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Doctoral Dissertation
Doctoral Programme in Demography

Indian Diaspora to Spain
Demo-spatial Analysis and Immigrant Integration

Presented by
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”

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Autonomous University of Barcelona (UAB)
Bellaterra, 2018

ਮਃ ੨ ॥

mehlaa 2

Second Mehl:

ਨਕਿ ਨਥ ਖਸਮ ਹਥ ਕਿਰਤੁ ਧਕੇ ਦੇ ॥

nak nath khasam hath kirat dhakē dē.

The string through the nose is in the hand of the Lord Master;
one's own actions drive him on.

ਜਹਾ ਦਾਣੇ ਤਹਾ ਖਾਣੇ ਨਾਨਕਾ ਸਚੁ ਹੇ ॥੨॥

jahā dānē tahānh khānē nānakā sach hē ॥2॥

Wherever his food is, there he eats it;

O Nanak, this is the truth. ||2||

(Shri Guru Granth Sahib Ji. Page: 653)

To

Sahibnoor

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1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Presentation

During the last two decades, accelerated globalization and neoliberal economic policies have contributed to the rapid movement of capital and people around the world. Due to the rapid means of transportation and communication, today's world is more mobile compared to any other period in human history. Most migratory movements are caused by economic and political reasons that force people to leave their homeland and live in other parts of the world. The regular entry of immigrants to different destinations results in the expansion of the traditional diaspora communities or the emergence of new diasporas. Large scale out migration of people from the developing world (which is the largest supplier of labour) to the developed countries, the increasing contribution of the emigrant population in the development of origin countries, and the significant role played by the diaspora members in the global politics, has revived the importance of 'diasporas' in academics and international relations debates. Since 1990s, the migrant sending countries, like India, China or Mexico, have identified the importance of diasporas and started to engage with their diaspora population to use them as a source of foreign direct investment and political power in the global context. It has raised my interest in studying 'how the rapidly globalizing world is changing the meaning and significance of traditional diaspora communities for the governments and people of origin and host countries'.

The term 'diaspora', which was used for the first time to explain 'the exodus of Jews from Jerusalem' and literally means the dispersion of people from their homeland to one or more countries (Safran 1991), has gradually expanded its meaning to include to all individuals who were born in a country and live in one or more countries (Vertovec, 1997). This expansion of the definition and data policy around the sensitivity of people living in different parts of the world and the governments of the countries involved in the migration process makes it very difficult to quantify the population of the diaspora and demarcate the geopolitical limits of the space of the diaspora. Currently there is no single source of data that can provide accurate information about all immigrants or their descendants who make up the diaspora population. Mostly, the diaspora population is grouped in various categories of 'immigrants' in different countries to satisfy the political needs of the countries of origin or destination. In the first part of this dissertation, I

focused on the Indian diaspora. First, I analysed different data sources that can be used to measure the population size and spatial expansion of the current Indian diaspora, which, according to the government of India, has more than 30 million people living throughout the world in 208 countries. With the use of a supra state register 'UN Global Migration Database', I captured the recent expansion of the diaspora through the continuous flow of immigrants and with Big Data (Facebook database), I unearthed the internal diversity of the population of the Indian Diaspora, consisting of different ethno-religious groups originated in different parts of India. Secondly, I have analysed the evolution of different diasporas and the effect of globalization on them. By focusing on the diasporas of India and Mexico, which are considered the two largest diasporas in the world according to the UN Global Migration Database of 2017, I have explored, on the one hand, the changing attitude of the recipient countries towards its population of the diaspora, and on the other hand, the impact of demographic, economic and political changes in the countries of origin on the growth of the diaspora communities. And finally, by focusing on Indian immigration (mainly from the Sikh community) in Spain, I have studied the creation of different diaspora spaces through the interrelation of immigrants with each other, and their internal mobility in the new destinations of the diaspora. I have also highlighted the importance of transnational communication networks in the creation of virtual spaces of the diaspora, which are multi-layered and very dynamic. These transnational links facilitate the movement of capital and people. It contributes to the expansion of diaspora and strengthens the links between the people who are living in different destinations far away from each other, but feels as part of a global community network, which has its roots in the same country of origin, in this case India. It gave them a new sense of diasporic identity that dissolves national borders and envelops the entire world. Through this dissertation, I have made a contribution to the existing studies on the population and space of the Indian Diaspora. The contribution of this dissertation in Indian diaspora studies also lies in the fact that it has made the first empirical attempt to measure the exact size of the diaspora population and demarcate the geopolitical boundaries of the Indian Diaspora with different data sources available now. It has also explored the internal diversity and different layers of diaspora spaces (physical and virtual) in the peripheral country of the Indian diaspora like Spain, which are in continuous formulation through new arrivals, natural growth and internal mobility of the diaspora population. lastly, it has also contributed to the ongoing debate on the importance

of diaspora communities in shaping global politics and economy and the importance of changing demography, politics and economy of the countries of origin of the current diaspora communities.

Spain is a recent addition to the Indian diaspora. The pioneer Indians entered Spain as Sindhi merchants, but their number was very small and they were limited to their commercial activities. This immigration was circular in nature. The direct immigration of Indian workers (mostly young Sikhs from the northern states of Punjab and Haryana) to Spain began in the 1990s and now form a significant part of the immigrant population in several large cities. The immigration of Indian workers to southern Europe has elevated Spain's position as a peripheral destination in the Indian diaspora.

Spain was not a known or final destination for most of the first Indian immigrants. They entered Spain because the United Kingdom (which was their favourite destination) and other countries in northern Europe had denied them permission to stay. Most of them settled along with the Mediterranean coast, from Catalonia to Malaga. The second part of this dissertation focuses on the Indian immigrant population in Spain, especially in its sociodemographic profile and spatial distribution. In this part, I studied the growth of the Indian community in Spain during the last two decades and its level of concentration and residential segregation in different metropolitan cities of Spain. I also studied the exposure of Indian immigrants to the host society and their socioeconomic condition as compared to other immigrant communities in different parts of Spain. This is a completely new dimension in studies of 'Indian immigration' to Spain, and it is my contribution to international immigration studies, which will provide a base for further research and policy making. The fact that the exponential increase of Indian immigration to Spain is relatively recent and the absence of historical and colonial ties between Spain and India makes this research more interesting, since it will give us an opportunity to observe the expansion of the Indian diaspora to virgin territories where they do not share common antecedents, but now they are contributing to the formation of a very diverse society and heterogeneous neighbourhoods.

Most of the Indians in Spain belong to the first or one and a half generations, and had no prior knowledge of the Spanish people and culture. A large number of Indian immigrants did not even aware of the Spanish language, which was a necessary prerequisite for any interaction with the host society and ascending socioeconomic mobility, before their arrival in Spain. This limited knowledge of the host country created

several problems for them to become a productive part of the host society and the labour market, which affected their level of integration in the host society. In the third part of this dissertation, I measured the level of integration of Indian immigrants in different spheres of the host society and the factors responsible for it. As the Sikh population makes a majority in the Indian immigrant population in Spain and the current Sikh population belongs to different generations of the Sikh community in India, I also studied how different generations of Sikh immigrants in Spain face the challenge of preserving their identity and peaceful coexistence with the host society. This dissertation contributes to studies of immigrant integration by providing empirical evidence on the status of Indian immigrants in Spain and Italy, and the effect of immigration policies of host countries on the welfare of Indian immigrants. It also gives us the opportunity to see how the different religious minorities reproduce their religious places and preserve their identity in the new countries of destination.

The Indian population is a rapidly growing immigrant community in Spain. With the process of family reunion and the expansion of social networks, every year thousands of new immigrants enter and settle permanently in Spain. This regular influx of immigrants produces a new social and relational space in the host society. Indian immigration is a topic little studied in Spain, which requires a lot of quantitative and qualitative research. This dissertation will add significant knowledge to the existing understanding of the Indian diaspora and the spatial and social relationships between Indian immigrants and the host society. One of the main reasons behind my interest in the study of 'Indian Diaspora and the position of Spain in it' is that I belong to the Sikh community in Spain. My experiences in Spain initially, as an irregular immigrant and currently, as a permanent resident have provided me with a solid base to carry out this research. In addition, my academic training as a geographer and demographer provides me with basic knowledge and methodological tools to carry out this research.

1.2 Antecedents and Origin of the Dissertation

This thesis is framed in three different lines of research, which are interrelated and complement each other to understand the phenomenon of international migration, the formation of the community and the integration or inclusion of immigrant minorities in the host society. The first line of research is the "Diaspora studies", which deal with the formation, evolution and quantification of the different dimensions of diaspora

communities and their impact on the countries of destination and origin through politics and the global economy. The second line of research is the 'Demo-spatial analysis of the settlement pattern of immigrant minorities'. Explore different demographic and socio-economic characteristics of immigrant minorities (composition by age and sex, occupational structure, legal status, internal mobility and structure of the household or family), and their spatial distribution (residential segregation, concentration and isolation) in different parts of the host countries. The third line of research deals with issues related to 'Immigration policy and the integration or inclusion of immigrants' in host societies. It focuses on issues related to social cohesion, peaceful coexistence, upward social and economic mobility of immigrant minorities, preservation of the identity and well-being of immigrants.

After finishing my Master's Degree in Geography from the Punjabi University, Patiala, Punjab, India, I emigrated to Spain in search of job opportunities. But due to the economic crisis and my irregular status, despite my higher education I did not get any work in Spain. During this time, I began doing manual work in the hospitality sector of Barcelona, and in my spare time I used to explore different aspects of the life of irregular immigrants in Spain, their expectations of the host government, their wishes, problems, fears and compulsions, their jobs and exploitations in the workplace, their relationship with the host society and other immigrants and their future expectations. After regularizing my immigrant status, I continued my studies in the field of international migration. As a geographer and part of the immigrant boom in Spain, international immigration was a very fascinating topic for me. In 2014, to pursue my dreams of studying international migration, I started a master's course in Territorial and Population Studies at the Centre for Demographic Studies and the Department of Geography of the Autonomous University of Barcelona. During this master, I got in touch with Dr. Andreu Domingo. He encouraged me to study the process of international immigration and settlement of immigrants from South Asia in Spain. At the end of this master, I presented a thesis entitled "*Immigration from South Asia to Spain, 2000-2014: Territorial distribution and sociodemographic analysis*", which laid the foundations of this doctoral dissertation.

After completing this master, I began my doctoral studies in the Demography program of the Autonomous University of Barcelona under the supervision of Dr. Andreu Domingo. He allowed me to join his research group GEDEM (*Grup d'Estudis*

Demogràfics i de Migracions), which is dedicated to several topics in the field of research on international migration. It was a turning point in my life when I started working with a group of highly qualified researchers on international migration. On the basis of the knowledge acquired during the master's course, I started working on my doctoral thesis project. My director supported me a lot during the preparation of the project. His support and his fascinating ideas played a crucial role in the development of this dissertation in the last three years.

After studying the territorial distribution and sociodemographic profile of South Asians in Spain, I published my first article in the *Asia Pacific Migration Journal* on the sociodemographic profile and spatial distribution of the South Asian population (SAP) in Spain. It encouraged me to enter a new field of research on the demo-spatial analysis of the settlement pattern of immigrant minorities in their new destination countries. I started looking for the concentration of Indian and other South Asian immigrants in different parts of Spain and the factors responsible for their concentration in some cities in Spain. I presented a paper in the *VIII Congress on International Migrations in Spain* on residential segregation and the concentration of the SAP in different metropolitan cities of Spain. I also published a book chapter on the concentration of the SAP in two of the main metropolitan cities of Spain, namely Barcelona and Madrid, and the relationship between their concentration and the diversity of the population in the different neighbourhoods of these cities. After exploring the situation of the different groups of immigrants in Spain, I published an article that compared the "socioeconomic level" and the "degree of exposure to diversity" of the Indian immigrants with other immigrant groups in Spain. Due to the lack of data sources to answer questions about the relationship of Indian immigrants with the host society and to find out the reasons for their residential segregation and high isolation, I began to collect data through interviews with Indian immigrants settled in different parts of Spain. I conducted interviews in 23 different municipalities in Spain, which had a considerable number of Indian immigrant population.

While studying the situation of the Indian immigrants in Spain, I noticed that the existing research on immigration originated from India, and the resulting population of Indian origin settled around the world, is very limited. There were no empirical studies available on the size, spatial dimension and internal diversity (in terms of ethno-linguistic origins or socioeconomic status) of the Indian diaspora. One of the main reasons behind

this lack of studies was the ever-changing definition of the term "diaspora", which was in continuous reformulation during the last decades. It was creating problems for researchers to answer questions such as: which part of the immigrant population should be considered as the population of the diaspora and which part should be excluded from it? Or should we include or exclude the descendants of Indian immigrants in the diaspora population, who are the children of indentured workers and live in the past British or French colonies? Or how will people of Indian origin in neighbouring countries such as Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Bangladesh and Pakistan be classified in the diaspora population? In addition, apart from the problems with the definition of the term diaspora, there was another big problem to obtain a relevant data source that could capture the entire population of the Indian Diaspora at a given time. So I started looking for the data sources that can capture the immigrant population of Indian origin and their descendants around the world that make up the Indian diaspora. This search for data sources encouraged me to write a paper about different data sources, which can be used to capture different dimensions and the internal diversity of the Indian diaspora. This article is published in the series of working papers of the Centre for Demographic Studies.

After measuring the size and demarcating the geopolitical limits of the Indian Diaspora, I begin to explore the process of creating diaspora space in its new destinations, such as Spain. I wrote an article on the Sikh community to analyse the process of creation of the diaspora space and the role of internal mobility in it. I also focused on the importance of transnational links in the creation of the virtual space of diaspora communities. This article was published in *Diaspora Studies*, a peer-reviewed journal. In studying the creation and expansion of the diaspora space, I begin to wonder about the evolution of all diasporas in the world. I found very interesting trends in the histories of the main diaspora communities with respect to their evolutionary process and their relationship with the countries of origin. After analysing the evolutionary process and the role played by the different diasporas in today's globalized world, I wrote a paper about the comparison of different diaspora communities (in this case, the Indian and Mexican Diaspora) around the world. Later it was published in the proceedings of the *Latin American population conference*, in 2018.

During my stay at the Sapienza University in Rome, I entered another line of research that focuses on issues related to the formation of immigration policies and the integration of immigrants in host societies. I analysed the level of integration of Indian

immigrants in the different areas (social, cultural, structural and identificational) of the host societies in Spain and Italy. To carry out this study, I gathered data with interviews of Indian immigrants living in three regions of Italy, namely Rome, Latina and Brescia. I wrote an article about the integration of Indian immigrants in Spain and Italy, which was later published in *Genus*, a peer reviewed journal. In this article, I also compared the effect of the different economic and political policies of the host governments on the upward social and economic mobility of Indian immigrants in the recipient countries.

The formation of this dissertation was a continuous three-year learning process for me. Some changes in the initial plan were introduced after discussions with my co-authors from different institutions, and with my director and other colleagues from my research group GEDEM at the Centre for Demographic Studies. The four months of international stay abroad at the Sapienza University in Rome, which allowed me to obtain the international mention of a doctorate, also contributed to broadening the scope of my knowledge and the objectives of this research. In addition, it gave me the opportunity to study the Indian immigrant community in Italy and make a comparison of the Indian population in the two receiving countries.

1.3 Working Hypotheses

On the basis of knowledge and understanding of the process of international migration and the Indian diaspora obtained during the master's course at the Centre for Demographic Studies, while preparing my doctoral thesis project, I formulated the following working hypotheses for the three sections of the dissertation:

1. To study the Indian diaspora and the position of Spain in it, I had formulated following working hypotheses:

H1. *The statistical visibility of the Indian diaspora is mediated by changes in "governability" and statistical advances due to the appearance of continuous records of population and Big Data (especially social networking sites).*

H2. *Globalization has not only strengthened transnational relations in already existing diasporas, but also tends towards the "diasporization" of all migratory movements to satisfy the economic and political interests of the countries involved.*

H3. *The diaspora space (both physical and virtual) is a dynamic multi-layered entity, which is in continuous reformulation through demographic (the size and composition of the population of the diaspora) and spatial changes (inclusion or exclusion of countries).*

2. Working hypotheses regarding the demo-spatial analysis of the Indian immigrants in Spain:

H4. *Indians in Spain are spatially concentrated in the most diverse (in terms of population diversity), residentially substandard, and deprived parts of the metropolitan cities.*

H5. *Owing to the constant flow and internal migration of Indian immigrants in Spain, their level of residential segregation and isolation is decreasing and they are spreading in all major metropolitan cities of Spain.*

H6. *The Indian community in Spain is characterized by a higher level of cocooning and precariousness, which affects its ascending socioeconomic mobility in different regions of Spain.*

3. Working hypotheses regarding the integration process of the Indian immigrants in Spain and Italy:

H7. *The integration of Indian immigrants in Spain and Italy has a very fragmented path, which leads to the situation in which some sections of the immigrant community are integrated into specific spheres of the host societies (mainly economic), while the remaining sections remained excluded.*

H8. *Indian immigrants in Spain and Italy suffer from precariousness in the host labour markets, but relatively, they are in a better situation in Spain compared to Italy in terms of social services and immigrant rights.*

H9. *Each generation of Indian immigrants (in this case, the Sikh community) responds to the challenges of maintaining group identity and peaceful coexistence with the host society, from their own different experiences marked by age, family status, religious beliefs, migratory routes and socioeconomic status.*

1.4 Main Objectives

Following the initial structure of this dissertation, the main objectives were also divided into three parts:

1. The main research objectives for the Indian Diaspora section and Spain were:
 - i. To create an accurate and up-to-date image of the Indian diaspora with available data sources, which satisfy the latest definition of the concept of "diaspora" as "all displaced or (de)territorialized persons".
 - ii. To analyse and contrast different sources of data that can be used to measure the size, internal dynamics and diversity of the Indian diaspora population, and to demarcate the geopolitical boundaries of the Indian diaspora space.
 - iii. To Analyse the evolutionary process of different diaspora communities as a source of economic development and soft power for the countries of origin, in a globalized world.
 - iv. To explore trends regarding the demographic, economic and political transition of countries of origin, which could shape the future of diaspora communities in the coming decades.
 - v. To study the effects of the internal dynamics of the diaspora population and its transnational links in the production and expansion of the diaspora space.

2. The main research objectives for the section 'demo-spatial analysis of the Indian population in Spain' were:
 - i. To explore the flow and stock, spatial distribution and sociodemographic characteristics of the South Asian population (SAP), which includes immigrants from India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, in different parts of Spain.
 - ii. To measure the level of concentration and residential segregation of the SAP in the main metropolitan cities of Spain, and to explore their relationship with the diversity of the population.
 - iii. To analyse the existence of 'Cocooning' and 'Precariousness' in the Indian community of Spain. Through the construction of indicators based on various socioeconomic and demographic variables available in the records of the 2011 census in Spain.

- iv. To compare the socioeconomic situation and the settlement pattern of Indian immigrants with other immigrant communities selected according to their size and level of concentration in Spain.
- v. Explore regional differences regarding the socioeconomic conditions of Indian immigrants in different autonomous communities with a high concentration of immigrant population.

3. The main research objectives for the section 'Integration process of the Indian population in Spain' were:

- i. To explore the level of integration of Indian immigrants in different areas (structural, social, identification and cultural) of the host society.
- ii. To study the effect of transnational relations on immigration and integration of Indian immigrants in Spain.
- iii. To analyse how generational differences, affect the sociodemographic structure, the migration process (reasons, routes, roads and destinations), religious practices and identity issues in the diaspora (in this case, Sikh diaspora).

1.5 Theoretical framework, Data sources and Methodology

Each article in this dissertation has a separate section for a theoretical framework, data sources and methodology. Therefore, to avoid repetitions, in this section, I will give a general overview of the theoretical framework, the data sources and the methodology used in each article.

In the theoretical framework, I followed three different research areas for each section of this dissertation. First, to study the Indian Diaspora, I followed the research framework of "Diaspora Studies," which was revived by authors such as Safran (1991), Tololyan (1991) and Vertovec and Cohen (1999). During the last three decades, they have contributed to the expansion of the definition of the term "diaspora". For my research on the Indian Diaspora, I have focused on the definition of diaspora provided by Vertovec (1997), in which he used it to describe practically any population that is considered "de-territorialized" or "transnational". It refers to a population, which originated in a different land from the one that currently resides, and whose social, economic and political networks cross the borders of national states or, in fact, cover the world (Vertovec 1997, 277). I used this definition of diaspora to target the Indian population and their

descendants who live outside of India for any reason. To study the transnational relations of Indian immigrants, I have also used the theoretical framework presented by Glick Schiller et al. (1995) on transnational communities around the world and their relationship with the host and destination countries.

For the second section of the dissertation, to study the spatial concentration and residential segregation of Indian immigrants in Spain, I followed the theoretical framework advanced by Karen Schönwälder (2007) and Roger Andersson (2007) on the study of residential segregation and isolation of immigrant minorities in different European cities. Additionally, to measure the level of exposure of Indian immigrants in Spain to the host society, I follow the framework provided by Botterman and Musterd (2016) on the cocooning behaviour of immigrant minorities in very diverse European cities. In the third section, to study the pace and direction of the integration of Indian immigrants in Spain and Italy, I used the framework proposed by Heckmann et al. (2001), which focuses on the integration of immigrants in all the main spheres of the host society.

One of the main challenges of this research was the lack of relevant data sources. First, the sources of data for the study of the Indian Diaspora were very limited and focused only on specific parts of the diaspora population. They were also affected by the *data politics* of the collection agencies. A source of data that could provide all the information about the entire population of the Indian Diaspora was not available. So we use different sources, such as the national registry, the UN global data base and Big Data (Facebook), to measure the size of the diaspora population and demarcate the geopolitical boundaries of the Indian diaspora. Secondly, for the study of Indian immigration to Spain, due to the small amount of Indian immigrants, the data were hardly available. The continuous municipal register (Padrón Continuo) in Spain provides useful information on size, age structure, composition by sex, time of arrival, place of birth, nationality and spatial distribution of the immigrant population. To know all the other socio-demographic and economic characteristics, we used the data from the 2011 census because, due to the small size of the Indian community, all the other surveys, which are generally conducted at the national level, neglect Indian immigrants. To study the level of integration and the relationship of Indian immigrants with the host society, I conducted 84 interviews with Indian immigrants in Spain and 39 interviews in Italy (Annex 3). I have also conducted 20 interviews in India with relatives of Indian immigrants in Italy and Spain. These interviews are still under analysis and the results will be published soon.

To achieve all the aforementioned research objectives of this dissertation, I applied a mixed methodology (qualitative and quantitative methods), in which I used classic tools of demographic analysis and spatial autocorrelation techniques to study the profile and spatial distribution of the Indian population. in Spain. To measure the concentration level of the immigrant population, I used the localization coefficient index (Brown and Chung 2006), to measure residential segregation, I used the dissimilarity index (Massey and Denton 1988) and to calculate the degree of isolation, I applied isolation index (Lieberson, 1961; 1981). All these indices are discussed in detail in the following papers. I have used qualitative methods, first of all, to analyse the process of immigration and settlement of Indian immigrants in Spain; second, to study the expansion of Indian diaspora in Spain; third, to study the relationship of Indian immigrants with host societies and other immigrant groups in Spain and Italy; fourth, to study the internal mobility of Indian immigrants in their new places of destination; and, finally, to explore the experiences of different generations of Indian immigrants (in this case, Sikh) about the preservation of their identity and the reproduction of their religious spaces and practices in Spain.

1.6 Structure of the Dissertation

This dissertation is a compendium of articles published in different peer review journals, books, working paper series and conference proceedings. We [and my director] decided to use the compendium format because the publications are very rewarding in terms of the dissemination of the research work carried out. It also gave me the opportunity to learn from other researchers and collaborate with experts in different fields of research. Despite a somewhat fragmented view of the dissertation and the inconvenience of the repetitions of some concepts in the papers (which we have tried to minimize), the compendium format has the advantage of being evaluated in the production process. As all the articles are reviewed by several authors and their comments helped me a lot to improve them. This continuous evaluation of the research articles was a very enriching process for the whole dissertation. The last and most important feature of the compendium mode is that it resembles Chinese calligraphy paintings, which means that "once published, it is impossible to modify". In a classical thesis, one has the freedom to go back to the first chapter and change the argument or the hypothesis or the research questions, but in the compendium format we lose this freedom to modify our first

hypothesis or research questions. Its main shortcoming is the dependence on the publication process, since the speed of publication in different journals makes it very difficult to follow the initial dissertation plan. As a result, there are still some articles under review, which I have not added to this dissertation.

This dissertation is divided into five sections: the first section, "Introduction", is divided into six subsections, in which the first subsection, presents the topic of the investigation; the second, provides the background to this thesis; the third, consists of the working hypothesis; the fourth, outlines the main objective of the investigation; the fifth, provides a general description of the theoretical framework, the data sources and the methodology used in different works of this thesis; and finally, the sixth, explains the structure of this dissertation.

The second section, 'the Indian diaspora and Spain' consists of three papers, in which the first paper

Garha, Nachatter S. (2018), "Indian Diaspora: National register, UN Global Migration Database and Big Data", in *Papers de Demografia*, 462: 1-35. Bellaterra: Centre d'Estudis Demogràfics.

presents the recent images of the Indian diaspora created by different data sources, including the national register maintained by the Government of India, the United Nations Global Migration Database, formed and updated by the Population Division of the United Nations, and Big Data in the form of social networking site Facebook. It also shows that the way in which the interests of the different data collection agencies shape the image of the Indian diaspora, by giving visibility (as the UNGMD provides visibility for the Indian refugees living in Pakistan) or denying it to some part of the diaspora population (such as the Indian government does not accept Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar as people of Indian origin). The use of Big Data reveals the internal diversity of the Indian diaspora and provides instant and up-to-date images of the Indian diaspora. The second paper in this section

Garha, Nachatter S. (2018), "Diaspora Communities in a Globalised World: A comparative study of Mexican and Indian Diasporas", in Session 26 *Sistemas migratorios y diásporas latinoamericanas. VIII Congreso de la ALAP*, Puebla, Mexico. 23rd to 26th October 2018.

analyse the growing importance of diaspora communities in the globalized world. At present, these communities are contributing to the economic development and extra territorialisation of the powers of the national state, beyond their national borders. By

taking the example of the Indian and Mexican Diaspora, this article explains this process of conversion of diaspora communities into tools of economic well-being and soft power for the countries of origin. It also focuses on the demographic, economic and political changes in the countries of origin, which will shape the future of both diasporas over the decades. Finally, the third paper in this section

Garha, Nachatter S. and Domingo, Andreu (2017), “Sikh Diaspora and Spain: migration, space and hypermobility”, in *Diaspora Studies*, 10(2): 193-216.

explains the production and expansion of the diaspora space through the internal dynamics of the population of the Indian Diaspora in Spain. When analysing interviews with Sikh immigrants (who represent two thirds of the total population of Indian immigrants in Spain) in Spain, it explains the hypermobility of Indian immigrants in their new places of destination and the statistically invisible spaces of the diaspora created by the lack of adequate data records on the internal movements of immigrants. It also explains the way in which accelerated globalization and the strengthening of transnational communication links have created a virtual space for the Sikh Diaspora community, which facilitates the expansion of the diaspora space by providing information and resources for new migrants.

The third section, which studies the sociodemographic characteristics and spatial distribution of the Indian immigrant population in different parts of Spain, consists of four articles, in which the first paper

Garha, Nachatter S., Galeano, Juan and Domingo, Andreu (2016), “South Asian immigration to Spain: Socio-demographic profile and territorial distribution, 2000–2014” in *Asian and Pacific Migration Journal*, vol. 25 issue: 2, page(s): 191-205.

by using the data available in the continuous municipal register and the census records of 2011, studies the evolution of the demographic structure (age structure, composition by sex), socioeconomic profile (structure of the household, legal situation, level of education, and economic and professional activities) and the spatial distribution (at a national level) of the main immigrant communities in South Asia (India, Pakistan and Bangladesh) in Spain. The second paper in this section

Garha, Nachatter S. and Galeano, Juan (2015), “Concentration and Diversity of South Asian Population in Spain”, In Session 7: *Diversidad: concepto, medida y gestión. VIII Congreso Español de Migraciones Internacionales*, Granada, Spain. 16th-18th Sep. 2015.

analyse the spatial distribution (residential segregation and isolation at the municipal level) of the South Asian communities in Spain, and the evolution of the spatial distribution pattern during the last two decades in all municipalities with their large population. It also focuses on the concentration of South Asians in the most diverse neighbourhoods (in terms of the origins of the resident population) of the metropolitan area of Barcelona. The third paper in this section:

Garha, Nachatter S., López-Sala, Ana María and Domingo, Andreu (2016), "Surasiáticos en Madrid y Barcelona: encarnando la diversidad" in Andreu Domingo (Ed.) *Inmigración y Diversidad en España: Crisis Económica y gestión municipal*. Barcelona: Icaria ISBN 978-84-9888-726-6, pp. 211-238.

measures the level of residential segregation of South Asians in the largest metropolitan cities in Spain, that is, Barcelona and Madrid, which also have the greatest population diversity. This document explores the relationship between the diversity of the population in a neighbourhood and the concentration of South Asians in that neighbourhood. The fourth paper of this section

Garha, Nachatter S. and Bayona, J. (2018) "Indian immigration to Spain: A comparative study". *Papers de Demografia*, 460: 1-28. Bellaterra: Centre d'Estudis Demogràfics.

by using the 2011 census and municipal register data, analyse the socioeconomic conditions and exposure to the diversity of Indian immigrants in different regions of Spain. It also compares the condition of Indian immigrants as compared to other selected groups of immigrants in Spain. Based on the information available in the census records, two indicators were constructed, that is, 'Cocooning' and 'Precariousness', to study the situation of Indian immigrants in different parts of Spain.

The fourth section 'the integration process of Indian immigrants in Spain' consists of two papers, in which the first paper

Garha, Nachatter S. and Pappas, Angela (2018), "Fragmented integration and transnational networks: a case study of Indian immigration to Italy and Spain" in *Genus Journal of Population Sciences*, 74:12.

with a qualitative analysis of the interviews with Indian immigrants, it explores the level of integration of all Indian immigrants in different spheres (social, cultural, structural and identification) of the host societies in Spain and Italy. It offers a comparison of labour market conditions, immigration and regularization laws and social services, which affect the level of integration of Indian immigrants in both countries. It also highlights the role

of transnational relations in shaping the level of integration. The second paper in this section:

Garha, Nachatter S. and Domingo, Andreu (2018), "Migration, Religion and Identity: A Generational Perspective on Sikh Immigration to Spain" in *South Asian Diaspora*. Online published on 03/04/2018.

with a qualitative analysis of the interviews with Indian immigrants (from the Sikh community), it shows how the different generations of Indian immigrants in Spain have different migratory experiences (different reasons for emigration, different routes and different results) and how these differences affect their relationship with the host society, and the construction of identity and religious practices in their new country of residence.

The fifth section of this dissertation presents some conclusions and opens a discussion on the topics studied in this dissertation. It reflects the main findings of all the papers presented in this dissertation and its implications for the purposes of the policy or for future research. It also highlights some new fields of research that can be studied in the future.


2. THE INDIAN DIASPORA AND SPAIN

Garha, Nachatter S. (2018), “Indian Diaspora: National register, UN Global Migration Database and Big Data”, in *Papers de Demografia*, 462: 1-35. Bellaterra: Centre d'Estudis Demogràfics.

Garha, Nachatter S. (2018), “Diaspora Communities in a Globalised World: A comparative study of Mexican and Indian Diaspora”, in Session 26 *Sistemas migratorios y diásporas latinoamericanas*. VIII Congreso de la ALAP, Puebla, Mexico. 23rd to 26th October 2018.

Garha, Nachatter S. and Domingo, A. (2017), “Sikh Diaspora and Spain: migration, space and hypermobility”. In *Diaspora Studies*, Vol. 10, issue 2, pp 193-216.

Indian Diaspora in 2017



Source: Own elaboration, with Data from Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs, GOI 2017.



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GARHA, Nachatter Singh (2018) "Indian Diaspora: National register, UN Global Migration Database and Big Data". *Papers de Demografia*, 462: 1-35. Bellaterra: Centre d'Estudis Demogràfics.

Abstract- *Indian Diaspora: National register, UN Global Migration Database and Big Data*

In 2017, the Indian Diaspora was one of the biggest in the world. But until the last decade of the twentieth century, owing to the limited interest of the successive Indian governments, no regular register was maintained for the diaspora population. In 1990s, the accelerated emigration under globalization and the growing interests of Indian government to use diaspora as a source of political and economic power, raised the need to quantify the size and demarcate the geographical and political boundaries of the diaspora. Consequently, from 2001 the Indian government started to collect data about its diaspora population from the countries of destination. This data often suffers from incomplete coverage, conflicting political interests, and methodological nationalism; and provides distorted images of the diaspora. Recently, the emergence of 'UN Global Migration Database' and 'Big Data' create an opportunity to explore other aspects of the diaspora population. In this paper, our main objectives are: firstly, to quantify the size of diaspora population and demarcate the geopolitical boundaries of the Indian diaspora from available sources; secondly, to explore the role of the UNGMD and Big Data (Facebook) in explaining the socio-demographic characteristics and internal diversity of the Indian diaspora; and finally, to present the advantages and shortcomings of existing data sources on Indian diaspora population.

Key words: Indian diaspora; National register; UN Global Migration Database; Big Data; Internal diversity.

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**INDIAN DIASPORA:
NATIONAL REGISTER, UN GLOBAL MIGRATION DATABASE AND BIG DATA¹**

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1.- Introduction

The hyper-migration accompanied with the process of globalization at the turn of the new millennium has revived the phenomenon of transnational communities and diasporas (Faist 2010). This revival of interest is not only limited to the demarcation of geopolitical boundaries of the diaspora, but also includes the socioeconomic and demographic analysis of its population. The increased diaspora engagement was driven by three main sets of interests and resources represented by the diasporas i.e. the extraction of material resources for economic gain, the creation or maintenance of domestic and international political legitimacy, and the utilization of those abroad as a culturo-linguistic resource to be used in defining the boundaries of national identity (Waterbury 2010; Barry 2006; Itzigsohn 2000). Moreover, diasporas also serve in the construction of national myths that are further used to legitimize nationalist political agendas and the modes of inclusion and exclusion that designate, 'who' will have access to political representation and the resources of the state and who will not (King and Melvin 1999). To reap the economic and political benefits from the diaspora, the origin countries have started to engage with their diaspora populations all around the world, claiming them as their goodwill ambassador or tools of soft power (Hercog and Siegel 2013; Kugiel 2017).

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The growing engagements of the countries of origin in their diasporas have created an unprecedented demand for accurate, up-to-date and policy-relevant migration data (both stock and flow). The administrative and other national statistical records over the diaspora population, frequently suffer from poor coverage and are subjected to "methodological nationalism" (Faist 2012). They respond to different historical realities and political interests of collecting agencies and provide distorted images of the diaspora population and territory. The lack of accurate data and the ambiguity in the available statistics are also connected to what can be called the "data politics" of the diaspora phenomenon (Sheffer 2003). Diaspora population can be a source of cooperation or conflict between the parties involved in the immigration process i.e. homelands, host governments, and the diasporic entities. It makes the counting of the diaspora population a sensitive and politically charged issue. Sheffer argues that 'to some extent the unavailability and inaccuracy of such data are neither accidental nor the result of "objective" difficulties in data collection and processing... the problem stems from deliberate policies of homelands and host governments intended to suppress or falsify information about modern diasporism, that is, to conceal its actual impressive magnitude, rapid growth, and emerging significance' (2003: 99). The problem of the inaccuracy and unavailability of migration data, force researchers and policy makers to look for alternative data sources, which are not affected by the data politics, and can be used to explore the actual size and characteristics of different diaspora populations all around the world.

Indian Diaspora, is one of the largest in the world. But owing to the limited interest of the successive Indian governments, until the last decade of the twentieth century no regular register was maintained for the diaspora population. In 1990s, massive emigration under globalization, the neo-liberal shift in Indian economic policies, and the ever-increasing desire of Indian government to commodify and categorise its diaspora as a source of political and economic power in the global context (Modi and Taylor 2017), raised interest in quantifying the size of diaspora population and demarcating its geopolitical boundaries. Since 2001, Indian Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), have started to collect and publish information about overseas Indians on their official website. This data has been collected from the countries of destination and often suffers from the political interests of the Indian government and the host countries, in including or excluding some members of diaspora population, based on the current diplomatic relations.

The shortcomings of the data collected by the Indian government force us to look for a supra-state data register, which is not affected by the data-politics of the Indian

government, and quantifies the flow and stock of Indian immigrants settled around the world. The United Nations Global Migration Database (UNGMD) collects and harmonises migration flow and stock data from all countries, owing to its global coverage, it can be used to measure the size and demarcate the geographical boundaries of the Indian diaspora. The information collected is limited to the number of people who were born in India and are living abroad. It doesn't provide any information about the socio-demographic characteristics of the diaspora population. To know about these characteristics, we need another data sources that can capture this information. Recently, the irruption of Big Data and especially, social media site Facebook has allowed us to explore the internal dynamics and diversity of the Indian diaspora population. As the Facebook collects data about the active users, it provides us with the most up-to-date information of the Indian diaspora.

Owing to the unavailability of relevant data sources, quantifying the Indian diaspora population has remained a very difficult task for the diaspora researchers. In this paper, we want to fill this gap in current academic research by applying different data sources that captures diaspora population through different ways. Our starting point is that there is no single register available that can capture the exact size, internal diversity and geopolitical dimensions of the Indian diaspora at any point in time. Hence, to study the expansion and internal diversity of the diaspora population, we have to depend on different data sources, including national registers, supra-state registers, and Big Data. In this study, our main objectives are: first, to analyse and contrast different data sources which can be used to measure the size of the Indian diaspora population and demarcate its geopolitical boundaries; secondly, to analyse the advantages and shortcomings of these data sources in highlighting the dynamics and internal diversity of the Indian diaspora.

The paper is structured as follows: section 2, presents the theoretical aspects regarding the diaspora population. Section 3, shows different images and the diversity of the Indian diaspora captured through different sources. Section 4, compares the advantages and shortcomings of each data source. And finally, section 5, presents some conclusions.

2.- Diaspora: concept and theory

Etymologically the term 'Diaspora' derived from the Greek term diaspeirein, in which dia- means 'across' and -speirein, means 'to sow or scatter seeds'. It was first used to describe

the conditions of dispersed Jewish communities (Safran 1991). In its initial definition diasporas are collectives of individuals who identify themselves, and are identified by others as part of an imagined community that has been dispersed (either forced or voluntary) from its original homeland to two or more host-countries and that is committed to the maintenance or restoration of this homeland (Durham Peters 1999: 23; Demmers 2007: 9). Safran argues that the term diaspora has been used to define displaced people who feel, maintain, invent or revive a connection with a prior home and 'regard their ancestral homeland as their true, ideal home and as the place to which they or their descendants would (or should) eventually return (1991: 83). Diaspora is also defined by the "role played by collective memory, which transmits both the historical facts that precipitated the dispersion and a cultural heritage" (Chaliand and Rageau 1995: 15). Sheffer defines modern diasporas as 'ethnic minority groups of migrant origins residing and acting in host countries but maintaining strong sentimental and material links with their countries of origin - their homelands' (1986: 3).

In their 'Atlas des Diasporas' Chaliand and Rageau utilise four criteria for defining a diaspora: forced dispersion, retention of a collective historical and cultural memory of the dispersion, the will to transmit a heritage, and the ability of the group to survive over time (1991: 14). Based on a variety of social and political contexts, Robin Cohen (1997) proposed a typology of diasporas i.e. victim diasporas, labour and imperial diasporas, trade diasporas, cultural diasporas, global de-territorialised diasporas. Some scholars argue that diaspora enters into a semantic field with other terms and terrains, such as those of exile, migrant, immigrant, and globalisation, and transforms into "the exemplary community of the transnational moment" (Tölölyan 1991). At present in its wider definition diaspora signifies the lives of 'any group living in displacement' (Clifford 1994: 310). In his editorial preface to the first issue of *Diaspora Journal*, Tölölyan writes, "the term that once described Jewish, Greek, and Armenian dispersion now shares meanings with a larger semantic domain that includes words like immigrant, expatriate, refugee, guest-worker, exile-community, overseas community, ethnic community" (1991: 3). Vertovec (1997) claims that in recent writings diaspora conveys at least three discernible meanings which are: 'diaspora' as social form, 'diaspora' as type of consciousness, and 'diaspora' as mode of cultural production. It can be used to describe practically any population which is considered 'deterritorialised' or 'transnational' and whose social, economic and political networks cross the borders of nation-states or, indeed, span the globe. According to Mishra (1996, 422) diaspora is a

product of human imagination, “around which anti-miscegenation narratives of homeland are constructed”.

In the above discussion, we have witnessed the expansion of the term ‘diaspora’ with the inclusion of all displaced people in the diaspora population. In an increasingly transnational world of floating communities, the migration has not remained unidirectional, and people keep on changing their locations frequently, which makes it difficult, if not impossible, to measure the exact size of the diaspora population at certain places and at certain points in time. In the Indian context, the lack of a national registers for the emigrants makes it very difficult to quantify the emigration flows from the country. The data on diaspora populations is collected from destination countries that suffer from data politics (as defined by Sheffer, 2003). In this paper, we consider that diaspora population includes all individuals who live out of their country of birth and maintain links with their homeland and the diaspora territory is the land appropriated by the diaspora population.

3.- The evolution of the Indian Diaspora

The Indian diaspora is a result of a two centuries’-long history of emigration from India. This evolutionary history can be divided into four periods:

3.1.- Colonial Period (1833-1947)

After the abolishment of slavery by England in 1833, to fulfil the demand of workers at sugar plantations, millions of Indian workers were sent to several British, French, Dutch and Danish colonies to work as indentured labour (Lal 1996), which is often described as another form of slavery (Tinker 1993). Tinker (1993) provides three distinct patterns of the Indian emigration during the colonial era: 1) Indentured labour emigration mainly from north and central India, 2) Kangani or maistry labor migration mainly Tamil families from south India, and 3) passage or free emigration (as cited in Kumar 1999, 7). Along with labour emigration, following the routes established by the British officials, a large number of Indian professionals (civil servants, craftsmen, carpenters, ironsmiths and armed forces) and traders (like Sindhis and Punjabis) also migrated to South-East Asia, North-Eastern Africa, North America and Europe (Tinker 1990). During the colonial era, the India diaspora extended from Fiji in the East to the West Indian colonies in the West (Khadria 2001).

During this period, the Indian government –appointed of British officials- treated the diaspora as a reservoir of cheap, docile, and dependable labour, especially to work on plantations (Tinker 1993; Tharoor 2017). Hence, the first official records available about the evolution of the Indian Diaspora consists of the boarding registers of the Indentured labourers, who were transported from the Indian ports of Calcutta, Bombay and Madras to several British, French and Dutch colonies, during the period of 1834 to 1920. According to Lal (2006), more than 1.5 million Indians had been shipped to colonies in the Caribbean, Africa, Asia, and Oceania.

3.2.- Post Independence period (1947-1990)

After the independence and the partition of India in 1947, the UK emerged as the leading receptor of Indian immigrants directly from India and from the African colonies after the rise of nationalist movements in Uganda and Kenya (Tatla 2005). This immigration flourished till the implementation of ‘the 1968 Immigration law’ that prohibited the free entrance of commonwealth citizens to the UK (Hepple 1968). On the other side of the globe, in the 1970s, the USA and Canada opened immigration visas for highly-skilled immigrants from India. It attracted many well-educated Indians and the flow of high-skilled migration diverted towards the USA (Khadria et al. 1991). During the same time, with the oil-boom in the Middle East, the demand for the manual labour for mega construction projects increased sharply, many unskilled or semi-skilled Indians seized the opportunity and migrated to the Middle East countries to work on massive construction projects (Kapiszewski 2006). During this period, the first major problem regarding the diaspora population emerged when the constitution of India and the citizenship law came into force in 1951 and 1955, respectively. The newly formed Indian government pushed the diaspora away by using the state’s physical boundaries to define the nebulous limits of national identity (Argawala 2015). Only those residing within the country’s borders were deemed “Indian”. This message aimed to protect the hundreds of thousands of new migrants who had left present-day Pakistan to enter present-day India and were viewed with suspicion after the partition of independence (Ibíd). The constitution of India considered all those people ‘Overseas Indians’, who had not sought Indian citizenship under the Article 8 of the Constitution. The overseas Indians were divided into several categories - citizens of the country of their adoption; holders of a valid British passport, but without local citizenship (e.g. East African Asians); and the people of the stateless category (e.g. Indians Tamils of Sri Lanka and the Burmese Indians) (Motwani et al.1993). In the coming four decades (1950-

1990), the attitude of the Indian government over emigrants was 'Overseas Indians are traitors', who left their country for economic benefits. It leads to a very inactive policy for emigrants in this period (Khadria 2008).

3.3.- India's neoliberal shift

In the 1990s, economic neo-liberalization and globalization, fuelled the mass emigration of unskilled labour from India to all over the world. The unskilled labour migrated to the Gulf countries and Southern Europe, mainly Italy and Spain (Garha and Domingo 2017). While, the skilled labour and students start migrating to the USA, the UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand (Hawthorne 2014; Lu and Hou 2015). During this period, the economic and political situation of the Indian diaspora population improved greatly, and the government of India start treating the diaspora as 'global Indian family' (Vardarajan 2005, 19). The contribution of the diaspora community to Indian economic development led to a swift change in the Indian government's perception of its own migrants, applauding their achievements with great pride (Hercog and Siegel 2013). The traitors of past decades become the 'angels of development' (Khadria 2008), a significant "strategic resource" and a major tool of India's "soft power" (Kugiel and Pędziwiatr 2014). They are considered as natural goodwill ambassadors, bringing Indian culture, religions, values, cuisine and traditions to the farthest corners of the globe and suddenly the forgotten children of mother India became a source of pride for the country (Sinha-Kerkhoff and Bal 2003). In 1998, the government of India started issuing PIO Cards for the Indians settled in some specific countries, promising visa-free travel and privileges in matters of investment and education (Singh 2014: 247). In August 2000, the Ministry of External Affairs formed a High Level Committee (also known as Singhvi Committee), on the Indian Diaspora to undertake a comprehensive study of the characteristics, aspirations, attitudes, requirements, strengths and weaknesses of the Indian diaspora and their expectations from India. Following the recommendations of the Singhvi committee (2001), the government of India started to celebrate an annual convention of Overseas Indians-Pravasi Bharatiya Divas (PBD, Day of the Overseas Indian). This event has been organized since 2003, with the participation of the higher-level Indian officials (including presidents and prime ministers of India), and serves as a platform for discussing key issues concerning members of the global Indian diaspora and their links with India (Mani and Varadarajan 2005).

In May 2004, a special Ministry of Non-Resident Indians' Affairs was established to oversee all issues concerning relations with Indian nationals settled abroad. The Ministry was renamed as the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs (MOIA) in September 2004, with a mission to "connect the Indian Diaspora community with its motherland." Besides dealing with all matters relating to overseas Indians, the ministry was engaged in several initiatives with Overseas Indians for the promotion of trade and investment, emigration, education, culture, health and science and technology. Subsequently, in 2005, the Prime Minister Manmohan Singh announced that his government would extend dual citizenship to all overseas Indians who had migrated out of the country after 26 January 1950, and assured the continuance of economic reforms at a greater speed to unleash India's latent potential (Singh 2014). In 2006 the government introduced the "Overseas Citizenship of India (OCI)" scheme, which for the first time in Indian history allows a limited form of dual citizenship (without any political rights including right to vote), and gives extra privileges to some overseas Indians (mostly settled in the developed world).

3.4.- The period of nationalist revival (2014-present)

This period is very important for the Indian diaspora population; as the Indian government start fostering direct engagement with the diaspora community. Since the new Indian government, led by N. Modi, took power in May 2014, several structural reforms have been introduced to the existing diaspora engagement policy. Addressing the PBD in 2015, Modi's External Affairs Minister summed up the new diaspora policy in terms of 3 C's, as the new diaspora policy encourages the diaspora to 'connect' with India, 'celebrate' their cultural heritage and 'contribute' to the development of the homeland (as cited in Mohan and Rishika 2015, 2). Modi and his government wish to make India a vishwaguru and a 'leading power', but on the whole, as Hindu nationalists -opposed to Congress political ideas and policies nurtured by Nehru and Gandhi-, they seek an alternative agenda grounded in the Hindu nationalist tradition of thought (Hall, 2015). Some prominent authors like Appadurai (2017) claim that Modi 'advocates Hindutva (Hindu nationalism) as the governing ideology of India and... combines extreme cultural nationalism with markedly neoliberal policies and projects', which is at the heart of his diaspora engagement policies. The positive policy consequences of Modi's government are some relaxation in the visa norms for the overseas communities, improving physical connectivity and the ease of doing business in India (Mohan and Rishika 2015).

At present for the Indian government the value of diaspora lies in three fundamental aspects: economic, political and soft power. First, economically it is an important source of capital for India's development, in the form of both remittances and foreign direct investments (FDI). Secondly, overseas Indians play a crucial role in enhancing political ties with other countries, in both formal and informal ways. In non-political circles, in capacities as journalists, entrepreneurs, and academicians, they also exert influence on the policy of their receiving country regarding issues important for India. Thirdly, the Indian diaspora is also an important soft power tool, essential in spreading a positive image of India abroad (Kugiel 2017, 120). It is important to note that, although the Indian diaspora is often considered as an asset for the country, it can also be a liability and a source of tensions in relations with other states e.g. The Indian Tamil minority in Sri Lanka and alleged discrimination against them has been a constant point of friction between India and Sri Lanka; safety and labour rights of Indian workers in the Gulf States have become a serious concern in Indian relations with the region (Kugiel and Pędziwiatr 2014), and most recently the Rohingya crisis in Myanmar is creating conflicts with neighbors in the region (Ghoshal 2017).

4.- Indian Diaspora through different Data Sources

As the diaspora population has become a very inclusive category that includes all individuals who are displaced from their homeland, to study the Indian diaspora population, we have used following data sources that capture and categorise it, based on their definition of an 'Indian immigrant' and 'persons of Indian origin'. It is worth mentioning that the position of the Indian diaspora in the hierarchy of the global diasporas, and the hierarchy of top destinations in the Indian diaspora changes with the change in the data source used.


4.1.- Indian government and diaspora

The government of India does not maintain any permanent register for the emigrant population. Hence, to quantify the size of diaspora population it collects the data from the host countries. In August 2000, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs formed a High Level Committee, on the Indian Diaspora to undertake a comprehensive study of the characteristics, aspirations, attitudes, requirements, strengths and weaknesses of the

Indian diaspora and their expectations from India. This was the first time, the Indian government formally tried to measure the size and demarcate the territorial dimensions of its diaspora. The committee collected information about the diaspora population from different countries of destination around the globe. In this data, the diaspora population was divided into two legal categories: Person of Indian Origin (PIO) and Non-Resident Indians (NRIs). The first category, PIO, are foreign citizens (except for citizens of Pakistan, Bangladesh and other countries specified by the Central Government at different time intervals), who at any time held an Indian Passport; or has either of his/her parents or grandparents or great grandparents (up to fourth generation) born in or permanently resident in India as defined in Government of India Act, 1935 and other territories that became part of India thereafter provided neither was at any time a citizen of Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, China, Nepal, Pakistan or Sri Lanka; or is a spouse of a citizen of India or a person of Indian origin as mentioned before (as cited in Verma 2013). NRI, on the other hand, are defined as Indian citizens who are usually residing outside India and hold Indian Passports. If PIO are sometimes called “old diaspora”, NRI are viewed as “new diaspora” (Gautam 2013). In addition, there are the not so numerous categories of Stateless Persons of Indian Origin, which includes people with no official documents to demonstrate their Indian origin, mostly based in South Asia, in countries such as Sri Lanka, Nepal and Myanmar (Thussu 2013: 76).

According to the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, in 2001, the size of the diaspora population was 16.7 million individuals, of whom the share of PIO and NRIs was 11.3 million and 4.9 million, respectively, and the remaining 0.45 million were stateless persons of Indian origin (the majority of whom live in Myanmar). The diaspora population was dispersed into 131 countries around the globe. Its biggest share was living in Asia (55.2%), followed by North America (15.1%) and Europe (10.6%). In 2017, with the regular emigration of skilled and unskilled labour and their family members from India, natural growth of the Indian diaspora population, and the statistical recognitions of Indians living in the neighbouring countries as PIO, the size of the diaspora population increased to 31.2 million people, of whom 17.9 million were PIO and 13.3 million were NRIs. They were settled in 208 countries around the globe. Similar to 2001, most of them were concentrated in Asia (58.7%) and North America (17.6%), which registered an increase of 3.2% and 2.5% in total diaspora population, respectively. On the contrary, Europe, Latin America and Africa lost their share by 1.2%, 2.1% and 2.4%, respectively (Fig. 1).

Figure 1.- The territorial distribution of overseas Indians in 2001 and 2017




Source: own elaboration with data from Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs, India, 2001 and 2017.

In the last two decades, along with population size, the hierarchy of the top destinations has also changed. In 2001, Myanmar (2.9 million), the USA (1.7 million) and Malaysia (1.6 million) were at the top three positions among the first fifteen destinations of the Indian diaspora. In 2017, the USA emerged as the leading destination, with more than 4.5 million overseas Indians, followed by Saudi Arabia (3.3 million) and Malaysia (3 million). Sri Lanka, Nepal and Qatar entered the list of top 15 destinations, while Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana and Fiji, which were the destinations of the old diaspora, have lost their places in the top fifteen destinations (Fig. 2). It shows the revival of the diaspora population, as the destinations of old diaspora are losing their importance and new destinations occupying their space in the hierarchy of top destinations.

While looking at both categories of the Indian diaspora population, we find that in 2001, most of the PIO were settled in Myanmar (2.5 million), Malaysia (1.7 million), the USA (1 million), South Africa (0.9 million) and Mauritius (0.7 million). Except the USA, where most of the PIO were naturalized citizens, all other countries have descendants of the immigrants who had emigrated (voluntarily or forcefully) from India during the colonial period. This situation changed in 2017, now a majority of the PIO were settled in the USA (3.2 million), Malaysia (2.8 million), Myanmar (2 million), Sri Lanka (1.6 million) and the UK (1.5 million).


As compared to their distribution pattern in 2001, their number multiplied 3 times in the USA and almost doubled in Malaysia and the UK, but declined in Myanmar (Fig. 3).

Figure 2.- Top 15 countries of destination in the Indian diaspora, 2001 and 2017



Source: own elaboration, with data from Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs (MOIA), India, 2001 and 2017.

Figure 3.- The territorial distribution of PIOs and NRIs, 2001 and 2017



Source: own elaboration with data from Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs, India, 2001 and 2017.

The rise in the number of PIO in the USA, the UK and Malaysia is directly related to the naturalization of Indian immigrants who emigrated from India long ago in search of work opportunities, while the fall in the number of PIO in Myanmar is caused by the remigration of the Indian origin population to other countries like Bangladesh, to escape from the discriminatory and hostile policies of the present Myanmar government (Ahsan-Ullah 2016). The recognition of Indian Tamils in Sri Lanka as PIO -who were not included in the 2001 PIO list owing to the fear of political conflict with the neighbouring country Sri Lanka- has increased the size of the diaspora population and added Sri Lanka to the list of major destinations. Countries like Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, which have a large number of Indian workers, have not even a single PIO. It was due to their citizenship laws that prevent the immigrants and their children from becoming naturalized citizens of their resident country (De Bel-Air, 2014).

In 2001, NRIs were mainly settled in Saudi Arabia (1.5 million), the UAE (0.9 million), the USA (0.7 million), the UK (0.5 million) and Oman (0.3 million). Of the total NRIs, 63.2% were living in the Gulf countries, where the share of PIO was only 0.4%. As compared to 2001, in 2017, the number of NRIs in Saudi Arabia (3.3 million) and the USA (1.3 million) doubled, and in the UAE (2.8 million), Kuwait (0.9 million), Oman (0.8 million) and Qatar (0.7) tripled. Except the USA, all other countries are in the Gulf region, where the share of NRIs increased to 65.9%, while the share of PIOs reduced to 0.06% (Figure 3). It was mainly due to the large-scale immigration of unskilled or semi-skilled labour to the Gulf countries.

4.2.- United Nations Global Migration Database and Indian Diaspora

In the last three decades (1990- present) under globalization, the size, diversity, distance, and intensity of international migration, has multiplied several times (Czaika and de Haas 2014). The need to study the characteristics of the immigrant population flows and their effect on the sending and host countries have created a demand for accurate, up-to-date and policy relevant migration data collected by some supra-state agency. In response, the United Nations Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) has developed the United Nations Global Migration Database (UNGMD) in 2006. It is a comprehensive collection of empirical data on the number (stock) of international migrants by country of birth or citizenship, sex and age as enumerated by population censuses, population registers, nationally representative surveys and other official statistical sources from more than 200 countries and territories around the world.

In estimating the international migrant stock, international migrants have been equated with the foreign-born population whenever this information is available, which is the case in most countries or areas. In the countries lacking data on place of birth, information on the country of citizenship was used as the basis for the identification of international migrants, thus effectively equating, in these cases, international migrants with foreign citizens. Equating international migrants with foreign citizens when estimating the migrant stock has an important shortcoming. In countries where citizenship is conferred on the basis of *jus sanguinis*, people who were born in the country of residence may be included in the number of international migrants even though they may have never lived abroad. Conversely, persons who were born abroad and who naturalized in their country of residence are excluded from the stock of international migrants when using citizenship as the criterion to define international migrants. Using country of citizenship as the basis for the identification of international migrants also has an impact on the age distribution of international migrants. In countries where citizenship is conferred mainly on the basis of *jus sanguinis*, children born to international migrants tend to be considered foreign citizens and are thus included in the count of international migrants. Conversely, in countries where citizenship is conferred mainly on the basis of *jus soli*, children born to international migrants are granted citizenship upon birth and are thus excluded from the migrant stock.


In relation to the Indian diaspora, owing to its global nature, the UNGMD collects information about all Indian nationals and refugees of Indian origin settled around the world. It provides information for the period of 1990 to 2017 that allows us to measure the evolution of the size of diaspora population and the territorial expansion of the Indian Diaspora during the last three decades. According to the UNGMD, in 2017, India has the largest diaspora in the world with 16.6 million individuals born in India and living abroad, followed by Mexico (13 million), Russian Federation (10.6 million) and China³ (10 million) (Fig. 4).

In 2017, the Indian diaspora was stretched to 130 countries around the globe, in which 70.9% were settled in Asia, 17.5% in North America and 7.9% in Europe. While, Latin America had the least share in the diaspora population i.e. 0.09%. In Asia, the UAE had the highest number of Indian immigrants (3.3 million) followed by Saudi Arabia (2.0 million), Pakistan (1.9 million), Oman (1.1 million) and Kuwait (1.1 million). In North America, 2.3

³ As the UNGMD only consider the people who were born in a country and living abroad permanently, it puts China at the fourth place, if we include all immigrants and their descendants, then China will be at the top in diaspora population with over 35 million people of Chinese origin living abroad.


million Indians were settled in the USA and 0.6 million in Canada. In Europe, the UK had the largest number of Indian immigrants, i.e. 0.8 million (Fig. 5).

Figure 4.- Top 15 Diasporas (in terms of population size in UNGMD) in the world, 2017



Source: own elaboration, with data from United Nations Global Migration Database, 2017.

Figure 5.- The territorial distribution and cartogram of the Indian diaspora in 2017




Source: own elaboration, with data from United Nations Global Migration Database, 2017.

If we see the evolution of the Indian diaspora, the last three decades have witnessed an enormous increase in the diaspora population. In the 1990s, with the Neo-liberal shift in Indian economic policy, the Indian economy was opened to the outer world. It facilitated the movement of skilled or unskilled labour to the Western and the Gulf countries. Initially,

the size of the diaspora population increased slowly from 6.7 million in 1990 to 7.9 million in 2000. But, in the next decades, it grew at a very high rate (7% per annum during 2005-2010) and reached 16.6 million in 2017. From 1990 to 2017, the share of North America and Oceania in the total diaspora population increased by 8% and 1.7%, respectively, that of Europe remained constant, and declined in Asia by 10% (Fig. 6a).

Figure 6.- The evolution of the size, growth rate and sex-ratio of Indian diaspora population at continent level,1990-2017




Source: own elaboration, with data from United Nations Global Migration Database, 1990-2017.

This period also witnessed the masculinization of the Indian diaspora population. In 1990, the sex ratio was 1.4 males per female and it remained more or less consistent till 2000. But in the following decade, due to the increased immigration of male unskilled or semiskilled workers to the Gulf countries, the sex ratio increased in the favour of males. In 2017, especially in the Gulf countries, like Oman (7.23 male per female), Qatar (6.24), the UAE (3.5), Bahrain (3.1), Kuwait (2.6), and Saudi Arabia (2.3), the sex-ratio was considerably higher as compared to the developed countries, e.g. the USA (1.1), the UK (1), and Canada (1). Nepal (0.4) was the only country in the top 15 destinations, where the sex-ratio was in favour of females (Fig. 6b).

In the year 1990, the top two destinations in the Indian diaspora were Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. The Indian immigrants in Pakistan were the people who moved to Pakistan after the partition of India. The Indian government doesn't consider them Indians anymore, but the Pakistani government and the United Nations commission for refugees still consider them refugees from India. Conversely, most of the immigrants to Saudi Arabia were economic

migrants who migrated to work on mega construction projects or in the service sector (Fig. 7a). In 2017, the situation changed and the UAE and the USA occupied the first two places shifting Saudi Arabia and Pakistan to third and fourth position. Meanwhile, Kuwait and Oman emerged as major destinations for the Indian immigrants. In the developed world Canada, Australia and Italy have also shown a considerable increase in diaspora population during the last three decades (Fig. 7b).

Figure 7.- Top 15 destination of Indian diaspora based on the United Nations Global Migration Database, 1990 and 2017



Source: own elaboration, with data from United Nations Global Migration Database, 1990-2017.

4.3.- Emergence of Big data and Indian Diaspora

At the beginning of the 21st century, the emergence of social media, cloud computing, and processing power through multi-core processors and GPUs, has contributed to the emergence of 'Big Data' (Manovich 2011; Agneeswaran 2012). Big Data has been seen as a source that can capture accelerated demographic phenomena, such as migration, almost in real time, leaving population registers and census-like operations outdated (Mayer-Schonberg and Cukier 2013). At the same time, it changes our perception of population and with it the discipline of demography, from the implicit categorization that it realizes, which according to some authors, like Han (2017), corresponds to the rupture that neoliberalism has imposed in the disciplinary regime of bio-politics, understood as a form of population governance (Foucault 1979). The diaspora population has captured the great advantages of online spaces and has extensively depended on the internet as a "central means of communication" (Kissau & Hunger 2008, 245). Diasporas are collectives of individuals who


have been dispersed (either forced or voluntary) from their original homeland; social media sites like Facebook, help to reduce the communication gap between 'dispersed' community members within the diaspora. Social media provides space for sustaining relations and connections across distance and across diverse subgroups (Georgiou & Silverstone 2007, 17).

Since its creation in February 2004, Facebook with its wide sample range has become a powerful research tool for the social sciences in which millions of social interactions are played out every day. It has 2.01 billion monthly active users around the world as of June 30, 2017 and company estimates that it has an average of 1.32 billion daily active users (Facebook, 2018). It provides a large and diverse pool of participants, who can be selectively recruited for both online and offline studies (Kosinski et al. 2015). As one of the most attractive social network sites, Facebook possesses three basic features - profiles, friends list, and postings (Boyd 2008). Additionally, it facilitates data collection by storing detailed records of its users' demographic profiles, social interactions, and affiliations.

In relation to the Indian diaspora, apart from the size of diaspora population and the territory occupied by it, Facebook is the only data source that enables us to capture its internal diversity. In this study, Facebook's advertising platform (a freely accessible platform created for advertisement purposes) has been used to target the study population (in our case Indian diaspora population), with different socio-demographic characteristics including age, sex, location, language, ethnicity and citizenship. We have extracted data for individuals (13 to 65 + years old), who were born in India and are living in different countries of destination. According to the Facebook data, in 2017, the Indian diaspora consisted of 12.8 million individuals living in 150 countries around the globe. Their territorial distribution was skewed in favour of Asia. Of the total diaspora population 60.7% were living in Asia, 20.9% in North America, 10.5% in Europe, 2.5% in Africa, and 0.8% in Latin America (Fig. 8).


In the top 15 destinations, the UAE was on the top with 2.7 million Indians, followed by the USA (2.1 million) and Saudi Arabia (0.9 million). In Europe, the UK and Germany, and in Asia, neighbouring countries like Nepal, Bangladesh and Pakistan were included in the top 15 destinations. As per the sex composition of the diaspora population, the overall sex-ratio was 2.5 males per female, and the highest values were registered in Gulf countries like, Saudi Arabia (8.6), Qatar (7.8), Kuwait (7.4), Oman (5.9), and Bahrain (5.2). On the contrary, Philippines and Indonesia had the sex-ratio in favour of females i.e. 0.6 and 0.9 males per female, respectively (Fig. 9).

Figure 8.- The territorial distribution and cartogram of Indian Diaspora (13-65) through Facebook data, 2017



Source: own elaboration with Facebook data, August, 2017.

Figure 9.- Top 15 destination of Indian diaspora based on the Facebook data, 2017




Source: own elaboration, with Facebook data, August, 2017.

Facebook data also provide relevant information about the age structure of the Indian diaspora population. In 2017, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Indonesia had the highest share of young adults (13-24 years) of Indian origin population i.e. 59%, 54% and 45%, respectively. On the contrary, the USA, the UK and Canada had the highest share of elderly (50 and more), i.e. 17%, 16% and 14%, respectively. It might be due to the long history of

immigration to these countries and a better social security system that encourages the elderly population to stay in these countries. The highest share of working population (25 to 49 years) was living in Singapore (81%), Saudi Arabia (78%) and Kuwait (78%) (Fig. 10).

Figure 10.- The age structure of Indian immigrants in 20 top destinations of Indian diaspora through Facebook, 2017




Source: own elaboration with Facebook data, August, 2017.

The most important contribution of the Facebook data to the study is its potential to reveal the internal diversity of the Indian Diaspora population. The native Indian population is highly diverse in terms of ethnic origins, languages and religious affiliations (Priya 2016). This internal diversity has an enormous impact on the composition of the diaspora population. As different ethnic groups seek to maintain their identity and languages in the diaspora (Cohen 2004) and it affects their level of integration in the host society, it becomes imperative to study this internal diversity. The use of a particular language in a foreign context, on the one hand, works as a marker of ethnic identity that binds the community, and on the other hand, also shows the connections with the homeland and its memories, which are significant characteristics of a diaspora population. In the past, owing to the lack of data sources on ethnicity, it was very difficult to explore the internal diversity of a diaspora population. Now with the Facebook data on the language used by the users as their mother tongue, one can find their ethnic origins in India. In this paper, with the help of this data, we have explored the ethno-linguistic diversity of the Indian diaspora.

According to the Facebook data, in 2017, the different ethnolinguistic groups were not equally represented in the diaspora population as per their share in the total Indian population⁴. Almost half of the Indian population (49.3%) was made up of the Hindi speakers, but they were underrepresented in the diaspora population (47.2%). Malayalis, Tamils and Punjabis were overrepresented in the diaspora, as their share in the total population was 3.8%, 7.1%, and 3.4% and in the diaspora population was 19.6%, 12.3% and 9.7%, respectively. On the contrary, Bengalis (3.1%), Telugus (5.6%), Gujaratis (2.3%), and Kannadas (1.9%) were underrepresented in the diaspora, as they had high share in the total Indian population i.e. 9.7%, 8.7%, 5.4% and 4.3%, respectively (Fig. 11).

Figure 11.- The share of different ethno-linguistic groups in the Indian diaspora through Facebook, 2017, and in India, 2011



Source: own elaboration, the data from Facebook, August 2017 and census of India, 2011.

Among all major ethnolinguistic groups, the Hindis, with 3.8 million individuals, was the biggest in India and in the Diaspora. In India, they were mainly concentrated in ten states of central and north India i.e. Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Bihar, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Uttarakhand, Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh and Delhi. In the diaspora, they were settled in more than 100 countries, but their territorial distribution was skewed in favour of the Gulf countries, where the UAE (25.6%), Saudi Arabia (12.2%) and Kuwait (7.1%) were their major destinations. The remaining 20% were settled in the North America, where the USA (13.5%) was their major destination followed by Canada (5.8%).


