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Doctoral Thesis

**‘State narrative’ construction on Twitter. A
case study around news stories on LGTB
issues in Russia**

*Elaboración de narrativa estatal estratégica en Twitter.
Estudio de caso de las conversaciones de noticias de
temática LGTB en Rusia*

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I dedicate this work to my husband Ivan, who has been incredibly supportive with this project and whom I love very much, to my sisters Anna and Julia, without whose unconditional love and care I would never have done it, to my parents Larisa and Alexey, who are always where my heart is, to my best friends Tatiana and Tanya, who are the anchors in my life. And of course, to my daughters Polina and Sonia who were always patient when mom said she was awfully busy with dissertation and to their elder sister

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ABSTRACT

This thesis combines 'state strategic narrative' theory from the intersection of communication and international relations studies with research on media and social networks. It takes as a case study the construction and deconstruction of the Russian 'state narrative' on Twitter around news on the LGBT community. Methodologically, it uses mixed qualitative and quantitative methods. The research blends Social Network Analysis (SNA), qualitative content analysis with human coding, computational text analysis (topic modelling), and qualitative semi-structured interviews so that each stage complements every other, and each answers our research questions. The main objective of this study is to explore the construction of the strategic 'state narrative' on Twitter around news on LGBT issues in a competitive authoritarianism country. The central conclusions are that the 'state narrative' is present in Twitter discussions and is being used by state actors such as pro-government media accounts. Exploiting the 'state narrative' on LGBT is also dependent on Twitter users' pro-government political affiliation, although the dependency is more significant for the media. Our findings demonstrate that 'state narrative' construction is taking place not only in official state sources but also on social networks such as Twitter. Moreover, our research indicates that the 'state narrative' is simultaneously also being questioned and deconstructed by Twitter users. The study also suggests that the use of the 'state narrative' by media accounts on Twitter may be connected to both external restrictive intervention by the state and internal editorial policies and self-censorship.

RESUMEN

Esta tesis doctoral combina la teoría de la "narrativa estatal estratégica" desde los estudios de comunicación, relaciones internacionales y la investigación sobre las redes sociales. Toma como caso de estudio la construcción y deconstrucción de la "narrativa estatal" rusa en Twitter en torno a las comentarios de las noticias sobre la comunidad LGBT. Metodológicamente, utiliza métodos mixtos cualitativos y cuantitativos. La investigación combina el Análisis de Redes Sociales, el análisis de contenido cualitativo con codificación humana, el análisis de texto computacional (modelización de temas) y las entrevistas cualitativas semiestructuradas, de modo que cada etapa se complementa con las demás y cada una responde a nuestras preguntas de investigación. El objetivo principal de este estudio es explorar la construcción de la "narrativa estatal" estratégica en Twitter en torno a las noticias sobre temas LGBT en un país de autoritarismo competitivo. Las conclusiones principales son que la "narrativa estatal" está presente en los debates de Twitter y es utilizada por actores estatales como las cuentas de los medios de comunicación progubernamentales. Según los resultados de esta investigación, la explotación de la "narrativa estatal" sobre la temática LGBT también depende de la afiliación política progubernamental de los usuarios de Twitter, aunque la dependencia es más significativa en el caso de los medios de comunicación. Nuestros hallazgos demuestran que la construcción de la "narrativa estatal" no sólo tiene lugar en las fuentes oficiales del Estado, sino también en redes sociales como Twitter. Además, nuestra investigación permite observar que la "narrativa estatal" también está siendo cuestionada y deconstruida por los usuarios de Twitter. El estudio también sugiere que el uso de la "narrativa estatal" por parte de las cuentas de los medios de comunicación en Twitter puede estar relacionado tanto con la intervención restrictiva externa del Estado como con las políticas editoriales internas y la autocensura.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Topic of the research and identification of the research problem

This thesis explores how the “state strategic narrative” (Miskimmon et al, 2013) is constructed and promoted on Twitter in countries with a competitive authoritarianism regime; it focuses on the case of Russia and the ‘state narrative’ construction on Twitter around news about the LGBT community. Methodologically, this study uses social network analysis, qualitative human-coding content analysis, computational text analysis, and qualitative semi-structured interviews.

If the world used to be seen as two-polar during the Cold War, or so the US’s and USSR’s state strategic narratives said, now it seems multi-polar (Roselle et al, 2014). There are now more multi-party autocracies in the world than there are military dictatorships, monarchies, or single party regimes (Magaloni, 2010). The political actors in all states, both democratic and authoritarian, are creating their own state strategic narratives—a tool to extend their influence, manage expectations, and change the discursive environment in which they operate (Miskimmon et al, 2013). This research takes a multi-disciplinary approach and uses the framework of hybrid regimes from political science (Ekman: 2009), the state strategic narrative conceptual framework from the intersection of international relations and communication studies (Miskimmon et al, 2013), and framing theory (Goffman, 1974) to explore the Russian state strategic narrative built around news about the LGBT community on Twitter.

A vast difference in the level of cultural normalization of the LGBT community between the so-called Western democracies and the former USSR at the start of the post-Soviet stage (1991) is noticeable. In the USSR, homosexuality (among men) had been a criminal offence until 1993 (Gessen: 1994). In contrast, from the end of 1980s, homosexuality became more accepted in Western democracies; indeed, the tolerance of homosexuality had become a marker of a “civilized” society (Puar and Rai, 2002; Massad, 2007). As Bracke argues, “the articulation between homosexuality and civilization has significantly changed between the time of historical European colonialism and imperialism, and contemporary Western neo-colonialism and neo-imperialism” (Bracke, 2021, p. 249). The exposure of the post-Soviet society to Western pop culture as well as to more liberal views led to a temporary impression

that homophobia, although present in the late 1990s, might be “softening” in Russia (Gessen, 1994). At the end of 1980s, the first LGBT organizations and gay clubs appeared in post-Soviet Russia, increasing the visibility of homosexuality (Gessen, 1994; Essig, 1995; Baer, 2009). However, surveys on attitudes toward LGBT people by one of the most prominent sociological research centers in Russia, the Levada-Center,¹ showed that from 2005 onward, views on the LGBT community have become worse.²

While there was a small decrease in negative views from 1998 to 2005, the worst year for views on the LGBT community in Russia was 2013. As the *Vedomosti* newspaper reported in 2013,³ citing the Levada-Center survey, since 1998, the number of Russians who consider homosexuality to be a promiscuous or a bad habit had grown from 35 to 43%. Another 35% of the population believed homosexuality to be a disease or the result of mental trauma. In 1998, this figure was 32%. The share of Russian citizens who consider homosexuality to be a sexual orientation with an equal right to exist beside heterosexuality had decreased from 18% to 12% in the same period (*Vedomosti*, 2013). The 2017 survey showed that 83% of respondents believed sexual relationships between people of the same gender to be reprehensible, while in 1998 the percentage was 68%.⁴

Most researchers suggest it was the year 2013—which was when the law against LGBT propaganda was adapted (Federal Law 135 of the Criminal Code of Russian Federation) that the media as well as policymakers started highlighting that the LGBT community existed outside Russia’s community of ‘shared national values’ (e.g. Stella & Narova, 2015; Medvedev & Makarychev, 2015; Byzov, 2017). At the same time, Western European countries were calling Russia, as well as other Eastern European and African countries, as inherently homophobic and backward (Dhoest, 2020). Many authors criticize this approach (Kulpa: 2014; Kahlina; 2015; Jungar & Peltonen, 2017).

¹ See more on Levada Center: https://directory.esomar.org/country/146-russian-federation/r771_Levada-Center.php

² See Gazeta.Ru: https://www.gazeta.ru/politics/2013/05/16_a_5324465.shtml

³ See *Vedomosti*: https://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/articles/2013/05/17/levadacentr_43_rossiyan_schitayut_gomoseksualizm_rezultatom

⁴ See RFI: <https://www.rfi.fr/ru/rossiya/20180111-levada-83-rossiyan-osuzhdayut-odnopolye-svyazi>

However, although the sexual and gender politics of the Russian state during these years might have had other underlying reasons than confrontation with the West (Ryabov & Ryabova, 2014; Stella & Nartova, 2015; Makarychev & Medvedev, 2015), and the US in particular, the rhetoric on traditional values has been intricately connected to creation of “us (Russia) vs. them (the ‘West’)” mentality (Rivkin-Fish, 2013; Persson, 2015). So, according to some researchers, the increasing homophobia within Russian society might have been linked to confronting the ‘West’ (Ryabov & Ryabova, 2014; Persson, 2015; Sleptsov, 2018).

Some studies suggest that the developmental paradigm of “catching up,” which dominated the Russian policy agenda in the 2000s (Rutland 2016; Gelman: 2020), has lost its attractiveness to the political elites. Thus, economic development priorities were replaced with great geopolitical goals and a desire to seek revenge on the West after the loss of Russia’s great power status (and narrative) with the collapse of the USSR (Gelman, 2020). Some researchers (e.g. Sakwa: 2014) suggest that NATO’s extension into Eastern Europe might also have added to Russia’s great power project and have further encouraged an anti-Western narrative among the political elites. The initial post-Cold war agreements, Sakwa argues, were broken, and when the countries of former Soviet bloc rushed into NATO, a deep divide appeared in Europe once again. “The asymmetrical end of the Cold War effectively shut Russia out from the European alliance system. The failure to establish a genuinely inclusive and equal European security system imbued European international politics with powerful stress points”, - writes Sakwa (2014, p. 3).

Russian media, meanwhile, has experienced dramatic changes over the years. In 2015, Lehtisaari (2015) described the Russian media landscape as complex and varied, with a few relatively independent commercial newspapers and online resources. By 2021, it is safe to say, this landscape has shrunk significantly. Although there are still independent outlets, they increasingly experience internal repressive interference (Shoemaker & Reese: 1996), such as being included within “foreign agents” lists, which compromise their business model. The online media outlet *Meduza* is one of the latest examples of such an interference⁵

⁵ See *Radio Liberty*: <https://www.rferl.org/a/eu-rejects-russian-labeling-meduza-foreign-agent/31220490.html>

“According to the independent Medialogia monitoring site, Meduza was among the top 10 most-cited Russian-language Internet sources in 2020 and was No. 1 in the ranking of most-linked-to in social-media posts. "It is extremely concerning that Russian authorities continue to restrict the work of independent media platforms, as well as individual journalists and other media actors," the EU spokesperson said. "It goes against Russia's international obligations and human rights commitments." The Russian state media monitor Roskomnadzor last year adopted rules requiring listed media to mark all written materials with a lengthy notice in large text, all radio materials with an audio statement, and all video materials with a 15-second text declaration.”

(Radio Free Europe, see <https://www.rferl.org/a/eu-rejects-russian-labeling-meduza-foreign-agent/31220490.html>)

At the same time, according to the editor-in-chief of *Meduza*,⁶ the website’s advertisers have stopped their contracts with the outlet, thus jeopardizing its further existence. The publication had to resort to crowdfunding⁷ (so far successful) in order to continue its work. Several other media outlets have faced similar problems. *Radio Liberty*,⁸ for example, is not following Roskomnadzor’s orders and owns over one million dollars in fees, but the outlet is sponsored by the US government, so it does not depend on advertising. Roskomnadzor is state media and telecom watchdog organization (created in 2008⁹). It monitors the media (as well as its’ finances, ownership and registration) and is able to declare one a ‘foreign agent’, revoke the registration or apply a fine for violation of any laws mentioned above.

At the time of this dissertation’s writing, two other outlets, the business publication *VTimes*¹⁰ and *Anti-Corruption Agency*, also faced financial problems; the former was forced to start a crowdfunding campaign.

