security policy, Smith was quite right when she lamented in particular the lack of “accumulation of knowledge” in this field of study (Smith, 2007: 2). Therefore, this dissertation tries to embed its research results and conclusions within the wider context of the analyses that have already been produced about European foreign and security policies. Its intention also addresses larger questions from IR about the role of ideas and collective action of states. In short, this section will present the dissertation conclusions within its wider analytical and theoretical context.  

European Foreign Policy Analysis

This dissertation has shown that an idea based approach can have strong explanatory power for collective policy output by the European Union in matters of foreign and security policy. In contrast to many other approaches, it can explain both why the EU is a very poor actor in some areas and why it is a forceful actor in others. In fact, it argues that theories of European foreign and security policy must be able to account for both failures and successes. However, as has been pointed out already in the introduction chapter, most scholars are either sceptics or optimists, i.e. they either focus on the power or the powerlessness of the European Union as an international actor. The first theoretical implication of this dissertation is, therefore, that much more attention has to be paid to the strong output variation of EU foreign and security policy.

324 The specific theoretical implications of idea based approaches and their relation with other theoretical frameworks has been dealt with in-depth in the first part of the dissertation. This section outlines only some wider implications for the development of European foreign policy analysis and IR theories.
Realists are usually overly pessimistic: “...the end of the Cold War, the widening of the Union, the continued differences in EU members’ strategic culture, ambitions, values, and historical relationships, and the lack – even after forty years of integration – of a European identity sufficient to permit delegation of sovereignty to centralized institutions mean that EU foreign policy cooperation will probably remain limited, fragmented, and intergovernmental” (Gordon, 1997/98: 100). Their problem is that they basically relegate important instances of substantial collective policy output as in Iran, Eastern Europe or concerning certain non-proliferation institutions to rare, ephemeral events. Yet, they are right when they point out the intergovernmental character of the CFSP and how difficult it can be to find consensus. As has been argued already (Wagner, 2003), it is also very unlikely that there are incentives to substitute intergovernmentalism in the near future. European integrationists, on the other hand, are often overly euphoric about the potential impact of the EU on international affairs. This is exemplified by the ‘power’ literature on the EU: Although it has taken many forms – civilian power Europe, normative power Europe, ethical power Europe or transformative power Europe – it is has always been the adjective that has changed and not the noun. In other words, the essential concept of the EU as being a ‘power’ in international politics has rarely been questioned. What has been questioned is the type of ‘power’ it is. The boldest approach in this regard has been probably Leonard’s concept of transformative power Europe. As the title of his most well-known book already says, he argues that the EU as a special kind of international actor will run the 21st century (Leonard, 2005c). However, as the EU’s divisions over Iraq or the 2005 NPT Review Conference demonstrate, it is too ambitious to characterize the EU as a ‘power’ in the international system. It can be a

325 Exceptions are Hill and Smith, 2005; Maull, 2005.
‘force’ in international affairs – as Maull maintains – but it is not necessarily a power (Maull, 2005). In a nutshell, realists have to be more realistic about what an intergovernmental EU can achieve in international affairs, whereas the EU foreign policy optimists have to be more cautious about the Union’s actual ‘power.’

The dissertation’s second theoretical implication is that given the absence of a dominant theoretical framework of EU foreign and security policy the combination of different approaches can lead to new insights. In this dissertation, for example, the already existing literature on the institutionalization of EU foreign and security policy has been combined with an idea based approach mainly developed at US universities. Many works on European foreign policy focus, however, too much on only one conceptual aspect. Especially institutions and instruments are an overly popular topic. Not surprisingly, the (institutional and instrumental) development of ESDP, cohesion, coherence or the expectations-capabilities gap have been very popular themes since the establishment of CFSP. Although it is comprehensible that institutions and instruments play an important role in European foreign policy analysis – after all they are an essential part of foreign policy – they are not enough to understand or explain policy-making.

