Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona

Strategy-making in the era of intergovernmentalism: The policy-making processes of the European Security Strategy (2003) and the EU Global Strategy (2016)

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PhD Thesis

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"The process [...] is as important as the outcome"

Federica Mogherini
High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission
Towards an EU Global Strategy - Background, Process, References
EU Institute for Security Studies
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AGRAÏMENTS

Aquesta és una tesi doctoral a cavall entre l'acadèmia i les dinàmiques polítiques de l'acció exterior europea. És fruit dels anys en què he pogut viure de prop el policy-making europeu i de l'esforç de traslladar aquestes vivències a l'àmbit de la recerca. Per aquest motiu, són moltes les persones que, a un costat i l'altre, el de la reflexió i el de l'acció, han contribuït al meu desenvolupament en esferes que sovint semblen incommensurables.

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CONTENTS

SUMMARY

The EU is seen as a body increasingly ruled by intergovernmentalism. Member states are portrayed as the winners of a power contest with supranational institutions, which have been marginalised in critical decisions of European politics. Following up on the traditional intergovernmental-supranational debate, new intergovernmentalism has captured this trend and inaugurated a renewed interest on the nature of European integration in the literature.

The central premise of this theory is that, since the Maastricht Treaty, member states have taken the reins of European integration and sidelined supranational institutions in setting the pace and direction of current policy developments. It also assumes that the institutions where member states are represented are at the centre of these dynamics, with the European Council acting as the catalyst of integration and the Council becoming the central decision-making institution. When delegation of power occurs, new intergovernmentalism understands that member states make use of *de novo* bodies such as the EEAS to provide support to their initiatives, but not to exercise leadership.

Most scholarly contributions to new intergovernmentalism have analysed the dynamics of the Economic and Monetary Union and the EU security and defence policies. However, there is an analytical gap in the literature, which this thesis aims to address, in applying new intergovernmentalism to hybrid areas of activity such as external action. In here, the Lisbon Treaty has brought together the supranational external relations of the European Commission and the intergovernmental CFSP/CSDP, in the hands of member states, for the purpose of policy coherence. The Treaty has also put forward remarkable institutional innovations such as the EEAS and created the position of the HR/VP, giving it a formal right of initiative.

This research aims to contrast the main assumptions of new intergovernmentalism against the policy-making dynamics generated by the Lisbon Treaty. To do so, it uses the policy-making processes of EU strategies as a way to illustrate the inter-

institutional relations in CFSP and external action. The case studies of this research are the European Security Strategy (2003), adopted under the former pillar system and in the realm of the CFSP, and the EU Global Strategy (2016), the first post-Lisbon strategy covering the whole of external action. The study of the policy-making processes of strategies -an empirical gap in the literature in itself- is performed by breaking down strategy-making into four different phases: agenda-setting, policy formulation, policy output and implementation.

The results of this research show an increased role of Brussels-based institutions in strategy-making. This trend can be traced back to the ESS, which inaugurated a novel policy-making mode based on institutionalised intergovernmentalism, whereby HR Solana and the Council Secretariat centralised the strategy-making process. This came as a consequence of Solana's strong activism and the partial delegation of initiative by member states, setting up a highly institutionalised policy formulation process in a prominently intergovernmental policy area, the CFSP.

This novel policy-making mode is further reinforced in the EUGS, where the HR/VP has become the policy entrepreneur of a new strategy-making process. Making full use of her right of initiative, Mogherini has shaped the process and the contents of the new strategy, in the benefit of a "whole of EU" approach to external action. The centrality of the HR/VP and the EEAS has resulted in a process of autonomy in intergovernmentalism, where the EUGS has become the vehicle for subsequent implementation initiatives.

In sum, this research nuances central aspects of new intergovernmentalism regarding the predominance of member states in current integration dynamics, arguing that the shift from CFSP to external action has fundamentally strengthened the capacity of *de novo* bodies to lead and shape policy initiatives.

RESUMEN

Cada vez más, la UE parece regirse por el intergubernamentalismo. Los estados miembros han ganado la batalla a las instituciones supranacionales, marginadas en la toma de decisiones en asuntos clave de la agenda europea. El nuevo intergubernamentalismo recoge esta tendencia y renueva el interés sobre la naturaleza de la integración europea, a la vez que supone la continuación del tradicional debate entre intergubernamentalismo y supranacionalismo.

Esta teoría argumenta que, desde el Tratado de Maastricht, los estados han tomado las riendas de la integración europea, dejando de lado a las instituciones. También considera que las instituciones en las que los estados miembros están representados se encuentran en el centro de estas dinámicas, con el Consejo Europeo actuando como catalizador de la integración y el Consejo siendo la institución central en la toma de decisiones. Cuando se delegan poderes, el nuevo intergubernamentalismo entiende que los estados utilizan organismos como el SEAE para apoyar sus iniciativas, aunque éstos carecen de liderazgo.

La mayor parte de las contribuciones al nuevo intergubernamentalismo han analizado la Unión Económica y Monetaria y la política de seguridad y defensa de la UE. Esta tesis, en cambio, cubre un vacío analítico sobre su uso en áreas híbridas como la acción exterior. Con el objetivo de aumentar la coherencia, el Tratado de Lisboa ha aunado las relaciones exteriores -supranacionales y pertenecientes a la Comisión Europea- con la PESC y la PCSD -intergubernamentales y en manos de los estados miembros. El Tratado también ha instaurado importantes novedades institucionales como el SEAE y la AR/VP, dotándola del derecho de iniciativa.

Esta investigación contrasta las asunciones del nuevo intergubernamentalismo con las dinámicas políticas generadas por Lisboa. Para ello, utiliza el proceso de toma de decisiones de las estrategias para ilustrar las relaciones inter-institucionales en la PESC y la acción exterior. Sus estudios de caso son la Estrategia Europea de Seguridad (2003) -adoptada bajo el antiguo sistema de pilares y en el marco de la

PESC- y la Estrategia Global de la UE (2016) -la primera estrategia post-Lisboa y que cubre la totalidad de la acción exterior. El estudio del proceso de formulación de las estrategias -en sí mismo un vacío empírico en la literatura- se realiza mediante el análisis en cuatro fases: la definición de la agenda, el proceso de elaboración, los resultados y la implementación.

Los resultados de la investigación muestran un refuerzo de las instituciones de Bruselas en ambas estrategias. Esta tendencia nace con la EES, cuya novedosa elaboración se basó en el intergubernamentalismo institucionalizado, en el cual el Alto Representante y la Secretaría General del Consejo centralizaron el proceso de elaboración. Ello se debió al activismo de Solana y a la delegación parcial de la iniciativa por parte de los estados miembros, obteniendo como resultado un proceso de elaboración altamente institucionalizado en un área preeminentemente intergubernamental, la PESC.

Este proceso se refuerza con la EGUE, en la que la AR/VP ha sido el motor de su elaboración. Haciendo uso del derecho de iniciativa, Mogherini ha ejercido una alta influencia en el proceso y los contenidos de la EGUE para reforzar la concepción global de la acción exterior. La centralidad de la AR/VP y el SEAE son muestra de mayor autonomía en el intergubernamentalismo y la EGUE se ha convertido en el vehículo para la implementación de iniciativas posteriores.

Esta investigación matiza aspectos centrales del nuevo intergubernamentalismo referentes al predominio de los estados en las dinámicas actuales de la integración y argumenta que el paso de la PESC a la acción exterior ha reforzado la capacidad de los nuevos organismos para liderar y delinear los contornos de nuevas iniciativas políticas.

LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES

LIST OF ACRONYMS

CARD	Coordinated Annual Review on Defence
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
COREPER	Committee of Permanent Representatives of the Governments of the Member States to the European Union
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
DG	Directorate General
DG RELEX	Directorate General for External Relations of the European Commission
DGE	Directorate General for External and Politico-Military Affairs of the General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union
ECHO	European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations of the European Commission
EDAP	European Defence Action Plan
EEAS	European External Action Service
EPC	European Political Cooperation
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
ESS	European Security Strategy
EU	European Union
EUGS	European Union Global Strategy
EUISS	European Union Institute for Security Studies
FAC	Foreign Affairs Council
GAC	General Affairs Council
GAERC	General Affairs and External Relations Council

GRI	Inter-Institutional Relations Group of the European Commission
HR	High Representative of the Union for Foreign Policy and Security Policy
HR/VP	High Representative of the Union for Foreign Policy and Security Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission
IPSD	Implementation Plan on Security and Defence
MPCC	Military Planning and Conduct Capability
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
PESCO	Permanent Structured Cooperation
POCs	Points of Contact
PSC	Political and Security Committee
QMV	Qualified Majority Voting
RIESS	Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy
TEU	Treaty on European Union
TFEU	Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION: RESEARCH PLAN, METHODOLOGY AND OUTLINE OF THE THESIS

1.1. Strategy-making in the era of intergovernmentalism

It is a truism these days that the European Union (EU) is a body increasingly ruled by intergovernmentalism. Member states are often portrayed as the winners of a power contest with supranational institutions, which have been marginalised in critical decisions of European politics. Some authors trace the predominance of intergovernmentalism all the way back to the Maastricht Treaty, which institutionalised the pillar structure of the EU. Fabbrini (2015: 125) has written:

> "post-Maastricht intergovernmentalism has recognized that integration should proceed without (...) going in the supranational direction. On the contrary, integration should consist in pooling national sovereignties within intergovernmental institutions. The decision-making power should not be in the hands of each member state, but in those of the institutions that coordinate the action of the member state governments (the European Council and the Council)".

This trend towards an intergovernmental Union has been reinforced with the dynamics of a crisis-ridden EU. Member states have taken the reigns of crisis management, in particular since the Euro crisis. Decision-making centred on the Council has turned the European Commission into "little more than a secretariat" and side-lined the European Parliament (Schmidt 2013: 2, see also Dinan 2011). Member states have established dynamics based on "hard intergovernmental bargaining and brinkmanship", where positive-sum outcomes have often disappeared (Schimmelfennig 2015b, see also Fabbrini 2013).

This has come to the advantage of the most powerful member states, particularly Germany, who is now at the centre of European power dynamics. Together with Berlin, the rest of EU capitals have adapted to the renationalisation dynamics and reasserted the "supremacy" of the nation-state in European politics

(Schimmelfennig 2015b, Grygiel 2016). This has created a power asymmetry, not only between creditor and debtor countries but also between states and institutions, which are not a principal agent of European politics anymore (Torreblanca 2014: 96-105).

External action has been no stranger to these dynamics. The crisis in the Eurozone has had implications for both the foreign policy of the EU and its member states (Youngs 2014, Kudnani 2016). The current EU governance has reinforced the intergovernmental dynamics of an intergovernmental policy *par excellence* - the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The prioritisation of national interests has also reduced the states' willingness to coordinate their foreign policies (Youngs 2014: 40) and enhanced the lead of the "big three" - thus making some member states "more equal than others" in a system ruled by unanimity (Lehne 2012). Following this logic, the power of the intergovernmental institutions of the EU, in particular the European Council and the Council, where foreign policy is designed, debated and decided, is assumed to have expanded (Lehne 2015).

Yet against this background, a closer look at recent external action developments seems to suggest different dynamics. This thesis aims to demonstrate that the shift towards intergovernmentalism is not so straightforward when analysing the policy-making process of the most decisive external action document since the Lisbon Treaty and the implementation policies that unfold from it. The European Union Global Strategy (EUGS), presented in June 2016 (EEAS 2106a), reveals a strengthened centrality of Brussels-based bodies, particularly the office of the EU High Representative/Vice-president of the European Commission (HR/VP) and the European External Action Service (EEAS) during the inception, drafting, output and implementation phases of this document.

In order to assess the changes brought about by the Lisbon Treaty in the field of external action, the policy-making process of the EUGS will be compared to the one of the European Security Strategy (ESS), adopted in 2003, before the Lisbon era. This comparative analysis will enable the assessment of the empowered role of Brussels-based institutions when devising a new strategy for the whole of the

Union. It will be argued that the increased leadership and initiative capacities of the HR/VP and the EEAS are key to understand the turning point that the Lisbon Treaty represents in the field of external action policy-making.

In addition to the empirical study at the policy level, this thesis also has a strong interest in understanding the evolution of current dynamics of European integration. The academic literature is currently experiencing a revival of studies on the path of European integration, after decades of scrutiny of particular EU policies. The "pragmatic turn" of the late 1970s led to a progressive shifting from "ontological questions about the nature of the EU to studying individual institutions and policy areas" (Bickerton 2012). Studies on the "nature of the beast" were substituted by specific accounts on particular EU policies, leaving aside rich discussions on the theories of European integration, to the point that "a policy-making focus [became] a coward's way out of a theoretical dilemma" (Webb 1977, in Bickerton 2012).

However, a series of developments have renewed the interest in theorising European integration. On the one hand, institutional reform from Maastricht to Lisbon has witnessed a progressive refinement of the working methods of EU institutions and member states that requires a new appraisal on how decisions are made. As this thesis will argue, this is particular relevant for the international relations of the EU and the shift from the Maastricht pillar structure (which put foreign policy and external relations in different pillars) to the Lisbon's external action. On the other hand, the recent crises suffered by the EU have also increased the interest of EU scholars to "return theories of European integration to the debate about EU's future" (Moravcsik 2016)[1].

[1] As it will be further specified in Chapter 3, external action will be understood in this thesis as a policy that integrates the EU's external relations and the CFSP. While the EU's external relations include those policies and instruments traditionally in the hands of the European Commission and formerly under the first pillar of the European communities, foreign policy refers to the CFSP and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), formerly in the second pillar, where member states prevail. The Lisbon Treaty eliminated the pillar structure and created a single external action, as provided by Title V of the Treaty of the European Union. However, specific provisions still apply to external relations and foreign policy, with the first ones dominated by European institutions and the second still ruled by intergovernmentalism and the predominance of the Council of the EU.

As Tortola (2015) argues, "the euro crisis has brought integration theory back to the top of the scholarly agenda" (see also Fabbrini 2015). A series of academic works aim today to analyse particular policy developments, shedding light into recent developments in EU integration and the crises of the European project. These works range from the study of the "incomplete nature of European integration" as revealed by the euro crisis (Jones, Kelemen and Meunier 2015) to the theoretical debates behind the EU's immigration and asylum policies (Andersson 2015), to name just two areas particularly affected by recent crises.

The interest to go back to the foundational debates of European integration has been particularly remarkable in the intergovernmentalist school of thought. New intergovernmentalism (departing from Bickerton, Hodson and Puetter 2015a) is currently building a theoretical architecture on which several EU policies can be tested. It assumes that, since the Maastricht Treaty, the EU is dominated by an "integration paradox", whereby there is a "tendency towards European integration without supranationalism" (Bickerton, Hodson and Puetter 2015b). Traditional supranational institutions are not given additional powers and any effort to advance in European integration follows the lead of member states.

As a consequence, the European Council has become the "catalyst of integration" (Puetter and Fabbrini 2016:634), with the Council acting as the main body for coordinating policies (Puetter 2014:Ch4). New intergovernmentalism also understands that *de novo* bodies such as the EEAS are the vehicle for coordinating the activities and resources of member states, but not policy initiators (Puetter 2014:Ch.1). The dynamics of new intergovernmentalism, which can be seen as the follow-up to the traditional debate between intergovernmentalism and supranationalism as the two main modes of EU policy-making, are present in all phases of the policy cycle (Puetter 2014:Ch.2).

So far, the literature has used new intergovernmentalism to study policies that are closer to intergovernmental practices. This is the case for the Economic and Monetary Union since the Euro crisis and the foreign, security and defence policies (Howarth and Quaglia 2015, Glencross 2016, Smith 2015, Amadio Viceré 2016).

But fewer efforts have been made to apply new intergovernmentalism in what can be named "hybrid policy areas" such as external action, which brings together the intergovernmental policies of the CFSP and the CSDP and the Commission-led external relations for the purpose of policy coherence.

This thesis will build on the theoretical debate between intergovernmentalism and supranationalism and new intergovernmentalism, contextualising it within recent institutional developments in foreign policy and external action. In addition to returning to ontological debates about the nature of European integration, this thesis will pay close attention to internal dynamics in these policy areas as a way to depict the relationships between EU institutions and member states, understanding that "process is as important as outcome" (Smith, M. 2015:300). This is in line with the studies on the system and practices of external action, which pay close attention to internal dynamics as a way to calibrate the relationship between EU institutions and member states (Bickerton 2015). In the domain of external action, Lequesne (2015:363) reminds us that "practice theory" is indeed essential for "capturing the relationship between the actions (decisions, policies, etc.) and the agents".

So combining an interest in the dynamics of European integration and the specific practices therein, this thesis will use new intergovernmentalism in policy areas where it has not yet been applied. Indeed, if new intergovernmentalism aims at explaining the dynamics of European integration since the Maastricht Treaty, it should be able to provide a careful diagnosis of the policy-making dynamics in foreign policy and external action, both prior and after the Lisbon Treaty. At the same time, it should also serve the purpose of better understanding the traditional debate between intergovernmental and supranational dynamics in these policy areas.

A departing assumption of this thesis will be that the institutional innovations of the Lisbon Treaty have fundamentally altered the policy-making dynamics in external action after the Lisbon Treaty. This has raised fears of the supranationalisation of a traditionally intergovernmental policy - the EU's CFSP

(Morillas 2011) and brought back to the centre of institutional debates on external action the traditional divide between supranationalism and intergovernmentalism (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008), in line with the abovementioned return of scholarly discussions on the nature of European integration.

The empirical analysis of this thesis will build on these discussions to assess the policy-making dynamics in foreign policy and external action through the making of EU strategies. EU strategies will be understood as "a policy-making tool which, on the basis of the values and interests of the EU, outlines the long-term overall policy objectives to be achieved and the basic categories of instruments to be applied to that end" (Biscop and Andersson 2008:3). As a source of policy inspiration, the study of EU strategies will serve the double purpose of shedding light into the policy-making dynamics of particular policies (foreign policy in the case of the ESS and external action in the case of the EUGS) and to read these dynamics against broader debates of European integration such as the new intergovernmentalism. As it is the case for the lack of use of this theory in external action, the policy-making of EU strategies is also an under-developed field of study.[2]

The study of the policy-making process of EU strategies will be divided into 4 different phases, all of them paying close attention to the inter-institutional dynamics and the relationship between member states and Brussels-based institutions therein. These phases are agenda-setting, where the inception of a policy takes place, policy formulation, policy output and implementation. Particular attention will be paid, mostly in the case of the EUGS, to this last phase, where several advances have been made in the field of security and defence policies and resilience building. Specific follow-up in the form of a roadmap for implementing the EUGS has tamed a traditional criticism on foreign policy strategies, which accuses them of lacking practical impact. The implementation of the EUGS has also provided further evidence on the capacity of strategies to act as policy inspiration tools.

[2] With the exceptions provided, to an extent, by Bailes (2005) and Tocci (2016a, 2017a, 2017b).

To sum up, this thesis aims to address two specific gaps in the literature on EU integration dynamics and specific policy-making practices. On the one hand, it will contribute to the discussions on the intergovernmental-supranational debate in EU foreign policy and external action and will fill a gap in the existing literature on the use of new intergovernmentalism in the field of external action. On the other, the empirical interest of this thesis will be based on the analysis of the policy-making processes of the ESS and the EUGS, considering both documents as milestones for the strategic thinking of the EU.

1.2. Research questions and hypotheses

As already introduced, the aim of this thesis is to assess the policy-making process of the two strategic documents of the EU (the ESS and the EUGS) in light of the emergence of new intergovernmentalism and its contextualisation in the institutional debates in foreign policy and external action, so before and after the Lisbon Treaty. To this end, the analysis undertaken will depart from the following three research questions, covering the overall approach of the study:

Research Question 1 (RQ1): In the framework of the intergovernmental-supranational debate and new intergovernmentalism, how do the policy-making processes of EU strategies reflect CFSP and external action dynamics?

The first research question targets the overall research objective of the study, which is to provide empirical evidence on the changing policy-making dynamics brought about by the Lisbon Treaty and the set-up of EU external action, against current theoretical discussions on new intergovernmentalism and the traditional intergovernmental-supranational debate. The research question introduces the case studies that will be used to assess the policy-making dynamics of foreign policy and external action: the two strategies that the EU has published so far, the ESS and the EUGS. In order to provide a more substantive approach to the research, RQ1 will be unpacked in the following two.

Research Question 2 (RQ2): How has external action, a hybrid policy area, shifted the policy-making dynamics when compared to the CFSP?

This research questions leaves (temporarily) aside theoretical discussions to focus on a key objective of this thesis: to shed light on the evolution of the policy-making dynamics in external action as a consequence of the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. As will be closely analysed in Chapter 3, this thesis considers external action as a "hybrid policy area", integrating the pre-Lisbon policies of external relations -in the hands of the European Commission and thus ruled by supranational procedures- and foreign policy, or CFSP -in the hands of the Council and thus ruled by intergovernmentalism. This thesis considers that the drafters of the Lisbon Treaty created this hybrid policy area and reinforced the powers of institutions such as the HR/VP and the EEAS for the purpose of horizontal and institutional coherence.

Research Question 3 (RQ3): How do the policy-making processes of the ESS and EUGS reflect the institutional dynamics of CFSP and external action?

The final research question focuses on the ESS and the EUGS as case studies to reflect the policy-making dynamics in foreign policy and external action, so before and after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. It brings back the discussions on the institutional dynamics to the broader debate on the intergovernmental-supranational divide and new intergovernmentalism and thus closes the research motivations put forward in the first research question. This research question enables the provision of empirical relevance to this study, complementing the analysis derived from the two previous questions.

These research questions are to be read alongside the following associated hypothesis (AH).

AH1, related to RQ1:

As a theory of EU integration and a continuation of the intergovernmental-supranational debate, new intergovernmentalism should be a relevant analytical tool for both the CFSP and external action, since it aims at aiming understanding the European integration dynamics since Maastricht. New intergovernmentalism should not apply only to policy areas that are, *per se*, prone to intergovernmental practices (as most applied research in new intergovernmentalism has done so far) but to the policy-making dynamics of all areas of EU activity. This hypothesis is elaborated in Chapter 2.

AH2, related to RQ2:

The emergence of external action has significantly transformed the policy-making dynamics when compared to the CFSP. This is due to the fact that external action brings together the previous intergovernmental and supranational processes of the CFSP and external relations under a single Title V of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), although respecting the intergovernmental provisions of the CFSP. The set-up of the EU's external action can be considered as the major effort in the Treaties to bring about horizontal and institutional coherence. This hypothesis is elaborated in Chapter 3.

AH3, related to RQ3:

The policy-making processes of the CFSP and external action can be assessed through the making of the ESS and the EUGS, which were drafted under two different Treaty configurations: the Nice Treaty (which maintained the pillar structure of Maastricht) and the Lisbon Treaty (which set up the EU's external action). As such, the policy-making processes of EU strategies provide relevant empirical evidence of the inter-institutional dynamics in CFSP and external action. This, in turn, facilitates the discussion of the premises of new intergovernmentalism, taking into account the policy-making dynamics of strategy-making. This hypothesis is elaborated in the empirical sections of this thesis, particularly Chapters 5 and 6.

When read together, the hypotheses of this thesis assume that the drafting process of the ESS and the EUGS show an increased role of Brussels-based institutions, even more so after the Lisbon Treaty and the creation of the position of the HR/VP and the EEAS. This trend disputes some of the central premises of new intergovernmentalism, particularly the increasing influence of member states, the European Council and the Council and the secondary role of *de novo* bodies such as the EEAS in EU policy-making (Puetter 2014).

The shift from traditional Council-based policies (such as foreign policy) to hybrid policy areas where EU institutions play a decisive role (i.e. external action) will be considered a significant development in European integration, not sufficiently assessed in the new intergovernmentalism literature so far. Hence, new intergovernmentalism will be assumed to necessitate additional empirical evidence (as presented in this thesis) if it wants to fully capture the policy-making and institutional dynamics of hybrid areas of activity. The ESS and the EUGS will be considered as relevant documents to that end.

1.3. Research plan, framework for analysis and methodology

1.3.1. Research plan

This thesis will be based on a research plan that will help to go beyond the state of the art in three distinctive ways. First, this thesis will contribute to analytically improve new intergovernmentalism by applying it to an underdeveloped field of study. As previously noted -and further developed in Chapter 2-, new intergovernmentalism has been used so far in policy areas that are mostly characterised by intergovernmental practices. In EU foreign policy, new intergovernmentalism has been applied to CFSP and CSDP, but has not been extensively used in the broader external action after the Lisbon Treaty. By bringing new intergovernmentalism to the study of external action, this thesis will

constitute a "theory improvement" exercise (King, Keohane and Verba 1994:19), thus filling an analytical gap in the literature[3].

In addition, this will shed light into the traditional divide between intergovernmentalism and supranationalism in EU external action, thanks to relevant evidence provided on the interactions between member states and EU institutions, both before and after the Lisbon Treaty. The study of the ESS and the EUGS will unveil the institutional dynamics in CFSP and external action policy-making and, in so doing, will contribute to further elaborate on the intergovernmental-supranational debate in the framework of the current European integration literature.

Second, this thesis will also fill an empirical gap in the literature by analysing the policy-making processes of EU strategies. As presented in Chapter 4, EU strategies have often been studied as a portrait of the strategic culture of the EU or as impact assessment documents, analysing the objectives of the Union at the global stage and the means at its disposal. The study of strategies as a tool to inspire policies is a third and less developed approach, as also are the policy-making processes of these documents.

This thesis considers that the policy-making processes of EU strategies deserve particular attention, as they unveil the institutional dynamics in EU foreign policy and external action. This assumption is present in the minds of policy-makers and scholars. While HR/VP Federica Mogherini (2015:6) has noted that "the process of reflection by a wide range of actors [on the EUGS] is as important as the end product of the exercise itself", Simon Duke affirms that "in strategic terms the journey is almost as important as the destination" (Duke 2017:73).

Hence, the institutional context in which strategies are drafted tells a lot about the *rapport de forces* between member states and institutions, and provides a valid empirical evidence for the purposes of this thesis. The study of the policy-making

[3] King, Keohane and Verba (1994:19) acknowledge that theory-improving exercises must start by choosing "theories that could be wrong", and this is indeed the departing point of the research presented here.

processes of the ESS and the EUGS will help to contextualise current institutional dynamics into broader debates of European integration, since both strategies belong to two different Treaty configurations (the ESS being adopted before the Lisbon Treaty and the EUGS, after).

Third, this thesis will also methodologically contribute to the study of the policy-making processes in foreign policy and external action. As it will be developed in the following section, this thesis will use existing methods in foreign policy analysis and European policy processes to provide an innovative framework for the analysis of strategy-making. This framework will cover all phases of the process, from agenda-setting to implementation. The role of the different actors involved in the policy-making process and their interaction will shed light into the analytical and empirical debates of this thesis.

1.3.2. Framework for the analysis of case studies

The research objectives of this thesis require using a relevant framework for the analysis of the policy-making processes of EU strategies that is simultaneously able to accommodate the theoretical premises of new intergovernmentalism and the intergovernmental-supranational debate. The following framework for analysis has been adapted from relevant literature on foreign policy analysis and European policy processes. Departing from White (2004) and Young (2010), the framework presented here will be applied to the study of the policy-making process of the ESS (Chapter 5) and the EUGS (Chapter 6).

Brian White has provided a framework for the study of the EU as a global actor departing from classical Foreign Policy Analysis tools (White 2004:45). His framework is relevant not only for the study of CFSP but also for wider developments in EU external action, in line with the objectives of this thesis. White places particular emphasis on "actor behaviour as a function of the international institutions or other structures within which actors are located" - instead of focusing on the impact of the EU in world politics (White 2004:45-46). His emphasis on policy-making actors and processes is particularly suited to the

purposes of this thesis, since its aim is to assess the policy-making processes and the inter-institutional relations in the making of the EU's strategic documents, rather than their specific contents.

White's starting point are the six standard Foreign Policy Analysis questions (White 2004:54):

1. Who makes EU foreign policy (i.e. who are the actors making foreign policy)?
2. What is the nature of the European foreign policy process (i.e. what is the process for making policy)?
3. What issues constitute the European foreign policy agenda?
4. What instruments are deployed by European foreign policy?
5. What is the context within which policy is made?
6. What are the outputs generated by the policy process?

Since the aim of this thesis is to assess the policy-making processes of EU strategies, particular attention will be put on the first two questions, related to the actors and policy-making. Less attention will be devoted to questions 3 and 4 on the issues and policy instruments, while the context (question 5) will only be considered insomuch the ESS and the EUGS belong to different legal frameworks, the Nice and the Lisbon Treaties, respectively. Finally, the outputs generated (question 6) will not be understood as the contents of the ESS and EUGS but rather as the form of their adoption and their implementation.

The particular emphasis of this thesis on the policy-making processes of the ESS and the EUGS also requires slightly refining the framework provided by White (2004). In this sense, White's analysis of the processes (question 2 above) requires some unpacking, and this is to be done through the toolbox provided by Young (2010), who applies the analysis of policy-making to European integration at large. Young's aim is to assess the role of the different EU institutions and member states in the EU policy cycle, taking into account their different weight and role in various EU policies. His departing premise is that "policy makes politics" (Young 2010:50), i.e. that the policy-making processes tell a lot about the political dynamics that

characterise the EU system. This thesis will make use of Young's analysis of the European policy process in different phases, which include agenda-setting, policy formulation, policy output and implementation, leaving aside the final evaluation phase (Young 2010:46)[4]:

1. Agenda-setting is the phase dedicated to "deciding what to decide (...), a crucial part of the policy-making process and one that often takes place in a context where there is a great deal of uncertainty" (Young 2010:52). It is related to policy initiative and reveals the "policy framing" - i.e. the way that actors push and present a policy in a way that resonates politically (Young 2010:52).

2. The policy formulation phase is where the drafting of the policy takes place. This phase involves a series of actors who interact at an early stage of the policy-making and can include epistemic communities as "policy networks". These are defined as "sets of formal institutional and informal linkages between governmental and other actors structured around shared if endlessly negotiated beliefs and interests in public policy-making and implementation" (Rhodes 2006:426).

3. The policy output phase is characterised by discussions on "choosing what (not) to do" (Young 2010:55), as well as on the kind of document resulting from the policy-making process. In the analysis of EU strategies, particular attention will be put at the discussions in the different institutions with responsibilities in external action.

4. The implementation phase usually puts emphasis on the way EU regulations are put into practice (transposed to national legislation); how do EU policies transform internal policies in EU member states; and the level of compliance of EU regulations (Young 2010:61-63). However, for the purpose of this thesis, the implementation phase will be understood as the impact that the EU strategic

[4] The reason for this choice is that the EU's strategic documents are not aimed at further legislative development but provide the general guidelines for CFSP and external action

documents have in foreign policy and external action implementation initiatives, and not necessarily the legislative acts that follow.

The use of White and Young's frameworks will be applied in this thesis to depict the policy-making processes of the ESS and the EUGS in order to produce empirical evidence on the current policy-making processes in foreign policy (in the case of the ESS) and external action (in the EUGS).

1.3.3. Methodology

The research of this thesis will use diverse and well-established methodological tools, including process tracing, case studies and qualitative semi-structured interviews. Methodological choices have been made according to the ambition of the research plan and are in line with the purpose to contextualise the debates on new intergovernmentalism into the institutional debates brought about by external action and when compared to the CFSP. The following methods will be used.

a. Process tracing

Collier defines process tracing as "the systematic examination of diagnostic evidence selected and analysed in light of research questions and hypotheses posed by the investigator. [It] can contribute decisively both to describing political and social phenomena" (Collier 2011:823). Since the focus of this thesis is based on the policy-making processes of EU strategies, process tracing appears as the most relevant method to assess the policy formulation process. As noted by Van Evera, "in process tracing, the investigator explores the chain of events or the decision-making process" (Van Evera 1997:64), while George and McKeown (1985:35) observe that this method consists in the tracing of "the decision process by which various initial conditions are translated into outcomes".

The focus on policy-making will require the use of process tracing tools in all stages of the policy formulation process. For each step of strategy-making, the

research will uncover the factors determining the decision-making process and the policy outputs, as well as the role of the different actors and the relations between them. Process tracing will be applied to all the phases of policy-making, as presented above.

The developments during the decision-making process will be considered as explanatory factors of the policy output, in this case the ESS and the EUGS. Process tracing will be mostly based on qualitative semi-structured interviews (more on this method below), although the empirical material gathered in interviews will also be triangulated with documentary analysis from primary sources and secondary literature on the topic analysed.

b. Case studies

Research for this thesis will also be based on case studies. Case studies allow researchers to get a "reasonably good knowledge of nearly all factors influencing a political decision" (Dür 2008a: 563). In this research, case studies will serve the purpose of understanding the policy-making processes that lie behind EU strategies, with the aim to understand CFSP and external action policy-making dynamics and to shed light on the main tenets of new intergovernmentalism. Since new intergovernmentalism has not been applied yet to this field, the selection of these cases also fulfils Van Evera's criteria to select "cases that are poorly explained by existing theories" (Van Evera 1997: 86).

The case studies of this thesis have been selected according to the following criteria. First, their topicality. Both the ESS and the EUGS can be considered the most relevant efforts of the EU so far to think strategically (Biscop 2005, 2015a). In addition, they provide the policy framework and strategic guidelines for further foreign policy and external action developments, so their policy-making reveals the policy-making processes of these areas. EU strategies can thus be considered as useful documents to assess theoretical developments on European integration such as new intergovernmentalism as a follow-up to the intergovernmental-supranational debate.

While the ESS will be considered a relevant document embodying the EU's foreign policy strategy, the EUGS will be understood as the first document specifying the objectives of external action in the post-Lisbon era. The EUGS will also be considered as a representative case study to test the institutional dynamics and policy-making processes in areas where the EEAS and the office of the HR/VP have exercised a decisive leadership. In addition, the ESS and the EUGS belong to different institutional frameworks, which increases their comparability. While the ESS belongs to the Maastricht's "pillar era" and was adopted in the framework of the CFSP, the EUGS has been produced in the Lisbon era, and thus reflects the policy innovations put forward by external action.

The policy-making processes of both the ESS and the EUGS provide relevant empirical evidence for the purposes of this thesis and, as the interviews with officials demonstrated, they can be considered as relevant frameworks to assess the institutional dynamics of the CFSP and external action. Indeed, the study of the policy-making process of the ESS and the EUGS revealed different policy-making dynamics and institutional equilibriums, given the different Treaty configurations in which they were produced.

Having these two cases as a reference of different Treaty configurations has also led the author to discard the Report on the Implementation of the ESS (RIESS) of 2008 (European Council 2008a) as a specific case study. As its title reveals, this document should not be considered as a strategy *per se* but a progress report of the implementation of the ESS, which by 2008 was still the main document of the EU's foreign policy strategy. The fact that the RIESS has been considered as a merely "revised security strategy" (Berindan 2013:403)[5] and the fact that it belongs to the same Treaty configuration as the ESS (so previous to the Lisbon Treaty) have been considered good enough reasons to discard it as a specific case study for this thesis.

[5] Speaking at the EU Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) Annual Conference 2016, the former Director of this Institute, Nicole Gnesotto, characterised the 2008 Review as a "non-event", Paris, 22 April 2016.

In addition to these considerations, which will be further elaborated in Chapter 4, EU strategies have also emerged as a relevant object of study in the fields of EU foreign policy and external action. Special issues in academic journals and monographs have been devoted to them (see for instance Contemporary Security Policy 2016, The International Spectator 2016 and EU Institute for Security Studies 2016, for the EUGS, and Biscop 2005 and Biscop and Andersson 2008 for the ESS). However, as it has been noted above, the literature on EU strategies has so far focused more on their contents rather than their policy-making processes.

To cover this empirical gap in the literature, a decision on the timeframe of the research has been made. While the case study of the ESS enables a full analysis on the overall policy-making process (from its inception to its implementation), the case of the EUGS is different. At the moment of writing, the implementation of the EUGS was still ongoing. The implementation priorities endorsed by the Council signalled the following five priorities for "concrete policy initiatives and action": "strengthening security and defence; investing in the resilience of states and societies to our East and South; developing an integrated approach to conflicts and crises; promoting and supporting cooperative regional orders; and reinforcing a global governance based on international law, including the principles of the United Nations Charter, and the Helsinki Final Act" (Council of the EU 2016c).

At the time of writing, implementation efforts were channelled through the Implementation Plan on Security and Defence (Council of the European Union 2016f) and the Joint Communication on resilience (European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 2017). With the implementation of the EUGS in these and other policy areas being a "moving target", this thesis covers developments until the first year of implementation of the EUGS, bookmarked by the publication of the first EEAS report on the implementation of the EUGS in June 2017 (EEAS 2017a)[6].

[6] The concluding chapter of this thesis will provide indications for further research on other aspects of the implementation of the EUGS, which fall beyond the timeframe of this thesis.

c. Qualitative interviews

For a better understanding of the policy-making processes in the field of foreign policy and external action, a series of qualitative semi-structured expert interviews have been carried out. Qualitative interviews are considered an appropriate methodological tool for the purposes of process tracing. As noted by Collier (2011:824), the description and characterisation of the most relevant steps in the policy-making process permits gaining substantial knowledge on the policy outputs, and qualitative interviews with policy actors provide crucial information regarding this process.

Qualitative interviews also enable researchers to identify the key actors involved in the policy-making process, to analyse the institutional procedures and developments and to carefully examine every relevant phase of the policy-making process. To this end, a careful selection of the officials interviewed has been made, including officials from the EEAS, the European Commission, the Council, the European Council and EU Member States, both in Brussels and in national capitals. Interviewees have been selected on the basis of their position in the EU institutional structure and their field of expertise, covering the case studies of this thesis. The interviews have been used to collect detailed empirical evidence on the policy-making processes and the EU's institutional dynamics during all phases of strategy-making, both for the ESS and the EUGS.

The interviewees have been selected according to their professional position or following the recommendation of other interviewees. Overall, 39 interviews have been conducted. Although the sample is representative of the different EU institutions and member states, the total number of interviews does not cover the totality of the actors involved in the policy-making processes of the ESS and the EUGS. Particularly in the first case, some officials who were active during the process of strategy-making in 2003 could not be reached and others had only partial memories of the policy-making process of this strategy. In some cases, interviews have been complemented with the inputs obtained in conversations at the margins of conferences attended by the author in his capacity as Research

Fellow in European Affairs at the Barcelona Centre for International Affairs (CIDOB).

Most interviews have been conducted in person at the premises of EU institutions, foreign ministries or at the margins of international conferences. A limited number of interviews have been conducted by Skype, and in two cases the interviewees provided further information by email after the interview was conducted. All interviews were conducted under the condition of anonymity in order to allow officials to speak freely. In some cases, interviews were recorded, although the information obtained has been used for the purposes of this research only. The contents of the interviews have been codified in a way that the data used cannot be attributable.

Each interview has been given a number and a list of interviewed officials is available as an annex to this thesis, although the position of each interviewee in the list (sorted alphabetically) does not correspond to the number of the interview. Transcripts of each interview have been produced and they include detailed inputs gathered during the conversations, although not the totality of the words pronounced. Each transcript also includes information on the position held by the official at the time of the drafting of the EUGS and the ESS, his/her position at the time of the interview, the date and place of the interview, its length and the language used. Most interviews took about 30 minutes, with the shortest lasting approximately 12 minutes and the longest, 90 minutes.

The research strategy during the interviews has been based on semi-structured questionnaires. Interviewees were interrupted as little as possible to let them speak freely and openly about their views of the policy-making process. However, a set of questions was prepared in advance. The questions followed all the phases of strategy-making, from agenda-setting, policy formulation, and policy output to implementation. The structure of the interview has been adapted during the meetings following the direction of the conversation, but, overall, questions have focused on the role of member states and EU institutions in all phases of the policy cycle. Particular attention has been devoted to the inter-institutional relations

between the different actors, their initiative and position during the policy-making process and their evaluation of the policy-making process.

A series of additional questions have been asked in order to cover aspects not previously addressed. These questions included an assessment of the debates on coherence during the policy-making process, the internal and external environment affecting the process of strategy-making, a scenario-based question on what would the interviewee have done differently during the process and recommendations on additional interviewees. Overall, the interviews have become the most relevant research method to collect extremely detailed empirical evidence[7].

The information gathered has also been triangulated with secondary sources (academic and think tank literature on EU strategies, duly referenced in this work) as well as with primary sources, including official documents of EU institutions such as Council Conclusions and other Council-related documents, EEAS documents, speeches of the HR/VP and, in one case, a non-paper facilitated by one of the national diplomats interviewed, treated only for personal use and under the condition of non-disclosure.

Finally, this research has also been based on direct observation of decision-making processes in CFSP and external action, thanks to the author's professional experience in the Spanish Representation to the EU and the Council of the EU (2009-2010). As Deputy Nicolaidis and coordinator of the Political and Security Committee (PSC) during the Spanish Presidency of the Council of the EU, I obtained first-hand experience on the working methods in the Council and the inter-

[7] It is worth mentioning, however, that interviews are also a method with its own set of weaknesses (Fielding 2003). Some interviewees might not be willing to disclose full information, particularly when this involves signalling the failures of the policy-making process or blaming other officials for inadequate or insufficient commitment. Sometimes, the information provided -particularly in a process-tracing exercise- might miss important details of the process as a consequence of a lack of memories, thus providing only partial and perhaps biased information. Of course, this qualitative method of enquiry is also an extremely subjective one. These risks have been mitigated with the conduction of additional interviews and with questions addressing possible loopholes, as well as the triangulation of the data obtained with official documents and sources. Overall, however, the interviews have compensated the lack of access to restricted and confidential documentation, thus providing valuable internal insights into policy-making.

institutional relations in external action. Most of the research undertaken since then and publications such as Morillas (2011) and Morillas (2014) reflect this author's experience in the Brussels machinery and have enabled me to build an extensive network of contacts of particular use for the empirical part of this work and the interviews conducted.

In addition, my position as Research Fellow in European Affairs at CIDOB and a research stay at the Institute of European Studies of the Vrije Universiteit Brussel (VUB) between 17th April and 21st July 2017, have also facilitated my participation in numerous research activities and seminars on the topic of this thesis, while building a relevant network of experts, policymakers and other stakeholders directly involved in EU strategy-making.

1.4. Structure of the thesis

This thesis is divided into two main blocks, in addition to this introduction and the concluding chapter with a reflection on the research results and the avenues for further research. As a reminder, the main object of analysis of this thesis are the policy-making process of the ESS and the EUGS, put in the context of the policy-making dynamics of EU foreign policy and external action, respectively, and read through the premises of new intergovernmentalism. In other words, this thesis uses EU strategies as a tool to assess foreign and external action policy-making dynamics against broader debates in European integration. While the ESS was adopted in the framework of the CFSP, an overwhelmingly intergovernmental policy, the EUGS has been produced under the framework of the Lisbon Treaty and external action, a hybrid policy area including the Commission's external relations.

The first part of the thesis provides the theoretical debate of this thesis and consists of two chapters. Chapter 2 builds on two sets of literature. On the one hand, it first inserts current debates on European integration and external action into the broader discipline of International Relations. Here, theoretical schools of thought such as realism, liberalism and constructivism are transferred to the EU

literature, helping us to understand the origins of intergovernmentalism and supranationalism.

On the other hand, Chapter 2 broadens the theoretical debate to current discussions in EU integration, paying particular attention to the intergovernmental-supranational debate. Intergovernmentalism is considered a follow-up in European integration of the realist school of International Relations and supranationalism, of liberalism. This part of Chapter 2 brings this debate to European integration and external action, and then assesses the emergence of new intergovernmentalism as the latest expression of the intergovernmental-supranational debate. The chapter demonstrates how new intergovernmentalism provides a relevant theoretical debate for this thesis. It questions as well whether new intergovernmentalism is able to explain the dynamics in hybrid areas of activity such as external action, a necessary feature if it aims to become a new theory of European integration.

Chapter 3 complements the previous theoretical debate with an in-depth analysis of the policy-making processes in EU foreign policy, external relations and external action. It provides a terminological clarification on the use of these terms and analyses their evolution in the different Treaty configurations, from Maastricht to Lisbon. The chapter introduces the discussion on coherence as a way to understand why the Lisbon Treaty puts forward institutional innovations such as the position of the HR/VP and the EEAS and analyses the main features of foreign policy, external relations and external action's institutions and practices.

