Political socialization processes of return migrants. The case of Turkish returnees from Germany

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Doctoral Dissertation

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To Maya,

“Let them not deceive you
There is no returning home.”
Bertolt Brecht – Against Deception

“The appropriate response to other people’s suffering is not empathy. The appropriate response is solidarity. Empathy may feel good and virtuous, but solidarity gets something done.”
Barbara Ehrenreich

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Summary

This doctoral thesis focuses on the relationship between migration experience and formation of political values and attitudes. It seeks to contribute to the literature by unpacking the process of migrant political socialization with an in-depth case study of the Turkish migrants returning from Germany. Its main structure is based on four central arguments in dialogue with the existing political socialization literature: 1) the political socialization is itself a political process, 2) migrant agency in the process of political socialization is understudied, 3) transnational dynamics of migrant political socialization are overlooked, 4) the processual dimension of political socialization is given limited attention. Following these critical points, the thesis seeks to examine the role of migrant agency in migrants' contact and interaction with German agents of political socialization, identify the process of negative political socialization as an alternative migrant political socialization model, and reveal transnational political socialization trajectories of the migrants.

Distinct from the common approaches to migrant political socialization, this thesis relies on an in-depth inquiry through the application of process-oriented methods such as the relational approach and grounded theory methodology to the analysis of the biographical interviews with Turkish returnees from Germany. Focusing on labor and student returnees, as well as the roots migrants, the research seeks to contribute to the literature by capturing a wide array of complexities of the political socialization experience in a time span of almost six decades, extending from pre-migration to post-return. It shows that class, social and cultural capital, transnational conditions, and the political contexts of Turkey and Germany that correspond to the time of migration are among the factors that account for group variations. The group-based approach also defies the tendency to treat the ethnic group as the primary unit of analysis in migration and migrant political socialization studies. Overall, the qualitative nature of the research permits studying the migrants' own narratives about their everyday experiences. By doing so, it seeks to complement survey research, which works with a number of formal variables for pre-process and post-process dynamics or non-migrant and returnee populations.

The analysis shows that in many cases the returnees have not been subject to the conventionally assumed processes of political socialization in Germany because, sometimes for reasons beyond their control, they did not have sufficient contact with the German agents of political socialization, such as the German media, political parties, and electoral campaigns. When there was contact, they often used their agency to strategically filter, ignore and play around these socializers based on their needs and concerns within the power inequalities of the German society. Furthermore, the narratives of the returnees reveal an alternative process of "negative political socialization". In contrast to the conventional image of migrants' uncritical embracement of host country values to "fit in", negative political socialization refers to migrants learning their place as the outsiders of the German polity and their contribution to diffuse system support mechanisms from this position. Lastly, the analysis provides a response to methodological nationalism in political socialization studies, which assumes that the process is contained to the national boundaries of the host and home countries. It reveals that we can differentiate between direct and indirect trajectories of transnational political socialization, in which the migrants' cross-border ties, identities and practices play a central role. Overall, the findings shed light on the political and processual nature of migrant political socialization, its transnational dynamics, as well as the role of the migrant agency in it.

List of abbreviations

Political parties in Turkey
AKP: Justice and Development Party
CHP: Republican People's Party
HDP: People's Democratic Party
MHP: Nationalist Action Party
TKP: The Communist Party of Turkey
LDP: Liberal Democratic Party

Political Parties in Germany
AfD: Alternative for Germany
CDU: Christian Democratic Union of Germany
Die Linke: The Left Party
DKP: The Communist Party of Germany
FDP: Free Democratic Party
MLPD: The Marxist-Leninist Party of Germany
NPD: National Democratic Party of Germany
SPD: Social Democratic Party of Germany
The Greens: Alliance 90/The Greens

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CHAPTER 1: Introduction

How does migration influence the political attitudes and practices of migrants? What kind of political values do migrants acquire in their host countries? What happens to these values when they return home? These questions are increasingly important in the current state of intense refugee and migrant movements, which hit the highest levels on record with 258 million people living outside of their country of birth in 2017 (IOM 2018)[1]. The literature on migrant political socialization and political remittances addresses these questions with an increasing interest after the downswing in the 1980s (Sapiro 2004).

Following the link between migration and home country development highlighted by international institutions such as the World Bank (Cassarino 2004; Kapur 2005), researchers in the last two decades have shown interest in topics such as social and political remittances and diffusion of democratic values in the home countries of migrants (Faist 2008; Goldring 2003; Kessler and Rother 2016; Levitt 1998; Meseguer and Burgess 2014; Perez-Armendariz and Crow 2010; Piper 2009; Rother 2009). In these debates, return migrants come forward with the potential to impact their home countries as actors of political and social change (Cassarino 2004). Concomitantly, the rise of new democracies in the post-cold war era (Jennings 2007) and the dramatic changes in receiving countries' immigration and naturalization policies raise curiosity about the effect of migration on national and local political cultures (Sapiro 2004, 2). Consequently, migrant political socialization and the question of how the migration experience affects

[1] According to IOM's World Migration Report (2018), this number will be around 405 million in 2050. In 2003, the organization's projection for the same year was only 230 million.

the political attitudes of the migrants have become topics of interest in the field (e.g., Black, Niemi, and Powell 1987; Jones-Correa 1998; Wong 2000; Gimpel, Lay, and Schuknecht 2003; Vargas-Ramos 2011; Careja and Emmenegger 2012a, 2012b; Wals and Rudolph 2018). This thesis seeks to contribute to the debate on return migrant political socialization with a case study on Turkish return migrants from Germany.

Political socialization refers to the process through which individuals learn their political behavior and establish political orientations, attitudes, beliefs and values related to the political system (Easton, Dennis, and Easton 1969; Greenberg 2017). Immigrants are already politically socialized individuals, who need to re-adopt their previous political learning and socialization to a new society (Wals 2011). This is a disruptive experience (Jones-Correa 1998) that can be interpreted as an exogenous shock that creates a natural test environment similar to that produced by wars and economic crises (White et al. 2008).

Studies on political socialization in general and migrant political socialization in particular have a strong quantitative orientation. Numerous scholars in the field focus on the comparison between migrant and non-migrant populations or the measurement of pre- and post-migration variables, rather than observing the dynamics of the socialization process itself. These studies contribute vastly to our understanding of the relationship between migration experience and changes in the political attitudes by producing systematic and generalizable findings based on large data-sets. However, the literature also receives criticism due to some of its basic theoretical assumptions and predominantly quantitative nature.

The starting point of this study is a four-fold argumentation in dialogue with the existing literature. First, following Greenstein (1970) and Conover (1991), I argue that political

socialization literature has a tendency towards normativity bias, which may lead to limitations when it comes to explaining *dissensus* and change in political systems. Secondly, and related to the first point, I defend that migrant political socialization studies tend to overlook the role of migrant agency in the course of the socialization processes, basing my argument on the work of authors such as Flanagan and Gallay (1995), Leung (2006) and Amnå et al (2009). Thirdly, I contend that studies limiting their focus to the pre- and post- migration variables or non-migrant and returnee populations in the measurement of the effects of political socialization are at risk of failing to capture the transnational dynamics of the political socialization process. Ultimately, I assert that the points addressed above stem from an overall tendency in the literature to overlook the processual dimension of political socialization and to predominantly concentrate on the outcomes of the process instead of the process itself (Greenstein 1970).

Based on these points, this study aims to contribute to migrant political socialization literature from an alternative theoretical and methodological perspective. I seek to examine the various aspects of the processual dimension of the political socialization of Turkish returnees from Germany, employing the relational approach (Desmond 2014), as well as the grounded theory methodology (Strauss and Corbin 1998, Charmaz 2006), both of which center on the study of social processes. Following an in-depth analysis of interviews conducted with the labor and student return migrants, as well as roots migrants (Wessendorf 2007), I reveal the inner dynamics of the socialization process from various vantage points. With the help of the migrants' biographical narratives, I seek to capture the process including the pre-migration and the post-return phases. I respectively address the role of agency in migrants' relations with agents of political socialization in the host country (Chapter 3), alternative pathways and constituent mechanisms of migrant

political socialization as a process (Chapter 4), and lastly its transnational trajectories (Chapter 5).

The analysis of the relation between return migrants and German agents of political socialization in Chapter 3 reveals that in many cases the return migrants do not have sufficient interaction with German agents to be subject to the conventionally assumed processes of political socialization. Rather, their accounts are rich in examples of political socialization within the German-Turkish or international migrant environments in Germany, which implies transnational mechanisms in political socialization processes. Chapter 3 also shows that when there is a possibility of contact and interaction, the migrants often use their agency to strategically filter, ignore and play around German political socializers, hinting at alternative socialization trajectories that are different than embracing and internalizing the host country political values. Chapter 4 unveils these alternative trajectories that constitute what I call "negative political socialization", referring to the migrants' learning and embracing their place as outsiders of a polity. Finally, Chapter 5 reveals a number of transnational patterns of political socialization through which conventional and negative processes of political socialization unfold.

Contrary to the neoclassical migration theory that "associates return migration to the failure to integrate at the destination" (De Haas, Fokkema and Fihri 2015, 415), the literature review shows that the characteristics and meaning of return from Germany change across migrant groups and epochs (Icduygu and Sert 2016). This thesis focuses on three different groups with different characteristics of class, transnationality and generation, as well as different dynamics of migration and return and seeks to contribute to the literature by revealing the variations within and among these groups in the unfolding of the political socialization process. The group-based approach helps in

unpacking the idea of return as failure and in questioning the assumption of political socialization as absorption of host country political values. It also constitutes an alternative to the treatment of ethnic groups as the primary unit of analysis, which is a main tendency in migration studies (Glick-Schiller 2012, 521).

Literature review

What is political socialization?

Political socialization refers to the process through which individuals learn their political behavior and establish political orientations, attitudes, beliefs and values related to the political system (Easton, Dennis, and Easton 1969; Greenberg 2017; Hyman 1959). The term political socialization was used for the first time in 1959 by Herbert Hyman in his book *Political Socialization*. Hyman emphasized the idea that political behavior was learned behavior, and mainly concentrated on political participation in the electoral sphere (Conover 1991). He mentioned family, schools and friends as the main elements that shaped the individual's learning (1959).

In the 1960s, in line with the behavioralist and functionalist spirit of the era, the central assumption in the field was that the major function of political socialization was to ensure political stability and maintenance of the current political system (Easton, Dennis and Easton 1969; Conover 1991). The centrality of the individual for the maintenance and functioning of political institutions also became more emphasized (Dahl 1961). According to Sapiro (2004), along with Easton's system theory, Almond and Verba's book *The Civic Culture* (1963) was another major theoretical base for the interest in political socialization at the time (in Wass 2007). Following Almond and Verba (1963), at the macro level, political socialization is regarded to have a central role in the development of the political culture, which, in turn, makes possible the functioning of

political institutions and practices or the production of individual's support for the political system.

However, later on, political events such as the Vietnam protests and student movements of the 1960s became an empirical challenge against the main theoretical assumptions of political socialization theories of the 1960s regarding early socialization (Conover 1991). In this atmosphere, more attention started to be paid to adult political socialization with an emphasis on the importance of generational effects and life cycles, as well as on the role of events and environment in political socialization (Niemi and Sobieszek 1977). Socialization started to be considered as a response to the context and to the ways in which the context might have changed (Jones-Correa and Ajinkya 2007). Although not very dominant in literature, a model of lifelong socialization, rather than persistent early socialization was adopted by a number of scholars at that time (Mortimer and Simmons 1978).

The theoretical elaborations on lifelong political socialization are divided into two major camps. One argues that there might be cohort and generational effects in political socialization since exogenous shocks such as deep economic crises or wars can significantly shape the attitudes of generations or cohorts at a particular time. This camp underlines the idea of individual resocialization as a result of external shocks (Searing, Wright, and Rabinowitz 1976; Jennings and Niemi 2014, Jones-Correa and Ajinkya 2007). The second camp asserts that individuals' experiences commonly change at different points of their lives at moments such as marriage or having children, which can affect their political socialization. The main idea of both camps is that political socialization might begin at early ages but may take a different course over time with significant life events (Jones-Correa and Ajinkya 2007).

Migrant political socialization

Immigrants are already politically socialized individuals who need to re-adopt their previous political learning and socialization to a new society (Wals 2011; Garcia-Castañon 2013). In the case of the first-generation migrants, migration generally means starting a new life at a new social and political context at the working-age. Undoubtedly, this is a groundbreaking experience and can be interpreted as an exogenous shock, as is the case with wars and economic crises (White et al. 2008; Jones-Correa and Andalon 2008). Creating a natural test environment, migration enables us to analyze the effects of this common exogenous shock on political socialization and gives the opportunity to sever it from individual life-course events (White et al. 2008). In this context, research on migrant political socialization focuses on issues such as persistency of early learning and life-long learning, the question of how to separate individual life course events from generational and cohort effects and the question of whether the findings in the literature, which mainly focus on middle-class whites, are generalizable (Garcia-Castañon 2013, Jones-Correa and Ajinkya 2007).

In this framework, there are three main approaches to the political socialization of immigrants. One possibility is that the beliefs and actions prior to migration stay resistant to change, supporting the persistency hypothesis. Or, in line with the exposure hypothesis, the longer the immigrants are exposed to the host country environment, the more they will adapt to it. A third alternative is presented by the transferability hypothesis, which focuses on the continuity of life experience across different contexts. Accordingly, pre-migration political socialization can help immigrants' adaptation to the host country, and migrants can find ways to transfer their beliefs and behaviors from the home country to the host country's political environment. (White et al. 2008, 270).

In the measurement of migrant political socialization, scholars extensively focus on themes such as electoral behavior, partisanship and political trust, investigating how pre- and post-arrival socialization affect these. Studies on post-arrival socialization investigate issues such as the role of learning through time rather than aging (e.g.,Cain, Kiewiet, and Uhlaner 1991; Black, Niemi, and Powell 1987), language skills (e.g., Wong 2000; Ramakrishnan 2005), the neighborhood context and immigrant networks (e.g., Cho, Gimpel, and Dyck 2006), citizenship status (e.g., Wong 2000; Staton, Jackson, and Canache 2007), and communication socialization agents (e.g., Liu and Gastil 2014), all of which imply adult re-socialization (Jones–Correa and Andalon 2008). As for the pre-arrival dynamics, earlier research focuses on the influence of national and ethnic differences on migrant political behavior (Wals 2011), whereas more recent studies investigate the role of pre-migration variables such as partisan identification, political trust (Wals 2011), political repression and poverty (White, Bilodeau, and Nevitte 2015; White 2017) on migrant resocialization in the receiving country.

Return migrant political socialization

As Vargas-Ramos (2011, 131) writes, returning home is quite different than going to a new country with many unknowns, and "familiarity with the home country would alone make re-entry a different process than it would be for someone who may have been never been there at all." However, he argues, return and settling down may not be a simple process especially if the home country or the individual have changed since his or her departure to the receiving country (Vargas-Ramos 2011).

As these points also hint, the literature on return migrant political socialization looks at the processes of desocialization and resocialization in host and home country contexts and tests hypotheses such as the life-long political socialization and the persistency of

early-learned values and attitudes. A number of studies also combine the political socialization approach with social and political remittances and ask to what extent the return migrants affect his or her home country's political culture in general or by way of influencing the household.

As in the case of migrant political socialization, the literature on return migrant political socialization heavily relies on quantitative approaches that compare returnees with non-migrants. In their study of the political attitudes and behaviors of the Romanian return migrants, Badescu and Sum (2008) set off with the hypothesis that political orientations learned in early life change over the course of a lifetime. In this context, they apply the political socialization theory to their investigation of whether the Romanian returning migrants "demonstrate a set of attitudes and norms that is more consistent with a democratic political culture than their compatriots who have not worked abroad?" They also ask, "to what extent the attitudes of members of migrant households differ from the general population." (2008, 3) The results, however, point to no significant difference in many measures of the political culture between return migrants and the rest of the population.

Following Hoskin (1989) and Siegel and Hoskin (1977), in his study on political resocialization of the Puerto Rican return migrants Vargas-Ramos (2011) states "on entering a new political system, migrants make assessments of the new environment on the basis of what they already know about the world of politics and the orientations toward that world they already have". Based on the idea of resocialization, he uses the case of Puerto Rican return migration to look at how the change in political environment caused by migration affects the political orientations of the returnees. His findings show that "migrants become desocialized when living in the United States, and become politically resocialized on their return" (2011, 125). He adds that when desocialized

abroad, the migrants internalize the patterns they display in the host country in order to deploy them when they return to Puerto Rico. Yet, he concludes that political desocialization in the host country does not have a permanent impact on migrant political orientations and "does not seem to suffuse the political system of the society of origin" (2011, 128).

Careja and Emmeneger (2012) ask the same question of whether the migrants returning from Western democracies to Central and Eastern Europe display different political attitudes than the non-migrant population. Their theoretical focus is on the changes in the material and cognitive conditions of the migrants, as the determinants of political attitudes and behaviors. They claim that political attitudes are determined by individual socio-economic characteristics (Almond and Verba 1963) and "migration improves the material and cognitive situation of individuals (i.e. better economic status and more knowledge) (Epstein and Radu 2007; Pantoja and Segura 2003), two factors which have been repeatedly identified as determinants of political attitudes and behaviors" (2012, 873). Based on this line of thought, they hypothesize that the self-improvement (economic and cognitive) acquired through migration influences the political attitudes of migrants vis-à-vis the political sphere in general and increases their political participation (2012, 883). Their findings show that migration experience has a significant effect on the political attitudes of the returnees, only if these attitudes are related to the material and cognitive improvements of the migrants.

In-depth approaches to return migrant political socialization and remittances are rare when compared to the deductive approaches. An example is the work of Kubal (2015), who focuses on the idea of legal consciousness as a form of social remittance by the return migrants. She asks how return migrants' experiences of legality abroad affect their attitudes and practices toward the law in their country of origin (2015, 68). Based on in-

depth interviews with Ukrainian returnees and their family members, she reveals the different ways in which the returnees and their family members interpret and innovate upon social remittances in different ways. On a general level, her findings show that social remittances are "shaped not only by people's experiences prior to migration and in their respective host countries, but are also adapted to the conditions they encounter *upon* their return." (2015, 68)

Overall, an examination of the literature on return migrant political socialization demonstrates that scholarship in this area is a continuation of migrant political socialization studies. It largely relies on comparative quantitative analyses of non-migrant and returnee populations and focuses on the main theories of political socialization such as life-long learning or persistence of early-learned values from the perspective of return migration. Moreover, it usually operates with concepts such as de-socialization from and re-socialization to the home and host countries after (return) migration, which assume a linear sequential logic of political socialization across the migration experience. Lastly, it tends to think of return migrant political socialization interlaced with the idea of social and political remittances.

Using large data sets that make it possible to systematically compare returnees and the non-migrants, these studies successfully present generalizable findings on the effects of the migration experience on political attitudes. Thanks to their deductive approach, scholars of return migrant political socialization test the fundamental theories in political socialization from the perspective of migration studies and in the context of different countries. This strategy offers rich possibilities of systematic comparisons of different migration contexts and a myriad of host country-home country pairs. Despite such

strengths, these commonly-adopted approaches to political socialization also have their shortcomings, a discussion of which forms the base of this thesis. I address these points in the following section.

Four arguments in dialogue with commonly-used approaches in migrant political socialization studies

System maintenance, status quo bias, and normativity: the politics of political socialization

In 1965 David Easton writes that the most important contribution of socialization to system maintenance is by the development of diffuse system support, which is "a generalized belief in the legitimacy of the regime and its authorities" (Kinder and Sears 1985, 715). The idea of system maintenance draws criticism of *status quo bias* or *conservative bias* (Greenstein 1970). For example, Greenstein (1970) argues that although it is possible to reject the prevailing political norms, along with the possibility of their absorption, political socialization studies fail to explain system change. Likewise, other scholars argue that studies with a focus on system maintenance "distort the vision of the researchers and lead them empirically to underestimate heterogeneity, *dissensus* and change." (Conover 1991, 135) (see Kavanagh 1983; Sapiro 1987; Lindblom 1982).

Parallel to that, political socialization approach is also questioned for being "normative" (Wass 2007). A number of authors assert that the focus on system maintenance prevents the researchers from questioning whose system or what kind of a system is maintained (Conover 1991; Wass 2007). Conover (1991, 137) writes that "to specify the content of socialization more fully and meaningfully, we must take seriously the fact that socialization is a political process. We must take seriously the question of who controls - and who benefits from - the socialization process." Similarly, Wass (2007) argues that researchers should be careful to not attribute any prescriptive value to the idea of political

socialization because what we understand from successful political socialization is "always the product of a certain period" (2007, 6).

When migrant political socialization is considered in this framework, the power inequalities within the system maintenance objective of the socialization process become clearer. Several authors contend that immigrants are pushed to 'fit in' with the way of life in the host country in order to gain membership and legitimacy in political and social terms (Conover 1991, Garcia-Castañon 2013; also see Daniels 2005; Ngai 2004, cited from Garcia-Castañon 2013). They are told "to 'socialize' towards the accepted system in order to attain citizenship, or risk alienation, subjugation or deportation" (Garcia-Castañon 2013). Critical scholars also underline a point in the intellectual history of the term where the distinction between the attainment of attitudes that do and do not serve system maintenance is made through the distinction between political socialization and political learning. Accordingly, political socialization refers to "society's molding individuals into citizens", whereas political learning refers to "idiosyncratic personal growth" (Kinder and Sears 1985, 714) and "the attainment of attitudes that do not necessarily contribute to the maintenance of the political system." (Conover 1991, 130)

Arguably, there is a tendency in migrant political socialization studies to take for granted the idea of 'support' orientation to the political system of the host country. This tendency manifests itself in measuring the positive attitudes of the individuals towards the system, rather than giving a thorough picture of their political orientations (Conover 1991; Garcia-Castañon 2013). In the work of Careja and Emmenegger (2012) for example, we see a direct positive association of improvement of cognitive and economic conditions with the migration experience and a following expectation that the return migrants will show support for Western democratic values. They base their study on the hypothesis that contact with democratic contexts translates into democratic political attitudes. However,

their results show that the diffuse support exists only regarding the EU institutions and that other components of Western democratic values are not in the picture.

Badescu and Sum (2008) also base their argument on the same hypothesis and find that when compared to the non-migrant population, there is no significant change in the position of the return migrants regarding Western democratic values. Such results may justify the persistence of early life learning theory, may refer to a quick and deep de-socialization from the politics of the host country upon return, may mean that the migration experience is not as effective as expected, or may simply imply that although there is a degree of political learning there is no political socialization that produces the diffuse support orientations (see, for example, Rother 2009).

Individuals are not passive receivers of the political socialization process

Similarly, political socialization studies are also criticized for considering individuals as passive receivers of the contextual and institutional changes and not attributing them active agency in their socialization process. Commonly-used terminology such as the 'democratic *spillover* effects' (Mahmoud et al 2013; Chauvet and Mercier 2014) and 'democratic *diffusion*' (Lauth and Pickel 2008; Rother 2009) illustrate how host country political values are presumed to be received positively and internalized automatically by the migrants as they imply that democracy is diffused across counties similar to a spontaneous and unintended communication of an attractive innovation. Arguably, this approach ascribes very little agency to the migrants themselves.

A part of more recent research on political socialization emphasizes that the socialization process is as not as static and passive as has been assumed by previous literature. Accordingly, individuals actively interact and negotiate with the social, political, economic and cultural contexts and they take their decisions through constant

constructing, refining and reconstructing their political realities (see Flanagan and Gallay 1995; Flanagan and Sharrod 1998; Amnå et al 2009). Research on political attitudes shows that rather than being a result of exposure to certain conditions, attitude change depends on various variables related to message, message context and individuals themselves (Leung 2006, 54). Arguably, this is in line with the aforementioned critique of Conover (1991), who disentangles political learning from political socialization and underlines that while the former can take place without generating system support, the latter involves "fitting in" to get accepted to the polity. Such a distinction makes possible the hypothesis that the migrants, as active agents, interact and negotiate with different economic, political and social contexts; they may deliberately learn, but refuse to support certain political attitudes and behaviors. In other words, they may strategically learn the political culture of the host country to navigate through the political and social institutions or to become a member of the polity without actually internalizing and supporting it.

Migrant political socialization can be transnational

Another tendency in the literature on migrant socialization is the assumption that the political socialization process is limited by the national boundaries of the home and host countries. In order to measure the effects of political socialization, researchers in the field mostly focus on quantifying and comparing political attitudes in the pre- and post-migration contexts or between returnees and non-migrants. Although they give systematic and generalizable results for hypothesis testing, these studies do not address the transnational networks, identities and practices of the migrants, which arguably have a central role in their political socialization.

Even though it is analytically convenient to theorize migration as an exogenous shock similar to wars and economic crises and measure the effects of pre- and post- migration

variables on political socialization, the fact that migration is not only a temporal but also a spatial exogenous shock creates a conceptual dilemma. Unlike wars and economic crises (which are temporal in nature), in the case of migration, pre-treatment (pre-migration) context may continue to exist along and in interaction with the post-treatment (post-migration) context, due to the transnational condition of migration, simultaneously including home and host countries as reference points. In other words, after migration, the migrant and his or her political socialization does not have to be isolated to the host country context (or home country context upon return migration). Rather, it may be quite a transnational process thanks to his or her transnational ties, practices and identities.

The limitations of the nationally-bounded conceptualization of political socialization become more obvious when categories such as resocialization and desocialization are used to explain the political socialization processes in return migration. In this literature, political socialization is conceptualized in a sequential order of socialization, desocialization and then resocialization. While desocialization means an "overthrow of existing values", socialization stands for "the inculcation of new values, attitudes and knowledge, and transmission of new information" (Roy 2014, 29). In the case of return migration, de- and re-socialization may occur twice: after emigration and after return migration. The work of Vargas- Ramos (2011) on the Puerto Rican return migrants from the US, which I cited earlier, illustrates this point clearly. Vargas-Ramos applies this rationale and starts with the question of "how change in political environment given by migration from one polity to another changes the political orientations of the individuals." (2011, 127) He undertakes a quantitative study based on the assumption that "change in orientations may take two directions: one occurs when the change is away from the sending society's patterns of political orientations and in conformity to established

patterns in the receiving society, while the other direction may be away from patterns in the sending society but not in conformity to established patterns in the receiving society." (2011, 137) Accordingly, while the former type means "desocialization of previous psychological makeup and resocialization to the new environment", the latter stands for "desocialization from a previous psychological profile, but resistance to socialization in the new environment." For Vargas-Ramos, "the extent of this desocialization and resocialization" depends on two factors: "length of exposure to and psycho-political engagement with the new political environment." (2011, 137) Arguably, the basic assumptions of studies as such suggest a methodological nationalist perspective in the analysis of political socialization of the return migrants (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002; Faist 2012), overlooking the possibility that the migrants could tap into both home (pre-migration or post-return migration) and host (post-migration) contexts in their socialization trajectories due to their transnational condition.

The processual character of political socialization is understudied

I argue that the limitations expressed above are corollaries of another tendency in political socialization literature. Although there is a clear conceptual difference between the process of political socialization and its outcomes, the empirical studies tend not to make a distinction between the two; and they tend to treat the outcomes of political socialization as the process of political socialization itself. One of the early statements in this line belongs to Greenstein, who underlines the inattention of the scholars to the actual sequences of socialization. He writes that while the political socialization researchers 'pay lip service to the *desideratum* of studying the actual developmental processes of inculcation and absorption' (1970, 972), only a few could observe these processes.

Put differently, despite the fact that 'political socialization ' is by definition a *process*, many studies actually do no more than measuring a number of variables for return migrants and non-migrants, or in the pre- and post-migration context. I argue that in this picture, the process of socialization itself remains as a black box, and this is why studies tend to overlook questions such as migrant agency, the forms of political learning that do not produce diffuse support for the political system, whose system is being maintained or reproduced by political socialization, power inequalities within the process and the transnational pathways within it.

These four main arguments constitute the central axis of this thesis. Each empirical chapter asks a question in dialogue with one or more of these points, challenging some of the common assumptions in migrant political socialization literature. Chapter 3 questions the democratic diffusion theory and tries to locate the role of migrant agency in the migrants' relations with the political socializers of the host country. Chapter 4 confronts the conceptualization of political socialization as a process of manufacturing diffuse support and transforming the migrants to the insiders of the host country political system. Chapter 5 disputes the methodological nationalism ingrained in migrant political socialization studies and tries to reveal transnational pathways of migrant political socialization. In a field predominantly evolving on the quantitative methodologies, studying political socialization from the perspective of the relational methodology and the grounded theory methodology is the main methodological contribution of this thesis. These approaches allow return migrants' own accounts on the socialization experience and everyday interactions to be revealed, in contrast to the focus on formal indicators such as electoral participation or political trust in survey methodologies.

Research design

Research context

This research concentrates on a case study of the Turkish labor and student return migrants, as well as the roots migrants from Germany. Given that the studies on migrant political socialization often adopt quantitative approaches, a case study can arguably address the lack of the in-depth approaches in this literature, calling for attention to the unpacking of the processual dimension and unveiling return migrants' socialization experience from their own perspective, in contrast to the attempts of capturing its formal expressions via survey studies (see Shkopi and Vathi 2017).

Return migration from Germany to Turkey is an interesting case for the framework of this study for a number of reasons. Turks are the largest immigrant group in Germany, constituting 15% of all individuals with a migration background in terms of their countries of origin (Federal Statistical Office of Germany 2017). Today, Germany has the highest concentration of the over six million Turkish citizens abroad, followed by France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria and Switzerland (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2017). Due to the difficulties in tracking down undocumented migrants, it is not possible to give an accurate estimate of the Turkish community in Germany. According to the 2016 figures of the Ministry of Family, Labor and Social Services[2], there are 6,610,781 Turks abroad, 3,081,113 of whom live in Germany; 1,575,000 of these are German citizens. Other sources state that the Turkish population in Germany is nearly four million (Sirkeci, Cohen and Yazgan 2012). According to Federal Statistical Office

[2] Former Turkish Ministry of Labor and Social Security

of Germany, between 1972 and 2009, 810,481 Turkish citizens received a German passport (2011).

Return migration is an increasingly significant phenomenon for the Turkish population in Germany. The decline in the number of Turks in Germany has been present since the mid-1990s (Icduygu and Sert 2016). In 2006, the number of German-Turks leaving Germany (33,229) exceeded the number of Turkish people migrating to Germany (31,449). According to the most recent figures in the literature, this new trend, which took place for the first time since 1980, still persisted in 2011, when 32,756 Turks left and 31,021 entered Germany (Aydin 2012).

Although Turkish migration to Germany and now return migration are popular subjects in migration studies, they are quite understudied from the perspective of political socialization. In this context, I choose to study Germany as the host country because, being the first country that opened its doors to Turkish labor migration and hosting the highest Turkish migrant population in the world, Germany allows socialization experiences across three generations of labor migrants, as well as the student migrants, which is a more recent phenomenon, to be captured.

Further, focusing on Turkish return migration enlarges the perspective of the research and permits a more complex analysis in a number of ways. First, in the case of the second and the third generation return migrants, in other words, the roots migrants, who migrate to their parents' homeland (Wessendorf 2007), it is only by focusing on return migration that the research can reveal the ways in which moving to a new country influences the socialization processes (assuming that these individuals have not lived in a third country before). Second, studying the biographical accounts of these three groups including the

pre-migration and post-return phases allows an analysis of political socialization that expands over almost six decades in two countries. This provides the opportunity to examine how the political and social contexts of the countries corresponding to the migration experiences of the participants may influence the socialization processes. Third, as return migration theoretically involves the so called 'de- and re-socialization processes' more than once (i.e. after emigration and after return migration), it provides the possibility of capturing more complex dynamics at the level of migrants' every day accounts, which supposedly include examples of de- and re-socialization both in Turkey and Germany.

The groups

In this thesis, I focus on the first-generation labor migrant returnees, their second and third generation descendants who return, in other words the 'roots migrants' (Wessendorf 2007), and the student migrant returnees. These three groups illustrate different faces of the Turkish migration experience in Germany, with different degrees of social, cultural and symbolic capital and different transnational conditions.

Turkish official records state that between 1961 and 1974 around 800,000 workers migrated to Europe through Turkish Employment Service, 649,000 of whom went to Germany (Icduygu and Sert 2016). According to the German Federal Bureau of Statistics, the number of Turkish citizens migrating to Germany as guest workers between 1961 and 1973 was 1,357,790 (Tezcan 2018).The first generation labor migrants are workers with very little education and language skills. They were recruited in the 1960s and 70s for blue collar jobs from small villages of Turkey, and many of them initially planned to return to Turkey as soon as possible. This group consists of migrants with the lowest

cultural and social capital and the weakest transnational ties, at least in the beginning (Caglar 1995).

According to the German Federal Bureau of Statistics there were 1.5 million second-generation Turks in Germany by 2012 (Hartmann 2016). Studies show that the second-generation Turks in Germany have managed to improve their positions in German society despite the lasting significant differences with the Germans (Crul and Vermeulen 2003). One important aspect of the second- and third-generation migrants for the framework of this study is that, unlike the students and first-generation labor migrants, they are born and/or raised in the German-Turkish transnational space (Levitt 2009). In this framework, their migration to Turkey is called roots migration, referring to migration to their parents' homeland generally with an expectation "to find an ideal homeland which had provided them with a strong sense of belonging during their transnational childhoods and adolescences." (Wessendorf 2007, 1083) Some possibly observe 'discrepancies between their images of the homeland prior to migration and the actual realities they meet once they settle there.' (2007, 1083)

Student migration is an increasingly important phenomenon all over the world. The number of international students reached 4.8 million in 2016 from 2 million in 2000. Germany is one of the six prominent receiving countries of student mobility (IOM 2018). Turkish student migrants, who migrate to Germany, especially since the 1990s in order to pursue mostly Master's, PhD and post-doctoral degrees and later return to Turkey, constitute the third group in this study. According to the figures of the German Federal Bureau of Statistics from 2010, Turks constituted the fifth largest mobile foreign student group in German higher education institutions, following Chinese, Russian, Bulgarian

and Polish students (Suoglu 2012). Among the 189,500 mobile foreign students in the winter semester of 2009/10, 6,635 were from Turkey. According to the same figures, mobile foreign students from Turkey constitute less than half of non-mobile foreign students from Turkey, meaning that students from Turkey in German higher education are predominantly the second-generation German-Turks (Suoglu 2012). However, as Suoglu (2012, 72), also suggests "existence of those coming from Turkey to Germany only for study reasons cannot be ignored."

Belonging to a migration type that includes both experience/travel/pleasure-seeking and migration of highly-skilled professionals (King 2002, 98-99), student migrants are the ones with the highest cultural, social and symbolic capital and they have important social class differences when compared to the two other groups. This migration type coincides with the globalization of education with programs such as the Erasmus scheme as well as the globalization of the labor markets for highly skilled individuals (King 2002). In this framework, rather than living in a transnational diaspora setting like the other two groups, these migrants tend to be embedded in a global student environment in their host countries.

Methodology

Following the idea that the processual dimension of political socialization tends to be overlooked in political socialization studies, I employ the relational ethnographical methodology (Chapter 3 and Chapter 5) and the grounded theory methodology (Chapter 4), both of which center on social processes from different perspectives. Relational social theorists criticize substantialist approaches, including statistical variable analysis, due to their "process-reduction" and artificially severing ties between people, places,

organizations, or ideas to study these entities in relative isolation (Desmond 2014). As an alternative, they suggest focusing on processes involving configurations of relations among different actors or institutions and studying fields rather than places, boundaries rather than bounded groups, processes rather than processed people and cultural conflict rather than group culture (Desmond 2014, 562). Chapter 3, where I examine the role of the migrant agency as a temporal and relational concept (Emirbayer and Mische 1998), and Chapter 5, where I focus on the unfolding of political socialization on the German-Turkish transnational field rather than containing it to bounded national territories, are the two chapters in which I rely on the relational approach.

In Chapter 4, where I reveal the mechanisms of an alternative process of political socialization, which I call 'negative political socialization ', I make use of the grounded theory approach. The grounded theory methodology aims at discovering relevant categories and the relationship among them and relating these categories to each other in new rather than standard ways (Strauss and Corbin 1998, 49). The coding paradigm in the grounded theory allows the researcher to "focus on specifying a category in term of the conditions that give rise to it; the context in which it is embedded; the action/interactional strategies by which it is handled, managed and carried out; and the consequences of these strategies" (Strauss and Corbin 1998, 97). My focus here is both on mapping social processes and their consequences for the participants, and on the individual experiences (e.g. their thoughts, feelings, beliefs, memories) in it (see Charmaz 2006).

The in-depth interviews conducted in this study follow the guidelines of the biographical research, which draw on narratives of the participants to analyze social processes

(Fischer-Rosenthal 2000). In the interviews, I ask the returnees to explain various biographic details such as how their life was before migration, why they decided to migrate, how they got used to their new life etc. Using the biographic researchers' vocabulary (see Fischer-Rosenthal 2000), I seek to shed light on the different ways in which the process of political knowledge and experience transfer occurs in the political socialization of the return migrants from Germany.

The structure of the thesis

In Chapter 2, I elaborate on my methodological motivations, my research strategies, and the selection of the case and the interviews. Chapter 3 is the first empirical chapter of the thesis, which addresses the role of the migrant agency in the migrants' relations with the German agents of political socialization. Based on the critique of the ideas of democratic diffusion and democratic spillover effects, the chapter asks to what extent the three migrant groups are in interaction with the German agents of political socialization while living in Germany and to what extent they use their agency to avoid or engage in contact with them, as well as to filter, ignore or reject their inputs. The analysis of the interviews inspired by the relational ethnographical approach shows that for all three groups of migrants, their interactions with the German friends, co-workers and community are often curbed by structural limitations such as the demographic constitution of the workplace or school. Moreover, in line with the critique on methodological nationalism, rather than speaking of German socializers, the migrants' accounts are rich in examples of transnational political socialization within the German-Turkish and other international migrant communities.

In terms of media and news consumption, factors beyond agency such as lack of language skills are at work on occasion especially for the first-generation labor migrants. However,

the three migrant groups also engage or sometimes refuse to engage with the German political news media strategically and selectively, depending on their needs and desires. As for messages of political parties and the election campaigns, the migrants again selectively and strategically engage with them, exclusively focusing on a limited number of topics, such as their pro-migrant policies or whether they have Turkish candidates.

The migrants' strategic engagement with the German agents of political socialization and the structural constraints that curb the interaction between the two hint that political socialization does not always unfold in the form of the migrants' uncritically internalizing German political values as assume by the defenders of the democratic diffusion theory or the spillover effects (Rother 2009; Lauth and Pickel 2008; Mahmoud et al 2014). With the help of the grounded theory approach, Chapter 4 takes this point one step further and attempts to unpack the political socialization process to reveal what other mechanisms might be at work in the interaction of the migrants with the agents of political socialization along their migration trajectories both in Germany and Turkey. The empirical findings point to an alternative process of *negative political socialization*, which, in contrast to conventional political socialization, stands for the migrants' learning and embracing their place as the outsiders of the polity and contributing to the diffuse system support mechanisms from this outsider's position. Negative and conventional political socialization are concurrent processes and both are constituted by mechanisms such as *discriminatory experiences*, *empathy with the discriminator and the discriminated*, and *critical and non-critical interpretations of rationality*. Moreover, they condition and are conditioned by *boundary making mechanisms for the contested identities* of the migrants; together they lead to a set of discourses and practices which constitute a *strategic integration* repertoire.

The last empirical chapter, Chapter 5, is based both on the theoretical critique of methodological nationalism in political socialization studies and the findings in Chapter 3 regarding the notable socializing effects of the German-Turkish and international migrant communities on the migrants. In this chapter I ask to what extent and in what ways migrant political socialization can be conceptualized as a transnational process. The analysis of the interviews informed by relational ethnographical approach reveals various transnational trajectories, including indirect socialization to Turkish politics through the immigration experience in Germany, direct socialization to Turkish politics in the German-Turkish community and through the Turkish migrants' Turkey-oriented organized politics in Germany, direct socialization to the politics of third countries through contact with migrants from these countries, and socialization to Turkish politics after roots migration with transnational consequences for Germany.

CHAPTER 2: Methodology

This chapter gives a methodological overview of the research developed in this thesis. In addition to the discussion introduced here, each empirical chapter (Chapters 3, 4 and 5) also involves a summary of the methodological concerns in relation to the research questions they address. Overall, the main data source for this thesis is 58 biographical interviews conducted with the three migrant groups. In Chapter 3, where I focus on migrant agency in the political socialization processes, and in Chapter 5, where I delve into the transnational dimension of political socialization, I rely on the theoretical concerns of the relational ethnographical methodology in the analysis and interpretation of the interviews. In Chapter 4, I apply the grounded theory methodology (Strauss and Corbin 1998) with the aim of identifying an alternative process of political socialization. Issues of reflexivity of the researcher in the analysis of the interviews and the effects of temporality in the biographical narratives are the two main challenges in the research process. One weakness of the design is that the post-return phase is not as strongly captured for the student and labor migrants as it is for the roots migrants. In the following section, I discuss the reasons behind my methodological choices, case and group selection, as well as the details about the recruitment and profile of the interviewees.

Case selection: Why Turkish return migration from Germany across three migrant groups?

Research context

Germany is the first European country that opened its doors to Turkish guest workers with a bilateral treaty signed in 1961, and today it has the highest Turkish emigrant population in the world (Turkish Ministry of Labor and Social Security 2016). Migrants from Turkey are the largest immigrant group in Germany, constituting 15% of all individuals with a migration background in terms of their countries of origin (The German

Federal Statistics Office 2017). Despite being an important subject in the field of migration studies, Turks in Germany are an interestingly understudied group in political socialization literature. One of the advantages of focusing on Turkish migration in the German context is that, thanks to its long history of Turkish migration, it offers the possibility of research across different migrant groups. Along with an established Turkish diaspora across several generations, the country has also been an attractive destination for Turkish students since the 1990s, which offers an enriching opportunity to include three different returnee groups in the comparative focus of the research. In this way, in a comparative perspective across three migrant groups (the first-generation labor migrants, the roots migrants and the students), the effects of factors such as class, social and cultural capital, generational differences and the political contexts of Turkey and Germany that correspond to the time of migration run like a red thread throughout the analysis in every chapter.

Glick Schiller (2012) underscores the historical and social construction of the *other* in the context of binary thinking in the European tradition and calls for more attention to the alterity of migrants in social sciences as a response to their ethnicization. She writes, with binary thinking,

> … internal migration disappears, the migrant becomes the ethnic, and the ethnic group remains the primary unit of analysis in studies of migrant sociality (…) Diversity studies, debates about immigrant integration, assimilation, transnationalism and explorations of cosmopolitanism and cosmopolitan urbanism all begin with or take for granted concepts of 'the other'. Such a conceptualization projects identities as bounded essences. (2012, 521)

In this framework, locating the role of the factors counted above in the variations of the socialization trajectories of the Turkish returnees is important in a field in which

ethnicization of the migrants and treating the ethnic group as the primary unit of analysis is the main tendency (Glick-Schiller 2012, 521, also see Faist 2012).

The other advantage of the German case is that, thanks to its rich and long Turkish migration history, today it allows for the study of return migration, which has become an increasingly significant phenomenon since the 2000s (Aydin 2012). Centering on return migration, the design of the research allows as much diversity as possible in the political socialization trajectories to be captured in a number of ways. First, studying political socialization of the Turks in Germany allows for the examining of the "exogenous shock" effects (Jones-Correa 1998, White et al 2008) of moving to a new country only for the first-generation labor migrants and the students. Although the political socialization of the 1.5, second-, and third-generation German –Turks in Germany is part of the process of migrant political socialization, it does not involve the disruptive effects of living in a new country, as these individuals are born and/or raised in Germany. By focusing on return migration, which, for the 1.5, second-, and third-generations is actually 'roots migration', the research attempts to capture the impact of moving from one country to another for this group, as well.