Following this train of thought, we arrive at a third theoretical implication: If possible, theoretical frameworks should not be exclusive. There are generally more, and often compatible, stories of the same issue. For example, many ‘inside approaches’ to European foreign policy are in principle compatible with the idea based approach of this dissertation. Some of these approaches have been even incorporated here, at least sparingly, e.g. Europeanization, epistemic communities or neofunctionalist spill-over effects. Frequently, bridges can also be built to neighbouring disciplines, in particular IR, and research in other countries such as the
United States. It can be refreshing to see how non-EU specialists see the Union, especially in matters of foreign and security matters. For example, in the field of non-proliferation US scholars are usually very sceptical of the EU. If they deal with the EU at all, it is usually as a regulator between its parts, i.e. its Member States, not as a regulator between the sum of its parts and the outside world. This helps certainly to maintain a critical eye and to sharpen one’s arguments.

The fourth implication is that so far it is futile to find a single common European identity. Yet, still today, identifying the EU as single international actor is a popular exercise in EU research, even on the other side of the Atlantic, where Kagan and other authors have emphasized the differences between the United States and a supposedly united Europe: “It is not just that Europeans and Americans have not shared the same view of what to do about a specific problem such as Iraq. They do not share the same broad view of how the world should be governed, about the role of international institutions and international law, about the proper balance between the use of force and the use of diplomacy in international affairs” (Kagan, 2004: 37). The key problem of these approaches is that they neglect significant intra-European differences about what the EU is and what it should be in international affairs: Europeans are not only from Venus, as Kagan famously has argued, they are also from Mars and Mercury. Consequently, as has been argued here and elsewhere (Barbé and Kienzle, 2007), the EU is an extremely hybrid force in international politics that is difficult to characterize: It can be a ‘force for good,’ but also a traditional realpolitik player; it can be a negligible paper tiger in some instances but also a power to be reckoned with in others; in some situations it resembles a state-like

326 Mercury was the Roman god of trade, profit and commerce. Mercury is also together with Venus, Mars and Earth one of the four terrestrial planets of our solar system.
entity, whereas in others it is not much more than a classical international organization. It is probably best to describe the EU as a chameleonic actor.

The final implication for European foreign policy analysis in a strict sense is a warning against the strong normative bias in some works towards seeing the EU as a ‘force for good.’ Especially in the literature on normative power Europe and on values and principles in the EU foreign policy, there appears to exist an underlying assumption that the EU is in contrast to nation states a promoter of human rights, good governance and other positive values. This dissertation has shown, however, that different and often competing ideas, values and principles underpin EU foreign and security policy. For example, the recent violent suppression of mass demonstrations against the allegedly rigged outcome of the 2009 presidential elections in Iran should have provoked strong and unequivocal protests by the European Union. After all, the Union is a self-declared champion of democracy and human rights in the world. However, the EU’s reaction has been at best half-hearted and confused. Most notably, it has refrained from questioning in any significant way the validity of the outcome of the elections and, thus, the legitimacy of the incumbent, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. The reason is that the EU is not only a promoter of human rights and democracy in Iran, but it also the country’s main negotiator regarding the controversial nuclear programme, in which it tries to diffuse its ideas of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. And these negotiations require a legitimate and powerful Iranian interlocutor who can deliver results. Consequently, EU Member States have been reluctant to condemn outspokenly the Iranian regime, even though this is hardly consistent with its ideas about human rights and democracy.
Different IR theories provide different explanations of collective action by groups of states in matters of ‘high politics’ such as non-proliferation. Basically all macro-theoretical frameworks foresee the possibility of collective action. Even (neo) realism can explain security cooperation, as one of its major representatives points out: “Although realism envisions a world that is fundamentally competitive, cooperation between states does occur. It is sometimes difficult to achieve, however, and always difficult to sustain. Two factors inhibit cooperation: relative-gains considerations and concern about cheating” (Mearsheimer, 1994/95: 12). The crucial issues for (neo) realists are national security interests. Under certain circumstances, especially when a common threat exists, these interests can coincide and nation states cooperate. The most important form of security cooperation is an alliance, e.g. NATO during the Cold War. (Neo) realists emphasize that such international institutions are always created in the interest of states, principally of the dominant powers, and that they serve exclusively the interests of states. As the quote by Mearsheimer suggests, however, states’ interests in relative gains, i.e. relative to other states in the international system, and fears of cheating prohibit under normal circumstances intensive security cooperation. Mearsheimer, in particular, predicted at the end of the Cold War, i.e. once the common Soviet threat that had hold NATO together ceased to exist, major crises and wars in Europe, including the possible development of nuclear weapons (Mearsheimer, 1990). However, this dissertation has shown that essentially the opposite has occurred: European Union Member States have strengthened their cooperation in matters of non-proliferation, even though overarching national security interests have been largely absent. For (neo) realists it is, therefore, particularly difficult to explain output or output variation by an actor such as the EU. In fact,
European integration in general is an anomaly for (neo) realist theory that is very hard to explain (Collard-Wexler, 2006).

