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Conceptual Metaphor Theory and Sartre's Philosophy

PhD Dissertation in Cognitive Science and Language
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Abstract

This dissertation deals with Conceptual Metaphor Theory and Experientialist philosophy by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson and Existentialist philosophy by Jean-Paul Sartre.

In the first chapter we study Lakoff and Johnson’s works on Metaphor (1980, 1999) and we also analyse the most important revisions, extensions and criticisms related to the theory.

In the second chapter we make a comparison between experientialism and existentialism by means of the concept of imagination — a key component of both theories.

In the third and last chapter we examine the central metaphors that are revealed in the most important book of existentialism: Jean-Paul Sartre’s (1943a) L’être et el Néant. As if it were another chapter in Lakoff & Johnson (1999) we will pay attention to this very important book of Sartre’s in order to discover which metaphors sustain his system. The analysis will be based on Lakoff & Johnson's Conceptual Metaphor Theory and Lakoff & Johnson's (1999) key idea that metaphor is an essential skill that allows us to build philosophical systems.

Finally, in a concluding section we will summarize the key proposals defended throughout this work.
Resum

Aquesta tesi se centra en la Teoria de la Metàfora Conceptual i la filosofia experiencialista de George Lakoff and Mark Johnson i en la filosofia existencialista de Jean-Paul Sartre.

En el primer capítol estudiem les obres de Lakoff i Johnson sobre la Metàfora (1980, 1999) i també fem una revisió crítica de les més importants reformulacions, ampliacions i crítiques que ha rebut la teoria.

En el segon capítol fem una comparació entre experiencialisme i existencialisme a través del concepte d'imaginació —un element clau en ambdues teories.

En el tercer i darrer capítol examinem les metàfores centrals que podem descobrir en el llibre més important de l'existencialisme: L'être et le Néant de Jean-Paul Sartre (1943a). Com si es tractés d'un nou capítol de Lakoff & Johnson (1999) centrarem la nostra atenció en aquest importantíssim llibre de Sartre per tal de descobrir quines metàfores sostenen el seu sistema. L'anàlisi es basarà en la teoria de la Metàfora Conceptual (tal com es presenta a Lakoff & Johnson 1999) i en la idea clau en aquest mateix llibre que la metàfora és una habilitat essencial que ens permet construir sistemes filosòfics.

Finalment, un apartat de conclusions tancarà la tesi per tal de recollir les principals propostes que han estat defensades al llarg del treball.
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Introduction

Let me start with a short personal history: in 2000 I defended my doctoral thesis in Philosophy at the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona (UAB — Autonomous University of Barcelona), focusing on the work of Sartre between 1927 and 1948, especially interested in the concepts of freedom, reality and imagination. Subsequently, I decided to study Catalan Philology at the Universitat Oberta de Catalunya (UOC — Open University of Catalonia), where, thanks to Jaume Mateu, I became interested in Cognitive Linguistics. It was then that I decided to follow this doctoral course in Cognitive Science and Language. When the time came to consider my Dissertation, it seemed to me that, given my academic background, I could carry out an application of Lakoff and Johnson’s Conceptual Metaphor Theory to Sartre’s work (as though it were another chapter of Lakoff & Johnson 1999).

Nevertheless, on reading Johnson’s works (with or without Lakoff) I felt a reminiscent tang or heard a tune I already knew. It is with this feeling that I threw myself into the work which I have carried out in the second part of the work: to compare the philosophical systems of Johnson and Sartre, especially interested in the same concepts as in 2000: freedom and imagination and its influence on the understanding of a meaningful reality.

Why is an analysis of Sartre’s philosophy necessary in these terms? Well, the reasons are various and I shall try to comment on them briefly.
In the first place, it is necessary to consider that Sartre was not two individual people — a philosopher and a writer — but one whole person, and as a writer he has left clear signs of his use of metaphor as an explicative tool. Simply by looking at the titles of his works we discover the following metaphors: we find that freedom has paths — in *Les chemins de la liberté* —, some flies represent the regrets and guilt of a community — in *Les mouches* —, responsibility and the limits of freedom are expressed as walls — in *Le mur* —, in lieu of things we are offered words — in *Les mots* —, the trial between men is held behind closed doors — in *Huis clos* —, etc. to name just a few significant examples. This clear reivindication of metaphor in Sartre’s literature pushes me to think that the same would occur in his philosophy.

Secondly, there are similarities to be discovered between the two systems, which for the moment we can exemplify briefly by citing these two phrases:

1) metaphors are not merely things to be seen beyond. In fact, one can see beyond them only by using other metaphors (Lakoff & Johnson 1980 [reed. 2003]: 239).

2) la compréhension est un mouvement qui se s’achève jamais, c’est la réaction de l’esprit à une image par une autre image, à celle-ci par une autre image et ainsi de suite, en droit, jusqu’à l’infini (Sartre 1940 [reed. 1948]: 150).
Similarities such as these (and many more which we will deal with throughout this work) make clear the need for an in-depth comparison of the two systems (which became the second objective of the thesis and whose result I present in Chapter 2).

In third place, I approached Mark Johnson personally with regard to my intention to write this thesis and posed these two questions: 1) Why does Sartre not appear in his texts? 2) Whether anyone had already carried out any broad, in-depth analysis based on any philosophical system similar to that which Lakoff and Johnson (1999) offers us. His answer was the following: with regard to 1) Mark Johnson said: “I have never given Sartre’s treatment of imagination serious study. I think there are two reasons for my ignorance of his views. First, many years ago (maybe 30 years) I did a survey of some of the literature on imagination. Whatever I looked at in Sartre back then somehow did not strike me as on the right track, so I never went any further. However, I have no real knowledge of his work in that area, and so I don’t trust my judgment about him. Second, I was always put off by his view of the self and of human freedom, and I think that kept me from reading further in his work. So, in short, my ignoring of Sartre is mostly a result of my failure to do a serious study of his views”; and with regard to 2) he added: “I do not know of anyone who has carried forth the kinds of analyses of philosophical systems that Lakoff and I did in Philosophy in the Flesh”.

This response clearly showed me nothing more than an urgency to carry out the analysis which I had set out to do, and to do so carefully, conscious of the novelty that it would represent at all levels.
The Dissertation presents the following structure: In the first chapter we present the key ideas of the Conceptual Metaphor Theory by Lakoff and Johnson, centring our attention especially on its relationship with Philosophy. We begin by referring to the central points in Lakoff and Johnson (1980) so as to extract the key points of their theory on metaphor. We have already referred to the most important reformulations, extensions and criticisms of the theory and we will end the chapter by referring to Lakoff and Johnson (1999) in order to obtain the authors’ central proposals through which their theory can be related to philosophical systems (this is what we will do with Sartre’s philosophy in the last chapter). This last part will also serve to complement the Conceptual Metaphor Theory presented in Lakoff & Johnson (1980) with the new insights and ideas included in this new work.

The second chapter presents the conclusions which we have arrived at by reading Johnson’s and Sartre’s works in order to compare both systems. We will see that there are similarities in all that concerns imagination, situation, freedom, morality, and so on. We will focus, therefore, on the works of Sartre’s existentialism, born between 1926 and 1948, since after that date there is a change of direction where his theory takes on board the most important aspects of psychoanalysis and Marxism — although this does not mean that parts of these systems do not appear in previous works. All the works of Johnson have been a reference for us, whether written with Lakoff or not, but in different parts of this work.
The third and last chapter presents the result of the application of Lakoff and Johnson’s theory on metaphor to the case of Sartre’s philosophy, as presented in the most important work of existentialism: *L’être et le néant*, a work published in 1943. We will see that an examination from this point of view gives coherence and organization to this work and gives us an idea of what Sartre considers as image at the time of writing his work.

Finally the conclusion will give a brief summary of what has been said throughout this work.
Chapter 1. Conceptual Metaphor and Philosophy

1.0. Introduction

In this first chapter we will examine the key texts in which Lakoff and Johnson present their Conceptual Metaphor Theory. In the first part we are going to present the basics of their theory as explained in Lakoff & Johnson (1980). Subsequently, we will review the most important additions, reformulations and criticisms that the theory has attracted to date. Finally we will present Lakoff & Johnson (1999) in order to show the relationship that these authors have discovered between metaphor and philosophy and also in order to offer the last version of Conceptual Metaphor Theory. All three parts will be important for us to present a further comparison between both Johnson’s and Sartre’s philosophical systems (Cf. the second chapter of the work) and the central metaphors that conform to Sartre’s existentialism as presented in Sartre (1943a) (Cf. the third and last chapter of the work).
1.1. Lakoff and Johnson’s (1980) Conceptual Metaphor Theory

Metaphor is pervasive in everyday life, not just in language but in thought and action. Our ordinary conceptual system, in terms of which we both think and act, is fundamentally metaphorical in nature (Lakoff & Johnson 1980 [reed. 2003]: 3).

This would be, in short, the point of departure of Lakoff and Johnson’s theory about the metaphorical systematization of the world that we find, described more completely in Lakoff & Johnson (1980) — we shall refer to this work as L&J 1980 from now on.

In order to be able to explain innovations in the real world, whether they be technical, whether they result from new knowledge or, even, from a change of thinking when interpreting areas of concrete or abstract experience (this could include anything from the internet, through human feelings, all the way to the true understanding of human freedom or the presence of divinity in our existence), we normally start from a systematized source domain. This is normally linked to physical experiences, thus helping us to categorize and conceptualize these innovations in a form that allows us to systematize the domain metaphorically. This metaphorical systematization is the most accurate

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1 Although we always refer to Conceptual Metaphor because it is the term that has become fixed in the cognitive bibliography (including that of Lakoff and Johnson), we must add that in this text they speak about Metaphorical Concepts, something which, as we will see, should still invite us to think along Sartrian lines in as far as the roles of the imagination and understanding are concerned.
way possible, given such little consistency, such fuzziness of borders and an inherent difficulty of giving linguistic expression to those experiences.

Thus, we tend to systematize the world through metaphors that are already systematized or even subcategorized into symbolic systems (this is especially true in the areas of new knowledge which continually appear), in order to attain a conceptual coherence that helps us towards our main goal: to obtain an understanding of reality in such a way that we can comprehend exactly what it is and to be able to project correctly what we want it to be.

In this way, therefore, we will find a jump from the physical to the non-physical in a direct way — in the majority of cases linked to the sense of sight or touch — and we will even find these same jumps implied in an already existing structured metaphorical system. This means that the metaphors themselves allow certain conceptual sets, yet not others, thus dividing them into living metaphors (those we most use in daily life while often ignoring the metaphor) and dead metaphors (even though these may be reused and may appear in areas of poetic or artistic creation in general, and even in the scientific field).

Taking this basic idea into account, L&J 1980 establish a typology of metaphors which we will attempt to summarize next. All of them establish a series of mappings from the source domain (normally structured, physical and concrete) to the target domain (normally abstract, non-structured and not physical) that makes a correspondence between the elements that participate in each domain. For example in the case of the metaphor ARGUMENT IS WAR: the argumentation is the fight, the
persons who argue are the fighters, the words are the weapons of attack or defense, and so on.

**a) Orientational metaphors**

Orientational metaphors are those that have to do with spatial orientation: above / below, in / out of, in front of / behind, and so on. They "are not arbitrary. They have a basis in our physical and cultural experience" (L&J 1980 [reed. 2003]: 14). It is precisely from these that a better understanding of certain abstract concepts can arise, such as, to quote some of the cases treated by the authors, kindness, the forces of happiness, the future, status, virtue, health, life, and so forth.

The diversity of our direct experiences in both the physical and the cultural environment gives rise to several metaphors, which have an internal coherence and which should lead to a fuller understanding of those experiences. All of these metaphors will be linked in one way or another to the experience that gives rise to them and they will be more or less successful according to the culture, which, also searching for coherence, will give priority to some over others, especially those related to space and the most abstract concepts.

Some examples of this kind of metaphor, some linguistic expressions that express them and their physical basis mentioned by the authors are:
HAPPY IS UP; SAD IS DOWN

I'm feeling up. That boosted my spirits. My spirits rose. You're in high spirits. Thinking about her always gives me a lift. I'm feeling down. I'm depressed. He's really low these days. I fell into a depression. My spirits sank.

Physical basis: Drooping posture typically goes along with sadness and depression, erect posture with a positive emotional state.

CONSCIOUS IS UP; UNCONSCIOUS IS DOWN

Get up. Wake up. I'm up already. He rises early in the morning. He fell asleep. He dropped off to sleep. He's under hypnosis. He sank into a coma.

Physical basis: Humans and most other mammals sleep lying down and stand up when they awaken.

HEALTH AND LIFE ARE UP; SICKNESS AND DEATH ARE DOWN

He’s at the peak of health. Lazarus rose from the dead. He’s in top shape. As to his health, he’s way up there. He fell ill. He’s sinking fast. He came down with the flu. His health is declining. He dropped dead.

Physical basis: Serious illness forces us to lie down physically. When you're dead, you are physically down (L&J 1980 [reed. 2003]: 15)
b) Ontological metaphors

These metaphors, as useful and necessary as the first ones in order to organize our understanding of the reality we experience, are based on the fact of “understanding our experiences in terms of objects and substances” (L&J 1980 [reed. 2003]: 25).²

This type of metaphor allows us to select units from our internal experience and to manipulate them as if they were physical things; it helps us to categorize, to group, to quantify and to rationalize them. Since every concept comes from the physical experience of the world, the authors state that "our experiences with physical objects (especially our own bodies) provide the basis for an extraordinarily wide variety of ontological metaphors" (L&J 1980 [reed. 2003]: 25).

As an example of this type of metaphor we will highlight, just as the authors do, the opposition between in and out of. Let us imagine our mind is a container, where the contents are both our previous experience and our new experiences. They are thrown together and our thought is the manager responsible for organizing what is to be seen and comprehended.

In order to construct ontological metaphors, Lakoff and Johnson highlight two procedures already known in literary analysis, but although

² This type of metaphor is the most criticized by Sartre in philosophy and psychology due to its lack of existential component and the action of human reality, although he is fully aware of using it himself in order to explain his ontological and phenomenological theory, repeatedly marking its use, however, through italics and inverted commas. We shall see this later on (Cf. Chapter 3, part 3.1).
they are linked to one’s experience and conceptualization of the world, they continue to mark a very important point of inflection:

a) Personification: the physical object is treated like a person, brought to life in human terms.

b) Metonymy: allowing us to name something in such a way that the abstract is explained in terms of the experiential.

From among all the explanatory examples of the authors, we would highlight the following metaphors with their linguistic expressions, for their importance, their general scope and for our particular analysis because some of them are also present in Sartre’s works:

THEORIES (and ARGUMENTS) ARE BUILDINGS

Is that the foundation for your theory? The theory needs more support. The argument is shaky. We need some more facts or the argument will fall apart. We need to construct strong argument for that. I haven’t figured out yet what the form of the argument will be. Here are some more facts to shore up the theory. We need to buttress the theory with solid arguments. The theory will stand on the strength of that argument. The argument collapsed. They exploded his latest theory. We will show that theory to be without foundation. So far we have put together only the framework of the theory.
IDEAS ARE FOOD

What he said left a had taste in my mouth. All this paper has in it are raw facts, half-baked ideas, and harmed-over theories. There are too many facts here for me to digest them all. I just can't swallow that claim. That argument smells fishy. Let me stew over that for a while. Now there's a theory you can really sink your teeth into. We need to let that idea percolate for a while. That's food for thought. He's a voracious reader. We don't need to spoon-feed our students. He devoured the book. Let's let that idea simmer on the back burner for a while. This is the meaty part of the paper. Let that idea jell for a while. That idea has been fermenting for years.

UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING; IDEAS ARE LIGHT-SOURCES; DISCOURSE IS A LIGHT-MEDIUM

I see what you're saying. It looks different from my point of view. What is your outlook on that? I view it differently. Now I've got the whole picture. Let me point something out to you. That's an insightful idea. That was a brilliant remark. The argument is clear. It was a murky discussion. Could you elucidate your remarks? It's a transparent argument. The discussion was opaque (L&J 1980 [reed. 2003]: 46-49).

Through both the use and the deepest development of these metaphors we can ascertain that there are parts of metaphor more used than others and that these end up becoming part of our ordinary literal language. Others, however, remain outside this vocabulary. Such figurative or
imaginative language (from now on) is more readily interpreted by specialists in the subject.

To summarize: what these metaphors aim to do is explain what is fuzzier by means of something clearer: "we typically conceptualize the non-physical in terms of the physical" (L&J 1980 [reed. 2003]: 59).

c) Structural metaphors

This last type of metaphor analyzed in L&J (1980) corresponds to those which use an already-structured concept for structuring other fuzzier concepts. The paradigmatic case mentioned by Lakoff and Johnson is the one that leads us to think that ARGUMENT IS WAR present in the following linguistic expressions:

Your claims are indefensible.
He attacked every weak point in my argument. His criticisms were right on target.
I demolished his argument.
I've never won an argument with him.
You disagree? Okay, shoot!
If you use that strategy, he'll wipe you out. He shot down all of my arguments (L&J 1980 [reed. 2003]: 4).

This is one of those cases which clearly shows that, in the construction of metaphors to aid understanding, not only do one's experiences but also one's personal actions have an important role, which, dialectically,
constitutes a specific thought, which, in turn, determines a way of behaving.

Every understanding, then, is mediatized by metaphor — apart from physical orientation — and it is from these basic experiences that we construct our understanding for establishing coherence and sense, either through one metaphor alone or through several metaphors that are coherent among themselves. Therefore, we can deduce that all understanding which is linked to something physical relates better to our experience and is therefore stronger and more coherent than any understanding that is not related to anything physical: those linked to surface, movement or similar concepts are clear examples.4

Next, once the fundamental basis of the theory and the typology of Lakoff and Johnson are established, two contrasting theories can be examined when understanding metaphor, both can be criticized for presenting their own idea.

a) The Abstractionist Theory: stating that there is only one general, abstract concept that permits two uses in two different areas of experience.

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3 Lakoff (1992) is clearer in this sense, just as in Johnson’s texts, among which we can cite Johnson (1987), which we will deal with at length at a later stage.

4 Beside Conceptual Metaphor there is also Image Metaphors, created without a system of structured mappings but only by resemblance or physical analogy. Metaphors called one-shot image-metaphors in Lakoff and Turner (1989). A good example of this kind of metaphor could be the “mouse” of computers.
b) The Theory of Homonymy: stating that there are two completely different concepts and that each one embraces an area of different action, one physical and the other non-physical.

For the authors neither of the theories is sustainable and they propose that metaphor allows us to understand one domain of the experience in terms of another. We use concepts from natural types of experience (the body, physical action, interaction with others) and orientation (objects, substances, journeys, war, building, etc.) in order to understand other areas of our “fuzzier” experience: emotions, time, ideas, common sense, work, happiness, etc. The first are structured well enough to help structure the rest of our experiences from our own interaction with both, so that we can describe them better by making prototypes and relationships among them. For the authors, then, as long as everything is based on interactional experience, the concepts are always open, an idea that we will retrieve later when speaking about Sartre and his theory of images and imagination.

From a “me-first” orientation we establish a series of concepts that will help us to conceptualize our experience: up, down, under, active, good, here, now, and so forth.

After having examined in depth the metaphors that structure the ordinary conceptual system of our culture, Lakoff and Johnson go on to examine the imaginative and creative metaphors, those which create reality and, therefore, a new understanding and action. This is to be understood as an adaptation to a new environmental understanding as
long as the metaphor gauges what is real for us. What we are looking for through metaphor is to establish, or to discover, resemblances. This will make the majority of new metaphors appear under the structural heading, since it is here where resemblances can be found among diverse entities, even though their basic foundation will continue to be ontological or orientational.

It is in establishing this resemblance that our imagination is put to work, mainly because there has to be an image (however diffuse) in order to establish it. There have to be two realities present (one of them probably absent or non-physical) in order to compare them, since the concept or word cannot itself be the source of the resemblance but merely its development in later linguistic reflection. The image, appearing in the territory of irreflexive intuition, will prepare the way for the understanding that will be developed later with the establishment — now reflexive — of new images and metaphors that will form a communicable conceptual system at the end of the process.5

Lakoff and Johnson highlight the fact that we comment on, but do not use, the distinction between reflection and pre-reflection — terms which are purely Sartrian — and go on to state that "metaphor is primarily a matter of thought and action and only derivatively a matter of language" (L&J 1980 [reed. 2003]: 153).

We highlight the examination that they carry out of what is a central structural metaphor for Lakoff and Johnson, because we will find the analysis again in Sartre: the idea according to which IDEAS ARE FOOD,

5 And in this sense science, philosophy and literature work in the same direction and with the same tools.
based on the construct that the mind is a container and the ideas are objects that enter the mind.\textsuperscript{6}

Finally, then, the primary function of the metaphor is "a partial understanding of one kind of experience in terms of another" (L&J 1980 [reed. 2003]: 154), and it has to be partial, because metaphors select a part of the experience and highlight it, while hiding others, since imagination is incapable of establishing the world as a whole but is selective in establishing a background for the image.

Having arrived at this conclusion, the authors decide to analyze the two basic problems of metaphor, which are:

\begin{itemize}
  \item[a)] Truth: the categorizing of reality with an adequacy related to the experience with mobile concepts (prototype, image schemata).
  \item[b)] Appropriacy of action: metaphor allows movement into the past and into the future in some interactional dialectics. That is what leads to understanding and communication in word and deed.
\end{itemize}

According to L&J (1980), the problem with truth is that it focuses on the analysis of the sentence and the truth which is implied by:

\textsuperscript{6} This metaphor is criticized by Sartre in many places and has its counterpart in transcendence and intentionality (Cf. Sartre 1936a or 1939b, for example).
— understanding the sentence and the situation that it refers to.
— adjustment in such a way as to agree sufficiently well with our purposes.

And understanding the situation very often means: projecting orientation onto what may have none, projecting entity onto what may have none, putting a background into place and putting categories into the sentence and applying them to the situation. In other words, a certain metaphorical projection with an ever necessary external reference reminds us a lot of phenomenological "intentionality".7

Moreover, just as in phenomenology, Lakoff and Johnson endeavour to find a third way somewhere between objectivism and subjectivism that uses, from the former, the ideas about science, truth, rationality, accuracy, justice and impartiality, and from the latter, ideas related to the emotions, intuition, imagination, humanity, art and supreme truth. They call this synthesis of the thought “experientialist” and describe it in the following way — the quotation is long but it is necessary to reproduce it in full in order to understand the reach of the proposal and also to see clearly the importance of imagination in the theory that they defend, since it is from the few places where it is quoted explicitly in L&J 1980:

What we are offering in the experientialist account of understanding and truth is an alternative which denies that subjectivity and objectivity

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7 Movement mentioned in a lot of texts by Johnson, and also by Lakoff (Cf. Johnson 1987 or 2007 and L&J 1999, for example).
are our only choices. We reject the objectivist view that there is absolute and unconditional truth without adopting the subjectivist alternative of truth as obtainable only through the imagination, unconstrained by external circumstances. The reason we have focused so much on metaphor is that it unites reason and imagination. Reason, at the very least, involves categorization, entailment, and inference. Imagination, in one of its many aspects, involves seeing one kind of thing in terms of another kind of thing — what we have called metaphorical thought. Metaphor is thus imaginative rationality. Since the categories of our everyday thought are largely metaphorical and our everyday reasoning involves metaphorical entailments and inferences, ordinary rationality is therefore imaginative by its very nature. (....) Metaphor is one of our most important tools for trying to comprehend partially what cannot be comprehended totally: our feelings, aesthetic experiences, moral practices, and spiritual awareness. These endeavours of the imagination are not devoid of rationality; since they use metaphor, they employ an imaginative rationality. What the myths of objectivism and subjectivism both miss is the way we understand the world through our interactions with it. What objectivism misses is the fact that understanding, and therefore truth, is necessarily relative to our cultural conceptual systems and that it cannot be framed in any absolute or neutral conceptual system. Objectivism also misses the fact that human conceptual systems are metaphorical in nature and involve an imaginative understanding of one kind of thing in terms of another. What subjectivism specifically misses is that our understanding, even our most imaginative understanding, is given in terms of a conceptual system that is grounded in our successful functioning in our physical and cultural
environments. It also misses the fact that metaphorical understanding involves metaphorical entailment, which is an imaginative form of rationality (L&J 1980 [reed. 2003]: 192-194).

Once reason and imagination are connected, as we have seen, the authors are in agreement that understanding is always an understanding for a specific person, that there is a meaning for a specific individual and that this understanding uses metaphor as a primary source of the imagination, but it is not the same as subjectivism for "its rejection of the Romantic idea that imaginative understanding is completely unconstrained" (L&J 1980 [reed. 2003]: 228).

Finally, the authors close the text with a post-script from which it is necessary to quote a fragment, in order to see from their perspective where knowledge ultimately lies:

But metaphors are not merely things to be seen beyond. In fact, one can see beyond them only by using other metaphors. It is as though the ability to comprehend experience through metaphor were a sense, like seeing or touching or hearing, with metaphors providing the only ways to perceive and experience much of the world. Metaphor is as much a part of our functioning as our sense of touch, and as precious (L&J 1980 [reed. 2003]: 239).

Thus, the classical order of perception → image → concept finally seems to be altered and these concepts pass into the imagination in the form of

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8 As we will see in the second chapter, this also occur in Sartre, with imagination linked to the body in an absolute way (movements, emotions, etc).
image schemata that enable us to think, and therefore, to categorize the world and to act in it as humans with projected goals and consequences. It is a dynamic relationship causing a conceptual model among the images, not a model selected from an objective world and postulated as a philosophical principle.
1.2. Extensions, reformulations and criticisms

The aim of this section is to present, and to comment briefly on, the most important extensions, reformulations and criticisms that have been made to the standard Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT) as we have presented it in Section 1.1.

1.2.1. Extensions and reformulations

— Lakoff (1987): he repeats the ideas presented in L&J 1980 in reference to metaphor but refers above all to the theory on conceptualization and categorization. Lakoff proposes a new view of human thought that he calls experiential realism or experientialism, which stems from the idea of giving answers to classical questions in the fields of psychology, linguistics, anthropology, philosophy and computer science from Cognitive Science; questions such as “What is reason? How do we make sense of our experience? What is a conceptual system and how is it organized? Do all people use the same conceptual system?” (Lakoff 1987: xi) and so on. The key ideas of experientialism are:

- thought is embodied (...), thought is imaginative (...), thought has gestalt properties (...), thought has ecological structure (...),
- conceptual structure can be described using cognitive models that

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9 We refer principally to books and works with aim of generality, but we include some articles when they present some important and influential ideas in posterior works on Conceptual Metaphor Theory. We also include works by Lakoff and Johnson in order to obtain a vision as complete as possible of their theories.
have the above properties (...), the theory of cognitive models incorporates what was right about the traditional view of categorization, meaning, and reason, while accounting for the empirical data on categorization and fitting the new view overall (Lakoff 1987: xiv-xv).

It is in this text, so, in reference to categorization and conceptual systems that are postulated as essential to Cognitive Linguistics ideas like prototype theory (that concepts are organized by means of prototypicity), basic-level categories (supposed to be primary with respect to gestalt perception, image formation and so on), family resemblances (that not all elements in a kind share all and the same characteristics) and fuzzy boundaries (categories and concepts are not discrete elements with clear-cut boundaries but a continuum in which are elements in an instable situation on the line), and so forth. Examples from colours, furniture, causation, mother, and others are used in order to found what is just been said. But the central claim of the work is that we organize our knowledge by means of ICMs (Idealized Cognitive Models): structured whole which uses four kinds of structuring principles: propositional structure, image-schematic structure, metaphoric mappings and metonymic mappings. The example of mother and its radial structure is quite clear at this point. Finally in the book, Lakoff presents arguments in favour of a new paradigm for knowledge and meaning: experientialism, in opposition to objectivism. At this point we can summarize the key ideas of the book as follows:
1. There are at least two kinds of structure in our preconceptual experiences:

a. Basic-level structure: Basic-level categories are defined by the convergence of our gestalt perception, our capacity for bodily movement, and our ability to form rich mental images.

b. Kinesthetic image-schematic structure: Image schemas are relatively simple structures that constantly recur in our everyday bodily experience: CONTAINERS, PATHS, LINKS, FORCES, BALANCE, and in various orientations and relations: UP-DOWN, FRONT-BACK, PART-WHOLE, CENTER-PERIPHERY, etc.

These structures are directly meaningful, first, because they are directly and repeatedly experienced because of the nature of the body and its mode of functioning in our environment. (For a detailed discussion, see Johnson, 1987)

2. There are two ways in which abstract conceptual structure arises from basic-level and image-schematic structure:

a. By metaphorical projection from the domain of the physical to abstract domains.

b. By the projection from basic-level categories to superordinate and subordinate categories (Lakoff 1987: 267-268).

References to Johnson (1987) in order to explain image schemata are continual all through the work and we will talk about this book later on in Chapter 2.

Case Studies at the end of the book present some approximations from the point of view defended throughout the book to some
experiences: the case of anger (an emotion explained via metaphor), with the help of Kövecses; the case of polysemy and radial organization with the preposition over; and There-Constructions, in order to present the importance of what is said about radial categories in cognitive grammar.

— Lakoff (1988): he explains the key points in Cognitive Semantics by focusing on cognition, image schemata and categories, repeating what we have seen in Lakoff (1987). The author refers to this later work in order to obtain a more complete view of his system.

— Johnson (1989): he explains the key ideas of Johnson (1987)\(^\text{10}\) in that meaning is founded by the body and image schemata. This text gives us an idea of the importance of image schemata theory in the whole of Johnson’s system.

— Lakoff and Turner (1989): It represents the application of Conceptual Metaphor Theory to literature. This text argues that metaphor in poetry is only a reformulation (of diverse complexity, such as when several metaphors are used instead of a dominant one) of day-to-day metaphors (common, unaware and automatically linked to standard cultural knowledge):

\begin{quote}
great poets can speak to us because they use the modes of thought we all possess. Using the capacities we all share, poets can illuminate
\end{quote}

\(^{10}\) As we have said above, we do not refer to this text in this chapter because we concentrate on it in much of the next chapter.
our experience, explore the consequences of our beliefs, challenge the ways we think, and criticize our ideologies (Lakoff & Turner (1989: xi)).