Chapter 4 kick-starts the empirical analysis of this thesis. It starts with the analysis of the debates regarding the capacity of the EU to act strategically and locates EU strategies in the framework of external action, reviewing the different types of strategies that the EU has published so far. The chapter then analyses the purpose of strategies, based on a three-fold categorisation. First, EU strategies are considered to embody the EU's strategic culture, thus acting as a soul-searching exercise to define the EU's position in global affairs. Second, EU strategies can be

analysed under a "means and ends" approach, which unpacks the instruments and objectives of EU foreign policy in the form of a "grand strategy".

Third, and most relevant for the contents of this thesis, EU strategies can be studied as a framework for policy-making[8], acting as documents for policy-inspiration in the field of foreign policy and external action. This chapter provides evidence on the relevance of strategies as case studies, since they can be considered as documents from which specific implementation policies and initiatives emanate. In addition, this chapter shows how the processes of strategy-making reveal broader policy-making dynamics that turn EU strategies into relevant case studies for the study of institutional debates in foreign policy and external action. As such, they are also useful tools to assess current debates on EU integration[9], including new intergovernmentalism.

Chapter 5 and 6 go deeper into the study of the policy-making processes of the ESS and the EUGS, respectively. Both chapters provide an institutional analysis of the policy-making processes of EU strategies, which, in turn, inform broader discussions on European integration dynamics as reflected by the premises of new intergovernmentalism. Both empirical studies make use of the theoretical debate presented in Chapter 2 and the policy-making dynamics of Chapter 3 and are unpacked following the different phases of the policy-making process, from agenda-setting to implementation.

The ESS is a strategy belonging to the former second pillar of the CFSP, so in principle drafted and adopted under the framework of a purely intergovernmental policy. The EUGS, on the contrary, is considered a reflection of the institutional dynamics of the Lisbon Treaty and of a hybrid policy area such as external action. The inter-institutional dynamics in the policy-making of EU strategies are read in light of the premises of new intergovernmentalism as a way to question the presumed direction of EU integration since the Maastricht Treaty.

[8] As noted also by Barbé (2016).
[9] See for instance Vennesson (2010:74) for a similar take.

The final concluding chapter brings together the empirical findings of the previous two chapters and reviews them in light of the research questions and associated hypothesis presented above. It also presents the implications of these empirical findings for the EU integration and external action literatures and signals avenues for further research on the topics covered in this thesis.

Figure 1.1. Summary of the research

Departing considerations

1. The trend towards an intergovernmental EU has become a truism in current integration debates, as reflected by new intergovernmentalism (NI). This theory has revived the traditional debate between intergovernmentalism and supranationalism.

2. The Lisbon Treaty has introduced substantial reforms into two policies traditionally ruled by intergovernmentalism and supranationalism (CFSP and external relations) and created a new hybrid policy area: external action

3. **This thesis analytically and empirically assesses the current debates in European integration and the changing institutional dynamics by exploring the policy-making processes of the ESS (under the CFSP) and the EUGS (under the Lisbon Treaty's external action)**

Research plan

- NI has been used to explain the policy-making dynamics of areas prominently ruled by intergovernmental procedures and has not been applied yet to hybrid policy areas such as external action. This thesis aims to address this analytical research gap.
- The policy-making processes of EU strategies, both the ESS and the EUGS, are an under-developed field of study, so the thesis also addresses this empirical research gap.
- To do so, this thesis departs from the analysis of the policy-making processes of EU strategies, taking into account the institutional frameworks provided by the CFSP and external action. These dynamics are contextualised into broader European integration debates such as the supranational-intergovernmental debate and NI, as reflected in the following research questions and associated hypothesis:

Research Questions (RQ)	Associated Hypothesis (AH)
RQ1: In the framework of the intergovernmental-supranational debate and NI, how do the policy-making processes of EU strategies reflect CFSP and external action dynamics?	***AH1:*** *As a theory of EU integration, NI should provide a relevant theoretical debate for the policy-making dynamics of all areas of activity, including the CFSP and external action.*
RQ2: How has external action, a hybrid policy area, shifted the policy-making dynamics when compared to the CFSP?	***AH2:*** *The emergence of external action has significantly transformed the policy-making dynamics, insomuch it brings together the previous intergovernmental and supranational processes of CFSP and external relations under external action, for the purpose of policy coherence.*
RQ3: How do the policy-making processes of the ESS and EUGS reflect the institutional dynamics of CFSP and external action?	***AH3:*** *The policy-making processes of the ESS and the EUGS provide relevant empirical evidence of the changing dynamics in CFSP and external action, so NI can be discussed taking these dynamics into account.*

Contributions

With regards to the theoretical debate between intergovernmentalism and supranationalism and NI

1. Critically assess the truism of the current reinforcement of intergovernmentalism in EU integration by studying the suitability of this theoretical debate in an underdeveloped area of study, EU external action.
2. Update the traditional debate between intergovernmentalism and supranationalism to the policy developments brought about by the Lisbon Treaty.

With regards to the empirical case studies of the ESS and the EUGS

3. Assess the policy-making processes of EU strategies as a reflection of the institutional context in which they are elaborated, both in CFSP and external action.
4. Contextualise these institutional dynamics in the framework of broader European integration debates.

With regards to the methodological tools

5. Provide a framework for the analysis of the policy-making processes of EU strategies based on process-tracing and qualitative interviews for the case studies.

CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL DEBATE ON EU EXTERNAL ACTION IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL-SUPRANATIONAL DEBATE AND THE PREMISES OF NEW INTERGOVERNMENTALISM

2.1. Introduction

This thesis interacts with two sets of literature. The first part of the theoretical debate builds on the traditional approaches of International Relations with the aim to insert current debates on European integration and EU external action, such as the one between supranationalism and intergovernmentalism, into the broader discipline of International Relations. Major theoretical approaches such as realism, liberalism and constructivism are at the roots of relevant research questions in the field of EU integration and external action, and this is why the theoretical debate of this thesis focuses first on the intersection between the International Relations and EU literatures.

This chapter then broadens the theoretical debate to current discussions in EU integration, putting particular emphasis on the intergovernmental-supranational debate. This debate confronts two offshoots of the theoretical discussions put forward in the first set of literature. While intergovernmentalism can be considered a follow-up in European studies of the realist school in International Relations, supranationalism emanates from the insights provided by liberalism. The intergovernmental-supranational debate finds its most recent evolution in the form of the "new intergovernmentalism", which attempts to theorise the current state of affairs in EU integration at large.

It is worth mentioning first that, for many years, International Relations theory and EU external action have ran in parallel with regards to their theoretical developments. Traditional thought in International Relations has usually treated the EU as a *sui generis* actor in the international scene, thus favouring distinct theoretical developments in International Relations theory, on one hand, and EU

integration, on the other. In addition, when focusing on EU external action as a subfield of EU studies, theoretical discussions have also tended to consider this particular policy area as a rare species.

Certain elements of the realist school (the predominance of member states and the use of intergovernmentalism in EU foreign policy-making) and the liberal one (the existence of a rich network of supranational institutions dedicated, among others, to provide development cooperation and to establish relations with neighbouring countries) coexist in external action. It is only in the last 20 years that the debates on the EU's global role have significantly expanded and consolidated, although most of the academic literature on EU external action has tended to develop somehow detached from classical thinking in International Relations (Krotz and Maher 2001).

The reasons for this are threefold. Firstly, International Relations theorists have sometimes studied EU external action as a purely empirical event in the broader discipline of International Relations (Rosamond 2000). Secondly, the literature on this field of EU activity has often been considered part of broader EU integration theories, borrowing key elements of grand and middle-ground integration theories to study the Union's role in international affairs (Nugent 2010). But above all, International Relations and EU external action literatures have run in parallel as a consequence of the very nature of the object of study, treating the EU as a unique actor in world affairs (Andreatta 2011). Such uniqueness means that conceptualising the EU in the field of international relations is a challenge in itself.

Nugent (2010) provides four different reasons why the EU cannot be easily categorised as a regular international actor. First, "[the EU's] nature has never been settled" (Nugent 2010:420), hence making it difficult to portray the Union simply as an international organisation or as a federation of states. Second, the character of the Union has been subject to constant transition, often as a consequence of the deepening and widening of integration dynamics. Third, the complexity of the Union demands multiple analytical lenses and theoretical approaches. And fourth, the EU "embodies both supranational and

intergovernmental features in its system of governance" (Nugent 2010:420), making it a unique object of study. Theoretical conceptions of the EU are thus better equipped when they draw upon varied sources and schools of thought.

Nugent's approach justifies the need to interact with two complementary sets of literature -International Relations and European studies- when analysing the current institutional developments in European integration and EU external action in particular. The remaining of the chapter will focus first on the theoretical approaches of International Relations that find particular representations in the field of EU integration and external action and will then dive deeper into the translation of these approaches to a specific debate in the literature: the intergovernmental-supranational debate.

2.2. Inserting EU external action in the International Relations literature

Building on the work of Krotz and Maher (2001), this section establishes the links between the main schools of thought in International Relations and their representation in EU studies and external action. To do so, it focuses first on the central paradigm of the International Relations discipline, realism, to put forward theoretical accounts that consider member states as the most relevant actors in EU policy-making. Then it turns into liberalism as a source to understand the power of supranational institutions in EU integration and external action. Finally, it presents the main features of constructivism as a way to understand the social dynamics that depict the socialisation processes currently upholding cooperation in these fields.

The link between theoretical approaches to International Relations and their application in EU studies and external action will be useful to understand why no single theory can fully explain the developments currently taking place in European affairs, particularly since the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty. While the leadership of states in the policy-making practices of areas such as the CFSP signals the pre-eminence of realist accounts, liberal theories focusing on supranational institutions seem better equipped to understand the reinforcement

of common institutions after the Lisbon Treaty. Finally, the existence of socialisation practices in Brussels and the consolidation of a "coordination reflex" are better understood when read through constructivist lenses[10].

2.2.1. Realism and the power of states

Realism has often been considered the central paradigm of the International Relations discipline, putting sovereignty and the security of nation states at its centre. What distinguishes realism in all its different strands is a consistent focus on the state as a unit of analysis, a major concern on national security and a permanent state of conflict among the units of the system (Barbé 1995). Realism pays close attention to the issues of national security and state survival and thus gives utmost importance to the issues of power, security and state-centrism (Jackson and Sorensen 2013). The central areas of study in realism are, above all, the foreign, security and defence policies of states, which are necessary to guarantee their survival under the conditions of international anarchy (Waltz 1979).

The emergence of the EU as an international actor challenged many of the theoretical underpinnings of realism (Waever 1995). The EU is neither a state, a federation of states nor a traditional alliance (see for instance Grieco 1997, Reichwein 2015, Wayman and Diehl 1994), and yet it has progressively developed into a relevant actor in the international scene. Most realists have been unable to understand the cooperation dynamics within the EU and the erosion of state sovereignty as a consequence of integration[11]. However, some others have surrendered to the evidence of the EU's role in the international system and have provided realist explanations to the EU's cooperation dynamics. Gilpin (1981), for instance, has argued that the systemic conditions of Europe under the influence of the United States (the only actor able to impose order in the international system

[10] Other major schools of thought in International Relations have been intentionally left aside. This is the case of critical theory, the English School or post-structuralism, among others, which have also found relevant theoretical parallels in the field of EU foreign policy (see Jørgensen et.al. 2015).
[11] In line with the main premises of realism, integration and the surrender of sovereignty by European states is unlikely to happen, since the outcome of integration is uncertain and may threaten the states' national security.

and offer a security umbrella for others to establish cooperation relations) have been the enabling factor of European cooperation.

Other authors have adopted a different turn to understand European integration and EU external action dynamics borrowing critical assumptions of realism. Through intergovernmentalism, national decision-makers are able to cooperate while, at the same time, protect their states' sovereignty. Intergovernmentalism, as will be further elaborated below, opens the door to cooperation by member states in the framework of international organisations such as the EU but does not prevent these member states to retain their sovereignty and to opt out of cooperation when they perceive their sovereignty might be at stake. Intergovernmentalism places power and sovereignty at the core of a state's decision to cooperate in the EU.

Through his theory of "liberal intergovernmentalism" Andrew Moravcsik (1995, 1998), has provided evidence on why EU member states decide to cooperate and the circumstances under which they do so. According to him, it is in the interest of member states to cooperate when the gains of cooperation outweigh the results of individual action. Cooperation responds to a rational behaviour of states, who benefit from the framework provided by European institutions but who, at the same time, preserve their sovereign decision to cooperate (Moravcsik 1998).

Moravcsik's liberal intergovernmentalism places greater emphasis on the dynamics between states in the framework of common institutions than to the weight of these institutions in defining the cooperation dynamics. In other words, he understands that inter-state relations are at the centre of cooperation and that states make use of common institutions to increase their bargaining power. Less attention is paid to the institutional dynamics of cooperation -such as routines or the constraints of integration for member states-, nor to EU institutions as key actors defining the states' behaviour (Nugent 2010:433).

Intergovernmentalism is particularly well positioned to understand the dynamics of cooperation in the fields of EU integration where decisions are taken by

unanimity. CFSP and CSDP have been ruled by intergovernmentalism since their inception and member states have always had the upper hand vis-à-vis EU institutions (Hoffman 2000). The often-assumed reason for this is that "since foreign, security and defence policy lie at the heart of national sovereignty, states will not integrate in these fields and an international organization itself cannot have a foreign policy" (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008: 29). So seen from a policy-making dimension, intergovernmentalism has translated into the rules of unanimity and consensus of the CFSP and CSDP, which reinforce the intergovernmental nature of these policies. It also reveals the minor role of supranational EU institutions in foreign policy when compared to that of member states (Reichwein 2015:102-103) and the protagonism of the European Council and the Council of the EU, where member states are represented (Bickerton, Hodson and Puetter 2015a, Puetter 2014).

Other authors have found in intergovernmentalism the main reason behind the shortcomings of EU external action. Christopher Hill has evoked the problem generated by intergovernmental decision-making, which generates a "capability-expectations gap" between what the (then) European Community was able to deliver and what it was expected to do (Hill 1993). This gap was due to several factors, including the ability of the main actors involved in foreign policy to agree on the policies to be adopted, the resources available for putting policies into place and the instruments at the European Communities' disposal.

Whereas Hill's first reason remits to the basic intergovernmental structures of CFSP and CSDP, the second one is particularly relevant for the capacity of the EU to become a relevant actor in crisis management. Hill acknowledges that "a coherent system and full actorness [of the European Community] are still far from realization (…) not just in terms of substantial resources (…) but in terms of the *ability to take decisions and hold to them* (emphasis in original)" (Hill 1993:318). A single European foreign policy is therefore difficult to achieve –"a difficult enough task given the unique combination (…) of a semi-supranational entity working alongside with sovereign states" (Hill 1993:308).

The link between realist International Relations theory and the power of states has found in intergovernmentalism a fertile ground to develop relevant research questions in the literature regarding the power of states in European integration and EU external action. Since the different revisions of EU treaties have never undermined their centrality in CFSP and CSDP, intergovernmentalism provides a relevant framework to understand why member states are still the key actors in European security and defence matters. The link between the power of states and intergovernmentalism will be further assessed in the foreign policy-making dynamics presented in the next chapter.

2.2.2. Liberalism and the power of institutions

Liberalism and its offshoot in the field of EU integration (supranationalism) constitute the second analytical framework to understand the linkages between International Relations theory, European studies and external action. Whereas realism has often been considered a "theory of non-integration" (Waever 1995) and thus unable to explain the contribution of the EU in world affairs, liberalism stands as better suited to understand the dynamics of cooperation and the role of EU institutions to facilitate such cooperation.

Barbé (1995) shows how, instead of focusing only on the state, liberalism focuses on a plurality of international actors, including NGOs, multinational corporations, sub-state actors and international organisations such as the EU. Out of the different liberal sub-theories that share a joint concern for cooperation and transnational relations, institutional liberalism provides the most relevant insights for the purposes of this thesis[12]. This strand of liberalism focuses on the benefits of institutions to promote cooperation, either from the point of view of the scope of cooperation (the number of issue areas where cooperation exists) and the depth of institutionalisation (the expectations, joint rules and autonomy of institutions) (Jackson and Sorensen 2013:110-111). The EU is considered the most successful example of institutionalisation, since member states have decided to surrender part of their sovereignty and functions of government in the benefit of the EU.

[12] See Jackson and Sorensen 2013: Ch.4 for a revision of post-World War II liberal thinking.

Grand theories of EU integration such as federalism and neofunctionalism understand that supranational institutions are the key promoters of integration processes (Nugent 2010). Cooperation in the framework of these institutions often goes beyond the original area of cooperation and provokes a "spillover of cooperation" from the economic dimension to more political ones such as foreign policy (Haas 1958). According to neofunctionalism, the role of European institutions in promoting cooperation is the backbone for integration in policy domains where member states are often reluctant to surrender sovereignty.

Nugent (2010:437) and Pollack (2010:21) focus on middle-range theories such as "new institutionalism" to study EU institutions, not as a rational tool to advance the interests of member states but rather as an object of study *per se*. According to them, the use of institutions goes beyond rational motivations and shapes "the actions of political actors and (determines) decisional outcomes" (Nugent 2010:437). As part of new institutionalist theories, supranationalism takes the delegation of authority and the surrender of state's sovereignty to institutions as the starting point for assessing why institutions matter.

Once member states start to cooperate in the framework of supranational institutions, institutional inertia becomes a driving force of policy developments. Institutional arrangements produce "path dependencies", which result in "relationships between institutions and other factors [shaping] political activities and outcomes" (Nugent 2010:438). Delreux has studied how political choices determine the range of possible actions and policies available, assuming that "since the political cost to deviate from the path that history has set out is too high, actors usually continue on that path and adopt policies that are determined by previous choices" (Delreux 2015:154).

In the field of EU external action, Michael Smith (2004) has studied the "institutionalisation of cooperation", that is, the way by which EU institutions have enabled cooperation among member states in security and defence matters. Smith argues that the institutionalisation of cooperation dynamics has enabled the

emergence of Europe's security policies and that the consultation and consensus building among member states have been key practices since the establishment of the European Political Cooperation (EPC).

Overall, liberal theories help us to identify the crucial importance of supranational institutions to foster cooperation in EU affairs, including in the area of external action. Institutions become a key element to understand the behaviour of member states, which are strongly influenced by supranationalism and cooperation dynamics within the EU. The link between the power of institutions and supranationalism will be further assessed in the policy-making dynamics in external relations and, to an extent, external action, as it will be studied in the next chapter.

2.2.3. Constructivism and the power of social dynamics

International relations theory suffered a dramatic turn in the 1990s with the emergence of social constructivism as a new approach to the discipline (Adler 1997). According to constructivists, the shortcomings of traditional International Relations theories boiled down to three: first, the failure to understand change in the international system (i.e. why some countries and even continents such as Europe have turned from a state of war and conflict to a state of peace upheld by common institutions such as the EU). Second, why certain social dimensions of international politics are crucial to understand current dynamics in world politics (for instance the emergence of new leaderships, ideas and discourses that changed the course of history with the end of the Cold War). And third, the processes of social interaction that are behind the social construction of international politics (Wendt 1999). The main premise of constructivism is that international relations are a "social construction" and that human and social acts define the nature of the phenomena under study (see for instance Jackson and Sorensen 2013:Ch 8). States, international alliances or institutions are the collective subjects of international relations and they take different political, historic and cultural forms as a consequence of the social interaction that takes place therein.

The consolidation of constructivism as a mainstream International Relations theory ran in parallel to a deeper degree of European integration and the development of the EU's CFSP since the Maastricht Treaty. When applied to EU integration, constructivism has been used to understand why European member states surrender the control of some policies and subscribe to common rules and norms (Hall and Taylor 1996), taking into account that the EU has become "an experiment in the construction of a different type of international order" (Andreatta 2011:37).

Membership to the EU triggers a certain behaviour of member states, who decide to follow a "logic of appropriateness", instead of simply a "logic of consequences" (March and Olsen 1995). Belonging to the same international institutions leads member states to "europeanise" their national policies, a process whereby the policies of member states' and the projection of states priorities at the EU level converge (Wong 2011). Joint work in Brussels-based institutions also shapes the member states' policies through a "coordination reflex". This reflex enables the emergence of a shared esprit de corps, of consensual and problem-solving approaches in policy-making and of trust and consultation among the elites (Tonra 2001, Krotz and Maher 2011:563, Nugent 2010, Andreatta 2011:36). In other words, EU member states develop a shared European identity by means of socialisation processes, which also becomes crucial to understand their behaviour towards third states.

When applied to EU external action, constructivism is also well suited to understand what kind of actor is the EU at the global scene (Smith 2014). These discussions often depart from Duchène's characterisation of the EU as a "civilian power" (Duchène 1973), which emphasises the use of civilian rather than military instruments when acting at the global scene. Manners' "normative power Europe" (Manners 2002, see also Whitman 2011, 2013) advocates for an understanding of the EU as an entity capable of shaping conceptions of what can be considered as "normal" in international politics. Ever since, different terminologies have defined

the EU as an “ethical power”, a “market power”, a “global power” or a "transformative power"[13].

Some of the Union’s policies at the global stage, particularly the CFSP, CSDP and the European Neighbourhood Policy, have also been studied under constructivist frameworks. As Chapter 4 will further analyse, several authors have studied the emergence of a shared "strategic culture" among EU member states through the study of the EU's strategies. This strategic culture is formed by “shared interests, values, priorities, perceptions of threat and legitimate means and ends for the use of military force, as well as agreement on Europe’s proper role in the world “(Krotz and Maher 2011:565), which facilitates a process of “normative convergence” (Meyer 2006) with regards to the member states' foreign policies.

CFSP and CSDP provide the reflex of the emergence of a shared strategic culture. When national foreign policy-makers discuss foreign and defence matters, the coordination reflex and socialisation practices also play a role (Tonra 2001:279, Aydin-Düzgit 2015:145). Some observers note that “all national foreign policies have been Europeanised to some extent and (…) some degree of socialisation has occurred among the political elites of even the largest member states” (Wong, quoted in Aydin-Düzgit 2015:145). These processes create a "sense of *we* feeling and community” (Sjursen 2015:199, emphasis in original) among EU member states, which acts as a motivation for them to adhere to the norms of CFSP and CSDP, even if formal procedures such as unanimity and the predominance of intergovernmentalism enable them to behave following national prerogatives.

In other policy areas, Manners (2010) has studied the normative approach of the European Neighbourhood Policy as a result of the enforcement of policies and instruments where democracy, the rule of law and human rights are at the core of the EU’s relations with third countries. Del Sarto has argued that the Arab Spring led the EU to prioritise its support for democracy in its southern neighbourhood in such a way that it has linked its policies with “the Union’s own history and

[13] See Aydin-Düzgit 2015:142-144 for a list of denominations of the EU's power and Börzel and Risse (2009) for discussions on the EU's "transformative power".

international identity, in a somewhat self-congratulatory way" (Del Sarto 2015)[14]. More globally, the EU can also be characterised as a "normative power" due to the inclusion of human-rights clauses in all its international agreements (Manners 2002).

In summary, constructivism provides a fertile ground to understand the power of social dynamics both within and outside the EU framework. While the processes of socialisation and the coordination reflex signal the emergence of a shared foreign policy identity within the EU, "normative power Europe" has also been used to describe the development of a particular vision of external action policies.

2.3. The intergovernmental-supranational debate and the premises of new intergovernmentalism

As the previous section has shown, International Relations and EU integration literatures have become inextricably linked in the last few decades, facilitating in turn the growth and diversification of theoretical approaches to EU external action. The theoretical building blocks of International Relations literature have found parallels in EU integration and external action debates. While realism has found in intergovernmentalism a fertile ground for a theoretical approach to the power of states in EU external action, cooperation dynamics lying at the core of liberalism provide a useful narrative for the study of the power of supranational institutions. Constructivism also serves as a tool to understand the socialisation dynamics in these fields.

This section will dive deeper into the conceptualisation of intergovernmentalism and supranationalism in EU integration and external action and will present the re-emergence of their longstanding debate in the form of "new intergovernmentalism" [15]. It will first discuss the main approaches of

[14] However, democracy promotion and human rights are not exempt from accusations of contradictions and the pursuing of the EU's own interests (see for instance Youngs 2004 and Peters 2012).

[15] Keukeleire and Delreux (2014) point out that the use of the intergovernmental-supranational debate can be misleading, while authors such as Dinan (2011:116) have gone as far as to say that the distinction is "completely anachronistic" (see also Manners and Whitman (2016) and

supranationalism and intergovernmentalism to EU integration and external action, putting forward their main characteristics in a comparative perspective and assessing the role of the different EU institutions. The section will then move to explore the main contribution of new intergovernmentalism as well as the re-emergence of the debate in light of the critiques put forward to this theory. The main premises of supranationalism, intergovernmentalism and new intergovernmentalism will complement the theoretical debate of this thesis, as part of the current discussions in EU integration dynamics.

2.3.1. Supranationalism and intergovernmentalism in EU integration

The terms supranationalism and intergovernmentalism have a long history in the literature on European integration. They can be considered the two main policy modes in EU policy-making (or the two ends of the EU integration spectrum)[16], although the evolution of EU institutions and policies has blurred their original features and other "ideal types" of policy-making have emerged (Wallace 2010)[17].

Rosamond (2016) for a similar take). Keukeleire and Delreux prefer to use the "Community method" and the "intergovernmental method" as the two ends of the institutional framework of EU foreign policy-making. In their words, "the Community method is not synonymous with supranationalism, which would imply that member states lose complete control over policy-making" (Keukeleire and Delreux 2014:62). This is certainly not the case in external action, but for the sake of conceptual homogeneity this thesis will use intergovernmentalism and supranationalism as two ends of the debate. The reason of this choice is to follow the conceptual terminology of new intergovernmentalism, which focuses on supranationalism and intergovernmentalism as the departure points of its analysis of current EU integration dynamics, even if the literature often depicts intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism as the two major approaches to European integration, complemented by postfunctionalism (Hooghe and Marks 2008, Börzel and Risse 2008).

[16] See the previous footnote regarding the choice for intergovernmentalism and supranationalism as the two major approaches to European integration, instead of more established preference for intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism.

[17] In this light, some authors have created a typology of EU policy modes "with the deliberate objective of escaping from the either/or dichotomy between 'supranational' and 'intergovernmental' ways of proceeding" (Wallace 2010:90). Nugent analyses four frameworks of EU policy processes: the Community method, intensive transgovernmentalism, open coordination and centralised decision-making (Nugent 2010: Ch. 17). Wallace prefers to lay down a total of five policy modes: the Community method, regulatory mode, distributional mode, policy coordination and intensive transgovernmentalism (Wallace 2010). This section takes supranationalism and intergovernmentalism as ideal types, conscious that, for example, both Wallace's Community method and regulatory mode are part of our supranationalism. The reason of this choice is that both supranationalism and intergovernmentalism can be applied to certain areas of EU external action. While supranationalism applies to the Common Commercial Policy and part of the Development Policy (both included in the Commission's external relations), intergovernmentalism applies to the CFSP (or foreign policy). On the contrary, the regulatory mode is useful to analyse competition, single market, environment, Common Agricultural Policy, new aspects of trade and social and employment policies; the distributional mode is useful to analyse budget and cohesion;

In their seminal work on *European integration and supranational governance*, Stone Sweet and Sandholtz argue that European integration is driven by the development of causal connections between "transnational exchange, supranational organization and EC [European Community] rule-making" (Stone Sweet and Sandholtz 1997:297). Supranational dynamics defining European integration are due to the expansion of the European Community regulation as a consequence of expanding cross-border transactions and the work of supranational organisations to uphold these regulations. In addition, "once EC [European Community] rules are in place, a process of institutionalization ensues, and this process provokes further integration (Stone Sweet and Sandholtz 1997:297).

Supranationalism thus follows the classical "community method" (Wallace 2010, Nugent 2010), "a centralized and hierarchical institutional process, with a clear delegation of powers, and aimed at positive integration" (Wallace 2010:94). According to Nugent (2010:295), this method is characterised by the leading role of the European Commission, who "takes the policy lead and has monopolistic power over the drafting and tabling of legislative proposals" and, more in particular in "policy design, policy-brokering, policy execution, and managing the interface with 'abroad'" (Wallace 2010:91).

In supranationalism, the European Council is a final decision-maker and an institution where "strategic bargaining and package deals" take place (Wallace 2010:91). Since the Lisbon Treaty, the European Parliament shares co-decision making powers with the Council and the EU's courts have jurisdiction over EU legislation. This method of supranational policy-making follows the functionalist logic, in which powers are transferred from the national to the EU level (Wallace 2010:94). The method is present in the field of external relations, where policies such as trade and development follow this policy-making process (more on this in the next chapter). However, the method does not apply to the CFSP and CSDP.

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and policy coordination applies to employment, fiscal policy, aspects of Justice and Home Affairs and economic reform (Wallace 2010: 93). These policies will not be explored in this thesis, which makes the choice of intergovernmentalism and supranationalism more relevant.

Table 2.1. The main characteristics of supranationalism[18]

	Supranationalism
Degree of centralization	High
Role of European Council	Rare (overcoming log-jams)
Role(s) of Commission	Extensive delegation: agenda-setting, implementation, policing and external representation
Role of Council of Ministers	Decision-making (QMV), co-legislator
Role of European Parliament	Co-legislator
Impact of European Court of Justice	Occasional, but significant
Member governments	Implementation of common policy
Engagement of other actors	Lock-in of stakeholders/ policy networks
Examples	Common Agricultural Policy, Common Commercial Policy

At the opposite end of the spectrum, the literature on intergovernmentalism understands that governments of member states are the central players in European integration. States "bargain with each other to produce common policies [and] bargaining is shaped by the relative power of the member states, but also by state preferences" (Stone Sweet and Sandholtz 1997:303). Following the definition of Nugent (2010: 428), intergovernmentalism refers to the "arrangements whereby nation states, in situations and conditions they can control, cooperate with one another on matters of common interest. The existence of control, which allows all participant states to decide the extent and nature of this cooperation, means that national sovereignty is not directly undermined" (Nugent 2010:428).

Therefore, common institutions serve the purpose of advancing the states' interests and facilitate bargain, following the work of Moravcsik (1993, 1995 and 1998)[19]. The intensive interaction between national policy-makers, with relatively little involvement of EU institutions, has led Wallace (2010:100) to depict this process as "intensive transgovernmentalism". According to her, "the term

[18] This table has been adapted from Wallace (2010: 92-93). It includes elements of the Community method and the regulatory mode, although it has been simplified to embody the main contents of supranationalism. Some of its original contents have also been discarded.
[19] Tsebelis and Garrett (2001) have studied how intergovernmental and supranational dynamics in European integration result in different institutional interactions and legislative processes.

'intergovernmental does not (...) really capture the character of this policy mode (since) it resonates too much on cooperation between governments in many other international organizations, in which the intensity of cooperation is quite limited. We therefore prefer the term 'transgovernmental' to connote the greater intensity and denser structuring (of policy areas), where EU member governments have been prepared cumulatively to commit themselves to rather extensive engagement and disciplines, but have judged the full EU institutional framework to be inappropriate or unacceptable" (Wallace 2010:101).

Nugent (2010:295-296) characterises intensive transgovernmentalism as a policy process where all key decisions are made by "the European Council or the Council of Ministers acting by unanimity" and where the "right of initiation is not exclusive to the Commission but is also held by the governments of the member states" (Nugent 2010:296). Despite Wallace and Nugent's preference for intensive transgovernmentalism, for the purpose of this thesis, the term intergovernmentalism will be kept given its resonance with the concepts analysed in the previous section and the theoretical debates provided by new intergovernmentalism (below).

As previously noted, intergovernmentalism is the basis of the CFSP and CSDP, where the power to take decisions remains in the hands of member states who act unanimously and seek consensus, the key institutions are the European Council and the Council of the EU. As Rummel and Wiedemann (1998:61) recall, member states are expected to use these institutions to achieve their national foreign policy goals.

Table 2.2. The main characteristics of intergovernmentalism[20]

	Intergovernmentalism
Degree of centralization	Low
Role of European Council	Sets direction
Role(s) of Commission	Marginal
Role of Council of Ministers	Predominant in agenda-setting and decision-making
Role of European Parliament	Limited
Impact of European Court of Justice	Limited
Member governments	Key players
Engagement of other actors	Excluded
Examples	CFSP, ESDP (CSDP after Lisbon), Justice and Home Affairs (in Maastricht)[21]

2.3.2. The intergovernmental-supranational debate in EU external action

Following Keukeleire and MacNaughtan (2008), the debate between intergovernmentalism and supranationalism in external action will also be understood as a difference in the policy-making method. These authors argue: "the intergovernmental method which characterises the second and third pillars [CFSP and Justice and Home Affairs][22] implies that member states retain complete control over the development of foreign policy within these pillars through the dominant position of the Council of Ministers and unanimity in decision-making. This is in contrast with the external relations policies of the first pillar "which is based on an institutional equilibrium between the Council of Ministers, the Commission, the European Parliament and the Court of Justice, and on majority voting for most decisions in the Council" (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008:30). Along similar lines, Larivé (2014) considers that the debate between supranationalism and intergovernmentalism is paramount to understand the relations between member states and institutions in the field of EU external action.

[20] Table adapted from Wallace (2010:92-93), who uses "intensive transgovernmentalism" to refer to our intergovernmentalism. Some of its original contents have been modified and/or discarded.
[21] See the next footnote.
[22] The Justice and Home Affairs policy traditionally fell within intergovernmentalism too, although recent years have witnessed its shift towards the community method (Lavenex 2010).

The foundations of the debate can be traced back to the times of the EPC and the European Communities. The EPC set the basis for the intergovernmental approach to EU foreign policy (Smith 2004). The institutional structure of the EPC was based on intergovernmental cooperation among the Foreign Affairs Ministries of the member states of the European Communities, with the aim to ensure regular exchange of information and consultations, strengthen the coordination of their positions in international affairs and to pursue common actions where possible (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008:44-48).

The working method of the EPC was based on the principles of unanimity and consensus among foreign ministers, who were supported by officials in their ministries and who regularly gathered in the framework of the Political Committee, composed of political directors, the European Correspondents[23] and thematic and regional working groups, participated by lower level officials (Smith 2014:25). Michael Smith (2004) has argued that the set-up of the Political Committee led to the "institutionalisation of cooperation" and the establishment of regular links with the European Communities, resulting in the mutation of traditional understandings of intergovernmentalism. Others have characterised the Political Committee and as an institution "less than supranational but more than intergovernmental" (Wessels 1982:15)[24].

The set-up of the EPC as a separate framework from the European Communities prevented the encroachment of the Community method on foreign policy and vice versa. Supranationalists were wary of the attempts to establish intergovernmental control over the European Communities, which were founded on the premises of supranationalism. Common policies related to the common market, foreign trade and agriculture were proposed by an independent Commission composed of officials (having thus the right of initiative) and were decided in the Council of Ministers by Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) (Smith 2014:23). The European Court of Justice interpreted the law of the European Communities and its decisions

[23] European Correspondents are the officials responsible for CFSP within national ministries of foreign affairs (Nugent 2010:390).
[24] Studies on the institutionalisation of the CFSP have emerged ever since to cover foreign policy developments until the Nice Treaty (Smith 2004) and the Lisbon Treaty (Duke 2008b).

were binding on member states. At the times of the European Community, an assembly of national parliamentarians (later to become the European Parliament) was consulted on common laws, although it had only a "little role to play in decision-making" (Smith 2014:23). Thus, the European Communities and the EPC embodied two different policy-making methods traditionally defining the EU's policies and activities: supranationalism and intergovernmentalism.

The complexity and density of cooperation in the practice of foreign policy and external relations over the years somehow diluted the strongest tenets of the intergovernmental-supranational debate. According to Keukeleire and MacNaughtan (2008:31), "it might be more accurate to characterize EU foreign policy as existing on a continuum, going from various degrees of supranational integration, over various degrees of intergovernmental integration, to purely intergovernmental cooperation", even making the pillar structure "less relevant".

An effort in bridging the intergovernmental-supranational debate in external action has been provided by Ohrgaard's concept of "integration through intergovernmentalism" (Ohrgaard 2004). According to him, three prominent features of supranational dynamics are present in a chiefly intergovernmental policy such as the CFSP. First, there are growing socialisation dynamics between decision-makers in the framework of the Council "resulting from working together on transnational problem-solving" (Ohrgaard 2004:38, see also Lewis 2003, 2005). Second, as a consequence of socialisation and consultation, "path-dependency" (Delreux 2015) leads participants of intergovernmental processes to rely on previous decisions and to increase the spill-over of policy decisions both in scope and in level (Ohrgaard 2004:39-40). Third, this process of strengthened cooperation becomes further formalised as a consequence of both socialisation and spill-over dynamics of cooperation.

Bridging the intergovernmental-supranational debate has also been the objective of refined intergovernmental concepts such as "Brussels-based intergovernmentalism" (Allen 1998), "supranational intergovernmentalism" (Howorth 2010), "deliberative intergovernmentalism" (Puetter 2003, Puetter

2014 and Sjursen 2011), "rationalised intergovernmentalism "(Wessels and Bopp 2008) and "institutionalised intergovernmentalism" (Christiansen 2001). Allen (1998) and Christiansen (2001) place particular emphasis on the Brussels-based institutions (such as the European Council and the Council), which, in principle, are ruled by intergovernmental procedures but where the dynamics of cooperation lead to an increased importance of policy-making in Brussels over the national capitals, otherwise called "brusselisation" (Koops 2011, Nugent 2010:439). The Brussels-based bodies and bureaucratic machineries, for instance the Council of ministers and the Council Secretariat, act as actors facilitating an institutionalised form of intergovernmentalism.

In the case of the CFSP, this translates into increased powers for Brussels-based diplomats, who hold quasi-autonomous decision-making powers thanks to constant interaction with their Brussels counterparts. These officials become more knowledgeable of the positions of other member states through constant interaction in policy-making discussions, often gaining more decision-making power and trust vis-à-vis their national counterparts. In other words, instructions and decisions are drafted and decided in Brussels, contrary to purely intergovernmental attitudes that would place more emphasis on the decision-making power in European capitals.

This situation has been analysed by Howorth (2010) in the framework of the PSC. According to him, this intergovernmental body, participated by ambassadors of all EU member states[25], has shown the emergence of a "trans-European strategic culture", otherwise called a "supranational culture (…) emerging from an intergovernmental process"(Howorth 2010). This is particularly the case for the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP, today's CSDP), where socialisation and a quest for consensus among PSC Ambassadors produce policy outcomes that resemble those of supranational practices. Howorth witnesses similar "supranational intergovernmentalist" practices beyond the PSC and within the CFSP and CSDP, where "decisions are shaped and even taken by small groups of

[25] More details on the PSC and other Brussels-based bodies in external action are provided in the next chapter.

relatively well-socialized officials in the key committees acting in a mode which is as close to supranational as it is to intergovernmental (Howorth 2011b).

In the field of external action, member states tend to establish "cooperative bargaining dynamics" (Thomas 2009), which do not signal a transfer of power to supranational institutions but which facilitate policy agreements among them. The method of deliberative intergovernmentalism (Puetter 2003, 2014 and Sjursen 2011) and cooperation between member states are departing premises of the "new intergovernmentalism" (below), which studies the transformation of institutional dynamics within intergovernmental policy-making systems, yet without a reinforcement of traditional supranational bodies such as the European Commission or the Parliament.

The unwillingness of member states to transfer decision-making powers to these institutions and to retain powers within the Council and stick to unanimity has been considered a form of "rationalised intergovernmentalism" (Wessels 2001). Rationalised intergovernmentalism signals a lack of real transfer of sovereignty towards supranational institutions but puts forward a series of minor modifications in decision-making procedures which lead to "increased complexity and differentiation" between EU institutions (Wessels and Bopp 2008:4), also in the field of external action[26].

2.3.3. The new intergovernmentalism

New intergovernmentalism is the latest attempt to provide a new interpretation of the intergovernmental-supranational debate in European integration. It depicts itself as a continuation of the debates introduced by Moravcsik on the interplay between supranational institutions and intergovernmental dynamics (Bickerton, Hodson and Puetter 2015a:706), but places particular emphasis on the dynamics of European integration since the Maastricht Treaty. It can also be considered the latest theoretical effort to provide a middle-range theory of European integration,

[26] The move beyond traditional forms of intergovernmentalism in supposedly intergovernmental institutions has also raised preoccupations regarding its democratic accountability (Juncos and Pomorska 2011, Sjursen 2011).

insomuch it focuses on "the politics and policies of the EU: on how the EU functions and what the EU does" (Nugent 2010:437). Most of its focus has been the study of the economic and monetary dimensions of European integration, hence paying particular attention to the policy-making dynamics of the Economic and Financial Affairs configuration of the Council and the Economic and Monetary Union and the Eurogroup (Bickerton, Hodson and Puetter 2015a, 2015b, Puetter 2014, Fabbrini 2016, Glencross 2016, Lequesne 2016).

New intergovernmentalism departs from the existence of an "integration paradox". According to its proponents, the post-Maastricht period has witnessed a "tendency towards European integration without supranationalism" (Bickerton, Hodson and Puetter 2015b). On the one hand, member states have shown their readiness to expand cooperation in all major domains of public policy in the framework of the EU but, on the other, they have been "eager to avoid further transfers of ultimate decision-making powers to the supranational level" (Puetter 2014). As a consequence, efforts of further integration have developed outside the supranational method and its institutions (mostly the European Commission, the European Parliament and the European Court of Justice). According to new intergovernmentalism, supranational institutions have not lost relevance in the traditional community policies, but have not been considered as the preferred option for member states when coordinating and deciding on new areas of EU activity either (Puetter 2014).

As a consequence, the institutions representing the member states have gained influence in day-to-day decision-making and coordination processes (Puetter 2014). The European Council and the Council of the EU have become institutions where regular policy debate takes place, so the number -and length- of meetings has expanded over the recent years. This has reinforced the preference for intergovernmentalism and unanimity as decision-making methods (Puetter 2014).

The European Council has become the "new centre of political gravity" and "embodies the new intergovernmentalism in post-Maastricht EU integration" (Puetter 2014 Ch.3, see also Dinan 2011). It is more involved than ever in the day-

to-day leadership of the EU political agenda. New intergovernmentalism considers that since member states are the real force behind current integration efforts, the leadership of Heads of State and Government requires strong consensus at the highest political level (i.e. the European Council). According to Puetter, there is a "correlation between the evolution of the new areas of activity and the increased role of the European Council" (Puetter 2014:Ch.3). It is in this regard that the European Council has become a "catalyst of integration" (Puetter and Fabbrini 2016:634)

The Council and its different formations have witnessed a move from "law-making to policy coordination", under direct supervision of the European Council (Puetter 2014:Ch.4). The Council is thus the place where most deliberations take place, and so its centrality in the policy-making system has been reinforced (Fabbrini and Puetter 2016). According to Puetter (2014:Ch.1), "the Council is assigned the role of the central political decision-making institution" and is supervised by the European Council, which determines the overall political direction and guidelines and provides final approval (Puetter 2014:Ch.3). The relationship between the European Council and the Council is primarily "a matter of hierarchy" (Puetter and Fabbrini 2016:635). The number of meetings and the intensity of negotiations in the different Council formations have also expanded, particularly those dealing with highly political aspects of EU integration.

This is not only the case for the meetings of finance ministers in the framework of Economic and Financial Affairs configuration of the Council and the Eurogroup, but also of the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC). New intergovernmentalism understands that "foreign ministers were assigned a central role in CFSP decision-making at Maastricht, Amsterdam and again by the Lisbon Treaty" (Puetter 2014:Ch.4), thus reinforcing the intergovernmental nature of this policy. The FAC is supported by a few expert committees reinforcing the intergovernmental nature of foreign policy, such as the PSC and the working groups of the Council. New intergovernmentalism acknowledges that the FAC, as well as other formations dealing with external action policies, have also been tasked with assessing the situation of EU's foreign

policy and the coordination of policy action in this regard, in the pursuit of policy coherence (more on this in the next chapter).

In addition to the political dynamics around the Council, the preferred policy-making methods are also crucial to understand the main premises of new intergovernmentalism. "Deliberative intergovernmentalism" (Puetter 2003, Puetter 2014, Bickerton, Hodson and Puetter 2015a, Puetter 2016 and Sjursen 2011) is the preferred method for seeking consensus in new intergovernmental policy dynamics. It holds that a "quest for consensus triggers permanent attempts at institutional engineering that are aimed at increasing the consensus generation potential of the EU's main forums for member state representation: the European Council and the Council of the European Union" (Puetter 2014:Ch.2). Deliberative intergovernmentalism becomes a major factor to understand why the EU has further integrated without recurring to the traditional supranational structures, preferring intergovernmental policy coordination instead.