( Neo) liberalism, (neo) realism’s sister in the family of rationalist theories, is in principle much better equipped to deal with collective actions of groups of states. For (neo) liberals, cooperation is a common feature in an increasingly interdependent world. In contrast to the relative-gains considerations of (neo) realists they emphasize states’ interest in absolute gains, i.e. for all states in the international system. However, states cooperate and form common institutions only under two key conditions: “First, the actors must have some mutual interests; that is, they must potentially gain from their cooperation (…) The second condition for the relevance of an institutional approach is that variations in the degree of institutionalization exert substantial effects on state behavior” (Keohane, 1989: 2-3). In other words, institutions are still the results of the national interests of nation states. Yet, their existence can influence how states behave. In this regard, (neo) liberals emphasize the reduction of transaction costs and the increased information international institutions provide (Keohane, 1984). However, as has been argued in this dissertation, the EU non-proliferation policy goes well beyond the reduction of transaction costs and increased information. Moreover, mutual interests are not sufficient to explain collective action. For example, the interests in the cases of Iraq and Iran during 2002/2003 were essentially the same – to prevent the development of WMD by despotic regimes. Yet, collective action occurred only in the latter.

Despite these general weaknesses of (neo) liberalism, two of its specific variances, which have had a profound impact on European integration theories,
should be considered apart: intergovernmentalism and two-level games. The central argument of intergovernmentalism is the following: “European integration resulted from a series of rational choices made by national leaders who consistently pursued economic interests – primarily the commercial interests of powerful economic producers and secondarily the macro-economic preferences of ruling governmental coalitions – that evolved slowly in response to structural incentives in the global economy. When such interests converged, integration advanced” (Moravcsik, 1998: 3). In his work, Moravcsik has made a very strong point in favour of his argument. The problem is that he mainly focuses on ‘historic moments’ of European integration, i.e. IGCs that reform the European treaties. In such situations it is quite possible that EC/EU Member States have negotiated treaty reforms on the basis of pre-defined national interests. However, the EU non-proliferation policy has not been developed during IGCs. It is not even mentioned in the European treaties. The dissertation has rather shown that the specific negotiation situations Moravcsik has analyzed have not existed in the EU non-proliferation policy. More specifically, collective policy output by the EU is not the result of bargaining. The EU has been able to internalize an important issue on the international agenda, i.e. non-proliferation, and to become active in this field, even though Member States have not been fully in control.