The authors analyze several realities that often occur in poetry (death, life, love, and so on) to show this. The text includes an outstanding fragment about image metaphors (p. 89-96), a concept rather hidden in L&J 1980. Here it is explained exhaustly as a metaphor without structured mappings but only with a projection based on physical analogy.

— Lakoff (1990): he presents his Invariance Hypothesis, as well-known as it is disputed, revisited by Turner (1990, 1993), Brugman (1990) and many others. According to this Invariance Hypothesis “imagistic reasoning patterns are mapped onto abstract reasoning patterns via metaphorical mappings” (Lakoff 1990: 39) and “metaphorical mappings preserve the cognitive topology (this is, the image-schema structure) of the source domain” (Lakoff 1990: 54).

— Sweetser (1990): this work represents a great innovation in linguistic analysis following the key ideas of cognitive linguistics in an early moment of its development. She explores generalizations about synchronic and diachronic patterns of meaning in the areas of modal verbs and conjunctions. It is a good book about the role of metaphor in polysemy, semantic change and the metaphorical basis of pragmatics.
— Lakoff (1992): it is a revision of the theory presented in L&J 1980, but with the addition of the Invariance Principle. Primary Metaphors Theory is not yet mentioned.

— Turner (1996): in this case, both the title and the subtitle “The Literary Mind - The origins of Thought and Language” clearly present what is going to be said in the book. It is clear that the book will deal with stories, projections and parables as the cognitive tools that give us the chance to reveal a meaningful world. It is evident that what is literary is ever-present in our world and the ability to narrate our experiences and our existence is the key point which allows our being to become a being with thought and language. As Turner (1996: v) says: “the literary mind is not a separate kind of mind. It is our mind. The literary mind is the fundamental mind”. Story is a basic principle of mind, because, as Lakoff and Johnson had fixed yet: metaphor and other figures of thought are present in our everyday life and make it possible to live in a world with meaning. The book also accounts for conceptual blending, image schemata, metonymy and other imaginative tools in order to explain human thought and language. It is necessary to add that mental spaces from Fauconnier and the importance of the body in narrative are highlighted all through the work.

— Lakoff and Johnson (1999): application of the theory to philosophy. We will talk about this work in depth in the next section (Cf. Section 1.3.) but
we do need to highlight the importance of the Theory of Primary Metaphors presented by Grady (1997).

— Lakoff and Núñez (2000): application of the theory to mathematics. We do not enter into this field because it is clearly far from our current interests.

— Kövecses (2002): he picks up on the contributions of L&J (1980) and sorts them into a thematic progression. It is necessary to highlight some of his other texts, like Kövecses (2005) — focusing on the idea of the search for universality and variation in metaphors among different cultures — and Kövecses and Szabó (1996), a really important piece in the sense that it gives a cognitive basis to the study of idioms. But there are also a lot of works by this author which center on the relationship between emotion and metaphor (Cf. Kövecses 1986, 1988, 1990, 1991, 1995, 2000, among others), a study that is born in Lakoff’s (1987) “Case Study 1” with the case of anger. Kövecses studies emotions and metaphors, as he does in the case of metaphors in general, from a cross-cultural point of view, in order to discover regularities and variations among different cultures and languages.

development. There are also other works centered on figurative language in general, related to embodiment, where it is necessary to highlight Gibbs (1994, 2005a) for their eagerness for generality. As the author says:

This book describes the ways that perception, concepts, mental imagery, memory, reasoning, cognitive development, language, emotion, and consciousness have, to varying extents, groundings in embodiment (Gibbs 2005a: 9).

From the concept of person, the author tries to explain, using embodiment in each case, action, perception, concepts, language, and so forth.

— The theory of the Conceptual Integration (or Conceptual Blending) by Fauconnier and Turner.11

We move on to examine the theory of Conceptual Integration by Fauconnier and Turner, which is presented as one of the most well-prepared and developed fields, not only not in the understanding of the functioning of metaphor, but also the functioning of thought in general, taking into account metonymy, categorization, idioms, counterfactual

11 We dedicate a special attention to this theory because of its global intention in explaining human thought. We can find this theory in a number of papers and books by both authors, and we can quote some examples here: Turner (2000), Fauconnier and Turner (1998, 2008), Fauconnier (2005), Turner and Fauconnier (1998), but it is important to focus on Fauconnier and Turner (2002) because of the completeness and depth on the analysis presented in it.
expression, alternative thought, the examination of possibilities, and so forth.\textsuperscript{12}

To offer a brief summary of Fauconnier and Turner’s theory, we should state that it springs from the theory of Idealized Cognitive Models (ICM)\textsuperscript{13} by Lakoff and of the Fauconnier’s own theory of mental spaces.\textsuperscript{14}

\textsuperscript{12} It is also necessary to say that these authors (as we can clearly see in Fauconnier & Turner 2002) give, as Johnson does — and Fauconnier & Turner 2002 quote Johnson —, a central role to imagination in the creation of meaning. And, also as Lakoff and Johnson (1999) do, they state that conceptual blending “operates largely behind the scenes” (Fauconnier & Turner 2002: v), that is to say that thought is mostly unconscious.

\textsuperscript{13} The constant references on the part of Fauconnier and Turner towards Lakoff’s analysis, for example that of “Anger” carried out by Lakoff (1987), show the dependence of both theories. Fauconnier also speaks of embodied reason, for example the text by Fauconnier (2001), and links it in this way to the theories of Mark Johnson. The fact that integration is very often unconscious brings us to think of the texts of Lakoff and Johnson, especially Lakoff and Johnson (1999). At this point in the work, we will take the opportunity to offer the reflections that Lakoff and Johnson make in the afterword of the 2003 edition of Lakoff and Johnson (1980) about the theory of Fauconnier and Turner, recognizing that Lakoff has a text produced jointly with the latter – Lakoff and Turner (1989) —, to which he refers throughout the Afterword, especially to refer to it as an example of analysis of poetical metaphor and the combination of simple metaphors to create complex metaphors, and to the combination between metonymy and metaphor. These reflections should be enough to explain the relationship that is established between the two theories in both senses. Throughout the Afterword, Lakoff and Johnson refer back to the Neural Theory of Language (developed together with Feldman) as a new paradigm to follow (for a complete analysis, they refer to Lakoff and Johnson (1999) and a future text of Lakoff with Feldman which finally appeared under the sole authorship of Feldman (2006)). In this way, Lakoff and Johnson highlight the proximity between Fauconnier and Turner’s theory of Conceptual Integration and Neural Theory, insomuch as both are based on the Principle of Invariance and the role of imagination, despite the projections of both theories being conceptual or directly neuronal or electrical. It appears that, for Lakoff and Johnson, the Theory of Fauconnier and Turner is nothing more than part of the possible development of Neural Theory, which is, in reality, the fundamental basis of all thought and language. Lakoff and Johnson believe, therefore, that the theory of Conceptual Integration is closely linked to cases which are excessively concrete in which there is a role for the imagination in general (which includes, therefore, metaphorical cases as well). In any case, the psychological reality of conceptual integration in the cases cited by Fauconnier and Turner is not put to any doubt, and are therefore believed to be compatible.

\textsuperscript{14} Coulson highlights this point in all her texts. See Coulson and Fauconnier (1999), or Coulson and Oakley (2000), for example.
The body of the theory\textsuperscript{15} consists in suggesting that from two (or more) INPUT spaces a GENERIC space (called FRAME on occasions) arises, in which the elements are shared.\textsuperscript{16} Later, we find projected the space BLEND (the reiteration of the concept of projection or "mapping" clearly shows the link between both theories), where reasoning is given the form of granting meaning to new experiences. They may be from a shared action (to play basketball with the wastepaper basket), or counterfactual (examples that they cite are numerous, the most famous case being "if Clinton were the Titanic, the iceberg would sink"), or logical problems (the example of the Buddhist monk and the mountain in Fauconnier and Turner 1998), etc. The following figure attempts to show this idea of selective projection of significant elements.

\textsuperscript{15} We can discover a very good aproximation in Figure 1.
\textsuperscript{16} The Invariance Hypothesis, advanced by Lakoff and Johnson, is seen to be completely relevant and appropriate in this circumstance, since the elements in generic space have to maintain the same primary structure linked to an image schema, such as CONTAINER or PATH.
For our part, the example examined by Turner in the second of the Collège de France lectures seems quite clear about the donation of the new meanings that we have just mentioned. When we say “this surgeon is a butcher” we find two INPUTS: the typical surgeon and the typical butcher, in a GENERIC space we find a person to whom we are able to attribute qualities and tools and, finally, a selective space of BLEND or conceptual integration generating the new meaning of "incompetence" by visualizing a typical surgeon working not in the way he or she is expected to work but as we would expect a typical butcher to work. We find, then, selective correspondences or projections across diverse domains (typical
of the metaphor) or of the same domain (typical of the metonymy) in an integrated space (BLEND) that gives an emergent structure with its own meaning; the resulting concept of incompetence was neither in the initial space of the typical surgeon nor that of the typical butcher.\textsuperscript{17} This projection, then, will not only arise in metonymy and metaphor but people will also face it in the understanding of any level of representational language or that which intervenes in several mental spaces: the counterfactual, desires, possible images, set phrases, and so forth. Finally, Fauconnier & Turner (2002: 390) defend, as Lakoff and Johnson defend in their works referring to metaphor,\textsuperscript{18} that “blending is not something we do in addition to living in the world; it is our means of living in the world”.

— Johnson and Lakoff (2002): the authors focus on the subject of embodied realism responding to Rakova’s (2002) criticisms. They defend embodiment as a central key in his global theory on imagination and metaphor. They also explain in this brief work why they had left the CMT presented in L&J 1980 to defend the new theory presented in L&J 1999.

\textsuperscript{17} Turner, himself, (1996) makes reference to the theory of Lakoff and Johnson and describes it by saying that the only difference between that theory and the theory of Fauconnier and Turner is that Lakoff and Johnson do not refer to blended space or generic space but to origin and destination, and this is precisely what impedes it from having the dynamism of Turner and Fauconnier.

\textsuperscript{18} We can see this point clearly defended in Lakoff & Johnson (1980: 239-240), for example.
— Modell (2003): this book presents a mixture of the theories of Lakoff and Johnson and of Edelman in which meaning is the central element. The author presents his books as follows:

How meaning exists in the unconscious mind as a potential property became clearer to me as a result of the contributions of the linguist George Lakoff and the philosopher Mark Johnson. I owe to them the crucial observation that metaphor is primarily a form of cognition rather than a trope or figure of speech. Further, metaphor as a cognitive tool can operate unconsciously, so that a metaphoric process is one aspect of the unconscious mind. Lakoff and Johnson also emphasized, as I shall do in this book (chapter 4), that the body, to paraphrase Merleau-Ponty, is an "experiential structure". If we combine Edelman’s selectionist principle with Lakoff and Johnson’s unconscious metaphoric process, metaphor becomes the selective interpreter of corporeal experience. (Modell 2003: xii)

— Afterword to the 2003 edition of L&J 1980: the typology of the metaphor presented in the 1980 edition is missing from the rest of texts of Lakoff and Johnson. This Afterword is quite clear about this when commenting that this typology is much too artificial:

The division of metaphors into three types—orientational, ontological, and structural—was artificial. All metaphors are structural (in that they map structures to structures); all are ontological (in that they create target domain entities); and many are orientational (in that they map orientational image-schemas). We did not yet see
the profundity of primary metaphor, and, as a result, some of our analyses were incomplete (L&J 1980 [reed 2003]: 264).

In this text, receiving ideas from Lakoff & Johnson (1999) — including the theories by Grady, Fauconnier and Turner, C. Johnson and Narayanan — the authors focus on the primary metaphors and the Neural Theory of Language.

This very important text ends with a general reflection about the state of metaphor theory at that moment which is necessary to quote here in order to see how the theory advances through time:

The theory of metaphor has come a long way from the humble beginnings presented in this slim volume. Yet, most of the key ideas in this book have been either sustained or developed further by recent empirical research in cognitive linguistics and in cognitive science generally. These key ideas are the following:

— Metaphors are fundamentally conceptual in nature; metaphorical language is secondary.
— Conceptual metaphors are grounded in everyday experience.
— Abstract thought is largely, though not entirely, metaphorical.
— Metaphorical thought is unavoidable, ubiquitous, and mostly unconscious.
— Abstract concepts have a literal core but are extended by metaphors, often by many mutually inconsistent metaphors.
— Abstract concepts are not complete without metaphors. For
example, love is not love without metaphors of magic, attraction, madness, union, nurturance, and so on.

— Our conceptual systems are not consistent overall, since the metaphors used to reason about concepts may be inconsistent.

— We live our lives on the basis of inferences we derive via metaphor (L&J 1980 [reed. 2003]: 272-273).

— Gallese and Lakoff (2005): a neural theory of understanding presents the processing of metaphors, a theory that we could summarize by stating that "the same neural substrate used for imagining is used for understanding" (Gallese and Lakoff 2005: 5). They defend an interactionist theory of meaning which includes the role of the body, of the brain and of the world. They defend a theory of embodiment in the same way that Lakoff and Johnson do, in general terms, where imagination and body have a central role in understanding. They talk here about innate image schemata, despite the doubt in reference to the whether image schemata are innate or not in other texts. Langacker (1999: 377), from his point of view, states that they appear innate to him: “Whereas Johnson and Lakoff take image schemas as being experientially derived, I myself tend to see them as reflections of inborn abilities that make it possible for structured experience to arise in the first place”.

— Feldman (2006): originally announced as a work by Lakoff and Feldman, it was finally published under the name of Feldman only. This
work presents the Neural Theory of Language that had already been published in Lakoff and Johnson (1999).

— Lakoff (2008): the Neural Theory of Metaphor is presented here, and we can understand it as part of the Neural Theory of Language in general, presented by Feldman (2006).

— Evans (in press a, b): these texts relate Image Schemata and spatial representation with a deep study of human senses. They are great texts in completing our vision of image schemata related to concrete forms of embodiment and physical and interactional experiences within the world.

— Other works: the works by psychologists such as M. Tomasello (Cf. 1999, 2003, 2008, 2009) or J. Mandler (Cf. Mandler 2004, 2008) are also important, because they collect more evidence to sustain the theories of Image Schemata and Conceptual Metaphor, but we do not intend discuss these because they are outside our immediate interest in this work. Similarly, other works by linguists like R. Langacker (Cf. for example 1987, 1991, 2008), A. Goldberg (1995, 2003, 2006), S. Peña Cervel (1998, 1999, 2003), J. Grady (1997, 2005) or others set out more important evidence in favour of Lakoff and Johnson’s thesis in the field of linguistics.
— Finally it is necessary to mention the works by Tim Rohrer (1995, 2001, 2005), some of them with Mark Johnson (Johnson and Rohrer 2006), concentrating on the relationship between the brain and metaphor.

1.2.2. Criticisms

— Jackendoff: Jackendoff (1978) presents his "cross-field generalization" theory, reflecting Gruber (1965), through which he claims that he can explain the same facts as Lakoff without referring to metaphor. It is also necessary to quote Jackendoff and Aaron (1991) where apart from criticizing the general lack of bibliography in the writings of Lakoff, the authors analyze several of the contributions of Lakoff and Turner (1989). The general question, for them, comes down to considering "what counts as a metaphor?" They believe that Lakovian theorists have broadened the notion of metaphor too much and that there are cases that can be explained in other words, not by metaphor but by abstract parameters — a central question in the analysis of Jackendoff which we find in the rest of his texts, such as Jackendoff (1978, 1983 or 2002), and other works. For Jackendoff and Aaron the metaphor LIFE IS A PATH is not nothing more than a specialized case of the thematic parallel between PLACE and CIRCUMSTANCE. They simply state that, taken this way, metaphor no longer has sense in Lakovian theory.

In Jackendoff (2002) are presented the following groups of sentences to illustrate the results from Gruber and Jackendoff:
(13) Spatial location and motion:
   a. The messenger is in Istanbul. [Location]
   b. The messenger went from Paris to Istanbul. [Change of location]
   c. The gang kept the messenger in Istanbul. [Caused stasis]

(14) Possession:
   a. The money is Fred's. [Possession]
   b. The inheritance finally went to Fred. [Change of possession]
   c. Fred kept the money. [Caused stasis]

(15) Ascription of properties:
   a. The light is red. [Simple property]
   b. The light went/changed from green to red. [Change of property]
   c. The cop kept the light red. [Caused stasis]

(16) Scheduling activities:
   a. The meeting is on Monday. [Simple schedule]
   b. The meeting was changed from Tuesday to Monday [Change of schedule]
   c. The chairman kept the meeting on Monday [Caused stasis]

(Jackendoff 2002: 356-357)

Fixing his attention “on a more abstract level (…) the meaning of the four groups of sentences are parallel” (Jackendoff 2002: 357). But, where does this more abstract level come from? Lakoff and Johnson would explain these propositions in base of image schemata and metaphors that we acquire all through our childness. The commitments of Cognitive Linguistics lead Lakoff and Johnson to think that these examples are related in a clear semantic form: all sentences in (a) show a CONTAINER
Schema, all sentences in (b) show a PATH schema while all sentences in (c) show the presence of FORCE and CONTAINER schemata. From this point of view we can elegantly explain the connections between each of the sentences above which has the same letter, by means of the participation of metaphors:

- In (13) we find the most basic experience of a physical location and physical motion. There is no metaphor here.
- We arrive to (14) by means of the participation of the metaphor according to which POSSESSION IS LOCATION.
- In (15) we find sentences constructed in base to the metaphor STATES OR PROPERTIES ARE LOCATIONS.
- Finally, in (16) we find the participation of the metaphor TIME IS SPACE.

Like this, as we can see, we can explain the fact presented by Jackendoff — I think that it is the most important criticism presented to the theory — in a very simple and elegant form, coherent and tied to our structured mind and body.

We can not discuss with Jackendoff because he bases his arguments on a different commitment than Lakoff and Johnson’s ones: he starts his analysis from a formal (abstractionist) or generative point of view based in the metaphor that states that MIND IS A MACHINE (or A COMPUTER).
It is necessary to say here that Goldberg, despite working sometimes with Jackendoff, does not deny the importance of metaphor in the case of transforming constructions.

— Glucksberg, Keysar et al. (Cf. Glucksberg (2001, 2003, 2008), Glucksberg and Keysar (1990), Glucksberg et al. (1997) or Keysar et al. (2000)): they propose and try to demonstrate with several experiments that there are projections when the metaphor or idiom is not conventionalized, but that these projections do not occur in the cases in which the idiomatic expression or the metaphorical constructions are conventionalized. McGlone (1996, 2001, 2007) follows Glucksberg and his "attributive categorization view". Contrary to this point of view from these psycholinguistics, the experiments carried out by Gibbs in the works just cited above demonstrate the inverse solution.

— Murphy (1996): a criticism from the viewpoint of psychology. The text presents an alternative to the two visions of Conceptual Metaphor that he believes exist, one rigid and one more flexible, defending what he calls "structural similarity view": a wider generality in the style of Jackendoff. A psycholinguistic follow-up is necessary in order to distinguish conceptual metaphor from simple polysemy.

— Green & Vervaeke (1997), Vervaeke & Green (1997), Kennedy & Vervaeke (1994): they criticize Lakoff (1987) especially for his defence of the criticism that objectivism lacks foundation. They argue that many of
the elements and many of the conventional expressions consistent with a certain Conceptual Metaphor are also consistent with other Conceptual Metaphors. But this is obviously a question of consistency, coherence and cultural variation.

— Rakova (2002): in this book, the author says that embodied realism is untenable and that this therefore makes Conceptual Metaphor Theory untenable.

— Haser (2005): she claims that Johnson and Lakoff’s theory is circular, and hence, fallacious and she claims that many conceptual metaphors are mere cases of analogy or simile, but not real metaphors. In addition, she notes that the level of generality for the source domain of a conceptual metaphor seems to be specified in an arbitrary manner. She does not take into account the importance of Primary Metaphors.

— Pinker (2007): chapter 5 is devoted to reviewing Lakoff and Johnson’s theory of metaphor. He agrees that the abstract is found in the concrete, but he criticizes Lakoff for going too far in his theory, finding his relativism far too exaggerated. The criticism from the psychology angle, according to which people can have ideas about things, leads to the same end but without metaphor. He refers to Keysar, Glucksberg and others. He considers that, without a generality beyond the metaphor, metaphors cannot be analyzed. He points to Gruber and Jackendoff as the solution (crossfield-generalization theory), with the theory of the non-metaphorical,
general, abstract schema which we have already presented (talking about Jackendoff at the beginning of this part). It is necessary, then, to have a more abstract frame that describes the similarities for understanding the metaphors. As a response, George Lakoff states that Pinker still believes in an old-fashioned, universal and disembodied logic — as the same occurs in Descartes’ seventeenth-century rationalism. But actually, in the twentieth century, with the important growth of scientific data, this idea is untenable — and Lakoff refers to Feldman (2006) in order to obtain a good idea about the neural mechanisms that the brain uses and to Gibbs in order to discover experiments that show exactly the opposite that Pinker states.

— Kertész & Rákosi (2009): they look again at the accusations of circularity against the Conceptual Metaphor Theory. They take some of the criticisms presented by Glucksberg, Haser, McGlone, Murphy and Rakova (all of them mentioned in these references of criticisms) and by means of a case study try to show that accusations of circularity made against Cognitive Linguistics are false.
1.3. Conceptual Metaphor and Philosophy (L&J 1999)

Lakoff and Johnson (1999), or L&J 1999 from now on, a bulky text of approximately six hundred pages, implies the continuation of the teamwork pioneered in L&J 1980 but it also entails some changes with respect to conceptual metaphor. We will now attempt to highlight these changes although without forgetting our main goal, which is to extract the most important ideas from the authors with regard to the role of metaphor in the construction of philosophical systems.

The text starts by stating three great recent revelations of modern Cognitive Science, namely that: “the mind is inherently embodied; thought is mostly unconscious; abstract concepts are largely metaphorical.” (L&J 1999: 3).\(^\text{19}\)

These revelations in themselves already force us to rethink philosophy from a new point of view (which they also do, in an intense way in parts two and three of the book, firstly by stating the main philosophical ideas and secondly by making references to several other authors).

\(^{19}\)Both Johnson and Lakoff go into depth about all the central ideas of this text in a series of other texts. For example, Johnson (2005) intends to show how image schemata (regular patterns of action within an environment) offer the step from the embodied mind to abstract thought, once again joining together imagination, reason, body and meaning. The regularity and logic of the image schemata is what allows abstract thought. He defends the central role of Kant, despite criticizing dualist thinkers. Once again, it is Kant who gets the most praise. Johnson and Lakoff (2002) insist on the importance of the body and on the extent of the imagination in meaning and defend experientialism as the only sustainable philosophical option. Finally, Johnson (2008) insists in the relation between philosophy, metaphor, imagination and image schemata.
Moreover, the first statement, according to which reason is embodied, can only be founded on a triple perspective: the authors themselves state that reason depends on the brain, on the body and on bodily experience. This idea — once again defying objectivist theories — leads us to consider that reason must be something evolutionary and non-universal, something tied not only to what is literal and completely conscious, but also to what is metaphorical and born out of, and fixed by, the emotions. There is no possibility of absolute transcendence, then, as everything — and we continue in the vein of L&J 1980 — is affected both by the body and by the imagination. There is still a need to show the existence of a third way somewhere between objectivism and relativism. The aim of their book is, they state, to rethink philosophy in order to reveal "a philosophy in the flesh, a philosophy that takes account of what we most basically are and can be" (L&J 1999: 8), as argued in L&J 1980, a philosophy we live by.

This first great revelation, according to which the mind is embodied, brings Lakoff and Johnson to refer to one of the central problems of Cognitive Science: that of categorization. They state that this human capacity is born out of our neural being, of our bodily experience of the world and it is developed by creating prototypes of concepts that will remain tied to the body, to all that is sensory-motor. It is in this sense that they relate their theory to interaction with the world; it is neither objectivism nor subjectivism, but embodied realism.

One of the greatest revelations of Cognitive Science, i.e. that the major part of our thought is unconscious, also allows us to refer to the
philosophy of Sartre insomuch as this author speaks about the pre-reflexive level of action as a last foundation of every pure reflection (which gives us concepts). This is the center of our attention at the end of the second chapter (Cf. section 2.3), comparing Johnson’s and Sartre’s philosophical systems.

As long as philosophical reflection — but it is valid for all kinds of reflections — is something human and understood within human limitations (i.e. it uses the same metaphors as every type of thought), what is necessary to give foundation to this reflection is to start from empirical research, not from concepts given a priori, the basis of which will obviously be that the human being interacts with something physical.

The empirical bases for their theory are given in several fields of research the authors use: the basic level categories (linked mainly to the concept of image), the colours and the concepts of spatial relations (container or path, for example) viewed as imaginative projections from the body’s interaction with the world through metaphor, which is now clear-cut like the use of mental images coming from the sensory-motor domains into other domains of subjective experience. It is because of this that metaphor is called conceptual; it is not only a question of language (as already argued in L&J 1980).

In this text, as we have already commented in the former section, the typology of the metaphor of L&J 1980 — which differentiated them into orientational, ontological and structural — is left aside in order to focus on the division between primary\(^\text{20}\) and complex metaphors. This

\(^{20}\)Lakoff & Johnson (1999: 50-54) presents a list of the most important primary
theory is born out of C. Johnson’s (1997a, 1997b and 1997c) theory of conflation in the course of the learning, Grady’s (1997) theory of the primary metaphor, Narayanan’s (1997a, 1997b) neural theory of metaphor and Fauconnier and Turner’s (1994, 1998) theory of conceptual blending, which we have also spoken about above. As the text develops, it quotes L&J 1980 and shows a desire to go beyond what is stated in that text by merging these theories just quoted. Now, each primary metaphor has a minimal structure and arises naturally, automatically, and unconsciously through everyday experience by means of conflation, during which cross-domain associations are formed. Complex metaphors are formed by conceptual blending. Universal early experiences lead to universal conflations, which then develop into universal (or widespread) conventional conceptual metaphors (L&J 1999: 46).

Some examples of primary metaphors quoted by the authors (L&J 1999: 50-54) are: AFFECTION IS WARMTH, IMPORTANT IS BIG, HAPPY IS UP, INTIMACY IS CLOSENESS, BAD IS STINKY, DIFFICULTIES ARE BURDENS, MORE IS UP, CATEGORIES ARE CONTAINERS, TIME IS MOTION, STATES ARE LOCATIONS, CHANGE IS MOTION, PURPOSES ARE DESTINATIONS, and so on. From these metaphors we can construct a complex metaphor in order to explain all our experiences. In all these metaphors they note which sensory-motor experiences (those normally related to the senses, especially sight and touch, and therefore to
image schemata)\textsuperscript{21} and which subjective experiences (normally related to emotions and intellectual life) maintain the mapping from the source domain to the target domain. We can clearly see that the typology of metaphors presented in L&J 1980 is set aside because there are no metaphors which are more or less structural, ontological or orientational than others. What counts now is the difference between primary and complex metaphors.

We are told that every metaphor is embodied in three aspects: 1) through the physical interaction with the world, 2) through the fact that the field of origin comes from the sensory-motor system and 3) because it manifests itself via neural connections. Thus, for the sole fact that every human being perceives, moves around and acts in the world, each person then has a series of primary metaphors which are useful afterwards for constructing complex metaphors. The only remnant of literal knowledge that we have left is that related to the sensory-motor system and with spatial relations. From this spatial experience and by using image schemata (as container, source-path-goal and others analyzed in the text)\textsuperscript{22} is constructed our understanding of the reality, and as we can see, our understanding is tied to our physical and subjective experience. Objectivity is just related to and sustained by the fact that we all share our bodily structure and we acquire when child the same primary metaphors.

\textsuperscript{21} Cf. Pérez i Brufau (2009, 2010) in order to obtain a good idea of theory on image schemata and its application to grammar and a profound review of the bibliography devoted to them.
\textsuperscript{22} We will deal with image schemata in the next chapter because they are the central piece in Johnson (1987), but we can mention here the great and important work Hampe (ed. 2005) in order to obtain a good and complete idea of the role of image schemata in Cognitive Linguistics in general.
Moreover, metaphors are useful in reasoning about new things and also in communicating these new things as long as we can share the images that have originally founded the metaphors.

Philosophy, therefore, is nothing more than abstract concepts being clarified with the help of a metaphor, considered correct from all the potentially possible ones, which is taken as literal. Metaphors constitute the meaning of the desired field (or domain), and because of that, since they help in the understanding, some are suitable and others are not.

In this text, following the criticisms of objectivism, a review is made of the History of Cognitive Science and the theory of the authors is called "embodied realism", born in contradiction to every a prioristic philosophy. The authors are considered to be from the second generation of researchers of Cognitive Science, differing from those in the first generation precisely because they consider the mind as embodied.

The key issues for this second generation are:

— The conceptual structure is born out of sensory-motor experience and neural structure.
— Mental structures are significant and linked to the body.
— There is a basic level of experience.
— There are levels of metaphors.
— Concepts are given through prototypes.
— Reason is embodied.
— Reason is imaginative.
— Conceptual systems are plural.
This collection of key issues from the discoveries of the Cognitive Science, is what, according to the authors, forces us to rethink philosophy from the beginning.

After recognizing the debt to John Dewey and Maurice Merleau-Ponty (L&J 1999: xi, 97, for example), Lakoff and Johnson delve into an analysis of the truth. They state that it depends on the situation and on our embodied understanding of that situation. As an essential basis of the mind as a development of the truth they make the point that the greater part of this development happens in an unconscious and metaphorical way, maintaining that this is intentional, representational and causal, that is, as Sartre was to state, pre-reflexive.

Finally, the first part of the book closes by stating that it is necessary to establish changes in Philosophy if we are to accept what we have just said about the role of the metaphor being the only possible step from the literal to the abstract. It is necessary to take into account at least these three key ideas of Cognitive Science: we are a body, and an imaginative entity and a metaphorical being — especially metaphorical, but also metonymical and narrative. We can not obviate — nor in philosophy nor in any science — the central role of image schemata in the construction of meaning — including philosophical meaning.

Some philosophical implications of metaphorical thought that the authors highlight are the following:
Correlations in our everyday experience inevitably lead us to acquire primary metaphors, which link our subjective experiences and judgments to our sensorimotor experience. (...) We all acquire these metaphorical modes of thought automatically and unconsciously and have no choice as to whether to use them.