Russian online space has also been through restrictive changes. In 2011 and 2012, the Russian internet was one of the spaces where political mobilization and empowerment had been happening (Alexanyan et al: 2012; Oates: 2013). By 2021, however, the government

⁶ See *Meduza*: <https://meduza.io/en/feature/2021/04/26/meduza-is-a-foreign-agent-now-what-s-next>

⁷ See *Meduza*: <https://support.meduza.io/en>

⁸ See *Radio Liberty* <https://www.rferl.org/a/eu-rejects-russian-labeling-meduza-foreign-agent/31220490.html>

⁹ See official website of Roskomnadzor: <https://rkn.gov.ru/about/p530/>

¹⁰ See *The Moscow Times* <https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2021/05/14/russia-declares-independent-vtimes-news-site-a-foreign-agent-a73898>

had managed to firmly control that space. Federal Law 511¹¹ introduced large fines to companies if they refused to block illegal content, and Federal Law 530¹² obliged social networks to take down content that is considered illegal under the Russian legislation. Numerous regulations from Roskomnadzor have appeared over the years, and a failure to follow them results in online content being blocked.¹³ However, Russian online censorship still has not reached the level of the Chinese firewall (Asmolov & Kolozaridi: 2021). All the major US-based social networking sites (and other platforms like Google) function in Russia as well as the Russian-based social media sites VKontakte and Odnoklassniki, and Chinese-based TikTok is gaining popularity (Asmolov: 2021).

“The struggle between Russian and Western online platforms unfolds in several areas of Russian internet rankings. In search engines, we see a continuous struggle between homegrown Yandex and Google, which compete for leadership in their category. In the sector of social networking, the top positions are held by VKontakte and Odnoklassniki. The Western social networks, particularly Instagram and Facebook, are close to the top, while Twitter is a little farther behind. These Western networks are popular despite continuous pressure by Russian authorities on Facebook, Twitter, and recently Tiktok, seeking to ensure that these foreign websites do not outrank homegrown counterparts on the charts. Though these platforms haven’t been banned thus far, Russian authorities’ recent decision to slow down the access to Twitter may not only decrease its popularity but also serve as a “yellow card” prior to a more thorough ban of Western social media in Russia” (Asmolov: 2021, p.53).

This study, though, focuses on subtle censorship in the Russia online space. As a lot of studies have indicated, Russian state actors are using social networking sites to set their agenda. Research by Stukal et al. (2017) and more recently by Zherebtsov and Goussev (2021) have indicated the existence of large communities of bots or bot-like behavior in political discussions on Twitter both abroad as well as within Russia, thus indicating the possible involvement of state-aligned actors on Twitter.

This study intends to contribute to the growing body of research on building and sustaining state strategical narratives through Twitter discussions around anti-Western values and the exclusion of an ‘out group’—in this case the LGBT community.

¹¹ See: http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_372707/

¹² See: http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_372700/

¹³ See: <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2021/country-chapters/russia#eea21f>

“The Russian government faces a fundamental struggle in whether its relatively indirect control of the traditional mass media will succeed with the online sphere. This is of particular importance as the rising popularity of bloggers will force the Russian government to adapt new policies for control and co-optation” (Oates: 2013, ch.4).

There is still a gap of the research on whether the state-aligned actors, including media, are actively involved in constructing a ‘state narrative’ through social networks. We believe that this research will shed light on the ways the states with competitive authoritarianism such as Russia, and without the ability of desire to fully block or censor the online spaces as China does, are using pro-state actors in social media discussions.

1.2 Objectives of the research

1.2.1 Main objective

The central focus of my research is to explore the construction of strategic ‘state narrative’ on Twitter, such as news around LGBT issues, in a competitive authoritarianism country.

1.2.2 Sub-objective 1

To explore Twitter comments and posts concerning LGBT issues and news and determine the role of state-aligned actors in these discussions.

1.2.3 Sub-objective 2

To determine the main actors and their roles in disseminating comments and posts on Twitter concerning LGBT issues.

1.2.4 Sub-Objective 3

To examine whether a state strategic narrative in Russia is being promoted on Twitter by analyzing Twitter-based discussions around LGBT news stories.

1.2.5 Sub-Objective 4

To describe who (pro-traditional, oppositional groups, government media sources, or other groups) was using particular frames of interpretation and symbols and what were the mechanisms of power behind them in Twitter discussions around LGBT news stories.

1.3 Research questions

1.3.1 Research question 1

RQ1: Which actors play the most important role in Twitter networks around LGBT news stories in Russia?

1.3.2 Research question 2

RQ2: What are the concepts used in describing or evaluating LGBT community as an 'out-group' in Twitter networks in Russia around LGBT news stories?

1.3.3 Research Question 3

RQ3: Which power mechanisms might be behind concepts on LGBT and main actors in Twitter discussions around LGBT news stories?

1.4. Structure of the dissertation

The dissertation is structured as follows. There are five chapters. Chapter 1 is the introduction, which is followed by the literature review (Chapter II). Section 2.1 of the literature reviews explores the existing research on hybrid journalism, citizen participation, and social networks. Section 2.2 describes studies looking at changes related to traditional modes of gatekeeping and agenda setting. Section 2.3 outlines previous studies on Twitter discussions worldwide, and Section 2.4 examines research on Twitter discussions in the Russian context.

Chapter III, concerning the theoretical framework and hypothesis development aims to conceptualize the theoretical framework of the presented research. Thus, Section 3.1 of this chapter provides an overview of the hybrid regime theory within political science and uses Russia as a case study within this framework. Section 3.2 reviews the connection between strategic 'state narrative' framework and framing theory, thus positioning this research within studies of 'state narratives' at the intersection of international relations and communication sciences as well as more traditional media and communication news framing studies. This multidisciplinary approach widens the scope of the research and builds our framework within three fields of social sciences: media and communication, political

science, and international relations, thus creating the necessarily broader context in order to comprehend the phenomena.

Section 3.3 of the Chapter III focuses on the current Russian media model and state-media power relations, and Section 3.4 describes the construction of the hypotheses and presents them to the reader.

Chapter IV outlines the methodology and data collection. Section 4.1 describes Twitter sampling in the literature and in our research and outlines the news stories around which the data collection happened on Twitter for four years (2017, 2018, 2019, and 2020). Social network analysis method and the results are described in Section 4.2, the human-coded quantitative content analysis is outlined in Section 4.3, and the computational text analysis method and results are reviewed in Section 4.4. Finally, the results of eight semi-structured qualitative interviews are presented in Section 4.4. All the results together as well as the contributions, limitations, and social impact of this dissertation are discussed in Chapter V.

CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW

CHAPTER II. LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Social networks and traditional media relationship

Internet users are now being empowered to constantly disseminate and share various content. In his 2005 conceptual article “What is Web 2.0,” O’Reilly posits that Web 2.0, just as a lot of principal concepts, does not have defined borders but more of a gravitational core (O’Reilly: 2005). Lasica and Gilmore, the former in the article on participatory journalism (2003), and the latter (2003) – in the book, have argued that by the beginning of the 2000s, people already had the option to construct their own news items, thus becoming active participants (Lasica: 2003; Gilmore: 2003).

Hermida and Thurman published an article in 2008, in which they further develop the concept of user-generated content, and its integration in professional journalism (Hermida, Thurman: 2008). Already in 2010, Hermida describes blogging as a new “awareness system” for professional journalists and highlights that the traditional model of news is changing, since social media has become a facilitator in the dissemination of information from a variety of sources. This, in turn, enables people to put together an intellectual model of the news and events that surround them, which Hermida describes as “ambient journalism” (Hermida: 2010).

“Examining Twitter as an awareness system, creating ambient journalism, provides a framework to analyse the emergent patterns of human behaviour and data interaction that offer an understanding of this place. It shifts the journalistic discourse on micro-blogging away from a debate about raw data to a discussion of contextualized, significant information based on the networked nature of asynchronous, lightweight and always-on communication systems.” (Hermida: 2010, p. 304)

For over a decade now, newsrooms are existing in an environment in which the border between journalism and audience is blurring. The term “participatory journalism” is used to describe readers and audience who actively participate in the dissemination and creation of the information (Zeller & Hermida: 2015). Studies on participatory journalism have been numerous, with some concentrating on the way journalists perceive these changes to the industry. Deuze discusses the main features of online journalism: “hypertextuality, interactivity, multimodality” (Deuze, 2003). He also focuses on redefining the professional

journalism, in terms of the changes that the main characteristics of specifically online publishing bring about. In 2020, Deuze, along with others, introduced the concept of “X Journalism,” of which examples include robot journalism, ‘foundation-funded journalism, cross-border journalism, or solutions journalism (Deuze et al, 2020). Deuze and Witschge in “Beyond Journalism” (2020) conceptualize changes in today’s journalism through case studies of journalistic start-ups worldwide.

“In this precarious setting – where newsrooms become networks of loosely affiliated competitor-colleagues, news organizations retool toward an enterprising mode of production, access to the profession is increasingly exclusive, and individual journalists are held responsible for market success (and failure)– to be a professional, working journalist means having to go and perform beyond journalism. Working in this environment demands journalists today to be committed well beyond what any profession could ask for – without most of the securities, comforts, and benefits enjoyed by being a member of a profession. Journalists are expected to reskill, deskill, and upskill their practices and working routines, generally without any direct say in the way the organizations they engage with operate.” (Deuze, & Witschge, 2018, p. 176)

The emergence of news recommendations in online media was studied by Thorson in 2008, and her research highlighted how the public would be able to shape news consumption in ways and on a scale that had not been possible before (Thorson, 2008). Thus, the traditional model of agenda setting and gatekeeping (McCombs & Shaw, 1972) has gone through important changes over the last decade.

2.2 Changes related to traditional mode of gatekeeping and agenda setting

With the development of online news media and online communication tools, a number of scholars have studied how the agenda setting model might have changed. Research examined electronic bulletin boards (EBBs) and the effect of the media’s agenda setting on discussions that were going on there, and correlation between media coverage of the issues and online discussions in bulletin boards was found (Roberst et al., 2002).

In 2004, Drezner and Farrell researched the effects of popular bloggers on agenda setting for traditional media. They used an analysis of the network of bloggers as well as interviewed media professionals concerning their preferences in blogs (Drezner & Farrell, 2004). This topic was further on examined by Meraz (2009), who defined a hyperlink as a

marker of influential source of the political bloggers and traditional media. One of the first studies of YouTube (Sayre et al., 2010) found that platform allows its users to often lead the public discourse instead of following traditional opinion leaders. In 2012, Grzywinska and Borden studied the Occupy Wall Street Movement's social media activities in order to determine whether social media can define the object that traditional media opts to cover as well as the place of social media in the agenda-setting process (Grzywinska & Borden, 2012).

McCombs and Guo have shown a correlation between the media and public agenda networks in their research of presidential election candidates in the US. The third level of an agenda-setting, or a network agenda-setting model, supposes that a network working on a particular topic can shift its focus from having media agenda to a public one (McCombs & Guo, 2012).

A study of European journalists was conducted in 2009 by Fortunati et al. It was designed to find out what had changed in the profession of journalists with the introduction of innovations related to the Internet. The survey was carried out in 11 EU countries. The authors conclude that at the time of the research, journalists were not supportive of the changes that the Internet brought; they resisted the changes that both their publishers and their audience were trying to implement. However, the researchers also highlight differences between Northern Europe's and Southern Europe's concerning perception of the Internet, gender differences (with women being more eager to use the Internet's advantages), and the fact that those journalists working exclusively in print were less motivated to move online (Fortunati et al, 2009). Meanwhile, Oates (2013) has highlighted the absence of professional journalistic standards and education in Russia, and Bodrunova et al. (2019) found that the journalists in Russia are active users of social networks, particularly Twitter. Another study looked at social media usage among students at departments of communication at universities in Brazil, Colombia, and Spain and found that they are overwhelmingly present on Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram (Tejedor & Giraldo-Luque, 2018).

Jenkins invented the term "participatory culture" while studying fan communities and trying to draw a distinction between fans and other forms of spectators (Jenkins: 1992). The term has since evolved, and now is used in a "range of different groups deploying media production and distribution to serve their collective interests" (Jenkins, For & Green, 2013,

p. 2). Williams, Wardle and Wahl – Jorgensen (2011) have studied the BBC's practice of working with user-generated content but as something that professional journalists only use as another source (Williams et al, 2011).