The central role of the European Council and the Council seeking consensus and deliberating a wide range of EU policies implies that competences are not transferred to the EU level as in traditional supranationalism, including "the authority to initiate legislation, to define policy more or less independently (...) and to represent the Union internally and externally" (Puetter 2014:Ch.2). New intergovernmentalism denies a central premise of supranationalism: the capacity of common institutions such as the Commission to act autonomously in the general interest of the Union, following a transfer of decision-making powers (Bickerton, Hodson and Puetter 2015a). New intergovernmentalism does neither foresee a major scope for the "formal delegation of policy initiative and leadership functions to the supranational level" (Puetter 2014:Ch.2).

However, when delegation of powers occurs, new intergovernmentalism understands that *de novo* bodies are created and empowered to fulfil new functions (Bickerton, Hodson and Puetter 2015a). The EEAS as an "autonomous body" acting under the authority of the HR/VP is a case in point (Bickerton, Hodson and Puetter 2015a, 2015b), yet it is understood as a vehicle for

coordinating the activities and resources of member states and EU institutions such as the Commission rather than "working on the principle of delegating executive competences to a genuinely supranational administration" (Puetter 2014:Ch.4). The EEAS is considered more as a tool for coordination than for policy initiative, leadership and policy definition, aimed at supporting "intergovernmental consensus generation at the political level" (Puetter 2014:Ch.1).

Contrary to traditional supranational premises, "the insistence on the ultimate nation state sovereignty is one assumption on which deliberative intergovernmentalism as an analytical framework is based" (Puetter 2014:Ch 2). Member states receive most attention when compared to supranational institutions so consensus generation at the intergovernmental level is constant in "all stages of the policy-making process, including the initiation and development of the policy, the agreement of specific guidelines and objectives and the collective monitoring of policy implementation - as opportunities to delegate particular functions to supranational decision-making are limited" (Puetter 2014:Ch.2). The preferred decision-making procedure under new intergovernmentalism premises has been summarised as follows: "wherever the EU exercises political authority in new areas of activity, it prefers to do so by coordinating national policies and the use of national resources within collective bodies for joint member state decision-making: the European Council and the Council" (Puetter 2014:Ch.1)

The written outcome of deliberations of the European Council and the Council in the form of Council Conclusions are the preferred empirical evidence to assess the policy-making practices under a new intergovernmentalist analytical framework (Puetter 2014:Ch.3). Council Conclusions are also an instrument for exercising leadership both at the EU and member state levels (Puetter 2014:Ch.2). For CFSP and external action in general, the FAC Conclusions[27] should provide evidence to validate the premises of new intergovernmentalism and the preference for deliberative and consensus-seeking practices. Process-tracing and lesson-drawing constitute the preferred methodological tools (Puetter 2014:Ch.1).

[27] Refer to footnote 50 in the following chapter for a description of the policy-making process of the FAC Conclusions.

In a sense, however, new intergovernmentalism has a more pronounced focus on the overall political dimension than specific policy developments. The theory is portrayed as a novel contribution to contemporary European integration, helping to determine "the character and direction" of the integration process since Maastricht (Bickerton, Hodson and Puetter 2015a:706). As it has been mentioned before, the areas where specific policy developments have been most tested against the premises of new intergovernmentalism are economic governance under the Economic and Monetary Union (see for instance Howarth and Quaglia 2015). New intergovernmentalism also claims to be particularly valid to analyse the policy-making dynamics in social and employment policy coordination (Puetter 2014), Justice and Home Affairs (Wolff 2015) as well as the foreign, security and defence policy. In this regard, new intergovernmentalism has been used to understand the consensus formation dynamics in CFSP and CSDP, emphasizing their "distinctive character as an area based on intergovernmental policy coordination" (Puetter 2014:Ch.1).

The pre-eminently intergovernmental nature of CFSP and CSDP and the consensus seeking efforts within the Council of Ministers are considered as substantial reasons for testing these policies against a new intergovernmentalist theoretical debate (Smith 2015, Amadio Viceré 2016). Smith (2015) argues that new intergovernmentalism's focus on member states, their reluctance to grant more powers to the European Commission and the set-up of the EEAS validate relevant premises of the new intergovernmentalism.

Smith (2015) and Amadio Viceré (2016), however, apply new intergovernmentalism to a "purely" intergovernmental policy, falling within the former second pillar of the EU, and do not cover additional aspects of today's external action (more on this distinction in the next chapter)[28]. Amadio Viceré (2016) provides interesting insights about the policy-making process of the EU

[28] A similar endeavour is made by Karolina Pomorska and Uwe Puetter in "The Two Pillars of New Intergovernmentalism. How CFSP and EMU have shaped Post-Maastricht EU Governance", a paper presented at UACES 2016. http://www.uaces.org/events/conferences/london/papers/abstract.php?paper_id=137#.WO4I91IznBI [last accessed: 31 August 2017]

policy on Kosovo, arguing that the European Council plays the role of agenda-setting and grants leeway to the FAC and the HR/VP to implement and further develop the policy decided at the European Council. She also witnesses overlaps between foreign policy and EU enlargement policy, which falls within the realm of the European Commission-led policies.

Finally, Amadio Viceré (2016) discusses the role of the HR/VP as "policy initiator", which will also be studied in this thesis in external action strategy-making. She concludes that "despite being a member of the Commission, the HR only plays a role as a policy initiator as far as her activities are backed by consensus within the FAC" (Puetter and Fabbrini 2016:637). This leads to the conclusion that, under a new intergovernmentalist perspective, "policy initiative is either exercised collectively by supranational and intergovernmental institutions or concentrated at the level of the European Council and the Council" (Puetter and Fabbrini 2016:641).

The use of new intergovernmentalism as an evolution of the traditional intergovernmental-supranational debate provides thus a good theoretical basis for two different reasons. On the one hand, its emphasis on post-Maastricht EU politics coincides in time with the birth and consolidation of CFSP as a prominent EU policy and the emergence of external action in the Lisbon Treaty. However, despite its focus on the post-Maastricht period, the theoretical underpinnings of new intergovernmentalism are much more recent (its major works have been published from 2014 onwards), so it is still an underdeveloped theoretical approach to EU integration, particularly if we take into account the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty.

On the other hand, since new intergovernmentalism has been chiefly applied to areas other than external action, the empirical interest to use it as a theoretical debate for this area of EU activity increases[29]. Thaler (2016) has used new

[29] Puetter (2014:Ch.2) acknowledges the lack of research on CFSP and CSDP decision-making under the framework of new intergovernmentalism. It must be noted, however, that Puetter does not place as much emphasis as this thesis on the distinction between foreign policy and external relations, conforming external action. According to him, "the area of foreign, security and defence policy ('FP') includes all external affairs activities that fall under the CFSP and CSDP frameworks"

intergovernmentalism to assess the agenda-setting mechanisms in the Energy Union. Energy policy is not part of the EU's external action, as defined by Part V of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), more on this in the next chapter), but can be considered -likewise to external action- a hybrid area of EU activity.

Puetter and Fabbrini (2016) refer to "mixed areas" of decision-making such as energy policy, justice and home affairs policy as "aspects of external relations in which traditional community instruments overlap with the intergovernmental foreign and security policy, [which leads] to modifications in the application of community method decision-making" (Puetter and Fabbrini 2016:641). This also applies to external action, although this thesis will prefer to use the term of "hybrid policy area", in line with the terminological discussion provided at the beginning of the next chapter. Michael Smith has also used the term "hybridity" to refer to the EU's external relations, which are characterised by the existence of different logics in institutions and policies or "a political, institutional and legal structure derived from heterogeneous sources, or composed of elements of different or incongruous kinds" (Smith 2012:700).

Hybrid areas are characterised by a strong involvement of both intergovernmental and supranational institutions (the European Commission in this case). No similar effort assessing the premises of new intergovernmentalism in external action (another "hybrid area") since the Lisbon Treaty can be found in the literature. Rightly so, the proponents of new intergovernmentalism call for the development of further research in policy areas not covered so far, particularly those where there is an overlap between traditional community instruments and the

(Puetter 2014:Ch.3). As it will be further elaborated in the next chapter, it is a departing premise of this thesis that the Lisbon Treaty introduces a ground-breaking novelty in the Union's foreign policy when creating external action, comprised of foreign policy (or CFSP/CSDP) and external relations (the rest of the foreign policies traditionally in the hands of the European Commission). The focus on mixed competences areas such as external action is thus an underdeveloped field of study of new intergovernmentalism and involves "a mix of intergovernmental policy coordination and classic community method decision-making" (Puetter 2014:Ch.3)

intergovernmental CFSP, that is, external action (Puetter and Fabbrini 2016:641)[30].

Table 2.3. The main characteristics of new intergovernmentalism[31]

	New intergovernmentalism
Degree of centralization	Low
Role of European Council	Centre of political gravity: overall political direction and day-to-day leadership
Role(s) of Commission	Predominant in traditional community policy areas; marginal in hybrid policy areas
Role of Council of Ministers	Policy definition and coordination, central political decision-making institution, deliberation and consensus-seeking.
Role of European Parliament	Limited
Impact of European Court of Justice	Limited
Member governments	Key players, coordinated in the European Council and the Council
***De novo* bodies (i.e. EEAS)**	Coordination of activities and resources of member states, no supranational competences, support of intergovernmental consensus generation
Engagement of other actors	Not foreseen
Period of pre-eminence	1990s onwards (since the Maastricht Treaty)
Prime examples	Economic and Monetary Union (and CFSP/CSDP to a lesser extent)

2.4. Conclusions: reviving the intergovernmental-supranational debate

New intergovernmentalism has generated intense scholarly exchanges that, in a sense, bring the traditional debate between supranationalism and intergovernmentalism back to the centre of EU integration discussions. Where

[30] As indicated by the main proponents of new intergovernmentalism, this thesis will contribute to combine broad reflections "with the analysis of specific, empirically testable instances of EU policy-making and institutional development" (Bickerton, Hodson and Puetter 2015a: 717), insomuch it will be aimed at bridging current analytical and empirical gaps with regards to the process of strategy-making and with particular emphasis to the role of the HR/VP and the EEAS under the Lisbon Treaty.

[31] This table departs from Wallace (2010:93-93), although it has been adapted to reflect the main characteristics of new intergovernmentalism.

Bickerton, Hodson and Puetter (2015a) see a rise in the Council's activity and the centrality of intergovernmental procedures, supranationalists seek to demonstrate that both traditional EU institutions and *de novo* bodies have gained new competences and exert an unprecedented autonomy of action that make them crucial actors in today's EU governance. New intergovernmentalism and new supranationalism have recently started a debate about who is actually "in control" of EU governance (Schmidt 2016) and whether the EU is witnessing a trend towards "supranational intergovernmentalism" (Howorth 2010) or "intergovernmental supranationalism" (Schmidt 2016:6).

Most of this debate has taken place in the policy areas most covered by new intergovernmentalism – i.e. economic policies and Eurozone governance. Renaud Dehousse argues that in "macroeconomic policy or banking regulation supranational institutions have seen their discretionary powers significantly enhanced", conforming what he calls the era of "new supranationalism" (Dehousse 2015). Dehousse problematizes the focus on the member states' capacity to shape the EU's response to the Euro crisis (above all due to the character of the crisis and the "deep contrasts" among member states) and sees large degrees of autonomy of action by supranational institutions such as the European Central Bank (Dehousse 2015:22, Dehousse 2016).

More central to the contents of this thesis are the claims that supranational institutions have gained further competences in certain new policy areas and that *de novo* bodies have also gained larger degrees of autonomy. In a debate on "whether intergovernmental or supranational institutions dominate the policy making process", Schimmelfennig (2015a) argues that "even the Commission has gained additional competences over time in justice and home affairs, foreign policy and economic policy" (Schimmelfennig 2015a:724-725).

There is currently a research gap in the literature –which this thesis aims to address- validating the "additional competences" of *de novo* EU bodies against the premises of new intergovernmentalism in hybrid policy areas such as external action. In other words, if the birth of external action with the Lisbon Treaty has

also increased the role of the HR/VP and the EEAS, then the premises of new intergovernmentalism would only be part of a traditional, two-sided debate between intergovernmentalism and supranationalism.

The research on the institutional implications of external action presented here will also contribute to shed light on what both Bickerton, Hodson and Puetter (2015a) and Schimmelfennig (2015a:727) consider is one of the most promising research potential of new intergovernmentalism: the focus on "new areas of activity". The study of the different policy-making procedures in "old areas" such as the CFSP and "new areas" such as external action would contribute to advance a shortcoming of new intergovernmentalism, as required by Schimmelfennig: the lack of reflection in "any theoretical propositions at the policy level" on these new areas (Schimmelfennig 2015a:728).

In addition, research on external action will further advance the study of the role of *de novo* bodies such as the EEAS and the HR/VP in post-Lisbon policy-making, contributing to assess another claim of new intergovernmentalism and its critiques on the "considerable autonomy" that "newly created institutions" often enjoy (Bickerton, Hodson and Puetter 2015a:705 and Schimmelfennig 2015a:724). Schimmelfennig (2015a:724) bases his critique on the fact that "'de novo bodies' display a wide variation of intergovernmental and supranational features", something that the study of the policy-making process of the EU strategies will seek to elucidate.

The theoretical debate presented in this chapter will be complemented in the next chapter with the study of policy-making processes in foreign policy, external relations and external action, particularly since the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty The empirical chapters of this thesis (based on the two most important documents in EU strategy-making, the ESS and the EUGS) will enable the assessment of the policy-making dynamics in the fields of foreign policy and external action and shed light into scholar discussions such as the intergovernmental-supranational debate and its evolution in the form of new intergovernmentalism, as presented in this chapter.

CHAPTER 3

POLICY-MAKING IN EU FOREIGN POLICY, EXTERNAL RELATIONS AND EXTERNAL ACTION

3.1. Introduction

The contents of the book *A Common Foreign Policy for Europe?* (Peterson and Sjursen 1998) provide an illustrative example of the disputed visions of what actually EU external action is. In this book, several authors contend their visions about either the CFSP or external relations being the central elements of external action. Fraser Cameron puts forward the idea that EU foreign policy should certainly be understood as the intergovernmental mechanisms that have enabled the Union to build a "common foreign policy", otherwise called the CFSP (Cameron 1998). On the other hand, Michael Smith (1998:77) acknowledges that despite "it is inevitable that attention centres on the (...) the 'high politics' of security and defence", focusing on the CFSP "blinds us to important elements of the development of the EU's (...) external economic relations and external economic policies, [which] are at the core of EU 'foreign policy'" (Smith 1998:78).

So what is EU external action? Is it the intergovernmental high politics issues of security and defence embodied in the CFSP? Or is it rather the supranational policies of the Commission's external relations? The Lisbon Treaty provides a new terminology by creating an overreaching "external action" structure, bringing together EU foreign policy and external relations. Until its entry into force, the debate between intergovernmental foreign policy and supranational external relations has generated vast academic debates on *what actually* defines the EU's international role and, most importantly, on the different policy-making procedures behind the CFSP and external relations. Indeed, as Wessels acknowledges, these discussions are not "free floating in an open discourse", since the debate "is normally dominated by the controversy between supranational/federal views on one side and intergovernmental/realist approaches on the other" (Wessels 2004:63).

Before entering into the details of the policy-making processes in foreign policy, external relations and external action, it is worth clarifying a semantic and analytical conceptualisation that will be recurrently used in this thesis[32]. The term "foreign policy" will be used to refer to the activities dominated by intergovernmental policy-making procedures, i.e. the CFSP and the CSDP, where the Council of the EU has a leading role. In line with Edwards (2011) and Howorth (2014), foreign policy will be considered to have its roots in the EPC in the 1970s and come fully into place with the set-up of the second pillar of the Maastricht Treaty on the CFSP. The CSDP will be considered as a sub-policy of the CFSP, dealing with defence matters and also following a prominently intergovernmental logic (Koutrakos 2013, Howorth 2014 and Pirozzi 2015).

"External relations" will be understood as the external activities of the European Commission. The origins of policies such as external trade and development cooperation can be traced back to the times of the European Communities, although the Commission's external relations also includes more recent policies such as environment and energy, which can be considered as the "external dimension of internal policies" (Keukeleire and Delreux 2014:61). While these will be left aside in this thesis, "external relations" will be understood as those policies where the European Commission has a leading role and where decisions are taken following the supranational method[33]. Particular attention will be put to the Common Commercial Policy and Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid, which in the Maastricht logic fell, contrary to CFSP, under the first pillar of the European Communities.

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[32] The literature on EU foreign policy has not reached an agreement yet on the use of a single word to refer to the EU's international relations. See for instance the different terminology used in the major works of the discipline -including monographs such as Jørgensen et. al. (2015), Hill and Smith (2011), Barbé (2014), Smith (2014) and Keukeleire and Delreux (2014)- as well as chapters in prominent EU textbooks - including Giegerich and Wallace (2010), Nugent (2010), Hix (1999). All these works have different understandings of what EU foreign policy is or, put differently, the ontological understanding of the EU activities when acting externally. Some refer to "external relations" to cope with all EU international policies (Nugent 2010), others speak about the "international relations" of the EU (Hill and Smith 2011, Barbé 2014), others about its "global policies" (Bretherton and Vogler 2006, Hix 1999) and others about "foreign policy" (Jørgensen 2015 et. al., Smith 2004, Keukeleire and Delreux 2014 and Howorth 2014).

[33] In line with the previous chapter, the use of the term "supranational" will be given preference over the most common use in the literature of the "Community method" (see for instance Dehousse 2011). The choice has been made to adapt the language of this chapter to the previous discussions on the supranational-intergovernmental debate and new intergovernmentalism.

Finally, "external action" will be understood as a policy area encompassing both foreign policy and external relations. Following the logic of the Lisbon Treaty, the emergence of the Union's external action is an institutional innovation aimed at enhancing the coherence of the Union's international relations (more on this below). Indeed, the TEU includes a Title V on the "general provisions on the Union's external action and specific provisions of the CFSP", where both external relations and foreign policy are located. However, as the wording of Title V recalls, specific provisions apply to the CFSP, derived from its intergovernmental nature (see below). Part Five of the TFEU is also dedicated to the Union's external action, although here specific guidelines are provided for trade, association and cooperation agreements, enlargement, development cooperation, sanctions and humanitarian aid. So contrary to the TEU, the TFEU attributes external action only to what we called before "external relations". This thesis will prefer the TEU's logic of external action, covering both external relations and the CFSP, with its "specific provisions"[34].

All in all, external action will be considered a "hybrid area" of EU policy-making, combining the policy-making processes of both intergovernmental foreign policy and supranational external relations. The following sections will be devoted to the analysis of the main institutional features and policy-making processes of foreign policy, external relations (only trade and development) and external action. In all these areas, the previous analytical differences between intergovernmentalism and supranationalism will be reflected into practical policy-making dynamics. The last part of this chapter will refer to policy coherence as a recurrent problem in external action that emanates from the coexistence of both intergovernmental and supranational policy-making dynamics and will look into the institutional developments of the Lisbon Treaty as a way to address it.

[34] Keukeleire and Delreux (2014) prefer to use the TFEU's understanding of external action. In Chapter 9 they analyse the "policy fields that are developed under what the Treaty calls 'external action' (Part Five of the TFEU)" (Keukeleire and Delreux 2014:197). They distinguish external action from EU foreign policy, thus using two terms instead of the three used in this thesis (foreign policy, external relations and external action).

3.2. The EU's foreign policy

The CFSP and CSDP, as part and parcel of the former, are subject to intergovernmental decision-making procedures. In its Title V, the TEU clearly specifies the "specific provisions" of the CFSP, which derive from its primarily intergovernmental nature and the predominant role of the Council and the member states, deciding by unanimity. The predominance of intergovernmentalism is as old as the EPC, but was further reinforced with the creation of the pillar structure after Maastricht, with the CFSP forming the second, intergovernmental pillar (Rummel and Wiedemann 1998, Ohrgaard 2004).

The following sections will review the main policy-making features of EU foreign policy, departing from the Maastricht Treaty and paving the way for the analysis of the main provisions of the Union's external action under the Lisbon Treaty. The institutional reforms under Lisbon have preserved the fundamentally intergovernmental nature of the CFSP and limited the role of supranational institutions in foreign policy, but have generated new policy-making dynamics by creating the external action. This has brought back the intergovernmental-supranational debate to the centre of institutional discussions in this policy area.

3.2.1. The birth of the CFSP in the Maastricht Treaty

Before 1993, EU foreign policy was little more than an effort to coordinate, in the framework of the EPC, the foreign policies of member states, on the basis of good will. With the Maastricht Treaty, Europe’s foreign policy was institutionalised through the establishment of a single institutional framework (the European Union), gathering the European Communities (first pillar), the CFSP (second pillar) and Justice and Home Affairs (third pillar). The pillar structure replaced the existence of the "external policies of the European Communities" and the "policies adopted by the EPC", as reflected in the Single European Act of 1987 (article 30.5).

Regarding the CFSP, Maastricht set up a policy-making system whereby the European Council defined the broad strategic guidelines of the CFSP, which were

then implemented by the foreign affairs ministers in the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC), chaired by the rotating EU presidency. The COREPER II prepared the meetings of the GAERC, although some overlap existed with the Political Committee (the predecessor of the current PSC)[35]. The Political Committee relied on the work of European Correspondents and the working groups of the Council, also formed by national representatives. The Commission, at the same time, was fully "associated" in the discussions of the GAERC and the European Parliament was informed about CFSP issues, although its views were not necessarily incorporated in the decision-making process (Smith 2014:30). Being the CFSP an intergovernmental policy, the European Court of Justice had no jurisdiction over this policy.

Decision-making in the CFSP witnessed some improvements compared to the EPC, albeit keeping its intergovernmental character. The Maastricht Treaty launched two new procedures: the Common Positions and the Joint Actions. Common Positions (article J.2) coordinated national actions of thematic or geographical nature in international organisations and international conferences and required unanimity in the Council for adoption. Member states were supposed to comply with their provisions, in agreement with their national positions. Joint Actions (article J.3) addressed specific situations where operational action by the EU was considered to be required and could be implemented by QMV, following the decision of the Council by unanimity (Smith 2014:32)[36]. They also committed the actions of member states when conducting their own foreign policies. Under Maastricht, the European Commission could submit proposals in the framework of the CFSP, although most actions were initiated by member states, "illustrating the extent to which the Commission was *not* a driving force in the CFSP" (Smith 2014:31, emphasis in original).

[35] COREPER II gathers Permanent Representatives of member states in Brussels at ambassadorial level. It has been defined as “the mother of all committees” (Vanhoonacker and Pomorska 2013), since it prepares the meetings of the European Council, as well as of the most relevant Council configurations. Both before and after the Lisbon Treaty, this body has been chaired by the permanent representative of the country holding the six-monthly presidency.

[36] Member states could oppose the use of QMV for reasons of important national interests, the so-called "national interest brake". QMV did not apply to decisions having military implications (Smith 2014:33).

According to Dashwood (2008:70), the Maastricht Treaty prevented the CFSP from encroaching upon European Community competences. As Geoffrey Edwards notes, member states have always been particularly determined to "keep EPC and then CFSP intergovernmental in terms of structures and procedures and therefore formally separated from the EC [European Community] and the Commission [...] despite a common awareness that the division was artificial and that policy outcomes were often limited as a result" (Edwards 2011:60). Smith also speaks about the desire of policy-makers in both sides to avoid "contamination" of the intergovernmental mechanisms by supranational institutions and vice versa (Smith 2004:7).

In practice, the Maastricht Treaty also compartimentalised the Union's international activities, since the external policies of the European Communities belonged to the first pillar and the CFSP, to the second. Each pillar had different objectives and decision-making mechanisms, but both the Council and the Commission were responsible for ensuring the "consistency" of the Union's external activities (Article 3), which translated into a wish for "observation" rather than an obligation (Nuttall 2000:182-183).

The existence of these two pillars can be considered at the roots of several institutional deficiencies. These included an overlap in decision-making across pillars, a lack of clarity regarding the EU's external representation (which often translated into disagreements between the European Commissioner for External Relations and the rotating Presidency of the Council) and the difficulties for financing the CFSP (Smith 2001: 176-183). The institutional deficiencies of Maastricht were overcome with a series of informal mechanisms (Smith 2001:184-188 and Smith 2004:220-226), which facilitated the conversion of formal intergovernmentalism into consensus seeking as a recurrent practice in decision-making (Smith 2001:185, see also Toje 2008). Not willing to make use of QMV in CFSP (something foreseen in the Maastricht Treaty only in rare occasions), member states tended to reach consensus and to avoid the use of veto powers –or strict intergovernmentalism, as Smith (2014:32) names it. This was in part thanks

to the socialization among member states in the Council, leading to a "reflex of coordination" of national positions (Juncos and Reynolds 2007).

Turf wars on competences between institutions were also reduced by means of policy coordination. The coordination both within the European Commission and the member states representatives in Council bodies such as COREPER II and working groups enabled the smooth functioning of the EU foreign policy (Smith 2001:184-188). Other informal mechanisms were aimed at "creative financing" of the CFSP and overcoming the lack of legal personality of the EU, by means of "mixed agreements", "memorandums of understanding" or "administrative agreements" (Smith 2004:225). All these mechanisms contributed to improve the performance of the CFSP "while also helping to break down the institutional distinction between the first and second pillars of the EU" (Smith 2004:226).

3.2.2. The Treaties of Amsterdam and Nice

Some of these informal mechanisms were codified in the Treaties of Amsterdam and Nice (Smith 2004:226-238). The adoption of "common strategies" (in addition to Maastricht's "common positions" and "joint actions", more on this in the next chapter) facilitated the involvement of the three pillars in a single legal instrument (Smith 2004:227). The Amsterdam Treaty also provided further specifications on the fundamental objectives of the CFSP (Article 11) and adopted new decision-making mechanisms that enabled the use of "constructive abstention", also reinforcing the use of QMV in foreign policy (Smith 2014:32-33), except for "important and stated reasons of national policy" (article 23.2). This provision drew a red line on the communitarisation of the CFSP and ensured that consensus remained the actual rule in CFSP (Smith 2004:228).

The most important innovation of the Amsterdam Treaty was however the establishment of the figure of the High Representative for the CFSP (HR) (Allen 1998:55). "*Mister PESC*" was meant to assist the rotating presidency of the EU in CFSP affairs and was also the Secretary-General of the Council (his primary task according to Article 18.3, which stated that the presidency "shall be assisted by the

Secretary-General of the Council who shall exercise the function of High Representative"). The office of the HR was assisted by the "CFSP Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit" housed in the Council General Secretariat. This unit, commonly referred to as the "Policy Unit", was formed by officials from the 15 member states, the Commission and the Council Secretariat. Some members of the Policy Unit had a double-hatted status, being simultaneously part of the Council Secretariat (as part of the DG for External and Politico-Military affairs, DGE) and representatives of member states. Other members were seconded officials to the Policy Unit under the direct supervision of Solana, his chief of cabinet and the director of the Policy Unit. The Policy Unit provided daily policy guidance and early warning advice to the HR and acted as an extension of his personal cabinet, being described as Solana's "eyes and ears" (Cameron 2012:54).

The creation of the post of the HR triggered some concerns in policy implementation and external representation matters. CFSP was then participated by a "Troika arrangement", including the HR, the Commissioner for External Relations and the rotating presidency. For some time, Javier Solana as the EU's HR and Chris Patten as External Relations Commissioner established a working relationship by which Solana played a political and outreach role and Patten focused on the CFSP's economic aspects.

But despite this arrangement, uneasy relations between them also surfaced: as HR, Solana could not initiate policies (this was the prerogative of the Commission in external relations areas or the rotating presidency and member states in CFSP) and had fewer financial resources than the Commission (Smith 2004:230). Some have summarised this duality as an "obscure institutional difficulty (…) mediatised as a personal duel" and provoking "institutional inconsistency" (Nuttall 2001). Cross-pillar tensions also affected other policy areas such as the response to emergencies or the European Neighbourhood Policy, where the Commission had long established responsibilities (Bretherton and Vogler 2006:176, Börzel and van Hüllen 2014).

The Amsterdam Treaty also formally established the PSC, an intergovernmental body within the realm of the CFSP, based in Brussels and formed by Ambassadors of member states. Its *de facto* birth took place with the launch of the first crisis management operations under the Treaty of Nice (Keukeleire and Delreux 2014:37). The PSC has been defined as the "linchpin" of the foreign and security policy of the EU (Duke 2005), since it monitors international crisis and defines the priorities of the EU in foreign security and defence matters. As Duke notes, it deals "with all aspects of the CFSP, including the ESDP and, in case of a military crisis management operation, the PSC [exercises], under the authority of the Council, the political and strategic direction of the operations" (Duke 2005: 16).

As it was the case with the Political Committee, the PSC is participated by an official of the European Commission, with the aim to ensure the link between the CFSP and external relations and include a longer-term perspective on crisis management, including post-conflict reconstruction or longer-term development policies (Duke 2005:20). From its creation until the Lisbon Treaty, the ambassador of the member state assuming the six-monthly rotating presidency chaired the PSC[37]. For the performance of its duties, the PSC works with the support of the Nicolaidis group, a working group of the Council composed of counsellors from the Permanent Representations of member states entrusted to coordinate the work of the PSC.

Finally, the Amsterdam and Nice treaties also introduced the formula of "full association" of the Commission in CFSP matters (Bretherton and Vogler 2006:175). This translated into the participation of the External Relations Commissioner in the meetings of the GAERC, where coordination between CFSP initiatives and matters falling within the European Communities was ensured. Lower bodies of the Council of the EU also contributed to facilitate coordination between the CFSP and other external relations policies of the European Commission.

[37] With the Lisbon Treaty, the chairmanship of the PSC is assumed by a stable president appointed by the HR/VP and part of the EEAS organizational structure, with the aim to ensure coherence and a long-term vision for foreign policy and security and defence matters.

3.2.3. The European Convention and the European Constitution

The European Council of December 2001 in Laeken convened with the conviction that the agreements reached in the Treaty of Nice were not sufficient to upgrade the role of the Union at the global stage. This meeting called for the establishment of a Convention for the Future of Europe and opened the door to the drafting of a Constitution for Europe (European Council 2001). The European Convention was formed by 11 working groups, with Group VII dedicated to External Action and Group VIII to Defence. The conclusions of Group VII identified the institutional deficits of the EU's international role since the Treaty of Amsterdam. These related to the increasing number of actors involved in external action (the HR, the Commissioner for External Relations and the rotating Presidency), and the lack of institutional links between the Council (in charge of the definition of priorities in CFSP and ESDP) and the financial resources available in the EU budget, administrated by the Commission.

The Group VII suggested a series of improvements. First, it aimed at abolishing the pillar structure in the EU and including all aspects of external action under a single Title (which would become the Title V of the Constitutional Treaty), albeit keeping different institutional arrangements for each policy. Second, it asked for the definition of a single set of principles and objectives of EU external action to ensure the coherence of its different policies. Third, it requested the formation of an External Action Council (instead of the present GAERC) to implement the strategic objectives and interests identified by the European Council in external action. And fourth, it aimed at merging the positions of the HR and the Commissioner for External Relations by making the later a Vice-President of the Commission and head of a specific EEAS to enhance the coherence of external action (European Convention 2002a).

During the debates of the European Convention, some representatives saw an opportunity for transferring supranationalism to all aspects of external action, while others remained committed to intergovernmentalism, particularly for the CFSP. The European Convention circumvented this debate by focusing on the

improvement of the institutional aspects of external action, since "further extension of aspects of the Community method to CFSP were simply not there" (Grevi 2007:804). In addition, as Nuttall (2004) notes, the pillars under the Constitution would continue to exist despite their formal disappearance, since "the erosion of the differences between Pillars 1 and 2 [did] not imply the communitarisation of the CFSP".

The text of the draft Constitution preserved a remarkable amount of the recommendations of the Convention. Legal provisions such as the integration of the different treaties and the end the pillar structure were accepted. A series of values were mentioned as guiding principles of the Union's relations with the wider world[38]. Its title V merged the provisions of the CFSP with external relations policies, setting-up the "Union's External Action". A key change introduced by the Constitution was that CFSP and CSDP were brought under the umbrella of external action, alongside the common commercial policy, development policy, and other external policies. According to Cremona, this was an attempt "to bring the CFSP into the same Treaty as Community-origin competences, under the same institutional framework and with some integration of legal instruments, but at the same time to preserve to some extent the differentiated character of the CFSP competence" (Cremona 2003:1353).

In addition, the Constitution created the post of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, which "intended to bridge the gap not only between the Council and the Commission, but also between the CFSP/CSDP and the other elements of Union external policy" (Cremona 2003:1355) thus unifying the Union's foreign policy and external relations. The Minister would have a formal right of initiative, contributing with his proposals to the development of the Union's external action. It would become a double-hatted official, exercising both the offices of the Vice-President of the Commission and the HR. As Grevi has noted, the European

[38] The text read as follows: "In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values and interests. It shall contribute to peace, security, the sustainable development of the earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and protection of human rights and in particular children's rights, as well as to strict observance and development of international law, including respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter." See Cremona (2003) for further details.

Constitution, if adopted, would have succeeded in "endowing the Union with an institutional 'centre of gravity' to conduct external relations" (Grevi 2007:800). However, the introduction of institutional reforms both in foreign policy and external relations did not threaten the fundamental intergovernmental character of decision-making in the CFSP.

To conclude this section, the following table provides a summary view of the policy-making processes in foreign policy and the role of the main EU institutions, (adapted from Wallace 2010:92-93). This table puts forward the main characteristics of the EU's foreign policy as an intergovernmental policy, taking into account the central role of member states and the limited functions of EU institutions.

Table 3.1. Policy-making in foreign policy: the CFSP

	Intergovernmentalism in foreign policy: the CFSP
Degree of centralization	Low: member states dominate the policy-making process
Role of European Council	Sets the broad strategic guidelines
Role(s) of Commission	Low: associated with the discussions and is able to submit proposals on external relations
Role of Council of Ministers (decision rule)	Central: decision-making by unanimity (with a few exceptions)
Role of European Parliament	Consultative: it must be kept informed about the progress of CFSP
Impact of European Court of Justice	No jurisdiction (with minor exceptions)
Member governments	Control of the CFSP and right of initiative
Engagement of other actors	Low: limited influence of policy networks

3.3. The EU's external relations

As previously mentioned, decision-making in EU external relations follows a completely different logic than in foreign policy. If the CFSP is the natural inheritor of intergovernmental decision-making, external relations follow the supranational logic. As noted in the beginning of this chapter, some scholars consider that

external relations should be considered the most prominent feature of the Union's action in international relations, both as a consequence of their long history, the amount of resources they mobilise or their effective impact in the international scene (Smith 1998).

Chief among these external relations policies are the Common Commercial Policy and Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid, which are two prominent examples where the EU has exclusive competence and shared competence. In areas of exclusive competence such as trade, "only the EU has the power to legislate and adopt legally binding acts ", according to article 3 of the TFEU (Keukeleire and Delreux 2014:95). In areas of shared competence where the pre-emption principle applies (such as environment or agriculture), "both the EU and the member states can legislate and adopt legally binding acts in a specific area, but the member states can only exercise their competence to the extent that the EU has not yet exercised its competence" (Keukeleire and Delreux 2014:95). In areas of shared competence where the pre-emption principle does not apply "the EU is competent to carry out activities and conduct a common policy, but in so doing it does not prevent member states from also carrying out activities and conducting a national policy" (Keukeleire and Delreux 2014:95-96). Development cooperation and humanitarian aid are examples of this last category of policies[39].

3.3.1. The Common Commercial Policy

The EU's trade policy is as old as the European Economic Community and one of the most prominent policies placed under supranational competence (Poletti and De Bièvre 2013). The Common Commercial Policy was already included in the Treaty of Rome of 1957 and its importance as an external relations policy has grown ever since, given that the EU is the world's largest trading bloc and that it has a market larger than the United States'. The links between the Common Commercial Policy and foreign policy are deep: since the Lisbon Treaty, both are

[39] For the sake of simplification, no examples will be provided for areas of shared competence where the pre-emption principle applies, as neither will be other external relations policies such as association and cooperation agreements, enlargement or sanctions. Further analysis on these policies can be found in Keukeleire and Delreux 2014:Ch.9.

part of the Union's external action (and must thus follow their principles and objectives -more on this in the next section), trade has become an essential instrument through sanctions or support measures and, if poorly executed, trade can also undermine foreign and development objectives of the EU such as poverty reduction (Keulekeire and Delreux 2014:200).

The Common Commercial Policy follows the principles of liberal trade and opening up of markets, including the lowering of customs and removing barriers, and covers trade in goods, services, property rights and foreign direct investment. Trade agreements take a number of different forms, including "pure" trade agreements (based on article 207 TFEU under the Common Commercial Policy and where the EU has exclusive competence), trade and economic cooperation agreements (which use a combination of article 207 TFEU, article 218 TFEU and other articles if they are linked to development or non-development cooperation), association agreements (based on article 217 TFEU and establishing rights and obligations with and towards third countries) and agreements with the EU's southern and eastern neighbours (based on article 8 TEU) (see Nugent 2010:372-375 and Keukeleire and Delreux 2014:203-207).

As part of the Union's external relations, the Common Commercial Policy follows the ordinary legislative procedure as defined in the Lisbon Treaty (Cremona 2017: 40-56). The European Parliament and the Council -by QMV- co-decide on the basis of a proposal from the Commission (Keulekeire and Delreux 2014:97). The Commission has the exclusive right of initiative, which makes it a pivotal actor in trade policy (Vanhoonacker 2011:79). Institutionally speaking, the Commission still has the upper hand vis-à-vis the EEAS in trade policy, since DG trade has not been brought within the EEAS structure and "continues to have a strong independent presence" (Cremona 2017:40). The rules for making decisions on the Common Commercial Policy have been supranational "right from the start" (Smith 2014:29), so today the "standard procedure" for trade agreements (according to article 207 TFEU) is as follows[40]:

[40] The procedure described here is an expanded version of the one presented in Nugent (2012:374-375), who describes the simplified procedure for standard trade agreements. It is worth noting that some factors complicate decision-making in trade negotiations. As it has been noted, some trade

- The Commission makes a recommendation to the FAC to open negotiations for a trade agreement with a third country or organisation.
- COREPER II discusses the recommendation and places it in the agenda of the FAC[41]. Negotiations previous to the Council also take place in the Trade Policy Committee, which meets in Brussels once a week at the deputies level and monthly at full members level, and is formed by trade experts from the member states and chaired by the rotating presidency (Vanhoonacker 2011:80).
- The FAC decides on the recommendation and gives the Commission a negotiating directive, setting the guidelines and a mandate. On the basis of the mandate, the Commission negotiates the trade agreement on behalf of the 28 member states, with the DG Trade taking a leading role -and thus making the portfolio of the Commissioner for trade a crucial one within external action (Vanhoonacker 2011:80). Since the Lisbon Treaty, the trade Commissioner coordinates with the HR/VP and the EEAS, in line with the policy-making procedures in external action (more details below). The HR/VP also ensures the involvement of other DGs of the Commission such as Development, Competition or Agriculture, as needed.
- The Commission regularly reports to the Council on the proceedings of the negotiation, so member states keep a "steady eye" via the negotiations in the Trade Policy Committee (Smith 2014:29). The European Parliament is also regularly informed about the progress of the negotiations (Nugent 2010:375). The Council can take decisions by QMV in trade agreements but usually proceeds by consensus (Nugent 2010:374). Unanimity is required for association agreements (Smith 2014:29). Since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the consent of the European Parliament is also required to conclude an agreement (Keukeleire and Delreux 2014:98, Vanhoonacker 2011:81).
- The Commission implements the trade agreement on the basis of a conferral of implementing powers, under the control of member states. The European Court of

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agreements are also part of association agreements, which are ruled by article 218 TFEU. This means that some agreements have "several legal basis", also if they cover issues such as environmental policy or belong to what is known as "mixed agreements", i.e., agreements that cover areas which fall under the competence of the EU and member states (see Keukeleire and Delreux 2014:99). A summary of the policy-making procedures for trade policy can be found here: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/policy-making/ [last accessed: 31 August 2017]

[41] When trade issues are on the agenda, the FAC is not chaired by the HR/VP but by the rotating presidency (Vanhoonacker 2011:80)

Justice has jurisdiction over the Common Commercial Policy and its powers often go unnoticed but are crucial (Vanhoonacker 2011:80), having developed the "doctrine of implied powers", according to which a ruling of the European Court of Justice permitted the (then) Community institutions to act externally (Young 2000:102).

All along the policy-making process, interest groups and lobbies operate to defend the interests of companies in trade regulations. Interest group pressure is exercised mostly by European exporting companies (Dür 2008b), although several protest groups have also targeted the institutions in charge of the Common Commercial Policy for instance when signing association agreements with undemocratic regimes abusing human rights (Nugent 2010:376).

3.3.2. Development cooperation and humanitarian aid

Development cooperation falls within areas of shared EU competence. This means that the exercise of this policy by the Union "may not result in member states being prevented from exercising theirs" (Article 4(4) TFEU). Development is thus characterised by "the parallel existence of 28+1 development policies" (Keukeleire and Delreux 2014:212). Nonetheless, put together, the EU's and the member states Official Development Assistance makes the EU the largest donor, providing over 50% of the world's assistance (Vanhoonacker 2011:82).

The shared competence of development cooperation is visible in the distribution of Official Development Assistance resources between the EU and member states. The latter account for 90% of the funds in development aid (Vanhoonacker 2011:82) and also manage a separate fund for African, Caribbean and Pacific countries, the European Development Fund. For this Fund, member states are responsible for the agreement on the spending and orientation of the funds and the Commission for their management. In the case of the Commission's own budget for Development aid, "decisions on the size and allocation of the aid budget are done through the supranational Community budgetary process" (Smith 2014:30). The shared competence nature of development aid thus translates into a

simultaneous existence of the supranational and intergovernmental methods for the Commission's managed aid programmes and the European Development Fund, respectively.

Policy-making processes in Development cooperation follow the co-decision procedure, so the most important institutions are the Commission, the FAC and the European Parliament (although its powers are limited to the aid that is funded from the EU budget) (Vanhoonacker 2011:85). In addition to managing the European Development Fund, the European Commission negotiates cooperation and association agreements with Third World countries. Different DGs implement and develop a coordinating role of the different development policies, while the EEAS is responsible for the first phases of the policy cycle (programming, identification and formulation) (Vanhoonacker 2011:85).

In addition to the programmes at the EU level, member states conduct their national development policies. The role of the Commission, in addition to being a donor, involves coordination and benchmarking tasks for national development policies. It also ensures that EU development policy pursues the principle of coherence with other external action policies, coordination between the EU and member states action and complementarity between policies and programmes of the EU and member states (Keukeleire and Delreux 2014:212-213).

Finally, on humanitarian aid (article 214 TFEU), the Commission also manages the funds provided by the EU through a separate agency, ECHO. This agency manages the whole project cycle and has a larger degree of flexibility in funds allocation, due to the nature of humanitarian emergencies. This means that ECHO acts "relatively autonomously from the College of Commissioners and the Council since it is able to take decisions through fast-track procedure" (Keukeleire and Delreux 2014:220). Humanitarian aid is also a shared EU competence so, taken together, the EU and its member states are by far the most important donor of humanitarian aid (Keukeleire and Delreux 2014:220).

The following table provides a summary view of the most important decision-making processes and the role of the main EU institutions in the Common Commercial Policy as a prime example of the Union's external relations (adapted from Wallace 2010:92-93). It provides a simplified description of the EU's external relations as a supranational policy, taking into account the central role of EU institutions (particularly the European Commission) and in opposition to the intergovernmental policy-making dynamics described in the previous section.