Many, if not all, of our abstract concepts are defined in significant part by conceptual metaphor. (…)

The fundamental role of metaphor is to project inference patterns from the source domain to the target domain. Much of our reasoning is therefore metaphorical.

Metaphorical thought is what makes abstract scientific theorizing possible.

Metaphorical concepts are inconsistent with the classical correspondence theory of truth. Instead, what is required is embodied truth.

Formal logic has no resources for characterizing any of the aspects of human concepts and human reason discussed so far in this book. (…)

Reason and conceptual structure are shaped by our bodies, brains, and modes of functioning in the world. (…)

Much of everyday metaphysics arises from metaphor (L&J 1999: 128).

The second part of the text — which we will not focus on — points out certain typically philosophical concepts to show their corporal origin and metaphorical development: concepts like causation, time, morality, etc.
The treatment that these concepts receive is similar to that offered by L&J 1980 in the collection of analyzed metaphorical expressions.

It is important here to highlight the analysis of the mind and the self in order to compare these ideas with Sartre’s later on. They think that there is a metaphor present in the major part of the History of Philosophy that turns the mind into a container that has ideas inside and objects outside and the action of the mind is explained as: “moving, seeing, manipulating objects, and eating, as well as other kinds of activities like adding, speaking or writing, and making objects” (L&J 1999: 266). But they think that this need for metaphor in order to explain the mind is just a mistake because the mind is just the body, and nothing more than that. And the same for the self: they criticize a lot of philosophical theories that use metaphors in order to turn the self into a physical object, a subject-self, a container or a separated part of the person; that is, the systems that defend the existence of an essential self.

The third part of the text — called Cognitive Science of Philosophy and to which we will not devote special attention either, even though the last chapter of this thesis could be considered one more application of the theory in the sense of that part — analyzes distinguished moments from the History of Philosophy in order to show which metaphors are the foundations of certain philosophical systems. It is stated that philosophy has to be understood by its relationship to popular knowledge, that of the people, of the day-to-day, in the same way that current linguistic expressions were analyzed in L&J 1980 to show their metaphorical foundation. Lakoff and Johnson state that what Philosophy really wants to
achieve is to give coherence and force to common metaphors and popular theories, and declare that philosophers are "poets of systematical thought" (L&J 1999: 542). In an interview with John Brockman, Lakoff states that

every important philosopher seems to take a small number of metaphors as eternal and evident truths in themselves and then, with rigorous logic and complete systematicity, follows the implications of those metaphors to the bitter end, wherever that might be.

However, it is necessary to say that Lakoff and Johnson remark an important oblivion of the body and imagination all through the History of Philosophy.

The goal pursued by Lakoff and Johnson in carrying out this analysis is:

1) to show that the central aspects of philosophy are born out of metaphors and popular theories.

2) to show that the logic of thought is metaphorical.

3) to show how we make something complex with very little basis.

4) to show that everything (metaphysics, epistemology and ethics) is born out of metaphors.

In order to reach this quadruple goal the authors analyze pre-Socratic philosophy, Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Kant, Analytical Philosophy,
Chomsky and the Theory of Rational Action, examining questions that can be metaphysical, moral or epistemological. We will do the same in the next and the third and last chapter of the Dissertation dealing with Sartre’s philosophy.

Finally, in the fourth part of the text — Embodied Philosophy — they return to the title of the book. It speaks about philosophy of the flesh, of the embodied person, in the sense that categorization is carried out through the body, and about metaphor as a development of the basic physical experience. We have, therefore, contrary to all objectivism, neither the possibility of universality nor that of freedom, since this is limited by the unconscious, by automatic conceptualization, by the difficulty of conceptual change and by limited desire. An embodied morality, not essentialist, is necessary, since human nature is, "variation, change and evolution" (L&J 1999: 557), precisely the same ideas that Sartre maintains as being central to his system — as we can see in the next chapter.

This idea of variation and continuous change in human nature could be related to the idea that creation in Johnson — although limited via the body — depends on imagination and image schemata, two semantic and symbolic elements that allow us to create form and content by means of figurative tools such as metaphor, metonymy or parable, for example. In Chomsky that creation is limited to syntax as a generative system governed by Universal Grammar — with the undoubtable presence of the

23 This is found in Johnson (1993), to which we dedicate a part later on (Cf. Section 2.1.2).

24 Clearly this consideration of human nature contrasts with Fodor’s (1975, 1987) where he defends a fixed conception of human nature.
metaphor MIND IS A MACHINE, inherited from Descartes as the idea of a universal and immutable mind that works as a mathematical engine —, and creation is, therefore, limited to language.

It is important to say that at the end of the book there is an appendix about the Neural Theory of Language in order to present this new paradigm that is developed especially by Lakoff and Feldman in the works that we have mentioned in the section 1.2.
Chapter 2. An analysis of Johnson’s and Sartre’s systems by means of the concept of imagination

2.0. Introduction

Since we want to show some important resemblances between both Johnson’s and Sartre’s philosophical systems, especially the role bestowed on imagination, we will now concentrate on the group of their works in order to analyze this resemblance in depth and also highlight the differences that divide them. We will consider both systems, paying special attention to three key aspects (the imagination, the general system of human nature and the moral implications). This point of view will lead us to examine a specific group of works by both authors. Firstly Johnson’s works: *The body in the Mind* (1987) because of his main focus on imagination and his general view of human cognition; *Moral Imagination* (1993) because of the focus on human action; *The Meaning of the Body* (2007) because of a new look at human nature. And then Sartre’s works: *L’image dans la vie psychologique: rôle et nature* (1926 [unpublished]), *L’imagination* (1936a) and *L’imaginaire* (1940) because of the focus on imagination; *L’être et le Néant* (1943a) because of the general vision of human nature; *Cahiers pour une morale* (1947-48 [1st ed. 1983]) because of the focus on human action and moral theory.
2.1. Mark Johnson’s system

In this section we will analyze the three principal texts of Johnson — apart from the texts written together with Lakoff, examined in Chapter 1 — and we will do so chronologically, highlightning here the important fact that Johnson (1987, 1993) are based in the theory of metaphor presented in L&J 1980, but Johnson (2007) is based on the Conceptual Metaphor theory as presented in L&J 1999.

2.1.1. Johnson (1987): *The body in the mind*

If L&J 1980 has been considered a groundbreaking and innovative book and has been used continually by researchers in several fields (psychology, linguistics, psycholinguistics, anthropology...), the same should happen with Johnson (1987) in the fields of psychology and philosophy. In this text Johnson concentrates his attention on the creation of meaning, as the subtitle indicates — “The bodily basis of meaning, imagination, and reason” —, on analyzing in depth the role of the body, imagination and reason.

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*25 We give here firstly the vision of Johnson on the topic, breaking the would-be chronological order, in order to bring Lakoff and Johnson’s theory completely to a close before delving equally fully into Sartre’s. Although a large part of Johnson’s work has been built up with Lakoff, we will leave Lakoff’s individual works aside, since Mark Johnson is the philosopher who has dedicated himself most to the analysis of imagination and image from the psychological and philosophical points view. That does not mean that when we establish comparisons at the end of this part we will not take into account all that is stated in the works in collaboration examined in chapter one.*
Now we will delve into the text in an attempt to extract a coherent vision of its contents, in order to be able to compare his theory, at a later stage, with what is said in Sartre’s.

Johnson’s text begins with the convincing statement that:

without imagination, nothing in the world could be meaningful. Without imagination, we could never make sense of our experience. Without imagination, we could never reason toward knowledge of reality. This book is an elaboration and defense of these three controversial claims. It explores the central role of human imagination in all meaning, understanding, and reasoning. (Johnson 1987: ix).

So, the centre of the book is a preoccupation about the imagination and its role in the construction of meaning, as happens in Sartre, as we will see later on. Johnson criticizes the oblivion into which philosophical and psychological research on the imagination has fallen and comments on some empirical evidence that make manifest the error that has led to this oblivion (categorization, framing of concepts, metaphor, polysemy, historical semantic change or the presence in Science of Non-Western languages and cultures).

His theory, indicated right from the preface, will revolve around the establishment of the human body as a centre of meaning, since it is from this, and the “embodied and imaginative structures” (Johnson 1987: xiii), that meaning is caused. Understanding arises out of bodily experience thanks to the participation of the imagination — which transcends the concrete even though it does not go beyond it, without “romantic flights”
(Johnson 1987: xiv) — in the form of image schemata that will be drawn from the concrete to the abstract for metaphorical projection. It is in this sense that his philosophy is presented to us as embodied realism or experientialism — that gives a central role to the body and imagination — , as a third way between objectivism and subjectivism, criticized harshly by Lakoff and Johnson in their texts.

In the Introduction, image schemata — preconceptual and nonpropositional that rules the propositional knowledge — and metaphorical projections are presented as the key components of understanding that is nothing more than a “network of meanings” (Johnson 1987: xvi). An image schema “is a recurring, dynamic pattern of our perceptual interactions and motor programs that gives coherence and structure to our experience” (Johnson 1987: xiv). As an example, Johnson examines the VERTICALITY schema, which “emerges from our tendency to employ an UP-DOWN orientation in picking out meaningful structures of our experience” (Johnson 1987: xiv). From here, taking into account “bodily movements” (Johnson 1987: xv) and the “constraints” (Johnson 1987: xv) that they impose to the image schema we can construct the metaphor according to which MORE IS UP that allows us to understand and express a lot of abstract experiences.

Even in the introduction, Johnson states that his argument:

begins by showing that human bodily movement, manipulation of objects, and perceptual interactions involve recurring patterns without which our experience would be chaotic and incomprehensible. I call
these patterns «image schemata», because they function primarily as abstract structures of images. They are gestalt structures, consisting of parts standing in relations and organized into unified wholes, by means of which our experience manifests discernible order. When we seek to comprehend this order and to reason about it, such bodily based schemata play a central role. For although a given image schema may emerge first as a structure of bodily interactions, it can be figuratively developed and extended as a structure around which meaning is organized at more abstract levels of cognition (Johnson 1987: xix-xx).

We move from what is basic (corporal) to what is abstract through a metaphorical projection when constructing meaning — a process of encoding, we might say —, but we also move in the inverse direction when understanding — a process of decoding. Imagination plays a central role in reasoning; it is not something wild and out of control but “a basic-schematic capacity for ordering our experience” (Johnson 1987: xx), being experience understood in large sense, as existence in Sartre.

Thus, Johnson clearly rallies against objectivism — which he calls a “God’s-eye point of view” (Johnson 1987: xxiii) — since this cannot give room to the figurative or the metaphorical and, yet, shows himself to be close to phenomenology, especially by quoting Husserl — “phenomenology of the post-Husserlian varieties” (Johnson 1987: xxxvii).²⁶

²⁶ Although in Lakoff and Johnson’s works Merleau-Ponty occupies more space than the founder of phenomenology, it is necessary to state that a great part of the work by Merleau-Ponty on perception is due to Sartre’s works on imagination,
The fundamental point, then, has already been stated — body and metaphor cause meaning — and Johnson devotes the text to giving support to his philosophy of an imagistic, non-propositional, “embodiment”.

Meaning may not be either literal or figurative alone since in the majority of cases we find a mixture of both components. Image schemata are abstract structures of an image and they are embodied — "non-propositional structures of imagination" (Johnson 1987: 19) — which offer themselves for us as a tie between concepts and perceptions. The image schema adapts itself to the situation (taking into account past and future, which Sartre will also argue in his texts about image). Moreover, not only limited to the visual, the image takes into account what is tactile and also the movement of the body\(^{27}\) and he names this "abstract analog"\(^{28}\) (Johnson 1987: 25) which, as a pattern, gives meaning to our experience, describing it as an entity somewhere between a rich image and an abstract proposition. Image schemata arise from dynamic and fluid interaction with the environment and are connected with activity.

Image schemata — that they “are not rich, concrete images or mental pictures, either” (Johnson 1987: 23) and because of it they “are not propositional” (Johnson 1987: 23) —, born from preconceptual experiences that give rise to meaning through schematic structure, are listed in Johnson (1987: 126), but now he talks about them as a concept related to Kant’s schematism that serves us to take order (organization) in ego and emotions.

\(^{27}\) Sartre (1943a) will do the same, as we will see later on (Cf. Section 2.2.4.).

\(^{28}\) Concept that Sartre will use himself to define the image, as we can see later on (Cf. Section 2.2.3.).
our experiences: Cf. from an existed experience of IN-OUT\textsuperscript{29} we discover the container schema, schema that we can present as the following Figure 2:

\begin{center}
\includegraphics[width=0.2\textwidth]{figure2.png}
\end{center}

\textit{Figure 2. Image schema: CONTAINER (JOHNSON 1987: 23)}

Johnson states that, there are, moreover, no static concepts but modifiable patterns, adaptable to the situation, which will help us in our understanding — as they “have a certain kinesthetic character” (Johnson 1987: 25). Logic (and related concepts)\textsuperscript{30} is born out of our bodily experience and our capacity for abstraction, and this creates structures or patterns we can apply to a variety of experiences (including linguistic) in order to give them meaning and coherence. Finally, then, abstract rationality continues to be linked to concrete experience (in the sense of activity) since it has been created through metaphor applied to two realities which share a specific image schema.

\textsuperscript{29}IN and OUT are studied in depth by Johnson and he defends that they are born “in our perception and movement” (Johnson 1987: 34), and from here, via metaphor, we can arrive to other domains of experience.

\textsuperscript{30}Lakoff and Núñez (2000) applies this idea according to which all abstract thought is sustained by metaphors to mathematics and Lakoff and Johnson (1999) to philosophy.
The PATH schema is a very good example for Johnson in order to show how image schemata organize elements in a whole (as a gestalt): there is a SOURCE, a PATH and a GOAL.

This schema blended with forces and interactions can give directionality or path of motion from a source to a target.

Before entering in the analysis of BALANCE he studies FORCES as a group of image schemata: he centers his attention on blockage, compulsion, counterforce, diversion, removal of constraint or enablement, all of them born in experiential situations and abstracted into the modal verbs (also examined by Sweetser 1990).

Johnson insists on the importance of situation and the relationship with the physical world as a basis for all knowledge, and analyzes, as an example, the case of BALANCE — born out of an “activity we learn with our bodies and not by grasping a set of rules or concepts” (Johnson 1987: 74) and which enables us to express feelings, ethics, justice, and so on in the form or systemic balance, psychological balance, the balance of rational argument, legal or moral balance or mathematical equality. Johnson then focuses on a description of what understanding is — he describes it as a structured action and also in a way that Sartre formerly had: “the way we ‘have a world’, the way we experience our world as a comprehensible reality” (Johnson 1987: 102). To understand is “being in
the world” or being “situated in the world”, both of which concepts clearly invite us to think of the existentialist phenomenology of both Sartre and Heidegger. In this way understanding is a situation in the world, a situation that takes into account not only the body but culture, language, history as well as the intention of every action. Understanding is dynamic in the sense that is constrained only by the dynamicity of image schemata, which in the main acts unconsciously (Johnson 1987: 30). Understanding “does not consist merely of after-the-fact reflections on prior experiences; it is, more fundamentally, the way (or means by which) we have those experiences in the first place” (Johnson 1987: 104).

Understanding can arise, moreover, on two levels: one pre-reflexive and one reflexive, the most outstanding difference between both being the presence of the propositional characteristic.

There is a lot of phenomena that shows the existence of image schemata: image-schematic transformations, systemacity of literal expressions, extensions of conventional metaphors, polysemy, historical change and metaphorical constraints on reasoning, all of them based on motion and imagination.

Before constructing a theory of imagination in Chapter VI (the real nucleus of his book), Johnson devotes a brief space to speaking about how metaphorical projections are limited, and asserts that they are limited by image schemata, focusing for this reason on Lakoff’s Invariance Hypothesis\textsuperscript{31} which states that it is necessary to sustain the topology of

\textsuperscript{31} Developed specially by Lakoff (1990) and revisited by Brugman (1990) or Turner (1990), among others.
the source domain in the target domain of the metaphor. In order to state this point Johnson examines now a lot of image schemata and metaphors based on them — with their implied mappings: PATH, SCALE, LINK, CENTER-PERIPHERY and CYCLE. PURPOSES ARE PHYSICAL GOALS is so related to the PATH schema and the Primary Metaphor — not called in this form here — STATES ARE LOCATIONS. Finally, Johnson recollects the linguistic expressions that show the presence of this metaphor:

Tom has a long way toward changing his personality. You have reached the midpoint of your flight training. I’ve got quite a way to go before I get my Ph.D. (Johnson 1987: 115).

And the same is presented for a lot of image schemata of the list presented in Johnson (1987: 126): CONTAINER, BLOCKAGE, ENABLEMENT, PATH, CYCLE, PART-WHOLE, FULL-EMPTY, ITERATION, SURFACE, BALANCE, COUNTERFORCE, ATTRACTION, LINK, NEAR-FAR, MERGING, MATCHING, CONTACT, OBJECT, COMPULSION, RESTRAINT REMOVAL, MASS-COUNT, CENTER-PERIPHERY, SCALE, SPLITTING, SUPERIMPOSITION, PROCESS, COLLECTION.

We present here the most complete list of image schemata that we know, by Hampe (ed.) (2005):33

32 Johnson analyzes in the text as an example the metaphor STATES ARE LOCATIONS, showing that the PATH concept is very useful for rationalizing goals.

33 The image schemata that appear in 1 are the central ones in Lakoff and Johnson, those of 2a just turn up in Johnson and those of 2b only in Lakoff.
1. (a) CONTAINMENT/CONTAINER, PATH/SOURCE-PATH-GOAL, LINK, PART-WHOLE, CENTRE-PERIPHERY, BALANCE.
   (b) the FORCE schemas: ENABLEMENT, BLOCKAGE, COUNTERFORCE, ATTRACTION; COMPULSION, RESTRAINT, REMOVAL, DIVERSION.

2. (a) CONTACT, SCALE, NEAR-FAR, SURFACE, FULL-EMPTY, PROCESS, CYCLE, ITERATION, MERGING, MATCHING, SPLITTING, OBJECT, COLLECTION, MASS-COUNT, SUPERIMPOSITION.
   (b) UP-DOWN, FRONT-BACK.

3. (a) INANIMATE MOTION, ANIMATE MOTION, SELF MOTION, CAUSED MOTION, LOCOMOTION.
   (b) EXPANSION, STRAIGHT, RESISTANCE, LEFT-RIGHT.

These image schemata, obviously, affect reasoning, as is demonstrated in a series of experiments (Cf. Johnson 1987: 127-137).

Next we analyze chapter VI, which is, as we have already said, the nucleus of the text; it is titled "Towards a theory of the imagination" and here Johnson initially reviews the theories on imagination to date. He states that imagination has an evident place in creativity, but that it must also have a place in rationality insomuch as he describes it as the capacity to organize mental representations in significant and coherent units. We are warned at the beginning that the foundation of his theory will be Kant since he offers us a rationality enriched with imagination.

Finally, those of 3 turn up in other authors like Mandler, Gibbs, etc. It is necessary to say, however, that Johnson (1991) adds to his list FIGURE/GROUND.
The review of the history of the imagination begins by presenting what are, for us, the two most general points of view about this human capacity: those of Plato and Aristotle. The first — essentialist, objectivist — speaks about a suspicious imagination that does not offer real knowledge, but which is linked metaphorically to the shadows, to reflections and to imitation as the basic level of experience. Aristotle, however, suggests that imagination is a necessary and indispensable mediation somewhere between feeling and thought and, moreover, he adds that this may be in presence or in absence.

From Hobbes to Kant the central preoccupation is cognition and a place for imagination is found because, since everything starts in experience, imagination becomes knowledge and creativity.

Next, focusing now on Kant, we are told that for him the central problem is precisely that of imagination — which ends up being described as the unit of representations, as schematism is the union between intuition and category — and that the notion of Judgment is what gives unity to critical philosophy. Johnson speaks about "four major stages in the development of Kant’s view of imagination" (Johnson 1987: 147), which are the following:

1) Reproductive imagination, in which everything is a union of perception and the mental structure that organizes it. A mental representation is a synthesis of perception, image and concept, that is, a synthesis of intuition (apprehension), imagination (reproduction) and recognition (concept); imagination, then, is a synthesis based on what is not present.
2) Productive imagination: we are told about a Kant's obscure passage, the conclusion of which is that "there can be no meaningful experience without imagination" (Johnson 1987: 151), and this gives coherence and unity to that experience.

3) Schematism: present in KrV, where we are told about the position between sensation (intuition) and common sense (concept) in the form of pure concept or category to be taken as a non-empirical rule. It is here that room is found for the transcendental schemata, which are both pure and sensitive, and may be understood as "a structure of a schematizing activity of imagination in time" (Johnson 1987: 153). That is, as a possibility to present the experience of the physical world in an orderly fashion. The schema, finally, which exists only in the mind, is the force behind the realization of an image, and Johnson uses this Kantian obscurity for relating the Kant’s theory to his own theory of image schemata understood as moulds for experiences.

4) Creative imagination: linked to reflection and judgment as a means of connection or categorization; Johnson links this to both his own and to Lakoff’s ideas of metaphorical and metonymic projections and the narrative of experience.

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34 In the diagramme 2 in page 154 of Johnson (1987), the author shows the different role of schemata, different from concept, image and perception.

35 Ideas in common with Turner (who has a book written with Lakoff, Lakoff & Turner 1989) and Fauconnier.
He defends, so, that there is creation in imagination in general, and this creation is the unique solid basis of all creation.

A good theory on imagination has to explain, at least, the following elements:

a) categorization  
b) schemata  
c) metaphor and metonymy  
d) narrative structure

Finally, Johnson focuses once again on the ideas of meaning and knowledge to defend his non-objectivist theory in this regard — taking into account understanding, embodiment and imagination —, stating that there are not only propositions in meaning but that the roles of the imagination and of the body are necessary for schemata and metaphoric projection. He insists again that understanding is phenomenologically “being in” or ‘having’ a world” (Johnson 1987: 175), aligning himself now with Heidegger and Gadamer (Johnson 1987: 175). He argues that the intentionality of understanding — related to phenomenology and Searle — is always for somebody and in a specific context and he defends that there is a certain objectivity in understanding inasmuch as the meaning, linked to the body and to the imagination, may be a basic, public faculty shared by all: bodily structures.36 On page 196 of the text he clearly states that he is searching for a third way between

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36 It’s what he calls “embodied understanding” (Johnson 1987: 175).
objectivism and relativism — as Sartre states repeatedly in his texts —, a third way which is directed through the centrality of the body and the imagination in order to extend the understanding through image schemata from the more concrete to the more abstract and vice-versa. Given that we share the basic bodily and imaginative tools, this understanding and meaning can be objective and therefore shared by a specific human community.

Thus, we can now state that there are two levels of the conceptual system: one basic connected to the physical interaction with the world and another founded on the metaphorical extension of image schemata.

Finally, a good view on knowledge has to have the following features:

1. Human knowledge and not one absolute, God’s-Eye knowledge. (…)
2. All knowledge is mediated by understanding. (…)
3. Shared understanding is a matter of embodied structures — image schemata and bodily structures — it is nor a matter of shared concepts and propositions (…)
4. It is a mistake, however, to think of an organism and its environment as two entirely independent and unrelated entities. (…)
5. We are organisms that have adapted to and transformed our environments in the course of our evolution. (…)
6. Thus, our conceptual system is “plugged into” our most relevant experiences very accurately at two levels. (a) The basic level (…) (b) The image-schematic level (…)
7. Finally, though basic-level and image-schematic structures are meaningful for us in the most immediate and automatic way, they by no means exhaust our understanding. (Johnson 1987: 206-209)

He states at the very end of the text that “understanding is an event” (Johnson 1987: 209), thus founding his “expertentialist” (Johnson 1987: 209) system, just as Sartre had founded his existentialist system in the same terms.

2.1.2. Johnson (1993): Moral imagination

In this text Johnson highlights the central role of the imagination — tied once again to frames, narrative and metaphors, and so, to image schemata: Cf. Johnson (1993: 1): “my central thesis is that human beings are fundamentally imaginative moral animals”. And in pages 199 to the end, Johnson talks about empathetic imagination and aesthetic imagination in order to obtain good ethics. The roles of the body and of imagination (metaphor, images, narrative (Cf. Turner 1996, for example), image schemata, prototypes, ICM, etc.) are again fundamental, this time for describing the key concepts of morality such as freedom, desire, rights and law among others.

Interaction by means the body with the world is the basis for image schemata and conceptual metaphor that gives us frames in order to understand our reality. It is clear to the author that all moral theories are
based on metaphors in the sense that all our abstract concepts are built from sensory-motor experiences by means of the body and imagination.

Johnson states that in this text he is searching for a third way somewhere between absolutism — or objectivism — and relativism — as Sartre thinks to do the same in his works (Cf. Sartre 1943a or Sartre 1947-48, for example). Johnson relates this third way directly to the concepts of project and projection as an underlying idea in the opening of possibilities to the human being — it is in this sense that change is important in all moral theory from Aristotle because we are moral only in the sense that we can change ourselves and our world by means of imagination (limited by the body structure, world and culture) as the capacity of “imaginative envisionment of possibilities for acting” (Johnson 1993: 202) and action.

Subsequently, after defending the importance of Cognitive Science and the role of prototypes and ICM, he enters into an analysis of several types of moralities claiming and justifying their bodily and metaphorical bases: he speaks about the morality of reason as a FORCE (basis of the popular theory of moral law), of the participation of the metaphor of PATH to speak about moral action, etc. He continues to demonstrate his high appreciation of Kant’s schematism, and he criticizes the utilitarian idea for being linked to the economy, and when he wants to speak about the self, he again criticizes objectivism because it tries to make out that it has some kind of rational essence which is non-historical, universal and unlinked to action — However, Kant is the center of his criticism, as in Sartre (1946a), the first public presentation of Sartre’s moral theory.
Johnson argues that in every moral theory, a process with selection of roles is developed, where one identity corresponds to an identity in a narration; it is because of this that he speaks about an "experientialist self" (Johnson 1993: 160-164). This self is related to time, body and situation. It is into the History, not essential, not universal, not separated into emotions and reason, not apart from its actions. It is here that Johnson — as Sartre does in his works (Cf. Sartre 1943a, for example) — talks about the “unity of the self and its actions” (Johnson 1993: 147). It is because of this that Johnson (1993: 133) says that “there is not some static ‘thing’ that the self just is or ought to be” because “we are creatures in process” (Johnson 1993: 133) — the same ideas and vocabulaire that we can find in Sartre (1943a), as we will see later on (Cf. Section 2.2.4.). There is not a fixed ego that we have to be in order to do the right thing.

Freedom, according to the author, is limited — “situated” (Johnson 1993: 162) — by the body and by society in a dialectic relationship in which the act both is and is not, since it is a synthesis of distance and commitment.

Our being in the moral world develops within a situation — "scenarios" (Johnson 1993: 166) — with a primary project with a motive, an agent, a context, others, a meaning a responsibility and a goal — in the same sense that Sartre (1943a), Johnson states here that the human being is “related to them [his goals] but distanced from them” (Johnson 1993: 148) and he also states that “goals are values for us” (Johnson 1993: 172).
Thus, in the end, moral theory tries to frame situations, and this is carried out through the opening of possibilities that metaphor gives us, since it is linked to the body and to society in terms of a physical action and the possibility of sharing the meaning of it. It is only in this new sense that we can talk about objectivity of the moral theory, due to the “public, social character of imagination” (Johnson 1993: 217) — as we can also see in Sartre (1943a or 1947-48).

2.1.3. Johnson (2007): The meaning of the body

In this book, Johnson analyzes meaning as a thing which is beyond words and propositions and is brought about by means of the interaction of both the body and the imagination, a forgotten concept in a lot of philosophical systems, with the world: “meaning is more than words and deeper than concepts” (Johnson 2007: 1). He states that he is looking for the “bodily sources of meaning, imagination, and reasoning” (Johnson 2007: ix). He highlights now movement, perception, emotion and communication in relation to the role of he body in the construction of the meaning but it is necessary to say now that Johnson ties himself to “phenomenology” (Johnson 2007: ix) from the beginning of the book. It is necessary to highlight here the works by Damasio (1994, 2003), the basis of the key points of this subject in the works by Johnson and Lakoff (Cf. Johnson 2007: 54-102, for example). Johnson now goes beyond L&J 1980 and Johnson (1987)\(^{37}\) because of the role given to emotion and qualities of the

\(^{37}\) It is necessary to notice that in this text Johnson collects much more empirical
world. According to the author, the qualities of the world are given as a presence in the percept and as an absence in the concept.\textsuperscript{38} We will see later on that these elements are also central in Sartre’s system.

For Johnson, the central concepts for the analysis of meaning continue to be: \textit{intentionality} (related to Merleau-Ponty (Johnson, 2007: 4)), \textit{embodiment} (without dualism — which should make us rethink Western Philosophy), \textit{interactionism} (with no separated self), \textit{image schemata} and \textit{conceptual metaphor} (through which philosophical concepts are constituted, so that metaphor continues to be the basis for philosophy).\textsuperscript{39} In this text, the set of primary metaphors (originally presented in Grady (1997)) described by L&J 1999 clearly becomes the last bastion of all meaning. But now, meaning is analyzed as a set of “nonconscious bodily processes” (Johnson 2007: 5) more than in Johnson (1987), showing the importance of analyzing human nature as a matter of process and not as a thing and the central role of the body, which “does its marvelous work for the most part behind the scenes” (Johnson 2007: 6).

He criticizes here Descartes as a dualist philosopher and Kant for his idea of purity in thought as a process free from feeling and emotions.

\textsuperscript{38} Concepts of presence and absence that we find already in Sartre’s works on imagination ( Cf. Section 2.2.4.).