One consequence of this design strategy is that the post-return political socialization trajectories of the labor and student migrants are not captured as vividly as those of the roots migrants. When asked about their post-return political socialization experiences, the first two migrant groups mostly do not come up with tangible narratives about their interaction with the agents of political socialization in Turkey. In their words, "there is nothing to say because it is the good old Turkey." As for the roots migrants, the disruptive impact of living in a new country is very salient in their accounts, which provides a fertile ground for the analysis of their political socialization in Turkey.

The strategy of capturing these disruptive impacts or "exogenous shock" effects for three groups has another implication for Chapter 3, in which my main concern is to examine whether the migrants are passive receivers of the host country political socialization messages in a context of democratic diffusion and spillover effects of these messages. As I question the concepts of democratic diffusion and spillover effects, I majorly focus on the relationship of the migrants with the German agents of political socialization in this chapter, without engaging in a symmetrical analysis of the same issue for Turkey. This could be considered as a weakness for the case of the roots migrants because, as I note above, their experience of migration as exogenous shock takes place when they move to Turkey, not while they are growing up in Germany. Although Chapter 3 fails to address this in the particular context of roots migrants' relationship with the agents of political socialization in the country they move to (i.e. Turkey) due to the design of the research and the theoretical concerns of Chapter 3, I strongly believe that the empirical material in other chapters adequately cover the trajectories of political socialization for this group from diverse angles, including their interaction with the agents of political socialization in Turkey. As transnational ties, networks and identities also play a role in the political socialization processes of the migrants, both Turkey and Germany, and the transnational political and social spaces across them constitute key reference points and contexts for the empirical analysis throughout the thesis.

As explained in Chapter 1, migrant political socialization studies assume a sequential order of 'socialization, desocialization, and resocialization', in which desocialization stands for the overthrow of existing values, while resocialization signifies the inculcation of the new ones (Roy 2014). Political socialization trajectories of the returnees, then,

involves two processes of de- and resocialization, one after migration to Germany and one after the return to Turkey. In this framework, concentrating on the returnees extends the possibilities of capturing variations in the political socialization processes, as well as their cross-border complexities. It is illustrative particularly in Chapter 5, in which I delve into the transnational dimension of political socialization.

Further, as briefly mentioned in Chapter 1, authors such as Leung (2006) and Rother (2009) argue, from very different perspectives, that the context in which the political socialization takes place is crucial for the socializing message to reach the individuals and have an impact on them. Arguably, it is important to capture the influence of the receiving political contexts of both countries, which have changed several times over the decades of Turkish migration to Germany, on the political socialization experiences of the migrants. For example, the German reunification of 1990 and the Gezi protests[3] of 2013 in Turkey are two events from two different decades, which often come up in the narratives of the labor migrants and the roots migrants, respectively. With a focus on three different groups of return migrants, this research obtains the chance to cover almost six decades in two countries to examine how the political and social contexts of the countries corresponding to the migration experiences of the participants may influence the socialization processes.

[3] Gezi protests are a wave civil unrest in Turkey that started in May 2013 as a reaction to the urban development plan for the Gezi Park in Istanbul. Following the violent eviction of the initial protests at the park, supporting protests and strikes broke out all over Turkey and a number of cities of the Turkish diaspora, with a vast array of concerns about the policies of the AKP government including limitations to freedom of expression and freedom of press.

The groups

Starting in the early 1960s as a temporary labor migration, the Turkish presence in Germany quickly turned into a permanent one. The recruitment stopped in 1973 due to the oil crisis, but Turks continued to migrate to Germany in other ways such as family reunification, especially in the 1970s and 1980s. Particularly after the 1980 *coup d'état* in Turkey, a political diaspora was added to the labor diaspora in Germany, and later due to the Kurdish conflict in Southeast Turkey. The 2000s witnessed an irregular migration (Sirkeci, Cohen, and Yazgan 2012).

The majority of the Turkish labor migrants came from small villages in central Turkey or the Black Sea region. They were recruited from the lowest socioeconomic layers and they did not have much education. Typically, their education was limited to the primary school level. Initially, they could not make significant advances in the labor market. Moreover, constraining factors such as economic crises and industrial restructuring caused them unemployment. However, in time, many managed to open their own businesses or assisted their children in doing so. (Crul and Vermeulen 2003).

Since the 1990s, the studies underline that Turks in Germany are internally stratified and they are also represented in almost every stratum of German society (Caglar 1995). It is not only that there is no significant difference between the German and Turkish workers regarding their economic capital, but the Turks also experience some upward economic mobility, owning firms and becoming employers (Caglar 1995, 311). Strong cohesion in the Turkish community significantly facilitated entrepreneurship. As Crul and Vermeulen (2003, 973) note, "The Turks as a group no longer seemed to fit into a collective

downward assimilation pattern. They exhibited many features of (…) upward mobility through ethnic cohesion" (also see Portes 1996).

Notwithstanding, cultural, social and symbolic capital of the first-generation is significantly weaker than the Germans. They have lower educational levels; their contacts and connections outside the Turkish migrant community are not effective and lower than the other migrant groups. Moreover, despite their economic upward mobility, they are unable to gain social recognition in Germany. This serious lack of symbolic capital depreciates the value of their economic, social or cultural achievements (Caglar 1995). On the same terrain, Diehl et al (2016, 243) draw attention to religious identities and write that ethnic boundaries and social distances are much stronger for the Turks when compared to many other non-Muslim migrant groups because ethnic boundaries are often defined in religious terms and "stereotypes about groups' alleged unwillingness to adapt and contribute to German society and culture are quite widespread." (also see Zolberg and Woon 1999; Foner and Alba 2008)

A frequently addressed aspect of the Turkish migration in Germany is its transnational ties. Today, there is an established Turkish community of several generations in Germany with strong transnational networks, identities and practices inquired from many different dimensions including transnational social spaces (Faist 1998), political practices (Østergaard-Nielsen 2001, 2003; Kaya 2012), sociality and belonging (Caglar 2001a; Ehrkamp 2005), cultural practices and identities (Caglar 1997, 1998; Yalcin-Heckmann 2002; Kaya 2007; Faas 2009) and cosmopolitanism (Caglar 2004; Mandel 2008; Pécoud 2004). Such studies have revealed that German-Turks have their own cultural and

political organizations, subcultures, and presence in German politics, and their networks and activities encompass both Turkey and Germany.

The second-generation German-Turks grew up in poor conditions by European standards. They experience significant disadvantages in their school careers, which stem from social rather than ethnic inequalities (Kristen and Granato 2007), especially the stratified school system creating barriers for migrants' children (Crul et al 2017). As Crul and Vermeulen (2003, 979) point out, in Germany the selection mechanism groups children into three school levels; when combined with "the late start in education and the below average contact hours", Turkish second-generation students find very limited time to "pull themselves out of their disadvantaged starting position." As a result, they typically choose shorter and more vocationally-oriented educational tracks when compared to the native populations or to Turks in other European countries (Crul and Vermeulen 2003).

Although when compared with the Turks in other countries, the second generation's position in the labor market looks more secure due to the apprenticeship, the employment gap between them and the Germans persists (Crul and Vermeulen 2003). Indeed, the employment gap between the second-generation Turkish men and the German men is worse than the first-generation. In terms of assimilation into the middle-class careers, again there is a significant difference between the Germans and the second-generation Turks due to lack of education, language skills, and social capital (Hartmann 2016). According to a study by Crul et al (2017), when compared to the equally educated respondents of native descent, respondents of Turkish descent with higher education degrees have a much higher probability to be unemployed or employed in a lower-level job, and many do not get hired for managerial positions, despite having advanced degrees.

As the authors write, individuals of Turkish descent find it difficult to "prove that they had been subjected to various forms of discrimination and exclusion", but that "almost all of them had had experiences that had lead them to think that, for example, their job applications had not been given equal consideration due to their family name or ethnic background. (Crul et al 2017, 3)

While their cultural, economic and social capital is higher than the first-generation, research shows that German-Turks are still significantly disadvantaged when compared to the German population. Another difference between the first and the following generations of labor migrants is that debates on transnational experiences, issues of identity and belonging, ethnicity and integration (Çelik 2015), blurry vs. bright ethnic boundaries (Alba 2005) are even more accentuated for the latter who are born and/or raised in the German-Turkish transnational social field (Levitt 2009).

Student migration is both 'a subset of youth migration motivated by a mixture of broader educational goals and experience/travel/pleasure-seeking' and a part of migration of highly-skilled professionals (King 2002, 98-99). While the migration of highly skilled people from Turkey has been observed since the 1960s with doctors and engineers as the first group of emigrants, student outmigration gains significance starting with the 1990s and 2000s. Media and scholarly attention to the phenomenon rise especially in the aftermath of the 2001 economic crisis (Tansel and Güngör 2003). Researchers explain this trend both due to the economic and political context in Turkey (Tansel and Güngör 2003) and as a result of the globalization trends on European education policies (King 2002, 99).

Germany is the most popular destination for Turkish and other international students after English-speaking countries (Süoglu 2012, 67). According to 2010 figures, students from Turkey enrolled at higher education institutions in Germany generally belong to the second-generation of immigrants, constituting the largest group of non-mobile foreign students (Suoglu 2012). Those coming from Turkey to Germany only for study reasons are less than half of the non-mobile students of Turkish origin, but they are still considered as a relevant group following students from China, Russia, Poland and Bulgaria (Suoglu 2012). A report by the Council of Education in Turkey (YOK), which dates back to 2007, underscores the lack of statistical data on the students from Turkey who go abroad to pursue their education. Relying on the figures by the Ministry of Education and the Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey (TUBITAK), which only focus on the scholarship holders of these institutions, the same report states that overall there are 19,209 students studying abroad who primarily prefer the U.S. and Germany (Suoglu 2012).

Given its class differences with respect to labor migration and the 'overlappings of socioeconomic and mobility types' it contains, student migration is an important component of the hierarchical divisions that arise in European migration since the early 1990s (King 2002, 98-99) (also see e.g., Koser and Lutz 1998; Baruch, Budhwar, and Khatri 2007). When compared to the labor migrants, student migrants have higher cultural and social capital, and they are likely to be embedded in the international student community in the receiving country, rather than a transnational diaspora environment.

Reasons for return

Following three different return waves before 1990s, return to Turkey declines between 1985 and 1998 as more migrants decide to settle down permanently in Germany (Kunuroglu et al. 2017). In the 2000s this tendency starts to change. In 2006, the number of German-Turks leaving Germany (33,229) exceeds the number of the Turkish migrating to Germany (31,449) (Aydin 2012). It is estimated that this trend stays the same each year between 2006 and 2012, with around 30,000 migrants of Turkish origin returning to Turkey each year (Aydin 2016; Kunuroglu et al. 2017).

The dynamics of returning from Germany to Turkey differ across the migrant groups. For the labor migrants, Razum, Sahin-Hodoglugil and Polit (2005) find that purely economic or health-related factors are seldom the reason to return; value-oriented and affective elements are almost always present. Issues such as religion and the sociocultural interpretation of health come up as factors that often predominate purely economic goals (2005, 732-34). The authors identify three 'ideal types': the ‘nostalgic' returnee “who is facing socio-economic problems in Turkey and has a transfigured notion of life in Germany which he would like to but cannot resume”; the 'cultural traditionalist' “who considers Turkish culture superior and left Germany without remorse after having made some money”; and the 'player of two systems' “who thrives in both Turkey and Germany”. (2005, 719)

In their study on the Turkish return migration from western Europe, Kunuroglu et al. (2017) argue that Turkish migrants already have the intention to return when they migrated to Western Europe. They state that the return is a multi-layered and multi-causal process, including both those that have been quite adapted, achieved their financial goals,

or have not experienced discrimination in the host society, and those that report the opposite. The migrants' reasons for return clustered around factors ranging from "the deteriorated economic conditions in the host country or recent improvements in the economy of Turkey to personal ones, such as wanting the children to pursue education in Turkey". They underline that perceived discrimination along with a strong sense of belonging to Turkey are the key factors that shape their decision (2017, 19).

As I stated earlier, I formulate the 1.5, second- and third-generation returnees as roots migrants, referring to the "migration of the second-generation to the parents' homeland" (Wessendorf 2007, 1083). These migrants "expect to find an ideal homeland which had provided them with a strong sense of belonging during their transnational childhoods and adolescences." (2007, 1083) Some possibly observe "discrepancies between their images of the homeland prior to migration and the actual realities they meet once they settle there." (2007, 1083) According to King and Kilinc (2014a, 132), both strong attachment to Turkish culture and detachment from the "inward looking traditional Turkish migrant communities" are factors that encourage roots migration from Germany. They find that education, marriage and escaping a specific condition are among the main motivations (King and Kılınc 2014a).

Also, in the case of the highly qualified second- and third-generation, the booming Turkish economy in the 2000s is cited as an alluring factor that attracts qualified professionals in this era. (Adaman and Kaya 2012; Aydin 2012)[4] According to Kunuroglu et al (2017), every year, attracted by the booming Turkish economy, 8,000 Turkish-origin

[4] In 2018, at the time of this writing, Turkey entered a currency and debt crisis, characterized by the plunging of Turkish lira and high inflation, the main cause of which is the excessive current account deficit and foreign currency debt. Partly as a consequence of this crisis, electoral support for the ruling party AKP fell in the local elections of March 2019.

immigrants and mostly their children return to Turkey for employment opportunities in sectors such as tourism and automotive. Moreover, the findings from Turkish Academics and Students in Germany (TASD) project by Sezer and Dağlar (2009) underline that with the increasing integration of the Turkish economy to the European market over the years, there is a rising demand for multilingual employees, which makes the booming regions such as Izmir and Istanbul attractive for the roots migrants. According to the same study, the lack of a sense of home in Germany is a characteristic reason for return, especially for young male graduate students, who mostly come from families who did not succeed in integration in Germany. For young women academics and students, professional reasons are in the foreground.

Icduygu and Sert (2016) underline the changing patterns and meanings of return migration of the guest workers and their descendants from Europe between the 1970s and the 2000s, pointing to a transition from a permanent to a more temporary and circular return. They explain how the characteristic of the return and the profile of the returnees change across decades. Accordingly, guest workers that returned in the 1970s stayed for relatively short durations and did not consider family reunification. Although they attained material and social benefits in the host country, these gains were not as high as expected. In any case, upon return they obtained a higher social status in Turkey.

As for those that returned in the 1980s, their duration of stay in Germany varied between two and 24 years. Due to longer years spent in Germany, they arrived in Turkey with more financial capital than those in the 1970s, which was generally enough to buy or construct family buildings in Turkey. One of the biggest differences

between this group and the previous was that as many of these migrants had benefitted from family reunification rights, among those who returned there were entire families (Icduygu and Sert 2016).

The profile of the returnees in the 1990s was significantly different than the previous decades. These were return migrants with more education, higher skills, longer periods of stay (between five to 35 years), and dual citizenship in Germany. They were regarded as successfully integrated to the host society, they had better language skills, and their children had no interest in returning to Turkey. In this period migrants started to strategically use the welfare system to make interest-based decisions, which gave rise to a post-retirement movement of dual citizens with a more circular character (Icduygu and Sert 2016).

As for the return patterns in the 2000s, Icduygu and Sert (2016) state that they are a continuation of the 1990s, with the addition of the roots migration to the picture. The authors describe the main profile of the roots migrants as follows: "many are German citizens born and raised in Germany with pink cards that grant them residence and work permits in Turkey. They are more educated. They are coming back for a certain period of time either as exchange students or professionals, literally looking for their roots and to understand life in Turkey." (2016, 270)

As to the student migrants, there is a very limited literature on their return dynamics. A few examples focus on the Northern American, British and the German context. Suoglu (2012) finds that the return intentions of the Turkish students in Germany are influenced by disadvantageous job prospects, homesickness, and feelings of discrimination. Aydin (2010) lists social and cultural networks and the economic growth in Turkey among the

pull factors for highly qualified migrant return, including the students. Suoglu (2012) further points out that high quality private universities with attractive employment opportunities in Turkey since the mid-1980s in contrast to the lack of job opportunities in Germany have been an important factor in Turkish academics' return. In their work on student non-return from the Northern American and British context, Tansel and Gungor (2003) find that political instability, lower salaries and lack of employment opportunities in the home country were the main explicatory factors. They also identify that there is a relationship between their return intentions and their initial return plans, which loses its strength with the duration of their stay abroad. Furthermore, return intentions appear to be weaker for the student migrants that work in academia or in specialized areas (Güngör and Tansel 2008).

Focusing on these three groups, this thesis aims at capturing the heterogeneities in the unfolding of the political socialization processes for the Turkish returnees from Germany, which is an understudied group in political socialization studies despite its popular place in migration studies. The differences between and within these groups hint that class, cultural, social, and symbolic capital, generational dynamics, and the political and social contexts of the countries at the time of migration are among the factors that may influence migrants learning and establishing their political values and attitudes. The research design allows an in-depth exploration of such factors, as diversely as possible.

It is important to underline that the insights obtained from this analysis are limited to the return migrants, although they include their political socialization experiences in Germany. Despite the fact that return migrants and immigrants are different in many ways, the heterogeneities in the profiles of the returnees across decades and across groups

indicate that a 'successful vs. failed integration' divide is not the core of these differences. Therefore, while the analysis attempts to cover heterogeneities of the returnee political socialization across groups, eras and countries, it is crucial to remember that it is not about individuals who could not successfully integrate to the host society, as the neoclassical approach to return migration would assume (Cerase 1974; De Haas, Fokkema and Fihri 2015).

Methods

The data collection in this thesis mainly relies on biographical interviews conducted with the three migrant groups. For all chapters, the interviews were transcribed and coded with Atlas.ti following an open-coding procedure inspired by the grounded theory methodology (Strauss and Corbin 1998) based on constant comparisons of the interview data to establish similarities and differences among the themes that emerge in the interviews. After the first round of open-coding I reached 170 codes, which I later grouped into 16 categories including German-Turks (Almancilik), citizenship, democracy, *raison d'état*, family, German politics, Germans, Germany, construction of identity, political party preferences, types of socialization, strategies, transnationalism, Turkey, Turks, Turkish politics. In Chapter 3 and Chapter 5, I analyze this material from the theoretical perspective of the relational ethnographical methodology. In Chapter 4, I use grounded methodology techniques: I further process the data with axial coding to understand the categories in terms of their conditions, contexts, consequences and the action strategies related to them, which enable me to re-integrate these categories to delineate return migrant political socialization as a social process. Below, I present a detailed discussion on the reasons for these methodological choices for each chapter.

Studying the processes of political socialization with the relational approach

In Chapter 3 and Chapter 5, analysis of these interviews is inspired by the relational ethnographical methodology. In the interpretation of the interviews I follow the theoretical concerns of the relational approach within the framework of the research questions in each chapter. In addition to this project's emphasis on the study of social processes, the approach to agency and structure in Chapter 3 and the focus on transnational dynamics in Chapter 5 make the relational approach a good fit in these chapters.

For the conceptualization of migrant agency in Chapter 3, I follow Emirbayer and Mische (1998), who turn to George Herbert Mead (1932) to build their own concept of agency with an endeavor to surmount the insufficient definitions of agency in rational-choice and norm-oriented approaches. The authors state that for their work two points raised by Mead (1932) are particularly crucial, revealing the centrality of relational thinking in their approach to human agency, which I elaborate on in the following chapter:

> "the concept of time as constituted through *emergent* events, which require a continual refocusing of past and future, and the concept of human consciousness as constituted through *sociality*, the capacity to be both *temporally* and *relationally* in a variety of systems at once." (1998, 968).

In Chapter 5, I attempt to unpack the unfolding of the political socialization process on the Turkish-German transnational political field, as a response to a bounded understanding of the process that contains it within the national frontiers of the host and home countries as implied by the concepts of de- and re-socialization. As Boccagni (2014, 2) writes, the challenge lies

> in exploring migrants' simultaneous references to two (or more) significant locales that are physically remote, biographically displaced from one another and still potentially connected by migrants' transnational ties; and in exploring the

> tangible effects of their interconnectedness both at homeland and in hostlands [sic].

The relational approach enables me both to relationally locate the migrant agency throughout the research, as opposed to its formulation in rational choice approaches, and to treat the political socialization of the migrants on a transnational political field, as a response to the simplistic formulation of a sequential socialization, desocialization, resocialization order.

As mentioned earlier, the literature on political socialization vastly relies on quantitative techniques and works with deductive approaches. These studies successfully present generalizable findings based on large data sets that allow the researchers to examine the differences in the political attitudes of return migrants and non-migrants, or before migration and after return. Thanks to this quantitative approach, the researchers can systematically capture the effects of the migration experience on political socialization and test the main theories in political socialization from the perspective of migration studies and in different countries.

However, as discussed in the introduction chapter, the statistical approaches to the topic have some shortcomings, as well. In accordance with this discussion, relational sociologists and ethnographers draw attention to the idea that statistical variable analysis is a substantialist perspective (Emirbayer 1997, 281), which "imposes static and atomistic categories on to a world made up of bunches of intertwining connections." Accordingly, "the analyst operating under the substantialist perspective artificially severs relations between people, places, organization s, or ideas to study these entities in relative isolation." (Desmond 2014, 551) By the same token, relational social theorists criticize

substantialist approaches, including statistical variable analysis, due to their "process-reduction". Following Elias (1978), process-reduction refers to "the reduction of processes to static conditions" , compelling analysts "to speak and think as though all objects of our thought - including people- were really not only static but uninvolved in relationships as well. " (Elias 1978, 112-113). This approach resonates well with my prior argument on how the process of political socialization is usually formulated as a black box, and how it creates conceptual limitations regarding the role of human agency in the process of socialization.

Instead of bounded groups or delimited locations as their object of inquiry, relational analysts focus on processes involving configurations of relations among different actors or institutions. The alternative data collection and interpretation offered in this approach includes studying fields rather than places, boundaries rather than bounded groups, processes rather than processed people and cultural conflict rather than group culture (Desmond 2014, 562). Regarding the study of fields, Desmond (2014, 563) underlines that "the relational ethnographer (…) does not amputate social relations through the imposition of categories based on bounded places (...) Rather, she attempts to construct a network of relations that guide everyday life, studying fields, rather than places." Accordingly, field theoretic analysis aims at mapping out the complex dynamics of social spaces and can reconstruct the perspectives of various actors situated at different points in the field (Desmond 2014, 563). Hence, this approach enables a look at people as "the evolving product of bundles of relationships with the other persons" and institutions (Weber 2001, 490 in Desmond 2014, 564). Arguably, this approach could provide a base for focusing on the transnational political field on which political socialization could take place, as a response to focusing on nation-state boundaries in the conceptualization of

migrant political socialization.

As Desmond notes, the relational approach is applied in three main different ways. Accordingly, the first group of researchers focuses on points of contact and conflict, observing "fight, struggle, cooperation and compromise, misunderstanding and shared meaning makings between actors occupying different positions in a field." (2014, 555). The idea of focusing on boundaries rather than bounded groups, and on cultural conflict rather than group culture is relevant in regard to the main argument I present in Chapter 3 in a critical dialogue with the assumption that political socialization in a democratic country (in this case Germany) takes place like an automatic transfer of political values, attitudes and culture with a spillover effect (see Rother 2009). This approach caters to an analytical perspective for studying the role of the migrant agency in migrants' contact with the German agents of political socialization, and the migrants' agentic acts of struggle, cooperation and compromise with these agents, as the main concern of Chapter 3.

The second approach involves studying "production of coordinated action through relational mechanisms" particularly in the study of organizations, with the question of how institutional actors create routines and shared meaning scripts together (2014, 555). As for the third approach, it concentrates on the ecology of a field by "focusing on the internal logics of distinct but interconnected social worlds." By doing so, it does not work with the logic of multi-sited ethnography that compares groups with their counterparts in other contexts.[5] Rather, it is tailored around chains, paths, connections and associations

[5] See Boccagni (2014) for a relational approach to multi-sited ethnography. While Desmond (2014) is critical about the multi-sited ethnography for its logic of cross-context comparisons, Boccagni (2014) argues that relationality can still be captured with "a flexible understanding of the 'multi-sited' – one open to the relational 'in-betweenness' and the ways in which every relevant site is negotiated, contested and reproduced over time."

of “at least two actors or agencies occupying different positions within the social space and bound together with a relationship of mutual dependence or struggle” (Desmond, 2014, 554-555). I find this approach particularly meaningful for Chapter 5, as my aim is to treat political socialization of the migrants as a continuous process taking place on the transnational political field, rather than conceptualizing Turkey and Germany as two different sites and comparing the socialization process after returning to Turkey with that in Germany as two different units.

Studying the political socialization processes with the grounded theory methodology

Like the relational methodological approach, grounded theory also focuses on the study of social processes, albeit from a different perspective. Earlier versions of grounded theory attempt to identify social processes and relationships, as well as their consequences for the participants (Willig 2013, 78). “What is happening here?” (Glaser 1978), or “What are the basic social processes?” are among the main questions that get the research started in these earlier versions (Charmaz 2006, 20). Rather than testing the relationship among variables, the grounded theory methodology aims at discovering relevant categories and the relationship among them and relating these categories to each other in new rather than standard ways (Strauss and Corbin 1998, 49). In this way, the researchers build contextualized theories ‘grounded in’ the data, instead of counting on analytical variables that come from earlier theories (Willig 2013, 69).

Grounded research starts with a question that makes as few assumptions as possible regarding the phenomenon under investigation and avoids using categories or variables barrowed from pre-existing theories. By the process of coding, the researcher identifies

categories, which, at low levels of abstraction, are generally descriptive labels that group together elements with common features. Further in the research, these initial descriptive concepts merge into more analytical meaningful and abstract categories. Along the coding process, the researcher engages in constant comparison and contrast of emerging categories to be able to identify further subcategories; searches for negative cases that do not fit the linkages s/he identifies between the categories so as to capture further complexities; and collects more data based on the emerging categories with the aim of reaching saturation and refining and narrowing down the categories. Theoretical saturation, which is an ultimate theoretical goal rather than an attainable reality (Willig 2013), occurs when no new categories arise from further data (Strauss and Corbin 1998).

The pioneers of grounded theory contest each other in their approaches to coding paradigms, which refer to merging low-level categories into more abstract higher-level ones. Coding paradigms define the particular ways in which the linkages between categories are established, giving priority to some categories over others. While Strauss and Corbin (1998) adopt a more structured approach and give special emphasis to 'process' and 'change', Glaser (1978) argues against the presupposition of the relevance of any constructs as such and states that the data itself should lead the researcher in deciding what categories and constructs should be given priority. More recently, Charmaz (2006; also 1990) advocates for a social constructivist approach and argues that theories are not *discovered*, neither do they *emerge* from data, but they are *constructed* by the researcher. Accordingly, 'the researcher creates an explication, organization and presentation *of* the data rather than discovering order *within* the data. The discovery process consists of discovering the ideas the *researcher* has about the data after interacting with it' (Charmaz 1990, 1169; original emphasis).

As the main concern of Chapter 4 is to decipher alternative processes of political socialization, I apply the structured approach of Strauss and Corbin (1998), which gives emphasis to 'process' and 'change'. Following the coding paradigm proposed by Strauss and Corbin (1998), which they call axial coding, I follow their advice to "focus on specifying a category in terms of the conditions that give rise to it; the context in which it is embedded; the action/interactional strategies by which it is handled, managed and carried out; and the consequences of these strategies" (Strauss and Corbin 1998, 97). Furthermore, in line with the constructivist approach of Charmaz (2006), I conduct the research considering the factors of subjectivity and reflexivity, considering that the researcher's decisions, questions, use of methodology and background may shape the research process and the findings (Willig 2013, 77).

In contrast to the early approaches' aim of mapping and explaining social processes, more recent research also makes use of the grounded theory approach only as a tool of analysis so as to be able to systematically present participants' experiences and understanding of a phenomenon. In this version, the researcher focuses on "the structure of the internal world of the participant (e.g. their thoughts, feelings, beliefs, memories) rather than its social context, causes or consequences" (Willig 2013, 78; also see Charmaz 1990). In Chapter 4, my aim is to combine these two perspectives and to capture both the lived experiences of the interviewees in the processes of political socialization and decipher both alternative constituent categories and mechanisms at work within the process.

Biographical research

The in-depth interviews in this thesis are conducted according to the framework of biographical research methodology. Biographical research draws on narrations of individuals to analyze social processes (Fischer-Rosenthal 2000). It seeks to understand

"the changing experiences and outlooks of individuals in their daily lives, what they see as important, and how to provide interpretations of the accounts they give of their past, present and future." (Roberts 2002, 1) The meaning and experience of historic change and institutional worlds (e.g. Germany under Nazism, German unification) have been studied with biographical methods, using biographical self-presentation in narrative format as the database (Fischer-Rosenthal 2000, 119).

Denzin (1989) notes that the biographical method is shaped by a number of concepts and terms such as life, self, experience, case, biography, discourse, narrative, personal history, life history, life story, and personal experience story. As Fischer-Rosenthal (2002, 119) writes, "the generative structures of the lived and experienced life history and of the self-presentation in the life-story interview, as well as their interdependence, are understood as principles that organize emergent events in the individual's life in order to enable him or her to achieve a consistent orientation." On this terrain, contemporary biographical research focuses on interactive 'transfer' of knowledge and experience, as well as on the question of generational transmission of experiences (2000, 119).

The structure of the interviews in this thesis evolves around the entire migration experience of the interviewees embedded within their broader life context. While seeking to capture the process of political socialization, I ask the interviewees to explain biographic details such as details about their lives before migration, why they decided to migrate and how they got used to their new life. In this context, using the biographical researchers' vocabulary (see. Fischer-Rosenthal 2000), I seek to reveal the different ways in which the process of "political knowledge and experience transfer" take place in the political socialization of the return migrants from Germany.

Biographical research has its bases in the understanding of the individuals as creators of meaning in their everyday lives. Roberts (2002, 7) states that as an interpretive and subjective approach to the study of lives, biographical research has its roots in traditions such as Weber's *verstehen*, Schutz's phenomenological perspective and Chicagoan interactionism. This interpretive and subjective line of thinking brings methodological problems such as the 'reality' of events and meaning attributed to them in life stories, means of interpretation and tools of language in the representation of the life experience (Denzin 1989, 13-14). In this respect, Miller (2000) distinguishes three different approaches in biographical studies. Accordingly, the grounded theory methodology, which is an example of the realist approach, uses induction and aims to reach saturation, with an emphasis on reliability. The neo-positivist approach relies on deduction and theory testing by using focused interviews. Thirdly, the narrative approach sees "fact" as secondary to the analysis of the individuals' construction of their standpoints.

Zinn (2004) makes another distinction among the approaches to biographical research based on the interview methods and the main object of research. The first approach, biographical identity research, focuses on the development of personality in the life course focusing on the themes that are not directly mentioned by the interviewee but exist under the surface. The key idea in this approach is that "individuals accumulate diverse biographical experiences into a coherent description of their life course" and these experiences are present in our knowledge of everyday life. "The link into the past gives us the possibility to do research on the past life history and the development of the today's self out of the present perspective." (2004: 7)

The second approach, action research, focuses on action modes and how individuals respond to certain problems, rather than the construction of the identities. The emphasis is rather on the observable or mentioned action logics than the development of the personality structures and the covered underlying unmentioned themes (2004, 10). Zinn (2004) gives the grounded theory approach as an example to action research, mentioning that the aim of the research is to identify "different ways of how people behave in different contexts and against the background of different interpretations of their context" (2004, 10).

The interpretation and analysis of the interviews in this thesis aims at deciphering both the construction of identities in the course of socialization and the actions and reactions of the interviewees in different socialization contexts. Also, the biographical method's emphasis on past, present and future of the interviewees' biographies fits well in the temporal-relational understanding of human agency that I adopt in this thesis. One point worth mentioning regarding the temporal dimension of the research is, as Rosenthal (2006, 9) argues, in the biographical interview the present of the interviewee may determine his or her perspectives of the past, along with the past experiences' influence on present. In her words,

> … in the course of a life with its biographical turning points, new remembered pasts arise at each point. This construction of the past out of the present is not, however, to be understood as a construction independent from the respective experienced past.

In this respect, the analysis and interpretation of the interviews in this thesis take into account how, in each individual case, the narrative at the time of the interview is shaped by past experiences and how the present influences the recalling of the past simultaneously.

The interviews

The data collection in this research consists of in-depth interviews conducted between 2014 and 2017 with 58 participants (24 female and 34 male). I conducted, recorded and transcribed all the interviews in Turkish. The interviews conducted before the failed *coup* of July 2016 were done face-to-face in Istanbul, Ankara and Mersin in Turkey. Due to the difficulties in data collection in the aftermath of the *coup d'état* attempt, the majority of the interviews with the second and third generation returnees, as well as the student migrants were conducted and recorded by online video chat applications (Gtalk, Facebook Chat or Skype). I preferred not to use this method for the first-generation labor migrants due to their lack of familiarity with online communication technologies. I anonymized the personal data of the interviewees and used pseudonyms for those that I cited. I also prepared an appendix that presents further anonymized details about the interviewees' biographies.

As noted earlier, I coded the transcribed material by using Atlas.ti for further analysis. The open and axial coding of the interviews, the quotations from the interviews, code networks and code families in this study are all stored in Atlas.ti. Thanks to this software, the raw data becomes easily accessible in the electronic format and the study complies with 'referential adequacy' (Lincoln and Guba 1985), referring to the archiving of the raw data so that the validity of the conclusions can be tested by different researchers (Andronikidis and Lambrianidou 2010).

The initial recruitment of the interviewees took place via online forums and Facebook groups, as well as personal contacts with the neighbors and local authorities in three Turkish cities: Mersin, Ankara and Istanbul. To recruit roots migrants, I also contacted

international offices of the Turkish universities, where the third-generation roots migrants pursue their undergraduate careers. At the beginning of the fieldwork, after establishing the initial contacts, I planned to use the snowball sampling technique to reach more participants. However, due to a number of obstacles in the fieldwork, which I explain below, personal contacts became the most productive way for recruiting interviewees in the overall. Reaching student migrants, who had? lived in Germany mostly to pursue their PhD and Master's degrees, was relatively easier thanks to my personal contacts in academic circles and also due to their active use of the social media, which provided an efficient ground for the snowball technique. Among the second- and third-generation returnees, the referral mechanism of the snowball technique worked well, especially for those that went to Turkey to pursue a university degree. This was mainly due to the fact that this group of returnees had already formed their own online networks and communities on campus and had efficient channels of communication among themselves.

Recruiting labor migrant returnees was the most difficult. Snowball technique for this group worked only partially due to the fact that they were not as tightly connected as the aforementioned second- and third-generation, and they were not responsive to self-selection sampling techniques through social media. Platforms such as returnees' associations were not useful, either, mostly due to non-response. Therefore, for this group I had to mobilize my personal contacts several times to find new entry points for further recruitment.

Moreover, in the aftermath of the failed *coup d'état* attempt in July 2016, convincing interviewees to talk about their political ideas became a very difficult task due to the climate of political tension and fear. In this phase, my personal contacts inevitably

became the only efficient source of recruitment for all groups and self-selective sampling through social media platform became completely useless. Unfortunately, this caused a considerable delay in the completion of the fieldwork. For the same reason, in some of the interviews conducted after the *coup* attempt, I deliberately avoided asking direct questions about the participants' political orientations, as I evaluated that it could hinder the possibility of an efficient and rich conversation.

I started the interviews with a brief introduction of my thesis topic and a standard consent request procedure. Then I tried to keep the tone of the conversation as casual as possible. The preliminary interviews showed that in order to help the interviewees recall their past experiences in Germany, it was crucial to start by asking them to casually explain why they decided to move to Germany in the first place. To the contrary, asking questions about German politics at the beginning stages of the interview proved to be counterproductive since such questions often made them feel tested about something that they found hard to remember without warm-up questions about their past. So, I first asked them unstructured questions about their earliest experiences, walking them gradually through their migration experience.

In most of the interviews, the topics that are relevant for the scope of this thesis usually emerged on their own during these fairly unstructured introductory conversations about their first experiences and memories in Germany. Most of the time, once the interviewees started to remember the details of their past actively, I began to ask more structured questions which I tailored to each interviewee's narrative. Overall, I asked the participants various questions including how they would describe their neighborhood/school/work environment in Germany, whether they experienced discrimination and/or exclusion in Germany or in Turkey, what they think about German politics in general, whether they

think they learned something from the Germans, whether the migration experience helped enrich their worldviews, why they decided to return to Turkey, what surprised them or felt different in Turkish society and politics after their return, whether they try to maintain the values/habits/practices they acquired in Germany after return.

The interviewees

The interviewees consist of 20 labor migrants, 20 student migrants and 18 roots migrants with different political identifications and levels of political engagement. Overall, the participants come from different age groups with ages varying between 22 and 77[6]. Their migratory experiences range between two and 38 years and cover different time intervals between 1962 and 2017, which correspond to various political contexts in Turkey and Germany.

Among the 20 labor migrant returnees, 15 are the first-generation migrants who migrated to Germany as guest workers in the 1960s and 1970s, and five are migrants that joined guest worker families by marriage mostly in the 1980s and 1990s. There are six women and 14 men in this group. Their ages vary between 36 and 77, and they lived in Germany between 1962 and 2014. Student returnees are students that have migrated to Germany to pursue their undergraduate and/or post-graduate degrees since the 1990s. Nine of the 20 student migrant interviewees in this study are female. Their ages vary between 25 and 44. They lived in Germany between 1990 and 2015. Roots migrants are the 1.5, second and third-generation returnees who were born and raised in Germany or started to live there in their childhoods or early teens. Among the 18 interviewees in this group, nine are

[6] Age at the time of interviewing

female, eight were born in Turkey and six are third-generation German-Turks. Their ages vary between 22 and 50. They returned to Turkey between 1982 and 2014.

With respect to their citizenship status and overall political identifications, among the roots migrants, there are nine Turkish citizens, seven German citizens and two participants with dual nationalities. For the first-generation labor migrants, the figures are sixteen, three, and one, respectively. The student migrants are all Turkish citizens. The overall political orientation of the interviewees is skewed towards the left. When asked which main political party in Turkey they would identify themselves with, 14 labor migrants responded CHP (social democracy/Kemalism), three responded AKP/MHP (religious, conservative, nationalist), one said he is not interested in politics, and two mention socialist parties/groups out of the parliament. Among the roots migrants, there are four CHP, three HDP (liberal left, Kurdish) and four AKP supporters, while seven mention that none of the major political parties represent them or they are not interested in politics. As for the student migrants, except two interviewees that identify with socialist parties, all of them vote for either HDP[7] or CHP, although they generally criticize both and argue that these parties do not really represent them but they are lesser of two evils. One important point is that only four migrants out of 58 (three labor migrants and one student migrant) have been mobilized in organized politics. It should be noted that the political orientations and the overall level of political mobilization of the participants influence their political socialization processes, its transnational trajectories and the use of the migrant agency in it. This is clearly seen in Chapter 4, in which I identify the

[7] The high support to HDP in the interviews is also related to the party's emphasis on their "*Turkeyification" (Turkiyelilesme)* project, which referred to representing all Turkey rather than the demands of the Kurds exclusively, during Selahattin Demirtas' term. The interviews conducted with the students coincided with the candidacy of Demirtas in the presidential elections of 2014, followed by the general elections of 2015, during which he represented this tendency strongly. The interviewees almost always made cues with this project as an explanation of their sympathy for the party.

process of negative political socialization, referring to the migrants' socialization to the outsider's position, rather than actively and collectively contesting it.

While the student migrants in this study represent a fairly homogenous group, the first-generation labor migrant returnees and the roots migrants have further in-group variations. Among the first-generation labor migrants, the first-comers of the 1960s and 1970s have very different accounts than the ones that arrived in the 1980s and 1990s mostly with family unification. For the first-comers, the lack of previously established transnational ties and *a priori* knowledge about Germany and being considered as guest workers, 'who would return home soon', play an important role both in their perceptions of the German society and in their reception by the Germans. For the ones that arrived later, "the tensions between eastern and western Germans in the economic and social trauma following reunification" and the changing positions of the Turks from guest workers to permanent settlers have negative effects on their reception in Germany (White 1997, 754). As an advantage, late-comers directly entered an already established German-Turkish community with strong ethnic ties and solidarity networks.

Despite these differences, the return stories of the first-generation labor migrants are more or less similar for the two groups, generally revolving around "doing what they always wanted to do once they get retired." Following the structuralist approach to the study of return migration, Cerase (1974) comes up with four main types of first-generation returnees. Accordingly, return due to failure takes place when the migrant cannot adapt to host countries because of social and political obstructs such as discrimination or lack of language skills. Return due to conservatism occurs when immigrants who emigrate with the intention to return go back home after saving money. Return due to retirement

refers to the return migration of the emigrants who prefer to live in the home country after retiring. Return to innovation stands for the return of the individuals that acquired new skills and assets in the host country and want to use them in the home country. According to this typology, the majority of the interviewees in this group enter the categories of return due to conservatism and return due to retirement, which is also defended by the theories of the new economics of labor which see return migration as "the logical stage after migrants have earned sufficient assets" (De Haas, Fokkema and Fihri 2015). Discrimination and structural problems, or failure to integrate, as the neoclassical approaches would argue, are not as relevant.

Concerning the roots migrants, it is possible to talk about two main groups according to the interviews. The first group consists of the 1.5 or second-generation, who return to Turkey due to their concerns about the upbringing of their children, who they want to protect from the problems they themselves had as immigrant children in Germany. The second group are generally the third-generation migrants who want to explore Turkey as a mythical country with a feeling of nostalgia, as described by Wessendorf (2007)[8]. In this second group, education and detachment from the 'inward looking traditional Turkish migrant communities' emphasized by King and Kilinc (2014) and, less often, the booming economy (Aydin 2010) are mentioned by the interviewees as factors that influenced their return.

As for the student returnees, they are the only group that can be considered within the framework of Cerase's first type or the neoclassical migration theory, which relate return

[8] See Tezcan (2018) for a critique of the tendency in qualitative studies' to over-represent "nostalgic" profiles in their analysis of return intentions.

to the failure of integration at the destination (De Haas, Fokkema, and Fihri 2015). The majority of the student migrants state that they tried to stay in Germany but they eventually had to return Turkey due to the problems with their legal status in the country and also the discriminatory experiences in their attempts at integration to the labor market.

As the array of reasons for return across the three migrant groups also suggests, this study does not consider return migration from the perspective of a success-failure duality. Neither does it exclusively deal with the effects of negative political socialization experiences on the decisions for return. Rather, with a focus on a heterogeneous group or migrants who migrated and eventually returned home for a broad diversity of motivations and reasons, it seeks to unpack the ways in which migrant political socialization takes place in Germany and creates repercussions after return to Turkey.

Final reflections

The methodological approaches used in this thesis constitutes one of its main contributions to political socialization studies. The relational approach, the grounded theory methodology and the biographical interviews offer different perspectives of studying social processes, which have often been absent in the common approaches to political socialization. Although not representative of all Turkish migrants who returned or stayed behind, the focus of the research design on three different migrant groups and on return migration amplifies the scope of the research, capturing as many complexities and heterogeneities of political socialization experience as possible.