Table 3.2. Policy-making in external relations: the Common Commercial Policy

	Supranationalism in external relations: the Common Commercial Policy[42]
Degree of centralization	High: EU has exclusive competence
Role of European Council	Rare: negotiations take place at the Council
Role(s) of Commission	Central: Makes a recommendation to open a negotiation Negotiates trade agreements on the basis of a mandate by the Council Implements trade policy
Role of Council of Ministers (decision rule)	Discusses the Commission's recommendation and agrees on a mandate Can take decisions by QMV but unanimity is more common Oversees negotiation and implementation of trade agreements
Role of European Parliament	Co-decision Gives consent to trade agreements
Impact of European Court of Justice	Has jurisdiction
Member governments	Member states are subordinate to EU and don't have the power to legislate
Engagement of other actors	Interest groups and human rights defenders exert pressure on Commission and member states

[42] The contents here relate to the Common Commercial Policy and not Development Cooperation and Humanitarian aid as external relations policies because the former can be considered a more pure supranational policy where the EU has the exclusive competence. The latter is, on the contrary, a shared competence between the EU and member states.

3.4. The recurrent quest for coherence

Coherence has been a constant preoccupation of officials and experts alike when assessing the EU's performance in international relations and derives from the very nature of EU foreign policy and external relations as areas governed by different policy-making procedures. As long as foreign policy has remained prominently intergovernmental and external relations supranational, the problem of coherence has resurfaced time and again. The literature on EU foreign policy has kept track of this preoccupation, although scholars have not yet agreed a single definition of "coherence". Several terms have been used to define a similar set of policy propositions, including coherence, consistency, coordination or even absence of contradictions. Among these different understandings, the distinction between coherence and consistency has attracted a large number of academic debates (see for instance Gebhard 2011, Nuttall 2005, Smith 2004, Tietje 1997, Bretherton and Vogler 2006, Duke 2011).

Some prefer to use of the term "consistency" when analysing the EU's external action. As Gebhard reminds us, this is the preferred term in English language, which translates into the French "cohérence" or the Spanish "coherencia" (Gebhard 2011:105). The Lisbon Treaty prefers to use the term consistency when dealing with the external action of the EU. Within Title V, Chapter 1 on the "General Provisions of the Union's external action", Article 21.3 notes: "The Union shall ensure consistency between the different areas of its external action and between these and its other policies. The Council and the Commission, assisted by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, shall ensure that consistency and shall cooperate to that effect." The Treaty also acknowledges the task of the HR/VP to ensure the "consistency" of the Union's external action in Article 18.4 TEU. Since it is the term preferred by the Treaty, there is a good legal reason to prefer the use of the term consistency over coherence.

However, there are also good reasons to prefer the use "coherence" instead. First, there is a legal argument. As Broberg (2012) has noted, the term consistency can be understood to be located in the Treaty in those sections dealing with the

Union's external relations only. Since, as we have mentioned above, external action includes both the EU's foreign policy (or CFSP) and external relations, the Treaty prefers to use the term "consistency" in Chapter 1, which is the one focusing on the General Provisions on the Union's external action, but not in the one for the CFSP (Chapter 2). In a sense, the Treaty is distinguishing between external action and CFSP (although this thesis considers the latter to be part of the former). This has led Broberg to understand that "this provision [on consistency] is not concerned with consistency regarding the Union's external activities [in our understanding, external action] as it does not cover CFSP" (Broberg 2012:189).

This is further understood with the reference to coherence in the TFEU, whose Article 7 states "the Union shall ensure consistency between its policies and activities, taking all of its objectives into account and in accordance with the principle of conferral or powers". According to Broberg, this means that, when requiring the consistency of external action, the Treaties are referring to "the common commercial policy, economic, financial and technical cooperation with third countries, and humanitarian aid. It therefore clearly enforces the obligation of consistency weighting on the European Union" (Broberg 2012:189). Under a legal perspective, the use of the term coherence over consistency enables to broaden its scope in terms of the policies under scrutiny, covering the whole of the Union's external action, also the CFSP.

In addition to legal arguments, the academic literature has also given priority to the term coherence over consistency. As Gebhard has noted, "'coherence' is commonly considered as superordinate to the notion of 'consistency'. It is seen as a high stage of structural harmonization. (…). 'Consistency' is thought as a 'minimal requirement' that mainly involves the absence of contradictions" (Gebhard 2011:106). When transferring this to the contents of this thesis, coherence also seems to be better fit for purpose, since it is more adequate to assess the EU's external action as a whole. According to Gautier "coherence encompasses both the absence of contradictions within the external activity in different areas of foreign

policy (consistency), and the establishment of a synergy between these aspects" (Gautier 2004:26)[43].

As a result, as Tietje has noted, the use of "coherence" has more positive connections that "consistency" (or absence of contradictions) (Tietje 1997:211-212). Marangoni further elaborates on this idea, arguing that "consistency means an absence of contradictions between the different dimensions of an action and the primary objective of this action, while coherence requires the creation of synergies between the different dimensions of an action in addition to the absence of contradictions" (Marangoni 2014:46). As a consequence, "coherence is seen as a permanent quest, while incoherence carries a negative baggage" (Marangoni and Raube 2014:473).

When brought to the discussions about the different EU policies on external action, coherence is also understood as a broader concept than consistency. Den Hertog and Stroβ (2013) define policy consistency as "the absence of contradictions within and between individual policies", while they prefer to use policy coherence in reference to "the synergic and systematic support towards the achievement of common objectives within and across individual policies". Along similar lines, Nuttall (2001) has distinguished between three different types of coherence[44]: horizontal, vertical and institutional.

a. Horizontal coherence

It refers to the coherence between the different policies of the EU or, in external action, the sound management and coordination of its different components, foreign policy and external relations. Although the focus here will be on the effects of (in)coherence in external action, horizontal coherence can also apply to policies out of the external action domain such as agriculture, environment or justice and home affairs, to name a few (Nuttall 2001:4)

[43] It must be noted here that Gauttier uses the term foreign policy in the sense that this thesis uses external action. The absence of contradictions that he speaks about can be understood as an absence of contradictions in the different domains of the EU's external action, i.e. foreign policy (or CFSP) and external relations (Gauttier 2004).

[44] Nuttall (2001) prefers to use the term "consistency", although here it will be replaced by "coherence" following the abovementioned criteria.

b. Vertical coherence

The second kind of coherence refers to "the concertation of member-state positions and policies with and in respect of the overall consensus or common position at the Community or Union level" (Gebhard 2011:107), or, in other words, to the coherence between member states and the Union. Referring to this kind of coherence, Nuttall (2001:8) questions "to what extent are Member States prepared to bind their national foreign policies to the outcome of the CFSP, thereby strengthening the EU's position as an international force?". In fields dominated by member states such as the CFSP/CSDP, "one of the central problems of the EU is that it is an unidentified political object, with the member states having different visions about its future" (Cameron 2012:40), so the lack of agreement among EU member states is at the source of vertical incoherence in several issues of external action. Vertical coherence is thus very much linked to previous discussions on "consistency" or the lack of contradictions between what the different actors do in the realm of external action (Tietje 1997).

c. Institutional coherence

Institutional coherence is the most relevant conception of the term for the purpose of this thesis. It is concerned with the "concertation at the Community and the Union level, i.e. with the coordination between the supranational and the intergovernmental spheres of external action, and thereby also between the main institutional entities governing them, meaning the European Commission and the Council of the EU" (Gebhard 2011:107). Since the set-up of the pillar structure in Maastricht and the creation of the CFSP, the question of cross-pillar coordination has been given wide academic and policy attention, particularly due to the increasingly complex interactions between the former pillars and the bureaucratic machineries put forward by since the Treaty of Maastricht (Nuttall 2001:6-7).

Cross-pillar coordination can be considered the original form of institutional coherence. According to Bretherton and Vogler, "in the context of CFSP, coherence problems are greatly exacerbated by the need for cross-pillar coordination –which

is essential if the Community policy instruments, and the Community funding, are to be used to further the political aims of CFSP" (Bretherton and Vogler 2005:175). The need for institutional coherence emanates from two main sources: a material and an institutional viewpoint (Gauttier 2004). From a material perspective, the executive branch of the EU (the European Commission) has not been charged traditionally with the definition of the interests, strategy and political priorities of the Union's foreign policy (defined in the CFSP) although it has been given the budgetary and material resources to implement most of the Union's external action. At the times of Javier Solana as HR and Chris Patten as Commissioner for External Relations, this translated into a "mediatised personal duel", "in spite of the good working relationship between the two men" (Nuttall 2001:7).

From an institutional viewpoint, the "dualism" of the Union's external action emanating from the pillar structure (Gauttier 2004) has forced institutional engineering to reinforce coherence. Cross-pillar coordination has been the preoccupation of each Treaty reform since Maastricht, and institutional arrangements have been the preferred tool to enhance coherence. The Lisbon Treaty formally removed the pillar structure and gave to the EU consolidated legal personality, although it did not fundamentally alter the policy-making system of foreign policy and external relations.

Intergovernmentalism is still the preferred decision-making method in the CFSP and CSDP and external relations are still in the hands of the Union institutions (mostly the European Commission). As a consequence, the need to enhance institutional coherence in external action is still of paramount importance in the Lisbon era. Most efforts have also tackled the institutional concertation of the supranational and intergovernmental spheres, above all via the introduction of a series of institutional arrangements such as the set-up of the EEAS and the creation of the post of the HR/VP, as the next section will explore.

3.5. External action and the institutional innovations of the Lisbon Treaty

The set-up of the EU's external action is one of the key innovations of the Lisbon Treaty. Many of the provisions ruling today the Union's external action come from the revision of the unborn European Constitution, although they lack the more symbolic elements present there, such as the position of a Minister of Foreign Affairs (Morillas 2014). The Lisbon Treaty maintains however a large number of the provisions of the Constitution that should establish "far-reaching changes (…) with the scope for the Union to become a more coherent actor on the international stage" (Duke 2008). Some authors have considered the external action provisions of the treaty "the most ambitious reform effort in European foreign policy, ever" (Lehne 2011:2).

Others have argued that the Lisbon Treaty should be understood as a constitutional change disguised as "business as usual" (Christiansen 2010:25, see also Barber 2010:58). Not having introduced fundamental reforms in the intergovernmental decision-making procedures of the CFSP/CSDP, the set-up of the Union's external action has increased the institutional capacities (and hence the power) of Brussels based institutions. This section will review the innovations of the Lisbon Treaty in external action, including the Title V of the TEU, the "de-pillarisation" of the EU, the recognition of a series of principles, values and objectives of the Union's external action and the institutional innovations of the post of the President of the European Council, the HR/VP and the set-up of the EEAS.

3.5.1. The Union's external action

The Lisbon Treaty has introduced a remarkable legal instrument to ensure horizontal coherence between the different policies of the Union at the international stage (Larivé 2014: Ch.9). Following the recommendations of the Working Group on External Action of the Convention, the new Treaty resulting from the rejection of the Constitution unifies the Union's foreign policy and external relations under a single provision on external action. The Treaty

establishing a Constitution for Europe included a Title V on the "Union's external action", in which several chapters reviewed the policies of the EU in the fields of CFSP, the Common Commercial Policy, the cooperation with third countries and humanitarian aid, among others.

The Lisbon Treaty maintains a single Title V on the "General provisions on the Union's external action and specific provisions on the CFSP", although it also divides the attribution of responsibilities in external action in two Treaties: the TEU and the TFEU. The former external relations policies in the hands of the European Commission are to be found in the TFEU (Part Five), while the CFSP is the object of a specific chapter and specific provisions in Title V of the TEU (Cremona, 2003:1353) –contrary to the text of the European Constitution, which unified the provisions on external relations and the CFSP in a single Title V[45].

Notwithstanding the difference, the Title V of the TEU sets up the Union's external action, formed by both the CFSP and external relations, so the provisions that govern all external action can be considered a step forward in horizontal and institutional coherence (see for instance Cremona 2008a:27, Koehler 2010:58-61). It can be argued that, by bringing together foreign policy and external relations under a single Title, the Lisbon Treaty aims at giving an equal *de iure* priority to both aspects of the Union's external action.

The principle of coherence ("consistency" in the English version) is thus well established in the provisions on the Union's external action. Article 21(3) TEU stipulates: "the Union shall ensure consistency between the different areas of its external action and between these and its other policies". Article 7 TFEU states: "The Union shall ensure consistency between its policies and activities, taking all of its objectives into account". While these provisions refer to horizontal and institutional coherence, the Lisbon Treaty also includes references to vertical coherence. Its Article 24(3) states: "The member states shall support the Union's

[45] As Cremona (2008a:27) notes, "instead of the replacement of the existing Treaties by the Constitutional Treaty, we will see a substantial amendment of the TEU and the EC Treaty, the latter being renamed the TFEU. The amendments to both the EC Treaty and TEU result in a much more integrated framework; the Treaties are referred to as 'the Treaties' throughout and they are of equal legal value".

external and security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity and shall comply with the Union's action in this area. The member states shall work together to enhance and develop their mutual political solidarity. They shall refrain from any action which is contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations".

3.5.2. The "de-pillarisation" of the EU

With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU is no longer structured around the former pillars, thus making "the pillar reading of the consistency challenge disappear" (Marangoni 2014:82). Both the intergovernmental (or CFSP) pillar and the European Communities (or supranational pillar) are now part of the same legal structure, the TEU and the TFEU. The Lisbon Treaty also gives legal personality to the EU, since the Union has replaced and succeeded the European Community (Koehler 2010:62). This legal novelty enables the EU to act as a contracting party in international agreements and to implement the provisions of the CFSP. The lack of legal personality was seen as a traditional shortcoming for its external projection -for instance at the time of signing agreements with third parties, which had to be ratified by the Commission and all member states (Cameron 2012:40).

Some authors have argued, however, that the de-pillarisation of the EU can also pose a challenge to coherence. First, since the wording of the Treaty emphasises the exceptional status of the CFSP "subject to specific rules and procedures", the Treaty does not abolish the separation of the issue areas and retains the dualism of the EU's supranational external relations and intergovernmental foreign policy (Koehler 2010:62). The potential for conflict of the Union's external action is likely to be more profound in those policies that overlap between the former first and second pillars, such as the European Neighbourhood Policy (Cremona 2008b, Börzel and van Hüllen 2014 and Van Vooren 2012). As Duke has put it, the Lisbon Treaty has failed to "suppress the intrinsic dualism of the EU's external action, thus

leaving CFSP subject to specific rules and procedure, a pillar in everything but name" (Duke 2012:51).

Second, the limited effects of the de-pillarisation on the Union's external action can also be analysed through the very limited jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice on CFSP matters (the Achilles' heel for coherence, according to den Hertog and Stroβ 2013:383). Since the Maastricht Treaty, the Court of Justice has not enjoyed jurisdiction on the CFSP, neither on the appeals against the provisions of the CFSP or the agreements adopted on the basis of these provisions (Saltinyte 2010). With the Lisbon Treaty, the Court of Justice can only enjoy jurisdiction over the consistency requirement, in particular with regards to the delimitation of Article 40 mentioned above (den Hertog and Stroβ 2013:381-383, Hillion 2008:31).

This situation has led some authors to argue that "the Lisbon Treaty has not ended the first/second pillar dichotomy of late" (Blockmans and Laatsit 2012:139). According to them, "due to their 'specific' character CFSP and CSDP remain located in the Treaty on European Union, under the umbrella of the general provisions of the Union's external action (Title V TEU) but nevertheless separate from the Union's other external relations policies in the TFEU" (Blockmans and Laatsit 2012:39)[46]. In a similar vein, Smith argues that the EU External Action remains "rooted in Maastricht", as foreign policy and external relations under the Lisbon Treaty "remain subject to distinctive policy-making processes" (Smith 2012:705).

3.5.3. The principles, values and objectives of the Union's external action

The Lisbon Treaty also enumerates the principles and objectives of the Union's external action, specified in Article 21 TEU. Any external action policy (both the Union's foreign policy and external relations) shall comply with these principles,

[46] The Declarations 13 and 14 on the CFSP annexed to the Final Act of the conference which adopted the Lisbon Treaty contribute to elucidate the enduring intergovernmental nature of CFSP "expressly safeguard[ing] the responsibilities and powers of EU member states in the formulation and conduct of their foreign, security and defence policies" (Pirozzi 2015:24).

which should be read in addition to the general principles of the Union (Article 3 TEU). For the Union's external action, the Treaty provides that:

> 1. The Union's action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law.
>
> The Union shall seek to develop relations and build partnerships with third countries, and international, regional or global organisations which share the principles referred to in the first subparagraph. It shall promote multilateral solutions to common problems, in particular in the framework of the United Nations.
>
> 2. The Union shall define and pursue common policies and actions, and shall work for a high degree of cooperation in all fields of international relations, in order to:
> (a) safeguard its values, fundamental interests, security, independence and integrity;
> (b) consolidate and support democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the principles of international law;
> (c) preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, with the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and with the aims of the Charter of Paris, including those relating to external borders;
> (d) foster the sustainable economic, social and environmental development of developing countries, with the primary aim of eradicating poverty;
> (e) encourage the integration of all countries into the world economy, including through the progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade;
> (f) help develop international measures to preserve and improve the quality of the environment and the sustainable management of global natural resources, in order to ensure sustainable development;
> (g) assist populations, countries and regions confronting natural or man-made disasters; and
> (h) promote an international system based on stronger multilateral cooperation and good global governance.

The presentation of these principles constitutes a novelty in the Union's Treaties, since member states and European institutions need to take them into account when "formulating and implementing intergovernmental and *communautaire*

aspects of EU foreign policy" (Gaspers 2008:36). This is a remarkable innovation of the Lisbon Treaty, since, their adoption "in a legally binding document" should translate into more coherence in order to "overcome the intergovernmental-*communautaire* dualism of EU foreign policy" (Gaspers 2008:37). Any policy under Title V of the TEU and Part Five of the TFEU on the Union's external action should take into account these principles in order to confer unity and coherence to the Union's external action. If fulfilled, the adoption of these principles and objectives should become "one of the potentially most influential innovations in terms of increasing the horizontal and institutional consistency" of EU external action (Gaspers 2008:36).

3.5.4. The institutional innovations of the Lisbon Treaty

The Lisbon Treaty has introduced a series of key institutional innovations to operationalise the Union's external action. These innovations should enable a better coordination between the Union's foreign policy and external relations, mostly via the creation of the post of the HR/VP, the set-up of the EEAS and the post of the President of the European Council. According to Cremona (2008a:34) "these innovations no doubt have the potential to enhance coherence if they work as intended" [47].

a. The HR/VP

The Lisbon Treaty establishes the office of the HR/VP, whose responsibilities and functions are very similar to those of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the European Constitution. The European Council in agreement with the President of the European Commission appoints the HR/VP and his mandate is of two and a half years, renewable once as HR, and five years as a member of the European Commission. Since this is a collegiate body, the HR/VP is subject to the consent of the European Parliament to perform its duties as a member of the European Commission[48].

[47] The analysis presented here elaborates on Morillas (2014).

[48] The fact that this figure has one foot in the Commission and the other in the Council is particularly complex in the case of resigning or dismissal of some of its functions. If the European Parliament were to vote in favour of a motion of censure against the Commission, the HR would

Article 18.1 TEU states that the HR/VP shall perform the functions previously performed by three people:

- The HR for CFSP and Secretary General of the Council, who was responsible for assisting the Council in the formulation, preparation and implementation of decisions relating to the CFSP and ESDP. This figure was occupied since its creation in 1999 until the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty by the former Foreign Minister of Foreign Affairs Spain and Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), Javier Solana, whose visibility in the international arena allowed him to stand as the voice of the EU in the world. While the Lisbon Treaty reinforces the post of HR, a European official of lesser rank holds the position of Secretary General of the Council.
- The Commissioner for External Relations of the European Commission, who had the right of initiative in issues not pertaining to the CFSP (i.e. in external relations) and who ensured that the Council's decisions were supported, when necessary, with the necessary budgetary resources in the hands of the Commission. The coordination between the HR and the Commissioner for External Relations was an essential requirement to ensure the coherence of the EU external action. The post of Commissioner for External Relations, which was exercised for the last time by Benita Ferrero-Waldner, disappears with the Treaty of Lisbon. It is replaced by a Vice-President of the Commission, hence establishing the post of the HR/VP.
- The Chair of the GAERC, a rotating post held by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the member state holding the Presidency of the EU during one semester. In addition to the duties as President of the GAERC, the Foreign Minister of the rotating Presidency was responsible for introducing the foreign policy priorities for the current semester and to

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then only exercise the tasks unrelated to the functions of the Vice President of the Commission (HR and Chair of the FAC) functions. The Council may also request the anticipated termination of the mandate of the HR, but in the event that the President of the Commission decided to relieve him of his duties as Vice President, this institution would need the agreement of the Council (Piris 2010:245-246).

ensure their implementation in accordance with national priorities. Under Lisbon, the GAERC has been divided into the FAC, chaired by the HR/VP and the General Affairs Council (GAC), which is still chaired by the rotating presidency of the EU.

The new post of the HR/VP is thus a position with "three hats", to which a fourth hat could be added coordinating the institutional framework of the EU's external action. Specific responsibilities of the HR/VP can be summarized in six main tasks[49]:

1. Participate in the work of the European Council and ensure the follow-up of the strategic guidelines provided by the Heads of State and Government.
2. To chair the FAC, to exercise the right of initiative shared with the member states in the field of CFSP and CSDP and to implement these policies as mandated by the Council, in cooperation with the member states' diplomacies. The HR/VP can also submit initiatives with the support of the Commission on other external action matters (including external relations). As Chair of the FAC, the HR/VP facilitates agreement among member states in the adoption of Council Conclusions[50].

[49] These functions are analysed in more detail in Piris (2010:246-247) and Wessels and Bopp (2008:19-23). Some warning signs regarding the ability of a single person to execute all these functions were raised from the outset. The Lisbon Treaty does not provide for "deputy HR/VPs", so one single person is now charged with enhancing the coherence of the Union's external action, ensuring institutional coordination and combining the responsibilities in Brussels with an extensive agenda of international relations as the highest diplomatic representative of the EU.

[50] The policy-making process for adopting Council Conclusions can be summarised as follows. In a first phase, the EEAS is entrusted to draft a first version of the conclusions and send them to member states to start the negotiations in the regional and thematic working groups of the Council. These groups are formed by specialized diplomatic counsellors from Permanent Representations of member states and are chaired, in most cases, by a representative of the EEAS, working under the authority of the HR/VP. The first negotiation of the Conclusions happens at the working group level following the instructions provided by the Foreign Affairs ministries. The Conclusions are then sent to the PSC, where political negotiations between Ambassadors take place and where conclusions are often agreed, thanks to the permanent contact of PSC Ambassadors with senior diplomats of Foreign Affairs ministries and often with the Minister himself. If PSC Ambassadors have reached an agreement, the conclusions go through COREPER II without a discussion there. The most controversial issues might be discussed at this level if that is not the case. The final draft is then sent to the FAC, where conclusions are either adopted as A points (procedural matters which are not discussed at the FAC) or B points, which include discussion among ministers.

3. To act as Vice-President of the European Commission and to ensure the coherence of EU external action, given that the Commission continues to exercise responsibilities in external relations.
4. To negotiate international agreements in the CFSP and to represent the EU with regard to this policy, including in political dialogues with third countries and the participation of the Union in international forums.
5. To exercise the highest authority of the EEAS, relying on the work of more than 100 EU Delegations in third countries and exercise authority over the EU Special Representatives, appointed by the Council.
6. To consult the European Parliament regularly on the action lines of the CFSP and the CSDP and its implementation as well as to ensure that the Parliament views are taken into consideration.

The first holder of the HR/VP position, Catherine Ashton (former United Kingdom Minister of Labour and Trade Commissioner), was subject to close scrutiny. Her performance gathered two main criticisms. On one hand, some argued that her lack of diplomatic experience did not help in enhancing the Union's external action at the time of implementation of the provisions of a new Treaty and that her diplomatic record was low (Barber 2010, Howorth 2011a, Howorth 2014b, Helwig and Rügler 2014). On the other, the appointment of Ashton alerted member states on a possible erosion of the intergovernmentalism of the CFSP and the CSDP, given that the first holder of the HR/VP position had limited experience in the Council's decision making system and had only performed duties in Brussels as Commissioner for Trade, a supranational policy (Morillas 2011). But beyond the assessment of Ashton's performance, the position of the HR/VP can be considered to enhance coherence of the EU external action in four different ways:

First, the suppression of the rotating presidency can be considered a step forward to ensure continuity in the priorities of external action. The six-months rotating presidencies were indeed a challenge to ensure the continuity of the CFSP and ESDP, since the CFSP priorities depended on the holder of the rotating presidency and the national Minister of Foreign Affairs, who, together with the rest of the member states, held the right of initiative. The Lisbon Treaty has removed the role

of rotating presidencies in the field of CFSP and given the HR/VP a formal right of initiative, together with the EU member states. The HR/VP is now able to contribute with her proposals to the development of this policy (article 18.2 TEU). The agenda-setting prerogatives of the HR/VP have been used to “build credibility” and “gain attention” for the priorities, both of the HR/VP and the EEAS (Vanhoonacker and Pomorska 2013). These are expressed in the form of "EEAS-steered foreign policy", aimed at promoting the "definition of a common European interest and policy" (Keukeleire and Delreux 2014:106).

Second, the post of the HR/VP also strengthens horizontal and institutional coherence. Having one foot in the Commission (as Vice-President and replacing the Commissioner for External Relations) and another one in the Council (as chair of the FAC), the HR/VP can establish better links between the Union’s external relations and foreign policy. Some have argued, however, that the fact that intergovernmentalism and supranationalism still define the policy-making processes in foreign policy and external relations respectively has limited the manoeuvre of the HR/VP (Helwig 2015).

Third, the position of the HR/VP is also a powerful tool to enhance vertical coherence. The HR/VP can coordinate the position of the EU and member states thanks to her participation in the meetings of the European Council and has the possibility to call for extraordinary meetings of the Council (art. 30.2 TEU). Through regular contacts with the member states, they and the HR/VP must follow the principle of “sincere cooperation” (article 4.3 TEU), a key aspect for vertical coherence. In foreign and security matters, the Lisbon Treaty requires both the HR/VP and the Council to act as guardians of this principle (Marangoni 2012:9), as well as to coordinate the action of member states in international organisations and conferences (article 34.1 TEU).

Finally, the HR/VP also ensures horizontal and institutional coherence thanks to the existence of the Commissioner's Group on External Action. This group, chaired by the HR/VP, gathers the Commissioners with responsibilities in external relations. The Group was first formed as the "Commissioners' Group responsible

for External Relations" and first convened by Catherine Ashton as Vice-President of Barroso's Commission. The group was composed at that moment by the Commissioners of International Cooperation, Humanitarian Aid and Crisis response, Development, Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy, Trade and Economic and Monetary Affairs. President Barroso also attended (and often chaired) the meetings, although "the gatherings had a rather formalistic character and added no value to the normal inter-service consultation processes in the Commission, let alone to the goal of joining up the Commission's strands of EU external action with those managed by the Council and the EEAS" (Blockmans and Russack 2015)[51].

The Commissioner's Group on External Action has gained more impetus under Juncker's Commission and with HR/VP Mogherini. In his "mission letter" to HR/VP Mogherini, Juncker expressed his willingness that the Group meets "at least once a month in varying thematic and/or geographic formats" and is chaired by the HR/VP herself (Juncker 2014a). Under Mogherini, the Group has met more often and deals with more substantial issues. In addition to the core group of Commissioners for European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, International Cooperation and Development, Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Management and Trade, the Commissioners' Group on External Action has "ballooned in size", often including the Commissioners for Migration and Home Affairs, Climate Action and Energy, Transport or Internal Market, to name a few (Blockmans and Russack 2015).

b. The EEAS

The Lisbon Treaty also provides for the launch of the EEAS, a key institutional innovation to support the work of the HR/VP and of the President of the European Council and the European Commission, particularly its President, in the tasks they carry out in the field of external action. This Service -neither part of the Council nor

[51] It is no coincidence that the review of the EEAS, published in July 2013, insisted on the need to improve working relations with various DGs of the European Commission with responsibilities in external relations. This coordination would benefit from further coordination in the framework of the Commissioners' Group on External Action, since the review specifically mentioned the need to better coordinate the relationship between the HR/VP and the DGs Trade, Neighbourhood, Enlargement, Development and Humanitarian Aid (EEAS 2013).

the Commission and without any organic dependence on either of them- is key for ensuring the coherence of the EU external action[52]. Article 27.3 TEU serves as a legal framework for the establishment of the EEAS, but it leaves a lot of leeway to the HR/VP on the modalities of its structure and implementation[53]. The mandate of the Service was approved by a Council decision, establishing its organization and operation, after months of intensive discussions between the Council, the Commission and the European Parliament[54]. Under the leadership of the HR/VP to reach the necessary inter-institutional agreement, the EEAS became operational on 1st January 2011. As Duke (2017:219) notes, since the EEAS was established under secondary law (a Council decision), it is considered a Service and not one of the seven official institutions of the EU.

Since its birth, the EEAS has had a complex structure of DGs and lines of command (Fernández Sola 2008). The core of the EEAS is made up of a number of geographic and thematic DGs covering all regions of the world and areas of particular interest to the EU's external action, including global, multilateral and crisis management issues. It also includes a series of departments under the supervision of the Secretary General and the HR/VP on issues such as strategic planning and strategic communication. The EEAS is staffed by seconded officials from national foreign ministries and EU officials and combines the departments previously divided between the Council and the Commission. On the one hand, the EEAS has absorbed former officials of the DGE of the Council Secretariat. On the other, the EEAS has integrated the offices -far more numerous- of the former Directorate General of External Relations of the European Commission (DG RELEX)[55]. The former Delegations of the European Commission in third countries, now called EU

[52] Dinan (2011:119) has considered the birth of the EEAS as the "most striking institutional development in the EU" after the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty's institutional innovations.
[53] Even more so if we take into account that the details on intra-institutional working relationships are not clearly specified in the Lisbon Treaty and are to be defined through institutional practice.
[54] Council of the European Union (2010a). Discussions on the early days of the EEAS and the positions of the various European institutions are analysed in Spence (2012).
[55] Some voices have pointed at the obstacles to a joint organizational culture and "esprit de corps" due to the different backgrounds of EEAS officials (Lequesne 2015), hence rendering institutional coherence more complex. While officials emanating from the national Foreign Ministries have tended to privilege intergovernmental accounts of EU foreign policy and the role of the EEAS, former DG RELEX officials have privileged the pursue of the Union's interests (Henökl 2015, Juncos and Pomorska 2014). On the opposite direction, other authors have pointed at the emergence of a common desire of EEAS officials to strengthen Europe's voice in the world, hence creating a common "esprit de corps" within the EEAS (Juncos and Pomorska 2013).

Delegations, have also been integrated in the EEAS structure under the command of the HR/VP.

Other external relations DGs of the European Commission such as trade, development or humanitarian aid have not been integrated into the EEAS due to their prominently supranational working mechanisms. In a similar vein, the crisis management structures of the CSDP have also kept a distinct location in the organizational chart of the EEAS, precisely to stress their intergovernmental nature (Blockmans and Laatsit 2012:152). This reveals the role that both the HR/VP and the EEAS must play to ensure the horizontal and institutional coherence of external action (Blockmans and Laatsit 2012). A specific case in point is the work of the EEAS in the fields of development and security, where both EU member states, the European Commission and the EEAS exert responsibility (Smith 2013, Furness and Gänzle 2016). In areas of shared competence, "turf wars" between EU member states and institutions and between the EEAS and the European Commission represent a further challenge to horizontal and institutional coherence for external action (Smith 2013:1309, see also Fernández Sola 2013).

The relationship between member states and the EEAS has been a source of particular interest in the literature. Balfour and Raik (2013) argue that the EEAS has facilitated cooperation with national foreign ministries over time. The reinforcement of vertical coherence has produced valuable policy outcomes such as consensus-building on the occasion of the preparation of EU foreign policy statements or the limitation of the EU's multiple and "cacophonic" voices (Balfour and Raik 2013:21). However, "mutual trust" between foreign ministries and the EEAS "remains to be built" (Balfour and Raik 2013:21). The collaboration between member states and the EEAS has faced difficulties with regards to the exchange of information, the development of a sense of belonging to the EEAS of seconded officials and a perceived lack of conduct in line with the interests of the Union by national diplomats (Duke 2012:62-64).

c. The European Council and its President

With the Treaty of Lisbon, the European Council of Heads of State and Government has become a formal EU institution. Article 26 TEU states that this institution is responsible for setting the strategic interests, objectives and general guidelines of the CFSP and the CSDP. In addition, the European Council may meet extraordinarily to define the position of the Union in relation to an international event that deserves the attention of the Heads of State and Government. Under this logic, it is the responsibility of the European Council to be at the top of the pyramid of the policy-making system of external action.

As Keukeleire and Delreux have noted, the meetings of the European Council are important since they "push decision-making forward from the highest political level; they make crucial intergovernmental and inter-institutional bargains on the most sensitive issues; and they confer legitimacy and visibility on decisions and policy documents essential from both internal and external audiences" (Keukeleire and Delreux 2014:65). In its conclusions, the European Council "confirms", "welcomes" or "endorses" documents previously agreed by the Council or developed by the HR/VP, with the European Council "inviting" or "asking" other actors to further elaborate on these measures (Keukeleire and Delreux 2014:65), as will be the case for the ESS and the EUGS.

The Lisbon Treaty also introduces a remarkable institutional innovation: the appointment of a permanent President for a term of two and a half years, renewable once. His functions are:

- Chair and promote the work of the European Council, facilitating cohesion and consensus.
- Ensure the preparation and continuity of the work of the Council, in cooperation with the President of the Commission and based on the work of the GAC.
- Submit a report to the European Parliament after each meeting of the Council (Article 15 TEU).

In addition, the President of the European Council may hold the representation of the EU towards third countries and international organisations like the General Assembly of the United Nations. The Treaty states that the EU representation in matters of the CFSP will be "without prejudice to the powers of the High Representative" (Article 15.6 TEU). Therefore, the institutional practice and agreements between both figures have been crucial to define their responsibilities in the international representation of the EU. Adding as well the powers of representation that the Presidents of the European Parliament and of the Commission also have, the EU has at least four visible faces abroad.

3.6. Conclusions

This chapter has analysed the role of the EU institutions and the main policy-making practices in foreign policy, external relations and external action. As it has been shown, foreign policy and external relations are characterised, respectively, by the predominance of intergovernmentalism and supranationalism. The Lisbon Treaty can be considered the latest attempt to provide an institutional response to the lack of coherence, which emanates, to a great extent, from the different policy-making procedures in foreign policy and external relations. As such, it can be considered a ground-breaking effort in bringing both aspects of external action closer. The analysis presented in this chapter has indeed revealed the transformative nature of the external action dispositions of the Treaty, particularly with regards to the post of the HR/VP and the establishment of the EEAS.

On the basis of the theoretical debate presented in the previous chapter and the inputs gathered here on the policy-making processes in foreign policy, external relations and external action, the following empirical case studies will evaluate the policy-making processes of the ESS and the EUGS against broader European integration debates. In particular, the case studies will help to assess the premises of new intergovernmentalism, as part of the supranational-intergovernmental debate, through a careful study of the inter-institutional dynamics in EU foreign policy and external action in the making of strategies.

CHAPTER 4

EU STRATEGIES AND THEIR PURPOSES

The previous chapter ended with the analysis of the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty in external action, aimed at providing coherence to the EU when acting at the global stage. As it has been argued, coherence has been one of the recurrent concerns in the minds of EU policy-makers and derives from the very nature of external action as a hybrid policy area, covering both foreign policy and external relations. But alongside coherence, being a strategic actor has also been the source of political reforms and the focus of intense debates in expert circles. While being a coherent actor tends to reflect a preoccupation with the internal (mal)functioning of EU external action, acting strategically is considered a prerequisite for being an effective global actor.

This chapter will present the main debates behind the EU's capacity to act strategically and will argue that EU strategies should be considered milestone documents to this end. The chapter will first locate EU strategies in the external action framework, reviewing the various sorts of strategies produced by the EU. Then the chapter will move into the discussions about the purpose of strategies as a way to kick-start the empirical work of this thesis. EU strategies will be understood as documents revealing the EU's strategic culture, as milestones for assessing the impact of the EU as a global actor and as a tool for inspiration in policy-making in foreign policy and external action.

In line with the objectives of this thesis, the third purpose of strategies will be given priority and will pave the way for the analysis of the policy-making processes of the ESS -the first major strategy for foreign policy- and of the EUGS -the first major strategy in external action. The review of the policy-making processes of EU strategies will shed light into broader debates about the current integration dynamics in the areas of foreign policy and external action, taking into account the theoretical debate provided in Chapter 2.

4.1. EU strategies in external action and the policy-making structure

EU strategies in foreign policy and external action have a long history both in legal and political terms. Their existence can be traced back to the provisions of the Maastricht Treaty, which entrusted the European Council with the definition of the broad strategic guidelines in foreign policy. The foreign affairs ministers in the GAERC implemented the strategic guidelines. Strategies as such were not an established political and legal instrument, which necessarily translated into a lack of continuity in the strategic priorities of CFSP, very much dependent on the priorities of the rotating presidency, as noted in the previous chapter.

The Amsterdam Treaty overcame the lack of systematisation of strategies as a legal and political tool via the introduction of "common strategies". Common strategies embodied an agreement in the European Council defining "the principles of and general guidelines for the common foreign and security policy, including for matters with defence implications" (article J.3) and were "implemented by the Union in areas where member states have important interests in common", "[setting] out their objectives, duration and the means to be made available by the Union and the member states". They were implemented by joint actions and common positions, which could be adopted by QMV when stemming from the strategies (Smith 2014:32).

The EU released three common strategies on Russia, Ukraine and the Mediterranean (a fourth one on the Balkans was dropped before adoption), although they did not generate any joint action (Missiroli 2015:9). The common strategies thus showed a poor record when it comes to their effectiveness and implementation. This was due to their lack of added value in areas where policies were well established, to the absence of guidelines on how to produce them and to their nature as merely declaratory texts (Missiroli 2014:viii). In addition, they were never meant to cover the whole of the EU's foreign policy but rather to have a specific geographic and thematic outreach (López-Aranda 2017).

The Lisbon Treaty replaced the former common strategies -together with the common positions and joint actions- with a single legal instrument: EU decisions. In foreign, security and defence matters, the Lisbon Treaty states that the European Council shall "identify the Union's strategic interests, determine the objectives of and define general guidelines" in these areas (Article 26.1 TEU). Article 22 TEU also refers to the European Council as responsible for defining the strategic interests and objectives in external action. The European Council can adopt decisions to that end and the Council is responsible for framing these policies and taking "the decisions necessary for defining and implementing it on the basis of the general guidelines and strategic lines defined by the European Council" (Article 26.2 TEU). Together with the HR/VP the Council is responsible for ensuring the coherence of these policies. The Lisbon Treaty also provides that the Council can adopt decisions by QMV when implementing a mandate of the European Council (see Smith 2014:32 and Keukeleire and Delreux 2014:102)[56].

As an object of study, EU strategies are however problematic. The disappearance of common strategies as a legal instrument with the Lisbon Treaty, the production of strategic documents by various EU bodies and the unclear delimitation of the responsibilities of each actor in strategy-making pose several analytical challenges. As Missiroli (2014:vii) notes, "very few of [the EU's] most successful strategies [have been] explicitly identified and labelled as such". The opposite is also true: not every document with the word strategy in its title is all-encompassing. Often, strategic documents are fragmented in thematic and institutional terms. As a consequence, there is a lack of clarity about what policy documents should be considered a strategy and the role of the different institutions in producing them.

As the next section will specify, the literature has not come up with a common understanding of EU strategies either. Vennesson (2010), Simón (2013) and

[56] An assessment of the strategic role of the European Council under the Presidency of Herman Van Rompuy can be found in Devuyst (2012), Howorth (2011a), and Blockmans and Laatsit (2012:148), who underline the intention of the European Council to develop a more strategic external action but which did not live up to expectations given the lack of monitoring and disappointing results, partly due to the predominance of economic governance and the euro crisis issues on the agenda of its meetings (Howorth 2014:54). Duke (2017:217-219) assesses the performance of the second President of the European Council, Donald Tusk, whose intention to set up strategic priorities in foreign policy and external action, particularly towards Russia, accentuated the difficulties in coordinating with the HR/VP and the EEAS.

Biscop (2015a) prefer to use the term "grand strategy" to refer to the documents that will be the object of study in this thesis, the ESS and the EUGS. Biscop understands that "documents like the ESS operate at the level of grand strategy (framing all dimensions of foreign policy or external action), and put forward broad long-term goals, which have to be translated into more specific functional and regional strategies" (Biscop 2015a:14). The same could be said about the EUGS, insomuch it focuses on the broader objectives of external action. Building on this definition, Biscop and Colemont (2012) provide a multi-layered typology of EU strategies, depending on the policy level where they are adopted, distinguishing between grand strategies, foreign policy strategies and implementation strategies (Biscop and Colemont 2012:22-23). The ESS and the EUGS can be considered as grand strategies, while other types of documents of strategic nature should be considered sub-strategies of sectoral, thematic or regional nature.

A similar distinction is provided by Duke (2017), who refers to the ESS as a "meta-strategy", i.e. a document providing a "meta-narrative for the Union" (Duke 2017:42). Meta-strategies in the EU are complemented with "a myriad of sub-strategies (which is what most European officials usually mean when they refer to strategy) in the form of 140 or so country strategies, numerous regional strategies (at least 16), thematic regional strategies (on topics such as the environment or energy), continental (Africa, Asia and the Arctic) and general thematic strategies (ranging from climate change, non-proliferation to cyber security)" (Duke 2017:43). As he notes, many of these sub-strategies were adopted before the update of the ESS' meta-strategy in the form of the EUGS (Duke 2017:234). In this thesis, "grand" or "meta-strategies" will conform the main object of study, although the ESS and the EUGS will be simply referred to as "strategies" for the purpose of analytical clarity.

In addition to the ESS and the EUGS, the EU has produced a remarkable number of sub-strategies both in the fields of foreign policy, external relations and external action and under the umbrella of the European Commission, the Council and the EEAS. As Worré (2014:155) has studied, sub-strategies "may be released under different titles, may vary in terminology, and normally include all policies and

documents of relevant strategic importance – the key common element being that they provide an action plan in their specific field". Before the Lisbon Treaty, both the Council and the European Commission adopted a wide range of sub-strategies, some of them as a follow-up to the ESS.

On the side of the Council, the adoption of the ESS triggered the adoption of several sub-strategies on foreign policy, falling within the intergovernmental domains of security and defence. Particularly remarkable are the "EU Strategy against proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction" (WMD) (Council of the European Union 2003a), the "EU Counter-terrorism Strategy" (Council of the European Union 2005), the "EU Strategy to combat illicit accumulation and trafficking of small arms and light weapons (SALW) and their ammunition" (Council of the European Union 2006a) and the "EU Strategy against the proliferation of WMD: Monitoring and enhancing consistent implementation" (Council of the European Union 2006b).

On the side of the Commission, several documents providing strategic guidance in areas falling within the Commission's external relations were published. Most documents were country or region specific, although others were of thematic nature. All of them informed the policies of this institution and the work of the Commission delegations in third countries. Regionally, the European Commission has a long track record in producing "regional strategies", also before the Lisbon Treaty and in order to inform its socio-economic and development policies. These covered most sub-regions in Africa (see for instance the "Strategy for Africa: An EU regional political partnership for peace, security and development in the Horn of Africa", European Commission 2006a), the Pacific, the Caribbean, Latin America, Central America or Mercosur, to name a few. These sub-strategies also included sea basin regional strategies, such as the one for the Arctic Ocean, the Baltic Sea or the Black Sea Synergy[57]. Other sub-strategies of the Commission stood as its contribution to traditionally intergovernmental areas such as defence, with "A Strategy for a Stronger and More Competitive European Defence Industry" (European Commission 2007) being a case in point.

[57] A list of relevant sub-strategies produced by the European Commission can be found in Worré (2014).

The strategy papers of the European Neighbourhood Policy can also be considered sub-strategies of the European Commission, departing from the founding documents "Wider-Europe Neighbourhood: a new framework for relations with our Eastern and Southern neighbours" (European Commission 2003) and the "European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper" (European Commission 2004). The European Neighbourhood Policy is also implemented through country-specific "action plans", which should also be considered national sub-strategies.

Since the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, additional sub-strategies in external action, foreign policy and external relations have been produced. In line with the objective of the Lisbon Treaty to foster policy coherence, some of these documents have taken the form of Joint Communications from the European Commission and the HR/VP to the Council. The policy-making process of Joint Communications follows inter-service consultations between the EEAS and the relevant DGs of the European Commission before they reach the Council and other institutions such as the European Parliament, the Committee of the Regions or the European Economic and Social Committee (depending on the issue at stake) for adoption.