\textsuperscript{39} Johnson analyzes in this case the example of \textit{CAUSATION}, in which states and places are metaphorically related, and he also applies the theory to the contemporary Philosophy of Language, specially centered in Fodor (1975, 1987).
He also criticizes “the conceptual-propositional theory of meaning” (Johnson 2007: 8), because it doesn’t take into account imagination and emotion. He states that it is necessary to defend an “embodied theory of meaning” (Johnson 2007: 10) based on “organic activities” (Johnson 2007: 11). This embodied theory of meaning has to have at least the following implications:

1. There is no radical mind/body separation. (…)
2. Meaning is grounded in our bodily experience. (…)
3. Reason is an embodied process. (…)
4. Imagination is tied to our bodily processes and can also be creative and transformative of experience (…).
5. There is no radical freedom (…)
6. Reason and emotion are inextricably intertwined (…)
7. Human spirituality is embodied. (Johnson 2007: 11-14)

All these elements are constructed on the ideas that body and mind are abstractions, a pure ego doesn’t exist, the reason is not a thing, and so on with all the ideas presented above.

Part I, which centers a criticism to “Anglo-American analytic philosophy” (Johnson 2007: 18), begins with the following important statement:

Discovering, making, and communicating meaning is our full-time job. We do it from the moment we are born until the moment we die. Sometimes we do it consciously and intentionally; but mostly,
meaning emerges for us beneath the level of our conscious awareness. Meaning is happening without our knowing it. So, to figure out where meaning comes from, we have to look deeply into mostly nonconscious bodily encounters with our world (Johnson 2007: 17)

In order to go ahead with the analysis that Johnson wants, it is necessary to begin with the most basic presentations of meaning and Johnson thinks that these basic elements are body and emotion. But even before these meaningful elements there is life and movement, which are the real basis for our existence. Movement — for the most part unconscious — manifests life as the finding between image schemata and qualities to our mind/body — “in our experience of movement, there is no radical separation of self from world” (Johnson 2007: 20). It is here where interaction is a key element in Johnson’s system in the sense that subject and object are only abstractions from this real experience.

Language is also examined in the book as a central experience which is based on body and emotion — emotion is for Johnson the base of the philosophical doubt — through action that gives us objects and forces from communication, object perception and manipulation and bodily movement.

Emotion is, so, the central piece in this book — Johnson analyses Damasio’s (1994, 2003) works in pages 54 to 68— because it is in

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40 It is a new element in Johnson’s theory but as important as image schemata in the sense that they are presented to us at the same time as image schemata and give us a more complete decoding of our situation in the world. They are given to us in the form of “explosive, graceful, halting, weak, or jerky” movements (Johnson 2007: 21).

41 Damasio also refers to Johnson in his books and uses his more important
base of them that we discover the qualities of life — as important as image schemata in order to construct meaning.

The analysis of the qualities of life is carried out by using Dewey’s and James’s philosophical systems in the sense that we experience the world as a global experience: perception, emotion, image, body schemata, and so on all working together at the same time in order to give us a meaningful experience. It is *a posteriori* that we can fix our attention in a concrete object following our interests, values, and so on. Percept and concept are so, as James stated, intertwined because both are actions and not things. Everything in our existence is action, including knowledge and thought, which are experiences: “we should speak of conceptualizing (as an act), rather than of concepts (as quasi-things)” (Johnson 2007: 88).

Part II is devoted to the construction of Sciences of Mind from the statement that meaning is an encounter between mind and world from our embodiment and from the idea that “cognition is action” (Johnson 2007: 120) because there is a “continuity from embodied experience and thought” (Johnson 2007: 121). For Johnson, the key role of the body is related to Edelman (1987) and a reference to James is also present:

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42 The generalization of action and process as the key idea in our existence is clear in Johnson when affirming: “But Nietzsche, James, Dewey, and a host of subsequent thinkers have shown us that life is change and existence is an ongoing process” (Johnson 2007: 105).

43 Here Johnson criticizes Fodor (Johnson 2007: 115-117) as a thinker who maintains the metaphor which turns the mind into a computer with a fixed essence. He also criticizes Fodor’s defense of representationalism.
What I am denying is that we have mental entities called “concepts” or “representations” in our “minds” and that thinking is a matter of manipulating these entities by surveying their properties, discerning their relations to each other and to mind-external objects, and arranging them in internal acts of judgement (Johnson 2007: 132).

Johnson defends that “there is no ontological rupture in experience between perceiving, feeling, and thinking” (Johnson 2007: 122) because they are experienced as actions in the same body-neural system.

Chapter 7 is devoted to the corporeal roots of symbolic meaning and he sends us to Lakoff (1987), Johnson (1987), Gibbs works and L&J 1999 in order to obtain a more detailed analysis of image schemata as preverbal and nonconscious patterns born from our spatial experience in the world. In this case, Johnson defends that our experience of image schemata is blended with an experience of qualities related to emotions. And he adds that these experiences are social and intersubjective in the sense that we all share the same bodily structure, and this is the only objectivity that we can find.

Chapter 9 presents the new vision of meaning related to Conceptual Metaphor Theory as presented in L&J 1999, with references to Primary Metaphor Theory and the importance of metaphor in Philosophy.

44 He analyzes here the case of “into” as a blend of the CONTAINER and PATH schemata.
45 He criticizes Fodor because he bases his ideas on the following metaphors: the THOUGHT AS LANGUAGE metaphor and the FORMAL LANGUAGE metaphor.
Philosophy is no more than "elaborations of particular complex, intertwining sets of metaphors" (Johnson 2007: 200) and he defends the need to search for metaphors in systems, to put them to the test, which is what we shall endeavor in the last part of the work (Cf. chapter 3), basing ourselves on the specific case of the principal work of existentialism: Sartre’s (1943a) *L'être et le néant*.

"Philosophy needs a visceral connection to lived experience" (Johnson 2007: 263) because meaning is related to “qualities, emotions, percepts, concepts, images, image-schemata, metaphors, metonymies, and various other imaginative structures" (Johnson 2007: 268). And this requires a return to the body in order to analyze all its manifestations: biological organism, ecological body, phenomenological body, social body and cultural body.

Finally, after highlighting the importance of art — centering especially on visual arts and music —\(^{46}\) in respect to meaning, he ends by declaring that this meaning can only be embodied (or experiential), since the body is our situation — it is not merely a thing —, placed in space; we do not have any absolute truth and it is necessary for us to think of human freedom at scale.

\(^{46}\) We do not analyze this part of the book because it does not have relevance to our purposes.
2.2. Jean-Paul Sartre's system

2.2.0. Introduction

In this section we will attempt to understand Sartre's revelational book, *L'imaginaire*, in the sense that it is where Sartre starts to forge the concepts that, as we will see later on, form the central axes of his philosophy: the concepts of reality, imagination and freedom, associated later on to the concepts of being and nothingness.\(^{47}\) In the last part of this section, this analysis will be useful in order to compare the ideas of Sartre with those of Johnson that we have just seen.

*L'imaginaire* (Sartre 1940 from now on) by Sartre was published in 1940, but it was written quite some time before, at least before 1936. Sartre wrote this book together with Sartre (1936a), when he was thirty-one years old. When Sartre took the complete text to the publisher Alcan, he rejected the part which became Sartre (1940), yet he did not hesitate to publish the first part of the book, Sartre (1936a). This part (Sartre 1936a) is just a study about what some philosophers and psychologists had suggested about imagination, contrary to what happens in Sartre (1940), where Sartre freely develops his own ideas on this human faculty. Moreover, the first part is more purely the work of a philosopher — a philosopher to be understood in the most basic sense, as a historian of

\(^{47}\) In order to have a complete vision of Sartre's system (regarding all his works — literary or philosophical — from 1926 to 1948) you can examine my 2000 Dissertation (Cf. Pérez i Brufau 2000). At the same time, for a complete examination of the bibliography concerning Sartre's work, you can examine the commented bibliography on Pérez i Brufau (2000: 507-543). We do not repeat here these references because in the main there is no reference to imagination, the central element of Sartre's system, as we will see.
philosophy; the second part is more work of psychologist – a phenomenological psychologist, obviously —, more rooted in psychology.

Before examining Sartre (1940), however, it will be necessary for us to have a look at the texts which Sartre had already devoted to the subject of image.

2.2.1. Sartre (1926): *L’image dans la vie psychologique: rôle et nature*

The study of the imagination does not start for Sartre with Sartre (1936a) and Sartre (1940). Sartre had already been devoted to the study of this human capacity in the Mémoire written to obtain the Diplôme d'Études Supérieures in 1926. At that time, however, he had not discovered Husserl and he was not influenced by phenomenology.

Sartre’s Diplôme — entitled *L’image dans la vie psychologique: rôle et nature* — is his first important text. In order to be able to write it he had to immerse himself in the study of psychology yet the treatment of the imagination in this text — and in the later ones about the image — is utterly philosophical.

Given that Sartre was a writer, we could be forgiven for thinking that he was interested in studying imagination from the point of view of

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48 But we can find Sartre in 1924 writing the following in reference to images: “lorsque l’esprit se trouve en face de notions difficiles à assimiler, difficiles à penser (...) il y substitue des images” (Sartre 1924 [1st ed. 1990]: 455). And in this same text Sartre clearly states the existence of intellectual and sensible images, both related to emotions (Sartre 1924 [1st ed. 1990]: 457).

49 We have notice of this text thanks to Maristany (1987: 295-307) and thanks to his personal attention when I wrote my Dissertation on Philosophy in 2000 (Cf. Pérez i Brufau 2000).
creativity; but we would be wrong. Sartre focuses on the study of imagination as a human possibility in general, not only as an artistic creation.

In the Diplôme, Sartre dedicates his efforts to studying image as an unreality, as an escape of the real world. From this point of view, the view that Sartre takes, one can consider several characters that live in imaginary worlds. These characters are the artist, the schizophrenic, the scientist (including the philosopher) and the mystic. This is the centre of the text. As happens frequently in the works of Sartre, the centre of his theory is the place of the characters, the place of the concrete experiences in the form of examples, even though they all have a logical order under the examples.

Sartre, in his Diplôme, considers that the philosopher and the writer are at the same level, both imaginary beings living amidst the unreal. The upshot of this is the fact that Sartre considers that concept and image are the same thing.

These two ideas will be what will cause Sartre many problems during his intellectual development. If we consider the first idea (the one which equates the writer with the philosopher) we can propose that all the work of Sartre (which would include Sartre 1943a — an example which attempts to be ontology, even if phenomenological) would be, after all, imaginary.

If we take as a point of departure the second idea (according to which concept and image are the same thing), we find ourselves in the same situation as before: objectively speaking (i.e. the point of view of the
reader), the situations of Sartre (1938b) and Sartre (1960) would have the same value.\footnote{It is necessary to say here that the collections of articles made by Sartre all along his life to be published as books take as title \textit{Situations}. And this central role of situations in Sartre’s system is what puts him to analyse so many authors (from the point of view of the relation between reality and imagination in all cases) in form of philosophical or literary work: Flaubert (Sartre 1971a, 1971b, 1972), Baudelaire (Sartre 1947), Mallarmé (Sartre 1953), Freud (Sartre 1962 [1\textsuperscript{st} ed. 1984]), Kierkegaard (Sartre 1966a), Il Tintoretto (Sartre 1966b), himself in \textit{Les mots} (Sartre 1963), Genet (Sartre 1952), and many others.}

These are two criticisms that we could make of Sartre. We, however, prefer to think that the work of Sartre has two aspects and one common root. The common root is, logically, his intuition, and the two aspects are: literature (where Sartre sets forth concrete situations – imaginary, of course – that have led him to his ideas) and philosophy (where Sartre endeavors to achieve an objective formulation that goes away from his concrete intuition and that does not demand to the intuition of the reader). The literary work of Sartre offers us the “pre-category” and the philosophical work the “category” — the first as an intuition of concrete situations, and the second as abstract situations, understanding, logically, that it will be necessary to fill them in with contents, even if it is the reader who has to put them there.

This, however, brings about a new problem: how far are we able to understand category without pre-category? And, how far is the pre-category sufficient to understand Sartre’s thought? To be more precise: how can we understand Sartre’s freedom without knowing anything of Orestes? Or conversely, how can we understand Orestes without the supporting theory?
There are several answers to these questions. I opt for a crossed reading that offers us a vision of both aspects. For example: thanks to Sartre (1943a) we know that Sartre’s freedom is freedom in a situation. We are to understand that the freedom he projects is a freedom to act, a freedom that claims action, and we are to understand, finally, that what is projected depends on the specific situation. Thanks to Sartre (1943b) we have a clear example of this theory, a very complete example indeed, since he shows us all the problems that arise from that freedom: the fight between inner freedom and the freedom to act — freedom of action —, the difference between freedom towards oneself with freedom towards others, the opposition between responsibility with gratuitousness, remorse with total responsibility, and so forth.

I believe that Sartre never managed to find the solution to the problem of concept and image, even though many of his efforts will be towards this end.

2.2.2. Sartre (1936a): L’imagination

Now, however, it is necessary to speak about the contents of Sartre (1936a) — the historical part of the Sartrian study of image.

In this inexperienced and unambitious study — if we divorce it from Sartre (1940) — the key distinctions and conceptual oppositions in the work of Sartre are already evident, especially one that will dominate all the work of Sartre: the opposition between action and passion. Key opposition that coincides with all the Sartrian vocabulary: under the
heading of action we can put subject, spontaneity, consciousness, freedom will, pour-soi; under the heading of passion we can put object, need, that which we have consciousness of, passivity and en-soi — very important concepts in Sartre’s later work, Sartre (1940). Already in this text, Sartre informs us that “en aucun cas, ma conscience ne saurait pas être une chose, parce que sa façon d’être en soi est précisément un être pour soi. Exister, pour elle, c’est avoir conscience de son existence” (Sartre 1936a [reed. 1965]: 1).

The basic axiom of Sartre in this book is: “consciousness can never be a thing (a passion)”, since consciousness is always "consciousness of something", that is the same as suggesting that consciousness is intentional. From this axiom — that brutally separates and necessarily unites consciousness and things at the same time — Sartre carries on constructing his theory on image, bringing the ideas of Husserl to the limit, which often means opposing Husserl himself.

The image, therefore, inasmuch as it is a product of consciousness, cannot be a thing — a present and inert object —, but the subject producing a conscious action for some motive is an act with a concrete intention — the contents of Sartre (1940) will be exactly the study of this. Sartre suggests that the image, "je ne la vois pas, elle ne s’impose pas comme une limite à ma spontanéité; elle n’est pas non plus un donné inerte existant en soi " (Sartre 1936a [reed 1965]: 2-3).

The main thesis of Sartre (1936a), therefore, is this: "the image is not a thing". So what is it? This is the question that Sartre (1940) attempts to answer; for this reason it is impossible to separate both books.
We could say that the thesis of the book is that "the image is not a thing", given that the rest of the book — and here it is necessary to bear in mind that everything I have said so far already appears in the introduction of the book, that is, on the first pages — is devoted to criticizing the suggestion that the image is a thing for some philosophers — representatives of what he calls the "naïve metaphysics of the image" — and also to the criticism of certain psychologists. Not until in the end of the book does he present the savior, whom we might already have guessed from the beginning: Husserl.

Sartre's thesis separates and joins consciousness and object at the same time — which later, in Sartre (1943a), will be called pour-soi and en-soi — since this thesis is divided into three parts that can only be divided theoretically:

1- The image is not the thing in image:

puisque l'image c'est l'objet, on en conclut que l'image existe comme l'objet. Et, de cette façon, on constitue ce que nous appellerons la métaphysique naïve de l'image. Cette métaphysique consiste à faire de l'image une copie de la chose, existant elle-même comme une chose (Sartre 1936a [reed. 1965]: 4).

2- The thing in image depends on the imagining consciousness.

3- The imagining consciousness depends on the thing in image.
And this is, precisely, what Sartre means for us: consciousness and thing only coincide in the image, at the thought-free level of consciousness, which at first may seem quite normal to us, but which will seem quite strange to us once we get down to describing what imagination is. The image is not a thing, the image is not imposed like a limit to my spontaneity since it depends on it; I do not see the image, I do not touch it, I do not smell it; it is neither a thing nor a copy of the thing. If the image has nothing to do with the thing, how can knowledge arrive at the thing? This is a question that Sartre will attempt to answer later on.

In the first part of the book Sartre criticizes Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz and Hume because they defend the idea about the image as a thing. Sartre wants to set out three levels of knowledge that for him are clearly different: sensation, image and intellect. Sartre considers that these three levels are mixed if the image is taken as a thing. He, therefore, starts from the opposite idea — "the image is not a thing" — in order to describe the three levels better. However, he will find numerous problems — something that we will soon see when we speak of Sartre (1940). Moreover, as we have already suggested in the first section, Sartre wants to rid the consciousness of all its inhabitants, he wants a complete phenomenological reduction.

He dedicates the second part of the book to the criticism of psychologists from the same point of view. This part, however, is more interesting since Sartre uses it to pose questions about the method which it is necessary to apply in psychological study. Sartre makes use of the classical philosopher, Aristotle. For Sartre the idea that "there is no
thought without image" is usable. Like Aristotle, Sartre believes that thought depends on imagination; that is, that objects become concepts by passing through imagination as a junction between the perceived world and the conceived world — necessary because there are no innate concepts (Sartre 1936a [reed. 1965]: 32). For Sartre every possibility of thought depends on the possibility of imagination. And it is for this idea, inherited from Aristotle in *De anima* — and transformed by him —, that Sartre considers the study of imagination to be so important.

In this part, Sartre continues his criticism of the classical theories of knowledge by relating them somehow to digestion, the same as he did in Sartre (1939b): "de même qu’il n’y a pas de digestion sans aliments, il n’y a pas de pensée sans images, c’est-à-dire sans matériaux venus de l’extérieur" (Sartre 1936a [reed. 1965]: 37-38). This does not mean that external objects are food, but that they are necessary so that the consciousness can be directed towards something.

In the third part of the book Sartre studies certain contradictions that turn up in the classical conception of image. As we have already suggested, it is necessary to distinguish between the perception of the imagination and of the intellect. It is when Sartre works on these distinctions that the concept of spontaneity is needed. Spontaneity, in Sartre, is the characteristic of the thing that "se determine par elle-même à exister" (Sartre 1936a [reed. 1965]: 125); that is, it is the characteristic of what exists "pour soi et par soi" (Sartre 1936a [reed. 1965]: 125). This is only accomplished by the intentional consciousness – the consciousness of existing at the same time as "consciousness of....". In other words: “la
seule façon d'exister pour une conscience c'est d'avoir conscience qu'elle existe" (Sartre 1936a [reed. 1965]: 126).

Sartre is very rigorous in the use of his concepts — despite the fact that the opposite has often been said — and from now on he will only apply the adjective "spontaneous" to consciousness, which has an *index sui*, as if every "consciousness of..." were at the same time consciousness of itself, at least in the prereflexive field — which we will speak about further on: "si donc l'image est conscience, elle est spontanéité pure, c'est-à-dire conscience de soi, transparence pour soi et elle n’existe que dans la mesure où elle se connaît. Elle n’est donc pas un contenu sensible" (Sartre 1936a [reed. 1965]: 126).

Finally, Sartre proposes the basis of a good theory of imagination — we could say the basis of Sartre (1940); a good theory about the imagination must:

1- "rendre compte de la discrimination spontanée que l’esprit opère entre ses images et ses perceptions" (Sartre 1936a [reed. 1965]: 128), and, moreover,

2- "expliquer le rôle que joue l’image dans les opérations de la pensée" (Sartre 1936a [reed. 1965]: 128).

That is, it has to be able to separate the three degrees of knowledge. And, after telling us what makes a good theory of image, he finally presents his method: phenomenology, the basic ideas of which already appear from the beginning of the book, from the moment that he makes it
clear that image is image of something, it ceases to be a "contenu psychique" (Sartre 1936a [reed. 1965]: 146) and becomes an imagining intention or an imagining transcendent consciousness.

In Sartre (1936a), he does not dare to separate imagination from intellect, but he does sketch out what the distinction between perception and image will be, saying that perception is "synthèse purement passive" (Sartre 1936a [reed. 1965]: 157) and the image is "une synthèse active, un produit de notre libre spontanéité" (Sartre 1936a [1965]: 157) an idea that will be the point of departure for Sartre (1940). This distinction based on activity, however, is a purely psychological distinction and Sartre knows that a material distinction (Sartre 1936a [reed. 1965]: 158) is necessary in order to be able to differentiate the perceived object from the imagined object. However, the distinction between whether there is action or not, is now very important, since this is the basic idea in many other works of his, like Sartre (1939a), where he states that an emotion is an intentional action of consciousness, thus preventing the emotion from being an unconscious fact or a passion; emotions will not be inhabitants of the consciousness either.

These are the contents of Sartre (1936a) so far. Before we finish, we summarize the most important ideas:

— "l'image est un acte et non une chose" (Sartre 1936a [reed. 1965]: 162) and

— the image is "une certaine manière d'animer intentionnellement un contenu hylétique" (Sartre 1936a [reed. 1965]: 149) where matter
may even be unreal or spontaneous — which we will soon see in the case of the mental image.

What, then, will image be in Sartre? This is what we will attempt to see by studying Sartre (1940).

2.2.3. Sartre (1940): *L’imaginaire*

From the beginning of the book, and especially in the third part of the Introduction, a distinction already appears between the two levels of consciousness: the prereflexive and the reflexive levels, one contained within the other — this will be the key to Sartre (1943a). The problem, however, appears when the distinction between these two levels disappears and they get confused. The reflexive level is necessary, for Sartre, in order to be able to describe image since "l’image comme image n’est descriptible que par un acte du second degré par lequel le regard se détourne de l’objet pour se diriger sur la façon dont l’objet est donné" (Sartre 1940 [reed. 1948]: 13).

Sartre continues the study of image from the point where he had left it in Sartre (1936a), but now with much more freedom, given that the pursued goal is not to criticize the "naïve metaphysics of image", but to present what image is for him; it is a matter of presenting his own metaphysics of image.

First of all, he reminds us that image is an intentional act of consciousness, deducing from this that the object of image is outside the
image itself; that is, that the object is outside consciousness. Image is no more than a way that consciousness has of giving itself an object; that is all very well, but what kind of object and where does it come from?

The method for studying image is, according to Sartre, very simple. It is a matter of "produire en nous des images, réfléchir sur ces images, les décrire, c'est-à-dire tenter de déterminer et de classer leurs caractères distinctifs" (Sartre 1940 [reed. 1948]: 14).

What worries Sartre, we already know, is the relationship between perception, image and concept — "percevoir, concevoir, imaginer, telles sont en effet les trois types de consciences par lesquelles un même objet peut nous être donné" (Sartre 1940 [reed. 1948]: 18). This is the first completely new thing, a characteristic of the image that he calls "phenomenon of quasi-observation", which we will now explain.

In perception knowledge "se forme lentement" (Sartre 1940 [reed. 1948]: 19), by focusing on the object, by letting ourselves become possessed by the object and its details; in image, however, "le savoir est immédiat" (Sartre 1940 [reed. 1948]: 19), and it is so, because image has "une espèce de pauvreté essentielle" (Sartre 1940 [reed. 1948]: 20): it does not have any external relationship and it has very little internal relationship — something we have already found in Husserl. This could deceive us into thinking that image teaches us more than perception, but it is not so, since image — and this is quasi-observation — does not give us more knowledge than what we have already given to it; "l'image n’apprend rien" (Sartre 1940 [reed. 1948]: 21) — we limit ourselves to finding what already we had put there consciously. Insofar as the image
is a construction of the subject one will never find anything that the constructor has not put there.

After presenting the phenomenon of quasi-observation as a characteristic of the image, Sartre goes on to set out the exact nature of image and its object. From the start we get a strange, complex and ancient surprise: he tells us that the imagining consciousness proposes its object as nothingness. It is because of this that the surprise is ancient, since it is an idea — as Maristany (1987) very well explains — that already appears in Plato’s *Sophist* in relating appearance and nothingness. Logically, the problem that Sartre will pose will be the same that Plato had posed: is nothingness the opposite of being or different from being?

Sartre, as he had already stated in Sartre (1936a), believes that image has to have an element of radical distinction with respect to perception and concept, a distinction in form as well as in contents, in matter. And, to begin with, he finds this distinction in negativity, in unreality, in nothingness. Image is an act of existing belief, a positional act in which the object is proposed as inexistent, absent, in another place or not proposed as existing — in an indefinite state (Sartre 1940 [reed. 1948]: 23-25).

According to Sartre, therefore, image hides a specific nothingness; image, in a certain measure — which it is necessary for us to determine —, is not.

Afterwards — and we will come back later with regard to the nothingness of image — Sartre suggests another characteristic of image
that we already know or can guess from what we have said so far: spontaneity, is image giving itself an object, as opposed to perception which limits itself to receiving the object as a limitation to consciousness; therefore, "l'objet en image n'est rien de plus que la conscience qu'on en a" (Sartre 1940 [reed. 1948]: 27); the perceived object, however, is always independent of consciousness. In other words, image, as action of the consciousness, is self concerning, a circle; perception is not so, since it finds itself limited by the object — a limit placed by the project of the subject itself, though.

Next, Sartre starts the reduction of the matter. The reduction of the "I" or Ego is found in Sartre (1936b).

Sartre makes a review of all those experiences in which imagination has a role: pictures, portraits, caricatures, etc. In all cases Sartre declares that the external object is merely an excuse to trap something that is beyond reality, that is to say, unreal. There is an intention that wants to trap something behind the given external form. But, at the same time, we ourselves put what we find into the photograph, into the caricature, into the portrait, etc. The real object — called matter of the image — is just a "représentant analogique" (Sartre 1940 [reed. 1948]: 34) of the object pursued by the image — an object we look for because it is not present and inert, because it can not be perceived. We will soon see that, in the case of mental image, the matter is the mental intention itself.

Now, however, in order to explain correctly what is meant when we say that the real object is an analogon, Sartre refers to the distinction
between sign and image. Sign, for him, is a thing that is forgotten once the object has meaning and no longer proposes anything, it is necessary that we rationally search for the object; image, however, is not forgotten, it just disappears once the object itself is present and the object is given directly, in a purely unreflexive way.

Once this clarification is made, Sartre continues his review, his listing of imaginary places, and he continues via imitation, telling us that the difference from what has come before is that the material of imitation is the human body. It is we who continue to put in place what we have to see. It is curious that Sartre forgets to mention the role of others at the beginning, when, really, he is making reference to it constantly. Somebody has said that the most important character in the works of Sartre is Pierre, the character who Sartre uses in the majority of his examples in Sartre (1940) and in Sartre (1943a), a character who, normally, is the representative of absence or of non-existence. It could easily be like this: Sartre would be the creator of others through imagination.51

We have said all this because now, Sartre tells us that the other imitator indicates what we have to see in his imitation. It is evident that the other has an important role, that of "having to...". Sartre, however, now forgets about this and he continues to examine the imagining consciousness.

51 Cf. Sartre’s texts on Kean, Kierkegaard, Mallarmé, Baudelaire, Descartes, Freud, Flaubert, Il Tintoretto, or himself in Les mots, all of them regarded from the point of view of imagination. Cf. Note 50.
To keep it short, I will just list the rest of the points studied by Sartre before he arrives at the mental image, where the subject finally disappears: schematic drawing — "intermédiaire entre l'image et le signe" (Sartre 1940 [reed. 1948]: 46) -, faces in flames, stains on walls, rocks with a human form, hypnagogic images — those of sleep —, coffee sediment, crystal balls. As we can see, the matter has less and less to do with a concrete object — "à mesure que nous nous élevons dans la série des consciences imageantes, la matière s'appauvrit de plus en plus" (Sartre 1940 [reed. 1948]: 72-73) —, knowledge has to fill in more gaps and "à mesure que le savoir prend plus d'importance, l'intention gagne en spontanéité" (Sartre 1940 [reed. 1948]: 73); it is ocular movement, affectivity — intentional, let us not forget — which increasingly dominates the imaginary object; the matter is more and more an appearance without a real substratum; there is more and more spontaneity; until, finally, it arrives at the mental image, where there is only room for imagination, unreality. In other experiences one can pass from perception to image — mutually exclusive, this is true. Now this cannot be done. Thus far, matter has been animated in order to make an absent or inexistent object present, an analogon acting as the real object through the knowledge that fills in the gaps. Now, the mental image does not have sensory content, it is not external; the mental image "represents" the external, it is not analogous to the external; it is the full spontaneous freedom of creation that makes consciousness what it is. Now, however, Sartre notices that he has to:
quitte le terrain sûr de la description phénoménologique et revenir à
la psychologie expérimentale. C'est-à-dire que, comme dans les
sciences expérimentales, nous devrons faire des hypothèses et
chercher des confirmations dans l'observation et l'expérience. Ces
confirmations ne nous permettront jamais de dépasser le domaine du
probable (Sartre 1940 [reed. 1948]: 76)

since we do not have evidence of the analog component of the mental
image as a psychic and non-material datum.

Now we move forward and examine the second part of the book,
called "the probable", in contrast to the first part, which carries the title
"the certain". It is in this second part that Sartre separates the elements
that constitute image in such a way that phenomenology becomes a kind
of unreal analysis. However, we can not criticize Sartre because of this,
since he knows that what he is carrying out can only be carried out
abstractly, given that the components of image always appear together
within it.

As we could have foreseen, Sartre deals first with knowledge, an
absolutely necessary element since, if image is conscious intention
towards something, it is necessary that there be previous knowledge that
fills it and guides it. Knowledge, however, in being part of image is
transformed radically, it is converted into something unreal, a creature of
nothingness; or rather, it becomes the creature of nothingness, since it
will give reality to the imaginary unreality by reflection — we can see how:
by unrealizing itself.
For Sartre images mean the first point of contact between the two worlds, the imaginary and the real, something especially epitomized by verbal signs — existing in both worlds.

The second constituent element of image is affectivity\(^{52}\) — also intentional: "les sentiments ont des intentionnalités spéciales; ils représentent une façon — parmi d’autres — de se transcender" (Sartre 1940 [reed. 1948]: 93) — studied in depth in Sartre (1939a). It is now that the dangers of image start to appear, since the affective object has the possibility to catch us out, even fascinate us. It seems that affectivity may be the most subjective point of all that constitutes image — it may even seem to be the only subjective point — but it is necessary to think that all elements that form image are subjective, since knowledge, for example, is also individual knowledge to know oneself.

The third element of image is movement, in a twofold sense: firstly, as a bodily movement, focusing especially on eye movement, the line of sight being the defining step of perception in image; secondly, movement can also be in time, either towards the past or towards the future. Imagination is what allows us to remember the past and to project a future; it allows us to move from what has already been to what has not yet been or what will never be.