The two-level game approach, for its part, emphasizes the domestic constraints during international bargaining situations; that is, in international negotiations governments deal not only with a certain international issue but take also domestic concerns, in particular domestic constituencies, into consideration. However, the research results suggests that two-level games have not played a crucial role,

327 Furthermore, liberal theories, especially the democratic peace theory, could be considered here. However, they are considered to be too vague on a regional level to explain policy output by an actor such as the EU.
whenever the EU has decided to become active in matters of non-proliferation. Generally, non-proliferation issues are highly technical that do not attract the attention of the wider public. A typical case are certainly the CTR programmes in the former Soviet Union. However, even in situations where national media and the wider public was heavily involved, e.g. during the Iraq war, two-level games in a strict sense did not occur: Most notably, the supporters of the American invasion in Iraq faced substantial public opposition, above all in Great Britain, Spain and Italy, which should suggest that when the EU deliberated on a common approach they should have joined the camp of invasion opponents. Yet, they did not. In spite of all these shortcomings, (neo)institutionalism and, in particular, intergovernmentalism have been useful after all in highlighting the essentially intergovernmental institutional set-up of CFSP, the main anchor of the EU non-proliferation policy. All too often this feature is passed over in integration theories.

The third macro-theoretical framework that is considered here is constructivism. As it has been used extensively in this dissertation, many of its key premises are seen as crucial for explaining the EU non-proliferation policy. However, two caveats should be pointed out: First, identity and identity formation are problematic concepts for explaining policy output in the case of the EU. It has been argued that so far no common European identity exists that may foster common EU actions. Collective identity formation among states (Wendt, 1994) is of course a possibility and a worthwhile research topic. Yet, it is not an explanatory variable for policy output. Secondly, the postmodern version of constructivism is not a helpful theoretical framework. Apart from the question if postmodernists have an interest at all in the research questions of this dissertation, they are far too sceptical about security cooperation among states. Müller argues that for postmodernists “…real
cooperative relationships can be hardly seen as anything else but hegemony imposed on the carriers of suppressed discourses” (Müller, 2002: 385).

The final theoretical issue that is taken into consideration here is if IR theories are helpful to explain EU issues or if ‘comparative politics’ would be more adequate.\footnote{328}{For an in-depth discussion, see Rosamond, 2000: 157-185; Various Authors, 2002.} As this dissertation has shown, IR theories are in combination with foreign policy analysis useful indeed. Even though traditional (neo) realist and (neo) liberal theories have clear difficulties for explaining European foreign and security policy, the post-Cold War period has seen the development of alternative IR frameworks that may well be adapted to this specific case. At the same time, there exists also a more fundamental problem with a comparative approach in itself: With what should the EU be compared? In principle, there are two options: either with another international organization, e.g. the IAEA, or a (federal) nation state, most likely the United States. It is probably easier to compare the EU with the United States than with another international organization. The EU has many state-like characteristics and, as Nye points out, “The closest thing to an equal that the United States faces at the beginning of the twenty-first century is the European Union” (Nye, 2002: 29). In fact, numerous studies about transatlantic relations lead in many cases to a comparison between the United States and the EU (see, for example, Barbé, 2005b). However, all comparisons with the EU – be it a nation state or an international organization – are essentially flawed, because the EU is more than an international organization but less than a nation state. Consequently, all comparisons lead automatically to the result that the EU is either a powerful international organization (if compared with another international organization) or a weak state (if compared with a nation state).
3. Practical Lessons

Although the present dissertation has a clear academic bias, its research results have also numerous policy implications. Even from the theoretical part important practical lessons can be drawn. As numerous policy documents on the improvement of European foreign and security policy show, the role of competing foreign policy ideas in the EU is not sufficiently recognized. Ideational factors appear merely in the context of calls for more coherent strategic objectives of the EU. The policy research community and policy-makers themselves focus rather on institutions and instruments (see Commission of the European Communities, 2006d; Grant and Leonard, 2006). This overly focus on institutions and instruments obscures, however, the impact competing foreign policy ideas have on them and on the European foreign and security policy in general. Although this dissertation recognizes that institutions and instruments are important indeed, they are not a panacea. They are basically tools that help the EU to overcome ideational conflicts. Therefore, it is crucial to pay attention to possible improvements and new measures that decrease the competition between foreign policy ideas and foster consensus.