Carpentier highlights that the concept of participation has again become one of the most important concepts in communication and media studies due to the appearance and appeal of Web 2.0 (Carpentier & Dahlgren, 2011). A study by Lasorsa et al (2011) describes how the journalists who use Twitter implement their professional norms in a new media environment. In the study's content analysis of 22 000 tweets, the authors found that journalists sometimes violate the professional norms of objectivity by, for instance, expressing their opinions on Twitter. In some cases, the journalists also shared personal information and insights about their jobs, though much less so when they worked for national media outlets (Lasorsa et al, 2011).

Ruiz et al (2011) applied Habermas' theory of democratic debate while analyzing over 15 000 comments from five newspapers across Europe and the US. They found that there are two models of audience participation: one based on argumentative debate, which is grounded on thoughtful conversations, and the other based on the model of homogenous communities, which is grounded on emotions rather than arguments (Ruiz et al: 2011). Díaz-Noci (2012) asks whether the participatory role of the readers is helpful and whether this role's characteristics fall into the models of media outlined by Hallin and Mancini's typology of media systems (Hallin & Mancini, 2004). Tous-Rovirosa and Díaz-Noci (2016) researched participation in political issues of active media users in Spain while aiming to describe their vision of participation by focusing on the quality of comments.

Yuan uses a media repertoire approach, which highlights that the consumption of news involves complex patterns instead of single media selection (Yuan, 2011). Her research shows that by 2011, the majority of Chinese news consumers were already using more than one media source and combined their sources in a way that enhanced their news gratification (Yuan, 2011 p. 1011). Gulyas (2013) has explored how social media is being used by journalists in the UK, Sweden, Germany, and Finland. While the research showed that the usage varies, with the greatest variance seen in the UK, it also concluded that "a myriad of different variables" influence journalists' practices in terms of social media use (Gulyas, 2013).

Users act as secondary gatekeepers, as they make editorial judgements about which information from news sites to share. Singer's (2014) study underscores how audiences now have the ability to evaluate what they think about what other audience members should read and what does not deserve their attention. By studying the websites of US newspapers, she confirms that the news organizations' websites largely support this new audience role as secondary gatekeepers (Singer, 2014). One danger in shifting the paradigm of democracy in traditional journalism towards participation in digital journalism lies in sacrificing the main function of watchdogs and intermediaries in journalism (Peters & Witschge, 2015). Before the digital age, despite various criticism towards the media's bias (due to political or commercial affiliation), journalism was still considered a social institution that bridged the divide between citizens and the political process. But in the age of "audience participation," this function is blurring, yet the audience does not assume the same watchdog role, despite the growing participation options in news media (Peters & Witschge, 2015).

Domingo et al. (2008) explores participatory journalism in the framework of evolving public communication; they propose a strategy for analyzing active audience participation in online media. Their main findings suggest that newspapers understand the participation of online readers merely as an option for them to comment on news items, since other editorial work has mainly remained closed to their involvement or controlled by professional journalists.

Newman (2009) has explored how media organizations use and respond to the options of participation provided by social media. Between 2007 – 2009, social networking and user-generated content had already become one of the main activities of the Internet users in the UK. This, claims Newman, has led to fundamental changes in the way breaking news is approached. News organizations started to employ social media editors and create special sets of practices for publishing on social networks. The majority of the audience, however, was still using the mainstream news organizations as their main source of news, while social networks started to add extra information and various opinions on what already existed. At the same time, social media discussions let the audience become more engaged in the content. An important role, Newman argues, now is paid by the recommendations in social media, and news organizations more and more use social media as means to drive traffic on the websites. Soon, Newman predicts, there might come the time when social networks become as important as search engines for traffic and revenue (Newman, 2009).

Ellison and Boyd (2013) present a currently used by many researchers' definition of social network sites as:

“A social network site is a networked communication platform in which participants 1) have uniquely identifiable profiles that consist of user-supplied content, content provided by other users, and/or system-provided data; 2) can publicly articulate connections that can be viewed and traversed by others; and 3) can consume, produce, and/or interact with streams of user generated content provided by their connections on the site” (Ellison & Boyd, 2013 p. 157).

2.3 Studies of Twitter discussions worldwide

Although academic research on Twitter has been extensive, the Russian sector of Twitter has not been studied so thoroughly, especially in terms of state strategic narratives on LGBT issues. This is the gap that this research intends to fill.

“The myth about Twitter Revolution is dying,” proclaimed the *New Statesman*¹⁴ at the end of 2019, saying that the uprisings against regimes in Iran (2009), Egypt, and Tunisia (2011) were once closely but mistakenly associated exclusively with communication via social networks (Pérez Altable, 2016; Alexander & Aouragh, 2014). Only about a decade ago, many assumed that the more digital a state became, the more options opened for opposition activism (Zuckerman, 2014). Twitter has been viewed by many in social science as a tool for organization and democratization (Pamelee & Bichard, 2011; Dann, 2010), especially when cyber utopianism was a dominant and “euphoric” idea among early internet researchers in the 1990s (Meredith, 2013). Free, uncensored political communication is what a lot of scholars saw as the role of social media in autocracies (Hermida, 2012; Lotan et al. 2011; Penney and Dadas 2014; Diamond, 2010).

Yet as early as 2013, Henry Hale had warned against adopting a simplistic view of social media's role in changing hybrid regimes, like the one in Moldova in 2009, where the crisis of succession and economic downturn played a much larger role than social media (Hale, 2013).

¹⁴ See *The New Statesman*: <https://www.newstatesman.com/science-tech/social-media/2019/11/we-are-witnessing-end-twitter-revolution>

“Indeed, more generally one notices that the pieces advocating a major role for social media tend to look primarily at patterns of Internet use, devoting very little in the way of original research to the larger set of events both inside and outside the Voronin regime that may have produced its downfall or made it vulnerable to tweeting masses.” (Hale: 2013, p. 484).

Pérez Altable & Blanco (2016), using SNA and semi-structured interviews, are also stating that the Tunisian uprising had not been solely due to online communication tools such as Twitter. In the last decade, more scholars started to draw attention to the way that these kinds of regimes use social media for their own purposes (MacKinnon, 2011; Morozov, 2011; Oates, 2013; Stukal & Tucker, 2019).

Marwick and Boyd (2011) have examined how users on Twitter see their audiences and manage self-presentation when dealing with networked audiences. Boyd, Golder and Lotan investigated users’ norms and behavior on Twitter via retweeting. Their research focused on reasons and styles of the users’ retweeting, and through series of case studies and empirically retrieved data, their study describes retweeting as a conversational practice (Boyd et al, 2010).

Analysis of paired Twitter and Facebook accounts of the sample of users, done through a social network analysis (SNA), was carried out by Kwon et al (2014). They have compared users’ behavior on both networks and highlighted that the behavior of the same person in two different social networks was not the same. There also was no overlap of any significance between users’ friends on Twitter and on Facebook (Kwon et al, 2014).

Investigating influences on Twitter through data mining tool was the goal of the study by Lahuerta-Otero & Cordero-Gutierrez (2016). Their study found out that mentions and hashtags are in general used more by influencers, but they use less words when they tweet. There has also been found a correlation between the influence and the number of people that influencers follow, how open and clear they are about their feelings. (Lahuerta-Otero & Cordero-Cutierrez, 2016). The combination of linguistic, metalinguistic, and social functions of hashtags was studied through campaigns and circulation of hashtags #JeSuisCharlie/#CharlieHebdos, highlighting the use of hashtags as resources for story-making (Giaxoglou, 2017). Micó and Casero-Ripollés (2014) studied online organization of political activism in the 15M movement, including their use of Twitter and Facebook.

The recent investigations in Spain (Pastor-Galindo et al., 2019) have found presence of political automated bots for all five major parties on Spanish Twitter during the 2019 general election campaign. Political citizen platform “Barcelona in Comú” on Twitter was the topic of research by García-Carretero & Pérez-Altable (2017). The COVID19 pandemic, political communication and spread of fake news has also been researched (e.g. Tous-Roviroso & Dergacheva, 2021; Gruzd & May, 2020; Drylie-Carey et al., 2020) Pérez Altable and Blanco (2016), using social network analysis and semi-structured interviews, also show that the Tunisian uprising had not been solely due to online communication tools such as Twitter. In the last decade, more scholars have started to draw attention to the way that these kinds of regimes use social media for their own purposes (MacKinnon, 2011; Morozov, 2011; Oates, 2013; Stukal & Tucker, 2019).

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#NiUnaMenos Twitter could be used in arranging collective actions against gender violence but not changing existent ideas.

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2.4 Twitter in the Russian context

Twitter has played two roles in Russia. It has been described as a vibrant and unregulated sphere, and up until 2013, social networks within the Russian-speaking segment of the Internet enjoyed relative freedom. For example, longitudinal research by Alexanyan et al (2012) found that the Internet and online debates in Russia were more diverse than those taking place in the public sphere. Renz and Sullivan also note that the previous openness of the Internet in Russia made it the news source of choice for politically engaged users.

Internet freedom in Russia has since been curtailed, yet there is still no evidence of large-scale Internet censorship machine like that seen in China (Koltsova & Bodrunova, 2019), although legislation on sovereign Internet has already been passed. Twitter in Russia has also been vastly used by the government itself, even before the Trump’s Twitter account became news. As Toepl (2012) as well as Renz and Sullivan (2013) highlight, Twitter has been actively used by governors of Russian regions and other government bodies.

“In May 2010, some Russian governors dedicated considerable amounts of their time weekly to keeping online diaries; for others, having a blog published by their press team seemed at least to be a mandatory part of their communication mix. Although most Russian governors started to blog as early as 2008, and the phenomenon of blogging Russian politicians is extremely important for an understanding of Russian political communication” (Toepl, 2012, p. 1436).

Even though this Twitter (and LiveJournal) usage started in the time of Medvedev (2008 – 2012) as president and at least one of the most popular Tweeting governors, Nikita Belykh,¹⁵

¹⁵ See Radio Liberty: <https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-bribery-belykh-kirov-oblast-trial-verdict-update/29010887.html>

is in jail (a case unrelated to Twitter), the governors, en masse, continue to tweet in today's Russia. Overall, the popularity of Twitter in Russia is less than that of Russian networks, such as Vkontakte (Brand Analytics Report, 2019¹⁶). With slightly above 650 000 users, Twitter sits in fourth place in Russia, far behind VKontakte (30 million users), Instagram (27 mln), and Facebook (1.7 million). However, it remains an important medium for news dissemination among politically engaged audiences. Journalists, people engaged in politics and interested in government affairs, as well as opposition politicians are overly present on Twitter (Zherebtsov & Goussev, 2021). The relative absence of enforced regulations of the Russian Internet in comparison to more traditional forms of media has meant that Twitter has emerged as the news source of choice for those politically engaged (Renz & Sullivan, 2013). For example, among the mostly cited top twenty-five Twitter accounts in 2019, five belonged to the opposition elite (not including anonymous accounts with a pseudonymized name) (Brand Analytics, 2019¹⁷).

As noted by Morozov (2011), state agents in Russia prefer to actively set the agenda rather than respond to it.

“If one assumes that authoritarian governments usually fall by surprise—if they are not surprised, they are probably committing suicide (e.g., the case of the Soviet Union)—then we also have to assume that, given how much data on the Internet can be harvested, analyzed, and investigated, surprises may become rarer. But even if the governments' attempts to control—directly or indirectly—the world of Internet search would not bring immediate results, the Internet could boost their intelligence-gathering apparatus in other ways. The advent of social media has made most Internet users increasingly comfortable with the idea of sharing their thoughts and deeds with the world at large. It may not seem obvious, but trolling through all those blog posts, Twitter updates, photos, and videos posted to Facebook and YouTube could yield quite a lot of useful information for intelligence services—and not just about individual habits, as in the Belarusian KGB case, but also about broad social trends and the public mood as a whole.” (Morozov: 2011, p. 166).

According to some scholars, control of the Russian media system and social networks is not done through total censorship but through a blend of techniques, such as manipulation and co-optation (Gunitsky, 2015). Alexanyan et al. (2012) have already described the influence

¹⁶ See the report here: <https://br-analytics.ru/blog/social-media-russia-2019/>

¹⁷ See the report here: <https://br-analytics.ru/blog/social-media-russia-2019/>

of the state on online content via paid bloggers and internet service providers. From the Russian perspective, there is no need for a stricter China model of Internet censorship; the option of subtle censorship is much cheaper and more widely used, as this research will try to prove with the specific case of LGBT news stories on Twitter.