One of the main challenges of this research is the issue of reflexivity within the framework of the above-mentioned social constructivist critique of Charmaz (1990) to the grounded theory. Throughout the analysis of the interviews, as a student migrant from Turkey in a Southern European country, I continuously question my positionality mainly

with respect to the participants, the generation of the research questions and the interpretation of the empirical material. The second challenge is the effect of temporality in biographical interviews. As stated by Rosenthal (2006) both past experiences and the present reality of the interviewee shape his/her narrative about the past. While, following Roberts (2002, 8) I contend that the accounts of the interviewees can be checked against other written, visual or oral accounts, in the interpretation of the interviews, I continuously question the interaction between the past and the present of the interviewees in the formation of their narratives, and question why they construct their narrative the way they do.

Further, concerning the effects of temporality, one needs to take into account the erratic nature of Turkey's domestic and foreign politics, the changes in which influence and supposedly cause variations in the narratives of the interviews along three years of data collection. For instance, the relations between the Kurdish party and the government deteriorated seriously when the resolution process that started in 2013 came to an end in 2015. Therefore, an interviewee that reported empathy for the Kurds in an interview conducted before the resolution process ended could speak differently if interviewed in the post- resolution process context. The same logic is also relevant for the interviews done in the aftermath of the failed *coup d'état* attempt. Although it was not a salient topic in the interviews in this fieldwork, people's (especially AKP supporters') ideas about the *Gulen Cemaati*, which is held responsible for the *coup* and had a close relationship with the government until then, significantly changed after the failed attempt. Therefore, not only the contextual varieties along almost six decades of migration experience, but also the political changes and transitivity in the over the course of three years of fieldwork need to be considered in the interpretation of the interviews.

Furthermore, although the thesis aims at capturing the political socialization processes including pre-migration and post-return, the post-return phase of political socialization is not as strongly captured for the labor and student migrants as the roots migrants. Unlike the roots migrants, who report their post-migratory experiences with great detail and interest, labor and student migrants tend to state there is nothing worth telling regarding the post-return phase. Many mention ‘it is good old Turkey’, which they know very well or have always been in touch with, signaling once more their transnational ties with the homeland during their time in Germany.

CHAPTER 3: Relations with German agents of political socialization and migrant agency

Introduction

This chapter seeks to delineate the ways in which the migrant agency plays a role in the contact and interaction of the migrants with the agents of political socialization in Germany. Its main departing point is a dialogue with the ideas of democratic diffusion (Lauth and Pickel 2008; Rother 2009; Perez-Armendariz and Crow 2010) and spillover effects (Mahmoud et al 2014; Chauvet and Mercier 2014), which imply the diffusion of host country political values and their absorption by the migrants. These concepts assume that the inputs of agents of political socialization efficiently reach the migrants, who, then, passively receive and embrace them. As a response, I examine to what extent the three groups of migrants in this study interact with German agents of political socialization while living in Germany and to what extent they use their agency to avoid or engage in contact with them, as well as to filter, ignore or reject their inputs.

For the conceptualization of 'agency' I follow Emirbayer and Mische (1998), who analyze it in three layers: habitual, projective, and practical evaluative, which respectively focus on the reactivation of past patterns, imaginative generation of future trajectories and normative judgments among alternative trajectories in response to presently evolving situations. This approach centers on the historical, cultural, and personal variability of agentic orientations. It essentially defends that the ways in which people understand their own relationship to the past, future, and present influence their agentic possibility, which is described as an interplay of habit, imagination and judgment.

In this chapter I address the interactions of the three groups of return migrants with German friends, coworkers and community, German media, and German elections and political parties since they come forwards as the recurrent agents of political socialization

in the biographical narratives of the interviews. I argue that in many cases, often for reasons beyond their control, the migrants did not have sufficient contact and interaction with these agents to be subject to the assumed processes of conventional political socialization in Germany. When there was a possibility of contact and interaction, they often used their agency to strategically filter, ignore and play around these socializers in the construction of their political subjectivities.

The differences across the three migrant groups regarding the intensity of interaction with agents of political socialization and the activation of agency mainly stem from structural factors such as social and cultural capital, generation of the migrants and their transnational condition, as well as the political context of the host country that coincides with the migratory experience. The conceptualization of agency I employ is particularly relevant in this framework as it emphasizes historical, cultural and personal variability of agentic orientations (and the lack thereof), as well as the social and relational character of human agency (Emirbayer and Mische 1998, 973).

In the rest of the chapter, I first discuss the ideas of democratic diffusion and spillover effects from a perspective that inquires the role of human agency in migration experiences. Then I present a short methodological framework, which is followed by a detailed analysis of the relations of the interviewees in this study with a number of German agents of political socialization: a) German friends, co-workers and community, b) German political news, c) German political parties, elections and electoral campaigns.

Passive absorbers or active agents? The conceptualization of migrant agency

In accordance with the critique of normativity in political socialization, which I address in the introduction chapter, Rother (2009) criticizes the literature on migrant political remittances for not adequately dealing with the idea of democratization. He states that

migration to economically developed countries does not necessarily mean that the immigrants will experience a democratic political system (2009, 247- 248). He draws attention to the fact that given the rules applied to residents and migrants may vary significantly, it is not certain whether the migrant will experience the ideal types of democracy and government even in a clearly democratic country. He argues that the restrictions and liberties experienced by the migrants seem to play a more important role in the shaping of this attitude than the political system of the destination country.

As Rother (2009) suggests, one of the theoretical grounds for this problematic approach in the literature is the idea of the diffusion of democracy, which postulates that democracy is diffused from country to country like a voluntary and unintended communication of an attractive innovation (Lauth and Pickel 2008). On this terrain, it is particularly useful to have a closer look at the democratic diffusion theory, as it plays a key role in the conception of the image of the migrants as passive receivers of the political values and culture of the host societies in political socialization and political remittances literature.

Studies of migrant political socialization and political remittances borrow the idea of democratic diffusion from the fields of international relations and comparative politics, which discuss the reasons of the regional patterns of democratization and the geographical clustering of democratic or non-democratic countries (Elkink 2011). Among the explanations of these patterns are the military-strategic-oriented domino theory, simple occupations by other countries, and, similar to Lauth and Pickel (2008), the conceptualization of democracy "as a technological innovation, imitated by more and more countries." (Modelski and Perry 1991, 2002; Starr 1991; Elkink 2011).

It has been argued that the literature on the international democratic diffusion generally concentrates on the macro-level regime change and tends to overlook the problem of

agency of the individuals (Elkink 2011, Perez Armendariz and Crow 2010). Research on policy diffusion addresses the question of agency by largely focusing on the role of the elite state actors in the adoption of policies from other countries, formulating the process as the importing of "policy innovations from other countries" (Perez- Armendariz and Crow 2010, 121). Moreover, scholars also focus on the mid-level state actors such as grassroots activists and nongovernmental organizations (Perez-Armendariz and Crow 2010, see Kapur and McHale 2005; Tarrow 2005; Keck and Sikkink 1998).

An alternative approach is to treat ordinary citizens as agents of democratic diffusion (Elkink 2011, Perez Armendariz and Crow 2010, Lauth and Pickel 2008). In this context, Lauth and Pickel (2008) identify four channels of democratic diffusion: media, networks, secondary socialization (such as education or work in companies), and migration. They argue that "migrants can be involved in distributing information and providing a first scheme of interpretation for the innovation considered as 'new' in their place of origin" (cited from Rother 2009, 250). On a similar terrain, Perez Armendariz and Crow (2010) write the following:

> the spread of ideas among mass publics in different countries can certainly contribute to democratic transitions, and democratic diffusion at the mass level may enhance the quality of democracy in countries that have already become democratic. We argue that migrants are vectors of this mass-level type of democratic diffusion. The diffusion of attitudes and behavior from more to less democratic countries via migrants has a single common root: Socialization and participation within a well-functioning democracy leads many migrants to learn and adopt the values, skills, and commitments of democratic citizenship.

Having its roots in the theory of 'diffusion of innovation' by E. M. Rogers (2010), the idea of democratic diffusion by the way of migration assumes that democratic values are new or innovative for the home countries. The underlying rationale is that the migrants almost automatically "absorb" (Perez Armendariz and Crow 2010) the democratic values

of the host countries, which are innovative and "contagious" (Elkink 2011), and which also have "primarily positive effects" (Rother 2009). Obviously, such an approach considers the migration experience as inherently positive and/or it attributes no agency to the immigrants and their friends and families in the home country for avoiding, ignoring or criticizing the inputs of agents of political socialization. Neither do they take into account the structural factors that may limit in the first place the interaction between the migrants and these socializers.

The traces of this tendency can be observed both in political socialization and in political remittances approaches discussed in the introduction chapter, as suggested by terms such as spillover effects (Mahmoud et al 2014; Chauvet and Mercier 2014; Barsbai et al 2017) and expressions like "material and cognitive benefits of migration" (Careja and Emmenegger 2012). In broadest terms, spillover effects refer to the changes or events in one context unintendedly causing changes or events in a seemingly unrelated other context (see Berkman 2011). In this sense, it is very similar to the idea of international diffusion which assumes that "the presence of certain political institutions and habits in one country effectively influence the probability that another country will also adopt them" (Elkink 2011). Like democratic diffusion, the idea of democratic spillover effects, too, take the migrants' socialization process as an unintended, involuntary, automatic absorption of host country political values.

Notwithstanding, research on political attitudes shows that rather than being a result of exposure to certain conditions, attitude change depends on various variables related to message, message context and individuals themselves (Leung 2006, 54). Especially recent research on political socialization of the youth emphasizes that the socialization process is as not as static and passive as has been assumed by the previous literature, and

that young people actively interact and negotiate with the social, political, economic and cultural contexts and they take their decisions through constant constructing, refining and reconstructing (Flanagan and Gallay 1995; Flanagan and Sherrod 1998). Critical authors underscore that rather than passive recipients of exposure to their parents, media and the school, young people actually are active agents with needs and desires that direct their behavior (Amnå et al. 2009; also see Achen 2002; McDevitt 2005).

Unlike the common emphasis on youth agency, the same level of attention is not drawn to the role of migrant agency in political socialization processes. Garcia-Castañon (2013, 33) underlines the role of earlier scholars in the shaping of this tendency as follows:

> Easton and Dennis (1965) set the tendency for a pro-system focus in political socialization, but one that does little to incorporate immigrants, even as they use immigrants to illustrate the political socialization of the native born. While they allude to immigrant re-socialization to a new system, their focus on exploring only the 'ideal' case problematizes political socialization as a mechanism for democratic stability and continuity. (…) This is not to say that their studies did not account for non-support, or 'negative support' responses, but rather chose to first model the primary outcome of 'positive support' amongst adolescents and children. (…) The resulting outcome was that this limited the framework of subsequent political socialization research, and effectively excluded immigrants because of their non-modal status."

In the context of these debates, I argue that migrants, too, can exercise their agency in their relations with agents of political socialization. Rather than passively absorbing the democratic values of the host country political system, they can exercise their agency and actively filter, ignore or avoid these messages or approach them strategically. I contend that the analysis of the migrant agency in the processes of political socialization could be done within the scope of positive support, non-support, and negative support responses.

Emirbayer and Mische define human agency as “the temporally constructed engagement by actors of different structural environments – the temporal relational contexts of action – which, through the interplay of habit, imagination, and judgment, both reproduces and transforms those structures in interactive response to the problems posed by changing historical situations.” (1998, 970) They describe three distinguishable components: habitual element, projective element and practical evaluative element. The habitual (iterational) element encompasses the selective reactivation by actors of past patterns of thought and action, as routinely incorporated in practical activity, thereby giving stability and order to social universes and helping to sustain identities, interactions, and institutions over time. Projective element refers to the “imaginative generation by actors of possible future trajectories of action, in which received structures of thought and action may be creatively reconfigured in relation to actors' hopes, fears, and desires for the future.” Lastly, practical evaluative element stands for “the capacity of actors to make practical and normative judgments among alternative possible trajectories of action, in response to the emerging demands, dilemmas, and ambiguities of presently evolving situations.” (Emirbayer and Mische 1998, 971). Depending on particularities of the circumstances, one of these elements may be more dominant on individuals’ actions. As the authors write, “it is possible to speak of action that is more (or less) engaged with the past, more (or less) directed toward the future, and more (or less) responsive to the present.” (1998, 972).

Mainwaring (2016) writes that scholarship on migrant agency and political belonging can be divided into two different approaches. The more frequent approach deals with specific instances of resistance or transgression such as campaigns or movements (e.g. Nyers 2003, 2006). The other one examines everyday forms of agency, such as the daily routines

and social interactions of migrants without legal status in the face of the challenges they experience such as deportation (e.g. Sigona 2012). As political socialization refers to processes of learning and establishing political attitudes and values, I concentrate on to what extent and in what ways the migrants exercise agency to critically engage in or avoid, filter and ignore these messages of agents of political socialization to take up or identify with different subject positions.

With the emphasis on agency in this analysis, I do not intent to overlook the structural constraints. To the contrary, structural factors such as discrimination and the demographic set-up of the socialization environments such as the workplace or the neighborhood play an important influencing role in the limitation of the interaction between the migrants and the socializers. I also avoid simplifying the concept of agency to the choices or free wills of rational actors, as this approach ignores how power structures the sense of self of the subjects (Gill 2007). An interviewee's fear of vulnerability and self-control to avoid political news in order not to get politicized in the host country environment, which she finds hostile towards politicized migrants is a striking example of the limits of free will. The approach of Emirbayer and Mische (1998), which emphasizes historical, cultural, personal and relational dimensions of agency, as opposed to a universalistic perspective that encompasses all times, places and persons is particularly meaningful in this context.

Methodology

Following Emirbayer and Mische's emphasis on the relational and temporal aspects of human agency, referring to "the situatedness of actors in multiple temporally evolving relational contexts" (1998, 969), I employ relational ethnographical methodology in the analysis of the in-depth interviews, which I initially coded by Atlas.ti following the open-coding procedure of constant comparisons. The relational analysis focuses on "the

relational processes of interaction between and among identities" as a unit of analysis, rather than individual entities such as agents or actors or structural wholes (society, order, social structure). "Explanation is found, then, neither in reference to external forces deemed "macro" or "structural," nor in the minds or dispositions of self-propelling agents, but in "contingent relational pathways" presented in narrative terms" (Desmond, 2014: 554). In this framework, the analysis in this chapter relies on in-depth interviews conducted with a biographical approach. Focusing on the narratives of the migrants on their interactions with a number of agents of political socialization, I intend to reveal how the habitual, judgmental and imaginative components of migrants' agency are at work and how they influence the process of political socialization.

Friends, co-workers, community and political socialization

The literature on political socialization and political learning of the migrants and non-migrants draws attention to the importance of the immediate community in the process. Early works such as (Cornelius 1975) suggest that certain characteristics of the migrants' immediate community may be more important than the individual socioeconomic factors in the determination of his political attitudes. Similarly, in studies on the effects of neighborhood on voting behavior, scholars find that the neighborhood context has a socializing effect on voters (Cho, Gimpel, and Dyck 2006; Gimpel, Dyck, and Shaw 2004), which is notably separate from the individual-level socio-demographic influences (Cho, Gimpel, and Dyck 2006). One repetitive finding that lies at the background of these arguments is that "politically active neighborhoods produce, and reproduce, politically active citizens" (Cho, Gimpel, and Dyck 2006) (see: Burbank 1997; Huckfeldt 1979, 1986; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995; Krassa 1988 in Cho, Gimpel, and Dyck 2006). [9]

[9]Communication studies also analyze these factors under the umbrella term of "communication socialization agents", which include news media and all human social connections and interactions (e.g. Liu and Gastil 2014)

Rather than adopting a political geographical approach that maintains its focus on localities, I break down the concept of "immediate community" into friends, peers at school, co-workers, and members of the community in which the migrant lives. I choose to use these categories because they are the ones that arise more significantly in the interviewees' narratives. While the socializing effects of friends and peers at school have majorly been a topic for studies on the political socialization of the migrant or non-migrant youth (J G Gimpel, Lay, and Schuknecht 2003; Hyman 1959; M K Jennings and Niemi 1974; Langton 1969; Silbiger 1977), friends and coworkers certainly have relevance for the socialization of the migrant adults, although it has not been investigated much.

The three different groups of return migrants in this study have very different trajectories of political socialization in Germany via their friends, fellow students, colleagues and communities, the variability of which can largely be accounted for structural factors such as the social and cultural capital and generational differences, rather than agentic factors. Albeit the differences, they have one thing in common: They do not report rich experiences of contact with the German friends, colleagues and communities that would cater to their political socialization. Indeed, previous research affirms this finding. In the 1990s it was shown that both the first and the second-generation Turks had less contact with the Germans when compared to other foreigners (Caglar 1995). Caglar (1995) wrote that according to the figures of the Foreigners' Office in Berlin, "30 per cent of the 1,000 Turks between 16 and 25 years old in their sample claimed to come into contact with German youth only very rarely, and 34 per cent had no contact with German youth at all" (Die Auslanderbeauftragte des Senats 1992, 14). Moreover, "those claiming to have no contact with Germans increased by 11 per cent between 1985 and 1991 and remained stable between 1991 and 1993" (Caglar 1995, 310). Østergaard-Nielsen (2003, 34)

emphasized that Turks socialized "with other Turks rather than members of the wider society." More recently, Crul (2016, 54) underscores that "children of immigrants nowadays no longer integrate into the majority group, but into a large amalgam of ethnic groups."

Especially in the case of labor and student migrant returnees, their narratives about the contact with the Germans reveal examples of sporadic observations which let them form certain impressions. Importantly, these sporadic observations and interactions have a much more striking effect of political socialization for the labor migrants compared to the other groups. Arguably, one of the reasons for this is that the labor migrants, especially the ones that migrated earlier in the 60s and 70s, had very limited transnational ties with Germany before moving there as guest workers, which limited their *a priori* impressions and preconceptions about the country and fortified the "disruptive" impact of migration (Jones Correa 1998).This, along with lower social and cultural capital, prepared a fertile soil for significant socialization to German values in conventional terms, even in a context of limited interaction with agents of political socialization. An example in this context is the workers who mention that they learned humanity and civicness from the Germans even though the interaction between these two groups hardly went beyond tenant-owner relationship or greeting each other every morning. I address these dimensions of conventional political socialization in the next chapter.

While the labor migrants predominantly had relations with the other Turkish migrants, students mostly established organic ties with other Turkish and international students. As for the roots migrants, they mention having close relations with other German-Turks or other migrants rather than the Germans. Interactions with other migrant groups opened alternative transnational political fields for the political socialization of the migrants,

which goes beyond an exclusively German-Turkish one. While social and cultural capital did not give the student and root migrants significantly higher access to closer relations with the German friends, coworkers and community, along with the generational differences, they played a role in the extensiveness of interaction and transnational political socialization with other migrant groups and international students. Below I discuss these points in more detail for each group.

Labor migrants' relations with German friends, colleagues and community have their own peculiar dynamics, which are very different for the interviewees that migrated to Germany in the 1960s and 1970s and for those that settled down there after the 1980s. The conditions for the first group, who migrated in the 1960s and 1970s, are also very different than all the other interviewees for a number of reasons. Interviewees in this group, who correspond to 13 of the 20 labor migrants, generally went to Germany with the intention of returning as soon as possible, once they saved some money. These first-comers started their new lives in places where there were no other Turks; they had no knowledge of and previous experience about Germany because at that time the issue of guest-workers was a new phenomenon for Turkey. Such differences generated a number of consequences on the relations of these labor migrants with the German friends, colleagues and community and their political socialization effects.

Among the migrants in this first group, some of those that migrated earlier found themselves in settings where there were no Turks and no one that they could speak to.

> There were only a few Turks in my first factory. There were not any Turkish food shops or restaurants. People used to confuse cat food with canned food and eat cat food. We were eating so many eggs that we were about to turn into chickens.[10]

[10] They did not eat meat to avoid eating pork meat by mistake. Eggs became a substitute of meat for protein.

> There were a few Turks. My friends were Germans and Yugoslavians. (Memduh)[11]

These migrants' sporadic meetings and contacts with the Germans, if there were any, tended to decline significantly once they found a Turkish community of workers or get together with other family members in Turkey via family reunification. The traditional obligation to protect the females' intimacy played an important role for the latter.

> We moved to Bremen, where there were many more Turks in the factory than our previous workplace. (…) There all our coworkers and community became Turkish. We kept on our courtesy with the Germans but we no longer were visiting them in their houses. We were only exchanging greetings on the street. Now we were only coworkers, not friends. (Guzin)

> Once I got married, I never had friendships with the Germans anymore. If you are married you do not get to spend time with them. My Turkish friends started to get married, too. Then we started to spend our time together. Then we saw the Germans only at the factory. Our relationship got cut off abruptly. (Akif)

Women who migrated to Germany with/after their husbands via family reunification might have had less contact with the Germans until they started to work especially if the newly formed nuclear family chose isolating themselves from the Germans.

> I went to Germany in 1974 with family unification. We were the only Turks in town. Every day I was waiting impatiently for my husband to return from work so that I could speak Turkish. (…) Then we moved to a new place. When I realized that it was full of Turks, it was the greatest relief for me. All the Turks were living in the same place. (…) So, I did not have much contact with the Germans. (Humeyra)

It is noteworthy that same as the Turkish migrants of the 1960s and 70s, the Germans did not have previous encounters with the Turkish guest workers, either. Again, just like the Turks, they also assumed that these "guests" would return home once they were finished with their contracts or saving goals. In this context, unlike the other groups of migrants in this study, who frequently mention discrimination and exclusion in their interviews,

[11] All names are pseudonyms.

the interviewees in this group underline many times that the Germans treated them impeccably and very kindly for a long time and that their attitude started to change especially in the 1980s (See White 1997). In this context, at the beginning, the two groups established relations without *a priori* experiences and some Turks benefited from this to learn German, as well. When asked about their relations with the Germans, these migrants mention very clear pleasant memories of the process of getting to know the coworkers in the factory, the service staff at the dorms, their landowners and neighbors.

> My German co-workers were pretty friendly. They used to invite me to their bowling games. (…) In my first factory, I was working with elderly Germans, who experienced all the pain and suffering of the world war. So, they were real humanists and they used to care a lot for us. They used to bring us homemade marmalades they made with fruits from their own garden. (Memduh)

Notably, for this group of labor migrants, the lack of transnational ties across Turkey and Germany and the absence of global means of communication, which would provide them preconceptions or *a priori* knowledge about Germany before migrating there, implied a significant cultural and social distance between the labor migrants and the host country at the time of migration, which fortified the 'exogenous shock' (White et al 2008) or 'disruptive experience' (Jones Correa 1998) effects of migration. Erdinc, a labor migrant that moved to Germany in late 1980s, adds to this distance the dualities of "developed vs. undeveloped" and "modern vs. backwards", referring to "the migration of villagers of a developing country to the cities of a developed one":

> I assume that your mother was a young girl in the 70s. Is it even possible for *you* to think like that young girl in the 1970s? Can *you* get into her head and understand her reasoning in the 1970s? I bet you cannot. Or, if we could travel in time and give her a smart phone, could that little girl from the 1970s do anything with it? Could she figure out how to use it? Could she understand what it really was? No, she could not. The difference between the people who migrated from here and the people in Germany was just like this.

Erdinc refers to an impossibility of communication between the two groups. Indeed, many of the labor migrants give accounts of limited sporadic contact with the Germans and observations thereof, which would not be expected to have changing effects on their political behaviors and attitudes. However, in the context of wide social and cultural distance, although the contact with the German friends, colleagues and community was sporadic, poor and no stronger than the other migrant groups in this study, it led some of the migrants in this group towards significant steps of political socialization to everyday politics. While some migrants in this group mention that their lives in Germany consisted of only working and they did not have time for anything else, many in this group vividly mention that they learned many things from the Germans, which they mostly express with expressions such as "humanity" or "being a human". Importantly, such profound changes via such poor contact is peculiar to the labor migrants in this group. I examine these dynamics in further detail in the next chapter, where I make a distinction between conventional and negative political socialization.

Furthermore, it is noteworthy that several migrants in this group did not have the intention of becoming an insider to the community. They neither wanted to do it formally by acquiring citizenship nor by developing a sense of belonging or political identification. In the words of Irfan, they did not want to "enter the German layer of the society" because they always lived with the idea of return. In their case, even an ideal example of political socialization would only include the internalization of attitudes and behaviors of the German political system, leaving out the part of 'becoming insiders to the polity'.

On a side note, politically active migrants from this first group, who were in contact with communist and socialist organizations in Germany report a much more intense contact with the Germans. Their socialization processes evolved around universalist values that

had their roots in Marxism. I address the political socialization processes of migrants with such profiles in Chapter 5, where I focus on transnational dynamics of political socialization.

The second group of labor migrants in this study are the seven interviewees that migrated to Germany after the 1980s, generally by marriage or with a false refugee status. Unlike the first group, these migrants directly joined the already established German-Turkish communities in Germany; and they already had *a priori* knowledge and impression of Germany due to the increasing globalization and transnational ties. At that time, Germany witnessed a rising xenophobia towards the Turkish migrants from the 1980s onwards, as the guest workers became permanent residents and increased in number by bringing their families (White 1997). The negative economic consequences of the German unification added more tension to the natives' relations with the migrants (White 1997). These circumstances inevitably influenced the relations of the labor migrants in this group with German agents of political socialization.

In this group, the women who migrated to Germany by marriage report strong isolation from the German society. Their narratives reveal that they spent most of their time at home or with their Turkish relatives; they could not learn German; and they started to work much later or they did not work at all. Eventually, they ended up convincing their husbands to go back to Turkey.

Aysegul, who went to Germany after getting married as a 24-year-old young woman, explains her contact with the Germans in her 12 years in Germany as follows:

> I was with my husband's family all the time. Most of our neighbors were German. If I had to talk to them, I used to try to communicate with them by drawing shapes in the air. I was very lonely. I went to a language school, but I could not learn German. I was also very shy. When we went to the supermarket, I used to wait for

> my husband in the car. For a long time, I felt like I would do something bad and the Germans would get mad at me. (…) These things started to change when I started working in our own mobile shop some years later. I started to become more self-reliant.

Men who migrated to Germany by the way of marriage had a different story than the women. Most saliently, although they directly joined the German-Turkish community like the women, work life provided many more opportunities of contact with the Germans and enabled them to thrive personally.

> Before I started to work, I had to learn German. In that period, I felt very bad because my wife was working, and I was at home. Then I started to make friends in the language school. The biggest mistake is to make friends with the Turks, because then you cannot learn German. (…) After two years I started to work with the Germans. It was really good for me because it is impossible to get to know the Germans without spending time with them. And this is only possible by working with them. It is very important. (Semih)

Echoing Süoglu (2012)'s findings, the interviews show that the students' relations with the German friends, colleagues and community were limited in their first few years in Germany. Despite their high social and cultural capital, the organic contact with their professors (or colleagues in the case of graduate students) was generally limited and did not evolve beyond workplace. This must be underlined as a footnote to the survey studies on political socialization, which include returnees that lived in the host countries for durations as short as 6 months or a year. Interviews demonstrate that in such a short time even highly skilled, highly educated migrants were not socializing to the German politics and society by the way of establishing solid relationships with the insiders of the German society, even though they wanted to. Moreover, rather than German friends and colleagues, the students socialized within international friend circles, which paved the way for a kind of transnational political socialization through non-German agents of political socialization, as mentioned above.

Erhan, who lived in Germany during his Master's and PhD studies and who is now a faculty member at a public university in Turkey, explains his experience as follows:

> The Germans do not let you in to their friend circles. When I first arrived there, I went to a German course with foreigners like me. I was generally with Turks or international students. At what point did I start to get to know the German culture? About three to four years later, when my colleagues start to invite me to their gatherings. Then I started to attend weddings, funerals and things as such.

Cigdem, who obtained her Master's degree in engineering in Stuttgart underlines the central role of the dorm and the campus environment for the students' experiences:

> Initially, I stayed in the dorm. There were people from everywhere (…) There were not many Germans in my program. We (the international students) did not have the opportunity to get in touch with the German people. Neither did we have linguistic support. We could not integrate ourselves to the society as students. I was hanging out with Eastern and Southern Europeans.

Zeynel, a German high-school graduate from Turkey, was already quite familiar with the German culture when he moved to Berlin for his Master's degree in Humanities. Even with an advanced knowledge of the culture and language, Zeynel ended up at a similar point. Different than the others, his trajectory presented an example of habitual component of agency, reactivating past patterns of action:

> When I went there, I had a group of German friends. They liked hanging out with Turks that had the same sense of humor as them. But after a while I started to get close with the Turkish students like me. This became my inner friend circle. I kept my relations with my German friends as well, however, I could not talk about things like politics with them. I was able to talk about political themes more with my Turkish friends.

To sum up, the student migrants' accounts show that German friends, peers and colleagues did not play a significant role as agents of political socialization. For the first few years of their lives in Germany, these migrants were contained in Turkish or international circles, mostly for structural constraints. Due to their limited individual contact with the Germans, they hardly found the opportunity to engage into political

dialogues with them in their first years. In these years, they relied more on their sporadic observations.

Last but not the least, striving to underscore their differences from and incompatibility with the German-Turkish community, the student migrants avoided building close ties with them, which decreases examples of student political socialization on the German-Turkish transnational political field. Notwithstanding, their relationships with students from other countries paved the way for another type of transnational political socialization for the student migrants in Germany, which was cultivated on the transnational political space of the third countries and Turkey, rather than the German-Turkish one. In these cases, the students learned about the politics and political values of other countries and questioned what they had always unquestioningly accepted about the politics and history of their home country. Such transnational socialization could even inhibit the socializing input that came from the German friends and peers. As one interviewee puts it, the social atmosphere for the students were so cosmopolitan that at times their German fellows could not maintain their typical German attitudes and values in these contexts. This transnational dimension of political socialization is further investigated in Chapter 6.

Friend circles of the roots migrants mainly consisted of international friends and Turks rather than German friends. Half of the interviewees underline the extensiveness of international friend groups, which consisted of second- and third-generation migrants from other countries. Sharing a common migrant or Muslim identity operated as a social binder for these groups and facilitated an initial political socialization to multiculturalism, which the migrants express as “respect and tolerance to other groups or cultures”. In general terms, the reason for this pattern is structural rather than agentic such as the demographic make-up of schools, and neighborhoods, as well as the minority condition

of migrants. The highly stratified German school system is a clear example in this regard. As Crul et al. (2017, 8) write, "in Germany, the stratified school system creates a lot of barriers and frustrations for children of immigrants and their parents. As a result of this stratification, there is a high concentration of children of immigrants in the lower levels of secondary school (Hauptschule and Realschule)."

While the older 1.5 and second-generation migrants were more likely to be predominantly in Turkish friend circles, all of the third-generation roots migrants, who migrated to Turkey with curiosity for the roots and identity, mention the predominance of international and multicultural friend groups in Germany. The demographics of the school environment and the neighborhood are central in the formation of these friend circles:

> At school, I was in mixed friend groups. Somalians, Polish, Russian, Arabs, Turks, Armenians... But this was only at school. Out of the school, my friends were third-generation German-Turks. (Buket)

In a number of examples the interviewees that grew up in migrant neighborhoods or towns state that they made almost no German friends until college or until they started to work.

> I was living in Neukölln.[12] I went to the primary school and high school there. I grew up in a very mixed environment. In our neighborhood, there were people from every country except Germans. People from Balkans, Arabs, Turks... Our classes were very mixed and colorful. I grew up with Arabs and Albanians. (...) In high school there were two or three German students, but then their families took them from our school and sent them to another one. Except the teachers, we did not have much contact with the Germans. After high school I started to enter different circles and started to get to know the Germans. (Umut)

Among 18 roots migrants, three state that they had only friends from Turkey. Among these three, Leyla and Pinar are 1.5 generation migrants who were taken to Germany for

[12] Neukölln is an inner-city district of Berlin that has a high percentage of immigrants, especially with Russian and Turkish background.

family unification, when they were young children. Belonging to traditional and conservative working-class families, they did not have close contact with the German society, did not learn much German and always wanted to return to Turkey. As Leyla explains:

> I was with Turkish friends all the time, speaking with them in Turkish. So, I could not learn much German. In my class, all of the students were German except one Turkish girl. I was always with her. (…) In the factory, too, there were only two Germans and the rest were Turks. I never had close relations with Germans. Nor did we get closer with other migrant groups. (Leyla)

A few cases demonstrate examples of migrant agency in the relations of the roots migrants with the Germans as political socializers. The ways in which Ece gradually disconnected from the German friend circles and stuck with friends who had more familiar cultural characteristics reflect the habitual dimension of migrant agency. She chose habitual actions and patterns of thought, which helped sustain her migrant/minority identity (Emirbayer and Mische 1998, 971).

> At school, we had mixed friend circles. Towards the end, I was making friends only with other migrants. Either Turks or Arabs. (…) It is because the Germans were a little sniffy and we were more chatty and sociable. Gradually I got disconnected from the Germans. (…) Arabs are warmer than Germans. We have a lot in common with Arabs. I do not like to mention religion but they are Muslim, too. They know us. (…) Also, we shared the feeling that we were all foreigners there. That made us even closer and supportive of each other. (Ece)

Among three interviewees who state that they became close friends with Germans at some point in their lives, none mention these friends as factors that helped them shape their ideas or change their attitudes regarding the social and political issues in Germany. Multicultural migrant groups and the dynamics of the German-Turkish communities, on the other hand, are mentioned extensively in their narratives on the transformative effects of the migration experience in Germany on their political ideas.

Among the few examples of migrant agency in this regard is the case of Osman, who formulates his friendship choices as a strategic balance between German and Turkish cultures. He chose his friends in a way that would not attract critique from either side. In this way, Osman thinks he also acquired the necessary social tools from both sides, which, he believes, enabled him to navigate in both communities. Cases as such reflect the activation of the projective element of the migrant agency, creatively reconfiguring the received settings in relation to migrants' hopes, fears and desires for the future.

> I am one of those people that managed to set a very fine balance. Not everyone is capable of it. *Gurbetci*[13] youth are either only with Turks or only with Germans. If they are only with Germans, they become like them, they lose their identities, traditions and customs. If they are only with Turks, they cannot get integrated and they feel excluded. I was very good at tuning a balance. Two to three days of the week I was with the Turks, and the other two to three days I was with the Germans. Both groups were trying to get me on their sides. I was a popular guy, but I never let them get me on their side. In this way, I speak both German and Turkish excellently and this is an advantage (Osman)

Given their transnational ties, identities and practices, the political socialization of the second- and third-generation is a transnational process from the beginning. Their relations with friends, peers, colleagues and community as agents of political socialization in Germany reflect this transnational condition. Interviews show that the German friends and the German community in general cannot be considered as effective agents of political socialization that would communicate and diffuse the host country political values to roots migrants during their stay in Germany. Rather than absorbing the host country values emitted by their German friends and other members of the German community, roots migrants in this study were likely to flock together with other Turks and other migrant groups. By individual choices and more often by the social structural

[13] A person with a Turkish origin who lives in another country, especially used in the context of the guest workers and their descendants in Germany

factors, a multicultural migrant environment and/or the German-Turkish community dynamics shaped the social relations and its consequences for political socialization. In some cases, migrants strategically maintained a balance between Germans and the Turks.

German news media and interest in the political news

While the literature on media, non-migrant political socialization and civic engagement is quite rich (Chen et al. 2013; de Vreese and Boomgaarden 2006), it is hard to say the same for the studies on the effects of media on the political socialization of the migrants. One of the earliest examples in the field is Park's *The Immigrant Press and Its Control* (1922), which argues that foreign-language press would eventually facilitate the assimilation of the immigrants to the United States. Subervi-Velez (1986) draws attention to the lack of pioneering work in the studies of the role of communication in the adaptation of different ethnic groups. Kim (1995), asserts that migrants' use of news media in the host country plays an important role in their political acculturation. In their study on the Korean-Americans in California, Chaffee, Nass and Yang (1990) finds that TV and newspaper exposure positively effects political learning and it is more important than some other political socialization predictors such as years of schooling. In contrast to the "stair step" metaphor that is used for the political socialization of the adolescents, which implies "climbing the ladder to adulthood" Chaffee, Nass and Yang (1990) use the "bridge" metaphor to depict the role of host country agents of political socialization for the adult immigrants, who relocate laterally from one country to the other. In their study of the Hong Kong migrants in Canada, Lee and Tse (1994) find that controlling for individual factors, media exposure is significantly related to the immigrants' acculturation to the host country. Yoon et al. reaches a similar conclusion for the adaptation of the Asian immigrant women in South Korea (Yoon, Kim, and Eom 2011).

Among the more recent studies, Liu and Gastil (2014) treat news media, social connections and community as 'communication socialization agents' and find that they not only facilitate immigrants' political socialization but also function as an important mediating path that "translates political learning into greater political engagement". Lastly, Alencar and Deuze (2017) adopt a less common approach and emphasize the agency of the migrants in news consumption. They talk about "immigrants' deliberate strategies" of host country news consumption. Their findings draw attention to the transnational dimension of the news consumption by the immigrants. They view the exposure to homeland and transnational news media as an integration strategy and report that the migrants use both home and foreign news websites to catch the current affairs of both host and home countries.

The focus of this section is on the strategies of the migrants in the consumption of German news media and it reveals very different dynamics across the three migrant groups. The most notable common aspect is that it is possible to talk about a selective process of news consumption by these groups rather than their 'exposure' to the news media. The three migrant groups consumed or refused to consume the German political news media strategically and selectively, depending on their needs, self-interest and even their perception of threat and fear. The three dimensions of agency (Emirbayer and Mische 1998) can be observed in these strategies.

The majority of the labor migrants were disinterested in German political news media. The labor migrants who arrived in Germany in 1960s and 1970s state German citizenship and the ability to speak German as the two most outstanding factors that influenced their overall interest in politics and news on politics. When they were not limited by poor language skills, their explanations on their lack of interest revolve around their perception

of self-interest and of the outsider's position, mainly reflecting the habitual and practical evaluative elements of the migrant agency. For example, Adnan and Guzin underline that as they were not German citizens, nobody asked their opinions, so they did not consider themselves as responsible of learning about German politics:

> I do not know much about politics because I never entered the German layer [stratum]. Those who entered the German layer follow politics because they vote. To me, they cannot say "why do not you follow the politics?" because I do not vote. (Adnan)

Guzin's account reveals that the myth of return (Mandel 1995; White 1995) also plays an important role in this picture, alimenting the outsider's position in the German polity:

> Sometimes I heard what the political parties were saying, here and there… However, I never paid attention. We were thinking that it wasn't our business because we never thought that we would stay there for such a long time. (…) We used to buy things that we wanted to take to Turkey and store them for the day that we would leave Germany. We felt like we would leave Germany any time. So, we were not interested in politics. Nor did I get German citizenship. (…) If I had got the citizenship, then I would have tried to comply with my responsibilities as a citizen.

Practical evaluative calculations become more notable in the narratives of Firuze, a German citizen, and Perihan, a Turkish citizen, both of whom consider "minding their own business and staying away from politics" as the "most intelligent choice". Although they have different citizenship statuses, they both state that they did not face discrimination or exclusion so "they minded their own business and just worked.":

> My whole family and I, we were never interested in politics. The government treated us the same was they were treating the Germans. So, we did not care about it. We minded our own business. (…) We never had time to follow politics because we were always working. (Firuze)

> I never followed politics, dear. I was working all the time. I was tired all the time. I did not want to follow anything with that exhaustion. (…) I lived there for 13 years but was completely unaware of what was happening around me. (Perihan)

Among the three labor migrants who state interest in German politics in this group, Ramazan and Memduh are the two that did not acquire German citizenship but were interested in German politics and they explain it with their overall interest in politics. Akif, on the other hand, is the only migrant in this group that has German citizenship and gives it as the reason why he thinks he should have knowledge and interest in German politics:

> I learned the German political parties by following the news and talking with my Turkish friends. You have to learn which ones are form the left and which are from the right. If you live there, if you vote, you have to know it.

As for the seven labor migrants who settled down in Germany after the 1980s, their interest in news on politics is congruent with their relations with the German friends, colleagues and community. Those that did not have much contact with the latter showed no interest in the former. Especially the women in this group, who did not enter the labor force in Germany and did not learn German, were completely uninterested in politics and political news. They state they were always following the Turkish radio and TV networks.

Among the men, who all joined the labor force and learned some German, German citizenship played a role in their overall interest in politics and news on politics. Mustafa, who lived in Germany for about six years without acquiring citizenship explains it as follows:

> In Germany, I was reading *Bild* and I was also watching the German TV networks, but I was not reading or following anything on politics. We only mind our own business, sister. I am not interested in who is in power, who is the leader etc. I only remember Strauss, who said that if he came to power he would sweep out all the Turks.

Semih, who is the only German citizen in this group of interviewees, explains that his interest in politics and news on politics was formed both by the need to learn German and

by the obligation he felt about following the news. Like in other examples, his particular interest was on what was being said on Turkey and the Turks:

> Of course I was watching the news. I was particularly looking at what they were saying about Turkey. I was also reading the newspapers in order to learn German. It is not enough to only watch Turkish TV. I am a German citizen. I was voting there. I was following the news on political parties.

Overall, the interviews reveal the labor migrants' lack of interest in the German political news media, which stemmed from migrants' self-perception as outsiders to the German polity, as well as their practical evaluative approach to the rights and responsibilities they had regarding their citizenship status and work life. For the majority, who does not have German citizenship, "minding their business" signified earning and saving as much money as possible in an environment in which they neither perceived any political conflict nor had the right to decide in politics. This resonates with the outsider's position, which is also alimented by the myth of return (Mandel 1995; White 1995).

The student migrants were mostly selective and used their agency to filter their learning and self-information about German politics via German news consumption. Because of the ambiguities of being a student migrant, which is a temporary status that does not guarantee any lengthened stay in the country, they strategically got engaged with specific topics that were related to their own situation, predominantly showing examples of practical evaluative dimension of the migrant agency. Reminiscent of the roots migrants, in some cases, they also motivated themselves to learn about German and Turkish politics to be able to arm themselves against the questions and critiques of their German and international friends.

When they followed the German political news media, they paid attention exclusively to the political developments and statements that were related to migration, integration and Turkey-Germany relations.

> I was watching TV to improve my German. I was not following the news on TV. Sometimes I was looking the headlines of the newspapers on the subway, over the shoulders of people who read newspapers. With my friends we were talking about both Turkish and German politics, but regarding the German politics we were mostly chatting on migration regulations. I mean, things that matter for us. (Burak)

Erhan says he was following the German media via his colleagues at work, who arguably served the role of communication socialization agents (Liu and Gastil 2014).

> I was not following the news. I was watching TV a little bit. I was reading the Turkish press more. But I knew more or less what was happening there. I was hearing it from my colleagues at lunch time. (…) Political scandals etc. What I was interested in was the theme of foreigners, the theme of integration and assimilation. For example, there was a minister of domestic affairs from SPD that had said that the best integration is assimilation. I was shocked to hear that.

In some occasions, rather than for the desire to learn the politics of the society in which they lived in, the student migrants strategically informed themselves about German politics with the intention of protecting themselves from racist threats and discrimination, or defending themselves against the criticisms and questions of their friends and colleagues.

> You feel uneasy when you miss what is happening (…) In the office, first thing in the morning, my colleagues used to talk to me about what was happening in Turkey or Germany. They used to say, "this and this are happening in Turkey, what do you think?" This pushed me towards following the news more and informing myself of the Germans' attitudes regarding the events. (...) I just felt obligated to know and learn. For example, if a racist attack took place in Dresden recently, I had to know where and when it happened and where we should not go (…) When I went to a conference out of Germany, I used to prohibit my wife and kid from going to specific districts after 7pm. (…)You never know where a racist attack can come from. A pregnant Egyptian woman was stabbed in our town, and her husband was a PhD student at my university. We were always at unease when we were in East Germany. (Huseyin)

Similarly, Merkel's victory was a turning point in Tuna's interest in German politics:

> I started to read the papers after Merkel came to power. The fascist attacks were on the rise in Dortmund, then. Throughout the eight years I lived in Dortmund, that was the time when I felt the biggest urge to run away from Nazis. With my foreign friends we were talking about the press, newspapers, what they were saying about the rise of nationalism and attacks on foreigners after Merkel's victory. Until then, I really did not care about the left party or the right party.