Drawing on the theoretical findings of this dissertation, three key lessons are suggested: First, it is essential that the development of foreign policy interests does not take place at the national level. This makes it much more likely that irreconcilable national positions evolve. Moreover, relatively fixed national interests lead to true negotiation situations at the European level and make it very difficult to reach consensus for collective action. One way to avoid this is increased coordination among Member States and EU institutions at early stages of international crises. Although this occurs already under normal circumstances, especially in the framework of the Council working parties, in crisis situations automatic EU
coordination is still scarce. Therefore, a kind of informal, but high-level ‘crisis group’ that meets immediately after the outbreak of an international crisis could foster the development of common European interests and agreement on collective action. In contrast to the formal External and General Affairs Council meetings, ‘crisis group’ meetings would be open to informal and frank debates. Puetter and Wiener suggest specifically to adopt the ‘minister-plus-one’ approach of the eurogroup, which is the informal gathering of finance ministers (plus one senior advisor) of the eurozone: “Whereas the Council framework is designed for formal decision-making, the minister-plus-one approach highlights the relevance of close informal policy dialogue. Only one senior policy adviser accompanies each minister. This creates an intimate atmosphere and allows for real conversations among the participants of the meetings” (Puetter and Wiener, 2007: 1084). Another possibility is the European External Action Service as foreseen in the Lisbon Treaty. Although its concrete functioning is still not clear, it will comprise officials from the Council Secretariat, the Commission and national Member States. Consequently, there exists the chance that the External Action Service is converted into a forum where Member States and EU institutions develop their foreign policy ideas into common interests, especially in international crises.

Secondly, European institutions – above all the Council Secretariat, the Commission and the Parliament – should support European consensus by promoting consciously moderate policy positions, in particular concerning security interpretation, the use of means and transatlantic relations. In this regard, the new foreign policy institutions of the Lisbon Treaty, in particular the permanent Council Presidency and the double-hatted High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, can play a crucial role. Thirdly, more ‘focal points’ are
Conclusions

needed. The dissertation has shown that to a limited degree ‘effective multilateralism’ as a ‘focal point’ has been able to foster at least weak consensus among EU Member States. More ‘focal points’ might strengthen the EU’s ability to achieve collective action. Moreover, European institutions can intent to define more precisely the meaning of ‘focal points,’ thus limiting diverging national interpretations.

Regarding the dissertation’s case studies, recent developments have increased the chances for strong collective action by the EU. Most notably, the foreign policy of the new US administration has become more moderate in tone and substance and has, thus, decreased substantially the risk of transatlantic and inner European dissonance. The EU should use this opportunity to improve its track record in the three case studies: In Iran EU foreign policy output has been already remarkable, though not necessarily successful. This case has shown that moderation and institutional flexibility can lead to substantial collective policy output. The crucial issue now is to replicate this at the EU/E3+3 level. That is, collective action is not only necessary by the EU, but by the EU together with the United States, Russia and China. As in the case of the EU itself, this requires fostering consensus between different foreign policy ideas. In order to avoid negotiation situations between pre-defined national interests, frequent informal meetings are necessary between the E3, the United States, Russia and China, where different approaches can be frankly discussed.

In the case of the European neighbourhood, the Euro-Mediterranean area is much more problematic than Eastern Europe. In fact, non-proliferation in Eastern Europe can be recorded largely as a success story. In the South, however, further steps are necessary: First, the EU should carry out finally its first profound analysis of non-proliferation issues in Mediterranean countries in order to create some kind of common policy framework. The Office of the Personal Representative would be well
suited to coordinate such an analysis, yet with the active cooperation of relevant Commission divisions, especially in the area of dual-use items and border control. Secondly, it is important to concentrate on feasible measures. For example, the EU should push ahead with the support of dual-use item and border control reforms in the Maghreb countries and Jordan: The BAFA programme in Morocco is certainly a promising start. Yet, broader and geographically more varied measures are needed. Thirdly, unfeasible measures should be left out of Euro-Mediterranean relations, especially the problem of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. Such a move would be actually very beneficial for the Euro-Mediterranean security relationship, as it would remove a major stumbling block to progress and would allow concentrating on what can be achieved realistically in the region.