A study of GitHub's free coding repository, in which the codes for creating automated Twitter bots are stored, found that geographically, bot coders are very much dispersed. In terms of the countries with the most bot developers, Russia ranks 23rd; in contrast, almost every second Twitter (automated) bot code was produced by a developer from the US. This trend has continued from 2008, when exactly 50% of bot codes were produced in the US, and the rest were produced in Europe and China (Kollanyi, 2016).

However, many studies have focused on the supposed involvement of Russian bots in recent international events, such as Brexit, the US elections, as well as the EU elections (Howard & Kollanyi, 2016; Stukal et al., 2019; Bail et al., 2019; Syrovátka, 2019). Of those studies that have gathered evidence of Russian involvement, some have tried to show the limited influence these pseudo-users have on international audiences (Bail et al., 2019).

CHAPTER III

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT

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3.1 Theory of hybrid regimes: competitive and electoral authoritarianism

Steven Levitsky, a Harvard professor of government and one of the authors of the term “competitive authoritarianism,” has recently co-authored an opinion piece in *The Guardian*, which is titled “This is How Democracies Die.” In this column, he describes how democracies are “dying” all over the world. But these deaths, he notes, are not because of military coups or foreign interventions but are due the actions of the elected governments themselves (Levitsky, Ziblatt, 2019). Since this transition to more authoritarian forms of government is not immediate, people continue to believe they are living in a democracy while bit by bit, and mostly by legal means, the press starts to self-censor or is bought-off, government critics face legal problems, and judicial branches become subjected to executive control. Levitsky and Ziblatt call this the “backsliding” of democracies and cite Georgia, Hungary, Nicaragua, Peru, the Philippines, Poland, Russia, Sri Lanka, Turkey, and Ukraine as examples of countries in which elected leaders have recently subverted democratic institutions (Levitsky, Ziblatt, 2019). Hungary and Poland, members of the European Union since 2004, are largely defined as countries that are ‘backsliding’ from liberal democracy, with some claiming them becoming authoritarian states today (Bustikova & Guasti, 2017; Mechkova et al, 2017). Turkey is another major example of the defeat of democratic principles of governance (Tansel, 2018; Akyuz & Hess, 2018; Gunter: 2018).

Moreover, several journalists, among them Eduard Luce of the *Financial Times*, have written about the overall retreat of Western liberalism, which is bringing about a resurgence in nationalism and populism not only in former Soviet bloc countries or Turkey but also in the US and other Western democracies too (Luce, 2018). *New York Times’s* columnist David Brooks also believes that democracy in the US has been degraded (Brooks: 2018). It has become clear that electoral, or competitive, authoritarianism is taking the place of democracy in Russia as well as in some other countries of the world.

It is worth mentioning here that the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the USSR at the beginning of the 1990s inspired the philosopher Francis Fukuyama to declare the “end of history” (1992). The idea that the communist view of the world order had lost to the capitalist liberal democracy one, and that Western liberal democracy had become the

ultimate form of government was widespread. It had also signified the culmination of the “Third Democratization Wave,” which Samuel Huntington described as the turn to liberal democracy among countries from the global south in 1974 and among Eastern European and former USSR republics at start of the 1990s (Huntington, 1991).

Within political science, there exists a critique of its former approach to the study of regimes. For a long time, a simplistic dichotomy predominated the field: democracy was on one side of the spectrum, and totalitarianism was on the other, as its “perversion” (Linz: 1975). Every other regime that did not fit into either of them was called authoritarian. Even though Linz has tried to make a typology of those, based on a lot of factors, it looked more like a list than a scientific systematic typology. There was thus no “universally accepted dimensions upon the world’s regimes. There was only democracy, its perversion, and its absence” (Anderson, 2017 p 7).

After the so-called Third Democratization Waive, a whole new branch of political science called transitology, or the study of the transition from authoritarian rule to democracy, both in the global south and Eastern Europe emerged (Anderson, 2017 p. 8). There existed a typology of the regimes, where the differences in regimes was only in the distance from democracy. This approach, which lasted in the final years of the twentieth century, encompassed an idealistic view that the post-Cold war former Soviet regime states were on the path to transition to liberal democracy. This framework was thus used to describe regimes in terms of linear transition from authoritarian rule to democracy: political scientists rather optimistically called the process of regimes’ evolution an “incomplete transition to democracy.” Numerous labels have been used to describe regimes in terms of their diversion from democracy.

“Some of the most popular terms were delegative democracy (O’Donnell, 1994), semi-democracy (Diamond, Linz, & Lipset, 1995), illiberal democracy (Zakaria, 1997), and pseudo-democracy (Diamond, 2002). Most recently, German scholars like Merkel, (2004) built on the concept of defective democracy or incomplete democracy. The central pre-occupation of these scholars was to understand why these diminished forms (or hybrid regimes) were unable to transition to democracy” (Mufti: 2018 p. 112)

Indeed, in the 1990s, many post-Cold War countries blended authoritarian governments and democratic mechanisms. Among such entities are many African (Ghana, Kenya,

Mozambique, Zambia, Zimbabwe), Latin American (Haiti, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru) and Eurasian countries (Albania, Croatia, Russia, Serbia, Ukraine) (Levitsky & Way, 2002).

However, already by the beginning of the 2000s, many of these regimes had proved to be sustainable, demanding a typology and definition of their own. It became obvious that adapting seemingly democratic institutions, such as elections or legislative bodies, was not a transitional stage to democracy but rather a way to support autocracies (Andersen: 2017). At the beginning of the twenty-first century, several autocracies started to adapt nominally democratic institutions to help stabilize their current regime. Indeed, first decade of the twentieth century saw roughly 70% of all the authoritarian states had legislative elections and over 80% had executive elections (Brancati, 2014 p. 314). Moreover, the vast majority of these authoritarian states also allowed multiparty elections. After the Cold War ended, multiparty autocracy appeared to be the most common approach among autocracies, more so than military dictatorships, monarchies, or single party regimes (Magaloni, 2010 p. 751).

A new way to understand these hybrid regimes as typologies on their own terms was needed, not in their relationship to democracy. The term “hybrid regimes,” or those that combine elements of democracy and authoritarianism, was not new. The oligarchic democracies in Latin America in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as well as some of the governments of Southeast Asia, Africa, and Latin America in the 1960s and 70s had multiple parties and held elections while being undemocratic (Diamond: 2002). By the beginning of the 2000s, scholars (Levitsky & Way: 2002; Diamond: 2002) proposed the term “competitive authoritarian” or “electoral authoritarianism.” Diamond also calls it a “pseudodemocracy,” since only after the end of the Cold War did the broadly legitimate form of the regime in the 2000s become the form of democracy under international and domestic pressure. Thus, hybrid regimes adapt and mimic democratic institutions, such as, in most cases, multiparty elections (Diamond: 2002).

According to Brancati (2014), hybrid regimes use democratic mechanisms and institutions to stabilize and preserve the *status quo* of an authoritarian government.

“More than three-quarters of authoritarian states in this period permitted more than one party to participate in these elections. As a result, many have come to wonder if these institutions are a sign that these states are democratizing. A burgeoning literature on

authoritarian states suggests otherwise. This literature looks at both why authoritarian regimes adopt nominally democratic institutions and what effect these institutions have on regime stability. It suggests that these institutions are not an indication that countries are democratizing, but that these institutions ironically help strengthen authoritarian regimes and forestall democratization. Authoritarian regimes adopt nominally democratic institutions in order to protect themselves against potential threats from both within the regime and within society at large through five different mechanisms. (Brancati: 2014, p. 315).

Over the last decade, political science has mostly used a four-fold regime typology with closed and electoral autocracies on the one end of the spectrum and liberal and electoral democracies on the other end (Lührmann et al, 2018 p. 62). Such a four-fold typology has been used both by Schedler (2013) as well as by Diamond (2002), Levitsky and Way (2002), and others.

Lewitsky and Way define “competitive authoritarianism” as a form of authoritarianism in which the formal institutions of democracy are used as the main modes of obtaining and using political authority. The rulers often breach the rules of those institutions; thus, the regime cannot be considered democratic according to the minimal standards used to identify democracies. Some of examples of competitive authoritarianism include Serbia under Slobodan Milosevitch, Russia under Vladimir Putin, Ukraine (before the 2004 revolution), Albania, Armenia, Ghana, Kenya, Malaysia, Mexico, and Zambia in the 1990s (Lewitsky, Way, 2002).

The distinctive features that define competitive authoritarianism, according to Lewitsky and Way (2002), are once again based on their opposition to democratic regimes. Modern democratic regimes have to meet four basic standards:

- 1) Executives and legislatures are chosen through elections that are open, free, and fair;
- 2) virtually all adults possess the right to vote;
- 3) political rights and civil liberties, including freedom of the press, freedom of association, and freedom to criticize the government without reprisal, are broadly protected.
- 4) elected authorities possess real authority to govern, in that they are not subject to the tutelary control of military or clerical leaders. (Lewitsky, Way, 2002 p 53)

Of course, formally democratic states do violate these criteria. However, until recently, these violations were not repeated on a large scale. Competitive authoritarian regimes, in

contrast, violate these basic standards on a large scale and in prolonged, systematic ways so that the playing field between the government and the opposition is uneven (Lewitsky, Way, 2002). Although these regimes generally do hold multiparty elections, sometimes without a massive-scale fraud, they are guilty of other violations:

- 1) the government in charge abuses state resources
- 2) does not let the opposition to have appearances in the media
- 3) leaders, members and supporters of the opposition get persecuted, harassed or oppressed
- 4) when needed, election results are manipulated. (Schedler, 2013 p.12)

Schedler also defines the competitive authoritarianism as “electoral authoritarianism,” the main feature of which is that behind the seemingly democratic institutions, such as national-level multiparty elections, there exists a violation of the standards of democracy that is deeply rooted and widespread. Features of electoral authoritarianism, according to Schedler, include the following:

- 1) holding multiparty elections on a regular basis, both for the legislative, as well as executive, branches of the government
- 2) all the population has access to vote (the so-called “universal suffrage” is supported)
- 3) some of the opposition parties can participate in the elections (“minimally pluralistic”)
- 4) some of the parties and candidates who do not belong to the party or coalition in power are permitted to win some votes, but never a full-scale victory (“minimally competitive”)
- 5) only selective and fragmentary, not massive, repression of the opposition leaders, members and supporters is applied (“minimally open”)
- 6) governments manipulate the elections in ways that violate the principles of fairness, freedom and integrity in systematic, harsh and continuous manner. (Schedler, 2013)

Schedler created a theoretical framework, regime-centered political institutionalism, to study these autocracies. It focuses on uncertainty and competition as the main political forces in authoritarian states. Insecurity within autocracies develops from both institutional and informational uncertainties (they are never sure how secure their hold on power is). According to Schedler, the actors in electoral authoritarianism struggle under

uncertainty at two levels: over votes during the imitation of elections and over rules of institutional change. In addition to the ongoing insecurity and uncertainty of the future of the regime, there is also the uncertainty of the authoritarian present, or facts. Schedler understands it as a driving force between rulers in electoral autocracies and their opponents. His framework is supported by the earlier works of O'Donnell & Schmitter (1986) and Bunce & Wolchik (2011).

“Regime-centered political institutionalism... focuses on the conflictive interaction between pro-regime and anti-regime actors. The former defends the political status quo, the latter strive to transform it. Regime conflicts confront the state with its citizens, but they also divide the citizenry within and often the ruling elite too”. (Schedler, 2013 p. 10).

For this research, I will use the definition of ‘electoral authoritarianism’ by Schedler and his framework of regime-centered political institutionalism.

As described earlier in this chapter, many countries are sliding towards authoritarianism, including Hungary and Poland, members of the EU, Turkey, as well as the US – at least during President Trump’s rule (2017 – 2021) (Bustikova & Guasti, 2017; Mechkova et al., 2017; Tansel, 2018; Akyuz & Hess, 2018; Gunter, 2018). Russia is also an example of a transition to democracy that never happened.