The interviews show that the student migrants informed themselves selectively about German politics mostly on the issues of migration, integration and racism. Contrary to the assumption of media exposure and absorption of the democratic values of the political system via host country news media, in some cases they felt the need to learn German politics via news consumption in order to arm, protect and defend themselves both at their workplaces and on the street. Obviously, such forms of learning and strategic self-information are far from being an example of conventional political socialization by which migrants uncritically adopt the political values of the host counties. In the following chapter I address this alternative process, which the traditional accounts of migrant political socialization fail to capture.

As for the roots migrants, while five of the 18 interviewees emphasize their interest in German political news, the rest show weak or no interest. Those with little or no interest explain it in ways that imply the involvement of migrant agency. For example, in her years in Germany, Nuray accepted and internalized that there was a dislike for and discrimination against Turks there. The fear of the political vulnerability of her condition as a migrant and the urge to self-protection made her abstain from politics altogether. Despite going to law school in Germany, she completely ignored the political scene of the country as she wanted to neither inform herself nor form political opinions. In her words:

> I was never interested in what was more than necessary. I did not want to know the details. I did not want to confuse my mind with these things. It was enough for us to know that Turks were not liked there.

Nuray's account is an example of the shading over of the habitual element of migrant agency into the projective dimension (Emirbayer and Mische 1998, 979), as knowledge gained in the past shapes the anticipation about the future, leading Nuray's lack of engagement with the political socializers to be reproduced over time, which in this case also means the reproduction of her outsider's position in relation to the German polity.

It is not always fear that led to a disinterest in German political news. A group of roots migrants explain their lack of interest by the idea that German politics is very stable and boring to follow. Migrants in this group report interest in Turkish politics, which, in their perception, is much more dynamic than the German one.

> In Germany, I was more interested in Turkish politics than German politics. I do not know why. Neither do I understand why the Turks there try to involve themselves in Turkish politics and do nothing about German politics. But I was like that, too, because Turkish politics is stirring and there is a lot of wheeling and dealing. It is like watching a soap opera. In Germany, on the other hand, everything is so well set that you do not feel like something bad can happen. (Nihan)

In line with this selective consumption of the media on German politics, they also state that if there were any political change that would affect their life, they might be more interested:

> Maybe the reason why I did not care was that there was nothing that would affect my life. If they were passing laws that would affect me maybe I would care. But this never happened. (Ece)

Such accounts constitute examples of how the habitual element, as acquired knowledge from past (German politics is boring) informs a routine behavior (of not following German politics). In a scenario in which they felt that German political agenda directly affected their lives, migrants activated the practical evaluative dimension through the

improvisation al orientation towards a rising interest in German political news, consciously creating space for maneuvers in their interaction.

The habitual element is again at work for some roots migrants, who intentionally avoided the German news media to manifest their dedication and loyalty to the homeland. Benan and Leyla, who learned limited German and always wanted to go back to Turkey, talk of avoiding German news and focusing on just Turkish news and Turkish TV as if it had been their national responsibility to the homeland:

> I never cared about what was happening in Europe. I always watched the Turkish TVs that broadcast from our homeland. I was interested in Turkey, not in Europe. (Benan)

Reminiscent of the student returnees, among the few roots migrants who emphasize interest in German political news media, some mention that they particularly followed the news about migrants and minorities in Germany. Sometimes this strategic choice is purported to the need of critical thinking on the positioning of the migrants and minorities in the German society by the media and the need of self-defense in the face of critiques to the migrant or minority identities. Informed by the already established perceptions about the German media and engaging with a future anticipation of self-defense in the face of critiques or attacks, such a choice reflects the habitual and projective dimensions of migrant agency.

> I follow every kind of news, but what I am more interested is the news about fights in big cities. I especially look at if there are any immigrants involved in the fight because I realized that when it is the case the news article tends to be very detailed. If it is a fight between Germans they keep the article very short. I was very sad about this. With my friends, we have a WhatsApp group where we share screenshots of these news articles. (Osman)

Osman's critical tone about the German media is repeated by other interviewees, as well, especially regarding German media's coverage of news on Turkey. This critical stance

on the discourse of the German media sometimes increases after they come to Turkey and start to experience Turkish politics on site. The political context in Turkey and the nature of the German-Turkish relations, both of which change at a great pace, also play a role in this picture:

> After moving to Turkey, I witnessed political reactions of the people in Turkey. I witnessed how they were resisting against repression. But I also understood how the German media was exaggerating everything about Turkey. They distort reality and exaggerate things to discredit Turkey. (Buket)

Except Demir and Umut, the roots migrants do not report any differences in their engagement with German politics and media after moving to Turkey. The two exemplify another form of strategic engagement with agents of political socialization and strategic perception of state-citizen relations. Demir, a roots migrant with German citizenship, states that he was actively following the German news media when he was in Germany. A CDU voter, Demir says he was very interested in the politics of the CDU and states that although he was aware of the cuts in social benefits, he was not critical of CDU because they were the ones who gave him all the welfare assistance. Upon moving to Turkey, Demir lost all the interest in German politics and the policies of CDU. His decision to stop following the news reflects how the practical evaluative dimension of migrant agency is at work, making practical judgements among alternative trajectories in response to emerging and presently evolving situations (Emirbayer and Mische 1998).

> Q: Are you following the German news now?
>
> A: Now I sit on my sofa in peace, keeping my hands clean. I put my social relations with Germany on the shelf. I am not receiving any assistance anymore. So, why would I bother myself with laws and politics? Not my pig, not my farm. It does not do me any good. The world is constructed on interest. Neither does Turkey serve my interest at the moment. Sometimes on Turkish TV I see Erdogan and Kilicdaroglu fighting, but I do not react. Why should I? Let those who earn their lives in this country talk. It is not my business. (Demir)

Opposite to Demir's case, Umut, who moved to Turkey to pursue an undergraduate degree in journalism, started to follow German news and politics after moving to Turkey. Although he did not have any interest in German politics while he was living there he says now it becomes indispensable to follow the German media. One of the reasons for this is to "reveal the real face of Germany to his friends in Turkey" who criticize the country, contrasting it with the Western democracies.

> Now I am more interested in German politics. (...) I am very disappointed that young people here do not know Europe well enough. They have a utopia about Europe, and they have no idea about its real face (…) They do not know how things actually work in Europe, so I follow the news on Europe as much as possible to discuss it with them. (Umut)

The interviews show that for the roots migrants, the German media did not function as an agent of political socialization in the way that it is often assumed in the literature. Rather, these returnees report significant examples of intentional avoidance or selective consumption of the political news media both when they lived in Germany and after they moved to Turkey. It is not uncommon for them to formulate their relationship with the German media and politics as a relationship of interest and strategy, which arguably are "imagined, evaluated, and contingently reconstructed by actors in ongoing dialogue with unfolding situations." (Emirbayer and Mische 1998, 966)

German political parties, elections and electoral campaigns

Studies on the political socialization of children indicate that political socialization to political parties begins with affective content, even before the children are capable of processing the cognitive content. Children start to have party attachments before they can understand the distinctions among the political parties (Greenstein 2017, 57). Political parties, especially through membership, are also seen as crucial in individuals' learning to adapt to new political contexts and systems. They are considered as channels of information which help the individuals interpret situations, as well as their own roles in

and responses to these situations. (Dawson, Prewitt, and Dawson 1977 cited in Warleigh, 2001, 621)

Although membership facilitates and intensifies the role of the host country political parties in the political socialization processes of the migrants, political parties can still play a role in this process for the migrants who are not members or citizens. Political parties diffuse their ideas and programs through media channels and also with their visibility in the public space, which intensifies greatly especially during the election campaigns. It can be argued that even if an individual is not a political party member or citizen, at least the election campaigns create an atmosphere in which s/he is exposed to the electoral messages and campaigns of the political parties.

As for the Turkish population in Germany, it is well-known that despite being predominantly conservative regarding both German and Turkish societies, they are represented by and vote for the left and liberal actors in the German electoral scene (Aktürk 2010). In 2017 German federal elections, 35% of the Turkish voters in Germany voted for SPD, 16% for the Left, and 13% for the Greens, adding the left-wing votes almost up to 65% (Goerres, Spies and Mayer 2018). CDU received 20% of the German-Turkish votes. So, although it was possible to talk about a slightly rising sympathy for Merkel among the Turks in Germany around 2013[14], this "representation gap" (Aktürk 2010, 71) is likely to persist. In this context, one of the interesting questions is how the political socialization of the migrants through political parties, elections and electoral campaigns can influence this representation gap. In other words, can voting for or being

[14] http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/turkish-voters-in-germany-turn-away-from-spd-a-916927.html
However, due to the volatility between the German-Turkish relations, this trend might have changed since then. Indeed, Erdogan called the Turks to vote against Merkel in the last elections. (https://www.trtworld.com/europe/erdogan-tells-turks-in-germany-to-vote-against-merkel-and-allies-9737)

represented by the left and liberal actors in Germany generate any attitude changes in the conservative Turks?

Interviews reveal that roots migrants and labor migrants tend to adopt a practical evaluative approach to German political parties and identify themselves with those parties only in terms of their pro-migrant policies or depending on whether they have Turkish candidates. They are not interested in the other political messages of these parties which could have an influence on their attitudes, otherwise. These migrants report sympathy for SPD and the Greens but state that they do not know much about the political agendas of these parties except the fact that they are pro-migrants. As for the student migrants, they tend not to report any identification with German political parties. They tend to know the main political parties in the German electoral scene and the cues they make to distinguish these parties are predominantly about their discourses on migration and minorities, as well as the corruption cases. As an example of conventional political socialization, a number of student migrants report that political messages of the Greens awoke environmentalist concerns for them. Below I elaborate on each group separately.

As explained earlier, the majority of the labor migrants do not have German citizenship, did not consider themselves as a part of the German polity and did not show interest in German politics in general. However, when asked about which political party they would vote for or with which political party they identify themselves, almost all the labor migrants have a clear answer. They do not have much information about the overall political position of these parties and they mostly focus on the positions of these parties regarding the foreigners and whether they have Turkish candidates. Some also mention that they look for the German ideological correspondent of the political party they support

in Turkey. Unsurprisingly, the overwhelming majority of the labor migrants support SPD or the Greens. There are also a few that report sympathy for the CDU.

Many, like Perihan, report their preference without much explanation or reasoning:

> If I could vote, I would vote for SPD because all the Turks were voting for it at that time.

Akif explains how indispensable it was for him to find the German counterpart of his political preferences in Turkey:

> I learned about the political parties from the newspapers and TV. Also by talking with my friends. This one is left, that one is right… You have to learn this, sister. You live there. You vote. You have to know.

Adnan makes a similar left-right distinction:

> SPD is a good party but they do not win. You know that woman…She always wins. (…) and they do not treat the foreigners well. (…) If I could vote, of course I would have voted for SPD. They are from the left. They were the ones that treated us so well when we first arrived. We won our bread when they were in power. Apart from that we did not learn anything about politics there. We did not see or hear anything.

Firuze states how her voting preference was formed around nothing but the origin of the candidate:

> Q: Who did you vote for in the last elections?
>
> A: That guy from Malatya.[15]
>
> Q: Which political party is he from?
>
> A: ……
>
> Q: The Greens?
>
> A: Yes, that one.
>
> Q: And what about the other political parties?
>
> A: I do not know the other ones. He is our boy. He is Turkish, so we voted for him and that's all.

[15] A province of Turkey in Eastern Anatolia.

The labor migrants that report sympathy for the CDU emphasize its political success, dedication and hard work:

> CDU is a patriotic political party they love their motherland and their nation. Merkel did many things for the development and growth of Germany. Normally I would vote for SPD because they defend the republic, but I would not mind voting for Merkel because I love the politicians that work for their homeland. (Ramazan)

As the majority of the labor migrants did not show interest in German politics in the overall and predominantly used their agency to filter the messages of German political parties on the basis of their positions regarding the migrants, it is not unsurprising that the elections and electoral campaigns did not contribute much to their understanding of the political positions within the German polity. However, their sporadic observations about how the election campaigns are implemented gave almost all of them an overall idea about a number of mechanisms in the German politics. The major observation for almost all of the interviewees is that the elections in Germany are not chaotic and corrupted like the ones in Turkey. Many also state that the election campaigns were so calm that it was hard to notice when the elections were taking place.

> There were SPD and others, but we did not see anything because they do not fight with each other. Neither on TV, nor on the street. Without any fights or any tension, all of a sudden, we have someone new in the government. Sometimes I came across their speeches. All of them speak well. Who came to power was not our business. We never thought we would live there for a long time. (Guzin)

Lastly, corruption is another cue for the labor migrants to reiterate their opinions about the political parties:

> I do not know much about the parties, but I remember that once a deputy from one of the left-wing parties asked for a job for his son. The people found out about it, and he immediately resigned. Another one got his name involved in a corruption case of 20.000 euros and he also resigned right away. (Firuze)

As for the student migrants, all of them know the major parties in Germany such as SPD, CDU, and the Greens. Some also pronounce NPD, die Linke, FDP and DKP and xenophobic movements such as PEGIDA. When asked about their impressions of the political parties, movements and figures in Germany the students mostly make cues about

them through their statements about politics of immigration and integration, issues of xenophobia and racism. However, their narrative rarely goes beyond basic cues and hardly reaches a deeper knowledge of party politics in Germany. For example, they do not know the majority of the party programs, the political debates within or among the parties, or the key figures in them. Similar to the filtering of German media, the student migrants seem to strategically filter the information on German political parties according to their subjective position in the German polity.

When asked about the political parties in Germany, SPD and the Greens are the two that come to Sevil's mind:

> I know SPD and the Greens. There is a Turkish bureaucrat in the Greens, Cem Ozdemir. That's why I know it. I guess I have more sympathy for the Greens as they support the Turkish integration to Germany.

Burak says the only systematic difference he knows between the CDU and the Greens is their approach to immigration:

> We thought it would be bad for us when CDU came to power. (…) I intuitively knew that there, CDU was different when it came to the migration laws. The Greens, on the other hand, looked like they wanted to provide opportunities for the immigrants. Apart from this issue, I did not distinguish them much in my mind.

Reported incidents of corruption about the German political leaders constitute another cue for the student migrants. These incidents caught their attention primarily because the reaction of the German society and political elite to these incidents was very different than in Turkey.

> There were hardly any political incidents or events that could be considered important for society. (…) Then, there was a political scandal about the PhD thesis of the defense minister. (…) He had plagiarism in his thesis. The world turned upside down for the Germans. They were talking about this all the time. (…) I thought about one of our politicians. We knew there were claims that he plagiarized his thesis, but nothing happened to him. He just got more powerful and richer. (Dilay)

In Dilay's story it is possible to see the signs of political socialization in the conventional sense of learning the first-world democratic values. However, it is again very strategically filtered because when she returned to Turkey she chose not to exercise the values she learned there simply because she was afraid to get in trouble.

> Overall, my experience in Germany taught me to be critical and reclaim your rights. Of course, I do not do stuff like that here. But at least I realized that it is possible in some countries in the world.

Similarly, Cigdem says:

> I do not remember the elections at all, but I remember the president. I remember very clearly that he had to resign from his post because of a corruption scandal. (…) His wife got a loan from the bank with a lower interest rate than it should be… Look at the corruption case (!) People protested against him very harshly. In Turkey we have "the case of lost billions"; there are videotapes showing corruptions worth billions and billions… (Cigdem)

Environmentalist politics of the Greens is another topic that finds itself a place in the narratives of the student migrants. Some state that they had never thought about environmentalism in the sense that it was debated in Germany. The change in the political attitudes of some student migrants regarding this issue is one of the few examples of that fit the conventional understanding of political socialization in the literature.

Serdar, who says he only could feel close to the Greens explains as follows:

> The only thing that I am sure that has changed in my life with my experience in Germany is the environmental consciousness that I gained there. I now have a lot of curiosity for nature. In Turkey, I never had that because of the structure of the urban areas.

Dilay explains,

> My friends there used to vote for the Greens. (…) I remember asking my friend, "how is it possible that there is a political party called the Greens? Are they vegetarian or what?" I could not imagine that a political party can aim at gaining political power through environmentalism. (…) It was unbelievable. I mean, in Turkey we have the green of dollars and the green of Islam… Putting the environmental values at the center of your policy and trying to gain support through this was unbelievable for me.

Although for a moment it looks like Dilay, like Serdar, internalized environmentalism and its place within the first-world democratic values, a closer look demonstrates that the questioning migrant agency enters the picture again, instead of a passive reception of these values:

> They support renewable energy resources, and I did my master's just on this topic. I think they promote this mainly because Germany is one of the leaders in the generation of renewable energy resources. These environmentalist policies have an automatic economic return for them. Moreover, it is expensive. So, I do not understand that vibe of "Let's go green" in our own context. I do not think it is reasonable to put this at the center of the policy making of a political party. In Germany, they defend this a lot because they gain a lot of economic returns from the promotion of green policies. Maybe the Greens do not think like this, maybe their hearts are very clean…But this is what I think.

Students generally explain their lack of knowledge and interest about the politics of different political parties by their outsider position in the German society. Temporariness and unknowns of the duration of their stay in Germany and not having the right to vote are the two elements reported by the students, which prevented the building of a sense of belonging to the German polity.

Tuna mentions not having the right to vote as a reason,

> I was a waitress at a coffee shop. People used to come there and chat about politics. What the leftists say, what the rightist say…But I was not interested in these, I think mainly because I did not have the right to vote.

For others, the temporality of their stay there or the lack of feeling of belonging were among the reasons:

> I did not have any relation of sympathy for a political movement there. For that, you need to feel a sense of belonging. I did not have a relationship as such with Germany. If I had wanted to stay there, then those feelings could have improved. But I did not. I decided to return to Turkey for personal reasons. (Pelin)

Elections and electoral campaigns do no constitute a significant sphere in which the students learned the politics and promises of these parties, either. A very common statement about the elections and electoral campaigns is that they do not remember

anything about the elections except one impression, which is very repetitive along the research: They find the electoral campaigns very modest and calm. Contrasting German political culture to the Turkish one, they state that rational arguments have more value than threats, bullying, and hues and cries, which they see as the driving power of the Turkish electoral campaigns. The only specific electoral campaign that is repetitively pronounced in the interviews is again a discriminatory one, the 2011 campaign of NPD, which used images of traditional Turkish men and women with slogans such as *'Ausländer raus!'* (meaning *"Foreigners out!"*).

As for the roots migrants, they only roughly know the party programs and political agendas of the parties, and they do not systematically follow the messages given by German political parties. Three of the interviewees state that they are not informed on or interested in German political parties so they do not have an opinion. 12 say they voted or would vote for the Greens or SPD. The reasons for this preference, on the other hand, barely go beyond the idea that these two parties are pro-immigrant and/or they have Turkish MPs. Almost none of the roots migrants make reference to other fundamental elements in these parties' agendas such as ecological concerns of the Greens. With a few exceptions, this form of reasoning can be considered as a strategic evaluation by the migrants rather than a dynamic of political socialization to the values defended by these parties:

> I would vote for SPD. They defend the Turks more. CDU is against the Turks. (...) My parents always voted for SPD. With the intention of protecting the Turks. (...) CDU was trying to send the Turks back to Turkey and limit their rights. All the Turks were voting for SPD so that CDU would not win. (Nuray)

Osman, who is a self-defined nationalist and conservative, explains his preference for SPD in a sharply strategic tone set around the idea of self-interest. His account can also

be considered as a response to the popular question of "why the Turks in Germany predominantly vote for right in Turkey and for left in Germany":

> SPD behaves very strategically. They benefit from the themes that are important for the *gurbetci*s. Dual citizenship came on their agenda. (...) At that time, we voted for SPD because dual citizenship was a life-long interest for me. To speak clearly, I think all of them are bad. We voted for SPD only because it was to our interest for all our lives. It is to our interest: they help us more than others. It is their tactic and strategy. (Osman)

Not all of the roots migrants identify themselves with SPD and the Greens. Three interviewees state that they would vote for CDU. CDU voters explain their choice with the idea that the party maintains the economic growth and political interests of Germany. What is more interesting is that examples in this case tend to be Turkish nationalists and conservatives that would vote for AKP in Turkey. What binds these preferences is the discourse on "the consolidation economic and political interests of the homeland." In this line, some of these individuals also argue that Turkey should take after the example of CDU, constituting a showcase for political socialization in its conventional meaning:

> If I rate them, it might sound weird to you but I would give six points to CDU for their success and four points to SPD for their sympathy for the Turks. I always look at the economic dimension. (...) Germany is a federation, and different people can live together. In Turkey, when the right time comes, Kurds, too, can live in a federal state. In Germany, this system works well. Everyone expresses their opinion and fight for the economy of the country under the same flag. (Yilmaz)

Other CDU sympathizers combine this with an act of gratitude to CDU for providing them a specific service:

> Once I said to a friend, "Merkel stripped us off our social rights." He replied, "She did her best under the current economic circumstances. Do not you see five million people like you and me live on welfare benefits?" (...) I mean, how can I criticize a party like this? If I criticize, they would say, "it is me who is taking care of you, I pay your rent and your bills." So, if I vote there, I vote for Merkel. (Demir)

Like the political parties and the media, elections and electoral campaigns are also considered as agents of political socialization mainly because they facilitate an

augmenting visibility of the political parties and the key political debates in the country. Given the overall picture of the interviewees' relationship with the German political parties as agents of political socialization, it is unsurprising that election times, when the individuals are more exposed to the messages of the political parties, do not represent an effective political socialization window in terms of understanding party programs and the relevant debates on policies.

Notwithstanding, the ways in which electoral campaigns and elections are carried out can often be efficient political socializers, as they manifest the rational, calm and modest political debate culture in Germany. The interviewees frequently compare and contrast it with the Turkish political atmosphere, which they find "infantile", "showy", or "American".

> Maybe it is a cultural thing, but there is a big difference between electoral campaigns in the two countries. In Turkey, it feels like 8-year-old boys are fighting for a ball. In Germany, the politicians are calm and they do *debatieren* (they debate). They discuss the issues calmly. Politicians here, on the other hand, just bully each other. (…) It feels like we are waiting with a bomb in our hands, which is about to explode. (Nihan)

Conclusion

Based on a critical engagement with the ideas of democratic diffusion and spillover effects (of the political values of the host country), this chapter seeks to examine to what extent the inputs/messages of German agents of political socialization reach the migrants and to what extent and in which ways the migrants use their agency in their interaction with these agents. An analysis of the biographical narratives of the migrants shows that due to structural constraints or agentic factors, the migrants often had limited interaction with the political socializers. When they were in contact, the migrants frequently used their agency to play around, ignore, or reject their inputs.

Lack of language skills, demographic make-up of socialization environments such as schools, neighborhoods and workplaces, political context of the host country in which migratory experience takes place, and discrimination are among the structural constraints for the migrant groups in their (lack of) interaction with German agents of political socialization. Differences in generational factors, transnational conditions and the cultural and social capital across the three migrant groups explain the intergroup variability.

In particular, socializing effects of the relations with the German friends, coworkers and community were very limited for all migrants. Rather, all three groups repetitively mention a rich transnational socialization experience in the German-Turkish community or other international migrant communities, in contrast to the weak relations with the Germans. When they were in contact with German agents of political socialization, migrants employed different dimensions of their agencies to strategically filter, ignore or engage with their inputs, depending on their needs and concerns. Especially, their engagements with German political news and political parties present interesting examples of the uses of the habitual, projective and practical evaluative dimensions of the migrant agency. Following German news according to the popular lunchtime topics at the workplace in order to be able to defend Turkey's position is a case in point. As another example, interviews reveal that instead of following the political messages of the German political parties and the election campaigns across a variety of topics, the migrants exclusively focused on a limited number of topics, such as their pro-migrant policies or whether they have Turkish candidates.

The active use of migrant agency as illustrated in these examples hints at alternative processes of political socialization in contrast to its conceptualization as a process of absorbing the political values of the host country. In the following chapter, I examine

these alternative processes of “negative political socialization”, by which I refer to migrants’ reproducing the outsider’s place through political learning in the host country rather than becoming insiders to it. I complete the analysis addressing the transnational dimensions of conventional and negative political socialization processes in Chapter 5.

CHAPTER 4: Processes of conventional and negative political socialization

Introduction

In the previous chapter, I show that the interaction between migrants and German agents of political socialization does not often pave the way for conventional forms of political socialization. I also attempt to demonstrate that rather than passively absorbing messages of these agents, migrants use their agency in these interactions to actively question, reject, ignore, or play around their socialization inputs. Given that these findings point out the possibility of alternative dynamics of political socialization, in this chapter I ask what other mechanisms might be at work in the interaction of migrants with agents of political socialization along their migration trajectories both in Germany and Turkey. I aim to identify the processual mechanisms that constitute an alternative to the common approaches to migrant political socialization. To do this, I focus on the processual character of political socialization with an attempt to unpack the process itself and reveal its inner dynamics.

The inductive approach of the grounded theory methodology helps delineate two processes of political socialization with a series of constituent categories. The first is the conventional political socialization process, which, as formulated in the existing literature, refers to the migrants' learning and establishing a number of hegemonic political and social values and behaviors in the German polity. As assumed by concepts such as the spillover effects, these values and behaviors are uncritically embraced by migrants as exemplary (and democratic) values of a first-world country. Migrants in this study tend to make an effort to maintain these uncritically embraced values (which are mostly social norms) after the return, even though they lead them towards conflictual situations. The main emerging categories that constitute the conventional process of

political socialization in Germany are *non-critical interpretations of rationality*, and *empathy with the Germans*.

The second basic social process revealed by the grounded theory approach in this chapter is the process of *negative political socialization*[16]. Narratives of the interviewees show that along with the conventional political socialization, there is also a different kind of political socialization in which immigrants are molded not into citizens but into the outsiders of the political system and they contribute to the maintenance of the political system by socializing into this outsider's position. In this model, migrants question the dynamics of the regime and its authorities, as well as the values and attitudes promoted by them. Notwithstanding, they strategically accept their position as outsiders to the system and navigate in it as such. This acceptance of the outsider's position contributes not to the disruption but to the reproduction of the German political system with its excluded and its outsiders. Hence, negative political socialization takes place concurrently with conventional political socialization. The grounded theory approach reveals a number of key categories that constitute the process of negative political socialization across all the three migrant groups with variations: *discriminatory experiences*, *empathy (empathy with the discriminated and impossibility of empathy)*, *critical interpretations of rationality*.

It can be argued that these two concurrent processes are symmetric counterparts of each other and the constituting categories for both processes are like mirror images. Moreover, both processes condition and are conditioned by *boundary making mechanisms for the contested identities.* This category explains that with an urge to reconstruct and maintain

[16] I coined this term with an inspiration from Adorno's *Negative Dialectics* (1966).

the boundaries of their identities, which are contested by changing positionalities on the transnational political space, all three groups of migrants act along the course of the two processes of political socialization with strategic discourses and practices. Lastly, conventional and negative political socialization processes lead to *strategic integration*, the main motive of which is to avoid conflicts in Turkey and in Germany to reach life goals.

In what follows, I first present a brief methodological discussion. Then I explain the processes of conventional and negative political socialization for the three migrant groups, with detailed discussions on their constituent categories such as critical and non-critical interpretations of discriminatory practices, empathy, and rationality and outcomes such as strategic integration to Germany. I also seek to show that the variations in the conventional and negative political socialization mechanisms among the three migrant groups can largely be accounted by the class differences, the transnational conditions and the political contexts of the host and home countries that correspond to the process of political socialization.

Figure 4.1: Conventional and negative political socialization model



Methodology

The analysis in this chapter relies on the grounded theory methodology, which aims to discover the basic social processes by the way of deciphering its constituent categories and the relations among them in new ways (Strauss and Corbin 1998). The grounded research makes as few assumptions as possible about the phenomenon it investigates and avoids borrowing variables and categories from previous theories. As an inductive method, it allows construction of theories 'grounded in' the data, instead of counting on analytical variables that come from earlier theories (Willig 2013, 69).

The relationships among the categories and the subcategories consequently form the Paradigm Model, which includes the causal conditions, the context, the intervening conditions, the action/interaction strategies and the consequences of the phenomena constituted by the categories (Strauss and Corbin 1998, 127). Two main techniques used in the grounded theory approach to construct the paradigm model are open and axial coding. Open coding is the first step by which the researcher identifies discrete concepts, and categorizes and labels them through constant comparison. The initial descriptive categories are later merged into more abstract ones by axial coding according to causal, contextual and intervening conditions and the action strategies. With axial coding, the researcher establishes new links in new ways between categories and sub-categories she constructs with open coding. Lastly, in the stage of selective coding, codes and categories are integrated into a final conceptual framework by relating them to one or two core categories (Strauss and Corbin 1998).

I begin the analysis by identifying the quotations from the interviews that make a political statement about any issue, or explain a political process in the lives of the interviewees in the broadest terms. Then I perform an open-coding procedure based on the principle of constant comparison, which is an iterative process of constantly comparing each quotation with the previously analyzed quotations in order to decide on their similarities and differences. The quotations that refer to the same phenomena are labelled the same and the open coding is completed when the same procedure is conducted for all quotations. Initially I come up with 170 codes after eliminating the duplicates, which I group into 16 main categories: German-Turks (Almancilik), citizenship, democracy, *raison d'état*, family, German politics, Germans, Germany, construction of identity, political party preferences, types of socialization, strategies, transnationalism, Turkey,

Turks, Turkish politics. In axial coding, in which I intend to discover the connections between the categories and the underlying factors that explain and shape these connections, I particularly seek to define how the category of "types of socialization" work as a bridge between the other categories. An example is how different transnational patterns of political socialization bind different understandings of democracy or citizenship. In this process, some of the codes that repeat in each of the 16 categories such as *discrimination* and *empathy* come forward as codes that explain the causal conditions, intervening conditions, and the context.

Conventional political socialization

As discussed in the introductory chapter, conventional political socialization produces a generalized belief in the legitimacy of the regime and the authorities (Conover 1991; Kinder and Sears 1985), as well as the values promoted by them. When it comes to the political socialization of the migrants, the literature tends to assume that this 'diffuse system support' (Easton 1965) will be created through the diffusion of democratic values, which postulates that democracy is diffused from country to country like a voluntary and unintended communication of an attractive innovation (Lauth and Pickel 2008 cited in Rother 2009, 251) This tendency can be observed both in political socialization and in political remittances approaches as suggested by terms such as spillover effects (Mercier and Chauvet 2014) and "material and cognitive benefits of migration" (Careja and Emmeneger 2012)

Indeed, all three migrant groups in this study experience this conventional political socialization process, in which they uncritically embrace and internalize the hegemonic values, practices, and discourses in the German polity. Such political socialization is different than political learning, which can be defined as "idiosyncratic personal growth"

(Kinder and Sears 1985, 714) or "the attainment of attitudes that do not necessarily contribute to the maintenance of the political system" (Conover 1991, 130), because it brings along support and empathy for the Germans and the German political decision makers. An in-depth inquiry shows that two main mechanisms operate at the background of this uncritical embracement: *Empathy with the discriminatory practices and non-critical interpretation of rationality*. In many cases, this uncritical embracing and internalization of the political and social values and norms do not result in the migrants' being molded into or accepted as the insiders of the polity. However, such conventional political socialization helps the migrants redraw and consolidate their identity boundaries in the face of challenges rising from changing positionalities. Hence, the migrants also tend to strive to maintain these values and attitudes after the return.

Figure 4.2: Conventional political socialization model for all migrant groups



How do migrants articulate conventional political socialization?

Among the three migrant groups, the most striking expressions of conventional political socialization emerge in the accounts of the labor migrants. In many interviews, the labor

migrants state that they discovered *humanity* and *civicness* in Germany. This is a repeating narrative that is almost exclusive to the accounts of the first group of labor migrants who arrived in Germany in the 1960s and 1970s. Arguably, the social class differences between the Germans and the guest workers coming from Anatolian villages, and the lack of previously established transnational ties and *a priori* knowledge about Germany discussed in the earlier chapters are among the main factors that make these articulations remarkable and affirming examples of the conventional understanding of political socialization. Migrants in this group state that they started to change their own values and attitudes as they observed the respectful and well-mannered Germans:

> I learned good manners from the Germans. My neighbors used to keep the building door open for me when they saw me approaching. (…) I learned how to be a decent human being, and I practiced what I learned. (Ali)

Secondly, life in Germany also had an effect on the gender relations among the labor migrants in this group. A number of women report emancipatory experiences, which are more remarkable for those that joined the labor force. Moreover, a few men, especially those with an *Alevi* background, mention how their treatment towards their wives transformed in Germany. This effect is again more visible among the first group of labor migrants.

> Germany influenced us a lot. When we first went there, our women were wearing *çarşaf*[17]. I went there and realized that the women did not wear *çarşaf*. I adapted myself to their dressing styles. *Carşaf* was a very improper thing. I told my wife to change her way of dressing so that she could adapt herself. Also, we used to treat our women violently before going there. We used to insult them. There, we learned the preciousness of the women. Women are our mothers. They are such precious beings... You have to give women the value they deserve. I learned these things from the Germans. (Ali)

[17] *Çarşaf*, similar to the Iranian *chador,* is a large and generally black cloth that covers the whole body except the face.

Labor migrants also repeatedly mention how their understanding of hygiene, discipline, punctuality, and civicness changed in Germany. Many labor migrants claim that after they came back to Turkey they have tried to maintain these embraced values, although it creates conflictual situations with the non-migrant Turks:

> There (in Germany) they fine you if you spit on the street. Here they almost take a sh*t on the street. They do not care. They throw their garbage everywhere. Once I warned someone and he responded to me, "What's the municipality for? Let them clean it, it's their job." I asked him. "Do you do the same in your own house?" They are ready to start a fight any time. (Guzin)

For the student migrants, productivity and work discipline constitute one of the main themes of conventional socialization and this comes up more strongly in their narratives when compared to the labor migrants.

> I tried to internalize their work principles and their honesty. I cannot stand the slackness of professional relations here. They cancel meetings at the last minute. Germans' work ethic and honesty… I would never give up on these. They call me names like "German Nazi" here at my current job. (Huseyin)

Although not as strong as the idea of work discipline, the student migrants embrace a number of other values in Germany. Witnessing the multicultural and liberal urban environment of German cities such as Berlin and the redistribution mechanisms of the German welfare state, some student migrants report becoming more egalitarian and tolerant. Some also report an awakening of consciousness in terms of the environmental issues:

> I became a libertarian. Also in terms of environmentalism, I can say that I changed a lot. I became curious about nature. In Turkey, I was not conscious of it. (…) Also, I became very conscious about traffic rules and the personal space. I understood that mutual respect as a social norm was vital in daily life. I maintain these reflexes here. (Serdar)

As for the roots migrants, although their political socialization processes in Germany unfold on a German-Turkish political transnational space, at times they distinguish the German values they embrace and internalize from the Turkish ones. Like the student migrants, the common themes of conventional socialization for the roots migrants are a number of social norms such as discipline, orderliness, punctuality and environmentalism.

> If you litter in the streets, the Germans look at you disapprovingly. There are rules, and people obey them. It is that simple. (…) Here, I make some driving errors in traffic, but regarding all the other issues such as environmentalism, I make no concessions. I try to practice all the rules I learned in Germany. (Umut)

The interviews show that the migrants have clear answers about the effects of conventional political socialization on their behaviors, which they have intend to maintain after return. An in-depth inquiry shows that two main mechanisms operate at the background of this uncritical embracement: *Empathy with the discriminatory practices and non-critical interpretation of rationality.* Boundary making mechanisms for the migrants' contested identities interact with both categories along the course of conventional political socialization. Below I present a detailed analysis of these categories.

Empathy with the discriminatory practices

All migrant groups in this study experienced random and/or systematic discrimination in Germany, which I delve on in the following section on negative political socialization. Despite this fact, all groups manifest ironic examples of empathy with the hegemonic discriminatory practices and discourses of the Germans. Almost in all cases this diffuse support to discrimination is alimented by the need to redefine and demarcate the contested identity boundaries as a consequence of the changing positionalities (Anthias 2008) of

the migrants on the transnational political space.

The labor migrants express empathy for the discriminatory an exclusionary practices and discourses of the German state and citizens. They do it mostly with respect to three main groups: “other” immigrants, Syrian refugees, and “other” Turks. Their emphasis on this feeling of empathy is much more predominant when compared to the student and roots migrants. At this point it is important to note that the positionalities of especially the first group of labor migrants (early migrants) change over time, firstly in Germany, secondly after the return to Turkey. These early migrants witnessed the transformation of the attitudes of the Germans towards them especially in the 1980s as the influx of the Turkish became permanent and the guest workers turned into permanent residents. With respect to the changing perceptions of the Germans, the migrants in this group felt the need to make a distinction between themselves and the “other” Turkish migrants and other migrants in general, who were unlawful, disrespectful and reluctant to adapt themselves to the society they live in. In this context, empathy with the Germans with respect to their prejudices against the Turks arises as a mechanism of boundary making against these “other Turks”:

> There was no xenophobia in Germany. But when I was there, it had come to such a point that I, myself, started to have xenophobia against the foreigners in Germany, even though I was a foreigner. I did not care if they were my fellow citizens. They were behaving in such manners that they were putting us to shame. (Humeyra)

Secondly, in Turkey, with the influx of the Syrian refugees, the labor migrant returnees find themselves in the position of the insiders of the receiving polity, just as the Germans used to be with respect to themselves. Such an empowering shift in positionality raises a retrospective empathy with the Germans:

> As the Syrians poured into Turkey, I started to understand how right the Germans are. We just have the Syrians here. In Germany, you have the Yugoslavians, Italians, Turks, Greeks… For instance, the Germans like to go for a walk with their family on Sundays. Lately, they are afraid to go out. If I were there, even I would be scared. (…) Then, of course, the Germans say, "I work, I pay my taxes and I cannot even go out with my family on Sundays." When we were there as foreigners, we did not realize how right they were in this thinking. Now, when we are in our own country and we see the Syrians everywhere, we understood how they felt. (Humeyra)

Ironically, in her depiction of the misconduct of the Syrians in Turkey, Aysegul uses the same expressions that some of the other labor migrants in this study use in order to describe the characteristics of the "other" German-Turks in Germany. She especially mentions aggressive behavior, lack of respect to the order and the rules and misconduct in traffic:

> The reasons why the Turks went to Germany and the Syrians came here are very different. Germans themselves wanted to invite workers. They needed those workers. However, we did not want the Syrians. (…) The Germans say, "you have come to my country, so you will obey my rules." But here, some of those people (Syrians) look at you with such eyes that you feel like they are kicking you out of your own country. For instance, while driving, they do not follow the rules. If you get angry, you see that he is ready to beat you up. (Aysegul**)**

As for the student migrants, empathy for the discriminatory practices and discourses of the Germans is not as strongly articulated in their narratives. A few interviewees who express this thought do it mostly in contexts where they raise their disapproval for the German-Turks' lifestyle and lack of integration in Germany, in tandem with conventional political socialization. Unlike the roots and labor migrants, the students do not develop empathy with the discriminatory practices and discourses of the Germans with respect to other migrant groups or the Syrian refugees. Arguably this finding supports my argument that boundary making for contested identities conditions and is conditioned by the category of empathy, as the students strive to mark their distinctiveness from the German-Turks in the eyes of the Germans.

> My general impression is that if I were German, I would not like the Turks. They go there to settle down and they show no single effort to get integrated to German society. (…) What makes me angry is that they take advantage of living in Germany, but they do not respect the German. (…) They do not obey the rules. They try to ride trains without paying for the ticket, because they think they are smart. They try to exploit the weaknesses and gaps of the social welfare system. (Dilay)

In the case of the roots migrants, empathy with the groups that exercise discrimination is expressed for Germans in Germany and Turks in Turkey. One type of post-migratory feeling of empathy for the Germans (as a group that discriminates or excludes) rises as a corollary of the migrants' emerging positionalities in relation to the Syrian refugees in Turkey. Their changing positionality from 'migrants in Germany' to 'locals of Turkey – a country that opens its doors to a large number of Syrian refugees' makes them not only justify the discriminatory behaviors of the Germans towards themselves but also understand what they call "Germans' jealousy" for their own achievements.[18]

> They said they would give citizenship to the Syrians. It drives me crazy. (…) Even though I have many Arab friends, when I go out in Istanbul, the density of the Arab population bothers me. It is not because they are Arabs. It is rather like how the Germans feel about the foreigners. They fear the strangers. In Turkey, I started to understand this feeling. I said, "now I understand how the Germans feel." I do not like going to Aksaray[19] now because I do not feel safe there. I mean, now I empathize with the Germans. (Ece)

Non-critical interpretation of rationality

German rationality is a theme that emerges very frequently in the narratives of the interviewees from all groups in various political and social dimensions at both state and individual levels. It is a main category around which the migrants formulate their support

[18] Although this pattern repeats many times in the narratives of the roots and the labor migrants, it is present but not as strong in the narratives of the student migrants. One reason for this might be the fact that at the time of the interviews with the student migrants, the number of refugees in Turkey were not as high and the social problems arising from the refugee influx were not as visible or ripe.

[19] A neighborhood in Istanbul.

and affirmation to the values they embrace and internalize during the course of conventional political socialization. When they articulate their approval of the values and attitudes they observe in the German state, citizens, political actors and political leaders or explain why they embrace them, the migrants constantly make references to the idea of rationality in different contexts and uses of the term which could best be gathered under Weber's idea of the Protestant ethic. At the individual level, this idea is pronounced in the sense of scientific-ness, productivity, hard work, normativity and rational communication. At the state level, it refers to rational-legal authority that guarantees a strong social contract.

Non-critical interpretations of rationality become a tool for all the groups in their attempt to (re)forge the boundaries of their contested identities. The roots and labor migrants mention how they embrace it at the individual level in order to underline their differences from the Turks in Turkey. The student migrants express the same thing so as to distantiate themselves from the German-Turks in Germany, as well as the non-immigrants in Turkey after return.

Labor migrants' impressions on the Germans' individual political behaviors, the interaction between the political parties, as well as the relations between the state and the citizens are eventually based on the idea of rationality in Germany in contrast to a *chaotic* and *tumultuous* Turkey. While at the individual level, the quality of honesty comes forward as a predominant observation, the election campaigns constitute the epitome of the rational communication between institutional political actors.