Ultimately, the EU has to make an effort to strengthen again international non-proliferation institutions. In this regard, two events will be crucial: the possible ratification of the CTBT by the United States and the 2010 NPT Review Conference. The former opens up the possibility that the CTBT enters finally into force. Therefore, the EU should renew its common commitment to the Treaty and agree on collective actions to put pressure on essential states that have not ratified the agreement, in particular India, Pakistan, Israel, Iran and China. Concerning the NPT Review Conference the EU has to coordinate more intensively the positions of its Member States, if it wants to avoid the failure of the previous Review Conference. Certainly more specific coordination meetings are necessary. In this regard, the Spanish Presidency of the EU during the Review Conference can play an important role. A key area where the EU as such has lost out so far is global nuclear disarmament as exemplified by UNSC Resolution 1887 (2009). Whereas the United States and other global players are at the forefront of these new developments, the EU is
conspicuously silent. If it does not address forcefully the issue collectively, it risks to be sidelined in one of the most important current non-proliferation issues for the foreseeable future.

4. Future Research

The theoretical implications and practical lessons have shown that more research is necessary to increase and specify our understanding of the European non-proliferation policy, European foreign and security policy and, in general, the roles of ideas in foreign policy and international affairs. This dissertation has tried to shed light on certain aspects in these areas, but it still has not achieved the precise and comprehensive picture that one might wish to have. In total, four possible avenues have been contemplated to complement the present research: The first one is essentially an extension of the research design of the dissertation. That is, the theoretical framework should be applied to more and, in particular, more varied case studies. Within the field of non-proliferation it is possible to include more cases of the EU’s fight against the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons. The dissertation has mainly focused on nuclear proliferation, which is the most disputed area. In principle the area of chemical and biological weapons is less controversial – no EU Member States possesses these kinds of weapons – and international standards are much stricter with international treaties calling for their worldwide destruction. Consequently, idea conflicts in the EU should be less severe and stronger policy output could be expected. Another possible case study is North Korea. Interestingly, the EU has been only marginally involved there, e.g. through KEDO. During the international negotiations with the regime in Pyongyang it is not even a marginal
actor. How can we explain this lack of policy output? Is it the result of disagreement among EU Member States? Or do Member States actually agree that it is better not to participate in the negotiations?

Apart from additional case studies from the field of non-proliferation, further research in the area of EU foreign and security policy in general could improve the accuracy of the theoretical framework of the dissertation. Above all, research in the area of conflict management might be a promising field of investigation: When, how and why does or does not the EU intervene in conflicts? Is there a relation between conflict intervention and competing foreign policy ideas? Finally, research outside the framework of the European Union can lead to new insights. When, how and why do other groups of states engage in sustained collective action in ‘high politics’? Potential case studies include post-Cold War NATO or the OSCE. All in all, more case studies should allow testing the theoretical framework and, wherever necessary, adapting, modifying and refining it.

The second avenue for future research proposes to re-examine more in detail one specific intervening variable – the role of the United States in European foreign and security policy. As this dissertation has suggested, almost inevitably US policies and transatlantic relations influence in one way or another EU foreign and security policies. But it is not completely clear when, how and why. So far most studies in the field of transatlantic relations deal either with the general relationship between the two sides of the Atlantic and possible gaps (see, for example, Lindstrom, 2003; Zaborowski, 2006) or the attitude of successive US administrations towards a stronger European role in security and defence issues, especially in the context of the burden sharing debate (Sloan, 2000). Specific studies of the direct impact of US policies on
EU policies in foreign and security matters are, however, rare, if not non-existent. Thus, many new research opportunities exist in this area.