After the collapse of the USSR in 1991, Russia underwent several drastic political changes. A “bloodless democratic revolution” that overthrew the Soviet regime (Sakwa, 2017) did not lead to the appearance of democratic mechanisms, since the first Russian president Yeltsin (1991 – 1999) and his government did not immediately announce national or regional elections but relied instead on the old elite and “nomenklatura” that was already been in place, especially in the regional areas (Golosov, 2015). In addition, Russia was declared a continuer-state after the USSR’s dissolution; it assumed responsibility of the former Soviet Empire in international treaties and inherited its nuclear arsenal but also Soviet institutions and the Soviet elite. This continuity had a long-lasting impact and resulted in the reproduction of neo-imperial aspirations, which was somewhat balanced by the adaptation of a liberal constitution (Sakwa, 2017). In 2003, Balzer defined the beginning years of Vladimir Putin’s presidency (1999 – 2008; 2012 – present) as “managed pluralism,” referring to the regime’s attempt to both support and limit diversity while being outside of categories of both authoritarianism as well as democracy (Blazer: 2003). In 2010, Lipman, Petrov, and

Hale called the Russian political order of Putin's second term onward an "over-managed democracy," which while being a hybrid regime combines the central position of the state with the partial destruction of democratic institutions. This regime type still has some of its initial functions but never to the extent of challenging the current rulers (Petrov et al, 2010). After 2010, practically no researchers used the term 'democracy' to describe the Russian regime. Researchers have come to a number of conclusions about the Russian state under Vladimir Putin:

"outrageously unfair and fraudulent elections, the coexistence of weak and impotent political parties with a dominant "party of power," a heavily censored (often self-censored) media, rubber-stamping legislatures at the national and sub-national levels, politically subordinated courts, arbitrary use of the economic powers of the state, and widespread corruption." (Gelman, 2014, p. 503).

At the same time, the regime in Russia of the last decade has also been defined as 'competitive authoritarianism' or 'electoral authoritarianism' by various researchers (Levitsky, Way, 2002; Hale, 2010; Petrov, Lipman & Hale, 2013; Schedler, 2013; Golosov, 2015; Gelman, 2015; White & Herzok, 2016; Sakwa, 2017, Robinson & Miln, 2017).

Russia has also been called a 'consolidated authoritarian regime' (Kuzuo, 2016) as well as a fascist political system (Motyl, 2016), but these definitions are rare. Most research defines the Russian political regime as either competitive or electoral authoritarianism, which will be the case in this research as well. After having reviewed the theoretical framework on Russian politics, this paper follows Schedler's observation (2013) that the current Russian regime fulfills all the requirements for it to be labelled an example of electoral authoritarianism:

1) Multiparty elections are held in Russia on a regular basis, both for the legislative as well as the executive branches of government. There exist regular elections for all legislative bodies (national, regional, and municipal). There exist (albeit formally) regular presidential elections conducted every six years. It is worth mentioning that during Soviet times, USSR citizens were not able to choose between candidate in a ballot but only vote "yes" or "no" to a Communist Party candidate; ballots were not kept private and voting "no" could have negative consequences. However, starting from the 1990s, the ballot in Russian elections

has had several candidates, and the voting procedure is done in private (Claypool et al., 2018).

2) All the population has access to vote (so-called universal suffrage is supported). Every citizen of Russia who has 18 years old and over has a right to vote (Article 32 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation). So far, instances of denying voting rights to any group of citizens have not been widespread or systematic.

3) Some opposition parties can participate in the elections (“minimally pluralistic”). In Russia, some opposition parties do participate in elections. As one of the regional elections (September 2018) for governor showed, the candidate of an opposition party can even win the election. A few other parties also operate on the outskirts of the Russian political sphere. They do not appear to pose any threat to the regime while lessening the uncertainty of widening opposition forces (Hale, 2006).

4) Some of the parties and candidates who do not belong to the party or coalition in power are permitted to win some votes but never a full-scale victory (“minimally competitive”). In Russia, even though the ruling party always wins a majority, some votes go to opposition parties as well.

5) Only selective and fragmentary, not massive, repression of the opposition leaders, members, and supporters is applied (“minimally open”). Though growing in scale from 2012, the repression mechanisms in Russia have been selective in the past ten years in Russia. In 2012, after the street protests of 2011 – 12, some experts agreed that the presidential administration in the Kremlin would begin¹⁸ tightening of screws. However, the list of political prisoners in Russia at that time still consisted of only 70 names, an extremely low number in comparison to many other autocracies (Gelman: 2014). It is true that since 2013, new legislation on extremism and public gatherings was introduced and that the number of people prosecuted under these new amendments has risen, these “selective” repressions still cannot be qualified as massive. The year 2021, though, might show a change in the policies of selective repression. In January, the prominent opposition leader Alexey Navalnyi

¹⁸ https://www.ng.ru/politics/2012-07-12/1_konsolidaciya.html?utm_source=yxnews&utm_medium=desktop&utm_referrer=https%3A%2F%2Fyandex.ru%2Fnews%2Fsearch%3Ftext%3D

was put in jail, and his foundation, FBK, was proclaimed an extremist organization.¹⁹ Over 1700 Navalny supporters were arrested during the April protests, which were to support him.²⁰ The number of prisoners classified as “political” by the human rights NGO Memorial in Russia has risen to 373 (this includes people persecuted for religious beliefs as well²¹).

6) Governments manipulate the elections in ways that violate the principles of fairness, freedom, and integrity in systematic, harsh, and continuous manner (Shedler, 2013). It is widely agreed by scholars that the Russian political regime deprives elections of its main role as transfer of power and political choice and uses the latter as a sign of current regime’s sustainability and mobilization (Gill, 2006; Hassner, 2008; McFaul & Stoner-Weiss, 2008).

3.2. Consultative and networked authoritarianism

Consultative authoritarianism is another term that has been widely used since the end of 2010s. It refers to the usage of the Internet’s quasi-democratic institutions, such as online voting (Toepfl, 2018), to support authoritarian regimes. Simultaneously, networked authoritarianism’ is founded on the ways authoritarian states have learned to use digital technologies in their favor (MacKinnon, 2011). ‘Networked authoritarianism’ is the term used to describe the controlling techniques used by authoritarian governments on the Internet to limit dissent and opposition. These techniques include content censorship, legal restrictions of online speech, the ban of certain sites, as well as the use of Internet trolls. While networked authoritarianism does not exercise complete control of the Internet, allowing a degree of freedom of communication, the government puts in place a system of censorship, control, and public opinion manipulation (MacKinnon, 2011). Under this approach, the main way to sustain the legitimacy and stability of the regime is to allow some degree of freedom of communication on some issues rather than completely suppressing online criticism.

The case of China highlights the ways in which an authoritarian regime can use the Internet to strengthen the regime’s legitimacy through networked technologies (MacKinnon: 2011). As noted in Hyun et al., the use of social media within networked authoritarianism

¹⁹ See at the BBC: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-56888845>

²⁰ See at Reuters: <https://www.reuters.com/world/russia-rounds-up-almost-200-people-protests-over-navalnys-failing-health-2021-04-21/>

²¹ Human rights center Memorial website: Memohrc.org/en

can support the regime and its articulated ideologies (Hyun et al: 2014). The authoritarian countries cannot abstain from the technologies of the new media if they intend to develop socially and economically in the world today, but they also use the Internet as a way to strengthen the legitimacy of the regime and uphold societal stability (Li & Lee, 2015).

Asmolov (2021) states that Russian online space exists in a dichotomy, a combination of its old independent architecture and the state's surveillance. He gives as an example the social network Vkontakte:

“At present, VKontakte cooperates with Russian authorities and allows surveillance of content by Russian security forces. At the same time, despite stricter copyright regulations, it still serves as a major host for pirated music, movies, and pornography. VKontakte embodies the contradictions of Runet, where the libertarian spirit of Durov's (*VKontakte's founder who later sold it and immigrated*) vision coexists with the state's online regulation and surveillance model. (Asmolov, 2021, p. 52)

While Russia is described by researchers as a country with competitive authoritarianism, there have not been many studies on the regime's relationship with the new media and social networks in particular. Some scholars have addressed possible influence of the regime on social networking sites or platforms. The first ones were computer science studies, which emerged between 2016 and 2018, with the accusation of Russian social media bots meddling in various elections (Stukal et al, 2017; Sanovich, 2017). Just recently, some Russian researchers studied user-generated content, mostly exploring its role in political protests and civil activity (Koltsova & Bodrunova, 2019). There are also studies on authoritarian deliberation within online media with opposing political views (Filatova et al, 2019) and social media clusters of pro-government and opposition users (Goncharov & Nechay, 2018; Zherebtsov & Goussev, 2021). However, Koltsova and Bodrunova (2019) highlight that the structure and content of online discussions in Russia remain seriously understudied. This study intends to add to this field of scholarship as well as to the study of media and social networks — and their role in constructing state strategic narratives under competitive authoritarianism.

3.3. 'State narratives' in competitive authoritarianism: framing state strategic narratives in Russia

This section examines the approach of a competitive authoritarianism state, such as Russia, to create and promote its preferred self-identity in a competitive struggle with the West. Using the strategic narrative conceptual framework (Miskimmon et al, 2013) and framing theory (Goffman, 1974), this study looks at ways the Russian state constructs and changes its strategic narratives and which frames have been put in place by state actors (including the media) over the years. This study also investigates the ways in which Russian state strategic narratives formed a certain and gradual opposition to the West at the beginning of the 2000s. This opposition also led to the appearance of neo-conservative ideology, neo-desecularization, and traditional values discourses, which subsequently included the prosecution of LGBT as an “out-group” for Russia’s strategic narrative, and subsequently national identity and ideology construction by the 2020s.

“While agenda setting and framing form the basis of much of political communication research, the study of narratives gives an opportunity to make a closer link between media content and state intentions by measuring strategic narratives” Oates, 2014, p.3.

Sanchez-Resalt and Tarin- Sanz highlight that “Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the idea of Russian Federation having its ‘own special way’ to pass from the soviet model to a market-based one, have been very popular among Russian citizens” (Sanchez-Resalt & Tarin-Sanz, 2018, p.15).

However, the “collateral damage” of this discourse has been the Russian LGBT community, as it seems that the worse the international relations with the countries perceived as Western have become, the more homophobic discourses haven been promoted as part of the Russian national identity within the ‘state narrative’. This paper suggests that the LGBT community in Russia is indeed a victim of Russia’s strategic narrative, which contrasts the “liberal” values in geopolitics, or at least, this is how official homophobia has begun in modern-day Russia.

Miskimmon et al. (2013) have argued that “there are multiple narratives with which the state engages... there are also narratives about the people of the state or the nation itself” (Miskimmon et al., 2013, p. 33). Moreover, state strategic narratives are usually articulated by state leaders, but there also exist collective identities articulated by other political actors (ibid, p. 35). The term itself comes from the intersection of communication and international relations studies. Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, and Roselle (2013) summarize what has been

written about the term up to this date and make theoretical implications for both international relations as well as communication. They cite Castell's theory of communication power (2007), Freedman's "Networks, Culture and Narratives" (2006), as well as Nye's concept of soft power (1990) as the foundation of the framework on strategic 'state narratives' that they themselves have created (Miskimmon, O'Loughlin and Roselle: 2013, p. 2). Explaining the nature of the term "narrative" as a framework allow humans to connect apparently unconnected phenomena around some causal transformation, as derived from Kenneth Burke, (1969), (ibid p. 3). They further identify the strategic 'state narrative' as follows:

"Strategic narratives are a tool for political actors to extend their influence, manage expectations, and change the discursive environment in which they operate. They are narratives about both states and the system itself, both about who we are and what kind of order we want. The point of strategic narratives is to influence the behavior of others."
(Miskimmon et al., 2013 p.5)

They also highlight that there are both strategic narratives about international actors' structure and behavior in the international system as well as national or 'state narratives' that focus on the state itself. This relates to national narratives that include characterizations of the state as an actor. As an example, they cite work on national character or role theory, work on American exceptionalism, and work on nationalist ideology as a regenerationist myth. (ibid, p. 3). The Spanish regenerationist movement was an influential one in the aftermath of disastrous Spanish-American War of 1898. It portrayed Spain both as a sick organism in need of remedy as well as a part of a new world order, in which the country had to use its natural and geographic advantages in order to succeed in the international marketplace (Driever, 1998, p. 37). This, according to the strategic narratives' framework, was a clear-cut example of one.