The fourth element of image is the word: the word is in the image, it cannot be outside it because, if so the image would be something that it is

\(^{52}\) Damasio (2003 [trans. into Spanish 2005]: 32) or Damasio (1994 [translation into Spanish 2006]: 16, 111, 131), giving his attention specially to emotions, also talks about imagination and body as central pieces of the mind. Also Damasio (1994 [trans. Into Spanish 2006]: 258, 269, 320) and Damasio (2003 [trans. into Spanish 2005]: 194, 302) refer to Johnson’s works.
possible to empty, it would be something significant, it would be a thing, and the image cannot be emptied of its contents because it comes from consciousness. Therefore the sign in the image is as unreal as the image, it does not have externality — it loses its value of objective meaning.

And, finally, to finish this part of the book, Sartre refers to the mode of appearance of the thing in the mental image, with special regard to perception and its coordinates of space-time and logic.

Image, Sartre tells us, is not found in real space, and cannot be touched; from here it turns out that the imagining consciousness wants its object but it cannot really have it because it is not in the same space. This is the motive for which the image is either rejected — for its lack of total magic — or becomes a fascination — happy for its unreal power.

We will have to come back later on to consider space and time in image; now, however, we wish to refer to the logic (or perhaps even better to say the non-logic) of image. First of all, he says the object in image is not individualized, it does not obey the "principe d'individuation" (Sartre 1940 [reed. 1948]: 119) according to which the elements of image become the image itself. The object in image presents "un certain coefficient de généralité" (Sartre 1940 [reed. 1948]: 119). The cause of this is affectivity: it wants to possess the object just as knowledge does, which makes it impossible for knowledge to individualize its object perfectly; something which does not occur in perception, where the object is known in a fixed space and time.

Moreover, the object in image, according to Sartre, does not have any reason to obey the principle of identity. One of the motives for this is
that "ce qui est successif dans la perception est simultané dans l’image" (Sartre 1940 [reed. 1948]: 122). Another is that the object in image does not have multiple aspects; it is perceived all at once, as a single entity. The object in image is the object related to consciousness and no more than this, it is not the object in image for itself. It is necessary that we know how many columns the Parthenon has in order to be able to count them out in an image.

Therefore, the conclusion of this part of the book is that imaginary objects are a special class of objects that do not have anything to do with real objects – they are, so to speak, out of this world, inhabitants of the imaginary world, of nothingness or, as Sartre will say further on, inhabitants of consciousness and consciousness only.

Let us remember the basic conclusions that we arrived at in the former section about the two first parts of the book: the object of image does not exist, image is a positional act and not a thing, and we have guessed at the incompatibility of two worlds: the unreal world and the real one. Moreover, and above all, we have identified the components of image.

Now we shall examine the rest of the book. We start on the third part where, after having distinguished perception from image quite clear in the former parts, Sartre starts to set forth the role of image in psychic life, in order to distinguish it from concept, from memory, etc.

Right at the beginning of this part, Sartre introduces the concepts of symbol and of understanding. Sartre resumes the definition of image in order to show us the reason for introducing the concept of symbol now.
The image, he reminds us, is consciousness that attempts to produce its object, therefore, the function of the image is symbolic, it always refers to another thing — either absent or inexistent —, a similar idea to when Sartre told us that the object of the image is an analogon. Sartre states: “Il nous paraît (…) qu’on ne saurait supprimer la fonction symbolique d’une image sans faire s’évanouir l’image elle-même” (Sartre 1940 [reed. 1948]: 128).

At the same time, this attempt to create the object on behalf of the imagining consciousness may be led by a variety of interests, one of which may be understanding, which does not always have to be a product of imagination. For Sartre there are two types of understanding: "une compréhension pure (qu’elle s’appuie ou non sur des signes) et une compréhension imagée" (Sartre 1940 [reed. 1948]: 132); but the distinction between them is not based on whether words intervene or not.

Mental schemata — for the resolution of a geometric problem, for example — always have the meaning that symbolized thought gives them, which, at the same time, always starts from the intention of the image; their role "est présentificateur" (Sartre 1940 [reed. 1948]: 137).

On the other hand, however, as we cannot find more in the image than what we have put there — and here we recall the phenomenon of quasi-observation —, understanding through images will be a reencounter of knowledge already acquired, however deformed this might appear. Because of this, understanding — also an act of consciousness — can be carried out with images, but not through — or even because of — them. The image is just a form of understanding, not its contents.
The symbolic schemata and the illustrations of thought are, then, the bottom steps on the stairway of thought, which are controlled by imagination; they are the first stages of thought and are always related to image — very similar to what Aristotle sets out in *De Anima* — because all knowledge comes from perception. It is from the image of illustration that we are led towards fantasy, towards understanding with images or towards pure understanding — in concepts —, which are the higher steps (Sartre 1940 [reed. 1948]: 146).

Image, therefore, is an indispensable step in the development of knowledge and in learning. This is made especially evident by the non-innatism of Sartre, essentially because he considers that "existence precedes essence". Sartre — as we have already observed — will be presented with the problem when he has to describe "concept". Sartre attempts to solve the problem by going back to the distinction between reflection and prereflection, but as these two levels have not been clearly separated because they are contained mutually, we cannot totally separate image from the concept either.

"En fait, il n’y a pas des concepts et des images. Mais il y a pour le concept deux façons d’apparaître: comme pure pensée sur le terrain réflexif et sur le terrain irréfléchi, comme image" (Sartre 1940 [reed. 1948]: 148). In Sartre (1926) he was much clearer and more convincing in resolving this problem: there is no concept, there are only perception and image; that is, that the activity of the consciousness is only presented in the form of image. The philosopher and the scientist were there alongside the artist, the mystic and the schizophrenic as imaginary beings.
Now, however, in Sartre (1940), he attempts to give concept its own place, even though it seems that he does not achieve this completely, since it seems we are all in evident danger of mistaking for a concept — an essence, even if it is from a former experience, a memory — what is merely an image, a creation of our own consciousness which does not have more existence than that given to it by the consciousness that created it. The fact that existence precedes essence condemns the world of eternal ideas to death and, with them, it also condemns man’s knowledge as relativism and as anguish which, in Sartre, are derived directly from taking Husserl’s intentionality to the extreme and not from a moral or religious existential attitude.

Whereas the distinction between thought and image is not clear, the distinction between image and perception is proposed with a supreme clarity – especially because he makes use of what he had already said in his Diplôme on this subject: image and perception "s’excluent l’une l’autre" (Sartre 1940 [reed. 1948]: 156), one cannot perceive and imagine at the same time. Activity (image, absence) and passivity (perception, presence) cannot occur together in consciousness. From this, Sartre will deduce that we all have — not are — two “I”s, something which we will examine further on.

To finish this part we shall return to the division established between image and thought. Sartre believes that "la pensée prend la forme imagée lorsqu’elle veut être intuitive, lorsqu’elle veut fonder ses affirmations sur la vue d’un objet" (Sartre 1940 [reed. 1948]: 158) and that "l’acte d’imagination, nous venons de le voir, est un acte magique. C’est
une incantation destinée à faire apparaître l’objet auquel on pense” (Sartre 1940 [reed. 1948]: 161).

For Sartre thought requires reflection, it forces us to think about ourselves in order to obtain certainties — albeit not very lasting; it forces us to intensify the consciousness in every instant. As this is impossible because we are mainly existing, conscious, free beings — that is, actors — we live very often in the imaginary world. The question will be, for Sartre, whether we are conscious of this fact or not and whether we use images to commit ourselves to the world or to escape from it.

We now enter the fourth and last part. In this part Sartre makes the journey home: if man can create the unreal, will he not also be unreal? Since man can make nothingness appear, will he himself not be nothingness? The affirmative answer to this question complicates everything.

He reminds us that the objects in image are neither in real space nor in real time; we can see them from several places at the same time, they are totalized. These objects, in being out of my reach, can only be touched, smelt, seen, etc, with imaginary, unreal “senses”. I cannot touch an imaginary glass, I cannot drink its unreal water, etc; I can only make it happen by putting myself within the image, that is, by “unrealizing” myself. A glass of unreal water does not quench my real thirst; it can only quench my unreal thirst. From here we can already deduce that consciousness has to be capable also of “unrealizing” itself, since an unreal thirst can only be felt by an unreal being.
Therefore, on sharing nothing with the real world, the imaginary world is, as a whole — a whole created abstractly in order to be able to theorize, not really existing —, totally isolated; I can only enter it by “unrealizing” myself — like an actor playing theatrical role —, which is like stopping being really me and becoming something else, a mixture of actor and author, creating an aesthetic world — unreal — for the spectators — in which I can be myself in a reflexive act.

So, the image “unrealizes” us, it converts us into inhabitants of nothingness; it returns us to our original nothingness. It seems that Sartre wants to tell us that imagination has the ontological and chronological primacy in consciousness; this would make it the first and most important act of the man-in-the-world. The project, as a potential of an imagined future, would be the first act of consciousness with the world as a background; the background is a being onto which something which does not really exist is projected. The man-in-the-world would be the one who transcends the world and, therefore, existence would truly precede essence.

Therefore, if both worlds are totally isolated, we have – as we have already said with some prudence – two “I”s: an imaginary “I” and a real “I” (Sartre 1940 [reed. 1948]: 189); two “I”s that are outside the consciousness and to which the consciousness refers separately according to the situation, since they both cannot both co-exist at the same time. These two “I”s — one necessary and the other contingent and free — are transcendental to consciousness; they are not contained by it: one we know ourselves and the other one is also known by the others.
This division is what may provoke the pathologies of the imagination that Sartre studies next, where both “I”s can get confused or one — the real one — may disappear. Sartre believes firmly that a schizophrenic knows that his objects are unreal and that for this very reason he creates them, in order to be able to control them without opposition in the magic of the image. In this way Sartre continues to defend the idea that imagination knows about its image-being spontaneously, it is precisely this knowledge that will allow the consciousness to direct itself intentionally towards an absent or inexistent object.

Sartre considers that every attempt to merge both worlds will end with the non-accomplishment of the real world, by projecting images onto the real world, some images — hallucinations — that will not be able to be destroyed, a kind of firm and indestructible real unreality. And it will be like this because intention will have changed and the spontaneity of image will now be definitive, inasmuch as what is created, from the outset, is required to be unreal and not real; the background will disappear and being will become nothingness. Fascination — whatever provokes it, be it fear, a complex, sectarianism, etc. — will convert the project into an attempt to globalize the unreal world; an unreal object will not be what is wanted any more but an unreal world, the path towards obsession lies nearby; the only possible deviation will be art, which is not a safe way out either — as can be seen at the end of Nausea.

Before finishing this section it will be necessary to summarize everything that we have said so far: the imagining consciousness is intentional, it is driven by the reflexive consciousness; it is because of this
that the image always appears spontaneously as unreal. Nevertheless, if the reflexive consciousness does not appear, or if it is disturbed, the image may strive to be isolated and unreal and if the real world runs the risk of being dominated by the unreal one. The question, then, is: can this happen to all of us? And Sartre’s answer is yes. According to him, it is necessary to make an effort not to fall into the trap of nothingness, because this trap has always surrounded us all. This trap is our own consciousness, our own freedom, our own being a project, our origin – let us not forget: ontological and, in a very doubtful and confusing way in Sartre, chronological.

We have examined the third and the last part of the book; Sartre, however, added a conclusion to the book where he speaks about two subjects that he treated in greater depth later. The two sections from the conclusion are called: "Consciousness and Imagination" and "The Work of Art".

We are going to revise the first section but not the second because it is not related with what we are analyzing in this Dissertation. In speaking about consciousness and imagination, Sartre attempts to separate memory from image, thus consolidating his criticism of Bergson. A memory, or a recollection, according to Sartre, is to consider something as "donné-présent au passé" (Sartre 1940 [reed. 1948]: 230), not as "donné-absent" (Sartre 1940 [reed. 1948]: 230), the latter being the characteristic of image. A recollection, then, has a real place and a real time; the recollection is, memory is, the past is; in Sartre (1943a) we will
discover that the past is the *en-soi*, which is the essence — preceded by existence, which, after all, is the consciousness necessary for there to be something. This will bring problems to Sartre, given that the *en-soi* will end up being the concept, within which both things and the past will be encompassed, two varied contents that are united under this concept only as long as they appear as oppositions to the *pour-soi*.

Image, in contrast to recollection, never is, nor has it ever been nor will it ever be. The expression “nor will it ever be” is very important, since we might have thought that what is projected by imagination towards the future will always happen in reality — something that would give “absoluteness” to the magic of image. For Sartre, on the contrary, nothing in image can ever be in reality, since if the imaginary were really to happen it would not be the same, either materially or in the intention of the consciousness referring to it. The embodied image can be perceived, it cannot now be imagined.

Continuing with the subject — any consciousness that can imagine has to be capable of proposing "*une thèse d’irréalité*" (Sartre 1940 [reed. 1948]: 232), it has to be capable of transcending the real, making a deniable world out of it, making a deniable whole; in Sartrian vocabulary: man has to be in-situ “in situation”, which is the mode of immediate appreciation of the real as a world — let us notice the proximity of this idea with the negativity which is found in the ontology of Sartre (1943a). And not only this: to be able to imagine, the consciousness has to be free in the world and from the world, it has to be able to go beyond it; which makes us see like Sartre, in order to be able to describe freedom, we
must move towards negation, to the possibility of denying, to nothingness — to consciousness and to image.

Therefore, Sartre states, imagination “c’est la conscience toute entière en tant qu’elle réalise sa liberté” (Sartre 1940 [reed. 1948]: 236) — creation, project, existence and improvement of reality all go together. A man in-situ “in situation” in the real world is always an imaginary as long as consciousness is presented as the possibility of improving the real. And, thus, as we might have already guessed: we are all imaginary beings — whether we know it or not. As consciousness is always in-situ “in situation” because it is free — spontaneous —, there is always a concrete possibility for it to produce the unreal, the possibility of creation, of improvement of the real within a project. The imaginary, therefore, is the appreciation of nothingness, the improvement of the real is its specific aim.

"L’objet d’une négation doit être posé comme imaginaire" (Sartre 1940 [reed. 1948]: 238). Since consciousness has negation as a fundamental ontological, temporary and psychological feature, we can state that imagination is the most important human faculty, both ontologically and chronologically – although in the unreflexive field.

The spontaneity of imagination will be the freedom of consciousness, of the pour-soi, in the ontological and ethical fields; the image will be the project; the object will be the en-soi; the act will be the decision, the chosen possibility; the actor will be the imaginary being, the man; the reader will be “the other one”, the gaze of God and of death. In
the subsequent works of Sartre, the background will continue to be imaginary. Ontology, morality and aesthetics will be all imaginary.

The specific consequences will be these: because consciousness is capable of imagining, everything is legitimate because reality does not have legitimacy or reference in itself, since the power of consciousness can cut through it and negate it. Image and freedom are the same, everything ends up being unreal (not only what is known but also the knower), as long as everything is dominated by (chosen by) freedom.

In Sartre (1943a) it is “the other one” who will make me unreal; “the other one” will contribute to my loss as a subject and to my conversion into an imaginary object. There will not be any real contact, in Sartre, between two subjects. There will be no space, then, for objectivist ethics. The only guarantees of ontology and Sartrian morality will be imaginary, not real, since at the unreflexive level, reality and unreality are blended so much that sorting them out at the reflexive level is Utopia. The pour-soi, as nothingness, can be filled with anything, and Sartre is convinced that the first and most important things are the images that will later blend with the concepts and end up distorting them. Knowledge in image is first of all self-knowledge and afterwards, by derivation, knowledge of things. In Sartre the image seems to be an attempt to find oneself, given that we do not really possess ourselves, because we are others, because we are possessed by others. As the en-soi never prevails by itself, it will always be seen as something surmountable by consciousness.

The only point of fusion of consciousness and its object is unreal; it is in image, in nothingness. Aesthetics and ethics meet just as happens
with image and concept, with consciousness and imagination or with the writer and the philosopher.

So now we will summarize everything that we have said so far: all consciousness is, above all, irreflexive, imagining. It does have the possibility to be reflexive, since the initial consciousness is already a consciousness of itself — let us not forget that special index sui of Sartrian consciousness —, even though it does not propose itself as an object but as a subject thrown at the world to transcend it. Therefore, from the beginning of our existence, unreality describes the real; our action is always guided by imagination.

Our existence is linked to temporality — especially to our project of future —, and temporality depends on the annihilating power of imagination; therefore, our existence depends on imagination or, more correctly, our being is existence because it is imagination; or, even, our existence is imaginary. The essence, then, is nothing more than what has happened, what is past.

Man, therefore, is defined by the future, because, inasmuch as freedom and action depend on imagination, he has the possibility to break away from the world. In Sartre we could say that we find ourselves waiting empty-handed — walking forward nonetheless — for our “I” and our world to come, knowing that they will both arrive in an imaginary, unreal way.
2.2.4. Sartre (1943a): *L'être et le néant*

We are now going to examine the most important work by Sartre (and perhaps the work that best presents existentialism), in which he presents the key concepts of his system in respect to human nature and its relationship with the world. We are going to see that concepts like imagination, unrealization and freedom continue to be central in this work along with others like, reality, world, situation and action, but we will see that these latter concepts cannot be defined without relating them to the former.

We are going to summarize the work by paying attention to the parts and concepts that we need the most in order to be able to have a complete vision of the Sartrian system and to compare his system with Johnson’s.

It is necessary to take into account that Sartre (1943a) is a huge work, in the sense that it is both a very important work on the History of the Philosophy of the 20th century and it is also a tome of more than 600 pages edited with a very small font and with very narrow line spacing. We need to choose the concepts we want to look at very carefully in order to accomplish the two goals that we have set out above.

We will analyze the work in order, highlighting the key elements.

Merely by contemplating the subtitle of the book (“Essai d’ontologie phénoménologique”) we can see that both the method and the focus of the work continue to be the same: phenomenology. It is not strange that from
the beginning of the book Husserl plays the most important role in the work.

The introduction to the book (with reminiscences of Proust in the title: *À la recherche de l’être*) is the strangest and most complex part. It is here that Sartre explains that phenomenological ontology depends on the phenomenological psychology presented in his early works, in the sense that we can access only the phenomena ("le relatif absolu", Sartre 1943a: 12), meaning that a phenomenon refers to itself but it exists only for me or for the observer), but not the essence (or being) of beings. There is nothing universal, in the sense that everything exists because of the human reality. From the beginning of the book we can see that the body has a central role in the definition of human nature, because it is this which gives being the most immediate form (Sartre 1943a: 14); it can be as a perception or as a proprioception. It is this necessity of the body to have “existence in” and posterior “knowledge of” the world that clearly relates Sartre to Johnson and Lakoff (although Sartre does not define the body as a system of neural and perceptual tools).

“Being is” is the ontological principle that we can already find in Plato, but for Sartre, if being has to be understood as “existenced”, experienced, known, felt, imagined, etc, it is necessary for spontaneity of the conscience also to exist in order to allow the possibility of viewing being from the outside, from a distance, separated, which is implied by nothingness.

The third and central part of the Introduction is where Sartre presents the validity of his works on ego, imagination, emotions, etc,
especially the works devoted to imagination. He states that the conscience is “être-conscient” (Sartre 1943a: 17) of the world and of itself at the same time; it could be in a reflexive form or an unreflexive form. He insists on the principle of existentialism (connected in this way to experientialism) where the consciousness “n’a pas de «contenu»” (Sartre 1943a: 17) and all knowledge arrives by means of the senses.

The object is, but it exists in first place “pour moi” (Sartre 1943a: 18) and “il y a un cogito préréflexif qui est la condition du cogito cartésien” (Sartre 1943a: 19), that is the same as saying (like Lakoff and Johnson 1999) that knowledge is mostly unconscious in the sense that “toute conscience positionnelle d’objet est en même temps conscience non positionnelle d’elle-même” (Sartre 1943a: 19), and, as we have seen above, we can understand that this non-positional consciousness can be defined as the feeling of the body (neural connections and senses).53

We can see from this point of the book that if consciousness is “consciousness (of) itself” (interpreting the parentheses as a non-positional element), existence in the human nature goes “before” essence, this essence depending on the acts of imagination, feelings, actions in freedom, and so on. We can also see in this point (and these two ideas are the center of the whole book) that “being” is divided in two spheres: pour-soi (for-itself) and en-soi (in-itself), the first is related to

53 In Vérité et existence, Sartre (1948a [1st ed. 1989]: 17) states that “la conscience n’est-elle connaissance mais existence” at the same time that he states that “vérité = activité” (Sartre 1948a [1989]: 18) in the sense that comprehension is action that illuminates the being by means of nothingness, which is manifested as existing, in our behaviour. It is because of this that Sartre says that the truth is not anonymous. From an original ignorance, each person increases his knowledge at the same time that he acts (in the same sense that in Johnson knowledge is born by means of experience and the appearance of image schemata).
consciousness and the second is tied to things in the world (including the body). It is in this sense that the *en-soi* (world, body, matter) is the condition for the existence of the *pour-soi*, but this second kind of being – the human being – has to give meaning to the *en-soi* in order to exist in it, and this act of giving meaning is what gives existence to the *en-soi*. The *en-soi* is in-itself, nothing more than this (and no more is said about it in the rest of the book, which is devoted to giving a complete and coherent definition of the *pour-soi*).

Sartre devotes the first part of the book to explaining the role of “nothingness” — related, as we can see, to Sartre (1940) — in his system. For Sartre it is this nothingness that separates and unifies both spheres of being at the same time. He refers back to Descartes in order to give us a solution to the problem of this relationship between *en-soi* and *pour-soi* in these words:

> [Descartes] s’est trouvé en face d’un problème analogue lorsqu’il dut s’occuper des relations de l’âme avec le corps. Il conseillait alors d’en chercher la solution sur le terrain de fait où s’opérait l’union de la substance pensante avec la substance étendue, c’est-à-dire dans l’imagination. Le conseil est précieux (Sartre 1943a: 37).

Like Descartes, Sartre gives us the key to the problem of the relationship between both spheres of being in the imagination, that is to say (as we know from previous works) negation or, simply, freedom.

> “Le non-être apparaît toujours dans les limites d’une attente humaine” (Sartre 1943a: 41). With these words Sartre insists on the
relationship between pour-soi and en-soi in the sense that the first gives existence to the second but the second, thanks to his description of existence in form of a project, gives meaning to the first. There is, then, for Sartre, a “compréhension pré-judicative” (Sartre 1943a: 42) of the “non-being” or “nothingness” which is understood simply as human action in the world. That is to say, once again, that an important part of our understanding of the world comes to us in an unconscious way.

The role of nothingness, however, is more important than this simply because it is necessary in our perception, for it is “constitution d’une forme sur un fond” (Sartre 1943a: 44), something that it is only possible by separating things, establishing empty spaces both in space and time. Our attention is an action of “nothingness-creation”, and precisely because of this, the concept depends clearly on the image (this aspect will be dealt with in more detail later on).

There is an argument in Sartre (similar to that in Hegel) that takes us from being (factuality, world, body) to nothingness (image, concept) and once again to being, by means of an action that gives new meaning to the world.

It is this dialectic that permits Sartre to state that “la liberté humaine précède l’essence de l’homme et la rend possible” (Sartre 1943a: 59). And voilà! the key point of existentialism. We have also seen that it is impossible to understand without first thinking about imagination, the same as we find expressed in Johnson. Sartre points us now explicitly towards Sartre (1940) in order to explain that freedom is negation, separation, fissure, escape.
Freedom, then, is related to nothingness and we can sense this in the feeling of anguish, as a consciousness “en situation” (Sartre 1943a: 74) that is consciousness of its non-foundation, of its nothingness. The feeling of “mauvaise foi” is the contrary project, that is to say that it searches for the feeling of oneself as another being or as a thing, but this project also shows our nothingness in the sense that we have to experience it as a project, not as a thing. However, these are elements of Sartre’s moral theory that we will take into account later on.

The second part of the book is devoted to the general presentation of the pour-soi, having already said that it is related to nothingness and goes beyond being because it is questioned by the pour-soi (which is also a part of being because it is a body, a factuality) in a project (related to consciousness or image) which gives meaning to the being (including itself). It is in this sense that Sartre can say that the pour-soi brings values to life (like the unreachable image in a mirror) because they are meanings in the future that one wants to be founded in the present (as a presence to the world and to oneself). Values “par delà de l’être” (Sartre 1943a: 129), then, are founded on a freedom seen as overcoming being in order to arrive at the possible. The en-soi has no such possibilities, it is what it is and nothing more, we have to remember this.

In this existence (living) of values and of possibilities Sartre states that “nous appellerons «circuit de l’ipséité» le rapport du pour-soi avec le possible qu’il est – et «monde» la totalité de l’être en tant qu’elle est traversé par le circuit de l’ipséité” (Sartre 1943a: 139), that is to say that it

54 Note the fact that compilations of articles by Sartre are called Situations.
is the only possibility for the *pour-soi* to exist in itself and to exist in a world which is already giving meaning to both by its actions or simply by its movements, which give form to the things that surround us.

Here Sartre enters into the first analysis of time (related in this case to Hegel and Kojève); we do not need to follow him too deeply in this part but it is necessary to present briefly the key ideas: past is connected to the memory, and to the *en-soi*, to the essences; present is understood as “being present at…” or “fleeing from …”; and finally future is understood as “par delà l’être” (Sartre 1943a: 162). It is never construed as “il se possibilise” (Sartre 1943a: 164); it is the place for the project, for meaning, for possibilities, for values, and so on.

Time is not a thing, time is spontaneity (connected by this to Sartre 1940), and Sartre himself writes at this point of the book: “nous avons exposé notre thèse en usant du concept de spontanéité qui nous a paru plus familier à nos lecteurs” (Sartre 1943a: 184), time is a movement that we experience in the pre-reflexive level of consciousness, while time in philosophy is the time of the *psyché*, born out of reflection, and because of that, abstract and fixed as a thing.

An important part in the definition of the *pour-soi* is transcendence, which is the focal center of the third chapter in this part. It is here that knowledge is examined in more detail. Sartre states (and this is another idea that shows his proximity to Johnson) that all knowledge is based on and realized in intuition, and that “la déduction et le discours (…) ne sont que des instruments qui conduisent à l’intuition” (Sartre 1943a: 208) in the sense that knowledge (as a form of realization of consciousness) is
“présence à...” (Sartre 1943a: 210) of the consciousness to another thing, that is to say that consciousness puts this object as a figure on a background in space, and this, as we know, is how intuition exists. It is this intuition (which has two crucial forms, as we know: conception-imagination and perception) which reveals the qualities and quantities in the world and imagination can extract categories from them (which are purely ideal forms like potentiality, utility, and so on). But these categories, in order to exist (to be experienced) in the world, depend on action tied to meaning.

This way of thinking leads Sartre once again to talk about space and time as the frame in which “place” and “moment” take place; he defends the centrality of both in order to understand the possibility of action and freedom as living extensions of knowledge, and once again, unlike Heidegger (who defends the centrality of time) he defends the centrality of being.

The third part of the book is devoted to the analysis of “others”, which are examined from two points of view: ontological and ethical (which is the theme of the last work of Sartre that we are going to examine in Section 2.2.5., Cahiers pour une Morale, a work that will serve to compare Johnson’s moral theory and Sartre’s).

From the ontological point of view, Sartre states that the so-called existence of the pour-soi as pour-autrui (for-others) is the key to getting round solipsism. And he does not search for the solution in an abstract community of pour-sois, but in an existing, lived, felt, imagined, kind of consciousness such as shame, where one perceives one’s actions as being watched. Such feelings, actions and experiences show that this
aspect of the *pour-soi*, called *pour-autrui*, is rather more basic that the *Mitsein* (being-with) postulated by Heidegger.

Our basic feeling in relation to others is clearly that others are not me (non-I), which encourages us to believe that others are living creatures with no established relationship with me, but which may look at me in their own way. There is nothing metaphysical in these ideas. All of them are taken by Sartre from our daily life (the same as Lakoff and Johnson do in the case of metaphors).

This specific experience of being looked-at leads us to think that we may be an object regarded by another subject (this feeling can even be imagined). Once more, there is a dialectic in the relationship with others, and once more this dialectic cannot be closed because we move from feeling ourselves as the object and the other as the subject to feeling ourselves as the subject and the other as the object, depending on the affectivity implied in the action or situation. We have seen that perceiving and imagining are not compatible, and here, again, we find that the relationship with others shows a new incompatibility in the sense that we cannot be both the object and the subject at the same time in a concrete relationship with others.

Sartre tries to show this impossibility in a succinct way by explaining how we can pass from shame to pride in the same situation depending on the affectivity felt at any one moment.

And now we enter into an important part of the work: the second chapter of this part, focused on the body. Sartre states that the body is the objective manifestation (real presence) of the *pour-soi* in the world. That is
to say that it is not merely a thing but an act of realization. The *pour-soi*,
for this reason, is totally consciousness and totally body at the same time,
it cannot be merely “uni à un corps” (Sartre 1943a: 344). The body is the
form of the facticity of the *pour-soi* in order to exist, that is to say, in order
to “be-in-the world” as a concrete situation.

The body, as the form of reality or contingency of the *pour-soi*, is
the beginning and the end of the dialectics of action as we have shown
above when we talked about the relationship between the two spheres of
being: *en-soi* and *pour-soi*. In Sartre, the body is the entity (part of the *en-
soi*) that must inexcusably exist in order for our being-in-the-world to exist
as a transcendence of this world thus giving it a meaning; that is to say
that all meaning comes to the world via the *pour-soi* and that all
knowledge is found in existence of the *pour-soi*, i.e. as a transcendence of
contingency, thus giving a meaning to our actions in the world.

Initially, then, the body is not used by us, “nous le sommes” (Sartre
1943a: 363). It is a thing which is lived, but not known, on an unreflexive
level. First of all, the consciousness “existe son sorps” (Sartre 1943a: 369,
every *pour-soi* has its body) and in this existence the body gives form to
the thought. The body *pour-soi* has two levels: a basic body that we exist
in and which gives us the possibility of feeling, thinking, imagining,
knowing, acting, and so on, but there is another body: the psychic body,
which fills a psychic space. But there are two more spheres of existence
for the body: the body *pour-autrui* and the body as we imagine that others
see it. This sphere, like the psychic body, is clearly an imaginary sphere of
our body, but despite this it does have great importance, since we take a
lot of things into account and we undertake a lot of actions on the basis of
this idea of our body.