⁴ 2011 census of population in India is the most recent source of data on languages, which we used as a marker of ethnic origin. In India all major ethnic groups have their own language.

The Malayalis was the second largest ethno-linguistic group with 1.7 million individuals settled in 44 countries around the globe. They originated from the south Indian state of Kerala. 85% of them were settled in Gulf countries, where the UAE (43.7%), Saudi Arabia (15.7%), Qatar (9.9%), Oman (8.2%) and Kuwait (7.6%) were their major destinations. A small share of Malayalis were also settled in the USA (2.9%). The Tamils was the third largest group in the diaspora with 1.1 million people living in 48 countries. They emigrated from Tamil Nadu, a southern state of India. They were settled in the UAE (29.8%), Singapore (15.4%), Saudi Arabia (10.2%) and the USA (9.3%). The fourth largest group was Punjabis, with 0.85 million individuals originated from the northern states of Punjab and Haryana, and settled across the world in more than 100 countries. Almost half of their population was concentrated in three countries i.e. Canada (18.8%), the UAE (17.6%), and the USA (12.9%). The UK, which was their major destination in Europe for several decades, had 6.81% share in the total Punjabi diaspora. In Oceania, Australia (9.3%) and New Zealand (4%) were emerging as major destinations for Punjabi students and high-skilled workers.


The Telugu group was in fifth place, with 0.5 million people settled in 36 countries around the world. They originated from Andhra Pradesh, a southern state of India. Their major destinations were the USA (28.4%), the UAE (22.3%) and Kuwait (14.6%). The Telugu group was divided into two subgroups, the highly-skilled part consists of software engineers emigrated from Bangalore to Silicon Valley in the USA and the low-skilled workers immigrated to the Gulf countries. The Bengalis was the sixth largest group with 0.3 million people, living in 54 countries. They emigrated from West Bengal, an eastern state of India. The UAE (21.7%), the USA (16.6%) and Saudi Arabia (12.9%) were their major destinations. The Gujaratis was the seventh largest group consisted of 0.2 million individuals living in 64 countries. They originated from the trading communities of Gujarat, a western state of India. More than half of them were settled in North America, where the USA (39.9%) was their top destination, followed by Canada (10.3%). The UK (9.8%), the UAE (9.3%) and Australia (6.9%) were their main destinations in Europe, Asia, and Oceania, respectively. The Marathis was the eighth largest group consisted of 0.2 million people settled in 36 countries. They emigrated from Maharashtra, a western state of India and most of them settled in the USA (28.9%) and the UAE (20.3%). The Kannada was the smallest among the selected groups with 0.15 million people settled in 32 countries around the globe. They originated from Karnataka state of south India, and mainly settled in the UAE (27.6%), the USA (17.4%) and Saudi Arabia (12.2%) (Fig. 12).

Figure 12.- Internal diversity (ethnic and linguistic groups) of Indian diaspora through Facebook data and top destination countries, 2017


HINDI DIASPORA




MALAYALI DIASPORA




TAMIL DIASPORA





PUNJABI DIASPORA




TELGU DIASPORA





BENGALI DIASPORA





GUJARATI DIASPORA



MARATHI DIASPORA



KANNADA DIASPORA



Source: own elaboration, the data from Facebook, August, 2017.

As per the sex-ratio of different ethnolinguistic groups, all groups had a high share of males in their total population. The Tamils had the highest numbers of males per female (7.8) in the diaspora population, followed by Malayalis (5.4) and Telugu (5.2). On the contrary, Gujaratis and Marathis have the lowest recorded sex-ratio. But here we should take into account that the use of Facebook is sensitive to gender bias. Especially, in the low skilled

population the use of Facebook is very limited among females. This may be a cause of the high male-female sex ratio registered for all groups.

5.- Comparison of different Data Sources

All above mentioned data sources present different size and geopolitical dimension of the Indian diaspora. These differences have mainly emerged from the way these data sources define 'Indian immigrant' and the data politics of collecting agencies. Firstly, the government of India categorises the whole diaspora population into two legal categories i.e. PIO and NRIs. In which PIO, includes the individuals who are the descendants of Indian immigrants (up to fourth generation) or the individuals who migrated long ago and now are naturalized citizens of other countries. The initial purpose behind the formulation of this category was to give recognition to the persons of Indian origin living in countries like Australia, the United Kingdom, the USA, Canada, New Zealand and Singapore, to facilitate the free movement of capital and skills to the country. Some authors criticise the double standard adopted by the Indian government while giving recognition to the PIO in different countries, as it left a huge number of PIO living in neighbouring countries uncounted (Lal 2006). Later on, on the demand of the population of Indian origin in other countries, this category was expanded to include the descendants of the Indian immigrants living in several other countries like Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Nepal. As per the diaspora population, the PIO data captures a large part of it, but the inclusion of all PIO in the diaspora population is a matter of debate, as most of them are fully integrated in the host societies, and have no contact with or intention to return to their ancestral homeland, which are necessary features of the diaspora population.

The second category 'NRIs' is commonly accepted as the diaspora population, as they were displaced from their homeland during the last few decades with Indian passport and maintain strong contact with their homeland. The only problem related with NRIs is regarding the inclusion or exclusion of their children in the diaspora population, who are born at their new destinations. These descendants of Indian immigrants have not emigrated from India, so their inclusion in the diaspora population is not fully justified. In favour of inclusion, we can argue that on the one hand as most of the host countries don't give citizenship (by birth) to the descendants of immigrants, most of them receive Indian citizenship and they have the right to be recognized as NRIs. On the other hand, in the

countries which grant the right to citizenship to all newborns, children born to the Indian immigrants have the right to be recognised as PIO, as one or both of their parents are from India.


The implicit desire of the Indian government behind the creation of these categories was to claim right on the whole population of Indian origin living in different parts of world, as its diaspora population. The strategy of the Indian government is to present the bigger size of the Indian diaspora, to reap the economic benefits from the diaspora population in the form of FDIs and use it as a tool of soft power in global politics. Another more explicit goal is to promote Indian culture around the world and present it as a vishwaguru, as now the Indian diaspora has become a place where the 'sun never sets' (Jain 2012). Hence, for them in 2017, the size of the diaspora population was 31.2 million people, who were scattered around the globe in 208 countries.

The main purpose of the UNGMD is to quantify the immigrant flow and stock in all countries and regions around the globe. As per the Indian diaspora population, it counts all individuals who are born in India and living in different countries with a valid Indian passport or registered as refugees. Hence, in the countries where the data on immigrants is registered on the basis of the 'place of birth', this data does not include 'the descendent of the immigrants who born at their new country of residence' as immigrants; while in the countries where the immigration data is collected on the basis of citizenship, all the immigrants who have accepted the host citizenship remained uncounted, as they are not the citizens of India anymore. As the dispersion of population is the basic prerequisite for the diaspora population, and during the initial phase of immigration, immigrants maintain strong ties with their homeland, the UNGMD, presents a very accurate size and geopolitical dimensions of the new Indian diaspora for the last three decades. As they collect data about the recent immigration flow and the immigrant population living in different countries, according to them, in 2017 the size of the Indian diaspora population was 16.6 million individuals, who were settled in 130 countries.

Finally, Facebook collects information from its active users to use it for commercial purposes. In their advertisement platform they provide information about the individuals who may be potential customers for different businesses. To target the Indians, Facebook uses the category of 'Indian expats', which includes all individuals who originated from India and living outside the borders of India, irrespective of their political and legal status in the host countries. The Facebook data is constantly changing with its active users and not affected by the data politics of the nations involved. Hence, it presents up-to-date accurate

size and spatial distribution of the diaspora population. According to Facebook data, in August 2017, the size of the Indian diaspora population was 12.9 million individuals living in 150 countries around the world. This low count on Facebook as compared to other sources, is mainly due to the absence of children below 13 years of age, as they are not permitted to have a Facebook account (Fig. 13).

Figure 13.- A comparison of the size and continental distribution of the Indian diaspora population through different data sources in 2017



Source: own elaboration with data from MIOA, India, Facebook and UNGMD, 2017.

All the above mentioned data sources have some benefits and limitations (Table 1). The data provided by the MOIA is reliable, as it is collected and published by Indian government agencies. It is the only official source, which is annually updated, and provides a long series of data from 2001 to 2017. It allows exploring the evolution of the Indian diaspora population in the last 17 years and makes a temporal comparison possible. The major shortcomings of this data source are: the lack of information about the demographic profile and socioeconomic status of the diaspora population; and limited information is available about the PIO or NRIs living in neighbouring countries. Secondly, the UNGMD is also a widely accepted good quality data source on global migration stock and flow, prepared by the UN agencies. Apart from the size and geographical distribution of the immigrant population, it also provides information about their sex composition and age structure. It is annually updated and temporal comparison is possible. The data is available from 1990 to 2017. But it has some shortcomings also, firstly, the data on the flow is not available for all countries, secondly, no information is available regarding the age structure of immigrants from the countries of origin. Thirdly, with reference to the Indian diaspora, it does not collect information about the PIO, who makes up a majority in the diaspora population.

Finally, the Facebook data includes self-reported information about the nationality and place of residence and ethnolinguistic affiliations, which helps in studying the internal diversity of the diaspora communities. Secondly, the data is of active users and constantly updated by the Facebook, so it provides up-to-date information about the diaspora community around the globe. However, a major challenge in studying observational data is to draw conclusions that are acceptably free from influences by overt biases. Secondly, the quality of Facebook profile data may be affected by user-induced biases typical for self-reports, such as social desirability and intentional misrepresentation. And lastly, the lack of information about children below 13 years of age left a big portion of the diaspora population unregistered.

Table 1.- The advantages and shortcomings of different data sources used to quantify the size and demarcate the geopolitical boundaries of the Indian diaspora

| Characteristics | Indian Government's Record | UN Global Migration Database | Facebook Data |
|---------------------|---|---|---|
| Variables collected | Stock data of Overseas Indians: • Non resident Indians (NRIs) • Persons of Indian Origin (PIOs) • Stateless Indian Territorial distribution (Country level) | Migrant Stock and Flow data: • Indian citizens living abroad • Immigrants living in India Age structure Sex composition Territorial distribution (Country, region and continent level) | Active Users: • Indian Expats (13 to 65+ age) Age structure Sex composition Internal diversity (Ethno-linguistic) Territorial distribution (from city to continents) |
| Periodicity | Annually updated | Annually updated | Instant update |
| Validity | Official records by the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs, India. | Globally accepted United Nations official record. | Social Media data collected for advertisement purposes |
| Data Availability | Available from 2001 to 2017 | Available from 1990 to 2017 | Only the present moment |
| Comparability | Temporal comparison | Temporal comparison Harmonized data to compare different countries | Not Possible |
| Shortcomings | No information about age structure, sex composition and socio-economic profile of Overseas Indians. | No information of age structure for origin countries. | No information about the children below 13 Continuously changing data Less precise data The user based bias Self reported information |

Source: own elaboration.

6.- Conclusion

In this paper we have used three sources to quantify the diaspora population and demarcate the geopolitical boundaries of the Indian Diaspora, which are under a constant restructuring with new migratory flows and changing categories of the immigrants involved. These sources inform us about the mixture of migratory movements that contributed to the formation of the diaspora, classified firstly, on the basis of typology, like

forced migration, economic migration, family regrouping and student migration; secondly, on the basis of immigration causes, like with the push factors of expulsion and the pull factors of corresponding attractions; and finally, with respect to the resulting populations, which include the social and demographic reproduction of heterogeneous groups of individuals, grouped under different ethnic and social categories.

The categorization and statistical registration of the diaspora population are two different operations, which are related to the bio-political will of the data collecting agencies (Indian government, United Nations or Facebook) to give visibility to some populations that, otherwise, only depend on self-recognition. In the first case, the Indian Government at the turn of new millennium started to collect data about the diaspora population. This statistical operation is presented as a measure of a pre-existing reality - the Indian diaspora - in a measurable form with an empirical approach. However, it conceals the creative aspect of the categorization of the diaspora population into PIO or NRIs, and their quantification according to this categorization (the people who are included or excluded in one of the categories), and its effect on the resulting cartography of the Indian diaspora. In reality, the revival of the Indian government's interest in the diaspora is mainly fuelled by their economic motives, especially, money received in the form of remittances and foreign direct investment from the diaspora population. It was at the base of the boom of Indian nationalism driven by neoliberal neo-conservatism in India (as stated by Modi and Taylor 2017).

Since 2000, the successive Indian government has maintained double standard for its diaspora. On the one hand with a nationalist agenda of creating a normative image of India as 'vishwaguru' and a 'leading power', they have glorified the achievements of the diaspora population in the western world, as good quality scientists, politicians and artists, to elevate their own position in the world. While, on the other hand their attitude regarding the PIO in neighbouring countries like Pakistan, Myanmar or Sri Lanka has always been of neglect and distrust. In their nationalist agenda these people don't represent India. Some authors criticize that the policies of the Indian government to engage overseas Indians targeted primarily the privileged professional-class diaspora working in high-tech jobs in the US and Western Europe, and the recent laws regarding PIO specifically excluded citizens of neighbouring countries, reflecting fears of inflaming regional tensions (Lall 2003: 122).

The recent efforts made by the Indian government to visualize the Indian diaspora can be linked to the tendency towards 'extra-territorialisation' of the powers of state (Collyer 2013), which means integrating emigrants or their descendants into the ideology of the

nation that is taking place in many diasporas with the process of globalization (Dumbrava, 2014). But at the same time it increases tension when ethnic minorities living under foreign jurisdiction, subjected to repression (manifested or imagined) due to their ethnic differences, start claiming rights on their original homeland (Joppke 2005). It applies to the population of Indian-origin in neighbouring countries who are now in a stateless condition, deprived of the citizenship rights in India or their host countries. In sum, the register maintained by the Indian government is a tool to satisfy its political interests and a result of their choice to present the image of India to the outer world. Additionally, it conceals the internal diversity of the Indian diaspora population, which was expelled from their homeland by different economic and political factors.

In the second case, the UNGMD, whose main objective is to capture international migratory movements effectively accounts for the flow and stock of the Indian immigrants in different countries around the globe. It is far from the classical definition of diaspora, but most reliable in terms of the migratory contribution to the diaspora, and allows us to measure the change in the diaspora population due to recent flows. The flow data about the Indian emigrants is sparsely available as the Indian government doesn't collect data about the emigrants, and due to the irregular nature of immigration most of the receiving countries also lack this information. Hence, owing to the lack of the flow data, changes in the stock of immigrants have been used to quantify the size of diaspora population and the changes in its geopolitical boundaries. The UNGMD collects data about the stock of immigrants from all countries on the basis of the place of birth, which is the case in the majority of countries or with citizenship in some countries where the information about the birth place is not available, hence in most of the countries they don't collect data about the descendants of the Indian immigrants who were born in the new country of residency. It is justifiable from their point of view that the children who were born in the diaspora do not have any migratory experience. In the second case, where citizenship is used as the criteria to categorise the population, all Indians who have accepted the citizenship of host countries are excluded from the data. In both situations a large chunk of the Indian population remained uncounted, which reduces the Indian diaspora to the stock formed by the recent migration from India. The ultimate goal of the UNGMD to create a complete picture of global migration flows and immigrants around the world is to large extent foiled by the national statistical sources. Firstly, due to the different definitions of immigrant population in all countries (like, foreign born or foreign national) and secondly, regarding the diaspora

studies it provides no information about the sense of belonging, which is a key argument behind the concept of 'diaspora'.

Finally, Facebook as a data source is unique in terms of the information it provides about the Indian diaspora (their ethnic origins, languages, socio-demographic profile, networks and preferences). This information is hard to get from any other source. Despite several shortcomings caused by age restrictions, users' social class and self-reporting bias, it provides possibility to explore the ethnolinguistic diversity and socio-demographic profile of the Indian diaspora population. The virtual image of the diaspora created by the Facebook data is closest to the reality of the diaspora population, as it corresponds to the individual users and not a state or supra-state institution that collects it. But from the point of view that permits the measurement of migration and transnational movements, it also appears as a fundamental part of bio-politics -although here neither descendants nor ancestral reference populations are counted as happened with the Indian government's registers- creating populations through the circulation of bio-power and the production of socio-spatial relationships (Bailey, 2013). In other words, the reproduction of spatial relationships is built up through transnational bio-politics. If the measure of the diaspora, especially that coming from the official sources of the Indian state, account for the extra-territorialisation of the state, those of Facebook remind us of the 'digital re-location' (as explained by Han 2016) of the population. This relocation beyond the national territories where they reside acts as a counterweight to extra territorialisation. Along with the web of expatriates, the use of the mother tongue in the diaspora by the Facebook users (both immigrants and their descendants) contributes to the creation of a virtual community, which is trying to retain the memories of their homeland culture and traditions.

As the world is changing rapidly and the digital revolution is entering all fields of research, in the near future we will witness a dramatic change in diaspora studies also. The spread of transport and communication technologies has intensified and accelerated the flow of information in the diaspora and connected the individuals who were dispersed in many countries for long time. It has energized the diaspora identities. The potential to count all movements around the world in a short time is making the geopolitical boundaries of diaspora communities more dynamic. It will reduce or, at least, complement the importance of population registers, which are often affected by the data politics of the collecting agencies.

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Diaspora Communities in the Globalised World

A comparative study of Mexican and Indian Diaspora¹

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Abstract

Since 1990s, under the effects of globalization the size and intensity of international migration flow have increased enormously. Owing to the increased flows, rapidly growing immigrant population, and their role in the global economy and politics, the concept of diaspora has revived its importance in international relations and academic research. This period also witnessed a shift in the attitude of sending countries, like Mexico and India, regarding emigrants, from their rejection as 'traitors' to the 'angels of development', who are contributing to the development of homeland and facilitating the extra-territorialisation of the powers of origin countries. At present diaspora has become a significant source of soft power and influence in the world systems. Hence, it has become imperative to study the evolution of different diasporas in the contemporary globalized world and the role played by them in the international politics and economy. By using secondary sources and the data from United Nations Global Migration Database (UNGMD), I am going to compare the evolutionary process, the policies and attitude towards diaspora population at origin countries, demographic profile and territorial dispersion of population in Indian and Mexican diasporas.

Keywords: Diaspora engagement, UNGM database, demography, territorial dimensions, India, Mexico.

Introduction: Diaspora communities in a globalised world

The process of globalization 'has been assuming different paradigms over time for centuries from silent trade and barter exchange, through international trade and multinational corporations, to a free flow of capital and culture beyond the boundaries of nation-states spanning the globe' (Bhat and Lakshmi Narayan, 2010: 13). During the last decades of the 20th century, the world entered in an era of accelerated globalisation fuelled by a neoliberal shift of governance in several countries around the globe. The enormous growth in the technologies of communication and transport has revolutionized the very thought of space and time and miniaturized the globe, by facilitating real time interactions among people poles apart and mobility at an incredible speed (Ibíd). It has increased the importance of diaspora as a productive and useful member, a bridge between nations, a potential mediator, a transmitter of values and a promoters of development for both sending and origin countries (Bloemraad, et al. 2008; Baubock, 2008; Mahroum, et al. 2006). The current definition of diaspora has widened from its historical annotation to explain the dispersion of Jews from

their homeland to an expression of 'identity in flux' (Safran, 1991; Cohen, 2008, Brubaker, 2005). While explaining the relation between globalization and diaspora, Safran (2004) states that the diasporas represent the leading edge of globalization because they are not merely minority communities of immigrants, but their members retain a memory, a cultural connection and a general orientation towards their homelands. They relate in some (symbolic or practical) way to their homeland; harbour doubts about their full acceptance by the host land; committed to their survival as a distinct community; and retain a myth of return (Safran, 1991, Cohen 1996).

Since 1990s, the governments of the countries of origin have started to design diaspora strategies, policies, schemes, and programs to capture, enhance and ramp up the possibilities of cooperation with diaspora population (Boyle & Kitchin, 2014). It resulted in some dramatic changes in official attitudes toward emigrants and their descendants, which were once neglected by their homeland governments as traitors are now honoured as 'angels of development' or 'national heroes' (Durand, 2004; Varadarajan, 2010). This increased diaspora engagement is driven in large part by three main sets of interests and 'resources' represented by diasporas, firstly, the extraction of material resources for economic gain, secondly, the creation or maintenance of domestic and international political legitimacy, and finally, the utilisation of those abroad as a cultural and linguistic resource to be used in defining the boundaries of national identity (Waterbury, 2010: 136). Additionally, by using new information and communications technologies to transmit expertise, the origin countries are also interested in recovering the costly skills lost with educated emigrants, by converting brain drain to brain circulation (Saxenian, 2005; Meyer, 2001). Now the major challenge for national and international governmental bodies is to create an environment with conditions that facilitate diaspora contributions (Brinkerhoff, 2012).

Recently, it has been pointed out how migrations, and therefore transnationalism, is a fundamental part of 'bio-politics' -a new form of governability that has as its object the modern concept of population (Foucault, 1979)- that creates populations through circulation of bio-power and the production of socio-spatial relationships (Bailey, 2013). This bio-politics applied to the diasporas implies, on the one hand the extra-territorialisation of the sovereign power of the State (Dumbrava, 2014), and on the other hand the redefinition of that sovereignty beyond state borders, also known as "Soft- power " (Nye, 2004). As a soft-power tool, diaspora is often used by the countries of origin to influence the decisions of the governments of the countries of destinations or the big multinational corporations to reap some political and economic gains, mostly through affluent members of their diaspora

community. Diaspora countries of origin also create new categories of external citizenship and opportunities for political participation to enhance engagement with diaspora population (Baubock, 2009; Collyer, 2013). The government officials in origin countries are increasingly re-claiming and re-defining ‘their’ diasporas, by fostering friendly cross-border networks and countering transnational communities of dissidents and detractors (Gamlen, 2014).

This new articulation of bio-politics, territory and population, which takes migratory movements as a driving force, is spreading in the third millennium hand in hand with globalization and the application of neoliberal policies at the origin countries of diasporas. Our main objective in this article is to study this process, with a comparison of the Mexican and Indian Diasporas, in three different areas: 1) their demographic profile and territory; 2) their evolutionary history and the changing relations between diaspora population and the origin countries; and 3) speculations on the changes might be caused by the demographic, economic and political conditions of both countries, on the future of their diasporas. The reasons behind the selection of India and Mexico are: firstly, both these countries occupy top two places in the hierarchy of world’s biggest diaspora communities, and are comparable in terms of the diaspora population size and have more than century long evolutionary histories. Secondly, both countries are making strategies to reap economic and political benefits from their emigrant population, and provide us an opportunity to analyse the diaspora engagement policies and their impact on diaspora and origin countries. And finally, the demographic evolution of both countries and its impact on diaspora population, provide us an opportunity to study how the demography of the origin countries affects the growth of diaspora communities.

2. Data Sources

The data for this study was taken from the United Nations Global Migration Database (UNGMD), which is a comprehensive collection of empirical data on the number (“stock”) of international migrants by country of birth and citizenship, sex and age as enumerated by population censuses, population registers, nationally representative surveys and other official statistical sources from more than 200 countries and territories in the world. The UNGMD was developed by the United Nations Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA). The data contained in this database were derived from numerous sources, including the Demographic Yearbook, produced by United Nations Statistics Division, tabulations collected by the Population Division as well as official

publications available from resource centres, libraries and the internet. It provides estimates for the years 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010, 2015 and 2017.

In relation to the Indian and Mexican diasporas, to estimate the number of total immigrants the UNGMD uses the codes 'B', which indicates that estimates were derived from data on the foreign-born population, and 'R', which indicates that the number of refugees or persons in refugee-like situations as reported by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) or, where appropriate, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) were added to the estimates. It provides this information for the period of 1990 to 2017, which allows temporal comparisons and to see the evolution of the size and territorial expansion of both diasporas.


3. Indian and Mexican Diaspora: Population and Space

3.1 Diaspora population: growth and stock

It is very difficult to define the term diaspora population. As who will be included in a diaspora population depends on the criteria used to describe an 'immigrant' and political interests of the nations involved. In the case of Mexican diaspora, it is very difficult to tell exact number of Mexicans living abroad. Only in the US, in the year 2016, estimated 36.3 million people of Mexican origin were registered in American Community Survey, in which almost 5.6 million were irregular and a great part of them are the children, who have one or both parents of Mexican origin. The Institute for Mexicans Abroad, which is a government entity for the emigrant's administration, reports that there are 11.9 million Mexicans living abroad, in which 97.8% are in the United States of America (IME, 2015). Similarly, in the case of Indian diaspora, according to the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs (MOIA), it is divided into two broad legal categories: 'Person of Indian Origin' (PIO) and 'Non-Resident Indians' (NRI). The PIO, consists of people who were (or whose ancestors were) born in India or nations with Indian ancestry, but who at present hold citizenship/nationality of another country. Some of them are also former citizens of India who had to renounce their Indian citizenship while going through the procedure of naturalization (in the case of countries that do not recognize multiply citizenships). The NRI, on the other hand, are defined as Indian citizens who are usually residing outside India and hold Indian Passports. In 2017, according to MOIA, the size of Indian diaspora was 31.2 million people, in whom 13.3 million were NRIs and 17.9 million were PIO.

As ‘diaspora’ relates to dispersion of people from their homeland to two or more destinations, the inclusion of children of immigrants into the diaspora population is a matter of debate. Hence, to avoid this confusion, following the classification of the UNGMD, in this paper the diaspora population is considered as the people migrated from their homeland to other countries or in other words, people who are not living in the same country where they were born. According to the UNGMD, in the year 2017 India has the biggest diaspora in the world with 16.6 million individuals born in India and living abroad, followed by Mexico (13 million), Russian Federation (10.6 million) and China (10 million). The size of Mexican diaspora population increased rapidly during the period of 1990 to 1995 from 4.4 million to 6.9 million individuals. In the coming decades, while the population size kept on increasing, but the growth rate declined sharply, ultimately reaching to 1% in 2015. Most of the Mexicans were settled in North America (98%). On the other side, the size of Indian diaspora increased slowly from 6.7 million in 1990 to 7.9 million in 2000, but during the first decade of the 21st century, the Indian diaspora started growing at a very high rate (38% during 2005-2010) and reached to 16.6 million in 2017. The number of Indians living abroad was highest in Asia (71%), especially in Gulf countries, followed by North America (17.5%) and Europe (7.9%). During the period between 1990 to 2017, the share of Indian immigrants increased in North America (by 8%) and Oceania (1.7%), remained constant in Europe and declined in Asia (10%). (Fig. 1). Despite the rapid increase and biggest size of Indian diaspora, the proportion of Indian diaspora population to its total population has never increased from 1.25%. On the other side, the Mexican diaspora population makes more than 10% share of its total population. Similarly, the proportion of diaspora population in Indian diaspora have increased very slowly from 0.8% in 1990 to 1.2% in 2017, while the proportion of Mexican diaspora population has been doubled from 5.2% in 1990 to 10% in 2017.

Figure 1: The evolution of stock and growth rate of Mexican and Indian Diasporas, 1990-2017.



Source: own elaboration, with data from United Nations Global Migration Database, UN, 1990-2017.

As per the sex composition of both diasporas, in the initial stages of evolution both diasporas were male dominated but at present the degree of masculinity is much higher in the Indian diaspora as compared to the Mexican diaspora, which is increasingly becoming more feminized with the large scale immigration of young females to North America and Europe. Owing to the strong patriarchal structure of the Indian society and the prevalence of male bread winner model, Indian diaspora always remained highly male dominated. At present, there is no continent around the globe with more female Indian population than males. In 1990, the sex ratio for the whole diaspora community was 1.4 males per female and it remained more or less consistent till the year 2000. But in the following decade, due to the increased immigration of male unskilled or semiskilled labour to the Gulf countries, the sex ratio increased in the favour of males. In 2017, especially in the Gulf countries, like Oman (7.23 men per woman), Qatar (6.24), the UAE (3.5), Bahrain (3.1), Kuwait (2.6), and Saudi Arabia (2.3), the sex-ratio was considerably higher as compared to the developed countries, e.g. the USA (1.1), the UK (1), and Canada (1). Nepal (0.4) was the only country in the top 15 destinations with sex-ratio in favour of females. On the other side, Mexican diaspora, shows a high degree of feminisation in all other continents, except North America, but as 98% of their population lives in North America, it can be concluded that they have sex ratio slightly in favour of males.

A major difference in both diasporas lies in the profile of the emigrant population originated from both countries. Shortly after the independence of India in 1947, the spread of technical and university education resulted in the creation of a class of highly educated and skilled workers. Owing to the lack of jobs in India, mass emigration of more educated professional class begins in the 1970s, which was termed as Brain Drain (Bhagwati 1976). The 'brain drain' explained as a quality exodus of India's cream of highly skilled professionals comprising doctors, engineers, scientists, teachers, architects, entrepreneurs, and more recently the IT workers, and nurses (Khadria 2008). India has experienced a loss of skilled professionals migrating abroad to the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. This immigration has converted the Indian diaspora, which was initially a diaspora of unskilled manual labour to the diaspora of mixed character, embracing low and highly skilled migrants. In 2017, where majority of Indian immigrants in gulf countries and southern Europe were engaged in low paid blue colour jobs, one third of the doctors in the National Health Service in England and 80% of the H1B visa holders, in the USA were from India (Garha et al. 2016; Esmail 2007; USCIS 2017). On the contrary, the emigration from

Mexico mostly consisted of the low skilled peasants and manual labours who fled from the country to work in the agricultural fields and factories across their northern border (Durand, 2016). In the USA, Mexican immigrants tend to have much lower educational attainment in comparison to the overall foreigners and native-born populations. In 2014, 6 percent of Mexican immigrants (ages 25 and over) had a bachelor's degree or higher, compared to 29 percent of the total foreign-born population and 30 percent of the U.S.-born population (Zong and Batalova 2016). While, 70% Indians in the USA complete their Graduation or Master degrees, before immigration.

3.2 Diaspora Space

Diaspora, as in its definition means dispersion of population from one country or region to two or more countries, is strictly related to space. Hence, while studying different diasporas, it is essential to measure the degree of dispersion of diaspora population. The diaspora space consists of the area occupied by the diaspora population and its recognition by the home state. In the initial evolutionary stages, the expansion of diaspora space is directly related to the addition of countries in the diaspora through emigration flows to new destinations. But in the later stages, with the shift of the political consideration of people living out of the national borders, the diaspora space converts into a territory with political interest for both sending and receiving countries, who try to expand or contract it by using different definitions for immigrants or by modifying laws regarding their legal status.

During the last two centuries, the core of Mexican diaspora remained fixed in the USA. The US-Mexico immigration corridor has become the world's busiest immigrant corridor. In the new millennium, the Mexican people also start emigrating to other destinations, like Canada in North America, and Spain, Germany and France in Europe, and Guatemala in Central America. In 2017, the Mexican diaspora was stretched to 68 countries. The presence of Mexicans in Asia, Africa and Oceania is almost inexistent. It reduces the Mexican diaspora to North Western countries along with the coasts of Atlantic. Unlikely to the Mexican diaspora, Indian diaspora expanded enormously, initially, owing to the migration of indentured labour to the British and French colonies, and later on with the emigration of traders, unskilled and skilled workers, and students to several destinations around the globe (Khadria, 2008). In the Indian history of migration several countries or regions have emerged as the core of diaspora and other disappeared from its map, like during the indentured period Caribbean Islands were the major destinations for Indian labour, after the independence the UK emerged as the leading receptor of Indian immigrants, during the Oil Boom of 1970s the gulf region becomes the major destination for the unskilled labour from India, and in the

coming decades the USA emerged as the leading receptor of skilled labour from India. According to UNGMD, in 2017, Indian diaspora was stretched to 130 countries around the globe. In Asia, the UAE had the highest number of Indian immigrants (3.3 million) followed by Saudi Arabia (2.0 million), Pakistan (1.9 million), Oman (1.1 million) and Kuwait (1.1 million). More than half of the total Indian diaspora population at present live in the Gulf Countries. In North America, 2.3 million Indians were settled in the USA and 0.6 million in Canada, while in Europe, the United Kingdom had the largest number of Indian immigrants, i.e. 0.8 million. After the UK, southern European countries like Italy, Spain and Portugal are emerging as preferred destinations for low skilled Indian immigrants. On the eastern side, apart from Singapore (0.15 million) and Malaysia (0.14 million), who have historical immigration ties with India, Australia (0.4 million) and New Zealand (71.6 thousand) are emerging as leading destinations for Indian students and skilled immigrants (Table 1).

Table 1. The size and proportion of Indian and Mexican diaspora population in 15 major destination countries in 2017.


| Country of Destination | Indian Immigrant | Proportion to Total (%) | Country of Destination | Mexican Immigrant | Proportion to Total (%) |
|------------------------|------------------|-------------------------|------------------------|-------------------|-------------------------|
| UAE | 3310419 | 19.96 | USA | 12683066 | 97.83 |
| USA | 2307909 | 13.91 | Canada | 81033 | 0.63 |
| Saudi Arabia | 2266216 | 13.66 | Spain | 49074 | 0.38 |
| Pakistan | 1873650 | 11.30 | Germany | 18329 | 0.14 |
| Oman | 1201995 | 7.25 | Guatemala | 18250 | 0.14 |
| Kuwait | 1157072 | 6.98 | France | 12770 | 0.10 |
| UK | 836524 | 5.04 | Bolivia | 9911 | 0.08 |
| Qatar | 658488 | 3.97 | Italy | 8982 | 0.07 |
| Canada | 602146 | 3.63 | UK | 8610 | 0.07 |
| Nepal | 440198 | 2.65 | Switzerland | 6851 | 0.05 |
| Australia | 408880 | 2.46 | Australia | 5176 | 0.04 |
| Bahrain | 310591 | 1.87 | Panama | 4989 | 0.04 |
| Singapore | 154788 | 0.93 | Netherland | 4577 | 0.04 |
| Italy | 138802 | 0.84 | Venezuela | 3890 | 0.03 |
| Malaysia | 135352 | 0.82 | Belize | 3810 | 0.03 |
| Others | 784690 | 4.73 | Others | 45564 | 0.35 |
| Total | 16587720 | 100 | Total | 12964882 | 100 |

Source: own elaboration, with data from United Nations Global Migration Database, UN, 2017.

While comparing the space occupied by both diasporas, Indian diaspora is much more dispersed than Mexican diaspora. The global dimension of Indian diaspora makes it world's most disperse diaspora, where now 'sun never sets' (Jain 2012). It has four major

clusters i.e. Gulf cluster 53.9%, North American cluster 17.5%, European cluster 7.9%, and Oceanian cluster 2.9%. The North American cluster is growing faster with the regular inflow of skilled or unskilled workers, students and family members of immigrants, followed by the Oceanian cluster, which have succeeded to attract a large number of students and high skilled workers from India. The European cluster is more or less stagnant or growing at a very slow pace, while the Asian cluster is relatively shrinking. On the other side, Mexican diaspora has very limited territorial dispersion, which is limited to the northern coasts of Atlantic. It has two major cluster, the North American cluster is the biggest one with 98% of the total diaspora population and European cluster is the smaller one with only 2%, scattered in Germany, Spain, France and the UK (Map 1).

Map 1. Major clusters of population in Mexican and Indian diasporas, 2017.



Source: own elaboration, with data from United Nations Global Migration Database, 2017.

4. From Space to Territory: convergent stories of Mexican and Indian diaspora

The attitude of people and successive governments of India and Mexico about their emigrants has remained changing with economic and political situation of both countries. Based on the attitudes towards emigrant population, the whole evolutionary history of both diasporas can be divided into three periods i.e. 'Genesis Phase', 'Emigrants as Traitors', and 'Emigrants as Angels of development or Heroes'.

4.1 The Genesis phase

In the case of Mexican Diaspora, Indigenous Mexicans were first invaded by the Spanish, then the French, and later the United States. The U.S. invasion resulted, among other things, in Mexico losing one half of its national territory and 100,000 of its population to the United States through the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848 (Rinderle, 2005; Gonzáles, 1999). Opposite to Indian, Mexican diaspora has a large part of its own territory which was occupied by the USA. Hence, a significant part of the Mexican diaspora population never migrated from their homeland (Durand, 2016). Initially, the attitude of Mexican government and local people regarding the diaspora was of sympathy towards emigrants who were badly treated by the US population and deprived of political and economic rights (Gutiérrez, 1995). To help the Mexicans left across the border, Mexican government established a repatriation program to encourage and assist Mexican nationals to return to their country (Zorilla 1965). During the Post-Revolutionary Period (1917–1932) period, the Mexican state engaged in various activities, including deploying Mexican consulates in the United States, aiding repatriation of Mexicans, and initiating public campaigns to dissuade Mexicans from emigrating, to protect the rights of Mexican immigrant in the United States (Cardoso 1980).

In the evolutionary history of Indian diasporas, we find a critical role played by the colonial rulers in dispersing the population to different destinations, some of which even today forms a part of its diaspora population and space. India remained a colony of British empire for almost two centuries (1757-1947). The first major emigration flow from India was started after the abolishment of slavery by England in 1833, under the indentured labour system (Kondapi, 1975). In the indentured labour migration system, one and a half million Indian workers were sent to several British, French, Dutch and Dane colonies, mainly to work on sugar plantations (Lal 1996). This emigration of labour in vast numbers extended the Indian diaspora from Fiji in the East to the Caribbean Islands in the West (Khadria 2001). The major push factor behind this immigration was the colonial loot of Indian economy and

the destruction of local businesses by the colonial rulers to safeguard the interests of industrialists in the United Kingdom (Tharoor 2017). Owing to the lack of employment opportunities in India and to save their life from starvation caused by the exploitative policies of colonial rulers, thousands of people emigrated from India by signing indentured labour contracts, which later termed as another form of slavery (Tinker 1993). In this phase, the attitude of the origin population towards the emigrants was of sympathy, because the emigrants were mainly depicted as manual labour exploited at the destination countries by the industrialists or planters to maximize their profits. In India, initially the colonial government used the diaspora as a reservoir of labour to work on their plantations. Their only interest in the diaspora was to extract maximum profit from the labour sent to their colonies under the indentured labour system. The local population of India was aware about the plights of indentured labours and with the birth of Indian National Congress (INC, 1st national political party of Indian origin) in 1885, the voice is raised to secure the rights of overseas Indians. In 1908, the INC fervently prayed the Imperial government to adopt a tough attitude towards those self-governing colonies which ruthlessly dealt with the Indian workers by denying them their just rights as citizens of the Empire (Sharma 1989).

4.4 Emigrants as traitors

In Mexico, the second period begins after the revolution of Mexico in 1920s. With the success of revolution under the Partido Nacional Revolucionario, state sovereignty emerged as a crucial concept and the idea that a strong and united nation would protect the sovereign social rights of Mexican nationals emerged in Mexican politics (Needler, 1995). For the emerging Mexican national consciousness, migrants were presented as messy symbols that came to represent a threat to the purity of the nation. For many Mexicans, crossing the border become analogous to an act of treason or disloyalty, and the Mexicanness of those who crossed become highly suspect. Those who emigrated were termed as “pocho”, which literally means “too ripe, rotten, or spoiled” (Cardoso, 1979). By the 1930s, this epithet was attached to Mexicans in the United States who were perceived to be imitating American culture. The label implied that these migrants were ashamed of their culture and their roots, and that they adopted an attitude of superiority toward Mexico in trying to assimilate to U.S. cultural norms (González Gutiérrez, 1999). For the elites in Mexico, emigrants were embarrassing peasants with low levels of culture and education and a source of national shame (Ibid). The Mexican state’s approach towards emigrants during this period can be labelled as the “policy of no policy,” and its response to the problems of migration have been described as reactive, defensive, ad hoc, and limited (García y Griego and Campos 1988).

In the Indian diaspora, the second period begins after independence of India in 1947. During this period, emigrants were treated as traitors, who had deserted their homeland for their selfish motives. The rise of nationalism in both countries (after the revolution in Mexico and Independence in India) and the new definition of citizenship and sovereignty of state in both countries resulted in the exclusion of emigrants from the imaginary of nation state. The first major problem regarding the overseas Indians emerged, when the constitution of India and the citizenship law came into force in 1951 and 1955, respectively. The newly formed Indian government pushed the diaspora away by using the state's physical boundaries to define the nebulous limits of national identity (Argawala 2015). Only those residing within the country's borders were deemed "Indian". In the coming four decades (1950-1990), the attitude of the Indian government over emigrants was 'Overseas Indians are traitors', who left their country for economic benefits. It leads to a very inactive policy for emigrants in this period (Khadria 2008).

This imaginary of emigrant as traitors or deserters of their homeland was implanted in the psyche of the native population of both countries, with several form of art, music and media. During this period several movies with titles such as "The Man without a Homeland" (El hombre sin patria, 1922), "Disobedient Son" (El hijo desobediente, 1945), "I Am Mexican First" (Primero soy mexicano, 1950), and simply "El pocho" (1969) were produced to stop people for emigrating. Similarly, in India many movies, like "East and West" (Purab Aur Paschim, 1970) and "Homeland and Foreign" (Des Pardes, 1978) were produced to depict the vices of western culture and the ill treatment received by the immigrants to stop people migrating from their country. The main idea behind these movies was to convey a message to the population as who cross the border suffer a certain loss of identity, and the only cure for those who have fallen victim of westernization is to return to the protective embrace of the motherland.

4.3 Emigrants as 'heroes' or 'angels of development'

In the third period, following the neoliberal turn in 1980s in Mexico and in 1990s in India the attitude of homeland governments regarding the diaspora changed from 'traitors' to 'Angels of development' or 'National Heroes'. In Mexico, by the late 1980s, the Mexican government aimed to reincorporate migrants to the main stream society by de-territorializing conceptions of the nation. In Mexico this period ushered in rapid political-economic changes associated with the spread of neoliberal governing logics and the rise of global economic integration (Durand, 2016). The Mexican government under President Salinas officially inaugurated its program of outreach to migrant communities with the foundation of El

Programa para las Comunidades Mexicanas en el Exterior (PCME) in 1990. After elected as President Vicente Fox repeatedly referred to Mexican migrants as “national heroes,” and recognize their courageous struggles and their enduring contributions to the homeland. The program PCME was reorganized and expanded during the administration of Vicente Fox, and it gained its current designation as the *Instituto de Mexicanos en el Exterior* (IME).

The Mexican policy about its diaspora has three main dimensions: economic programs that aim to advance the flow of migrant investments into Mexico; political programs that aim to enfranchise Mexican migrants and encourage their political participation on both sides of the border; and cultural and educational programs that aim to instil in migrants a sense of pride in Mexican national identity. In the economic program the most important initiative for migrants in the United States is the introduction of the *matrícula consular de alta seguridad*. Several other programs like *Invierte en México* (Invest in Mexico) and *Mi casa en México* (My home in Mexico), started to encourage migrants to allocate their monies toward particular types of investment. Among the most consequential of political reforms for Mexican migrants, in 1996 the Mexican government amended the national constitution to grant dual nationality to Mexican immigrants. The 1996 electoral reform allowed migrants to vote, but only if they travelled to polling stations established on Mexican soil near border crossings. The 2005 reform allowed Mexican citizens to vote by mail from abroad, but only if they were registered in their hometown municipalities, necessitating for most trips to Mexico to acquire voting credentials. In 2002, the Fox administration established an advisory board, the *Consejo Consultivo del Instituto de los Mexicanos en el Exterior* (CCIME), which currently comprises 101 elected delegates that represent Mexican communities from all geographic regions of the United States, twenty delegates selected for their work on behalf of Mexican communities in the United States, and seven representatives from the largest Latino organizations in the United States.

In the socio-cultural program, at the core of the Mexican government’s program to organize migrants in the United States are hometown associations or HTAs. Such organizations fuse social, political, and economic elements, and as such, highlight the limitations of organizing the state’s programs by these three distinct categories. Mexican government has organized several programs including health programs i.e. ‘*Semana Trinacional de Salud*’ (Tri-national Week of Health) and ‘*Ventanillas de Salud*’ (Health Stations), educational programs i.e. ‘*plazas comunitarias*’ (Bilingual classes in collaboration with US schools by sending teachers and adult education), programs that aim to cultivate enduring ties to the Mexican homeland amongst migrants and their children ‘*Éste es mi México*’ (This is My

Mexico), and informational outreach strategies that aim to inform Mexicans abroad about all of these programs. The IME also confers a number of awards like Order of the Aztec Eagle, Bilingual Teacher of the Year, and the most prestigious *Obtli* award to Mexicans in the United States that recognize their contributions to strengthening their communities.

On the other side, in 1990s the economic and political situation of the Indian diaspora improved greatly with the economic liberalization and globalization, and the government of India start treating the diaspora as ‘global Indian family’ (Vardarajan 2005, 19). The traitors of past decades become the ‘angels of development’ (Khadria 2008), a significant ‘strategic resource’ and a major tool of India’s “soft power” (Kugiel and Pędziwiatr 2014). They are considered as natural goodwill ambassadors, bringing Indian culture, religions, values, cuisine and traditions to the farthest corners of the globe and suddenly the forgotten children of mother India become a matter of pride for the country (Sinha-Kerkhoff and Bal 2003). In 1998, the government of India started issuing PIO Cards for Indian settled in some specific countries, promising a visa-free travel and some privileges in matters of investment and education (Singh 2014: 247). In August 2000, the Ministry of External Affairs formed a High Level Committee (also known as Singhvi Committee, 2001), on the Indian Diaspora to undertake a comprehensive study of characteristics, aspirations, attitudes, requirements, strengths and weaknesses of the Indian diaspora and their expectations from India. Following the recommendations of the committee, the government of India started to celebrate an annual convention of Overseas Indians—Pravasi Bharatiya Divas (PBD, Day of the Overseas Indian) (Bhat and Laxmi Narayan, 2010). This event has been organized since 2003, with the participation of the highest level Indian officials (including presidents and prime ministers of India), and serves as a platform for discussing key issues concerning members of the global Indian diaspora and their links with India (Mani and Varadarajan 2005). Several new programs like ‘Know India Program’, ‘scholarships for diaspora students’, and ‘Find your roots’ were started to promote diaspora engagement. The government of India also confers an award Pravasi Bhartiya Samman to honour the distinguish personalities of diaspora. In May 2004, a special Ministry of Non-Resident Indians’ Affairs was established to oversee all issues concerning relations with Indian Nationals settled abroad. The Ministry was renamed as the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs (MOIA) in September 2004, with a mission to “connect the Indian Diaspora community with its motherland.” Besides dealing with all matters relating to overseas Indians, the ministry was engaged in several initiatives with Overseas Indians for the promotion of trade and investment, emigration, education, culture, health and science and

technology. Subsequently, in 2005, the Prime Minister Manmohan Singh announced that his government would extend dual citizenship to all overseas Indians who had migrated out of the country after 26 January 1950, and assured of the continuance of economic reforms at a greater speed to unleash India's latent potential (Singh 2014). In 2006 the government introduced the “Overseas Citizenship of India (OCI)” scheme, which, for the first time in Indian history allows a limited form of dual citizenship (without any political rights including right to vote), and give extra privileges to some overseas Indians (mostly settled in the developed world).


5. Future perspectives: Demographic, Economic and Political concerns

The future of Indian and Mexican diaspora engagement largely depends on the demographic, political and socioeconomic conditions of the origin countries. All these factors are discussed below:

5.1 The changing Demography and Diaspora


The first important concern is the changing demography of both countries. Apart from the colonial destruction, the unbalanced demographic and economic growth of India and Mexico played an important role in the expansion of diaspora and it is expected to play a decisive part in shaping the size and space of diaspora in the coming decades. Late and slow first demographic transition (in the second half of the 20th century) in both countries, as compared to the European countries, resulted in the fast natural growth of population. In both countries, the death rate began to fall after 1920, but the birth rate remained high up to 1960. After 1960s, the birth rate also began to fall, but the fast decline of death rate, resulted in continuous population growth. The gap between birth and death rate narrowed in the last decade with a small decline in the population growth rate, which shows that both countries are moving from the middle transitional stage to the late transitional stage of the first demographic transition (Fig. 2). The demographic dividend or the surplus of population due to natural increase put enormous pressure on the local labour markets -which were mainly agriculture based economies and recovering from the wounds of colonial loot and civil wars- to produce employment opportunities for all. The failure to fulfil the employment aspirations of native population leads to the economic expulsion of masses from the rural parts of India and Mexico to developed countries. It increased the size of diaspora community and expanded the diaspora space by including several new destinations to it. Similarly, from Mexico low skilled workers mostly ended up in the USA, which has remained the prime destination for Mexican low skilled workers.

Figure 2. The first demographic transitions and natural growth of Mexican and Indian Population, 1900-2050.



Source: Kulkarni (2014), Office of the Registrar General, India and Partida-Busb, V. (2004), National Council on Population (2002), Mexico.

Figure 3. Total registered (1950-2015) and projected (2015-2100) population of India and Mexico.



Source: UN population projection, World Population Prospect, 2017

The present trends of population change show that the continues decline in total fertility in both countries will reduce the number of potential emigrants in the coming decades. It will also affect the growth of diaspora which is a demographic reproduction system based on emigration. In both countries the total population is still increasing, but the growth rate of population is continuously decreasing. According to medium variant UN population projections, the growth rate will become negative in 2060 and afterwards the total population will start decreasing. As most of the people emigrate in the age group of 15-49 years, the fast decline in the size of this age group will also affect the growth of both diasporas. The size of population in this age group is projected to start declining from 2040 (Fig. 3). On the other side, the Indian and Mexican economies are growing rapidly, and the demand of labour for the home industry and services is increasing exponentially. In future, both countries can become able to absorb all manpower they produce. This change in demographics and the growth of local economies will affect the growth of diaspora. Mexico have already started to observe these changes (Giorguli-Saucedo, et al. 2016), but in India, where the demographic momentum is still very strong to maintain the positive net population growth, these changes are expected to start appearing in 2030s.

The future of diaspora population also depends on the return migration of emigrants who left their country for work and finally return after spending some time in one or several destinations in the diaspora, and on the policies of origin governments to include or exclude them as member of their diaspora population. While comparing the return migration, the number of Mexicans who returned from diaspora is much higher as compared to India. In the case of Mexico, the forced and voluntary deportation system expel a large number of Mexicans who were living irregularly in the USA. This forced return of Mexican nationals and their children born in the USA creates a huge problem for the Mexican administration for their rehabilitation in the country. The Mexican government has launched many programs to rehabilitate the return migrants and their children. In India, the return migration from the western developed countries is very low and mostly people return after retirement or through involuntary deportation, but the rate of return from the neighbouring countries (which were part of India before independence), is extremely high, which creates problem for the local administrations in the border states. The government of India have no policy for the people who return from the diaspora, on the contrary, it encourages the people to settle in their new destination countries. Even at the time of crisis, where the life and property of the Indian emigrants are at stake, the government of India have double standards regarding their diaspora population. They have launched missions for the evacuation of

Indian immigrants trapped in Kuwait during Gulf War and Yemen in the recent civil war, but they have not shown any sympathy towards Indians in Myanmar also known as Rohingya Muslims.

5.2 Economic contribution of diaspora to homeland development

The second important factor is economic contribution of diaspora to homeland development. Financial remittances are a highly recognized contribution from diasporas to homelands (Brinkerhoff, 2012). Remittances, as the portion of international migrant workers' earnings sent back from the country of employment to the country of origin, have come to play a central role in the economies of labour-sending countries (Stanton-Russell, 1986; Boyle & Kitchin 2014). Both India and Mexico are considered as labour sending countries and receives a large amount of foreign currency in the form of remittances from their diaspora. In the year 2017, Indian was the leading nation with \$68.9 Billion received in the form of remittances, which makes 11.2% of the world's total remittances. While Mexico, has received \$30.6 Billion in the form of remittances, which makes 4.9% of the total global remittances. In 1990s, the amount of remittances received in Mexico was higher than in India, but in the coming years owing to the rapid growth of Indian emigration and remittances, Mexico lagged behind in this race. After 2006, the inflow of remittances to Mexico declined, but to India remained increasing with some small ups and downs in the last three years (2014-2017).

While comparing the per capita remittances to both countries, Mexicans are receiving higher amount than India. According to World Bank estimates, in 2017 the per capita remittance to India was 51.5\$ as compared to 236.9\$ in Mexico. The money received as remittances plays a very crucial role in elevating the socioeconomic status of the emigrant's families and contributes to the development of several projects in the origin countries. Apart from the remittances, the programs like 2X1 and 3X1 in Mexico are the clear symbols that represents the importance of financial contribution of diaspora in the local projects. In India also the government is giving rebates to attract foreign direct investment. NRIs are encouraged to have their bank accounts in India and to deposit their savings in these accounts. It shows the potential of diaspora as a major source of foreign exchange for the local economy (Afram, 2012; García Zamora, 2005), which encourages the governments of both countries to build strong relations with their diaspora.

5.3 Diaspora political and cultural engagement: soft power or liability

As per the political engagement is concerned, Mexican diaspora is more politically engaged in the homeland and destination politics as compared to the Indian diaspora.

Mexican government has given the dual nationality (in 1996 constitutional reform) and right to vote (in 2005) in the local elections to all Mexican immigrants living abroad. It facilitates the direct participation of immigrants in homeland politics through general elections. Now the political parties in Mexico also organise campaigns to attract diaspora voters, hence making them capable of political change in Mexico. Mexican government have also reserved seats for the immigrants in their parliament, and an administrative body has been created to deal with the issues related to emigrants. On the contrary, Indian government still don't allow dual citizenship and voting rights to the Indians living abroad. Owing to the pressure from its Diaspora (mainly in North America), in December 2003, through an amendment of the Citizenship Act 1955, Indian government has evolved an 'Overseas Citizenship of India (OCI)' card, which is actually a follow up of the earlier grant of a 'Person of Indian Origin' or PIO Card. OCI cards deprived overseas Indians of political rights, while it conferred them some economic privileges. OCI card is not to be misconstrued as a 'dual citizenship', at best, it could be called 'dual economic citizenship' (Singh, 2012). Indian nationals living abroad still have no right to vote or participate in the local elections in India. Since the new Indian government, led by N. Modi, took power in May 2014, several structural reforms have been introduced to the existing diaspora engagement policy. Modi and his government wish to make India a *vishwaguru* and a 'leading power'. The main idea of the Indian government is to use the diaspora community members, who now occupies high political and professional posts in the diaspora countries and big multinational companies, as a soft power tool to influence the strategic decisions in favour of Indian businesses and its position in the world politics. It is important to note that, although the Indian diaspora is often considered as an asset for the country, but it can also be a liability and a source of tensions in relations with other states e.g. The Indian Tamil minority in Sri Lanka and alleged discrimination against them has been a constant point of frictions between India and Sri Lanka; safety and labour rights of Indian workers in the Gulf States have become a serious concern in Indian relations with the region (Kugiel and Pędziwiatr 2014), and most recently the Rohingya crisis in Myanmar is creating conflicts with neighbours in the region (Ghoshal 2017). On the contrary, owing to the lack of 'global dimension' and 'highly qualified human resources', Mexican government is still not in a position to use its diaspora as soft power tool. Their all efforts are limited to serve their population in the USA, where they explicitly claim that they have no intention to interfere in the local affairs of the US government or lobby groups. For them diaspora is a liability than a source of soft power.

On the cultural front also Mexican government has started several programs to promote Mexican culture and Spanish language in the diaspora. Through home town associations and by sending teachers to the US schools to teach Spanish to the descendants of the Mexican immigrants. The government is investing resources in the maintenance of Mexicanness in the diaspora. These efforts are facilitating the preservation of language and identity among new generations of Mexican immigrants born in Diaspora. On the contrary, Indian government have not contributed sufficiently to preserve the language and identity in the diaspora. Some efforts have been made to provide education to the children of manual labours in the Gulf Countries, but they are insufficient to support the large number of diaspora population in these countries. From 2010 some scholarships have been awarded for the diaspora students who want to study in Indian Universities.

6. Conclusions

As the bio politics at its birth was linked to 'liberalism' (Foucault, 1979) by putting 'market' as a model and limiting the regulatory functions of the State, and to fertility and the increase of life expectancy -as forms of creating life in the 21st century-, the management of the emigrated populations has become a new source of power based on the influence that it wants to operate on the emigrated individuals and the population as a form of governability. After releasing from the shackles of civil wars and colonialism, both Mexico and India have managed to create world's biggest diaspora communities, which are now contributing to their economic development and secure their position as key actors in the world politics. Since 1990s, under globalization and neoliberalism, the attitude and policies of origin governments towards emigrants have witnessed a remarkable change and the engagement with diaspora in economic, political and socio cultural spheres has increased significantly.

While comparing Indian and Mexican diaspora population and space, we can conclude that despite a small difference in the total size of diaspora population, Indian diaspora is growing much faster in terms of space occupied (by increased flow and by adding new destination countries) as compared to the Mexican diaspora. As per the dispersion and growth of the population is concerned, the Indian diaspora is polycentric and growing in the form of different nodes, like first around the USA, second around the UAE, third around the UK and most recently fourth emerging around Australia. These nodes are growing parallel by attracting new immigrants from India. On the contrary, the Mexican diaspora is monocentric, and revolves around the USA. In the last decade, with an increased emigration

to European countries like, France, Germany and Spain, a small cluster is emerging along with the eastern coasts of Atlantic.

The use of diaspora as a soft power tool has contributed to the increased diaspora engagement and extra-territorialisation of the powers of origin countries. The governments of the countries of origin have started to give more rights and recognitions to the affluent members of the diaspora community to use them as their ambassador in the countries of destination. Since 2006, Indian government have started OCI cards for the Indians living in some selected Western countries to enhance their participation in Indian business and trade. Where Indian government is mainly focusing on the economic benefits from the diaspora and tries to use it as a soft power tool, the Mexican government has engaged itself in promoting the political and cultural participation of their emigrants in homeland socio-cultural and political affairs. They have encouraged the direct participation of Mexicans living abroad by extending them dual citizenship and right to vote in general elections of their homeland. In sum, we can conclude that the Mexican diaspora population enjoys more political rights and recognition from their homeland, as compared to Indian diaspora.

The future of both diasporas depend on the demographic and socio economic conditions of the origin and host countries. The rapid demographic (decreasing fertility) and economic changes (high economic growth) in India and Mexico can negatively affect the growth of diaspora. With continuously decreasing total fertility, the supply of labour –which is the main element of growth for both diasporas- is expected to reduce in the coming decades and with the increased return of emigrants, especially in the case of Mexican diaspora, the size of diaspora population and space may reduce in the coming decades. At the same time, with the fast means of transport and communication, and the globalization of the production process, it is also possible that the national boundaries will lose their importance to control the movement of capital and humans, and leads to the emergence of floating transnational communities of diasporic character.

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Sikh diaspora and Spain: migration, hypermobility and space

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Sikh diaspora and Spain: migration, hypermobility and space

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ABSTRACT

The recent emigration from Indian Punjab has included Spain into the global Sikh diaspora. This group is selected to study the production of 'diaspora space' and the transformation of the territory included in it. To achieve this objective, we have focused on the historical migratory waves, the itineraries followed by immigrants and their internal mobility, which provides the essential mechanism for the expansion of diaspora space. Alongside this, an attempt has been made to delimit the extent of virtual space of diaspora through transnational communication links from Barcelona (the municipality with largest Sikh population in Spain) to rest of the world. The preliminary finding from the mixed methodology used in the research illustrated that the Sikh diaspora is a dynamic physical and virtual space, which is expanding firstly with intense immigrant flows from Punjab to new destinations, and secondly with the spread of advanced communication source like internet calling and other messaging services. Their appropriation of territory is visible in the form of Gurudwaras (Sikh temples) as a node of symbolic and communitarian network of the Sikh diaspora situated at different parts of Spain.

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1. Introduction: creation of diaspora space

Taking up the argument of Lefebvre (1984) on the 'production and reproduction of social space', while talking about globalization, Appadurai (2013) explained how history produces localities. From the impact of globalization on mobility and the establishment of transnational communities, this suggestive formula of 'space in motion' leads us to consider an additional qualitative dimension of the concept of 'diaspora' that emerges from both the quantitative increase in the size of diaspora communities and their increasing complexity. It raises two initial questions. Firstly, what is a diaspora space and how it is created? And secondly, how the territory transforms while coming in contact with a migration of diasporic character?

A fluid idea of space has influenced the way in which connections between and across diasporic and transnational communities have been conceptualized. In 1996, Avtar Brah advanced the notion of 'diaspora space' as a conceptual category which is 'inhabited' not only by those who have migrated and their descendants, but equally by those who are

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constructed and represented as indigenous (1996, 181). For Brah, it is the nexus constituted from the confluence of journeys and narratives re-produced through individual and collective re-memory, which are re-lived through multiple modalities of gender, race, class, language and generation, among different diasporic communities relationally positioned among multiple others (1996, 183–184).

The term diaspora was originally used to describe the conditions of dispersed Jewish communities (Safran 1991) and also to describe groups which had been displaced through various processes of migration, such as movement of labour and trade (Vertovec and Cohen 1999). With the expansion of transnational studies, it is also sometimes used to refer to the scattering of people over space, forming what has often been described as ‘exemplary communities of the transnational moment’ (Tölölyan 1991, 5). The generalization of the concept of diaspora to any migration of mass character has been echoed by Vertovec (1997). He explains that

diaspora is the term often used today to describe practically any population which is considered ‘deterritorialised’ or ‘transnational’. By this he means a population, which has originated in a land other than which it currently resides, and whose social, economic and political networks across the borders of nation-states or, indeed, span the globe (Vertovec 1997, 277).

This paper uses the term diaspora in its narrower definition, as claimed by Safran (1991), where the group members who are the real actors retain the myth or the collective memory of their homeland; they also consider their ancestral homeland as their true home, where eventually they will return and are committed to the restoration or maintenance of that homeland. Finally, they also relate ‘personally or indirectly’ with that territory to the point that it shapes their identity. It is not only a simple volume or the extent of transnational networks, but the special relationship with the place of origin which articulates and transforms the given space. In the case of Sikh community, the religion serves as an anchor of this privileged relationship that migrants keep with their origin, in the authentic diaspora communities.

Our starting point is the hypothesis that there is not only a single static space of the diaspora, but there are several dynamic spaces. Furthermore, these are mutable layers, depending both on the time and on the dimension under analysis. The existing diaspora studies only focus on the size of population, but this concept also involves the mobility (international and domestic) of the flows, or of transnational relations (especially in the case of Sikhs), which are responsible for carving a distinct image of each diaspora. In addition, each of these layers is mobile through its demographic changes with time, settlement period or antiquity, age structure, gender and generations that dominate it. Moreover, the territories where they settle are transformed by their inclusion in the diaspora, following the rhythm scheduled by globalization and the resulting circuits, scales and speeds involved.

Secondly, we emphasize the importance of transnational relations in the Sikh diaspora, which are, thanks to new technologies of transportation and communication, multiplied during the last few decades to contribute to the rapid and efficient movement of humans, capital and ideas around the globe (Zhou 2004). This mobility leads to the formation and expansion of a relatively stable and durable transnational space for the Sikh diaspora, by establishing a dense network of relationships that go beyond the borders of Spain. Adapting this to the definition of authors like Faist (2000a, 2000b, 2010), we

consider that transnational space is composed of a combination of links, positions within networks and organizations, and networks of organizations that cross the borders of at least two national states.

The few studies that have explored the Sikh population in Spain have focused more on the religious phenomenon itself (i.e. Sikhism), rather than their socio-demographic behaviour or relationship of Sikhs with space. The current literature consists of a study of Sikh religion and its expansion in the world through the diaspora (Paniker 2007), case studies describing the community's establishment in Spain (Estruch et al. 2007) and in the tradition of international studies, analysis of its internal contradictions exacerbated in the migration process, such as regarding the castes system (Lum 2010). There are, however, works that put some light on the pioneer Sikh immigration (Farjas 2006a, 2006b), or references to the community in broader sociological approaches on Indian immigration (López-Sala 2013). However, we found no research on the geographical distribution, and appropriation and transformation of the territory by the group; hence, we want to fill this gap.

The specific objectives of this paper are therefore: (1) to present the most recent picture of global Sikh diaspora; (2) to estimate the size of Sikh population residing in Spain, its spatial distribution and socio-demographic characteristics; (3) to analyse the dynamics (international and internal migration) that contributes to the creation of diaspora space; and (4) to delimit Sikh diaspora from their transnational communication links from Barcelona to the rest of the diaspora locations.

2. Methodology and data sources

In this paper, we have used a mixed methodology, a quantitative part that includes the demographic analysis relying on available statistical data, and a qualitative part based on the analysis of in-depth interviews of the members of the Sikh community in Spain. The main limitation in this study was the lack of relevant statistical data sources about Sikh community, because in many countries the data about ethnic backgrounds and religious affiliations are not collected (neither in censuses nor in different surveys of specific characteristics), to avoid its misuse for other political purposes. Therefore, to produce a recent picture of global Sikh diaspora, we have used secondary sources; most of them are estimates about Sikh population from various organizations and NGO's run by Sikhs around the globe.

In the case of Spain, as the National Statistics Institute (*Instituto Nacional de Estadística, INE*) collects information about the surnames of the whole population registered in municipal register of inhabitants, we have made an indirect estimate of Sikh population through their surnames. This was possible as in Sikh population all males share the same surname of 'Singh', while all females share the surname of 'Kaur'. We asked the INE to cross surnames with the information in the municipal register of inhabitants (*Padrón Continuo*) of 2015, firstly with the micro data records of the 2011 Census for the stock and socio-demographic characteristics of the population, and secondly with the Residential Variations Statistics to estimate their internal and external mobility during the period of 2000–2014. This has allowed us for the first time to have some estimate about the size of Sikh population, their province of residence, sex, age, education level and occupation in Spain. However, because of the statistical confidentiality and

the small number of Sikh residents in Spain, the detail and crossings provided by the INE was very limited. In this sense, for the sake of anonymity, other Sikh family-names like Sandhu, Sidhu, Gill or Johal could not be considered. Similarly, the population born in Spain is subject to follow the rules of the imposition of surnames in order of father and mother, so in some cases, it becomes difficult to find the sex of the individual, although we believe that this bias is minimal as most of the Sikh population in Spain belongs to first, or one and a half, generations. Therefore are identified by their Indian passports with only one surname 'Singh' for males and 'Kaur' for females.

Data from the statistics available in Spain were then compared and contrasted with the results of a qualitative study carried out during the period of November 2015 to June 2016 using semi-structured in-depth interviews conducted with representatives of 22 Sikh temples (Gurudwara committees) situated in different parts of Spain, and 56 interviews with other members of different profiles from the community, progressively chosen with the advances in research, following the Glaser and Strauss (1967) Grounded theory. Another important thing we have taken into consideration was the diversity of the socio-economic characteristics of the municipalities where they live (metropolitan areas, tourist areas, areas with high concentration of agriculture or the food industry), which can be observed in the municipal registers (Padrón Continuo) of 2015. A total of 26 municipalities were represented, seeking the greatest possible variation in basic socio-demographic characteristics (sex, age, occupation, education level, marital status or year of arrival in Spain).

3. The Sikh diaspora: genesis and extant

3.1. *Diaspora space through population distribution*

This Sikh diaspora is a product of continuous emigration from the Sikh homeland Punjab or their first migration destinations such as east African countries, such as Kenya and Uganda, and the British colonies in Southeast Asia (Figure 1). Historically, in Punjab migration there was a family strategy where the younger sons joined the army or went abroad to add to the family's fortunes (Barrier and Dusenbery 1989). The existing research distinguishes three waves of emigration from Punjab on the basis of the selection of destinations, the socio-demographic characteristics of migrants and the motives of emigration: (1) The colonial period from 1860 to 1947, in this period the Sikh diaspora space expanded from South East Asia to the African British colonies; (2) the period of economic migrants, which includes the flow of labour from independent India to oil rich gulf countries and other Western developed nations during 1947–1984; and (3) the refugees, who emigrated in the decades of the 1980s and 1990s, fleeing from the repression of the Indian state after the operation Blue Star¹ on the Golden Temple and the consequential socio-political unrest in the state (Tatla 1999). In addition to the above-mentioned phases, we can add a recent phase of emigration (2000–present), which is dominated by young educated Sikhs.

In the first phase of the creation of diaspora (1860–1947), the Sikh emigration followed the routes mapped by the British colonial rulers. The Sikh diaspora was then basically composed of officials, soldiers, policemen, labourers and servants scattered throughout the Empire (Dhillon 2007). During this period, they moved in masses to the British colonies as indentured workers hired under a regime of semi-slavery (Tinker 1974). During this phase, the Sikh diaspora space expanded from Southeast Asian colonies such as




Figure 1. The major emigration flows from Punjab and the genesis of Sikh diaspora. Source: Compiled from estimates of Sikh population in the book *The Sikh Diaspora: Search for statehood* (Tatla 1999) and recent estimates (see Appendix 1).