"Strategic narratives are representations of a sequence of events and identities, a communicative tool through which political actors—usually elites—attempt to give determined meaning to past, present, and future in order to achieve political objectives. Critically, strategic narratives integrate interests and goals—they articulate end states and suggest how to get there." (Miskimmon et al., 2013, p.5).

There is a distinction that needs to be made between strategic narratives, discourses, and framing. In the strategic narratives' framework, the concept of discourses as Foucault defined them (1972), have a structural effect upon narrative, since actors use discourses available to them in the current historical situation. "Actors reflexively work with discourse to construct narratives with the instrumental aim to influence the opinions and behavior of others. History, analogies, metaphors, symbols, and images can trigger and/or shape narratives" (Miskimmon et al., 2013, p. 7).

Framing is also the building instrument for strategic narratives. Framing involves processes of inclusion and exclusion as well as emphasis. Entman (1993) describes the framing processes:

"Framing essentially involves selection and salience. To frame is to select some aspects of perceived reality and make them more salient in the communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation and/or treatment recommendation for the item described. Frames, then, define problems—determine what a causal agent is doing and costs and benefits, usually measured in terms of cultural values; diagnose causes—identify the forces creating the problem; make moral judgments—evaluate causal agents and their effects; and suggest remedies—offer and justify treatments for the problem and predict their likely effects" (Entman, 1993, p. 55)

There is a large body of literature that exists on news framing. Aalberg et al. (2012), for example, have reviewed research in news framing in political communication. The various approaches applied to the study of news framing has also been summarized by de Vreese (2005). Studies have also explored discourse analysis and framing in Russian media and policy papers (e.g. Stella & Nartova, 2016) and in US political speeches (e.g. Wolfsfeld, 2004); studies have also examined framing's effects on attitudes (e.g. Pfau et al: 1995) and in other areas (de Vreese, 2005). A narrative, in contrast with a frame, has a temporal dimension: it must introduce the past causes and future outcomes (Miskimmon et al., 2013). So, the narrative, while not being equal to a frame, must be framed in a certain way in its various components. The two are closely intertwined, and frames are constituting components of the 'state narrative' (ibid).

Yet media ecologies, including social media, which includes transnational perspectives on events, are changing rapidly and can challenge the narrative construction (Miskimmon et al.,

2013). These factors are included in this study's research questions because the field of social media (in our case Twitter) is not only where the state strategic narratives might be constructed but also where they might be challenged.

The Russian strategic 'state narrative' has changed drastically since the collapse of the USSR, which transformed Russia from a great power to a normal power (Miskimmon et al., 2013). However, in the post-Soviet period (1991 – 2021), Russia has developed its own narrative, which the political elite has already changed several times. Some researchers coincide this change with the change in international relations, especially the US-Russia ones (Janeliunas & Kojala, 2019).

Some authors declare that after the collapse of the USSR, Russian foreign policy, though hectic, was showing an initial pro-Western orientation, which was associated with the post-Soviet Russia's first president Boris Yeltsin (1991 – 1999) and the political elite of that time (McFaul, 1999). However, as democratic institutions were never strengthened, presidential power, as was described in Chapter II (competitive authoritarianism in Russia), has changed the narrative several times. Some researchers highlight three types of political elites in modern Russia: pro-liberal, power balancers, and Slavic nationalists (Tsygankov, 2010). However, in the years following 2012, the nationalists have gained more prominence, thus promoting "Russia's exceptional values and mission to lead the Slavic world, and to oppose Western traditions and even democratic values" (Janeliunas & Kojala, 2019, p. 263). Connecting this change to the first peaceful protests (2011 – 2012) against unfair elections in Moscow (Makarychev & Medvedev, 2015) or a desire to balance the increasing role of the US, especially in the Central and Eastern Europe (Sakwa, 2014), the 'state narrative' has nevertheless changed to a neo-conservative one, which depicts the countries with liberal democratic regimes as "other" and emphasizes the importance of traditional morals and values. As Stella and Nartova highlighted in 2015:

"Less attention, however, has been given in recent work to other articulations of sexuality and nationalism, which, unlike homonationalism or femonationalism, do not hinge on liberal attitudes towards sexual and reproductive rights as a defining feature of national identity but emphasise 'traditional' family values, gender roles and sexual norms... we seek to understand how discourses about the national interest, national identity and patriotism in contemporary Russia promote a specific brand of sexual conservatism as a shared value, as

well as specific sexual and gender normativities which are constructed as ‘traditionally Russian’” (Stella & Nartova, 2015, p. 18)

Yet others connect the neo-conservative turn to Russia’s patriarchal society as well as the machismo of the main political actor, President Putin, whose legitimation strategy highlighted his masculine attributes. This in turn provoked the opponents to use a look-alike gendered reply, which included not only notions of masculinity/femininity but also homophobic rhetoric. Legitimizing the regime also involves other notions, such as family values, national patriotic pride, as well as gender norms. Sperling also calls attention to the fact that politicians could utilize these norms only if and when there exists a tradition of patriarchy and sexism en masse (Sperling, 2015).

However, recently there have appeared other views not connected to one political actor concerning the changes that have happened in Russia over the past decade. A group of researchers (Kivinen & Humphreys, 2021) in a recent collection of articles on Russian modernization provide a hypothesis. As European conservatism was a reaction to the unintended results of the French Revolution, Russian conservatism is a reaction to the results of two great transformations: first, the failed leftist project of USSR, and second, the turn toward liberalism in 1990, which resulted in chaos and poverty. It seems that this reaction provoked that both the socialist as well as liberal ideas are ‘discredited’ in the mass perception.

“If we look at the broader field of ideology and culture, we can conclude that Russia has a special antinomy between global processes versus nationalistic closing. In the contemporary world, Russia wants to be a global conservative player, even arguing that it represents the *original* Western values... In fact these two antinomies: the **conservative hegemonic project** versus **secular liberalism**, and **global processes** versus **nationalistic closing** are interdependent in a complex way. Liberal ideas of human rights and democracy flow in when the society is more or less open to international information networks. A very consolidated conservative hegemonic project can also cause unintended consequences. Individualistic consumption and mass culture contradict the idea of nationalistic and religious mythologies at the ‘paleosymbolic’ level of basic cultural codes.” (Kivinen & Humphreys: 2021, p. 136)

In the beginning, when the USSR collapsed in 1991, many of sacred taboos suddenly ended, especially those connected to the perception of foreigners (especially from the Western

liberal democracy countries, as they almost never allowed into the USSR, and the Soviet citizens were never allowed to visit those countries). In addition, since there was a shortage of practically everything in the USSR in terms of consumer culture, a mystification around all Western things had been created; individual objects of Western origins were considered almost “magical” (Kivinen & Mustajoki, 2021).

When the borders opened in the early 1990s, Western consumption products and culture came pouring into the market, also bringing a change to a closed Soviet mass culture by a forceful and all-encompassing Western, especially Anglo-Saxon popular culture (ibid. p 148)



A satirical re-make of a song by a pop band Pet Shop Boys (1993) “Go West” (where the skies are blue..) has been widely popular in post-Soviet Russia. Photo – youtube.com. Pet Shop Boys, album “Very”, Parlophone Studio.

Some researchers have also described the changes in sexual practices and public discourse in post-Soviet Russia as a “sexual revolution” (Temkina & Rotkirh, 2002; Kon, 2010). Moreover, the term “sexual revolution” was being discussed not only in the Russian Post-Soviet context but also in other post-Soviet countries at the beginning of the 1990s (Lukjanova & Ostrovska, 2015). Others state that Russia was only following a universal trend in transforming its sexual culture and its liberation of sex from purely its reproductive function (Kon, 2010). Thus, this sexual revolution was anti-Soviet in its essence (Kon & Riordan, 1993). According to these authors, attitudes to sex in post-Soviet Russia became a symbol of the new, hedonistic, and pro-Western mentality. As Baer (2009) points out, some Western authors were even referring to the perception of sex and sexual identity in Russia at that time as liberating.

Laura Essig (1995) helps us to understand the situation in the 1990s, as she wrote a book based on her field work living in Russia in the 1990s. As Essig herself admitted, she was imagining Russia as a “fantasy” of a world of multiple desires and flexible identities, that was not yet colonized by sex and its meaning.” Furthermore, Baer (2009) analyzes the literature and cinema that appeared after the collapse of the USSR and highlights the complexities that accompanied changing perceptions of homosexuality in Russia in the 2000s.

“The association of homosexuality with the West is something evident at both ends of the political spectrum and across generations. While cultural conservatives routinely discuss homosexuality as a sign of the unwanted infiltration of Western values and diseases, many Russian young people, too, insist on the ‘non-native origin of homosexuality – and more recently bi-sexuality’ (Baer, 2009, p. 6).

During the Soviet period, men having sex with men was against the law, and the law was only repealed after the collapse of the USSR in 1993 (Gessen, 1994). Sex-change operations (Kon: 2010; Belkin & Golubeva, 1979) and the double life of Soviet lesbians (with an official marriage with a man), for example (Stella: 2015) were all a reality, as were real prison sentences for being gay (Mole, 2018).

“Following the death of Lenin (1924), the political goal under Stalin (1922 – 1953) was not to bring about the revolution but to ensure absolute control over society, with this shift in objectives bringing about a hardening of attitudes towards adultery and the eventual recriminalization of homosexuality in 1934 and abortion in 1936. The “Soviet body”, according to official rhetoric, was meant only for hard work, sport, and building communism, not sex. While the Khrushchev (1953-1964) era ushered in a Thaw in sexual as well as political relations and saw the decriminalization of abortion (although not homosexuality) in 1954, sex education remained non-existent, contraceptives were of poor quality, and sexual freedom was constrained by the lack of private space for young people, who had to resort to having sex in parks, woods, and stairwells. This situation continued throughout the stagnation years of the Brezhnev (1964 – 1982) era, until *glasnost* encouraged Soviet citizens to discuss issues that had heretofore been taboo.” (Mole: 2018, p. 1049)

Gradskova, on the other hand, highlights that the ‘developmental paradigm’ that Russia was following the ‘Western modernizing path’ was challenged later by some scholars on queer sexualities (Gradskova, 2020, p. 392).

However, the non-existent earlier sexual revolution discourse in post-Soviet Russia, including positive narratives about the LGBT community as one of the features of a pro-Western mentality, was brought about in the early 1990s by both liberal values, which prevailed among the ruling elite at the time, as well as by Anglo-Saxon popular culture. The latter at that time had already started framing LGBT identities as normal and socially including lesbians and gay men (Dhoest, 2020).

As one example of a new way of approaching sexual life in Russia in the 1990s, Gradskova (2020) studied talk shows, a TV-genre imported from the West. For the first time in many years, sexual experiences, practices, and norms were being discussed on television. She highlights, though, that they were mostly discussed as a matter of personal life rather than as political because talk shows (at least Western ones) are often characterized by exploring personal issues.

At the same time, the 1990s also presented several problems in Russia: a value vacuum, extreme poverty, as well as a lack of social capital and trust.