> What did Germany do to me? It made me let go of my bad temper and start thinking rationally. Before I went there, I was always witnessing the political

> conflicts and tension on the streets in Turkey. The common way of interacting with the rival political groups was using violence instead of talking to them. There, I saw that the politics do not work like that. Never. They talk. (Erdinc)

The emphasis on hardworking politicians along with honesty and lack of corruption in the political scene is reminiscent of the Weberian understanding of legal rational authority and the Protestant ethic:

> The political scene in Germany is fabulous. Nobody tries to defame or denigrate anybody. When I went there the prime minister was Willy Brandt he resigned immediately when his secretary was discovered to be a spy. Another corruption case was found to be related to another guy. I do not remember what it was. But that guy also resigned immediately (Adnan)

The labor migrants refer to a very strong social contract between the honest and disciplined individuals and a state that guarantees the rule of law and normativity to the highest extent. Underlining the orderliness and rule of law, they state how comfortable they felt there knowing that their rights are guaranteed:

> The only thing we learned from them is order and regulation. For example, when we went to the Turkish Consulate, we were always worried about how they would treat us there. But when we needed to go to a German state institute, we felt very comfortable. The person in charge treats you in such a correct and helpful manner that you go there without dreading whether they will solve your problem or not. (Memduh)

They have the impression that law and order is for everyone in Germany as long as they are honest:

> There, you should be honest. You should abide by the laws. Their law is strict. There are no lies. Not like here. There is not trickery. The police and the state do not cheat you of your rights as long as you are honest. (Ali)

This picture is completed with the image of the unity of state and the honest citizens to protect the interests of the state and the society:

> Germans are very good and trustworthy people. They believe your word. I also like one specific thing about them: they are very nationalist for their state [sic]. They do not accept the slightest error. Try passing at the red light, the citizens themselves warn you. They say, "My kids see that you are breaking the rules, I cannot let you be a bad example, you have to wait for the green light." (Guzin)

In the interviews with the student migrants, the non-critical interpretation of rationality does not emerge as strongly as the labor and roots migrants. Like the other two groups, they emphasize with approbation that reasonable and rational arguments always have more prestige than the populist, emotional or bullying ones in the political scene:

> I really like one thing about the Germans. When they have a debate about something, they keep away from populism. They debate to solve a problem. Here when we debate about something, we do it to needle people or defeat them (…) rather than solve a problem. (…) In Germany, if you criticize someone, they think about it seriously and they try to learn from you. For this reason, I find the political debates on German TV very educational and valuable. (Huseyin)

The student migrants also underline their observations on the qualities of the German polity, such as the rational communication between the political actors, stability, order, and lack of corruption. In some cases, they explain these qualities by the civilized political culture, established democratic values of Germany or the benign character of the German state.

> There I saw a society at peace with their own values…They get together and debate about anything in a very civilized manner. There I understood how to make a civilized debate (…) There is justice there. Even though I think Turks are discriminated socially, they have economic advantages in that system. There I realized that social democracy and economic justice are the things that create peace in society. Germany is a very important example, in terms of the role of rule of law. There I saw that the law is not bended to secure the interests of the powerful. (Hüseyin)

The more remarkable versions of the non-critical interpretation of rationality belong to the roots migrants. Their formulation of rationality is essentially based on their imagination that the German people are *educated* and *rational* individuals who think

scientifically and who communicate with each other rationally. In the narratives of the interviewees, this constitutes a high contrast with the *immature*, *uneducated* and *infantile* Turks, who do not know how to communicate rationally and who are open to manipulation. On the same terrain, German citizens are voters with rational political behaviors, who are well educated and who make their decisions on the basis of a rational reading of party programs and political agendas of the parties. For the interviewees, this is in contrast with the Turkish voting behavior, according to which, they argue, supporting a political party is like supporting a football team. In this narrative, Turkish voters represent an uneducated mass of "emotional chaos" and they make their decisions in an infantile manner, based on irrational criteria such as the handsomeness or charisma of a leader.

> The biggest contrast is that they are rational and we are an emotional chaos. They have a developed democracy but this is maintained because they are educated and they have high political awareness. Here people can vote even though they do not know how to read and write. They have no idea… They go to the ballot box and vote for a party that someone else tells them to vote for. It is all very corrupted here. (Melek)

The interviewees attribute rationality to the German polity as a whole, as well. Political parties, political leaders, electoral campaigns and debates on TV play an important role in the dissemination of this image of rationality. German political parties and political leaders are argued to engage into rational communication.[20] As the interviewees put it, the Germans enter rational debates, where the tension never rises, and they know how to praise their rivals upon their accomplishments. Turkish political parties, on the other hand, resort to bullying, provocations and manipulations.

> Maybe it is a cultural thing but there is a big difference between electoral

[20] Almost in a Habermasian way in the sense that "participants reciprocally raise validity claims that can be accepted or contested and reach a rationally motivated agreement that is measured against (these) criticizable validity claims" (Habermas 1984: 99)

> campaigns in the two countries. In Turkey, it feels like 8-year-old boys are fighting for a ball. In Germany, the politicians are calm and they do *debatieren* (they debate). They prepare themselves for the debate and discuss the issues calmly. Politicians here just bully each other. They make absurd promises to their voters. They treat the people as if they had low IQs and they did not know how to read and write. The quality of electoral propaganda is very low. It feels like we are waiting with a bomb in our hands, which is about to explode. (Nihan)

Like the other two groups, reminiscent of the Weberian idea of rational legal authority, the interviewees perceive Germany as a country where the rule of law is established and protected very well, sometimes at exaggerated levels. Not surprisingly, they see the German people as law-abiding, disciplined and honest citizens with a deep and consolidated social/national consciousness. Turkey, on the other hand, is contrasted to this image as a chaotic, volatile and uncanny country; and Turks not so law-abiding, disciplined and honest.

> Turkish laws are pointless. There are many weak points and gaps that can be manipulated. I do not believe that there is rule of law here. Individuals themselves take care of it personally. Germany is very well organized in that sense, but they have many unnecessary laws. They will almost ask people to sign papers to go take a piss. (Melek)

Nuray explains how hard it was for her to understand that honesty and justice means a different thing for the Turks in Turkey:

> When I first came to Turkey, it was very hard for me to adapt because of the people. In Germany, when you say something, you mean it. Here they say something but they may mean something else, and there is always some background thinking behind the curtains. (...) So, in the beginning they treated me like a stupid naive person because I was saying what I was thinking. People who come from Germany like me do not know how to hide things. I have learned this in time. They teach you. (...) Germans are very disciplined, ruly and just. Turks, on the other hand, are very unjust. (...) They treat you according to the quality of your outfit. (Nuray)

Ece articulates how confusing it is for her to navigate without rules and regulations in her professional life in Turkey:

> One of the things Germany gave to me is that I look for reason and rationality behind everything. In Turkey, some things look so absurd to me. There are no rules. Give me the rules and norms, give me a regulatory framework and let me do my job accordingly!! In Turkey, everything can be an exception. What I got from Germany is that I need rules in my life. (Ece)

Another manifestation of the category of rationality formulated around normativeness, discipline and rational communication both at the state and the citizenship level is the impression that there is a very strong social contract between the state and the citizens in Germany. Accordingly, the Germans are very dedicated to their state, and there is a very established state tradition and *raison d'état*.

> Germans are very disciplined. Germany is a very orderly country. Germans think of their homeland more than themselves. Let's say, if the government says "This week it is forbidden to eat eggs to support the state budget", that week nobody eats eggs. They would not find excuses like, "I am sick" or "I really feel like eating one egg." The interests of the country are more important than their individual interests. However, unfortunately in my country individual interests are more important than the common ones. This hurts me. (Pinar)

To sum up, interviews reveal that *empathy with the discriminatory practices* (and discourses) of the Germans and *non-critical interpretation of rationality* are the two main mechanisms through which the conventional political socialization takes place in Germany and creates consequences in Turkey after the return. Although with slight variations across the three migrant groups, they are the two main pillars that shoulder the process of legitimization, embracement and internalization of the norms and values promoted by the German polity and its actors. For all the three migrant groups, the non-critical understanding of rationality is constructed around the concepts such as discipline, normativeness and rational legal authority, which fit well to Weber's Protestant ethic. These two pillars also become handy tools for the (re)forging of the contested identity

boundaries for the migrants as their positionalities shift across space (by migration) and time (with historical changes such as changing migration patterns or the collapse of the Berlin wall).

Negative political socialization

Like conventional political socialization, negative political socialization is also a process of apprehension and internalization. However, in negative political socialization, the migrants do not learn and acquire the hegemonic political values and attitudes of the receiving country, which not only generate a diffuse support for the legitimacy of the polity, but also are a condition for the approval and acceptance of the immigrants as insiders to it. Rather, by negative political socialization, the migrants learn their places as the outsiders of the polity. In other words, migrants' learning their place of exclusion is not directly about apprehension of the values that promote a diffuse support mechanism. However, it contributes to the reproduction of the legitimacy of the German political system not only because it fails to disarray the reproduction of the exclusionary mechanisms but also it goes together with and does not disrupt the conventional political socialization processes.

Negative political socialization presumes an actively critical migrant agency as it refers to migrants' critical interpretation and questioning of the dominant values, practices and discourses in the German polity and learning their places as outsiders in a system that they do not necessarily support. The interviews show that the process of negative political socialization takes place through three main categories: *discrimination, empathy for the discriminated and excluded,* and *critical interpretation of rationality*. The last two are the symmetrical counterparts of the main categories of the process of conventional political

socialization, *empathy for Germans' discriminatory practices and discourses* and *non-critical interpretation of rationality*.

The labor migrants experience the process of negative political socialization differently than the roots and the student migrants. For the latter two, critical acknowledgement of discrimination in the host society leads to empathy with the excluded and discriminated groups in general and also to a conviction that it is impossible for the Germans to empathize with them. As to the labor migrants, they are exposed, but not sensitive to the sporadic or systematic experiences of discrimination. Neither do they make an inference of empathy with the discriminated following their own discriminatory experiences. Arguably, this difference stems from the fact that the labor migrants accept and take for granted the outsider's position in Germany from the very beginning of the migration experience, and the negative political socialization process affirms this rather than teaching it to them. Notwithstanding, the conditions are not the same for the roots and student migrants. Roots migrants are in an ambiguous insider's status in Germany as they are born and/or raised there and have citizenship. As for the student migrants, with their high cultural, social and educational capital, they have direct access to the insider's context, in which they are equals with the insiders without being one.

Lastly, a critical interpretation of rationality reveals how the same aspects mentioned in the non-critical interpretation of rationality are perceived in a mirror image by the migrants. Accordingly, migrants raise the conviction that the German state and society are rational in the sense that they are self-seeking actors and benefit-maximizers that only think of their own interests, which is a way of thinking that directly positions the migrants themselves as the others and outsiders. The categories reveal that conventional political

socialization and negative political socialization are not mutually exclusive and they actually occur concurrently.

Like the conventional political socialization, the dynamics of boundary making for the contested identities shape and are shaped by negative political socialization across the three migrant groups. For example, the roots and labor migrants associate the experience of discrimination and the critical understanding of rationality with the German's jealousy of the empowering shifts in their positionalities in the German society. As for the student migrants, the experience of negative political socialization shrinks their perceived positional distance between themselves and the German-Turks.

Figure 4.3: Negative political socialization model for the roots and student migrants



Figure 4.4: Negative political socialization model for the labor migrants



Discrimination

While the discriminatory experiences stated by the roots and student migrants have many similarities, labor migrants, especially those in the first group, have a very different account. The first group of labor migrants, who migrated to Germany in the 60s and 70s, tend to report that they do not feel discriminated in Germany. Very differently from the others, these labor migrants tend to emphasize that in those decades the Germans treated them impeccably and they note that this attitude started to change especially in the 1980s. The positive interaction between the two groups are explained by three main factors that emerge in the narratives of the labor migrants. First, neither of these groups had *a priori* impressions and judgements about each other that would lead to discrimination against the Turks. Second, both believed that the Turkish migrants were there temporarily as

"guest workers". Third, conflicts got more serious between the migrant groups and the Germans with the effects of the collapse of the Berlin wall.

According to the figures by the Senate of Berlin and a report by the Minorities at Risk project, in 1992 more than 5,000 attacks against foreigners were reported in Germany, more than 2000 of which were thought or proven to be related to right-wing radicalism. This figure was almost the double of the previous year (Senat von Berlin 1994:33, 78-79 in White 1997; Minorities at Risk Project 2004). Initially, in a context of high skepticism about the asylum seekers, this violence was majorly directed against eastern European refugees and asylum seekers (White 1997). Indeed, in a survey conducted in 1992, it was found that 75% of the Germans thought that the asylum seekers were "misusing the right" (Kanstroom 1993, 163). Soon the violence started to be directed at members of Germany's long-term Turkish population (White 1997).

According to the Chronology for Turks in Germany report by Minorities at Risk project (2004), by 1997, there were around 48,000 right-wing activists in Germany, half of which resided in east Germany. Indeed, according to media reports, east Germany, where foreigners were only around 1.5% of the local population, was increasingly becoming a "de facto no-go regions for foreigners, left-wingers, gays and teenage punks, that is, for anyone who appears un-German". The same year the authorities recorded 5,173 radical right offenses. Right-wing groups were reported to become more dangerous "due to more effective recruiting methods, improved organizational skills, the use of the internet to disseminate neo-Nazi propaganda, and their ability to obtain more sophisticated weapons" (Minorities at Risk 2004)

White (1997) explains that in the German media and political discourse, Turks were portrayed both as the victims of xenophobia and as criminals. With the influx of asylum seekers and Eastern Europeans after the unification, the Turks' image was conflated with those groups as "a kind of lumpen foreigner, perceived to be an economic and cultural threat to German national health" (1997, 761). In this era, the division between the German and the Turkish came to have connotations of "eastern vs. western". Especially in the East, attacks against foreigners were increasingly justified by rising unemployment rates. Turks' responded to this majorly by drawing back from German culture and consolidating their communities. While some, especially the educated ones, got politicized and strived to obtain German citizenship, some preferred to withdraw from both Turkish and German identities, leaning towards more transnational definitions of identity based in interpersonal relationships. (1997, 761-766)

The most significant difference between the labor migrants and the other two groups is that the former took for granted the outsider's position from the very beginning and had no problem about perceived like one. Unlike the ambiguous positions of the roots migrants, who were born and/or raised there and tend to be members of the German polity, and the student migrants, who found themselves in the insiders' context without being one thanks to their high social and cultural capital, the labor migrants had it very clear in their minds that they were and would always be outsiders. In this respect, their interaction with the conventional and negative political socialization processes were much more different than the student and the roots migrants.

While many of the labor migrants that arrived in Germany in the 1960s and 70s state that initially they did not have to deal with any kind of discrimination or racist attitudes, almost all of them underline the importance of educated, proper and kind behavior, as

well as the benefits of keeping their head down in general, which I touch upon later under the category of strategic integration.

> I did not experience any racism in Germany. This is because I never got into polemical conversations with anyone. (..) If you speak German well enough, they do not discriminate against you. (…) I was not worried about the racist aggressions and attacks. They attack you only if you are looking for trouble, only if you are asking for it. Our Turkish boys always fight with guns and knives in their hands. The Germans are not like that. They become aggressive only if you push hard. (Firuze)

Although migrants in this group witnessed, experienced or heard about occasional racist attacks, they tend to report it as a marginal attitude of some marginalized groups in Germany (such as the skinheads or the former DDR citizens), rather than the reflection of a systematic discrimination against themselves:

> Yes, there was racism. But only the skinheads did it. Germans, in general, never did it. Skinheads were saying "you do not belong here, why do you come and live here? Go back to your country!" With the Germans, we were like brothers and sisters. (…) They were very fair to us. They gave us our rights, minority rights… They opened *Cemevis*[21] for us. The skinheads did not like the Turks. But the Turks were also harassing German women (…) We should say that, too. (Adnan)

Having to work in conditions that the Germans themselves would not accept does not change their idea, either, because at the end of the day what is more important for them is that they felt welcome and wanted in Germany. Importantly, as they take for granted the idea of being an alien in Germany, practices that could be interpreted as discriminatory by the other migrant groups are not categorized as such by the labor migrants:

> The police officers used to come to our door and ask us how we were doing, if we were alright, if we had any problems. The owners of the factory used to call us and ask how the other co-workers were treating us, or if we had any complaints. We made friends with them. They did not practice any discrimination against me. (…) But also… We did all the dirty work that they did not want to do. If I had

[21] Prayer hall for Alevis.

> told them I did not want to do it, they would have kicked me out. Even so, no matter how much you work in nasty jobs, you are always a foreigner in their eyes. Some would even say "if those nasty Turks had not come, we would be much better off." They forget that we did all the work that they did not want to do. (Ali)

Contrary to the first group, the second group of labor migrants, who majorly migrated in the 1980s and 1990s, mention discrimination as an important dimension of their social and political experience in Germany. As stated earlier, with the guest workers becoming permanent residents and rapidly increasing in number, the social and cultural tensions between the Turks and the Germans got crystallized gradually. Both the first and the second group of labor migrants explain these tensions by the lack of integration and respect of the migrants to the German life style:

> In the beginning, there were not any racist attacks. As the Turks got numerous in number, the Germans started to feel uneasy with us. Every Tom, Dick and Harry came to Germany… People like cavemen, people with a village mentality…They tried to practice their customs in Germany. They made us anxious, as well. This started towards the end of the 70s and intensified in the 80s. People brought over their kids and wives… There were too many of them. (Guzin)

Both groups also emphasize exacerbating effects of the rising economic conflicts between the migrants and the East Germans following the collapse of the wall. Indeed, after the unification, both groups of migrants started to experience explicit attacks or instances of discrimination:

> Even though the East Germans were former citizens of a communist country, they started to support the fascists in the West Germany after the collapse of the wall. They became racists. Why? They thought they would have all the work opportunities to themselves if they could kick the foreigners out. They became selfish and egotistic people. (Erdinc)

Workplace became one of the most relevant terrains where this crystallization manifests itself. Contrary to the first groups' accounts on the kind and friendly attitudes of the Germans in the workplace, the second group frequently mention their experiences of discrimination.

> The Germans are very prejudiced. Not all of them, but some of them are fanatics. At work, there was this guy. He was a Nazi. He did not like the Turks. One day he needed a lift after work and there was no one that could give him a drive. So, I offered to take him where he need to go. He got in unwillingly. Then this thing went on for a couple of weeks. After a month he said, "I want to admit something. I was wrong. I thought the Turks were really bad people, but I was wrong." I said, "Well, you should not reach conclusions before getting to know us. You should not be prejudiced." They are very prejudiced. They think like Europeans, but we do not. (Semih)

The labor migrants mention that acquiring German citizenship is pointless because whether they have it or not, the Germans would treat them as "third-class citizens" due to their Turkish origin. Again, the ironic co-existence of the two contradictory statements that 'they do not feel discriminated by the Germans' and that 'Turks with German citizenship are treated like "third-class citizens"' can be explained by one peculiar characteristic of the migrants in this group: As stated above, coming to Germany as "guest" workers and living there for years with the myth of return in their mind, these migrants never had the expectation or idea of becoming insiders to the German polity. In this context, they became oblivious to the systematic or random instances of discrimination and micro-aggressions that the student migrants and the roots migrants complain about. In this context, the idea of third-class citizenship is accompanied by a strategical and instrumental approach to the German citizenship:

> Why leave the citizenship of my own country and become the citizen of another country? My kids needed it because they were going to school. So, let them get it. But me? It has no extra benefits for me. I could live there and do my things with or without citizenship. (Guzin)

The student migrants learned their places as outsiders in German society, when they were actually in the insiders' context, although they were not insiders. Their high social and cultural capital positioned them in an advantageous social milieu from the beginning, as they were surrounded by highly educated Germans (colleagues or classmates), who were

their equals in terms of social and cultural capitals. Notwithstanding, they state that they experienced and/or witnessed discriminatory practices by German friends and colleagues in their schools or prestigious research institutes. As a result, *subtle racism* and *glass ceiling* came forward as two *in vivo*[22] sub-categories of discrimination, which, as I present later, are very similar to the roots migrants' narratives.

All of the interviewees in this group remember experiencing racism and discrimination, but almost exclusively in subtle, indirect and implicit ways, or as microagressions. "Subtle racism", as one of the interviewees calls it, occured in an everyday context and was directed at the student migrants by the most unexpected people like friends and colleagues. In this way, the students, who shared high cultural and social capital with their German or international colleagues and friends, gradually learned how to relate to the German politics and society from an outsider's position, in an insiders' context. While in some cases socialization to German politics and society from an outsider's position resulted in the thought of "I have no place in this society", in other cases the student migrants realized that it was "impossible to communicate with the Germans" because they would never understand them".

Burak describes what he understands form subtle racism as follows:

> What matters is people's attitudes towards you. They take an attitude against you without making you realize it. Racism is a crime there, so people do it implicitly. If you discriminate against certain groups and try to rationalize it with certain explanations, you are racist.

[22] In grounded theory, *in vivo* codes refer to the codes formed with direct citations from the quotations. They are the expressions used by the interviewees (Strauss and Corbin 1998).

To escape from what he perceives as subtle racism, another interviewee, Hüseyin, made a strategic move and rented a flat in one of the most expensive districts of the town, instead of living in the Turkish district. However, being a PhD holder and living in an elite district did not save him and his family from unpleasant experiences:

> My wife was constantly trying to socialize with our German neighbors. She wanted our daughter to play with our neighbors' children. But they never wanted to send their kids to play with her. We realized that they were seeing it as a status loss.

Eventually, what they perceive as subtle racism became a main reason for them to return.

> Because of my job, we moved from city to city, never really settled down. Everywhere we went we had a couple of Turkish friends. However, every time we moved to a new place, we needed to show the people around that we were not bad foreigners. We had to earn their trust in order to be able to get over the social barriers. This was extremely time and energy consuming and we got very tired.

Another strategy against subtle racism and micro aggressions is ignorance. Nukhet, like Huseyin, returned to Turkey because she got intimidated by the daily discriminatory practices she experienced in Germany. She remembers saying to herself "these people are prejudiced against me and I cannot change this and I do not have a place in this society." With such a feeling, Nukhet says she did not even try to look for employment opportunities after receiving her Master's degree. She just wanted to return. During her time in Germany, Nukhet mostly resorted to ignoring what she perceived as micro-aggressions, which, in her account, were often taking place at school:

> I felt the disadvantage of being Turkish from the very beginning. I was tarnished from the beginning for being Turkish. (…) Once I was called to my advisor's office. There I told her that the problem was not about me, that it was a problem about how I was perceived there. But you know… It is like bullying in high school. If you do not take it seriously it disappears. This was my strategy. I accepted one fact: They do not like the Turks. And I cannot fight this fact on my own. (…) My reaction was just to ignore it. (…) I distanced myself from them and I ended up being friends with just Turkish students.

Similarly, another strategy against micro-aggressions and subtle racism used by some of the interviewees is ignoring the comments, critiques or interventions made in German and pretending not to understand it. This strategy comes from their discovery that when a German realizes they do not speak German, he or she directly categorizes them as tourists or outsiders that could not be kept responsible for rules and values of the German society.

> One day I was waiting in line like a regular German. I did not know but it turned out that I was waiting at the wrong part of the line. A man came and started to talk to me in German but I did not understand a word. I listened to him and then I said in English, "I am sorry I do not understand German". His reaction was just to apologize and walk away. Then from the beginning I realized that not understanding German was a very good thing for me. It was very comfortable because I did not understand the negative things. It was to my advantage, rather than to my disadvantage (…) Later on, one day in the supermarket I crashed into a man with my backpack by mistake. He started to scold me. I said sorry in German but he was still talking. Then I just said in English "I am so sorry I do not understand German. How can I help you?" He just said, "Ok, no worries." I think not being able to speak German is a good thing because you never get the criticisms of the Germans. (Handan)

In the work place, the subtle racism leaves its place to the "invisible" barriers in the improvement of their careers, which one of the interviewees describes with the commonly used expression "glass ceiling." As explained in the introduction chapter, the glass ceiling is one of the key reasons why the students in this study decided to return to Turkey. Many returned in order to reach the long-deserved prestigious and influential positions in their careers, which could not attain in Germany.

> In your career development, you are faced with a glass ceiling. You can see it, but to many people it is invisible. You cannot get over it. No one talks about this barrier, neither in the company nor in the state…So at some point with my wife we had to decide this: Are we going to keep on desperately struggling here or are we going to go to Turkey and improve our careers on a less frictional, smooth surface? (…) With the same amount of energy, we can go much further here in Turkey. (Burak)

Zeynel explains how he thinks the Germans imagine their Turkish co-workers as potential threats:

> If there is a German that has a slightly worse CV than mine, they would hire that German, not me. I mean, in their eyes, every Turk has the possibility of feasting at Ramadan, even though he eats bratwurst and drinks beer today. In us, they still see the potential of eating green onions in the morning and coming to work with a nasty smell on our breath. (…) Therefore, my professional network would eventually be limited to the Turks. (Zeynel)

At this point it is worth opening a parenthesis to discuss how discriminatory experiences interact with the students' boundary making mechanisms for their contested identities. According to White (1997, 754), one of the three components of identity is "a dialectic between how people see themselves and how others see them." The student migrants state this dialectical need of being made feel like integrated to the German society by the Germans. Especially, as a part of boundary making dynamics for their contested identities in Germany, they needed an affirmation from the Germans that they were different than the German-Turks. A number of interviewees express the importance of 'being made feel like they fit in' as follows:

> I tried to get integrated to German society. Maybe at some point I felt integrated, maybe at the very end. However, this is not something you can feel yourself. Society should make you feel integrated, and this never happens. (Burak)

As Burak's quote also shows, as a corollary of discriminatory experiences, the students often did not receive the affirmation they longed for from the Germans, which eventually contributed to their socialization as outsiders to the German society and polity. In return, the students responded to this in two main ways. The first response is congruent with the dynamics of conventional political socialization, as the migrants tapped on the non-critical interpretations of German rationalism for the demarcation and re-establishment of their identity boundaries with an 'industrious scientist" image, as opposed to the 'disrespectful and lazy' German-Turkish image. As I explain in the section on *strategic*

integration, they worked harder and tried to be as productive as possible to show the Germans that they were "good" foreigners.

As a second reaction, which is more in line with the negative political socialization dynamics, they started to develop the idea that they had many things in common with the German-Turks and they began to reconcile with the German-Turkish identity. In other words, as a part of the socialization to the outsider's position, which stemmed from perceived discrimination, some of these students realized that the German-Turks and themselves shared the same experience of prejudice and otherness essentially because of their Turkish identity. In some cases, this awareness awoke nationalist feelings and made the students relate to the German-Turkish identity. In other cases, like Begum's, students discovered unknown parts of their Turkish identity as German-Turks mirrored at them aspects of that identity that would not be possible to realize otherwise:

> My relationship with Turkishness has changed in Germany. In Turkey, Turkishness for me was always something to avoid. However, experiencing the Turkishness there as a part of the minority rather than the majority changed my vision entirely. There I have seen the Turks as a minority, as migrants, as a community with a subculture… Producing arts and cultural products based on this (…) There a Turk is a migrant, and a Pakistani, too. They have something in common. There was something enriching about this. (Begum)

The student migrants also strove to maintain the boundaries of their student migrant identity with reference to how the Germans perceived them in terms of their physical appearance and their Turkish accents. Ironically, while working as a boundary maintenance mechanism against the German-Turks, German's comments on these issues are also perceived as a component of subtle racism and micro-aggressions by the student migrants.

> From the very beginning, you understand that there is something there. They tell you "whoa, you do not look Turkish at all!" When they say this to you, they are

> expecting a "thank you" in return. They act like they just gave you a compliment, as if they just said something like "whoa! You are so beautiful!" You realize this and you do not know what to say in response. Because when they say this, you know it is not just a compliment, it is also the sign of "Look, I will treat you like a human being." This is very stressful. (Dilay)

Lastly, in the narratives of the students, it is also possible to see how they creatively used the 'contestedness' of Turkish student migrant identity in relation to the worker migrant identity to challenge and play around the negative political socialization, which pushed them to the position of outsiders with high cultural and social capital:

> A friend of mine that used to work with me at the same institute as a PhD researcher had a T-shirt that says "Gastarbeiter"[23] on it. You know, the Turks in Germany are workers. And, to be respected in Germany you have to earn a lot of money and have a good title. So, he was trying to give the message "we are not just workers." He wanted to make fun of their perceptions by proving his value from the other way around. Using irony…

The roots migrants learn their outsider's place in Germany, while they are formally insiders to the polity because of their German citizenship. Some of the interviewees make a conceptual difference between state and society as different sources of discriminatory practices, which eventually showed them their place as the outsiders.

No matter which narrative they use, they eventually refer to "invisible barriers" in the society resonating with the concepts of "glass ceiling" and "subtle racism" highlighted by the student migrants.

> After middle school, they encourage the Turkish students to go to the high schools where the Turkish students go. There are high-quality high schools, but even if you are successful, they never encourage you to go there. Our parents had to have arguments with the teachers and principals to pressure them to guide us towards schools with higher educational quality. To discourage our parents, the teachers were telling them the stories of other Turkish students who failed in those high schools. Observing all this and hearing discouraging words from my teachers, I gradually lost all my confidence in my own academic capacity. *I mean, I would say*

[23] Guest worker

there are invisible barriers. (Fuat)

In addition to underlining that the discriminatory practices are subtle or invisible, the roots migrants also frequently emphasize that they did not experience or witness these practices every day, but they lived with the idea that it may happen any time. The perceived risk of experiencing these practices becomes the determining factor in the migrants' perceptions of their own position in the German polity. As Utku puts it: "It does not happen often, however it makes you feel down all the time. *You live like a loser*."

Although their discriminatory experiences were mostly not systematic, in some cases the *perceived risk of discrimination* became a reason for apoliticization, which is a blatant manifestation of negative political socialization that molds the migrants not into citizens, in the full sense of the word, but into outsiders to the German polity. As I mentioned in the previous chapter, Nuray, who is a German citizen and a law school student, gives a striking account on why she avoided German politics in all possible manners when she was in Germany. Her fear for political vulnerability as a migrant made her not only renounce some of her political rights, which are essential components of citizenship, but also forced her to avoid developing interest in German politics.

> I have never been interested in politics neither did I go to any marches or protests. Because I was scared. (...) They could take your picture there. Indeed, in Germany these things come up when you have paperwork about citizenship or other things. If they open a file on you like that, you cannot be anything in life. Let alone getting German citizenship (…) So, I abstained from anything that has something to do with politics. (Nuray)

Another manifestation of the role of perceived or experienced discrimination in the negative political socialization is the migrants' belief that the German system did not let them expand and reach out especially professionally and educationally, which is different

from but reminiscent of the concept of glass ceiling articulated by the student migrants. The German educational system, which leaves students with migration backgrounds at a disadvantaged position (Kristen and Granato 2007), comes forward frequently in the narratives of the students. This belief is also a main reason why roots migrants with young kids chose to return to Turkey for their education.

> In Germany, we used to hear about sons and daughters of our neighbors who became doctors or engineers in Turkey. In our town, on the other hand, there were very few people who went to college. Like two people in 100. The socioeconomic structure of Germany encourages foreigners like us to become factories workers or mid-range professionals. (…) They motivate you towards professional formation, not towards university. PhDs, MA degrees are not really available to my generation. When all the kids in your community are like this, you become like this. (Fuat)

The quotation above demonstrates that negative political socialization unfolds along established structures of social inequality. The most ironic manifestation of this is Umut's response to the question of "What do you think is the best way to be an approved and accepted member of the German society?". He says, with no pun intended, "I think the best way to get accepted in the German society without any problems is selling Doner kebab." He continues:

> Two friends of mine work as teachers in Germany. When you hear the stories they tell about the parents of their students, you would not know if you should laugh or cry. The reactions of the parents make you think that although these guys were born there, raised there, went to college there and got their diplomas there, they still do not get recognition or acceptance from the Germans. (Umut)

Structural inequalities pave the way for other ironic ways of unfolding of negative political socialization as in the case of Umut and Fuat, who thought there was not any discrimination or social exclusion in Germany until they got out of their town or neighborhood for reasons related to education or work. In Umut's case, it was simply because there was not any Germans around in his neighborhood and at school. In Fuat's

case, there was a strict segregation between Germans and non-Germans at school. Ironically, Fuat and Umut did not have much opportunity to observe the power inequalities between the Germans and the non-Germans until they left their hometowns. In other words, these migrants were not aware that they were socially segregated, simply because they were socially segregated. It was only when they started college or work that they could witness other cases, compare them with their own stories and realize that what seemed natural to them was actually a systematic discrimination.

> At younger ages, I did not observe any kind of discrimination. I thought it did not exist in Germany. But I understood the reality after entering different social circles in Germany, and also after coming to Turkey. I realized that we did experience discrimination: in our classes, there were at most one or two German students. Other than that, all were Turkish, Italian, Moroccan etc. The other class were completely German. At that time, I did not think it was a form of discrimination.(…) When you grow up in such an environment, both your level of German and your understanding of the world are determined by your experience in class. This is discrimination. (Fuat)

As in the case of the labor migrants, another notable manifestation of negative political socialization for the roots migrants is the idea of "third class citizenship". Even if the interviewees became legal members of the German polity as its citizens, they state having the feeling that they remained at the margins and that they were not equal to the Germans. As Utku says, "Even if I am a German citizen, I do not feel like one." Their general conviction is that more essential/ innate features such as their names, faces and hair color determined their place in the German society.

> Being a German citizen does not make a difference. There I was feeling like a third-class citizen. They look at your face and treat you accordingly. (Nuray)

> In Germany, I was feeling like I was from there. I was born there and grew up there. But at the same time, I was feeling like I was at the outside of Germany (I was out of Germany). (Fuat)

Empathy with the discriminated groups and the impossibility of empathy

Empathy with the discriminated groups almost never emerges in the narratives of the labor migrants, regardless of whether they migrated to Germany earlier or later. Unlike the students and the roots migrants, in their case, personal experiences of discrimination and exclusion do not translate into a critical and reflexive thinking about power relations. Even when directly asked about their opinions regarding the "subaltern groups" such as other migrant groups the Syrian refugees, or the Kurds, the labor migrants prefer expressing feelings of empathy with the Germans

As for the student migrants and the roots migrants, discriminatory experiences pave the way for empathy for the discriminated groups, as well as a conviction that Germans are not capable of empathizing with the subaltern groups. Empathy is a transnational category that generates notable effects on the political orientations of these groups after their return to Turkey, creating changes in their political behavior. I elaborate on this transnational dimension in the next chapter.

The student migrants' experiences of subtle racism, glass ceiling and discrimination pave the way for empathy for the discriminated and excluded groups. Many interviewees declare that after their experience in Germany, they started to understand what it meant to be excluded and subordinated and that it caused solid changes in their attitudes towards social relations and politics in Turkey, mostly regarding the Syrian refugees and the Kurdish population. At the other end of the spectrum, in some cases this experience makes them empathize with the nationalist and conservative tendencies of the German-Turks. I have touched upon this phenomenon in the discussion on boundary making mechanisms for their contested identities,

The conditions of the Syrian refugees in Turkey remind Huseyin of his own past experience in Germany, even before starting our interview.

> When you live in Germany, you have the chance to look at your own culture from a different perspective. You earn the power to empathize with the people. For example, people around me here judge the Syrian refugees so easily. They talk about them positively, or negatively but what they say is totally empty. We, on the other hand, lived that trauma of not being in our own country, although in a very slight and soft way… The refugees here live the same experience in much more traumatic ways because they have no country to return to. (Huseyin)

Sevil converts the feeling of empathy to a self-critique with respect to the Kurdish question in Turkey:

> I experienced racism in Germany. Before going there, I would never ever call myself a racist… but… you know there are ways of racism you practice in your daily life. We talked a lot about this issue with my friends later. For example, why were not there any Kurdish in our closest friend circle?... Do they have a different lifestyle, different political ideas? Is that why? The answer is no. What I realized is that I was practicing a type of racism against those people. My perception of this issue has changed a lot after returning from Germany, after I myself became subject to subtle racism in Germany. (Sevil)

Emre interprets the social consequences of internal migration of the Kurds through the lens of his migration experience:

> In Germany, my sense of humanism improved a lot. I realized that I did not know that feeling of humanism, the feeling of putting yourself in somebody else's shoes, the feeling of empathy… I did not know the Kurds before, but I returned to Turkey as a person with a lot of compassion for the Kurds… Before going to Germany, I did not care about the foreigners in Turkey. But after seeing the cruel life conditions of the foreigners in Germany… Those days, Albanians were trying to come to Germany. The Italians still do not want the Albanians today, some Mussolini thing, I think. And we in Turkey, we do not want the Kurds. When I lived the same story there, the feeling of being a stranger, I understood all. Kurds are strangers here, we were strangers in Germany. (Emre)

When student migrants returned to Turkey and started to work in prestigious positions in companies or universities, some also developed empathy for the foreigners at the work

place, who mostly migrated to Turkey from third-world countries such as Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Even if they are highly educated and have high social and cultural capital, migrants from these countries may experience discrimination in the Turkish labor market, just like Turkish student migrants in Germany. Awareness of these similiarities caused changes in some of the student migrants' attitudes towards such foreigners. Burak, who runs his own company in Ankara, gives an example of how this affected his attitude towards the candidates in the recruitment processes:

> Now I own a small company. I hired two foreign employees from Afghanistan and Pakistan. If I had not lived in Germany, I would not have done this. I would have many prejudices. But, I mean, when I was in Germany in their position, in the position of a foreigner… It was really hard to live somewhere where there were prejudices against the Turks. The bureaucratic relations you have to have with the state were also very difficult. You have to renew your visa every 6 months. You have to wait in the line at 4 am in the morning to get your papers ready. There is no guarantee that you will get your work done that day. These things hurt my pride, being treated like a second-class citizen…

Huseyin tells a story about his relations with his students from eastern countries:

> We have more empathy for the foreigners, migration issues, refugees etc. For example, I have students from Iran, from Bangladesh. They prefer coming to my classes. I think I am more able to communicate with them and understand them when compared to the other faculty. I can touch their souls more. It makes it easier for me to work with them and they prefer me. I have many foreign students at the university. I think one of the reasons for this is that I have been able to improve my relations with my students with the experience I had in Germany as a foreign student.

On the flip side, Mert is an example of how the experience of subtle racism in the work place and occasionally in daily life resulted in strengthening nationalist and religious values. As a researcher in a very prestigious research institute, Mert says his experience made him understand how the German-Turks felt and led him to relate to their nationalist and religious sensitivities. This marked an important turn in his political attitudes as

following his migration experience in Germany he was driven away from atheism and socialism towards some level of nationalism and religion. In his words:

> As a college student in Turkey, I had very rigid leftist tendencies. When I went to Germany, I started to get close to nationalism. My experience in Germany awakened this feeling in me because I witnessed and experienced tiny little bits and pieces of discrimination against people with specific skin colors or religions. Then I started to find myself more conservative and reactionary. I started to feel like I have to maintain and protect those values that were discriminated or attacked. (…) Before there was a big distance between my values and nationalism but now I think I understand why the German-Turkish community is so sensitive about it.

The narratives of the students also reveal an interesting symmetrical counterpart of the feeling of empathy with the oppressed and the discriminated: the idea that Germans could never understand them or empathize with them. The base point for this argument is the perceived lack of a common historical and social repertoire for the Turks and the Germans to understand and sense the reality. Arguably, 'Impossibility of empathy' in itself is a manifestation of how the negative political socialization functions as a process in which the migrants learn their places as outsiders to the German polity and relate to the German polity from this position.

Pelin mentions this idea while she explains her observations about her colleagues in the institute where she did her PhD in social sciences.

> My experience in Germany did not cause a particular change in my perceptions. However, I observed how the people there understood or were trying to understand the political context in Turkey. I saw that they did not understand anything. I felt that they were very alien to us. I felt very lonely. I mean, even a country with a lot of migrants from Turkey does not understand what is really going on in Turkey. Today we have the rule of Erdogan, one day we will have someone else. It does not matter. They look at the politics and society of Turkey and just say "Umm, hmmm". They live in a very different context. Seeing that made me lose my hope. They try to have empathy with us because of the values they claim to have but in fact it is all very superficial.

Mert expresses this idea when he talks about the political discussions he had with his international and German friends regarding the Turkish relations with the Kurds and the Armenians:

> If I have to explain a political idea to someone, how would I explain it? I was always thinking about this question all the time there. For example, the Kurds have their issues with the Turks and in Germany if you look at the writings on the walls, they write them in Turkish. Thus, I mean, I always prefer to discuss these political issues always with someone from my side. I mean with an Armenian or a Kurdish. I mean it is more difficult to explain these things to the Germans. Somehow, they are the winners and we are the losers, so I did not believe that I could explain this internal problem to them. I thought they would not understand it in any case. I was also thinking that they would approach to the question with an imperialist gaze.

Begum explains her point with reference to women's' rights and gender inequalities:

> When I took a gender studies class, I realized that the concerns of the German people were very different than ours. I felt like I did not belong there. I felt like their concerns were not my concerns. Their concerns were more like first-world concerns. This coincides with the era when I was consolidating my political ideas. I realized that I was not a good fit to their world. (…) I remember asking myself, "How can I explain myself to these people?" I thought it was not possible for me to communicate with them. Maybe I did not have enough political or theoretical knowledge at that time but I had my own reality that I experienced as a woman in Turkey. I was like, "Hold on a second. We have never shared the same reality with you!"

Based on their migrant condition and minority experience in Germany, roots migrants empathize with a number of marginalized groups, focusing on the transnational parallels between their circumstances. Similar to the students, the factor of empathy marks significant differences in their way of thinking in comparison to the non-migrant population in Turkey, especially regarding the Kurds and the Syrian refugees. As one interviewee states:

> I definitely think that living in Germany has taught me a lot. If I had not lived there, most probably I would never read international news. The issues of the refugees would not affect me this much. The dead body of that little boy that was washed off

> to the shores of Bodrum would not depress me this much.[24] That Hungarian journalist that tripped up the father and son refugees would not repel me this much. I can exactly understand what it made them feel. (...) If I had not lived in Germany, at least I could not empathize with the refugees and migrants. (Utku)

Like the student migrants, the concept of empathy also emerges in terms of its impossibility for the roots migrants, who occasionally state that it is impossible for the Germans to empathize with the Turks. Similar to Begum, Melek gives the example of women's rights issues while explaining her take on the impossibility of empathy:

> The Germans' way of thinking is very different. I think they are unable to empathize with the Turks. (…) In general, I would say the Germans do not know how to empathize. They criticize everything about Turkey. Yes, they can criticize but they should not do it with contempt. When they come here they behave like brats complaining about everything. I tell them "this is Turkey, this is what it is." In comparison to the hardships in Turkey, the debates in Germany look so absurd. For example, for a German woman, one of the most important topics of struggle would be getting equal pay for equal work. I am like, "are you kidding?" In Turkey women are still struggling not to get murdered in honor killings, what are you talking about? I wish my only problem was equal pay…(Melek)

Utku explains it through the experience of racism, arguing that Germans would not empathize with him because they do not experience racial discrimination like him:

> It (racism) can affect you only if you experience it. An ember burns where it falls. It hurts you only when you experience it. Only then you can understand it. (Utku)

The idea of impossibility of communication and empathy speaks to the concept of incommensurability as it is developed in the subaltern and postcolonial studies. Spivak's famous *Can the Subaltern Speak?* (Spivak 1988) plays around the concept with reference to the "gap between the 'sender' and 'receiver' of messages inflected by power" (Byrd and Rothberg 2011, 6). As Byrd and Rothberg (2011, 6) underlines non-reception of a message can occur in different forms: it can "mean a complete lack of reception, that is,

[24] He refers to Alan Kurdi, the three-year-old Syrian refugee who drowned in the Mediterranean while trying to reach Europe in 2015 and sparked worldwide debates on the question of refugees

a relegation of subaltern subjects to silence, absence and non-recognition" or it can mean "reception that fails to acknowledge an incommensurable relation to the source of the message, an incommensurability that is not a 'natural' product of cultural difference but derives from established power differentials." On a similar terrain, Nihan gives an account of "relegation of subaltern subjects to silence" in her interpretation of the history classes in Germany. Her argument is in tune with Chakrabarty's critique in his well-known *Provincializing Europe* (1992) that the non-European history is marginalized in the academies of the West:

> Turkey is seen as Europe's *other*. The east is always considered bad. I remember very clearly that when we were in high-school, in the history classes on World War I, they were not even mentioning the name of Turkey. However, we know that Turkey played a key role in the war, for example in the Battle of Gallipoli. So many people died there, but the Germans do not even bother themselves to mention it in history classes. I struggled a lot against this mindset when I was there. (Nihan)

Critical interpretations of rationality

Critical interpretations of the concept of rationality, which constitute a key category in the negative political socialization are formed around the idea of rationality of the self-seeking, egotistical individuals, and, on the same terrain, *raison d'état* of the German state. At the individual level, the image of the industrious and disciplined German, which is the basis for the non-critical interpretations of rationality, is replaced by a selfish one, who only thinks of his individual material benefits rather than political ideals. On a similar fashion, the stability of the German political scene is explained not by established democratic values, rule of law and rational communication, as in the non-critical version, but by a deeper *raison d'état* that operates at the background and controls everything. On the same terrain, the posture of Germany in the international political arena regarding democracy and human rights is regarded as hypocritical, arbitrary and delusive. While all

three groups give critical accounts of rationality, labor migrants mention it much less than the other two. Below, I discuss the different dynamics of each group in more detail.