Fiji, Malaysia, Hong Kong and China to the shores of East Africa (Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania). This emigration was favoured by the British government to promote the mobility of labour in their colonies.

The second phase began with the independence of India in 1947, when the partition of Punjab and the formation of Pakistan triggered the internal and external migration on a large scale, causing an estimated 14.5 million people to migrate within four years (Bharadwaj, Khwaja, and Mian 2008). Since the mid-twentieth century, Britain has received a significant number of Sikh workers, including many retired army personals, from India and other diaspora locations to support the war-affected national industries (Tatla 1999). In the decade of 1960s, the direct flow from Punjab reached to its peak, but in the 1970s, it was replaced by the flows from former African colonies such as Kenya and Uganda (expelled by African nationalist governments) and East Asia (Bhachu 1985; Kaur 2007). In 1968, under the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), the U.K. stopped the free entry of commonwealth citizens into its territory; hence, a significant number of Sikhs migrated to the oil rich Gulf States, which were passing through the period of the oil boom in the 1970s and had a high demand of manual labour for massive construction projects (Singh and Tatla 2006). In the same decade, other Western countries, such as U.S.A. and Canada in North America, also opened the doors for Asian immigrants. In the U.S.A., the Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1965 (the Hart-Celler Act) abolished the system of national-origin quotas and similarly in the 1960s changes in the Canadian Immigration Policy facilitated the immigration of Sikh immigrants in large numbers.

In the third phase (after 1984), many Sikhs emigrated to escape from the political crisis of Punjab and the consequential persecution of Sikh youth by the Indian state. This flow helped in the expansion of the global diaspora by integrating new countries with it, most of them settling in the U.K., Canada, the U.S.A., Italy, Germany or the Scandinavian countries, under the status of political refugee or asylum seekers.

In the new millennium, under the impact of globalization, Sikh diaspora entered into a new phase of expansion, which can be considered as the fourth and last period. In general, the globalization has accelerated the outflow of labour (skilled and unskilled) from different Indian states, such as Punjab, Haryana, Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat and Kerala. In the South of India, this emigration was promoted by the demand of skilled workers such as Kerala nurses and IT professionals (Bhatnagar 2006; Kodoth and Jacob 2013), while, in the case of Punjab, it was related to the impoverished agriculture and unemployment caused by the introduction of neoliberal policies of privatization from the public sector firms after the 1990s (Mani and Varadarajan 2005). The recent emigration of educated young people from Punjab is fuelled by their search of better jobs and living conditions, many of them ending up in the European Union, Australia and New Zealand, which are the recent additions to the global Sikh diaspora.

In the case of the Sikh immigration to Spain, following the thesis of Sassen (2014), we can consider these movements, as an extreme case of 'expulsions', mainly caused by the unemployment and precarious working conditions in Punjab. In the pull factors, we can include the availability of job opportunities in the Spanish labour market during the first years of the twenty-first century (before the Economic recession of 2008). Taking into account the response of interviewees, in the pull factors, we can include the attraction of the Spanish immigrant regularization laws (both before the implementation of the regulation *Arraigo* in 2006 and later on), which helps new irregular immigrants to get legalized more easily than in other European countries.

All these emigrant waves have contributed to the formation of present Sikh diaspora, which is made of more than two million Sikhs living out of India in more than 50 countries; half of their population have settled in only three countries: Canada, the U.K. and the U.S.A. Canada, with more than 468,673 registered Sikh inhabitants (2011 Census), occupies the top position (with 23% of the total overseas Sikh population) in the global diaspora community (Figure 2). In Canada, they have mostly settled in the Western coastal cities, such as Vancouver, and Surrey in the province of British Columbia, and Toronto in the province of Ontario in the east. The expansion of Sikh diaspora space to Canada dates back to the first decade of the twentieth century, when pioneer Sikh immigrants reached the state of British Columbia (Johnston 2005). Now, Canada has become the hub of transnational relations and the centre of reference for the Sikh community worldwide. Britain, with 432,429 Sikhs registered in the Census of 2011,² occupies the second place in the population stock hierarchy of the diaspora. This is logical if we consider that Britain, due to colonial ties with India, was one of the first countries which entered into the Sikh diaspora space, with mass Sikh immigration directly from Punjab or from Kenya and other African colonies. In the U.K., two-third of Sikhs have settled




Figure 2. The global Sikh diaspora, 2015. Source: Own elaboration with data from various entities (see Appendix 1).

in the West Midland and London regions. The U.K. is still one of the most favoured destinations for Sikh immigrants; hence, the flow of new immigrants is also continuing from their homeland Punjab or from other diaspora locations, like the Middle East and south European countries, for example, Portugal, Italy and Spain. The U.S.A. occupies the third place. Due to the absence of information on religion and ethnicity in census, we have only some indirect estimations of the size of Sikh population. The World Religion Database at Boston University estimated that there are about 280,000 Sikhs in the U.S.A., based on the number of Punjabi immigrants from India and Pakistan and an assumption about the proportion of them who are Sikh. According to the latest estimates published by the Pew Forum in 2012 'Survey of Asian Americans: Religion and Life', more than 200,000 Sikhs live in different metropolitan cities stretching from California in the west to New York in the east.

After this, we can also find a significant number of Sikhs in South East Asian countries (around 130,000), including Malaysia, Thailand and Singapore and in Middle East (120,000) especially in Dubai, UAE. In the first decade of twenty-first century, Australia (72,000) and New Zealand (20,000) have emerged as the favourite destinations for the young Sikhs, who have migrated for higher studies or better work opportunities and eventually settled in these countries. Except for Britain, all other European countries remained in the periphery of Sikh diaspora. However, it is worth mentioning that Italy (70,000 Sikhs) has received a huge flow of Sikh immigrants in the last two decades, which place it well ahead of Germany (40,000) and Spain (19,774).

3.2. Sikhs in Spain

Due to their recent arrival (according to data from the Residence Variance Statistics (EVR) 55% arrived between 2005 and 2014) and small number (19,774 registered in municipal registers on 1 January 2014; 51% of the total Indian residents in Spain), Spain occupies a peripheral position in the global Sikh diaspora. If we see the age structure, this population is very young, with 70.6% individuals aged 15–45 and only 10.4% aged above 45 (Figure 3).

As migration is usually dominated by males in Punjab, and given the relatively recent arrival, the group is distinguished by a strong presence of males. About 71% of the total Sikh population of Spain are males, despite more than half of the Sikhs being married (53%) and living in family households. According to census data, 39% are living in 'Couple with or without children' households and 19% in complex household 'nucleus family and others'. The education level is generally low, almost 60% are below completed primary education and only 8% have higher university education. In terms of citizenship status, only 5% are Spanish nationality holders.

The pioneer Sikhs migrated to Spain in the early 1970s, but their number was limited to about 20 individuals. These early immigrants came from the northern European countries to work in the agriculture sector in the region of La Rioja. Later on, during the decade of 1980s, attracted by job offers in the food processing industry, a substantial number of Sikhs arrived into Catalonia, especially, in Olot and neighbouring municipalities where they settled in huge numbers (Farjas 2006b).

According to the Padrón Continuo 2014, Catalonia alone accounts for 61% of the total Sikh population of Spain (Figure 4), which is reflected by their share in the total Indian




Figure 3. The age structure and sex composition of Sikhs in Spain, 2015. Source: Own elaboration with data from municipal registers (Padrón Continuo, 2014).

population in Catalan provinces (81% in Girona compared to 5% in Las Palmas of Canary Islands). Furthermore, in provinces such as Murcia and Valencia, it also exceeds 75%. The sex ratio can serve as an indirect indicator of the family settlement, considering that most women take the place of wives, mothers or daughters in a family household. The provinces




Figure 4. The spatial distribution of Sikh population (provinces) and Gurudwaras by year of foundation (municipalities) in Spain, 2015. Source: Own elaboration, with data from municipal registers (Padrón Continuo 2015), INE.

of Girona and Barcelona, with sex ratios of 1.4 and 2.1 men per woman respectively, depict the consolidation of community in these provinces. Conversely, Madrid and Alicante, with 6 and 5 men per woman, respectively, illustrate the recent arrival of Sikhs in these provinces. Due to the problems of statistical confidentiality, we only have the information on the territorial distribution at the provincial level; however, we have estimated municipal distribution from the presence and year of foundation of Sikh temples in these municipalities.

The production of diaspora space and appropriation of territory is clearly visible through the construction of Sikh temples (Gurudwaras) at different locations around the globe. In this sense, one cannot ignore the presence of 22 Gurudwaras (literally translating as 'the door of the Guru') constructed in Spain during the last two decades. Even though the temples are often modest in appearance, they nonetheless have a very central position in the cohesion of the community. They serve as a meeting place and refuge for the new immigrants, a source of maintaining strong ties with homeland Punjab, and also act as an institution that converts the diaspora into a transnational space (Jacobsen 2012). The Gurudwaras are the symbolic centre of the reproduction of the group's identity. The very layout of the temple space in which the community moves show the internal mechanism of community building: firstly the interior spaces that are devoted to worship, *Darbar* (place of prayer and exposition of Guru Granth Sahib) and *Sachkhand* (space of rest for Guru/Holy Book), provide a common space for the community to discuss their religious issues and on the other side the *Langar* (the dining room open to everybody) demonstrate the community's commitment towards selfless service. In relation to the articulation of diaspora space, Gurudwaras in Spain, regardless of the areas (rural or urban) where they are established, represent the possibility of entering into transnational networks. Generally, Gurudwara managing committees invite priests from Punjab and other countries such as Britain, Canada or Italy, to join in the annual religious functions (Myrvold 2013; Purewal and Lallie 2013). These efforts are made to strengthen the legitimacy of new temples and encourage people to take part in religious activities, as well as passing religious beliefs to the next generation, who are mostly born outside Punjab.

The chronology of the foundation of Gurudwaras illustrates the history of the immigration flows and more or less estimates the size of the actual Sikh population in all municipalities with Gurudwaras (Figure 4). We can see the spread of Sikh population from the north to the south of Spain through the chronology of construction of Gurudwaras (first in Barcelona in the year 1998 and last in Los Alcázares (Murcia) in 2015). The geographical distribution also represents the insertion of immigrants into the labour market, especially for males (71% of males were economically active as compared to 21% of females in 2014). More than half of Spanish Sikh population lives in Catalonia and are employed in the food industry, with a special presence in the slaughterhouses of Olot and Vic, and in the restaurants of Barcelona and neighbouring municipalities. Consequently, half of the total Gurudwaras in Spain are situated in Catalonia. In the first decade of the twenty-first century, the Sikh population moved from Catalonia to the south of Spain, along with the Mediterranean coastal provinces of Girona, Barcelona, Tarragona, Valencia, Alicante, Murcia, Malaga and Mallorca diversifying their economic activities from temporal jobs in bars and restaurants to work in the agricultural fields of Torre Pacheco (in Murcia).

4. Crossing borders

4.1. Sikh's immigration routes to Spain

The reconstruction of migratory routes with the help of in-depth interviews (Figure 5) shows the expansion of diaspora space by including new territories in it. On the basis of the responses of interviewees, these routes can be classified into five different types. The first two types, an Eastern Europe route via Moscow and an African route, are already observed in other studies (Thandi 2012). In the Spanish case, however, the 'Baltic route' is not often used, which has a notable significance for the Sikhs living in Sweden and Germany. The third type is the Middle East route, which includes a stay in Dubai. Alongside, these three routes are two uncommon types: an American route, which is used by professional Sikhs, who first migrated to U.S.A. for higher studies and then moved to Spain for work, and a 'direct route' which is commonly used by the family members of different Sikhs who migrated to Spain under the process of family reunification.

Generally, most of the migratory flows from the Indian subcontinent, but particularly from Punjab, occurring during the economic crisis can only be understood in the context of the 'illegal migration industry' (Saha 2009). This involves both human trafficking (Salt and Stein 1997) and more or less formal circuits in which assistance is provided by NGOs and world organizations for immigration purposes (Gammeltoft-Hansen and Nyberg Sorensen 2011). In this migratory process, the main engine and the beneficiary are no longer the immigrants themselves, but the intermediary involved in the process, who promotes these movements either with the help of Russian human smugglers or the African travel agents. These illegal immigrations are charged depending on the target place of destination, the route selected by the immigrants and the time when migration is undertaken, for example, among interviewees, many have claimed about paying 5000 euros for Dubai, 20,000 for Spain and 40,000 for Canada or the U.S.A.


This illegal immigration market exists, thanks to the combination of three factors: Firstly, the demand of cheap manual labour for agriculture and industry in Spain, promotes the flow of illegal immigrants, as they accept blue colour jobs on low wages (which lead to their over-exploitation by Spanish businessmen, especially in some municipalities dedicated to agriculture and agro-industry). Secondly, some community members also promote the illegal immigration of Punjabi youth to Spain, seek to exploit these immigrants upon arrival by hiring them for their own benefit utilizing their status and position in Gurudwaras. The final factor results from the failure of the state (the Spanish but also Indian) to regulate and control of the immigrant flow and their insertion in the labour market. This situation increases the isolation and vulnerability of the Sikh population illegally living abroad.

We can also consider that the restrictions applied on the immigration from Commonwealth countries to the U.K. under the British Immigration Act of 1968 led the Sikh immigration to other European countries and can be a remote factor of their arrival in Spain, initially in the region of La Rioja during the 1970s and then in Catalonia (Farjas 2006a). Political instability in the Punjab during the 1980s undoubtedly played a role in promoting migration to European countries, although most Sikh immigrants, who then ended up in Spain, were firstly, attracted by the possibility to get legalized more easily than in other countries and secondly, by the economic opportunities especially during the economic boom period. This emigration has opened the Sikh

Type 1: African route



Type 2: Middle East route



Type 3: East European route



Type 4: American route



Type 5: Direct route




Figure 5. The different types of routes followed by Sikh immigrants to reach Spain. Source: Own elaboration from in-depth interviews of the doctoral thesis 'Indian Diaspora to Spain: Demo-Spatial Analysis and Neighbourhood Relations' (2015–2016).

diaspora to non-English-speaking countries, which has resulted in the community's exposure to a great diversity.

Between 1999 and 2010, the Sikh immigration flow has increased 10-fold, reaching to its peak in the year 2010 with 2105 individuals in a single year. State regularization of immigration during 2000 and 2005 marked as milestones in the Sikh's immigration history to Spain, as well as the application of the *Arraigo* system since 2006, which has encouraged flows even during the period of economic crisis. According to data from EVR 2000–2014, the municipalities that have received the largest number of immigrants directly from outside of Spain are Barcelona (6225), Valencia (2362), Hospitalet de Llobregat (2214), Lloret de Mar (1513), Badalona (1454), Olot (1108), Palma de Mallorca (1077) and Santa Coloma de Gramenet (1043). Except Valencia and Palma de Mallorca all other municipalities are from Autonomous community of Catalonia and four of them (Barcelona, Hospitalet de Llobregat, Badalona and Santa Coloma de Gramenet) are the parts of Barcelona Metropolitan Area, in an urban agglomeration.

4.2. Internal mobility: the statistical trail

Internal mobility not only informs us about the progressive spread of the Sikh population in Spanish territory directly related to the job offers, but also the strength of the ties that interconnect these territories, which forms the diaspora space. We must therefore consider internal mobility as a pillar in the formation of the Sikh community. Of the total of 73,756 movements recorded by the EVR during the period of 2000–2014, Barcelona received the highest proportion coming directly from abroad (22%). However, from here these migrants move to other Spanish cities. Almost 26% of the total recorded movements departing from the municipality of Barcelona.

As shown in [Figure 6](#), Barcelona and especially the neighbourhood of El Raval, undoubtedly, have served as the gateway of immigration, that is, as a filter and distributor of the population by establishing a centred metropolitan area network. On the basis of the exploration of the EVR data 2000–2014, we find that the municipalities of Hospitalet de Llobregat (56%), Badalona (40%) and Santa Coloma de Gramenet (36%) are the leading receiver of the Sikh population from Barcelona municipality.

Mostly Sikh migratory movements follow kinship networks. The concentration of Sikh population in Barcelona is also a result of these kinship networks. Pioneer Sikhs settled in Barcelona and became the main source of information for other immigrants. Together with Gurudwaras, they have created a place of refuge for new immigrants. With increasing influx of immigrants (brothers, cousins and nephews), communication and kinship networks also strengthened, which increases in attractiveness of the city for the diaspora. The centrality of Barcelona is complemented by other poles of attraction, which represents very diverse occupational niches, from jobs in the agriculture sector, which is capitalized by the municipality of Torre Pacheco in Murcia, to the work in the food processing industry in Vic and Olot in the province of Girona, and the hospitality sector jobs in Palma de Mallorca, Lloret de Mar, Torrevieja and Fuengirola. In recent years, many Sikhs have moved to jobs in restaurants and hotels, which allowed them to settle in other coastal cities such as Valencia, Alicante, Palma de Mallorca, Torrevieja and Salou. It is especially interesting to know that the job offers, and the concentration of Sikhs in the hotels and restaurants in the province of Alicante (and partially in




Figure 6. The Sikh emigration from municipality of Barcelona, 2000–2014. Source: Own elaboration with data from Residence Variance Statistics, EVR 2000–2014, INE.

Murcia), are partly to satisfy the demand of Indian food by British population, which is highly concentrated in these areas (Sabater, Galeano, and Domingo 2013), and not the indigenous market. Now many Sikhs from other diaspora locations like U.K. and Germany migrate to Spain for the establishment of Indian restaurants and ethnic food stores, not only for the British tourists looking for Indian dishes on the Spanish beaches, but mainly for the retired British community, which is permanently settled in the south of Spain and dreamed for Colonial ambiance in their new settlements. It includes Indian meals served with ‘Colonial Indian style’ catering in some resorts in British enclaves in Spain. While the neighbouring municipality of Torre Pacheco, popularly known as a ‘school’ among the Sikh population, is characterized by the flow of new illegal immigrants and the harsh working conditions. Finally, it is noteworthy that Madrid is an exception in the case of internal migration of Sikhs during this period. It is the only municipality with a sizable amount of Sikh population, which has not received immigrants from Barcelona. The small Sikh community of Madrid entered directly from outside or from other cities of Spain.


4.3. The hypermobility of Sikhs: the invisible space

As we know from other works, the mobility recorded by the residence variance statistics (EVR) should be considered as only a very small part of the real inter-municipal mobility (see, e.g. what Cohen and Berriane (2011) tell us about the internal mobility of Moroccan population in Spain). On the basis of the responses of in-depth interviews, we find that the difference in the real and registered internal and external movements is of such magnitude that it deserves special attention with regard to the hypermobility of Sikhs.

In the in-depth interviews, both high mobility of the group and its statistical invisibility became evident. The initial registration (as an essential requirement for the regularization process) and the search for work opportunities at different places explain the existence of invisible hypermobility, while the permission of permanent residence and family reunification mark the end of the period of hypermobility. According to the testimony of the interviewees, it is common that the first registration does not correspond

7.1 Simple internal mobility


SUKHJIT SINGH, 33 years
Year of Arrival: 2006



7.2 Mixed mobility (internal and international)

MATINDER SINGH, 28

Year of Arrival: 2006



7.3 Family mobility

GAGANDEP SINGH

Year of Arrival: 2010




Figure 7. Typologies of internal migration of Sikhs in Spain. Source: Own elaboration from in-depth interviews of the doctoral thesis Indian Diaspora to Spain: Demo-spatial analysis and neighbourhood relations (2015–2016).

to the real place of residence, and most commonly a payment is made to the owner or resident of the home to get registered in that house, as it ensures the possibility to get legalized after three years of regular registered stay in Spain, under the immigration law called 'Arraigo'. On average, an irregular Sikh immigrant changes his place of residence three to four times annually, without any registered entry (Alta) and exit (Baja) from the municipal register of inhabitants. Based on the socio-demographic profiles, the destinations, and the time of stay, we can classify three types of internal migration: (1) 'Simple internal mobility', (2) 'Mixed mobility' including international movements and (3) 'Family mobility' related to family reunification. After the family reunification, internal mobility tends to disappear because it becomes very costly to move with the whole family. However, many families still try to emigrate to Britain or Canada for better education of their children and better living conditions, especially after obtaining Spanish nationality.

In all types of internal migrations, much of the movements never get registered. In Spain, these movements or residential changes are captured by the EVR statistics. However due to the lack of registration of the immigrants in all places of residence, it becomes impossible to track the actual movement of immigrants from one municipality to another and the time spent in each of them. As shown in [Figure 7](#), in the first case of simple internal mobility, only four movements were registered in the municipal registers. However, in reality 17 residential changes had been made during the last 9 years. In most of the cases, the actual time spent in places where immigrants were actually registered, constituted not even half of total registered time. Part of this hypermobility is related to seasonal employment such as in agriculture and hospitality, forcing the need to move for work. The greater knowledge of Spanish territory acquired through these movements is inversely related to their assimilation to their neighbourhoods and society, as mostly they live in a kind of provisional state, where they move according to the availability of seasonal work. As a result, they do not maintain regular contact or relations with the host community, which contributes to their isolation and 'cocooning' behaviour. In the early stages of immigration, this strategy helps them to earn their living and survive till permanent settlement.

After watching the share of unregistered migrations, we can conclude that there is an invisible diaspora space, which is not captured by any administrative register or other data sources. In Spain, the perfect example of this invisible space is the municipality of Torre Pacheco in Murcia, where according to our interviewees at present live more than 1000 Sikhs. However, in the municipal records, only 327 Sikhs were registered as inhabitants, mostly living in isolated areas.

5. Diaspora through transnational communication links

The world we live in is characterized by accelerating, intensifying and deepening social, economic, cultural, religious and recreational interconnections between one geographic and cultural area of one people to another (Magu 2015, 642). These interconnections create a virtual transnational space, which provides a platform for the interaction of different actors of diaspora community. Contrary to diasporic communities that imagine and recreate connections across migrant groups with a territorial basis for attachment, belonging and identity, research on transnationality focuses more on connections that exist through actual networks (Bonnerjee et al. 2012, 12). In his article, Vertovec (1999, 447)

refers to transnationalism as ‘multiple ties and interactions linking people or institutions across borders of nation-states’. According to Mitchell (2003, 84), the key feature of transnationality is that it refers to ‘embodied movements and practices of migrants and/or the flows of commodities and capital, and [we] analyse these flows with respect to national borders and the cultural constructions of the nation, citizen and social life’.

The movements in the Sikh diaspora, and the relationships derived from them can be considered as ‘transnationalism from below’ (Guarnizo 1997), which focuses on individual immigrants as agents of their own migration (Glick Schiller, Basch, and Blanc Szanton 1995), in contrast to the studies that put the movement of multinational or political parties as the hub of transnational relations (Faist 2009). In our preliminary ‘transnational relations’ approach, we have focused on the social networks of Sikh individuals, who are active in different parts of the diaspora and help the flow of information and resources across the borders. These networks include the people, who are mostly family members or friends, who share the information about the living, work, weather and marriage market conditions of their country of residence with others. Mostly they compare different parts of the diaspora and decide the position of different countries in the hierarchy of the most desired destinations.

The Sikhs have maintained strong transnational ties with their homeland Punjab and all other destinations, where they have settled around the world. The spread of new electronic means of communication has intensified the links between diaspora (Kumar 2012). These transnational communication links provide a mechanism for the movement of people, capital and ideas throughout the diaspora. Due to the increased use of information technology and the hyper-connectivity via Internet, WhatsApp, Facebook, phone calls and television channels, the present Sikh diaspora is densely interconnected and forms a virtual transnational space, where all actors of the diaspora interact with each other and discuss the main issues of community’s identity struggle and challenges related to religion, society and politics in the global and local contexts. In this space they feel connected with their community around the world, which provides them with strength and a sense of security. These links on the one hand are used for the better allocation of resources of the community and on the other hand are also helpful in finding partners within the diaspora community via matrimonial web pages.

On the basis of interview responses, we have delimited the extent of diaspora through transnational communication networks, which are expanded from Barcelona to the rest of the diaspora (Figure 8). We have asked interviewees to tell us about the Sikh people whom they call at least once a week and their present place of residence. Taking into account the number of calls made by Sikhs from Barcelona, we find that they have communication links with their friends and relatives in 30 countries around the globe. After the Indian Punjab, the other important places are Canada, the U.K., the U.S.A., Germany and Australia, which are also the major centres of attraction in the diaspora. More than 25% of the total calls go to Canada and U.K. only. The flow of information through regular contacts also affects the central position in the diaspora, which is very mobile and currently lies in Canada.

Hyper-communication in the Sikh diaspora has a multiplier effect on social control, creating a specific panoptic device; everyone knows everyone and everyone is interested in everything. At the same time, scrutiny for the possibility of migration creates a space where the imaginary hierarchies of cities, sometimes becomes confused with the countries themselves. Thus, the imagined space emerged from transnational relations, overlaps




Figure 8. Transnational communication links from Barcelona to rest of the Diaspora. Source: Own elaboration from in-depth interviews of the doctoral thesis *Indian Diaspora to Spain: Demo-spatial analysis and neighbourhood relations* (2015–2016).

practical information about actual job opportunities, facilities for regularization or social services concerning health or housing, or possible marriage markets, and incorporates a categorization, which connects them with the prejudices that European countries have traditionally had for one another. The symbolic capital of the city or the country of destination determines the social capital of the immigrant residing in that country, regardless of his own actual socio-economic status. Thus, Sikh migrants living in Germany consider themselves better than those who live in Spain; even when they belong to the same family, have the same education level and similar occupations. That prestige also affects their price as a candidate in the Sikh marriage market both at origin and in the diaspora.

The imagery of the different destinations created by discussions on transnational virtual spaces results into greater migration from one country to another, which generally are supposed to be in better conditions, for example, in qualitative work many interviewees told us about the mass movement of Sikhs from Spain to Canada and the U.K. in the last five years. Especially in the Sikh diaspora, the status of an individual is largely determined by the country in which he lives. For example, a person who lives in an Arabian country would not have the same status as a migrant living in Germany. One who has migrated to Germany is in turn considered to be well below those who have gained a foothold in Canada. These differences encourage further migratory flows from countries, which are considered as poor or peripheral, to the countries which are considered as rich or central. The transnational communities from the flow of information transform the sense of spatiality in such a way that affects both its practices and its own image (Debarbieux 2015).

6. Conclusions: mobility and appropriation of space

Demographers and geographers, generally all social scientists who depend on statistics, are the prisoners of ‘methodological nationalism’. By that we mean to impose the framework (and perspective) of a state to our studies, both from below, when we try to study regions or nationalities without State, or from above, when we approach the transnational movements and communities. This limitation is exacerbated in the case of religious

communities like Sikhs, for which only a handful of countries collect data systematically. To this statistical limitation; we can also add the complexity of the concept of 'diaspora', which is mostly confused as the sum of different interactions only. Sikh diaspora is a dynamic space produced by regular emigration. On the one hand, it provides a reproduction place for the community out of Punjab and on the other hand, it affects the demographic reproduction of the population in Punjab, as emigration has become one of the key elements of demographic change in Punjab.

In answer to the first research question, the Sikh diaspora space can be considered as a large transnational community that extends from their homeland Punjab to North America in the west and New Zealand in the east. It has dynamic geometry and polycentric character. Its main centres are Canada, the U.K., the U.S.A. and Australia. It is formed by the three historical migration waves, colonial migrations, economic migrants and refugees each with their own specific characteristics. The Sikh diaspora organizes itself through the dynamics of the centre and periphery, in which the centre is centripetal (that attract immigrants from periphery) and periphery is centrifugal (that push immigrant to the core or other peripheral locations). Each centre is surrounded by its own peripheral region, ancient or modern, for example, we can consider Malaysia, Thailand as peripheral regions in the colonial period and recently France, Italy, Portugal and Spain have occupied this peripheral position. The hierarchy between centre and periphery depends largely on the cultural construction, configured through information flows that make the relational diaspora. The Sikh diaspora intersects and interacts with the Indian diaspora in general and to a lesser extent with the Pakistani Punjabi or Bangladeshi, with which they share territory in different countries. Factual information about the labour market, housing, legalization processes 'papers', social benefits or matrimonial markets are taken into account during the allocation of symbolic capital to each place in the diaspora. The hierarchical logic established between centres and peripheries, results in increased mobility. Hence, we can conclude that the Sikh diaspora space is created through movement and transnational interconnectedness.

The second objective of this paper was to explore, how the diaspora space transformed while coming in contact with a migration of diasporic character. As we have seen, Spain is a recent addition into the Sikh diaspora. Most migrants are settled on the Mediterranean coast between Catalonia in the north to Andalucía in the south. Their presence in Spain has contributed to the population diversity and now they have become a part of the human mosaic of Spain. The Gurudwaras play a prominent role in the articulation of the Sikh diaspora. Along with their formal role as religious centres, they also serve as a common platform for the community to discuss their social and political issues. In the Sikh community, it is their primary duty to establish a Gurudwara when the number of residents reaches to a critical mass at a place (mostly 3–4 hundred individual or 100 families), which is needed to permit its construction and maintenance. The existence of Gurudwara at a particular place changes the setup of that space and mostly in the neighbourhood it is seen as the appropriation of space by a foreign religious group.

Due to the structural adjustments made by the Spanish government during the economic crisis, Spain has become a 'mousetrap' for Punjabi lions, attracted by the facilities to regularize their legal situation and job opportunities during the boom period. Now most Sikh migrants are trapped in low-paid jobs, with no chance of improving their situation in the short or medium term and many are forced to undertake a second migration to get out

of this precarious situation. The widespread experience of harsh working conditions (due to exploitation by Spanish bosses or by their own ethnic business community) and concentration in highly segregated residential neighbourhoods have resulted in the withdrawal of Sikh migrants from social and economic spheres. This in turn results in the paradox that hypermobility, which was the symbol of their regular movement for betterment, in fact contributed to their isolation, making the community generally invisible and marginalized.

Both the first and second question require more qualitative research to be answered satisfactorily. This paper has highlighted the need for further research in the areas like: how the presence of Sikhs in Spain has changed neighbourhood relations, and how host community has reacted towards these changes? Furthermore, we need to establish whether we can consider Sikh diaspora as a demographic reproduction system based on emigration. Finally, further research is required to elucidate how the endemic shortage of women at the origin and in the diaspora will affect the marriage market in the near future.

Notes

1. Operation Blue Star was an Indian military operation which occurred between 3 and 8 June 1984, ordered by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, to crush the Sikh movement for greater autonomy and to establish control over the Harmandir Sahib Complex in Amritsar, Punjab.
2. Data are obtained from various secondary sources, please follow the web links in Appendix 1.

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Appendix 1. Estimated Sikh Population in different countries.

| Country | Sikh population | Data sources |
|-------------|-----------------|---|
| India | 20,800,000 | http://www.punjabdata.com/Sikh-Population-In-India.aspx |
| Canada | 468,673 | http://www.statcan.gc.ca/daily-quotidien/130508/dq130508b-eng.htm |
| The U.K. | 432,429 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sikhism_in_the_United_Kingdom |
| The U.S.A. | 200,000 | http://www.pewresearch.org/2012/08/06/ask-the-expert-how-many-us-sikhs/ |
| Malaysia | 100,000 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sikhism_in_Malaysia |
| Australia | 72,296 | "2011 Census Quick Stats: Glenwood." Retrieved 14 February 2015. |
| Italy | 70,000 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sikhism_in_Italy |
| Thailand | 70,000 | https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2006/71359.htm |
| Philippines | 30,000 | http://propunjab.blogspot.in/2014/05/countries-highest-sikh-population.html |
| UAE | 50,000 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sikhism_in_the_United_Arab_Emirates |
| Germany | 40,000 | http://www.sikhiwiki.org/index.php/Sikhism_in_Germany |
| Mauritius | 37,700 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sikhism_by_country |
| France | 30,000 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sikhism_in_France |
| Singapore | 23,000 | http://www.sikhphilosophy.net/threads/sikh-population.636/ |
| Spain | 20,797 | Padron continuo, 2015, INE |
| Greece | 20,000 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sikhism_in_Greece |
| Kenya | 20,000 | http://www.sikhiwiki.org/index.php/Sikhism_in_Kenya |
| Kuwait | 20,000 | http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2006/71425.htm |
| Pakistan | 20,000 | http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2006/71443.htm |
| New Zealand | 19,191 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sikhism_in_New_Zealand |
| Indonesia | 14,000 | http://www.sikhphilosophy.net/threads/sikh-population.636/ |
| Holland | 12,000 | https://www.sikhiwiki.org/index.php/Sikhism_in_Netherlands |
| Belgium | 10,000 | Dutch newspaper on Sikhs celebrating Maghi in Brussels |
| Hong Kong | 10,000 | http://yp.scmp.com/article/2275/sikhs-hong-kong |
| Afghanistan | 3000 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sikhism_in_Afghanistan |
| Mexico | 8000 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sikhism_by_country |
| China | 7500 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sikhism_by_country |
| Portugal | 7000 | http://www.sikhiwiki.org/index.php/Sikhism_in_Portugal |
| Nepal | 5790 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sikhism_by_country |
| Norway | 3363 | https://www.ssb.no/en/befolkning/artikler-og-publikasjoner/_attachment/225814?ts=14d005aeb20 |
| Burma | 3000 | http://www.epw.in/node/131164/pdf |
| Lebanon | 3000 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sikhism_by_country |
| Malawi | 3000 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sikhism_by_country |
| Nigeria | 3000 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sikhism_by_country |
| Zambia | 3000 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sikhism_by_country |
| Austria | 2794 | http://www.sikhiwiki.org/index.php/Sikhism_in_Austria |
| Fiji | 2577 | Population by Religion – 2007 Census of Population |
| Japan | 2000 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sikhism_by_country |
| Tanzania | 2000 | http://www.sikhiwiki.org/index.php/Sikhism_by_country |
| Ireland | 1200 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_Asian_people_in_Ireland |
| Sweden | 1000 | http://www.sikhiwiki.org/index.php/Sikhism_in_Sweden |
| Kazakhstan | 800 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sikhism_by_country |

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
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| Country | Sikh population | Data sources |
|--------------------|-----------------|---|
| Denmark | 700 | http://www.sikhiwiki.org/index.php/Sikhism_by_country |
| Poland | 700 | http://www.sikhiwiki.org/index.php/Sikhism_by_country#Europe |
| Finland | 600 | http://research.jyu.fi/jargonia/artikkelit/jargonia21_hirvi.pdf |
| Cyprus | 500 | http://www.sikhiwiki.org/index.php/Sikhism_by_country |
| Iran | 500 | http://asiasamachar.com/2015/08/24/bathing-dead-in-tehran-gurdwara-divides-iranian-sikhs1/ |
| Switzerland | 500 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sikhism_in_Switzerland |
| Argentina | 300 | http://thelangarhall.com/general/buenvenidos-a-la-comunidad-sikh-de-la-argentina/ |
| Papua Nueva Guinea | 120 | http://www.sikhiwiki.org/index.php/Sikhs_in_Papua_New_Guinea |
| Iceland | 100 | http://www.sikhiwiki.org/index.php/Sikhism_in_Iceland |

3. THE DEMO-SPATIAL ANALYSIS OF INDIAN IMMIGRATION IN SPAIN

Garha, Nachatter S., Galeano, Juan and Domingo, Andreu (2016), "South Asian immigration to Spain: Socio-demographic profile and territorial distribution, 2000–2014" in *Asian and Pacific Migration Journal*, vol. 25 issue: 2, page(s): 191-205.

Garha, Nachatter S. and Galeano, Juan (2015), "Concentration and Diversity of South Asian Population in Spain", In Session 7: Diversidad: concepto, medida y gestión. *VIII Congreso Español de Migraciones Internacionales*, Granada, Spain. 16th-18th Sep. 2015.



Source: own elaboration, data from Municipal Register (*Padròn Continuo*) Spain, 2017.

Garha, Nachatter S., López-Sala, Ana María and Domingo, Andreu (2016), "Surasiáticos en Madrid y Barcelona: encarnando la diversidad" in Andreu Domingo (Ed.) *Inmigración y Diversidad en España: Crisis Económica y gestión municipal*. Barcelona: Icaria ISBN 978-84-9888-726-6, págs. 211-238.

Garha, Nachatter S. and Bayona, J. (2018) "Indian immigration to Spain: A comparative study". *Papers de Demografia*, 460: 1-28. Bellaterra: Centre d'Estudis Demogràfics.

South Asian immigration to Spain: Socio-demographic profile and territorial distribution, 2000–2014*

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Autonomous University of Barcelona

Abstract

The South Asian group, which includes people from India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, is one of the oldest and least known immigrant groups in Spain. Because of its relatively small size (131,230 in 2014) very limited research work has been done about this community. Existing studies mainly focus on their economic participation while their socio-demographic characteristics remain unexplored. In this paper, we examine the evolution and demographic profile of their flow and stock during 2000–2014, their socio-economic characteristics and territorial distribution. The recent huge flow of young males has made this group more masculine and younger. Their low education level and lack of professional skills result in occupational segregation in a few sectors, which is contributing to their residential concentration in the big metropolitan areas of Spain. The economic crisis in Spain has halted further growth, but the continuation of family reunification process is consolidating their settlement in Spain.

Keywords

South Asian population, immigration, occupational segregation, demography, territorial distribution, Spain

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Introduction

South Asians are one of the oldest immigrant groups who settled in Spanish territory and have had a presence in the country for more than a century (López Sala, 2013). Despite the increase in their population in the second half of the 20th century, this group did not receive research attention because of the lack of basic data about this community (it is smaller compared to other immigrant groups in Spain) and the absence of historical and cultural links between South Asia and Spain. In the last decades of the 20th century, a new flow from South Asia that is larger and with distinctive profiles arrived in Spain. This dramatic growth and increased visibility attracted research attention, but the majority of these studies have been on the economic and social aspects while the community's demographic profile and their evolution over time have been neglected.

In this paper, our main objectives are, first, to explore the evolution and demographic features of the flow and stock of the South Asian population (SAP) in Spain, and second, to describe its territorial distribution and its evolution during 2000–2014, and to present its socio-demographic characteristics.

Data sources

The Residential Variation Statistics (*Estadística de Variaciones Residenciales* or *EVR*), collected by the National Institute of Statistics (Instituto Nacional de Estadística or INE), provide information to measure the flow of the immigrant population in Spain. Information on the internal and external movements of the population is gathered by collecting all entries and exits from the municipal registers of all municipalities in Spain. To measure the stock population, we used data from the Continuous Municipal Register of Population (*Padrón continuo*) from 2000 to 2014. It collects and incorporates the information of all population changes due to natural events like birth and death or demographic changes caused by migration. On an individual level, it records information about the age, sex, place of birth, nationality and municipality of residence at the time of each individual's registration. The data on flow and stock of population have been extracted from the micro data files provided by INE from the municipal registers (2000–2014).

The major data source on the various socio-demographic characteristics of the immigrant population in Spain is the Census of Population and Housing, which is a decadal event and recently held in the year 2011. For this study, census data containing information on household structure, occupation and level of education of its members were provided to us in the form of micro data files from INE. For the legal status of immigrants, we have used data from the *Statistical Yearbook, 2000–2014* published by the Ministry of Employment and Social Security (2015a).

An overview

Flow data

South Asian immigration to Spain was characterized by a small and steady flow during the last century, but in the first decade of the 21st century, this flow multiplied 16 times to reach its peak by the end of the first decade. Despite the exponential growth, the share of South Asian immigrants was only 2.7 percent of the total immigrant flow to Spain in the year 2014. This flow not only originated from South Asia, but also from its diaspora around the globe.

This flow was historically dominated by Indians, but as the number of Pakistanis increased substantially in the last decades of the 20th century, the latter surpassed Indians in the overall flow. In the year 2014, the share of Pakistanis was 60 percent, followed by 28 percent of Indians and 12 percent of Bangladeshis. According to data from the municipal registers (2000–2014), this flow increased exponentially from 1,747 immigrants in the year 2000 to 28,593 in 2010 (Figure 1). The most significant annual increase was in 2004 when it multiplied fourfold to cross the mark of 14,865 immigrants. This tremendous increase can be associated with two events: the registration of immigrants and the regularization process. First, in 2004, INE started registering immigrants in the municipal registers of inhabitants, without information on origin, which was generally referred as registrations by omission (*Altas por Omisión*). It is probable that a small part of this increment in the flow comes from these registrations. Second, due to the regularization process of




Figure 1. Changes in the immigrant flow of South Asians to Spain, 2000–2014.

Source: Authors' elaboration of Residential Variance Statistics (EVR, 2000–2014), INE.

immigrants that took place in 2005, many immigrants who were already living in Spain before and, for some reason, were not registered in their municipal registers, started registering to reap the benefits of the legalization process. It also generated a call-effect i.e., increased immigration flows resulting from the spread of information about a proposed regularization process within an immigrant group. South Asians who were contemplating of migration in their home countries as well as those in an unauthorized situation in other countries may have been encouraged to migrate to Spain in the hope of availing of the regularization process. In 2006, however, immigration actually declined partly because most of those who wanted to immigrate to Spain had already arrived in the country during the regularization period in 2005. After 2006, immigration increased because many workers who legalized their status in 2005 started bringing their families to join them in Spain. Eventually, it reached its peak (28,593 immigrants) in 2010, after which it declined to 15,069 immigrants in 2014. This decline can be associated with the economic crisis and shortage of job opportunities in Spain.

South Asian immigration to Spain has been historically characterized by a high level of masculinity and dominated by the young adult population. In 2000, one-fourth of the immigrants were females, which increased to one-third of the total in 2014, but were still lower compared to other immigrant groups in Spain (Figure 2a). Young adults comprised about 40 percent during the study period (Figure 2b). The small female population was also concentrated in this age group.




Figure 2a. Changes in the sex composition of the immigrant flow of South Asians to Spain, 2000–2014. **Figure 2b.** Age structure of the immigrant flow of South Asians to Spain, 2000–2014.

Source: Authors' elaboration of Residential Variance Statistics (EVR, 2000–2014), INE.

Stock data

The stock of South Asian population (SAP) in Spain remained small until the end of the 20th century. In 2000, their total number was 12,819, in which 57 percent were Indians, followed by Pakistanis, 39 percent, and Bangladeshis, 4 percent. Back then, it was only 0.87 percent of the total foreign population

residing in Spain. This stock increased dramatically in the first decade of the 21st century and multiplied more than 10 times to reach its peak in the year 2013. As of 2013, the South Asian community comprised about 60 percent Pakistanis, 29.9 percent Indians and almost 10.1 percent Bangladeshis. In all, its share of the total foreign population and total population of Spain increased to 1.99 percent and 0.28 percent, respectively. The increase halted in 2014—their total number declined by almost 1 percent but their share of the foreign population increased to 2.08 percent (Table 1).

The year 2001 witnessed a significant increase of 48 percent (from 12,819 to 19,001) in the size of SAP in Spain (Figure 3), which can be attributed to the regularization process in 2000. It attracted many South Asians from the home countries and other diasporic locations around the globe, and at the same time, it forced hitherto unregistered South Asians already living in Spain to enter their records in the municipal registers. After this sharp increase, it kept on growing at a regular pace and reached 72,451 in 2006. The year 2006 witnessed a very insignificant increase in the total stock, which was partly because of the cancelation of registration from the municipal registers, also known as ‘cancelations by expiration’ (*Baja por Caducidad*), which was introduced by INE in the same year to control the overestimation of the immigrant population. From 2008 onward, the growth rate of SAP declined. As of 2013, their number reached 132,398, and in 2014, their number fell to 131,230. Like the flow data, up to 2000, Indians were the largest group, but from 2001, Pakistanis ranked first, followed by Indians and Bangladeshis. Similarly, the stock data showed a high level of masculinity and concentration in the young adult age groups. These were especially marked in 2014.

In 2000, the sex ratio of the SAP was 8,226 males to 4,593 females; this ratio increased in 2014 to 96,741 males to 34,485 females (see Figures 4 and 5). In 2014, the SAP community was predominantly male: among the Bangladeshis, Pakistanis and Indians, the share of the female population was 24 percent, 25 percent and 34 percent, respectively.

Table 1. Changes in the South Asian population in Spain: Comparison with native and foreign populations, 2000–2014.

| Year | South Asians | Population of Spain | % of Total Population | Total Immigrants | % of Total Immigrants |
|------|--------------|---------------------|-----------------------|------------------|-----------------------|
| 2000 | 12,819 | 40,460,484 | 0.03 | 1,471,232 | 0.87 |
| 2004 | 42,668 | 43,197,684 | 0.09 | 3,693,806 | 1.15 |
| 2008 | 83,964 | 46,157,822 | 0.18 | 6,044,528 | 1.38 |
| 2012 | 130,268 | 47,265,321 | 0.27 | 6,759,780 | 1.92 |
| 2014 | 131,230 | 46,771,225 | 0.28 | 6,283,596 | 2.08 |

Source: Authors' elaboration of data from the Municipal Register of Inhabitants (*Padrón continuo*, 2000–2014), INE.




Figure 3. Changes in the immigrant stock of South Asians in Spain, 2000–2014. Source: Authors’ elaboration of data from the Municipal Register of Inhabitants (*Padrón continuo*, 2000–2014), INE.




Figure 4. Age and sex composition of the South Asian population in Spain, 2000. Source: Authors’ elaboration of data from the Municipal Register of Inhabitants (*Padrón continuo*, 2000–2014), INE.

Figures 4 and 5 indicate that SAP became younger and more masculine during this period. The share of the working population (15–64) increased significantly by almost 5 percent while that of the older population (65+) declined by the same percentage. Likewise, the share of females fell from one-third of the total SAP in 2000 to one-fourth in 2014.




Figure 5. Age and sex composition of the South Asian population in Spain, 2014.

Source: Authors' elaboration of data from the Municipal Register of Inhabitants (*Padrón continuo*, 2000–2014), INE.

Socio-economic characteristics

Legal status

SAP had the highest proportion of rejected applications for regularization in 2005 (25 percent) and for the continuous process of regularization (*Arriago*) from 2006 to 2010 (more than 60 percent) compared to other immigrant groups in Spain (Domingo et al., 2012). Many applications were denied due to suspected irregularities in the work contracts and contracting firms. According to data from the *Statistical Yearbook 2000–2014* (Ministry of Employment and Social Security, 2015a), in 2000, there were 16,835 South Asians (on the basis of nationality) who held a permit for permanent residence in Spain in which the share of Indians, Bangladeshis and Pakistanis was 7,813, 1,179 and 7,843, respectively. As noted earlier, this increased because of new inflows and the regularization process. In 2014, there were 116,572 South Asians with residence permits, in which 61 percent were Pakistanis followed by Indians (29.5 percent) and Bangladeshis (9.5 percent). The number of females with residence permits in 2014 was almost one-third (37,586) of the total SAP.

The process of Spanish nationality acquisition for SAP has remained low because of the stringent eligibility criteria: 10 years of permanent and uninterrupted regular stay in Spain and a certain level of integration in Spanish

society. Many South Asians fall short of the residence requirement. In 2000, 298 South Asians received Spanish nationality, in which 232 were Indians, followed by 60 Pakistanis and six Bangladeshis. In 2013, a record number of 4,536 South Asians received Spanish nationality. This exceptional increase resulted from administrative changes introduced by the government of Spain in 2013 which authorized the Public Notary to process citizenship applications.¹

Level of education

As of the 2011 Census, almost one-third of the SAP (above 16 years of age) was illiterate or with no formal education and another one-third with only primary education. These immigrants were mainly from the rural regions of South Asia. A small proportion (2.63 percent) also had professional training courses after arriving in Spain to improve their human capital. Overall, it is clear that the level of education of SAP was very low. Among the South Asians, Indians had the highest education, followed by Bangladeshis and Pakistanis.

Economic activities and occupational status

Migration from South Asia to Spain has been motivated by economic reasons (Beltran, 2002). In the last century, South Asians have entered almost all sectors, but they were more visible in the service sector, including trade (corner shops, small-scale import and export), restaurants (bars, cafeterias, take away and traditional fast food stalls), personal services (barber shops, repair shops), travel and communication (calling booths, travel agencies), private academies (language and art schools) and recently, small construction firms (Beltrán and Saiz López, 2009). In Barcelona, where there is a big Pakistani community, many ethnic business activities like *halal* meat shops, traditional garment shops, grocery stores and food stalls flourished (Moreras, 2005).

Another important feature was the limited participation of women in economic activities. The majority of working women were engaged in their family businesses or were in domestic work. According to the *Statistical Yearbook 2014* (Ministry of Employment and Social Security, 2015b), only 10 percent of the

¹In order to respond to the increased number of nationality applications, in 2012, the Spanish government approved a processing plan for Citizenship by Residence (PIT). In this plan, the management of civil registration was delegated to registrars of property, including the management of the nationalization process, except the final step—swearing in or oath-taking—which was commissioned to notaries. This initiative, which in fact was an attempt at outsourcing, proved unsuccessful due to the unusual increase in refusals by registrars, among others. In 2013, the entire process was passed on to the College of Notaries, to deal with the accumulated record number of applications.

South Asian working population were women. By country, the share of women workers was highest in the Indian community (17 percent), followed by Bangladeshis (9 percent) and Pakistanis (5 percent).

Based on the 2011 Census, 44.2 percent of South Asians were employed either full-time or part-time, in which 42 percent were engaged in the service sector, followed by 24 percent in construction, and 19 percent in trade and commerce. Forty-two percent were temporary workers and 36 percent were permanent workers with full-time indefinite work contracts. A small proportion of 8.8 percent were either self-employed in the service sector or owners of small shops. Another 10.6 percent were the owners of firms employing other wage-workers.

Household structure

In the first decade of the 21st century, family reunification has changed the household structure of SAP to a greater extent. Earlier, the majority of males came alone in search of work and other economic opportunities. These cohorts of single men started living together in small shared flats in the low-cost zones of big cities. This trend resulted in the formation of many households of unrelated persons. Once the men have become established, they bring their families to Spain. Consequently, the structure of SAP households changed and many complex households with one or more than one couple living together come into existence. The presence of children also become a regular feature of SAP households. It is also interesting to note that despite of the high rates of masculinity, a major part of the SAP live in complex households.

In 2011, the average number of inhabitants in different household typologies of SAP (see Figure 6a), was between one (single-person household) and seven (two or more couples households). The most common household typology, 'couples with kids,' has on average 4.4 inhabitants per household. Shared households (two or more couples with or without kids) have the highest number of inhabitants (6.5) per household. It shows that many South Asians are living in shared houses.




Figure 6a. Average inhabitants per household among the South Asian population in Spain, 2011. **Figure 6b.** Household typologies of the South Asian population in Spain, 2011.

Source: Authors’ elaboration of data from Census 2011, INE.

In 2011, among different household typologies, ‘couples with kids’ households (35 percent) were the most frequent as compared to others. It is followed by households of unrelated persons (17 percent), which were mostly formed by new immigrants who were still in the early phase of settlement and these households were a part of their migration strategy to settle in Spain (see Figure 6b).

Spatial distribution

The spatial distribution of South Asians reflects the different immigrant waves that arrived in Spain with different motivations and socio-economic profiles and the concentration of various economic activities—agriculture, mining, industry and services—in specific areas in Spain. In the last decades of the 19th century, the initial settlement of South Asians was limited to the Canary Islands (Navarro, 1974) and the southern cities of Ceuta and Melilla (Falzon, 2007), where they settled as traders to participate in the international trade market. At that time, they were few in numbers and they were concentrated in the coastal zones and central market places (López-Sala, 2013). Later on, in the 1980s, with the decline in trade opportunities in the Canary Islands, they moved to the coastal cities of the Mediterranean and big metropolitan areas like Barcelona, Madrid and Valencia.

In the late 1970s, a new flow of immigrants in search of job opportunities moved to other regions of central and southern Spain. These flows attracted

specific groups of South Asians: the Pakistanis pioneered the migration to the mining regions of the provinces of Teruel, Leon and Jaen (Aubia and Roca, 2005) while the Sikh community from India were attracted to the intensive agricultural activities in La Rioja, Valencia, Catalonia and Murcia (Torre Pacheco) and the meat factories of Vic and Olot in Girona (Farjas, 2006). Later on, with the construction boom in Spain (mainly during 2002–2008) a major part of SAP settled in the expanding cities and suburbs, where they became engaged in the construction business like in Catalonia, Valencia and Madrid. Recently, other important settlements have emerged with the concentration of ethnic businesses in boroughs like El Raval in Barcelona and Lavapiés in Madrid. Because of the economic crisis and reduced work opportunities in the other sectors, many South Asians in the big cities have entered the tourist sector.

In 2014, the spatial distribution of SAP is highly unequal (see Figure 7). Six municipalities including Barcelona (21.5 percent), Madrid (6 percent), Badalona (5.62 percent), Valencia (5.6 percent), Hospitalet de Llobregat (4.6 percent) and Santa Coloma de Gramanet (3.6 percent), accounted for 47 percent of total SAP. Except in the two clusters of Madrid and northern




Figure 7. Territorial distribution of the South Asian population in Spain, 2014.

Source: Authors' elaboration of data from the Municipal Register of Inhabitants (*Padrón continuo*, 2014), INE.

Autonomous Communities² of La Rioja and Basque Country, the majority of SAP was concentrated on the Mediterranean coastal region and island groups of Spain. Another distinguishing feature was its concentration along the banks of the River Ebro passing through Vitoria (Basque Country), Logroño (La Rioja), Zaragoza (Aragon), and Tortosa and Amposta (Catalonia).

In 2014, at the level of Autonomous Communities, the distribution of SAP is even more skewed as compared to the municipal level. Only four Autonomous Communities, that is, Catalonia (53.8 percent), Valencia (13.6 percent), Madrid (7.9 percent) and Andalucía (4.9 percent), accounted for 80 percent of the total SAP in Spain. Catalonia alone had more than half of the total SAP, while Navarra, Cantabria, La Rioja and Extremadura had the least share (1.4 percent each).

Conclusions

In the last two decades, SAP in Spain has not only increased substantially in numbers, but also evolved in socio-demographic and territorial aspects. The flow and stock have multiplied more than 16 and 10 times to reach 15,069 and 131,230, respectively in 2014. The number of females in the total population has increased, but interestingly the level of masculinity was even higher in 2014 as compared to 2000. The same holds true for the age structure—the proportion of young and young adult population has increased but the elderly population has declined.

The regularization process of immigrants remained very slow for South Asians. They had the highest number of rejected applications under the process of continuous regularization process (*Arraigo*). Their level of education was poor as more than half of the population above 16 years had below primary education. It also resulted in their occupational segregation in few sectors of the economy, where high skills are not required. Only a small share of women was engaged in economic activities, and that was mainly in their family businesses, where they live and work with very limited exposure to local society. The majority of SAP was engaged in the service sector followed by trade and commercial activities, and most had temporary work contracts. This occupational segregation contributes to their residential concentration in big metropolitan cities of Spain. In 2014, almost 80 percent of the total population were settled in the metropolitan cities of Barcelona, Madrid and Valencia. Half of the SAP can be found in the autonomous community of Catalonia.

The majority of South Asians were living in family households (i.e., couples with children, including households with two or more families). Family

²In Spain, an Autonomous Community is a first-level political and administrative division, created in accordance with the Spanish constitution of 1978, with the aim of guaranteeing limited autonomy to the nationalities and regions that comprise the Spanish nation. At present, there are 17 autonomous communities and two autonomous cities (Ceuta and Melilla) in Spain.

reunification has increased the number of family households, that is, households comprising related members. However, at the same time, the number of households of unrelated persons continues to increase, which suggests the continuing immigration facilitated by social networks and the tendency of shared-housing among new immigrants from South Asia. The average number of inhabitants in two or more couples households is 6.5 individuals.

It is evident that the economic crisis has disrupted the immigration and settlement process, integration in the labor market and family reunification plans of SAP in Spain. Presently, Spain has become a center of dispersion for SAP to another diasporic location as increased level of unemployment and poor living conditions forced many South Asians to return home or migrate to other locations after receiving Spanish nationality.

In the future, it will be interesting to explore other aspects of SAP in Spain: its spatial distribution (residential and occupational segregation) and concentration in different Spanish cities and its contribution in the formation of highly diverse neighborhoods the comparison of new migratory movements with old diasporic settlements around the globe; and how SAP and the Spanish population view and engage with each other.

Declaration of conflicting interests

The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this paper.

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CONCENTRATION AND DIVERSITY OF SOUTH ASIAN POPULATION IN SPAIN^a

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Introduction

Since the first decade of the 21st century, the spatial concentration of immigrants has become a hotly debated issue in many European countries. Basically, it was related to the exponential increase of international immigration to various European countries (Schönwälder, 2007). During this time, Spain remained in the list of top immigrant-receiving countries in Europe. According to Eurostat, in 2010, there were 6.4 million foreign-born residents in Spain, corresponding to 14.0% of its total population. Of whom, 4.1 million (8.9%) were born outside the European Union and 2.3 million (5.1%) were born in other member states. Along with the large size of the immigrant population, the most important feature of this immigration was its level of diversity, in terms of different origins and ethnic backgrounds of immigrants, that it brought to the host society (Anderson, 2007).

In this huge flow of immigrants to Spain, a small part was consisted of South Asian immigrants (including immigrants from three most represented countries i.e. India, Pakistan and Bangladesh). During the last decade, the number of south Asians also increased dramatically. The most distinguishing feature of the South Asian population (SAP) was its 'spatial concentration'. It fuelled the debate over the residential segregation of immigrants in major metropolitan cities of Spain. In this paper, our main objectives are: first, to explore the flow and stock of the SAP and their spatial distribution in Spain; secondly, an empirical analysis of the level of concentration and segregation of the SAP in Spain; thirdly, to explore that the concentration of the SAP is coinciding with the areas of high population diversity or not.

This paper is divided into four sections: 1) an overview of the growth and settlement pattern of the SAP in Spain; 2) the spatial analysis of the level of residential segregation (evenness and isolation) of the SAP in different parts of Spain; 3) a comparative study on the levels of concentration of the SAP and its relation with the existing population diversity in the metropolitan area of Barcelona in Spain; and finally, an open discussion for future studies.


1. THE GROWTH AND SETTLEMENT PATTERENS OF THE SOUTH ASIAN POPULATION IN SPAIN, 2000-2014

1.1 The flow of South Asians to Spain

South Asians have a long history of immigration to Spain. For a long time, this immigration flow was dominated by the Sindhi traders and later on by the semi-skilled and highly-skilled workers (Sala López, 2013). The Sindhis first entered Spanish territory in the last decades of the 19th century (Navarro, 1974). This flow remained continued thereafter. According to the Residential Variance Statistics (EVR, 2000-2013) published by the INE, the flow of immigrants born in South Asia increased exponentially during the last decade, from a mere 1,747 in the year 2000 to 28,593 in the year 2010 (Fig. 1). The most significant rise has been witnessed in the year 2004, when it multiplied 4 times to cross the mark of 14,865 immigrants from just 3,516 in the year 2003. This tremendous increase can be associated with two important events: first related to the data collection system, and second is of legal character. Firstly, in the year 2004, INE started to make entries without the information of origin, which was generally referred as '*Altas por Omisión*'. It is possible that a significant part of this increase had come from these entries. Secondly, due to the regularization process of immigrants that took place in the year 2005, many immigrants who were already living in Spain before and for some reasons were not registered in the municipal register of inhabitants, had started to

get registered in the municipal register to reap the benefit of the regularization process. It had also worked as a ‘call-effect’ for the people who were thinking about migration. They rushed to Spain to get regularize and become legal residents of Spain. Along with direct flow from South Asia many immigrants from the neighbouring countries, where they were living in an irregular situation, also entered Spain to regularize their legal status. In the year 2006, this flow witnessed a sharp decline. Again it may be a result of the ‘exits due to expiry’ (*Baja por Caducidad*), which was introduced by INE in the year 2006 to control the overestimation of the immigrant population. After this steep decline, owing to the process of family reunification, this flow increased in the coming years. Eventually, it reached to its peak in the year 2010, with 28,593 individuals entered only in this year. From here it starts falling at a considerable speed to stabilize around 15,631 immigrants in the year 2013. This fall was a result of the recent economic crisis and scarcity of jobs in the Spanish labour market. Along with its exponential growth, some other important features of this flow were: its concentration in young adult age groups 15-45 (80% lies in this age groups), and the high level of masculinity (4 men per women among Pakistani and Bangladeshi immigrants, and 3 men per women among Indian immigrants).

Figure 1: The evolution of the inflow of South Asian Immigrants to Spain, 2000-2013.



Source: Own elaboration with Residential Variance Statistics (EVR 2000-2013), INE.


1.2 Stock of South Asian Population in Spain

The stock of the SAP has remained very small till the end of the 20th century. According to the data from municipal register of inhabitants (*Padrón Continuo*, 2000-2014), in the year 2000 the total number of South Asians in Spain was 12,819 individuals, of whom 57% were Indians, 39% were Pakistanis and 4% were Bangladeshis. Owing to its small size, in the year 2000 it consisted of only 0.87% of the total foreign population residing in Spain, and 0.03% of the total population of Spain. During the first decades of the 21st century, it witnessed a dramatic increase of more than 10 times to reach on its peak in 2013, with 132,398 residents registered in municipal register. In the year 2013, the share of Pakistanis and Bangladeshis in the total SAP was increased to 60% and 10.1%, respectively, that of Indians was reduced to 29.9%. The share of the SAP in the total foreign population and the total population of Spain also increased to 1.99% and 0.28%, respectively. But this process of regular growth halted in the year 2014, and the total number of SAP fell down (almost 1%) to 131,230 individuals, in whom the proportion of Pakistanis and Bangladeshis declined to 59.5% and 10.04% respectively, while the proportion of Indians increased to 30.4%. This decline in the stock is a result of the decline in the new flow of new immigrants from South Asia to Spain, and

owing to the re-emigration of south Asians to other diasporic locations, like Germany, England and most recently Canada, due to the ill-effects of the economic crisis on the labour market in Spain.

In the year 2000, the size of the SAP was merely 12,819 individuals, which increased to 19,022 in the year 2001. This was a tremendous increase of 48% in one year (Fig. 2). It was an outcome of the regularization process of immigrants held in the year 2000. After this sharp increase, the size of stock started to grow at a regular pace and reached to 72,451 individuals in the year 2006, but in the next year it increased only 1.6%, this low rate of growth was probably caused by the exits from the municipal registers caused by the expiry of registration '*Bajas por Caducidad*' introduced by INE in the year 2006. From 2008 onward the growth rate of the SAP also reduced. In the year 2013, it reached to its maximum size of 132,398 individuals. But owing to the remigration of south Asians from Spain, their number declined to 131,230 individuals in the year 2014. Up to the year 2000, the SAP was dominated by the Indian immigrants, who were replaced by Pakistanis in the year 2001. During 2001 to 2014, the proportion of Pakistanis and Bangladeshis in SAP increased by 23% and 6%, respectively; on the contrary the proportion of Indians reduced by almost 29%.

Figure 2: The evolution of the stock of the South Asian Population in Spain, 2000-2014.




Source: Own elaboration, data from Municipal Register of Inhabitants (*Padrón continuo*) 2000-2014, INE.

Throughout its history the SAP was dominated by young males (Fig. 3), in the year 2000 there were 4,593 females for 8,226 males, this difference widened in the coming years and finally in the year 2014 there were 34,489 females for 96,741 males. Within the SAP, the level of masculinity was highest in the Bangladeshi community (4.1 men per woman), followed by Pakistani (4. men per woman) and Indian (3.4 men per woman) communities. Another important feature of this population was its concentration in the young adult age groups (25 to 39 years old). In 2014, around 45% of the SAP was in the young adults age group.

Figure 3: The evolution of age structure and sex composition of SAP in Spain, 2000-2014

2000

2014



Source: Own elaboration, data from Municipal Register of Inhabitants (Padrón continuo) 2000-2014, INE.

1.3 Spatial distribution of South Asian Population in Spain

After exploring the size and structure of the SAP, for the better understanding of their living conditions and their level of residential concentration and segregation in Spain, it is also important to explore its territorial distribution in different parts of Spain. The present territorial distribution of the SAP is a result of different settlement strategies and timings of all major waves of immigrants (including traders, unskilled workers and highly skilled workers) from South Asia and other diasporic locations. Moreover, it has also affected by the concentration of various economic activities, including agriculture, mining, industries and services, in some specific parts of Spain. In the last decades of the 19th century, the first settlement of the SAP was the Canary Islands, where they settled as traders to participate in the international trade market. At that time their number was limited and they were concentrated in the coastal zones and central market places of the free port cities in the Canary Islands (López-Sala, 2013). They flourished in this region till late 1970s. Later on, they entered other southern cities of Spain, i.e. Ceuta and Melilla, and to a neighbour country, Andorra, in the north of Spain (Borra, 2006). In the 1980s, most of them moved to the coastal cities of the Mediterranean Sea and the big metropolitan cities of Spain, like Barcelona, Valencia and Madrid.


In the late 1970s, a new flow of the south Asians entered Spain with totally different profile and settlement strategies. This flow entered Spain in the search of job opportunities and migrated to other regions of central and southern Spain, where there was the concentration of jobs in agriculture, industry and other primary activities like mining. These early settlements were shaped by some very diverse, but specific economic activities, like the mining regions of the provinces of Teruel, Leon and Jaen attracted many Pakistanis; regions with intensive agricultural activities like La Rioja, Valencia, Catalonia and Murcia, and food processing industry like Vic and Olot in Girona, attracted many Indians for the permanent settlement (Aubia and Roca, 2005; Farjas, 2006a, 2006b). This process of settlement in the internal rural and suburban zones led to the emergence of new areas of concentration for the SAP. Later on, with the construction boom in Spain (mainly during 2002-2008), an important part of the SAP settled in the expanding cities and suburbs, where they get engaged in the construction business, like in Barcelona. Recently, with the concentration of ethnic businesses including souvenir shops (Indians), grocery stores and wholesale businesses of cloths and food products (Pakistanis and Bangladeshis) and the increased participation of the SAP in Service sector of major cities, like Barcelona, Madrid, Badalona, Lloret de Mar,

Salou, Valencia, Benidorm, Alicante, Torrevieja and Malaga other important settlements are emerging in different parts of Spain (Beltrán and Sáiz-López, 2002).

In the year 2014, the distribution of SAP was highly unequal in the favour of some municipalities (map 1). Only six municipalities, including Barcelona (21.5%), Madrid (6%), Badalona (5.62%), Valencia (5.6%), l'Hospitalet de Llobregat (4.6%) and Santa Coloma de Gramanet (3.6%) had half of the total SAP. Except two clusters of Madrid and northern Autonomous communities of La Rioja and Basque Country, most of the SAP was concentrated on the Mediterranean coastal region (mainly in Catalonia with more than half of the total population) and island groups of Spain. Another distinguished feature of this distribution was the concentration of the SAP along with the banks of the river Ebro passing through Vitoria (Basque Country), Logroño (La Rioja), Zaragoza (Aragon), Tortosa and Amposta (Catalonia). This concentration of population was due to the availability of jobs in the intensive agriculture of the plains of the river Ebro, which was the main occupation of many South Asians in the 1990s. If we draw a line dividing Spain longitudinally, the majority of the SAP was settled in the eastern part while the western part was still unoccupied.

In 2014, the distribution of the SAP was even more skewed at the level of Autonomous Communities of Spain. Only four Autonomous communities' i.e. Catalonia (53.8%), Valencia (13.6%), Madrid (7.9%) and Andalucía (4.9%) had 80% of the total SAP. Catalonia was leading with more than half of the total SAP. On the contrary Navarra, Cantabria, La Rioja and Extremadura were having the least proportion of the SAP (1.4%).

Map 1. The territorial distribution of the South Asian Population in Spain, 2014.




Source: Own elaboration with data from Municipal Registers (Padrón Continuo 2014) INE.

During 2000-2014, the territorial distribution of SAP was affected by new arrivals, expansion of economic activities, government policies and social or family networks. Barcelona always remained the centre of attraction for the South Asian immigrants. According to the data available from municipal register (Padrón Continuo 2000-2014), in the year 2000 there were

2,422 (19%) South Asians in Barcelona municipality. This number increased to 28,184 individuals (22%) in the year 2014. After Barcelona, Badalona and Valencia also registered a significant increase from 185 (1.4%) individuals to 7,388 (5.6%) and 328(2.6%) to 7,358 (5.6%), respectively. Interestingly, in the case of Madrid population was increased from 980 individuals in the year 2000 to 7,941 individuals in the year 2014, but its proportion in the total SAP has reduced from 7.5% in the year 2000 to 6% in the year 2014. The major fall in the share of the SAP was witnessed in Canary Islands, where its relative proportion falls from 18% in the year 2000 to 3.4% in the year 2014. This fall was resulted by the absence of new arrivals, re-emigration and the exponential growth of population in other parts of Spain. Hospitalet de Llobregat, Palma de Mallorca, Logroño, Benidorm, Alicante, Lloret de Mar, Vitoria, Torrevieja and Salou were emerging as new centers of concentration. During this period SAP has witnessed a large concentration in the eastern parts of Spain.