As always in Sartre, the psychic parts of our knowledge are
imaginary (those that can be understood as among the abstract realities,
as opposed to the physical part of the reality linked to perception, or in this
case, to the body-in-the world as a physical entity), in the same sense that
metaphors in Johnson and Lakoff act to explain a lot of abstract entities
based on concrete and physical realities.

The next chapter in Sartre’s book delves into the analysis of the
relationship with others. The first part of the chapter explains a first group
of relationships that Sartre considers prototypical of our relationships with
others, with the pour-soi existing as an object: love, language and
masochism. The fact that this group appears before the other ones does
not mean that this is first ontologically or chronologically, since the original
meaning of the pour-autrui is conflict, in the same sense that this conflict is
the basis of the relationship between en-soi and pour-soi. Unity with others
is “irréalisable” (Sartre 1943a: 406) in the sense that the conflict between
freedoms inevitably leads us to exist either as a subject in the face of
objects or as an object in the face of subjects.

In this group, it is only love which shows the possibility of a “we”
construction (being-with-another) in the sense that love has to be lived as
a project, as an enterprise, as an unstable but constant effort in which two
pour-sois endeavour to experience each other as a subject of foundation
for the other.
The thing is that this project may well lead towards masochism, by trying to be entirely the object for another or sadism by trying to be entirely the subject. In the first case one wants to be completely the object in the face of another’s freedom and with no element of facticity (i.e. that which underlies your existence), and in the second case one wants to have absolute freedom with no element of contingency.

The second group of relationships presents indifference, desire, hate and sadism. All of them are forms in which the pour-soi wants to be a subject, making the other an object in different forms. It is at this point of the work that the influence by Freud and Stekel is central in the sense that sex takes on a prominent role as an inexorable basis of our relationships with others, not in terms of libido or unconscious desire, but simply as a fact that the body (contingency, facticity of the pour-soi) is a sexual entity, and the body gives us original or fundamental attitudes.

We were born with a fundamental indifference towards others: they are essentially objects with which we interact just as we do with other objects in the world. Desire is the relationship in which one wants to turn another into a body at the same time that one wants to have freedom in a body in order to satisfy or fulfill a necessity. Sadism, on the other hand, is simply the contrary of masochism. If in masochism one wants to be an object in the light of another’s freedom, in sadism, one wants to have freedom and simply treat the other as a thing, as an instrument which can be used freely.

Finally, hate is the desire for the total elimination of the other, and along with that specific other you desire the total elimination of all others. It
is a contradictory attitude, in the sense that the hater needs the hated in order to continue existing. Hate loses its meaning if the hated thing ceases to exist. We can see, then, that all these relationships lead to a never-ending circle that relentlessly shifts the dialectics from subject to object, or vice-versa. There is no possibility of closing in a “we” as in Heidegger or Hegel. Heidegger’s *Mitsein* is really the foundation of the “we”, but this *Mitsein* is based on a more fundamental and basic *être-pour-autrui* (being-for-others). The “we” will arise in the dialectic relationship that is engendered by the appearance of a third party, in experiences such as the theater, in which there are two spheres of reality (the play and the audience), and you can be in one of the two spheres with others forming a “we”.

There are, therefore, two kinds of “we”: a “we-object” born from the appearance of a third party that sees “us” (and this is not a real we in the sense that it cannot be experienced without reflecting on it, since this experience requires a third party as an onlooker; it is because of this that this we requires inverted commas) and a we-subject (indeed experienced as a “we”, and so it does not require inverted commas) which appears only in a group action (in Sartre 1960, the Storming of the Bastille will be the prototypical group action). This action in motion is clearly a fact (lived, experienced) at the preflexive or unreflexive level, and when we do reflect on it, it turns into a fixed entity, and because of this the situation shows once more the instability of our relationships with others.

At the end of this part of the book, it is necessary to insist that it is only action which is the active part of realization in the dialectics between
en-soi and pour-soi and that all the rest is pure unrealization in the imagination, except for the passive action of perception, which also reaches the world directly.

The fourth and last part of the book follows on from the former, by showing the importance and centrality of action, and indicating that we have to finish the analysis of the pour-soi by fixing our attention on the key forms of its existence: “to have”, “to do” and “to be” (what Sartre calls the “catégories cardinales de la réalité humaine”, Sartre 1943a: 475). Obviously the central concept is “to do”, in the sense that “le pour-soi est l’être qui se définit par l’action” (Sartre 1943a: 475). Do, be and have is a hierarchical triad, with the transitive do at the top and be or have below.

Freedom, as we know from the works on imagination, is the being of consciousness, and it has to be understood as nothingness, as the form of existence of the pour-soi. But as a condition of action, this freedom is founded on the facticity of the existence of the pour-soi as a material being. Freedom, therefore, is the possibility for the pour-soi “to put nothingness” into the world as separation, negation or image: “dès la conception de l’acte, la conscience a pu se retirer du monde plein dont elle est conscience et quitter le terrain de l’être pour aborder franchement celui du non-être” (Sartre 1943a: 478). And this simple action of being conscious, or paying attention to the world, is the creation of a meaning in the en-soi.

Freedom, then, as a transitive form of existence, and always existing “par-delà” or beyond itself, has no essence; it is a rupture with the world and with itself, the creation of nothingness, of distance. If freedom
has no essence, then there is no possibility for determinism (it only can exist as “mauvaise foi”, self deception), but there is a little room for a deterministic fact: we cannot be non-free. Freedom is our form of existence in the sense that everything within us is action and intended goals (free will simply being the reflection of these goals). Decisions are always taken by means of a specific freedom in a world, in a situation (which, though not an absolute obstacle, depends only on the point of view of our individual project), including a body with a certain form, skills, senses and neural networks, and these decisions are taken with an intention of being or having, because in the *pour-soi* “être se réduit à faire” (Sartre 1943a: 521) and “la liberté est choix de son être [du *pour-soi*], mais non pas fondement de son être” (Sartre 1943a: 524).

So in the *pour-soi* we find a combination of freedom and facticity that leads Sartre to state that while freedom is not total, it is indeed absolute, in the sense that you can know yourself as foundation for your actions, but not for your being or for the fact of being. It is because of this that Sartre says that the *pour-soi* is free in the sense that it is autonomous (it is its own limit). There is a dialectic between freedom (future, project, image) and facticity (past, place, environment, others) that takes place in a situation in which the world is regarded as something to transcend (constantly, in each action) with a certain project that gives meaning to what we experience as a situation. This fact, however, has its counterpart in the responsibility of the consequences of our actions and the responsibility of our way of being (meaning), although not of our being in itself.
Existential psychoanalysis, as defended by Sartre in this work, takes these assertions as key principles: human reality is not a collection of facts but a totalization of acts, in which each one has a meaning because it forms part of a project; the only possible starting point for our way of being, and for our reflection on it, is experience, and the key point in support of this is the “compréhension pré-ontologique et fondamentale que l'homme a de la personne humaine” (Sartre 1943a: 614) in the sense that we live out our way of being (pour-soi). Apart from this, there is an important difference between his psychoanalysis and Freud’s, evident in the fact that in Freud it is the past which decides our way of being, and in Sartre is the future which has this important role.

The concept of having (and, therefore, knowing as a metaphorical extension of possession, related to the fact that, when children, we want to eat whatever we find) is the form for the pour-soi to be the foundation of the object possessed or known, searching for an impossible fusion of pour-soi and en-soi. And the act of possession or knowledge, then, has a symbolic function (experienced, existing, but not known) in order to create a new kind of being (perfectly pour-soi-en-soi). Therefore, the role of meaning is central in all of Sartre’s analysis: facticity (blending of feeling, body, and matter) and project both merge in order to offer to the pour-soi what Sartre calls qualities of being, an important concept in Johnson (2007), as we have seen.

As a conclusion to the book, Sartre refers briefly to the metaphysical and moral perspectives of phenomenological ontology presented in the work. As a metaphysical conclusion, Sartre clearly states
the “primauté ontologique de l’en-soi sur le pour-soi” (Sartre 1943a: 667), that is to say (like Johnson and Lakoff) that matter, as a form of our being-in-the-world, is previous to our consciousness (which is born from our interaction with and experience of the world). The dialectics that we have shown from the beginning of this part of the dissertation is a phenomenological fact but to try to search for its foundation is a metaphysical question.

From a moral point of view, it is necessary to say that the most fundamental values are freedom and situation, in the sense that the former illuminates the latter with a project that is born (like our images) from our knowledge (based on experience), feelings (that prompt us in the way of acting), movements (that put us in relation to the world) and words (as a physical expression of concepts).

Finally Sartre promises a future work on moral theory, summarized simply as the theory of human action in the world (in the same sense as in Aristotle) as an expression of our freedom.

2.2.5. Sartre (1947-48): Cahiers pour une morale

Between 1947 and 1948, Sartre writes a fragmentary text in which he reflects on the construction of a moral theory (fulfilling in this manner the promise made at the end of Sartre 1943a, which we have just examined in the previous part of this Dissertation). Given that the text is very fragmentary we are going to center our attention on the longer parts, complementing them when necessary with references to the shorter ones.
The text begins with the assertion that a moral life needs a “conversion permanente” (Sartre 1947-48 [1st ed. 1983]: 12) in the sense that human life is a continuous project to which we have to give meaning, sense and content in each action. And, not forgetting the works on imagination, Sartre states that “la base unique de la vie morale doit être la spontanéité” (Sartre 1947-48 [1st ed. 1983]: 12), related, as we know, to the work of imagination in our human life.

Despite history having an important role in the construction of a moral theory, Sartre continues by saying that this moral theory (which is both absurd and necessary at the same time, because it has no foundation to exist yet it has to create itself and create meaning of the world at the same time) always has to be individual (as was the case for knowledge, consciousness, imagination, and so forth).

In order to construct a moral theory, Sartre says that he has to take into account, at least, these elements: body, world, self and others; and furthermore, he has to place “meaning” and action (“ce qui importe c’est la réalisation [as opposed to the unrealization of imagination] de l’acte” (Sartre 1947-48 [1st ed. 1983]: 25) right at the center of the quest.

Despite Sartre’s preoccupation in this text being morality, he examines at some length both art (as another form of creation, in which not only meaning but also matter is created) and history.

There is no human nature because there are no given (universal) values because there is no God to support them. Human nature is defined by one’s action, and this free action (and “toute action est création” Sartre 1947-48 [1st ed. 1983]: 129, be it creation of meaning or creation of form
and matter, like in art) can find freedom in itself and in others (*bonne foi*), but one can also act with the aim of converting oneself into a thing (*mauvaise foi*, which is no more than self-deception).

Contrary to Kant and his imperative, Sartre reminds us that the situation is always concrete data experienced by means of our personal projects in a quasi-dialectics because there is no possibility of total final synthesis (as opposed to Hegel). In opposition to laws and religions, Sartre asserts that the “have to be” is always founded in the being as experienced by human creatures in a concrete situation; the “have to be” can never found the being itself.

Although action is the center of the moral theory, there is a crucial point that has to be taken into account: “le moment essentiel est donc la création, c'est-à-dire le moment de l'imaginaire” (Sartre 1947-48 [1st ed. 1983]: 480), and this entrance of nothingness (imagination) into the morality (as in ontology) leads us to feel our non-foundation or our existence without a given meaning, and this necessity to create a meaning for ourselves in our actions is the unique basis of moral theory.

Conversion is simply the appearance of pure reflection within us, that leads us towards thinking about our actions as part of a “projet ouvert” (Sartre 1947-48 [1st ed. 1983]: 494) in our quest to give meaning to the world and to ourselves.

The key point in Sartre’s moral theory, then, is generosity as donation (as a realization of an action that gives meaning to others) and also as reception of this gift (obviously with art as an epitome, as is also the case in Johnson). With the *en-soi* and the imagination there are two
prototypical kinds of creators: the engineer and the artist, with the important difference between them being that the first creates from a concrete necessity of our being-in-the-world and the second from a necessity of our consciousness as nothingness.

Finally, the foundation of everything must be freedom and, just as in the works devoted to imagination, Sartre repeats “l’imagination c’est la liberté” (Sartre 1947-48 [1st ed. 1983]: 565).55

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55 Fact noted by Scanzio (2001: 75) as continuity from the first works by Sartre to Being and Nothingness and to Cahiers pour une morale.
2.3. A comparison between Mark Johnson's and Jean-Paul Sartre's philosophical systems by means of the concept of imagination

2.3.0. Introduction

After having revised the works of Sartre and of Johnson (part of them written in conjunction with Lakoff), and bearing in mind that the former wrote his own work (the part we have examined) before 1950 and that the latter wrote from 1980 onwards, we shall try to compare them in their most essential points.

Evidently, it is also necessary to take into account that Sartre moves clearly in the current of Continental Phenomenology whereas Johnson moves in what he calls the second generation of Cognitive Science. Sartre positions himself within Phenomenological Psychology in various short works (Sartre (1938a, 1939b)) as well as Sartre (1936a, 1936b, 1939a i 1940), and he subtitles his extensive work, Sartre (1943a), “An Essay in Phenomenological Ontology” and Lakoff and Johnson (1999: 77) coin the term “the second generation of Cognitive Science” with the clear aim of incorporating into their philosophy all that Cognitive Science had demonstrated thus far.

Nevertheless, we cannot ignore the effort already made by Johnson to prove himself open to the contributions of continental philosophy, especially to phenomenology — in Johnson (1987: xxxvii) he positions himself clearly within phenomenology. It is clear that Lakoff and Johnson (1999) distance themselves from it for scientific reasons, but it is also
necessary to point out that in Johnson (2007) he re-states his links to phenomenology —, mentioning Heidegger, Husserl, Gadamer and Merleau-Ponty various times as important supports for his proposal.

2.3.1. Relationship between consciousness and the world: experience and existence

Sartre establishes dialectics between consciousness and the world which surrounds it and which is given in the form of understanding, just as Johnson also talks of the movement which understanding supposes in the form of “establishing a world” or “having a world” with meaning — we find this statement, for example, in Johnson (1987: 102: understanding is “the way we ‘have a world’, the way we experience our world as a comprehensible reality”) or in Johnson (1987: 175: [understanding] is “‘being in’ or ‘having’ a world”).

Both defend the essentiality of the concept of interaction in that experience and existence are the process of encountering a mind and a world, both only analyzable as abstractions born from reflection but not really felt and experienced as two entities. The appearance in both works (Cf. for example consciousness “«en situation»” Sartre 1943a: 74) of the concept of situation in order to explain the concepts of experience and understanding is also a clear point of contact between both systems.

Sartre (1936a) repeatedly states that consciousness can never be a thing but a sequence of intentional actions:
en aucun cas, ma conscience ne saurait être une chose, parce que sa façon d’être en soi est précisément un être pour soi. Exister, pour elle, c’est avoir conscience de son existence (Sartre 1936a [reed. 1965]: 1).

And Johnson states that

what we call “reason” is neither a concrete nor an abstract thing, but only embodied processes by which our experience is explored, criticized, and transformed in inquiry (Johnson 2007: 13).

It is this meaning which is to be understood in both cases through a body in its situation — a situation in which it acts intentionally. A body in situation is also to be understood in both cases linked to the world via the body: Sartre dedicates large parts of Sartre (1943a) to the body (especially chapter II of the Third Part) and of course Johnson (1987, 2007) also does so. Johnson (1987), like Sartre, does the same and he states that even understanding is a structured action, a process, and not a given state or static representation:

[Understanding] does not consist merely of after-the-fact reflections on prior experiences; it is, more fundamentally, the way (or means by which) we have those experiences in the first place (Johnson 1987: 104)
Johnson (1987: 138) shows this clearly by stating that understanding is our “situatedness in, and toward, our world”. Also in Lakoff & Johnson (1980) they found that in speaking of understanding there was a relationship between the fact of “projecting” orientation and entity. Johnson shows the importance of intentionality. As far as Sartre is concerned, one does not have to insist that the concept of intentionality is basic in his system, the title of Sartre (1939a) is clear enough “A fundamental idea of Husserl’s phenomenology: intentionality”:

One of the chief ways the body hides from our conscious awareness is a result of what Michael Polanyi (1969) called the “from-to” character of perception. All our acts of perception are directed to or at what is experienced and away from the body doing the perceiving. This is what phenomenologists call the intentionality of the mind (Johnson 2007: 4).

So, the concepts of body, experience (equated to existence in Sartre, thus giving a parallelism between existentialism and experientialism), situation (for example, in Johnson (1993: 162) or all Johnson (2007)), action (and linked to this, the preoccupation for the moral, particularly Johnson 1993 and Sartre 1948a, 1947-48) and comprehension (linked to meaning, essential in Johnson) are all given as central in both theories.⁵⁶

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⁵⁶ Lakoff & Johnson (1980) speak of “Metaphorical concepts” — although the term which has passed into the History of Linguistics is “Conceptual Metaphor”— which is closer to Sartre, as we will see. It is in this sense that we can better understand when, for example, in Lakoff & Johnson (1980: 3) we find the following statement: “metaphor is pervasive in everyday life, not just in language but in thought and action. Our ordinary conceptual system, in terms of which we both think and act, is fundamentally metaphorical in nature”.
The fact that both state the idea of an ongoing process of understanding in the world — “understanding is an event” (Johnson 1987: 209) — is what relates both theories in their criticism to objectivist theories of meaning and knowledge. The only objectivity that both defend is an objectivity related to shared structures of human beings in imagination and body. Both assert their own philosophy as research towards a third way, a midway term between absolute objectivism and subjectivism or relativism (an individual’s romantic vision of imagination or postmodernism). Johnson speaks of experientialism, of experientialist synthesis, embodied realism or experientialist realism. Sartre gave a name to his system which would become fashionable and, as an adjective would often allow understanding of things his own system does not explain: existentialism.

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57 There are endless places where Sartre makes this statement. Johnson (1987: 196), for example, also states the same.
58 The authors dedicate many pages especially to criticize currents of this type, to which we have to add those of Johnson in collaboration with Lakoff (Lakoff & Johnson 1980 and 1999).
59 This is the name given to their system in Lakoff & Johnson (1980: 192-194).
60 The novel L’écume des jours de Boris Vian is an ironical insight into the ambience surrounding the movement during those years in Paris. He would have to defend himself from bad interpretations in Sartre (1946a), a text which includes the conference given on 28th October 1945 at the Club Maintenant in Paris, although in 1944 he had already published a related article in Action, just the conference to which Vian refers in his novel.
2.3.2. Imagination as a central theme

Both authors return to the history of philosophy, and through the concept of imagination, they defend Aristotle’s point of view in *De anima* in stating that “there is no thought without image”.

For Sartre there are two types of understanding: “une compréhension pure (qu’elle s’appuie ou non sur des signes) et une compréhension imagée” (Sartre 1940 [reed. 1948]: 132); but the distinction between them is not based on whether words intervene or not.

Image, therefore, is an indispensable step in the development of knowledge and in learning. This is made especially evident by the non-innatism of Sartre, essentially because he considers that "existence precedes essence". Sartre — as we have already observed — will be presented with the problem when he has to describe "concept". Sartre attempts to solve the problem by going back to the distinction between reflection and prereflection, but as these two levels have not been clearly separated because they are contained mutually, we cannot totally separate image from the concept either.

"En fait, il n’y a pas des concepts et des images. Mais il y a pour le concept deux façons d’apparaître: comme pure pensée sur le terrain réflexif et sur le terrain irréfléchi, comme image" (Sartre 1940 [reed. 1948]: 148). In Sartre (1926) — which we have previously referred to — Sartre was much clearer and more convincing in resolving this problem: there is no concept, there are only perception and image; that is, that the activity of the consciousness is only presented in the form of image.
Sartre states that all knowledge is based on and realized in intuition, and that “la déduction et le discours (...) ne sont que des instruments qui conduisent à l’intuition” (Sartre 1943a: 208) in the sense that knowledge (as a form of realization of consciousness) is “présence à...” (Sartre 1943a: 210) of the consciousness to another thing.

The last part of Sartre (1943a) shows the importance and centrality of action, indicating that we have to finish the analysis of the pour-soi by fixing our attention on the key forms of its existence: “to have”, “to do” and “to be” (what Sartre calls the “catégories cardinales de la réalité humaine” Sartre 1943a: 475). Obviously the central concept is “to do”, in the sense that “le pour-soi est l’être qui se définit par l’action” (Sartre 1943a: 475).

Do, be and have is a hierarchical triad, with the transitive do at the top and be or have below.

Freedom, as we know from the works on imagination, is the being of consciousness, and it has to be understood as nothingness, as the form of existence of the pour-soi. But as a condition of action, this freedom is founded on the facticity of the existence of the pour-soi as a material being. Freedom, therefore, is the possibility for the pour-soi “to put nothingness” into the world as a separation, a negation or an image: “dès la conception de l’acte, la conscience a pu se retirer du monde plein dont elle est conscience et quitter le terrain de l’être pour aborder franchement celui du non-être” (Sartre 1943a: 478). And this simple action of being conscious, or paying attention to the world, is already the creation of a meaning in the en-soi, which is simply what it is.
Freedom, then, as a transitive form of existence, and always existing “par-delà”, in itself, has no essence; it is a rupture with the world and with itself, the creation of nothingness, of distance. If freedom has no essence, then there is no possibility for determinism (it only can exist as “mauvaise foi”, self deception), but there is a little room for a deterministic fact: we cannot be non-free. Freedom is our form of existence in the sense that everything within us is action and intended goals (free will simply being the reflection of these goals). Decisions are always taken by means of a specific freedom in a world, in a situation (which, though not an absolute obstacle, depends only on the point of view of our individual project), including a body with a certain form, skills, senses and neural networks, and these decisions are taken with an intention of being or having, because in the pour-soi “être se réduit à faire” (Sartre 1943a: 521) and “la liberté est choix de son être [du pour-soi], mais non pas fondement de son être” (Sartre 1943a: 524).

As a metaphysical conclusion, Sartre clearly states the “primauté ontologique de l’en-soi sur le pour-soi” (Sartre 1943a: 667), that is to say (like Johnson and Lakoff) that matter, as a form of our being-in-the-world, is previous to our consciousness (which is born from our interaction with and experience of the world). The dialectics that we have shown from the beginning of this part of the dissertation is a phenomenological fact but to try to search for its foundation is a metaphysical question.

What stands out most of all, though, is the fact of giving fundamental importance to imagination in constructing meaning — In this sense both are linked to Aristotle, as we have said above, when in De
anima (431b) he states that “the soul never thinks without an image”. All of Johnson’s texts (especially Johnson 1987, 2007) point out this fact and all the works of Sartre (prior to Sartre 1943a) also do so, and close perusal of Sartre (1943a) — especially the start of Sartre (1943a: p. 37) where we are given indications about the connection between nothingness, imagination and freedom when talking about Descartes — also leads us to consider the imagination as central in this voluminous text:

[Descartes] s’est trouvé en face d’un problème analogue lorsqu’il dut s’occuper des relations de l’âme avec le corps. Il conseillait alors d’en chercher la solution sur le terrain de fait où s’opérait l’union de la substance pensante avec la substance étendue, c’est-à-dire dans l’imagination. Le conseil est précieux (Sartre 1943a: 37).

The introduction to Johnson (1987) also incorporates this same idea when saying that:

without imagination, nothing in the world could be meaningful. Without imagination, we could never make sense of our experience. Without imagination, we could never reason toward knowledge of reality. This book is an elaboration and defense of these three controversial claims. It explores the central role of human imagination in all meaning, understanding, and reasoning. (Johnson 1987: ix).

Before Sartre (1940), he had already dedicated other works to the analysis of this faculty, Sartre (1926) or (1936a). Moreover, Sartre continues, after
his text of 1943, to state the centrality of the imagination in all his texts. Cf. Sartre (1947-48, 1948, 1946a, 1946b, 1946c, 1971a, 1971b, 1972). In subsequent declarations in his above-quoted works Sartre still relates them to the problematic of the imagination and recognizes the centrality of this idea right to the end of his life. Cf. Sartre (1976: 101-102): “J’ai repensé certaines des notions exposées dans L’imaginaire, mais je dois dire que, malgré les critiques que j’ai pu lire, je tiens encore l’ouvrage pour vrai: si on prend uniquement le point de vue de l’imagination (en dehors du point de vue social, par exemple) je n’ai pas changé d’avis”.

It is certain that Sartre very clearly related imagination to freedom — “l’imagination c’est la liberté” (Sartre 1947-48 [1st ed. 1983]: 565) — , thus being able to give a sensation that this Sartrian freedom has nothing to do with freedom limited by the structure of the body (including the nervous system) as defended by Johnson. We cannot overlook, however, according to what Sartre says (1940), that imagination is limited by four basic elements, four elements which clearly have to do with the structure of our body: bodily movement, knowledge, emotional-affective state, and words. Bodily movement at the kinaesthetic level is defended clearly by Johnson 2007, especially at the beginning of the book, and at the ocular level it is also highlighted in, for example, Johnson (1987: 25) or Johnson (2007: chapter 1). Knowledge, which we have only been able to accumulate through bodily experience, is something which Johnson also states. Emotional-affective state, which is experienced at a bodily level, is,

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61 The fact that the interview with Daniel Cohn-Bendit in 1968 was entitled “L’imagination au pouvoir” is also meaningful.
62 Cf. Sartre (1940: 40-42). Existentialism is clearly based on this statement when he states that “existence precedes essence”.

again, something which Johnson states, related to the works of Damasio (1994, 2003), in Johnson (2007: chapter 3). Words can only be experienced through the senses of sight, hearing and touch. That is to say, that when Sartre (1940: 236) states that the imagination “c’est la conscience toute entière en tant qu’elle réalise sa liberté” he is not offering us an absolute freedom at all but a freedom in a situation, limited by a body — Sartre (1943a: 378): “le corps est sa substance et sa perpétuelle condition de possibilité (de la psyché)” — and a world. Whereas Sartre speaks of two spheres of reality: consciousness (nothingness, pour-soi) and world (being, en-soi), Johnson avoids this by following the principle of non-dualism which had been established by Cognitive Science. Sartre was fighting especially against catholic ethics and it is because of this that he argues for an absolute freedom and responsibility — in the sense that we can always decide what to do and to want what we can do — in order to show that, given that God does not exist, there are no suprahuman rules to follow, everything is at human scale: morality, knowledge, language, imagination, freedom, and so on.

The role of imagination (despite the differences which can be established between the two, since Sartre does not postulate image schemata in his own theory) is the same for both of them: to give rise to concepts, to categorization and to abstraction; that is to say, to allow understanding and, therefore, meaning — in general, existential — whether referring to the literal or to the figurative (according to Johnson) or whether to the real or to the imaginary (according to Sartre). The difference between the two is that one speaks of metaphor and the other
of images, but the similarity we find in the following statements is more than revealing:

a) metaphors are not merely things to be seen beyond. In fact, one can see beyond them only by using other metaphors (Lakoff & Johnson 1980 [reed. 2003]: 239).

b) la compréhension est un mouvement qui se s’achève jamais, c’est la réaction de l’esprit à une image par une autre image, à celle-ci par une autre image et ainsi de suite, en droit, jusqu’à l’infini (Sartre 1940 [reed. 1948]: 150).

For Johnson, however, the postulated ending for this “endless” movement is image schemata, born out of direct physical contact (experience and motor interaction) with the world via our bodily structure — the most important of these image schemata to stand out, from Lakoff & Johnson (1980) to Johnson (2007) are: object, substance, path and container. Sartre, on the other hand, also proposes two bodily experiences as the end of the movement towards understanding, although these are mainly connected to emotional experiences: nausea in the face of being and anguish in the face of nothingness. Both, therefore, are seen to be related to each other by bodily experience as the basic foundation of all understanding.

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63 Despite speaking continually of images, Sartre does not forget the need for space and body in the formation of thought, already mentioned in his Mémoire pour l’obtention du Diplôme d’Études Supérieurs (Sartre 1926 [unpublished]).
64 Wider (1997: 126) relates Johnson and Sartre precisely for the role they grant to the body and the fact that both state that understanding is the way we have a
Metaphor, according to Lakoff and Johnson, is not a separate power of the mind:

it is as though the ability to comprehend experience through metaphor were a sense, like seeing or touching or hearing, with metaphors providing the only ways to perceive and experience much of the world. Metaphor is as much a part of our functioning as our sense of touch, and as precious (L&J 1980: 238).

as Sartre (1940: 236) says that “l’imagination n’est pas un pouvoir empirique et surajouté de la conscience, c’est la conscience tout entière en tant qu’elle réalise sa liberté”.

From the beginning of Sartre (1943a) we can see that the body has a central role in the definition of human nature, because it is this which gives being the most immediate form (Sartre 1943a: 14), it can be as a perception or as a proprioception. It is this necessity of the body to have “existence in” and posterior “knowledge of” the world that clearly relates Sartre to Johnson and Lakoff (although Sartre does not define the body as a system of neural and perceptual tools).

2.3.3. The unconscious or pre-reflexive level

In both authors we find support for the pre-reflexive level in understanding, since, in the main, they consider that we are so concerned about activity that we treat both knowledge and experience at this level. One of the
bases of *Philosophy in the Flesh* (Lakoff & Johnson 1999: 3) is precisely that “thought is mostly unconscious.”

Sartre, for his part, and in much the same way, presents an essential difference between the pre-reflexive and the reflexive level throughout his works Sartre (1940, 1936b, 1948b, etc.). This is a difference which accounts for self-reference — the fact that consciousness of one thing (intentionality) is always unreflexively consciousness of itself — at the same time that it accounts for the difference established by Sartre between consciousness (unreflexive) and knowledge (reflexive). The conference of 2nd June 1947 (“Conscience de soi et connaissance de soi”), published in 1948 (Sartre 1948b) presents this distinction well. Johnson states that:

> discovering, making, and communicating meaning is our full-time job. We do it from the moment we are born until the moment we die. Sometimes we do it consciously and intentionally; but mostly, meaning emerges for us beneath the level of our conscious awareness. Meaning is happening without our knowing it (Johnson 2007: 17).

The object is, but it exists in first place “pour moi” (Sartre 1943a: 18) and “il y a un cogito préréflexif qui est la condition du cogito cartésien” (Sartre 1943a: 19), which is the same as saying (like Lakoff and Johnson 1999) that knowledge is mostly unconscious in the sense that “toute conscience positionnelle d’objet est en même temps conscience non positionnelle d’elle-même” (Sartre 1943a: 19), and we, as we have seen above, can
understand that this non-positional consciousness can be defined as the feeling of the body (neural connections and senses).