“This transition is characterised by a rapid decline in gross domestic product (GDP), especially affecting industrial production, and high inflation... Anyone dependent on the state budget, especially pensioners, the disabled, the unemployed, civil servants and military personnel, experienced a sharp drop in living standards...The sudden collapse of the Soviet system disrupted the very basis of the organisation of production. Previously, the system provided universal human security, including full employment, controlled prices of essential goods, universal health care, education and a broad safety net to guarantee residents' minimum needs” (Atlani et al: 2000, p. 1547)

Byzov highlights that while a neo-conservative wave was visible in Russia in the beginning of 2000s, he suggests that it was mostly due to the aspirations of the newly emerged middle-class to uphold the social order, the conservative revolution of the 2014 and further on has several explanations. First of all, some believe that this revolution was delayed by over 20 years because of the failure of liberal democrats to establish a post-Soviet state (Byzov, 2017 p. 3); a historical, natural process of a setback which happens when something as radical as shock therapy happens. Murrell (1993) defines shock therapy reform programs as those “whose central element is an uncompromisingly radical stance toward existing society” (p. 111) and cites Poland and Russia as two examples of such reforms in the 1990s. He also

highlights that they were encouraged by International Monetary Fund and promoted but only weakly aided by Western economies (ibid p. 110). The economists Sachs and Aslund advised the Russian and Polish governments during these reforms (1992 – 1994). As Marangos (2013) suggests, they guided the shock therapy process of transition in order to immediately establish the market economy, sometimes ignoring evidence of its failures (Marangos, 2013).

However, Byzov doubts that this kind of postponed reaction, an evident change in the ‘psychological atmosphere’ and evolution of a value system in Russia towards conservative, which gained momentum in the last 15 years, marked by the deep polarization in the society, has not been superimposed on this natural process by the Putin’s “meta-ideology” (Byzov, 2017, p. 4- 5). This is not surprising, he continues, since starting from after the mass protests of 2011–12, official state ideology became more conservative, and Putin himself during his speech to the Federal Assembly in 2012 stressed that “Russia would be able to stand up against the erosion of moral norms and the ‘chaotic darkness of the Middle Ages’ coming from the West” (Byzov, 2017, p.8).

Previous research suggests that at the same time with ‘Western’ consumption habits and popular culture, some of the ‘old’ Russian orthodoxy are also returning, filling up the vacuum created by the collapse of ‘Soviet sacred’ (Aitamurto & Kahla, 2021, p. 157). An epoch of de-secularization begins, although for many Russians, still, and especially then, being religious is sometimes only a fashion, without any previous knowledge of the matter (ibid p. 158). Massive de-secularization is accompanied by

“a broader conservative offensive that becomes dominant when the economic and political resources of ideological state apparatuses are consolidated towards the end of that decade. This development is linked with the new ruling party United Russia, as well as with the more anti-Western foreign policy, especially after President Putin’s Munich speech in 2007 and the Georgian War of 2008” (Kivinen & Mustajoki, 2021, p. 149).

According to Szostek (2017), the Russian ‘state narrative’ of the latest decade has been centered around fighting the enemy - an intense anti-Western and anti-American political and media discourse, which was formulated to defend against rival, threatening narratives projected from other countries (Szostec, 2017, p. 571). However, some scholars note that this neo-conservatism in Russia is a strange mix of ideas. Bluhm (2016), who has studied

Russian neoconservatives, states that Russian think tanks are taking into account European conservatism, neoliberalism, and geopolitics not unlike neocons in the US. Yet they criticize globalization and emphasize the nation, which may bring them closer to the critics of the European Union and anti-globalization coalitions.

“To make the mix even more complicated, all contemporary think tanks deal with modernization and geopolitics. The geopolitical aspect is connected with an interpretation of the Great Patriotic War in a sense that Russian conservatives see themselves as guardians of the joint victory. Thus, revisionists of the international order are seen as a “New Europe”, challenging the Yalta agreement-based international order. For these conservatives, modernization is always on the agenda but meaning almost exclusively only what we have in this book called “narrow modernization”, technological modernization, usually accompanied by some ideas about mixed economy.” (Kivinen & Mustajoki, 2021, p. 151)

In addition, Russian economic elites, according to various scholars, are also divided in their approach toward Western neoliberal ideas (*Aalto & Lowry: 2021; Roberts & Hudson: 2016*). While there is still a neoliberal majority in the Russian economic establishment, since about the mid-2000s, others have begun to advocate for Russia to prioritize its own resources, protesting the neoliberal approach, which they mirror Western policies (*Roberts & Hudson, 2016*).

Some ideas link the neo-conservative turn with the so-called remasculinization of Russia, which emphasizes the masculine nature of Russia (*Ryabov & Ryabova, 2014*). These thinkers also note the appearance of official ‘state narrative’ (in response, as they say, to the accusation of gender deviancy of the regime (too masculine)).

“The most prominent feature of their response is the urge to ascribe them to Western influence. This discourse describes the West as a danger to the very foundations of the gender order of Russian civilization. even Sergei Lavrov characterized the European Union’s support for the Russian gay community as “attempts to load universal approaches with additional personal views of human rights . . . these attempts go beyond universally accepted values.”¹⁰⁴as is well known, the accusation of opponents’ homosexuality has served as a weapon in political battles (for example, during the McCarthy era in the United States).¹⁰⁵ The assertion that political opponents are homosexual (“abnormal in the gender sense”) aims to represent them as abnormal also in the political sense (pro-Western).” (*Ryabov & Ryabova: 2014, p. 31*).

In discussing homosexuality, these authors mention the term “Gayropa,” which highlights for them the demasculinization of Europe and places homosexuality at the core of European living. In contrast with Europe, which has drowned in its sins of homosexuality, same-sex marriages, and feminism, Russia emphasizes morality, and the authorities work to protect this (ibid, p. 29).

As it has been formerly explained, there is a strong relationship between the LGBT ‘state narrative’, anti-Western sentiments, and the promotion/preservation of traditional values. This change in the ‘state narrative’ from pro-Western to anti-Western can be seen, among other frames, in the framing of the LGBT community both in the media as well as in government policies and official speeches.

For example, in February 2013, it was still possible that one of the most read printed magazines in Moscow, *Afisha* (it distributed about 100 000 copies in 2013 [afisha.ru: 2021]), could publish an edition with rainbow colors as its cover and that featured 30 stories of people identifying themselves as LGBT.



The announcement of this new issue among different social network platforms read as follows:

This is an issue with stories of 30 Russian gay people: from a locksmith to a PR manager, from an intensive care physician to a pastry chef, from an official of the mayor's office to the program director of an orchestra. In addition: what do their fellow citizens think of gays -

parishioners of the Danilovsky Monastery, passersby on Krasny Oktyabr and Pushkinskaya, workers of the Rot-Front factory, students of Moscow State University, and officials of the State Duma and Government. (Facebook page of Afisha magazine: 2013)

However, in June 2013, the law “Against LGBT propaganda for children” was adapted (Federal Law 135 of Criminal Code of the Russian Federation), which implemented substantial financial penalties for a story like the one above. Research by Emil Persson concerning main Russian media sources during the campaign, when Russian parliament passed a law against propaganda of “non-traditional sexual relations” (2013), showed frames that the media used to talk about the LGBT community. Persson uses theories on visibility, media, and belonging to describe the narratives used, in which non-heterosexuals are presented as a risk to the continuity of the nation itself. He also mentions that this narrative included a frame of radical minority norms being imposed on the majority and a frame of the Western origins of homosexuality and the West’s wish to extinguish Russia and Russian ‘traditional’ values (Persson, 2015).

It seems that the Russian ‘state narrative’ constructs its description of LGBT as ‘others’ in the same frames that during the 1990s geopolitical landscape was constructed as ‘the clash of civilizations’. However, if in the beginning, after the collapse of the ‘soviet sacred’ and appearance of all things Western, including the powerful mass culture, post-Soviet Russia and its political elites were themselves on the ‘Western’ side of civilizational clash. Afterwards, through the 2000s and 2010s, when the neo-conservative narrative developed, it increasingly framed the Russian cultural and national identity as ‘anti-Western’ (but not in any way ‘eastern’ either), although as some researchers suggest, Russia, among some other countries, on the basis of being non-LGBT friendly, are constructed as ‘others’ in the Western Europe, too (Dhoest, 2020). Gender and sexual politics continue to frame state national narratives in Europe as much as in Russia.

“Thus, in a European context, we can observe various ways in which homosexuality is played out in national debates about national identity, ‘multicultural society’ and Islam, while in a wider geopolitical realm, it emerges as a marker of the ‘civilized West’” (Bracke, 2012, p. 244).

In 2009, Baer states, homosexuality in the US was also similarly situated in highly charged oppositions as it was in Russia, for instance, the liberal-conservative or modern-traditional

oppositions, to mention a few. “However, in Russia - as in many other non-Western societies -the homosexual is deeply implicated in a cultural contest with the West” (Baer, 2009 p. 6). It is intensely connected to Western cultural codes, such as values (noticeable sexuality, sex for pleasure, consumerism) as well as political notions (civil rights, tolerance, diversity). In many cases, Baer admits, it is usually depicted as very threatening to the Russian male in an immensely patriarchal society (Baer, 2009).

“The increasingly widespread Russian neologism “gayropa” points to the distinctive feature of Western Europe’s demasculinization: homosexuality as the essence of the European lifestyle. The hegemonic discourse of Russian nationalism depicts Europe as a degenerate civilization best manifested in the collapse of the traditional gender order: the triumph of homosexuals and feminists, the legalization of same-sex marriages, and the destruction of the family.” (Ryabov & Ryabova: 2014, p. 41)

Increasingly, Russia, though not in any sense positioning itself as an ally of Islam (on the contrary), has also framed its ‘state narrative’ as anti-Western in terms of both gender and sexual politics. As several scholars have indicated, sexual minorities in Russian national identity, as defined by the ‘state narrative’, are inherently framed as part of the “out-group,” which takes many forms, but the most important of which is Russia’s opposition to Western liberal values (Ryabov & Ryabova, 2014; Makarychev & Medvedev, 2015; Healey, 2014; Kondakov, 2014, Essig, 2014).

While secular liberalism and global processes prevailed in the 1990s in post-Soviet Russia, in the late 2010s, the conservative hegemonic project and nationalistic closing became the ‘state narratives’. Even though the elites do not agree on the form or degree of conservatism, the Russian Orthodox Church is usually taken as an example for neo-conservative morals and values. Widely popular, especially after Putin’s speech at the annual think-tank Valdai (2012), is the idea that “Gayropa” (the term used to refer to Western liberal democratic countries) is giving up genuine Christianity, which is still being preserved in Russia (Aitamurto & Kahla, 2021).

Based on the previous studies of the Russian neo-conservative narrative, the frame of the Russian ‘state narrative’ concerning the LGBT community can be defined as follows: the LGBT community is depicted as an “Out-group”.

LGBT, apparently depicted as an “Out-group”. On the one hand, this “Out-group” does not belong to the traditional Russian nation, society and values, constructed through the state strategic narrative of neo-conservatism and ‘upholder of traditions. Since the Russian state strategic narrative is contrasting itself with the so-called ‘western’ one, the normalization of LGBT in the ‘western’ countries is contrasted with ‘normal’ ‘traditional’ ‘Christian’ family and heterosexuality that Russia ‘upholds and is striving to support’. On the other hand, although LGBT people might exist in the Russian society, they are not ‘normal’ and should not show it publicly, and if they do, they are representatives of the declining ‘West’ and ‘Gayropa’, whose so-called ‘tolerance’ is not in agreement with the ‘Russian traditional values’ that the nation shares in its’ collective ‘state narrative’.

3.4. Media systems in hybrid authoritarian countries

Noam Chomsky and Edward Herman, describing a ‘propaganda model’ of the US mass media (1988), claim that in order to fulfill the role that the media plays, a systematic propaganda is required. In the countries with ‘authoritarian’ or ‘totalitarian’ modes, official censorship and monopolistic control of media, it is more obvious that the media is serving the elite in power. It is not as obvious for the countries where the media are privately owned and there is no formal censorship at all (Chomsky and Herman, 1988). Yet, there exist various complex interactions between media and the government that vary amongst countries (Hallin and Mancini, 2004).