Figure 4: The municipalities with highest number of the South Asian Population in Spain, 2000-2014.



Source: Own elaboration, data from Municipal Registers (Padrón Continuo 2000-2014) INE.

2. RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION OF THE SAP IN SPAIN

The distribution of the SAP in Spain remained highly uneven in the favour of metropolitan areas, like Barcelona, Madrid and Valencia. This pattern is also visible at the infra municipal level, with some areas of high concentration, like El Raval in Barcelona, Russafa in Valencia and Lavapiés in Madrid. This residential segregation of population has an enormous effect on the changing physical landscape of urban areas, diversification of neighbourhoods and in the modification of the traditional functions of these boroughs.

Residential segregation is the physical separation of two or more groups into different neighbourhoods (Massey and Denton, 1988). For the spatial analysis of residential segregation, we have opted for the municipalities with more than 1000 South Asian residents in 2014. The selection of municipal level is based on two reasons; firstly, because it's the smallest individual political unit with separate identities and local administration, which is keenly interested in population settlement strategies and internal movements, sometimes for the administrative purposes and sometimes to deal with the demands of different minority groups; secondly, data from the municipal register (Padrón continuo, 2014) is availability up to the census track level, which helps in micro level analysis of residential concentration and segregation. For the statistical calculation of the level of segregation, we have applied the most widely used measures of segregation i.e. Lieberman's Isolation index (P^*) and the Dissimilarity index (ID).

2.1 The degree of Isolation of the South Asian Population in different municipalities of Spain

Conceptually, Isolation Index (P^*) measures “the extent to which minority members are exposed to one another,” and is computed as the minority-weighted average of the minority proportion in each area (Lieberman 1961; 1981). It is an asymmetric index: what is true of one group of a pair is not true of its comparator. P^* works on the principle that if in a city the majority population ('a') forms, say, 90 per cent of the population and the minority ('b') forms 10 per cent, then the 10 per cent is much more exposed to contact with the 90 per cent than the 90 per cent is exposed to the 10 per cent. The value of P^* indicates the percentage probability of a member of group 'a' meeting a member of the group 'b' in the areas where group 'a' lives. To measure the internal differences of the SAP, the indices of isolation are calculated separately for all countries of this group.

2.1.1 INDIA

The Indian population in Spain is highly concentrated in the big metropolitan cities. The value of the isolation index for selected municipalities with a significant number of Indian population has increased from 0.78 in 2000 to 1.5 in 2014 (Fig. 5.1). Interestingly the values of the isolation index for almost all municipalities have been increased except Santa Cruz de Tenerife, where this value reduced from 3.32 in 2000 to 2.34 in 2014. In the year 2014, the maximum value of Isolation Index was recorded for the municipality of Santa Coloma de Gramanet (2.4), followed by Santa Cruz de Tenerife (2.3), Hospitalet de Llobregat (2) and Badalona (1.6) and minimum value (0.20) was for the municipality of Vitoria-Gasteiz. In the major metropolitan cities, Barcelona topped with the value of 1.3, followed by Valencia (1.1) and Madrid (0.36).

2.1.2 PAKISTAN

The exposure of Pakistani population to native Spanish population was also considerably low. On the average, the value of the isolation index has been increased from 0.7 in 2000 to 3.8 in 2014 (Fig. 5.2). During 2000-2014, the highest increase in the isolation index has been

recorded in the municipality of Badalona (11.7), followed by Benidorm (5), Barcelona (4) and Santa Coloma de Gramenet (3.6). In the year 2014, Badalona topped with highest Isolation score of 13 and the lowest was recorded in Santa Cruz de Tenerife (0.36). In the metropolitan cities, the isolation index for Pakistanis was highest in Barcelona (7.7) followed by Valencia (2.6) and least in Madrid (0.6).


2.1.3 BANGLADESH

The value of the isolation index for the selected municipalities on the average has been increased from 0.3 in the year 2000 to 2 in the year 2014 (Fig. 5.3). The highest increase in the value of isolation index was witnessed in the municipality of Madrid (5.9), followed by Barcelona (3.8) and Santa Coloma de Gramenet (3.4) and the lowest increase was witnessed in Valencia (0.11). In the year 2014, the highest score of isolation was recorded in Madrid (7) followed by the municipalities of l'Hospitalet de Llobregat (6.24) and Barcelona (4.5), and the least index value was registered in the municipalities of Torre Vieja (0.3), Alicante and Palma de Mallorca (0.5).


The P* values calculated for the different countries of the SAP in all municipalities have shown an increase in the level of isolation, which further interpreted as an increase in the level of segregation and low exposure to native population. But here it is important to mention that the P* is highly sensitive to the percentage changes of population, so a test is essential to overcome the effect of proportionate population growth on the P* values.

Figure 5: The evolution of Isolation Index for SAP in different municipalities of Spain, 2000-2014.


5.1 India



5.2 Pakistan



5.3 Bangladesh



Source: Own elaboration with data from Municipal Registers (Padrón Continuo 2000-2014) INE.

2.2 The Indices of Dissimilarity (ID) of SAP in different municipalities of Spain

Another important measure of residential segregation applied to study the evenness of the distribution of the SAP in different municipalities is the ‘dissimilarity index (ID)’. It measures the percentage of a group’s population that would have to change residence for each neighbourhood to match the distribution of other group in the whole territory under study (Duncan and Duncan, 1955). The index ranges from 0 (complete integration) to 100 (complete segregation). It compares the residential distribution of pairs of population groups in cities. It has proved attractive because the theory underlying ethnic segregation studies explains that there is an inverse relationship between the degree to which two populations are segregated from one another and the degree of assimilation or social interaction between the two groups. Values below 39 are taken as ‘low’ segregation; 40-49 are taken as moderate, 50-59 as moderately high, 60-69 as ‘high’ and 70 and over as ‘very high’ segregation.

2.2.1 INDIA:

The dissimilarity index of Indian population shows that the level of unevenness has declined significantly in all the selected municipalities. It declined from 87.6 in the year 2000 to 61.3 in the year 2014 (graph 6.1), which is still very high as per international standards. The highest decline has witnessed in the municipality of l'Hospitalet de Llobregat (40) and the lowest decline has recorded in the municipality of Santa Cruz de Tenerife (4) but here it is relevant to mention that the fall in ID of l'Hospitalet de Llobregat can be related to the new entrance and settlement of Indian population in its different areas, but this little fall in Santa Cruz de Tenerife is associated with the failure of the process of assimilation, as it has the oldest settlements of Indian population in Spain and still the level of segregation is very high (ID more than 70). In the year 2014, the ID of all municipalities ranged in between the maximum of 82.4 in Vitoria-Gasteiz to the minimum of 49.6 in l'Hospitalet de Llobregat. Barcelona and Madrid were at the same ID in the year 2000 i.e. 85, but interestingly in the year 2014, in Barcelona it declined to 56, whereas in Madrid it declined to 66. This difference of 10 points is related to the arrival of relatively high number of immigrants to Barcelona as compared to Madrid during this time period.

2.2.2 PAKISTAN

The ID for Pakistan has also declined significantly in the last decades from 87.4 on the average in 2000 to 60.1 in the year 2014 (graph 6.2), with the exception of the municipality of Santa Cruz de Tenerife, where it increased from 85.5 in the year 2000 to 86.2 in the year 2014. The highest declined has witnessed in the municipality of Vitoria-Gasteiz (53) from 99.2 to 45.9, followed by Benidorm (43), l'Hospitalet de Llobregat (42), Palma de Mallorca and Valencia (30). Among the big metropolitan cities, in the year 2014, the municipality of Madrid has the highest level of segregation with ID of 82 followed by Barcelona (63.4) and Valencia (56.6). Interestingly, Valencia with a small absolute number of Pakistani populations, as compared to Barcelona and Madrid, has registered the least level of residential segregation among metropolitan cities.


2.2.3 BANGLADEH

Bangladesh has a relatively small population among South Asians in Spain, but the level of residential segregation is relatively higher than others countries of South Asia. The average value of ID has been reduced from 94.6 in the year 2000 to 80.5 in the year 2014 (Fig 6.3), but still it is higher as compared to any other immigrant group in these municipalities. The maximum declined in the value of ID has been witnessed in the municipality of Arona (18.4) followed by Palma de Mallorca (17.6) and Badalona (16.8) but still it is more than 75 in all these municipalities, which is referred as very high segregation as per international standards. In the year 2014, the lowest level of segregation was recorded in the municipality of Santa Coloma de Gramanet (56.4) and the highest was recorded in in the municipality of Valencia (93.8), this huge gap in the level of residential segregation is the outcome of the difference in the time of settlement and the size of Bangladeshi community in both municipalities. Metropolitan cities like Madrid and Barcelona, where lives almost half of their total population, have also recorded the high level of residential segregation in relatively poor areas of the city, with the ID of 84.1 and 85.3, respectively.


The values of ID of the SAP in all the selected municipalities has shown a considerable decline during 2000-2014. It indicates that the degree of residential segregation is declining in all municipalities. It is a good sign for the south Asian community but if we compare their dissimilarity index with other immigrant groups in same municipalities, they still are in the high side of the residential segregation.

Figure 6: The Dissimilarity Index of the South Asian Population in different municipalities of Spain, 2000-2014.


6.1 India



6.2 Pakistan



6.3 Bangladesh



Source: Own elaboration with data from Municipal Registers (Padrón Continuo 2000-2014) INE.

2.3 Comparison of both Indices of Segregation

After calculating the results of both indices of segregation (i.e. P* and ID), we reached over a paradoxical situation. In which, on the one hand the values of Dissimilarity Index (ID) show decline in the level of residential segregation of the SAP, while on the other hand the values of Isolation Index (P*) show the rise of Isolation. The explanation for this lies in the fact that P* is highly sensitive to a group's proportional size in a city's population. While the ID is largely insensitive to the percentage size of population, hence it provides relatively more reliable results on the level of segregation.

2.3.1 TEST OF P* VALUES

The calculated P* values of SAP, show its increasing isolation in almost all selected municipalities of Spain, but in fact it is misleading, because the P* values are highly correlated with the proportion that immigrant groups form of the total population in these municipalities. Since the size of the SAP has increased by several times between the year 2000 and 2014, it is inevitable that P* values will increase. To control the effect of increasing proportion of population on P* value, these values are divided by the per cent share that the group forms of the whole population (Sin, 2002). If the group were randomly distributed, its percentage in every municipality would be the same, as the percentage that it forms of the population of the whole country. If the distribution were random, P* divided by the group's county per cent would be 1. Thus any value above 1 would represent clustering or isolation. The increase in the values of isolation in all the municipalities is the result of increasing percentage of the SAP in the total population of the municipality (table 1). It does not really correspond to the increasing level of segregation of the SAP in these municipalities. For example, the P* value for Pakistanis in Barcelona has increased from 3.58 to 7.7, but in relation to its proportion of population in Barcelona it decreased from 39.3 to 3.34. It is clear that the degree of isolation and hence segregation of the SAP is high, but it is reducing considerably with the new arrivals and the expansion of south Asians in new territories.

Table 1: Comparison of P* values for SAP in major municipalities of Spain, 2000-2014.

| YEAR | 2000 | | | 2014 | | |
|---------------------------------|------|-----------|--------|-------|-----------|-------|
| | P* | % POP (T) | P*/T | P* | % POP (T) | P*/T |
| BARCELONA | | | | | | |
| INDIA | 0.85 | 0.12 | 7.2201 | 1.36 | 1.39 | 0.977 |
| PAKISTAN | 3.58 | 0.04 | 85.173 | 7.70 | 0.36 | 21.5 |
| BANGLADESH | 0.69 | 0.01 | 65.279 | 4.49 | 0.23 | 19.31 |
| MADRID | | | | | | |
| INDIA | 0.24 | 0.01 | 43.831 | 0.62 | 0.06 | 11.13 |
| PAKISTAN | 0.33 | 0.02 | 13.264 | 0.36 | 0.07 | 4.876 |
| BANGLADESH | 0.41 | 0.01 | 70.372 | 6.31 | 0.16 | 39.12 |
| SANTA COLOMA DE GRAMANET | | | | | | |
| INDIA | 0.50 | 0.08 | 6.0374 | 4.12 | 1.96 | 2.104 |
| PAKISTAN | 0.35 | 0.03 | 12.124 | 2.40 | 0.95 | 2.525 |
| BANGLADESH | 0.66 | 0.12 | 5.7049 | 4.12 | 1.30 | 3.179 |
| BADALONA | | | | | | |
| INDIA | 1.33 | 0.05 | 28.571 | 13.09 | 2.97 | 4.403 |
| PAKISTAN | 0.91 | 0.02 | 39.291 | 1.58 | 0.47 | 3.341 |
| BANGLADESH | 0.62 | 0.02 | 29.45 | 1.19 | 0.18 | 6.684 |

| HOSPITALET DE LLOBREGAT | | | | | | |
|--------------------------------|------|------|--------|------|------|-------|
| INDIA | 0.52 | 0.04 | 12.508 | 2.63 | 1.74 | 1.511 |
| PAKISTAN | 0.39 | 0.03 | 11.503 | 2.03 | 1.17 | 1.736 |
| BANGLADESH | 0.07 | 0.00 | 148.29 | 0.24 | 0.03 | 7.706 |

Source: Own elaboration with data from Municipal Registers (Padrón Continuo 2000-2014) INE.

3. CONCENTRATION OF SAP AND POPULATION DIVERSITY IN THE METROPOLITAN AREA OF BARCELONA

In this section our prime objectives are: first, to mark the areas of high concentration of the SAP in the Metropolitan Area of Barcelona (AMB); and secondly, to analysis the population diversity in the AMB, to determine that the areas of high concentration of the SAP coincides with the areas of high population diversity in the AMB or the concentration areas of the SAP are becoming the ethnic enclaves or ghettos of a specific country.

3.1 Concentration of SAP in the Metropolitan Area of Barcelona


Concentration is the most important feature of the SAP and it is visible in almost all metropolitan cities of Spain. The level of concentration has been increased in the past decade with huge arrivals of new immigrants through social and family networks and the increased concentration of economic activities in the big cities. To show the level of concentration, we are using the data from municipal registers (Padrón Continuo 2013), which provides detailed information over spatial distribution of SAP in different census tracks of all municipalities. For the statistical calculations of the degree of concentration, we are applying the index of Coefficient of Localization (QL). It relates the proportion of a particular group in a census section to the proportion of this group in the whole territory. The value of QL is interpreted as if the value is below 0.85, it is considered as the situation of under representation, if the value is in between 0.85 to 1.2, neutral and if the value if over 1.2, as overrepresentation or high concentration (Brown and Chung, 2006).

For the detailed analysis of concentration at census section level, we are going to focus on the AMB. It is a territorial entity operating on the principle of metropolitan municipality composed of Barcelona and 34 adjacent municipalities around the city. It has remained the centre of attraction for the SAP for the last century. It has the highest share of the SAP in Spain, which is mainly concentrated in the boroughs of the old city centre, where they first settled in the initial stages of their migration process. More than 40% of the total SAP lives in the AMB. Interestingly, one can find two most distinctive types of neighbourhoods, where they live. In first place is the central city area of El Raval, which is mainly occupied by the lower income daily wage workers, who are living in poor conditions in old substandard apartments and work mainly in the service sector. In the second place, we have found the ancient Spanish immigrant neighbourhoods of La Verneda, Trinitat Vella, Trinitat Nova, parts of El Poblenou and Santa Coloma de Gramanet. These areas were initially occupied by the Spanish immigrants, but as now many of them have moved to other areas, these cheap and substandard residential areas are now occupied by the South Asian immigrants.

In the AMB, the areas with over representation of the SAP include the districts of Ciutat Vella (El Raval) and Sants-Montjuic (Poble Sec) in the municipality of Barcelona, which is the most significant area in the context of immigrant population settlement (map 2). The neighbourhood of El Raval has the highest number of Pakistani immigrants followed by Indians and Bangladeshis, and after El Raval another area which is emerging as a new centre with over representation of the SAP is the district of El Poblenou. Second important cluster includes the districts of Collblanc-Torrassa, La Florida-La Planes and Pubilla Casas-Can

Serra in the municipality of l'Hospitalet de Llobregat. The district of Collblanc-Torassa has a significant number of Indians, while the concentration of Pakistanis is higher in the Pubilla Cases and La Florida districts, as compared to other South Asians. Third important cluster includes the districts of Gorg, Sant Roc, Congrés, Artigas, La Mora and El Remei in the municipality of Badalona. These areas are low income and poor housing zones of Badalona. Fourth area of over-representation includes the neighbourhoods of Besós, La Verneda and La Mina in the municipality of Sant Adrià de Besós. The increasing concentration of the SAP in these areas is the result of vacant chain of cheap houses left by the Spanish immigrants, which is attracting many South Asians. The fifth cluster includes the Central borough of the District 1 and Fondo of Santa Coloma de Gramanet. These areas have the highest share of Bangladeshi population. Central city areas of the municipalities of Sant Boi de Llobregat, Gavà, Montcada i Reixac and Ripollet also show some over representation of the SAP. This is mainly related to the concentration of some economic activities in these areas.

Map 2: The Coefficient of Localization (QL) of the South Asian Population in the Metropolitan Area of Barcelona, 2014.



Source: Own elaboration with data from Municipal Registers (Padrón Continuo 2014) INE.

While comparing different countries of South Asia in relation to their QL in different parts of the AMB, we can say that the Indian population is living in the most diverse neighbourhoods in terms of socioeconomic status which ranging from the poorest parts of the borough of El Raval, Besòs and Badalona to the richest parts of Castelldefels and Sant Cugat. This difference is an outcome of their economic activities, as the majority of Indians

in the first type are wage workers of service sector and has poor economic conditions, but the residents of Sant Cugat are generally highly qualified professionals who work in education sector or have their own businesses. The municipalities of Gavà, Viladecans and Sant Boi de Llobregat also have a significant number of Indians, who are mainly engaged in the agricultural and service sectors.

Most of the Pakistanis and Bangladeshis in the AMB are generally living in the homogeneous neighbourhoods in terms of housing conditions and socio-economic status. These areas are, generally, characterized by substandard housing and of low socioeconomic status. It also depicts the homogeneous profile of these communities in the AMB. They are over-represented in the central zones of several districts of the Barcelona municipality like El Raval in Ciutat Vella, Poble Sec in Sants-Muntjuic and Sant Martí in Besos, where they have established their small businesses and work in Service sector. El Raval is becoming an ethnic enclave for Pakistanis. The neighbourhoods of Sant Roc and Gorg in Badalona, Fondo and central district 1 in Santa Coloma de Gramenet and the districts of Pubilla Casas-Can Serra in Hospitalet de Llobregat, which are generally the most deprived areas of these municipalities, also have high concentrations of Pakistanis and Bangladeshis.

The concentration of the SAP in the AMB has increased in the last decade. It is mainly because of the high immigration attracted by the social networks and settlement of the new immigrants in the AMB close to their relatives or friends, which results in their increasing share in all areas of low or high population density. Moreover, from the social perspective, because of their younger age and cultural expectations of early marriage, the process family formation is very fast among the South Asian communities. At the same time, and particularly for the Pakistani and Bangladeshi population, there are strong pressures to keep the new families close to the parental homes. It further leads to their high concentration in some specific areas of the city (Beltran and López, 2007).

3.2 Population Diversity in Metropolitan Areas of Barcelona and SAP


To explore the relationship between the existing population diversity and the concentration of the SAP, it is essential to measure the level of population diversity in the AMB. For the measurement of the level of diversity, we are applying the Simpson's Diversity Index (D). To calculate the value of Simpson's Diversity Index, first the whole population is divided into different groups on the basis of their place of birth e.g. Spanish, Latin Americans, Asians, Africans, East Europeans, West Europeans and Others. Then the proportion of people in each immigrant group relative to the total population of that area is calculated and squared. The squared proportions for all immigrant groups are summed, and the reciprocal is taken. In the present study the level of diversity has been calculated for the above mentioned 7 major groups of population. This index takes into account both richness and equitability of population groups. For a given number of ethnic groups represented in an area the value of the index increases as equitability increases, and for a given equitability the value of the index increases as the number of ethnic groups' increases. Our main objective in this section is to explore that the areas with over-representation of the SAP coincides with the highly diverse neighbourhood in the AMB or not.

In the first decade of the 21st century, the large scale immigration has changed the population mosaic of the AMB. The most significant feature of this immigration was not only its large volume, but the diversity of ethnic and national identities it brought to the host society. As a result of this multi-origin and multi-ethnic immigration, Barcelona has become one of the most diverse cities of Spain. But this immigrant population is not equally distributed in the AMB. Hence, the level of diversity also varies greatly from one part to another. In the AMB, the most diverse region in terms of population diversity were the neighbourhoods of El Raval (Ciutat Vella) in the municipality of Barcelona, followed by highly diverse central urban

areas of the districts of Collblanc-Torrassa and Pubilla Casas-Can Serra in the municipality of l'Hospitalet de Llobregat, the Central District 1 of Santa Coloma de Gramenet and few areas of El Besós in the municipality of Sant Adrià de Besós (Map 3).

The medium level of population diversity can be found in the entire municipality of Barcelona, Gava, Castelldefells, Santa Coloma de Gramenet, parts of Sant Boi, Badia de valles, Barbera de valles and Badalona. On the contrary, the areas with the most homogeneous population include the municipalities of Sant Climent de Llobregat, Torrelles de Llobregat, Prat de Llobregat, Cervello, Castellbisbal, Tiana and Montgat.

Map 3: The level of Population Diversity (Simpson's D) in AMB 2013.



Source: Own elaboration with data from Municipal Registers (Padrón Continuo 2013) INE.

3.3 SAP: Moving towards Multicultural Society

After exploring the concentration of the SAP and the level of population diversity in the AMB, we reached at the conclusion that the SAP is not a segregated group, rather it is settled in the most diverse neighbourhoods of the AMB. It is quite clear that the level of concentration is comparatively higher as compared to other population groups, but the reasons for this concentration are more internal (family bonds and socioeconomic status) than the racial and ethnic discrimination.

In the light of spatial distribution, it is quite clear that the SAP in Spain is having a pluralistic structure. From the very beginning of its immigration process, it was economically integrated into Spanish society, but remains socially encapsulated within its own ethnic groups (also see Sala-López and Sanchez, 2009). This pattern is still prevailing and the level of social participation is still very low in the South Asian community.

In spatial terms also the SAP has showed the prevalence of multicultural mosaic model. In this model the immigrant minorities participate in economic activities but remains socially invisible or encapsulated (Peach, 1997). The residential segregation of SAP remained high in all the settlement areas irrespective of their time of origin, with dissimilarity index value of

above 50. Another important argument in the favour of this model is that the SAP has maintained its separate identity and social setup (unlike the assimilation model in which minorities lose their identities and mix with native majority) at all new territories where they get settled during the last decade. The age and sex composition of the SAP has also remained almost same in all the different neighbourhoods irrespective of their time of settlement (map and graph 4). The SAP at all their new and old locations occupying immigrant neighbourhoods. We can say that the SAP is expanding in the form of homogeneous clusters in the most diverse neighbourhoods of the AMB.

Map 4: Age and sex composition of SAP in different boroughs of high concentration in AMB, 2013.



Source: Own elaboration with data from Municipal Registers (Padrón Continuo 2013) INE.

4. DISCUSSION

During the last two decades, the SAP in Spain has not only increased in numbers, but has also evolved in all socio-demographic and spatial aspects. Along with its skewed distribution, it has a high level of residential segregation in some specific areas of different municipalities of Spain. The level of segregation has been reduced considerably with its increasing size but still it is high as compared to other immigrant groups and as per international standards. During the economic crisis, the re-emigration of South Asians from Spain to other countries has reduced their level of segregation in the major cities, which otherwise was increasing with the family reunification process. In future, it will be interesting to see how their residential distribution will evolve and what will be the consequences of this over the integration of the SAP into the host society.

Spatial concentration remained the most significant feature of the SAP in Spain. The SAP is concentrated in the big metropolitan cities like Barcelona. This concentration coincides with the most diverse neighbourhoods of the AMB e.g. El Raval in Barcelona. It is worth mentioning that while living in highly diverse neighbourhoods the SAP has maintained its separate identity and tight social and family structure, which has helped this community to expand in the form of homogeneous clusters with common characteristics in different municipalities of the AMB. In future it will be interesting to study the links between social and spatial mobility of the SAP and its appropriation of territory. The two most important questions yet to respond are, firstly, Is El Raval doing the role of an entry gate for the SAP or Is it a trap for new immigrants? Secondly, Is SAP transforming the functions of neighbourhoods of their high concentration?

An important form of the transformation of space in terms of concentration and segregation is 'Ghettos', depending upon the auto perception of the people living in these areas and the perception of people around these areas towards them. In this transformation a major role played by socio-cultural practices and the kinship networks, which binds people close to each other. A detailed qualitative study is needed to explore these features of the SAP.

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VIII. SURASIÁTICOS EN MADRID Y BARCELONA: ENCARNANDO LA DIVERSIDAD*

Nachatter Singh Garha, Andreu Domingo y Ana María López Sala

Introducción: enclave étnico, segregación y diversidad poblacional

Los conceptos de enclave étnico (identificado con el negocio étnico), la segregación residencial (confundida con la concentración) y la diversidad del barrio donde se localizan dichos enclaves, aparecen indeleblemente asociados en nuestro imaginario. Poblaciones y territorios determinados ya lo habitaban, incluso antes del reciente boom migratorio acaecido en España.

En los inicios del nuevo milenio hemos asistido a la disposición cómo espectáculo de la diversidad producto de la inmigración, de modo que los barrios más heterogéneos desde el punto de vista del origen de sus vecinos, se convierten en polos de atracción turística generada por la exposición de la diversidad reelaborada como objeto de consumo. Zonas del centro urbano que en la crisis económica de mediados de los años setenta se obscurecieron bajo la sombras de la inseguridad y que más tarde quedaron al margen de los procesos de gentrificación, tras haber sido muchos de ellos puertas de entrada de la inmigración internacional, se promueven ahora a modo de escaparate escénico del cosmopolitismo que se supone acompaña a la globalización. Esa transformación replicada ciudad tras ciudad en el mundo entero, conlleva una estandarización en la que también en el territorio podemos reconocer la «diversidad homogénea». Diver-

* Este texto forma parte de la tesis doctoral de Nachatter Singh Garha, «*Indian Diaspora to Spain: Demo-Spatial Analysis and Neighbourhood Relations*», inscrita en el Doctorado de Demografía de la Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona, y dirigida por el Dr. Andreu Domingo.

sidad tematizada a partir de las narrativas dominantes, deudora de la lectura orientalista (Said, 1996). Barrios como Lavapiés en Madrid o El Raval en Barcelona, se adecuan a ese cliché, que se articula alrededor de la oposición dialéctica entre la visibilidad —indumentaria, fenotípica, religiosa—, y la invisibilidad —aislamiento del grupo, desconocimiento por parte de los autóctonos, invisibilización de los centros de culto.

Las poblaciones del Sur de Asia —las tres más representadas en España pakistaníes, indios y bangladeshíes— constituyen en estos barrios uno de los mejores ejemplos de esa inestable confluencia entre lo visible y lo invisible, de la identificación entre diversidad, enclave étnico y segregación residencial, de la plasmación en lo local de lo global. Son los que más fielmente encarnan la idea de diversidad. Y, sin embargo, poco sabemos de ellas. Esa ignorancia se debe en buena parte a su relativo escaso número en comparación a otros orígenes: los surasiáticos con 131.000 personas empadronadas en España en 2014 representaban tan sólo el 2% de todos los residentes nacidos en el extranjero; escasez que ha supuesto no disponer de muestras representativas en las principales encuestas de población, salvo en contadas excepciones para la más numerosa de ellas, la pakistaní. En parte también, a causa de la percepción de su propia heterogeneidad, empezando por el desequilibrio en el número de inmigrados entre los pakistaníes y el resto (estos representan el 59,5 % de los residentes nacidos en los tres países citados). Pero igualmente en su distribución territorial (el 55,1 % de los pakistaníes, y el 46,8% de los indios viven en Cataluña, mientras que el 35,7% de los Bangladeshíes lo hace en Madrid).

En este capítulo ofrecemos una breve pincelada empírica sobre la distribución territorial, la concentración y segregación residenciales de los colectivos surasiáticos en Madrid y Barcelona, a la vez que analizamos la diversidad de los principales barrios donde se ubican y las características demográficas básicas de las poblaciones que la componen.

La renovación de la diáspora surasiática en España


Pese al desconocimiento que acabamos de señalar, sorprende que la migración surasiática —por lo menos la procedente de la

India—, tenga una larga tradición, cuya historia se remonta al asentamiento en la década de los ochenta del siglo XIX de comunidades de comerciantes procedentes de la región del Sindh en las Islas Canarias (Murcia Navarro, 1974; y López-Sala, 2007). A esos primeros flujos que se convirtieron en enclaves comerciales y residenciales, y su posterior expansión por la península acelerada a partir de la entrada de España en la Unión Europea, le siguieron los flujos de trabajadores desde las últimas dos décadas del siglo XX, protagonizadas en primer lugar por pakistaníes mayoritariamente oriundos del Punjab, e indios de las regiones de Punjab y Haryana (Farjas, 2006; López-Sala, 2013), a los que se añadió poco después la migración procedente de Bangladesh (Beltrán y Sáiz, 2002). El último flujo y el más minoritario, correspondería, a los inmigrantes con un perfil de estudiante o profesional de alta cualificación, con origen frecuentemente en las región India de Gujarat (Ventura, 2013).

Esos flujos que llegaron a su punto álgido el año 2010 con 28.593 entradas empezaron a decaer rápidamente como consecuencia de la crisis económica (Figura 1), viendo frustrada tanto la reagrupación familiar como la expansión de la migración surasiática en España —que, como veremos, se caracteriza por su fuerte concentración territorial—, e iniciando un proceso de re-emigración o retorno, de modo que en los últimos años se ha traducido en un estancamiento también de los efectivos de población (de 132.000 residentes nacidos en sus respectivos países de origen en 2013, se ha pasado a 131.000 en 2014).

Las corrientes migratorias han conformado una población con un perfil demográfico caracterizado por su juventud y masculinización (Figura 2). Entre los 25 y los 39 años se concentra el 48% de toda la población masculina y el número de hombres casi triplica al de mujeres (96.700 por 34.400 mujeres). Desequilibrio que encuentra su razón de ser en la estrategia migratoria familiar donde los hombres son pioneros de unas poblaciones que en su lugar de origen se caracterizan ya por ese desequilibrio —los solteros únicamente representan el 21% de los residentes mayores de 21 años—, pero que determinará tanto las redes de sociabilidad de los diferentes colectivos como, en parte, explicará también su relativo aislamiento de los autóctonos.

FIGURA 1
**FLUJOS INMIGRATORIOS DE SURASIÁTICOS EN ESPAÑA,
 POR SEXO Y LUGAR DE NACIMIENTO, 2000-2014**




Fuente: Elaboración propia, Estadística de Variaciones Residenciales a 2000-2014 (INE).

Respecto al nivel de instrucción e inserción laboral, los datos que proporciona el Censo de 2011, se corresponden con la imagen que se tiene del grupo: mayoritariamente con niveles de instrucción bajos (62%) —aunque esa mayoría oculte una gran heterogeneidad—, y volcados por lo tanto en sectores con gran demanda de trabajadores no cualificados. Mientras esas escasas mujeres —esposas e hijas— de los inmigrados presentan una muy baja tasa de actividad (tan sólo el 37,6% de las mujeres entre 16 y 64 años se declaran activas). La mayoría de los hombres se ha concentrado en el sector servicios, un 42%, en especial en la restauración, y en la construcción, con el 24%. Se trataba de un trabajo de elevada temporalidad (42%), que cuando es fijo, se basa mayoritariamente en la autocontratación (un 45% de los fijos) y la figura de asalariado dentro del negocio étnico (Beltrán y Sáez, 2013). Claro está que esta distribución, como ya hemos avanzado, esconde disparidades significativas entre los tres países, así el 26,8% de la población de Bangladesh y el 25,5% de la

India posee estudios medios o superiores, en la pakistaní esa proporción se reduce al 21%. Ello explicaría la mayor concentración en los sectores primarios de los pakistaníes (8%) en contraste con los ciudadanos nacidos en Bangladesh (2%) o el peso de la población india en el comercio (27%) respecto a pakistaníes (12,6%) o bangladeshíes (17,5%).

FIGURA 2
**PIRÁMIDE DE LA POBLACIÓN NACIDA EN EL SUR DE ASIA
 EMPADRONADA EN ESPAÑA, 2014**




Fuente: Elaboración propia, Padrón Continuo de población, 1 de enero de 2014 (INE).

Distribución territorial

Aunque destaca la concentración en Cataluña, que por si sola agrupa a un poco más de la mitad de toda la población surasiática (53,3%), la distribución territorial corresponde en buena parte a la versatilidad y adaptabilidad en la actividad de los inmigrados de este origen, y el rastro que ha ido dejando su asentamiento a lo largo del tiempo (Figura 3 y 4).

FIGURA 3
**DISTRIBUCIÓN MUNICIPAL DE LA POBLACIÓN SURASIÁTICA
 EN ESPAÑA, 2014**




Fuente: Elaboración propia, Padrón continuo de población, 2014 (INE).

Como ya hemos dicho, la precursora de la diáspora fue la comunidad Sindhi en las Islas Canarias —Santa Cruz de Tenerife, pero también Adeje o Las Palmas—, junto con las Ciudades Autónomas de Ceuta y Melilla, de la cual aún se puede encontrar florecientes asentamientos por toda España. Los inmigrados durante las últimas décadas del siglo XX —especialmente los pakistanís—, se ocuparon inicialmente en el sector primario, tanto en la minería —Sonseca en Teruel, Bembibre en León o Linares en Jaén—, (Aubia y Roca, 2005), como en la agricultura, siguiendo el curso del río Ebro —en diversas localidades como Vitoria en el País Vasco, Logroño en La Rioja, Zaragoza en Aragón, y Tortosa o Amposta en Cataluña (Delta del Ebro)—, junto con Valencia y Murcia —con un lugar destacado para Torre Pacheco. Su participación en el sector servicios, en el comercio y la hostelería, explica su presencia en las áreas metropolitanas, como Madrid o Barcelona, o del litoral mediterráneo incluyendo además de la extensión a Lanzarote y Fuerteventura en las Islas Canarias, Palma de Mallorca, desde Lloret de Mar hasta

Málaga, pasando por algunas de las ciudades de mayor reclamo turístico como Barcelona, Salou, Valencia, Benidorm, Alicante, o Torrevieja. Pero del mismo modo, la reconocida tradición de los sikh como matarifes les ha hecho presentes y apreciados en el sector de la industria de transformación agroalimentaria, específicamente en los mataderos (Vic y Olot). El auge de la construcción en esos mismos municipios, implicó acentuar su concentración, atraídos por las nuevas oportunidades que se estaban brindando, y aunque la crisis ha hecho disminuir esa participación, como hemos visto, aún la cuarta parte de la población seguía dedicándose a ese sector. Los negocios étnicos propiamente dichos también se caracterizan por su diversidad, y están en la raíz de su distribución territorial (Morera, 2001). Así, abarcan desde la venta del recuerdo turístico, hasta la restauración o la importación y venta de alimentos propios del lugar de origen (o de otros países con presencia de inmigrados en España), que en el comercio al por menor se compagina con la de productos españoles (Valenzuela, 2010).

FIGURA 4
PRINCIPALES MUNICIPIOS CON POBLACIÓN SURASIÁTICA,
ESPAÑA, 2014



Fuente: Elaboración propia, Padrón continuo de población, 2014 (INE).

La segregación residencial

Concentración y segregación no son lo mismo, aunque frecuentemente se confundan. La segregación incluye siempre un aspecto relacional con por lo menos otro grupo, mientras que la concentración tan sólo se refiere al propio grupo considerado. La segregación residencial respecto al grupo mayoritario (la población autóctona) en diferentes barrios es, sin lugar a dudas, una de las preocupaciones de cómo se está articulando territorialmente la diversidad. Antes de pronunciarnos sobre los aspectos negativos o positivos que esta puede entrañar, lo que nos proponemos hacer es medir esa separación para los indios, pakistaníes y bangladeshíes con respecto a los nacidos en España, a nivel infra-municipal, que es al fin y al cabo de lo que hablamos, cuando hablamos de segregación residencial (Massey y Denton, 1988). De todos los índices que sirven para medir esa separación hemos escogido el índice llamado de disimilitud. ¿Por qué esa elección? El índice de disimilitud (ID), de lo que nos informa es del porcentaje de personas del grupo minoritario que deberían cambiar de residencia y distribuirse en cada área para obtener una representación equitativa en todo el municipio considerado (Duncan y Duncan, 1955). Este tipo de índice se ve muy afectado por el número de personas de los colectivos «minoritarios» sobre todo cuando, como es el caso, este volumen varía de forma significativa.

Para entender la evolución del índice para cada colectivo en los municipios de Madrid y Barcelona, lo hemos representado sobre la evolución de los diez primeros municipios que concentran la población de cada nacionalidad (Figura 5 y Tabla 1). Respecto a otras comunidades, presentan unos índices muy elevados de segregación con niveles casi siempre superiores al 50% de población a distribuir. Aunque la tendencia para todas las nacionalidades consideradas y en casi todos los municipios sea descendente.

Para Pakistán, la reducción de la segregación medida a partir del índice de disimilitud ha sido muy significativa, del 84,9 en 2000 al 55,1 en 2014. Entre los diez municipios principales Vitoria Gasteiz, ha marcado la caída máxima (53) en el nivel de disimilitud. Aunque también descendente, el mayor nivel de segregación de la población pakistaní en Madrid (de 95,6 a 82,5) respecto a la de Barcelona (de 84,6 a 63,4), debe buscarse en el volumen dispar en ambas ciuda-

des: en 2014 Madrid registraba 1.508 personas nacidas en Pakistán empadronadas, mientras que Barcelona 19.794.

La tendencia del índice de disimilitud de la población de la India también ha sido hacia la franca disminución, manteniéndose a niveles elevados respecto a los estándares de otras nacionalidades en todos los municipios considerados. Se bajó de 83,5 en el año 2000 a 54,8 en 2014. La caída más alta se ha presenciado en Hospitalet de Llobregat (40), esta puede estar relacionada con la nueva entrada y asentamiento de población india en sus diferentes áreas. En el año 2014, el ID de todos los municipios varió entre 67,6 de Adeje a 37,4 de Lloret de Mar. Barcelona y Madrid se encontraban en el mismo ID en el año 2000, es decir 85, pero curiosamente en 2014, en Barcelona se situada 56,5, mientras que en Madrid a 65,8, esta diferencia de casi 10 puntos puede estar relacionada con el relativamente alto número de inmigrantes en Barcelona en comparación con Madrid durante este mismo período.


TABLA 1
PRINCIPALES MUNICIPIOS DE RESIDENCIA PARA LA POBLACIÓN DE PAKISTÁN, INDIA Y BANGLADESH, ESPAÑA, 2014

| BANGLADESH | | INDIA | | PAKISTÁN | |
|------------------------|-----------|------------------------|-----------|------------------------|-----------|
| Municipio | Población | Municipio | Población | Municipio | Población |
| Madrid | 4.399 | Barcelona | 5.085 | Barcelona | 19.794 |
| Barcelona | 3.305 | Hospitalet d Llobregat | 2.384 | Badalona | 6.061 |
| St. Coloma de Gramenet | 1.475 | Madrid | 2.034 | Valencia | 5.261 |
| Badalona | 362 | Valencia | 1.975 | Hospitalet d Llobregat | 3.543 |
| Palma de Mallorca | 178 | Palma de Mallorca | 1.399 | Logroño | 2.333 |
| Arona | 165 | Lloret de Mar | 1.13 | St. Coloma de Gramenet | 2.223 |
| Alicante | 124 | Olot | 1.124 | Madrid | 1.508 |
| Valencia | 122 | St. Coloma de Gramenet | 1.082 | Benidorm | 1.438 |
| Vilafranca del Penedés | 99 | Adeje | 1.001 | Vitoria-Gasteiz | 1.21 |
| Torremolinos | 98 | Badalona | 965 | Tortosa | 654 |
| Total España | 13.211 | Total España | 39.924 | Total España | 78.095 |

Fuente: Elaboración propia, Padrón continuo de población, 2014 (INE).

Si tenemos en cuenta que la población de Bangladesh es mucho menor que la de los otros dos países surasiáticos no nos debe extrañar que la segregación sea aún mayor. El valor promedio de índice de disimilitud se ha reducido de 95,2 en 2000 a 81,1 en 2014, pero todavía es más alto en comparación con cualquier otro grupo inmigrante en estos municipios. A diferencia de lo que ocurría con

FIGURA 5
ÍNDICE DE DISIMILIDAD DE LA POBLACIÓN SURASIÁTICA
RESIDENTE EN MADRID Y BARCELONA, SOBRE LA TENDENCIA
DE LOS 10 PRINCIPALES MUNICIPIOS DONDE SE ENCUENTRA
CADA UNA DE LAS POBLACIONES, 2000-2014



Fuente: Elaboración propia, Padrón continuo de población, 2000-2014 (INE)

la evolución de la segregación pakistaní y India en Madrid y Barcelona, en la que la diferencia de efectivos explicaba la disparidad entre los dos municipios, los niveles de disimilitud en esa evolución descendente son casi idénticos, de 84,1 en el primer caso y 85,3 en el segundo, situándose ambas ciudades en la franja alta de la segregación. En el año 2014, su nivel más bajo se registró en Santa Coloma de Gramenet (56,4) y el más alto en Valencia capital (93,8), esta enorme brecha es el resultado de la diferencia en el momento de la llegada y el de su tamaño en ambas ciudades.

Resumiendo, los niveles de segregación residenciales son para los tres países surasiáticos excepcionalmente altos, en las principales ciudades donde cada uno de ellos se asienta. Estos elevados niveles han tendido a descender levemente a medida que su número crecía, pero permanecen aún en los niveles superiores en comparación con otros orígenes que podían haberse caracterizado también a inicios del siglo XXI como muy segregados, pero que quince años más tarde han dejado de serlo. El tamaño del grupo explica también que la máxima segregación aparezca para el grupo más reducido, Bangladesh, respecto India y Pakistán, mucho más numerosos. Asimismo es ese menor tamaño el que explica la mayor segregación en Madrid que en Barcelona, pese a que la tendencia a la moderada disminución del indicador sea la misma para ambos municipios.

Barcelona y Madrid como ejemplos de concentración

Aunque el municipio de Barcelona por sí sólo concentra más población india y pakistaní que el de Madrid, hemos decidido representar el Área Metropolitana de Barcelona (AMB) para analizar la concentración de la población surasiática en España, por dos razones principales: la primera porque para el total de la población es más comparable el municipio de Madrid (con 3.165.232 habitantes) con el total de los 36 municipios que componen la AMB (con 3.210.643 residentes). En segundo lugar, la representación de la concentración en el caso de la AMB nos brinda la oportunidad de ver cómo su implantación en el territorio ignora las fronteras municipales, cuando la metrópolis es un continuum urbano.

Para los cálculos estadísticos del grado de concentración, hemos aplicado el índice de Coeficiente de Localización (QL). Mediante


este indicador se relaciona la proporción de un grupo en particular en una sección censal con la proporción de este grupo en todo el territorio. En este caso interpretaremos el valor de QL como de baja concentración si los valores se encuentran por debajo del 0,85, neutrales, si van de 0,85 a 1,2 y de alta concentración en el caso que superen el 1,2 (Brown y Chung, 2006).

El Área Metropolitana de Barcelona con 50.791 residentes surasiáticos empadronados en 2014 (Figura 6) ostenta la mayor proporción de esta población en España (el 38,7%), que se concentra principalmente en los centros urbanos de sus mayores municipios, que fueron los lugares de recepción inicial de la inmigración procedente de cada uno de los tres países considerados. Pero además de esta tipología, a la que correspondería por ejemplo El Raval (con el 17% de toda la población surasiática de la AMB) o los cascos antiguos de Badalona o Santa Coloma de Gramenet, encontraríamos un segundo modelo residencial, que representan los barrios populares con alta concentración de población inmigrada del resto de España, mayoritariamente llegada en los años sesenta, que ahora gracias a la cadena de vacantes que el envejecimiento de esta población está provocando en el parque de viviendas, se convirtieron en una alternativa residencial para la población surasiática. Es el caso de barrios como La Verneda, Trinitat Vella y Trinitat Nova en el mismo municipio de Barcelona, o los de Collblanc-Torrassa, La Florida-Les Planes y Pubilla Casas-Can Serra en L'Hospitalet de Llobregat, los barrios de Gorg, Sant Roc, Congrés, Artigas, La Mora y El Remei, en el municipio de Badalona y Fondo en Santa Coloma de Gramenet. La misma dicotomía que se encontrarían en los municipios de Sant Boi de Llobregat, Gavà, Montcada i Reixac y Ripollet que también muestran una sobrerrepresentación de población surasiática.

Si examinamos la concentración de cada uno de los orígenes en la AMB (Figura 7), podemos destacar la hetero-localización de la población india respecto a la pakistaní y bangladeshí en cuanto a las características de los barrios donde se concentran. De este modo, vemos cómo se alternan los barrios ya citados de mayor concentración (El Raval), y otros similares en Sant Adrià del Besòs, con barrios de municipios que no corresponden a esta tipología, todo lo contrario, como sucede en el municipio de Castelldefels

o Sant Cugat del Vallès. Esta diferencia debe imputarse a la heterogeneidad socioeconómica y laboral de esta población, ya que la mayoría de los indios en el primer tipo es de los trabajadores asalariados del sector servicios mientras que los vecinos de Sant Cugat son generalmente profesionales altamente cualificados que trabajan en el sector de la educación y los negocios. Los municipios de Gavà, Viladecans y Sant Boi de Llobregat también tienen una representación significativa de indios, que se dedican principalmente al sector agrícola y de servicios.

FIGURA 6
**CONCENTRACIÓN DE LA POBLACIÓN (QL) SURASIÁTICA
 EN EL ÁREA METROPOLITANA DE BARCELONA, 2014**



Fuente: Elaboración propia, Padrón continuo de población, 2014 (INE).

La mayoría de los paquistaníes y bangladesíes, con un perfil socio-demográfico menos contrastado que el de la población india, generalmente se concentran en barrios de nivel socioeconómico bajo y con un parque de viviendas precario, que presenta la dicotomía ya expuesta en el comentario sobre el total de la población surasiática. Así, aparecen sobrerrepresentados en las zonas centrales

de varios distritos del municipio de Barcelona, como El Raval, en Ciutat Vella, Poble Sec en Sants-Muntjuic y Sant Martí, donde han establecido sus pequeñas empresas y el trabajo en el sector servicios. El Raval, como veremos, se puede ya considerar un enclave étnico de los paquistaníes. El barrio de Sant Roc y Gorg en Badalona, Fondo y Centro en Santa Coloma de Gramenet y los barrios de Pubilla Casas-Can Serra en L'Hospitalet de Llobregat también muestran altas concentraciones, que coinciden generalmente con las zonas más desfavorecidas de estos municipios.

FIGURA 7
**CONCENTRACIÓN DE LA POBLACIÓN (QL) NACIDA EN PAKISTÁN,
 INDIA Y BANGLADESH EN EL ÁREA METROPOLITANA DE
 BARCELONA, 2014**







FIGURA 7 (continuación)



Fuente: Elaboración propia, Padrón continuo de población, 2014 (INE)

FIGURA 8
CONCENTRACIÓN DE LA POBLACIÓN (QL) SURASIÁTICA EN EL MUNICIPIO DE MADRID, 2014



Fuente: Elaboración propia, Padrón continuo de población, 2014 (INE)

En el caso del Municipio de Madrid (Figura 8), la polarización en la distribución territorial de la población surasiática explica la fragmentación de su concentración en todo el municipio, conformando un mosaico en todo el territorio municipal. De este modo, podemos encontrar la esperada concentración en el distrito Centro, donde se incluye el barrio de Lavapiés, que como veremos es una zona de referencia para la población bangladeshí, pero también concentraciones en el vecino distrito de Carabanchel, con características socio-demográficas completamente diferentes, y rompiendo la continuidad territorial el distrito de Villaverde o Puente de Vallecas en el sur. Grosso modo, esa distribución coincide con las pautas observadas para el Área Metropolitana de Barcelona, pero aún más exageradas. Así, la primera separación entre barrios centrales receptores de migración como Lavapiés, correspondería a la función tradicional de El Raval en Barcelona, mientras que la expansión por barrios como San Cristóbal de los Ángeles en el distrito de Villaverde o Palomeras en Puente de Vallecas, tendrían su explicación en el origen como barrios con una fuerte concentración de inmigración

procedente del resto de España previo, que estarían produciendo la citada cadena de vacantes en el parque inmobiliario.

FIGURA 9
**CONCENTRACIÓN DE LA POBLACIÓN (QL) NACIDA EN PAKISTÁN,
 INDIA Y BANGLADESH EN EL MUNICIPIO DE MADRID, 2014**





FIGURA 9 (continuación)



Fuente: Elaboración propia, Padrón continuo de población, 2014 (INE).

El Raval y Lavapiés como ejemplos de diversidad

Para el análisis de la diversidad, hemos escogido el llamado Índice de Simpson (Simpson, 1949), que mide la equidad en la distribución de diferentes grupos en un mismo territorio. De modo que es un concepto que tiene más que ver con una distribución más o menos equitativa de los principales grupos considerados que con la simple cantidad de países representados en el área considerada. El número como tal que es lo que frecuentemente se utiliza como indicador de diversidad, ya ha perdido toda relevancia, ya que tanto en el Área Metropolitana de Barcelona como en el Municipio de Madrid encontramos representación de casi todos los países del mundo. Así, se ha decidido partir del cálculo de los primeros 6 orígenes para el conjunto del Área Metropolitana de Barcelona, y el Municipio de Madrid, siendo uno de ellos el agregado de los tres países surasiáticos, y el resto en cambio correspondiente a estados, más el conjunto de los nacidos en España. Los valores que se consideran en este caso van del 1 al 7, siendo el 1 nula diversidad y el 7 máxima. Este ejercicio



nos permitirá localizar los barrios con mayor diversidad de ambas zonas y comprobar si coinciden o no con el área de distribución de la población surasiática que hemos podido ver anteriormente gracias al análisis de la concentración.

En el caso barcelonés el barrio de El Raval, para casi todas las secciones censales que lo componen junto con algunas del barrio gótico pertenecientes al mismo distrito de Ciutat Vella, es el que presenta la máxima diversidad seguido de muy variadas áreas urbanas centrales de los diferentes municipios que componen la AMB, y efectivamente entre estas volvemos a encontrar los mismos barrios donde habíamos situado una concentración significativa de la población surasiática. Estamos hablando de los barrios de Collblanc-Torrassa y Pubilla Casas-Can Serra en L'Hospitalet de Llobregat, el Distrito Central 1 de Santa Coloma de Gramenet y algunas secciones censales en el municipio de Sant Adrià de Besòs (Figura 10). Con lo cual la primera deducción es que la población surasiática en la AMB se concentra en los barrios con mayor diversidad.

¿Qué sucede en el caso del municipio de Madrid? A diferencia de lo observado en Barcelona, la diversidad —que tal y como la hemos medido en términos generales es menor que en el barcelonés— no se destaca tan claramente en un solo barrio, como sucedía con El Raval, ni todas las zonas de máxima diversidad coinciden con las que mayor número de población surasiática concentran. De este modo, sí que coinciden claramente en el caso de Lavapiés, que en la zona Centro presenta la mayor diversidad junto con Justicia o Universidad, San Cristóbal y Los Rosales en Villaverde o Chamartín, pero no en los de Usera en el sur o de Tetuán al norte (Figura 11).


Los dos barrios donde la concentración de población surasiática resulta más elevada coinciden en los dos ámbitos pues con los barrios de mayor diversidad: El Raval en la AMB y Lavapiés en Madrid. Seguidamente exploraremos algunas de las características poblacionales de los dos barrios citados (Figura 12 y 13). Para empezar, aunque en los dos, son comparables en el número total de vecinos con 47.489 para El Raval y 45.707 para el de Lavapiés, difieren en el peso general que tiene la población nacida en el extranjero, que en el primer caso sobrepasa la mitad de la población (55,6%), mientras que en el segundo se reduce a poco más de la tercera parte (33,8%). Tal como ya hemos dicho, el conjunto de la población surasiática tiene

FIGURA 10
 DIVERSIDAD POBLACIONAL EN EL ÁREA METROPOLITANA
 DE BARCELONA Y MUNICIPIO DE MADRID, 2014



Fuente: Elaboración propia, Padrón continuo de población, 2014 (INE).

FIGURA 11
CONCENTRACIÓN DE LA POBLACIÓN SURASIÁTICA EN EL BARRIO DE EL RAVAL, 10 PRIMERAS NACIONALIZACIONES, Y PIRÁMIDES DE POBLACIÓN SURASIÁTICA Y ESPAÑOLA, 2014




Fuente: Elaboración propia, Padrón continuo de población, 2014 (INE).

una buena representación en ambos, en cambio el peso que tiene cada uno de los países considerados en cada barrio es muy desigual. Así, en El Raval, los 5.327 pakistaníes son el segundo origen tras Filipinas, representando el 11% de toda la población del barrio (el 20% si sólo consideramos la nacida en el extranjero), y muy por detrás aparecen en primer lugar Bangladesh con 2.341 empadronados representaban el 5% del total de nacidos en el extranjero, mientras los 959 oriundos de la India a penas representaban el 2%. Para Lavapiés, sin embargo la primera nacionalidad representada para

el total era la de Bangladesh con 2.575 empadronados (un 16,7% de la población nacida en el extranjero), mientras que Pakistán y la India ocupaba respectivamente los últimos lugares entre los 10 primeros, con tan sólo 151 y 73 residentes. Es decir, El Raval puede considerarse un enclave étnico para las tres nacionalidades que componen el conjunto de la población surasiática, significativamente para Pakistán y Bangladesh, mientras que Lavapiés es el enclave étnico por excelencia de la población de Bangladesh pero tiene una relativa importancia para las otras dos.

FIGURA 12
CONCENTRACIÓN DE LA POBLACIÓN SURASIÁTICA EN EL BARRIO DE LAVAPIÉS, 10 PRIMERAS NACIONALIZACIONES, Y PIRÁMIDES DE POBLACIÓN SURASIÁTICA Y ESPAÑOLA, 2014



Fuente: Elaboración propia, Padrón continuo de población, 2014 (INE).

En cuanto a las estructuras por sexo y edad de la población surasiática en ambos barrios, es similar, la misma que hemos observado para el conjunto de la población tanto en la AMB como en el Municipio de Madrid: una población muy joven y muy desequilibrada a favor de la presencia de hombres y con muy escasa presencia de menores (significativamente nacidos en España). Lo mismo sucede con la población española nacida en España, muy parecida en ambos barrios, que destaca por un lado por la combinación del envejecimiento por la cúspide con la sobrerrepresentación de la población en edad activa correspondiente a las generaciones del *baby boom*, pero también a una generosa base en la que queremos ver el peso de la natalidad reciente en el barrio debido a la población nacida en el extranjero, especialmente la latinoamericana a cuyos hijos nacidos en España se les otorga casi automáticamente la nacionalidad española.

Conclusiones

Las poblaciones relativamente poco numerosas como las que integran el conjunto surasiático en España, suelen quedar fuera del foco tanto de los científicos como de la administración. Con escasa representación en las muestras de las encuestas devienen casi invisibles, invisibilidad estadística que puede tornarse en vulnerabilidad social. Su visibilidad se concentra en el mayor o menor exotismo al que se ven relegadas allí donde se concentran.

Sin embargo, su estudio, es de gran interés ¿Por qué razones? La primera es que pueden ser consideradas poblaciones emergentes. Hemos visto cómo, pese a las dificultades, durante los primeros años de la crisis económica siguieron creciendo gracias a la reagrupación familiar. En segundo lugar, su propio funcionamiento como sistema migratorio, con una alta segregación residencial (que presumiblemente se acompaña de la segregación laboral) del grupo, y el emplazamiento en barrios de muy alta diversidad plantea retos teóricos, con derivaciones aplicadas en el mundo de la gestión de la interculturalidad de gran trascendencia. En efecto, esas características que singularizan a las poblaciones surasiáticas son propias del carácter de la diáspora en la que se enmarcan sus diversas corrientes migratorias. Carácter que por un lado favorece la vulnerabilidad de los colectivos en su asentamiento —aislamiento, sentimiento de

provisionalidad—, y, por otra, tienden a chocar frontalmente con la orientación intercultural de la gestión de la inmigración que ha devenido hegemónica en España —baja participación política y asociativa de los diferentes grupos que la componen, repliegue en los contactos transnacionales y, en fin, disminución de las ocasiones de interrelación con la población autóctona u otros grupos de inmigrantes—. Es por ello, que el estudio más profundizado de las corrientes migratorias y el asentamiento de la población procedente de estos países, resulta prioritario para entender el (des)encuentro que puede producirse entre un sistema demográfico de carácter diaspórico y otro que se articula teniendo cada vez más la inmigración como eje central de su dinámica demográfica.

Y, con todo, cada grupo se comporta de forma diferente respecto al territorio, incluso en aquellos barrios que aquí se han seleccionado como emblemáticos: Lavapiés y El Raval. Si el primero constituye un enclave étnico para la población de Bangladesh, no lo es en cambio para población india o pakistaní que residen en Madrid, o no lo es por lo menos en cuanto a la residencia. De este modo, la población india de Madrid, específicamente la población Sikh originaria del Punjab, mantiene en Lavapiés uno de los dos centros de culto, siendo este barrio su referente comunitario, pero la mayoría de su población ya no reside en Lavapiés. No nos deberíamos dejar engañar por el negocio «étnico» de los restaurantes indios que atestan el barrio, muchos de ellos regentados por población de Bangladesh o del Pakistán. Por otro lado, en el caso de El Raval, cabe preguntarse hasta qué punto la preponderancia de la población surasiática (compartida con la población filipina), no está alterando la propia función del barrio.

Esta realidad orienta nuestro futuro trabajo en dos direcciones complementarias: en aumentar la sofisticación de la aproximación cuantitativa en los datos referentes a las características socioeconómicas del asentamiento de cada una de las poblaciones consideradas en cada uno de los barrios observados, y, por otra parte, en emprender un trabajo cualitativo que nos permita analizar el sistema de referencias mentales que acompaña su asentamiento, y el dar significado a su comportamiento como grupo y como colectivo. Es decir, aquellos símbolos que les permiten a la vez crear las fronteras identitarias y los principios de relación con el otro, empezando por

la apropiación del barrio como primer espacio físico y social con el que tienen relación.

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Abstract- *Indian immigration to Spain: A comparative study*

At the turn of the new millennium, when Spain was passing through immigration boom period, the size of its Indian community also increased rapidly and reached to 40,580 individuals listed in the municipal register in 2015. Contrary to most of the immigrant groups in Spain, the number of Indian immigrants remained increasing despite a severe economic crisis (2008-2014). Along with their exponential growth, they had an intense residential and occupational segregation, which raises the risk of their isolation and socioeconomic exclusion from the host society. In this paper, our main objective is to explore the existence of material characteristics of a 'bubble' in Indian community in Spain. For this we are going: 1) to create two indicators, i.e. 'cocooning' and 'precariousness' (which for us are the basic characteristics of a bubble) based on socioeconomic and demographic variables available in 2011 census data, 2) to compare the values of both indicators for Indians with other immigrant groups in Spain; and 3) to check the regional differences of these indicators in different Autonomous Communities in Spain. We have used micro-data from 2011 census records and municipal register (Padrón Continuo, 2015) of Spain. In conclusions, we found that the Indian immigrants in Spain have a high level of cocooning and a moderate level of precariousness, which converts their high concentration areas into "precarious bubbles".

Key words: Indian immigrants; Spain; Cocooning; Precariousness; Comparative study.

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COCOONING AND PRECARIOUSNESS AMONG INDIAN IMMIGRANTS IN SPAIN A DEMO-SPATIAL ANALYSIS ¹

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1.- Introduction

Diaspora communities, as a social form (Vertovec, 1997) commonly mix their transnational experiences and tendencies to stay close to each other as a part of their socio-cultural and demographic reproduction strategy at all new destinations. The tendency of maintaining strong ties with origin or so called 'homeland' (in the form of information flow, remittance or family relations) and within their own group at new destinations, limits their exposure to diversity in the host societies. The exposure to diversity is referred to the probability of encountering people with different attributes. According to Wilson (1987), exposure to diversity would create better socialisation opportunities, better conditions for offering strong role models, and more supportive social networks. On the contrary, lack of it results to the residential and occupational segregation that affects the use of public spaces, services, and upward social mobility of immigrants (Santiago and Wilder 1991). It often contributes to the formation of ethnic enclaves or isolated "bubbles", which are mostly characterized with high segregation and precarious socioeconomic conditions (Massey and Fischer 2000). With the passage of time, these bubbles may disappear through the assimilation of immigrant minority into the host society, which is the most desirable outcome, but in the worst

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scenario, if the situation of isolation exists for a long time, these bubbles can emerge as poverty stricken ethnic enclaves or ghettos.

Spain, like most of the south European countries, is a recent addition to the countries of global Indian diaspora (Garha et al. 2016b). Indians, with 40,580 residents listed in the municipal register (on the basis of birth place) on 1 January 2015, make a relatively small, but highly diverse immigrant community in Spain. They have different ethnic origins, languages, religions, socioeconomic profiles, legal statuses, skills and qualifications (López Sala 2013). Mass immigration from India to Spain started in the 1990s (Garha and Domingo 2017). They have maintained a high degree of residential segregation in their all old and new settlements in Spain (Garha et al. 2016a). In recent studies, the contribution of Indian community to the economic sphere (Beltran 2002; López-Sala & Sánchez 2010), their territorial distribution and socio-demographic profile (Garha et al. 2016b), social networks and ethnic enclaves (Valenzuela et al. 2014), religious communities (Lum 2010; Garha and Domingo, 2017) and their changing profiles from traders to worker (López-Sala 2013) have been studied by some researchers in Spain.

The reasons behind the selection of Indian immigrant community in Spain for this study are: 1) Spain is a good example of peripheral diaspora country, which has no colonial or historical links with India. It can be used as a laboratory to study the evolution of socioeconomic conditions of Indian immigrants at new diaspora locations; and 2) Despite the economic crisis (2008-2014) in Spain, the number of Indian immigrants kept on increasing, which makes their immigration unique. In this paper, our main objective is to explore the existence of material characteristics of “bubble” in the Indian community in Spain. For this we are going: 1) to construct two indicators i.e. ‘Cocooning’ and ‘Precariousness’ (which are the basic characteristics of a Bubble) by using several socioeconomic and demographic variable available in 2011 census records in Spain; 2) we are going to compare Indian immigrants with 10 other immigrant communities selected on the basis of their size and level of concentration in Spain; and 3) we are going to explore the regional differences regarding the socioeconomic conditions of Indian immigrants in different Autonomous Communities with high concentration of immigrant population.

This paper is structured as follows: second section provides a theoretical framework regarding the concept of ‘bubble’ and its material aspects i.e. ‘cocooning’ and ‘precariousness’. Third section presents detailed description of data sources and methodology used for the construction of cocooning and precariousness indicators from different variables selected from census micro-data records 2011 for Indians and 10 other

immigrant groups. Fourth section, presents the results about the cocooning and precariousness indicators. In the fifth section, we have explained the regional differences in the values of both indicators, and the degree and causes of dispersion. Last section, presents some conclusions.

2.- Theoretical background

In this paper, the term 'Bubble' refers to a minority group that becomes encapsulated in its own boundaries due to some external (discrimination in the housing and labour market) or internal (groups own will to maintain their separate identity like 'gated communities' mentioned by Atkinson, 2004) factors. When it appears because of external reasons, it breeds social conflicts between hosts and immigrants, and generate socioeconomic inequalities, which further contribute to the emergence of poverty stricken areas or ghettos (Iceland, 2014). Conversely, when it comes from some internal reasons, it helps in the formation of ethnic enclaves, in which group members interact with each other, and maintain strong ties and control inside the group (Galeano et al. 2014; Krysan and Reynolds 2002; Peach, 1996). However, a consequence of this may be decreased exposure to the majority society, which often maintained in all domains of life e.g. residential, occupational and social (van Ham and Tammaru 2016). This concept was explained by Boterman & Musterd (2016) as 'Cocooning behaviour', which is a necessary prerequisite for the formation of a bubble.

The idea of cocooning was first popularized by Popcorn (1992), suggesting that cocooning could be of three different types: the socialized cocoon, in which one retreats to the privacy of one's home; the armoured cocoon, in which one establishes a barrier to protect oneself from external threats; and the wandering cocoon, in which one travels with a technological barrier that serves to insulate one from the environment. The different dimensions of the cocooning are rightly explained by Atkinson & Flint (2004), arguing that the time-space trajectories of immigrants suggest a dynamic pattern of separation that goes beyond the place of residence and includes the place of work and mobility.

The cocooning of a group is more visible in residential and occupational domains, where people spend most of their time. Hence, residential and occupational segregation are considered to be the most important indicators of cocooning behaviour. According to Iceland (2014), residential segregation is widely perceived as 'the antithesis of successful immigrant integration'. In recent studies, segregation is positively correlated with the deprived living

status of immigrants (van Gent & Musterd 2016; Iceland & Wilkes 2006). Oliver and Wong (2003) found that interethnic proximity corresponds with lower levels of prejudice to the out-group and saw this as a plea for more diverse environments. The recent research into occupational segregation (on the basis of ethnicity and migrant status) highlights its importance in causing the exclusion of immigrant minorities' from the host society and the persistent difference in the income and standard of living among foreigners and native workers (Liu et al. 2004; del Río & Alonso-Villar 2015; Farber & Allard 2012). Some studies have argued that the diversity at the workplace may have positive effects on the integration of immigrants into the host society (Thomas & Jackson 1992). On the contrary, some scholars have questioned the effect of 'exposure to diversity' on cocooning, emphasising that residents of specific groups even when they live in proximity hardly interact with residents of other groups (Blokland & Van Eijk 2010) and the proximity to others does not equate with meaningful contact and often generates or aggravates negative viewpoints toward other groups (Valentine 2008).

Some authors consider that residential segregation is too static as an approach, and fails to address the fact that most people move out of their neighbourhood to work, recreation and socialize with others (Ellis, Wright, & Parks, 2004; Kwan, 2013). Kwan (2013) therefore, argues for an integration of segregation literature with time-space geographies and mobility literature that includes the temporal dimension. Wong and Shaw (2011) present an alternative evaluation of segregation based on 'activity space'. Activity spaces encompass a combination of spheres of life; not just the residential, but also spaces such as work and leisure (Wang, Li, & Chai, 2012). Following this, we argue that the concept of bubble is not only limited to residential or occupational segregation; rather it has a dynamic part also, which is related to their mobility and activity space. As Wong and Shaw (2011) state in their activity space approach, exposure to others occurs in time and space, and on the move people meets others, interacts with them, and may even establish social bonds.

Mobility is assumed as an important feature of exposure to host society, as movement results in contact with other individuals. Hence, transport spaces (inside a bus, tram, metro, car etc.) are key sites of encounter and identity formation (Wilson, 2011). Exposure to others in transport space or mobility space depends on the mode of transport, as well as the route, the time of day and the duration of journey (Alaily-Mattar, 2008). Modes of transport can also be used as means to get separate from others, as Atkinson and Flint (2004) have referred to the transport from the neighbourhood to workplace as 'corridors'. Sometimes the affluent

upper middle class use private cars as a status symbol or to maintain distance from others (Atkinson 2006).