In the section on the non-critical interpretations of rationality, I have tried to show that the migrants have this image of honest and committed German citizens who are conscious of their political and social responsibilities as part of the social contract that they have with a state that strongly guarantees rule of law and democracy. Contrary to this appreciative perception of the social/national consciousness of the Germans, some labor migrants interpret the same line of attitudes in a rather inimical fashion. Although not as strongly as the other two groups, the labor migrants depict the Germans as egotistic, self-interested benefit maximizers. Unsurprisingly, this impression is mainly rooted in their experiences of labor relations.

> You can carry a German on your back for 40 years. If you get tired and say I carried you for 40 years let me take a break for 10 minutes, you become the worst in their eyes. This is how the Germans are. They are good to you as long as they have an interest in it. If they do not have an interest, they cut off their ties with you. (Memduh)

This critical interpretation of rationalism at the individual level translates itself into a critique of the German politics with an emphasis on the *raison d'état* of the German state and the hypocrisy of the German discourse of democracy and humanitarianism. The refugee 'crisis' and the reception of the migrant groups by the German state become the epitome of this critical approach.

> Q: Have your political opinions changed based on your experiences there?
> A: Yes; I have changed my opinions about Europe. Europe is hypocritical. (…) They exaggerate the problems in Turkey, and they try to hide their own errors. (…) Democracy and human rights are there only for themselves. I do not believe this crap any more. (…) The refugees became a problem in Turkey because of their policies. They sold weapons to the warlords and we, in Turkey, have to suffer from the problems that the war created. What happened to human rights? (…) In

> the past I used to say there is democracy in Germany, because then I did not know how these things worked. Then I realized if there is democracy, I should be entitled to what everyone else is entitled to. If this is not the case, then there is no democracy. (…) It all depends on their interests. They have double standards. (Semih)

The student migrants observe that there are no marginal ends in the German society and that there are not significant differences between political parties. Again, while some interpret this as an outcome of some advanced democratic values such as rational communication and social consensus, as shown in the earlier sections on conventional political socialization, others think that the Germans do not mind the status quo as long as their material benefits are secured, and they do not have political ideals or motivation to change things.

> To me they seem very cold and they seem to be supporters of the status quo. (…) It looks like it is very hard to change people's perceptions in Germany because they have an instinct to protect the system, and they avoid hardships. People in Germany are like a glass of beer without foam. (Cigdem)

Similarly, while some explain the stability in the German society and politics by the abundance of freedom of speech and liberties or by high economic standards, others explain it with the conceptualization of the state-citizen relationship as a relationship of interest. Other accounts draw attention to the relationship between the welfare state and the citizenship and note that the German welfare system works as a control mechanism over the citizens through the relations of interest:

> Marginal people were usually also statist people. As it is a social state, there is a welfare system there. The state is like a father. It says, "Let me feed you, let me give you what you need." However, this comes with its sanctions. People receive welfare benefits, but then they cannot leave their cities. Okay, they do not have to face hunger, or ask for bread from their neighbors, but they always have to be accountable to the state. I think this is why they are so individualistic, so loyal to the state and they do not need social relations that much. (Tuna)

More cynical ones directly formulate the Germans as pragmatist citizens.

> In Germany people are very pragmatic. What matters for them is to have money and a job. They do not have ideological struggles on their minds. This is also the rationality behind the EU Economic interests (…) It is enough for Germans to know that all things are on the rails and that nobody threatens their comfort zone. Turks are easily moved by emotions and values. Germans have a more professional attitude. (Zeynel)

The interviewees who explain the stability of the German politics and society with the *raison d'état* argument state that they observe a well-set, well-maintained state system in Germany, which cannot be changed or modified by the political parties and governments:

> The political parties in Germany cannot contribute to the society, they cannot take away from the society, either. The state system is very established in itself, so the governments do not have a capacity to change more than 10 % of what exists. Governments cannot produce and implement big policies. (…)You cannot disrupt or change the state structure in Germany. It is very well preserved. It is a very static system. (…) So, eventually it does not really matter who governs. (Emre)

Like the labor and the student migrants, some – predominantly conservative – roots migrants come up with critical interpretations of concepts such as the German democracy, rule of law, and state-citizen relations, questioning their rational basis. In this reading, the German state is hypocritical and it has double standards in domestic and international politics with respect to democratic practices and the rule of law.

> The Germans remain silent in order to hide their secrets. They know that if they reveal their secrets, the external powers would say that in Germany there is no democracy and no rule of law. (…) We, the Turks, are fond of revealing our secrets and inner conflicts to the world. That's why we lose. Other countries do not do this. (…) They say there is no corruption, no bribing in Germany, but, in fact, they are the kings of corruption. Their democracy is no different than our democracy, but their media know how to hush it up. They market themselves like this to the other countries (…), and not a single citizen raises up and asks why. (Osman)

The image of self-seeking, egotistic, rational individual usually comes up when the interviewees articulate their thoughts on the political attitudes of the Germans regarding

elections and the state-citizen relations. Accordingly, when it comes to politics, Germans "avoid meddling"[25], believe that they should "let the sleeping dog lie"[26] and only think of their interests[27]. Interestingly, they also perceive this as a reason why the German society is not politicized and polarized.

> You know the strong nationalist emotions of the Turks... Well, the Germans are not like that. They just care about whether they get their paychecks or welfare payments, whether they have access to health care etc. If these things are okay, they say "let the sleeping dog lie". (Buket)

Like the student migrants, the roots migrants believe that the German state system is an established and consolidated one, and that "things stay more or less the same" no matter which political party is in power. They not only attribute a strong *raison d'état* to the German state but also argue that the German politics do not operate on the basis of a democratic competition between different political ideologies. This also resonates with their conceptualization of the German electoral behavior based on pure individual interests. They differentiate between voting for political ideologies/ideals and voting for personal interests, associating the latter with the German electoral behavior.

> The political system is very consolidated there. No matter which party comes to power, left or right, this system does not change. Neither is there a political change on a scale that can bother me. This is a very established system and I was born into it. (...) Whoever comes to power does superficial changes: a little bit of change in taxes, a little bit of change in the health care system. The core always stays the same. (Buket)

In a number of cases, the comparison between Turkey and Germany on this terrain motivates the roots migrants – especially the younger ones, who come to Turkey to

[25] Turkish idiom "suya sabuna dokunmayan", meaning "a person that touches neither water nor soap."

[26] Turkish idiom "bana dokunmayan yilan bin yasasin", meaning "let the snake that does not harm me live a thousand years."

[27] Turkish idiom "kendine Musluman", meaning "being Muslim only for himself"

explore their roots, – to become actors of change when they return to Turkey. As explained in the introductory chapter, the literature on migrant political socialization and political remittances conceptualizes return migrants as "actors of change", hypothesizing that return migrants who socialize to the political values of Western democracies return their home countries with the motivation to create a change there in line with the political values, assets and culture adopted from the host country. Curiously, among the roots migrants in this thesis, this idea comes up as a result of a different political socialization dynamic: roots migrants who articulate this idea simply believe that in Germany there is an established system that does not and will not change whilst in Turkey there is a lot to be done to improve the social and economic conditions of the country as well as the state of its democracy. In their narratives, the roots migrants do not demonstrate any motivation to remit the political values and principles of German democracy to Turkey as actors of change.

> In German politics everything is so established that we were feeling like "what is the worst thing that could happen? There is nothing to worry about." (...) When I was there, I was more interested in politics of countries such as Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq or Pakistan and India. They were in miserable condition and I was curious of how they got to this point. I have my sentimental ties with Turkey and lately I feel like it is a sick dying man and I need to hold his hand. So, I want to be here. (Nihan)

Just like the other groups, at the state level, the concept of rationality corresponds to the idea of *raison d'état* for the roots migrants. With explicit or implicit references to *raison d'état,* the roots migrants question a number of issues including the German state's approach to the refugees and migrants, as well as the concept of Western democracy, reminiscent of especially the student returnees. Regarding the refugee question, a number of migrants point out to the image of the calculating, rational German state, which looks humanitarian but which, in fact, is doing everything according to her interests. Some

contrast this with Turkey, which, according to them, acts more emotionally rather than rationally. German-Turkish political relations are also interpreted from a similar perspective of rational calculations:

> Germans acted *wisely*. They paid some money to Turkey and solved the refugee issue. They did not accept the refugees because they *calculated* the situation they will have in 5-10 years. We accepted all of them without thinking. (Emre)

The interviewees' critical accounts of German democracy based on concepts such as state interest, state strategies, and discriminatory practices make the idea of democratic diffusion, which is inherent to the concept of political remittances and conventional political socialization, questionable. Nihan's account sharply depicts how skeptical the roots migrants can get with their understanding of Western democracies, which paves the way for a political socialization trajectory that dramatically drifts away from the common assumptions:

> I think Europe is not in a very good political condition. I accept that they have social standards. But if you dig deeper, you see that they are condemned to a number of things, especially the capitalist system. I think that no country exercises democracy in its full meaning and that it is a utopia. This hurts me deeply. Every time I distantiate myself from Turkey ideologically and hold on to Europe, I realize how messed up Europe is and I distantiate myself from Europe, too. I am bouncing back and forth between the two. In this way, I am gradually becoming apolitical. (Nihan)

On the same terrain, Nuray criticizes the German democracy through daily and institutional discriminatory practices, which also constitute a key element in negative political socialization:

> There is not much democracy for the Turks in Germany. There is democracy in the following sense: they give equal welfare benefits to everyone. Both to the Turks and to the Germans. (...)But they do everything they can to not send your kid to a good high school if you are Turkish. At the surface, everything looks equalitarian but if you dig down it is not. (Nuray)

Lastly, critical interpretations of rationality combined with the discriminatory experiences in Germany interact with the mechanisms of boundary making for the contested identities in interesting ways. Roots migrants, as well as some labor migrants, refer to the idea that Germans – as selfish and discriminating individuals – are jealous of their success, which arguably point at their emerging contested positionalities as a result of upward social mobility in the last decades. Similarly, a number of migrants contrast the opportunities that the second and especially third-generation migrants have with the first-generation and emphasize that on educational and professional grounds younger generations have achieved things that the first-generation could never imagine. Instead of interpreting this as a corollary of successful integration and political socialization to the German society, the interviewees argue that these achievements provoke jealousy in the German population, auto-confirming their outsider's position once more.

Some explain the racist attacks in Germany by this feeling of jealousy. Others combine it with the Turkish government's discourse of the "great Turkey that gives envy to the world" and see it as the reason why "political games are played on Turkey". This strand of thinking is present especially in the accounts of migrants with nationalist and conservative sensibilities.

> Germans support the HDP against the Turks because they see Turkey as their rivals now. For example, my mother was a housemaid in Germany cleaning houses of the Germans. Today maybe the grandkids of the people that paid her to clean their houses work under the supervision of her son. So, it is normal that the Germans are cautious about us. (…) They are putting the Kurds forward to stand in the way of the developing Turkey. (Yilmaz)

Strategic integration

In a context of negative political socialization based on discrimination, exclusion and migrant vulnerability, migrants in this study use their agency to develop a strategical understanding of integration to be able to navigate along the power inequalities in the

German society. The strategic integration, which is mainly adopted by the roots migrants and the labor migrants, helps them live and reach their life goals in the German society without experiencing any confrontation from the Germans. At first glance, the attitude and action repertoire built with this strategic mindset may appear like regular examples of integration. However, an in-depth inquiry reveals a dominant urge to stay away from conflicts and confrontations with the Germans, rather than eagerly embracing the values of the host society, which would be expected to take place in a conventional political socialization process.

The labor migrants articulate their understanding of strategic integration in three different ways, which have certain similarities with the roots migrants'. One difference between the two group is that while the roots migrants report strategies to avoid conflicts with the Turkish community in addition to the German society, the labor migrants' concern is exclusively with the Germans. Accordingly, respecting the rules of the society and avoiding conflicts with the Germans are perceived as mechanisms of survival in a context of discrimination and exclusion against immigrants. For the labor migrants, one of the three approaches to strategic integration is to intentionally avoid conflicts with the Germans by keeping silent or saying yes to anything:

> Since 1970, I never had any problems with the Germans. They try to help you with your slightest problem. However, you need to keep silent. You should maintain your silence. (…)You should say "yes" to whatever they say. (Firuze)

The second approach is based on the importance of "being a decent person" and adapting to German customs and culture in order to receive good treatment from them. It is noteworthy that for many, adaptation to German customs and culture, which could be

evaluated as an example of regular integration to the host society, was a price that needed to be paid in return for a life free of conflicts.

> I never came across bad things there. It was because I was a decent person. I did not steal; I did not lie (…) We obeyed their rules as decent people. If you do not lie, if you do not steal, why shall they not love you? (Ali)

> If you adapt yourself to them, you do not experience discrimination neither by the state nor by the people. But if you want to feel discrimination, it is very easy to get it. You get the treatment that your lifestyle allows you. (Mustafa)

Thirdly, the idea of "playing by the rules of the system", which comes up as part of their critical perceptions of the relationship between the state, citizens and the migrants, plays a significant role in their strategic integration. In this narrative, the interviewees claim that the German state needs a specific profile of migrants: migrants who constitute an obedient and highly qualified labor force. They believe that migrants who do not match with this profile will eventually have conflicts with the German state. So, they argue that in order to avoid any problems, the smartest thing was to follow the rules of the system:

> The EU, in fact, is not the union of people, but the union of capitalists. (…) In Germany, you have to play by the rules of the system. If you have extreme ideologies, the government does not let you live there. For instance, my brother was politically active in Germany. (…) While they were accepting the asylum applications of everyone else, they wanted to deport my brother. Why? They thought he would not serve their purpose. (…) They accept the asylum seekers, thinking that they would live and work there obediently. (…) They want you to work like pigs to the slaughter and to be submissive. They need to make sure that the system can control you, shape you and lead you. If they are convinced that this is the case, they let you in. Then you have chance to make a life there. (Erdinc)

Student migrants' accounts on integration and its strategic interpretations are different than the labor and the roots migrants. They approach the matter in two main lines. The first group hardly make any references to the idea of strategical integration when they talk about their experiences in Germany, because they did not need such strategies. Most of them returned to Turkey at the point where they felt that they were not conceded the

professional privileges they deserved for their merits. Although very few in number, some of the students state that they always felt integrated and made their ways easily through the dynamics of the German society thanks to their high language skills, education levels, cultural and social capital:

> I think the student migrants like me are exceptional cases. I felt like I was integrated to Germany even before I could learn proper German. I was doing every single thing a German of my age would do. (…) I never felt excluded. I had both German friends and non-German ones. I was always feeling very integrated. (Handan)

The second group are the ones who chose to struggle to find job opportunities and to continue living in Germany. Many in this group found it very challenging to create the impression of proper, decent and likable individuals in the eyes of the Germans. In these cases, the student migrants strategically used "hard work" or "productive work" as a tool of distinction between good and bad foreigners and a means of constructing a proper foreigner identity for themselves. As mentioned earlier, the student migrants also use this strategy to re-forge the boundaries of their migrant identities, which is blurred and contested by the German-Turkish identity.

> There is one thing that I bitterly resent. I had friends that came to Germany from poor countries for their MAs. Then they did everything they could to be able to stay there. They did way too many internships, working for free, with the expectation that maybe someday someone would want to hire them. However, none of them could get a job. I watched them trying to hold onto life there by trying to impress the Germans to get some affirmation or acclaim from them. I found this very humiliating. Integration and that urge to try to make the Germans like you should be two different things. I would like to try to get integrated by much more natural ways. (Nukhet)

In a rational and disciplined society, they see hard work as a way to normalize and legitimize themselves and to distinguish themselves from the other illegitimate outsiders.

For example, Nukhet admits directly that she used hard work as a strategy to cope with the discrimination mechanisms:

> In the beginning, it looked like I did not care about classes and the school. But for the Germans it is very important to be hardworking. (…) I was always treated like a third-class citizen and I always had to prove that I was a good person, that I was not lazy. For example, we had a group project at the university. To guarantee myself, I took two responsibilities while everyone took one. In this way, I prevented them from saying "Nukhet did not do enough work".

Different from the student migrants and the labor migrants, one of the main concerns for the roots migrants is maintaining a balance between the Turkish and the German societies in order not to fall into conflictual situations with either of them. So, the roots migrants learn to "dance to the tune" of both groups:

> I have never praised the Turks, nor have I ever denigrated the Germans. I have always positioned myself in the middle. I never shared my opinions with anyone. In this way, the Turks could not say that I was becoming like a German, and the Germans could not criticize me for not integrating properly. (...) I think I have acted very rationally on this issue. I think I have got the best aspects of both sides. (Osman)

Similar to the labor migrants, another way for the roots migrants to avoid conflict with the Germans is to keep silent, and adopt a non-critical or passive attitude towards them. Some believe that avoiding critique against the Germans save them from exclusion, and that this is true for the relations between the immigrants and the local people in every host country.

> I had very good relations with the Germans. (...) Think of it, what if you criticize the Spanish culture? They exclude you. I never criticized my German friends. I always respected them. The contradiction between people comes from criticism. With criticism, you lose the fundamental elements of a relationship. I know people who have been there for 30 years and do not have any German friends. I had many. I got on well with them. The Turks say the German culture is different from our culture. No sir. In every part of the world the cultural relations are the same. Intercultural relations are constructed upon two main elements: If you love me, I love you; do not criticize me and I will not criticize you. (Demir)

Alternatively, at some occasions, hiding their Turkish origins becomes a practical strategy to avoid conflictual or disadvantageous situations. Skin and hair color, as well as physical resemblance to people from other 'more acceptable' countries often come up as advantageous or disadvantageous factors when the interviewees speak about this strategy.

> It was hard not to gain political and social consciousness there. (...) The skinheads used to throw stones at us while we were playing in front of our house. They thought I looked like an Italian. Even so, they sometimes insulted me on the bus etc. (…) If they found out that we were from Turkey, the look on people's faces used to change. So, when they flirted with German girls, my friends used to say they were from Cyprus. They knew that if they had said Turkey, the distance would double up. (Utku)

Conclusion

Following the findings of the previous chapter, which underscores the possibility of alternative dynamics of political socialization, in this chapter I aim to unpack the process of political socialization with the help of the grounded theory methodology and identify its inner dynamics and constituent mechanisms, such as the causal and intervening conditions, context, and the strategies of the migrants involved (Strauss and Corbin 1998). Consequently, I define two distinct social processes of political socialization. The first is the conventional political socialization process, which refers to the migrants' uncritically internalizing a number of hegemonic political and social values and behaviors in the German polity, as assumed by concepts such as the spillover effects and democratic diffusion. The main emerging categories that constitute the conventional process of political socialization in Germany are *non-critical interpretations of rationality,* and *empathy with the Germans*.

The second is the process of *negative political socialization*, in which the immigrants are molded not into citizens but into the outsiders of the political system, and contribute to its maintenance by socializing into this outsider's position. In this model, the migrants critically approach the regime, its authorities as well as its hegemonic values. However, they accept their position as outsiders to the system, contributing to its reproduction with its excluded and its outsiders. *Discriminatory experiences*, *empathy (empathy with the discriminated and impossibility of empathy)*, and *critical interpretations of rationality* are the main categories that constitute the process of negative political socialization, which takes place concurrently with the conventional model.

the variations in the political socialization mechanisms among the three migrant groups can mostly be explained by the class differences, the transnational conditions and the political contexts of the host and home countries that correspond to the process of political socialization. In broad terms, the labor migrants' accounts of negative and conventional political socialization are more distinct when compared to the student and the roots migrants, who have more common narratives. Coming from Anatolian villages with very limited social and cultural capital, working at unsolicited blue-collar jobs to save money and return home as soon as possible, the labor migrants experience both processes distinctively than the other two groups. They accept and take for granted the outsider's position in Germany from the very beginning of the migration experience. Hence, as the interviews show, although they experience sporadic or systematic instances of discrimination, they are not sensitive to them. In addition, the lack of transnational ties with Germany before migration, which limit their *a priori* impressions and preconceptions about the country, and coming from the developing Turkey of the 1960-70s to one of the most advanced Western countries create a social distance between the

Germans and the labor migrants. In this context, the labor migrants state that their encounters with the Germans "taught them humanity and civicness", exemplifying a remarkable case of conventional political socialization.

Unlike the first-generation, the roots migrants are in an ambiguous insider's status in Germany due to their transnational condition as migrants born and/or raised in Germany, often with German citizenship. As for the student migrants, many of who belong to a global class of young professionals with high cultural, social and educational capital, they have direct access to the insider's context, in which they formally are equals with the insiders. Therefore, unlike the labor migrants, these two groups are sensitive to discriminatory practices they experience in Germany and their critical acknowledgement of discrimination leads to empathy with the excluded and discriminated groups in general and also to a conviction that it is impossible for the Germans to empathize with them.

As a consequence of migration itself and/or as an outcome of historical transformations like the fall of the Berlin Wall, migrants in this study experienced shifts in their positionalities on the transnational political space, which often involved challenges for their identities. In this context, they applied *boundary making mechanisms* to protect their contested identities, which condition and are conditioned by both models of political socialization. In other words, student migrants' efforts to distinguish themselves from the German-Turks, or early labor migrants' distanciating themselves from the late comers are connected with how they experienced the conventional and negative socialization processes. Lastly, conventional and negative political socialization processes led to *strategic integration*, the main goal of which can be formulated as avoiding conflicts in Turkey and in Germany to reach life goals.

It should be acknowledged that the concept of negative political socialization draws a rather pessimistic picture as it points to migrants' learning their places as the outsiders of the system, which, at times, led them to leave Germany for good, as in the case of some student migrants. Even when the migrants were willing to and capable of learning to 'fit in' (Garcia-Castañon 2013), the mechanisms that showed their place as the outsiders were still present. Facing these mechanisms, migrants in this study used their agency for strategic integration, or responded by ignoring, rejecting or playing around the messages of the agents of political socialization, as covered in the previous chapter. However, they did not resort to disruptive actions that target the reproduction of the system with its outsiders. One reason of this could be that the great majority of the participants in this study either preferred to remain apolitical or did not engage into collective forms of mobilization, which is key to generate a disruptive impact at the system level. In this respect, it is important to underline that their accounts of political socialization and their attempts of strategic integration are not representative of all Turkish migrants, who returned or who stayed behind.

Last but not the least, although negative political socialization is present in all returnee groups, it would be wrong to assume a causal link between this process and return. As mentioned earlier, the interviewees in this study returned to Turkey for a myriad of reasons, sometimes including but never limited to the factors that constitute negative political socialization. The concept of strategic integration, which is an outcome of negative political socialization and represents avoiding conflicts with the society to reach life goals, is a relevant case in point for this argument.

CHAPTER 5: Transnational processes of political socialization

Introduction

This chapter is based on a dialogue with the existing political socialization literature from a transnational perspective. Following the literature on migrant transnationalism, I hypothesize that migrant and return migrant political socialization cannot be adequately understood with the lens of methodological nationalism (Faist 2012; Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002). The point of departure in this chapter is the question of whether we could conceptualize migrant political socialization as a transnational process given that migrants have cross-border ties, identities and practices. More specifically, I ask to what extent and in what ways political socialization of Turkish return migrants from Germany can be a transnational process and to what extent the transnational trajectories can vary for different return migrant groups.

In Chapter 3, I show that migrants in this study use their agency in political socialization processes; and that rather than German friends, colleagues and community, their accounts are rich in contact with migrants from other countries, along with the German-Turkish community. Complementing these findings with theories on migrant transnationalism, this chapter seeks to understand the ways in which migrants can play an active role in the socialization process with their cross-border ties, identities and practices, encompassing both the host and home countries. It also seeks to understand how the political socialization experience in one country can be related to the other, or sometimes even to a third country.

The analysis of interviews inspired by the work of Østergaard-Nielsen (2001) shows that we could differentiate between direct and indirect trajectories of transnational political socialization. For the migrants in this study, direct transnational political socialization refers to political socialization to politics of Turkey or another migrant-sending country

in Germany. Migrants' developing and/or changing attitudes about Turkish politics with the influence of transnationally organized migrant politics in Germany is a case in point. Indirect transnational political socialization is socialization to politics of one (host) country with indirect consequences of attitude formation for the other (home or a third) country. A typical example is migrants' changing Turkish political party preferences following discriminatory migration experiences in Germany.

In what follows, I first discuss migrant political socialization and tendencies of methodological nationalism in the literature through the lens of migrant transnationalism. Then I delineate my own methodological approach, and move on to explain in detail the emerging forms of "direct vs. indirect" transnational political socialization for the three migrant groups. I also discuss the inter- and intra-group variations of these processes.

Migrant political socialization, methodological nationalism, transnationalism

Methodological nationalism presumes that the national state provides the main social context for studying migration. Studies on migration control and social integration of immigrants are noted among primary examples of this assumption (Faist 2012). As Faist writes, most of these studies deal with their subjects of inquiry

> (…) in a single national state, at most, they are comparative in nature and thus compare regulations and social processes in various nation states. Consequently, the organization of the empirical research is limited to the territorial 'container' of a national state, usually an immigration one. (2012, 53)

Faist (2012) underlines that considering the national state as the main social context of migration determines strategies of research design, as well as methods of data collection He further adds that while for specific research aims, such as immigration control, a focus on the national state is useful; it would be insufficient, if the objective of the research is to analyze topics such as immigrant incorporation, which requires considering the cross-

border ties and practices of persons (2012, 53-54)

As explained in Chapter 1, one tendency in the literature on migrant and return migrant socialization is the assumption that political socialization process is confined to national boundaries of the home and host countries. Following by Faist (2012), this rationale arguably determines the research design and data collection strategies of major studies. Focusing on the measurement of a number of pre- and post-arrival variables, or comparing the migrants with the non-migrant population largely by surveys, researchers tend to overlook the transnational networks, identities and practices of the migrants, which have a potential central role in political socialization of migrants.

At the first glance, migration looks very similar to wars and economic crises to be conceptualized as an exogenous shock, the effects of which can be analyzed through pre- and post- treatment measurements (White et al. 2008; Jones-Correa and Andalon 2008). However, unlike wars or economic crises, migration is not only a temporal but also a spatial treatment, and the pre-treatment (pre-migration) context may continue to exist along and in interaction with the post-treatment (post-migration) context via transnational ties of the migrants. In other words, after migration, the migrant and her political socialization does not have to be confined to the host country context (or home country context upon return migration). Rather, it may be a quite transnational process, encompassing both home and host countries. Further, in some cases it may even involve other 'third countries' due to the international migration context in the "superdiverse" cities of the host countries (Vertovec 2007; Crul 2016).

Easton and Dennis (1965) likens political socialization of children to migrants, with the exception that while the former is being socialized for the first time, the latter has a

number of pre-existing values:

> ". . .[I]n many ways a child born into a system is like an immigrant into it. But where he differs is in the fact that he has never been socialized to any other kind of system. That is to say, he is being socialized politically for the first time rather than re-socialized as for an immigrant. The fact that the new member is a child rather than an adult with a pre-existing set of attitudes toward political life creates a need for special devices to build support for the regime and authorities" Easton and Dennis, on the political socialization of adolescents (1965, 54).

This approach draws a parallel between the socialization of a child, which has no past, and resocialization of a migrant, which has a past in another country that may or may not be resistant to change in the new country. The three main theories of migrant political socialization address this point further. The theory of early learning suggests that the formative early years of a person's life, i.e. childhood and adolescence, are the key in establishing his/her political values, which would not change later. The transferability approach raises the claim that "immigrants are able to draw on past experience and transfer the lessons learned from their old environment, applying them to the new host environment" (White et al 2008). The theory of exposure focuses on the duration of exposure to the host country political environment, arguing that more exposure means more adoption (White et al. 2008). These assumptions pretend that political socialization to the home country's political system comes to an end upon migration; and it is subsequently followed by a de-socialization from the home country and re-socialization to the host country.

As political socialization to home country is accepted to be a matter of the past, the exposure theory assumes that with the time spent in the host country, home country socialization dynamics will fade away gradually. The 'transferability' approach seems to take into account the home country political socialization, as in this approach the migrants are assumed to build on their past experiences during their resocialization in the host country. Notwithstanding, in this approach, too, the home country political socialization

belongs to past, rather than being conceptualized as a process that may continue after migration. These approaches clearly overlook migrants' cross-border networks, practices, identities and political engagements that encompass both home and host countries.

When considered within a transnational perspective, if migrants have cross-border political networks and engagements, arguably they could simultaneously tap on political contexts of both home and host countries in their political socialization after migration. In this context, rather than being a matter of the past (i.e. pre-migration), home country political socialization can continue unfolding concurrently and interaction with the host country political socialization on the transnational political field of the home and host countries. Hence, my departure point in this chapter is the following question, "given the cross-border ties, identities and practices of migrants, why could the process of political socialization not be a transnational process for migrants, which not necessarily unfolds in a sequential order of socialization – desocialization – resocialization?" Below I present an overview of theories in migrant transnationalism and elaborate on how I integrate the transnational approach to migrant political socialization.

Transnationalism as an analytical approach to migration was firstly brought into the scene by Glick-Schiller, Basch and Blanc-Szanton (1992), who argue that there is a new kind of immigrants whose activities, networks and patterns of life involve both their home and host countries. Accordingly, due to their multi-stranded social relationship in both societies, these two societies merge into a single social field, which is more than the sum of them (1992).[28]Transnationalism involves the circulation of goods and ideas in a field over national borders. In this picture, the immigrants (or transmigrants) are regarded as

[28] There are also alternative approaches. For example, Portes and his colleagues develop an alternative conceptualization of transnationalism, limiting the term to refer to activities that take place on a regular basis across borders (Portes, Guarnizo, and Landolt 1999).

active agents that can interact, negotiate and resist to global political and economic situations, with their transnational ties, identities and practices.

This study adopts a transnational approach to return migration, taking into account the agency of the returnees in the process of political socialization in Germany and its continuation after their return to Turkey. My assumption is that the political socialization of the return migrants from Germany takes place on the Turkish-German transnational political space, rather than being limited to national boundaries. This has two main meanings: 1) Migrants play an active role in the socialization process with their cross-border ties, identities and practices; and 2) political socialization experience in one country can be directly or indirectly related to politics of the other country, and even to politics of other countries of origin, given the socializing effects of international migrant communities as explained in Chapter 3.

Transnational migrant identity

Cross-border connections and practices raise the question of identity in the transnationalism literature, which is undeniably related to the process of establishing political orientations (Greenberg 1970) or learning how to relate to a political system and community (Easton, Dennis, and Easton 1969). According to Vertovec (2001, 573), the idea behind the question of transnational identities is that while migrants engage in cross-border exchange and participation based on a perception of common identity, identities of many individuals and groups are "negotiated within social worlds that span more than one place." Hence, transnational connections push migrants towards constructing, maintaining and negotiating collective identities (Vertovec 2001, 575) Transnationalism scholars, especially from disciplines such as cultural studies, talk about global diasporas and diaspora consciousness (Appadurai and Breckenridge 1988), referring to multiple

identifications, de-centered attachments and several identities linking migrants to more than one nation (Glick-Schiller, Basch, Szanton-Blanc 1992; Vertovec 1999).

A criticism against theories of transnationalism is that their empirical focus is on the individuals as the unit of analysis. Several critiques argue that broader structural processes like the uneven capitalist development, or the regulatory authority of the nation-state, institutional procedures and policies of the receiving and sending states should also be taken into consideration as units of analysis in the studies of transnationalism (Sassen 1998; O'Flaherty, Skrbis, and Tranter 2007, 822). In their attempt to "ground transnationalism" Smith and Guarnizo (1998) draw attention to the fact that transnational practices do not take place in an imaginary "third space" (Bhabha 1990; Soja 1998) and transnational practices are not free from opportunities and constraints imposed by the context. Hence, they underline that transmigrants are not unbounded social actors. Although they establish collective identities across borders, these "are embodied in specific social relations established between specific people, situated in unequivocal localities, at historically determined times." (Smith and Guarnizo 1998, 11)

In the specific case of Turkish labor migration in Germany, the German-Turkish transmigrant identity is argued to be hybrid or a diasporic one that carries homeland to diaspora and diaspora to homeland (Kaya 2007). Kaya (2007, 2) argues that German-Turks "have adopted a rather more vibrant set of identities—more cosmopolitan, syncretic, rhizomatic, and transnational" under social, political and economic imperatives of both Germany and Turkey. Caglar (2001) underlines that Turkish-German transnational practices and images challenge the narratives of incorporation in German public sphere characterized by exclusion based on ethnic /national terms. Vertovec (2001) interprets this as a demonstration of how transnational experiences lead to "more cosmopolitan senses of participation and belonging" (2001, 578).

Student migrants, the other group studied in this paper, do not constitute a diaspora, neither do they have hybrid identities comparable to the labor migrants and especially their descendants. However, as explained in the introduction chapter, student migration coincides with the globalization of education and labor markets for highly skilled individuals (King 2002), and these migrants tend to be embedded in a global student environment in their host countries. Therefore, it is possible to talk about intensive cross-border networks and practices, which pave the way for transnational political socialization trajectories for the student migrants.

Transnational political networks and practices of the migrants

Transnationalism scholars have approached the transnational political networks and practices in different ways. As mentioned above, while some see them as manifestation of the end of bounded notions of society and call for a transnational de-territorialized framework (Glick Schiller et al 1992), others call for a "bounded" understanding of transnational practices. According to Smith and Guarnizo (1998, 10):

> Transnational actions are bounded in two senses—first, by the understandings of "grounded reality", socially constructed within the transnational networks that people form and move through, and second, by the policies and practices of territorially- based sending and receiving local and national states and communities.

In congruence with the bounded approach, I consider that political practices, experiences and value formations of migrants are shaped both by the grounded reality of their transnational political space and by policies and practices exercised in their home and host countries. In other words, although cross-border ties, identities and practices weave a transnational political space over national borders, where the political socialization experience unfolds, borders are still important in the sense that the peculiar political contexts of home and host countries also play a central role in the shaping of the political

socialization process.

In her analysis of "how the social and political contexts in receiving countries affect the transnational political practices of migrants and refugees", Ostergaard-Nielsen (2001) makes a distinction between direct and indirect transnational political practices. Accordingly, direct transnational political practices refer to "direct cross border participation in the politics of the home country", while indirect transnational political practices stand for "indirect participation via the political institutions of the host country". In the latter, "the political participation in one country, such as voting patterns or lobbying, is informed by political events in another" (Østergaard-Nielsen 2001, 262). She finds that the migrant groups in her study, i.e. the Kurds and the Turks, can have an influence on the political developments in Turkey directly by "giving economic, political or even military support to political counterparts in the homeland" (Østergaard-Nielsen 2001, 271). Alternatively, they can employ indirect means such as forming lobby groups to "work within the political institutions, such as political parties or consultative councils of the host-country" or to "stage events 'on the outside', such as demonstrations, mass meetings, or alas, violent activities." (Østergaard-Nielsen 2001, 272)

Inspired by this distinction, I argue that the transnational dimension of migrant political socialization can be conceptualized as "direct vs. indirect" in terms of its cross-country consequences. Accordingly, direct transnational political socialization means exclusive political socialization in Germany to politics of Turkey or politics of any other third countries that send migrants to Germany. Migrant communities and their transnational organizations (such as hometown associations or German branches of Turkish political organizations) are the key agents of political socialization in this direct transnational socialization model. As for indirect transnational political socialization, it refers to political socialization to German politics in Germany with indirect consequences of

political learning and attitude formation regarding the Turkish polity. These indirect consequences could be changing Turkish political party preferences or transforming attitudes towards certain political actors in Turkey with the influence of the migrant experience in German polity, such as being subject to discrimination or enjoying welfare benefits. These trajectories of political socialization can take place simultaneously and have different dynamics for different migrant groups, at times continuing after return migration, especially for the roots migrants.

Table 5.1 Examples of direct vs. indirect forms of transnational migrant political socialization

Direct	**Indirect**
	In Germany
Socialization to Turkish politics in the German-Turkish community	Increasing empathy for the Kurds and other minority groups in Turkey Changing political party preferences in Turkey
Socialization to Turkish politics via the organized left and right-wing migrant politics in Germany	Changing understanding of the official historical narrative of Turkey Increasing appreciation for Turkey and Turkish political institutions
Socialization to the politics of third countries through contact with migrants from other countries of origin	**After return to Turkey (predominantly roots migrants)** Changing political attitudes regarding the Germans, the German-Turkish community, German polity Adoption of cosmopolitan and post-national values

Methodology

As discussed in detail in Chapter 2, the data collection and analysis in this chapter are inspired by relational ethnographical approach. The relational approach enables me to treat the political socialization of migrants on a transnational political field, rather than

confining their political engagements and processes of socialization to the boundaries of the home and host countries. To borrow Desmond (2014)'s words on substantialist approaches, as an alternative to which he suggests the relational approach, the formulation of a sequential 'socialization -> desocialization ->resocialization' order "artificially severs relations between people, places, organizations, or ideas to study these entities in relative isolation." (551) Clearly, this is not independent from the reduction of the transnational processes of political socialization to static pre- and post-migration conditions (Elias 1978), which does not consider the transnational relations the migrants foster and maintain.

Regarding the study of fields, Desmond (2014, 563) underlines that "the relational ethnographer (…) does not amputate social relations through the imposition of categories based on bounded places (...) Rather, she attempts to construct a network of relations that guide everyday life, studying fields, rather than places." Accordingly, field theoretic analysis aims at mapping out the complex dynamics of social spaces and can reconstruct the perspectives of various actors situated at different points in the field (Desmond, 2014: 563). Hence, this approach enables a look at the people as "the evolving product of bundles of relationships with the other persons" and institutions (Weber 2001, 490 in Desmond 2014, 564). Arguably, this approach could provide a base for focusing on the transnational political field on which political socialization could take place, as a response to concentrating on nation-state boundaries in the conceptualization of migrant political socialization.

Direct transnational political socialization

Direct transnational political socialization takes place in the form of socialization to Turkish politics or politics of other sending countries during the migration experience in

Germany. Turkey-oriented organized migrant politics in Germany, migrants' random and sporadic encounters in the German-Turkish community, as well as with other migrant communities play the central role in this trajectory with different dynamics across the three migrant groups.

Direct transnational socialization to Turkish politics via organized Turkish migrant politics in Germany

Examples of this kind of direct transnational political socialization majorly come from the narratives of the labor migrants and most of them belong to the era between 1960s and 1980s. Despite being in Germany in these decades, the labor migrants strongly experienced the deep political polarizations in Turkey, due to their transnational condition. Many labor migrants report that they learned 'whatever they know about Turkish politics' when they were in Germany, thanks to homeland-oriented migrant organizations. Both left and right-wing organizations played an active role in this process.

Akif explains his political socialization in the 80s as indispensable because of the extremely conflicting right-left politics of the era. He speaks of the post-*coup d'état* atmosphere of the 80s, when many Turks fled to Germany as political refugees:

> When a politically important thing happened in Turkey, the Turkish associations used to organize protests and we used to participate (…) There was a very strong left vs. right divide then. You know, you have to know your class. You are either from the left or from the right. You have to choose. At that era, it was like this. In our community, everyone knew everyone, so there was no chance to hide or escape from this (…) In those years, in Germany we lived in the same political atmosphere that people were experiencing in Turkey. Nothing different… Same fights, same clashes between the right and the left (...) Before going to Germany, I had no political ideology. I had not even voted before. There I learned my class thanks to the association, to the other workers in the factory, etc. It is indispensable, sister; we had to take sides with someone. We could not just hang around in the middle.

Ramazan's story is an example of political socialization to right-wing Turkish politics in Germany:

> All my family supports CHP. But I decided to support MHP. I decided this in Germany. Why? Because they are nationalists. They are very active in Germany. In Germany I observed that they love our flag and they play the anthem of the Ottoman janissary band. They take care of the mosques in Germany. They are pious… and they are nationalists. They love our land more than the others.

Irfan presents an example of political socialization to right-wing religious politics in Turkey through the mosque associations in Germany. He learned the details about different religious groups in Turkey and the political implications of these differences on the Turkish politics via the religious community he was in touch with in the mosque association in Germany:

> Political parties do not send their representatives to the mosque, however, there are differences and conflicts within the religious community there. Some support the Aczimendi movement[29], some support the Erbakan movement[30], some support the Diyanet[31]. Supporters of Erbakan do not want to come to the mosques of the Diyanet. They say they are more Muslim than the Diyanet people. (…) So, they bring *hodja*s to Germany from Turkey for their own prayer service. They all have connections in Turkey. (…) I did not know these things before. In these associations I saw that there was a lot of conflict and fighting between these groups.

Ahmet explains how his life as a practicing Muslim village boy from Anatolia was transformed into a revolutionary one in Germany:

> You know, the environment he lives in determines a person's consciousness. You think differently when you live in your village than in another country. For example, I saw the first Turkish television network in Germany because in our village there was no TV. (…) That played a big part in my transformation. I started to question the differences in the two countries. I started to ask if poverty is destiny, or not. First, I started with novelists like Maxim Gorki, then I moved on to theoretical and scientific texts like those of Marx and Lenin. I started the political struggle actively in 1974.

Ahmet joined a Turkey oriented Marxist-Leninist organization in Germany in 1974 and still continues taking an active role in the organization today. He says there were two main groups that were influencing his ideas in the first years of his life in Germany:

> In my first years there were two different (Turkish) groups that were influencing

[29] A religious sect defending sharia rule

[30] Milli Gorus movement founded in 1969 by Necmettin Erbakan. One of the leading Islamist diaspora organizations in Europe

[31] Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs. It was founded in 1984 as a branch of the Presidency of Religious Affairs in Ankara. Funded by the Turkish state, it has closer links with the government.

> me. In 1970-71 I was a practicing Muslim and when I listened to one group, they were talking about the vainness of worldly issues, they were only talking about afterlife, hell and heaven. The other group, on the other hand, explained my life to me, why I was in Germany as a worker now, why we were poor in Turkey. These were immigrant workers I was working with.

As for the student migrants, their political socialization to Turkish politics via organized Turkey-oriented politics in Germany is limited when compared with the labor and roots migrants. One of the reasons for this is the social distance between the German-Turkish community and the student migrants, who go there for educational purposes. As explained in the previous chapter, student migrants tend not to establish close relations with the German-Turks and, in many cases, see them as an "other". Hence it is not common for the students to join Turkey oriented political organizations and associations unless they are already connected with such organizations before migrating to Germany. Mert articulates the social distance as follows:

> Let me tell you without beating around the bush, they (German-Turks) did not understand us; neither did we understand them. The first thing they ask is "which city do you come from?" We did not really understand their questions. (…) We could not really mingle with them (Mert).