These Joint Communications can be considered sub-strategies embodying the spirit of external action. Relevant examples are the "Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union: An Open, Safe and Secure Cyberspace" (European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 2013a), "A Strategic Framework for the Great Lakes Region" (European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 2013b), the "Joint Framework on countering hybrid threats a European Union response" (European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 2016), "For an open and secure global maritime domain: elements for a European Union maritime security strategy" (European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 2014) and "An open, safe and secure cyberspace: Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union" (European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 2013c).

The Joint Communications are also produced in the area of the European Neighbourhood Policy, with two major documents consisting in the revision of this policy worth highlighting, "A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood: a review of European Neighbourhood Policy" (European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 2011) and the "Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy" (European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 2015). Other sub-strategies of the Lisbon era possess a stronger ownership of the EEAS and are presented to the Council as inputs from the Service. It is the case, for example, of the "Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel" (EEAS 2011)[58].

The Council still produces its own sub-strategies in the area of foreign and security policy and following the traditional policy-making procedures through intergovernmental bodies such as the Working Groups of the Council and the PSC. These strategic documents can be released by the Council or attached as an annex to the Conclusions of the Council. Relevant examples are the "Internal Security Strategy for the European Union. Towards a European Security Model" (Council of the European Union 2010b), the "EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy" (Council of the European Union 2012a), the "EU Drugs Strategy 2013-2020" (Council of the European Union 2012b), "A Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa" (Council of the European Union 2011) or the "EU Strategy on the Gulf of Guinea" (Council of the European Union 2014).

Finally, the European Commission has also continued to issue strategic documents in areas of its competence, including external relations. Some are similar in scope to the pre-Lisbon sub-strategies and they inform the Commission's development policy. They can be either regional and sea basin in scope (for the Danube, Alpine, Atlantic or the Adriatic and Ionian regions)[59] or Communications of the European Commission to the Council and other EU institutions, such as the "The EU Internal

[58] The EEAS is also in charge of implementing "strategic partnerships" with world powers such as Brazil, Canada, China, Japan or India, among others, although their fate has been shrinking recently (see Renard 2013).
[59] See Worré (2014).

Security Strategy in Action: Five steps towards a more secure Europe" (European Commission 2010) or the "European Agenda on Security" (European Commission 2015a), which dealt with the internal-external security nexus and was an attempt to confine security to the competence of the EU as opposed to a more intergovernmental CSDP, according to Duke (2017:62).

Particularly relevant are also the sub-strategies produced in other external relations areas such as trade. The document "Trade for All. Towards a more responsible trade and investment policy" (European Commission 2015b) informs key aspects of the Commission's commercial policy and can be considered a strategic contribution to external action insomuch it proposes "a trade agenda to promote sustainable development, human rights and good governance" (European Commission 2015b:22, see also Duke 2017:63).

Table 4.1. EU strategies and sub-strategies before and after the Lisbon Treaty

	Before the Lisbon Treaty	**After the Lisbon Treaty**
Strategies	European Security Strategy (2003)	EU Global Strategy (2016)
Sub-strategies	**Foreign Policy (Council)** - EU Strategy against proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (Council of the European Union 2003a) - EU Counter-terrorism Strategy (Council of the European Union 2005) - EU Strategy to combat illicit accumulation and trafficking of small arms and light weapons (SALW) and their ammunition (Council of the European Union 2006a) - EU Strategy against the proliferation of WMD: Monitoring and enhancing consistent implementation (Council of the European Union 2006b)	**Foreign Policy (Council)** - Internal Security Strategy for the European Union. Towards a European Security Model (Council of the European Union 2010b) - EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy (Council of the European Union 2012a) - EU Drugs Strategy 2013-2020 (Council of the European Union 2012b) - A Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa (Council of the European Union 2011) - EU Strategy on the Gulf of Guinea (Council of the European Union 2014)
	External Relations (Commission) - Strategy for Africa: An EU regional political partnership for peace, security and development in the Horn of Africa, European Commission 2006a) - A Strategy for a Stronger and More Competitive European Defence Industry (European Commission 2007) - Wider-Europe Neighbourhood: a new framework for relations with our Eastern and Southern neighbours (European	**External Relations (Commission)** - The EU Internal Security Strategy in Action: Five steps towards a more secure Europe (European Commission 2010) - European Agenda on Security (European Commission 2015a) - Trade for All. Towards a more responsible trade and investment policy (European Commission 2015b) - Other regional, sub-regional and sea

	Commission 2003) - European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper (European Commission 2004). - Other regional and sub-regional strategies (for the Pacific, the Caribbean, Latin America, Central America, Mercosur, etc.) and sea basin strategies (Arctic Ocean, Baltic Sea, Black Sea Synergy, etc.)[60]	basin strategies (i.a. Danube, Alpine, Atlantic or the Adriatic and Ionian regions)[61] **External Action (EEAS/Joint Communications)** - Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union: An Open, Safe and Secure Cyberspace (European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 2013a) - A Strategic Framework for the Great Lakes Region (European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 2013b) - Joint Framework on countering hybrid threats a European Union response (European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 2016) - For an open and secure global maritime domain: elements for a European Union maritime security strategy (European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 2014) - An open, safe and secure cyberspace: Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union (European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 2013c). - A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood: a review of European Neighbourhood Policy (European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 2011) - Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy (European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 2015) - Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel (EEAS 2011)

4.2. The purposes of EU strategies

Partly as a consequence to the wide array of strategic documents produced by the EU, the literature on EU strategies is also abundant and wide-ranging. Some works

[60] See Worré (2014) for a detailed list of relevant sub-strategies produced by the European Commission.
[61] See Worré (2014).

focus on the capacity of the EU to act strategically at the world stage, and enquire about its role in world politics and its distinctive actorness, as presented in Chapter 2. Others prefer to analyse the EU's strategic behaviour by dissecting its strategic documents, considering these as a necessary framework to define the goals of EU external action and the means at its disposal. Another set of literature understands EU strategies as a source of inspiration for policy formulation at the global stage. The following sections will analyse the role that EU strategies (both the ESS and the EUGS) play as soul-searching documents, as tools for assessing the impact of the EU and as frameworks for policy inspiration[62].

4.2.1. Soul-searching: the EU's strategic culture

The first set of analysis on EU strategies focuses on their capacity to unveil the strategic culture of the EU and the kind of actor that the Union is at the global stage. As it has been presented in Chapter 2, the debates about Europe's actorness depart from the constructivist school of International Relations (Smith 2014, Aydin-Düzgit 2015) and find their roots in the discussions about the EU as a "civilian", "normative" or "ethical power", among others[63]. The EU's strategic documents thus act as a representation of the EU's "strategic culture", which helps to understand the Union's role in the world (Krotz and Maher 2011:565), as well as to create a shared feeling of "community" among member states (Sjursen 2015). Broadly understood, a strategic culture "defines a set of patterns of and for behaviour on war and peace issues [and] helps shape but does not determine how an actor interacts with others in the security field" (Booth 2005:25).

The EU's strategic culture has been the object of wide attention in the literature. In line with the "progress report" presented by Cornish and Edwards, there has been an attempt to assess whether the policies and action of the EU at the global stage unveil a "possible development of an effective and relatively coherent European security policy and strategic culture" (Cornish and Edwards 2005: 801). The use of

[62] This section will use the term “strategies” to refer to the understanding of Biscop (2015a) and Duke (2017) of "grand strategies" and "meta-strategies", here the ESS and EUGS.
[63] See Chapter 2 for further reference to these terms.

joint military mechanisms under the auspices of the ESDP and CSDP reveals this development (Heiselberg 2003, Howorth 2002, Toje 2005, Howorth 2014).

The joint action and cooperation in the framework of the ESDP and CSDP, for instance by pooling national military capabilities under a European flag, is considered as a determinant factor for the progressive formation of a European strategic culture that overcomes different national understandings on the use of force (Biava, Drent and Herd 2011). This strategic culture, in turn, determines (Johnston 1999) or shapes (Gray 1999) the decisions of policy-makers in strategic matters, also at the EU level.

However, the development of joint military action is considered by some as insufficient to overcome different national strategic cultures rooted on particular historical backgrounds (Meyer 2005). As a consequence, the EU has often been unable to show a coherent approach to the use of force and thus a joint strategic culture (Rynning 2003, 2005 and Lindley-French 2002). In this regard, since the CSDP remains a "creature of member states", these actors –and not the EU- retain the quality of being strategic actors (Biava, Drent and Herd 2011:1230).

Despite the limitations for setting up a joint strategic culture, the ESS has been characterised as "the first major attempt at policy level to formulate a coherent approach to CSDP" (Howorth 2014:217) and as a document that embodies the EU's international identity (Biscop 2007:10). Since the ESS is considered a central document identifying the EU's threats and how to face them (more on this in the next section), it "represents the codification of an already existing way of thinking and practice" (Biava, Drent and Herd 2011:1235). The ESS indeed acknowledges the "need to develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention" (European Council 2003a:11) and by defining a framework to face threats and respond to crisis, the ESS goes beyond joint practices in EU defence (such as CSDP) and enables the characterisation of a joint strategic culture (Brok and Gresch 2005, Toje 2005).

The adoption of a joint strategic culture -something authors such as Biscop (2005,

2007), Biava, Drent and Herd (2011) and Meyer (2006) believe the ESS achieves - also serves the purpose of identifying the fundamental choices in policy-making. It gives the Union and the member states a sense of direction that becomes institutionalised by cross-referencing specific policies and decisions to the spirit embodied in the ESS (Biscop 2005:133-135, Grevi 2004)[64]. In addition, by defining the EU's strategic culture, the ESS also helps to identify the transformative power of the EU's actions abroad[65]. Barbé, Herranz-Surrallés and Natorski (2015) have for instance studied how the objective set in the ESS to promote "effective multilateralism" (i.e. reinforcing international norms and multilateral cooperation) has become one of the most salient objectives of EU external action and a representation of the EU's transformative purpose.

A specific reference to the EU's strategic culture is absent from the EUGS. As Lehne (2016) notes, the text does not mention these words and replaces them with a "more realist" understanding of the EU's transformational agenda. The concepts of "principled pragmatism" and "resilience" included the EUGS (EEAS 2016a) can be interpreted as a way to downscale or at least avoid an excessive transformative ambition (Techau 2016, Juncos 2016) or, as Biscop (2016a) puts it, adopting "realpolitik with European characteristics". An adverse international landscape and internal crises are the reasons behind a less ambitious document with regards to the EU's transformative power (Barbé 2016).

Regarding the external challenges, the confrontational stance of other world powers such as Russia and a troubled neighbourhood are considered as reasons for a stronger focus on geopolitics and a diminished idealist narrative as it was the case for the ESS (Biscop 2016b, more on this in the next section). Internal crisis such as the economic crisis, the United Kingdom's exit from the EU or even the erosion of the European social model are factors diminishing the capacity of the EU to project internal values abroad (Biscop 2015b).

[64] The links between the ESS and policy-making will be further analysed in section 4.2.3.
[65] Relevant analysis of the EU's transformative power can be found in Grabbe (2006) and Börzel and Risse (2009).

To sum up, read under the lenses of strategic culture, EU strategies serve "identity-building aspirations" (Mälksoo 2016:4, see also Becher 2004) and are tools for providing a distinctive narrative on security. By analysing the EU's strategic culture and its reflection in documents such as the ESS and the EUGS, the EU undertakes a "soul-searching" exercise (Grevi 2016), publishing "'autobiographies' [and] outlining its conception of self as a security actor of a particular kind" (Mälksoo 2016:3). This reading of the EU strategies is very much in line with a constructivist and an "actorness" understanding of EU foreign policy, but it will not be the preferred lenses through which to study the ESS and the EUGS for the purpose of this thesis.

4.2.2. Impact assessment: strategies depicting the EU's "ends and means"

Somewhat closer to the relevance of EU strategies as empirical case studies for this thesis is their second reading as impact assessment documents. This understanding of the ESS and EUGS brings us closer to their nature as a source for policy-making (developed in the next section). The analysis of EU strategies under an impact assessment focus draws on the capacity of these documents to provide an operational toolbox for acting effectively at the global stage or, in Biscop's words "the reference framework guiding the EU's performance as well as the benchmark to judge it" (Biscop 2007:3). It is a widespread understanding of both the ESS and the EUGS and finds very relevant examples in the literature, often analysing these documents against the concept of a "grand strategy" (Rogers 2009, Toje 2009, Howorth 2010b, Vennesson 2010, Smith 2011, Biscop and Colemont 2012, Biscop 2012, Biscop 2015a, Barrinha 2016, Duke 2017; and Berindan 2013 for a critical view).

This reading of strategies is inextricably linked to political practice. Strategies provide external action with a sense of purpose (Biscop and Colemont 2012:4), but also help breaking down this sense of purpose into particular policies. As Vennesson (2012:59) specifies, strategies provide "a broad vision of international security, define the nature of potential threats and risks, and identify the options and instruments that the polity considers the most efficient for dealing with those

threats". Therefore, it is a reading based on an "ends and means" approach, which, elaborating on Biscop (2015a:31), enables the assessment of the EU's strategic documents through a four-layered analysis: the global environment affecting the EU's position in the world, the threats and challenges identified, the EU's interests and priorities and the instruments at its disposal to face them. When all these aspects are homogeneously reflected in a strategy, the EU increases its options for being an effective strategic actor (Biscop and Colemont 2012:21).

The fields of security and defence are particularly suited to reflect this understanding of strategies. In the case of the EU, this exercise is undertaken via the assessment of the ESDP and CSDP against the ESS and the EUGS (Haine 2004, Deighton and Mauer 2006, Howorth 2008, Biscop and Colemont 2012, Winn 2013 for the ESS; and Biscop 2016c and Drent and Zandee 2016 for the EUGS). The association of strategies with provisions on the use of force is a regular feature in the field of strategic studies of the realist school (Biscop and Andersson 2008:2), and authors coming from this perspective have criticised the EU for not being able to produce a relevant framework for security and defence policies (Heisbourg 2004 and Toje 2005). Marsh and Rees (2012:48) argue that the ESS's "very few references to military instruments are invariably presented as part of a wider toolbox and hedged", so the document should have been called a "foreign policy" rather than a "security strategy".

Beyond the criticism to the ESS as lacking specific provisions on security and defence, several observers consider this document an embodiment of the EU's strategy. The ESS is a document "central to understanding the EU's identification of threats and how they should be addressed" (Biava, Drent and Herd 2011:1235, see also Andersson et. al. 2011:32). It also provides a prolific diagnosis of the global security environment, which takes into account the effects of globalisation and interdependence and the proliferation of new threats. The ESS thus defines terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure and organised crime as the "key threats" facing the EU (European Council 2003a:3-4)[66].

[66] The 2008 "Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy. Providing Security in a Changing World" (European Council 2008a), which is not object of detailed analysis in this thesis, adds new threats such as cyber security, energy security, climate change, piracy and the

It also presents the interests or "strategic objectives" to pursue, which Biscop (2005:16-17) summarises as early prevention, building security in the neighbourhood and establishing an international order based on effective multilateralism.

In particular, the ESS identifies three main strategic objectives. First, it focuses on early action when addressing international threats and highlights that "the first line of defense will often be abroad" (European Council 2003a:7). The ESS acknowledges that security policies require a mixture of military, economic, humanitarian, intelligence and judiciary instruments, so conflict and threat prevention should become the Union's main priority. Second, the ESS focuses on building security and good governance in the EU's neighbourhood, advancing the subsequent development of the European Neighbourhood Policy, on the basis of the need to establish a "ring of well governed countries" (European Council 2003a:8) in the EU's eastern and southern neighbourhoods.

Third, the ESS puts strong emphasis on the notion of "effective multilateralism" (European Council 2003a:9), linking EU policies with the primacy of international law and the United Nations Charter, and the need to foster regional integration. As mentioned above, the ESS has been object of criticism for insufficiently specifying the security and military instruments at the EU's disposal, but nonetheless specifies the need to follow a comprehensive approach to security, to increase its capabilities in the field of security and defence, to reinforce the coherence of its instruments and capabilities and to work with other partners, including international and regional organisations[67] (European Council 2003a:11-14).

The transformation of the internal and international landscape and the emergence of new threats sparked considerable debate on the need to update the ESS. Up until the publication of the EUGS in 2016, several initiatives emerged with a view to "reinvigorate, revise or reinvent" the ESS (Andersson et. al. 2011). The

spread of small arms and light weapons to the Union's security and fine-tunes some of the EU's policies to face such threats. On the 2008 document, see Biscop (2009) and Toje (2010).

[67] For instance, the ESS opens the door to the set-up of the European Defence Agency and the EEAS (European Council 2003a:12).

consolidation of an "age of power transition and global political awakening" (Dennison et. al. 2013, see also Drent and Landman 2012) and the need for a proactive, realistic and adaptive European engagement to the changes in the global environment (Istituto Affari Internazionali, Polish Institute of International Affairs, Elcano Royal Institute, Swedish Institute of International Affairs 2013) demanded the publication of a new strategy (see also Biscop 2012), precisely at the time when the new world players were also starting to think strategically (Howorth 2010b).

Other voices argued that the internal developments were not a sufficient reason for updating the 2003 strategy. Menon (2012) acknowledged that the exercise of drafting a new strategy would not only be unproductive but also counterproductive, since it would incentivise member states to shift attention from real problems such as insecurity while engaging in divisive political discussions and would raise expectations of the capacity of the EU to actually match ends and means. On a similar fashion, Berindan (2013) has noted that the limitations in terms of structure and capabilities should force the EU to focus on pursuing realistic ambitions in the security field instead of acting as if the Union were a great power and had a joint strategic culture- which, according to him, it has not. These critical voices, however, do not deny the nature of the ESS as the Union's first attempt to produce a comprehensive security strategy.

Several of the EUGS's characteristics also point to its nature as an impact assessment document and a tool to identify the ends and means of EU external action. Following Mitzen (2015), the EUGS has been read through its capacity to provide a "collective intention" via a "joint commitment to contribute to global security in a particular way" (Mälksoo 2016:3), which would be in line with the requirements of a strategy. The EUGS provides an assessment of the global environment, which, drawing from the strategic review presented by the HR/VP to prepare for the EUGS (EEAS 2015) is depicted as "more connected, contested and complex".

However, the EUGS avoids entering into a careful diagnosis of the global environment, unlike its 2003 predecessor, and has been considered a more instrumental and policy-oriented document of limited ambition (Barbé 2016)[68]. Well present as a background are though the effects of internal and external "existential crisis" (EEAS 2016a:7), which comprise the questioning of the European project and the destabilising effects of the civil war in Syria, the disintegration of the Libyan state, the spread of violence and terrorism in Europe's neighbourhood and the contestation of the European security order as a consequence of Russia's actions in Crimea and Ukraine.

The EUGS does not portray the Union as a "force for good" (Barbé 2016), but rather aims at adapting to an ever more complex global strategic environment by establishing its interests, principles and priorities while acting in a coherent manner. It has thus been considered a "less complacent and more energized" strategy (We Perfectly Know 2016). Much emphasis is placed on the EU's interests and priorities, which according to the EUGS "go hand in hand" (EEAS 2016a:13), ending a long-lasting dichotomy between values and interests in EU foreign policy and the tendency to treat the EU's interests as a taboo (Barbé 2016).

According to the EUGS, the first interest of the EU is to "promote peace and guarantee the security of its citizens and territory" (EEAS 2016a:14), taking into account the inextricable link between internal and external security. Also, the EUGS puts forward the need to provide prosperity to Europeans and to the world, in line with the objectives of the Sustainable Development Goals, and to promote a rules-based global order. These priorities must follow a "principled pragmatism" approach based on the unity of action, engagement in world affairs, responsibility in crises and partnership to build a rules-based global order.

The EUGS also provides specific measures guiding the priorities of external action. These priorities are divided into five building blocks. First, the EU must ensure its own security, which involves investing more in its security and defence capacities

[68] This is due to the existence of a diagnosis in the strategic assessment preceding the EUGS (EEAS 2015) and to the ambition of the Strategy to be an "actionable" document (Tocci 2017b:85-87), as will be further elaborated in Chapter 6.

and to reach an "appropriate level of ambition and strategic autonomy" (EEAS 2016a:19). The EUGS opts for taking full advantage of the dispositions of the Lisbon Treaty in this regard (for instance the mutual assistance and solidarity clauses), to cooperate with NATO, to enhance its counter-terrorism measures, to focus on cyber security and to foster energy security.

Second, the EUGS focuses on fostering "resilience" in its Eastern and Southern neighbourhoods and beyond[69], which drives the EUGS away from the ESS purpose to foster democracy, good governance and a "ring of well governed countries to the East of the European Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations" (European Council 2003a: 8). Third, the EUGS adopts an integrated approach to conflicts and crises, to the point that it fulfils -by naming the term- the desire of former advocates to adopt a "human security" doctrine (EEAS 2016a:28) after the publication of the ESS (Kaldor 2004). Beyond addressing the multiple dimensions of crises, the integrated approach demonstrates why the EUGS was devised as a strategy for the whole of the EU's external action - geographically and thematically, so both in terms of instruments and policies (Tocci 2016)[70].

Fourth, the EUGS acknowledges the limitations of exporting the EU's model of regional integration, conscious of the effects of long-lasting crises such as the Euro, refugee and Brexit crises. Contrary to the ESS, which openly advocated for spreading regionalism, the EUGS aims at "cooperative regional orders" (EEAS 2016a:32), thus adapting the EU's discourse to the new international context (Barbé 2016:9), marked by the Russian threat to the European security order and instability in the southern neighbourhood. Finally, the EUGS also adopts a more pragmatic -and thus less normative- approach to multilateralism, substituting the ESS' "effective multilateralism" for a new framework of "global governance for the 21st century" (EEAS 2016a:39). The EUGS also advocates a revision of multilateral institutions (EEAS 2016a:39), given the new distribution of power at the

[69] The issue of resilience has been object of close attention in the first analyses of the EUGS. See for instance Wagner and Anholt (2016), Biscop (2017) and Barbé (2016).
[70] This aspect will be further analysed in the chapter dedicated to the case study of the EUGS.

international level and the inadequacy of a strategy based on entrenchment to preserve the existing system (Barbé, Costa and Kissack 2016).

The last chapter of the EUGS, titled "from vision to action" (EEAS 2016a:44-51), contains a series of specific policy recommendations that pave the way for the analysis of strategies as a framework for policy-making in the next section. In line with Biscop's understanding of strategies (Biscop 2015a:31), the EUGS finishes with a specific reference to the instruments at the disposal to face a changing global environment, the threats emanating from it and to fulfil the EU's interests and priorities. This chapter of the EUGS has led several authors to characterise the EUGS as a policy-oriented strategy (Barbé 2016, We Perfectly Know 2016, Dijkstra 2016, Lehne 2016, Tocci 2016a). Several references are made to specific measures to be developed under the framework of the Lisbon Treaty (such as security and defence enhanced cooperation, the use of battlegroups or policy coherence between foreign policy and external relations) and the need to further detail the contents of the EUGS in the form of, for instance, sectoral sub-strategies (EEAS 2016a:44).

4.2.3. Policy inspiration: strategies as a framework for policy-making

Whereas the previous section underlined the role of EU strategies under an "ends and means" perspective, the conception of EU strategies as policy inspiration tools looks at their impact on policy-making. This understanding of EU strategies is fully in line with the purpose of this thesis, insomuch it links the EU's strategic documents with foreign and external action policy-making practices, thus revealing their impact on the functioning of these policy areas over time. As a source of policy inspiration, Biscop and Andersson (2008:3) define a strategy as "a policy-making tool which, on the basis of the values and interests of the EU, outlines the long-term overall policy objectives to be achieved and the basic categories of instruments to be applied to that end".

With a few exceptions, this understanding of strategies is the least developed in the literature, when compared to the previous two. Only a few works have focused

on the impact of the ESS in the day-to-day foreign policy-making, the most notable being Biscop and Colemont (2012:Ch.1) and Grevi (2004), both referred to the ESS. Less studied in the literature is the policy-making process of EU strategies understood as policy-making instruments, i.e. the way EU strategies have been initiated, drafted, adopted and implemented -only Bailes (2005) for the ESS and Tocci (2016, 2017a, 2017b) for the EUGS cover these aspects-. This research gap on the policy-making processes of EU strategies is one that this thesis aims to address; following the theoretical debate discussed in Chapter 2 and the contextualisation of new intergovernmentalism within the framework of current institutional dynamics in external action and beyond.

Yet enough has been written to understand that EU strategies are an essential component of EU foreign and external action policy-making. Strategies shape policies and act as a tool for "preference formation" (Vennesson 2010:61), which reveals their utility as case studies for analysing the policy-making processes in foreign policy and external action. As guiding documents, EU strategies inform policy-making and enable consensus among different actors.

Even if this consensus is not explicitly linked to the contents of EU strategies, their existence provides the different actors with "general guidelines" to develop a joint sense of direction, determination and coherence and renders unilateral action more difficult (Biscop and Coolsaet 2003:1)[71]. As such, EU strategies act as a "benchmark and reference framework" for day-to-day policy-making, not only from a narrow politico-military understanding of security policies but for EU external action as a whole (Biscop 2007:9), thus enhancing the coherence of external action (Andersson 2007, see also Vennesson 2010:62). Their analysis can ultimately depict the relation between strategies and broader European integration debates, unveiling the "finality of the European integration project" (Vennesson 2010:74, see also Morgan 2005).

[71] According to Biscop and Andersson, "the more convincingly a proposed initiative can be linked [to the ESS], the more difficult it is to oppose" (Biscop and Andersson 2008:2), so "codification [in the ESS] creates a framework from which it is afterwards more difficult to depart; it circumscribes the room for manoeuvre of future policy-making" (Biscop 2008:8).

The ESS fulfilled the role of policy inspiration by providing a framework for consensus among EU actors, particularly after the divisive episode of the Iraq war. Even if it lacked thorough implementation[72], it became an evoking document that did not disappear right after its adoption[73]. The ESS remains one of the "most spread and read EU documents among the general public [and], within the EU [it appears] in many policy documents and decisions on different aspects of foreign policy, especially those relating to the CFSP and (...) the ESDP (...), the speeches by High Representative Javier Solana and in the discourse of EU representatives generally" (Biscop 2007:10). Andersson adds that the ESS also provides a "common base for negotiations with other countries and organisations on issues of strategic importance" (Andersson 2007:136).

In other words, the ESS became "omnipresent -in EU discourse, in statements by European as well as other policy-makers, in the debate in think tanks and academia" (Biscop 2007:3). As Bailes has noted, the ESS emerged as a "transmission belt (...) to translate specific desiderata into more immediate operational requirements" (Bailes 2005:22). Taking into account the legal framework before the Lisbon Treaty, the ESS also helped to structure the different dimensions of foreign policy, security and defence of the former second pillar (Biscop 2007:9).

The adoption of the Lisbon Treaty has been considered a timely moment for the revision of the ESS (de Vasconcelos 2010, Howorth 2010:464, Biscop 2011, Andersson et. al. 2011, Dijkstra 2016, Duke 2017). There are at least two reasons for that. Firstly, the Lisbon Treaty sets up the EU's external action, which replaces the formal pillar structure to which foreign policy and external relations belonged. The ESS was a document falling within the CFSP realm, so the set-up of the Union's

[72] This point will be analysed in depth in Chapter 5.

[73] Authors such as Grevi (2004) have studied the contribution of the ESS in rationalising the instruments, procedures and policies during its implementation phase. However, it is worth noting that some authors have also criticised the ESS for not being able to translate words into specific action, particularly when compared to the United States National Security Strategy or the NATO Strategic Concept (See Berindan 2013 and Andersson et. al. 2011). Berindan (2013:403) specifically notes that the United States National Security Strategy, unlike the ESS, succeeds in complementing the strategy with "an entire set of policies, strategic and operational, put forward by different departments of the administration".

external action demands a new strategy that encompasses the whole of the Union's external action and provides coherence to it[74].

Indeed, the EUGS broadens the CFSP focus of the ESS and covers external relations areas such as the European Neighbourhood Policy, trade or development, so the change of strategy becomes a "natural result of the Lisbon Treaty" (We Perfectly Know 2016:1204). The Lisbon Treaty also mandates the European Council to provide strategic direction to all EU external action and not only CFSP (Article 22.1), so the Treaty also "forces" the revision of the ESS in order to translate the "abstract language of the Treaties into pragmatism"(We Perfectly Know 2016:1200).

Secondly, the Lisbon Treaty also establishes a series of institutional innovations that demand a new sense of strategic direction. The creation of the EEAS and the inter-institutional dynamics that the Lisbon Treaty puts forward between the Council, the Commission and the EEAS should benefit from a "single framework for all of the EU external action, across the complex institutional machinery", in the form of a new strategy (Biscop 2015a:24, see also Andersson et. al. 2011).

Also, the multiple-hatted figure of the HR/VP should benefit from the guidance provided by a revised strategy, taking into account her functions as HR for the CFSP, chair of the FAC and Vice-President of the European Commission. Initial assessments of the EUGS indicate that such considerations have been taken into account in the contents of the strategy, since it is "more concerned to answer questions about how to translate the Union's overall objectives into specific policies and actions" (We Perfectly Know 2016:1202, see also Barbé 2016:5)[75].

[74] Andersson et. al. (2011) demanded a new "European External Action Strategy" already in 2011, taking into account the novelties introduced by the Lisbon Treaty.

[75] Biscop and Colemont (2012:22-23) have devised a possible structure of the strategic architecture after the Lisbon Treaty, arguing that a grand strategy should be led by the European Council, which is the institution setting the general guidance of the Union's external action (Article 22.1 TEU) - in line with the assumptions of new intergovernmentalism. This strategy should be similar to the ESS, but should cover external action as a whole, in line with the novelties introduced by the Lisbon Treaty. A foreign policy sub-strategy should complement the European Council's strategy, for which the FAC and the PSC should take the lead. Other sub-strategies, which could be sectorial, regional or thematic, could deal with trade, development or any other aspects of the EU's external action, informing policies and completing the full circle of the EU's strategic architecture. The EEAS and the

4.3. Conclusions

This chapter has argued that strategies can be considered useful objects of study of the policy-making dynamics in EU foreign policy and external action. Despite the numerous studies that focus on strategies as a representation of the EU's strategic culture and as a tool to assess its impact at the global stage, the ESS and the EUGS also provide relevant frameworks to analyse policy-making dynamics, thus serving as policy inspiration tools. At times of institutional reform, strategies also provide the new actors (today the HR/VP and the EEAS) with guidance for the development of EU external action. EU strategies have however rarely been analysed as policy inspiration documents, which has created the empirical gap in the literature that this thesis aims to address.

The following chapters will analyse the policy-making processes of the ESS and the EUGS, assuming that they provide frameworks for policy inspiration. The policy-making processes of both strategies will be considered as particularly enlightening developments to assess the institutional dynamics in foreign policy and external action, while, at the same time, shedding light into the supranational-intergovernmental debate and the new intergovernmentalism, as part of current discussions in EU integration.

HR/VP should take a leading role in implementing the strategy and sub-strategies by means of particular policies and actions.

CHAPTER 5

THE POLICY-MAKING OF THE EUROPEAN SECURITY STRATEGY (2003)

5.1. Introduction

Exploring the policy-making process of the ESS is also assessing the first experience of the EU in strategy-making in foreign and security policy. The ESS falls within the realm of an -in principle- purely intergovernmental policy, where the role of member states is assumed to be central. The policy-making of the ESS should thus help us to identify the inter-institutional dynamics in the former second pillar, to which both the CFSP and ESDP belonged. Also, it should help us understand the role of supranational and intergovernmental institutions in foreign policy, shedding light into the main assumptions of new intergovernmentalism.

As this chapter will reveal, the different phases of the policy-making process of the ESS provide a nuanced interpretation to the central role of member states and the predominance of intergovernmentalism. The ESS marks the first steps towards an experimental mode in EU foreign policy-making that will be further reinforced with the EUGS (next chapter). The absence of procedures and regulations for the first EU "grand strategy" enabled the salient institutionalisation of policy-making within a pre-eminently intergovernmental area. The HR Solana and his team took a leading role, both thanks to an innovative policy-making method and a sense of trust and permissiveness by member states.

Solana enjoyed a wide room of manoeuvre in all phases of a relatively short policy-making cycle, although member states were strongly involved in the agenda-setting phase. Once national capitals had given their blessing to the process, the institutionalisation dynamics within the General Secretariat of the Council and in Solana's close circle of advisors during the policy formulation phase resulted in a process of institutionalised intergovernmentalism (Christiansen 2001). This is even more remarkable if one takes into account that such a process took place in

an environment marked by the great divisions during the Iraq war and in the framework of the EU's second intergovernmental pillar.

5.2. The agenda-setting: the launching pad of policy experimentation

The ESS did not emerge floating freely in the air, but rather as per the alignment of several internal and external factors during the agenda-setting phase, always characterised by a great deal of uncertainty. The first internal element that contributed to institutionalise strategy-making were the common strategies of the Amsterdam Treaty. Not free from shortcomings and rarely used (see the previous chapter), the common strategies facilitated that, by 2003, EU member states were already "familiar with the idea of strategies" (Bailes 2005:7). Some sub-strategies (although not necessarily labelled as such) had already been drafted in both foreign policy and external relations before the ESS and since the codification of these documents in the Amsterdam Treaty, enriching the EU's capacity to think strategically.

Second, the operationalisation of EU security and defence was already underway at the time of the ESS thanks to the ESDP. The Cologne European Council in June 1999 marked the inauguration of the defence policy of the EU as an integral part of CFSP, with the first missions operational since January 2003. Both the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) in the Western Balkans and the EU Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia Herzegovina operationalised the security and defence policy of the EU and reinforced a process of institutionalisation of cooperation in these areas (Smith 2004), albeit without clear strategic guidance. The ESS was meant to fill the gap between the operationalisation of the ESDP and the lack of a strategic umbrella (Biscop and Andersson 2008: 5-6).

Finally, and eventually the most determinant factor for the adoption of the ESS, the United States-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003 acted simultaneously as the source of internal divisions and as an external federator for member states. Operation Iraqi Freedom put the EU's big countries in support (United Kingdom) and against (France and Germany) the war at odds with one another and divided

the continent between what the United States Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld called the "old and new Europe". Iraq stood as the most divisive event for transatlantic relations and inside the EU (Barbé 2005), but the invasion of Afghanistan and other post-9/11 United States' policies also played their part (Hill 2004). Nevertheless, the Iraq war also acted as an external federator, particularly when member states and the HR Javier Solana saw the opportunity to heal Europe's wounds through the adoption of the ESS. An overall sense of optimism regarding the European integration project, with 10 new member states soon to join, also contributed to overcome the sense of disunion (Interview #7, see also Tocci 2017b:8).

The idea to adopt a document to overcome a general sense of division in EU foreign policy emerged from the active commitment of HR Solana and the good will of "the big three", Germany, France and the United Kingdom (Interview #32). Some accounts trace the first discussions on this document back to a dinner between Solana and the ministers of foreign affairs of these three countries in "early 2003" (Koops 2011:234). The evidence gathered for this thesis suggests that the idea was first put forward by the German Foreign Minister, Joschka Fischer, at an informal Council meeting (the so-called Gymnich meetings) held on the Greek islands of Rhodes and Kastellorizo on 2-3 May 2003, at the end of Operation Iraqi Freedom (Interviews #3, #5 and #18).[76] In this meeting, held on board of a boat close to the Greek border with Turkey, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the 27 member states[77] heard the proposal of Joschka Fischer to adopt a "European strategic concept", which would be entrusted to HR Solana. This document (the word "strategy" would appear later in the process) should present the threats to the EU and its strengths to face them, departing from a strategic assessment provided by HR Solana (Interview #5).

The reluctance to speak about a "strategy" right from the start is also present in the only written outcome of the Gymnich meeting in the form of remarks from the

[76] This account coincides with Missiroli (2015:13).
[77] Although in 2003 the central and eastern European countries had not joined the EU yet, they were invited to participate in the CFSP and took part in the formal and informal meetings of the GAERC. This was actually the first time that ten new member states participated in a Gymnich meeting, held under the auspices of the Greek Presidency of the EU (January-June 2003).

Presidency.[78] In a press statement after the meeting, the foreign minister Giorgos Papandreou framed the discussions about a "strategic concept" under the auspices of the ESDP, providing evidence of the background against which these strategic discussions were taking place[79]. Beyond terminological discussions, the substance of the proposal made by Fischer "hardly encountered any opposition" in the Gymnich meeting, with the participants aware of their need to repair the deep divisions and to overcome the absence of a "framing" document for EU security and defence matters (Interview #3). As Fischer put it on board of that boat, the idea was not to reflect on the Iraq war itself, but rather on the consequences of the war, taking into account the United States' vision of world affairs (Interview #5).

Member states were conscious that the operationalisation of the ESDP and their long-running exchanges on CFSP matters had forged a particular way of thinking on foreign and security policy, resulting in a coordination reflex of their national positions in Brussels. A sense of a shared strategic culture across the EU was more salient when assessed against the contents of the National Security Strategy of the United States of 2002 (from which the ESS would end up borrowing significantly in terms of the structure and topics to be covered, Interview #10, see also Berindan 2013:399). The analysis informing about the transatlantic rift also put the EU and the United States at odds regarding their vision of world affairs (Interview #3). Key among them was Kagan's "Power and Weakness" (2002), where he famously stated that "it is time to stop pretending that Europeans and Americans share a common view of the world", with the first coming from Venus and the second from Mars.

[78] Since the Gymnich meetings are informal, there is no written outcome in the form of Council Conclusions.

[79] The press note states that, while avoiding "getting bogged down in a discussion on process (...), many useful ideas have emerged and they should be considered on the basis of their intrinsic, rather than procedural, merit. What is clear is that we are in urgent need of a European strategic concept". These discussions needed to result in Europe assessing and agreeing the threats faced, including WMD, and "then candidly assess its capabilities and draw up an appropriate policy to deal with them effectively". To this end, foreign ministers agreed "that High Representative Javier Solana should draw up specific proposals in the coming weeks on how to project and deepen ESDP", in view of the Thessaloniki European Council to take place on 20-21 June 2003. The press statement can be accessed here: http://www.eu2003.gr/en/articles/2003/5/3/2662/ [last accessed: 31 August 2017].

Yet while most participants in the Gymnich meeting acknowledged that there was indeed a common way to look at security issues through European lenses, formulating that question out loud also carried a great level of uncertainty. Discussions at EU15 on such an emotionally loaded issue risked fostering further division and possibly ending up with a not sufficiently coherent strategic document (Interviews #3 and #10). No one really had "great appetite" to embark on an "impossible operation" after the division of Iraq (Interview #10) and, as a consequence, the Greek presidency handled the preparations of the discussions with great care[80].

Despite the risks, participants to the meeting in Rhodes and Kastellorizo also recall the value that ministers gave to a joint definition of Europe's role in the global stage. As a former diplomat who would later take part in the drafting of the ESS put it, "the goals that you fix to yourself [in a strategy] determine the means that you want to acquire" (Interview #4). So in a context dominated by uncertainty and division, the participants to the Gymnich meeting eventually came up with a "Rhodes agreement" that would provide the political basis on which to act in common foreign and security affairs (Andersson et al 2011:18). What participants were less aware of is that, when Solana was entrusted to work in such a task, "they would end up adopting the first EU security strategy" (Interview #5). Right from the agenda-setting phase, the ESS was conceived as a document for member states but entrusted to the HR and his team, opening the door to policy-making experimentation in CFSP.

Reading these developments against the premises of new intergovernmentalism, the agenda-setting phase of the ESS depicts a high degree of activism of Brussels-based bodies. The new intergovernmentalism places most emphasis on the European Council as a catalyst of political initiatives, whereas the ESS emanated from the strong activism of HR Solana, combined with the good will of the Foreign

[80] The texts published by the Greek Presidency note that the meeting took place "aware of the tension and mutual distrust that cast their shadow on the relationship between the EU and the US [United States], having in turn been affecting a wide range of bilateral issues". The Greek Presidency also "prioritized the need to re-establish the transatlantic relationship on a new, equal, and mutually beneficial basis which will ultimately promote international stability, security, cooperation, peace, and development". These statements can be accessed here: http://www.eu2003.gr/en/articles/2003/5/1/2620/ [last accessed: 31 August 2017].

Ministers of the big three member states. At a moment when member states were deeply divided as a consequence of the Iraq war, Brussels-based bodies (i.e. Solana and his team at the Council Secretariat) took advantage of the window of opportunity provided by an informal mandate of member states to undertake a "healing" exercise in the form of a joint security strategy.

The initiative did not emanate from the highest political level where member states are represented (the European Council), as assumed by the new intergovernmentalism. It rather benefited from the confidence in a strong and charismatic Brussels-based political figure, Javier Solana. His national counterparts accepted to launch an experiment in foreign and security policy, not aware that it would result in the adoption of the first comprehensive EU strategy. As rightly reflected by new intergovernmentalism, the agenda-setting phase did not witness an active role of the European Commission, which was not present in the initial discussions on the ESS.

5.3. The policy formulation: towards institutionalised intergovernmentalism

Experimentation in foreign policy-making consolidated during the formulation phase of the ESS. This period is characterised by the simultaneous existence of deep institutionalisation dynamics in the framework of the General Secretariat of the Council and the influence of the intergovernmental method.

Following the informal meeting in Rhodes and Kastellorizo, Solana went back to Brussels with an informal tasking to work on a joint "strategic concept". Traditional working methods in the field of the CFSP, under which the ESS was to be framed (de Vasconcelos 2009), would have required launching a joint drafting exercise in Brussels-based intergovernmental bodies, including the Council working groups, the PSC and COREPER - and thus a "cumbersome drafting by committee" process by member states (Grevi 2004:3).

Instead, Solana gathered around him a small circle of officials and advisors, in his capacity as Secretary General of the Council, in order to devise a "personal, non-

bureaucratic approach to drafting" (Andersson et. al. 2011:18). Solana set up a "task force" formed by members of the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit (or Policy Unit, headed at that time by the German diplomat Christoph Heusgen) and a few officials from the General Secretariat of the Council, particularly the Director General of DGE, Robert Cooper (Interview #5). As seconded officials, the members of the Policy Unit were very close to their capitals (Interviews #4, #11, #28 and #32), although they worked with a strong sense of cohesion and self-identification among its members (Interview #28), facilitating socialisation and Brusselisation practices.

The task force did not include all the members of the Policy Unit. Solana only relied on those "few" national representatives whose countries "had something to say about the ESS" (Interviews #10 and #11), and some members of the task force were not even officially part of the Policy Unit or the organizational chart of the Council Secretariat. They acted as a sort "submarines" sent by member states, directly involved in the policy-making process of the ESS (Interview #32).

The cohabitation in the task force between officials from the General Secretariat and members of the Policy Unit created some tensions, given the different nature of the bodies they represented. While the members of the Policy Unit liked to emphasise their "high profile" and "policy-oriented" mindset (Interview #28), the DGE was part of the bureaucratic machinery of the Council Secretariat and thus more focused on the routine and administration of the Secretariat. Some members of the Policy Unit were reluctant that, in the framework of the ESS task force, they were being asked to work alongside officials who were supposed to work *for* the states (i.e. Robert Cooper as part of the General Secretariat of the Council).

These discussions were reproduced at the time of deciding who would be the penholder of the ESS (Interviews #5, #11 and #28). The two main candidates, Heusgen and Cooper, came from countries with specific sensitivities in EU foreign policy (Germany and the United Kingdom, respectively). This duo of advisers was complemented with the strong role of the French representative (Patrice Bergamini) and the Italian one (Leonardo Schiavo) who, besides Solana, formed

the quartet of the ESS (Interviews #32 and #38). The French representative maintained strong disputes with Cooper -as also did their respective countries vis-à-vis the Iraq war (Interviews #28 and #38)- and pledged that his country should have a strong voice in the discussions of the task force and the drafting of the ESS (Interview #11).