Another important concept used in this study is of 'Precariousness', which is literally defined as unsure, uncertain or a delicate situation, and is generally used to explain the unstable working or housing conditions. Precarious working conditions is the most important factor in consistently low standards of living and low social upward mobility of immigrant minorities (Fleras 2015). On the other side, it is well acknowledged that the standard of housing can affect migrants' health and quality of life (Lee and Park 2010). Housing also situates migrants in a neighbourhood, a physical and social environment, which provides opportunities to work, access to public services, to socialize with natives, and to feel more or less secure from crime and discrimination (Phillips 2006). Hence, when measuring the socioeconomic conditions of immigrants, the standard of housing, level of segregation, proportion of migrants living in deprived areas and levels of homelessness are often included within the basket of indicators (Ager and Strang 2004; Entzinger and Biezeveld 2002). A key argument of Massey & Denton's (1993) American Apartheid was 'the residential segregation and minority poverty rates combine interactively to produce spatially concentrated poverty zones'. This explains that the existence of cocooning is one of the main causes and effects for the precariousness among immigrant communities, which contributes to the formation of 'precarious bubbles'.

3.- Data source and Methodology


3.1. Data Sources

The data has been extracted from 2011 census of population and housing, and municipal register of inhabitants (*Padrón Continuo*, 2015) of Spain. To measure the level of residential segregation, we depend upon the municipal register data. It provides information about the present residence of all individuals, including immigrant population, at census section level. The data has been collected on the basis of the variable 'place of birth' for different immigrant groups. For the study of occupational structure, demography, housing, and mobility, we have used 2011 Census data. It is the only source of data on various socioeconomic aspects of the whole population and most importantly about the immigrant minorities, which are owing to their small size, often neglected by the surveys conducted at national level.

3.2.- Methodology

We have constructed two indicators based on several variables that directly or indirectly affect 'exposure to diversity' and 'socioeconomic conditions' of different immigrant communities. The first, which we named as "Cocooning", is used to measure the existence of possible situations of isolation or segregation among Indian immigrants and the other selected immigrant groups in Spain. The second indicator, which we named as 'Precariousness', shows the socioeconomic characteristics of immigrant communities marked by several factors related to labour market and housing.

Figure 1.- Main variables of Cocooning and Precariousness indicators



Source: own elaboration.

The indicators are constructed at the national level to see the overall conditions of Indians and other immigrant communities, and at regional levels to explore the regional disparities regarding the conditions of immigrants in different regions of Spain. To avoid dispersion of values between variables and to ensure their comparability we have used the following

method to normalize minimum and maximum values obtained (OECD 2008). In this case, it applies the following formulation to each of the x values of the different variables v :

$$I_v = \frac{x_v - \min(x_v)}{\max(x_v) - \min(x_v)}$$

3.2.1.- Cocooning indicator

For the construction of Cocooning indicator, we have focused on the three major domains marked by Boterman and Musterd (2016): residential, occupational and daily mobility. To these we have added a fourth domain i.e. socio-demographic characteristics. We argue that the socio-demographic characteristics (age structure, sex composition and family structure) have an enormous impact on the exposure of immigrant population to host society. We have selected two representative variables for each of the first three domains. For residential domain, we have selected 'residential segregation' and 'per capita living space'; for occupational domain, we have selected 'occupational segregation' and 'the proportion of inactive population'; and for the daily mobility, we have selected 'the share of people working at their usual place of residence' and 'the share of workers using private transport'. However, in the socio-demographic sphere, we have used three variables i.e. 'the sex-ratio', 'the percentage of complex households', and 'the period of stay in Spain'. In the final value of the indicator all domains have same weighting. The high value of these variables depicts high cocooning and vice versa.

First, in the residential domain, residential segregation has been calculated with the help of dissimilarity index (D) proposed by Duncan and Duncan (1955). This is a classic indicator that computes the differences in the distribution pattern of two population groups. Formulation of dissimilarity index (D) is as follows:

$$D = \frac{1}{2} \sum_{i=1}^n \left| \frac{x_i}{X} - \frac{y_i}{Y} \right|$$

The x_i refers to the population of the studied group (X) and y_i refers to the population of the reference group (Y). The ' i ' refers to the number of spatial units. On a scale of 0 to 100, it indicates residential proximity or relative distance of the immigrant population to autochthons. The minimum value indicates that the two groups have the same distribution

pattern in all spatial units; on the contrary, the maximum value shows that groups do not coincide.

Secondly, per capita residential space is calculated, by dividing the 'average area of house' with the 'average household size'. Owing to the lack of sufficient data for all immigrant groups at the regional level, we have ruled out the use of the indicator of residential overcrowding (Myers and Lee 1996), which in fact measures more accurately the living condition by relating the number of occupants and square meter space available.

In the occupational domain, firstly, occupational segregation is measured by the above mentioned classical measure of segregation i.e. dissimilarity index. One digit coding of occupation (CNO11) in the Census 2011, which classify total occupations in nine major categories, has been used for the calculation of occupational segregation. On a scale from 0 to 100, lower numbers indicate a high proximity to the occupational structure of the reference group and vice versa. Secondly, the variable proportion of inactive population has been calculated only for the working age group (16 to 64 years), to avoid the effect of age-structure on the value of the variable, which affects countries with large dependent (minors or elders) population. Furthermore, in this calculation we have excluded those individuals who remained studying after the age of 16. The inactive situation therefore includes three categories: people with permanent disabilities; early retirees, pensioners or annuitants; and a group of other situations, including housewives.

The third domain is the daily mobility. Generally, most of the daily mobility is related to jobs, as people travel to reach their work places. It is therefore appropriate to use 'proportion employed at home' as a suitable measure for exposure to others. In some professions, like old-care services at home or agricultural labour in remote areas, this would be a clear indicator of limited exposure to the outer world. The second variable is related to the means of mobility, in this area the proportion of private transport users for job purposes, has been calculated. Here, we assume that the possibility of contact with other people in public transport is much higher than in private transport. To operationalize this variable, those who travel by car or motorbike are placed in the category of private transport, while those who travel by train, metro or bus are placed in the category of public transport.

Finally, in the socio-demographic domain, we assume that the demographic composition of the group contributes to the existence of possible cocooning, like the imbalance among sexes, the existence of complex households, and small time of stay contributes to the increased level of cocooning, and vice versa. Firstly, we have calculated the sex-ratio with the data provided by the municipal register 2015. To avoid potential problems of symmetry in the distribution, the sex-ratio is calculated as $R = |\ln(M/F)|$, Where, M corresponds to the number of Males and F to Females, expressed as an absolute value. Total equality between males and females gives a value of R as zero. R becomes further from zero when there is a major imbalance in the number of individuals of any of both sexes. The use of the logarithm ensures symmetry, i.e. apply the same value if inequality is caused by a higher concentration of males or females. We assume that the imbalance of sexes leads to less exposure and hence promotes cocooning behaviour. Secondly, we have used the percentage of individuals living in complex households, i.e. where in addition to the nuclear structure (couple with or without children, or a single parent) other people also live in the home. We consider that the presence of complex households is a symbol of high segregation, which contributes to cocooning. Thirdly, the duration of stay in Spain is important because with time people form contacts at new destination and they generally become less “cocoon”, as compared to their early immigration and settlement period. Hence, less time is positively related with cocooning.

For the construction of Cocooning Index (CI), the weighted averages of all above mentioned variables have been used. Its value lies in between 0 to 100. Higher CI values interpreted as high level of cocooning and vice versa.

3.2.2.- Precariousness Indicator

The precariousness is a common feature of immigrant communities from developing world. In the initial stages of settlement, it is quite normal that the displaced people find difficult to get better jobs and houses. The problem arises when this state of precariousness persists for a long time, resulting in the emergence of poverty stricken areas in big cities or around them.

For the construction of Precariousness indicator, we focus on three areas where the precariousness is more apparent i.e. labour market, housing market and level of education. We have measured ‘Precariousness’ in the host labour market by calculating the proportion of ‘unemployed’, ‘temporary workers’ and ‘non-income households’ in the total population. By unemployed we mean a person who is in the working age group (16-64 years), and

searching for a work, but does not get any job. Unemployment is considered as the most important determinant of precarious living conditions (Martínez et al. 2003). Secondly, by temporary worker, we refer to a person who is working with a temporary work contract with a fixed tenure. Under-employment or temporary work contracts also adversely affect the wellbeing and living statuses of immigrant workers (Rodríguez-Planas & Nollenberger 2014). Thirdly, non-income household is a household in which nobody is employed or receives any kind of retirement pension. To differentiate the immigrant-households from others, all households with at least one immigrant member have been considered as immigrant households. In some cases, where immigrants from different origins share the same house that house was attributed to the member (or origin), who has spent more time in Spain.

In the housing market, 'habitable conditions of the residential building' and 'house ownership (rental situations as opposed to property)' were taken into consideration. The better habitable conditions and the high rate of house ownership show a lower degree of precariousness (Kees & Boumeester 2017). To explore the condition of houses, we classify all residential buildings occupied by immigrants as 'well habitable' or 'sub-standard'. In sub-standard buildings, we include residential buildings with three different conditions i.e. in ruins, bad and deficient, as categorised in the 2011 census records. The third area of prime importance regarding the precariousness is the level of education. It shows the quality of human capital among different immigrant groups and affects the pace of cultural and socioeconomic integration into the host society and labour market. In this variable, we consider the 'share of illiterates' in the total population of different immigrant groups in Spain. The large share of illiterate people in a group increases the possibility of precariousness, and vice versa (Rodríguez-Planas & Nollenberger 2014). Precariousness index (PI) is the weighted average of the values of all above mentioned variables. All variables have equal weighting in the final value of PI. It ranges from 0 to 100 points. Lower values show less precariousness and vice versa.

To compare the situation of Indians with other immigrant groups, we have selected 10 different immigrant communities of Spain, based on their population size and their spatial concentration levels in Spain. Firstly, we have selected the immigrant communities that are at the same population threshold as Indians (30,570 individuals listed in 2011 census records), like Belgians (39,075), the US immigrants (35,165), Philippines (31,770), Hondurans (30,675), Pakistanis (37,750) and Nigerians (23,470); secondly, two immigrant communities with largest population in Spain, i.e. Moroccans (716,685) and Romanians (690,505); and

finally, the immigrant communities with same concentration levels in big metropolitan cities as Indian immigrants, like Chinese (90,255) and Dominican Republicans (119,490).

And finally, to see the regional differences regarding the cocooning and precariousness among Indian immigrants, we have calculated both indices for 6 regional categories, i.e. 4 autonomous communities (Catalonia (1,279,511 immigrants listed in municipal register), Madrid (1,149,118), Valencia (826,653), Andalusia (786,266)), the Islands group (613,472), which consists of the Balearic and the Canary islands, and the sixth category Rest of Spain (368,467, including rest of the autonomous communities of Spain).

4.- Results: The Cocooning and Precariousness Indicators

4.1.- The Cocooning Indicator

Residential segregation is one of the most important components of cocooning. The dissimilarity index (D) values show that among all selected immigrant groups of Spain, in 2015, the Indian community, with D of 78.1, was only second to Philippines, which had the highest level of residential segregation i.e. 79.8 (Table 1). This high value of D shows that 78.1% of the Indians had to change their houses to get a residential distribution pattern similar to the host population. The main reasons behind this high D might be 1) the Indian immigration was mainly supported by the kinship networks, which support the entry and settlement of new immigrants in Spain (Garha et al. 2016a). Hence, the tendency of new immigrants to settle close to each other increases the degree of residential segregation. 2) The availability of cheap houses in the degraded poor residential areas in the big cities attracted Indian immigrants, which contributed to their segregation in poverty stricken areas (Garha & Galeano 2015). At the other extreme, Moroccans and Romanians had the lowest D values of 47.9 and 49.8, respectively. It was mainly due to their presence in more census section than other immigrant groups e.g. Philippines and Indians were living in only 18.8% and 19.2% of the total census tracts, however, Moroccans and Romanians were settled in 84.4% and 82.4% of them, respectively. For the total immigrant population in Spain the D was 34.4, as different immigrant groups complement each other on the territory to have similar residential pattern like the host community.

Table 1.- The values of different variables used in the construction of 'Cocooning' indicator

| DOMAINS Variables | RESIDENTIAL | | OCCUPATIONAL | | DAILY MOBILITY | | SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC | | |
|-------------------------|-----------------------------|------------------------------------|-------------------------|------------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------------|-------------------|------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| | Residential Segregation (D) | Per capita Space (m ²) | Inactive Population (%) | Occupational Segregation (D) | Work at Residence (%) | Private Transport users (%) | Sex Imbalance | Complex Households (%) | Duration of Stay in Spain (years) |
| Immigrant countries | | | | | | | | | |
| India | 78.1 | 22.4 | 29.2 | 32.6 | 7.0 | 74.7 | 58.6 | 38.1 | 11.9 |
| Nigeria | 74.7 | 25.7 | 16.7 | 39.2 | 9.0 | 69.6 | 37.1 | 20.3 | 11.3 |
| Philippines | 79.8 | 23.1 | 12.1 | 50.9 | 26.9 | 46.1 | 54.7 | 36.6 | 14.6 |
| USA | 59.7 | 40.8 | 20.9 | 37.4 | 13.3 | 70.5 | 14.5 | 12.1 | 18.2 |
| Dominican Rep. | 55.7 | 23.1 | 11.9 | 37.9 | 10.0 | 61.8 | 44.8 | 33.2 | 11.5 |
| Belgium | 62.2 | 45.9 | 20.6 | 10.6 | 15.5 | 81.7 | 1.4 | 6.1 | 22.6 |
| Rumania | 49.8 | 24.9 | 15.1 | 34.8 | 6.6 | 77.1 | 4.4 | 24.7 | 9.1 |
| Morocco | 49.7 | 23.1 | 22.7 | 35.1 | 10.7 | 77.8 | 30.4 | 21.7 | 14.8 |
| Pakistan | 77.5 | 17.6 | 26.3 | 32.8 | 5.6 | 66.5 | 116.9 | 29.3 | 9.5 |
| China | 51.3 | 25.9 | 19.7 | 48.6 | 9.6 | 71.4 | 11.8 | 26.9 | 11.8 |
| Honduras | 69.4 | 24.0 | 15.9 | 44.8 | 13.4 | 61.8 | 103.7 | 31.5 | 8.5 |
| Total Immigrants | 34.4 | 29.2 | 16.1 | 16.34 | 9.5 | 71.9 | 3.2 | 20.1 | 13.6 |

Source: own elaboration with data from the Census of Population and housing 2011, INE.

The second important variable is per capita residential space available to immigrants. To calculate it first we calculated the average house size and second we have calculated the average household size and then we have divided the average house size with the average household size. For Indian immigrants in Spain the average house size was 82 square meter. It situates them between Pakistanis (70.3 square meters) and the US immigrants (108.3 square meters). However, it was below the average immigrant house size, i.e. 85.9 square meters. The average immigrant family size in Spain was ranging from close to 4 among Indians (3.67) and Pakistanis (3.99), to a lower of 2.22 persons for Belgians. It gives an average of 22.4 square meter space per person for Indian immigrants, which is more than Pakistanis, who had the smallest per capita space (17.6 square meters) as compared to all other immigrants, but lower than the US (40.8 square meters) and Belgians immigrants (46.0 square meters), who had more per capita space than the average foreigners.

After residential, the other domain where the cocooning is more apparent is occupational. Mostly, the insertion of unskilled immigrants into the labour market depends upon their ethnic network (Patacchini and Zenoudef, 2012). The recruitment of new workers through kinship chains and lack of access to other occupational areas contribute to the occupational segregation of immigrants in some specific niches in the labour market, e.g. the segregation of Indians in agricultural activities and hospitality services in Spain (Lopez Sala, 2013). The census data shows that the Indian immigrants have the dissimilarity index value of 32.6 (Table 1), which places them in between the lowest value of Belgians (10.1) and the highest of Philippines (51.0). But still they have higher occupational segregation than the average

immigrants (16.3). In the selected immigrant communities Honduras, China and the Philippines have high values, mainly because of their strong occupational concentration in trade or domestic service.


In the economic sphere, another important variable is 'share of inactive population'. The inactive population has very limited contact with the host community as compared to the active one (Gallie et al. 2012). In Spain, Indian immigrants had the maximum share of inactive population (29.2%) followed by Pakistanis (26.3%) and Moroccans (22.7%). In all these communities the limited participation of females in labour market was responsible for their high share of inactive population. Indian immigration is always remained male led. Mostly, males migrate first in search of work opportunities, and later females follow them through family reunion process (Garha et al. 2016). These females are normally limited to their houses; hence, their low participation in the labour market and social sphere increases the inactivity rate and contributes to cocooning. On the contrary, the share of inactive population among Philippines (12.1%) and Dominicans (11.9%) was the lowest, mainly owing to the highest rate of female participation in the labour market, as compared to other immigrant groups.

In the domain of daily mobility, the share of workers who work at their usual place of residence was almost same among the Spaniards (9.9%) and immigrants (9.5%). In the selected immigrant communities, Indians (7.0%) had the third last position after Pakistanis (5.6%) and Rumanians (6.6%). It shows that Indians were more exposed to diversity in the mobility domain. On the contrary, Philippines (26.9%) had the highest proportion of workers employed at their usual place of residence. It was mainly owing to their segregation in the category of domestic workers, who often live in the same house where they work. Second important variable is the 'use of private means of transport' for travelling to work places. In Spain, immigrants (71.9%) had a higher share of workers using private transport than the host workers (62.5%). Most of the Indian immigrants (74.7%) were using private vehicles, which contributed to their high level of cocooning. Among the selected immigrant communities, Belgians (81.7 %) were leading the foreigners, but also Moroccans and Romanians had a high use of private means of transport, i.e. 77.8% and 77.1%, respectively. On the other extreme, Philippines (46.1%) had the lowest use of private transport, as they mostly lived in densely populated areas of big cities where the public transport was cheap, easily available and of good quality.

In socio demographic domain, the most important factor is 'sex composition' of an immigrant population. The imbalance of sexes, caused by the shortage of one or another sex reduces the participation of immigrant groups in the social sphere. The results indicate that the Indian community (58.6) had a sex imbalance in favour of males. Among the selected immigrant communities Pakistanis (117.0) had the highest presence of males and Honduras (103.7) had the highest presence of females. Belgium and Romania were on the opposite ends with lowest disparity between sexes. Secondly, the percentage of complex households, which we consider that leads to cocooning, among autochthons (7.7%) is significantly lower than immigrants (20.1%). In the selected immigrant communities, Indians (38.1%) had the highest share of complex households followed by Philippines (36.6%). It is mainly due to the high rate of shared houses in the Indian community, where two families or a family with other relatives live together to share the cost of living. On the contrary, Belgians (6.1%) and the US immigrants (12.1%) have the lowest share of complex households.

Thirdly, the time of stay in Spain is also important, as the new immigrants often find it very difficult to relate with their new neighbourhoods and host society. The result shows that the average time of stay in Spain for Indians was 11.9 years, which was below the average for all selected communities, i.e. 13.6 years. It was mainly due to the recent mass immigration of Indians into Spain. In the selected immigrant communities Belgians (22.6) had the longest and Hondurans (8.5) have the shortest average duration of stay in Spain.

India and Pakistan have the highest value (0.71) of Cocooning index (CI) in Spain, followed by Philippines and Honduras (0.64). The high level of cocooning among Indians is mainly due to their high residential, and occupational segregation, high use of private transport, large number of complex households, and less duration of stay in Spain. At the opposite extreme, Belgians (0.30) and the US immigrants (0.40) had the least score of cocooning (Fig. 2). In sum, the high CI value illustrates the existence of cocooning behaviour among Indian immigrants, which is a material feature of a bubble.

Figure 2.- The Cocooning Indicators of 11 selected immigrant communities


Source: own elaboration, data from municipal registers (Padrón continuo, 2015) and census 2011, INE, Spain.

4.2.- The Precariousness indicator

The precariousness is mainly visible in the economic sphere. The 2008 economic crisis in Spain resulted in high unemployment and sharp decrease in job security among immigrants, especially low skilled ones (Chaloff, et al. 2012). The economic crisis had affected the Indian immigrants also, and left one-third of the population unemployed (35.6%). However, as compare to other immigrant groups, they were at an intermediate position. In selected communities, Nigerians had the highest share of unemployed population (62.9%), followed by Moroccans (55.5%) and Dominicans (49.3%). On the contrary, Chinese (16.7%) and Philippines (22.3%) had the lowest proportion of unemployed people. The high unemployment rate among Indians affected adversely their standard of living in Spain and forced them to live in poor residential areas, where cheap flats were easily available (Garha and Galeano 2015). After unemployment another variable that defines 'precariousness' in the labour market is working conditions related to work-contracts, and the stability of jobs for the employed population. In 2011, the share of temporary workers among natives (21.6%) was much lower than the immigrant workers (34.1%). In the Indian community, 40.5% of the total working population were temporarily employed, which was above the average for the selected immigrant communities (34.8%). The temporary workers normally receive fewer salaries and incentives from their employers, and enjoy limited access to social security (Polavieja 2006). High share of temporary workers in the Indian community shows their high level of precariousness. While, comparing with other immigrants, Pakistan (56.8%)

and Nigeria (55.7%) had the highest share of temporary workers, but Philippines and Belgians had the lowest share, 18.7% and 19.4%, respectively. Finally, the share of non-income households also shows the degree of precariousness among different immigrant groups. In the Indian community, the share of non-income households was 11%. However, there are immigrant communities, like Nigerians, who had one in three households in the same situation. Chinese (4.8%) and Philippines (5.5%) had the lowest share of non-income household among the selected immigrant communities. (Table 2).

Table 2. The variable used for the construction of Precariousness indicator

| DOMAINS Variables | LABOUR MARKET | | | HOUSING MARKET | | EDUCATION |
|----------------------------|---------------------|--------------------------|----------------------------|-------------------------|----------------------------|--------------------|
| | Unemployment (%) | Temporary Workers (%) | No Income Household (%) | Rented apartment (%) | Substandard Housing (%) | Illiterates (%) |
| Immigrant countries | | | | | | |
| India | 35.6 | 40.5 | 11.0 | 54.2 | 13.0 | 12.0 |
| Nigeria | 62.9 | 55.7 | 33.9 | 61.8 | 12.4 | 16.7 |
| Philippines | 22.3 | 18.7 | 5.5 | 45.1 | 16.6 | 4.2 |
| USA | 24.3 | 31.5 | 6.6 | 33.1 | 4.6 | 2.4 |
| Dominican Rep. | 49.3 | 33.1 | 16.9 | 62.4 | 9.4 | 7.9 |
| Belgium | 27.2 | 19.4 | 8.5 | 23.9 | 5.4 | 1.9 |
| Rumania | 42.3 | 41.3 | 16.7 | 70.8 | 7.3 | 2.9 |
| Morocco | 55.5 | 43.5 | 27.3 | 60.8 | 15.6 | 29.9 |
| Pakistan | 45.1 | 56.8 | 16.4 | 63.5 | 15.2 | 17.1 |
| China | 16.7 | 29.6 | 4.8 | 39.3 | 4.7 | 20.1 |
| Honduras | 34.5 | 43.8 | 9.9 | 66.9 | 8.2 | 4.7 |
| Total Immigrantes | 39.9 | 34.8 | 19.8 | 52.4 | 8.9 | 7.6 |

Source: own elaboration with data from the Census of Population and housing 2011, INE.


The second main area where the precariousness is more apparent is housing market. In Spain, home-ownership is considered as the most important factor of security and stability. For immigrant communities it has been seen as a symbol of integration and economic stability (Módenes et al. 2013). The percentage of people living in the rental houses is much higher among immigrants than the natives. More than half of the immigrant population is living in rented accommodation. India (54.2%) was not an exception to this. This high proportion of rented apartment shows the unstable situation of Indian immigrants in the housing market. Among the selected countries Romanians (70.8%) had the highest share of rented apartments; on the contrary, Belgians (23.9%) and the US immigrants (33.1%) had the lowest share of it. Secondly, the condition of houses is also a very good indicator of precariousness. The share of Indians living in substandard houses was 13%, which was above

the average among immigrants (8.9%). This percentage was exceeded by Philippines (16.6%), Moroccans (15.6) and Pakistanis (15.2). On the contrary, the US, Chinese and Belgians immigrants had around 5% people, who had reported problems with their houses.

As the education is directly correlated with the success of Immigrants in the labour market. Hence, a high share of illiterate population results in precariousness. Interestingly, the overall percentage of the illiterates in the total immigrant population (7.6%) is lower than the natives (11.4%). It can be explained by the difference of age-structure between immigrants and native population. Among the Indian immigrants in Spain, 12% were without any formal studies, which was much higher than the overall average for immigrants (7.6%). This high share of illiterate population contributed to their segregation in the low paid manual jobs and resulted in precarious living conditions. Belgians (1.9%) and the US (2.4%) immigrants had the minimum share of illiterate population, followed by Romanians (2.9%). On the contrary, Moroccans (33%), Chinese (20.1%) and Pakistanis (17.1%) had a significant share of illiterates in their total population.

The Precariousness Index (PI) shows that the Indian immigrants, with a moderate value of 0.48, situate themselves in the middle of selected immigrant communities. Moroccan (0.83), Nigerian (0.83) and Pakistani (0.71) immigrants have the highest values of PI; while, at the opposite extreme, Belgians and the US immigrants have fairly good standards of living in Spain (Fig. 3).

Figure 3.- The Precariousness Indicators of 11 selected immigrant communities




Source: own elaboration, data from municipal registers (Padrón continuo, 2015) and census 2011, INE, Spain.

4.3.- The correlation between Cocooning and Precariousness indicators

At first glance, the correlation between Cocooning and Precariousness indicators tells us that there is a very low linear relationship between the two indicators ($R^2 = 0.213$). If we compare the degree of cocooning, India situates itself on the top position among all selected immigrant communities (Fig. 4). However, when it comes to precarious living conditions, Indian immigrants were at an intermediate position. The high degree of cocooning is a matter of worry for the Indian community, as it deteriorates their possibilities to participate in the labour market, which in turn is a prime cause for their precarious living conditions. If this situation of cocooning and precariousness persist with coming generations, it will convert the areas where they live into ghettos or ethnic enclaves, which we named 'Precarious Bubbles'.

Figure 4.- Correlation between Cocooning and Precariousness indicator



Source: own elaboration, data from municipal registers (Padrón continuo, 2015) and census 2011, INE, Spain.

If we compare with other countries, Pakistanis and Moroccans show extreme values, although not in the same direction. Pakistanis had the highest level of cocooning, coincided with high precariousness. Moroccan however, was an exception as they characterized with the most precarious situation and comparatively lower cocooning values. Their low level of cocooning might be due to their more territorial dispersion and their relatively large size of population, as compared to other groups. For the precariousness indicators Moroccans and

Nigerians had the worst position, with all values above the average for all immigrants. Furthermore, the level of education was extremely low. On the contrary to African communities, Belgians and the US immigrants were in the best situation. Belgians had the least levels of cocooning and precariousness, followed by the US immigrants, who were a little ahead of them. The main reasons behind their greater exposure and better living conditions were their proximity to the native population, high education level and better occupations.


5.- Regional differences of cocooning and precariousness

The territorial distribution of Indian population is highly skewed in the favour of some Autonomous Communities of Spain. According to the municipal registers 2015, almost half of the Indian immigrants were settled in Catalonia (46.6%), followed by some significant concentration in Valencia (13.9%) and the Canary Islands (13.1%). To measure the regional differences in socioeconomic status and level of exposure, we have calculated both previously mentioned indicators, for all selected immigrant groups, at different Autonomous Communities and selected regions.

The cocooning indicator in Catalonia and Madrid shows that the Indians among all selected immigrant groups were only second to Pakistanis in cocooning. Valencia, Islands group and Andalusia had the highest cocooning score for Indians. While, in the 'Rest of Spain' they were comparatively less cocooned than Pakistan, Honduran and Philippines immigrants (Figure 5).


The precariousness indicator shows that the Indians had relatively good living conditions as compared to other immigrant groups in different territories of Spain. In the Island communities, they had better economic position than all other immigrant groups except the US immigrants. On the contrary, in Valencia they had the most precarious living conditions as compared to all other immigrant groups. Overall Indians were in relatively good conditions than Moroccans, Pakistanis and Nigerians in all Autonomous Communities except Valencia; while, Philippines, the US, Chinese and Belgian immigrants were in far better conditions than Indians at all places (Fig. 6).

Figure 5.- Cocooning Indicator for the selected immigrant countries in all Autonomous communities



Source: own elaboration, data from municipal registers (Padrón continuo, 2015) and census 2011, INE, Spain (*in the case of Pakistan the data for the island group was not significant, so we have not used it for the calculations).


Figure 6.- Precariousness Indicator, for the selected immigrant countries in all Autonomous communities



Source: own elaboration, data from municipal registers (Padrón continuo, 2015) and census 2011, INE, Spain (*in the case of Pakistan the data for the island group was not significant, so we have not used it for the calculations).

Now when we explore the correlation between both indicators (Fig. 7).

Figure 7.- Correlation between the Cocooning and Precariousness for the selected immigrant countries in all Autonomous communities



Source: own elaboration, data from municipal registers (Padrón continuo, 2015) and census 2011, INE, Spain (*For Pakistan the data for the island group was not significant, so we have not used it for the calculations).

We find that the Indians were in the worst condition in Valencia, where they had the highest degree of cocooning and precarious living conditions, on the contrary, they were relatively well situated in Catalonia and Madrid. The Islands group (the Canary and the Balears islands) present an exception with high degree of cocooning and relatively better living conditions. A possible reason for this might be the high concentration of Sindhi trading community of Indian origin in Islands group, who have settled their businesses there and living in clusters within or near the central market areas of port cities (López Sala and Sánchez, 2010).

5.1.- The dispersion of Bubble indicators in different Autonomous Communities


As we have already seen that most of the Indian immigrants in Spain were living in a moderately precarious bubble. But it is a generalized view of the whole Indian community, which is a highly diverse group in terms of origins, education, occupations and legal statuses. Now an important question arises: Is the level of precariousness and cocooning same for all Indian immigrants in different regions of Spain? The values of Precariousness indicator show the maximum dispersion among the Indians as compared to other selected immigrant groups in different regions of Spain. The maximum (0.72 in Valencia) and the minimum (0.21 in the Islands group) values had the difference of 0.51 points. After them, Nigerians (0.49 points separation between maximum and minimum) also showed a similar dispersion caused by the exceptional case of Andalusia, where their precariousness indicator is 0.99. In all other cases, the difference is between the minimum of 0.10 (from 0.54 to 0.44) in the case of Dominicans and a maximum of 0.29 (0.50 and 0.21) for the Hondurans (Figure 8a).

The Cocooning indicator of different groups showed a smaller dispersion, ranging from the maximum of 0.30 points for Belgian or 0.27 points for the US immigrants, and the minimum of 0.05 points and 0.06 points for Chinese and Philippines. Indians had a dispersion of 0.22 points, from a high of 0.78 in Valencia to a minimum of 0.56 in the Rest of Spain. It explains the existence of cocooning behaviour among Indian immigrants over the entire Spanish territory (Figure 8b).

Figure 8.- The territorial dispersion of the Bubble indicators for selected immigrant countries

a) Precariousness Indicator

b) Cocooning Indicator



Source: own elaboration, data from municipal registers (Padrón continue, 2015) and census 2011, INE, Spain.

6.- Conclusion

It is now clear that the Indian population in Spain was living in a situation characterized by high cocooning and moderately precarious living conditions, which is previously defined as a ‘bubble’, in most of the autonomous regions of Spain. Their high level of cocooning in all domains was caused by their have high residential and occupational segregation, less use of public transport, high share of complex houses, high gender imbalance in favour of males and less duration of stay in Spain. Similarly, they had precarious living conditions in all regions, except the Island groups.

While comparing with other immigrant groups in Spain, Indian immigrants were at the intermediate positions in the selected immigrant communities. When compared with African immigrants, e.g. Moroccans and Nigerians, they were at much better position in terms of occupation, housing and education, but compared with their first world neighbours, like the US or Belgian immigrants, they were still lagging behind in all aspects of cocooning and precariousness. Among the Asian countries, Indians were only second to Pakistan in precarious living conditions, while China and Philippines were at much better position in terms of housing and the labour market participation.

In this study, following Boterman and Musterd (2016), we have focused on the different domains of cocooning, however, owing to the shortage of data on household income and neighbourhood relations for all immigrant groups, we have based our study on the

information available in the census records regarding different socioeconomic and demographic aspects, which we consider, directly or indirectly affects their 'exposure to the host society' and 'living conditions' in different parts of Spain. We also found that the Indian bubble prevails throughout the Spanish territory with a comparatively great dispersion between different autonomous regions. As per regional differences, we found that they had worse situation in Valencia, where they had registered high degree of cocooning and precariousness as compared to all other regions.

As mentioned before, the 'bubbles' are not static objects, they can evolve socioeconomically or remain precarious forever or disappear with time. Indeed, we have seen a great dispersion in terms of precariousness among Indians, which was primarily related to their ethnic origins, i.e. rich Sindhi traders and poor Punjabi farmers. The Bubble always maintain a difficult balance between endogenic (the group's own desire of not to be exposed to diversity), and exogamic forces (the boundaries maintained by the majority group to limit the exposure of minority group) that works together to secure its existence. In Spain, a great majority of Indians were either from 'first' or 'one and a half' generation, and for new immigrants it is always a challenge to make their place at a new destination. Their cocooning behaviour, which was visible in all spheres of life, i.e. economic or social, can be a result of their personal desire to stay closer to their own group or owing to the lack of resources and the limited knowledge of Spanish language. Hopefully, with the passage of time, Indian immigrants will become familiar with their new social environment, become more exposed to diversity in all spheres, and begin to challenge the boundaries of the bubble that separates them from the host society. Then this bubble will disappear. On the contrary, if the precariousness persists with the next generations, then it will be more disturbing for the Indian immigrants and the host community, as it will affect their social cohesion, integration into the host society and their upward social mobility.

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4. THE INTEGRATION PROCESS OF INDIAN IMMIGRANTS IN SPAIN

Garha, Nachatter S. and Paparusso, Angela (2018), “Fragmented integration and transnational networks: a case study of Indian immigration to Italy and Spain” in *Genus Journal of Population Sciences*, 74:12.

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Indian community in Spain



Indian people celebrating their religious procession in l’Hospitalet de Llobregat, Barcelona, Spain.

Indian Bollywood Restaurant in Andalucia, Spain.



Indian Sikh temple in Sant Adrià de Besòs, Spain.

Source: own elaboration, Photos by lovely studio Barcelona and Bollywood Marbella.

ORIGINAL ARTICLE

Open Access



Fragmented integration and transnational networks: a case study of Indian immigration to Italy and Spain

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Abstract

According to 2016 municipal register data, Italy has the highest number of Indians in continental Europe (151,000), followed by Spain (41,000). Mass immigration from India to Italy and Spain started in the 1990s, but economic and political environments more conducive to the entry and permanent settlement of immigrants have resulted in more rapid growth of the Indian immigrant community in Italy than Spain. Due to the unskilled and irregular nature of Indian immigration and the lack of integration policies for unskilled labour in both countries, the level of integration of Indian immigrants remains unexplored. In this research, we used a qualitative methodology to explore the integration level of Indian immigrants into different spheres of these host societies. We conducted 86 semi-structured interviews with Indian immigrants in seven cities with high concentration of Indian immigrants in both countries over 2016–2017. We found that the level of integration of Indian immigrants into the host societies is fragmented: some segments of the Indian community are integrated into specific spheres of the host societies, while the rest remain excluded. The main reasons for this fragmented integration are the absence of integration policies for unskilled immigrants, Indians' provisional attitudes towards permanent settlement in these countries, the internal diversity of the Indian immigrant community and frequent international mobility through transnational networks.

Keywords: Indian immigration, Fragmented integration, Diaspora, Transnational networks, Qualitative research, Italy, Spain

Introduction

In the first decade of the twenty-first century, Spain and Italy, traditionally emigrant countries, emerged as leading recipients of immigrants from different parts of the world (Arango and Finotelli 2009). According to municipal registers (*Padrón Continuo 2000–2016* in Spain and *Anagrafe 2000–2016* in Italy), the foreign population increased from 1.12 million to 5.03 million (78% non-European Union [EU]) in Italy and 0.92 million to 4.72 million (60% non-EU) in Spain from 2000 to 2016. The share of foreigners (based on citizenship) in the total population also rose from 1.8 to 8.3% in Italy and 2.2 to 10.1% in Spain from 2000 to 2016. This huge influx was driven mostly by the favourable economic environment for unskilled and semi-skilled labour in Spain and Italy after their inclusion in the Euro zone in 1986. This mass immigration has resulted in remarkable population diversity in both countries and posed challenges for

local governments, which were quite unprepared for the management of immigrants' integration into the labour market and society (Einaudi 2007). The major immigrant communities in Italy and Spain are Moroccans, Romanians, Albanians and Chinese.

The Indian community, which is a rapidly growing immigrant group, constitutes only 2.9% and 1.9% of the total foreign population in Italy and Spain, respectively. Despite these smaller numbers, this population has high internal heterogeneity in ethnic origins, skills and socioeconomic statuses (López-Sala 2013; Lum 2010). Despite the rapid growth of Indian immigrants in both countries, researchers have given them little attention in recent years. Studies have mostly described the immigration process (Farjas 2006a, 2006b; Garha et al. 2016a), spatial distribution (Garha and Galeano 2015; Garha et al. 2016b), religion and identity struggles (Garha and Domingo 2017, 2018; Estruch et al. 2007; Denti et al. 2005; Paniker 2007), Punjabi culture, gender relations, family formation (Bonafanti 2015; Bertolani 2017) and Indians' economic contribution to the dairy industry, agriculture, trade (Sahai and Lum 2013; Bertolani 2005; Beltrán 2004) and hospital services (Gallo 2005, 2008). Very few studies have considered the integration of Indian communities into host societies (Lum 2012; López-Sala 2013).

Italy and Spain were selected as case studies in this research for two reasons: (1) since 2000, both countries have experienced mass immigration from India, with shared sociodemographic characteristics, and (2) both countries are new destinations for the Indian diaspora and have no cultural, political, historical or colonial links with India. It provides us an opportunity to study Indian immigration to new destinations within the Indian diaspora. This paper does not intend to be comparative *sensu stricto* (data and method do not allow us to pursue this goal). However, we believe that studying the Indian community in two destination countries, such as Italy and Spain, which share some important common characteristics summarised in the so-called 'Southern European model of immigration' (e.g. King et al. 2000; Arango and Finotelli 2009)—as far as the management and the policy-making of immigration and integration—is useful in order to shed light on Indian immigrants' sociodemographic characteristics, patterns of integration, perceptions and opinions of their lives in the country of residence, links with the country of origin, transnational activities and future migration intentions in a common albeit faceted framework, by highlighting similarities and differences between the two countries. This will help researchers to fill an important gap in migration and integration studies, and Italian and Spanish policy-makers to improve their migration (residency rights, regularisations and citizenship) and integration policies (language, training courses, culture and religion) towards an immigrant group, whose size in these two countries and whose international diaspora is of particular interest.

In particular, in this paper, we explore Indian immigrants' level of integration into different spheres of host societies and the role of their transnational kinship networks in determining the pace and direction of integration. We believe that the diversity of the Indian community significantly affects the pace and direction of the integration process in the host countries. At present, with different origins (Punjab, Haryana, Gujarat, Maharashtra or Kerala), religions (Sikh, Hindu, Muslims or Christians), reasons of migration (manual labour, trade, services or study), education levels (Illiterate, Primary, Secondary or University), occupations (agricultural labour, hospitality workers, salesman and nurses), legal status (irregular or regular) and marital status (single or married), Indians make a very heterogeneous immigrant community in both countries.

These internal differences have a significant effect on their pace of integration into the host societies. Additionally, immigrants' transnational relations, as documented by Garha and Domingo (2017) for the Sikh community in Spain, contribute to provisional attitudes towards permanently staying in host countries and discourage them from investing time and resources in learning the host language, culture and social norms. This, in turn, leads to fragmented integration, which tends to include some segments of the Indian community (e.g. Sindhis and Malayalis) into some specific spheres of the host society (i.e. the labour market) and exclude others.

Our main arguments are as follows. First, Indian immigrants in Spain and Italy live in a provisional state as their ultimate goal is to settle in English-speaking countries (e.g. the USA, the UK and Canada). Their stay in Italy and Spain then is only a step in their whole immigration strategy, and they do not put sufficient efforts and resources into the learning language and customs of the host society. Second, most Indian immigrants are of working age, employed in blue-collar jobs in exchange for very low wages and do not demand anything from the host states' social welfare departments. Consequently, their host governments feel no threat from them and do not take an interest in their integration.

The paper is structured as follows: The 'Theoretical background' section presents theoretical concepts regarding immigrant integration. The 'Indian immigration in Spain and Italy' section explains the history and characteristics of Indian immigration to Italy and Spain. In the 'Data sources and methodology' section, the data and methods are described, followed by the main results of the analysis in the 'Results: the level of integration of Indian immigrants into different spheres' section. In the 'Integration and transnationalism: quite conflicting processes' section, we discuss the influence of transnational networks on the level of integration of Indian immigrants, and finally, in the 'Conclusions' section, we present some conclusions.


Theoretical background

The inclusion of immigrant minorities into the mainstream society has been studied through different concepts, e.g. absorption, adaptation, race relations cycle, assimilation, acculturation, inclusion, incorporation and integration (Heckmann 1992: 162–207). The concept of integration is widely used to explain the changing relationship between the newcomers to a residence country and the native or mainstream society. In the recent time, several authors defined integration differently. For instance, Penninx and Garcés-Mascareñas (2016: 14) define integration as 'the process of becoming an accepted part of society' and propose 'three analytically distinct dimensions in which people may (or may not) become an accepted part of society: (i) the legal-political, (ii) the socio-economic, and (iii) the cultural-religious', while Lucassen (2005) defines integration as a general sociological mechanism that describes the way according to which migrants and non-migrants find their place in a society. It does not produce a unitary and homogeneous society; on the contrary, it allows a number of important differences, which may lead to a multicultural society (ibid.). He further clarifies that the integration of immigrants is an interactive process of learning a new culture, obtaining rights, accessing a new status and building personal relations between migrants and the receiving society. Another crucial aspect of immigrant integration is the degree to which the host society allows the immigrants' insertion into the host society through its

policies, programs and initiatives (Sardinha 2009) and allows them to retain their specific features and identities (Buenfino 2007). Hence, the integration is presented as a two-way process, where immigrants and the host population interact with each other. Moving ahead from this two-way model, Garcés-Mascreñas and Penninx (2016: 2) highlight a major shift in the EU policy framework, starting from 2011 with the renewed European Agenda for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals, which added the countries of origin as a third key actor in the process of immigrants' integration. Last but not least, during the last decades, integration has been conceptualised as a process (not necessarily straightforward), instead of a goal (Penninx 2004).

To measure the integration level, we focus on the four dimensions of integration identified by Heckmann et al. (2001), i.e. social, structural, cultural and identificational (Fig. 1). We have referred to this model for studying Indians' integration in Italy and Spain, as it is a well-tested model in the European context; it covers all aspects of the process of immigrant integration, and therefore, it provides a complete framework for the analysis of the level of integration of the Indian community in both the countries.

Social integration includes participation and membership of immigrants in the private sphere of the host society. It is reflected in people's private relationships (social intercourse, friendships and marriages) and group memberships (voluntary associations and NGOs). In private relationships, a high rate of interethnic friendships and marriages is generally considered as an indicator for immigrant integration (Alba and Golden 1986; Pagnini and Morgan 1990). *Structural integration* is the acquisition of rights and access to membership of the core institutions of the receiving society, such as education, training, labour market, housing and citizenship. Education is considered as the most crucial factor for the integration of immigrants and their children into the host society (Heckmann 2009). As education is important for the immigrant children, the civic integration is equally important for the adult immigrant population. Recently, most European countries have started civic integration of immigrants. It refers to those policies that push immigrants to learn the local language, civic values and culture of the host country, in order to apply for a permit of stay or the citizenship (Joppke 2007a, 2007b). After education, it is



well acknowledged that the standard of housing can affect migrants' health and quality of life (Lee and Park 2010). Housing also situates migrants in a neighbourhood, a physical and social environment, which provides opportunities to work, access to public services, opportunities to socialise with natives and opportunities to feel more or less secure from crime and discrimination (Phillips 2006). Hence, when measuring migrant integration, the standard of housing, level of segregation, proportion of migrants living in deprived areas and levels of homelessness are often included within the basket of indicators (Ager and Strang 2004; Entzinger and Biezeveld 2003). The acquisition of the citizenship of a host country is considered equally important for the successful integration of immigrants. In the recent public debate, two positions exist on the issuance of the citizenship status to the immigrants residing in European countries (Ersanilli and Koopmans 2011). The first position argues that citizenship is not the end of the integration process, rather it is a part of it. The second position argues that citizenship is the final step of the integration process. Therefore, immigrants holding the citizenship of the residence country are expected to have completed their integration process. These positions can have different implications for the easiness with which immigrants can obtain the citizenship status of a new residence country. Academic literature recognises citizenship status as an objective indicator of immigrant integration (e.g. Diehl and Blohm 2003; Vink 2013), as it helps to reduce gaps between immigrants and natives. However, many migrants show their interest in the host country's citizenship not only for achieving their political or social rights, but also for gaining autonomy and freedom of circulation, which may facilitate returning to the home country or travelling without constraints towards other countries (Massey et al. 2015). After citizenship, employment is probably the most explored aspect of immigrant integration (Castles et al. 2001). It has consistently been identified as a factor influencing many relevant issues: economic independence, planning for the future, opportunity to develop language skills, restoring self-esteem and encouraging self-reliance (Bloch 1999; Tomlinson and Egan 2002).

Cultural integration is a precondition for the participation into the host society, and it refers to the processes of cognitive, cultural, behavioural and attitudinal change. This change concerns primarily the immigrants and their descendants but secondly the receiving society, as integration is an interactive, bidirectional and mutual process. According to Sardinha (2009), cultural integration means embracing different religious beliefs, sexual orientations and cultural affiliations, thus ensuring equal rights for all people living in a society. It is a heterogeneous area, relating to values and beliefs, cultural competences, popular culture and everyday practices. It can be divided into three major spheres: the behavioural and attitudinal sphere (moral attitudes and religious matters), the cultural preferences and practices sphere (music, art and cuisine) and the cognitive sphere (learning language and skills). In the cognitive sphere, language ability is considered fundamental to enhance social mobility and the integration of immigrants into the labour market of the host country (Dustmann and Fabbri 2003). On this regard, recent studies have shed light on the positive relationship between socioeconomic integration and language proficiency (e.g. Di Bartolomeo and Strozza 2014). Age of immigration, length of stay, parents' background and higher education level facilitate the cultural integration of immigrants (Alba and Nee 1997) and in particular the acquisition of the host-country language (Esser 2006; Luciak 2004). Finally, *identificational integration* refers to subjective sense of belonging and identification, particularly in


forms of ethnic and/or national, regional or local identifications (Heckmann 2007). Sense of belonging to the host country is extremely important for the integration process of any immigrant group, since it strengthens the attachment to the host society and reinforces the intention of a permanent and durable residence abroad (Barbiano di Belgiojoso 2016). The personal identity of immigrants and its recognition in a host society is also relevant in the process of integration (Heckmann 2007). It is also politically relevant whether the immigrants identify themselves with other immigrants in efforts to gain recognition and rights or share a collective social identity with the host population (Westin 2003). The four dimensions of integration will be disentangled in the 'Results: the level of integration of Indian immigrants into different spheres' section and analysed with respect to Indian immigrants.

In this paper, the concept of *fragmented integration* refers to a situation when some segments of an immigrant community are integrated into specific spheres of the host societies (mainly economic), while the rest remain excluded. It commonly happens with the immigrant groups from countries with high ethno-religious and socioeconomic diversity, like India. Immigrants coming from different backgrounds integrate at a different pace, but due to our tendency to treat all immigrants from a country alike (so-called methodological nationalism (Faist 2012)), we undermine these differences and we tend to consider all immigrants as a single homogeneous unit.

Indian immigration in Spain and Italy

Pioneer Indians entered Italy as British soldiers during the Second World War, but they returned after the war (Bedi 2011). In the 1960s, an immigration flow composed of theology students (in Catholic churches and convents), priests, nurses and housemaids from Kerala (a south Indian state) and central parts of India entered and settled permanently in the capital region of Rome and northern parts of Italy (Gallo 2005; Sahai and Lum 2013). On the other side, pioneer Indian immigrants in Spain settled in the Canary Islands in the 1950s (Navarro 1974). They were merchants from the Sindh province of undivided India and came with the sole motive of trade (López Sala and Sánchez 2010). Their number was limited to a few hundred and they had limited contact with the host society (López-Sala 2013). These first movements of Indian unskilled workers, students and traders towards Southern European countries marked the routes of immigration for further immigration.

Following the neoliberal turn in India's economic and foreign policy, mass immigration from India to Italy and Spain started in the 1990s (Garha et al. 2016b). This immigration was featured by the male unskilled labour force coming from the northern Indian states of Punjab and Haryana (Garha and Domingo 2017). It coincided with the immigration boom in both countries (Peixoto et al. 2012). In Italy, the 1990s immigration law (Law 39/90, so-called Martelli Law) facilitated the permanent settlement of immigrants (Einaudi 2007) and opened Italy for unskilled labour immigration (Bonifazi 2007). Similarly, in Spain, the First Immigration Law of 1985 (*Ley de Extranjería 07/1985*) with all its amendments paved the way for permanent settlement of immigrants (Aja 2006; Moya 2006), including Indians. After the first settlers, transnational kinship networks played a major role in attracting new immigrants from India and other diaspora locations (Garha and Domingo 2017). From 2000, the flow and stock of Indian immigrants multiplied several times, till the economic crisis engulfed both countries and slowed the inflow (Fig. 2).



According to ISTAT, the annual inflow of Indian immigrants to Italy doubled in the last 16 years, passing from 4.6 thousand annual immigrants in the year 2000 to 11.6 thousand in the year 2015 (Fig. 2). This inflow has witnessed a significant increase in the period of 2002–2004, which was partly due to the direct migration from India and partly related to the regularisation process of irregular immigrants who were already present in Italy. However, this sharp increase was followed by a steep decline till 2006. On the contrary, from 2006 to 2010, despite the economic crisis, the number of Indian immigrants increased three times with a high annual growth rate. In 2010, the inflow reached its peak with 15 thousand immigrants entered only that year. After 2010, it started declining again and now it is around 11 thousand immigrants per year. The most important characteristics of that inflow are its young age structure and the skewed gender composition in favour of males. As in North India, males are still considered as breadwinners, and they mostly migrate to earn livelihood and to settle in other countries. Consequently, initial inflow was mainly composed of young males, although the proportion of females started increasing when males started bringing their families from India to Italy.

This regular inflow of Indian immigrants has contributed to the formation of the sixth largest foreign community in Italy. According to ISTAT, in the year 2000, only 22 thousand registered Indian immigrants were living in Italy, but their number increased rapidly to 121 thousand in the year 2010. After 2010, under the impact of economic crisis and the shortage of the labour opportunities, many Indians left Italy and moved to other countries, some of them also returned to India. Consequently, despite of the highest inflow in 2010, the size of the Indian community reduced to 118 thousand individuals in the year 2011. After this small decline, the size of the Indian community again started to grow rapidly in the coming years and reached its peak, for instance 150 thousand in the year 2015 (see Fig. 2). The gender composition and the age structure of the stock of the Indian immigrant population is characterised by male dominance and concentration in the young age groups.

In Spain, according to INE, the annual inflow of Indian immigrants in the year 2000 was merely around 539 individuals, but this number increased sharply to 6.6 thousand in the year 2008. It was mainly due to the regularisation program of 2001 and 2005 that attracted a large number of Indians, who migrated directly from India or entered the country from the neighbouring countries like France, Germany or Nordic countries, where they were living irregularly. Later on, owing to the negative effects of economic crisis, this flow declined, amounting to around 4 thousand individuals per annum. As a result of this inflow, the total population of Indians in Spain increased from 7 thousand individuals in the year 2000 to 46 thousand in 2015. Like in Italy, the Indian community in Spain is male dominated and mainly concentrated in the working age group of 15–49 years.

To sum up, we can argue that the history of Indian immigration in Italy and Spain fits the so-called Southern European model of immigration. In particular, the main characteristics of this model are (a) the timing and the size of inflows, (b) the reasons for and the modes of entry (a lack of selective immigration policies and the use of *ex post* instruments to provide a legal status to immigrants, such as regularisations, quota systems and flow decrees) and (c) the distinctive way of integration into the local labour market (a large underground economy attracting undocumented immigrants and a strong segmentation of the labour market) (Peixoto et al. 2012; Di Bartolomeo et al. 2016).

Data sources and methodology

The data has been collected through 86 semi-structured interviews conducted by the first author, during the period between January 2016 and June 2017. Interviews were conducted in seven cities where Indians are mainly concentrated in Italy (i.e. Rome (13,702 individuals listed in municipal register 2016), Brescia (15,028) and Latina (10,003)) and Spain (Barcelona (5895), Valencia (2276), Madrid (2262) and Santa Cruz de Tenerife (1146)). Interviewees were selected through snowball sampling technique (Johnson 2014). All socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of participants, like age, gender, place of residence, education, legal and marital status, year of arrival, employment and religion, were taken into consideration (Table 1). The interviews were conducted with a semi-structured open-ended questionnaire, and respondents were asked to express themselves on the following issues: their immigration history, transnational networks, family background, education and training, religious affiliations, entry into labour market, access to public institutes in the host country, regularisation process and citizenship, marriage and family reunion, participation in social sphere (friends, partners or social groups), awareness of local politics, children's education, neighbourhood relations and future expectations. Average time of interviews was 60 min, and interviews were conducted in one of the three languages, i.e. Hindi, Punjabi or English, as per the convenience of interviewees. Most of the interviews were conducted at the interviewees' usual place of residence or at some public places selected by them. All interviews were audio recorded.

We have used qualitative research methodology. The inductive approach, also called a bottom-up approach, under 'grounded theory' (Glaser and Strauss 1967) has been applied. All interviews were encoded on the computer programme Atlas.ti, using a thematic classification offered by Boyatzis (1998). After transcribing the interviews, following the steps mentioned by Braun and Clarke (2006) for thematic analysis, we searched for the issues highlighted by the interviewees in their discourse and coded the

Table 1 Sociodemographic characteristics of the interviewees in Italy and Spain

| Sociodemographic characteristics | Interviewees | |
|----------------------------------|--------------|-------|
| | Italy | Spain |
| Sex | | |
| Male | 26 | 34 |
| Female | 12 | 14 |
| Age | | |
| Young adults (16–30 years) | 12 | 16 |
| Adults (31 years and above) | 26 | 32 |
| Religion | | |
| Sikh | 22 | 30 |
| Hindu | 12 | 16 |
| Christian | 4 | 0 |
| Muslim | 0 | 2 |
| Education | | |
| Primary | 18 | 26 |
| Secondary | 14 | 14 |
| University | 6 | 8 |
| Occupation | | |
| Agriculture | 11 | 9 |
| Factory workers | 6 | 7 |
| Services | 11 | 15 |
| Unemployed | 7 | 13 |
| Students | 3 | 4 |
| Duration of stay | | |
| 1 year | 3 | 8 |
| 1 to 5 years | 14 | 16 |
| 5 and more years | 21 | 24 |
| Marital status | | |
| Never married | 15 | 16 |
| Married | 22 | 30 |
| Others | 1 | 2 |
| Legal Status | | |
| Irregular | 4 | 6 |
| Regular | 28 | 34 |
| Naturalised citizen | 6 | 8 |
| Generation | | |
| First | 32 | 36 |
| One and half | 6 | 12 |
| Total | 38 | 48 |

Source: compiled by the first author on the basis of in-depth interviews in Spain and Italy during 2016–2017

content of interviews with initial codes. We formed families of primary codes to classify the information related to one theme in one place from all interviews and prepare the primary data for the analysis. Then, we searched for the patterns and themes repeated in all interviews. We selected quotes to present different views regarding the themes

under study. Finally, we prepared a report on the overall pattern and trends regarding the integration of Indians into different spheres of the host societies.

Results: the level of integration of Indian immigrants into different spheres

Social integration

Social integration refers to people's 'private relationships' and their 'associational membership' in the host society. In private relationships, we include both interethnic friendships and mixed marriages. Among Indians, private relationships are mainly limited to their own ethnic and religious groups. Despite their long stay in both countries, most of them have very weak social ties with natives, which show their low integration to the host societies. Generally, they point out existing cultural differences with the host society as a prime reason for this. Amandeep, 23, female, a restaurant worker from Barcelona states that 'I don't have friends from the host community. Our cultural differences like language, eating habits, socializing and way of thinking, make any interaction very difficult'.

As already elucidated, most of the Indians are economic migrants. They are doing labour-intensive jobs, like agriculture and services (in particular, sales, restaurants and hospital services), where they mostly work with their countrymen or other immigrants. Therefore, they get very few opportunities to make friends and socialise with host population. Subhash, 45, male, a salesman in Madrid, says 'my all friends have come from India and are immigrants like me. We work and live together. We don't have time to make local friends'. Sometimes, the seasonal nature of their work and long working hours make it difficult to get connected with the local community. Parminder, 28, male, an agricultural worker in Latina, explains 'I work from 6 am to 6 pm. After finishing my work, I return directly to my apartment. Because of seasonal work I keep on moving from one farm to another. I have least contact with the host community'. Another main problem is less command over host languages. A common language provides a bridge of communication for any human interaction and encourages interethnic friendships; contrarily, the lack of language skills creates a barrier for any possible interaction. As explained by Mohani, 32, female, a housewife in Valencia, 'our main problem is language. Mostly Indians do not learn Spanish before immigration Without common language we fail to communicate with local people. It cuts our chances to have local friends'.

Recently, with the occupational diversification among Indians, many of them are coming forward to have relations with the host community and other immigrant groups, like Kailash, 36, male, a travel agent in Barcelona, explains 'by changing my occupation from an agricultural worker to a travel agent, I have widened my friends circle. Apart from other immigrants, now I have friends from the host community also'. The situation is much better for the younger generations, who have studied in the local schools, like Gagan, 22, female, a student from Barcelona, says 'In school I come in contact with many students from different nationalities, now I have friends from Pakistan, Ecuador, Bangladesh, Peru and some local girls also', but their number is very small.

Among Indians, mixed marriages are very rare, mainly because of religious and culture differences with the host societies. In the Indian community, religion plays an important role in marriage ceremonies. Hence, the restrictions imposed on the inter-religion marriages among traditional Sikhs and Hindus affect the number of mix marriages; as explained by Prakash, 44, male, a Hindu in Valencia, 'in our Hindu

marriage system bride and groom, should be from the same caste and religion. Otherwise, they are not allowed to marry'. Most of the young men and women in both countries also want to marry in their own community in India, as they feel that in the host societies the institution of marriage has lost its importance, like Sandeep, 23, female, a computer professional in Barcelona, says 'I will marry in India. Here in European society marriage has lost its importance. People live together without marriage, and if they marry they divorce in few months'. Sometimes, the differences regarding the gender roles and the division of work at home observed during the cohabitation with natives also discourage young adult males to marry in the host communities, as explained by Inderjit, 24, male, restaurant worker in Barcelona, 'I have a girlfriend here [in Barcelona], but I want to marry in India [with an Indian girl]. Especially after spending some time with her, I felt that I should marry in India, in our own culture, where gender roles are clearer'. Mixed marriages as an indicator of integration is also questionable because sometimes these are used instrumentally by migrants, as a source of residency or citizenship permits, like Avtar, 47, male, an unemployed in Barcelona, admits that 'I have done a paper marriage with a Spanish woman, to regulate my legal situation in Spain. I have paid her 6000 euros for this'. Interethnic friendships and marriages between Indian immigrants and natives are rare in both the analysed countries; this feature confirms their low integration to the personal sphere of the host societies.

As per the associational membership is concerned, Indians have very low participation in the host sociocultural or labour associations. Lack of information regarding immigrant NGOs is the main reason behind their low participation. Several religious places (like Gurudwaras 'Sikh temple' and Hindu temples) provide them platforms to socialise within their own group, but it limits their interaction with the host societies. Majority of Hindus in Spain and Italy associate themselves with the Hare Krishna Group, which has temples in Barcelona, Madrid, Valencia and Rome. On the other side, the Sikh community has organised itself around local Gurudwaras, which are the centres of their social life (Sikh temples, 22 in Spain, see Garha and Domingo 2018, and 62 in Italy). As explained by Baljeet, 35, female, a housewife living in Rome, 'we have a Gurudwara [Sikh Temple] in Rome, where we spend all our free time with friends and other community members, we hardly go out for socializing'. Finally, although most Indians belong to the working class, their participation in labour unions is also limited to some parts of the Brescia region in Italy. Sindhi business community in some cities of Spain, like Barcelona and Santa Cruz de Tenerife, has organised itself in some *Industani clubs*, but they are also limited to business elites and they have very limited contacts with the host society. In sum, we can conclude that in both countries, immigrants' social participation is quite low, although, contrarily to Spain, some Indian workers have started to participate in worker unions' activities in Italy.

Structural integration

In the Indian community, the education of kids is considered as a very important issue. The primary education is free of cost and available to all children in both countries. Mostly Indian parents enrol their children in public schools, but a majority of them are unsatisfied with the standard of education. On this regard Daljeet, 35, a housewife from Brescia, says 'I have enrolled my children in a public school. Here [in Italy] the access

to public schools is easy, but the quality of education is lower as compared to schools in India. Especially, they don't teach English. Private schools are good, but they are very expensive, which we can't afford'. Secondly, most Indian parents are also worried about the segregation of immigrant students in public schools and neglect of public education system on the part of local governments. According to interviewees, Indians who afford the fees also send their children to private schools. For example, Gurnaib, 34, male, a restaurant owner in Valencia, says 'In public schools you will find only immigrant children, upper-middle class Spanish families send their children to private schools ... that is why nobody cares about public schools. I also enrolled my children in Cambridge school'. Owing to the lack of trust in the public education system, some parents encourage their children to enrol in professional courses, in order to have more chances to get a stable job in the future, like Avtar, 46, male, a factory worker in Brescia, says 'I encourage my sons to enrol in a professional course, here [in Italy] the higher studies are difficult and most of the immigrant students don't receive any job after completing their degrees. It is better if they learn some professional traits, so in future at least they can earn their livelihood'. Some Indian students have also noticed discrimination regarding the availability of scholarships to immigrant students who want to continue their higher studies, as explained by Ramandeep, 28, male, a student in Rome, 'There is no discrimination with immigrant students in primary schools, but when it comes to the higher studies, there exists some discrimination with them. School management encourage them to opt for professional courses, and often they do not receive any scholarship for higher studies'. To sum up, we can say that the public education system in both countries is not fulfilling the aspiration of Indian parents regarding their children's education. Consequently, most of them want to move on to an English-speaking country, where they think that their children will get better education. The stated discrimination in the upper education in Italy is a matter of concern also for the Indian community, as it reduces the chances of immigrant students to have higher education, thus affecting their upward social mobility in the host society. Conversely, in Spain, we have not registered any kind of discrimination in the public education system.

As argued in the 'Theoretical background' section, many European countries have recently implemented civic integration policies, with the aim of enhancing and, to some extent, controlling the level of cultural integration of adult immigrants in receiving societies (Paparusso 2016). According to these policies, the immigrant's success in civic integration courses implies the issuance or the renewal of a permit of stay and the granting of the citizenship status. In Italy and Spain, municipal council entities provide civic and language courses for the immigrant population. In Spain, these courses are freely available for all immigrants including irregular immigrants, whereas in Italy, owing to the limited resources and infrastructure facilities, these courses are not fully operational yet and only available for regular immigrants (Paparusso 2016). In Spain, the basic knowledge of Spanish and another regional language is a must for all applicants of continuous regularisation process (*Arraigo*¹). Therefore, all irregular Indian immigrants apply for these language courses. However, many of them consider these courses as insufficient for proper learning of the host languages, but they accept that these courses help them to regularise their legal status in the country, like Harwinder, 34, male, an irregular immigrant in Barcelona, explains 'I have done two language courses because now it is compulsory for the papers [regularization]. I still don't speak

Spanish or Catalan properly, but I have school certificates to fulfil the requirement of Arriago'. On the other side, in Italy, the knowledge of the Italian language (level A2) and culture is needed to renew the permit of stay, to apply for the long-term residence permit and indirectly to apply for naturalisation. But opposite to Spain, in Italy, all the language courses are reserved for regular immigrants. Hence, in a significant number of Indian immigrants who have entered irregularly in Italy or become irregular after arrival, the possibilities to learn the Italian language are extremely low. As explained by Param, 26, male an irregular immigrant in Rome, 'In Italy if you don't have papers, you cannot enrol in any public school, it makes very difficult to learn host language and get connected with the local community'.

Moreover, in both countries, employment offices, immigrant, catholic and no-profit organisations set up various professional courses for unskilled immigrant workers. However, the participation of Indian immigrants in the professional courses is still quite limited. It is mainly owing to the lack of information about these programs and the limited number of seats available in different courses. As explained by Kuldeep, 30, male, an unemployed in Barcelona, 'I have heard that the 'INEM' [employment office] offers some professional courses, but the information does not reach us on time. Every time when I go there they have no vacant seats'.

Indian immigrants in both countries have a high degree of residential segregation in poor housing areas (see Garha et al. 2016a for Indians in Spain). Low rents, easy availability of apartments and their will to settle close to their relatives and religious places are the main reasons behind this residential segregation (Garha and Galeano 2015). According to Surjit, 54, male, a shopkeeper in Barcelona, 'In Barcelona good apartments are very expensive, that is why most of the Indian immigrants are living in deteriorated residential buildings of El Raval, Badalona or Hospitalet de Llobregat, which is the cheapest option in housing market'. In Spain, most of the Indian immigrants face economic exclusion from the good residential areas, but there are no recorded cases of discrimination against immigrants in the housing market. On the contrary, in Italy, some of the interviewees highlighted the discrimination in the housing market, which indirectly forces the immigrants to settle in poor residential areas, like Mandeep, 31, male, factory worker in Brescia, says 'many Italians do not rent their apartments to immigrants, especially, Asians or Africans'. This economic exclusion or discrimination based on origin contributes to the segregation of Indians in poor immigrant neighbourhoods, where they spend most of their free time with their countrymen or other immigrants, which reduces their chances to get integrated into the host society. Like Karamjit, 32, male, an agricultural worker in Latina, states that 'I live in an immigrant neighbourhood, where apartments are deteriorated, but cheap. No Italian lives in this area, so I hardly meet anyone here'.

As theorised in the so-called Southern European model of immigration (e.g. King et al. 2000; Arango and Finotelli 2009), irregular immigrants largely contribute to the Italian and Spanish informal sector of the labour market, particularly at the lower skills level. It results in the definition of immigrants' residence rights primarily in economic terms and as temporary workers. As most of the Indian immigrants enter irregularly in both countries or become irregular after arrival and depend on the immigration laws of the host countries to regularise their legal status, the regularisation processes in both countries play an important role in affecting their status mobility and level of

integration. Since 2000, in Spain, the *Arriago law* has been initiated to control the number of irregular immigrants in the country. Although it is a lengthy process and has some serious weaknesses, it has helped 5745 irregular Indians to regulate their legal status during 2009 to 2015, who have entered irregularly in Spain and were living there for more than 3 years. According to Jasbir, 41, male, a chef in Valencia, who get regularised through *Arriago*, 'The main problem with the 'Arriago' law is its necessary pre requisites, as it requires three years of registered uninterrupted stay in Spain (without work and residence permission), knowledge of host languages, a full time work contract, police clearance certificate from the country of origin and a valid passport. Many Indians fail to fulfil these requirements'.

Unlike Spain, Italy does not follow a continuous process of regularisation of irregular immigrants. However, starting from the late 1970s, periodical amnesties have been used by the Italian governments as an ex post instrument to allow the regularisation of many immigrants in Italy and therefore the granting of residency rights (Paparusso et al. 2017). The uncertainty regarding the next amnesty negatively affects the settlement intentions of irregular immigrants that hinder their pace of integration. As explained by Hardeep, 33, male, a factory worker in Brescia, 'here [in Italy] you don't know when the government will announce next amnesty for irregular immigrants. This insecurity declines the stability of immigrant population and they always keep looking towards other countries, like Spain or Portugal for regularization'. In Spain, the *Arriago* law gives hope to the irregular immigrants that if they stay in country, learn the language and arrange a work contract, after 3 years, they can become a regular resident. It works as a positive trap for irregular immigrants, because it pushes them towards integration. Conversely, in Italy, the uncertainty regarding the regularisation contributes to the provisional attitude of immigrants and do not provide them space for integration.