Moreover, when compared to the decades of labor migration to Germany, the hegemonic power of the organized Turkish left has decreased starting with the 1980s, which explains the lack of involvement of the student migrants in such circles in Germany. Nevertheless, Turkey-oriented political organizations still worked as agents of political socialization for the student migrants in this study, who were sporadic observers of such organizations from the outside, be it on the street, be it on the university campus. One significant point that influenced the student migrants in such encounters was the strong visibility of certain political groups that are illegal and hence invisible within the political field in Turkey. Such experiences enabled the migrants to discover different aspects and currents in Turkey-oriented politics, which they would never come across had they never migrated to Germany.

> There were protest events in Stuttgart but I never participated. There were protests about the Kurdish issue or other topics such as F-type prisons but I was scared because you never know who is who. (…) One day I went to a kebab restaurant and I saw a map of Kurdistan on their wall. These things scared me. I never went to that place again. I stayed away from all of it. (Erhan)

These sporadic observations opened the eyes of the students to the strong political divisions and conflicts within Turkish politics in Germany, which would not be visible in Turkey, and made them contemplate on the situation of Turkish politics

> Unfortunately, they (German-Turks) have very strong political engagements. Every group has their own coffee house, mosque, restaurant etc. Kurds, Alevis, Kemalists… In Germany, I saw these strong divisions and polarizations and it made me sad. I never went to any of them. I do not know what it is that they cannot agree upon. It was sad to see that people fell up apart so dramatically in their social lives because of the differences in their political ideologies. (Huseyin)

Gezi protests against the Turkish government in the summer of 2013 also encouraged some student migrants to participate in protest events in Germany, facilitating contact with Turkey-oriented leftist organizations. For some, these protests in Germany served as their first contact point with the Turkish left and helped them form their first opinions about the organizations.

> There was one leftist group that I did not know before and I had my first negative impression about them there in the Gezi protests. They were singing an anthem which had some lyrics that could annoy some others in the crowd. I was eavesdropping on the conversations that other people in the crowd were having and started to get some impression about certain conflicts within the Turkish left (Begum)

As for the roots migrants, direct transnational political socialization to Turkish politics via organized homeland politics in Germany majorly took place with respect to the religious identities, the Kurdish question and left-wing ideologies. The relevance of these topics depends on the interviewee's age or the year in which they settled down in Germany. While older second-generation return migrants report examples of socialization to the Kurdish issue or leftist ideas through Turkey-oriented political

organizations in Germany; the younger second- and third-generation predominantly mention the religious associations that operate in both countries.

> I became a member of a student's association. I had politically conscious friends. I had many leftist friends, many friends that fled from Turkey as political refugees. Together with them we had a socialist association. If it were not for my friends, I would be a different person. For example, I was listening to Ibrahim Tatlises (arabesque music) until college. In college, I started to listen to *Ezginin Gunlugu* (protest music with leftist symbolism). My friends' influence on me was always very big. (Utku)

> Turkish Cultural Association works in coordination with Diyanet. They send imams to us. We built our own facilities for the association. Our fathers worked in its construction. It has a masjid on the upper floor. We had our imam 24/7. He taught us classes on Turkish and religion. He also taught us historical facts such as how we won the Canakkale battle. The official name for the association is Turkish Cultural Association but we call it *Cami*[32]. As a community we decided which *cemaat*[33] we wanted to belong to. In our town there were mosques that belonged to Suleymancis and Fethullahcis[34]. In some small villages you see two mosques next to each other because each *cemaat* has its own mosque. It is so weird and it's a waste of money. (…) These religious differences were a part of our childhood. Depending on their *cemaat*, some families did not let their kids play with other kids. (Osman)

Direct transnational socialization to Turkish politics in the German-Turkish community

This type of direct transnational political socialization majorly (almost exclusively) comes up in the narratives of the roots migrants. Unlike the student and labor migrants, who are both first-generation, for the roots migrants, socialization to Turkish politics through random and sporadic encounters in their daily lives is an inherent part of their transnational condition. Family, the German-Turkish community and friends, and Turkish media act as agents of direct transnational political socialization to Turkish politics and polity. Their families and the German-Turkish community largely affect the initial formation of their Turkey-oriented political party identifications and political orientations. In this context, Islam, the Alevis, the Kurdish question, and a number of

[32] *Cami* means mosque in English.

[33] Religious congregation

[34] Religious sects from Turkey

issues regarding Turkish domestic politics are recurrent themes that arise as a part of this direct transnational socialization.

> Q: Did you know the difference between the Alevis and the Sunnis before you went to Germany?
> A: Not that much. In Turkey I had never had friends from Siirt, Batman or Sirnak[35]. But, in Germany, you live with people who escaped from politics in Turkey. In Germany, I had friends from Mardin, from Siverek. Everyone has a different story. Now I know them and I respect their rituals. In Turkey people criticize their neighbors depending on their religious background. As if being Turkish or Sunni were something supreme (!) In Germany you understand these things. (Demir)

The roots migrants also report changes in their attitudes as a consequence of self-motivated historical research with an urge to find their true identities within the German-Turkish political circles:

> At school, I was with Turks mostly. These were educated Turks. Under their influence, at the age of 16, I read the first book I chose myself and then I started to adopt a Kemalist framework. Then when I was 18 I started to investigate the Turkish history. At that time I was very nationalist. In the periodicals I read, I discovered minority related topics and the issues about the Armenians. So, I investigated even more. Once I started to investigate, I gave up on my nationalist arguments. (Nihan)

One interesting finding here is that due to the lack of a concrete educational framework about teaching the history of Turkey and the Ottoman Empire to second- and third-generation, these migrants learned Turkish and Ottoman history from diverse resources such as family, friend circles or Turkey oriented religious or political associations. Therefore, their understanding of the history of Turkey may vary widely in the absence of a nationally unified educational program and in transnationally diverse loci of political socialization. The above-mentioned motivation to individually investigate Turkish and Ottoman history is also fed by this factor.

[35] Kurdish provinces

> My parents raised me with Ataturk's ideology. I never knew so much about him. Neither was I a fanatic. But in general, I did not know anything about Turkish history. I knew that the republic was founded in 1923 but sadly not many more things. Because I was born in Germany and went to school there. Maybe I knew much more about Hitler than the history of Turkey. (Ece)

Direct transnational political socialization in Germany to the politics of third countries

Studies on migrant transnationalism generally examine their objects of inquiry across the borders of two countries: the home country and the host country. However, migrants' interaction with migrants from other countries in the host country opens new transnational social and political fields constituted by alternative cross-border ties that include the home countries of the other migrants. Indeed, there is an increasing interest in the idea of 'superdiversity' in the host country context referring to an unprecedented "dynamic interplay of variables among an increased number of new, small and scattered, multiple-origin, transnationally connected, socioeconomically differentiated and legally stratified immigrants " (Vertovec 2007, 1024). With the recently emerging super-diverse demographic patterns in the host countries, the conventional characterizations regarding the ethnic minorities are no longer possible. The transnational dynamics of the migrants' condition and the interactions among them are more complex than before.

In line with this, the interviewees sometimes experience political socialization in Germany to politics of other countries. This pattern is visible in the narratives of all of the returnee groups, as they often mention having close relations with migrants from other countries. The first-generation interviewees often mention the factory floor as the context of this type of political socialization, while the second- and third-generation mention the neighborhood and the school. The students usually make reference to the university campus and other friendships.

When it is about the third countries, migrant political socialization does not refer to embracing political values of a system and learn to 'fit in' (Conover 1991), rather it describes formation of political attitudes regarding a third country based on the migrants relations with migrants from that country in Germany. It can be argued that what they learn regarding the politics of other countries make the migrants form their political attitudes towards these countries. Further, based on what they learn, they can critically reflect on politics in general, or on Turkish politics specifically, which may indirectly result in changes in their political attitudes and values.

In the case of the first-generation labor migrants, the relations with the other guest workers such as the Greek constitute an example:

> For example, in Turkey we used to believe that the Greeks and the Turks are enemies. In Germany we realized that it was a lie. Thanks to our friendships with the Greeks I understood that the enmities that we were taught did not exist. We have the same character and manners, the same family structure. For example, we always say that the Muslim religious leaders tend to be very corrupt. Our Greek friends were saying the same thing for their religious leaders. (Humeyra)

Listening with his Greek and Yugoslavian friends to the news about the Turkish invasion of Cyprus after the Greek-led *coup d'état* on the island in 1974 is a vivid memory for Memduh, whose impressions were built in a transnational context of political socialization:

> I was working in the factory on the day of Turkey's invasion of Cyprus. On the break, we started listening to the news about the invasion with our Greek friends. We did not have a single discussion or a tense conversation. Because we were all there together for a single aim: to earn our lives. We were each other's sidekicks, we were sharing a common fate. We were so united. We were aware of the absurdity of the engagements of the ruling classes of our countries. (Memduh)

For the student migrants, the international student bodies in the campuses offers a rich context of political learning and socialization. Begum remembers reflecting on the concept of "guerilla" in the context of the Kurdish issue following learning what it meant

for the Colombians:

> At school, we had a quite international context. Everybody had a different background. So, we did not talk about German politics. But I remember talking all the time to a Colombian friend about Colombian politics. I kept bombarding him with my questions about the Colombian guerillas. I mean, in Turkey I had heard people talk of guerillas, but I did not understand the context. I was making him explain Colombian politics to me, and what place these guerillas had there.

The roots migrants often mention growing up with immigrant children from other countries, which unsurprisingly played a role in the formation of their attitudes regarding these countries and their cultures.

> Turks and Arabs have a lot in common. I do not like mentioning the issue of religion here, but we are both Muslims. I am not a religious person, but we have the same religion. Also we are both strangers in Germany. We were embracing and supporting each other because of this. My Arab friends have made me an open-minded person without prejudices. For example my parents are very prejudiced against the Arabs. I do not like prejudiced people. I hate when they think they are superior to people from other nations. What makes you different than an Arab or an African? (Ece)

Indirect transnational political socialization

In this section I first look at the ways in which political socialization to the German polity can generate indirect effects of political socialization to Turkish politics. This type of political socialization usually takes place through sporadic individual experiences of the migrants, which include both Germany and Turkey as reference points in the formation of change in their political attitudes. Second, I explain how indirect transnational political socialization continues in a reverse fashion after migrating to Turkey especially for the roots migrants, revealing the ways in which political socialization in Turkey instigates changes in their political attitudes about German politics.

Indirect transnational political socialization in Germany to Turkish politics

According to the interviews, one of the most significant examples of the indirect socialization to Turkish politics through the immigration experience in Germany is

political socialization to the Kurdish issue of Turkey through the migration experience in Germany. This is an emerging theme in the interviews, which comes up in different ways in student, labor and roots migrant groups, without being asked. Among the other emerging themes in this section are changing political party identifications, changing understanding of "historical enemies of the Republic of Turkey", changing perceptions about the refugees, increasing nationalist values, and rising liberal and cosmopolitan values.

Turning back to the relational approach, all these themes manifest instances of contact and conflict, crystallizing instances of "fight, struggle, cooperation and compromise, misunderstanding and shared meaning makings between actors occupying different positions in a field." (Desmond 2014, 555) Internal logics of German and Turkish polities, as distinct but interconnected social worlds, are considered to be "tailored around chains, paths, connections and associations of different actors, such as German institutions of political socialization, the labor migrants and their descendants (German-Turks), the student migrants and the political actors in Turkey, which are "bound with relationship of mutual dependence and struggle." (Desmond 2014, 555)

Contrary to the other two groups, the labor migrants report very limited experiences of indirect political socialization in Germany to Turkish politics. This can be associated with the fact that labor migrants in this study were more immersed and limited to the Turkish community in Germany; they report less contact with the Germans; they do not speak much German; they were not very interested in German politics; and they did not obtain German citizenship.

The Kurdish issue comes up in the narratives of a group of labor migrants and it has a very different nature when compared to the other migrant groups. Some in this group underline the successful economic growth in Germany, attributing it to her national union and solidarity, despite being a federal state. They note how well Germany manages the issue of foreigners, treating them with equal opportunity and social services. For them the Kurdish question should be approached in a similar way. Although this group report bolder incidents of discrimination and exclusion, the conclusions they reach about the Kurds are rather based on their positive political experiences in Germany. Another interesting thing is that these labor migrants are conservative nationalists who have sympathy for the CDU.

Referring to the success of the CDU, these migrants take Germany as an example that should be followed in Turkey for two main reasons: The economic growth and success come with national unity even if Germany is a federation; and Germany successfully solves the problems related to the foreigners. Arguably, this picture fits very well to the conventional assumptions of the political socialization literature because what is observed here is a group of migrants who, despite all the conflict and domination, choose to internalize the German way of doing politics and apply it to the Turkish case. For example, Ramazan supports CDU because it protects the interests of Germany and the federal states. In his words,

> CDU was in power in Bayern, where I lived. They protected the interests of Bayern. (…) They are patriots and nationalists. They love their nation and their land. They work the most for the growth and development of their country (…) For example when the Kurds make protests here, they do not use the Turkish flag. CDU would not let this kind of thing happen. They want everyone to unite. So, if you live here in Turkey, you need to love the Turkish flag.

For some other labor migrants, the first years of the migrant experience in factories and dormitories with guest workers from other countries such as Greece opened a new

window in terms of their understanding of the "historical enemies" of the Turkish state. For example, the image of the Greek as the great enemies of the Turks, stemming from the history of the foundation of the Turkish Republic, gradually eroded for the guest workers, who made life-long friends with the Greek in the workplace. These labor migrants not only observe in awe that they have "many things in common" with people from these countries but they also come to the conclusion that "the ruling classes generate these images of the enemies on purpose for their own interests".

> There were people from all over the world. Everybody was telling their own story. There I understood that people from other countries were not bad people. I realized that conflicts emerged from people's interests, ambitions and greed. I am referring to the ruling class' greed to rule and dominate. We used to tell each other that it was not us but the rulers of our countries who had problems with each other. With the Greek, for example, we have everything in common, except religion. Apart from that, we have the same traditions, customs, many other things. (Memduh)

Differently, some first-generation migrants report an increasing feeling of Turkish nationalism or an increasing support for Turkish political institutions, sometimes in the absence of any negative experiences in Germany. Aysegul went to Germany in the early 2000s at the age of 24 for family reunification and came back with her family after a short while as she did not want her children to grow up in Germany. In her opinion, her emerging nationalist emotions were related to the experience of living away from the homeland and the obligation she felt to defend her homeland to the German-Turks:

> If I wanted to be a German citizen, I could. But I did not. My nationalist feelings outweighed the idea. I said I wanted stay as a Turkish citizen. (…) Before I was not aware of the sensation, but, in Germany, I learned to be a nationalist, because before I had never had to defend my country to other people. German-Turks who were born and raised there sometimes talk badly about Turkey. My driving teacher was one of those. We were practicing in the car, when he started to defame Turkey. I pulled the car over and told him: "Please watch your language! Both of us are Turkish but you do not know anything about Turkey. I lived there half of my life. Go there and live there. Only then you can make your comments." I am still like that. I learned being a nationalist in Germany and I have never given up on it.

As for the student migrants, in Chapter 3, I show that they did not absorb the democratic culture of Germany, remitted it and/or desocialized from it when they returned, as it would be suggested by the literature on political socialization. In Chapter 4, I argue that their political socialization process is mainly mediated by their experience of exclusion and discrimination and they learned how to relate to the German politics and society not in order to be molded into its members, but through the outsiders' position. This *negative political socialization* in Germany indirectly translates itself into the transformation of their attitudes and values regarding the Turkish politics, because when they think about their negative experience of "foreignness" in Germany, or that of the German-Turks, they think on a transnational political space. They think about power relations and power inequalities within/without the borders of nation-states and some of them develop empathy with the Kurds in Turkey "for the first time in their lives" as they put it.

The indirect transnational political socialization of the student migrant stem from their random experiences and observations in Germany as they "met people from all over the world", had daily random socializing encounters at school and at the workplace, witnessing social heterogeneities in the urban context. As a group of student migrants explain, foreignness, discrimination or any form of racism experienced or witnessed in Germany become a contact point with a different actor on the transnational political field, the Kurds. For almost all of the left and center-left oriented student returnees, their conflictual experience in Germany creates understanding and shared meaning making mechanisms with the Kurds – as a historically oppressed and discriminated ethnic group with a national identity in Turkish territories.

> After I went to Germany I understood Turkey much better. I understood what migration and racism meant. This is the thing I am enlightened about the most. In

> Turkey, for example, there are Armenians and Kurds. I knew this before I went to Germany. I knew they were treated badly and there were problems regarding these groups. But when I experienced racism personally, meaning that I experienced the otherization against me as a person with black hair, I understood what domestic migration in Turkey was really about and why these people migrating to the west of Turkey from the east were furious and easily criminalized. I understood the fight they had to give to defend their culture and identity. (Tuna)

Tuna states realizing that she was ardently defending Turkishness in Germany became a reason for her to decide to return to Turkey. She said to herself, "I need to go. Instead of defending Turkishness in Germany, I should return to Turkey and defend the subordinated groups that need to be defended."

The indirect transnational political socialization to Turkish politics through German politics also has consequences on the electoral preferences of the interviewees in the Turkish polity. Burak explains how hard it was to live in a country where there has been an established prejudice against the Turks and how this transformed his political position in Turkey:

> It was really hard to live in a country where there is prejudice against the Turks. It was also hard in terms of the official relations you have with the German state. You have to renew your visa almost every six months and they treat you badly at the Foreigners Police (…) Before moving to Germany I used to vote for CHP. Now I identify myself with HDP. Now, looking at it personally, not politically, I developed a new tendency since I came back from Germany. I am always at the side of the oppressed. Germany has had an effect on me on this issue. Politically, personally, professionally… In all senses. (…) My approach to politics has changed through the relations of the oppressor and the oppressed in Germany.

Similarly, both Tuna and Sevil used to vote for CHP before migrating to Germany, and their experience there made them lose their interest completely in electoral politics. They stopped going to the ballot box, reaching a point where they rejected the uniform approach of CHP based on the idea of republican nationalism (*ulusalcılık*).

Sevil explains it as follows:

> Before living in Germany, I would surely vote for CHP, with the rationality of uniting on the common grounds. But in Germany you have the opportunity to meet and chat with a lot of people, people from many different backgrounds. You

> have the chance to understand them all. CHP, on the other hand, wants to fabricate a standard citizen; wants that all the streets are the same like here[36].

Tuna makes a similar comment:

> My ideas about CHP started to change. The republican nationalism (ulusalcılık) they defend started to disturb me. In Germany, I realized how this nationalism works. There I realized that you found a country then you create a nation and you start to cultivate the idea of nationalism to be able to go on ruling that country. In Turkey, because of the education system, I had not realized it. There I understood how painful it is to experience racism, just because of your ethnical roots.

Distanciating themselves form Turkish electoral politics due to their political experience in Germany, Tuna and Sevil leaned towards different tendencies upon their return, despite preferring to stay mostly apolitical. While Tuna states mobilizing from time to time with the anarchists, Sevil says she has become interested in the happiness of the people around her on a micro scale. On a follow up to the interviews, I found out that they voted for the Kurdish HDP in the 2015 elections.

The migration experience in Germany causes a different kind of shift in the political party identification of Huseyin, who used to be a party member of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) before living in Germany. After witnessing the labor relations, the social security system and redistribution of the wealth through taxes, Huseyin became a strong supporter of the welfare state and started to identify himself with the CHP as the defender of social democracy in Turkey:

> I was a member of the LDP (…) We were teenagers in the early 1990s, when the USSR collapsed, and the United States was the only hegemonic power. (…) We were thinking that everything good and perfect comes from the United States. (…) After 9/11 as the war signs appeared at our borders, I understood that the United States had another face. That was a turning point for me. First, I chose to go to Germany for my graduate studies instead of the United States. There I realized (…) that we could have a better society with a just system of redistribution. (…) I realized that social democracy and economic equality could bring social happiness. (…) Germany got me closer the social democracy.

[36] She is referring to the location of the interview, Moda which is a secular neighborhood of İstanbul majorly supporting CHP.

As for the roots migrants, the transnational condition is present in the establishment of their political orientations from the beginning of the socialization process in early life. Unlike the other two immigrant groups, who experienced transnational subjectivities and changing positionalities (Anthias 2002, 2008, 2016) upon arrival to the host country, migrants in this group directly found themselves in a transnational milieu constructed around instances of struggle, cooperation, compromise, misunderstanding and shared meaning makings with reference to both countries. In this transnational context, political socialization to German politics has indirect consequences in the formation of political attitudes and political party preferences in Turkish politics. Similarly, political socialization to Turkish politics after migration to Turkey has implications for their attitudes regarding the German polity.

For some roots migrants, the minority experience and discriminatory practices faced while growing up in Germany paved the way for leftist and liberal thinking with respect to both German and Turkish politics.

> I would not vote for a conservative political party in Germany. (…) It would not be appropriate, considering all the things I had to live through (as an immigrant in Germany). Conservative parties have an assimilationist approach. The leftists do not. (…) I would not vote for the conservative parties in Turkey, either. If you ever live in a society that discriminates against you, and experience how the right-wing ideologies try to crash you, you simply cannot vote for the right. (Utku)

Buket and Nihan, who are in their twenties, moved to Turkey for their college education with concerns such as getting away from a monotonous life in Germany in restricting German-Turkish community and experiencing their roots. They have a very similar narrative in terms of the transnational effects of the minority experience in Germany on political socialization:

> Being born and growing up in Germany do not mean anything, neither does being a German citizen. Whether they accept me or not I am always a minority there. (…) Maybe this is why I have always been on the side of the minorities. I have always defended the minorities (and the oppressed). I defend that everybody should be able to think and live as they wish. When I talk like this they say, "you need a country like Cuba." (Buket)

> I have always tried to understand and empathize with other people. (...)This is also what my family taught me. I do not know any other way. Because I am a minority, I have always been interested in minority rights. I have always been on the side of the minorities. (Nihan)

Second- and third-generation return migrants also mention growing up with kids from other migrant groups much more frequently than growing up with Germans. In these cases, the minority or Muslim identity was a social binder for them. Growing up in multiethnic and multicultural environments may also evoke liberal attitudes in their interpretation of Turkish politics.

> In Germany I was mostly surrounded by Turkish or Muslim friends. (...) When I was younger, I was very curious about fasting in Ramadan and I tried it. I had friends next to me who were eating pork meat while I was fasting. It did not bother me; neither did it bother them. (...) But here they are fighting with each other for religious matters. I do not understand why they are so furious. Especially in Ramadan in Istanbul... Here live twenty million people. Kurds, Armenians, Arabs, Christians... Nobody should dare bother or say a word to a person drinking booze in Ramadan. (Buket)

In some cases, the experience of discrimination and the minority feeling may create a drift towards Turkish nationalism in Germany. This majorly happens in conservative families. Of 18 second- and third-generation return migrants, none of those with leftist or non-nationalist parents reports becoming Turkish nationalists and conservatives. For the children of conservative families, on the other hand, the minority experience serves to the fortification, justification and consolidation of the conservative and nationalist ideas.

Osman, a young man that came to Turkey for a college degree in aviation, speaks as follows:

> Since we had to undergo racism in Germany, we are profoundly passionate about Turkey. More than ever. This is what my experience in Germany contributed to me: I am very passionate about my homeland and my nation, and I plan my future accordingly. My experience in Germany made me take a dislike to her. We (migrants) do our best to serve Germany. We pay our taxes. However, they discriminate against us. After every racist incident my passion for my homeland increases ever more. Now I am at a point where I am questioning whether it is really a good thing to get Europeanized. (Osman)

For some of the roots migrants, "gurbet"[37] feeling in Germany also created patriotic values even in the absence of any discriminatory or racist experience. However, it is important to note that not everyone who reports patriotic feelings has conservative and nationalist orientations. Also, patriotic feelings for symbols such as Turkish flag, national anthem are reported regardless of family's political orientation.

> I remember that I cried when I heard the first call to prayer in Turkey after I returned. I was deeply touched. Or when I first heard our national anthem. I was so emotional. Still from time to time it affects me. I do not know why. (Demet)

For a number of roots migrants, transnational political socialization to the Kurdish issue is reminiscent of the labor migrants. Those with nationalist and conservative tendencies mostly refer to the success of economic growth in Germany thanks to her national union and solidarity, underlining that they manage this is despite being a federal state. They also note how well Germany manages the issue of foreigners, treating them with equal opportunity and social services. For them, the Kurdish question should be approached in a similar way.

> Everyone is right in their own worlds. It is not odd that the Kurds want to speak up. But, look, Germany is a federation and different people live there together. In Turkey, when the right time comes, Kurds, too, can live in a federal state. In Germany this system works well. Everyone expresses their opinion and fight for the economy of the country under the same flag. (…) Everyone should think about raising their life standards, about the economy, sending their kids to prestigious schools. Kurd or Turk, what is the difference? For me every citizen of Turkey is

[37] Homesickness

> Turkish. Everyone should speak Turkish and work for our future. Look, the Germans are united. If they could have done it, why can't we? (Yilmaz)

Socialization to Turkish politics after roots-migration and its indirect transnational consequences regarding Germany

In the case of the roots migrants, transnational dynamics of the political socialization trajectory continue to unfold after migration to Turkey. This time, political socialization in Turkey produces indirect consequences of change in political attitudes regarding the German polity. The transnational consequences of this process include four dimensions: they may change their political attitudes regarding the Germans, they may change their political values and beliefs regarding the German-Turkish community, they may reevaluate the political conditions they were living in when they were in Germany and reposition themselves regarding the German polity or they may adopt cosmopolitan and post-national values, which is undeniably connected with their transnational identities.

Many roots migrants realize that before moving to Turkey they only had an idea about the country based on their three weeks-long annual vacation experiences. They start to think that their perceptions on a number of core themes in Turkish politics were shaped by their imaginations and not by the reality of Turkey. Of course, these imaginations were not only formed during the yearly trips to Turkey but also through the direct and indirect transnational political socialization to Turkish politics in Germany.

After migrating to Turkey, their perception regarding the degree of nationalism and patriotism in Turkey, as well as their understanding of Islam may change. Some of the interviewees report disappointment regarding the conducts of the Turks in Turkey, as their religious fellows and compatriots. For a number of interviewees, like Nuray, this is

accompanied by a reevaluation of their ideas with respect to Germans and the German polity:

> In Muslim countries people do not respect, neither do they tolerate each other. Nobody has patience and tolerance. For example, in the traffic... I feel like everyone is like a spy with guns in their hands. It's all about interests. When I was in Germany, from afar, I used think that in a Muslim country like this people do not offend or hurt each other. Here I have realized that Germany is much more peaceful. I had Catholic and Orthodox friends that never hurt or offended anyone. So now I think there is something else behind this. This is different than the Islam I thought I knew. When there are many Muslims, there is a lot of conflict and a lot of fighting. (Nuray)

Those that returned to Turkey in the recent years are also surprised by the extremely polarized Turkish politics. For some of the roots migrants, realizing such levels of polarization causes changes in their political attitudes or ideological orientations:

> Especially after coming to Turkey, I realized that people want to classify you. They want to put you into a certain category as if you had to be part of a certain group. (…) You cannot say you do not belong to any of them. There is no middle ground. This played a role in my changing attitudes towards nationalism. (Ece)

Similar to Ece's changing attitude towards nationalism, in some cases, having to take sides and being labeled or classified incessantly may make them change their political opinions. Buket gets critical about both ends of the political spectrum in Turkey after observing her Turkish friends' attitudes. The shift in her opinions has a transnational character as her reference point is the subjectivities she experienced and her positionality in Germany.

> Unfortunately, there is this attitude now assuming that if someone has a headscarf it means they support AKP. But it is not true. (…) Some of my friends say they would not make friends with veiled women. I say whether she has headscarf or not does not matter. What matters is whether I could learn something from her as a friend. (…) On the other hand, for example they criticize the people who drink booze in Ramadan. I could grow up in peace in a city like Berlin as a Muslim and as a Turk. What are you talking about? (Buket)

Upon moving to Turkey, the second- and third - generation return migrants also have changing opinions regarding the politics and economy of the country as well as regarding

the success of the ruling AKP, which has been in power since 2002. Some of those who lived in pro-AKP communities in Germany state that they realize that neither AKP nor its achievements are like how they thought them to be. This recognition has transnational consequences as it causes a reevaluation of the German-Turks' political position and a critique of the external voting rights.

After moving to Turkey, some start to come to terms with the idea that the government's discourse of "a great and powerful Turkey that challenges and gives envy to Europe" is a crucial leverage or discursive tool for the Turkish population in Europe, especially in the context of patriotism and yearning for the mythical homeland. Others start to think that German-Turks that live in Germany are blindfolded to the problems of the country because they cling on to this idea too much.

> In Turkey, I observe AKP's policies in person. In Germany, everybody I know is supporting AKP. I kind of understand why. They grew up there with love for their homeland. You know the flag, the homeland etc. They easily adopt the image of Erdogan as a leader that brings the world to heel because they want to see a powerful leader in the homeland. I explain to them the problems I observe in Turkey but they do not want to see the mistakes of AKP. For example, AKP changed the minister of education five times. It is unacceptable. But they do not know these things. Even if they know, they do not care. Why would they care? The idea of a great and powerful Turkey is enough for them. (Fuat)

Others that are less critical of the Turkish government just argue that visiting Turkey only in summer makes it impossible to realize a number of problems.

> Here I follow the actions of the government more closely. The only thing I criticize is the education policy. I could not observe this if I were in Germany. I have a young cousin here. So, I observe her education-related problems in person. (Umut)

Acknowledging that Turkey and Turkish politics are not the way they seem from afar, some interviewees reposition themselves politically with respect to the German-Turks, who generally only come to Turkey for their yearly vacations and who have strong opinions on Turkish politics:

> They have no solid arguments for the topics in which they defend AKP. They do not see it in person; they do not know it. The only thing they would say is that we have a "great Turkey, powerful Turkey, great economy" (…) When I came here, especially when I started to work here, I became very conscious of the problems. Turks in Germany earn their salaries in Euros and come here to spend those Euros in their 6-week-long vacations. They feel like they are the king. I mean come on, 1 Euro is 4 Liras. All they say is AKP has constructed many roads and that the world envies us. They have blinders on their eyes. (Ece)

As an interesting consequence, interviewees who are critical of AKP also become very critical against external voting rights.

> This summer I had fierce arguments within the family. My father votes for AKP. I told him that if he loved his country that much, he should move back here. Why does not he come back? He does not risk it. He really does not have the balls. (…) On the day of the *coup d'état,* brothers of some of my friends went out to the squares in German cities to sing the call to the prayer. It is nonsense. They are not credible, at all. In Germany, they did not have military jets, F-16s flying over their heads. Nobody attacked them with water cannons. They are comfortable there. They go out and scream as much as they can, but then they come back home and sleep in their warm beds. This is not the way things work in Turkey. So, I am very critical of such people. They live there, but they vote for domestic politics here so that Erdogan would reign here. It does not affect their lives. (Buket)

On the other hand, those who support AKP are not critical of the external voting rights even though they acknowledge that living in Germany makes it impossible to realize the problems stemming from the government's policies. Their argument is that seeing things from afar provides the voters a clearer picture of the country's political condition. These two opposing opinions formed after moving to Turkey show the implications for different transnational positionalities on the political socialization process.

> When you are in it you do not see it that clearly. (…) People in Turkey do not realize how fast it is developing. Taking into consideration what the Germans say,

> I would say I see very positively how Turkey is improving. (…) This is why secret games are played on us. We are growing so fast that they are looking for ways to stop it. Germans openly tell us not to grow as much as them. (…) They fear us so they help our enemies and do propaganda against us. They see it from afar because some things are seen better from afar. (Osman)

As for the ideological orientations and political party preferences, second- and third-generation migrants that were socialized into social democratic and Kemalist values represented by CHP experience various transformations. Some get intentionally apoliticized due to the disappointment upon their discovery of how Turkish politics really is. Some become critical of the history of the Turkish Republic and various elements of Kemalism especially regarding ethnic and minority issues and/or they adopt cosmopolitan values, rejecting the idea of national borders and citizenship.

> My attitudes regarding nationalism have changed since I came here. I was raised with Ataturk's worldview. (…) In college in Turkey we had mandatory history classes. There. I learned about Turkish history starting from the last decade of the Ottoman Empire. There. I realized that until the foundation of the Republic there was chaos in Turkey and that until they founded the republic, they were exercising something like a single party regime. I am very opposed to the current government in Turkey, but I also think that in terms of their styles, the current period is very similar to the single party era. (Ece)

In the second group, some state that even though they are critical, they would still prefer CHP. Others experience change in their preferences with a shift towards HDP, which, at the time of the interviews, was symbolizing liberal leftist values for them.[38]

> My political preferences have changed after moving here. When I was in Germany I was supporting CHP. But when I came here, I processed their political position better. Now I do not support them. I do not support anyone. In the last elections, I voted for HDP. In Germany, I would vote for CHP but it is also related to living in Germany. There, most of the people I know were CHP supporters. (Ekin)

[38] Due to the extremely rapid shifts in balances of power and alliances, the non-Kurdish popular support for HDP has changed significantly after the interviews were conducted.

Among those who were socialized into nationalist and conservative values in Germany, represented by MHP and AKP, the majority do not change these orientations after moving to Turkey. They mostly report no change whatsoever in their political orientations. A smaller number intentionally get apolitical due to political disappointments they experience upon their arrival to Turkey. A similar number of the interviewees start to approach critically to these values, adopting liberal leftist and/or cosmopolitan ideologies and identifying themselves with HDP.

For a number of migrants, another axis of political socialization upon arrival to Turkey is a gradual adoption of a cosmopolitan or post-national worldview along with the construction of a citizen-of-the-world identity that rejects and protests the idea of borders, passports, nationalities and citizenships. Such a transformation is usually the case for the younger third-generation migrants that end up with liberal and left-leaning political ideologies and typically has a number of stages. Migrants in these group tend to leave Germany for Turkey with nostalgic and patriotic feelings along with an urge to search for their roots. Upon their arrival, the political experience they have in Turkey paves the way for the deconstruction of the myth of Turkey in their imagination. Expressed by the statement of surprise and disappointment, "I could not find what I was expecting", this face-off originates from the conflictual situations they experience with the Turks in Turkey and their on-site discoveries about the Turkish history and politics. As their positionalities change, migrants in this group come to terms with the idea that "they are not that much Turkish after all," that "they feel German in Turkey" or that "they need a German-Turkish country".

> I think I am a citizen of the world. I am both German and Turkish. I have never felt 100% German. I kind of know that I am Turkish. It is hard to tell. Neither of them. Somewhere in between. When I came to Turkey, the German aspects of my

> personality came up to the surface. I realized that I have a lot in common with the Germans and that it was an essential part of my character. I think I am both German and Turkish. (Ekin)

As the earlier quotes also suggest, the cosmopolitan or post-national values also emerge as a product of the transnational experience of living in different countries:

> Q: You know two different countries very well. Do you think this experience has contributed anything to your worldview?
> A: Yes. The following: I think nationalism is a very old-fashioned concept. I know how things work in the United States, as well. I've traveled there a lot recently. I think nationalism will collapse and disappear after a while. I know in Europe far right is on the rise. In the US, Trump won. But then again, knowing two different countries makes me see that there are good people everywhere. It made me realize that you cannot say "that guy is German therefore he is a bad guy." (…) Every human being has an innate goodness. It is the laws and politics that push them towards radical right. (Fuat)

Political socialization in Turkey to Turkish politics also have indirect consequences for the migrants' ideas and attitudes regarding the Germans and the German polity. As I address in the previous chapter in the section on 'empathy', a tendency to "start to understand the Germans arises especially with regards to the issue of the Syrian refugees in Turkey. Introspectively analyzing their own feelings about the Syrians, the interviewees report that they can *now* see "why the Germans treat like that to the German-Turks."

> My friends are mostly Arabs, but when I go out the density of the Arabs in Istanbul annoys me. It is not because these people are Arabs. It is like the Germans' getting annoyed by strangers. The Germans fear the strangers just because they are strangers. In Turkey, I started to empathize with them. I said, "so this is how the Germans feel…" When I go to Aksaray[39] I feel anxious. I do not like going there. I do not feel safe there. I mean, I think this means I am empathizing with the Germans. (Ece)

[39] A neighborhood in Istanbul

Conclusion

This chapter is built on a dialogue with the literature on migrant political socialization from a transnational perspective. Given migrants' cross-border ties, practices, identities and political engagements, I argue that studying political socialization from a methodological nationalist perspective is not adequate. I seek to inquire the ways in which holding on to one's already established political values and attitudes, changing them, or embracing new ones along the migration experience can be a transnational process.

Inspired by Østergaard-Nielsen (2001)'s differentiation between direct and indirect transnational political practices, I argue that it is possible to talk about direct and indirect forms of migrant political socialization in terms of the transnationality of its consequences. Direct transnational political socialization refers to socialization to Turkish politics or politics of other sending countries during the migration experience in Germany. It usually takes place through migrants' contact with Turkey-oriented organized migrant politics, their random and sporadic encounters in the German-Turkish community, as well as their interactions with other migrant communities. Indirect political socialization stands for political socialization to the German polity in Germany with indirect effects of attitude formation or attitude change regarding Turkish politics. Especially for the roots migrants, indirect political socialization continues in a reverse fashion after migrating to Turkey, whereby socialization to Turkish politics in Turkey creates indirect effects of political socialization to German politics.

Class, social and cultural capital, generational differences, as well as home and host country political contexts corresponding to the time of migration appear as relevant factors that influence socialization processes. For example, indirect mechanisms are more

common for the student migrants and the roots migrants, while labor migrant returnees give fewer examples of it, which, arguably could be explained by the fact that the latter group is more immersed to the 'inward looking traditional Turkish migrant communities' in Germany (King and Kilinc 2014) when compared to the former two groups. Similarly, student migrants' direct political socialization to Turkish politics through migrants' organizations in Germany is more limited than the other two groups due to their social distance from the German-Turks. The labor migrants' accounts give rich examples of this mechanism mainly because the decades, when they migrated to Germany, witnessed a polarized political atmosphere in Turkey, along with the presence of a strong organized left and right. Overall, the findings underline the relevance of the critique of both methodological nationalism in political socialization studies and ethnicization of migrants in migration studies.

CHAPTER 6: Conclusion

This thesis seeks to unpack the migrant political socialization processes with an in-depth case study of Turkish returnees from Germany. It is based on four main arguments addressed to the common assumptions in the political socialization literature: 1) the political socialization is itself a political process, 2) migrant agency in the process of political socialization is understudied, 3) transnational dynamics of migrant political socialization are overlooked, 4) the processual dimension of political socialization is not paid much attention. In the light of these arguments, I examine the role of the migrant agency in the migrants' contact and interaction with agents of political socialization; identify an alternative model of migrant political socialization process; and reveal the transnational socialization trajectories of the return migrants in three empirical chapters.

Applying the relational approach and the grounded theory methodology to the analysis of the biographical interviews, this study offers a qualitative take on migrant political socialization in a field predominantly shaped by quantitative studies, which run the risk of missing the inner dynamics of the process. Although not representative of all Turkish migrants, who returned or who stayed behind, the research design allows capturing a wide array of complexities of the political socialization experience with its focus on three different return migrant groups in a time span of almost six decades that expand from pre-migration to post-return.

The in-depth interviews reveal the migrants' own narratives on their everyday experiences in the process, in contrast to the survey research that intends to measure pre- and post-process dynamics or compare returnees with non-migrants with a number of formal variables. The following sections summarize the core arguments in dialogue with the existing political socialization literature, the main research questions and findings in

each chapter. Subsequently, I reflect on the limitations of the study and suggest ways of expanding it in future research.

Four tendencies in migrant political socialization literature: a recap

The backbone of this thesis is a dialogue with the existing political socialization studies built on four main axes. The research design, methodological choices, generation of the research questions and organization of the chapters are done in line with the four main arguments about the political nature of political socialization, the role of the migrant agency in it, its transnational dynamics, and its processual character. According to the functionalist understanding of the concept (Easton, Dennis, and Easton 1969), political socialization of the individuals to the political values of a system caters to system maintenance by the reproduction of a diffuse system support, which is a generalized belief in the legitimacy of the regime and political consent. Critical scholars draw attention to the fact that such functionalist assumptions fail to explain heterogeneities, *dissensus* and change in political systems, and overlook the fact that political socialization itself is a political process shaped by power relations (Conover 1991). This point is particularly crucial for migrant political socialization studies because migrants move to a host country as outsiders of its political system, to which they need to learn to "fit in" (Conover 1991). In the words of Garcia-Castañon (2013, 54) "immigrants are tasked with integrating into the larger society, to 'fit in' (…) in order to gain both societal and legal membership (…), or risk alienation, subjugation, or deportation."

The second and related argument addresses the literature's overlooking the role of the migrant agency in political socialization processes, as implied by the ideas of democratic diffusion and spillover effects (Barsbai et al. 2017; Chauvet and Mercier 2014; Mahmoud et al. 2014; Perez-Armendariz and Crow 2010; Pfutze 2012), which I critically examine

in Chapter 3. These concepts postulate that democracy is diffused from country to country like a voluntary and unintended communication of an attractive innovation (Lauth and Pickel 2008 cited in Rother 2009, 251). They consider the migration experience as an inherently positive one and regard migrants as passive receivers of the political values of the host country. Such assumptions hide the power inequalities in the unfolding of the political socialization processes, and overlook the possibility that political system of the destination may matter less than the migrants' individual experiences on liberties and restrictions in that system (Rother 2009).

The political nature of political socialization of the migrants, the role of the migrant agency in it and the power inequalities that shape it come forward clearly in Chapter 3, where I study the migrants' relations with German agents of political socialization with a specific focus on their agency, and especially in Chapter 4, where I identify the alternative process of negative political socialization. Chapter 3 shows that in many cases, sometimes for reasons beyond their control (such as the systemic inequalities between themselves and the natives), the returnees do not even have sufficient contact and interaction with German political socializers to be subject to conventionally assumed processes of political socialization. Moreover, when there is a possibility of contact and interaction, they often use their agency to strategically filter, ignore and play around these socializers based on their needs and concerns, which are also shaped by the power inequalities in the German society. A blatant example of the structural constraints is a second-generation migrant's account of how he did not realize the discriminatory practices against the Turks until he started to work in another town, because in his own town and school almost everybody was an immigrant. One of the most striking examples of strategic engagement is again a second-generation migrant's avoiding informing herself about politics because she was afraid of getting politicized, which, she thought, would put her in danger as an

immigrant.

Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 follow the lead of the findings in Chapter 3, which suggest that the political socialization process may involve active migrant agency and does not necessarily unfold as a process of passive absorption of host country political values. In Chapter 4, where I unpack the process of political socialization and reveal alternative socialization trajectories with the help of the grounded theory methodology, the power inequalities shaping the socialization processes crystallize even more, as the narratives of the returnees point at a process of negative socialization. In contrast to the process of conventional political socialization, in which the migrants uncritically embrace the political values of the host country and learn to "fit in" to become an insider, in negative political socialization, they learn and embrace their place as the outsiders of the polity and contribute to the diffuse system support mechanisms from this outsider's position. Discriminatory practices they face along their migration experience constitute one of the core mechanisms of this process, along with empathy for the discriminated groups, and critical interpretations of German rationality.

The third main axis of this thesis addresses methodological nationalism in political socialization studies. It arises from the observation that commonly used terminology such as resocialization and desocialization after migration assume a sequential order of political learning and unlearning contained within the national boundaries of the host and home countries. This argument constitutes the starting point of Chapter 5. The central question that inspires this chapter is "given that the migrants have transnational networks, practices and identities, why can their political socialization process not be transnational?"