### 2.3.4. The role of emotions and body movement

Johnson highlights in all his texts the importance of emotion, stating that we cannot place it in opposition to intellect and that, in reality, this emotion forms part of the creation of the meaning of the world and that it is one of the foundations of our understanding — we refer to Johnson (2007: chapter 3). In this sense, the appearances of Damasio (1994, 2003) in Johnson’s texts (even those written together with Lakoff, Cf. Johnson 2007: 54-102) are fundamental. For example, Johnson (2007: 14) tells us that “reason and emotion are inextricably intertwined”.

Sartre, for his part, proposes an analysis of emotion from the phenomenological point of view in Sartre (1939a), a work which formed part of a projected more extensive work which was going to be entitled Psyché. Subsequently, in Sartre (1940) emotion was to have a highly important role linked to imagination, and thus to the process of understanding. On the other hand, finally, Sartre (1943a) also highlighted the role of emotion as fundamental for human existence — specifically nausea and anguish because they present us with the two spheres of reality: being and nothingness.

Johnson states that image schemata “have a certain kinesthetic character” (Johnson 1987: 25) and Johnson (2007) begins by analyzing movement as the condition for life, and especially for human life defined
as action with a goal or purpose. For his part, Sartre shows that movement is a key element of life and imagination as the origin of the dialectics of existence. It is these dialectics that permits Sartre to state that “la liberté humaine précède l’essence de l’homme et la rend possible” (Sartre 1943a: 59).

The body, as the form of reality or contingency of the pour-soi, is the beginning and the end of the dialectics of action as we have shown when we talked about the relationship between the two spheres of being: en-soi and pour-soi. In Sartre, the body is the entity (part of the en-soi) that must inevitably exist in order for our being-in-the-world to exist as a transcendence of this world, thus giving it a meaning; that is to say that all meaning comes to the world via the pour-soi and that all knowledge is founded in the existence of the pour-soi, i.e. as a transcendence of contingency, thus giving a meaning to our actions in the world.

Initially, then, the body is not used by us, “nous le sommes” (Sartre 1943a: 363). It is a thing which is lived, but not known, on an unreflexive level. First of all, the consciousness “existe son corps” (Sartre 1943a: 369, every pour-soi has its body) and in this existence the body gives form to thought.

2.3.5. Moral theory

As we have seen, imagination, action, emotions and body have a key role in both theories, and in a very similar sense. It is because of this coincidence that moral theories defended by both authors are also very
similar: a good moral theory has to be one with individual experience and thought. Body, action, world, meaning, imagination, self and others must all be defined from the point of view of existence or experience as an experienced process in situation. There are no absolute rules, only values “par delà de l’être” (Sartre 1943a: 129), values that are to be defined by our goals and actions in the world among others. Just as Johnson also states that “goals are values for us” (Johnson 1993: 172).

Morality is “empathetic imagination” in Johnson (1993: 199) and imagination is “imaginative envisionment of possibilities for acting” (Johnson 1993: 202) as for Sartre human nature is defined by one’s free action (“toute action est création” Sartre 1947-48 [1st ed. 1983]: 129), in the same sense that imagination is the only base for morality in Johnson (Cf. Johnson 1993: 1: “my central thesis is that human beings are fundamentally imaginative moral animals”). Although action is the center of the moral theory, there is a crucial point that must be taken into account: “le moment essential est donc la création, c’est-à-dire le moment de l’imaginaire” (Sartre 1947-48 [1st ed. 1983]: 480), and this entry of nothingness (imagination) into morality (as in ontology) leads us to feel a sense of non-foundation or existence without meaning, and it is this necessity to create a meaning for ourselves in our actions which is the unique basis of moral theory.

The key point in Sartre’s moral theory, then, is generosity as donation (as a realization of an action that gives meaning to others) and also as reception of this gift (obviously epitomized by art, as is also the case in Johnson).
The foundation of everything must be freedom and, just as in the works devoted to imagination, Sartre repeats “l’imagination c’est la liberté” (Sartre 1947-48 [1st ed. 1983]: 565). And, without forgetting the works on imagination, Sartre states that “la base unique de la vie morale doit être la spontanéité” (Sartre 1947-48 [1st ed. 1983]: 12), related, as we know, to the work of imagination in our human life.

Johnson (1993: 133) also states that “there is not some static “thing” that the self just is ought to be” because “we are creatures in process” (Johnson 1993: 133). For Johnson, freedom is a limited, “situated” (Johnson 1993: 162) possibility and it is the only base to a good moral theory. A human being is “related to them [goals] but distanced from them” (Johnson 1993: 148). As for Sartre there is also a vide between our projects and our actions.

So, both are looking for a third way between objectivity — which, in both, can only be related to the “public, social character of imagination” (Johnson 1993: 217) — and relativism in morality.

### 2.3.6. Conclusions

So, then, after this analysis we can state that the philosophical systems of Mark Johnson and of Jean-Paul Sartre have a long list of things in common which we can summarize in the following way: their concepts of experience and existence (filtered through the concepts of understanding, meaning, body, action and intentionality) are very close conceptually; both establish imagination as a central element in the process of understanding
and the creation of meaning; both uphold the role of emotion in the creation of meaning as well as the fact that the human being moves mostly at an unconscious level, immersed in daily routines; as we have seen, the body has also a central role in the construction of meaning in the sense that it is from it that our knowledge is constructed, and imagination is in both cases, limited by our bodily structure — in the case of Johnson is clear throughout his works, and Sartre’s case is also clear because, as we have seen examining Sartre (1940) imagination is constituted and limited by emotions (tied to the affection of the body), the movements of the body and knowledge, which has to be gained by means of the body because we acquire it existing and experimenting the world and ourselves; finally both systems also have in common the criticism of radical objectivism and a firm proposal to find a third way somewhere between absolute objectivism and radical subjectivism.

Let me finish with a curious fact: in 1980 appeared one of the most well-known works to date in Cognitive Linguistics, *Metaphors we live by*. This groundbreaking work, whose subsequent influence is undeniable, was published on 15th April, the very day on which Sartre died at 9 p.m. in the Hospital Broussais in Paris.
Chapter 3: Metaphors of existentialism

3.0. Introduction

It would be impractical to try to survey the metaphorical foundations of all our philosophical theories. But it is a task that can and should be undertaken if we want to understand the inner workings of any particular theory in philosophy or science (Johnson 2007: 205).

In this last chapter we will examine the central metaphors that can be discovered in the most important book of existentialism: Jean-Paul Sartre's (1943a) *L'être et le Néant*. We will center our attention on Sartre's very important book as if it were another chapter in L&J 1999, in order to discover which metaphors sustain Sartre's system. In this chapter we will work in the following order: firstly, we will take a look at what Sartre says in some of his works about metaphor and then we will examine Sartre (1943a). At the same time, we will try to order the metaphors we have discovered in form of tables thus giving systemization to them and explaining which physical experiences they are founded on.

From the idea — present from Sartre (1926) to Sartre (1943a) — that concepts and images are related, in the sense that they are the same and differ only in the fact that concepts appear in reflection and images are present in a unreflexive way, we may say, just as Noudelman (1996: 60) does, that “les images ne sont pas des effets de style, mais sont
produites au sein d’une pensée qui s’élaboré en associant images et concepts” — a dynamic usage of concept and image not only very original in philosophical discourse, but also in literary discourse — that normally takes the form of schemata. Images, figures and metaphors — that present the necessary mappings between things in order for us to understand them better — which stand by themselves, are alive in the sense that they allow us to comprehend the being of the thing, they have a meaningful intention. They are not rhetorical but illustrative. We move, as we know, from image to image, from metaphor to metaphor; but they are not only decorative, they intend to teach, to communicate, to establish new meanings.

3.1. Sartre’s metaphors and Sartre on metaphor

Sartre refers very little to metaphor throughout his works, but we are going to take a look at the places in which he does indeed talk about it. At the same time we will take into account the places in which Sartre himself uses metaphors to explain his ideas — the reiterative fact of using inverted commas and italics to signal this metaphorical usage shows how Sartre was conscious of this usage. We refer only to texts before Sartre (1943a) in order to see how the metaphors in this text are founded on those discovered and used before, especially in the first works by Sartre, where he was trying — as an essay — to give form to his intuitions about life and human nature in linguistic expression.
In Sartre (1926 [unpublished]) we discover a young Sartre who dedicated 272 pages to imagination in his "Mémoire pour l'obtention du Diplôme d'Études Supérieurs" entitled “L'image dans la vie psychologique: rôle et nature”. It is an unpublished text that presents a large number of pages identical to those in Sartre (1936a) or Sartre (1940), the only difference being that Sartre was not aware of the philosophy of Husserl at the moment of writing the “Mémoire”.

In this text, Sartre criticizes the usage of metaphors, as we can see in the following examples: “Je crois que toute cette théorie n'est qu'une métaphore, conçue par imitation inconsciente de certains faits physiques” (Sartre 1926 [unpublished]: 10), "autre manière de saisir la métaphore" (Sartre 1926 [unpublished]: 10) and "dire qu'une image est derrière la conscience, qu'elle se présente à sa porte, c'est une métaphore spatiale qui ne peut rien signifier" (Sartre 1926 [unpublished]: 28). Even so, he uses metaphors in this text to explain thought as light or the process of comprehension of a word as “un effort, une tension” (Sartre 1926 [unpublished]: 71).

In a fragment on Messer's psychology, Sartre states that logic needs images (in the sense of spatial representation as a presence) in order to express coordination, subordination or supraordination. Space is also necessary in order to express identity, otherness, difference, wholeness, parts, and so on. These ideas put Sartre very close to Lakoff and Johnson in this respect, which is entirely logical since all of them defend a perceptual (experiential) origin of all knowledge and the centrality
of the role of the body in order to obtain meaningful experiences of the world.

In this text, Sartre already shows that there are theories which are “un retour à l'ancienne psychologie qui fait de l'image un corps opaque sur lequel se projetterait la lumière de la pensée” (Sartre 1926 [unpublished]: 118) (something that we will find in numerous works by Sartre we will examine later on) because “notre tendance est perpétuellement de dépasser l'image dans le sens du concret, d'appliquer à l'image le vocabulaire de la perception” (Sartre 1926 [unpublished]: 124-125). Sartre proposes a very short analysis centered on the images that found the psychologists’ approximations to their object of analysis (thought or consciousness) and he finds that all of them are based clearly on space and perception (container with objects, river, osmosis, movements, forces, biological organization, speed, and so on). As in Bergson, we have to understand the use of spatial images and words in order to obtain a symbolic schema.

We can see in this text that metaphor and image are very close, in the sense that after comparing a lot of psychologists, Sartre finds that some of them might use the expression image and others metaphor, but they are all referring to the same experience.

In Sartre (1936a), he states that "de même qu'il n'y a pas de digestion sans aliments, il n'y a pas de pensée sans images, c'est-à-dire sans matériaux venus de l'extérieur" (Sartre 1936a [reed. 1965]: 37-38); metaphorical usage of philosophical language (constant in Sartre, above all because of his double profession: both a philosopher and a writer) that
turns the mind into a CONTAINER or RECEPTACLE and turns ideas into THINGS (based on the metaphor according to which IDEAS ARE FOOD). It is clear that Sartre uses this metaphor in order to make it clear that thought cannot function without images because he is very critical of this idea of the mind as a container. As a phenomenologist, he defends that everything we know is outside the mind and that the mind refers to it – phenomenological intentionality that takes the mind out of itself. In Sartre (1939b) — a very important text, as it is here that he tries to conceptualize his thoughts in a philosophical form for the first time —, for example, he begins the text with the sentence "il la mangeait des yeux" (Sartre 1939b [reed. 1990]: 9), Sartre establishes the idea according to which KNOWING IS EATING and criticizes its realism and idealism by extending the metaphor to include ideas like "Esprit Araignée" (Sartre 1939b [reed. 1990]: 9), and using terms such as spider’s web, swallowing, digesting, dribbling, showing a disagreeable metaphorical image of what he calls "philosophie alimentaire" (Sartre 1939b [reed. 1990]: 9), based on "nutrition, assimilation" (Sartre 1939b [reed. 1990]: 9) that lies very close to the concept of ideas as things.

Extending the metaphor still further, he says that what is known is solid, and that assimilation occurs through deliquescence, as if the thing passes from one state to another, the spirit of it being like a mist or a gas, that will enter the solid object and dissolve it into a fluid state.

In this same text Sartre uses yet more metaphors, and he states that it is very difficult to make an explicative image of consciousness and finally he finds the image of explosion, "éclatement" (Sartre 1939b [reed. 1990]: 9).
to explain intentionality, the same idea as in Husserl's phenomenology, a fundamental idea in all philosophical and psychological texts by Sartre. Continuing the metaphor, Sartre proposes that in this explosion, which is an escape, a break for freedom from the "moite intimité gastrique" (Sartre 1939b [reed. 1990]: 10) consciousness tries to "filer" (get away) (Sartre 1939b [reed. 1990]: 10).

The theory which asserts that knowledge is a possession is also criticized; and transcendence is once more taken as a basic characteristic of consciousness, defined as external to everything, which, reached by means of purification, leads to consciousness which is "claire comme un grand vent" (Sartre 1939b [reed. 1990]: 10), which slips and slides to the outside, a "fuite" (Sartre 1939b [reed. 1990]: 10) or "suite liée d’éclatements" (Sartre 1939b [reed. 1990]: 10).

Still in this text, Sartre reinforces Husserl's intentionality — "toute conscience est conscience de quelque chose" — with Heidegger's help by stating that "être [...] c'est être-dans-le-monde" (Sartre 1939b [reed. 1990]: 11). He adds that we have to understand this being as a movement from phenomenology towards existentialism, because sense, meaning and direction are added to consciousness, thus making it act in the world, directing it somewhere. This is evident because being is, once again, "éclater dans le monde, s’est partir d’un néant de monde et de conscience pour soudain s’éclater conscience-dans-le-monde" (Sartre 1939b [reed. 1990]: 11), that is to say, that we must take into account not only knowledge but all the movements of consciousness: emotion, image,
action and perception, since they are all "des manières de découvrir le monde" (Sartre 1939b [reed. 1990]: 11).

Finally, and metaphorically once more, the text denies all interiority, all "inside", as opposed to the "outside" just stated, because everything is on the outside, even ourselves — Sartre (1936b) will continue this analysis in more profundity and he asserts (continuing the metaphor) that it is necessary to criticize the theory which says that "l'Ego est un «habitant» de la conscience" (Sartre 1936b [reed. 1996]: 13), a personified entity. In this text, and related to consciousness, Sartre adds the image or metaphor of "rayons" to the others just mentioned ("éclatement", intentionality, and so on). Clearly present in this text are metaphors according to which IDEAS ARE LUMINOUS THINGS or KNOWING IS SEEING. We can see clearly the continuity in the use of metaphors from one text to the others in the sense that Sartre states here that consciousness is "toute légèreté, toute translucluidité" (Sartre 1936b [reed. 1996]: 25), like the wind which he has talked about before: "tout est donc clair et lucide dans la conscience" (Sartre 1936b [reed. 1996]: 24), and marking the step to the books on imagination and later, in Sartre (1943a), Sartre states that consciousness "en un sens c'est un rien" (Sartre 1936b [reed. 1996]: 74).

On the other hand, Sartre (1939a) criticizes the psychologists who "veulent être en face de leur objet comme le physicien en face du sien" (Sartre 1939a [reed. 1965]: 7), obviously criticizing in this way the belief in the validity of metaphor to establish connections between ideas and physical things (ontological metaphor which allows us to manipulate abstract entities as things). It is important to say that Sartre criticizes here
his use of ideas as things not for the participation of the metaphor (which I think he believes indispensable) but by the fact of turning the consciousness into a thing when it is a process (an idea that we have seen treated profoundly in the second chapter).

Still in this text, and referring to emotion, Sartre says, just like in the case of image, that it is a meaningful experience and that “signifier c'est indiquer autre chose” (Sartre 1939a [reed. 1965]: 16), and precisely this indication towards something else is one of the key points of the conceptual metaphor theory as presented in the first chapters of the dissertation.

In Sartre (1936a) Sartre continues to present the following idea in the same way: “il faut surtout se débarrasser de notre habitude presque invincible de constituer tous les modes d'existence sur le type de l'expérience physique” (Sartre 1936a [reed. 1965]: 3); once again we find the appearance of ontological metaphor according to which abstract entities exist as physical things. A new criticism of the “métaphysique naïve de l'image” that turns images into things and by the same token turns consciousness into a thing.

Image is transparent, while perception is related to opacity. In all cases, however, consciousness appears as a series of images, that is to say, it is an active process and not a thing. And we can see that Sartre continues using metaphor without problems: “sortir à la lumière”, “«remplir» les savoirs vides” (Sartre marks the metaphor with inverted commas, recognizing and fully aware of its usage), “animer”, and so on.
Finally, in Sartre (1940) he continues both using and criticizing the use of certain metaphors which make us believe that thoughts are things:


This idea corresponds clearly with the rest of Sartre’s texts but also with Lakoff and Johnson’s ideas. Going against the idea that suggests that things enter into our consciousness (understood as a container), Sartre defends the idea of transcendence as intentionality: everything is on the outside.

In this text image corresponds to “une lumière diffuse” (Sartre 1940 [reed. 1948]: 26) because “l'image n'est pas un état, un résidu solide et opaque, mais qu'elle est une conscience" (Sartre 1940 [reed. 1948]: 27), so that, metaphorically, the physical state which corresponds to consciousness is gas, light, translucence, the immaterial, while physical things are related to the image of solidity and opacity; and we can see that Sartre is conscious of the usage of metaphors when he states the following: “c'est en ce sens qu'ils peuvent parler d'une pensée qui s'appuie sur des images. Nous savons maintenant qu'il faut renoncer à ces métaphores spatiales” (Sartre 1940 [reed. 1948]: 27) (ontological and
orientational metaphor at the same time) and “pour bien concevoir la nature de ce type de synthèse il faut renoncer aux comparaisons tirées des mélanges physiques” (Sartre 1940 [reed. 1948]: 97) or “dans ce chapitre et dans les suivants nous emploierons pour plus de commodité des tournures et des expressions qui semblent donner à l'objet irréel un pouvoir de causalité sur la conscience. Il reste bien entendu que c'est par métaphore” (Sartre 1940 [reed. 1948]: 127).

So, he criticizes these metaphorical practices but later on he says that “il est aussi absurde de dire qu'un objet est donné à la fois en image et en concept que de parler d'un corps qui serait à la fois solide et gazeux” (Sartre 1940 [reed. 1948]: 27), that is to say that he criticizes the belief in metaphors as the reality of a concept but when we want to turn our thought intuitive it is necessary to use a metaphorical or imagistic presentation of this concept.

After this look at Sartre’s works, we can see that he took into account the idea of consciousness as a presence to its object in the sense that this presence can only be by means of space, and this necessity of spatiality is the principal reason for using metaphors to refer to conscious experiences, he criticizes this use by the fact that it turns our existence (living, experiences, forms of consciousness, and so on) into things, making us forget that it is really a process, a series of actions.
3.2. Underlying metaphors in Sartre (1943a)

As we said in the introduction to this chapter, we will examine Sartre’s book with Lakoff and Johnson glasses\(^{65}\) in the order in which it is written so as to present and systematize the key metaphors that are the basis of his work.\(^{66}\) We will do this by centering our attention on the key concepts of the book — \(être\), \(néant\), \(pour-soi\), \(en-soi\), \(liberté\), nausea, anguish, and so on — in order to find the conceptual metaphors and the mappings that Sartre uses to defend his system as both coherent and complete. It is in this sense that we can state that we are searching the pre-categories of Sartre’s system: his vital experiences, his image-schematic mappings, his qualities of life and his Primary metaphors.

It is necessary here to point out that Sartre himself wants us to recall his ideas from earlier works on imagination (Cf. Sartre 1943a [reed. 1996]: most evident in the Introduction and the First Chapter),\(^ {67}\) and that in those works we can find the following metaphors which aim to differentiate perception and imagination. It is important for us to fix our attention on these metaphors because they are inherited from the early works and used once again in a more developed form in Sartre (1943a) to explain \(être\) (being) and \(néant\) (nothingness).

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\(^{65}\) You can clearly see that we base our analysis more on Lakoff & Johnson (1999) than on Lakoff & Johnson (1980). Apart from this we have varied some pieces of the standard model in order to obtain a clearer and more exact vision of Sartre's metaphors. There is no doubt, however, that we defend Lakoff and Johnson's position in the sense that metaphors are conceptual and very closely linked to physical experience.

\(^{66}\) Noudelman (1996) tries the same but he refers to different aspects: désagrégation, comblement, arrachement, and so on. We prefer the presentation of metaphors referring to different spheres of reality or forms of existing for the \(en-soi\) and the \(pour-soi\).

\(^{67}\) We assume the reference [reed. 1996] throughout this chapter.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PERCEPTION</th>
<th>IMAGINATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>opaque</td>
<td>brouillard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>solidité</td>
<td>gaz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>état</td>
<td>fluidité</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>résidu</td>
<td>lumière</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rempli</td>
<td>processus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>chose</td>
<td>activité</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>passivité</td>
<td>absence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>présence</td>
<td>évanouissement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>être</td>
<td>néant(^68)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>arrêt</td>
<td>se glisse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>éclatement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>vide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>spontanéité</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 4. Metaphorical expressions related to perception and imagination\(^69\)**

\(^68\) It is important to highlight the fact that this key and central concept in Sartre (1943a) — as appears in the main title of the book — is already present in Sartre (1940), relating both texts in their argumentation but also in their logic and in their intellectual development.

\(^69\) It is necessary to highlight here the fact that each metaphorical expression collected in these figures can be presented in a standard form as "PERCEPTION IS SOLIDITÉ" or "IMAGINATION IS A GAZ", for example. This standard construction can be made for all the expressions we have collected but we prefer this form of tabulation to obtain a clearer and more concise result. It is clear that not all the collected expressions correspond to Conceptual Metaphors as defined by Lakoff and Johnson in the sense that we structure an abstract concept based on concrete experiences. These expressions, analyzed throughout the text, are not included in the tables because they are at the same abstract level as the target domain that appears in the heading.
It is clear that all these metaphors can be understood by means of a sense (principally sight and touch) because we can reduce them to function simply as adjectives of solid objects and gaseous objects respectively. Sartre concentrates his attention on this opposition in order to identify material things as those that we can locate and interact with, whereas the imagination or consciousness is constructed as nothing; he centers his attention on the sensations (and hence on emotions and bodily interaction with our environment) that an encounter with these kinds of objects awakens: solid and gaseous.\textsuperscript{70} Here, however, metaphors are still constructed without using image schemata in a conscious form; we will see later on that when Sartre compares the two spheres of reality he uses image schemata (without referring to them in this way) in order to be coherent and consistent when pushing his analysis further, by assuming an idea very close to the Invariance Hypothesis defended by Lakoff and Johnson in the sense that the structure of the elements and the conceptual content related to the experience is what sustains the metaphor. For example, as we will see further on, \textit{être} and \textit{néant} — the essential elements of Sartre’s ontology — can be represented by the following figures (a) and (b), while anguish and nausea — the first related to the experience of freedom or nothingness, and the second related to the experience of contingency or being — can be represented and thought as follows in (c) and (d):

\textsuperscript{70} It is this duality which most differentiates Sartre from Lakoff and Johnson, as we can see all through their works by affirming that they defend a non-dualistic account of meaning and reason.
This figure is obviously a construction of mine because Sartre never talked about image schemata and Johnson never examined Sartre's philosophy from the point of view of image schemata. It is a visual representation of the conjunction of image schemata (force, container and path) that shows us that these most important concepts can be visually understood and experienced in this way as a sensation of open possibility or closed limitation, experienced, following Sartre, as anguish or nausea. At the same time, this representation must lead us to think that être, néant, anguish and nausea, are all born from bodily experiences that we can conceptualize as the figures show, and they are, hence, more basic and not as abstract at an experiential level. Figure (d), which shows anguish may also represent other metaphorical expressions used by Sartre related to consciousness such as fuite, éclatement and échappement.
From the beginning of Sartre (1943a), he refers to two spheres of being which are opposed and defines them little by little in order to show their differences. Being (être) is defined as "positivité" (Sartre 1943a: 12), as an act (the opposite of potentiality). Initially, Sartre states (Sartre 1943a: 14) that we perceive this being in the form of emotions or affectivity clearly linked to bodily sensations (anger, nausea, and so on). It is in statements like this that we can see Sartre clearly affirming the key role of the body and emotions evident throughout Sartre’s works, from 1936 — with books devoted to imagination and emotions, but both referring to the central role of the body — to 1943 — where he constructed his ontology — and beyond — to ethics and so on. Affectivity, body and imagination are the origin of meaningful experiences connected with sensations coming from the interaction with the world and ourselves — as occurs in Johnson.

The essence of being is the form in which it appears, a form that implies opacity as condition to discovery since we can not perceive what is transparent. Being is "passivité" (Sartre 1943a: 24), relativity, "rempli de lui-même" (Sartre 1943a: 32), "opaque" (Sartre 1943a: 32), because "l'être est partout" (Sartre 1943a: 28). Being is the condition of all appearance but it has no intentionality, it is not action with goals and purposes, it is simply there. It is, therefore, consciousness which will give meaning to it.

Contrary to this idea, consciousness is presented by Sartre as an entity with no content that creates its self-being. It is not substantial, it is a "vide total" (Sartre 1943a: 23). This “vide total” is related to nothingness and nothingness is related to imagination in all of Sartre’s works. For
example, in Sartre (1972: 794) he says “imaginaire et Néant: une seule chose”, as highlighted by Noudelman (1996). And it is necessary to highlight the fact that this statement of Sartre’s is taken from a book that was written by Sartre in the 70s, which shows the centrality of imagination all through Sartre’s life. This is, as we have defended all through our dissertation, the key to Sartre’s philosophical system.

Conscious acts are "tout activité" and "tout spontanéité" (Sartre 1943a: 25), "translucidité" and "transcendance" (Sartre 1943a: 28). The following figure summarizes the most important metaphors for être and consciousness at the beginning of the book, we will see later on that metaphors for être appear slowly throughout the book, as the opposite to consciousness, néant, or pour-soi (taking the name of en-soi when opposite to it). It is important here to highlight the fact that Johnson (2007) defends the importance of image schemata in our meaningful experiences but he also maintains the centrality of qualities of the world as an important element in the construction of our existence. This fact is important because it allows us to believe that Sartre uses these metaphors with être and conscience because they are related to his own personal experiences and whether they were pleasant or unpleasant.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ÊTRE</th>
<th>CONSCIENCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>il est ce qu’il est</td>
<td>éclatement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>passivité</td>
<td>fuite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rempli de lui-même</td>
<td>arrachement</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>vent</td>
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<tr>
<td>il est partout opaque</td>
<td>glisser opaque</td>
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<td>----------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>opale</td>
<td>rayons</td>
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<tr>
<td>légèreté</td>
<td>flux</td>
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<tr>
<td>désagrégation</td>
<td>échappement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>flux</td>
<td>translucidité</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rien</td>
<td>rien</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>claire</td>
<td>claire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lucide</td>
<td>lucide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>enchaînement d’éclatements</td>
<td>vide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vide</td>
<td>activité</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spontanéité</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 6. Metaphorical expressions related to being and consciousness**

Now we have the key elements that form the fundamental structure of the book: being as an opaque *plein* and consciousness as an empty *vide*, related, as we have seen, to the metaphors which are sustained by imagination in Sartre’s previous works on the subject.

We can see here, once again, that Sartre constructs the system by means of image schemata (container, path, movement, forces, etc.) systematizing the usage of them: movement, forces and paths are only

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It is clear that the names up in the figure are the target domains, and the expressions listed represent the various sources domains, all related to physical experiences with our sense and body.
related to the metaphors that refer to consciousness, and images such as container or thing can only be related to being. In this way, we can understand consciousness as emptiness, transparent and always directing its attention outwards in form of explosions. Figure 5 is clear in this respect, showing containers and forces that trace paths which are used to construct or to explain (or both) the essential elements of Sartre’s system.

Sartre’s metaphorical expressions presented in Fig. 7 still compare being with consciousness, but now he refers to the latter as nothingness.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ÉTRE</th>
<th>NÉANT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>passivité</td>
<td>vide total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rempli</td>
<td>activité</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>opaque</td>
<td>spontanéité</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>partout</td>
<td>translucidité</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>plein</td>
<td>transcendance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no dehors</td>
<td>évanescence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 7. Metaphorical expressions related to being and nothingness\(^2\).

The continuity from previous works is clear here but it is necessary to highlight the metaphor of the *trou* (hole), because it is this metaphor which shows most clearly the physical basis of all the metaphors used by Sartre. This metaphor, moreover, shows the relationship between metaphors and

\(^2\) Satre also refers to these target domains in terms of *positivité* and *négativité*, but this is an abstract level as is that for *être* and *néant*; it is not a Metaphor in the sense defended by Johnson and Lakoff.
our childhood experiences in the sense that holes, as Freud has already noted, constitute simple, basic experiences when we are children. And it is important here also to highlight the fact that holes are not only conceptually related to nothingness but also to containers and the absence of within. The action of filling a void (“remplir”) is what is born from this metaphor when we think of it as the existential goal of having a meaningful life. The importance of action and future is what most differentiates Sartre’s existential psychoanalysis from Freud’s standard theory, in which the most important role is given to the past.

Spatial metaphors, along with the metaphor according to which UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING, are present in this part of the book in the sense that Sartre states that there is a "domaine de la conscience" (Sartre 1943a: 30) with "régions" (Sartre 1943a: 30) and he says things like "la claire vision du phénomène d’être a été obscurcie souvent..." (Sartre 1943a: 31). It is clear that Sartre uses metaphors in order to explain his central ideas, but he uses them in all consciousness, recognizing our tendency to think in terms of spatial experiences — just as Johnson and Lakoff do.