Generally, regularisations in both countries issue a temporary residence and work permit for 1 year, and its renewal depends upon the tax paid during the period of stay, the availability of a regular work contract, a minimum income and proper housing conditions. Immigrants who fail to fulfil these requirements may lose their residence permit and become irregular again. Among the interviewees, this does not occur very frequently: four in Italy and two in Spain have lost their initial residency permit, due to the lack of work contract or less tax paid in the first year of stay. This supervening irregularity among Indian immigrants is more visible in Italy than Spain. As according to Satnam, 55, male, a salesman in Rome, 'a significant part of irregular immigrants of Indian origin in Italy entered with working visas of six month or nine months, which they often fail to renew and become irregular. Also sometimes people provide some fake work contract to get the working visas for their relatives and when they reach Italy, they don't find any work contract to renew their permits'. We know that moving from a regular to an irregular status has a very negative impact on immigrants' lives and on their status mobility in the country of residence, because of the difficulties to re-fulfil requirements (Paparusso et al. 2017).

In Spain and Italy, the acquisition of citizenship is a lengthy process, which for non-EU migrants, like Indians, takes 10 years of uninterrupted legal stay in the country and some knowledge of the host language, history and culture. The new criterion based on civic exams in Spain has declined the chances of many Indians to become a naturalised citizen of their country of residence, like Resham, 35, male, a restaurant worker in

Barcelona, claims that 'I want Spanish citizenship, but now they have placed an exam also, I don't know if I will get it or not'. In Italy, no citizenship test is required for naturalisation; however, the knowledge of the Italian language and culture is required for the immigrants who apply for host citizenship in a discretionary way, as elucidated before. Thus, the limited knowledge of the Italian language can represent a problem for those Indians who want to acquire the Italian nationality. In Spain, Latin American immigrants need only 2 years of regular residence to apply for the citizenship status. This discrimination hurts sentiments of other immigrants, as expressed by Jagtar, 34, male, a salesman in Madrid, 'this positive discrimination with Latinos, makes us feel as second-class citizens. It is against the principles of equality before law and shows the double standards of the Spanish government'. Deprived of the host citizenship, most Indians feel less attachment or sense of belonging with the host countries, which results in their low integration into the host society.

In particular, most of the Indian immigrants consider citizenship as a key that can open the door of the Western world, for them and for their children. On this regard, Satnam, 55, male, a salesman in Rome, says 'I think the citizenship is must for everybody, especially for children. With European citizenship they can move to any country'. Hence, for the Indian immigrants, it is difficult to conclude that the host citizenship positively or negatively affects their integration process. Moreover, Indians in both countries declare their intention to move to the UK. Although our respondents do not directly mention Brexit in their narratives, we believe that it may affect their long-term migration intentions, changing their preferences for other English countries. For instance, we could make the hypothesis that the fact that some of them have started thinking to migrate also to Canada, where they have some kinship networks and think their children will have a better future, could be partly related to it. However, our interviews do not allow us to verify this hypothesis.

Despite their low socioeconomic profiles, Indians have been significantly contributing to the labour market and economic development of the host countries, especially by filling the jobs, like agricultural labour, industrial worker or hospitality services, which the native population are reluctant to do (Sahai and Lum 2013). Nevertheless, Indian immigrants are mostly trapped in the low-paid blue-collar jobs, which affect their upward economic mobility and integration into the host society (Lum 2010). The host communities generally appreciate them because of their honesty, limited demands, easy availability and sense of responsibility. Manjeet, 40, male, an agricultural worker from Brescia, says 'Indian immigrants in Italy are mostly engaged in manual jobs, like cleaning of cow sheds and agricultural work, which the local people don't want to do ... local farmers prefer us because we do these jobs at very less price, without demanding worker's rights'. As a result of their occupational segregation in low skilled jobs, they have very limited contact with the host working class. It reduces their social circle to their countrymen or other immigrants, with whom they share their work places.

Owing to the recent economic crisis (2008–2014), most of the Indian parents feel insecure about the future of their children in both countries. The high unemployment rate, even for the native population, is their major concern. Malu, 48, female, a shopkeeper in Santa Cruz de Tenerife, explains that 'My son has completed a diploma here [in Spain], but there are no jobs in Spain, even the local people are immigrating to other countries for work, may be in future my son will also migrate for work'. Even in

the Sindhi community, which is an economically well-established business community, economic uncertainty is increasing. They are also worried about the continuation of their family businesses, and some even have diverted their attention towards services and public administrative jobs, which can be seen as a positive move towards integration. Chandru, 53, male, a shopkeeper in Santa Cruz de Tenerife, Spain, shows his concern as 'Businesses are not going well. I think our next generations will have to leave our traditional occupational niches and look for jobs in other sectors'.

Another important aspect is the limited participation of females in the host labour market. In the Sikh community, which makes the majority in both countries, the participation of females in the labour market is considerably lower than Malayali (who mostly work as nurses) and Sindhi females (who are mainly engaged in family businesses). This low participation in the labour market reduces their contact with the host society and adversely affects their integration, as in the words of Vasundra, 34, female, a nurse from Rome, 'here in Indian community women are mostly limited to their houses. They are unemployed and do not go out in search of work. It reduces their contact with Italians and affects their level of integration into the host labour market'. To sum up, we can argue that Indian immigrants, especially males, in both the countries have higher employment rates, compared to other immigrant groups, but they mostly work in the unskilled sector of the host labour market; this affects their upward economic mobility and integration into the host society.

Cultural integration

In the behavioural and attitudinal sphere, we include the moral attitude towards gender roles, divorce, cohabitation and homosexual relationships. In the Indian community, there is a clear divide regarding the perceptions of the host society. There are some Indians, like Gurwinder, 24, female, a factory worker from Valencia, who claims that 'the host society is an egalitarian and free society, where all individuals have full freedom of choice, without any racial and gender discrimination' and admires the openness of the host culture. However, for the majority of Indians, the host society is excessively open, individualist and lacking family values, like Swaran, 48, male, a shopkeeper in Barcelona, says 'here [in Spain] the society is excessively open, young boys and girls wear short cloths, call their parents with their names, and drink or smoke in front of them, which is unacceptable'. Similarly, regarding divorce and cohabitation, the majority of Indians have traditional views, like Jayant, 49, male, a wholesaler in Valencia, says 'European society is a mess, here young boys and girls start cohabiting without marriage ... they change their partners like dresses and don't want kids ... mostly they don't marry, but if they do, they get divorced soon'. Owing to their religious beliefs, most of the Indians are against same-sex marriages. As explained by Kulwant, 37, male, a milkman in Brescia, 'In our culture it is clear that each man for a woman, and each woman for a man, but here [Italy] boys are marrying with boys and girls with girls ... there is no sense at all'. When it comes to gender roles, in the Indian community, the division of work is also very traditional: males are breadwinners and females are housewives. There are some men, who do not allow their wives to go out for work, but most of the women claim that their husband has no problem with their desire to work. Mostly they do not get any job due to the responsibility of kids and the lack of host language skills.

Sarabeet, 34, a housewife in Rome, says 'My husband goes out for work and I manage home and children. I want to work outside, and my husband has no problem with it, but now I have two kids and I want to give time to my kids'.

Religious matters include religious practices, like attendance of places of worship, food avoidance for religious reasons, attitudes towards both host and origin country festivals and attitudes towards being a member of a religious association. Among the Indian immigrants in both countries, majority belongs to the Sikh religion, which is broadly divided into Moderate (90%) and Baptised Sikhs (10%) (these estimates are provided by the Gurudwara managing committee heads in both countries), followed by a small number of Hindus, Christians and Muslims. Owing to their unique physical appearance (with turban and long beard), outfits, diet (purely vegetarian) and lifestyle (no smoking and no drinking alcohol), baptised Sikhs find it difficult to fit in the host culture. Gursharan, 24, male, a baptised Sikh from Barcelona, argues that 'I cannot fully adopt Spanish culture, because I have everything different, starting from my physical appearance, my cloths, my food, my music, my way of living, everything is different'. It is also a big problem for the school-going baptised Sikh children, who got bullied by their classmates and cannot share meals with other kids. Kuljit, 37, female, mother of two baptised kids in Brescia, explains that 'Here [in Brescia] in schools, children tease my sons for having long hairs. It puts enormous stress on their young minds. Secondly, my kids are vegetarians and in school they serve meat in the midday meals, so I have to bring them back to home for lunch and it reduces my chances to work outside'. Baptised Sikhs also face bans on wearing their religious symbols at public places, which includes a sword *Kirpan*. Sukhchan, 42, male, a Gurudwara committee member in Madrid, explains that 'as a baptised Sikh I am not allowed to undress my sword, but here when police caught me with sword, they snatch it and fine me ... now because of this ban I don't go out of Gurudwara sahib with sword'. They also face discrimination in the labour market as many employers (especially in the hospitality and sales sector) hesitate to hire them because of their different look. Some of them even change their physical appearance to be eligible for jobs in the hospitality sector. Ravinder, 26, male, a restaurant worker from Valencia, who changed his look, explains that 'I was a baptised Sikh in India, when I reached Spain my friends told me that if you don't trim your hairs, you will not find any job in Spain, so I trimmed my hair and now I am working in a restaurant'. The number of baptised Sikhs is very small as compared to the moderates, who have adapted their lives according to the cultural norms of the host societies. Majority of them have cut their hairs and modified their eating habits to get mixed in the host society and get jobs in restaurants and hospitality sector.

Another main problem is related to the opening of new Gurudwaras or Temples in the host countries. After the religion-based attacks in many European cities, people feel unhappy with the opening of any new religious places in their neighbourhoods. In Spain, the local population stopped the construction of Gurudwara in various parts of Barcelona, as explained by Karan, 36, male, a baptised Sikh in Barcelona, 'Local people were against the inauguration of Gurudwaras in Salt, Olot and Santa Coloma de Gramanet municipalities. They confuse us with Muslims, and saw it like an encroachment of their space by a foreign religion'. It has damaged the relationship between the Sikh community and the hosts in many cities. In comparison to the Sikhs, the Indian Christians and Hindus do not have such problems with the host society. Indian

Christians settled in Italy feel blessed to be in a Christian country. Among the interviewees, most of the Indian Hindus have also expressed their freedom to practice their religion in the host countries, like Prem, 54, a Hindu priest in Krishna Temple in Barcelona, says 'here [in Spain] people are very kind to all other religions of the world. They give full respect and freedom to practice any religion. Even there are many Catalans, who have converted to Hinduism'. As far as the religious sphere, most interviewees in Italy expressed a higher level of satisfaction compared to interviewees in Spain. In Italy, the Sikh population is currently trying to register Sikhism as a registered religion and organising itself to have a presence in the local politics.

Indians mostly do not take part in the local festivals, mainly because of their very little knowledge about the host festivals. But they do celebrate Indian festivals in their religious temples or by renting public buildings. According to interviewees, all religious groups invite the hosts to take part in their religious events (Nagar Kirtans, Poojas and Yoga camps), but the response of the local community is very limited. Kashmir, 57, male, Gurudwara head from Barcelona, states that 'We celebrate our Sikh festivals in Gurudwara sahib and invite local people to take part in our festivals, but only few people from the native population come to join us'.

In the cultural preference, change in immigrants' preferences for food, music and art under the effect of the host culture and the impact of immigrants on the arts, cuisine, music and fashion of the host society is included. In Spain and Italy, we still do not find fusion of Indian music and cuisine with the host ones, like we see in other countries of Indian diaspora (e.g. the UK Bhangra Pop music and Manchester's Curry lane). Some of the Indians stick to their traditional Indian vegetarian diet mainly because of their religious beliefs, like Gagandeep, 21, male, a baptised Sikh from Hospitalet de Llobregat, says 'I have my vegetarian diet. I don't eat Spanish food because they put meat or eggs in all dishes'. But most of Indians have added the local dishes in their daily meals, like Gaurav, 24, male, a salesman in Madrid, Spain, says 'I love Mediterranean food. My favourite food is Pizza and Pasta; occasionally I eat Indian food also, but now I find it very spicy'. An important change is occurring in some supermarkets in major cities of both countries: now, they provide a separate section for South Asian food, in order to satisfy the needs of the immigrant population. Moreover, Indian Bollywood music and dance is also becoming popular in some parts of Spain. In the future, it will be interesting to see when and how the Indian cuisine and music get fused with those of the host countries, and hybrid music and cuisine come out from this fusion.

For the Indian immigrants, the host language remains one of the main integration problems in both countries. Majority of Indians have none to very little knowledge of host languages, which affects their personal, social and economic life, and level of integration into the host society. Even within the Indian community, a majority of Sikhs have relatively little language skills as compared to Indian Christians and Hindus. Sometimes, the skills learned in India become useless because of the lack of host languages and the long waiting time for the homologation of professional degrees in both countries, like Nitu, 30, female, a housewife in Roma, explains that 'for me language was the first main problem. In India, I was a nurse in a hospital, but here [Italy] without Italian, I failed to get any job. Even my nursing degree is not homologised here, so all skills learned in India becomes useless here, that's why I don't want to settle here permanently'. Indian immigrants who are engaged in sales and health care services

(mostly Sindhi shopkeepers or Malayali nurses) learn language quickly to fulfil the requirements of their jobs; conversely, for the agricultural labour and other manual factory or construction workers (mostly Punjabis), the language learning process is very slow. As Pritpal, 47, male, a construction worker in Barcelona, states that 'I am living in Spain for the last 13 years, but still I speak only functional Spanish. Mostly I work with Indians, so I don't feel any need to learn it'.

Indian families take huge interest in the language learning of their children. Most of the Indian children speak their native language (Punjabi, Hindi, Sindhi or Malayalam) or English with their parents and the host country's language (Spanish or Italian) with their siblings and friends. Generally, parents are worried about the lack of English in public schools and preservation of their native languages. Gopal, 47, male, a shopkeeper in Santa Cruz de Tenerife explains: 'With my children I converse in Sindhi, and sometimes English, so that they can learn their mother tongue, and a foreign language. The Spanish they will learn in schools, but mother tongue is necessary for their attachment to their own culture and English is compulsory for their future. With English they can migrate and work at any place'. While retention of migrants' own language may offer no advantage in educational attainment, it may nevertheless do so in relation to the migrant's sense of belonging and access to ethnic networks. Recently, in many Gurudwaras and Hindu temples, language of origin courses has been organised for children; Gurmukh, 63, male, head of Gurudwara committee in Barcelona, explains 'In Gurudwara we organise summer camps for children, where we teach language and religion. It is very important otherwise they will forget their mother tongue'.

Identificational integration

The sense of belonging is a fundamental sign of integration, as already stressed. It shows the level of attachment and the loyalty with the host communities. The Indian immigrants have shown very little attachment to the host countries, as they believe that their true home is in India, and Italy and Spain are only their temporary shelters. As in the words of Balwinder, 48, male, a factory worker living in Barcelona for the last 21 years, 'my true home is in India. I have lived almost half of my life here [in Spain], but still my feelings are attached to the places where I have spent my childhood and teenage'. Generally, the Indian community has not experienced any racial or ethnic discrimination in both countries. They have very positive thoughts about the host community, but some explain about a shift in the host's attitude towards immigrants because of the increasing incidences of crime committed by immigrants, like in the words of Kamal, 30, female, a shopkeeper in Barcelona, 'Generally, native people are very good. They treat all immigrants very well, but due to the increasing crime mainly because of Romanians, Moroccans or African immigrants, now they feel afraid of immigrants and don't want more immigration'.

In the Indian community, the concept of identity is multi-layered. Most of the Indians first identify themselves with their place of origin in India (like Punjabis, Haryanvi, Keralite or Sindhis), then with their religion (Sikh, Hindu, Muslim or Christian), then with their national status (Indians or foreign citizens) and lastly with their new place of residence (Italian or Spanish). Mostly they feel that in the minds of the host community, their identity will always be an immigrant. Gurpreet, 30, male, a salesman from Madrid, explains his identity as 'I am a Punjabi Sikh, from India, this is


my identity. When I will get the Spanish nationality, I will add another layer of being Spanish to it. But I will remain Indian forever -an immigrant- in the eyes of local people'. A very crucial aspect of immigrant integration is the degree to which the host society permits insertion of immigrants into the society through its policies, programs and integration initiatives (Sardinha 2009). While explaining the attitude of Italian people regarding the immigrants, Ranjit, 48, male, an agriculture worker from Latina, says 'Italian people don't want to make us 'Italian', they need us for work. We are welcome here until we serve their purpose, when we start asking for our rights, they will label us as foreigners and through us out'.

Many Indians (especially Sikhs), complain about their confused identities in both countries, as the hosts often confuse them with Pakistanis or Afghans in Barcelona and Bengalis in Rome and Madrid. It is basically owing to the large concentration of other immigrant groups in these regions. Baptised Sikh males are confused with Muslims and owing to this confusion sometimes, they receive harsh treatment from hosts. Harjeet, 28, male, a baptised Sikh from Barcelona, explains 'often local people confuse me with Pakistanis and sometimes they call me Bin Laden or terrorist. Sometimes I feel hurt, but I know they are ignorant and don't know anything about me and my religion'. Among immigrants, the emergence of hyphenated identities is a symbol of integration and the acceptance of host society as their new home. Some Indians in both countries have started presenting themselves as Spanish-Sindhis or Italian-Sikhs.

Integration and transnationalism: quite conflicting processes

As well acknowledged, transnationalism and integration are two interconnected processes and they are not necessarily mutually exclusive (Cassarino 2004; Carling and Vatne 2014). However, their outcomes are not always easy to schematise: integration tends to strengthen the linkages with the country of residence, while transnationalism reinforces those with the country of origin. According to transnationalism, frequent movements between host and home countries and exchange of information, which have been intensified through the advancement of technologies, can increase migrants' opportunities to remain connected with the country of origin. However, transnational migrants may decide to return to their homeland to invest with the resources acquired from the host country, regardless of the level of integration abroad (De Haas and Tineke 2010). From another perspective but similarly, according to the social network theory, migrants are likely to move and eventually to return home if they maintain ties with their former place of settlement (Glick Schiller 1999).

Transnational networks provide a mechanism for the flow of information and resources in the global Indian diaspora, which help them to move from one country to another. It often results in the provisional attitude towards their permanent stay in the first host country, where the conditions are not satisfactory. In particular, when they compare their standard of living with that of their relatives or friends in other destinations countries, it discourages them to nurture a sense of belonging and attachment to the country of residence and in putting effort to increase their degree of integration into the host society (Fig. 3). In particular, the information they receive from their transnational community, about work and living conditions elsewhere, facilitate their plan to move on to other countries, where they think they can find better jobs and welfare conditions for themselves and their children.



As explained by Gurjeet, 42, male, a restaurant worker in Barcelona, ‘at present the flow of information and transport is very fast. People receive information from their relatives and friend, and compare the opportunities at different places. If they find that there are more opportunities at other destination, they move on there’. We believe that this mechanism may encourage the so-called instrumental use of citizenship that the 2008 economic crisis has contributed to increase (Finotelli et al. 2017) and according to which the citizenship of the host country is used by immigrants to move to EU or non-EU destinations. Sandeep, 32, female, a housewife from Brescia, illustrates her plan ‘my sister lives in the UK. She told me that life in the UK is very good. There are many jobs for women also, and for kids the best English education is available at relatively cheap price. So, when we get red passports [citizenship], we will move on there’. In Spain, 22 out of 48 and, in Italy, 24 out of 38 respondents have declared the intention to re-emigrate after having received the citizenship of the host country. Moreover, some of them affirm that their friends or relatives have already moved to the UK or to Canada, after having obtained the host nationality. In Italy, the number of people interested in onward migration is higher than Spain. Nevertheless, our findings do not allow us to conclude that Indians are making an instrumental use of citizenship, even though they point to a possible instrumental approach to citizenship acquisition: obtaining the citizenship of the country of residence also in order to move to other destinations, especially when the integration process and thus the sense of attachment to the host country appears fragmented and the transnational links within the diaspora quite strong, as in the case of the Indian community in both countries (Prieto et al. 2018).

Finally, the perceived provisional stay in Spain and Italy, together with the objective difficulties met in learning a language, which is quite different from their own languages, discourages Indians to put the necessary efforts in learning the language and culture of the host countries. On this regard, Sarabjot, 38, male, a serviceman in Barcelona, says ‘I don’t want to learn Spanish or Catalan perfectly because I am not going to live here forever. I have relatives in the UK. They are going to sponsor my visit there. If plan goes well, I will settle there permanently’.

Conclusions

Integration can be understood as ‘processes that increase the opportunities of immigrants and their descendants to obtain the valued ‘stuff’ of a society, as well as social acceptance, through participation in major institutions such as the educational and political system and the labour and housing markets’ (Alba and Foner 2016: 5). From the discourse of our interviewees, we found that Indian immigrants in Italy and Spain have limited access to the valued ‘stuff’ of the host societies and lacked the acceptance from the host societies (Penninx and Garcés-Masareñas 2016: 14). They have very low integration into different spheres (defined by Heckmann et al. 2001) of the host societies. At present, the process of integration is working properly only for few segments of the Indian community in both countries. The inherent diversity of Indian immigrant population, in terms of their gender, level of education, employment, religion and legal status, which our qualitative work has highlighted, affects the pace of the integration into the host society. As well acknowledged, more educated, highly skilled and legally resident immigrants integrate faster and successfully in the host society (Busetta 2016). The majority Sikh population, who is mainly irregular, low educated, and low skilled, is less integrated as compared to other religious groups of Indian origins (i.e. Hindus and Christians) in both countries. Moreover, the small segment of Indian community, which is integrating to the host society, is also mainly limited to the economic sphere. It results in what we have called the ‘fragmented integration,’ which is mainly caused by the uncertain attitude of Indians towards permanent stay in both countries.

As discussed, the discrimination faced by Indian immigrants in the labour market, housing, education institutes and the civil society, especially because of their language, religion, and physical aspects, negatively affects their level of integration into the host societies (also see Busetta et al. 2018). Similarly, the lengthy regularisation and naturalisation processes, degraded public education system and lengthy process of homologation of professional degrees adversely affect their perceptions and satisfaction from the host countries and further discourage the efforts required for the building of a strong sense of attachment and belonging to the host countries. Additionally, it encourages them to move on to other countries, such as the USA, Canada or the UK. The English education for their children, better job opportunities, kinship networks, high social capital and a better value attached to these countries in the diaspora are among the major pull factors that attract Indian immigrants to these countries. On this regard, most of our interviewees are waiting for the European passports to migrate to their desired destinations. The transnational networks provide them necessary information, resources and assistance for immigration to these countries, by reducing the costs. This possibility to get settled in another more developed country decreases their interest in a successful integration process and a permanent settlement in Italy and Spain.

On the part of the host governments, firstly, investment in the host language learning programs can make a significant contribution in improving the pace of integration of Indian immigrants. Host languages which are now acting as barrier can become a bridge, by facilitating the exchange of feelings and ideas between Indian immigrants and host societies. Secondly, the vocational training programs for women can help them to enter in the labour market, which will improve their level of economic integration into the host labour market. Thirdly, the simplification of regularisation laws can improve the upward legal mobility of irregular Indian immigrants, which will improve

their chances to get permanently settled in the host countries. Fourthly, the registration and official recognition of their religions can facilitate the sense of belonging among them. And finally, the strict control over discrimination of all types can encourage the different sections of the Indian society to integrate with the main stream host societies.

While comparing the level of integration of Indian immigrants in both countries, some differences emerged. The most important one pertains to the recognition of rights of irregular immigrants. In Spain, the right to be registered in municipal office; the right of education and enrolment in language courses; the right to use public health facilities; the right to use social services, libraries and community centres; and finally the *Arraigo* law helped the most part of Indians to improve their social and economic status. On the contrary, the almost total denial and neglect of irregular immigrants in Italy (with the exception of urgent medical cares and children's education, as regulated by the *Turco-Napolitano law* in 1999) has contributed to the isolation and the marginalisation of Indian immigrants. Time is the most relevant factor for the integration process for both immigrants and receiving societies. For first-generation immigrants, integration needs a second socialisation that requires many intellectual and emotional costs. However, second-generation immigrants are expected to pass through possibly demanding forms of bi-cultural socialisation and identity formation. In future, it will be interesting to see how the second generation of Indian immigrants in both countries evolve their relation with the host societies. Lastly, we want to acknowledge that, although they contribute to fill an important gap in migration and integration studies, all the empirical findings reported in this study are based on the perceived and self-reported experience of Indian immigrants in Italy and Spain; therefore, they are not necessarily representing the whole Indian community, which is a very heterogeneous and multifaceted immigrant group, and for this reason deserves further research.

Endnotes

¹The continuous regularisation with *Arraigo* (rootedness) was introduced in Spain through Immigration Act 4/2000. With its two modalities (*laboral and social*), *Arraigo* works as a permanent regularisation mechanism. Through this legal apparatus, immigrants are given the possibility of applying for regularisation after two (*Laboral Arraigo*) or three (*Social Arraigo*) years of registration in the municipality, providing a clean criminal record, an employment contract and a 'social insertion' certificate, provided by the town council of residence.

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Ethics approval and consent to participate

We have consent letters signed by all interviewees.

Consent for publication

We have consent letters for the publication of all contents of the interviews signed by all interviewees.

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The authors declare that they have no competing interests.

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
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ABSTRACT

Spain is a recent addition to the places of the Sikh diaspora, with 21,000 individuals recorded in 2016 (1% of the Sikh diaspora, but half of the total of Indian immigrants in Spain). This immigrant group shows clear generational components and is marked by expulsion from the political and economic spheres of their homeland, Punjab. Our main objective is to study how generational differences affect the socio-demographic structure, the migration process (reasons, routes, ways and destinations), religious practices and identity issues in the diaspora. We use a qualitative methodology. Primary data were collected in 60 in-depth interviews of Sikhs of diverse socioeconomic profiles and generations, from 25 municipalities of Spain during 2015–2016. We find that all the generations respond to the internal and external boundaries of the community in different ways which shape their views regarding the preservation and reproduction of religious practices and identity in a foreign setting.

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Introduction: Sikh diaspora and generations

The colonial wound that led to the birth of independent India in 1947 particularly affected Punjab state. The partition of India, or crude division of Bengal and Punjab by the Radcliffe Line, took place in the most dramatic and violent fashion (Brass 2003). Ethnic cleansing typifying the homogenising efforts of the nation-state (Yeoh 2003) occurred on both sides, even when cultural, ethnic and religious diversity was an important part of the construction narrative of post-colonial India. Hence, the memories of many Punjabis in general and Sikhs in particular, mainly the older generations who lived through this period, are memories of displaced people whose experience of displacement changed their environment and emotional landscapes. These differ substantially from those of subsequent generations which eventually produced the leaders of the contemporary Sikh diaspora, now settled in more than a hundred countries around the world, including Spain (Garha and Domingo 2017).

In Spain, the Sikh population consists of 21,000 individuals listed in municipal registers on 1 January 2016 and making up half of the total of Indian immigrants in Spain. Most of

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the Sikh population is settled in the northern Autonomous Community of Catalonia. Taking colonial migration routes, the majority of the early Sikh emigrants initially went to the UK, but with the increasing restrictions on the entry of Commonwealth citizens (after the Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1968), they started migrating to the Gulf countries and later on to Canada and the USA (Tatla 2009). Owing to the availability of low-skilled jobs and possibilities for permanent settlement in Europe, their orientation in the 1990s and early twenty-first century shifted to new destinations such as Spain, Italy, Germany and France (Thandi 2012).

The Sikh population in Spain consists of different generations of the Indian Sikh community who immigrated during the period of 1960–2015. Among the challenges they faced were reproduction and preservation of Sikh religious practices and identity in a foreign context. Internal (tensions between baptised and non-baptised members, gender roles and recognition of castes and clans) and external (between the immigrant group and host community) boundaries of the Sikh community have made these challenges more difficult. Our main objective is to analyse the tensions around these internal and external boundaries on the basis of the viewpoints of three different generational groups: first, the ‘Children of Independence’ (COI) generations, whose members were born before 1980; second, the ‘1980s generation’, with members born in the decade of 1980s and finally, the ‘millennium generation’, consisting of people born after 1990.

The generational perspective on religious purity and external boundaries

The concept of ‘generation’ apart from its biological connotation as a birth cohort refers to groups of individuals, who belong to a common location in the historical dimension of the social process (Mannheim [1927/28] 1972, 290). These people share with one another a particular type of social location (Mannheim [1927/28] 1972, 291), determined by the way in which certain patterns of experience and thought tend to be brought into existence (Mannheim [1927/28] 1972, 292). In transnational migration scholarship, generations have been a key theme or category of inquiry shedding light on the rationality of experiences, emotions and trajectories among migrants in a particular period of time, or between them and their family members (Fresnoza and Shinozaki 2017). Less common, but increasingly important, are analyses of intra-generational differences within and between the diverse cohorts that comprise migrant diasporas (Baldassar and Pyke 2014; Baldassar, Pyke, and Ben-Moshe 2017).

The migration process affects the inner world of the immigrants, influencing their sense of self and their identity formation process (Phinney et al. 2001; Schwartz 2005; Schwartz, Montgomery, and Briones 2006). The descendant of immigrants, especially adolescents in the process of constructing their identity (Erikson 1968), face conflicting social contexts in which they attempt to incorporate ‘here’ and ‘there’ into a meaningful sense of self (Rumbaut 1994). In terms of identity and integration, ‘generations’ especially, the migrant generations and their descendants, can be understood through their attitude towards boundaries, as quoted by Massey and Sanchez (2010, 16), ‘Immigrant assimilation is a process of boundary-brokering in which immigrants, encountering categorical boundaries that separate them from natives, do whatever they can to challenge, circumvent, or accommodate those divisions to advance their interests’. These are the external boundaries that separate immigrants from hosts, and generally, immigrants negotiate with the host

community for maintaining these boundaries to preserve their separate identity and peaceful coexistence. But also there are internal boundaries in the group based on the internal social hierarchy, and different generations respond to these boundaries in their own way. In this concern, South Asians in the diaspora have not only maintained the homeland culture and identities, but also created, recreated and negotiated such identities under different circumstances in the multiracial and multicultural societies (Sahoo and Sheffer 2013).

The identity of a particular group which shares some sort of set of rules also includes existing divisions and fractures within the group, and the tensions polarised between 'purity and contamination' give rise to the internal dynamics of the group (Douglas 1966). A major concern of the Sikh community in new diaspora countries like Spain is reproduction and preservation of purity (mainly religious) – as explained by Douglas (1966) in her classical analysis – in a foreign context, and its transmission to the coming generations. Maintenance of purity in the community and peaceful coexistence with hosts create tensions around the internal and external boundaries of the community and often requires a restructuring of religious beliefs.

At the same time, and like Barth (1969), we believe that the boundaries that define a group when it comes into permanent contact with other groups need some structuring of the interaction which allows the coexistence and persistence of cultural differences. In this paper, we aim to show how different generations of Sikh immigrants are restructuring both internal and external boundaries of the community in order to prosper and peacefully coexist with the host society. In the case of internal structuring, we refer to negotiations around the boundaries between baptised and non-baptised Sikhs, different castes and clans, gender and generation roles, and their effects on the migration process and socio-religious reproduction of the community.

Data sources and methodology

The data have been collected through 60 in-depth interviews of individuals with different demographic and socioeconomic profiles, who identify themselves as Sikhs, and who are now living in Spain irrespective of their legal status. The interviews were conducted during the period between November 2015 and June 2016, in the 25 municipalities where Sikhs are mainly concentrated in Spain, among them 18 municipalities with Sikh temples. Interviewees were selected through the snowball sampling technique (Johnson 2014). The interviews were semi-structured, and respondents were asked to express themselves on the following issues: family background, migration history, present socioeconomic condition, religious practices and beliefs, attitude towards castes and clans, generational relations, marriage, gender roles and future expectations. The interviews were conducted in the Punjabi language. Of a total of 60 interviews, 25 were from the COI group, 20 from the generation of the 1980s and 15 from the millennium generation. One-third of the interviewees were females (Table 1).

We have used a qualitative research methodology. The inductive approach, also called a bottom-up approach in the terms of 'Grounded Theory' (Glaser and Strauss 1967), has been applied. All interviews were audio recorded and encoded in the computer programme Atlas.ti, using a thematic classification. This prepared the content of the interview for theme-by-theme analysis. Each interview was summarised in a 'portrait' based on a thematic grid (generation, migration history, entry into Spain, access to the labour

Table 1. Socio-demographic characteristics of interviewees.

| Socio-demographic characteristic | CIO group | Interviewees | |
|----------------------------------|-----------|------------------|-----------------------|
| | | 1980s generation | Millennium generation |
| Sex | | | |
| Males | 18 | 12 | 10 |
| Females | 7 | 8 | 5 |
| Education | | | |
| Primary | 16 | 7 | 0 |
| Secondary | 8 | 9 | 12 |
| University | 1 | 4 | 3 |
| Occupation | | | |
| Agriculture | 3 | 2 | 0 |
| Factory workers | 3 | 4 | 0 |
| Services | 8 | 8 | 10 |
| Retired | 3 | 0 | 0 |
| Unemployed | 8 | 6 | 5 |
| Marital status | | | |
| Never married | 0 | 2 | 15 |
| Married | 23 | 17 | 0 |
| Others | 2 | 1 | 0 |
| Total | 25 | 20 | 15 |

market, family reunion, views about religious practices and social classes (caste or clans), relation with hosts and identity consciousness). These portraits were illustrated by quotes. By comparing the portraits, we established a typology of representations and practices of different generations. The typology was defined separately for each different generation in order to make a comparison. Finally, we report on how generational differences affect the attitudes of different groups regarding preservation and transfer of religious practices, caste and clan boundaries and identity issues.

Different generational groups: causes, motives for and ways of immigration

Each generation of the present Sikh population of Spain has the imprint of different political events of Punjab's history on their lives and this shapes their migratory experiences, religious beliefs and identity. In order to follow the important events in the lives of individuals, from all generational groups and through the time, we have used the Lexis diagram (Figure 1), where we present the life trajectories of the members of all generations, including events like first migration, arrival in Spain, marriage, family reunion, birth of children, legalisation and citizenship. The Sikh population in Spain consists of 20.7 thousand individuals, registered in the municipal registers on 1 January 2015, which makes half of the total Indian immigrants in Spain. Majority of Sikhs is settled along with the Mediterranean coast in which half of them have settled in the Northern Autonomous community of Catalonia. The present Sikh population of Spain belongs to the different generations of the Punjabi Sikh community. Each generation has the imprint of different political events of Punjab's history on their lives that shapes their migration experiences, attitude towards religion and relation to their homeland. In order to follow the important events of an individual's life from all generational groups, we have used the Lexis diagram (Figure 1), where we present the life trajectories of all generations depicting the events, such as first migration, entrance in Spain, marriage, family reunification, birth of children, legalisation and citizenship.




Figure 1. Lexis diagram represents the three generational groups, illustrated by Sikh immigrants interviewed in Spain, 2015–2016. Source: Own elaboration, with in-depth interviews during 2015–2016.

Children of independence

Members of the COI, the largest and oldest generational group of Sikhs in Spain, were born soon after Indian independence or in the period of the Green Revolution. First of all, their childhood memories are those displaced people as many of their forebears migrated from West Pakistan to the Indian Punjab after the division of British India (Singh and Tatla 2006). As adolescents, they witnessed the emergence of the ‘Punjabi identity’ struggle and the formation of Punjabi Suba (a state with a majority Sikh population) on the basis of language in 1966, and the transformation of Punjab from the land of displaced people to the bread basket of India with the Green Revolution. In their thirties, they led the struggle for Sikh rights during the period of political crisis in Punjab. In this period, their perception of Punjab was marked by two historical events, first, the Operation Blue star (Indian military operation on the Golden Temple in Amritsar to crush Sikh protesters in June 1984), which was followed by the assassination of Indira Gandhi by her Sikh bodyguards on 31 October the same year (Dhillon 2007) and, second, the period of militancy (1984–1992).

The main causes of their emigration include the first demographic transition, agricultural failure and political unrest in Punjab. The first demographic transition began in

Punjab soon after independence. After 1961, the population started increasing at a decadal growth rate of more than 20%. The combination of the growing population and the laws of inheritance (land was divided equally between all male children) meant that the size of land holdings was getting smaller and the situation became unsustainable for the whole population. As explained by Gurmukh, 63 who was a teenager the time ‘I had three brothers and there wasn’t enough land for the survival of anyone, so one of my brothers entered in Indian army and I decided to emigrate in search of work’. In the 1960s, the Indian government decided to introduce an intensive agricultural plan in Punjab, which later becomes famous as the ‘Green Revolution’ (Randhawa 1977). The new technology favoured capitalist farming which significantly reduced opportunities for employment in previously labour-intensive rural areas of Punjab, while rapidly growing inflows of labourers from other states of India further worsened the plight of local rural workers (Singh and Singh 2006). All these events triggered their exodus as economic migrants, first to the UK and then to countries of the Middle East during the oil boom of the 1970s. The UK was the most favoured destination, but due to restrictions imposed by the British government on free movement of Commonwealth citizens under the Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1968 (Hepple 1968), Sikhs were denied access to the UK, whereupon they started migrating to Middle Eastern countries (especially Dubai) where, thanks to the construction boom, the demand of manual workers was high (Tatla 2009).

In the following decade, with the emerging demand of autonomy and the political crisis caused by the operation Blue Star and assassination of Indira Gandhi in 1984, Punjab became a battleground ground for young Sikhs when the central police and other armed forces unleashed anti-Sikh pogroms and, in particular, targeted rural youth in orchestrated encounters. During this period, many Sikhs migrated from Punjab to save their lives and for a better future outside India (Dhillon 2007). Most of them moved to Canada and the USA, where they initially applied for refugee status but, when the governments of these countries rejected their applications for asylum, they moved to Europe, mainly to Germany or Italy. Some eventually settled permanently in these two countries and others moved to neighbouring countries including Spain, where the conditions for permanent settlement were comparatively easier (Farjas 2006). As explained by Harwinder, 48, a baptised Sikh in Barcelona, ‘the police were targeting the young boys in orchestrated encounters in our village; so my family forced me to emigrate from Punjab. First I first entered Germany illegally and then moved on to Spain for regularisation’.

In Spain, according to the interviewees, 90% of the individuals among the COI generations were stepped migrants. As for their motives, those who migrated directly from Punjab during the period of the Green Revolution (before 1980) were economic migrants but the majority, who migrated after the events of 1984, were political refugees. Most of them entered Spain during the period of regularisation (2000, 2001 and 2005) with the main aim ‘getting legalised’. Owing to the fact that there were fewer restrictions on legal immigration before the 1970s, the majority of the first-wave immigrants arrived on flights to Europe, and some even came by sea on the post-colonial shipping routes from the port of Calcutta to Mediterranean ports. However, others, who migrated in the late 1980s, have taken the same routes as irregular immigrants from Africa or northern Europe, as subsequent immigrants (Figure 3(a)) have also done. According to the

municipal registers of 2014, the size of the COI group was 7665 individuals of whom 24% were female (Figure 2).

The 1980s generation

The 1980s generation of Sikhs suffered from a process of cultural ‘purification’ in India promoting intolerance towards ethno-cultural, linguistic or religious minorities (Appadurai 2015). They are very far from the idyllic image conjured up by Friedman (Friedman and Friedman 2006, 196–197) of India’s neoliberal shift (citing what he calls the generation of ‘zippies’) featuring the children of liberalisation as ‘entrepreneurs’. This generation was born in a period of estrangement between the Sikh community and the Indian state. They have memories of an insecure, terrified Punjab with deteriorated public infrastructure and services. During their childhood, they saw older generations emigrating from Punjab in search of a livelihood and sometimes to escape persecution or even save their lives. As in the words of Karmjit, 30, male, a restaurant worker in Barcelona, ‘I was very young when my father emigrated from Punjab, he was terrified because of the political unrest in Punjab, then following him my uncle also emigrated for work’. As adolescents they suffered from the effects of a hostile neoliberal government which was taking advantage of Punjab’s political crisis and the situation of shock (Klein 2007) after the attacks on Golden Temple, and selling the neglected public infrastructure and services (public distribution system, education, health, power and transport) to private companies. They were deprived of good public education and health services (Patnaik 2014) and, as a result, their low level of schooling and lack of formal training made them unqualified for decent jobs in industry and the public administration in India. As explained by Sukhjot, 31, male, an agricultural worker in Murcia,




Figure 2. Age structure and sex composition of different Sikh generations (Indian or Spanish nationals) in Spain, 2014. Source: Own elaboration with data from municipal registers (Padron Continuo 2015), INE.

after the events of 1984, government stopped funding and quality control of education in Public Schools in Punjab. Hence, the quality of education deteriorated sharply. The investment in professional training was also stopped and young masses were left uneducated and untrained.

Their recruitment into the Indian army, which was their traditional occupation for many centuries, also declined after the political crisis of the 1980s. All of these factors led to a decline in the average living standard and quality of human capital in rural areas of Punjab. Hence, the little-educated and unskilled Sikh youth started emigrating to the western countries on a massive scale, which could be described as ‘Expulsions’, to use Saskia Sassen’s word (2015).

The motives of these emigrants were clearly economic. Tightening border controls in Europe and ever-increasing numbers of youth wishing to immigrate have fuelled illegal human trafficking networks controlled by immigration mafia in Punjab and abroad, the real beneficiaries of the process (Bhawra 2013). Punjab has become the leading centre for illegal emigration from India (Saha 2009). According to interviewees, people were paying more than 20,000 euros to enter Europe or 40,000 for Canada or the USA, after selling their ancestral land or mortgaging their houses. In the words of Karamjit, 34, an agriculture worker in Murcia, ‘my father sold part of our ancestral land to buy a Schengen Visa for me. He paid an agent 10 lakh rupees [€12,480] ... this is the story of every second emigrant from Punjab’. The magnitude of emigration was so great that in the first decade of the twenty-first century, every middle-class family in rural Punjab (especially the Doaba region) had one or two members living outside India. Kartar, 31, a restaurant worker from Barcelona says, ‘now it is difficult to find young boys in our villages [in the Doaba Region], because they all emigrating before their twentieth birthday’.

As they explain in the interviews, the majority have come to Spain from other European countries. Owing to strict border controls and EU immigrant detention policies, many entered the country through illegal routes from northern European or African countries (Thandi 2012). In the case of the Northern route, as explained by Sandeep, 31, who took this option,

mostly they [immigrants] reach Russia by air and then from Moscow, with the help of agents, they enter Europe through land routes, mainly going to Germany via Ukraine and Poland. As the rules for regularization and permanent settlement are very strict in Germany, they move on to Spain or Italy, where they get legalized easily.


The second route passes through Africa. Harjot, 28, who took this route explains that,

first they enter an African country, like Burkina Faso, Mali, Algeria or Morocco by air and then, with the help of human traffickers, they enter Morocco through land routes and, from Morocco, the agents smuggle them to the Spanish city of Ceuta. After entering Ceuta, they contact the Red Cross, which provides them with assistance in camps and helps them to enter mainland Spain. (Figure 3(b))


These routes have been described as the ‘donkey flight’ (Smith 2014) and they are a clear characteristic of the 1980s generation.

A small part of this group entered Europe with Schengen visas issued by Greek, Spanish or Portuguese embassies in India, and many interviewees suspect the involvement of embassies in an immigration racket. One Jagtar, 34, says, ‘these embassies give visas

3.1 The Children of Independence:



3.2 The 1980's Generations (donkey flights):



3.3 Millennium Generations:



Figure 3. Itineraries taken by different generational groups of Sikh immigrants in Spain, in the period 1960-2015. (a) The children of independence, (b) the 1980s generations (donkey flights) and (c) millennium generations. Source: Own elaboration, with in-depth interviews by the first author during 2015-2016.

and the agents charge money, so surely they [agents] give part of this money to the embassy people also'. In exceptional circumstances, there are also some highly qualified Sikhs from this group, who entered Spain with legal job contracts to work in Spanish

companies. The 1980s generation in 2014 consisted of 6228 individuals, among which the female share was about 27.7% (Figure 2).

The millennial generation

This generation was mostly born after 1990, into divided transnational families where one or two members were already living and working outside India. In most cases, owing to the male-dominated nature of Sikh emigration, the father is working outside India. As in the case of Gurjit, 19, female, a student from Alicante, 'I was only two years old when my father emigrated from Punjab, I lived my whole childhood with my mother. At the age of 16, my father sponsored our visit to Spain here under family reunion'. During the decades from 1990 to 2010, the regular flow of remittances from outside has changed the socioeconomic environment and the aspirations of Sikh youths in Punjab. Now the young men who are poorly educated and have no future in rural areas start emigrating by legal or illegal means to seek their share of 'El Dorado'. As explained by Gurkamal, 54, male, Gurdwara managing committee member in Valencia, 'The Western money [remittances] has spoiled the minds of young boys and girls, they don't want to study or have a job in India. They only want to immigrate to western countries'.

This group is composed of three subgroups, namely relatives of Sikhs living abroad, unskilled and poorly educated workers and university students. In Spain, 90% of the millennium generation were family members of other immigrants and had migrated legally the family reunification process (Figure 3(c)). Some explain their migratory experience as culture shock and others relate it with their future expectations, for example, Amardeep, 19, a restaurant worker in Barcelona, who explains, 'I immigrated to Spain under the family reunion plan to join my father, who sponsored my visit. It was like dream come true for me'. Almost all of them travelled directly from India by air with official permission. They took the shortest route, without any intermediaries and were aware of their final destination at the beginning of their journey. By comparison with the others this is the smallest group – 5723 individuals – but also that with the highest share (39%) of female immigrants (Figure 2).

Generational boundaries: religion and identity

The interviews show that these generational groups have different ideas regarding their religion (beliefs and practices) and they live by them in their own ways. The differences are strongly influenced by age, sex, parental status (grandparents, parents and children), socioeconomic profile and migratory experiences, including their exposure to the host society and relations with their origin. With regard to religion, the immigrants' experiences reveal a constant reformulation of religious orthodoxy and rituals in a foreign setting in order to enable peaceful coexistence with the host society and other immigrant communities. In this situation, traditional religious values have remained oscillating between 'purity' at the origin and a reformulation of rituals in order to accommodate at the destination. Religious discourse among the different generations of the present Sikh community in Spain is focused on the themes like constructing a Gurdwara (Sikh temple), management and control; baptised and non-baptised Sikhs; caste and clan system; and, finally, the role of women in religious institutions.

Gurdwaras: construction, management and control

For Sikhs, the Gurdwaras in Europe, along with their formal role as places of worship, are centres of power and representation, where the whole community comes together to pray and share resources and ideas (Hirvi 2010). They also provide a platform for discussion of all social and political issues (Jacobsen 2012). The features that characterise Gurdwaras in Punjab are maintained and transformed in Europe where they are conceived as sites of spirituality and for transmitting Sikh principles and identity, although they also contribute to enhancing community well-being and development (Gallo 2012). It can be said that the social life of the majority of Sikhs is organised around the Gurdwaras.

In Spain, there are 22 Gurdwaras, constructed in different municipalities during the last two decades. The first Gurdwara was established in 1998 in Barcelona, which has the largest Sikh population, and almost half the Gurdwaras in Spain are situated in Catalonia. More recently, the last Gurdwara was inaugurated in 2015 in the municipality of Los Alcazares, Murcia. Most of the Gurdwaras have been constructed by the COI generations, who also control their functioning through managing committees of five or more members of fixed tenure (mostly two years) selected by the community. Being a member of the managing committee is a matter of prestige and power, so everybody wants this position. The associated rivalry sometimes breeds internal conflicts which end up in violent clashes (Qureshi 2014), leading to division and the creation of new Gurdwaras. Indeed, this is the experience of most Spanish towns with two Gurdwaras, among them Madrid, Valencia, Torre Pacheco and Mallorca. Intra-community clashes also include disputes on issues of orthodoxy, the division between baptised and non-baptised Sikhs, and caste and clan conflicts for representation and power in the Gurdwaras (Takhar 2008). Women theoretically have full rights to participate in Gurdwara management but there are hardly any female members in managing committees in Spain. This shows gender bias in the community regarding public life and representation. In the words of Kulwant, 46, a baptised Sikh woman from Barcelona, 'Our religion gives full freedom to women to participate in Gurdwara management, but our Sikh society is still very reluctant to give these responsibilities to women ... Women are only allowed to help in the kitchen and cleaning activities'.

In the interviews, we have found that the Gurdwara has a different importance and significance in each generational group. For the COI group, as explained by Kartar, 57, a baptised Sikh,

the Gurdwaras, along with their formal duty of providing religious services to the people, are the cornerstone of the community building process. They promote a strong sense of identity, bonds of brotherhood and unity in the community, and provide a platform to transfer religious beliefs and the knowledge of rituals to the coming generations.

However, Major Singh, 47, highlights the role of Gurdwaras in the 'reception of new immigrants and their mobilisation towards different occupational niches in different parts of Spain'. In the discourse of the 1980s generation, the Gurdwara is a place for contact with the community where people share problems related with work and social life. Many are like Gurjit, 35, a restaurant worker in Lloret de Mar who states, 'my whole social life is limited to the Gurdwara where I spend my all my free time with friends discussing all the problems related with work and family'. The 1980s generation contributes to the functioning of the Gurdwara with financial support or serving there in weekly meetings. However, most of them visit the Gurdwara at weekends, during festivities or when

they have a day off. They mostly criticise the elder generations for spoiling the atmosphere of the Gurdwaras because of the power struggles, and try to ignore Gurdwara politics. In the words of Kuldeep, 29, a restaurant worker in Valencia,

The Gurdwara is a place of worship, but they [Gurdwara managers] have turned it into a battleground. Everybody wants to be the head of the Gurdwara committee, to control the resources, and have influence in society, but nobody talks about unity and peace.

By contrast, for the millennium generation, it is a place of learning about their religion and culture, and to have fun with friends. Sukhdeep, 18, a student from Murcia, explains, 'I come to the Gurdwara to get closer to my origin. Here I learn about my religion, culture and way of life ... While learning, I also come in contact with many others like me'. They come mostly at weekends. Some Gurdwaras also organise summer camps, where they learn Punjabi language, read religious scriptures and come in contact with other youth. Gagandeep, 19, a baptised Sikh from Barcelona, states, 'I attend summer camp every year. I have learned Gurbani [religious scripture] and now I have many friends, who visit Barcelona to attend this camp with me'. Gurdwaras provide them with a space to discuss problems and issues regarding their own identity and religious beliefs.

Baptised and non-baptised Sikhs

Within the present Sikh community, an important boundary is drawn, based on the distinction between baptised (Amritdhari) and non-baptised (Sehajdhari) Sikhs. Baptised Sikhs wear the 5 K's, or articles of faith: kesh (long uncut hair), kanga (a wooden comb), kara (iron bracelet), kachera (undergarment) and kirpan (sword) (Singh 2014). They do not change their physical appearance, which means not cutting their hair or piercing or tattooing their bodies. Since they lead the performance of religious rituals in the Gurdwaras they have symbolic capital, and they represent a normative appearance for Sikhs and, to some extent, perform the role of guardians of the faith. Their number in Spain is very limited (less than 5% of the total Sikh population, according to the Gurdwara heads we interviewed). The majority group is that of the non-baptised Sikhs who believe in the teachings of Sikh gurus but are not strict adherents of the code of conduct and rituals. They are more flexible in their religious beliefs and adaptable in a foreign context. They form a majority in the global Sikh diaspora and even in Punjab today (Panikar 2007). As for the role of women, they have an equal right in Sikhism to be baptised and freely to follow the religious code of conduct. In fact, the number of baptised Sikh women in Spain is much higher than for males.

There are frequent clashes between both groups for power and control of the Sikh temples. The non-baptised Sikhs frequently complain about the others, alleging exclusion from Gurdwara activities, as happens with the Badalona Gurdwara where committee members' positions are reserved for baptised Sikhs only. Hardeep, 32, a non-baptised Sikh from Badalona, protests that 'the baptized Sikhs have a monopoly on the management and control of Gurdwaras. They don't allow us to participate in management, but they want us for funding, cooking and cleaning'. Meanwhile, baptised Sikhs claim they have a legitimate right to control the Gurdwaras as they rigorously follow the code of conduct. In the words of Sulakhkhan, 54, a baptised Sikh and Gurdwara manager, 'a

non-baptized Sikh is not pure. He therefore has no right to manage the Gurdwara sahib. I don't even consider him a Sikh, as he doesn't follow the order of Guru'. These conflicts often lead to violent clashes between the two groups and sometimes the local police must intervene to resolve their issues. This has happened repeatedly in Barcelona, Murcia and Madrid and, in other countries like Denmark, it resulted in the closing of a Gurdwara in the year 2006 (Ilkjær 2011).

Baptised Sikhs in Spain enjoy the respect of the Sikh community, but they often receive harsh treatment from the host society. Spanish people are generally ignorant of the Sikh religion and customs, so they tend to confuse them with Muslims, as explained by Sandeep, 24 a baptised Sikh from Vic, 'Owing to my long beard and turban, they [local people] often confuse me with Muslims, and call me "Bin Laden or terrorist"'. They have very limited contact with the host society and face huge problems finding jobs and better housing. In some places, because of their sword-wearing tradition under the 5 Ks, even local police treat them as suspects. In the sphere of public administration, their different appearance is often used to represent population diversity so they were treated as community spokespersons and funded by local government to promote social cohesion. Yet they very often promote youth radicalisation by encouraging them to embrace religious fundamentalism. As Preetpal, 47, a non-baptised Sikh in Barcelona explains,

they [baptized Sikhs] receive money from the city council, and teach kids that if you cut hair or eat meat you will go to hell, and you shouldn't mix with the host society, as it will pollute your mind and soul.

By contrast non-baptised Sikhs, gradualists who do not observe the 5 K's or keep their hair uncut, are generally neglected by the public administration, but are fairly well treated by the host society. They usually do not face discrimination at work and public places.

As the interviews show, the COI generations in which the number of baptised Sikhs is comparatively higher than in the groups of their descendants, put greater emphasis on homogenisation – as baptised members – of the whole community. Kashmir, 52, a member of Gurdwara management committee in Mallorca, states that 'everybody should get baptized, as it is the only way to conserve our traditional way of life and religious values'. However, the 1980s generation generally relates traditionalism with problems in the labour market. Major, 32, a non-baptised Sikh in Malaga, says, 'I work in a restaurant and they [the owners] don't allow me to work with long hair and a beard. Work is important, so I cannot get baptized right now'. Some relate baptism with age, and plan to get baptised at a certain age, more or less around retirement. The number of baptised Sikhs in the 1980s group was lower by comparison with others.

In the millennium group, there was a mixed response. On the one hand, there are young men and women, who are baptised and strictly follow the Sikh code of conduct. One interviewee, Harsimran, claims, 'I am a proud Sikh and I will never change my Sikh appearance for anyone or for anything'. They have little contact, limited to schools or workplaces, with the host community and spend most of their free time including summer holidays at the Gurdwaras learning about religion and the Punjabi language. They are much more prone to the temptations of fundamentalism since sticking with the basic tenets of the religion and eliminating the space of flexibility gives them the strength which their ancestors decreed makes survival possible in foreign lands. On the

other hand, many young Sikhs do not want to get baptised, as they believe that it will make them look different, which could limit their possibilities for making friends, having a social circle, and getting better jobs in the host society, as Jaswinder, 19, a student from Alicante, explains: 'I don't want to get baptized, as it will give me a different look and way of living. I think it will create a rift between me and my friends'.

Caste and clan system: hundred years on ...

In traditional Sikh doctrine, no importance was given to the castes and clans of Indian society, as the founder of the religion Guru Nanak ruled out discrimination on the basis of castes or clans. Yet many Sikhs relate with their origins from different caste groups within the broader Hindu society, maintain their caste identity and pass it to the next generation. These caste boundaries are among the main causes of conflict in Punjab and also in the diaspora (Singh 2015). In the interviews, almost all the participants of different age groups and profiles have confirmed the existence of caste discrimination in the present Sikh community in both Spain and at the origin. There are some Gurdwaras in Spain which are also associated with certain caste groups. The *Ravidasia* Gurdwara of Barcelona, which was opened by the lower caste *Ravidasia* community and closed after the conflict that occurred in Vienna when a *Ravidasia* Sikh cleric was murdered and another injured in 2009, by a group of upper caste Sikh fundamentalists (Lum 2010), and the *Ravidasia* temple of Valencia, are the good examples of caste-based Gurdwaras. This conflict is not only limited to castes because clans like the *Jatts* and *Lubanas*, which comprise the majority of the Sikh population in Spain, are also fighting for power and representation in the Gurdwaras. Sarbjeet, 24, a *Lubana* Sikh living in Vic, explains that 'the construction of the Gurdwara Sahib in Vic [a town in the Barcelona Province] was delayed because of the conflict between the *Jatts* and *Lubanas* regarding control of the Gurdwara Sahib'.

In the interviews, we found that Sikhs of the COI generations, always deny that they follow caste rules because it is politically incorrect to talk about this openly, but most of them still feel attached to their clans, which they call *Biraderi*, especially when it comes to the marriage of their children. Inter-caste marriages are very rare and unacceptable for the greater part of the community. In the words of Swaran, a *Jatt* Sikh from Barcelona, 'I will not allow my kids to marry into the lower castes. They have to marry into our own religion and caste'. Some clearly state that they do not like socialising with lower castes. Hardeep, 28, an upper caste Sikh from Madrid, pulls no punches: 'I don't discriminate, but the lower caste people are not worth any relationship, they are filthy, mean creatures'. These attitudes reveal the tough rigidity of these inner boundaries and tensions which are very dangerous for the unity and development of the community. Embodying the traditional female role as transmitters of religious and social identity, Sikh women in Spain are more caste-discriminatory than males when discussing inter-caste marriages and other social ties. In the words of Kulwinder, 47, an upper caste woman living in Murcia, 'I don't believe in the caste system, but I don't want my kids to marry into lower-caste families, as it will bring shame on my family'. These boundaries are expected to disappear in time as the 1980s generation is comparatively less discriminatory than their parents' generation. Hence, Kirat, 31, a *Ravidasia* Sikh from Valencia, says, 'the old people are more discriminatory than the young ones. Many of my colleagues are

from the upper caste and they show no discrimination with me'. The millennium group shows the least interest in caste conflict as they have very little contact with Punjabi society in India, although Indian social media, which is full of material that discriminates among castes, has a powerful impact on their young minds. As Kuldeep, 28, a lower caste Sikh in Valencia, comments, 'it will take 100 years more to fully eradicate this caste discrimination from Sikh society'. Being in a country where ideas of equality are taught in all the institutions, we can expect a change in the thinking of youth with regard to these social problems.

Conclusions

The experience of migration shared by different Sikh generations does not make them more homogenous, but has widened the differences between them. Immigration imposes the need to restructure boundaries and codes of interaction with the host society on a different basis from the way things used to be done in India in order to reinforce and maintain the Sikh identity. Opposition or distance from Hinduism and Islam, which had a fundamental role to play in the creation of the Sikh identity, is not so important in twenty-first-century Spain. Here, each generation is responding to the challenge of maintaining group identity from their own different experiences marked by age, family status, religious beliefs, migratory routes and socioeconomic status.

During the last five decades of immigration to Spain, the different Sikh generations have responded to different push and pull factors in their migratory process. The COI group, which includes economic emigrants and refugees, were expelled by unemployment and insecurity caused by population growth, the Green Revolution and political crisis in Punjab. Most of them stayed first in countries of the Middle East and then entered Europe by sea or by air. The 1980s group mainly comprised unskilled economic migrants with little education who, owing to the diverse effects of neoliberal policies, had to leave Punjab in search of better job opportunities overseas. They have used 'donkey flights' and unscrupulous intermediaries to enter Spain. By contrast, the millennium generation were brought by their family or kinship networks. Theirs was the shortest and most direct journey to Spain, which they entered legally with family, study or work visas.

As for religion, the chief concern of the COI group is to preserve religious purity (as explained by Douglas 1966) and pass on religious practices, beliefs and identity to the coming generations who are now living in a diverse foreign society which can contaminate their minds and souls. To accomplish this goal, they are investing time and resources in the establishment and functioning of Gurdwaras as centres of learning for the next generations. Meanwhile, the 1980s generation is struggling to comply with their religious duties and to keep their jobs in the service sector, especially in restaurants, where most of them work. And, finally, the millennium generation is divided into two groups, one which wants to assimilate into Spanish society and the other which wants to go back to their roots by learning about Sikhism and following it very strictly.

Clashes for power and control in the Gurdwaras are common in Spain where the conflicts between the different groups are based on internal lines of division between baptised and non-baptised Sikhs, or castes and clans. Here, the community will need to think about how to abolish these internal divisions, which are becoming breeding grounds for violent

clashes which can lead to fragmentation of the community. The millennium generation, whose members are growing up in an environment of equality, are expected to play a decisive role in abolishing castes from the Sikh society and easing the tensions between baptised and non-baptised Sikhs.

In future, as explained by Massey and Sánchez (2010), the possibility of keeping the religion alive will also depend on the negotiating capacity of the Sikh community for brokering of internal (within the Sikh community) and external (with the host community) boundaries. In the host society, this will largely depend upon recognition of the Sikh religion by the host government and society as a valuable component of the society. When Sikhism becomes a registered religion, and the wearing of religious symbols (5 K's) becomes symbolic capital for the Sikhs, and discrimination of all kinds against baptised Sikhs in public places and the labour market disappears, Sikhs, who have changed their appearance in the hope of better work opportunities will be able to return to their religious beliefs and their religious identity will be strengthened. In the Sikh community, a revival and restructuring of the religion (dissolving internal boundaries) in the foreign context could reinforce the community (by unifying all castes and clans) and their acceptance in the host society. Otherwise, rigidity in these boundaries, as explained by Barth (1969), can contribute to their social exclusion and be an obstacle to their integration into the host society.

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5. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION

All the articles included in this dissertation have a separate section for key findings and concluding observations. In this section, I will discuss the key findings of this dissertation. Similar to the structure, the conclusions are also divided into the following three subsections:

5.1 Conclusions regarding the Indian Diaspora

This dissertation offers several images of the current Indian diaspora based on the empirical estimates of the population and space of the diaspora through different data sources. These sources capture different segments of the diaspora population, depending on the categorization of immigrants or their descendants in several categories. The Indian Diaspora is a demographic and geopolitical entity, which is in constant restructuring with new migratory flows and changing categories of immigrants involved. I have used three different sources (the Government of India register, the United Nations Global Migration Database and the Big Data 'Facebook') to quantify the population and demarcate the geopolitical boundaries of the Indian Diaspora. Each source classifies Indian immigrants, according to their own criteria and data politics. This classification and statistical registration of the diaspora population is based on the bio-political will of the data collection agencies to give visibility to some populations that, otherwise, only depend on self-recognition.

To defend my first hypothesis '*The statistical visibility of the Indian diaspora is mediated by changes in "governability" and statistical advances due to the appearance of continuous records of population and Big Data (especially social networking sites)*', I forward the evidence that at the beginning of the new millennium, the change in attitude of the government of India towards its diaspora led to the collection and categorization of data on the diaspora population. The categorization of the diaspora population (people who are included or excluded in one of the categories) in 'People of Indian origin' (PIO) or 'Non-resident Indians' (NRI), and their quantification according to these categories, show the Indian government's intentions to include all people in their Diaspora community, who have (up to the fourth generation) any relationship with India. This categorization also affects the mapping of old (PIO) and new (NRI) Indian diasporas. In fact, the reactivation of the government of India's interest in the diaspora is mainly due to its economic motives, especially the money received in the form of remittances and foreign direct investment from the members of the diaspora community. The recent

efforts of the Indian government to visualize the global image of the Indian diaspora can be linked to the tendency to 'extra territorialisation' of state powers (Collyer 2013), which means 'integrating immigrants or their descendants into the ideology of the nation'. This is happening in many diasporas around the world with the process of globalization (Dumbrava, 2014). In summary, the data record kept by the government of India is a tool to satisfy their political interests and the result of their choice to present the image of India as "vishwaguru" [world leader] to the outside world. The main shortcomings of this record is that it hides the internal diversity of the population of the Indian Diaspora, which was expelled from different parts of India for various economic and political reasons. And secondly, it includes the descendants of Indian immigrants to the diaspora population, which is questionable, since most of them have no contact with India or any intention of returning their ancestral homeland.

Statistical advances in the form of the 'United Nations Global Migration Database', whose main objective is to capture international migratory movements, effectively represent the flow and stock of Indian immigrants in different countries around the world. It has opened new possibilities to measure the size of the diaspora population. It is the most reliable source of data to capture the contribution made by recent migratory flows to the diaspora. It does not count the descendants of immigrants, who form a large population of the Indian diaspora. Facebook as a data source is unique in terms of the information it provides about the Indian diaspora (its ethnic origins, languages, socio-demographic profile, networks and preferences). This information is difficult to obtain from any other source. Despite several deficiencies caused by age restrictions, the social class of the users and the self-report bias, it offers the possibility of exploring the ethno-linguistic diversity and the socio-demographic profile of the population of the Indian diaspora. The virtual image of the diaspora created through Facebook data is much closer to the reality of the diaspora population, since it corresponds to individual users and not to a state or supra-state institution that collects it. If the measure of the diaspora, especially that which comes from the official sources of the Indian state, explains the extra-territorialisation of the state powers, those of Facebook remind us of the "digital relocation" of the population (as explained by Han 2016). This relocation beyond the national territories where they reside acts as a counterweight to the extra-territorialisation. Along with the expatriate network, the use of the mother tongue in the diaspora by Facebook users (both immigrants and their descendants) contributes to the creation of a

virtual community, which tries to preserve the memories of culture and traditions of their country of origin.

In summary, we have seen how different data sources present different images of the Indian Diaspora, which sometimes complement and sometimes contradict each other. With the development of information technology, it is now possible to count on all migratory movements around the world in a short time. It makes the size and geopolitical boundaries of the diaspora communities more dynamic. We can expect that in the future the importance of population registers will be reduced, which are often manipulated by data collection agencies to serve their political purposes.

My second hypotheses '*Globalization has not only strengthened transnational relations in already existing diasporas, but also tends towards the "diasporization" of all migratory movements to satisfy the economic and political interests of the countries involved*' highlights the role of globalization in strengthening the transnational links of the diaspora population throughout the world. Under accelerated globalization and neoliberal economic policies, the spread of transport and communication technologies has intensified the flow of information, people and capital in the diaspora. It has connected individuals or groups of people (who identified with certain ethnic or religious identities), who dispersed in various countries around the world for a long time and have lost their connection and attachment to their ancestral homeland. It has made possible for the countries of origin to rememorize the diaspora population about their ancestors, and their links with the ancestral homeland. It has energized the diaspora identities and has encouraged people living in the diaspora to invest in the welfare of people in their ancestral places of origin. In doing so, governments also expect the diaspora population to act as their ambassador in the country of residence, and try to influence decisions that may be economically or politically beneficial for them.

In the 21st century, the management of emigrated populations (as a form of biopolitics) has become a new source of power, based on the influence exerted on emigrated individuals and the population as a form of governance (Foucault 1979). By comparing the population and the space of the Indian and Mexican Diaspora, we conclude that the use of the diaspora as a tool of *soft power* has contributed to the increased participation of the governments of countries of origin in the diaspora, which results in the extra-territorialisation of the powers of the state. The governments of origin have begun to grant more rights and recognitions to the affluent members of the diaspora community to use

them as their ambassador in the countries of destination. Since 2006, the government of India has initiated OCI cards for Indians living in selected western countries to improve their participation in Indian business and commerce. Foreign direct investment has been facilitated by providing tax-free access to local businesses. When the government of India focuses mainly on economic and political benefits, the Mexican government is committed to promoting the political and cultural participation of its emigrants in socio-cultural and political affairs in their country of origin. They have encouraged the direct participation of Mexicans living abroad by extending dual citizenship and the right to vote in general elections in their country of origin.

Regarding the production and the nature of diaspora space, my third hypothesis '*The diaspora space (both physical and virtual) is a dynamic multi-layered entity, which is in continuous reformulation through demographic (the size and composition of the population of the diaspora) and spatial changes (inclusion or exclusion of countries)*' highlight the multi-layered nature and dynamic character of the diaspora space, which is modified by several demographic and political factors. The diaspora space is in constant metamorphosis; on the one hand, it expands or contracts with the natural growth and internal migrations of the diaspora population, since it provides a place of reproduction for the diaspora community in all its new destinations, and on the other hand is affected by the emigration of people to the existing or new diaspora countries, which depend on the demographic structure and economic development of the country of origin.