The decision would eventually be taken by Solana himself, who appointed Robert Cooper as the main penholder of the ESS. Solana considered that only "one of the brightest writers in European diplomacy" (Interview #5) would be able to come up with a "short, sharp and punchy" paper on shared security threats and how to face them (Interviews #4 and #5). The task force thus emerged as a sort of micro-cosmos of the internal divisions over Iraq, enabling the representatives of confronted member states to come to an agreement over the ESS, in the same way as the strategy was meant do at the EU level[81]. Solana placed himself at the centre of the discussions through personal contacts with member states representatives (Interview #32), setting in motion a highly institutionalised strategy-making process (Interviews #3, #4, #5, #10 and #11).

Solana was well aware that the drafting process of such a unique document could not follow the traditional working methods (an "impossible metaphysical ", in the words of a close collaborator, interview #5)[82]. As per the "Rhodes agreement", member states agreed that "drafting by committee" (i.e. involving the multiple instances of the Council and negotiations among member states) was out of the question (see also Grevi 2004:3-4, Biscop and Andersson 2008:1, Koops 2011:234). This implied that the task force would work under the leadership of Solana and with a single penholder and, since there was no precedent or delimited procedures for such a text, early drafts would not be circulated or negotiated with

[81] Particularly enlightening of the micro-cosmos that the ESS represented is the final agreement on the term "effective multilateralism". While the United Kingdom saw the exercise as a way to stand by its American ally in the fight against terrorism, France wanted to put strong emphasis on the need to respect multilateral institutions and international law. Germany wanted above all to repair the damage that the Iraq war had done inside Europe, dividing the continent between supporters and opponents to the war. The ESS thus enabled reaching a compromise between the big three, with the term "effective multilateralism" embodying this agreement (Interview #38).

[82] The short timeframe given to Solana, from the Gymnich in May until December 2003, when the ESS was adopted, was also not enough to go through the traditional intergovernmental channels (Interview #18).

member states (Interviews #10 and #11). In other words, the ESS was Solana's responsibility, for which he would have a "considerable room of manoeuvre" (Interview #32).

However, the institutionalisation of the ESS drafting process did not come free of informal intergovernmental procedures. Instead of traditional intergovernmental discussions, member states provided comments via their representatives in the ESS task force. Robert Cooper was responsible for gathering their inputs and make sure that they were articulated in a coherent manner (Interview #3), so that all national visions would be accurately reflected and red lines avoided (Interview #11). The officials of the Policy Unit were in constant contact with their member states (Interviews #28 and #32), and these contacts were complemented at the highest level with discussions between Solana and key foreign ministers (Interview #4). The loyalty of the officials of the Policy Unit towards their member states was considered as a given -"they would not be doing their job if they had not consulted the contents of the ESS with their capitals ", as an interviewee put it (Interview #28).

The involvement of member states was considered a prerequisite for obtaining the ownership of the document (Interviews #3, #4 and #10). However, in order not to derail the overall ESS process at times of deep division among member states, "no one saw the full text" before Solana presented it (Interviews #4, #10, and #11). The consultations with the member states were held in a highly centralised framework, "with inputs flying back and forth from Brussels to national capitals but without the member states knowing each other's demands" (Interview #5). So despite the absence of "real negotiation" on the contents of the text, inputs were constantly shared between Brussels and national capitals (Interview #32).

The Commission was absent from the overall drafting exercise. Despite being part of the Policy Unit, it was not included in the task force for the ESS nor consulted during the process (Interviews #11 and #32). At an early stage, the Commission perceived the overall ESS exercise with "deep anger", with pressures at the highest level to put an end to it (Interview #5). In its own view, the Commission was to be

"either in or out", with no half-way compromise on "soft" consultations (Interview #32). Solana came to an agreement with the Commissioner for External Relations, Chris Patten, thanks to which the Commission would not come in the way of the drafting process.

The agreement was based on an *entente cordiale* between Solana and Patten, on the one hand, and due to the intergovernmental nature of the issues covered by the ESS (i.e. security), on the other (Interviews #4, #5, #10, #11 and #32). As a close collaborator of Solana at the time noted, "if we want the strategy to be released, it has to be a text agreed by member states" (Interview #11). In such a framework, neither the member states nor Solana wished to give any supranational flavour to the exercise via the involvement of the Commission in the task force, so that "both the process and the text" would be acceptable by member states (Interview #11).

The first phase of the policy formulation ended with the presentation of the document at the European Council of Thessaloniki of 19-20 June 2003. Previously, Solana had presented the text over lunch at the GAERC held in Luxembourg on 16 June, where the expression "European security strategy" was first officially coined (Council of the European Union 2003b:9). Giorgos Papandreou, foreign minister of Greece and rotating chair of the GAERC, played a key role in ensuring that the text would be discussed and duly "reinforced and approved" by the Heads of State and Government at the European Council (Interview #11). There, Solana presented the text "A Secure Europe in a Better World. Report by the EU High Representative for the CFSP on the Security Strategy of the EU". The text was welcomed by the European Council in the form of "recommendations submitted by SG/HR Solana for an overall strategy in the field of foreign and security policy", as the European Council conclusions read (European Council 2003b), but not yet as the final ESS.

The European Council tasked instead Solana "to bring this work forward, to further examine our security challenges, in close cooperation with Member States and the Commission, with a view to submitting an EU Security Strategy to the GAERC in order to be adopted by the European Council in December" (European Council 2003b). Although the first step of the policy formulation process was

welcome with enthusiasm (Interview #10), the text could not yet be adopted by member states as a strategy. Member states understood that it was too much of a "personal exercise" and wanted to "soften the precedent that was being created" (Interview #18), so they gave Solana six additional months to come up with the final text. These months were used to open up a more proceduralised process of consultations with experts and member states.

The second phase of the policy formulation began with the conclusions of the June European Council and lasted until the adoption of the ESS in the European Council of December 2003. In between, a series of consultations with experts and member states complemented the highly institutionalised process in the framework of the task force so far. On the one hand, a series of seminars were organised by the EU Institute for Security Studies in Rome (19th September 2003) on the threats faced by the EU, in Paris (6th-7th October 2003) on the EU's global objectives and in Stockholm on the coherence of EU foreign policy (20th October 2003)[83].

In these seminars, policy networks comprised of experts and policy-makers were mobilised to provide inputs to the text, which was partly distributed to participants. This enabled participants to provide specific comments to different sections of the text, with those coming from member states taking advantage of the seminars to reinforce national positions expressed in the previous consultations at the task force (Interview #25). Otherwise, the conferences were considered more as a "public diplomacy and outreach exercise" than an opportunity for joint drafting (Interview #18).

The intergovernmental features of the consultation process among policy networks were reinforced with the inputs provided by member states through more regular diplomatic channels. When the European Council gave six additional months to Solana and his team to produce the final version of the ESS, member states submitted to the Policy Unit a series of "fiches" or "non-papers" signalling specific inputs or red lines to the text disclosed in the June European Council. Not all member states provided Solana's team with such inputs, with some "having

[83] Further details on the contents of the workshops can be read in Andersson et.al. (2011:19-20).

other channels of communication for influencing the process" (Interview #18) - i.e. more direct contacts with Solana himself or the members of the Policy Unit.

The contributions of the 10 acceding member states were particularly remarkable (Interview #18). These countries used the "fiches" to show allegiance to the United States as the guarantor of European security, while others signalled national priorities that would be adequately reflected in the final version of the ESS.[84] Particularly noteworthy was the French insistence on the replacement of the concept "pre-emptive engagement" to "preventive engagement", in order to distance the EU from the United States' response to the security situation post 9/11, embodied in its National Security Strategy (Interview #18). Overall, however, the two versions of the text were not too far apart, which signals the general acceptance of Solana's text and method right from the start of the process (Interview #10).

At the end of the consultation process, the text of the ESS was sent to the Council, who "endorsed" it and forwarded it to the European Council for "adoption" (Council of the European Union 2003c). In the sitting of 12-13 December 2003 and as a discussion point on CFSP/ESDP, the European Council "adopted the European security strategy and warmly congratulated SG/HR Javier Solana for the work accomplished" (European Council 2003c). The text was finally published as "A Secure Europe in a Better World. European Security Strategy" (European Council 2003a).

Throughout the policy formulation phase, Solana and the task force for the ESS managed to avoid the most cumbersome dynamics of the intergovernmental procedures of the CFSP. The text was drafted by a small group, free from a "drafting by committee" in intergovernmental bodies such as the working groups of the Council, the PSC and COREPER. This method differs from core assumptions of deliberative intergovernmentalism (Puetter 2014), which places strong emphasis on traditional intergovernmental bodies as the place where negotiations and deliberation among member states take place.

[84] A comparative exercise of both versions can be done by reviewing the June and December 2003 texts, reproduced in Missiroli (2015).

Instead, Solana benefited from the absence of formal rules of procedure to come up with the EU's first-ever grand strategy and fully exploiting a "legal vacuum" in strategy-making (Interview #18). The absence of formal rules gave a large room of manoeuvre to Solana and his team to coordinate the drafting process of the ESS, restricting deliberation in traditional intergovernmental bodies, yet keeping member states regularly engaged in the framework of the task force and on a personal basis. As a result, the EU stroke "an acceptable balance between different strategic approaches and policy requirements" (Grevi 2004:3), avoiding the risk of a "Christmas tree" process of strategy-making[85].

Some external observers have characterised the policy formulation phase of the ESS as a "method security strategy", a "Solana method" or even a process of "Solanaization" (Koops 2011:234, see also Larivé 2014). This phase is characterised by a "move from member-states towards the EU's common institutions in the process of defining the EU's overall foreign policy framework and norms" (Koops 2011:234), in line with the dynamics of "socialisation" and "brusselisation" (see Chapter 2 for reference to these concepts). However, the coexistence of a large degree of institutionalisation and the influence of intergovernmentalism through the consultations with member states can be better depicted as a process of institutionalised intergovernmentalism (Christiansen 2001), given that "member states showed a considerable degree of self-restraint and allowed Solana to operate without much interference" (Missiroli 2015:14).

This process certainly benefited from the leading role and strong personality of Solana, who has been characterised as an "acute politician and excellent policy maker" and who "lacking a predecessor, a budget or even a consensus on what his job should be, [has] turned the role into whatever he can make of it" (Larivé 2014:164, 166). His understanding of EU foreign policy-making was more based

[85] Several interviewees referred to a "Christmas tree" process as the result of purely intergovernmental drafting procedures, whereby member states express their national priorities and end up adopting a shared text where it is no longer possible to identify what's common and where, on the contrary, the reader can easily spot the national positions in the different sections of the text (Interviews #3, #4, #5, #10 and #18).

on a "sort of art exercised through personal contacts" than through traditional institutional methods (Interview #32).

Indeed, as shown in the policy formulation phase of the ESS, Solana went well beyond the prerogatives of the position of HR as set in the Amsterdam Treaty, which actually did not give him a formal right of initiative, and worked in a "pioneering political spirit" (Interview #32). In the words of a closer collaborator, the process was not an intergovernmental one but a "Solana process", who would rely on his personal standing, contacts and on Joschka Fischer's original proposal to proceed as desired, "or else be sacked" (Interview #5). The trust of his colleagues, both foreign ministers and Heads of State and Government, also played its part (Interview #18).

Reviewing the main assumptions of new intergovernmentalism against the policy formulation of the ESS, this phase shows how the expected day-to-day leadership of the European Council in new policy initiatives was replaced by a strong leadership of Solana and his team of close advisors. Regular policy debates that new intergovernmentalism assumes to take place in intergovernmental bodies happened instead in the framework of the task force, which became a sort of micro-cosmos for discussions among member states representatives. The contributions of member states sent during the June to December consultation process did not substantially alter the contents of the first version of the ESS, drafted by Robert Cooper with the inputs of the task force.

This resulted in a highly institutionalised policy formulation process, where the working groups of the Council or the PSC were largely side-lined by Solana's team, precisely to avoid cumbersome intergovernmental negotiations. As in the previous phase, however, new intergovernmentalism rightly points out at the absence of the Commission's role in the formulation of prominently intergovernmental policies such as the CFSP. The *entente cordiale* between Solana and Patten enabled the HR to take the lead on a strategy covering issues of an intergovernmental nature, such as security and defence. More emphasis, however, should be placed on the influence of epistemic communities, which are not considered relevant actors by

the new intergovernmentalism but which however played a certain role during the consultations on the ESS.

5.4. The policy output: the success of innovation in strategy-making

It is remarkable that the first experience in strategy-making in the domain of EU foreign policy was "adopted" by Heads of State and Government in the European Council of December 2003. Even more so if we take into account its innovative policy formulation process, which witnessed high degrees of institutionalisation in prominently intergovernmental areas such as the CFSP and ESDP. As one interviewee recalls, the fact that there was no precedent for the 2003 document enabled innovation in the method and substantial contents, no matter if the ESS is a text "without a legal basis, just a political reference" (Interview #18, also #4).

Precisely to avoid the intergovernmental procedures, Solana preferred not to adopt a "common strategy", as provided in the Amsterdam Treaty. The varied nature of security threats post 9/11, the poor track record of common strategies and the deep divisions among member states after Operation Iraqi Freedom also discouraged him from pursuing thorough negotiations with national representatives in the Council. And still, "no one thought about anything else than adopting the document" when it was presented at the European Council (Interview #3).

The adoption at the European Council also provided a strong political signal. As suggested by new intergovernmentalism, the European Council has become the "new centre of political gravity" (Puetter 2014) so it plays a key role in defining the direction of the Union and the ambition of member states in European integration. Getting the ESS approved at the European Council enabled the "necessary relevance and credibility for all member states to follow its parameters" (Interview #11). In addition, its adoption at the highest political level also increased the ownership of the document by member states, something that an innovative policy-making process circumventing the traditional intergovernmental procedures was not certain to obtain. For any subsequent steps, the sense of

ownership was of utmost importance if member states were to act under a shared umbrella and provide the necessary resources for joint action.

The ESS succeeded in climbing the pyramid of intergovernmental policy-making without carrying the burden of cumbersome negotiations among member states. In other words, Solana "got away with a procedure by which he was not held accountable in any intergovernmental body" (Interview #18). It was a process designed at the upper level (the Council) and adopted at the highest one (the European Council), whereby intermediate negotiations by member states were replaced by an innovative method of institutionalised intergovernmentalism (Christiansen 2001).

As previously noted, new intergovernmentalism falls short in explaining why, contrary to its assumptions, regular policy-making did not happen at the official intergovernmental instances (such as the working groups of the Council, the PSC or COREPER) but rather in the task force under the supervision of the HR. The fact that, following this process, the European Council did not backtrack on the adoption of the ESS signals both the extraordinary times at which this Strategy was produced and the success of the "Solana method" of policy-making innovation. The pyramidal structure of foreign policy-making looked less pyramidal and more institutionalised after the ESS experience.

In a way, this contradicts a central premise of new intergovernmentalism, which understands that initiatives emanate, not end, in the European Council. The innovative method of strategy-making inaugurated by the ESS did not preclude the ownership of member states of the Strategy. Member states rather benefited from a strongly institutionalised process at a time when political divisions over the Iraq war ran deep in EU foreign policy matters.

5.5. The implementation: a source for (soft) policy-inspiration

The European Council, when approving the ESS, also asked "the incoming Presidency and the SG/HR, in coordination with the Commission, to present, as

appropriate, concrete proposals for the implementation of the European security strategy" (European Council 2003c:22). However, this clashed with the fact that the ESS was conceived as a political reference, not a legally binding document (Interviews #3, #4, #10 and #18). Here again, Solana got the upper hand in the implementation phase of the ESS, insomuch he preferred to "keep the ESS as a general doctrine and resist calls to translate it into a series of detailed action plans" (Missiroli 2015:14).

The initial idea, reflected as well in the text of the European Council conclusions, was to unpack the ESS into a series of specific action plans on EU capabilities for conflict management, enhancing the coherence of EU foreign policy and adopting a series of sub-strategies for regional and thematic aspects (Interview #18). The negotiation of these action plans would have brought back the traditional intergovernmental policy-making method, insomuch they would have been discussed at the various levels of the Council. Solana wanted to avoid "limiting the scope of the ESS" and keep it as an inspirational and policy guidance document, a "sort of doctrine" (Interview #18 and also #3). The fact that the ESS was kept as a generic prescriptive document also ensured the ownership of its contents by member states (Interview #18).

As soon as it was adopted, the ESS thus became a source for policy-inspiration, "not so much to embody good policy decisions as to create the environment and mood for taking them" (Bailes 2005:14, see also the references in the previous chapter). Some voices argued that the ESS should have been called a foreign policy strategy rather than a security strategy (Marsh and Rees 2012:48), precisely due to the lack of specific implementation and provisions on security and defence aspects. Others favoured the term "European Security Concept" to reflect its intangible nature, as a key official behind the ESS put it (Interview #3).

That said, the ESS did not go unnoticed nor was to be soon put in a drawer. As the previous chapter analysed, the ESS can be considered the source of a wide range of sub-strategies, starting with the EU Strategy against proliferation of WMD (Council of the European Union 2003b), which was adopted alongside the ESS (European

Council 2003c). Other subsequent policies were adopted "within the framework that the ESS provides" (Interview #4), with Giovanni Grevi (2004:5) arguing that the implementation of the ESS unfolded in 5 main axes: WMD, fight against terrorism, the Balkans, the Middle East and effective multilateralism.

More specifically, the ESS enabled the codification of existing practices in the fields of foreign and security policy and the search for coherence in the EU's activities (Interview #11, see also Andersson 2007). In this regard, the ESS notes the need that foreign policy addresses all dimensions. As it reads, "diplomatic efforts, development, trade and environmental policies, should follow the same agenda" (European Council 2003a:15). The European Commission would later build on the momentum generated by the ESS to further advocate for policy coherence in its communication to the Council "Europe in the World - Some practical proposals for greater coherence, effectiveness and visibility" (European Commission 2006b).

In the field of the ESDP, the ESS gave "permissiveness" to ongoing missions and "implicit recognition to keep developing them" (Interviews #10 and #18). As an interviewee put it, the ESS enabled the EU to move "from practice to theory" (Interview #11) in security and defence policies, which also had an impact on the perception of other actors vis-à-vis the EU's actorness in global affairs. As such, the ESS not only served as an inspiration for ASEAN and Latin America but also for more relevant international players such as Russia and the United States, who now recognised that the EU *also* had a strategy (Interview #11).

For member states, the ESS also became a "key framework for policy formulation" in the same way that it did for the EU, as the European Council noted a year after it first discussed the ESS (European Council 2004:11). Policy planners of national foreign ministers became accustomed to devise national policies keeping the ESS in mind, linking actions, discourses and political references to its contents (Interview #11). The ESS played a bigger role in countries that did not have a national security strategy, such as Germany, where it acted as a "substitute" (Irlenkäuser 2004:7). In other cases, as in Spain, the ESS inspired the adoption and contents of its own national security strategy (Gobierno de España 2011). Finally,

the ESS also helped to project a sense of unity and common action in foreign policy, raising the profile of the HR himself. In the words of a close aide, EU foreign policy, the HR and the ESS became "mutually reinforcing" (Interview #11).

Although not subject to in-depth analysis in this thesis, the "Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy. Providing Security in a Changing World" (European Council 2008a)" also reveals some interesting insights when read from the angle of its policy-making process. The RIESS was not originally conceived as part of the implementation of the ESS. Rather, the first discussions on updating the ESS were more ambitious than a simple implementation report. The Georgia war and the increasing tensions with Russia called for the reappraisal of the security threats to the EU, with the Baltic states particularly adamant to see Russia listed at the top of the list (Interview #5). President Sarkozy of France wanted a new security strategy under the auspices of the French Presidency, while others believed that reaching consensus on a single list of threats would be too difficult due to internal divisions (Interviews #5 and #18). Cyprus also proved particularly uncompromising over NATO discussions (Interview #18).

As a consequence, a series of consultations with PSC Ambassadors were held at the beginning of the reflection process, bringing the traditional intergovernmental method of CFSP to the fore (Interview #5). Provisional versions of the RIESS text were also shared with member states on multiple occasions, enabling them to provide specific comments to the text (Missiroli 2015:39). According to another interviewee, the process of the RIESS became "bureaucratised" through the protagonism of national diplomats and Brussels-based structures, without leadership at ministers level nor a strong drive from Solana (Interview #38). Particularly remarkable when compared to the ESS process was the lack of leadership by Solana, who was deeply disappointed with the failure of the European Constitution, the prospects to become the first EU foreign minister and "tired of the job" (Interview #38).

Working through more intergovernmental procedures than in 2003 was one of the main reasons why Helga Schmid, in her capacity as Director of the Policy Unit in the General Secretariat of the Council, failed to foster consensus among representatives of member states for the adoption of a new security strategy (Interview #18). Unfitted with the ESS' innovative policy-making process, member states could only agree on an implementation report, which was discussed in the European Council of December 2008. The conclusions of the European Council reveal a large degree of ambiguity regarding the RIESS, with Heads of State and Government only "shar[ing] the analysis of the report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy of 2003" - i.e. not adopting it (European Council 2008b). As a consequence, the RIESS was soon considered "a footnote" in EU strategy-making, with no political purpose (Interview #38).

Looking at the last policy-making phase of the ESS against the premises of new intergovernmentalism, the Strategy does not provide excessive evidence on the development of intergovernmental implementation initiatives, given the lack of emphasis on this last phase of policy-making. New intergovernmentalism assumes that the implementation should be characterised by trickling down political initiatives into policy negotiations at lower Council decision-making bodies.

However, the ESS was not conceived as a strategy with a detailed follow-up but as a soft policy-inspiration tool. Solana did not want to enter cumbersome intergovernmental negotiations after its publication, which would have transformed a political exercise into a bureaucratic endeavour. The 2008 experience on the RIESS provides evidence on the limits of intergovernmentalism to produce such documents, given the deadlock to which the RIESS was confronted when member states were fully involved in the exercise. Solana and the Brussels-based machinery exercised a leading role in modulating the fate of the ESS, maintaining its original, high politics, *raison d'être*. The ESS nonetheless inspired further policy developments in the form of various sub-strategies, developed both in intergovernmental and supranational instances, as reviewed in Chapter 4.

5.6. Conclusions

The ESS inaugurated a trend towards innovative strategy-making mechanisms in a prominently intergovernmental policy area. Circumscribed to the second pillar of the CFSP, the first EU grand strategy defied the traditional leadership of the Council in putting forward foreign policy initiatives. Instead, HR Solana benefited from loopholes in procedural matters to embody a highly institutionalised strategy-making process. His strong personality and policy-making skills enabled him to fully grasp the opportunity to heal the wounds of the Iraq war, which had left the EU, and particularly the big three, in a deep sense of disunion. The ESS initiative was fully in line with the intergovernmental practices in the CFSP, but Solana and a special task force within the General Secretariat of the Council came up with a highly institutionalised policy formulation process in the benefit of a sharp and bold document for EU foreign policy.

The predominance of institutionalised intergovernmentalism in the ESS coincides with some of the main premises of new intergovernmentalism, although downplays some others. As new intergovernmentalism rightfully acknowledges, the initiative to launch the first-ever EU security strategy came from the member states, particularly the big three, in the context of an informal Council meeting. The member states also took part in the policy formulation phase, insomuch their presence in the Policy Unit of the General Secretariat enabled them to have their voice heard during the drafting process. This Unit, however, was also characterised by deep levels of socialisation among national seconded officials, which nuanced the weight of national positions and contributed to the institutionalisation of the policy-making process. Also in line with new intergovernmentalism, the ESS witnessed no major role of the main supranational bodies of the EU, particularly the European Commission.

However, the Brussels-based machinery around the HR soon overcame legal weaknesses such as not having the formal right of initiative to place itself at the centre of the policy-making process. Contrary to the premises of new intergovernmentalism, negotiation during the ESS did not follow a pyramidal

process under the leadership of the European Council. Once the initiative was launched, member states took a back seat in the benefit of Solana and his team, complementing rather than leading the process. Regular policy debate took place in the framework of the Policy Unit of the General Secretariat and of the task force for the ESS in particular. The HR also secured political backing at the highest level by member states, who endorsed the ESS at the European Council. Interestingly, they did so without having been the "centre of political gravity" (Puetter 2014: Ch. 3) as foreseen by new intergovernmentalism.

Instead of being more involved than ever in the day-to-day management of the EU political agenda, member states relinquished part of their prerogatives to Solana in a non-formalised policy-making process. The trust of ministers of foreign affairs and even Heads of State and Government in Solana also helped to empower a common European leadership, with national governments buying into the process. All in all, for the ESS, the "catalyst of integration" (Puetter and Fabbrini 2016:634) was the HR, rather than the member states. In all phases of the policy-making process, the HR and his team fostered consensus in a supposedly purely intergovernmental policy such as the CFSP. AS a result, the policy-making of the ESS witnessed a high degree of institutionalisation in a CFSP -thus intergovernmental- dominated area.

This innovative approach to policy-making found some backlashes in the implementation phase. Despite the non-negligible impact of the ESS as a tool for policy inspiration, several observers have highlighted the shortcomings of the ESS when translating into specific policy action (Andersson et al 2011:5, Grevi 2004:5). The ESS missed explicit links to sub-strategies and provided short guidance on future policy developments in CFSP and ESDP (Interview #18), although it legitimised their further development (Interview #10). The lack of thorough implementation could certainly be considered an element of discord for such an innovative policy-making process of institutionalised intergovernmentalism. This is why the study of the EUGS, a strategy partly conceived to overcome the lack of implementation of the ESS, will conform the second case study of this thesis.

Table 5.1. Summary of the findings of the policy-making process of the ESS

Phases of policy-making	Assumptions of new intergovernmentalism	Evidence-based analysis of the ESS policy-making process
1. Agenda-setting	- Overall political direction provided by the European Council (catalyst of integration). - Initiatives emerge from a strong consensus at the highest level between member states. - No role for the Commission[86].	- Combination of a strong activism of HR Solana and the good will of the Foreign Ministers of the big three member states, despite the division over Iraq. - Delegation of the initiative from member states to HR Solana.
2. Policy formulation	- Day-to-day leadership provided by the European Council. - Regular policy debates, policy coordination and decision-making in the Council, supported by its intergovernmental bodies (working groups and PSC). - No role for the Commission. - No role for epistemic communities.	- Leadership of HR Solana and his team in the Council Secretariat. - Discussions among member states in the framework of the task force. - Highly institutionalised policy formulation process, without discussions in traditional intergovernmental bodies, through the involvement of member states in the task force and their consultation via the "fiches". - Certain degree of consultation with epistemic communities. - Absence of consultations with the Commission, thanks to an *entente cordiale* between Solana and Patten.
3. Policy output	- Final approval of initiatives by the European Council. - Quest for consensus among member states, embodied in Council conclusions.	- Adoption of the ESS at the European Council, increasing the ownership of member states. - Consensus on the ESS despite the absence of intergovernmental negotiations, due to institutionalised intergovernmentalism.

[86] This table excludes the EEAS in the different phases, since the ESS was adopted before the Lisbon Treaty. It focuses instead on the role of the main institutions, the European Council, the Council and the Commission, in light of the assumptions of new intergovernmentalism.

4. Implementation	- Intergovernmental consensus for policy implementation, with the Council exercising the coordination of subsequent policy initiatives under the guidance of the European Council. - No role for the Commission.	- Desired absence of implementation by Solana to avoid intergovernmental policy-making processes in the Council. - Soft policy-inspiration of the ESS for sub-strategies, both in intergovernmental and supranational instances.

CHAPTER 6

THE POLICY-MAKING OF THE EUROPEAN UNION GLOBAL STRATEGY (2016)

6.1. Introduction

The study of the policy-making process of the ESS revealed a large degree of institutionalisation within an intergovernmental policy, the CFSP. This did not translate into a dramatic change of the policy-making procedures in EU foreign policy, mostly due to the lack of implementation of the EU's first security strategy. The ESS was nonetheless a tool for policy inspiration and its novel policy formulation process, the germ of an innovative approach to intergovernmental policy-making practices in line with "institutionalised intergovernmentalism" (Christiansen 2001).

The policy-making process of the EUGS cannot be understood without a reference to the 2003 experience. On the one hand, strategy-making in the EUGS has further reinforced the innovative practices of the ESS, giving additional leverage to Brussels based bodies. The provisions of the Lisbon Treaty on external action have enabled the EEAS and the HR/VP to fully grasp the advantages of having a right of initiative, both regarding the range of policies to be covered by the new strategy and its policy formulation process. On the other, the EUGS has been conceived, contrary to the ESS, as an implementation-oriented document.

As this chapter will analyse, the policy-making process of the EUGS has inaugurated a trend towards autonomy in intergovernmentalism, whereby all phases, from agenda-setting to implementation, unveil a large room of manoeuvre of the HR/VP and the EEAS when drafting a document that should belong to a traditional intergovernmental policy area. This shift cannot be understood without referring to the inter-institutional dynamics put forward by the Lisbon Treaty and the objective of the HR/VP and the EEAS to pursue a coherent and joined-up approach to external action.

Also, the EUGS has been conceived as a framework for future policy developments in the field of external action. The focus on its operationalisation has led the EU to make progress in different areas of implementation, particularly security and defence and resilience, for which the centrality of the post-Lisbon institutional architecture has been instrumental. All along the process, member states have attempted to nuance the autonomy of Brussels-based institutions during the strategy-making process of the EUGS, challenging some of the central premises of new intergovernmentalism.

As a high-ranking national diplomat put it, the EUGS has become the "vehicle" through which current developments in external action circulate (Interview #28), signalling the centrality of *de novo* Brussels-based bodies. One year after its publication, the EUGS has shaped policy-making dynamics in external action thanks to its implementation and follow-up. As this chapter will analyse, the EU's new strategy has become a tool for policy inspiration and facilitated the parallel convergence of subsequent policy initiatives.

6.2. The agenda-setting: fully grasping the HR/VP's right of initiative

The 2008 experience of the RIESS left a bitter taste to those in favour of revising the ESS. Despite the changing global and internal environment, the EU had failed to agree on a large-scale revision of the 2003 document. Such a failure would be taken into consideration at the time of producing a new strategy, both in terms of its process and substance. On substance, several major developments had triggered the adoption of a renewed strategy-making mode by the beginning of the 2010s.

First, the global environment had dramatically changed since 2003. In addition to wide-ranging transformations of the international order such as the rise of the BRICS and the global shift of power, the EU was confronted to the ongoing destabilising effects of the crisis in its neighbourhood (Smith 2016, Mora Benavente 2017). In the south, the so-called "Arab Spring" had mutated into a "prolonged winter", with a civil war in Syria, the disintegration of the Libyan state,

the consolidation of an authoritarian state in Egypt and the security threats emanating from the Sahel (Gerges 2014). In the East, Russia pursued a defiant position towards the EU and continued to threaten the European security order following the conflicts in Crimea and Ukraine (Mankoff 2016).

Internally, the EU was deeply affected by the prolonged effects of the economic and financial crisis, the inability to provide a durable response to the refugee crisis and the questioning of the European integration project with the rise of populism and euroscepticism (Tsoukalis 2016, Youngs (forthcoming). As an interviewee summarised it "the motivation for new strategic thinking was more defensive, based on security threats, the diminishment of internal cohesion and a wobbly internal and external environment" (Interview #33). So in the eyes of many observers, the opening motto of the ESS "Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure nor so free" (European Council 2003:1) was fully uncontemporary.

This changing strategic environment had already triggered discussions among member states on the need to revise their own national security strategies, with Denmark, the Netherlands, Germany and France starting a process of internal strategic reflection before the reproduction of a similar initiative at the European level. National discussions "created the atmosphere" for launching a strategic review process in the EU (Interview #13) departing from the assumption that "the world did not want to be like us Europeans anymore" (Interview #33).

In parallel, a series of discussions in expert circles on the need to update the ESS following the changing external and internal environments had been ongoing for a while. Particularly remarkable was the work carried out by four major European think tanks under the auspices of their respective foreign ministries (Italy, Poland, Spain and Sweden) who initiated the project "European Global Strategy"[87]. The result of a series of seminars and publications came in the form of the report "Towards a European Global Strategy" (Istituto Affari Internazionali, Polish Institute of International Affairs, Elcano Royal Institute, Swedish Institute of

[87] The involvement and commitment of the foreign ministers of Sweden (Carl Bildt) and Poland (Radoslaw Sikorski) to produce a new strategy was particularly strong and were disappointed when HR/VP Ashton did not include this issue in her list of priorities (Interview #38).

International Affairs 2013). This project, together with many accompanying publications requesting an update of the EU's strategic document (Andersson et. al. 2011, Biscop 2011, 2012 and 2015, Dennison et. al. 2013), raised awareness among member states and EU institutions on the need to update the 2003 ESS (Interviews #4, #9, #12 and #18). Think tanks and research institutes acted as policy networks framing the discussions that would later crystallise in a new strategy-making process.

More central to the analysis of this thesis is the impulse given by the Lisbon Treaty to think anew in strategic terms. The institutional developments brought about by the new Treaty demanded some sense of direction for the HR/VP and the EEAS, taking into account the recent shift from foreign policy to external action.[88] The set-up of the Union's external action brought about renewed calls for the adoption of a strategic document providing a sense of direction to the new institutions (Biscop 2015a, Duke 2017).

In addition, such calls should take into account the renewed impulse for policy coherence so, rather than simply revising the 2003 ESS, a "broader Global Strategy (...) [should] bring together into a coherent whole all dimensions of EU external action, security and non-security related" (Tocci 2015:117). This idea was summarised in the constant references to a "joined-up" and coherent approach to external action (Interviews #2, #4, #21, #22, #24, #26, #27, #31 and López-Aranda 2017:68). The added value of an all-encompassing strategy would be to "avoid silo mentalities" (Interview #31) and to apply the principle of coherence to "policies, institutions and member states" (Interview #2).

The discussions to match the innovations of the Lisbon Treaty with a renewed strategic thinking had been present since its entry into force in December 2009. The first HR/VP, Catherine Ashton, hinted at the possibility to formulate a new strategy, but several factors prevented her from going down that path. First, she considered that the experience of 2008, the current strategic environment and internal disagreements over EU crisis risked exacerbating divisions among

[88] See Chapter 3 for a revision of these institutional transformations and Chapter 4 for the relationship between institutional reform and strategy-making in external action.

member states (Interviews #34 and #38). Second, she had "too much on her plate", including the negotiations to set up the EEAS, the Iran talks and the Kosovo-Serbia rapprochement (Interviews #22 and #38, see also Duke 2017:208). And third, Ashton showed a genuine lack of interest in strategic and far-reaching discussions on the future of external action, particularly when combined with her "reluctance to act as vice-president of the Commission" and thus devise a "whole of EU" strategy (Interviews #2, #37 and #38)[89].

By the time the Juncker Commission replaced Barroso's, a few developments facilitated the re-emergence of favourable positions towards a new strategy. The EEAS was already fully operational and the position of the HR/VP, "largely defined" (Interview #22). The Juncker Commission had also put Europe as a "Stronger Global Actor" among the ten political priorities guiding his 2014-2019 term (Juncker 2014b, see also Duke 2017:207-217). The set-up of the Commissioner's Group on External Action (as reviewed in Chapter 3) and the "mission letter" to Federica Mogherini as the new HR/VP also demonstrated a renewed interest in taking external action to the next level (Juncker 2014a)[90]. All in all, whereas Solana was not able to have a strategy for the whole of external action; Ashton was not willing to use the resources at its disposal and was not interested in strategy; Mogherini was "able and willing" (Interview #2).

Making full use of her right of initiative, the push by HR/VP Mogherini became the most determinant factor in the inception phase of the EUGS. She understood that the launch a strategy-making process would translate into her personal footprint in external action (Interviews #9, #17, #22, #24, #28, #34 and #38). The machinery at the EEAS was also pleased to witness a renewed interest in strategic discussions following Ashton's disappointing results in this regard (Interview #7).

[89] The discussions to produce a new strategy took into account the post-Lisbon structures right from the beginning. According to one of the interviewees, initial exchanges between Barroso and Ashton hinted at the possibility that the new strategy was signed by Barroso as President of the European Commission, Ashton as HR/VP and Herman Van Rompuy as President of the European Council, thus reinforcing a "whole of EU" approach to strategy-making (Interview #38).

[90] As noted in Chapter 4, the Juncker Commission has shown interest in bringing the security aspects of external action closer to the work of the Commission, as shown by the Commission's communication "European Agenda on Security" (European Commission 2015a).

Before her appointment as HR/VP, Mogherini had already showed interest in strategy-making. In her hearing at the European Parliament, she stated:

> "It is clear that this environment has changed significantly, rapidly and dramatically, and that the EU cannot simply carry on with existing policies as if nothing had happened. So a comprehensive stock-take and reflection is needed, to ensure that our approaches are relevant and realistic - and based on a shared strategic outlook. So I will aim to stimulate a wide-ranging and inclusive debate, involving not just the EU institutions and member state governments but the wider foreign policy community as well. (...) The experience from the 2003 European Security Strategy indicates that the process of reflecting strategically and collectively on EU foreign policy is crucially important to define how we want to act in the world. In light of the radically transformed global and regional circumstances we live in, a joint process of strategic reflection could eventually lead the way to a new European Security Strategy." (Mogherini 2014)

Soon after, Mogherini confirmed her intention to produce a new strategy at the 51st Munich Security Conference, where she noted: "We need a sense of direction. We need an ability to make choices and to prioritise. We need a sense of how we can best mobilise our instruments to serve our goals and in partnership with whom (...). We need a strategy" (quoted in Tocci 2015:115-116).

Mogherini built on what was available to launch a process of strategic reflection. Under Catherine Ashton as HR/VP, the European Council had invited "the High Representative, in close cooperation with the Commission, to assess the impact of changes in the global environment, and to report to the Council in the course of 2015 on the challenges and opportunities arising for the Union, following consultations with the Member States" (European Council 2013). Given the timeline provided, and in addition to the above-mentioned factors, Ashton decided not to embark on this strategic assessment, since its results would fall outside her mandate as HR/VP. But as soon after taking office, Mogherini used the mandate of

the European Council to launch a process that would eventually lead to the EUGS two years later.

Member states favouring an intergovernmental understanding of external action emphasised that the launch of the strategy-making process derived directly from a mandate given by member states to the HR in the European Council (Interviews #17 and #23), so in line with traditional policy-making methods in CFSP. Indeed, they circumscribed the exercise to the fields of security and defence only (Interviews #23 and #29), given that the European Council of 2013 was actually a "thematic debate on defence" (European Council 2013). A member state-driven process enabled reluctant capitals not to lose grip on subsequent developments in strategy-making.

This became an important departing point for the discussions on the new strategy, particularly because the "big three", together with others countries such as Netherlands, saw with a certain degree of scepticism the launch of a reflection process void of specific results and risking internal divisions (Interviews #22, #26 and #29, see also Tocci 2015:118). Also, in the words of an external observer, reluctant member states had no interest in embarking into an "academic exercise while the [European] house was burning" (Interview #32).

Mogherini's vision was however to broaden the scope of the strategic assessment beyond security and defence matters, prioritising instead a joined-up or "whole of EU" approach (Tocci 2015, 2016a, 2016b). Mogherini and her team escaped the idea of simply revising the EU's foreign policy from a narrow security dimension (along the lines of the ESS) and opted instead for producing a strategic assessment covering all of the EU's external action, broadening the scope to a "global" assessment (Tocci 2015:119). The final strategic assessment (EEAS 2015) thus went beyond the original requirements of the European Council, although did not go as far as interpreting the mandate of the European Council as a tool to produce an EU Global strategy yet. [91]

[91] As Tocci (2015:118, 2016a:3) notes, some understood the European Council's mandate in 2013 as a mandate for a new strategy. Given the recent appointment of Mogherini as HR/VP and the willingness to involve a wide range of institutions and external stakeholders in a new strategy, she

For the purpose of the strategic assessment, the HR/VP established a working group including representatives from the EEAS, the Commission, the Council Secretariat and the European Council who would work on a joint document during eight months, from November 2014 to June 2015 (Tocci 2015:119). As some interviewees recall, the involvement of the Commission from the early stages of the process signalled the willingness of the HR/VP to use her "two hats fully" in order to devise an assessment of the whole of the EU's external action (Interviews #1, #34, #36). The inputs from the Commission President's cabinet and the Secretariat General of the Commission showed that there was already a clear acceptance that the strategic assessment and the policy consequences deriving from it would not only impact the member states but the totality of the EU, including the Commission (Interview #34). This working group was perceived as a trial-and-error mechanism for the next stages of strategy-making, with its members noting that national capitals should be further involved in the process for ownership purposes (Tocci 2016:3-4).

Following the mandate of the European Council to consult with member states, a series of meetings were organised with the members of the strategic planning departments of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and a few briefings were held at the PSC, COREPER and FAC levels (López-Aranda 2017:71). However, member states adopted a listening mode during this preliminary agenda-setting phase, conscious that the HR/VP was producing a "strategic assessment" rather than a new strategy, for which there was still no sufficient agreement among the various stakeholders (Interviews #29 and #34). Nonetheless, the HR/VP used the mandate of the European Council to stretch as much as possible her prerogatives, going beyond the elaboration of a report on the international environment and considering the strategic assessment as the first milestone of the EUGS.

The result of the strategic assessment was published in June 2015 under the title "The European Union in a changing global environment. A more connected, contested and complex world" (EEAS 2015) and presented to the European

preferred to stick to the idea to only produce a strategic assessment as a first phase of the EUGS process.

Council in June 2015. Heads of State and Government mandated "the High Representative [to] continue the process of strategic reflection with a view to preparing an EU global strategy on foreign and security policy in close cooperation with Member States, to be submitted to the European Council by June 2016" (European Council 2015).

Reading the agenda-setting phase of the EUGS against new intergovernmentalism, the assumed leading role of the European Council and the necessary consensus among member states for new initiatives was secondary when compared to the activism and interest of the HR/VP in producing a new strategy. The overall political direction and the catalyst of the initiative came from the leader of the EEAS, a *de novo* body after Lisbon, who gave the necessary political push for the revision of the ESS, despite the initial reluctance of some member states. Mogherini built on the mandate of the European Council to undertake a strategic assessment but also interpreted it generously, considering it the first step towards the elaboration of a new strategy. She became the true policy entrepreneur of the new strategy[92].

From the early stages of the EUGS, Mogherini also decided that strategy-making after Lisbon should cover the whole of the EU's external action, instead of security and defence only. She opted for fully using her hat as Vice-President of the Commission for the purpose of horizontal and institutional coherence, avoiding a silo mentality in the post-Lisbon's external action and bringing together the intergovernmental CFSP and CSDP and the supranational external relations. This opened the door to the full involvement of the Commission in external action strategy-making, although under the leadership and centrality of the HR/VP via her second hat. By using her right of initiative, the HR/VP also inaugurated a process towards an increased autonomy of the EEAS in a traditionally intergovernmental policy, which would be more pronounced in the second stage of strategy-making, the policy formulation phase.

[92] On policy entrepreneurs, Kaunert (2011) has studied the role of supranational institutions, particularly the European Commission, in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice.

6.3. The policy formulation: autonomy in intergovernmentalism

At the beginning of the drafting process of the EUGS, early inter-institutional discussions on the proceedings of the exercise unfolded. For member states, the wording of the conclusions of the June 2015 European Council reflected that the initiative emanated from an intergovernmental process, insomuch it was the "high representative" (not the HR/VP) who was tasked to prepare an EUGS in close cooperation with the member states. Their representatives signalled as well that the Commission did not figure in the wording of the European Council conclusions, so the new strategy was to be considered along the lines of the ESS, i.e. a security strategy falling within the realm of the CFSP[93].

In the mind of the HR/VP, however, the reading of the European Council conclusions was more nuanced. Mogherini understood that, along the lines of the strategic assessment process, she had been put in the driving seat of a new strategy, with member states giving her a wide room of manoeuvre for delineating the contours of the process and the actors involved. In her words, "the Treaty of Lisbon entrusted the Union with a powerful set of external action instruments [so] my task as HR/VP, in collaboration with the EEAS, is to bring these together in a coherent whole" (Mogherini 2015a:5). She emphasised: "outlining how the different instruments of our external action can be put to the service of a common set of goals is precisely the aim of a *comprehensive EU global strategy*" and also "[the goal is to] succeed in elaborating a genuinely *common EU global strategy*. And the key is precisely the word *common*" (Mogherini 2015a:5-6, emphasis in original)[94].

The emphasis on the *comprehensive* and *common* approach to strategy-making was to be noticed from the early policy formulation steps. As Mogherini put it in her

[93] At the early stages of the EUGS, debates on the scope of the new strategy were also influenced by the security situation and the threat of terrorism on European soil. The intention of some member states to focus on security only became more evident after the Paris terrorist attacks of Bataclan in November 2015 (Interview #9).