The next avenue for future research is the use of alternative methodologies. One possibility is to move towards psychological investigation. A promising approach is Holsti and Rosenau’s analysis of the belief systems of the US foreign policy elite. This study is based on large samples of questionnaire responses: 2,282 in 1976 and 2,502 in 1980 (Holsti and Rosenau, 1984: 264). So far no similar study has been carried out in the European Union. However, the analysis of the ideas of a large sample of the European foreign policy elite – both in the 27 Member States and the European institutions – could provide strong empirical data on foreign policy ideas and idea complexes in the European Union. It could be used to explore more in detail potential fields of consensus and dissonance and to establish more precise limits of common European foreign and security policy. Obviously such a research endeavour is far too expensive for a PhD research project, but with the financial support of foundations or public institutions it might be feasible to conduct a study with a sample of, for instance, 1,000 persons. In addition, quantitative content analysis methods can be used to examine a large amount of relevant European and national documents to discover certain recurring patterns of foreign policy ideas. Alternatively, historical case studies could be examined, as in these cases substantial archival material is available, often including formerly classified documents. An interesting starting point might be the origins of EURATOM and the role of nuclear weapons development. In such a case, research might lead to new insights on the impact of

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329 Vennesson’s and his collaborators’ study of the worldviews of several leading members in EU institutions is a first, though very limited step into this direction (see Vennesson, 2007).
330 Approximately 150 European officials and more or less 30 officials per Member State could be included in such a sample.
331 For a brief introduction, see Buttolph Johnson and Reynolds, 2005: 222-226.
foreign policy ideas on how nuclear policies evolved in Western Europe. Historical studies would also allow studying how foreign policy ideas evolve and vary over time.

The final avenue leads away from the relatively narrow focus on policy output in this dissertation to policy outcomes. In other words, further research cannot only try to understand better policy output as such, but it can also intent to explain better the link between policy output and policy outcome. As has been pointed out already in this dissertation, policy output does not lead necessarily to the desired outcomes. Although the traditional European foreign policy research gives sometimes the impression that the EU’s weakness in international affairs is mainly related to its lack of internal coherence and consistency, in practice effectiveness is much more complex. Even if the EU were a united and powerful international actor, it is illusionary to assume that it would achieve automatically its desired policy outcomes. Therefore, it is desirable to pay greater attention to the issue of policy effectiveness: Under which conditions can such a peculiar actor as the EU be effective in international affairs? Which factors have to be taken into consideration?

Closing Remarks

As the numerous avenues for future research suggest, the present dissertation is far from providing a thoroughly conclusive and definite analysis of the role of ideas in foreign policy, European foreign and security policy or even European non-proliferation policies. It is rather a contribution to growing fields of scholarly investigation that will require further attention, especially for the period after 9/11. As Carlsnaes pointed out in an article on ‘foreign policy’ a couple of years ago, the role
of ideas in foreign policy analysis will be increasingly important. It is already a hotly debated issue in academic circles, yet “…this debate is only at its beginning and it will continue to be a focal point for critical discussion” (Carlsnaes, 2002: 344). In a sense, this dissertation is thought to be part of this discussion. It is also a contribution to the academic controversy about EU foreign policy more in particular: It has addressed such controversial issues as the Union’s nature, its functioning in foreign policy or its output in international affairs. Finally, it has tried to put forward new ideas on the EU non-proliferation policy, which is likely to become an increasingly disputed field of international security in Europe – both academically and politically. Overall, the dissertation is a piece of academic debate that intents to provoke further discussions on ideas in foreign policy, European foreign and security policy, non-proliferation policies and, more in general, international cooperation.
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