To study the production and metamorphosis of the diaspora space, I focused on the Sikh diaspora, which extends from its homeland Punjab to North America in the west and New Zealand in the east. It has a dynamic geometry and a polycentric character, which is in constant restructuring due to the reasons mentioned above. Its main centres are Canada, the United Kingdom, the United States and Australia. The expansion of diaspora space in the Sikh diaspora depends to a large extent on the direct immigration of the Sikhs from their country of origin i.e. India or from the countries that we consider peripheral in the Sikh diaspora. The Sikh diaspora is organized through the dynamics of the centre and the periphery, in which the centre is centripetal (which attracts immigrants from the periphery) and the periphery is centrifugal (pushing immigrants to the nucleus or other peripheral locations). Each centre is surrounded by its own peripheral region, ancient or modern, for example, we can consider Malaysia or Thailand as peripheral regions in the colonial period and recently France, Italy, Portugal and Spain have

occupied this peripheral position. The hierarchy between the centre and the periphery depends to a great extent on the cultural construction, configured through information flows that form the relational diaspora. The hierarchical logic established between centres and peripheries results in greater mobility. Therefore, we can conclude that the space of the Sikh diaspora is expanding through international and internal migrations. The Sikh diaspora has another layer, which is virtual in nature and is the result of the transnational interconnection of the Sikh population throughout the world through the internet. The recent development of information and communication technology is contributing to the creation and expansion of this virtual space of the Sikh diaspora.

5.2 Conclusions about the demo-spatial analysis of Indian immigrants in Spain.

While we study the spatial distribution of Indian immigrants in Spain, we treat them as part of the South Asian group of immigrants. It is mainly due to the fact that Indian immigrants share most of their neighbourhoods with other South Asians, such as Pakistanis or Bangladeshis; and second, it provides us with reference categories to see how Indian immigrants are different from other important immigrant communities from South Asia. I discovered that during the last two decades, the number of Indian immigrants in Spain increased at a much slower pace compared to other immigrant groups from South Asia. The age structure of the South Asian population (SAP) in Spain becomes younger and the composition of sex deviates in favour of men. Their regularization process remained very slow and they had the highest number of rejected applications in the continuous regularization process (Arraigo). Their level of education was poor, since more than half of the population over 16 years had less than primary education, which translates into an occupational segregation in some sectors of the economy, where high skills are not required. Only a small part of female population participates in economic activities, and that was mainly limited to family businesses, where they live and work with a very limited exposure to the host society. Most of the SAP was engaged in the service sector, followed by sales and marketing activities, and most had temporary work contracts. This occupational segregation contributes to their residential concentration in the large metropolitan cities of Spain. The majority of immigrants from South Asia lived in family homes (couples with children, including households with two or more families). It is evident that the economic crisis has

interrupted the process of immigration and settlement, the integration into the labour market, and the family reunification plans of the South Asians in Spain.

As signalled in my fourth hypothesis, *'Indians in Spain are spatially concentrated in the most diverse (in terms of population diversity), residentially substandard, and deprived parts of the metropolitan cities'*, the SAP in Spain was concentrated and residentially segregated in some neighbourhoods of the main metropolitan cities of Spain. In our study, we found that spatial concentration remains its most significant characteristic in Spain, that is, 80 percent of them settled in the metropolitan cities of Barcelona, Madrid and Valencia. It was mainly due to the concentration of economic activities, the availability of manual works and the diffusion of social networks of immigrants in these cities. Their low socioeconomic profile as manual workers forced them to look for cheap apartments in the degraded residential areas of metropolitan cities, where they live with other immigrant communities. It resulted in their concentration in the most diverse neighbourhoods of metropolitan cities, for example. El Raval in Barcelona, Lavapiés in Madrid and Ruzafa in Valencia.

During the last decades, as I outlined in my fifth hypothesis, *'Owing to the constant flow and internal migration of Indian immigrants in Spain, their level of residential segregation and isolation is decreasing and they are spreading in all major metropolitan cities of Spain'*, the level of concentration and residential segregation are rapidly decreasing in the main metropolitan cities of Spain. Many small towns with a flourishing hotel and tourism industry along with the Mediterranean coast, such as Lloret de Mar, Los Alcázares, Benidorm, Salou, Fuengirola, have emerged as new centres for immigrants from South Asia, where they work in tourism services. In the same way, agricultural cities such as Torre Pacheco in Murcia and industrial cities such as Sabadell, Olot and Vic have also become the centre of attraction for the South Asian low skilled workers. Along with its skewed distribution in favour of some cities, the SAP has a high level of residential segregation in some specific areas of different municipalities in Spain. The level of segregation has been reduced considerably with its increasing size and the internal migration of immigrants to small cities, but it is still high compared to other groups of immigrants and according to international standards. During the economic crisis, the re-migration of South Asians from Spain to other countries has reduced their concentration in the main cities, which otherwise increased with the process of family reunification. It is worth mentioning that while living in very diverse neighbourhoods, the

people of South Asia and especially the Indians have maintained their separate identity and strict social and family structure, which has helped them to expand in the form of homogeneous clusters with common characteristics in different municipalities of Spain.

My sixth hypothesis '*The Indian community in Spain is characterized by a higher level of cocooning and precariousness, which affects its ascending socioeconomic mobility in different regions of Spain*' highlights the relationship maintained by Indian immigrants with their neighbourhood and their level of exposure to the host society. After studying socioeconomic profile and spatial distribution of Indian immigrants in Spain, which marks their exposure to the host society, we conclude that they were living in a "bubble", which was characterized by high level of cocooning and moderately poor living conditions. Their high level of cocooning was maintained in all domains, since they had a high residential and occupational segregation (according to international standards), less use of public transport, high proportion of complex houses, high gender imbalance in favour of men, and less length of stay in Spain. In the same way, they had precarious living conditions in all the regions, except the islands group (where the Sindhi community is concentrated). When compared to other immigrant groups in Spain, Indian immigrants were in intermediate positions among the selected immigrant communities. In comparison with African immigrants, e.g. Moroccans and Nigerians, they were in a much better position in terms of occupation, housing and education, but compared to their first world neighbours, such as American or Belgian immigrants, they were still lagging behind in all aspects of the 'cocooning' and 'precariousness' indicators. Among Asian countries, Indians were second only to Pakistan in precarious living conditions, while China and the Philippines were in a better position than India in terms of housing and labour market participation.

In Spain, most of the Indians are of the first generation or one and a half generation. For new immigrants, it is always a challenge to make their place in a new destination. Their isolation behaviour, which was visible in all spheres of life, that is, economic or social, may be the result of their personal desire to be closer to their own group or due to lack of resources and limited knowledge of the Spanish language. Hopefully, with the passage of time, people will become familiar with their new social environment, will be more exposed to diversity in all spheres of life and will begin to challenge the limits of the bubble that separates them from the host society. Then this bubble will disappear. On the contrary, if precarious material conditions prevail over time,

it will be more disturbing for Indian immigrants and the host community, as it will affect social cohesion, the integration of immigrants in the host society and their upward social mobility.

5.3 Conclusions about the integration process of Indians in Spain.

All immigrant communities are expected to integrate into the host societies, while retaining their own religious or cultural identity. My seventh hypothesis '*The integration of Indian immigrants in Spain and Italy has a very fragmented path, which leads to the situation in which some sections of the immigrant community are integrated into specific spheres of the host societies (mainly economic), while the remaining sections remained excluded*' signals to the rhythm and nature of the integration process of Indian immigrants to host societies in Spain and Italy. From the analysis of the interviews with Indian immigrants in Spain and Italy, we find that in both countries they have limited access to the "valued things" of the host societies. They have very low integration in different spheres of the host societies. Currently, the integration process works correctly only for some segments of the Indian community in both countries. The inherent diversity of the Indian immigrant population, in terms of their gender, level of education, employment, religion and legal status, which our qualitative work has highlighted, affects the pace of integration in the host society. The majority of the Sikh population, which is mainly irregular, poorly educated and low qualified, is less integrated compared to other religious groups of Indian origin (i.e. Hindus and Christians) in both countries. In addition, the small segment of the Indian community, which is being integrated into the host society, is also mainly limited to the economic sphere. The result is what we have called "fragmented integration", which is mainly due to the uncertain attitude of the Indians towards a permanent settlement in both countries.

The discrimination faced by Indian immigrants in the labour market, housing, education institutes and the civil society, especially because of their language, religion, and physical aspects, negatively affects their level of integration into the host societies. Similarly, the lengthy regularisation and naturalisation processes, degraded public education system and lengthy process of homologation of professional degrees adversely affect their perceptions and satisfaction from the host countries and further discourage the efforts required for the building of a strong sense of attachment and belonging to the host

countries. Additionally, it encourages them to move on to other countries, such as the USA, Canada or the UK. The English education for their children, better job opportunities, kinship networks, high social capital and a better value attached to these countries in the diaspora are among the major pull factors that attract Indian immigrants to these countries. In this regard, most of our interviewees are waiting for the European passports to migrate to their desired destinations.

The transnational networks of Indian immigrants provide them the necessary information, resources and assistance for immigration to other countries, by reducing the costs. This possibility to get settled in other more developed country decreases their interest in a successful integration process and a permanent settlement in Italy and Spain. On the part of the host government, firstly, investment in the host language learning programs can make a significant contribution in improving the pace of integration of Indian immigrants. Host languages which are now acting as a barrier can become a bridge, by facilitating the exchange of feelings and ideas between Indian immigrants and host societies. Secondly, the vocational training programs for women can help them to enter into the labour market, which will improve their level of economic integration into the host labour market. Thirdly, the simplification of regularisation laws can improve the upward legal mobility of irregular Indian immigrants, which will improve their chances to get permanently settled in the host countries. Fourthly, the registration and official recognition of their religions can facilitate the sense of belonging among them. And finally, the strict control over discrimination of all types can encourage the different sections of the Indian society to integrate with the mainstream host societies.

By comparing the level of integration of Indian immigrants in Spain and Italy, as pointed out by my eighth hypothesis *'Indian immigrants in Spain and Italy suffer from precariousness in the host labour markets, but relatively, they are in a better situation in Spain compared to Italy in terms of social services and immigrant rights'*, I found that despite some similarities with respect to exploitation in the labour market and poor housing conditions, the pace and direction of integration are not similar in both countries. The most important difference is regarding the recognition of rights of irregular immigrants. In Spain, the right to get registered in municipal office; the right of education and enrolment in language courses; the right to use public health facilities; the right to use social services, libraries and community centres; and finally, the *Arraigo* law helped many Indian immigrants to improve their social and economic status. On the contrary,

the almost total denial and neglect of irregular immigrants in Italy (with the exception of urgent medical cares and children's education, as regulated by the Turco-Napolitano law in 1999) has contributed to the isolation and the marginalisation of Indian immigrants. The integration process has also been affected by the different working conditions and the space occupied by the Indian immigrants in both countries. In Italy most of the Indian immigrants work in the agricultural activities and live in the remote areas, while in Spain they are mainly concentrated in the hospitality services and live in major tourist cities. It affects their contact with the host population and their level of integration. Time is the most relevant factor for the integration process for both immigrants and receiving societies. For first-generation immigrants, integration needs a second socialisation that requires many intellectual and emotional costs. However, second-generation immigrants are expected to pass through possibly demanding forms of bi-cultural socialisation and identity formation.

As mentioned above, generational differences have a great impact on the migratory process and the level of integration of immigrants in the host society. In my ninth hypothesis *'each generation of Indian immigrants (in this case, the Sikh community) responds to the challenges of maintaining group identity and peaceful coexistence with the host society, from their own different experiences marked by age, family status, religious beliefs, migratory routes and socioeconomic status'*, I highlighted the generational effect in the Sikh migration process, and its role in the preservation of its religious identity and to resolve its internal conflicts. When studying about the different generations of Indian immigrants (Sikh community) in Spain, we find that the experience of migration shared by different Sikh generations does not make them more homogenous, but has widened the differences between them. Each generation of Sikhs living in Spain had emigrated from Punjab during different periods characterized by different socio-economic and political conditions. These differences have shaped their migratory process, reason for emigrating and way of life in the host society. Therefore, at present, each generation is responding to the challenge of maintaining group identity from their own different experiences marked by age, family status, religious beliefs, migratory routes and socioeconomic status.

During the last five decades of immigration to Spain, different generations of Indians have responded to different push and pull factors in their migration process. The children of independence generations group (COI) that includes economic emigrants and

refugees, who were expelled by unemployment and insecurity caused by demographic transition, the Green Revolution and political crisis in Punjab. Most of them stayed first in countries of the Middle East and then entered Europe by sea or by air. The 1980s generational group was mainly comprised of unskilled economic migrants with little education who, owing to the diverse effects of neoliberal policies, had to leave Punjab in search of better job opportunities overseas. They have used 'donkey flights' and unscrupulous intermediaries to enter Spain. By contrast, the millennium generation was brought by their family or kinship networks. As per the religion and identity, the chief concern of the COI group is to preserve religious purity and pass on religious practices, beliefs and identity to the coming generations who are now living in a diverse foreign society which can contaminate their minds and souls. To accomplish this goal, they are investing time and resources in the establishment and functioning of Gurudwaras as centres of learning for the next generations. Meanwhile, the 1980s generation is struggling to comply with their religious duties and to keep their jobs in the service sector, especially in restaurants, where most of them work. And, finally, the millennium generation is divided into two groups, one which wants to assimilate into Spanish society and the other which wants to go back to their roots by learning about Sikhism and following it very strictly.

5.4 About Future Research

This dissertation, on the one hand, contributes to the existing knowledge about the Indian diaspora and the spatial distribution and integration of the Indian immigrants in the host society, while, on the other hand, it opens some new lines of research that could be studied in the future. In the field of studies of the Indian Diaspora, I am interested in studying how the internal dynamics between the nucleus and the periphery of the Indian diaspora is changing over time and what effects these changes have on the household and the occupational structure of Indian immigrants in different countries of the diaspora. Secondly, how will the demographic and political changes (growing nationalism and neo-conservatism) affect the politics and population of the Indian diaspora in the near future? And, thirdly, how will the endemic shortage of women in the new destinations of the Indian diaspora and the origin in the marriage market (especially in the Sikh marital market) affect the coming decades?

In the field of studies on the spatial distribution of immigrants, I will try to answer questions such as: Does the high level of residential segregation of Indian immigrants

affect the academic performance of Indian students or the employment of young Indian students in Spain? Secondly, how is the presence of Indian immigrants in Spain changing neighbourhood relations and how is the host community reacting to these changes? And finally, how do religious minorities of Indian origin produce their community spaces, reproduce their religious places and appropriate urban spaces in the metropolitan areas of Spain? In the field of studies of immigrant integration, with respect to Indian immigrants, I would like to focus on issues such as: How are Spanish immigration policies affecting the level of integration and upward social mobility of Indian immigrants? Secondly, what will be the composition of the social networks of the next generation of Indian immigrants in Spain? And finally, how will the position of women in the Indian community established in Spain change?

One of the main limitations of this dissertation is the lack of gender analysis, which I have planned to do in future studies. I have relevant information (in the form of personal interviews) about the role played by men and women in the Indian community in Spain, which allows me to study the changes in gender roles and the construction of masculinity or femininity in the population of the India diaspora. In addition, the interviews conducted in India (especially with the wives of immigrants) provide very useful information about the change in the role of women, mainly due to the emigration of men in Indian society. Secondly, I would also like to study the change in the demographic and socioeconomic behaviour of the second generation of Indian immigrants in Spain. Finally, I have also done some interviews in India with the relatives of the Indian immigrants who entered irregularly in Spain or Italy. I will analyse these interviews to find out the causes, courses and consequences of irregular migration (which is very common in the Punjabi community) for immigrants, their families and the host society.

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Annex

1. Guide for the interviews

Thematic blocs for the interview of Indian immigrants living in Spain and Italy

1. Personal Information:

- Name, age, place of birth, Education, professional qualification, Marital status, family situation, religious affiliation, Present address, present occupation, legal status

2. Migratory Experiences:

- Decision of migration: why and who decided? (Personal or family decision).
- Plan of migration (pull or push factors), First migration, further migrations.
- Why Spain/Italy? Early perception of Spaniards/Italians.
- Tell me about your first contact with hosts.
- How you entered Spanish labour market?
- What were your major problems and fears at the time of migration?
- Tell me about your transnational relations.
- What is your present legal status in Host country?
- Do you want to settle permanently in the host country or you want to move to any other country?
- Do you want to bring your family here?
- Do you want to return to your birth country at some time or not?

3. Social contact and Intercultural relations

- Tell me your first experiences in the host community.
- How was the attitude of individuals and institutional behaviour?
- Which language you speak at home?
- Do you speak host language or not?
- Do you participate in national festivals and organizations?
- Do you practice any political or democratic right?
- Do you have any idea or interest in your birth-country's or host country's politics?
- Do you receive any kind of assistance from local government?
- Do you have friends from the local or other immigrant communities?
- Do you want to marry here or not (for unmarried)?

4. Neighbourhood relations:

- Where do you live and how is your neighbourhood?
- Do you feel at home here or is it a temporary shelter?
- Do you live with your family or with friends?
- With whom you are sharing the neighbourhood?
- What is your level of satisfaction in the present residential area?
- How people identify you?
- Have you witness any change in the attitude towards you during your stay?

5. Future perspectives:

- Do you want to stay permanent in Spain or not?
- Do you want to bring your family in Spain or not?
- How you see the future of new generations in the host country?
- Do you want to take part in local politics?
- What are your plans after retirement?

Thematic blocs for the interview of Gurudwaras Managing Committee Members

1. Personal Information:

- Personal information: Name, address, age, place of birth, marital status, education level, family situation, occupation, present position in Gurudwaras management
- Migratory experiences: First migrations, further migration, push or pull factors.
- Relationship with origin, destination and diaspora: Remittances, family relations, socialising, transnational projects, desire of return migration.

2. Gurudwara Characteristics:

- Circumstances at the time of inauguration: Year, place, funding, external support of other Gurudwaras or diaspora.
- Objectives of the Gurudwara: Main objectives, Daily activities; major festivals and celebrations.
- Relationship with other Gurudwaras in Spain, in diaspora and in India: Mutual projects and community welfare programs.
- Characteristics of Sikh community: Number, family characteristics, interests, demands, demography, role of women.
- The role of Gurudwaras in the expansion of diaspora: Transnational links, support to immigrants
- Internal conflicts and cooperation: conflict between different sects (Caste based or Religious beliefs based), conflicts between different Gurudwaras

3. Major Challenges for Sikh community in Foreign Context:

- The quest of identity.
- Caste and clan conflict of Sikhs in Spain.
- Traditional or fundamentalist and moderate or liberal Sikhs.
- Sikh matrimony: Inter religion or caste marriages, gender bias, problems related to match-making and the part played by Gurudwaras in it.
- Sikhism and challenges in the European labour market demands and social setup.
- Young generation and the transfer of religious and social values.

4. Neighbourhood Relations

- Relations with neighbours.

- Attitude of Local people towards establishment of Gurudwaras and Sikh functions at public spaces.
- Participation in the local politics?

5. Future of Sikhism in Spain and diaspora

- Future of young Generation.
- Role of Gurudwara to promote Sikhism.

2. Information and Consent letters for the interviews

INFORMATION LETTER

Date:

Dear Sir/Madam:

This letter is an invitation to consider participating in a study I am conducting as part of my Doctoral degree in the Department of Demography at the Autonomous University of Barcelona (UAB) under the supervision of Dr. Andreu Domingo, and part of the project “*Diversity, segregation and vulnerability: a socio-demographic analysis*”, financed by the Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, Spain (Ref. CSO2014-53413-R).

This study will focus on the migratory experiences, social imaginary and neighbourhood relations of Indian population living in Spain. Participation in this study is voluntary. It will involve an interview of approximately 1-hour length to take place in a mutually agreed upon location. You may decline to answer any of the interview questions if you so wish. Further, you may decide to withdraw from this study at any time without any negative consequences by advising the researcher. With your permission, the interview will be video or tape-recorded to facilitate collection of information, and later transcribed for analysis. All information you provide is considered completely confidential. Your name will not appear in any report resulting from this study, however, anonymous quotations may be used. Data collected during this study will be retained till the completion of the project. Only researchers associated with this project will have access to this data. There are no known or anticipated risks to you as a participant in this study.

If you have any questions regarding this study, or would like additional information to assist you in reaching a decision about participation, please contact me at 0034 632260279 or by e-mail at nachatter.singh1@gmail.com. You can also contact my supervisor, Andreu Domingo at 0034 93 581 30 60 or e-mail at andreu.domingo@gmail.com.

I hope that the results of my study will be of benefit to those organizations directly involved in the study, other voluntary recreation organizations not directly involved in the study, as well as to the broader research community. I very much look forward to speaking with you and thank you in advance for your assistance in this project.

Sincerely,

Nachatter Singh

PhD student, Centre for Demographic studies,

Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona, Bellaterra, Barcelona.

Dr. Andreu Domingo

Sub director, CED

CONSENT FORM

I have read the information presented in the information letter about a study being conducted by Nachatter Singh under the supervision of Dr. Andreu Domingo of the Department of Demography at Autonomous University of Barcelona. I have had the opportunity to ask any questions related to this study, to receive satisfactory answers to my questions, and any additional details I wanted.

I am aware that I have the option of allowing my interview to be video or tape recorded to ensure an accurate recording of my responses.

I am also aware that excerpts from the interview may be included in the dissertation and/or publications to come from this research, with the understanding that the quotations will be anonymous.

I was informed that I may withdraw my consent at any time without penalty by advising the researcher.

With full knowledge of all foregoing, I agree, of my own free will, to participate in this study.

YES NO

I agree to have my interview tape or video recorded.

YES NO

I agree to the use of anonymous quotations in any thesis or publication that comes of this research.

YES NO

Participant's Name (please print) _____

Participant's Signature _____ Date _____

Researcher's Signature _____ Date _____

Researcher's Title _____ Department _____


Faculty Advisor Signature _____ Date _____

Faculty Advisor Title _____ Department _____

3. Geographical distribution of the interviews:

For the qualitative part of this dissertation, I have conducted 84 interviews of the Indian immigrants in Spain and 39 interviews in Italy.

The geographical Distribution of Interviews and Indian population in Spain and Italy, 2017.



Total number of interviews conducted at different regions.

| INTERVIEWS IN SPAIN | | | |
|-----------------------------------|---------------------------|-----------|-----------|
| BASIC CHARACTERISTICS | GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION | INDIANS | |
| | | MALES | FEMALE |
| METROPOLITAN AREAS | BARCELONA | 14 | 14 |
| | MADRID | 9 | 4 |
| | VALENCIA | 5 | 3 |
| TOURIST PLACES | PALMA DE MALLORCA | 4 | 1 |
| | TORRE VIEJA, ALICANTE | 3 | 1 |
| | LOS ALCAZARES | 1 | 1 |
| | LLORET DE MAR | 2 | 1 |
| INDUSTRIAL AND AGRICULTURAL TOWNS | VIC,SALT, S.C. FARNERS | 5 | 2 |
| | SABADELL, TERRASSA | 1 | 1 |
| | VILADECANS | 1 | 0 |
| | TORRE PACHECO | 2 | 1 |
| INICIAL SETTELMENTS | FUENGIROLA | 1 | 1 |
| | OLOT | 2 | 1 |
| | SANTA CRUZ DE TENERIFE | 2 | 1 |
| INTERVIEWS IN ITALY | | | |
| METROPOLITAN AREA | ROME | 11 | 5 |
| AGRICULTURAL TOWNS | LATINA | 8 | 3 |
| INDUSTRIAL TOWNS | BRESCIA | 3 | 2 |
| | BERGAMO | 4 | 3 |
| TOTAL | | 78 | 45 |

Source: Own elaboration.

4. Selected interviews:

INTERVIEWEE: INDERJEET SINGH

PLACE OF INTERVIEW: BARCELONA

AGE AND SEX OF INTERVIEWEE: 27 YEARS, MALE

DATE OF INTERVIEW: 15/03/2016

OCCUPATION: RESTAURANT CHEF

INTERVIEWER: NACHATTER SINGH

Q. PLEASE TELL ME ABOUT YOURSELF.

A. My name is Inderjeet Singh. I am from Dhilwan, a small village in Kapurthala district of Punjab. I was born on 24th of October 1988. I have formal education till matric. Then I emigrated from India in search of a better future outside. In India, along with my studies, I used to help my parents in agricultural work. I also worked as a part time electrician, to earn some extra money. Now I am working as a receptionist in a hotel. Still, I am single. In my family, I have my parents and two brothers. One of my brothers is three years elder than me and the other one is two years younger than me. They all live in India. My elder brother is married and the younger one is still in college. I belong to the Sikh religion. After a decade long journey, I enter Barcelona in the year 2009. Now I am a permanent resident of Spain and live in Barcelona. I do my studies and work. I also work part-time in an Italian restaurant as a helper to the chef. I have a permanent residence permit in Spain. I got my first residence and work permit through Arraigo law.

Q. WHEN AND WHY DID YOU FIRST LEFT INDIA?

A. In India everybody has the same problems...poverty, unemployment and endless desires of a wealthy life. I am from a middle class family. Our family occupation was agriculture. But due to the small landholdings and mechanisation of agriculture, it was not sufficient for the survival of the whole family. We were three brothers, so the share of land was too small for the survival of anyone. There was no hope of any job in India. My elder brother was also unemployed. We were having a life of misery and hardships. I had no relatives abroad, who could give me some advice. All my relatives were in Indian and all of them were engaged in agriculture. I can say that my desire to emigrate was fuelled by the TV shows, and news-stories from my friends and neighbours who were living in the UK or the USA. I was willing to do something big for my family. My dreams were to earn a lot of money and to explore the world. I was sure that in India, I will not get any reward for my hard work, but if I will go abroad, I will earn a lot of money in short time, that's why I planned to emigrate to England. Some of my neighbours and

friends were living in England, they told me that in England life is very good. My parents were not willing to send me abroad but I insisted to emigrate. Actually, I was very young, so my father was not willing to send me away.

I was just 15 years of age, when I decided to emigrate from the country. The decision of emigration was mine, because many of my friends were already moved to different countries. I talked to my father about my desire to emigrate from India. He said ‘you are too young for immigration’ and ‘can’t go alone’. I talked to one of my uncle about my desire to emigrate. He introduced me to an agent in our village. This agent has already smuggled many young boys from my village to the United Kingdom. He was expert in *kabotarbaazi* [irregular immigration]. People had a lot of faith in him, they used to say that the government can fail to keep his promise but this agent never. I met this agent at a family function, and we planned my journey to the United Kingdom in 900,000 rupees. After talking with him about the details of the journey, I convinced my parents to pay money for my journey. My father mortgaged our land and took a debt of five lakh rupees from a money lender in the village. I promised my father to repay the debt as soon as I reach the UK. The remaining money was collected from the relatives and family friends in the village. The village agent collected the money from my parents and handed over them to a big agent in the city. This agent cheated me, and after receiving the money he brought me to Africa. I was with many other boys from Punjab and Haryana. He told us that we have to move from African countries to enter the United Kingdom. Rest everything is a history now. A very tragic history.

Q. PLEASE TELL ME ABOUT YOUR JOURNEY?

A. My journey began from my village in Punjab to Delhi in June 2003. Our city agent told us to stay at a hotel in Chandni Chowk Delhi. When I enter the hotel there were 8 more boys waiting for their turn to get smuggled into Europe. All have paid the same amount to the agents. All were older than me. I was the youngest in the group. My brother accompanied me till Delhi. We spent 5 days in that hotel room. It was very hot outside so we used to spend the whole day sleeping in the hotel room. After 5 days, the Delhi agent come to visit us. He handed over our passport to us, and told us to get ready for the flight. We were very happy that our visa had been arrived so quickly. He told us to call our family members to tell them that we have the visa. We were not aware that the visa was for Burkina Faso, not for the UK.

After the plane landed in Burkina Faso, the agent transported us to a hostel. We were amazed to see the airport and black people all around. The Delhi agent left us in the hostel, and returned to India. We stayed there three months. Actually, from Burkina Faso with the help of local

authorities, they were operating an illegal immigration racket. They used to call it “PC passport”. They used to bribe the airport authorities and send the people on forging passports or on the identity cards of others. They were mainly smuggling people to the European countries. They use the identity cards of Indians or other Asians who were already living in Europe to make travel documents. That *donkey* [illegal immigration] was stopped due to changes in staff, and with the change in staff, our fate was also changed.

When this *donkey* stopped, the African smugglers told us that the money which we have paid to them has gone as the official in the airport were changed. They are not going to refund anything. If we want to return India, it is our own wish, but if we stay and cooperate with them they can do something for us. Now we had no other option left. We have already paid a huge sum of money, and nobody was willing to return home empty handed with shattered dreams of a wealthy life in Europe. On a world map they explained us the journey in 10 minutes, which took 6 years of suffering.

From Burkina they shift us to Mali, from Mali to Sahara, from Sahara to Algeria and from Algeria to Morocco. In all these countries the immigration rules were similar. Every time when they used to catch us crossing international borders of Burkina Faso, they returned us to Burkina Faso border authorities. It happened with us almost 15 to 20 times. The border guards were doing their job of deporting us and we were trying to enter at any cost. During this hard time, my family used to send me money to buy some food and other necessities. The place where we suffered a lot was Sahara, the largest desert of the world. Even some of the group members lost their lives. We stayed there for three months. There was sand everywhere. Wherever you see... only sand. Some agents come to supply us food and water, daily or sometimes weekly, so that we don't starve to death. Actually, most of the deaths during the journey was caused by the hunger and illness. Almost 5 young boys died on the way. The agents used to threaten us that if we get sick, they will leave us in the desert and move ahead. The group will not stop for anyone. They had arms so everybody was scared of them.

Q. HOW YOU ENTERED CEUTA?

A. After a long journey we reached Morocco. In Morocco we spent some time in a hostel. The agents were forcing us to ask more money from our families. I told them my family is very poor and they have nothing left to pay. My village agent contacted the Delhi agents, and they told other African agents to smuggle us to Ceuta. From Morocco they smuggled us to Ceuta in a truck. It was a 40 minutes' journey. They put me in the tool box of the truck, and they told me that it will not stop until the journey is finished. That was a horrible experience. I was almost

dead when I reached Ceuta. The local police arrested me in Ceuta while roaming in the streets. They send me in a refugee camp maintained by the UNO. In that camp, I spent five long years of my life.

When I entered the camp. I saw many Punjabis in that camp. Most of them were living there for three or four years. In our camp, we have decided to do some agitations so that they transfer us to mainland Spain. But they started to deport people to India. They used to arrest people from the camp and deport them to India. Then we moved out of the camp because in the camp there was a risk of being deported.

We started to live in a hut under a bridge. Out of the camp we were safe, often even police also used to ignore us. In the camp they used to give us food and shelter, but out of the camp we were living in slums. There were almost 150 Punjabi boys living in that camp at that time. There were lots of Pakistanis in the camp, who had registered themselves as Indians from Kashmir to get asylum. Real Indians were very less in numbers. We appealed many times against this false registration, as the number of real Indians was 1 to 10 fake Indians, who were actually Pakistanis or Bangladeshis. Basically, the majority of human smugglers were Pakistanis, they used to tell their people to register as Indian as it will improve their chances to enter mainland Spain. Indian agents have only their influence till Delhi, after that they had no control, only Pakistanis and Africans were doing human smuggling to European countries.

The local people of Ceuta were very kind to us. They helped us a lot. The Human Rights organisations and the UNO have also helped us, during our stay in the Camp. I personally feel very grateful to all these people and organisations. They saved life of many immigrants who want to enter Europe with a dream of better life. The Red Cross and Caritas also helped us by providing food, clothes and other basic necessities. Through these organisations they have collected 15000 signatures of Spanish people to stop our deportation and allow our entry to Spain. They fought our case in a Spanish court, and after a few months they allowed us to enter Spain. In 2011, I first entered Spain and reached Barcelona. There were still many people in the Ceuta camp who were waiting their luck, when I left the camp.

Ceuta is a jail. If you once trapped there, you have no other option. If you go back to Morocco, they don't let you enter and the European governments only make you wait for years and years. You lose an important part of your life just waiting for your turn. I repented a lot about my decision to emigrate irregularly from India. I had no knowledge.

Q. WHAT WERE YOUR FIRST EXPERIENCES IN BARCELONA?

A. Barcelona was really beautiful. Actually, some of my friends from Ceuta camp were already arrived Barcelona before me. When I came to meet them in Barcelona, it was the crisis time. They were unemployed, and had no permission of work and stay. They were living a life of misery. They used to go to the Gurudwara for food, and sleep in a very substandard apartment, even worse than the camp accommodations. I still remember, at that time 12 persons were living in a single apartment of 40 square meters. Some of them used to sleep during the daytime and other during the night hours.

I saw many Indians and Pakistani young boys selling beers and cold water bottles on the beaches to earn some money for their survival. Some were selling toys on the La Ramblas street. If someone had a dishwasher's job in a restaurant, he used to feel as the luckiest person in the world. It was really heart-breaking for me. The biggest shock of my life. I had struggled a lot to enter Spain. In Ceuta, every night I used to dream about a very comfortable life in Spain. But when I saw the reality of that dreamland, it was really shocking. I felt so sad that I can't explain in words. I got depressed. After spending a long time and huge sum of money in the journey, I was not in a position to do anything for my family. My father had to sell our land to repay the debt, which we took for my journey. I was in a dire need of money but my consciousness was not ready to do this disgusting work of selling beers at the corners of the streets, hiding from the police.

After some time, things improved and I managed to survive the hardest time of my life. When I was irregular, I started to work in the agricultural sector. During the free time, I used to help mentally retarded people in an NGO. Then I came in contact with a German man, who was impressed with my participation in social services. He gave me a work contract, to apply for the Arraigo certificate. I paid him only three thousand euros for the payment of my tax. After receiving Arraigo certificate, I applied for the regularisation. Then I got one-year residence and work permit of Spain. Since, I had lived five years in Ceuta, so when I reached Barcelona within six months I applied for the papers and got the first residency permit. Actually, in all this process my Spanish girlfriend helped me a lot, she is an advocate.

The first thing that I did after getting papers was to visit India. After such a long time, everything was changed even my own family not recognized me. Second time, almost 8 months ago, when I visited India again, it was quite well, not as strange as it was first time. During my first visit, I felt that I have detached from my family and the Indian society, I am not the same person who had left India years ago, and I have become a stranger on both sides. Actually, now I have spent more time out of India than in India, which is my birth country.

Q. HOW YOU ENTERED IN SPANISH LABOUR MARKET?

A. When I returned from my first visit to India, I searched for a job in Barcelona. Because of my good knowledge of languages, I got a good job of receptionist in a hostel near Las Ramblas. The owner of that hostel was a Jew. I worked there for two years. I repaid all my debts here in Spain and in India. Along with my work, I was also studying. I have done ESO here in Spain. When the first hostel owner left the hostel, the new owner replaced me. Then I worked in an Indian restaurant in Salou as a helper in the kitchen, which was my friend's restaurant. Now I am working in an Italian restaurant. I have passed the driving licence exam also, now I want to study more.

Q. TELL ME ABOUT YOUR FIRST CONTACT WITH SPANISH PEOPLE?

A. Actually, I had my first contact with Spanish people in the Ceuta camp. In Ceuta, all were Spanish. They speak Spanish, live like Spanish and do everything Spanish. They were really nice people. I will also like to add, if today I am alive, it is because of those kind people who helped me a lot. Here in Barcelona also the people are very nice. They helped me a lot.

Q. HAVE YOU FACED ANY DISCRIMINATION IN SPAIN?

A. No, I have been to many public offices, they don't discriminate with anyone. All are equally treated in the government offices. In many offices, they even help you if you don't know language or you have any other legal problem with your paperwork or so.

Q. HOW MANY LANGUAGES YOU KNOW?

A. I speak Spanish, Catalan, Hindi, Punjabi, Arabic and French. Most of these languages I learned during my journey to Europe. At home, I speak only Punjabi.

Q. TELL ME ABOUT YOUR NEIGHBOURHOOD?

A. I am living in a Catalan majority area. There are some families of Pakistanis also, but they are everywhere. Catalan people have a very cordial relationship with our Indian community. Generally, I greet them when I saw them at the doors. I say hello, how are you? And they respond very well to me. Actually, I feel that if we give respect to the native people they also treat us well. I like my neighbourhood, all are very good people. They have some problems with Pakistanis. Pakistanis are very disturbing and don't give respect to others. Catalan people don't like them at all.

Q. DO YOU AWARE ABOUT SPANISH FESTIVALS?

A. Spanish people have many festivals like Punjabis. Firstly, because of Christian majority population, they celebrate Christmas day and *Dia de Barcelona*. As per my participation in these festivals, I don't have time to participate. I am not interested in festivals.

Q. DO YOU PARTICIPATE IN THE ACTIVITIES ORGANISED BY MUNICIPAL COUNCIL?

A. I have participated in some language courses of Catalan and Castellano organised by the municipal council. After that I completed ESO [obligatory secondary education] for 2 years. Now I am doing *Grado Medio*, from an institute on the street Sant Pere Mes Baix in Barcelona centre. I am not a regular student. Actually, my study depends on my work schedule. If I get some free time I study, but during full working hours, I prefer to work because here I am alone and the living costs are high. In the future, I will like to train myself as a professional in health care of mentally retarded persons. I think they need a lot of help and company. I want to learn ways to help them. I have not done much formal study in India. I want to complete my study here to help in the health sector.

Q. DO YOU WANT TO MARRY IN SPAIN?

A. No, I don't want to marry here. My parents are asking me to get married. But I don't want to marry yet. I want to get settled first. After earning some money, I will think about marriage. I feel that we Indians should marry in our country and culture. We are not compatible with the native population. The chances of success of mixed marriages are only 10%. It is my personal experiences. I had lived with a Spanish girl for almost 4 years. During my stay with her, I find that the Spanish people are very individualistic. This self-centred behaviour is the main problem. Here everybody thinks about herself or himself, the family values are missing, which are the basic pillar of our Indian community. Basically, when we emigrate, the future of our family depends upon us. If we don't send them money, they will die in poverty. But here in Spain people only think about their own lives. We can't support our parents if we are married here because then your partner force you to spend your whole income here. As we are now living in cheap flats, sharing with other native people, to save money for remittance, we can't do this with a Spanish partner. With a Spanish partner it will be impossible to save money for the family.

The second thing I feel that our cultural differences are also very high. We can't adjust with them. As my girlfriend was from a rich family and I was from a middle class poor family, so this rich and poor mentality or class differences were also affecting our relation. Now I don't even think about Spanish girls.

Now I will definitely marry in India with a Punjabi girl. Next year I will visit India and will marry there. The best things in Indian weddings are firstly the whole family is involved and secondly, the cultural differences don't exist. My family is looking a suitable match for me. We

have discussed that first they will search a suitable girl for me. Then I will call her to know about her desires. Then if we like each other we will meet in my visit to India. If things go well, then we will marry in the coming year. I think the parent's choice will be the best because they have good experience of life. They are always best-wishers of their kids. Even when I will become a father, I will not do anything that can hurt my kids. I think for me, my family is everything. I can't think about leaving them, but here in Spain the family bonds are very weak and people leave their parents when they get old. Here in Europe a famous quotation says that in Europe there is no surety of three w's: weather, work and wife. You spend precious years of your life with a person and then it is very much possible that he or she ditches you for other.

I want a normal Sikh girl. I don't want any dowry or marriage gifts. Only thing what I want that the girl should be well-educated. I think this journey to Europe has changed me a lot. I have seen lots of hardships and now I value the life most. It made me very humble and now I want a simple life. I want a partner with whom I can spend the rest of my life in peace.

Q. DO YOU RECEIVE ANY ASSISTANCE FROM THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT?

A. I think the local government only provides help if you are not working. As I am working, I never asked for any help. I always had some work so I never asked for any help. Now if anytime I lose my work, I can ask for unemployment benefits. But till this moment I am doing pretty well with my job. I don't need any help. Apart from financial help, I have done some language courses which were sponsored by the municipal council. I have completed compulsory education also free of cost. Here medical health care system and other public infrastructure services are also very well maintained by the local government. I use public hospitals when I am Sick. They give rebate in the medicines also. I like this system.

Q. DO YOU HAVE ANY LINK WITH SIKH TEMPLES IN SPAIN?

A. Yes, I do come to Gurudwara every Sunday. During the weekdays, I work in a restaurant and do my studies, so I don't have enough time to visit Gurudwara. I like to visit Gurudwara as it is a place where you find peace of mind and come in contact with many fellow countrymen. I tried many times to become a baptised Sikh and follow the life style of a Khalsa, but my work is not allowing me to do so. My restaurant owners want a very neutral looking person in the restaurant and in reception. Here the employers discriminate with baptised Sikhs. Nobody wants to give them work in their restaurants and hostels. Barcelona is a tourist city and have only those jobs. So indirectly Barcelona expels baptised Sikhs economically or force them to change their physical appearance or modify their beliefs. Many people trim their hair and beards to get a job. At this moment I can't leave my job to become a baptised Sikh. When I complete

my studies and receive a degree from the university, then I will think about a job where there will be no such problem regarding my looks. Hopefully in future I will return to my roots and religion.

Here the work is the most important thing. So as per now I don't want to get baptised, in future provided with the chance I will think about this. In India I used to have long hairs. I was too young for beard, but I had some moustaches. I trimmed my hairs before my emigration. Actually, Delhi agent told me to trim the hair so that they can use the documents of another person for my travel. At that time my only goal was to enter Europe, so I followed their advice and trimmed my hair. I was not aware about the value of hairs that time. Now I repent some time.

Gurudwara is doing a great job in unifying people. When I was new in Barcelona I used to visit Gurudwara daily. My Spanish girlfriend used to come with me. She was very attached to the Gurudwara. I had told her everything about Gurudwara and our culture. Even the people in Gurudwara were very kind to us. I think that our community accepts mix couples very easily. As now we have decided to get separated, many people in Gurudwara asked me about her. I told them that I didn't leave her, rather she was not willing to continue our relationship. Here this is a common practice, people stay with someone for some time, and after that they start looking for another. Even my family in India was aware of my relation with that girl. They told me one thing that if you want to stay with her then you should marry her and it will be for the rest of your life. You will not abandon her at any cost. I have not abandoned her. I still have feelings for her. Now I don't want to be with any other Spanish girl.

Now I will marry in India. I will bring my wife to Spain as early as possible. I feel here in Barcelona the environment for a family reunion is very good. I will guide my wife in this new environment and hopefully she will quickly adapt to this environment. I will encourage her to learn Spanish and have a job. I don't want to restrict her to domestic chores.

Q. DO YOU WANT TO RE-MIGRATE TO ANY OTHER COUNTRY?

A. At the moment, I don't have any plan to move to any other country. I have already spent a lot of time in reaching here. Now I don't want to move to any other place. Here I feel like my home. Now I have friends and social circle, I feel Spain as my new home. I am very comfortable here and will not go anywhere. I know people are emigrating to Canada or England, but I think it is a waste of time. You will have to start again from zero. New place, new language, new people... it costs a lot to adapt to any new environment.

Q. DO YOU HAVE RELATIVES IN OTHER COUNTRIES?

A. NO, I don't have any relative living out of India.

Q. DO YOU WANT TO RETURN INDIA PERMANENTLY?

A. No, not at all. I will never return to India permanently. In India people are very annoying. They unnecessarily interfere in your personal life. That's why I don't want to return to India. Here we are free, we enjoy our lives, and we do what we want. Nobody bothers about us. In India everybody is interested in your life and they give advices to you. They have nothing to do except giving you advices about your life.

In India people are very selfish, they just want your money. They don't give you respect if you don't have money. Most of the people are unemployed. They don't want to work in the service sector, and they feel shame in doing these jobs. Here we work whole day, night, sometimes we don't have time to come to Gurudwara, the life is busy, but in India people have all free time to interfere in the other's life.

Q. DO YOU HAVE WITNESSED ANY CHANGE IN THE ATTITUDE OF THE HOST SOCIETY TOWARDS IMMIGRANTS?

A. No, I have not witnessed any change in their attitude. Host people are very good. They are always kind to me and helped me a lot. I like Spanish people. But I can't say the same for other immigrants like Moroccan people. They can kill you for 2 euros. They are bloody corrupt people. They are so lazy, don't do any job and always want to steal your belongings. Moroccans and Romanians steal money and belongings of the tourists. If somebody is drunk, they steal everything what they can. Even Pakistanis are better than Moroccans.

The most beautiful things of Spanish people are: they are honest and they love humankind. They don't follow religions, but they do respect human life. They don't go to church every Sunday, but still they are very honest. Even here in our Sikh community there are many people who visit Gurudwara daily, but are so corrupt and exploit their own countrymen. The only thing which I don't like of Spanish people that they don't take good care of their parents. They have very limited interest in their families. They left home at 18 and don't return to help their parents when they get old. When they don't have money they go to their parent's home, but when they get some job they forget about their parents.

Q. WHAT ROLE GURUDWARA PLAYS IN COMMUNITY BUILDING?

A. Gurudwaras play a good role in community building. But contrary to it, here in Barcelona Gurudwara is a place of conflict between many groups and sects. There are people who know nothing about religion, but wants to become chief of managing committee. Everybody wants to get control over the resources of Gurudwara. They want to use community resources for their

own benefit. These power clashes are the most dangerous thing. I think the Gurudwaras are built for helping the poor people, but these so called managers do nothing to help the poor. They only create problems. They don't want to take any responsibility of service they only sell drugs on the streets and then come to Gurudwara for food.

Q. DO YOU FEEL ANY DISCRIMINATION AT WORK PLACES?

A. No, I feel very comfortable at work. Even I say I feel special for being Indian. They give me full respect. I don't disturb anybody and they respect me also.

Q. DO YOU HAVE FRIENDS IN THE HOST SOCIETY?

A. Yes, I do have many friends from the local community. We go for outings. I love to spend time with them. I have friends at all places: at my work, in my neighbourhood and in the institute where I study.

Q. DO YOU WANT TO APPLY FOR SPANISH NATIONALITY?

A. I don't think so. There is no need of Spanish nationality. I don't want Spanish nationality. The only place where I want to visit is my home in India. In India I can go with my residency card and Indian passport. Hence, I don't think that there is any other benefit of Spanish nationality.

Q. DO YOU HAVE ANY INTEREST IN LOCAL POLITICS?

A. No, I don't have any interest in local politics and political parties. I have heard about the Catalan independence movement. These are some crazy people shouting for the independence of Catalonia. Spain is a country and its economy depends upon Catalonia. If Catalonia is separated from Spain, it will ruin the economy of Spain. The whole burden of Spain is on the shoulders of the Catalan people. They will not allow Catalonia to get separated at any cost. I have toured whole Spain. I know the reality of southern Spain. But on the other side, I feel Catalonia should support Spain, just as a rich brother should support his poor siblings. In Catalonia one can find work for a whole year. Here you can find construction work, agriculture, factory work or restaurant jobs. Nowhere in Spain you can find this. In the south of Spain, land is not fertile. People are poor, so they can't invest and have good industry. The best thing for Spain is to remain united in this time of crisis. Nothing will happen in the short run. It's a long time struggle with no any happy ending. I have heard many people who are against this movement.

Q. PLEASE TELL US ABOUT NEIGHBOURHOOD.

A. I live close to the Arc de Triomf metro stop. The area is very good. I like my neighbourhood very much. Except El Raval, I like whole Barcelona. El Raval is the area with highest crime in

Barcelona. Lots of incidences of theft and robbery, prostitution and all illegal activities take place in El Raval. These high rates of criminal activities directly correlate with high immigrant population of Morocco, Algeria, Black Africans and Romanian people. You can find all the illegal activities in El Raval. Only those people like El Raval who themselves are involved in these activities. Here, our Indian people also face many problems. Sometimes local police stop us for checking because they think we are Moros or Pakis. I don't even think to live in this area with my family. Out of Raval all areas are good. I will prefer to live in Poble Sec or Montjuic side than Raval.

Q. WITH WHOM YOU SHARE YOUR APARTMENT?

A. I am sharing my apartment with two boys. We met each other in our journey to Europe. Initially, they were living in Andalusia and now they have moved to Barcelona. They applied for papers [regularisation] 5 or 6 times in Andalusia, but they didn't get papers. Hence, now I told them to apply for their regularisation in Catalonia. They have brought a one-year work contract from a Spanish shop owner. If my friends would have bought a work contract from the Indians or Pakistanis, they would have taken 10000 euros. But now they have paid only 1500 euros for the tax purposes.

Q. HOW YOU SEE YOUR FUTURE IN SPAIN?

A. I feel my future in Spain is very bright. Now I have papers, I have a good job and I am living with peace of mind. I feel Spain is my new home. I don't feel here stranger. Now it is my place. I have integrated well with the host community. I follow the same diet, living style and language, like Spanish people. I don't feel outsider anymore. Now when I visit Punjab, I feel more strange there than in Spain.

Q. DO YOU WANT TO ADD SOMETHING IN THE INTERVIEW?

A. The only thing which I want to say to the people who wants to come to Spain is that this is a huge mistake. Please don't spend too much money to enter these countries illegally. Here if you enter illegally, you will not find any good job and your future will be destroyed. Please don't do this foolish thing, which I have done. I am telling this, but I know that nobody in Punjab will listen to this. I still remember when I was in India, many people used to say me the same things, but I have not followed their advice. But if you reach here, then don't stop your struggle. You can learn language and with the passage of time you can adapt to the society. You can find your new home and place in the host society. You should not stop your study, so you can learn more skills and become a productive part of the society. Many people have spent 20 years in Spain and still don't know a single word of Spanish, this is not acceptable.

THANK YOU.

INTERVIEWEE: GAGANPREET KAUR

PLACE OF INTERVIEW: SANTA COLOMA DE GRAMENET

DATE OF INTERVIEW: 22/03/2015

AGE: 28 YEARS, SEX: FEMALE

OCCUPATION: OLD CARE HOME WORKER

INTERVIEWER: NACHATTER SINGH

Q. PLEASE TELL ME ABOUT YOURSELF.

A. My name is Gaganpreet Kaur. I was born in Gurdaspur district of Punjab on 1st October 1987. At present I live in Santa Coloma de Gramenet municipality in Barcelona. I belong to a Sikh family. I am working as a helper in an old-care home. I am married. My husband lives in India. I have a two-year-old son. I live with my parents. My father works in the construction sector and my mother is a housewife.

Q. WHEN AND WHY DID YOU EMIGRATE FROM INDIA?

A. I emigrate from India in the year 2005. My father was already living in Spain. He sponsored my visit under family reunification process. I entered Spain on a family visa. My father has been living in Europe for the last three decades. He has lived in several European countries, including England, Germany, Paris (France) etc. In the year 2000, he finally settled in Spain. He received a legal permit of stay under the regularization program of the year 2000. After becoming a permanent resident of Spain, he applied for our visas. I directly come from India. At that time, I was almost 18 years old. Actually, I was only 2 months short of 18 years when I got the visa, otherwise the immigration department have not allowed me to enter Spain. Emigrating from India was a mixed feeling for me, on the one hand, I was happy because I always wanted to live close to my father, but as he was living abroad, I used to miss him a lot. Hence, it was an opportunity for me to fulfil my dream, and on the other hand I was sad about leaving my friends and other family members in India. I was also fearful of living in a strange country, where I hardly know anybody. At that time, I had no knowledge of Spanish language. It was really tough time of my life. I was studying in the 12th standard. I had many friends, whom I used to miss a lot. Leaving a friend circle and start a new life in a strange country was really a difficult task for me.

Q. TELL ME ABOUT YOUR FIRST CONTACT WITH THE HOST SOCIETY?

A. Early days of my stay in Spain were challenging. I was new to this social environment. It was an entirely different world for me. I had no knowledge of the Spanish language so I had no communication with the host people. Suddenly, I became deaf and dumb for the most of the people around me. It was a strange situation when I have to depend on sign language to communicate with others. When I started mixing with local people and took some language courses of Spanish and Catalan, slowly things start getting better for me. After learning some Spanish, I started to feel comfortable while dealing with local people. Actually, when I was in India, my father used to advise us about learning some Spanish. I had bought some Spanish learning books also. But these books were useless. In Indian books, Spanish is very different, when you compare with actual Spanish here. Because our pronunciation of letters is very different as compared to Spanish language. So initially it was very difficult to have a simple chat with some local girls, but slowly I learned the way how they pronounce different letters. Now I can speak and understand Spanish. During the first months of my stay in Barcelona, I visited all major tourist attractions of Barcelona. My father used to take us on visits and then I started my studies in a public institution.

Q. HAVE YOU EVER VISITED OTHER COUNTRIES?

A. Only once I travelled out of Spain. I visited Paris with my family. Many of my cousins are living in different countries around the globe. I have one cousin in England and another in Singapore. One of my cousin sisters is married in Australia. I have two cousins in India. My brother in law is also settled in Australia. I regularly contact them on the telephone. I want to visit my cousins in England soon. I want to travel, but now my son is very young and my husband is in India, when he will come to Spain we will go for a long tour.

Q. HAD YOU ANY PRECEPTION OF SPAIN BEFORE YOUR JOURNEY?

A. Before reaching Spain I had no idea about Spanish people and culture. My father used to tell us that in Spain the people are different. The language and the lifestyles are also different. Initially, I felt strange but with the passage of time I started feeling better. Actually, I was told that the people here are self-centred, and children don't care of their parents. Especially, girls are very free minded and they don't follow their parent's decisions. But when I entered Spain I found that the host society is very liberal. Actually, the liberties which I enjoyed and still enjoying here were not possible in India. Moreover, here the workers receive a lot of respect as compared to India. In India there is a huge class difference between workers, and people feel shame to do cleaning or blue colour jobs. Here in Spain nobody bothers about your job and all

workers have the same respect. I like this open attitude. Even I like the way people deal with each-other. Mostly they are very helpful and encouraging, even the old people give you much respect and love.

Q. HAD YOU WITNESSED ANY DISCRIMINATION IN SPAIN?

A. I entered Spain with a family visa. Hence, I had no problems with my legal status. Generally, the people in the public administration deal very well with immigrants. Even I felt that they like people from other countries, with different cultural backgrounds. Here nobody discriminates with immigrants. Sometimes when I go out with my traditional dresses people ask me about my culture and my life style. They show great interest in immigrants. Sometime they ask me about whether I am a Hindu or something else. Generally, I respond to them that I am a Sikh. I think they recognize Sikh men easily, then Sikh women because of their turban and long uncut beard. It is difficult to differentiate between Sikh women and other women from South Asia. But after knowing that I am a Sikh girl, they give me more respect. I feel very proud and being special. It helped me a lot to improve my self-esteem. I was very shy in the past. Now I am full of confidence.

Q. DO YOU HAVE ANY CONTACT WITH YOUR FAMILY MEMBERS IN INDIA?

A. Yes, I maintain a regular contact with them. Mostly, I call them once a week. I regularly visit my family in India and attend all family functions. Most of my family members also want to come to Spain. They want to see the beaches of Spain and how people live in this part of the world, but because of the visa problem they can't come. I visit India almost every year.

Q. DO YOU WANT TO REEMIGRATE FROM SPAIN TO ANY OTHER DIASPORA COUNTRY?

A. No, I am happy in Spain. Now I don't want to move to any other country. I have a permanent job here. I am happy with my job and life. At this moment, I don't even think about moving to any other place. Still, my son is very young and I want to bring my husband to Spain who is still living in India. But as my salary is below the required limit and I don't have a separate flat for us, I can't sponsor him yet. I am looking for a flat for us and I will sponsor him in the next year. Hopefully, he will join us soon. Sometimes I feel that I should go to India to live with my husband, but it is very difficult. A month ago, I was in India. Now it is impossible for me to stay there forever.

Basically, in India everybody wants to enter and settle in Europe. So it hardly matters who sponsors whom. Indians are crazy to go abroad at any cost. My husband is a teacher in a college in Phagwara district. I have explained him about the lifestyle in Spain and the problems of

language and work. Still, he is taking it very lightly and not putting efforts in learning Spanish or other skills. Sometimes, I feel nervous about the fact that he will not get any job in Spain equivalent to his studies in India. I suspect he will not get the same opportunities in Spain what he can in India. The main problem is language and the validity of the degrees. The study system in Spain is different. He will not have any good future in Spain. The jobs offered in the Spanish labour market are not up to his qualification. It will be very difficult for him to adjust with blue colour jobs and long duty hours. One option is there we can move to any other English speaking country. But until I don't have Spanish nationality, I will not move to any other place. In future when I get nationality I will think about it. It will be better for my husband. But as now I have a stable job in Spain I think here we are good.

Q. HOW WAS YOUR FIRST CONTACT WITH HOST SOCIETY?

A. Here in Spain, the neighbourhood relations are very different as compared to India. I still remember, when I was new here, the most disturbing thing was the sensation that I am trapped in a building where I don't know anybody. We were not aware that with whom we were sharing the walls of our apartment. Here nobody bothers about their neighbours. Don't even know their names or have no contact at all. At that time, there was hardly any Indian family in Santa Coloma de Gramanet. We were totally isolated. After some time, I met some Pakistani girls, who were doing a language course with me. These Pakistani girls were very kind to me. Generally, they used to criticise their own society for putting too many restrictions on females, as they were not allowed to go to the mosques or to wear clothes which they want, and to work outside. We never discussed about the Indian-Pakistan politics, or who is good or bad. We were just good friends. We had no issues regarding our nation or religious identities.

Q. WHICH LANGUAGE YOU SPEAK AT HOME?

A. I am living with my parents and my two-years-old son. My brother and his wife, and their two kids also live with us. At home, we generally speak Punjabi. But with my son I also speak in Spanish or English. At work I only use Spanish. Now I have no language problem. All my colleagues understand me and we converse without any problem. I have done few language courses to improve my language skills. Now I am trying to learn Catalan also.

At my work, I try to speak Catalan with old Catalan people. They feel very happy to converse in Catalan. I understand Catalan perfectly, but still find difficult to speak. Unlike Spanish, in Catalan, generally, people don't pronounce same as they write. I have some problems with accents. As per my job, all my colleagues are immigrants from different countries. Some of them are from Morocco, Chile, Argentina, Brazil and Ecuador. They all speak Spanish, so I

don't find any reason to learn Catalan. But still I put some efforts to learn it, because I like to talk to the old people in the hospital care.

Q. HOW YOU FEEL WHILE WORKING IN A DIVERSE WORKING STAFF?

A. It is amazing. I feel very good with them. They all are very encouraging and helpful. They give a lot of information about their countries and cultures, and ask a lot about Indian and Punjabi culture. I feel it is an opportunity for me to learn more about different cultures. I think I am blessed to be with them. I never feel strange to them.

Q. DO YOU SOCIALIZE WITH MEMBERS OF THE HOST SOCIETY?

A. Socialize in the sense of outings.... Not much. As there is a huge difference in our eating habits and lifestyles, I generally don't go for outings. I finish my job and return to home. My job is exhausting, after 12 hours of daily duty only thing I want is to take some rest at home and spent time with my son. When there are some events in the care centre, I do participate in them. Even I have done courses about old care organized by our firm in different parts of Barcelona and Spain. Here people do a lot of late night parties, but I don't like night parties. I prefer to stay at home, spend time with my family. My family normally don't interfere with my work and life. I have full freedom to do what I want to do, but it is my personal decision to avoid night parties. I like to spend all my free time with my son and family. I call my husband daily, whenever I have some free time we have a video call.

Q. DO YOU CELEBRATE SPANISH FESTIVALS?

A. Yes, I celebrate all festivals of Spain. I celebrate all major local festivals at work like Sant Jordi, San Juan, Castaneda, New Year, and Christmas. But at my home, we generally celebrate our own religious festivals. Normally, we go to gurudwara for the celebration of Sikh festivals.

Q. DO YOU KNOW ANYTHING ABOUT THE LOCAL POLITICS?

A. No, I don't know anything about the local politics. All politicians are corrupt people and they exploit the poor, no matter if they are from India or from Spain. I don't like any political leader. I don't know who is in government in Spain. I have no intention to take part in electoral politics of Spain or of India. I have not voted any political party ever, even when I was in India I used to avoid political parties.

The only thing I know that the Catalan people want independence from Spain just like Sikh people demand Khalistan in India. They are demanding their own free country Catalonia. They have all rights to demand their independence, but I feel it is not in their favour. Now Catalonia is home to the people from many different countries. It is an autonomous community with highest population diversity in Spain. It should remain a part of Spain. I personally feel that the

independent Catalonia will not be in favour of the immigrant minorities. Still, my knowledge is very limited about it, but I have some doubts regarding the situation of immigrants in independent Catalonia. I don't like those Catalan people who feel that they are superior and all other immigrants and Spanish people are inferior to them. They discriminate with everybody who is from Alicante or the south of Spain. I want to see a united Spain. Where everybody should respect others.

Q. DO YOU RECEIVE ANY KIND OF ASSISTANCE FROM THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT?

A. Yes, as a single mother, I receive some financial aid for my son. Apart from that here health services are freely available. At the time of my deliver in the hospital, they charged nothing. I use public health services whenever I need. Here government also spends a lot of money on public transport and social services. I always use public health and transport services.

Q. HAVE YOU NOTICED ANY DISCRIMINATION IN SPAIN?

A. No, the public system of Spain is superb. They give full attention to all. There is no discrimination in public places. You can go to any office with an appointment. They listen everybody and help in all possible ways. They help a lot with official paperwork. They provide equal service to everyone. General public is also very kind. They don't bother anybody and give respect to all. Here the atmosphere for girls is much more secure and better as compared to India. I don't feel afraid to go out during the night hours also. In Indian it is not possible. Host people are very nice.

Q. DO YOU HAVE FRIENDS FROM THE HOST COMMUNITY?

A. Yes, I have many friends from the local community. Most of my friends are working with me. Some of them also accompanied me to India to attend my marriage ceremony. I often visit their homes and they also come to my home. I have a very good time with my friends. We go out for shopping also.

Q. DO YOU FEEL INTEGRATED TO THE HOST SOCIETY?

A. Yes, I am integrated into the host society. I am an independent working woman. I am happy to be part of Spanish society, but I can't fully integrate with it. There is a huge difference in the Spanish and Indian way of life. For example, our eating habits, generally, Spanish people always eat meat and drink alcohol, which in our case is not allowed. We are vegetarian and don't drink alcohol. Secondly, they like the night party culture, which we don't like much. Thirdly, their dressing styles are very different. Here girls expose their body a lot. They wear very short cloths, which are not appropriate according to our culture. But I think it does not

affect my level of contact with the host society. Every individual has different choices and I respect their way of life. I noticed that when I wear Punjabi dresses people like me more, than when I wear Spanish dresses. We can have our own identity and values, and live peacefully with the local people. We have to make a balance between the host traditions and our own cultural values.

Q. PLEASE TELL ME ABOUT YOUR MARRIAGE.

A. I married to an Indian man in the year 2012. My husband is from Punjab and still lives there. My marriage was a typical Punjabi arrange marriage. At the time of marriage, I was 25 years old. My parents selected him, and I accepted the decision of my family. Now I am happily married for three years. I always wished that my parents should search a match for me. I believe that the parents are very important, and the decision of marriage should be taken by them as they have good experience of life.

Initially, when they asked me for this alliance, I insisted that I don't want to marry at the age of 25. I wanted to study or work for some more years. But my parents told me that I should talk to this guy once and if I don't like him, I can say no. They left the last decision in my hands. I had no pressure from their side. They even asked me that if I like someone else I can tell them and they are ready to meet him. But I had no one in my mind.

Like me, my husband also belongs to a Sikh family. At the time of marriage, my parents only considered his religion, no emphasis was made on the caste or clan. My family doesn't believe in the caste system. They were only looking for a guy who is well-educated and respect given. My parents gave me the opportunity to talk with him. Then we started to phone call each other daily. Through these calls I tried to know about him and his family. Before our marriage, I visited India for a week. During this visit we met at my aunt's home. It was my brother's marriage ceremony. We talked with each other for a while and then I returned to my home.

I always wanted to marry in India, with an Indian Sikh boy. Some people do say that in Indian men don't respect their wives, but I think even in Spain, which is said to be a developed country, the females are not equally treated. I always preferred an Indian boy who at least knows my culture. Now in Punjab also time has changed. Now men are more respectful than their father's generation. Indian marriage is a lifelong promise, here in Spain marriages are very fragile.

In India discrimination with females is much worse than Spain. There are many families in Punjab, which even today doesn't allow their daughters to work outside. They force women to stay at home and do domestic work or take care of kids. They don't like that females go out for work, as it is a matter of shame for them. Sometime, they discourage females for higher

education also, as for the domestic work higher studies are not needed. Everybody wants to have sons nobody wants to have daughters. Actually, the main problem is dowry system. Many people don't want daughters because they feel them as an economic burden. In India, marriage of a daughter is the costliest affair for a middle class family. To avoid these expenses, many people kill their daughters before birth. Which is the main reason of female foeticide in Punjab. Even today, many families think that only sons carry the name of family. So they want only sons or at least one son. Daughters are always treated as a burden or liability. While sons are assets for the family. Even in Spain many Indians have same views. They are still living in the 19th century, with no any change in their patriarchal behaviour.

Actually, my husband is from my aunt's village. She made a proposal of my marriage to my parents and the parents of my husband. She had sent a photo of my husband to my parents. Then in the coming months, I visited India with my mother and during that visit I met with my husband in my aunt's home. We liked each other and within a few days we get engaged. After the engagement, I returned back to Spain, but then I had a regular contact with my fiancé. We used to talk daily. We married four years after our matchmaking. Initially, because I was studying, my family decided to wait for two years for marriage, so I can complete my study. When I completed my study and my family was ready for the marriage, my husband's family told us to wait a bit more, because my brother-in-law was in Australia, and he was waiting for his permanent residence permit, and without him they were not willing to celebrate our marriage. When he came from Australia, my grandfather passed away and again the marriage was postponed. Finally, after four years of delay, in 2012, I went to India with my whole family and friends for my marriage. At that time, I was a bit sad because my grandfather had a strong desire to see my marriage, but he died a few months before. After marriage, I spent few months with my husband at his home in India and then I returned to Spain for my work.

Q. HAVE YOU EXPLAINED YOUR HUSBAND ABOUT LIVING CONDITIONS IN SPAIN?

A. Yes, I have explained him everything. I told him that the life in Spain is very tough. Initially, I was willing that he should come to live in Spain but now I am a bit worried. At the time of our marriage, he said that he has a good future in India and he will prefer to stay in India. But because of my wish he accepted to emigrate from India. If he had asked me, even I was ready to go to India forever. But then we decided that life in Europe is much better as compared to India, so we should settle in Europe. But now I am worried about his future in Spain.

Q. HOW YOU MANAGE YOUR WORK AND FAMILY LIFE IN SPAIN?

A. This is a difficult job. I have double duty, first as a mother and then as a worker. Luckily my family is here and they support me a lot. My son is born in Spain, now he is two-years-old. When I am at work, my mother takes care of my son. Without her support, it is not possible for me to maintain my job. I always miss my husband. Hopefully he will come soon and join me. To be a single mother is a huge responsibility.

My husband told me that he will not stop me from working outside. I told him that he has to share the domestic work, so that I can earn some money. If I work outside, he should take care of our son. I expect he will support me but still I can't predict the future. You know Indian men feel ashamed of doing domestic work. Sometimes, it worries me a lot. I hope he will adapt in this European context. As per my work, I can't leave this job in any case. Now in Spain it is very difficult to get a stable job. He has to understand my situation and help me to make balance between house and work.

Q. DO YOU KNOW ANYTHING ABOUT YOUR NEIGHBOURS?

A. My all neighbours are Spanish people. Generally, we exchange greetings while passing through the lift and doors. They are nice people. We have no problem with each other. They are very kind to me. One of our neighbours is an old lady. She lives on the first floor. She is the president of our building and our good friend. Here people generally don't visit their neighbours. We just see each other passing through the common places. But we feel comfortable here. Nobody talks or behaves badly with us. We are very happy in our neighbourhood. Since 2004, we have lived in this neighbourhood. Initially, our neighbours used to confuse us with Muslims or Pakistanis. But now they know that we are Sikhs from India. They give us full respect. In reality, our contact with neighbours is limited to formalities, it can't be like in India.

Q. DO YOU FEEL LIKE HOME IN SPAIN?

A. I have been living in Spain for the last 10 years. Now Spain is my home. I can't imagine my home elsewhere. Now I am settled here. I have spent a significant part of my life here, now I feel this is my home.

I love Barcelona. It is very beautiful place to live in. I have been to Rambla Catalunya, Tibidabu, Sagrada Familia and Porta Ventura. Barcelona is a beautiful city. From our roof you can see the whole panoramic view of Barcelona. I always lived in Santa Coloma de Gramenet and I love to be here. Santa Coloma has people from all parts of the world. I feel very good to be a part of this highly diverse society.