[94] According to an official interviewed, the main difference between the ESS and the EUGS was that whereas the first one only aimed at achieving the "unity of purpose" (a joint narrative for EU foreign policy after Iraq), the EUGS aims at the "unity of action" (thus tackling institutional developments and the horizontal and institutional coherence of external action) (Interview #2).

public speeches (2015b, 2016a), the word global was not to be understood only in the geographic sense of the word but also the thematic. The EUGS was conceived as a strategy for the "whole of EU", covering the security and defence matters of the CFSP and CSDP *and* the external relations activities of the European Commission, unlike the ESS.

According to Mogherini and her team, policies such as development cooperation, humanitarian aid, energy, neighbourhood, trade, and many other Commission-protagonised policies also had to fall within the scope of the EUGS. This responded to the changing nature of EU external action and the institutional developments put forward by the Lisbon Treaty. After all, the purpose of this Treaty was to "bridge the gap between the Commission and the member states" (Interview #1), so the EUGS provided the perfect opportunity to showcase the evolving nature of EU external action[95].

Yet commonality and comprehensiveness did not derive from the thematic aspects of the EUGS only. The policy-making process was meant to reflect the joined-up and "whole of EU" understanding of the EUGS, so it also had to be as inclusive as possible. As Mogherini and her team stated in various forums, "the process is as important as the outcome"[96], so specific attention was put in devising an inclusive strategy-making process that would bring together the intergovernmental and supranational features of the EU under the coordination of the EEAS and the leadership of the HR/VP. Since the inception phase, the EUGS process was embedded in the objective to promote policy coherence across policies,

[95] It is interesting to reproduce here the words used by Nathalie Tocci, penholder of the EUGS, in an interview on the policy-making process of the EUGS: "Javier Solana presented the first European Security Strategy. He did so as High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy. In other words, he could present *only* a security strategy because this is what fell within the remit of his mandate. Federica Mogherini is not *only* the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, she is *also* the Vice President of the European Commission, chairing the Commissioners' Group on External Action. She has therefore presented a Global Strategy, where the meaning of 'global' is both functional and geographic. In other words, we worked not only on the security aspects of the strategy, but took a 'whole of EU' approach, looking also at trade, development, migration, energy, climate and much more" (Tocci 2016b:2, emphasis in original).

[96] In Mogherini (2015a:6), one can read: "the process of reflection by a wide range of actors is as important as the end product of the exercise itself". See also We Perfectly Know (2016), Tocci (2016a:3), EEAS (2016b) and López-Aranda (2017:73). This idea is also reflected in the literature on EU strategy, as in Duke (2017:6), who writes "in strategic terms the journey is almost as important as the destination".

institutions and member states, even being considered its "major objective" (Interview #2). The focus on horizontal and institutional coherence would have major implications on the design of the drafting process and the objective to pursue a global rather than a security strategy only.

To that end, Mogherini and her team sat at the driving seat of the policy formulation process. The interest of the HR/VP in strategy-making and her right of initiative in external action were fully used to devise an innovative policy formulation process, building on the ESS experience but placing most responsibilities within a more established EEAS. Right from the beginning of the policy formulation, Mogherini appointed an external advisor for the drafting of the EUGS, Nathalie Tocci, who had also been involved in the strategic assessment (EEAS 2015).

Tocci, with a wide experience in the think tank community and EU external action matters, was considered a safe choice to keep the drafting process out of the bureaucratised methods of EU institutions and come up with some "out-of-the-box thinking" (Interview #20). Her appointment was welcomed both by member states and the European Commission (Interviews #6, #12, #20, #28 and #31), although some warned against the risk of placing such a potentially polarising process in the hands of a non-diplomat (Interview #7) and criticised an excessive weight of Italian officials in the team of advisors for the EUGS (in addition to Mogherini herself, Tocci and the Head of the Strategic Planning Directorate of the EEAS, Alfredo Conte, are both Italian nationals, Interviews #15 and #33).

The policy formulation was designed from the start as a "highly centralised" process (Interview #16). In order to obtain a strategic document, traditional drafting by committee methods would need to be avoided (Interviews #9, #12 and #22). The working methods of Council conclusions, whereby the contents of the texts are negotiated at subsequent intergovernmental bodies, tend to produce a "lowest common denominator" agreement among member states (Interviews #17, #22, #24 and #34). Also, the risk of intergovernmental negotiations for an EU strategy is to end up with a "Christmas tree", whereby the priorities of the

different actors are included in the text as a result of joint drafting (Interviews #18, #27 and #30). This risk was even higher if we take into account that the EUGS was meant to include policies in hands of the member states and the Commission. These two possible outcomes, the lowest common denominator and the Christmas tree approaches, were to be avoided if the aim was to produce a comprehensive but also strategic document for the EU's external action (Tocci 2017a).

The process proposed by the EEAS did not encounter major objections from the member states. Some, however, noted that not being fully involved would translate into Brussels-based bodies going "too far" in their prerogatives (Interview #21). A new strategy, whereby the changing security environment and the different perspectives among member states had to be reflected, required the buy-in from national capitals from the early stages of the process. Doubtful voices argued that taking initiatives without the early involvement of member states was like "walking on thin ice" (Interview #21), with the risk that the strategy would be put in the "dustbin" soon after its adoption (Interviews #17 and #38).

The necessary balance between the member states' buy-in and a highly centralised process ran throughout the sub-phases of the policy formulation process. In all of them, the leading role of the EEAS-based drafting team was encompassing. First, the team led by Nathalie Tocci under the supervision of the HR/VP came up with a skeleton of the main contents of the strategy, its structure and driving philosophy (Tocci 2017a). The skeleton was the product of bilateral conversations between Tocci and Mogherini from June to December 2015 (Interview #2) and excluded the diagnosis of the strategic environment, already included in the previous EEAS assessment (EEAS 2015). The skeleton focused instead on the most prescriptive aspects of the strategy (López Aranda 2017:71), including a structure divided in chapters on the interests, the priorities and the policies of EU external action.

Once Nathalie Tocci and the HR/VP agreed on the structure of the future strategy, the core of the work with the official institutions started (Tocci 2017a). The "flesh on the bones" of the strategy required a sophisticated and unorthodox strategy-making process, for which the buy-in and ownership of member states and the

Commission were considered crucial (Interview #2). A process of consultations unfolded during the next months (until a first full draft was available by April 2016, Tocci:2017a). These consultations remained separate for the intergovernmental and supranational spheres, with the services of the Commission and the member states representatives never meeting together to discuss the contents of the strategy (Interviews #15 and #34). The coherence of the exercise was ensured by the HR/VP, at the highest level, by Nathalie Tocci, in her capacity as penholder of the EUGS, and by Alfredo Conte as Head of the Strategic Planning Division of the EEAS.

Before scrutinising the policy formulation tracks of member states and the Commission, it is worth mentioning that the making of the EUGS also comprised a wide public consultation process with epistemic communities and policy networks, including NGOs, think tanks, universities and experts. The EUISS co-organised seminars in partnership with national think tanks or universities on a wide range of EUGS-related topics. Over 50 events were organised on the EUGS across the EU, with all foreign ministries of member states organising at least one event (Tocci 2017b:41). Additional seminars on the EUGS were organised by Brussels-based think tanks and a specific website (www.europa.eu/globalstrategy) was also set up during the process, where the results of multiple seminars and conferences and several written contributions were posted.

Presentations of the EUGS were also carried out in non-European countries, including in the United States, Japan, Brazil, Australia, Norway, Georgia and Serbia, as a way to "balance the emphasis between the EU's global and its regional roles" (Tocci 2017b:41). Consultations also included organisations such as the United Nations and NATO and a discussion at the European Parliament. An important outreach initiative was undertaken by the EUISS, which gathered the opinions of over 50 experts and published opinion pieces on the EUGS (EU Institute for Security Studies 2016). Other consulted stakeholders included Erasmus alumni, human rights NGOs, the defence industry, trade unions or the Catholic Church, to name a few (Tocci 2017b:41). The effort to include varied civil society voices in the public outreach and consultation process of the EUGS was also meant to increase

the ownership of the European public in external action at times of rising euroscepticism (Tocci 2017b:42-43).

6.3.1. The member states policy formulation track

On the side of the member states, an unorthodox system of consultations with national points of contact (POCs) was set in motion. POCs were appointed officials from member states who met regularly during the policy formulation phase (a total of 7 times between October and April 2016, according to López-Aranda 2017:74). Member states decided who would be part of the group of POCs and participants were often diplomats from the strategic planning departments or the European Correspondent of the ministries of foreign affairs. Their meetings took place at the premises of the EEAS and were convened by Alfredo Conte, whose Strategic Planning Division coordinated the formalities of the consultation process. Tocci, in turn, focused on the contents of the strategy (Interview #15). The meetings of the POCs covered the different aspects of external action and the discussions were based on a series of questionnaires that the EEAS sent to the member states ahead of the meetings.

These questionnaires included summaries on the topic to be discussed, in order to fragment the text of the EUGS and avoid a general and thorough discussion of its contents (Interviews #2, #6, #15 and #34). This ensured that the EEAS kept the upper-hand vis-à-vis the member states in the drafting process, although it simultaneously enabled POCs to provide comments and thus reinforce the national ownership of the text. Parts of the wording used by member states when providing the answers to the questionnaires were kept in the final draft of the EUGS (Interviews #2 and #15).

The method also enabled the penholder to structure the drafting process around the questionnaires produced by the EEAS, instead of the non-papers by individual or groups of member states that started to come in (Interviews #2, #12, #15 and

#16)[97]. The process also prevented the POCs from "writing the strategy from scratch" (Interview #2), which would have had negative consequences for the overall homogeneity and coherence of the text[98]. The EEAS officials were then in charge to find the "common denominator" of the inputs received and, most importantly, to not aim for the "lowest" one (Interview #34), as it is usually the case in a drafting by committee process.

During the consultation process with the POCs, a few tensions with member states surfaced. Some participants to the meetings complained that they were not given access to the full draft of the text, so they were too much in the hands of the EEAS when it came to reflect their inputs into the strategy (Interviews #6, #20, #21, #22, #26 and #33). The HR/VP, EEAS officials and sympathetic member states reacted by saying that the process was based on monthly consultations with the POCs, a far more extensive consultation process than the one of the ESS in 2003 (Interviews #4, #6, #9). Indeed, when compared to the ESS, the totality of member states were included in the consultation process via the POCs, whereas in 2003 Solana only consulted a few member states in the framework of the task force of the ESS.

As a well-acquainted voice of the process put it, the consultations via the POCs were the only possible compromise to obtain a high degree of ownership by member states "but not the full ownership that a negotiation process would have had" or, in other words, "to have member states on board without giving them a formal say on the document" (Interview #18). The POCs system contrasts with the core assumptions of deliberative intergovernmentalism (Puetter 2014), which gives a prominent role to the member states and intergovernmental bodies such as the working groups of the Council or the PSC in policy deliberations. On the

[97] As interviewees recall, the non-papers were mostly produced by groups of member states depending on their joint interests. For instance, the Baltic countries presented a paper on trade and on cyber-security (together with Finland and Denmark), France, Germany, Spain and Italy presented one on security and defence, the Czech Republic and Poland on NATO and Netherlands and Germany one on maritime security, to name a few (Interviews #12, #15 and #22).

[98] Some interviewees highlight that the parts of the text that were not subject to thorough discussions with the member states, particularly the chapters on the principles and interests of EU external action, are of more quality than the rest, which resembles a "Christmas tree" strategy-making exercise (Interviews #18 and #38).

contrary, during the consultations of the EUGS, deliberations were strongly led by an EEAS-devised and controlled system.

Along similar lines, some officials also recall how the Brussels community was "shocked" when they learned that the HR/VP wanted to set up the consultation process via the POCs and not the PSC or COREPER (Interviews #7, #9 and #13). These bodies, particularly the PSC, are supposed to have the competences for discussing strategic and foreign policy and security matters. But as a representative of a member state put it, PSC ambassadors discuss these issues "in the wrong way" (Interview #9). Instead of a long-term view, they tend to reproduce national positions on the basis of what governments and ministers say on a daily basis in the Council bodies. This working method was certainly not suitable for a policy formulation process that was meant to be longer than in 2003 but which negotiations in the PSC and COREPER would have rendered impossible (Tocci 2017a).

Working with capitals' representatives had an additional advantage. By avoiding the involvement of PSC representatives, the EEAS also avoided cumbersome negotiations and weekly discussions on the EUGS in Brussels, which gave additional leverage to the EEAS to set the agenda and the pace of the drafting process (Interviews #20 and #22). At the PSC, the process would have become much more formalised and personality-driven (Interviews #18 and #22) whereas working through capitals enabled the EEAS to enjoy a larger degree of manoeuvre while securing the political involvement of member states (Interviews #12, #14 and #20). Working with capitals also helped the drafters of the EUGS to avoid the tendency of Brussels-based diplomats to consult with their ministries the progress made in Council negotiations. For certain member states, the work through POCs was welcome as a way to break the socialisation and coordination reflex dynamics in Brussels in favour of a more intergovernmentalised process (Interview #20), although, with the EEAS keeping the upper-hand in the drafting process, their hopes vanished.

The involvement of capital-based diplomats also came with a price. Not so acquainted with the dynamics of external action and the involvement of the Commission in these discussions (more on this below), a series of clashes at the meetings of the POCs regarding the scope of the EUGS emerged. Contrary to the understanding of the HR/VP and the EEAS on the need of a "global" strategy, representatives from some member states wanted to limit the exercise to a purely security-based one, thus not buying into the broader conception of external action (Interviews #35 and #36). They feared that entering into external action discussions among POCs meant accepting the move from a purely intergovernmental policy (the CFSP) to a hybrid one (external action), whereby EU institutions enjoyed larger prerogatives. The willingness of the EEAS to reinforce the coherence of external action with the drafting of a global strategy also raised eyebrows among member states, with disputes permeating into the internal mechanisms of national diplomacies and the relations between ministries (Interviews #12 and #21).

The fears over the institutional impact of coherence-seeking were overcome again thanks to the central position of the EEAS in the drafting process. As soon as member states signalled "red lines" in the summaries provided by the penholder, these were removed from the draft of the EUGS (Interviews #2, #22 and #33). This procedure facilitated the identification of national positions regarding the contents of the strategy and the ownership of member states, which became "incremental" thanks to the subsequent meetings of the POCs and the "iterative process of consultations" (Interviews #15, #22 and #28). The early identification of national red lines also enabled the smooth transition to the subsequent phases of the policy formulation process.

Once the working procedures of the POCs were well established, the leading team of the EUGS broadened the scope of consultations with other member states' representatives, since buy-in required "more than the regular interaction with the POCs" (Tocci 2017a). Nathalie Tocci and the HR/VP started a series of briefings with political directors, security directors, defence directors and secretary generals of the national ministries of foreign affairs and with the PSC, the EU

Military Committee, the permanent military group and the FAC and the informal Defence and Development Councils (Tocci 2017a). In these meetings, representatives of member states received details on the drafting process and discussed most of the contents of the EUGS. However, they were soon proceduralised in a traditional intergovernmental format, whereby subsequent "tours de table" dominated the discussions and only generic national positions were expressed (Interviews #9, #15 and #26).

At the PSC, for instance, Ambassadors took the opportunity to voice their discontent with the drafting process, which was excessively directed from the EEAS and lacked sufficient involvement from member states -or at least the PSC's (Interviews #17, #18 and #22). During these presentations, EEAS representatives avoided "entering into this kind of conversation" (Interviews #18 and #26), which reinforced a sense of lack of ownership by some member states. In many of these meetings, PSC Ambassadors reacted against a "take it or leave it" approach to the text and insisted on the necessity to not only be briefed on the contents of the EUGS but also contribute to them (Interview #17). Briefings at the PSC were considered by some a "box ticking exercise" (Interview #16) so to avoid this, PSC Ambassadors suggested that parts of the text should be referred to the Council working groups for discussion (Interview #17), which the EEAS avoided.

It is noticeable that the complaints of an insufficient protagonism of the member states were not equal among all of them. Interviewees from medium and small sized member states emphasised that consultations did indeed take place before formal discussions, but only with big member states (Interviews #12 and #26). High-ranking diplomats from big member states confirmed the early access to the text, thanks to their contacts with the EEAS (Interviews #12 and #29). Others saw bilateral contacts being carried out only with "supporters or trouble-makers" of the whole exercise, with some member states being treated as "more equal than others" (Interview #33). As a consequence, the member states that perceived an insufficient involvement in the process were left with a choice to either accept

"*faits accomplis*"[99] or to adopt a confrontational attitude, the latter being generally avoided (Interview #33).

The complaints regarding a non-sufficiently intergovernmental policy formulation process were exacerbated in the latest phase of the consultations with the member states. In the so-called "confessionals", the penholder of the EUGS presented a first draft of the strategy to the member states in order to identify additional "red lines" or particularly problematic contents, which had been reduced to a minimum thanks to the previous consultations with the POCs (Interview #9). The "confessionals", which were held in the EEAS premises between April and June 2016, consisted in discussions on a bilateral basis with groups of member states - not in a EU28 format (López-Aranda 2017:74). Representatives of member states read fragments of the text of the EUGS but could not ask that their opinions were automatically reflected in the final text (López-Aranda 2017:75). Instead, the EEAS staff would take their comments back to its headquarters and work on a revised version, keeping the upper hand on the drafting process.

Some member states complained that the method chosen prevented thorough consultations on the contents of the EUGS with the capitals. They stressed that the global thematic approach of the strategy required consultations with several ministries, particularly in view of the implementation of the EUGS (Interview #26). Participants in the "confessionals", on the contrary, were asked not to take copies of the text with them and even to leave their mobile phones outside of the room, in order to avoid leaks (Interviews #2, #26 and #33, see also Tocci 2017a).

The most reluctant participants to the process underlined that the confessionals became a "childish exercise" (Interview #33). The treatment received by PSC Ambassadors and other participants was characterised as a "messy process" of "pseudo-consultations" (Interviews #26 and #33). Others, who focused on the secondary role given to the member states by the EEAS, saw the exercise as a "smoke screen for keeping them away from the writing process" (Interview #22).

[99] A similar take is present in the analysis by Sus (2016) on the reactions of Polish officials towards the policy formulation of the EUGS.

Interestingly, the criticism on the process also came from the side of the European Council and the General Secretariat of the Council, whose officials complained that they had not been sufficiently involved during the drafting process (Interviews #7 and #23). In the case of the European Council, the risk was a diminished ownership of Heads of State and Government towards the new strategy, which signals a relatively autonomous policy formulation process vis-à-vis the highest level of intergovernmental decision-making.

Member states, however, opted for adapting to the proceedings established by the EEAS rather than confronting them. The general understanding was that the delicate balance between producing a good EUGS text and securing their buy-in required a degree of flexibility regarding their involvement in the drafting process. To many, since the HR/VP had been put in the driving seat since the beginning, she was also legitimated to set-up the policy formulation process as desired (Interviews #6, #7, #9, #12 and #24). So in order to avoid a "lowest common denominator" outcome, a drafting by committee exercise had to be avoided in exchange of a "manageable" process led by the HR/VP and her team (Interviews #13 and #26, see also Tocci 2016a:10).

The consultations with member states were eventually considered to provide enough ownership to satisfy their demands and devise an inclusive process (Interviews #7 and #9), with the major red lines respected in the final text of the EUGS (Interviews #16 and #33). To make sure this was the case, member states "chose their battles" during the consultation process, so that issues of national concern would be duly taken into account by the pen-holder of the strategy (Interviews #16 and #28). Overall, the text was considered as "negotiated", although following an unorthodox and innovative policy formulation methodology (Tocci 2017a) whereby the EEAS discouraged member states to work following traditional intergovernmental methods. As an interviewee put it, the EUGS ended up having "a single womb" (i.e. the HR/VP) but "multiple fathers" (i.e. the member states) (Interview #15).

6.3.2. The Commission policy formulation track

The consultation process with member states, including in limited bilateral formats, lasted until the last hours before the circulation of the EUGS to member states and its presentation at the European Council (Tocci 2017a). In parallel to the member states' track, a series of consultations with the European Commission also took place. In her capacity as vice-president of the Commission, Mogherini understood that a "whole of EU" approach to strategy-making required the full involvement of the Commission from the beginning of the process. Although the mandate of the European Council was to the HR, horizontal and institutional coherence demanded a comprehensive understanding of external action, thus covering the Commission's external relations policies as well (Interview #27). The EUGS was understood, from the side of the HR/VP and the Commission, as an embodiment of the Lisbon Treaty's "inclusive" external action (Interviews #2, #37 and #39), also in line with Juncker's political priorities (Interview #31).

Despite the necessary buy-in of the Commission, the EUGS was not a supranational endeavour driven by the Commission services. As some member states did, the Commission also read the conclusions of the European Council (2015) as a mandate to Mogherini in her capacity as HR only (Interviews #7, #31 and #37). The EUGS was not conceived as a joint initiative between the EEAS and the Commission, but rather as a political priority of Mogherini to which the Commission would not oppose. In practical terms, this meant that the Commission would not work on the EUGS following the traditional "community method", i.e. with formal Commission inter-service consultations, followed by a joint communication approved at the level of the College of Commissioners (Interviews #15, #18, #27 and #31).

Despite the absence of formal involvement, the Commission participated in the policy formulation process in several ways. First, Commission officials participated in a series of consultations convened by the EEAS during the policy formulation phase. These meetings, held at the EEAS premises, were separate to the member states consultations and included officials from all DGs whose portfolios were

related to the contents of the EUGS, not only in terms of external relations policies but also internal policies with an external dimension (Interview #2). These meetings were conducted in a manner similar to the member states', on the basis of questionnaires produced by the EEAS and discussed by Commission officials, who provided lengthy and detailed inputs (Interview #13). To that end, the Commission also set-up an internal task force for the EUGS, which was not a formal inter-service group but which *de facto* acted as such when providing comments to the pen-holder and the EEAS staff (Interview #31).

As a result of the consultations, the Commission prepared, under the coordination of its General Secretariat, a joint contribution containing the input of all DGs (Interview #34). This contribution, however, did not seek the approval of the College of Commissioners (Interviews #27, #31 and 39), which instead discussed the main elements of the EUGS and gave Mogherini the "political vetting" to pursue the exercise making use of her Vice-President hat (Interview #31). While some saw this as a sign of "ambivalence" and "disassociation" from the exercise (Interview #7), others acknowledge that the Commission "played ball" with the HR/VP's priority to draft the EUGS (Interview #15). A joint document EEAS-Commission for the EUGS (as it would have been the case of a Joint Communication) would have resulted in a "duplication" of Mogherini's hat as VP, so the Commission opted for including its priorities in the text as a result of the consultation process and the joint contribution (Interviews #34 and #39).

Also, not entering a formal process of inter-service consultation enabled the HR/VP to avoid the often cumbersome, hierarchical and rigid Commission's working procedures (Interviews #9 and #39). Such a process would have resulted in a "Christmas tree" approach to strategy-making, so Mogherini preferred to secure the engagement of the Commission at the top level, knowing that it would then trickle down to the different services of the Commission and the buy-in of the institution as a whole (Interview #15). This method was chosen to overcome the initial reluctance of some officials to adopt the "coherence" mentality of the EUGS (Interviews #31 and #37).

As much as Mogherini counterbalanced the traditional intergovernmental method through an innovative policy formulation process with member states, she also avoided the traditional community method necessary for College-approved documents. Avoiding both a drafting by committee process and inter-service consultations, she placed herself and the EEAS at the centre of the policy formulation process. This did not preclude the ownership of member states, secured via regular consultations, and of the Commission, whose external relations policies were all included in the EUGS. The policy formulation phase of the EUGS thus revealed features not proper of pure intergovernmentalism or supranationalism. Instead, it was characterised by a novel mode of autonomous policy-making, in which the EEAS and the HR/VP gained autonomy during the formulation process of traditionally intergovernmental policies.

The assessment of the policy formulation phase against the premises of new intergovernmentalism shows a lesser degree of leadership of the European Council and intergovernmental bodies than expected. The day-to-day discussion of policy initiatives in the European Council and their coordination in the Council and lower intergovernmental bodies was replaced by a policy-making process structured around the office of the HR/VP. After providing a "global" interpretation to the mandate of the European Council for a new strategy, the HR/VP avoided the intergovernmental method of drafting by committee and set up a consultation process whereby member states were not in the driving seat. Instead of confronting this novel policy-making method, national capitals adapted to it, increasing the autonomy of the EEAS in a traditional intergovernmental policy. In addition to fully exercising the right of initiative, the HR/VP, together with the EEAS, became executive bodies in the policy formulation of the EUGS. This nuances the new intergovernmentalism's understanding of the EEAS only as a tool for the coordination of member states' initiatives.

Also unforeseen by new intergovernmentalism was the role of member states in the policy formulation phase. This theory seems to assume that member states use their right to veto in intergovernmental bodies if they do not buy in new initiatives, with all states being equal. However, the policy formulation of the EUGS shows

how big states became "more equal than others", with the EEAS and the HR/VP consulting them first on key elements of the EUGS. Also, new intergovernmentalism underscores the influence of external stakeholders such as policy networks and epistemic communities, which played a big role in the consultation process of the EUGS -far more extensive than for the ESS.

More in line with the premises of new intergovernmentalism is, however, the absence of the Community method during the policy formulation of the EUGS. As much as Mogherini wanted to involve the European Commission for the purpose of a "whole of EU" approach to strategy-making, she also avoided inter-service consultations, not to fall victim of the arduous negotiations of Collegial documents. Instead, Mogherini prioritised EEAS-led consultations with relevant DGs of the Commission, again increasing the centrality of this *de novo* body vis-à-vis traditional EU institutions (either intergovernmental or supranational).

6.4. The policy output: a strategy not formally adopted but broadly accepted

When the policy formulation phase ended, the full text of the EUGS was circulated for the first time to member states three days before the European Council of 28-29 June 2016, where it was presented by the HR/VP (Tocci 2017a). The discussion of the text among Heads of State and Government was overshadowed by the Brexit referendum, which took place on 23 June. Some voices, including among favourable member states, argued in favour of postponing the presentation of the EUGS due to the lack of attention that the initiative would gather (Interviews #6, #21 and #25). They were afraid that most leaders would focus their attention on the effects of Brexit for the future of European integration and for European security and defence in particular (Whitman 2016)[100].

However, as it was the case in previous phases of the policy-making process, the decision to present the EUGS regardless of the Brexit referendum results came out of a personal initiative of the HR/VP (Interviews #2, #12 and #33). Again, this

[100] According to Tocci (2017a) and López-Aranda (2017), the campaign of the Brexit referendum affected the degree of transparency of the overall policy formulation process, forcing the EEAS to handle with extreme care the consultation process to avoid leaks of the document.

faced negative reactions at the European Council level (Interview #23) and among some member states, which accused the HR/VP to take the decision autonomously, without consulting them (Interviews #9, #21 and #33). An additional concern by some member states, in line with the political atmosphere generated by Brexit, was the need to consult national parliaments before the treatment of the EUGS at the European level (Interviews #2, #6, #21).

The decision to present the EUGS was made out of a personal conviction of the HR/VP. Mogherini understood that, as a result of the long consultations, the EUGS had been agreed "line by line by all 28 member states and the Commission [so it was] not a wish list of the HR/VP" (Tocci 2016b:8). This meant that "all member states are or should be politically committed to it", since "while led by the HR/VP, the Global Strategy is of and for the EU, not simply of the HR/VP" (Tocci 2016b:5). Reluctant member states eventually acknowledged that, seen in a wider perspective, Mogherini took the right decision to move ahead with the presentation of the EUGS on 28 June (Interviews #21 and #33).

The disagreement between the HR/VP and the EEAS and some member states on the appropriateness to release the EUGS after Brexit is symptomatic of the debates that took place during the whole policy-making process. Despite the consultations with member states, critical voices pointed at the EEAS-led unorthodox policy formulation method as the reason for a lack of full ownership of the EUGS. Several national diplomats from small and medium sized member states perceived that an insufficient involvement in the drafting process led to the non-adoption of the new strategy at the European Council (Interviews #16, #21, #26 and #33). Also, member states, and in particular Heads of State and Government, complained that they had not had enough time to digest the document when it was presented at the European Council (Interview #23). This was reinforced by the fact that the rules of procedure of the Council (Council of the European Union 2016g) prevented the adoption of the EUGS if it had not been discussed before at lower intergovernmental bodies such as COREPER, the FAC or the GAC (Interviews #18, #25 and #30).

As a consequence, the conclusions of the European Council of 28-29 June read as follows: "The European Council welcomes the presentation of the Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy by the High Representative and invites the High Representative, the Commission and the Council to take the work forward" (European Council 2016a). The European Council did not formally adopt the EUGS, as it was the case for the ESS in 2003. Instead, it "welcomed the presentation of the text", which in principle signals the distance of member states vis-à-vis the outcome of the strategy-making process. Some voices argue that the process left no other option to the President of the European Council than to seek a soft form of agreement via the "welcoming" formula (Interview #23), while others hint at a lack of enthusiasm of Donald Tusk vis-à-vis the EUGS initiative (Interview #18).

In practice, however, the discussions on the adoption, welcoming or endorsement of the text were only a "ritualistic" discussion (Interview #22). The European Council's "weak endorsement" (Interview #15) had little impact on the degree of ownership and the implementation of the EUGS (Interviews #2, #6, #9, #14, #15, #16, #17 and #24). This contrasts with the policy-making dynamics foreseen by new intergovernmentalism, which gives to the European Council the role of catalyst of integration and the central institution where political agreements are made. New intergovernmentalism also assumes that any new initiative necessitates the consensus among member states, as expressed in the conclusions of the European Council or the Council. As it will be further developed in the next section, the lack of endorsement of the EUGS at the European Council actually had little impact on its implementation. The new strategy quickly became an inspirational document, even if member states disliked the way the policy formulation process unfolded (and hence were reluctant to fully adopt the EUGS, as they did with the ESS).

Member states acknowledged that the EUGS became a "point of reference" as soon as it went public (Interviews #14 and #28). They overcame initial uneasiness with the process and acknowledged that the text of the EUGS was of great quality and in line with their aspirations (Interviews #12, #13, #16, #21 and #33). Despite

complains about the strategy-making process, they ended up accepting the contents of the EUGS and the decision of the HR/VP to proceed with its presentation regardless of the Brexit referendum. This provides evidence of the determinant role of initiative of the HR/VP and the EEAS, their growing autonomy in current policy-making dynamics and their capacity to shape developments in external action, modulating the initial position of member states.

6.5. The implementation: towards parallel convergence

Traditional scepticism towards strategies has it that they are empty words, with little impact on foreign policy and security developments. The ESS had indeed fell short in its implementation, not prompting the "change of gear" that would have given it additional political weight (Grevi 2004:15). External observers have often referred to the EU as underperforming "in terms of implementing many of its external strategic goals" (Smith 2016:447). Taking the shortcomings of the 2003 strategy as a reference, the EUGS was conceived as an actionable, instrumental and policy oriented document (Tocci 2017a, Barbé 2016, Mora Benavente 2017). And in spite of the endorsement of the European Council of the ESS and not the EUGS, the most remarkable achievement of the EU's new strategy have been the initiatives that followed.

The specific policies adopted during the implementation phase of the EUGS validate the understanding of strategies as policy inspiration documents, on the basis of developments on security, defence and external action. The fact that the EUGS has been accompanied by a specific implementation plan also enables the assessment of the policy-making dynamics since its publication, including the role of the different EU institutions and the inter-institutional relations of the post-Lisbon era. As an interviewee put it, while the ESS was a symbol, not a tool, the EUGS has become a "symbol *and* a tool" (Interview #21). Indeed, whereas the ESS only included generic provisions on the way ahead[101], the last section of the EUGS

[101] Some developments usually referred to as emanating from the ESS are the European Neighbourhood Policy, the European Defence Agency (Tocci 2017a) or "a stronger diplomatic capability" (European Council 2003:12) as an indication of the future EEAS. The references of the ESS to them only indicate possible ways ahead since, as noted in the previous chapter, the ESS was not meant to be implemented through a specific follow-up.

commits to revise existing sectoral strategies and to develop new thematic and geographic ones in line with the EUGS; establishes a periodic review on a yearly basis of the state of play of the EUGS and its implementation; and opens the door to future processes of strategic reflection when the EU and member states so decide (EEAS 2016a). Every sense of the ambition to implement the EUGS is present in its title: "shared vision, common action".

In line with the EUGS as a joined-up document for the coherence of external action, its implementation also falls within a "whole of EU" approach. The mandate for implementation provided by the European Council is wider, in institutional terms, than the mandate for the EUGS itself. Whereas the European Council mandated the HR (not the Vice-President) to prepare an "EU global strategy on foreign and security policy in close cooperation with Member States" (European Council 2015), in June 2016 it tasked "the High Representative, *the Commission* and the Council to take the work forward" (European Council 2016a, emphasis added).

In so doing, the European Council acknowledged the need to adopt a "whole of EU" approach to the implementation phase and to external action in general, with the aim of fostering horizontal and institutional coherence under Mogherini's leadership. The implementation of the EUGS is thus more hybrid than the EUGS itself, bringing together the intergovernmental CFSP and the supranational external relations under the double hatting of the HR/VP. As noted by Mogherini (2016b) soon after the publication of the EUGS, "today we have to make sure that we use as Europeans all the instruments we have in a coherent and synchronised way. This is a key part -maybe the key part- of the Strategy, and this will be vital also for its implementation".

The actors who disliked an excessively autonomous policy formulation process have also come to accept the EUGS as a point of reference and a platform to move initiatives forward (Interviews #14, #16, #21, #22, #24, #33). For many of them, the process that prevented the full adoption of the EUGS at the European Council did not end up having much impact in its implementation, considering the new strategy a *fait accompli* (Interviews #14, #17, #22, #24 and #27). While some

voices argue that, not being a binding document, the EUGS cannot become the *de iure* reference for external action, it has become the *de facto* one, which member states own "like it or not" (Interview #28). The role of the HR/VP and the EEAS as facilitators of current discussions is also often mentioned (Interviews #21, #28 and #34), including references to the "activation" of the Vice-President hat during the implementation to ensure the coherence of external action as a whole (Interviews #24 and #27).

Soon after the presentation of the EUGS at the European Council of June 2016, the HR/VP set in motion a multi-staged process of implementation, which started with the discussion among foreign affairs ministers at the FAC of July 2016. In this Council, foreign ministers "welcomed" the EUGS document and the intention of the HR/VP to present a "framework with processes and timelines", which would "operationalise the vision set out in the strategy" (Council of the European Union 2016a). After July, ministers of foreign affairs discussed again the EUGS on the occasion of the Gymnich meeting of 2-3 September and then the development ministers and defence ministers also discussed the contents of the EUGS in their informal meetings of September (Council of the European Union 2016b). Before the FAC meeting of October, the HR/VP proposed a "roadmap" for implementation in which she detailed five priority areas for the first year (until June 2017)[102]:

- Resilience building and integrated approach to conflicts and crises;
- Security and defence;
- Strengthening the nexus between internal and external policies;
- Updating existing or preparing new regional and thematic strategies;
- Stepping up public diplomacy efforts[103].

In the October FAC, ministers adopted Council Conclusions on the EUGS, in which they acknowledged that the strategy "will guide the EU's external action for the years to come" and committed to its implementation "jointly with the High

[102] As noted in the introduction, the empirical work of this thesis ends with the publication of the first implementation report of the EUGS (EEAS 2017a).
[103] The roadmap, although not being a public document, was released in the blog Bruxelles2.eu. The text can be found here: https://club.bruxelles2.eu/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/feuilleroute-strategieglobale@ue160922.pdf [last accessed: 31 August 2017].

Representative and the Commission", underlining the "Member States' ownership and involvement throughout the process" (Council of the European Union 2016c). The text of the conclusions also endorses the priority areas of the roadmap as "five priorities for the EU's external action" and calls for taking the work forward, "drawing on all available instruments and policies in a comprehensive manner" (Council of the European Union 2016c). As it was the case during the policy formulation process, the HR/VP and the EEAS took the lead in the definition of the areas of implementation and the priorities for the year ahead and these were subsequently adopted by the member states[104].

The EEAS set up a steering committee for the implementation of the EUGS, formed by the senior management of the Service, the penholder of the EUGS, Nathalie Tocci and members of the cabinet of the HR/VP (Interview #19)[105]. This steering committee was behind the drafting of the roadmap, which was also discussed at the Commission in order to reach to the services with competences in hybrid areas of activity.

Following the consultation with several DGs of the Commission such as DG DEVCO (Development Cooperation), DG ECHO (Humanitarian Aid) and DG NEAR (Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement), among others, the roadmap was endorsed by the Commission at the College level (after discussions at the Inter-Institutional Relations Group, GRI) and was later presented to member states at the PSC (Interview #19). This process signals a strong involvement of the Commission in the implementation of the EUGS and the "whole of EU" approach to external action deriving from the strategy. As the HR/VP repeatedly put it, the implementation of the EUGS was also meant to go beyond a "security only" approach, and should include other areas of EU activity for the purpose of policy coherence (Mogherini 2016c).

[104] This can also be assessed when reading the "CFSP Report - Our priorities in 2016", which was endorsed by the Council on 17 October 2016 and which opens with a reference to the EUGS and the need that "the second half of 2016 is dedicated to follow-up and implementation in the priority areas identified by the EU Global Strategy" (Council of the European Union 2016d).

[105] As an interviewee noted, one of the problems during the policy formulation phase of the EUGS was the insufficient involvement of officials from the EEAS and the Commission, who only knew about the final text at the moment it was released (Interview #15). The fact that most of the implementation work requires the involvement of officials from both institutions led the HR/VP to expand the number of officials present in the steering committee (Interview #34).

Two particular areas of implementation will be covered in the following sections: developments on security and defence and resilience. These two areas, as part of the roadmap of implementation of the EUGS, represent a traditionally intergovernmental area (security and defence) and a new hybrid area of activity (resilience), so their assessment also enables the study of distinct policy-making processes and the inter-institutional relations therein.

6.5.1. The implementation on security and defence

Of all areas of implementation, security and defence has been the one where most progress has been made. A series of initiatives at different EU levels have inaugurated a path towards "parallel convergence"[106], for which the EUGS provides a structuring narrative. These initiatives include the Implementation of Plan on Security and Defence (IPSD), the cooperation initiatives between EU and NATO led by the President of the European Council, Donald Tusk, and the European Commission's European Defence Action Plan (EDAP).[107]

These initiatives have built on developments such as the results of the Brexit referendum and the election of Donald Trump as President of the United States. While Brexit has prompted debate about reinforcing internal and external security cooperation by the EU27 (EU28 minus the United Kingdom, as signalled in the Bratislava Declaration and Roadmap of 16 September 2016, European Council 2016b), the election of Trump has fostered discussions on Europe's "strategic autonomy" (Besch 2016**,** Howorth 2017). These developments are at the roots of the EU's current efforts in common security and defence, driven either by external necessity (Trump) or internal crises (besides Brexit, the recent terrorist attacks are also often mentioned, Interview #32). Others see the big member states as the

[106] The expression "parallel convergence" has been used in defence studies by King (2006:258) and was also chosen by the Director of the EUISS, Antonio Missiroli, to depict current developments in security and defence after the publication of the EUGS, taking into account the institutional set-up led by the HR/VP and the EEAS (Welcome and Introduction session of the EUISS Annual Conference, Brussels, 20 June 2017, attended by the author).

[107] While proposals on EU-NATO cooperation will not be object to specific analysis here, both IPSD and the EDAP will be analysed as reflecting the intergovernmental and supranational processes and dynamics following the presentation of the EUGS.

force behind the current renewed impetus in EU security and defence (Interviews #8 and #30). The EEAS, in turn, places more emphasis on the fact that, thanks to the EUGS, the EU has "moved more in the last ten months than in the last ten years" (EEAS 2017b).

Whether the security environment, the push of member states or the leadership of EU bodies are behind current developments, many voices argue that the EUGS has indeed become the "vehicle" through which security and defence discussions take place (Interview #28). According to this view, the "volet" of implementation on security and defence is progressing and kept on the table of discussions from Council to Council thanks to the EUGS and its agenda for implementation, which sets clear timelines and deliverables (Interviews #28 and #34). The EUGS and its follow-up serve the purpose of "pushing the envelope forward and shaping the agenda", avoiding that discussions are locked in intergovernmental bodies due to the differences among member states (Interview #18). Even if officials from some member states and EU institutions are not always willing to give full credit to the EUGS (Interviews #23 and #31), representatives from big member states also recognise that the "declination of current initiatives on security and defence takes as a departing point the EUGS" (Interview #29).

This is not to say that the intergovernmental method is not in use anymore, since member states continue to hold decision powers in the areas of security and defence. As soon as the EUGS and the roadmap for implementation were presented, member states emphasised the need to resume a "word-by-word" negotiation of the FAC conclusions for security and defence matters (Interviews #17 and #20). The FAC of November 2016 examined a proposal of the HR/VP on the IPSD (Council of the European Union 2016e) in which "a new level of ambition" in security and defence was presented as part of a "wider package" including EDAP (more on this below) and EU-NATO cooperation. The proposal of the IPSD included references to three major initiatives, the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence

(CARD), the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) and the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), among others[108].

The EU's "level of ambition" was reflected in the FAC conclusions of November 2016 (Council of the European Union 2016f), which were negotiated following the traditional intergovernmental method through the Council working groups, PSC, COREPER and FAC. The text of the IPSD was also the basis for the conclusions of the European Council of December 2016, which endorsed the previous Council conclusions (European Council 2016c), and of the Council conclusions of March 2017 and May 2017, which assessed the progress in implementing the EUGS in the area of security and defence (Council of the European Union 2017a, Council of the European Union 2017b).

Member states criticised the attempt by the EEAS to adopt the initial proposal of the HR/VP on the IPSD as Council conclusions, without proper intergovernmental negotiations (Interviews #16, #17, #18, #22, #23, #24, #26 and #33). Member states forced the system to go back to the traditional intergovernmental procedures of security and defence, instead of following the innovative policy-making process of the EUGS. Member states reminded the HR/VP that the procedure followed for security and defence matters had to be done "within the order" (Interview #16) and that they intended to use the EEAS text for the IPSD only as a basis for the negotiation of Council conclusions.

However, despite the return to traditional "deliberative intergovernmentalism" formats (Puetter 2014), observers of the process note that the EEAS text for the IPSD (Council of the European Union 2016e) and the final council conclusions (Council of the European Union 2016f) do not dramatically differ, with the latter nuancing the level of ambition of member states (Interviews #17 and #23). Other

[108] CARD, a mechanism for the "gradual synchronisation and mutual adaptation of national defence planning cycles and capability development practices" as defined by the EUGS (EEAS 2016a:20-21, see also Fiott 2017a), was announced in the same FAC meeting of November 2016 (Council of the European Union 2016f). The MPCC, which assumes command of EU non-executive military missions, was established by a Council Decision on 8 June following the Council Conclusions of May 2017 (Council of the European Union 2017d) and PESCO, a mechanism to enhance cooperation on security and defence among willing member states, was launched by the European Council in June 2017 (European Council 2017).

voices note that the influence of big member states was as present in the IPSD as in the EUGS proper, given that the EEAS tended to consult them and leave smaller member states without the capacity to influence the process (Interview #33). In short, the return to intergovernmentalism was only for big member states, with the rest still feeling the institutional-driven flavour of the EUGS in the IPSD.

Despite the reaction of member states, the inputs provided by the EEAS acted as the departing point of the discussions on the implementation, with the IPSD text acting as a "political trigger" (Interview #24). The HR/VP's right of initiative triggered a novel policy-making methodology, whereby the EEAS kick-started the first discussions including input papers and a pre-set timetable of deliverables and the member states adopted Council conclusions to operationalise specific commitments (Interviews #2 and #34). In this regard, the EUGS and its IPSD provided "strategic impetus" (Interview #34), although decisions in certain domains could only follow the intergovernmental method as per the attributions of the EEAS and member states.

The role of the EEAS was central in setting the path of cooperation. Following the attribution of responsibilities in security and defence as per the Lisbon Treaty, the IPSD showed a "partial transmission" of the initiative to the HR/VP (Interview #27). Mogherini took advantage of her right of initiative and the "outsourcing" by member states (Interview #22) to reinforce the EEAS' and her own leadership, providing evidence of the tendency of member states to "bounce back the ball" to institutions in divisive security and defence initiatives that, by the book, should be driven by them (Interview #22). So while the intergovernmental method is still in use for security and defence matters after the Lisbon Treaty, it also benefits from the inputs and initiative of the HR/VP and the EEAS (Interview #29).