Despite the rich literature on migrant transnationalism, the main theories of migrant political socialization interestingly treat home country experiences as a matter of the past, sidestepping the possibility of the migrants' simultaneous involvement in the political contexts of both home and host countries through their cross-border ties, practices and identities. For example, the theory of transferability in political socialization studies raises the claim that "immigrants are able to draw on past experience and transfer the lessons learned from their old environment, applying them to the new host environment" (White et al 2008). The theory of exposure focuses on the duration of exposure to the host country political environment, arguing that more exposure means more adoption (White et al. 2008). As their wording implies, these theories assume that migrants' cross-border political engagements that take place concurrently on the transnational political field of the host and home countries are not taken into account in the main approaches to migrant political socialization. As a reaction, Chapter 5 asks to what extent and in what ways the process of political socialization, which, as discussed in Chapter 3, may involve migrant agency, can be a transnational process, if the migrants themselves are transnational.

The empirical analysis reveals various transnational socialization trajectories, which I mainly categorize as "direct vs. indirect" based on the transnationality of their consequences. These transnational patterns include indirect socialization to Turkish politics through the immigration experience in Germany, direct socialization to Turkish politics in the German-Turkish community and through the Turkish migrants' Turkey-oriented organized politics in Germany, direct socialization to the politics of third countries through contact with migrants from these countries, and socialization to Turkish politics after roots migration with transnational consequences for Germany.

As emphasized in the introduction chapter, the three critical points addressing the common tendencies in the political socialization literature, are, in a way, corollaries of the fourth point, which underlines that political socialization studies tend to overlook the processual dimension of the concept. To repeat, although the definition of the term strictly involves the idea of *process*, the literature is full of statistical analyses of variables such as political trust and political participation levels comparing them between non-migrants and returnees, or in the pre- and post- migration contexts. This approach causes the process to remain as a black box and makes the research insensitive to the questions such as the agency of the individuals, the political nature of the process i.e. whose system is being maintained or reproduced by political socialization and the power inequalities within the process, as well as the transnational pathways in it.

This final axis is a determinant of my methodological choices for this thesis. As a qualitative case study, the thesis relies on three methodologies that explicitly focus on the study of processes: the relational ethnographical approach, the grounded theory methodology and biographical interviewing. The relational approach, which I use as a theoretical framework in defining my strategies of how I interpret the interviews, openly criticizes the statistical methodologies with the argument that substantialist studies run the risk of process-reduction, artificially severing ties between people, places, organizations, or ideas to study these entities in relative isolation (Desmond 2014). As an alternative, it proposes studying fields rather than places, boundaries rather than bounded groups, *processes rather than processed people* and cultural conflict rather than group culture (Desmond 2014, 562). This approach provides a solid framework for the analysis of the interviews in Chapter 3, where I use a temporal-relational conceptualization of

migrant agency and in Chapter 5, where I concentrate on the unfolding of migrant political socialization on the transnational political field.

In Chapter 4, where I attempt to decipher an alternative mechanism of political socialization, I apply the grounded theory methodology, which aims to identify and map social processes (Strauss and Corbin 1998). In this chapter, rather than trying to assess the relationship between a number of pre-existing concepts and/or variables, I set off with a simple question such as "What is happening here?" (Glaser 1978), or "What are the basic social processes?". In the search for an alternative socialization process, my aim is to discover relevant categories and the relationship among them and relate these categories to each other in new rather than standard ways (Strauss and Corbin 1998, 49). In this respect, Strauss and Corbin (1998)'s version of grounded theory approach, which concentrates on process and change, works well with my analytical objectives in this chapter. The social constructivist approach of Charmaz (2006) is helpful for considering issues of reflexivity and the researcher's position in the research.

Diversity of political socialization experiences across the three migrant groups

The project's focus on three different groups reveals the heterogeneities of socialization experiences among Turkish returnees. In a comparative perspective across these groups, effects of factors such as class, social and cultural capital, generational differences, as well as the political contexts of Turkey and Germany that correspond to the time of migration arise throughout the analysis in each empirical chapter. Chapter 3 shows that especially in the case of labor and student migrant returnees, contact with the Germans took place in the form of sporadic observations, which have a much more notable effect of political socialization for the labor migrants compared to the other groups. While the

labor migrants tended to maintain relations with the other Turkish migrants, the students mostly established organic ties with other Turkish and international student migrants. As for the roots migrants, they built closer relations with other German-Turks or other migrants rather than with the Germans, which opened alternative transnational political fields for their political socialization beyond an exclusively German-Turkish one.

The socializing effects of the German political news media are influenced by the migrants' citizenship status and language skills especially in the case of the early labor migrants, who arrive in Germany in the 1960s and 1970s. Late comers, who settled down in Germany after the 1980s, showed interest in news on politics parallel to their relations with the German friends, colleagues and community. Especially the women in this group, who did not enter the labor force in Germany and did not acquire German language skills, were disinterested in politics and political news during their migration experience in Germany. The few roots migrants who showed interest in German political news media mostly followed the news about migrants and minorities in Germany in particular. Interestingly, at times this strategic choice stemmed from the need of questioning the approach of the German media to the migrants and minorities and the need of self-defense in the face of Germans' critiques against the migrants or minorities. Like the roots migrants, students, too, were mostly selective and used their agency to filter the German political news. In their case, due to the ambiguities of their temporary migration status, which did not guarantee any lengthened stay in the country, they strategically got engaged with specific topics such as migration regulations and requirements.

As for the socialization effects of political parties and electoral campaigns, with a practical evaluative approach, the roots and labor migrants tend to identify themselves with German political parties on the basis of these parties' pro-migrant policies or their

Turkish candidates. Despite voting for SPD and the Greens, the returnees report that they do not know much about the political agendas of these parties apart from the fact that they are pro-migrants. The student migrants tend not to report any political party identifications, but they generally know the German political parties by name, and the cues they make about them are often about their discourses on migration and minorities, as well as the corruption cases. Furthermore, as an example of conventional political socialization, a number of student migrants report that political messages of the Greens awoke environmentalist concerns for them.

Chapter 4 shows that the labor migrants constitute the group that went through the most striking instances of conventional political socialization, which are crystallized in their accounts on how they discover *humanity* and *civicness* in Germany. For the student migrants and the roots migrants, the common themes of conventional socialization were a number of social norms such as discipline, orderliness, productivity, punctuality and environmentalism. Similar to conventional political socialization, the labor migrants also experienced the process of negative political socialization differently than the roots and the student migrants. The latter two witnessed, experienced and critically accepted the exclusionary and discriminatory practices and discourses in the German society, which taught them their places as its others and outsiders. Further, for these returnees, the experience of discrimination led to empathy with the excluded and discriminated groups in general, as well as to a conviction that it was impossible for the German to empathize with them. As to the labor migrants, although they were exposed to the sporadic or systematic discriminatory practices, they were not sensitive to them like the other two groups. Moreover, rather than empathizing with the discriminated groups, they were often in favor of the discriminatory behaviors and stated empathy with the Germans.

Arguably, these differences stem from the fact that the labor migrants, who went to Germany as blue-collar guest workers with the idea of returning home as soon as possible, took for granted the outsider's position in Germany from the very beginning of the migration experience. The negative political socialization process affirms this already held belief, rather than making them discover it. Notwithstanding, the roots and the student migrants had a very different (and more ambiguous) position in the German society. The roots migrants were in an ambiguous insider's status as they were born and/or raised there and had citizenship. With their higher cultural and social capital, the student migrants had direct access to the insider's context, in which they were equals with the insiders, without being one.

Lastly, Chapter 5 shows that indirect transnational mechanisms of political socialization are more common for the student migrants and the roots migrants. In case of the roots migrants, this indirect transnational mechanism works in the reverse fashion after migration to Turkey, as political socialization to Turkish politics produces indirect consequences of attitude changes regarding certain elements of the German polity. As for the labor migrants, due to their relatively isolated lives in the conservative Turkish community in Germany, the labor migrant returnees give fewer examples of socialization to German politics with indirect consequences for Turkish politics.

Moreover, the student migrants' direct political socialization to Turkish politics via Turkey-oriented migrant organizations was relatively limited in comparison to the other two groups mainly because of the social distance between the German-Turks and the student migrants, which made them hold back from getting in touch with migrants' associations. As the decades in which the labor migrants went to Germany witnessed a highly polarized political atmosphere in Turkey and the rise of a transnationally organized

strong left, their accounts are rich in examples of this mechanism. In the case of the roots migrants, the locus of this form of political socialization also changes depending on the interviewee's age or his or her year of migration to Germany. For instance, while the older second-generation report examples of socialization to the Kurdish issue or revolutionary ideas through Turkey-oriented political organizations in Germany; the younger second- and third-generation refer to the mosque associations funded by the Turkish state or other religious associations that work across the borders of two countries.

Future Research

In broad terms, this study aims to reveal the processual dimension of migrant political socialization. The relational approach and the grounded theory methodology, which this thesis heavily relies on, are two of the many ways of analyzing social processes. Future research can concentrate on the processual dimension of political socialization by applying other process-oriented methodologies. One handicap is that although participant observation would be a good fit for such an endeavor, longitudinal research that involves direct observations of political socialization is arguably difficult to carry out mainly due to time concerns (Greenstein 1970).

Second, as I discuss several times earlier, although the political socialization literature is rich in statistical studies generating systematic and generalizable findings, it is arguably limited in terms of qualitative case studies, which have advantages in unpacking complex social phenomena and identifying unexpected interaction effects (Bennet 2006). Indeed, focusing on the case of Turkish returnees from Germany, this thesis seek to reveal a number of dynamics that could challenge some of the common assumptions in migrant political socialization theories. Likewise, the literature could benefit further particularly from heuristic case studies, which identify new or unexpected paths by studying marginal

or outlier cases, as well as from theory-testing case studies, which assess the validity and scope conditions of competing theories (George and Bennet 2005, 75-76).

Third, as discussed before, several migration scholars underline that migration studies lack a focus on subgroups within one ethnic group and do not examine within-group differences in depth (Glick-Schiller 2012, Shkopi and Vathi 2017). Therefore, in-depth analyses of other migrant groups and subgroups in other political contexts could make a valuable contribution to the literature. Taking this one step further, cross-case and cross-group comparisons could also be designed to look for patterns of political socialization for each migrant subgroup across different cases.

Furthermore, in Chapter 3, where I examine the role of agency in the migrants' interaction with German agents of political socialization, and in Chapter 5, where I focus on its transnational dynamics, international migrant communities or international student migrant circles come forward as relevant agents of political socialization. I shortly cover these 'third party transnational dynamics' but do not offer a detailed analysis of the phenomenon due to data limitations. Studies dealing with transnational dimensions of political socialization could specifically focus on these contexts as they reveal alternative transnational dynamics beyond the 'home country-host country' dichotomy. This 'third party' dimension could be increasingly relevant for transnational political socialization studies given that new migration patterns in *superdiverse* cities not only bring in more countries of origin but they also produce "new patterns of inequality and prejudice including emergent forms of racism, new patterns of segregation, new experiences of space and 'contact', new forms of cosmopolitanism and creolization, and more." (Vertovec 2019, 126)

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Appendix: Short biographical notes on the quoted interviewees

Worker migrants

Adnan: Adnan tried to enter the guest-worker list three times in different cities within four years, but it didn't work. Eventually in 1968 they recruited him as a factory worker. He remembers the year he went there the song "Germany, give me back my brother" was very popular in Turkey. Adnan sent the majority of his salary to his family in Turkey. When he wanted to invite his wife to Germany with family unification, they couldn't find a decent place to live and had a hard time trying to settle down for a long time. They worked in different factories at tough jobs that, in his opinion, the Germans would never want. However, sending money to Turkey and making their living as a family of five wasn't easy. Later on, Adnan started to suffer from occupational diseases and needed an operation. Eventually he had to get retired due to disability. Financial reasons pushed the family to return to Turkey in 2000. Adnan's pension wasn't enough for a decent life in Germany but it would let them live a comfortably in Turkey. During his life in Germany, he was surrounded by the German-Turkish community but he never trusted them because he finds them too self-seeking. He is a Turkish citizen. He says he would surely vote for SPD if he could. In Turkey he identifies with CHP. I interviewed him in April 2015.

Ahmet: Ahmet migrated to Germany in 1970 as a student worker. He went to vocational school there and then started to work as a miner. A religious young man from the country side, Ahmet gradually got influenced by the rising leftist tides of the era and started to read on Marxism in Germany. He joined a Turkey-oriented socialist organization in 1974, in which he took part until he returned to Turkey in 1997. His ties and engagement with the German political actors gradually got weaker. He is a German citizen but never voted in Germany because he says he couldn't find a decent party to vote for. I interviewed him in April 2015.

Akif: Son of a rich landowner in rural Turkey, Akif wanted to get away from his father's authority and migrated to Germany in 1973, when he was 21. After the military service, he worked as a miner a couple of months in order to be able to enter the list of the guest-workers that would be recruited from there by the Germans. After working as a miner for 4 years he found a job at a paper factory. In his first three years in Germany he socialized with the Germans, but once he got married, he thought it is more appropriate to make friends with other Turkish couples. Akif returned to Turkey in 2000 after getting retired due to occupational illness. His disease got better a couple of weeks after returning, which he explains by the healing power of being in his homeland. Later his children and wife joined him and the family cut all their connections with Germany. Akif is a CHP member. He is a German citizen but he never voted in the German elections. He says he would vote for a leftist party in Germany if he had to. I interviewed him in April 2015.

Ali: Ali migrated to Germany in 1973, when he was 35 years old. He lived there for 25 years, during which he worked at a Siemens factory. Later on, he also opened a restaurant. Ali is very content about the way in which the Germans welcomed them and treated the Turkish workers. At every opportunity during the interview, he expresses gratitude for the German people and politicians. He never became a German citizen. After retiring, he came to Turkey and constructed a residential building. All his family members are still in Germany but, although unwilling, Ali has to live in Turkey to take care of the building. I interviewed him in April 2015.

Aysegul: Aysegul migrated to Germany with family unification after getting married to German-Turkish husband in 2002. At 24 years old, Aysegul's plan was to learn German and work but adjusting to Germany was much harder than she expected. She got depressed with a dominating feeling that she was doing everything wrong, and she started to live an isolated life. Aysegul spent all her time with the family of her husband and felt very lonely. She went to a language school but had a very hard time learning German. Aysegul lived in Germany for 12 years then, after saving the money they aimed for, they returned to Turkey with her husband and daughter. Schooling of their daughter was the most important factor in their return. Ayse was never interested in politics but she says living in Germany made her more nationalist. I interviewed her in January 2017.

Erdinc: Erdinc had to drop out of college due to political reasons in 1985. He migrated to Germany with family unification in 1989, when he got married with his wife. As the couple, who were also cousins, couldn't find housing, they lived with their extended family for a long time. Erdinc started working illegally at a restaurant then he quickly learnt German and managed to get a permanent residence permit. He never became a German citizen. Erdinc worked in several factories and was active in the labor union. He remembers he was very disappointed by the backward mentality of the Turks in Germany, who only thought accumulating money. Before going there, he thought they would have already adapted to the modern Western lifestyle. The monotonous life in Germany, which he thinks is marketed under an image of "fake freedom", and the desire of the family to send their children to school in Turkey led them to return in 1998. Erdinc identifies himself with DKP in Germany and the socialist left in Turkey. I interviewed him in April 2015.

Fikri: Fikri was working as a mechanic at the public bus repair-shop. Amazed by the buses imported from Germany, Fikri started to get intrigued by the idea of migrating there to see how the German technology had advanced so rapidly after the war. He managed to get recruited as a factory worker with the help of an acquaintance in 1962, when he was 24 years old. His original plan was to travel around and discover Europe but he quickly realized that he had to work in order to survive. He never worked at "tough and dirty jobs" like typical guest-workers would do. In 1972, Fikri became member of a Turkey-based socialist organization, in which he stayed active for many years. In this period, he had close relations with the Communist Party of Germany. Fikri married a German woman in 1968. They had two kids together and got a divorce later on. He returned to Turkey in 1992, when Turkish politics began to normalize after the 1980 coup d'etat. I interviewed him in September 2014**.**

Firuze: Firuze went to Germany in 1970, when she was 20 years old, to join her husband who had been there for a year. She started working right away at a gun factory. She got retired due to a? disability in 1991 after getting seriously injured at work. She speaks very happily about her life in Germany, which she summarizes as working like a soldier. She lived in a closed German-Turkish community but she also acknowledges that the Germans treated them very well. Firuze has dual nationality and she voted for the Greens. In Turkey, she identifies with CHP. I interviewed her in April 2015.

Guzin: Guzin was a teacher in Turkey. After getting a divorce at the age of 28, she decided to go to Germany in 1973, leaving her child behind. She started to live with her

sister, who had been there already for 5 years. The two sisters worked in hotels as cleaners and also in factories. Later her daughter joined them. She remembers finding it very disappointing to work as a cleaner, after leaving her decent teaching job in Turkey. Guzin was always surrounded by the German-Turkish community but she also did her best to get integrated to the Western lifestyle. She didn't learn German more than she needed to manage daily routine conversations. She returned to Turkey in 1993, after marrying a man from Turkey and getting retired. Guzin is a Turkish citizen. She says she is not interested in politics. I interviewed her in April 2015.

Humeyra: Humeyra went to Germany in 1974 with family unification to join his husband with their baby. The family was the only Turkish family in the neighborhood. As she didn't know German, Humeyra had a very isolated life in her first year, when she was almost only communicating with her husband. Then the family moved to another neighborhood where she met the other Turkish guest workers. Humeyra could learn German only after she raised the kids. She opened a grocery store, which also obliged her to have a better command of the language. She says she could never get closer to the Germans and she had better relations with other migrants because they had much more in common and with them she wasn't afraid of making grammar or comprehension mistakes. Humeyra is a Turkish citizen and she says she has never been interested in politics. She returned to Turkey with her husband upon getting retired. I interviewed her in January 2017.

Irfan: Irfan migrated to France in 1970, when he was 28 years old. After staying there two years, he moved to Germany to join his brother. Irfan started to work as soon as he got there. He remembers at that time the Germans appreciated the guest-workers a lot and treated them in a very friendly manner. Irfan lived all his life in Germany in a Turkish community, without having ties with the Germans. He didn't learn German and he didn't become a German citizen. He also never showed interest in German politics. When his wife passed away, Irfan felt very lonely and decided to get married again. After 40 years, he returned to Turkey after getting married, as he was already retired. His children and grandchildren are still in Germany. I interviewed him in April 2015.

Memduh: Memduh went to Germany in 1972 when he was 22 years old. His wife joined him in 1974 with their 3-month-old baby. Although he had the intention to return in two years, the couple lived there until 2010, when Memduh got retired from his factory job. Memduh remembers living in an international community of guest workers initially, as in his city there wasn't a German-Turkish community in the beginning. He never experienced any discriminatory behavior, nor did he have any unpleasant experiences with the Germans. He never became a German citizen. He identifies with CHP in Turkey and the social democrats in Germany. I interviewed him in January 2017.

Mustafa: Mustafa went to Germany from a South Eastern Anatolian village in 1979 when he was around 20 years old. A lawyer helped him with the migration procedure, in which he was presented as a political refugee to German authorities. He says at that time he didn't know what a political refugee meant and wasn't aware of the procedure. He just followed the instructions of the lawyer, who he never actually met. Mustafa settled down in Berlin, where he shared a flat with Turks from his village. He worked in leather and glass factories doing jobs that "Germans didn't want to do". After the initial settlement phase, he avoided getting close with the Turks as he didn't trust them. He says he had

many German friends. He returned to Turkey six years later. I interviewed him in April 2015.

Perihan: Following the financial problems that arose after her husband's death, Perihan migrated to Germany in 1969 to join her elder sister. She first worked at a textile factory in Frankfurt and then became a crane operator. Her three daughters came to live with her intermittently. She says she chose to keep her life in Germany contained to work and home to protect herself and her daughters. She retired early due to an occupational injury and returned to Turkey in 1982. I interviewed her in April 2015.

Ramazan: Ramazan went to Germany in 1969 and worked there as a welder, who worked in different factories for 28 years. Later he opened his own repair workshop that he ran for 10 years. He returned to Turkey in 2007 with his wife, while his children stayed there. Ramazan was active in a mosque association during his time in Germany. He is a Turkish citizen. He says he would vote for the CDU if he could. In Turkey he identifies with MHP. I interviewed him in April 2015.

Semih: Semih migrated to Germany in 1990 at 28 years old when he married a German-Turkish woman, who was born and raised there. He quickly got bored at this new country the language and laws of which he was unfamiliar with. He decided to go to language classes to learn German and make new friends. He wanted to find a job as soon as possible because the idea of staying at home while his wife was working made him feel inferior. Soon he had a big friends circle, mainly consisting of Turks. When he started to work at a factory, he came across with the discriminatory attitudes of the Germans at the work place. He says by now the Germans have got used to the Turks and couldn't do without the Turkish culture. Semih opened a business in Germany, where he hired Germans, a story he is very proud. He is a German citizen. He voted for the SPD and the Greens in the German elections. He identifies himself with the social democrats in Turkey. Semih returned to Turkey after getting retired because he says he likes the lifestyle there. I interviewed him in January 2017.

Zehra: Zehra migrated to Germany by marriage in 2001, when she was 21 years old. She could not learn German and did not work despite having a university degree in Turkey. She spent most of her time at home and with her husband's family. She had her first child in Germany, which also limited her working options. After the birth of their daughter Zehra and her second-generation husband returned to Turkey in 2005. I interviewed her in January 2017.

Student Migrants

Begum: Begum went to a high-school that offered Austrian education, which made her already familiar with the German culture and language. She went to Germany for an MA degree in English Language and Literature. Begum lived in Germany for 4 years during which she was in an international student community. Begum wasn't interested in German politics during her stay there. Towards end of her time in Germany, Begum started to get active in the feminist movement, especially in Turkey-oriented topics. She returned to Turkey in 2014 as she couldn't find a job to make her living after finishing her MA. She identifies herself with HDP in Turkey. Begum returned to Germany in 2017. I interviewed her in September 2016.

Burak: Burak went to Germany in 2002 after finishing his undergraduate degree in order to pursue his master's in mechatronics. He finished his MA in three years, found an internship opportunity and then started a PhD program in the same field. Until the last years of his PhD, Burak lived in an international student community, mostly with Turkish students. He started to establish friendship ties with the Germans only when he started to work as an instructor and became their colleagues. He always had the idea to return to Turkey so he never showed a deep interest in German politics. He sympathizes with the Green in Germany. His experience there created a change in his political preferences in Turkey as he switched from CHP to HDP. Burak returned to Turkey in 2010. Realizing that he wouldn't be offered the financial compensation and professional opportunities he deserves played a key role in his decision to return. After returning he opened his own high-tech business. I interviewed him in September 2015.

Cigdem: Cigdem went to Germany in 2010 to study an M.Sc degree in telecommunications engineering. She returned to Turkey in 2013 after finishing her studies and her internship. Although she had the chance to continue living there, she wanted to leave as she didn't like the lifestyle. Cigdem was in an international student community as both her program and her dorm were full of students from other countries like herself. She says these students don't get mixed up and establish ties with the Germans. Cigdem is politically active in Turkey at a socialist organization. She also followed German politics closely when she was there. I interviewed her in September 2014. At a follow up interview, I found out that she moved to Norway for a PhD degree.

Dilay: A chemistry graduate, Dilay studied in Germany between 2007 and 2011. After her undergraduate studies in Turkey, she decided to pursue a Master's in this country mainly because in a previous internship there she realized the high quality of education it offered to students and interns. First, she went to Berlin for a Master's degree in Chemistry but the lack of orientation programs for international students and the poor social ties made her feel isolated there. Consequently, she withdrew from the program and started a new degree in Heidelberg, where she finally felt settled. She initially wanted to continue with a PhD in Germany but upon getting accepted to an MBA program in Istanbul she chose to return. I interviewed her in April 2016.

Emre: Emre went to Germany in 1997, when he was 22 years old to study Film and Television and also to live with his German-Turkish girlfriend. Her girlfriend provided him professional connections and also helped him find a school. The couple got married later and Emre opened various businesses including a TV network and a bar. Emre returned to Turkey in 2005 after his marriage collapsed. He says he never felt like he belonged there and he was bored. Emre identifies himself with far left in Turkey and the Greens in Germany. I interviewed him in September 2014.

Erhan: Erhan went to Germany after finishing his undergraduate degree in engineering in 2000 for an M.Sc and a PhD degree. He was in an international student environment for the majority of his life there. Only after his fourth year, he started feel accepted in German friend circles. He was interested in German politics especially regarding topics on migration and integration. He had sympathy for the Greens and the SPD. He says he went there and returned as a social democrat and his opinions about the Kurdish issue might have changed a bit. Erhan returned to Turkey in 2007 as he always wanted to work as an academic in his alma mater. So, he never really tried to take roots in Germany. I interviewed him in September 2015.

Handan: Handan graduated from Political Science and International Relations in 2009 and went to Berlin for an MA program in German-Turkish Studies. She says the city and the quality of the university were factors that attracted her. Also, she had been in Germany before for an Erasmus program, so she wasn't completely unfamiliar with the country. However, she says, in Erasmus she almost never had "real contact" with the Germans because she spent all her time with other Erasmus students. In Berlin, she shared a flat with Germans by coincidence, which gave her a chance to get to know the Germans more. With the help of her flat mates she got a bartending job at a bar. She also had a German boyfriend. After finishing her Master's, she returned to Turkey to work with refugees. I interviewed her in May 2016.

Huseyin: Huseyin who has his roots in Lebanon, was born and raised in a south-eastern city of Turkey. He identifies himself as Turkish with Arabic roots. After finishing an undergraduate degree in engineering at a public university in Turkey in 2001, he went to Germany to study an M.Sc and a PhD degree. He married to his girlfriend from Turkey when he was there. He thinks living as a couple in Germany made the two more closed in when compared to single student migrants, in the case of which he would have more interesting experiences. Huseyin played a role in the foundation of a Turkish Academics Association in his locality. He was interested both in German and Turkish politics. His experience in Germany made him identify with social democracy in both countries. The couple returned to Turkey with their daughter in 2013 due to Huseyin's disappointment about the career opportunities he had in Germany. I interviewed him in September 2015.

Mert: Born in a provincial Kurdish city, Mert is a professor at a private university in Turkey. He went to Germany in 2004 with this wife, for a post-doc degree in materials science. His workplace offered him a very international environment. The couple wasn't in touch with the Germans apart from Mert's workplace. Due to the international scientific habitat he was in, Mert didn't try to learn German; neither did he feel the need to make an effort to adapt to the country. He says, he only focused on proving his academic competence. The couple returned to Turkey in 2007, when Mert finished his post-doc. He says his experience in Germany made him more nationalist and less radical in terms of leftist ideologies. He had sympathy for SPD and the Greens in Germany and votes for CHP in Turkey. I interviewed him in March 2016.

Nukhet: After finishing her undergraduate degree in Translation Studies, Nukhet started to work at a company. A few years later, she started to question herself about whether she was doing what she really wanted and look for career alternatives. Getting accepted to an MA program in Berlin in 2009, Nukhet decided to move to Germany without a plan but with a lot of enthusiasm and curiosity, as it was her first time abroad. Initially, she was surrounded by an international student community but gradually she limited her close friends circle to student Turks like herself. Nukhet says she always felt prejudice and discrimination during her year in Germany, including at school. After finishing her MA degree Nukhet returned to Turkey in 2011 because she was tired of feeling like a second-class citizen. Nukhet is a Turkish citizen. She was never interested in German politics. Her experience in Germany changed her political preferences in Turkey. An old CHP supporter, Nukhet started to identify with HDP. I interviewed her in April 2014.

Pelin: Pelin graduated from Political Science and International Relations from a public university in Istanbul in 2008 and did an MA in cultural studies in the same city. She went

to Germany in 2013 for a PhD degree in cultural studies. The scholarship options and research opportunities in Germany were important in her decision. She didn't know German and she remembers speaking English was not enough to socialize in her daily life. She could meet the local students from her program only at special gatherings, as PhD work was mostly solitary and the Germans were not very interested in making friends with the international students. Her overall feeling during her PhD years was about living at the peripheries of German every day life. Pelin returned to Turkey and settled down in Istnabul after finishing her PhD, as she married a Turkish man. I interviewed her in May 2016.

Serdar: Serdar obtained an undergraduate degree in archeology in Turkey, during which he met a German archeologist by chance, who offered him an MA degree in Germany. Before moving there in 1995, Serdar had no familiarity with the language or culture of the country. He quickly learnt German and started his studies. Serdar finished an MA and a PhD degree in Germany and returned to Turkey in 2010. Serdar says he was interested in German politics but he felt like an observer, rather than a part of the events in the country. He identifies himself with the Greens. After 15 years he returned to Turkey in 2010 as he found it difficult to advance in his career. The opportunities he had in Turkey were more attractive and he also had the sensation of a strong homesickness. Later, he says, he discovered that the homesickness was an illusion. I interviewed him in April 2016.

Sevil: Sevil went to a high-school that gave German education in Turkey. After finishing her undergraduate degree in International Relations at a public university, Sevil went to Berlin to pursue an MA degree in cultural studies in 2008. She says it was her dream since high-school and it was very easy to get accepted to the program and adapt to the life there thanks to her high-school education. Sevil spent most of her time with international students like herself. After finishing her MA, she tried to find a job to be able to continue living there, with no success. Financial hardship made her return to Turkey after 2 years in Germany. It was a decision that consequently caused her a depression. So, she says, after returning she made a huge effort to forget the details of her life in Germany, which she considered impossible to achieve again. Sevil defines herself apolitical. She has sympathy for the Greens in Germany and the Liberal Democrat Party in Turkey. I interviewed her in September 2014.

Tuna: Tuna is a classical guitarist. She went to Germany for an undergraduate degree in music in 2000. She lived there for 8 years, during which she never became close with the Germans. She says she was comfortable with people from other migrant backgrounds like herself. Apart from music, Tuna also worked as a waitress occasionally. She emphasizes the toughness of navigating through the German bureaucracy as a student to get the residence and work permits. She decided to return to Turkey when she realized that the discrimination and prejudice she felt was gradually turning her into a nationalist, a change she found quite dangerous. Tuna lives in Turkey since 2008. She says she would only return to Germany if she felt like her life or civic liberties were in danger in Turkey. I interviewed her in February 2014. At the time of the interview she was pursuing a PhD degree in music.

Zeynel: Zeynel went to a public high-school designed for the children of the returnees, along with regular students. It was financially supported by the German government and the majority of the classes were taught in German. He says he grew up reading on German

culture and literature much more than the Turkish. He felt like the mission of the school was to impose the German way of life to the students. After high-school, Zeynel studied philosophy at a public university in Turkey, which also offered a joint-degree MA program in collaboration with a university in Berlin. Zeynel got accepted to the program in 2008 and lived in Berlin for two years as an MA student. He says he was very familiar with the German lifestyle and didn't need to adapt himself. Zeynel initially made an effort to be in German friends circles exclusively. But later on, he found it much more pleasant and satisfying to be with other Turkish students like himself. Zeynel returned to Turkey after finishing his degree and realizing that he wouldn't have the career opportunities and the financial compensation he deserved if he stayed in Germany. Zeynel is a Turkish citizen. He identifies with HDP in Turkey and Die Linke in Germany. I interviewed him in February 2014. On a follow-up, I found out that he moved back to Germany

Roots migrants

Buket: She was born in Berlin in 1990 to a "typical Almanci family", in her words. She went to Turkey in 2013 to pursue an undergraduate degree in Public Relations. She says her real reason to move to Turkey was to test herself and see how far she could stand on her feet without the support of her family. As a third-generation German-Turk, she also mentions her desire to live in Istanbul, a city that she only used to visit in her yearly vacations with great curiosity and passion. She voted once in Germany and it was for the Greens. As she only has German citizenship, she couldn't vote in any of the Turkish elections. She says she wouldn't vote, even if she could because she doesn't believe in any of the Turkish political parties. Coming from a conservative family that supports the Justice and Development Party (AKP), Buket says her political views about Turkey were immensely influenced by her experience in Turkey, which led her to identify with leftist movements, including the Gezi Resistance. I interviewed her in September 2016.

Benan: Benan was born in 1964 in Turkey. After his father, who migrated to Germany as a guest-worker settled down there, Benan and his mother joined him with family unification in 1967. He worked as a truck driver until 2013 and as soon as he got retired, he returned to Turkey with his wife and daughter. He says his pension wouldn't be enough in Germany but with the same amount he can provide a decent living to his family in Turkey. Benan remembers his childhood days as peaceful and harmonious. He mentions that while he didn't experience any hostility towards the migrants in his childhood and had many German friends, his children have to deal with discrimination every day, thus he feels they are not integrated to the German society as much as he was. Benan became a German citizen in 1999 but then renounced it in 2004 because it wasn't practical to navigate through the Turkish bureaucracy. He votes for AKP or CHP in Turkey and identifies himself with CDU in Germany. I interviewed him in September 2014.

Cemil: Cemil was born in 1982 to an underclass Kurdish family in Adana. In 1994, he went to Germany with his mother and sister to join his father, who had been there with a political refugee status. In his first six months in Germany, Cemil stayed in a refugee camp, waiting for the results of the trials on his legal status in the country. Cemil says they weren't real political refugees but just poor people looking for better life conditions and they needed to give a reason to the German political authorities to get the residence permit. Cemil worked as a construction worker after finishing school. He never learnt

enough German to get better jobs. In his adolescence, his father's political refugee status and his Kurdish background drew Cemil to the Kurdish political movement in Germany, even though initially he was disinterested in politics and didn't want to be in it. Later, he gradually pulled away due to his disappointing experiences regarding the movement. Cemil returned to Turkey in 2002 to take care of his father, who fell terminally ill. I interviewed him in September 2014.

Demet: Demet was born and raised in Germany as a third-generation in 1976. In her eyes, her working class parents, both of who migrated to Germany at very young ages, were very 'Germanized' and well-integrated to the society. In 1994, her mother decided to return to Turkey and took Demet with her, even though she wasn't willing to. Obliged to live in Turkey with her mother, Demet has always felt that her roots are in Germany and she belongs there. Currently she works as a primary school teacher in Turkey. Demet is a Turkish citizen but she would like to have a German passport because she thinks it would provide her a better life. She doesn't feel identified with any of the Turkish political parties and doesn't trust politicians. I interviewed her in January 2017.

Demir: Demir migrated to Germany in 1980 when he was 13 years old to join his father, who was a factory worker. After finishing high-school and working at several blue-collar jobs, Demir started his own business, which didn't last very long. Currently he is on welfare assistance. He says he unofficially moved to Turkey in 2014, but he needs to go to Germany several times a year so that the German state wouldn't cut his welfare payments off. He emphasizes how the second and third generation Turks thrived in Germany, opening successful businesses and obtaining advanced educational degrees. He thinks the key to success in Germany is to get on well with the Germans and not to criticize them because "no one likes to be criticized." He votes for CDU in Germany, because he sees "they actually do something for the country". He states it was impossible for him not to find out about the developments in Turkish politics when he was in Germany, because he was surrounded by people who escaped from Turkey for political reasons. The multicultural environment in which he grew up in Germany makes him have sympathy for HDP, which, at the time of the interview, declares that it aims conviviality and addresses not only the Kurds but every citizen in Turkey. I interviewed him in January 2015.

Ece: A third-generation migrant, Ece was born in 1995 in Germany. She moved to Turkey in 2013 right after finishing high-school. She is pursuing a BA degree in Tourism Administration in Istanbul. She says her intention was to get away from the monotonous life in Germany and experience the colorful life in Turkey, which she used to witness when she visited the country in her summer holidays. Ece grew up in a multicultural migrant community in Germany and says that she always felt equal to the Germans and never experienced discrimination while she was there. She has dual citizenship but never votes in the elections. She doesn't feel identified with any political parties neither in Turkey nor in Germany. I interviewed her in January 2017.

Ekin: Ekin was born in 1991 in Germany as a third-generation member of a German-Turkish family. She moved to Turkey in 2011 to pursue an undergraduate degree in German Language and Literature. Like Buket and Ece, migrating to Turkey meant realizing her dream of experiencing the Turkish lifestyle she was longing for. Ekin grew up in a multicultural migrant environment. She remembers discriminatory behaviors of

the Germans at school but she doesn't find it significant. She identifies herself with the Greens in Germany due to their pro-migrant approach. While she supported CHP when she was in Germany, her opinions changed once she started to witness the Turkish politics in Turkey. At the time of the interview she says she doesn't identify herself with any of the political parties and she sympathizes with the Gezi Movement. I interviewed her in September 2016.

Fuat: Fuat was born in 1985 in Germany to working class German-Turkish parents. He moved to Turkey in 2003 with his mother and sister after finishing high-school. His father joined them 7 years later, when he got retired. Born and raised in Germany, Fuat says he was happy about his life there and he never wanted to move to Turkey. However, his parents had always dreamt of their children living in their homeland after finishing high-school. In this way, in his father's mind, they wouldn't lose their cultural and family ties, and wouldn't get stuck in the lower segments of the German society, like most of the migrants are destined to. Fuat never felt any discriminatory behavior towards himself in Germany. However, once he started to live in Turkey and had a chance to compare the two countries, he became aware that he actually had experienced discrimination there. Fuat is a German citizen but was never interested in German politics. His curiosity increased once he moved to Turkey because of the highly polarized atmosphere of the Turkish political arena. Moving to Turkey changed his opinions on the government's performance as "things look different from far away." He says his approach to the solution of the Kurdish issue is also highly influenced by his migration experience in Germany. In interviewed him in March 2017.

Leyla: She moved to Germany with family unification in 1978 at 8 years old. She had a hard time getting used to the country and learning its language. She never felt a part of the society and always wanted to return. She dropped out of school and started to work at a factory when she was 18. She lived in an isolated environment, where she was almost always with the Turks. Leyla and her husband returned to Turkey in 1996 before their children reached the school age. Leyla has never been politically engaged but she is a loyal CHP voter in Turkey. She says she doesn't know the political parties in Germany. I interviewed her in January 2015.

Melek: Melek was born in 1980 in Germany. Although all her family were in Germany and she spoke a very broken Turkish at the time, she decided to move to Turkey in 2002 to realize her dream of living in the homeland she always longed for. After a few unhappy work experiences, she pursued a college degree in German Language and Literature and an MA degree in education. Melek says the beauty of Istanbul always captivated her in contrast to the cold and monotonous life in Germany. As she grew older she became conscious of the social and political inequalities experienced by the migrant communities and it consolidated her decision to leave Germany. Melek had a very hard time adjusting to Turkey and had to learn to live in disappointment at every sphere of life. Despite the hardships, she was attracted to the idea of challenging herself. So she stayed in Turkey. Melek says she grew up with leftist ideas of her family and has always been an idealist. Her political engagement peaked with the Gezi Movement in Turkey. She is a Turkish citizen. I interviewed her in September 2016.

Nihan: Nihan was born in 1990 to as a third-generation member of a crowded German-Turkish family. She says it was a typical migrant family in the eyes of the German, who, hence, treated them as second-class citizens. She has always been in conflict with her

parents, who are hard-line conservatives. In the search for her identity in Germany, Nihan tried several different colors of the political spectrum including Kemalism and Turkish nationalism. Like Melek, Ekin, Ece and Buket, Nihan had always dreamt of living in Turkey, most of all Istanbul, as she was always attracted to its beauty in her summer vacations. She moved to Istanbul in 2009 to pursue an undergraduate degree in German Languge and Literature. At the time of the interview she was doing her MA. In Germany Nihan grew up in a multicultural migrant community and friends from many different ethnic backgrounds. She is a German citizen but has always been more interested in Turkish politics. I interviewed her in October 2016.

Nuray: Nuray was born in 1970 in Turkey and was taken to Germany when she was 1.5 years old with family unification. After graduating from law school, Nuray married her husband, who was living in Turkey. She continued to live in Germany with the intention of doing her bar exams. However, entering the loop of two pregnancies and child care, she never realized her plans. Nuray moved to Turkey in 2004, although she never wanted to. She thought she belonged to Germany and couldn't get used to the Turkish life style. Bad peer influence from other migrants' children at her son's school in Germany eventually made her give up. Nuray is a German citizen. She defines herself as an apolitical person and intentionally stays away from politics. She says she was never interested in what happened in Turkey because she never thought of living there and she had cut off her ties. I interviewed her in January 2017.

Osman: A third-generation migrant, Osman was born in Germany in 1995 in a conservative family. Since his childhood, he wanted to work in the aviation sector as he was always impressed by the airplanes he rode in his yearly vacations to Turkey. He moved to Turkey in 2013 to pursue a college degree in aviation as he thought the Turkish lifestyle suited him more. Osman has dual nationality. He has always been highly engaged in both German and Turkish politics. He defines himself as a Turk who gives importance to national values but has integrated to the German society in a correct manner. I interviewed him in January 2017.

Pinar: Pinar was born in Turkey in 1963 and went to Germany in 1976 to join her mother, a single-mom who worked as a crane operator there. She dropped out of high-school and started to work at a factory. She returned to Turkey with her mother in 1982, when her husband, who was living in Turkey at the time, sent her an ultimatum, obliging her to return if she didn't want to risk her marriage. As the daughter of a single-mom, who were one of the few women guest-workers that migrated to Germany without depending on a man, Pinar was raised in a very disciplined and conservative fashion. Apart from daily conversations with the neighbors, she didn't have close relations with the Germans or the Turks. The family preferred to spend most of their free time at home. Pinar is also reluctant to engage in political discussions as she finds it risky and dangerous. I interviewed her in January 2015.

Umut: Umut was born in 1993 in Turkey. He was taken to Germany in 1995 with family unification. He was raised in a multicultural migrant community. Umut moved to Turkey in 2012 with one plan in his head: to have some fun and then return to Germany in a year. However, later on he started an undergraduate degree in Film and Television Studies. Umut describes himself as a religious conservative. His family are AKP supporters, who identify with the CDU in Germany, a choice he criticizes a lot, as he

finds CDU old-fashioned. He is a Turkish citizen and votes for AKP, as well, as he is especially attracted to conservatism. I interviewed him in December 2016.

Utku: Utku was born in 1970 in Turkey and raised there by his uncle until he was 10 years old, when he joined his family in Germany. After living there for 28 years, Utku returned to Turkey in 2008, because his wife, who had moved to Germany upon marrying him, couldn't adjust herself to the life in Germany. Following the negative and traumatic interactions with the German children in his early childhood, Utku pulled away from the Germans and always felt the need to protect himself. He had relatively closer relations with the Germans in his university years, when he shared the same campus with more open-minded people. He is a German citizen and he voted for SPD a couple of times. Utku defines himself as a world citizen and always a leftist. At the time of the interview he was thinking about returning to Turkey as he couldn't find what he expected in his professional life. In a follow-up, I found out that he eventually returned. I interviewed him in October 2016.

Yilmaz: Yilmaz was born in 1975 in Germany to a factory worker father and a cleaner mother. He returned to Turkey with his family after high-school due to his family's desire to send their children to university in Turkey. He didn't have any contact with Germany until 2004, when he started working for a Germany-based company in Turkey. He says he got promoted quickly to the top thanks to his skills and now is giving orders to Germans who once gave orders to his parents. Yilmaz says it was difficult for him to get used to living in Turkey and he preferred his entourage in Germany for years. He was raised in a nationalist and conservative family. He says, because of his professional position, he bases his political decisions on the economic situation of the country, which leads him to lean towards CDU in Germany and AKP in Turkey. I interviewed him in September 2014.