The good thing about this area is there are many immigrant families from India and other Asian countries living close to each other. But it has some shortcomings also as generally, they criticise you if you wear modern dresses, or go for outing, or if you are doing a blue colour cleaning job. They interfere in your life and even sometimes make comments about you, which is senseless and insane. Their minds still live in the 19th century. They can't leave their old thinking ever. There are three or four Indian families living in this area, we have very good relations with them. With other communities we don't have much contact but they don't disturb us at all. We are happy here.

When my husband will come to Spain, I will prefer to search a small apartment for us. I don't want to live with my parents any more as they are paying all my expenses. After my husband's arrival, I will prefer to rent a flat, but possibly close to my parent's home. My husband is also willing to live separately. My parents are paying my expense, but I don't want them to pay for him also. I will like to move to a village, where we can get some fresh air. Santa Coloma is good, but it is bit congested. For kids it is not good.

Q. HOW PEOPLE IDENTIFY YOU?

A. Now people identify me with my son. When I go out for shopping or a walk with him, he has long uncut hairs like all Sikh kids, so people easily identify him and then ask me are you Sikh? But if I go alone sometime they confuse me with Pakistani or Muslim. Then, if somebody calls me Pakistani, I explain them "I am not a Muslim or Paki, I am an Indian Sikh girl". I personally feel that my identity is that I am an Indian Sikh girl and I will always remain Indian Sikh. I will never become a Spanish girl.

Q. DO YOU GO TO GURUDWARA SAHIB?

A. Yes, I go to gurudwara every Sunday. Actually, I work on the rotation bases that includes four days' work and four day offs. If I am working on Sunday I miss the gurudwara visit, but if I am not working, I visit gurudwara with my family. I take my son to the gurudwara, so he can also learn about Sikhism. When I am at work, my mother takes him to gurudwara with her. My mother helps me a lot in child care. Otherwise, child care homes are very costly in Spain and they serve non-veg meals to kids which our religion doesn't allow. As my family is vegetarian, I don't want to give non-veg diet to my kids. I feel family support is very important.

Q. DO YOU WITNESSED ANY CHANGE IN THE BEHAVIOUR OF SPANISH PEOPLE?

A. Not exactly, they are same as they were. Initially, they were very kind to us, and still they are very kind and supportive to us. I feel very comfortable with them. And the level of comfort has increased now than in the past.

The only thing that I don't like about Spanish society is that the Spanish people don't take care of their parents. When the parents get old and need the support of their children, they left them in old care homes, where they die in isolation. In Indian society, I like this thing that we take good care of our kids and parents. We love our parents and never abandon them. Indian takes good care of their parents until their last breath. Parents also give their full life to their kids and grandkids.

Q. WHY THE AVERAGE FAMILY SIZE IS DECLINING IN THE SIKH FAMILIES?

A. Actually, in this time of economic crisis, people don't afford many kids. Now most of the families are scared of having more kids, as the education and living is very costly. They prefer only one or maximum 2 children. My grandfather had four children, my father three and I just want two children. It is the story of almost all Sikh families. It will certainly affect the population growth in the future, but I think it is irreversible. It has no easy solution. In the past, women were only occupied in domestic chores. Hence, they have enough time to take care of large families, but in the present world women are doing jobs outside and these career conscious girls want to improve their career and status instead of having kids and stay at home. I think it is the most important change which I have witnessed in my life. The role of women has changed a lot. It has a great impact on the family size.

Q. DO YOU LIKE SPANISH EDUCATION SYSTEM FOR YOUR KID?

A. Yes, I like the schooling system of Spain. I like the play way system of teaching in Spain. Here teacher takes good care of students and they don't put much stress on students. But if we compare the quality of education, I think in India the quality of education is much better than Spain. Here the education is free for all but the quality is very poor. In India they put a lot of pressure on students, but here nobody bothers about the student's future. Another important thing is the lack of English learning in the public schools. I think more emphasis should be placed on English learning as it is the language of the whole world. I teach English to my son and nephews at home. I think it is very important for them to learn it. With English they can go anywhere and find work in any country. Recently, in few Spanish schools they have started few English classes, but still these are insufficient. The good learning of English requires a lot of efforts.

Q. DO YOU TEACH PUNJABI TO YOUR SON?

A. Yes, I teach him Punjabi regularly. He understands Punjabi perfectly. Punjabi is of prime importance for the kids who born in Spain. They should learn Punjabi first because it is their mother tongue. If they lose Punjabi, they will lose everything related to our culture. If they

don't learn Punjabi, they can't read *Gurbani* [religious scripture]. They will forget religious teachings of the Sikh Gurus, and our Punjabi cultural values. After the Punjabi language, English is also very important. With English they can move more freely. In India, all schools put a lot of emphasis on English learning from primary classes, which is very good for the students, as at a young age children learn quickly.

Q. HOW YOU SEE THE FUTURE OF SIKHS IN SPAIN?

A. I think the young generation has very good future in Spain. If they study well they can get better jobs in Spain. It also depends on their parents. If they give full support to their children, and send them to good schools, they can reach to higher positions in the labour market. I don't think that our kids will suffer from the same problems which we did. Kids born in Spain will have no problems of language and understanding the host labour market.

Q. WHAT ARE YOUR FUTURE PLANS?

A. I want to learn more in the field of old-care services. I have been working in an old care centre for the last seven years. I want to do a nursing course. In the old-care centre, they often look for nurses to help older patients. I want to serve the helpless old people. I am trying to get some information about nursing courses. I contacted the human resource department of municipal council to get some information about professional courses. They provide good information about the courses and timings. Actually, I want to study while doing my job. Hence, I am looking for a course where I can do both. I am also thinking to apply for some scholarships, but as I am working, there is little possibility to get some scholarship. I will change my duty to night shifts, if I get a good course of nursing for me. My life will be much easier when my husband will come to join me.

THANK YOU

INTERVIEWEE: KARTAR SINGH

PLACE OF INTERVIEW: GURUDWARA GURUDARSHAN SAHIB, BARCELONA

DATE OF INTERVIEW: 12/04/2016

AGE AND SEX OF INTERVIEWEE: 55 YEARS, MALE

OCCUPATION: SHOP OWNER

INTERVIEWER: NACHATTER SINGH

Section I: Personal Information

Q. PLEASE TELL ME ABOUT YOURSELF.

A. My name is Kartar Singh. I am from Kapurthala district in Punjab, India. I was born in the year 1960. So now I am 55 years old. I have been living in Barcelona for the last 18 years. In India, I used to work as a manager in a private firm. Now in Barcelona, I have two grocery shops. I live with my family. My kids are working in a hotel. Apart from my business, for the last two years I am also managing the Gurudwara Gurudarshan Sahib, which is situated in the central district of Barcelona.

Q. PLEASE TELL ME ABOUT YOUR FAMILY.

A. I got married in the year 1989. I have two kids a boy and a girl. My son is 21 (born in 1994) and my daughter is 24 years old (born 1991). They work in a Hotel. My son works in the kitchen and my daughter is in serving staff. My wife is a housewife. In 2009, I regrouped my family under the family reunification law. Now we all are the permanent citizens of Spain.

Q. WHAT IS YOUR ROLE IN GURUDWARA MANAGING COMMITTEE?

A. I am the head of the present Gurudwara managing committee. This committee has taken the charge of gurudwara two years ago. Initially, there were 7 members of the committee selected by the Sikh community of Barcelona. Later on, four members resigned from the membership of the committee, for their personal reasons. Now the committee consists of only three members, who are currently managing the gurudwara. The main responsibility of the committee is to manage the accounts of the gurudwara, and to look after the supply of food, and the payments of other bills and monthly rents. We decide the allocation of funds to different activities in the gurudwara each month. At the end of the month we prepare the monthly balance sheet of the gurudwara, which shows income and expenditures.

Q. WHEN DID YOU FIRST TIME EMIGRATED FROM INDIA?

A. I left India for the first time 25 years ago in 1990. I immigrated to England. There I lived for almost 7 years. I had no legal permission of work and stay in England, hence, I used to work

illegally in the sales sector. As there were no chances to get legalized in England, so after spending 7 years, I returned to India. I spent six months in India and then I tried to immigrate to Spain. I arrived in Spain in the year 1998. Since then I have been living here in Spain, now I have my own business.

Q. TELL US ABOUT YOUR JOURNEY.

A. I arrived in Moscow with a temporary visa in 1998, and then with the help of human smugglers (Donkey mafia) I crossed the north European country's borders. I walked day and night, through the passes in the jungles and village roads. The human smugglers used to force us to stay in the abandoned houses, during the daytime, so we can hide from the local authorities. We used to cross borders during the night time. No or very little food was given to us. There was no place to take showers or clean our body. After three months of very hard journey, I finally entered Germany. The human smugglers left me in Berlin. After the stay of three days in Berlin, I moved to Paris, where I lived for next three months. In Paris I worked for one month or so, and then I heard about the regularization program for the irregular immigrants in Spain, in the year 1999, I moved to Spain. But unfortunately my application was rejected. Then I decided to stay here in Spain and wait for the next regularization. I got legalized in the year 2005, when the Spanish government of Zapatero legalized all irregular immigrants. I come to Spain for regularization. Spain is the best country for regularization. Even now, if you stay here three years continuously and don't do anything wrong, they will give you papers under *Arraigo*. At that time, my first wish was to get legalized in any European country.

Q. WHY DID YOU CHOOSE BARCELONA FOR PERMANENT STAY?

A. I had some friends and relatives in Barcelona. They invited me to Spain. At that time, even the work conditions were very good. They searched a job for me and I came to Barcelona. Before 1999, the internal borders in Europe were opened, so nobody asked me for my legal documents. At that time, I was not a baptized Sikh, so my physical appearance was not so different from the host population. Even when I entered Spain nobody checked my documents. In the last 15 years, only once or twice local police asked me for my identity card, otherwise they don't bother about immigrants.

Q. WHY DID YOU EMIGRATED FROM INDIA?

A. As you know, Punjab has an agriculture based economy, and even today, if you see the newspapers, many farmers are committing suicides because of their high debt and financial burden. I am from a farmer family. Our land was snatched by the government of India, when they were making a military installation in Kapurthala. The remaining land was not enough for

the whole family. I start working as a manager in a private firm, but the salary was very low, so I have decided to emigrate for better earnings.

Q. DO YOU HAVE FAMILY MEMBERS IN INDIA OR ANOTHER COUNTRIES OF DIASPORA?

A. I have two brothers in India. They have their own businesses in India. One of my brothers is migrating to the USA in the coming months. My mother passed away in the year 1984 and my father in 1990. I frequently visit India to see my brothers and their families. I have one sister in England, my two nieces are in the USA, and I have friends in Canada, and other relatives of my wife are also living there. I have some relatives in Germany and Holland. I frequently travel to visit these relatives. I have very strong ties and good relation with my family members all around the globe.

Q. DO YOU REMIT MONEY TO INDIA OR SUPPORT ANY SOCIAL OR RELIGIOUS ORGANISATION IN PUNJAB?

A. Yes, I often send money to India, when my family members ask me. In my family, all are well settled, they generally don't ask for money. Often they ask for some products, which I send them as gifts. In my village, half of the population is of Ravidasia community, they often ask me for some financial help for their daughter's marriage or reconstruction of their homes. I help them with whatever I can do.

Q. DO YOU WANT TO RETURN INDIA?

A. When we are at work, we don't miss Punjab, but when we are passing through the periods of unemployment, we think it's better to be in Punjab. I am just waiting that my children get settled, when they get settled in their lives and I get my retirement pension, I will prefer to return to India. We are here for the bright future of our kids. I want to spend the last years of my life in my own village, with my brothers and friends.

Section II. Gurudwara Sahib

Q. PLEASE TELL ME ABOUT THE INAUGRATION OF THIS GURUDWARA SAHIB?

A. It is the central gurudwara of Barcelona where many visitors come from other European and sometimes Arab countries. We find many currency notes of different countries when we open the donation box every month. This gurudwara was first inaugurated in the year 2002, at the Union Street of the central district of Barcelona. Later on, in 2006 it was shifted to the Hospital Street in Barcelona. Since 2006, it has been functioning there. In 2002, the number of Sikhs in Barcelona was very small, hence they used to collect 20 euros monthly to run gurudwara. At that

time the gurudwara was in a residential flat, which was rented to host the weekly gatherings. Later on, when the number of visitors increased, it was moved to its present location on Hospital street. Now with the grace of God, we have four gurudwara sahibs in Barcelona alone. Even today we have some founding members of the first gurudwara sahib in the managing committee. In 2006, owing to the shortage of space in the Union Street Gurudwara, we rented an abandoned factory in the Hospital street of the El Raval neighbourhood in Barcelona. The building was in ruins, so we reconstructed it to serve as gurudwara. People support a lot for the reconstruction of the building. We received some financial aid from other gurudwaras in Italy and France also.

Q. WHAT ARE THE MAIN OBJECTIVES OF GURUDWARA?

A. The main objective of the gurudwara is to provide religious services. From the historical times, Sikh uses gurudwara as a place of worship, where they chant the name of the Guru. Apart from religious services it also provides a platform to discuss our social and political issues. It is a community space, where everybody connects with the community. Every Sunday we organize a weekly gathering here; in which we pray to the God for the wellbeing of the whole humankind. *Sangat* (visitors to the gurudwara) come daily to bow their heads in front of *Guru Granth sahib Ji* (Sikh religious scripture). Now many people from the host society are also coming here to have Langar [sacred food] with us. We can say, the main objective of the gurudwara is to promote social cohesion among the Sikh community. We make all possible efforts to encourage brotherhood in the Sikh community of Barcelona and all over the world. We have also made an organization called Sikh Counsel of Spain, through this organization we want to unite all people of the Sikh faith in Spain.

Q. WHAT ARE THE MAIN RELIGIOUS SERVICES PROVIDED BY THIS GURUDWARA?

A. Along with daily prayers, we conduct Sikh marriage ceremonies, birth and naming ceremonies, baptizing rituals and if somebody dies, we also offer prayers for the deceased and his/her family. At gurudwaras we provide all services which are allowed by the Sikh code of conduct issued by the Akaal Takhat SGPC.

Q. HOW THIS GURUDWARA IS CONNECTED WITH OTHER GURUDWARAS IN SPAIN OR IN DIASPORA?

A. We don't receive any financial support from other gurudwaras, this gurudwara functions with the support of the local Sikh population, who donate money to pay all costs of gurudwara. When Sikhs come to Barcelona from other European countries like Germany, France or England, they come to this gurudwara because it is in the centre of Barcelona. We provide food and shelter to all Sikhs, who come from other countries. We have a very good relation with other gurudwaras.

We organise many functions together. In this gurudwara we daily serve free food to 400-500 persons, irrespective of their religion, caste or creed. Many homeless and poor people from the host society also come to eat food. We provide food for all without any discrimination.

Q. WHAT ARE THE DAILY ACTIVITIES OF THIS GURUDWARA?

A. The Gurudwara opens every day at 04.30 am, with the *Prakash* (opening ceremony) of Guru Granth Sahib Ji. The priest prepares the parshad (sacred food) and performs daily prayers 'Nit name', from 5.00 to 7.00 am. Devotees start visiting Gurudwara from 6.00 am, to read or hear the hymns from the religious scripture. Many devotees read the prayers from the religious booklets. Some even come at 9 or 10 in the morning to read the morning prayers. After finishing the morning prayers, the preparation of *Langar* (vegetarian food) begins. First in Gurudwara we serve tea to the visitors, the tea *Langar* ends up with the midday meal. We daily serve *Langar* (midday meal) from 12.00 to 16.30. Exceptionally, for the visitors who are from other cities, we provide food whole day. But for the local people *Langar* closes at 16.30. From 16.30 till the evening prayers we again serve tea *Langar*. At 19.00 we start the evening prayers that finishes around 20.30. After evening prayers, we serve dinner to the visitors. At 21.30 we close the main gate of the gurudwara. We serve *Langar* to all visitors of the gurudwara, irrespective of their religion or country of birth, we have visitors from all communities Indians, Pakistanis, Spaniards and Latinos.

Along with these daily activities, we also organize camps for the students who want to learn Punjabi language and to perform *Kirtan* (religious prayers). In this summer, we have organized religious studies and Punjabi language learning camp for the kids. We invite professors from other countries also to give classes on religious scripture *Gurbani*. we also organise Spanish classes for the adults who want to improve their Spanish speaking skills. We organize *Tabla* and *Harmonium* classes also, for the kids who want to learn *Kirtan*. To encourage the students, we also give prizes to the students who perform better in the summer camp or the language exams. This year we have also provided uniforms for all children who have participated in the Sikh summer camp.

Q. DOES THIS GURUDWARA ORGANISE ANY ACTIVITY FOR WOMEN EMPOWERMENT?

A. The participation of women in the gurudwara activities is limited. We tried to start language courses (Spanish and English) for women; we have arranged a woman teacher also for the classes of Spanish, but in our community women don't want to come out of their houses. This program

failed because of low participation. We have asked the female visitors to tell their demands to the committee, but they do not take any interest in the gurudwara activities.

Women play a huge role in the preparation of *Langar* (food). Every day a small group of women prepares *Langar* for the visitors. Initially, everything was done by males, but now women have taken the charge of the kitchen. They are happy with this. Apart from cooking they also provide stitching and cleaning services to the gurudwara.

Q. WHICH ARE THE MAIN CELEBRATIONS ORGANISED AT GURUDWARA?

A. Generally, we celebrate all festivals related to Guru's life and recent Sikh history. A month ago we have celebrated the throne ceremony of *Guru Granth sahib Ji*. In the past, under the effect of Brahmanism (Hinduism), Sikh people also started to celebrate their festivals, but now we are telling people to celebrate functions related to Sikh history alone. In this gurudwara, we celebrate the festivals related to Guru's life, which are allowed by the *Akaal Takhat Sahib*, Amritsar. We don't celebrate Hindu festivals, like Diwali, Dashehra or Holi in this gurudwara. We only celebrate our *Gurpurabs* [Birth day of Sikh Gurus]. If people demand, we allow them to celebrate Diwali or Lohri at their homes, but in gurudwara we celebrate only Sikh festival of *Bandhi shod*, which coincides with Diwali. In the coming month, we have planned a *Nagar Kirtan* (religious procession) on the birthday of Guru Nanak Dev. Generally, we conduct annual *Nagar Kirtan* with the collaboration of all other gurudwaras in Barcelona. But now we are thinking to conduct two *Nagar Kirtans* annually. In each *Nagar Kirtan*, which we conduct in Ciutat Vella, around 10,000 Sikhs participate from Barcelona or outside.

Nagar Kirtans are very important for the cohesion of the Sikh community. People from whole Barcelona come to join these *Nagar Kirtans*. It provides visibility to the community and a chance to come in contact with the host society. Local administration helps a lot to organise these processions. In procession we show our culture, dresses, food and martial arts to the host society. For these processions we invite *Kirtan* and *Gatka* groups from Italy, Germany and France also.

Q. DOES THIS GURUDWARA RECEIVE FUNDS OR ANY OTHER ASSISTANCE FROM THE SIKH DIASPORA?

A. No, we don't receive any kind of financial help from other gurudwaras, but in Spain we help in the establishment of other gurudwaras with cash or kind. Now we are planning to construct a big gurudwara, like we have in Punjab, in the suburbs of Barcelona, where we have planned to construct 30 rooms for the visitors, a well equipped kitchen, and a big *Langar* and *Darbar* hall. We have also planned to open a Sikh religious study centre, and a big library for Sikh students.

For that project we are expecting funds and support from all Sikhs in Spain and other European countries.

Q. HOW THIS GURUDWARA CONNECTS WITH RELIGIOUS AUTHORITIES IN PUNJAB?

A. We have a regular contact with the head of *Akaal Takhat's* managing committee [*Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee*] in Amritsar. We contact him weekly through telephone calls. He guides us on every question regarding Sikh religion and philosophy. If we have any doubt regarding any ritual, we ask him and he responds to our queries with pleasure. We follow the instructions given by him and we respect him as the supreme authority of Sikhism. We have also invited him to visit our gurudwara in Barcelona. He assured us that he will come to this gurudwara during his next visit to Europe.

Q. DOES THIS GURUDWARA SUPPORT ANY PHILANTHROPIC PROJECT IN PUNJAB?

A. Last year we transferred some money from the gurudwara account to help the families of Sikh prisoners, who were arrested by the Indian government in the aftermath of 1984 events. We are supporting the construction of a gurudwara in the memories of Beant Singh and Satwant Singh (who assassinated Indra Gandhi in 1984) in Punjab. This year still we have not done anything in this concern. We are thinking to send some money for the widows of the Sikh fighters who fought against the Indian government in 1984 onwards. I personally try to help poor families in Punjab. This gurudwara helps in the construction and maintenance of other gurudwaras in Spain like last year we participated in the establishment of a gurudwara in Lloret de Mar. Our motive is to help the gurudwaras in the whole world. We generally provide minimum 1500 Euros as help for the gurudwara building fund.

Q. CAN YOU PROVIDE ESTIMATES OF SIKH POPULATION IN BARCELONA?

A. In Barcelona centre the number of Sikhs is around 1500 individuals, in which majority are young males, but now the number of females is also increasing with more families entering Barcelona. In this gurudwara daily 400 to 500 people come for the midday meal. A huge number of local people also come to have lunch. Around 1200 to 1500 individuals participate in the Sunday gatherings. In these almost 30% are females and remaining 70% are males. The number of kids also accounts for almost 10%. During the last decade, the number of people living alone is declining rapidly. With the *Arriago* law many people get legalized and now bringing their families to Spain. In the children's camp this year we have registered 55 children (5-16 years of age). The community is growing fast, but most of the people when brought their families, generally, they move out of Raval, because it is not considered as a good place for families.

Q. WHAT IS THE ROLE OF WOMEN IN GURUDWARA MANAGEMENT?

A. Still, we don't have any female member in gurudwara managing committee. We are encouraging women to take part in the gurudwara management, but no woman is ready to come in the managing committee. In our community women are happy with their kitchen activities and reading prayers. This time also we have requested women to come forward, but nobody wants to take initiative. If we left Spain, in all other countries, women actively take part in gurudwara management, but in Spain we have 21 gurudwaras and not even a single female member in management committees.

In Spain, the size of Sikh community is small, and due to the economic crisis, there is a shortage of work, in gurudwara management sometimes there are many expenses which we have to incur ourselves, but as women are not working and they don't incur these expenses so they don't come forward to take part in the management. In the coming years, we can expect the participation of females in gurudwara management. In Spain, still we are not fully established. In England one third of committee members are women, same in Germany and even in Italy women take active part in Gurudwara management. In Barcelona centre, till the year 2002, there were only 15 to 20 Sikh men and 6 to 10 women, who used to come to the gurudwara daily. Women participate in other activities like cooking, sewing, cleaning and sometimes reading *Banis* and *Kirtan*. In the *Seva* (service) women are ahead of men.

Q. WHAT ROLE GURUDWARA PLAYS IN THE SETTLEMENT OF THE SIKH COMMUNITY IN SPAIN?

A. Gurudwaras play an important role in the process of settlement. Gurudwara attracts people from other countries. When people see that they have gurudwara in Barcelona, they feel secure to come to Barcelona. For the whole Sikh community, gurudwara is their shelter in the whole world. They can come here and ask for their basic necessities. All gurudwaras provide basic needs like food, clothes or temporary shelter to all Sikhs who come from far places. It helps the migration and settlement of the community from one place to another.

Section III. Identity Quest

Q. HAVE YOU WITNESSED ANY DISCRIMINATION WITH SIKHS IN SPAIN?

A. Yes, there are some problems in Spain regarding our normative Sikh identity. We are working with the local administration and the police authority to solve these conflicts. We are making them aware about our religious and cultural norms. In many areas still police and public officials think that we are Muslims or Pakistanis. They have no idea about the Sikhs. We have explained

our religious symbols to the local police, now many policemen are aware of our Sikh identity, and when they see our iron bracelets they left us without inquiry. In the past, they used to confuse us with Muslims and treat us disgracefully, but now when they are becoming familiar with our Sikh identity they give us full respect. They like our tradition of service, and our way of life. Often they come to have a chat with us, and we cooperate with them.

I am living in Barcelona for the last 17-18 years, I personally never faced any racial discrimination. For the last 7 years, my family is also living in Barcelona, we never find any such problem. If we go out of Barcelona, I still remember once we were returning from a meeting in Madrid, we stopped to take some rest in a town near Madrid called Guadalajara and suddenly three or four police vans reached there and they surrounded us and asked for our documents when they have completed their investigation they informed us that they were suspecting us as a Muslim group. They had seen us through CCTV cameras. I personally feel that in the cities where our number is limited, still there is a problem of misunderstanding, but in the areas of considerable Sikh population like Barcelona, Lloret de mar, Vic etc. people know well about the presence of Sikhs. They know that Sikhs are good hardworking people, and do no harm anybody.

Q. HOW THE HOST SOCIETY DEALS WITH SIKH COMMUNITY?

A. We don't have any conflict or confrontation with Spanish people. Sometime they saw us with some suspicion, but when we tell them that we are not Muslims they treat us respectfully and generously. Even in the far villages of Catalonia when we tell people that we are vegetarian, non-smoker and religious people not from the Muslim community, they respect us and sometimes they confirm that they have heard about us in the past and they are happy with our presence in the country. Normally we don't have any problem with local people. They are very kind, peace loving people.

Q. HOW LOCAL AUTHORITIES DEAL WITH SIKHS?

A. They treat us with respect and cooperation. Whenever we go to municipal offices, they hear our demands very carefully. They don't provide any financial help to the gurudwara, but they support our religious and cultural events. The political parties come to ask for support in the elections, we generally welcome everybody in gurudwara to tell his or her views, but we are not engaged with any political party. We treat equally all parties, and participate in their meetings, whenever they invite us.

Q. ARE THERE ANY INTERNAL CONFLICT IN SIKH COMMUNITY IN BARCELONA?

A. We don't have any such conflict in this gurudwara. Few fundamentalist people generally try to create some situations of conflict to take control over the gurudwara resources. We are very

new in Spain; in other countries we have long histories of settlement. Even in Punjab still nobody knows the name of Spain, now people are becoming aware of that there is a country named Spain in Europe. In other countries, we have a large number of Baptised Sikhs who perform all duties in gurudwaras, but in Spain it is not possible. Last time we have tried that all members of the gurudwara managing committee, if they are not baptized Sikhs, should not cut their hairs and beards, to save the normative look of Sikhs. But still, in the managing committee of 11 members, there are 5 members who are clean-shaved and only two are baptized Sikhs. We don't have baptised persons who want to become members of the committee. In the last 20 years, the majority of Sikhs who have immigrated to Spain are not baptised Sikhs. We have made many gurudwaras, but the number of baptized Sikhs is not increasing.

Actually, our main problem is the unavailability of jobs. The majority of Sikhs are working in the service sector or in the restaurants. The employers in the hospitality sector, generally don't allow workers to have long uncut beard and hairs. Hence, many Sikh men cut their hair and beards to keep their jobs in restaurants. Hopefully, our coming generations will not face this problem. As Spain is passing through an economic crisis period, there is a huge shortage of work opportunities, as a result, many Sikh families are now migrating to Canada for better future. Hopefully, in the coming years this crisis will over and the community will flourish in Spain.

In gurudwara all human beings are equal. We welcome people of all nationalities and religions in the gurudwara. Generally, we tell them to pay respect to *Guru Granth Sahib Ji*, as Guru is the supreme authority in the gurudwara. Sometimes a few fundamentalist Muslims enter gurudwara and refuse to give respect to *Guru Granth Sahib*, in that case we don't allow them to stay inside or have a meal with us. And our volunteers even tell them to leave the gurudwara immediately. I sometime told them to give some food to them also to take away that nobody should return empty handed from the house of the guru.

We allow everybody to enter gurudwara but one should be clean, properly dressed and free from the influence of any drug, tobacco or alcohol. We always tell people that this is a religion of the whole Universe. Along with Sikh gurus our religious scripture also has the hymns of 30 Hindus and Muslim saints. It is the duty of everybody to give respect to this religion. We give respect to every religion and we ask everybody to do so. It is my personal experience that whoever who come into the shelter of guru, his life becomes pure and almighty guru blesses him with all the happiness of the world. Hopefully, this place of guru remains in high spirits.

We encourage all Sikhs to get baptised. We are trying to bring back our brothers who have left religion for work to Sikhism. We are also trying to register our religion in Spain, when we get

registered in Spain as separate religion we can ask for our religious rights. In Italy there are three gurudwara managing committees working for the registration of religion in Italy also, but again their internal conflicts don't allow them to work on this project collectively. In England, Germany and Holland now the Sikh religion is a registered religion, but in Spain and Italy we are not still registered as a separate religion.

Q. IS THERE ANY PROBLEM OF CASTE SYSTEM IN THIS GURUDWARA?

A. No, not at all. A few days ago, we were discussing this issue of castes which is now entering in other gurudwaras of Barcelona. We noticed that few people of Ravidasia community who lives in Raval are planning to go to the Ravidasia gurudwara, which is in Badalona, to celebrate the procession (*Nagar Kirtan*). We called them to stay away from the caste politics in gurudwaras. We tell them to celebrate all functions in the centre gurudwara. We don't want to divide gurudwaras on the basis of caste or clans. Generally, we allow everybody to participate in the events celebrated in this gurudwara. We even encourage the people from other sects to participate in activities. In this gurudwara, we don't discriminate on the basis of castes or religious beliefs. It is one of our objectives to remove the caste system from the Sikh community in Spain and all around the world.

In this gurudwara, many devotees belong to the Sindhi community. They often contribute to the Langer (food) and other services in the gurudwara. We respect everybody and allow them to take part in gurudwara activities. Sindhis used to offer more money for Langer than the money fixed by the gurudwara managing committee. In the past, due to the internal conflicts of the previous managing committees, Sindhis have stopped to visit gurudwara. We have encouraged them to come to the gurudwara, and now they come frequently. They also believe in the teachings of Guru Nanak, but sometime here in gurudwara some fundamentalist Sikhs treat them badly. We are trying to bring them back to the gurudwara. From the last few months they even celebrate their birthdays and other family functions in the gurudwara. We generally don't ask them for financial help, but they send some money every year. With the grace of god, we have a very peaceful environment in Barcelona gurudwara.

I think the main problem is naming a gurudwara on the basis of a particular caste or clan. Now people start calling *Ravidasia* or *Lubana* gurudwara, but the gurudwara is the same for everybody and the *Guru Granth Sahib* is the guru of all Sikhs. It is unfortunate that people still labelling gurudwaras with the sect names, which was strictly prohibited by the Sikh gurus. We don't believe in this caste system. We welcome everybody in this gurudwara. We don't allow anybody to hurt the sentiments of other religions or sects.

Apart from castes, I have seen in some gurudwaras people use clan conflicts for their personal benefits. They spread rumours about other clans or spread hatred in the community to divide it for their personal motives. Like in Ravidasia gurudwara, some people provoke others by spreading fake rumours about other Sikhs. But fortunately their number is very limited. We, generally, don't allow anybody to do this discrimination in our gurudwara.

Q. DOES THIS GURUDWARA PROVIDES MATRIMONIAL SERVICES?

A. Yes, we conduct marriages of Sikh couples, according to the Sikh rituals. This gurudwara has a legal jurisdiction to give marriage certificate, which is valid for the civil marriages in civil registers. In Barcelona only our gurudwara has this authority. Sometimes, in other gurudwaras they conduct marriages and ask us for the marriage certificate, but we generally refuse because we can't give a certificate for a marriage which was not held at this gurudwara, it is illegal.

For a Sikh marriage, we generally prefer that both partners should be from the Sikh community, but if a boy or girl wants to marry a person who is not a Sikh, he should inform well his partner about our religion, our culture and lifestyle. We always make a detailed inquiry that the marriage is real or fake. As we are responsible for all the marriages held at this gurudwara. We ask for the unmarried certificate of both parties, and if parents are not available here, some relatives should be present at the time of marriage. After full inquiry, we allow a marriage in the gurudwara. If anybody fails to fulfil these requirements, he or she can't get married in this gurudwara. Few days back a lady came to gurudwara with a proposal of marriage with a 60-year-old man, we refused that marriage, as married couple should be of the right age, later on she had a civil marriage in the court. We think if somebody wants to marry in front of the guru, he or she should be respectful to the guru or a believer of guru's teachings.

We also allow the marriages with host community members, if the couple fulfils all requirements. But in that case there should be solid evidences that the marriage is not fake and both partners are of almost the same age and want to stay together as husband-wife. Mostly we tell the couple to bring their parents or relatives. We first ask their parents about the marriage and after the acceptance of parents, we proceed to the marriage ceremony. Now many people from other countries are also coming to this gurudwara sahib for their marriage. A few days ago a couple came from the USA to celebrate their marriage in this gurudwara. During the next month, we have booked two marriages of the UK based couple, who want to get married in Barcelona.

We don't allow any force marriage in this gurudwara. We strongly prefer that a religious marriage should be conducted after the consents of the parents and the couple. In Sikh marriages the blessings of parents are essential. We don't allow any marriage where some relatives or parents

are not present. Along with other requirements like date of birth and unmarried certificates some family members should be present at the time of the wedding. If there is a conflict in the family, we generally discuss the situation with parents, if then they change their mind we allow the couple to get married. In some cases, the older people don't like inter caste marriages, but if you see now in India the situation is worse than here, many young couples are marrying within the village, which was strictly prohibited in the past, now *Jatt* boys (upper class) are married with lower caste girls or low caste boys are married with *Jatt* girls. We are still better in Spain than in India. We never denied anyone for a religious marriage, but we do make a full inquiry of his or her feelings about Sikh religion. If somebody confess the he/she wants to become a Sikh, we even encourage him or her to do *Seva* (service) in gurdwara sahib every Sunday or any weekday when he/she can. If we see that someone is lying and his or her intentions are not good, we refuse to conduct the marriage ceremony. We are responsible for all marriages conducted in the gurdwara and we are also responsible to *Guru Granth Sahib Ji*, we can't allow the marriage of a 60-year-old man with a 25-year-old girl, it is a fraud with guru that we can't do. There are few limits which we can't cross.

Q. DO SIKHS FACE DISCRIMINATION IN THE LABOUR MARKET?

A. Yes, there is a huge problem of work in Spain. Especially, in hotel and restaurant employers don't hire a person with long hairs and beard, and our majority population works in this sector so many Sikh men cut their hair because of the lack of work opportunities in other sectors. In agriculture there is no such problem even they prefer Sikh workers than any other immigrant group. I know a farm owner, who lives close to Barcelona and only hires Sikh workers. He appreciates the hardworking nature of the Sikh community. Many employers prefer Sikh workers, even in some hotels they are now looking for turban boys to work as gate keepers. In a hotel in Rambla Raval, two Sikh boys are working as gate keepers. In England and America, we have more options of jobs. Our young Sikhs are now working in the armed forces, public administration and transport services, but in Spain we still have no jobs in the armed services or other public services. Our coming generations will enter these sectors when they become Spanish citizens. But for the first generation it has become very difficult to keep religion and job together. Our main problem in Spain is limited knowledge of Spanish language. Without language we fail to express our feelings to the local people. Sometime people want to know about Sikhism, but due to our limited knowledge of Spanish, we don't convey our beliefs to them. Our coming generations will not suffer from this as they speak good Spanish. They will get employment in all other sectors, while maintaining their unique separate identity.

Q. HOW GURUDWARA ENGAGES WITH THE YOUNG GENERATION?

A. In this Gurudwara main emphasis is placed on the teaching of Punjabi language and religious scripture to the Sikh youth. Our main purpose is to pass the religious beliefs to the next generation and make them aware about our values and beliefs. As I have told you earlier, in the coming decades, our young generation will enter economic and social spheres of the host society, if we don't invest in teaching of Punjabi language, *Gurbani* prayers, and Punjabi Culture, these kids will lose their cultural and religious heritage. That will be a disaster for our Sikh community. We have to give our young generation, good knowledge of religion and our culture so they can resist the effect of Western culture and lifestyle. Our duty in gurudwara is not only limited to provide food to the visitors, our prime motive is to transfer religious and cultural values to the coming generations, which we have received from our ancestors. The religious dresses, which we have gifted to the kids who have participated in the summer camp, was to create a sense of uniqueness between them. We encourage them to wear these outfits, so that they can feel special and privileged to have this faith. We are preparing these kids as pillars of Sikhism in Spain. Hopefully, they will contribute to the prosperity of the community in the whole country.

Section IV: Neighbourhood relations

Q. HOW DOES THE NEIGHBOURS OF THIS LOCALITY DEAL WITH GURUDWARA?

A. We have very good relations with our Spanish and Catalan neighbours. If sometime they feel some disturbance because of loud music, they ask us and we try to respond them positively. We welcome them to the gurudwara and explain them what is going on. They hear our views and are generally very kind to us. We respect them, they respect us. We live in peace and harmony. Sometimes, few Moroccans and other Muslims show hatred, but we ignore them. Even they also come to eat in gurudwara but they have ill thought about all other religions except Islam. We serve them food equally, but they don't show any compassion to us. Bengalis and Pakistanis also come to have a mid-day meal, we allow everybody to enter gurudwara. Now we are worried as some Moroccans guys come here for food and then steal shoes from the shoe racks and other things from the gurudwara. It is a big problem, now we have placed video cameras to control this theft.

Catalans are very kind people. Sometimes they come and teach Catalan to our community members. Like our Khalistan movement, they also want their own Catalan country. They often discuss with us over this topic and we support them. They told us the atrocities carried out by the Spanish government upon them, but I respond to them it is nothing as compared to the

discrimination faced by the Sikhs in India. In India, the government tortures Sikh boys in an inhuman way, put in jails and even kill them, when they demand a separate country. Now even some Catalan people also know about the harsh treatment received by the Sikhs in India. They show their sympathy with us. Very rarely, if any Spanish or other immigrant community member come drunk, we don't allow him or her to enter gurudwara. Otherwise, we welcome everybody who wants to join us.

Q. DO YOU HAVE FRIENDS IN THE LOCAL COMMUNITY?

A. I have many Catalan friends. Mostly my friends are old Catalan men and women. They always ask me that my turban is very beautiful. They often question me that is it puts any stress on my mind when it is hot outside or not? I generally respond them that this turban act like a shelter for my head, and save it from the sun, and in winter it saves me from the cold. Then I explain them that it is like a crown for Sikhs. It is a symbol of our unique royal identity. My ancestors have fought for this turban and sacrificed their lives for its owner. It also helps to take care of our long hairs, which are remained covered beneath it. They generally ask how long it takes to tie a turban? I tell them that I wear 8 meters' turban and it takes only four to five minutes. They get surprised.

Q. DO THE LOCAL PEOPLE PARTICIPATE IN GURUDWARA ACTIVITIES?

A. Yes, there are few Catalan people who come daily to the gurudwara. A young man named Gurdit Singh (named by the gurudwara), his real name I don't know, always come with food and other stuff to contribute to the *Langar*. He always helps us with any official work. If we need some permissions from the local administration, he helps us in all this official work. We also provide the service of free catering, when he invites his Catalan guests to the gurudwara or at some other place near the gurudwara. He also helps young kids to enter into multi-cultural programs at the international level. He is providing a valuable service to this gurudwara and the Sikh community in Barcelona.

Q. ARE THERE ANY OTHER IMMIGRANT COMMUNITIES COME TO GURUDWARA?

A. We have contact with all immigrant communities like Bengalis, Pakistanis, Latinos, Europeans, Gujarati and Sindhis. We welcome everybody. We have no direct relation to major immigrant groups of Moroccans and Romanos. They are thieves and don't respect anybody. We invite the members of all other communities in the processions or *Nagar Kirtans*. They come and participate in our processions. We generally invite big businessmen from the host society and public servants in the procession. We don't give them *Siropao* (highest owner from the Gurudwara sahib), but we honour them with small trophies, as a symbol of respect. Next year we are planning to give everybody a small model of the golden temple.

Q. DOES GURUDWARA TAKE PART IN LOCAL POLITICS?

A. Gurudwara management welcomes all political parties, but on the personal level I support the Catalan independence party. Whenever they ask me, I participate in their meetings and manifestations. They give us full respect. I support them at a personal level, but in gurudwara we welcome all parties.

I know the independence is very difficult. These are the promises of politicians, which they never fulfil. Even in India, our political leaders give us this lollipop of promises, but in Spain at least they are working with their young generation to promote Catalan education and language. They have the strategy to spread Catalan in the whole Catalonia. They have promised us if Catalonia gets independence they will give us equal rights, including land for the construction of a gurudwara and other facilities. We are supporting them, with a hope that they will keep their promise in an independent Catalonia.

Q. WHAT WILL BE THE FUTURE OF SIKH COMMUNITY?

A. I see a very bright future for the young generation of Sikhs in Spain. My own kids are doing well in Spain. They have offers of work in England or Canada, but they refused to go there. They want to stay in Catalonia. I think when Punjabi kids learn the host language and get integrated into the host society, they don't even think to migrate to other countries. My kids have planned to buy flats and get permanently settled here. Our community often criticizes Spanish government for discrimination and corruption, but if we see, we also cheat the government, as in many small businesses, we hire people without paying their taxes. If we treat the government like this, we can't expect a better treatment from their side. When things will change on both sides, we will live better here than at any other place in the world. My kids don't even want to return to India, they feel that in Spain life is much better than India.

Q. DO YOU WANT TO ADD SOMETHING?

A. At last I just want to say that we should respect everybody, so other do the same with us. We have to work hard to preserve our unique identity, otherwise it will dissolve in the Western culture. If we present our values and beliefs to the host society they will not get afraid of us, and will start feeling comfortable in our company.

We have to generate confidence in the host society. If we do good deeds people will give us full respect. Many times I have seen that many young Sikhs help others and they left their seats for others when they are travelling on the trains or buses. People look at them with a kind look and bless them. They present a very good image of the Sikh religion and society. In our religion the concept of *Seva* [service] is very important, we should serve the people, feed the hungry, dress

the poor and help everybody to have independence of his or her religious beliefs. Religion is useless if we don't serve the people. It is the message of all gurus.

Waheguru Ji Ka Khalsa, Waheguru Ji Ki Fateh...

INTERVIEWEE: PARAMJIT SINGH

PLACE OF INTERVIEW: ROME, ITALY.

DATE OF INTERVIEW: 18/09/2017.

AGE AND SEX OF INTERVIEWEE: 31 YEARS, MALE

OCCUPATION OF INTERVIEWEE: AGRICULTURE / PUBLICITY WORKER

INTERVIEWER: NACHATTER SINGH

Q. PLEASE TELL ME ABOUT YOURSELF.

A. My name is Paramjit Singh. I was born in Bhadas village of Kapurthala district in Punjab. I am 31 years old. I have completed my secondary education from *Sant Baba Prem Singh Khalsa* senior secondary school, Begowal in Punjab. After completing secondary education, I have done a degree course in hotel management from a college in Switzerland. There I lived for one year in Anseren and for two years in Zurich. When my study visa was over, they told me to return back to India. But I was not willing to do so. Hence, I moved to Italy. In India my family business was agriculture. My mother was a tailor. Now I am working as an agricultural labour. For the last 11 years, I am working on mushroom farms. I am married and have two kids. My wife lives in India. Owing to some family reasons she could not come to Italy. I want to bring her here. Actually, my parents are very sick, my father has heart problems and my mother has chronic back pain. So, I can't let them alone. My wife is taking care of them. I have two brothers. One of my brothers is in the UK and the other is in the USA. I am the eldest one. My children are twins, a boy and a girl. They are now four years old and have started their school. My daughter also learns *Gatka* (Sikh Marshal Art). I don't want more kids, because I think two is enough. Now the Sikh religious committee is encouraging people to have more children as the population of Sikhs is declining, but they don't give any help to the poor families. Sikh population will decrease in near future.

Q. WHEN AND WHY DID YOU EMIGRATE FROM INDIA?

A. When I first emigrated I was just 14 years old. I was in the 8th standard, when I left my studies. I was willing to go to the USA, but the travel agent told me to go to Europe. I tried to enter Europe via Moscow route. But the police arrested me at the border and deported me to India. Then after some time I went to Egypt. At that time, I was trying to enter Italy, through the sea route. I stayed in Egypt for one year. In Egypt there were many Indians. They had very good businesses in Egypt. My agent had contacts in Egypt to smuggle people through the sea route. When I was in Egypt I had the chance to see the Pyramids. I waited there for one year, because due to some problems the donkey route was temporarily closed. Then I returned to India again.

I started my studies and gave the exams of 12th class. Then somebody told me to look for legal ways to enter Europe. I start looking for the student visas. After completing my 12th class exams in the year 2005, I applied for a study visa. An agent of Chandigarh [capital city of Punjab] helped me to get this visa. I gave interviews in the Swiss embassy and got a student visa to study in a Hotel management school in Switzerland. I stayed there for two years. I was willing to stay in Switzerland, but they didn't renew my visa. After refusal of my visa extension application. I moved to Italy. A Pakistani donker [human smugglers] helped me to enter Italy. He had smuggled me to Italy in 700 euros. The route was very dangerous and it was raining the whole day. We crossed through many mountains peaks and villages to avoid main roads. Pakistani left me in Milan. Then I called one of my cousins, who was living in Brescia. He sent me his address and I picked the train from Milan station. After some days he bought me a ticket to Rome. In Rome, I had my maternal uncle. He helped me to stay in Rome. I stayed with him for some days and then I started to look for work.

Q. TELL ME ABOUT YOUR ENTRANCE IN THE HOST LABOUR MARKET?

A. I entered Italy in 2007. At that time, I was irregular. I had no permission of work and stay in Italy. I started to look for any job in agriculture sector because people had told me that in agriculture the owners usually don't ask for papers, and the police ignores agricultural workers. After a few days of search, I got some work in a mushroom farm. I learned to cultivate mushrooms, and started to work with other Indian workers on a farm. There were 11 workers of Indian origin at that farm. Most of them were irregular. The owner of the farm was a very good person. He helped us to regulate our legal status in Italy. I worked at the farm for almost 10 years. Until he sold the farm to a new owner. When the Romanians entered Italy they started to work at lower wages. The new owner was not a good man. He started to hire Romanians because they were cheap. They were ready to work for 30 euros a day, which we were doing for 40 euros. But the owner was not aware that the Romanians were thieves. They entered in the farm and start stealing everything what they can from the farm. Then slowly all Indians left that work. Now I am doing publicity work. This is a good work. I work only half day and earn 40 euros daily. I am happy with this work.

The Indian community in Rome is engaged in diverse economic activities. Most of the Indian men are working in the restaurant or agriculture sector. And some women also work in the old care sector. Some Indians have their own shops. They sell electro-domestic products and some Asian products. Few people are also engaged in the food processing industry. They make breakfast items like biscuits and cakes.

Q. TELL ME ABOUT THE WORKING CONDITIONS AT THE FARM.

A. At the farm I used to work 8 hours daily. Initially I had no working contract, hence the owner used to pay me in black. I used to earn 4 euros per hour of work. I used to work 8 hours a day and 6 days a week. The money was less, but we had a regular work. When I got the paper he raised my salary to 5 euros per hour, but the work contract was only about 2 hours per day. Hence, he was not paying full tax. We had no paid vacations. In a full month's work I used to earn 1000 euros. Here the income was comparatively good as compared to other areas, in Sabodia or Latina people was working for 3 euros per hour. Farm owner had provided us an apartment, and he used to pay all the bills like water or electricity bills. So we were not paying any rent, whatever we used to earn was our net income.

Q. HAVE YOU WITNESSED ANY DISCRIMINATION AGAINST INDIANS IN ITALY?

A. All Italians are not bad, but there are some Italians who hate us or any immigrant. Mainly because of my long beard and turban, they think that I am a Muslim, and they shout at me. Actually, Muslim people conduct terrorist activities and people think that we are Muslims so they comment on us. Every time, when there is a terrorist attack in Europe, they attack our Sikh people. It is a very serious issue for our Sikh community. Now we have tried to inform all these people about our different religion and identity. Now we show our Kara [iron bracelet] so they can differentiate that we are not Muslims. We told them that Muslims don't have moustaches and they wear a cap not a turban like us. When we told them that we are Sikhs, their attitude towards us completely shifts from hostile to very friendly. They respect Sikh people a lot, but they hate Muslims. They have some reason to feel offended because Muslim come here in Europe and destroy the peace of the host countries. All Muslims are not bad, but some of them throw bomb on the local public and whole community pay the price for that. Even we also pay the price for their sins.

Here in Italy, people don't want to see anybody with turban. When I decided to get baptised, my boss said me that I should cut my hair or I have to leave the job. At that time, I resisted that I will not cut my hair if you don't want to hire me it's up to you. Then he told me that you can work, but you have to wear a cap to cover my head. I was clean shaved before marriage. My wife told me to get baptised. I am happy to get baptised.

Q. DO YOU HAVE ANY FAMILY MEMBER IN THE DIASPORA?

A. I have one maternal and one paternal uncle in Italy. They live with their whole families here in Italy. If I count all my cousins, we are almost 12 in Rome. Actually, in the mushroom farm

most of the workers were from my family. My uncle helped many of them to get this work at the farm.

After me many of my cousins came to Italy and now living in different parts of Italy. If we count all the members of my family in Italy, it will reach around 60 to 70 individuals. I don't miss India at all.

I have many friends in other countries. In my village all boys of my age have migrated to Europe or America. Most of them have emigrated to the USA. Now if you go to my village you will only find old people or young kids. There is no any boy between the age group of 15 to 30 years. Girls are also marrying to the boys who are settled abroad and emigrating to join their husbands. An agent in my region has smuggled all boys in the USA. In coming years, my village will be disappearing from the map of Punjab.

Q. WHEN DID YOU GET REGULARIZED IN ITALY?

A. I got my papers in the year 2010. I applied for the regularisation in the year 2007 and in 2009 they accepted my application. After the acceptance of my application, I returned to India to apply legally for a working visa. After getting the visa, I again entered Italy in 2010. In Italy there are many ways to get legalised. They change regularisation laws every one or two years. In 2007 there was a law called *Flusi*, under this law, there was a condition that if you want to become a legal resident, you have to return India once and then apply for a working visa in Italian embassy. After getting a working visa you can enter Italy again with one-year work and stay permit, which was renewable. Now I have permanent papers. Three months ago I renewed my residency permit. I am waiting for the Italian passport. In Italy for Indian immigrants the waiting period for Italian passport is 10 years. I still have to wait 4 years more to get eligible for the citizenship. I want Italian passport.

Q. PLEASE TELL ME ABOUT YOUR FIRST EXPERIENCE WITH ITALINS?

A. Actually, here the main problem was of the limited knowledge of Italian language. When I arrived Italy, I had no knowledge of Italian. I enrolled in a language course in 2009. But the instructors used to speak only Italian, and for me it was very difficult to make any sense of their lectures. At the mushroom farm, I was working with Indians, so I had no problem of language. But I was aware that if I spent all time with the Indian workers, I will never learn Italian language. So I decided to change my work. The farm owner had a restaurant also and I started to work at his restaurant. The first month in the restaurant was very difficult as I had no knowledge of Italians. Slowly I started to speak with my colleagues in Italian and I learned some functional Italian. Still, I am not perfect. But now I manage all my activities, I can go alone for medical

visits, I do my shopping and all other official works without any help. Now I help other newcomers, who don't know Italian. When I was new, I was clean shaved. Italian people used to treat me very well. I had very friendly relations with them. But when I start wearing turban and stop trimming my beard, they start looking at me with suspicion. They don't like people with turban. They think all are Muslims.

Q. HAD YOU ANY FEAR ABOUT YOUR IRREGULAR STATUS IN ITALY?

A. No, in Rome I never felt any fear of police. Here nobody checks if you have documents or not. Police are very good as compared to other countries. Actually, most of the time I lived in the outskirts of Rome, where police never come. Even when I used to go to the inner city nobody has ever checked me over. Here If you don't disturb anybody, nobody bothers you. But if you disturb others, then the police will surely check your documents.

Q. TELL ME ABOUT YOUR NEIGHBOURHOOD.

A. Now I am living in a caravan. These are temporary places to spend nights. Here most of the Indians don't have houses. They have a place to spend nights. Here in Rome the houses are very costly. A single person cannot pay rents of an apartment in Rome. So people generally share apartments to reduce the living cost.

Q. DO YOU HAVE REGULAR CONTACT WITH YOUR FAMILY IN INDIA?

A. Yes, I maintain regular contact with my family. When I was new, the phone calls were very costly, but now the phone is almost free. You can call on the internet whenever you want. Now I call my wife and kids daily. My wife wants to come here, but still my parents need her in India. So she cannot come.

Both of my brothers are living out of India. We talk once or twice a week over the phone. I visited my younger brother in England. I do not like the Indian people living in England because they were rude to other Indians, especially, the newcomers. I visited Southall and the Ilford boroughs of London. I was there at the time of Brexit propaganda. I was amazed with the number of Sikhs in the Southall. If you enter Southall it seems you entered a market in Punjab. People have their stalls along the roads and the Punjabi music is in the air. There you feel that you are in mini Punjab. You can find ICICI bank or the Punjab National Bank branches in the UK. But the people are very cold. They don't feel happy to see other Punjabis. They are living in the Southall for long, so they have become rude like the British. In Italy, people are very kind to each other. They help a lot their countrymen. Here, now 90% Indians are regular immigrants. They visit India regularly and have contact with their families. So they live happily. In the UK, most of the people are undocumented and they live in very poor conditions. The salaries in the UK are higher as

compared to Italy, but the living cost is also many times higher than here. So, I think people are happier in Italy than the UK.

In Rome other things are cheaper, but apartments are very costly. If you go out of Rome, you can get cheap apartments, but in Rome the cheapest apartments also cost 800 euros per month. It is very high for a normal Indian who earn 1000 euros monthly. Here in Rome people share their apartment to save some money for their families in India. Here normally, 8 to 9 Indian men live in an apartment. They collect 100 euros each to pay the house rent. Even many Indian families also live together. you can find easily many apartments with two or more Indian families. Here most of the women don't work, so it is also very difficult for the families to pay all the expense.

Q. DO YOU WANT TO BRING YOUR FAMILY TO ITALY?

A. Next year I am planning to reunite my family here. After making their papers in Italy I will send them back to India. If once they have papers they can come to see me any time. It is also important for the future of my kids. As if they have papers, they can come to Italy without any problem. I want that my kids should complete their studies in India and get settled there. The education in India is much better than Italy.

Here, in Italy everybody speaks Italian, they don't teach English to the kids. It reduces the chances of students who want to get higher education. I want my kids should get a good base of English, so that they can move to anywhere in the world. In Italy, Indian students don't get opportunities to do better in studies. The Italian education system is not good for Indian students. It is good for Italians, but for Indians no.

Q. WHAT ARE THE THINGS IN THE HOST CULTURE YOU DISLIKE?

A. Firstly, their living style and their way of talking with elders. We give respect to our parents and all elders, but here most of the young boys and girls don't respect their parents and teachers. They call parents and teachers with their names. It is unacceptable in our society. We give full respect to our parents.

Here the rules of marriage are not clear. Italians daily change their partners and they don't like to stay with one person for a long time. They start cohabiting without marriage. They start having sex at a very young age, both boys and girls do this in their parental homes. And the parents don't prohibit them. I don't like this type of relations.

I feel that I am here for work, and I don't want to become an Italian. I like my culture and traditions. I do my job and return to my home. I have nothing to do with the local people. I want to invest money in Indian and hopefully I will return to India in near future. I think the environment here is not good for kids. In India also there are some problems, but in future I hope

the conditions will be better and I will eventually return to my homeland to stay with my family. I want that my children must have a good education so they can have a job in India. If they get a job in India, I will return.

We have to educate our kids in India. It is very important for the creation of Khalistan. One day whole Sikh community will have its own country in India. If we don't prepare our kids, then who will fulfil the dream of a Khalsa land.

Q. DO YOU WANT TO APPLY FOR ITALIAN PASSPORT?

A. There are four years left yet, for me to become eligible for the Italian passport. I don't know how will be the world in coming 4 years. But if I stayed in Italy I will think of it.

Q. IS THERE ANY DISCRIMINATION WITH INDIAN IMMIGRANTS IN PUBLIC OFFICES IN ITALY?

A. No, here you will not find any discrimination in the public offices. People behave very well with the immigrant population. They treat everybody with full respect. Last week, I visited an office, they told me to apply for a transport discount, which is available for the low income people like me. I asked many Indians they have not told me anything about this, but when I asked in the office they gave me full information.

Q. WHICH LANGUAGE YOU SPEAK AT HOME OR AT WORK?

A. At home, I normally speak Punjabi, because I live with other Punjabis. At work we mostly speak Italian. Now I work with Italian people, so I speak Italian with them. Actually, they teach me Italian. When I speak with other Indians at work I speak in Punjabi. Sometimes the employer feels offended when we talk in Punjabi. They told us to talk in Italian only at work. Sometimes they feel that we are talking about them, so they feel insecure. Here, most of the Indians don't know much Italian. Mostly they use few words and the sign language to communicate with Italian and other immigrants.

My cousin brothers speak Rumanian and German languages. As there were many girls from Romania and Poland working with us, so they had friendship with these girls. These girls taught them their languages.

Q. ARE THERE MANY MIXED COUPLES IN INDIAN COMMUNITY IN ROME?

A. There are few. Here most of the people are busy in their work so they hardly get time to make friends in the host society. Most of the mixed couples are with other immigrants. Italian people generally don't marry with Indians. Actually, we Indians are limited to our jobs. Mostly we start our work at 8:00 and finish at 18:00, we don't have time for the girls. After finishing our work, we return to our homes to get some rest. The only thing we do in our free time is to call our

families in India. When we have some free time we watch Punjabi films on the internet and listen to the Punjabi news on international TV channels.

Q. DO YOU CELEBRATE THE LOCAL FESTIVALS?

A. Here, most of the community members are Christian. They celebrate Christmas in the month of December. They have another festival called Pascua in the Month of March. They have many small festivals. Sometimes our employers invite us on their festivals. I participate in these functions.

Q. DO YOU CELEBRATE INDIAN FESTIVALS?

A. Here we celebrate all festivals in the Gurudwara. In Gurudwara, we celebrate the birthday of all gurus and all other Sikh festivals related to the Sikh history and culture. We invite the local people also. There are many Italians who have converted to Sikhism. They participate in all events. They help us to take permissions for the processions and public festivals. I know one Italian Sikh. He has a Sikh martial arts school, where he teaches *Gatka* to the Italian Kids. Here they have a replica of Sikh religious scripture in Italian and English also.

Q. DO YOU RECEIVE ANY KIND OF ASSISTANCE FROM THE GOVERNMENT?

A. Yes, the government provide free health services to all residents. One of my aunt had cancer. My uncle sponsored her here, and now she is receiving treatment from the public hospitals. In India, the doctors have said that she will not survive. Government hospital here are very good. I can't say same about the public schools. I don't know how they work. But most of the Indian families are not happy with the education system.

Q. WHY YOU GET MARRIED IN INDIA?

A. I was always willing to marry in India. So when I got the papers I returned to India for marriage. I never thought about marrying an Italian girl. For me our culture is of prime importance. I follow the teaching of my Guru and the Guru said we should marry in our own community. There is some Indians boy who has marital relations with the host girls. I know one Indian man, he was married to an Italian girl and he had a son. Then he married again to an Indian girl and now he has two sons with his Indian wife. Actually, the mixed marriages don't last for long. People get married in the host society and then they repent of their decision. They get divorced and again marry in India. Here marriages don't last forever. I was sure that I will marry in India.

Here girls want money and the night parties. With Indian men, this is not possible. They have to send money to their families in India so they can't live like Italians.

Q. PLEASE TELL ME ABOUT YOUR NEIGHBOURHOOD.

A. I live close to my mushroom farm. It is on the outskirts of Rome. We don't have any human settlements around us. We live in complete isolation from the city. Most Indian people live at their workplaces, as most of the employers provide shelter to the workers. All the agricultural workers have this benefit that they live in the farmhouses.

Q. DO YOU HAVE ITALIAN FRIENDS?

A. Yes, I have one Italian friend. I taught him Punjabi also. Now he speaks good Punjabi. Here people are not so friendly.

Q. HAVE YOU WITNESSED ANY CHANGE IN THE BEHAVIOUR OF LOCAL PEOPLE DURING THE LAST DECADE?

A. No, I have not witnessed any change. When I was clean shaved people used to think that I am one of them, but when I raised my beard and hairs, people start looking me differently. Here in Rome the number of baptised Sikhs is very small, but if you go to the Brescia and Carmona you will find many baptised Sikhs. Here we have agricultural work, so there is less problem for baptised Sikhs. But in the restaurant sector, they don't give work to baptised Sikhs. Here in Rome the share of baptised Sikhs is only 5% of the total Sikh population.

Q. HOW THE LOCAL PEOPLE IDENTIFY YOU?

A. The local people call me Singh. They know I am a Sikh. They look at my iron bracelet and they assume that I am a Sikh. I feel proud of being a Sikh. My name is Paramjit Singh, but local people call me only Singh. The firm owner where I work, treat me like his cousin.

We have an image of good workers in Italy. My previous employer used to hire only Indian men. He has a very good relation with Indian. Because Italian people don't like to work on the fields. They spend time on smoking and chatting and ask for all worker rights, like full work contract and full salary. Hence, local farmers used to hire Indian men, who work more and demand less. In the last few years the value of workers has declined in Italy. Owing to the crisis in the north Italy, many people moved to the south for work. It has contributed to the decline of the wages and living standard in the south.

In the northern region, for the regular workers the life is very good. They earn up to 2000 euros per month, here in Rome the normal salaries are 600 to 700 euros. People generally don't feel that we are snatching their work. They know we are doing the jobs which they don't want to do.

Q. DO YOU SPONSORED ANYBODY TO ITALY?

A. No, I have not sponsored anybody to Italy. I offer my help to all who wants to return to India and do not have money to pay for the ticket. I also work in Gurudwara to help new comers. Here, Gurudwara helps new immigrants, who have no place to go. In Gurudwara, they provide food

and shelter for all visitors. In Rome now we have four Gurudwaras, two of them belongs to the *Jatt Biradari*, one to the *Lubana Biradri* and one to the *Ravidassia Biradri*. Initially, there was only one Gurudwara in Rome. But owing to the internal conflicts in the community for the power and control over the resources of the Gurudwara. Three more Gurudwaras established during the last decade. The first Gurudwara was for everybody. At that time all caste groups used to visit the same Gurudwara. In 2009, a brutal fight in the Gurudwara resulted in the division of the Gurudwara into two. A new Gurudwara was established by the *Lubana Biradari*. It divided the resources and the congregation into two sects. Now, as the head of the first Gurudwara is from *Jatt* community, that Gurudwara is known as *Jatt* Gurudwara and the head of second Gurudwara is from *Lubana* Community so the second Gurudwara is named as *Lubana* Gurudwara.

I have never been to Ravidasia Gurudwara and I have never heard anything about their Gurudwara. They live separately. After the Vienna incidence they returned the religious scripture and now they read only the poetry book of *Ravidass*. Our Sikh people don't go there. But they still call their place Gurudwara.

Q. WHAT IS THE IMPACT OF CASTE SYSTEM ON THE INDIAN SOCIETY IN ROME?

A. I think the caste boundaries are getting harder in the diaspora. In India, now people are becoming more liberal. They are crossing the barriers of castes, but here in the diaspora people are still very much attached to their castes. They don't treat the whole humanity as one, which was the main teaching of all Sikh gurus.

I have some Ravidasia workers with me. We don't discriminate with them. But they often speak slang language with each other. So, sometime I warn them to improve their language. Sometimes they ask me that they dress like me then how people find that they are from a lower caste and I am from upper caste. I told them because of your slang language. If you speak like this, everybody will know that you are of low caste. The other thing that makes them different is their smoking habit. Mostly Sikhs don't smoke. Only the lower caste people smoke.

Q. DO YOU HAVE INTEREST IN LOCAL POLITICS?

A. I don't have much interest in the local politics. During the last election one man from the Sikh community participated in the elections and won a seat in the Rome city council. I have seen him in the Gurudwara. I don't have permission to vote so I don't take an interest in the local politics. Mainly Indian people are limited to their jobs and making money. They don't take interest in any other activity.

Some political leaders come to the Gurudwara, to ask for a support during the elections, but as the number of voters in the Sikh community is very small so they don't give much importance.

In the north of Italy, where the number of naturalised citizens is very high, they have good participation in the local politics.

Initially, the public system was very honest. But now with the immigrants they are also becoming corrupt. Our people teach them how to give and take bribes. Now some of the Indians also bribe the Italian authorities to get papers for their family members.

Q. HOW YOU SEE THE FUTURE OF INDIAN COMMUNITY IN SPAIN?

A. Most of the Indians have a very bright future in Italy. Only some of them who have become drug addicts, the future has lost meaning. There are many people who become addicted to the poppy seeds and the opium. There were two Indian men and a Nepali who was selling these drugs illegally. The local police arrested them. It became the headline of many newspapers. It was a matter of shame for the Indian community in Italy.

Generally, here Indians are doing well. If they don't have good work, they wait till the permanent residency permit and then they move to other European countries. Many families have already moved to England. Now some families have also migrated to Germany or France. They convert their legal residence and work permit and settle there permanently.

Most people don't feel satisfied here. Due to the high cases of drug abuse, now even in India people think that if you are from Italy then you are even worse than Dubai. People don't give respect, when they know that I am from Italy.

Good thing here is that people are not corrupt. If one works with dedication, he can live a good life with his family.

Q. DO YOU WANT TO ADD SOMETHING TO THIS INTERVIEW?

A. I think I have said everything... I hope it will serve for your project. Good luck with your studies.

THANK YOU

5. List of codes for the Qualitative Analysis

| List of Codes used for the Qualitative Analysis | | | |
|---|----------------------|-------------------------------------|------------------------|
| ESTRUCTURAL CODES | | THEMATIC CODES | THEORETICAL CODES |
| 1 | PERSONAL INFORMATION | 1.1 Basic Information | 1 Diaspora |
| | | 1.2 Marital Status | 2 Gender |
| | | 1.3 Legal Status | 3 Generation |
| | | 1.4 Family situation | 4 Integration |
| 2 | MIGRATORY EXPERIENCE | 2.1 First Migration | 5 Diversity |
| | | 2.2 Journey | 6 Demography |
| | | 2.3 Internal Migration | 7 Identity |
| | | 2.4 Reagrupation | 8 Racism or Xenophobia |
| | | 2.5 Return | 9 Migration |
| 3 | DIASPORA | 3.1 Links with Origin Country | 10 Transnationalism |
| | | 3.2 Transnational Links | |
| 4 | LABOUR MARKET | 4.1 Entry into Labour Market | |
| | | 4.2 Working Conditions | |
| | | 4.3 Major problems at work | |
| | | 4.4 Discrimination at work | |
| 5 | FAMILY AND HOUSEHOLD | 5.1 Livig arrangements | |
| | | 5.2 Family Relationships | |
| | | 5.3 Gender Roles | |
| | | 5.4 Reproduction | |
| 6 | MARRIAGE | 6.1 Marriage | |
| | | 6.2 Caste and Marriage | |
| | | 6.3 Gender Roles | |
| | | 6.4 Dowry | |
| 7 | RELATIONAL FIELDS | 7.1 Neighbourhood | |
| | | 7.2 School | |
| 8 | SOCIALISING | 8.1 Friendship | |
| | | 8.2 Cultural information exchange | |
| | | 8.3 Festival participation | |
| | | 8.4 Group membership | |
| 9 | LANGUAGE | 9.1 Host Languages | |
| | | 9.2 Mother Toungue | |
| | | 9.3 English Learning | |
| | | 9.4 Other languages | |
| 10 | RELIGION | 10.1 Gurudwaras | |
| | | 10.2 Sikhism | |
| | | 10.3 Hinduism | |
| | | 10.4 Islam | |
| 11 | POLITICS | 11.1 Political Participation | |
| | | 11.3 National politics | |
| | | 11.4 Homeland politics | |
| 12 | PUBLIC SYSTEM | 12.1 Public services | |
| | | 12.2 Public Assistance | |
| 13 | DISCRIMINATION | 13.1 Relations with administration | |
| | | 13.2 Administrative discrimination | |
| | | 13.3 Racism and xenophobia | |
| | | 13.4 Caste system | |
| 14 | ORIGINS | 14.1 Autoctonous (Spanish/Italians) | |
| | | 14.2 Moroccans | |
| | | 14.3 Pakistanis | |
| | | 14.4 Italians | |
| | | 14.5 Other Origins | |
| 15 | IDENTITY | 15.1 National Identity | |
| | | 15.2 Religiou Identity | |
| | | 15.3 Hybrid Identities | |