The path towards autonomy in intergovernmentalism is further reinforced when the Commission's initiatives are added to the mix. Along the parallel initiatives on the IPSD and EU-NATO cooperation, the Commission presented its EDAP in November 2016, including a European Defence Fund to support member states' more efficient spending in joint defence capabilities and to foster a competitive

and innovative industrial base (European Commission 2016) The European Defence Fund is based on two complementary windows, a "research window" to support investment in joint research and a "capability window" for the joint development of defence equipment and technologies (see Fiott 2017b).

The European Commission's involvement in defence matters and the use of European budget to fund defence related activities was considered a "big shift", "previously unthinkable" (Interviews #23 #27 and #30), in line with Junker's political priorities on external action and avoiding a silo mentality in the implementation of the EUGS. However, the Commission considered EDAP as belonging to its prerogatives on internal market development, so part of the supranational sphere (Interviews #30 and #31). In so doing, the Commission vigorously preserved its domain of activity, emphasising that "not everything happening now is subject to the EUGS", even if "all external action should be tight into the EUGS" (Interview #31). EDAP was simultaneously part of the implementation of the EUGS but also "independent" from it (Interview #31)[109].

The Commission's involvement in the implementation of the EUGS through EDAP - together with developments on the IPSD and EU-NATO cooperation- crystallised in a process of "parallel convergence". Member states reacted positively to the Commission's involvement in defence matters (Interviews #8 and #20), as part of a process of convergence of the priorities of external action (Interviews #2 and #33). This helped to overcome institutional inertia in security and defence matters and to break traditional taboos (Interview #18). While parallel convergence did not hinder the observance of the intergovernmental and supranational policy domains, it also facilitated the different institutions to work in an "integrated way and under a single political direction", thanks to the EUGS' political drive[110]. In other words, whereas the institutional dynamics differed for EDAP, IPSD and EU-NATO cooperation, these were all part of a single political clout. While critical

[109] This position sometimes carried clashes with the member states at the COREPER, where the Commission forced member states to withdraw documents on EDAP that had not gone through established supranational working procedures (Interview #39).
[110] The idea was pronounced by the European Commission official Lowri Evans, Director General of the DG for Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs, during the EUISS Annual Conference in Brussels, 20-21 June 2017.

voices point out that internal and external factors are at the roots of developments in EU security and defence, it is also safe to argue that the EUGS has acted as a vehicle for parallel convergence.

6.5.2. The implementation on resilience

The EUGS also became an enabling factor for work across the board in the field of "resilience building and integrated approach to conflict and crises" (as referred to in the roadmap for the implementation of the EUGS). Following the "whole of EU" approach of the EUGS, the implementation phase was also marked by reiterated calls that progress in security and defence should be accompanied by a balanced and comprehensive approach to external action (Interviews #2, #19 and #28). The work on resilience was characterised by a major involvement of the EEAS and the European Commission, whose different external relations DGs, particularly development cooperation, have a long track record on the concept of resilience (see for instance European Commission 2012, EEAS 2017a).

The leading role of the EEAS and the Commission in this area was reflected in the policy-making process of the Joint Communication on resilience (European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 2017). The process followed the traditional method of joint communications, i.e. a co-drafting exercise between the EEAS and the Commission (Interviews #15, #27, #30 and #31). On the side of the Commission, the Secretariat General coordinated the inputs of the various DGs involved in the joint communication through inter-service consultations and on the basis of a draft produced by the EEAS. The document was then discussed at GRI and approved by the College of Commissioners, before being sent to member states for comments and its presentation at the FAC (Interview #19)[111]. According to representatives from active member states in the EUGS process, the work on resilience signalled the activation of the role of Mogherini as Vice-President, since many of the external

[111] The first discussion on resilience by foreign ministers was held in the FAC of June 2017, where ministers "welcomed the report [presented by the High Representative on the first year of implementation of the EUGS (EEAS 2017a)] and highlighted the important work achieved over the year, not only in the area of security and defence cooperation, but also in building the resilience of states and societies in the East and South" (Council of the European Union 2017c).

relations policies of the Commission are included in the Joint Communication (Interviews #22 and #24).

Throughout the process, member states were consulted on an informal basis and the EEAS took the lead in the coordination of the process, following the external action logic of the Lisbon Treaty. Institutions were "not obliged" to tell the member states the exact wording of the future EEAS-Commission Joint Communication (Interview #18). As a consequence, some member states adopted an observer position on developments on resilience, although others preferred to broaden the concept to include not only external relations' policies but also a security-based dimension (Interviews #19 and #22). In so doing, they aimed at bringing the resilience portfolio to areas where intergovernmentalism applies.

On the side of the Commission, cooperation with the EEAS also encountered some difficulties when sharing with the Service traditional competences of the Commission. Officials working on development cooperation and humanitarian aid were reluctant "to be told what to do" (Interview #32) and they expressed doubts on whether a new communication on resilience was necessary (Interview #39)[112]. However, the College of Commissioners understood that the adoption of the Joint Communication would reinforce the Vice-President hat of Mogherini, so finally opted for fully backing her initiative in this area of implementation of the EUGS (Interview #39). All in all, the Joint Communication on resilience served the purpose of further involving the Commission in the implementation process of the EUGS beyond EDAP.

6.5.3. Final remarks on the implementation of the EUGS

The initiatives on security and defence and resilience were protagonised by member states, the EEAS or the Commission depending on their prerogatives in each portfolio, but the EUGS provided a shared umbrella and political pace for them all. A process of parallel convergence of the different initiatives occurred thanks to the leadership of the HR/VP and the EEAS, advancing the objective of

[112] The large number of DGs involved also hindered the process, with some diplomats noting the "rigidity" of the Commission in moving portfolios forward (Interview #9).

horizontal and institutional coherence of the EU's external action. Member states attempted to draw a clear line in the delimitation of responsibilities in security and defence matters, prioritising an intergovernmental reading of the implementation of the EUGS. Nonetheless, the implementation phase of the EUGS also reveals a large degree of autonomy of *de novo* bodies such as the EEAS when developing policies in hybrid areas of activity.

When analysed through new intergovernmentalist lenses, the implementation of the EUGS nuances again the centrality of the European Council and the Council and the need for intergovernmental consensus to move initiatives forward. Instead of the EEAS implementing the initiatives set forth by member states and assisting in generating policy outputs, the European Council and the Council followed the path of the EUGS and embraced a "whole of EU" approach to external action. The European Council included the Commission in its mandate for implementing the EUGS and put the HR/VP in the driving seat of subsequent developments, fostering policy coherence. The centrality of the EEAS in the policy formulation phase was not an impediment for the later consensus at the Council to implement the EUGS, along the lines devised by the EEAS.

As new intergovernmentalism rightly acknowledges, the operationalisation of the EUGS came in the form of Council conclusions. Member states tried first to regain the ownership of the developments in security and defence, although the EEAS and the HR/VP had already set the tone of developments via the proposal on the IPSD. The EEAS thus acted as the trigger of new initiatives, including in traditional intergovernmental areas. In them, member states played a more prominent role, although a process of parallel convergence of intergovernmental and supranational initiatives such as EDAP was possible thanks to the vehicle provided by the EUGS. In other policy priorities such as resilience, the role of the European Commission was stronger, reinforcing a comprehensive understanding of external action and the implementation of the EUGS, in line with its contents.

6.6. Conclusions

The ESS of 2003 inaugurated an innovative policy-making process that resulted in the institutionalisation of intergovernmental areas such as the CFSP. More than ten years later and with the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty in between, institutionalised intergovernmentalism has mutated into autonomy in intergovernmentalism, whereby the HR/VP and the EEAS have transformed the policy-making processes in hybrid areas of activity. New dynamics have been present in external action during all phases of the EUGS, from agenda-setting to implementation. The result has been a process of parallel convergence, whereby the EUGS has streamlined decisions across the EU institutional board for the purpose of horizontal and institutional coherence. Without necessarily changing the intergovernmental and supranational foundations of foreign policy and external relations, the first strategy for the EU's external action has brought to the fore novel policy-making methods in external action under the leadership of the HR/VP and the EEAS.

When read through new intergovernmentalist lenses, it is true that progress in the area of external action has occurred outside traditional supranational institutions and methods. What is more, the implementation of the EUGS has witnessed a willingness of member states to bring the debates on security and defence back to the intergovernmental method. However, new intergovernmentalism also needs to unpack the different policy-making phases if it aims to understand the dynamics generated by the EUGS. The agenda-setting and policy formulation phases witnessed a strong leadership of *de novo* institutions such as the EEAS, and particularly the HR/VP, given their interest in a coherent, global and joined-up approach to external action.

This is at odds with the premises of new intergovernmentalism, which understands that intergovernmental bodies such as the European Council and the Council are always at the roots of new policy initiatives. During the policy formulation phase of the EUGS, most debates took place under the auspices of the EEAS, who designed an innovative platform of POCs to avoid traditional

intergovernmental methods of "drafting by committee". Deliberative intergovernmentalism was secondary when compared to the path set by the EUGS process, so consensus generation at the intergovernmental level was not constant in "all stages of the policy-making" (Puetter 2014), as assumed by new intergovernmentalism.

The result of the policy formulation process was a strategy that "everybody owns but no one negotiated", in the words of the HR/VP Mogherini[113]. Despite disagreements on the way the process was handled, member states ended up accepting the EUGS as the vehicle through which subsequent initiatives would navigate. The implementation of the EUGS in the fields of security and defence and resilience, including the timing of such developments, also witnessed a strong leadership of the EEAS and the HR/VP. Regardless of whether these discussions took place in intergovernmental bodies such as the FAC, the centre of political gravity of the EUGS had already been established at the EEAS, under the leadership of the HR/VP.

The analysis presented here also nuances the premise of new intergovernmentalism that the EEAS works as a tool of coordination rather than policy initiative. True, the European Council gave the mandate to Mogherini to draft a new "security strategy". But her interpretation of this mandate led to the publication and implementation of a document with wide effects on the whole external action system, not only in security and defence, in the hands of the member states, but also in external relations, where the Commission has long-standing prerogatives. The delegated powers to the HR/VP thus became stronger than what new intergovernmentalism would assume.

In line with previous findings when analysing the dynamics of the euro crisis (Schimmelfennig (2015a) and Dehousse (2015, 2016), institutions such as the European Commission or the European Central Bank have gained autonomy in recent years. In the EEAS case, this *de novo* body has gained autonomy in intergovernmentalism thanks to its right of initiative in external action, a new

[113] The expression, as recalled by the author, was used on the occasion of the closing speech of the EUISS Annual Conference in Brussels on 8-9 October 2015.

hybrid policy area. During the implementation of the EUGS, member states remitted progress in the IPSD to intergovernmental forums, while the Commission provided a supranational flavour to EDAP. Sometimes, during the implementation of the EUGS, intergovernmental and supranational initiatives looked as incommensurable paradigms.

But, throughout the process, the EEAS and the HR/VP took the driving seat and lead the process, reinforcing their autonomy in traditional intergovernmental areas. The path put forward by the EUGS also helped to maintain the pace and intensity of cooperation in security and defence policies and resilience. The parallel convergence of developments in security and defence, which the EUGS has enabled, has eventually reinforced the autonomy of the EEAS and its leader in external action.

The focus on implementation of the EUGS has also tamed the voices that criticise strategies as empty words. In contrast with the ESS, which did not have a proper implementation phase, the EUGS has translated into specific developments in security and defence such as CARD, MPCC and PESCO. This has led the HR/VP to say that the EU has "moved more in the last ten months than in the last ten years" (Mogherini 2017). Even if this might read as an overstatement, the EUGS has served the purpose of vehiculating exchanges among member states on traditionally divisive issues.

Without the timeline set by the EUGS and its implementation in the form of a roadmap, it is unlikely that these issues would have been kept on the table "from Council to Council" (Interview #28), particularly at times of divisive dynamics in European integration, including Brexit. This would have probably been the case if, as suggested by new intergovernmentalism, the European Council had fulfilled the role of "catalyst of integration" (Puetter and Fabbrini 2016:634). Divisions among member states would have undermined progress in areas where sovereignty prevails. Thanks to the initiative of the EEAS and the engine provided by the EUGS, progress has been made despite the absence of formal adoption of the document at the European Council. So far, the EUGS has become the framework for commitment

of member states in new external action initiatives, including for those who strongly opposed its policy-making process.

Table 6.1. Summary of the findings of the policy-making process of the EUGS

Phases of policy-making	Assumptions of new intergovernmentalism	Evidence-based analysis of the EUGS policy-making process
1. Agenda-setting	- Overall political direction provided by the European Council (catalyst of integration). - Initiatives emerge from the strong consensus at the highest level between member states. - No role for the Commission or the EEAS as policy initiators (EEAS as a vehicle for coordinating member states' initiatives).	- Lack of consensus among member states on the need to produce a new strategy, overcome thanks to Mogherini's interest to revise the ESS. - HR/VP Mogherini as the main policy entrepreneur of a new strategy-making process. - Generous interpretation of HR/VP of the mandate of the European Council to initiate the process towards a new strategy, beyond security and defence and for the whole of the EU, including the Commission. - Initiative emerging from a joined-up understanding of external action after the Lisbon Treaty and Mogherini's intention to fully exploit her role as VP.
2. Policy formulation	- Day-to-day leadership provided by the European Council. - Regular policy debates, policy coordination and decision-making in the Council, supported by its intergovernmental bodies (working groups and PSC). - EEAS without executive competences (only a tool for coordination). - No role for the Commission. - No role for epistemic communities.	- HR/VP in the driving seat, interpreting the mandate of the European Council to produce a comprehensive "global strategy" for the purpose of policy coherence. - Innovation in policy formulation, centralised by the HR/VP and EEAS and avoiding intergovernmental bodies (criticism by member states due to the absence of drafting by committee in the Council). - Adaptation of member states to the method established by HR/VP and the growing autonomy of a *de novo* body (EEAS). - Small and medium-sized member states complain about the predominant role of EEAS and the influence of big member states. - Commission involved, although without inter-service consultations or Community method policy-making (replaced by EEAS-led consultations with relevant Commission services). - Wide consultation process with policy networks and epistemic

		communities.
3. Policy output	- Final approval of initiatives by the European Council. - Quest for consensus among member states, embodied in Council conclusions.	- Non-adoption of the EUGS at the European Council due to the reluctance of member states vis-à-vis the policy formulation process. - Weak endorsement of the European Council does not prevent the EUGS to become a "point of reference" for external action. - Decision to present EUGS regardless of Brexit as a personal initiative of HR/VP, welcomed by member states. - Consensus around Council conclusions replaced by a growing autonomy of HR/VP and EEAS in external action policy-making, modulating the position of member states.
4. Implementation	- Intergovernmental consensus for policy implementation, with the Council exercising the coordination of subsequent policy initiatives under the guidance of the European Council. - EEAS implements the initiatives set forth by member states and assists in generating policy outputs (no lead of EEAS or Commission in implementation initiatives).	- European Council follows the path set forth by EUGS in its mandate for implementation, adopting a "whole of EU" approach to external action. The involvement of the Commission and the objective of coherence are pursued by the European Council. - Intergovernmental consensus at the Council on the EUGS (considered a *fait accompli*), despite the unorthodox and EEAS-centralised policy-making process. - Operationalisation of the EUGS through Council conclusions, on the basis of the EEAS proposals and including the Commission. EEAS steers discussions on implementation and acts as a political trigger of initiatives. - Protagonism of the Council in the implementation on security and defence, with a process of parallel convergence of intergovernmental and supranational initiatives, through the vehicle of the EUGS. - Strong involvement of the Commission in the implementation on security and defence and resilience.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSIONS

This research started highlighting the seemingly contradictory trends in the current theorisation of European integration and the observed phenomena in external action policy-making. While scholarly efforts to depict the state of European integration signal a growing trend towards intergovernmentalism, the latest strategy for the EU's external action -the EUGS- reflects a leading role of Brussels-based bodies in its making. The contradiction is more salient if we observe that the EUGS should be, in principle, circumscribed to an intergovernmental policy *par excellence*, the EU's foreign and security policy. The departing objective of this thesis was thus to understand why a prominently intergovernmental area of activity is witnessing highly institutionalised policy-making dynamics.

To be fair, the intergovernmental foundations of EU foreign and security policy have been critically altered since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. A new institutional structure for the EU's external action has been set up, bringing together the traditional CFSP and CSDP and the supranational external relations of the European Commission. By creating an overarching external action structure, the EU has strengthened the position of the HR/VP and the machinery at her service, the EEAS. The HR/VP is today a triple-hatted figure, leading the EEAS, chairing the FAC and acting as vice-president of the Commission. The Lisbon Treaty has also given this position a formal right of initiative, which has substantially increased the room of manoeuvre of the HR/VP to put forward policy initiatives and to set the pace and agenda of external action.

This thesis has aimed at capturing these developments in a three-step process. First, it built on the theoretical debates on the "nature of the beast" of European integration. It explored the revival of the traditional intergovernmental-supranational debate, whereby member states and EU institutions fight over decision-making mechanisms and policy prerogatives, including external action. The theoretical debate addressed the main provisions of new

intergovernmentalism, understood as the latest effort to depict current trends in European integration. New intergovernmentalism has taken sides in the intergovernmental-supranational debate by emphasising a trend towards "integration without supranationalism" or, in other words, the willingness of member states to further enhance their cooperation in the EU but keeping the reigns of policy-making. New intergovernmentalism also gives little role to bodies other than the European Council and the Council, such as the EEAS.

Second, scholarly debates have been complemented with the analysis of policy-making dynamics in traditional intergovernmental and supranational policy domains. Chapter 3 studied the specificities of policy-making in an area where member states have always wanted to preserve their national prerogatives. Insomuch security and defence are core parts of the states' sovereignty, CFSP and CSDP have always been ruled by intergovernmentalism and unanimity, also according to the specific provisions of the Title V of the TEU. On the contrary, external relations in the hands of the European Commission such as development cooperation, humanitarian aid or the common commercial policy have followed supranational policy-making, whereby the Commission holds the upper hand. In external action, understood as a hybrid area of activity bringing together the CFSP/CSDP and external relations under a single Title, the EEAS and the HR/VP have gained autonomy thanks to the right of initiative, which member states have accepted to share. Since the Lisbon Treaty, the member states and the HR/VP can initiate policies in external action in order to reinforce the coherence of external action. Both horizontal (across policies) and institutional incoherence (lack of coordination among the intergovernmental and supranational spheres) have traditionally diminished the capacity of the EU to be an effective global actor.

Third, this thesis has aimed at capturing current scholarly discussions and institutional developments in light of the policy-making processes of foreign policy and external action strategies. The ESS and the EUGS are the only two comprehensive documents inspiring initiatives in the fields of the CFSP and external action, respectively. They have been published in two different Treaty configurations, with the ESS adopted in the framework of the CFSP and the EUGS

reflecting the innovations of the Lisbon Treaty. Both strategies serve as policy inspiration documents, although the EUGS has had a larger impact than the ESS on specific developments in EU security and defence and beyond. Hence, the analysis of these two strategies through their policy-making process enabled the assessment of the inter-institutional dynamics that characterise foreign policy and external action. EU strategy-making has been considered here as a relevant evidence of current policy-making debates and dynamics, given the capacity of EU strategies to act as a source of policy inspiration.

The overall research question of this thesis aimed to understand how the policy-making processes of EU strategies reflect the dynamics in CFSP and external action, departing from the intergovernmental-supranational debate and new intergovernmentalism and contextualising these scholar discussions in current institutional developments. The main research question was unpacked into two more specific ones, targeting the institutional developments in foreign policy and external action, on one hand, and the case studies selected, on the other:
- How has external action, a hybrid policy area, shifted the policy-making dynamics when compared to the CFSP?
- How do the policy-making processes of the ESS and EUGS reflect the institutional dynamics of CFSP and external action?

The findings of these research questions will be summarised here by reviewing the theoretical, empirical and methodological contributions of this thesis, departing from the hypothesis presented in the introduction.

7.1. Theoretical findings: EU external action, not so intergovernmental after all

The first hypothesis of this research dealt with the capacity of new intergovernmentalism to account for current dynamics in European integration, particularly in areas of activity where the theory has not been used. New intergovernmentalism depicts itself as the continuation of the intergovernmentalist approach to European integration since the Maastricht

Treaty, analysing how member states have held the reigns of integration initiatives without transferring powers to the supranational institutions (Bickerton, Hodson and Puetter 2015a). But as of today, most applied research has used the new intergovernmentalism to explain dynamics in areas that are, *per se*, characterised by intergovernmental practices. By contrasting the main assumptions of new intergovernmentalism to a hybrid area of activity such as external action, this thesis has aimed to improve the explanatory capacity of this theory.

The research undertaken has unveiled how many of the assumptions of new intergovernmentalism fall short in explaining the dynamics of external action since the Lisbon Treaty. The passage from foreign policy to external action[114] has had profound implications on the policy-making dynamics, as evidenced by the policy-making processes of the ESS and the EUGS. The Lisbon Treaty has empowered the role of *de novo* actors such as the EEAS and the HR/VP, thanks to their right to initiate policies in external action.

This has fundamentally altered the presumed centrality of the European Council and the Council as catalysts of integration, often acting as followers, not policy entrepreneurs, of the path set by these new actors. From the ESS to the EUGS, this research has shown how novel policy-making methods have characterised the different stages of strategy-making. Whereas the making of the ESS signalled a strong leadership of HR Solana and his team at the Council Secretariat (along the lines of institutionalised intergovernmentalism, Christiansen 2001), the EUGS signals the increasing autonomy of the HR/VP and the EEAS in external action policy-making.

In other words, what was more intergovernmental under the Nice Treaty (the CFSP/ESDP) is now constructed in a different manner, with more powers attributed to Brussels-based institutions in the different policy-making phases. This trend has been studied in the different phases of the EUGS' policy-making

[114] As a reminder and for the purpose of clarity, this thesis has recurrently differentiated between foreign policy (referring to the CFSP/CSDP) and external action (including, since the Lisbon Treaty, the CFSP/CSDP, in the hands of the Council, and external relations, in the hands of the European Commission).

process, from agenda-setting (where the HR/VP played a key role as a policy entrepreneur) to implementation (where the EUGS is transforming developments in the fields of security and defence, two intergovernmental areas of activity *par excellence*). This research has argued that, since the Lisbon Treaty and in the area of external action, we are witnessing a trend towards "autonomy in intergovernmentalism", whereby the HR/VP, supported by the EEAS machinery, are at the centre of new policy developments.

This counters some of the arguments of new intergovernmentalism, aimed at explaining why member states are gaining power at times of crisis in European integration (Schimmelfennig 2015b, Fabbrini 2013, Grygiel 2016). New intergovernmentalism does not sufficiently depict the policy-making dynamics of areas where there is a fundamental shift in responsibilities of the actors involved (as it is the case for hybrid areas of activity such as external action). Their policy-making process is not characterised by a continued leadership of the European Council and the Council and the consensus among member states but rather by the initiative exercised by the HR/VP and the EEAS. These actors do not appear only to facilitate consensus and coordinate the position of member states but also act as triggers of new political endeavours. In short, new intergovernmentalism underestimates the role of *de novo* bodies since, as a national diplomat put it, "when you give powers to an institution, don't be surprised it takes them" (Interview #28). The changing dynamics between member states and Brussels-based bodies also opens the door to the involvement of external actors in the policy-making process, as shown by the influence of policy networks and epistemic communities in the making of the EUGS.

As rightly acknowledged by new intergovernmentalism, this novel policy-making mode has not seen the powers of the Commission strongly reinforced. During the policy formulation phase of the EUGS, HR/VP Mogherini avoided entering formal negotiations with the Commission, as much as she also avoided the drafting by committee method of intergovernmental bodies. Using her hat as Vice-President, she reinforced her own stance (and that of the EEAS) in external action, side-lining the centrality of the College. Hence, the autonomy of the HR/VP and the EEAS was

also reinforced vis-à-vis this supranational institution, who decided to be involved in the EUGS process under the leadership of Mogherini -and her Vice-President hat.

All in all, what was thought as a purely intergovernmental policy (EU security and defence) has not mutated into supranationalism but has not remained purely intergovernmental either. The Lisbon Treaty has increased the centrality of the bodies it created and has enabled them to acquire enough autonomy to move initiatives forward. And in so doing, the outcome and the contents of the EUGS (not the process) now have a more supranational flavour[115]. In a certain sense, the study of the making of the EUGS reveals today the existence of three modes of post-Lisbon policy-making: the intergovernmentalism of the CFSP/CSDP, the supranationalism of external relations and the post-Lisbon "hybrid" synthesis embodied in external action initiatives. To expand its explanatory and interpretative power, new intergovernmentalism needs to further differentiate between the different issue areas at stake, as evidenced by the different dynamics in foreign policy (in the ESS) and external action (in the EUGS).

7.2. Methodological contribution: unpacking new intergovernmentalism

This thesis has built on the debates introduced by new intergovernmentalism to explain the current institutional developments in external action and by comparing them to the situation prior to the Lisbon Treaty. By choosing the supranational-intergovernmental debate and new intergovernmentalism as its most recent evolution, this thesis has used a theoretical debate that could be considered parsimonious and general in scope, insomuch it uses a limited number of observations to explain the current developments in the European integration process[116].

[115] The author is grateful to Prof. Christian Kaunert for this argument.

[116] Parsimonious and general are also characteristics that have been attributed to liberal intergovernmentalism, which justified the need to further investigate its main premises (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig 2009:85). This was also a departing point of this thesis when using new intergovernmentalism as a theoretical debate, with the aim to contribute to the improvement of theories, particularly those that "could be wrong" (King, Keohane and Verba 1994:19).

In terms of the capacity of new intergovernmentalism to explain developments in the different phases of policy-making, the literature remains vague, with no systematic attempt being made beyond Puetter's statement that the search for consensus among member states is constant in "all stages of the policy-making process, including the initiation and development of the policy, the agreement of specific guidelines and objectives and the collective monitoring of policy implementation" (Puetter 2014:Ch.2).

As Chapter 1 introduced, this thesis has used a more systematic approach to the phases of policy-making. Combining the frameworks provided by White (2004) and Young (2010), the analysis of the policy-making of EU strategies has been divided into 4 different phases: agenda-setting, policy formulation, policy output and implementation. This has enabled the use of new intergovernmentalism throughout all the policy cycle of the ESS and the EUGS, as summarised in the tables of Chapters 5 and 6. As it has been argued, new intergovernmentalism requires some unpacking of the different phases of a policy-making process if it aims to capture the inter-institutional dynamics and the role of the different EU institutions in initiating, producing, adopting and implementing policies.

As the research undertaken has demonstrated, the involvement and initiative of member states and institutions is more nuanced than new intergovernmentalism broadly assumes when the different phases of policy-making are taken into account. In the case of the EUGS, for instance, the initiative to launch a strategy-making process came from the HR/VP and the EEAS, whereas the implementation in the fields of security and defence witnessed a stronger role of member states. Also, the comparison between the policy-making of the ESS and the EUGS has revealed how the role of the member states, the Council secretariat, the European Council, the Council, the HR/VP, the EEAS and the Commission is different if the analysis focuses on the pre-Lisbon pillars (with external relations and the CFSP/ESDP located in the first and second pillars, respectively) or the post-Lisbon external action.

The methodological contribution of this research has thus been to highlight that, if new intergovernmentalism wants to fully depict current developments in European integration, it needs to further specify the role of the different actors in the different phases of policy-making.

7.3. Empirical findings: Lisbon policy-making in the making

The novel policy-making mode of external action deserves additional attention here. The second departing hypothesis of this thesis was that the emergence of external action since the Lisbon Treaty has significantly transformed the policy-making dynamics when compared to the EU's foreign policy. This comes as a consequence of the integration of the CFSP/ESDP and external relations under a single Title of the TEU (Title V on External Action) as a way to foster horizontal and institutional coherence. To a great extent, the transforming effect of external action has been confirmed with the analysis of the making of the ESS and the EUGS, insomuch the first unveiled a process characterised by institutionalised intergovernmentalism and the second a move towards autonomy in intergovernmentalism.

The shift in policy-making has been gradual. The third hypothesis of this thesis considered that since the ESS and the EUGS were drafted in different Treaty configurations, they depicted the policy-making and inter-institutional dynamics of an intergovernmental policy area (the CFSP/ESDP) and of a hybrid area of activity (external action). The evidence presented here reveals that a shift in policy-making dynamics has indeed occurred from Solana to Mogherini.

The policy-making process of the ESS was characterised by a strong leadership of the Council bureaucracy around the figure of the HR. His highly political stance and leadership enabled him to build consensus among member states at a time of deep divisions over the Iraq war. He placed himself at the centre of the discussions to draft a new strategy, circumscribed to the task force set up to that end in the Council Secretariat and on which Solana had a strong ascendancy. His activism was combined with the good will of member states, particularly the big three, who

blessed Solana's initiative to heal the wounds of Iraq via the ESS and who adopted the document at the European Council. The highly institutionalised policy-making process of the ESS around the task force did not prevent the influence of member states but circumscribed it in the Council Secretariat, not the intergovernmental bodies of the Council. Hence the characterisation of this process as institutionalised intergovernmentalism.

This highly institutionalised process inaugurated a novel policy-making mode in strategy-making, whereby Brussels-based personalities and bureaucracies exerted major influence than expected by new intergovernmentalism. The EUGS built on the ESS experience to further reinforce the autonomy of the HR/VP and the EEAS in policy-making. Both took particular advantage of the HR/VP's right of initiative to devise a policy-formulation process lead by the HR/VP and her team, raising the eyebrows of member states accustomed to intergovernmental procedures in the CFSP/CSDP. The autonomy of the HR/VP and the EEAS from the agenda-setting to the implementation of the EUGS lead to emergence of a hybrid policy-making mode in external action, as previously noted.

However, post-Lisbon policy-making is still in the making. As a national diplomat noted, there is a certain mismatch between the HR/VP having the right of initiative and member states still deciding by unanimity in foreign policy and defence matters (Interview #21). Their centrality in the system provoked harsh criticisms at the time of adapting to the EEAS suggested mode of policy formulation of the EUGS (the group of POCs and the "confessionals"). Reactions to the policy formulation phase included constant demands to further involve capitals and national diplomats in the discussions. And during the implementation phase, interviewees recall how member states tried, for instance, to bring discussions on security and defence back to the traditional intergovernmental method. As a result, the implementation of the EUGS has witnessed the emergence of policy silos: some of them follow the Community method (EDAP), some are characterised by traditional intergovernmentalism (IPSD) and others follow a hybrid policy-making mechanism (the Joint Communication on Resilience).

Nonetheless, the logic reaction of member states to go back to intergovernmentalism as a consequence of innovation in policy-making has not prevented the progress of this novel method. The EUGS is currently being implemented in several areas, with progress being made particularly in security and defence. The different initiatives have converged in parallel, thanks to the framework provided by the EUGS. Despite the efforts of member states and the Commission to have full ownership of EDAP or the IPSD, the EEAS and the HR/VP remain in the middle of the system, projecting influence, exerting leadership and setting the agenda.

Moreover, even if member states prioritise an intergovernmental reading of the new strategy and its implementation, they also acknowledge the success of an innovative policy-making method when reading the contents of the EUGS and the proposals emanating from it. This innovative method has been characterised by the provision of inputs by the HR/VP and the EEAS (thus exerting the right of initiative, setting the scene and influencing the debates) and the development of specific initiatives (for instance in security and defence) through Council conclusions. While this represents the endurance of intergovernmentalism, there also seems to be a new Lisbon policy-making mode in the making.

7.4. Limitations of the study and avenues for future research

The study has encountered some limitations that, simultaneously, open avenues for future research, both in terms of the theoretical debates on new intergovernmentalism and in strategy-making.

First, as noted in Chapter 6, criticism of strategies has it that they are only empty words. The "so what" question is often associated to the publication of any new strategy, insomuch these serve as an inspiration but do not have binding effects on member states or EU institutions. Others note that developments in security and defence happen regardless of the contents of strategies and as a consequence of external factors (a new foreign policy crisis, a new conflict in the neighbourhood) or internal decisions (the willingness of some member states to make progress on

defence cooperation)[117]. This observation has been confronted to evidence on strategies as a source of policy inspiration, as studied in the implementation of the EUGS, which has provided external action initiatives with a path and sense of direction[118]. Nonetheless, the opposite argument could be made by focusing on the effects of the Ukrainian or Syrian crisis in strengthening the foreign policy mechanisms of the EU or the Franco-German agreement to advance defence cooperation after Brexit, to provide only two examples of alternative future research paths.

Second, the timeframe used for the study also limits the capacity to fully assess the influence of EU strategies in foreign policy and external action. While the ESS did not have a thorough implementation due to the willingness of its promoters to act as a highly political document, the EUGS is only in its first year of implementation at the time of writing. Further research is needed to assess the developments in external action in the following years of implementation in order to show that the EUGS has not gone unnoticed a few years after its publication. If the EUGS is not put in a drawer soon and external action initiatives continue to emanate from it, additional research will be able to depict the inter-institutional dynamics that characterise the policy-making of these new initiatives. Of particular interest will be the adaptation of the work programmes of the different EU institutions to the roadmap devised by the EUGS. As an EU official interviewed noted, this will be most problematic for the Commission machinery, whose workplan follows different timelines than the EUGS roadmap (Interview #34). This will also test the capacity of the HR/VP to influence the procedures of the Commission and make full use of her Vice-President hat. To this end, the continued relevance and activity of the Commissioner's Group on External Action will provide a relevant test case.

Third, and linked to the previous point, the case studies of this thesis have analysed two frameworks for foreign policy and external action, not specific policies in these areas. The conclusions reached on inter-institutional dynamics and the limited role of new intergovernmentalism to depict practices in external

[117] The author is indebted to Prof. Luis Simón for this observation.
[118] This process has been called in Chapter 6 as "parallel convergence", particularly when referred to the initiatives in security and defence.

action need to be tested in specific policy developments. An interviewed EU official noted that, since the publication of the EUGS, the involvement of the Commission in security and defence is not the only ground-breaking development. According to this official, the understanding of security among EU actors, particularly member states, has also shifted to incorporate external relations policies such as development and trade, beyond the traditional focus on CFSP and CSDP (Interview #34). Further research needs to be undertaken to assess whether this is the case and if this becomes a trend, not a specific development linked to the recent publication of the EUGS.

Fourth, the analytical contribution of this research has been to apply new intergovernmentalism to areas where no research had been conducted yet. The study of a hybrid area of activity such as external action has provided relevant insights on its usefulness to assess current inter-institutional dynamics and the relationship between member states and EU bodies therein. However, the study remains limited to assess the validity of new intergovernmentalism in other areas of external action. Additional research needs to be done to assess whether a process of autonomy in intergovernmentalism also characterises the developments in the European Neighbourhood Policy, development cooperation or the internal-external security nexus, to name a few. Also, the exercise can be broadened to other policy areas where intergovernmental and supranational dynamics are also at play, such as Justice and Home Affairs. The addition of these analyses to the existing body of literature on a new intergovernmentalist reading of the euro crisis would consolidate its position as a middle-range theory of European integration.

And fifth, when conducting the interviews for this research, heated debates on the position of the EEAS in the EU's external action architecture recurrently emerged. Some interviewees recalled how member states fought for the control of the EEAS when it was established, not to lose grip on their foreign policy prerogatives (Interviews #1 and #33). The tensions between member states and the EEAS have

weakened today, with some representatives accepting that states have outsourced part of their policy-making to this *de novo* body (Interview #22)[119].

Commission officials, on the contrary, lament that they have lost grip on the EEAS (Interview #37) and that member states try to "intergovernmentalise" the competences of the Commission in external relations as part of the EU's external action (Interview #39). These voices note that the aim of the Commission is to avoid that member states use the HR to impose their agenda on the Commission via her Vice-President hat. More optimist views signal a positive evolution in the relations between the Commission and the EEAS, "from hostility to cooperation" (Interviews # 32 and #22). These discussions bring to the fore a recurring debate on whether Mogherini today "represents a High Representative/Vice-President or whether she might become a Vice-President/High Representative" (Duke 2017:217).

As noted by a former high EU official, "you don't change the system [only a few years] after the Lisbon Treaty" (Interview #1). So additional research needs to be done on the future shape of the EEAS, its autonomy in the external action system and the distribution of competences in the areas of foreign policy and external relations. When it comes to comply with the requirements of horizontal and institutional coherence (not to mention the EU's influence in international affairs), the EU external action system is still on its way to adulthood.

7.5. Concluding remarks

Current crises are affecting the European integration project and, in so doing, the capacity of the EU to be a credible international actor. This contrasts with the situation in 2003, when the Iraq war divided Europeans on a crucial foreign policy matter but the split did not permeate into the core of the EU project. In more than

[119] When speaking at the EUISS Annual Conference 2015, Mogherini acknowledged that at the start of her mandate, she felt a big sense of distance between Brussels and the member states. Today, she noted, "Brussels and member states are coming together to decide EU foreign policy and how these decisions serve the member states, are convenient for all and embody the common interest. There is today a common European direction and goal" (the idea, as paraphrased by the author, was expressed on the occasion of the closing speech of the EUISS Annual Conference in Brussels on 8-9 October 2015).

a decade, internal divisions have mutated into existential crises, and member states have turned inwards to protect their sovereignty and reduced the scope of supranational cooperation. The European integration literature has captured this trend with the new intergovernmentalism, arguing that member states hold the upper hand in EU integration matters.

But beyond scholar accounts on the current path of integration, a detailed observation of the institutional dynamics in the post-Lisbon external action suggests a fundamental shift in the relationship between EU actors. Member states once decided to empower the role of common EU bodies to have a stronger say in international affairs. And the HR/VP and the EEAS have seized the opportunity. In spite of the authority that member states still exercise in security and defence matters, the set-up of the EU's external action has fundamentally altered the relationships between Brussels and national capitals. As an official put it for this research, "perhaps we only see the big waves of intergovernmentalism, but there is an undercurrent that is much more nuanced" (Interview #31). This is what this thesis has sought to demonstrate with the analysis of strategy-making in the era of intergovernmentalism.

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ANNEX
LIST OF INTERVIEWS[120]

Cristina Barrios

Policy Advisor, Strategic Planning Division, EEAS

Date of the interview: 19/04/2017

Armando Barucco

Head of Unit, Analysis, Planning and Historic Diplomatic Documentation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Italy, and national Point of Contact for the EUGS

Date of the interview: 12/12/2016

Sven Biscop

Director, Europe in the World, Egmont Institute

Date of the interview: 12/05/2017

Miguel Ceballos Baron

Deputy Head of Cabinet, Cabinet of Commissioner Cecilia Malström, Trade, European Commission

Date of the interview: 20/06/2017

Alfredo Conte

Head of the Strategic Planning Division, EEAS

Date of the interview: 12/12/2016

Robert Cooper

Special Advisor, European Commission

Former Director General, DGE External Relations and Politico-Military Affairs, Council of the EU

Date of the interview: 22/09/2016

[120] This list of interviews is sorted alphabetically, by surname. The position in which interviewees appear does not correspond to the number of the interview they are given in the contents of this thesis, in order to ensure the anonymity of the sources. The professional position of each interviewee corresponds to his/her position at the time of the interview and, if relevant, during the policy-making process of the ESS or the EUGS.

Oliver Dajic
Political Advisor to the Secretary General, EEAS
Former Desk Officer, Crisis Management Planning Directorate, EEAS
Date of the interview: 23/05/2017

Julia De Clerck-Sachsse
Adviser, Strategic Planning Division, EEAS
Date of the interview: 6/06/2017

Erik de Feijter
Deputy Representative of the Netherlands to the PSC, Permanent Representation of the Netherlands to the EU
Date of the interview: 4/05/2017

Sofie From-Emmesberger
Ambassador, Representative of Finland to the PSC, Permanent Representation of Finland to the EU
Date of the interview: 9/05/2017

Cristina Gallach
Under-Secretary-General for Communications and Public Information, United Nations
Former spokesperson of Javier Solana, High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy
Date of the interview: 05/01/2017

Anna Jardfelt
Ambassador, Representative of Sweden to the PSC, Permanent Representation of Sweden to the EU
Date of the interview: 3/05/2017

Ilze Juhansone
Deputy Secretary-General in charge of Relations with other Institutions, European Commission
Date of the interview: 16/05/2017

Gergana Karadjova
Ambassador, Representative of Bulgaria to the PSC, Permanent Representation of Bulgaria to the EU
Date of the interview: 20/04/2017

Maciej Karasinski
Acting PSC Representative, Permanent Representation of Poland to the EU
Former First Counsellor, Head of Common Security and Defence Policy Section, Permanent Representation of Poland to the EU
Date of the interview: 24/04/2017

Alexander Kmentt
Ambassador, Representative of Austria to the PSC, Permanent Representation of Austria to the EU
Date of the interview: 2/06/2017

David Král
Director of Policy Planning Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Czech Republic, and national Point of Contact for the EUGS
Date of the interview: 22/04/2016

Eva Kratochvílova
Head of CFSP/CSDP Unit, Permanent Representation of the Czech Republic to the EU
Date of the interview: 16/05/2017

Sebastian Kurpas
Policy Officer, International Dimension, Policy Coordination, Secretariat General, European Commission
Date of the interview: 24/05/2017

Florian Laudi
Deputy European Correspondent, Federal Foreign Office, Germany
Date of the interview: 12/01/2017

Stefan Lehne
Visiting Scholar, Carnegie Europe
Former Director for the Western Balkans, DGE External Relations and Politico-Military Affairs, General Secretariat of the Council of the EU and member of the Policy Unit for Austria
Date of the interview: 1/06/2017

Ricardo López-Aranda
Director of the Office of Analysis and Forecasting, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Spain, and national Point of Contact for the EUGS
Date of the interview: 07/10/2016

Aurora Mejía
Deputy Director General for Security Policy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Spain
Date of the interview: 12/12/2016

Antonio Missiroli
Director, EU Institute for Security Studies
Former Senior Research Fellow at the WEU Institute for Security Studies
Date of the interview: 25/04/2017

Enrique Mora
Director General for Foreign Policy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Spain

Former Deputy Director for the CFSP (European Correspondent), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Spain
Date of the interview: 07/10/2016

Stephan Müller
Ambassador, Representative of Luxembourg to the PSC, Permanent Representation of the Luxembourg to the EU
Date of the interview: 2/05/2017

Marc Otte
Director General, Egmont
Former Special Advisor on Security and Defence, General Secretariat of the Council of the EU
Date of the interview: 23/09/2016

Emil Pietras
Strategy Analyst, Permanent Representation of Poland to the EU
Date of the interview: 22/04/2016

Fernando Sampedro
Policy officer, Representation of the European Commission to the PSC, European Commission
Date of the interview: 22/06/2017

Patrick Schäfer
Policy Planning Staff, Federal Foreign Office, Germany
Date of the interview: 12/01/2017

Christoph Schwegmann
Senior Defence Advisor, Policy Planning Staff, Federal Foreign Office, Germany
Date of the interview: 12/01/2017

Javier Solana
President, ESADEgeo
Former High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy
Date of the interview: 14/12/2016

Nicolas Suran
Ambassador, Representative of France to the PSC, Permanent Representation of France to the EU
Date of the interview: 17/05/2017

Zuzana Sutiakova Michalcova
Advisor, Foreign Policy Team, Cabinet of the President, European Council
Date of the interview: 4/05/2017

Nathalie Tocci
Special Advisor to HR/VP Federica Mogherini for the EUGS
Deputy Director, Istituto Affari Internazionali
Date of the interview: 05/05/2016

Pierre Vimont
Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Former Secretary General, EEAS
Date of the interview: 17/09/2015

Quentin Weiler
Political Advisor to the Secretary General, EEAS
Date of the interview: 28/04/2017

Noel White
Ambassador, Representative of Ireland to the PSC, Permanent Representation of Ireland to the EU
Former Director, Permanent Representation of Ireland to the EU
Date of the interview: 17/05/2017

Alexandros Yannis

Policy coordinator on global issues and responsible for energy diplomacy, EEAS Former Official of DGE External Relations and Politico-Military Affairs, General Secretariat of the Council of the EU

Date of the interview: 22/06/2017