Following this presentation of the two spheres of reality (being and consciousness) Sartre begins to define his approximation of forms of existence or being, and he presents both kinds of reality with the names: être-en-soi and être-pour-soi — abbreviated for convenience to en-soi and pour-soi. And continuing the metaphors that have guided the previous analysis related to être and néant, perception and imagination or être and
consciousness, he says that the *en-soi* is "massif" (Sartre 1943a: 32), "pleine positivité" (Sartre 1943a: 33), "contingence" (Sartre 1943a: 33).

According to Sartre, that is all we can say about the *en-soi*, and the rest of the book is devoted to *pour-soi* and the relationship between both spheres of existence. We can see these “new” metaphorical expressions listed in Figure 8.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>EN-SOI</strong></th>
<th><strong>POUR-SOI</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>massif</td>
<td>défaut d’être</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>chose</td>
<td>décompression</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>positivité</td>
<td>fuite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>contingence</td>
<td>destruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>plein (sans fissure)</td>
<td>dehors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>densité infinie</td>
<td>valeur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>il est</td>
<td>processus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>trou</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>manque</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>il se possibilise</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 8. Metaphorical expressions related to en-soi and pour-soi*

It is still clear that Sartre upholds his system within the same metaphorical system when he tries to define the two spheres of reality: the first related to solid objects and thus to perception, and the second related to the experience of gaseous objects and thus to imagination. Both kinds of
object cannot be blended into a new kind of object: it would be the viscous thing (physical experience) which, thanks to his declarations, we know Sartre hates.\footnote{Cf. for example: de Beauvoir (1981 [translation into Spanish 1982]: 399). This is an important point in the sense that it shows us that Sartre also relates his metaphors to his life and personal feelings and sensations in interaction with the world in the same way that Lakoff and Johnson found their Conceptual Metaphor Theory on image schemata and qualities born from our experience.}

In relating his analysis to Descartes and imagination (Sartre 1943a: 37), and as we have seen in the previous chapter and at the beginning of this chapter which deals with this work but goes further with Heidegger's aid, Sartre assumes that for the consciousness "to be" means "being-in-the-world"; that the principal way of putting these spheres into contact with each other (ontologically and genetically speaking) is by means of perception. This is nothing more than "constitution d'une forme sur un fond" (Sartre 1943a: 44), the focus of attention for Cognitive researchers in several fields such as psychology, linguistics, neurolinguistics, and so on.

The example given by Sartre at this point (and it is precisely in Sartre's examples that we often find the key to his argumentation)\footnote{Even his literary works and analysis focusing on real people can be considered examples of his philosophical argumentation.} in order to explain differences between perception and imagination is as follows: you enter a bar and you are looking for Peter; you are searching for Peter with your imagination projecting his form into the space, but he is not there; your knowledge of Peter continues to be this image (absence, nothingness in reality, "évanouissement" (Sartre 1943a: 44) that "se glisse" (Sartre 1943a: 44), "papillotement de néant" (Sartre 1943a: 44), multiple metaphors that might lead us to think of this imagination or absence as dissolution), but if you found Peter "mon intuition serait remplie par un
élément solide" (Sartre 1943a: 44) turning image into perception, solidity, presence, fulfillment, solidification, halt. In this case, the negativity that comes with thinking that "Peter is not there" "nous arrache à ce mur de positivité" (Sartre 1943a: 45) which is the being en-soi, understood, as we have seen, as a complete presence.

Being and non-being are both the contributors to reality as we know it, as light and shadow are both necessary in order to see an object. And as if he were talking about the relationship between real and physical objects he says that “il n’y a pas de non-être qu’à la surface de l’être” (Sartre 1943a: 51), proximity and contact between être and non-être from the ontological point of view of being but emergence “au-delà” from the point of view of the pour-soi. Non-being is to be understood, therefore, as contact with the surface of being, giving “contours” (Sartre 1943a: 53) to the world, giving form and meaning (quantity, quality, values, and so on) to the world.

Sartre defines consciousness as “arrachement à soi” (Sartre 1943a: 60) and this “arrachement” of the consciousness is defined next by Sartre as “décrochage” (Sartre 1943a: 62), “coupure” (Sartre 1943a: 62), “séparation” (Sartre 1943a: 62) or “décollement” (Sartre 1943a: 62), all of them ontological and structural metaphors that lead us to think in terms of space. The typical form that this “arrachement” takes is “angoisse” (Sartre 1943a: 64), as a form of feeling freedom or nothingness. Now, Sartre explains that freedom is sustained by the following metaphorical expressions presented in Figure 9.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONTINGENCE</th>
<th>LIBERTE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>It corresponds to: lieu, passé, espace, les autres et la mort (understood as a <em>mur or empêchement</em>).</td>
<td>arrachement à soi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>décrochage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>coupure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>séparation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>décollement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>fuite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>projet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>rupture néantisante</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>vide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>spontanéité</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>délaissement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>échappement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>supération de la facticité</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 9. Metaphorical expressions related to contingence and freedom.*

Here, once more, we find the same metaphors for freedom related to movement, forces, paths and explosions from a container to the outside; they are also founded, as we can easily see, on image schemata. And they are the same as those in relation to imagination, *pour-soi* and consciousness. But now action takes place and puts us in the situation of planning goals and going for them. The fact of introducing action creates a “vide actif” that puts us in the future separated from the present.
Contingence and freedom are related and will come together within a situation (a mixture of imagination and action) which brings into existence the three essential goals of the human being: doing, having and being. It is important to highlight that Sartre defends the transitivity of doing which is the key point, in the sense that without it we can neither have nor be anything, because we are an empty entity from our birth.

Next, Sartre begins his definition of time in the same terms: time puts us into existence as “là-bas” (Sartre 1943a: 66), “dans l’avenir” (Sartre 1943a: 66). Time “sépare” (Sartre 1943a: 66) and signals that “un néant s’est glissé” (Sartre 1943a: 66). We must pay close attention to the metaphorical words: “là-bas”, “dans”, “sépare” or “glissé”, all of them connected to physical and spatial experiences as forces, motions and paths, all of them image schemata in the Conceptual Metaphor Theory and in Johnson’s philosophical system.

The essence of the pour-soi is merely what has already been, the past, in the sense that time is “écoulement” (Sartre 1943a: 70) because we are “lancés dans le monde” (Sartre 1943a: 72) without essence, we are simply “surgit” (Sartre 1943a: 74) in a “monde peuplé d’exigences” (Sartre 1943a: 74) and we are born as a “fuite” (Sartre 1943a: 77) in front of us is what we want to be, to have, or to do, and what we want the world to be.

However, despite all this, Sartre often states in the work that consciousness is not a container and image is not the contents (ideas central in Sartre’s system that we have seen in earlier books). But in this text Sartre says that consciousness is “un être pour lequel il est dans son
être question de son être” (Sartre 1943a: 81). By using the spatial indicator “dans”, it obviously makes us think of a container or receptacle.

Being continues to be “opacité” (Sartre 1943a: 83) that has no “dehors” (Sartre 1943a: 83) and consciousness is “évanescente” (Sartre 1943a: 84). Both are central metaphors that are related to our physical (visual and tactile) experience.

Talking about psychoanalysis Sartre argues that this theory postulates that there is a “censure, conçue comme une ligne de démarcation avec douane” (Sartre 1943a: 84) and “résistances” (Sartre 1943a: 86) and “racines” (Sartre 1943a: 86), a theory that he thinks is a “mythologie chosiste” (Sartre 1943a: 87) full of “metaphors” (Sartre 1943a: 87) and that all of this is only a “terminologie verbale” (Sartre 1943a: 87) without reality as a reference. He thinks that, by using these terms, psychoanalysis turns consciousness into a thing and this is not what Sartre upholds. He believes that the images that correspond to consciousness are those of “désagrégation” (Sartre 1943a: 93, 105), “flux de conscience”, “échappement”, that is to say, images of movement tied to “fuir” or “fuite”.

The en-soi is defined as a “plein”, with no “vide” and no “fissure” (Sartre 1943a: 110) implied: a “densité infinite” (Sartre 1943a: 110). Contrary to this image of the en-soi, consciousness is “décompression” (Sartre 1943a: 110), a perceived distance in the illusion of “reflet/reflétant” that continuously takes it outside itself.
Throughout the book the “trou d’être” (Sartre 1943a: 115) image is connected in a general way to nothingness. Nevertheless it is a “trou à remplir” because of the appearance of the pour-soi, bringing to the world meaning and goals and values. The pour-soi, despite being defined as a “fuite”, “destruction” or “décomprimante” (Sartre 1943a: 120), is also “facticité” and “gratuité” (Sartre 1943a: 120); but in this sense it is also connected to nothingness because this facticité has to be understood as “défaut d’être” (Sartre 1943a: 121) or “manque” (Sartre 1943a: 122) which must be taken as an imagined whole projected into the future. This may take on a real form, for example, a “désir” (Sartre 1943a: 123). And this is the foundation of Sartre’s dialectics of existence: 1) being is, 2) nothingness (born from the appearance of a concrete body with a characteristic structure) appears with the coming of the pour-soi, and that nothingness projects its goals (imagination) and 3) by means of action with contingence (body) it acts to change the world and itself in giving a new meaning to situation and existence. As we can clearly see, it is just the contrary to Hegel’s idealistic dialectics.

All human life is, therefore, a search for an impossible synthesis of pour-soi and en-soi — intentionality already indicates this “fuite” or evasion, as we have seen in Chapter 2 — in which the former tries to be the proper foundation. It is a synthesis that cannot be realized and this causes “malheur” (Sartre 1943a: 127), in the sense that we experience it as an “absence, irréalisable” (Sartre 1943a: 127). But this search, which connects us with our project and reveals the world to us, also gives us a

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75 Noudelman (1996) also highlights this image to indicate Sartre’s concept of nothingness.
value: “la valeur est par delà l’être” (Sartre 1943a: 129) and we can think of it as a thing “solidifiée, figée en en-soi” (Sartre 1943a: 130), an ontological metaphor that puts us in an intellectual space in which we can see values and ideas as things. But, really, values and possible options are born out of “décompression” (Sartre 1943a: 133) and they exist and are experienced as a process — half presence but half absence, too — not as a thing.

Once more on temporality, Sartre says that past is “arrière” (Sartre 1943a: 146), connected to possession or “avoir à être”; it is en-soi, as are all the things in the world; it has a “densité compacte” (Sartre 1943a: 153); it has the “lourde plenitude d’être” (Sartre 1943a: 152). But we can go back to it from a distance in order to give a new meaning to it. “Le passé c’est la substance” (Sartre 1943a: 154) and it is “hors de portée” (Sartre 1943a: 155). We can see, only by these short phrases that the metaphor which invites us to see time as a kind of space is really present in Sartre's thinking. The present, on the other hand, is “pour-soi” (Sartre 1943a: 156) and “présence” (Sartre 1943a: 156) or “dévoilement” (Sartre 1943a: 245). And finally the future is “par delà” (Sartre 1943a: 162), it shows a series of “vides (ou trous) à remplir” as possible actions. The following Figure 10 tries to show the essential metaphorical expressions that concern the three moments of time:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PASSÉ</th>
<th>PRÉSENT</th>
<th>AVENIR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>essence</td>
<td>pour-soi</td>
<td>par delà</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>arrière</td>
<td>présence</td>
<td>vides à remplir</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Temporality, therefore, is succession, synthesis, motion, distance or order that takes the pour-soi out of itself, or “hors de soi” (Sartre 1943a: 172), as if it were a “diaspora” (Sartre 1943a: 172) or a “manque” (Sartre 1943a: 177).

It is curious that Sartre talks about reflection within the point he makes on temporality, but he justifies it by saying that this is another type of “diaspora” of the pour-soi in the sense that it tries to be “témoin” (Sartre 1943a: 137) and “regardé” (Sartre 1943a: 137) at the same time; it tries to turn itself into another (Sartre 1943a: 190), and this transformation leads to a stalemate or “échec” (Sartre 1943a: 189) because we cannot be totally others for ourselves because our psychic existence is “inerce” (Sartre 1943a: 201): it is seen as a thing but it exists as a process — an idea that we can find, as we have seen in Chapter 2, in Sartre (1936a or 1936b).

Transcendence in the pour-soi is linked to knowledge, and Sartre postulates that all knowledge has to be intuitive — related to presence,
because, as we have said in Chapter 2, imagination as absence gives no knowledge to us apart from what we ourselves have put into the concrete image. That is to say, discourse and deduction are merely instruments that drive us towards intuition as contact, as presence. As we have seen in the former part, Sartre says that “les descriptions de la connaissance sont trop fréquemment alimentaires” (Sartre 1943a: 223).

He repeats that meaning comes to us from the future in the sense that it now indicates absences as “vides à remplir” (Sartre 1943a: 236) — key idea that we have highlighted all through our work.

Finally, the last “diaspora” of the pour-soi is what Sartre calls “pour-autrui”. In order to eliminate the philosophical possibility of solipsism, Sartre states that we come into existence with experiences like “honte” (Sartre 1943a: 256) that are experienced in a physical way, as an embodied experience or sensations or feeling. The fact that we — unconsciously, at an embodied level — can experience others as other-pour-soi is the simple evidence that solipsism is untenable.

The appearance of the “regard” of others (Sartre 1943a: 292) gives us objectivity and takes us towards a new “desintégration” (Sartre 1943a: 294), “désagrégation” (Sartre 1943a: 294), “arrière-fond” (Sartre 1943a: 294), “fuite” (Sartre 1943a: 295) or “décentration” (Sartre 1943a: 295). This view of others turns us from a “trou” (Sartre 1943a: 295) that “s’écoule” (Sartre 1943a: 295) into a “massivité” (Sartre 1943a: 295),

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76 This existence, as an experience, is given in the form of fluidity, as opposed to the petrification of being-en-soi. Sartre does not like the non-conscious elemental parts of nature such as rocks or roots at all: he thinks that mineral and organic life is a good example of being.
“solidification” (Sartre 1943a: 302) and puts us into a new situation where our being “[nous] échappe” (Sartre 1943a: 304).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POUR-AUTRUI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>désintégration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>désagrégation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>arrière-fond</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fuite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>décentration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>trou</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>s’écoule</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>massivité</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>solidification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>m’échappe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dehors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>s’enliser</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 11. Metaphorical expressions related to the pour-autrui*

The body — another key element in both Sartre’s and Johnson’s systems, as we have seen in Chapter 2 and the element that relates freedom to contingency in action and feeling — is what puts us into contact with both the world and with others. It is the element that leads us to “dévoiler” (Sartre 1943a: 359), it is the “centre de reference” (Sartre 1943a: 359) in our situation that brings into existence our being-in-the-world; it is
“dépassement” (Sartre 1943a: 366), “le corps est le négligé, le «passé sous silence»” (Sartre 1943a: 373), “arrachement” (Sartre 1943a: 373) or “rattachement” (Sartre 1943a: 373) that puts us in relation to ourselves, the world and the others; a figure-ground organization born out of our proper “scission” (Sartre 1943a: 376) in the sense that we live “au-delà” (beyond) ourselves. It is, finally, “toujours le passé” (Sartre 1943a: 391), what we live, exist, experience as either flesh or as a window to the world and to us. So, Nausea has no special status; it is only a way to capture the world and our existence within it. In Sartre’s works after 1948 (Critique de la raison dialectique (1960) being the most important) an “incarnation” (always projected but never achieved) manages to overcome this “manque” that shows the pour-soi from its origin.
Relations with others are, then, “fuite vers” (Sartre 1943a: 402), “poursuivre” (Sartre 1943a: 402), “dehors” (Sartre 1943a: 402) and in specific attitudes such as love (connected in Sartre to sexuality and desire) human reality searches to turn itself into flesh, “s’enliser” (Sartre 1943a: 432). But it is like this not only in the case of love, it is so for all kinds of actions in the world, because actions must be done with the body. And actions are founded on freedom and “la liberté (...) est fondement de toutes les essences” (Sartre 1943a: 482), clearly using the metaphor.

IDEAS ARE CONSTRUCTIONS. Apart from this, “fuite”, “poursuivre”, and

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77 Linked to project, and so, to freedom or pour-soi, because it is a part of it.
78 Linked to contingence, and so, to en-soi, because it is a part of it.
79 It is this metaphor that best shows the relation between imagination, body and world in the sense that incarnation is an action that has to occur through intentionality.
so on, leads us to think of motion along a path, once more, relating Sartre’s ideas to image schemata.

Just as there is a dialectic in our relation to the world there is a dialectic in our relation to others, a dialectic that, born from our bodily existence, causes us to think or imagine, and to show, by means of an action, our feeling with respect to specific others. Once again, we find a dialectics which is materialistic rather than essentialist or idealistic.

Apart from this, freedom — and we continue with the same metaphors— is “rupture néantisante” (Sartre 1943a: 483), breaking contact with being — “plein” (Sartre 1943a: 485) — whilst freedom, as the way for the consciousness to exist, is “vide” (Sartre 1943a: 485), “spontanéité” (Sartre 1943a: 486), “délaissement” (Sartre 1943a: 508).

As we can clearly see all through this chapter, freedom, nothingness, spontaneity, imagination, pour-soi and consciousness are different facets of the same entity and are connected with the same metaphors. Finally, human reality is a series of intentional actions that gives meaning to the world and to itself. It is in this sense that Sartre talks about a “liberté engagée” (Sartre 1943a: 524) in one specific project.

Facticity is what is given to the consciousness in a situation; a situation which is the result of a project in the sense that the pour-soi exists as “échappement” (Sartre 1943a: 530) of the meeting or presence that this original facticity or contingency presupposes.

Contingency is specified by the pour-soi as place (which is created from nothingness, from the future), past, environment, others and death.
All of them can be overcome (that is to say that we can escape from them) by means of a “projet ouvert” (Sartre 1943a: 552).

Death is seen as the point at which we enter “l’autre côté du «mur»” (Sartre 1943a: 576), in clear reference to his literary work. Death is, then, the “empêchement imprévu” (Sartre 1943a: 580), the “absurde” (Sartre 1943a: 584) by means of which we turn into opacity as a being and nothing more than being.

We experience our situation — “être-en-situation” (Sartre 1943a: 593) — as the key point in our existence, because the situation “c'est le sujet éclairant les choses par son dépassement même” (Sartre 1943a: 594) “ou c'est les choses renvoyant au sujet son image” (Sartre 1943a: 594) clearly marking the fact that the existence of the pour-soi is the appearance of a new sphere of being in the en-soi; this new sphere gives order, image, meaning, and so on, to existence in general, and occurs due to the participation of freedom and action of the pour-soi.

Finally, in this work Sartre tries to present his idea of what must be taken as existential psychoanalysis: to take human reality as a “totalité” (Sartre 1943a: 608) and the key point in explaining it is the concept of experience, although nothingness, too, has a central role as we can see in this statement by Sartre: “entre l’en-soi néanti et l’en-soi projeté, le pour-soi est néant” (Sartre 1943a: 611), nothingness in the sense that imagination, as a place of decision-making, presenting possibilities, evaluating, etc. is just a “néant”. But we have to return to reality by means of action (the transitive function of “doing” is evident here) in order to confront the situation and achieve the “being” or “having” which has been
projected. And it is this continual action that allows us to understand the qualities of the world, qualities we understand logically in a symbolic or metaphorical way because they always refer to certain experiences in our existence.

The conclusion of the work offers us a brief account of the moral and metaphysical perspectives of the ideas presented throughout the book. We simply refer to it as the image that best summarizes the presentation of the pour-soi: “(le pour-soi) il est comme un trou au sein de l’être” (Sartre 1943a: 665).

It is clear, as we have seen, that Sartre bases his ontological categories (phenomenological-ontological, to be precise) on his intuitions and feelings about the world, using solidity to describe what he feels to be the opposite of existence and using gaseous properties to describe what he feels to be freedom and existence.

3.3. Concluding remarks

Following Lakoff and Johnson (1999) we have shown that Jean-Paul Sartre’s philosophical system is founded in a several metaphors all of them connected to physical experiences that are important for him in the sense that they exemplify his thoughts and feelings in the light of the phenomenological-ontological concepts of être and néant. These metaphors are extended from one correlation of concepts to another always respecting the image schemata implied by the physical or emotional experience that are the basis of the first metaphors, those
related to anguish and nausea (from the point of view of bodily experiences) or to perception and imagination (from the point of view of psychological faculties).

The fact that we now know the metaphors which are the foundation of Sartre’s system does not devalue it, because, as we know, all abstract systems are constructed on the basis of physical interaction with the world via metaphors, image schemata and qualities which emerge by means of our action in the world in a specific, individual situation.

Sartre’s system is as valuable, or not, as it was before revealing the central metaphors that he bases it on. But now we are more prepared to judge it because we know not only the categories of the system but also the pre-categories from which the whole system is born.
Conclusions

At the beginning of this dissertation we fixed two related but different goals: to explore Johnson’s system to compare it with Sartre’s and to apply Lakoff and Johnson’s Conceptual Metaphor Theory to Sartre’s philosophy, in particular as it appears in his most important work: Sartre (1943a) *L'être et le Néant*.

Because of this double aim we have divided the work into three parts: in the first part we have analyzed Johnson’s works written with Lakoff in order to shed light upon the central pieces of their Conceptual Metaphor Theory: metaphor is a matter of thought more than simply a question of language; metaphor is based on our physical interaction with the world and that it is projected from this direct experience onto other kinds of experiences (more abstract and general) by means of image schemata; metaphor appears in a lot of experiences and among them it is necessary to include philosophical thought. Also in this first part we examined the most important criticisms and reformulations of Lakoff and Johnson’s theory.

With these key ideas in mind, in the second part we have centered our attention on the works by Johnson and Sartre in order to ascertain the most important similarities and differences between them. After analyzing their most important works we have noted that they differ in the central fact that Sartre still presents a duality in the human nature between mind and body (although Sartre states that this duality is theoretical rather than real because the human being exists as a unity) which Johnson does not
uphold at all. In spite of this, and the fact that both systems were born at different historical moments and in different places and are influenced by different philosophical systems, they hold a lot of points in common:

1) Sartre establishes a dialectic between consciousness and the world which surrounds it. It is described in the form of understanding, just as Johnson also talks of the movement which understanding presupposes in “establishing a world” or “having a world” with meaning. It is this meaning which is given in both cases through a body in its situation, a situation in which it acts intentionally.

2) The role of imagination (despite the evident differences since Sartre does not postulate image schemata in his own theory) is the same for both of them: to give rise to concepts, to categorization and to abstraction; that is to say, to allow understanding and, therefore, meaning. The difference between both is that Johnson speaks of metaphor and Sartre of images, but the similarity we find in the following statements is more than revealing:

   a) Lakoff & Johnson (1980 [reed. 2003]: 239): “metaphors are not merely things to be seen beyond. In fact, one can see beyond them only by using other metaphors”.

   b) Sartre (1940 [reed. 1948]: 150): “la compréhension est un mouvement qui se s'achève jamais, c'est la réaction de
l’esprit à une image par une autre image, à celle-ci par une autre image et ainsi de suite, en droit, jusqu’à l’infini”.

3) In both authors we find support for the pre-reflexive level of understanding, since in the main we are so concerned about activity that we treat both knowledge and experience at this level. One of the bases of Philosophy in the Flesh (Lakoff & Johnson 1999: 3) is precisely that “thought is mostly unconscious.” Sartre, for his part, and in much the same way, presents an essential difference between the pre-reflexive and the reflexive level throughout his works (Sartre 1940, 1936b, 1948b etc.). This is a difference which accounts for self-reference — the fact that consciousness of one thing (intentionality) is always unreflexively consciousness of itself. It is similar to the difference that Sartre establishes between consciousness (unreflexive) and knowledge (reflexive).

4) In all his texts Johnson highlights the importance of emotion, stating that we cannot oppose it intellectually and that, in reality, this emotion forms part of the creation of the meaning of the world and that it is one of the foundations of our understanding — we refer to Johnson (2007: chapter 3). In this sense, the appearance of Damasio in Johnson’s texts (even those written together with Lakoff) are fundamental. For example, Johnson (2007: 14) tells us that “reason and emotion are inextricably intertwined”. Sartre, for his part, proposes an analysis of emotion from the phenomenological point of view in Sartre (1939a), a work which formed part of a projected more extensive work which was going to be entitled
Psyché. Subsequently, in Sartre (1940) emotion was to have a highly important role linked to the imagination, and thus to the process of understanding. On the other hand, finally, Sartre (1943) also highlighted the role of emotion as fundamental for human existence.

5) Apart from the concept of intentionality (central to both authors as we have stated earlier), both also point out the fact that meaning is always true for someone (a criticism of radical objectivism) and that, therefore, objectivity is seen as a community, including, as we have seen, objectivity in respect to morality.

6) Both assert their own philosophy as research towards a third way, a midway term between absolute objectivism and subjectivism or relativism (an individual’s romantic vision and imagination or postmodernism). Johnson speaks of experientialism, of experientialist synthesis, incarnate realism or experientialist realism. Sartre was to give a name to his system which would become fashionable and, as an adjective would often allow an understanding of concepts, his own system does not explain: existentialism.

Finally, the third chapter is devoted to Sartre’s metaphors. That is to say, to the metaphors that form the basis of his system as presented in his most important work (and the most important work of existentialism): Sartre’s (1943a) *L’être et le Néant.*
Before examining these metaphors we centre our attention on what Sartre says about metaphors in his works. Thanks to this analysis, we have seen that Sartre considers that metaphor must play a central role in philosophy because we tend to explain (as Lakoff and Johnson also say) mental concepts by using physical concepts.

In order to obtain a clear vision of the metaphors that appear in Sartre (1943a) in reference to being, nothingness, pour-soi, en-soi, pour-autrui, time, and so on, we have chosen the metaphors that we can find in Sartre’s earlier works in reference to perception and imagination. We have seen that these metaphors are the same as those we find in Sartre (1943a) in reference to ontological concepts.

From the beginning of Sartre (1943a), he refers to two spheres of being that are opposed and defined little by little in order to show their differences. Being (être) is defined as "positivité" (Sartre 1943a [reed. 1996]: 12), as act (as opposed to potentiality). Initially, Sartre states (Sartre 1943a [reed. 1996]: 14) that this being is given to us in form of emotions or affectivity, tied evidently, to bodily sensations (disgust, nausea, and so on). The only essence of this being is the form of its appearance, an appearance which implies opacity as condition of discovery. It is, then, "passivité" (Sartre 1943a [reed. 1996]: 24), relativity, "rempli de lui-même" (Sartre 1943a [reed. 1996]: 32), "opaque" (Sartre 1943a [reed. 1996]: 32), because "l'être est partout" (Sartre 1943a [reed. 1996]: 28). Contrary to this idea, consciousness is presented by Sartre as an entity with no content that creates its self-being. It is not substantial, it
is a "vide total" (Sartre 1943a [reed. 1996]: 23). Conscious acts are "tout activité" and "tout spontanéité" (Sartre 1943a [reed. 1996]: 25), "translucidité" and "transcendance" (Sartre 1943a [reed. 1996]: 28).

The central concepts in the book (which are present in the title) are presented throughout the work using the same metaphors related to solid existence and gaseous existence, as we can see in the following figure:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ÉTRE</th>
<th>NÉANT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>passivité</td>
<td>vide total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rempli</td>
<td>activité</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>opaque</td>
<td>spontanéité</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>partout</td>
<td>translucidité</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>plein</td>
<td>transcendance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no-dehors</td>
<td>evanescence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Trou</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 13. Metaphorical expressions for être et néant*

Following this presentation of the two classical spheres of reality (being and consciousness) Sartre defines his approximation to forms of existence or being, and he presents both kinds of reality with the names: "être-en-soi" and "être-pour-soi". And continuing the metaphors that have guided

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80 This "vide total" is related to nothingness and nothingness is related to imagination in all Sartre’s works. For example, in Sartre (1972: 794) he says “imaginaire et Néant: une seule chose”, as highlighted by Noudelman (1996).

81 As Noudelman (1996) says, the image of "trou" is the most important in order to explain the appearance of the the pour-soi in the en-soi.
the previous analysis he says that the *en-soi* is "massif" (Sartre 1943a [reed. 1996]: 32), "pleine positivité" (Sartre 1943a [reed. 1996]: 33), "contingence" (Sartre 1943a [reed. 1996]: 33). And, according to Sartre, that is all we can say about the *en-soi*, and the rest of the book is devoted to *pour-soi* and the relation between both spheres of existence.

There are, therefore, two "régions" (Sartre 1943a [reed. 1996]: 57) in reality, and the *pour-soi* is the "être qui fait éclore le néant dans le monde" (Sartre 1943a [reed. 1996]: 58), because "l'homme est l'être par qui le néant vient au monde" (Sartre 1943a [reed. 1996]: 59) because he can put himself "en dehors de l'être" (Sartre 1943a [reed. 1996]: 59) — and we can see that "éclore", "vient" and "en dehors" make us think of space — in the sense that he has (or, at best, he is) freedom, which is nothing more that the "être de la réalité-humaine" (Sartre 1943a [reed. 1996]: 60), which in itself has no essence, because it is "arrachement à soi" (Sartre 1943a [reed. 1996]: 60), separation that we can experience as question or doubt, for example.

This "arrachement" of the consciousness is defined next by Sartre as "décrochage" (Sartre 1943a [reed. 1996]: 62), "coupure" (Sartre 1943a [reed. 1996]: 62), “séparation” (Sartre 1943a [reed. 1996]: 62) or “décollement” (Sartre 1943a [reed. 1996]: 62), all of them ontological and structural metaphors that we can imagine in terms of space. And the typical form that this "arrachement" from us as, seen as a freedom or nothingness, takes on is “angoisse” (Sartre 1943a [reed. 1996]: 64).

And Sartre constructs his system in this way by using the same metaphors to refer to different concepts that take the same reality as a
reference: first we can refer to pour-soi, nothingness, imagination, freedom and consciousness; and next to en-soi, being, body, perception and contingency.

As we have seen, it is so clear that Sartre bases his ontological categories (phenomenological-ontological, in order to be exact) on his intuitions and feelings in the world. He assigns solidity to what he feels to be the opposition to existence and gaseous properties to what he feels to be freedom and existence. And to the combination of both the qualities, a mixture of solidity and gas that he assigns viscosity, a physical experience he particularly hated.

This third and last chapter in the dissertation has been useful to us in the sense that we have discovered the key metaphors that underlie Sartre’s existentialism and we have also seen that the key ideas by Lakoff and Johnson (1999) are really true in the case of another philosophical system, in this case: existentialism.
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