Hallin & Mancini (2011), introducing the volume “Comparing Media Systems outside of the Western World”, admit that when they first developed the media system framework and classification (2004), they did so according to the experience they have had: the ‘Western’ countries of Europe and North America. Indeed, it may be difficult to categorize countries outside of the ‘Western’ paradigm by the classification given in 2004, although there were certainly attempts to do so. For instance, “Comparing Media Systems Beyond the Western World” (Hallin & Mancini (eds): 2011) covers Brazil, China, Israel, Lebanon, Lithuania, Poland, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and Thailand, attempting in each case to study whether the ‘Western’ classification of media models is applicable or not. One of the conclusions of the volume is that sometimes countries of post-Soviet world, like Poland, could be characterized as close to Mediterranean model (Dobek-Ostrowska: 2011). Many of

the authors, however, say that it is impossible to fit in any of the different models (e.g. Brazil, South Africa, Russia) and there are those that do not fit in the existing three-model paradigm (Albuquerque, 2011; Hadland, 2011; Vartanova, 2011). We will in this chapter review the Russian media model which does not fit in any of the ‘western’ ones, just like Brasil’s or China’s or Thailand’s and many others.

Vartanova describes Russian media model (for the year 2011) as consistent with paternalism, neo-authoritarianism and influenced by a “growing commercialism of the media industry” (Vartanova, 2011, p. 142). Lehtisaari & Miazhevich (2019) provide an overview of research done on Russian media system from the collapse of the USSR. They are describing three stages (waves) of it. The first wave is connected to glasnost and diminishing of barriers, when often times Russian media is compared to the ‘western’ models (e.g. Mickiewicz, 1999; Vartanova, 2002; Zasurski, 2004). The second wave, when the situation became more stable, paid attention to the interplay of political and economic actors (e.g. Koltsova, 2006; Roudakova, 2008). The last wave in the 2010s has described the parallel existence of state-influenced traditional media and partly free and very developed online sphere (e.g. Bodrunova & Litvinenko, 2013; Lehtisaari, 2015; Oates, 2013).

Some important changes have happened, however, in 2019 - 2021. Most of the business periodicals that Lehtisaari described in 2015, have either changed owners (e.g. *RBC online* media publication and periodical²²; business periodical *Vedomosti*²³) or started following a more strict editorial policy with political journalists quitting the periodical (e.g. *Kommersant* in 2019 fired two journalist for an article they wrote²⁴).

Most scholars agree that during the Soviet period, there was one ‘agent of control’, a Party-State, and media had to be responding to it (Koltsova, 2001, Sparks and Reading, 1994; Roth and Zaharova, 2015). In terms of the ownership of the media, things do not seem to be as obvious as they have been during the times of the USSR. The market system, which was ‘successfully established in Russia’ through shock therapy and radical reforms in 1993 – 1997 (Aslund, 2014), transformed in the late 2000s. The resulting system was described as a form

²² See *New Yorker*: <https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-demise-of-rbc-and-investigative-reporting-in-russia>

²³ See *The Moscow Times*: <https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2021/05/20/chief-editor-leaves-russias-vedomosti-year-after-censorship-row-a73957>

²⁴ See DW: <https://www.dw.com/en/firings-at-russias-kommersant-newspaper-prompt-press-freedom-concerns/a-48822489>

of natural-resource-based capitalism with Russian characteristics or a “state corporatism” (Rutland, 2009)

However, it would be a mistake to suppose that the relationships between the authoritarian regimes and the media only depend on suppressive mechanisms. On the contrary, in many cases the media is eagerly providing the needed services, in return benefiting from the state: enjoying state subsidies in a market competition or securing well-paid jobs (Veltmer, 2013 p.78)

As Roudakova points out, the current news programs and talk shows on state-aligned television have turned into a “daily ritual of identifying Russia’s external and internal enemies – the “duplicitous” and “degenerate” West, the “fascist usurpers” in Ukraine, the “traitors liberals at home” (Roudakova, 2017). Petr Pomerantsev (2014) claims that the news programs on federal channels now resemble staged performances, with actors dressed up as rebels, refugees or factory workers are appearing regularly in the news of major TV channels (Pomerantsev, 2014, Roudakova, 2017). It is not correct to see these developments in news journalism and broadcasting as a return to Soviet-style propaganda, Roudakova (2017) points out.

3.5 Media system in post-Soviet Russia: the three stages of power relations

3.5.1. Previous research on media and censorship

In January 2021, Twitter, a private social networking platform, had blocked the account of the former US President Donald Trump²⁵. Twitter explained its ban as due to the “risk of further incitement of violence in the context of horrific events this week” (meaning the riots at the US Capitol building which Trump urged and supported with his Tweets.²⁶ Twitter’s actions provoked debates both in the media both on censorship²⁷ as well as on the role of private platforms²⁸.

²⁵ Twitter (2021): https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2020/suspension.html

²⁶ BBC (2021) <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-56004916>

²⁷ Vox (2021): <https://www.vox.com/culture/22230847/deplatforming-free-speech-controversy-trump>

²⁸ *The Philadelphia Enquirer* (2021): <https://www.inquirer.com/news/twitter-bans-trump-free-speech-first-amendment-20210109.html>

Censorship has been studied before related to press, radio and TV in several countries. For instance, censorship in the British media (broadcasting ban) was a particular form of censorship, both direct and indirect, and included government pressure as well as self-censorship of the broadcasters on the issues of Northern Ireland conflict (Pettigrew, 2016, Seaton, 2013). Seaton highlights that it did damage to the BBC's world service reputation but was both supported and fought against by the broadcasters and newspapers (Seaton, 2013, p. 452). Censorship of the Irish Free State which was introduced in 1929 as a 'cornerstone' of the Catholicism and had led to the lack of trust of the Irish people to both the church and the state (Keating, 2013). The censorship of the cinema in Franco's Spain was also connected to Christian morality, which the government thought necessary to promote, imposing certain gender roles, which is evident through studies of files issued by the Film Censorship Council (Gil, 2016). USSR and the Soviet bloc censorship of the media, literature and film has been researched extensively (e.g. Blium, 2005; Petracovschi, 2016; Bates, 2004).

As for the censorship practices in the media of the twenty-first century, works have been published on Turkey's Internet censorship (Akgul, Kirlidog: 2015); China media censorship has been paid a lot of attention to by the researches (see, for example, Tai, 2014; Cook, 2013; Roberts, 2013; Lorentzen, 2014). The censorship in media performed by the Russian authoritarian regime has also attracted a lot of academic attention. Simons and Strovsky (2006) describe the self-censoring features of the Russian media as having roots in the Soviet censorship system and 'war on terrorism' as an excuse to introduce censorship measures by the government, Simon (2004) talks about the cult of a leader and self-censorship of the Russian media, Oates (2007) concludes that the media operates in the neo-Soviet mode, which include interference of the government, rejection of objectivity, censorship and self-censorship, among other features.

"In the past decade, the study of digital activism has emerged as one of the dominant subfields in research on communication in China, unravelling the intricate dynamics of control and resistance between party regulators (e.g. King et al., 2013; *MacKinnon, 2011*; Schneider, 2016) and savvy social media users, who negotiate restrictions and engage in subversive and imaginative discourses online (e.g. Esarey and Xiao, 2008; Yang, 2009)" in (Fang & Repnikova, 2017 p. 3). Researchers of the Chinese networked authoritarianism have

also been investigating the role of citizens themselves in the emergence, continuation, and expansion of censorship (Kou et al., 2017).

3.5.2. The Soviet period: censorship and party-state

While during the Soviet period, there was one 'agent of control', a Party-State (Koltsova, 2001, Dzirkals et al., 1982), the break-up of the Soviet Union and 'bloodless liberal-democratic revolution' (Sakwa, 2018) of the 90s, has brought many agents into play. In the USSR, the Soviet political leadership was controlling and directing the media, and the reason for its existence was to "propagate the directives of the Party and carry out Party's policies" (Dzirkals et al, 1982, p. 85). At the same time, the role of internal controls, or 'self-censorship', were secondary, because the limits of media operations were defined externally by the Party-State (Dzirkals et al, 1982). Moreover, the highest level of the communist party leadership, Politburo, appointed top media officials both in the party structures, as well as in the media themselves, and every level of party structure controlled what was written or broadcasted at every level: from central to local, such as a factory newspaper (Dzirkals et al, 1982 p 87).

Some scholars, however, such as Natalia Roudakova, name other actors which have "mediated between the Soviet state and the ethical ideals of the state" (Roudakova, 2017 p .51). These actors were journalists, she goes on, and they, both propagandists and intellectuals believed, were the ones who often thought they had the 'final say' in how society should be governed, and the socialism project implemented. The Soviet state, on the other hand, needed to show some degree of accountability to its' citizens, thus allowing the criticism of bureaucracies through taking citizens' grievances to press, and the party-state responded by 'taking measures' and punishing the accused. (Roudakova, 2017 p. 94)

In the 1990s the journalists, and the media, lose the 'moral high ground' which they might have had during late Soviet Union. Newspapers, magazines, TV channels and radio, as every other asset of the planned economy, went through a process of privatization.

When the Soviet Union collapsed, mostly under internal economic pressure, the weakened state was accompanied by what some researchers call a 'dramatic' expansion of the market role and capitalism, as well as radical economic reforms, or the above mentioned 'shock therapy'. Russia has undergone a path from being a planned state economy to a functioning

market economy in the duration of only five years (Aslund, 2014, p.4). “Acting on the advice of Western economists, Yeltsin sought to achieve a rapid, radical transition from communism to capitalism through the administration of what came to be referred to as “shock therapy.” (Friedberg, 2017 p 27):

Elena Gapova argues that this ‘substitution’ of socialism with capitalism in the 1990s, has put an emphasis on ‘individual autonomy’ and ‘responsibility for own’s well- being’, and the Soviet welfare system was thus demolished and pulled to pieces by the rapid transition to market economy, which was called by the economists a ‘shock therapy’ (Gapova: 2016). After a while, she argues, there came an understanding that the newly acquired freedoms, where one had to rely only on oneself, created whole new groups of losers under the free market: women, the elderly, people with disabilities among them. This situation had moved the regional election results in favor of leftist/socialists, or in many cases, nationalist or authoritarian parties and regimes. She goes on to explain this pattern that the parties/regimes mentioned would rely on policy rather than on ‘invisible hand of the market’ for distribution of resources. Among countries which followed these models, she mentions, in particular, Belarus, Russia, Ukraine, Poland, Hungary. (Gapova, 2016).

3.5.3. The 90s- mid 2000s: privatization and capitalism

During the process of privatization, some media outlets were bought by Western media conglomerates. They were providing their own set of rules and practices, and business, financial and consumer-oriented press constituted one model of media, and tabloids – another (Roudakova, 2017).

The ownership of many media outlets, however, also ended up in the hands of editorial staff, since the president Boris Yeltsin’s government has given the ownership of media brands (but not assets) to the editors and journalists (Roudakova, 2017, p. 100). Without the history of private media ownership and lacking the entrepreneurial skills, economic models of these media started to include various means of obtaining capital: from selling shares to businessmen whose main business interests would not lie in the media (and who further on used the media as a source of influence to follow one’s own interests), to selling advertisement concealed as a genuine story (Roudakova, 2017 p. 98).

This created particular feature to the media ownership in Russia. In the 'western model' there is still a great influence of the free flow model of information. As Koltsova points out:

"In the West, when ownership is external to a media organization, it is usually in the hands of the state. Private ownership is mostly internal; it means that owners possess media outlets only, have no interests outside the media industry and thus do not use media as a vehicle for promotion of those interests. In Russia, however, nearly all media, including private ones, are owned externally, and most of them are unprofitable. Because Russian business and political elites are extremely interdependent both see media first of all as weapons to gain political capital - a vital resource that later can be converted into all other forms of capital outside the media domain." (Koltsova, 2001 p 322)

Voltmer highlights that the consequences of withholding the information and omitting the public debate at all costs in the 'information wars' of the 90s, were a "growing dependency of the media on powerful political actors and on acute cynicism of Russian audience" (Voltmer, 2013, p. 35). It is very important to know, what shape private media ownership has taken in the region, and how it influenced the journalism practice. Especially in post-socialist context, these relations had to be created from scratch, on the contrary with, for example, Latin America or Southern Europe, where change from authoritarianism was less dramatic since capitalism had already existed beforehand (Voltmer, 2013). At the same time, Yeltsin's liberal government distributed significant financial support to the struggling print media. As a result, an entire system of state financial support was put in place, ranging from state-run subscriptions to being directly financed by the government or large industrial groups. This made the press financially dependent on local and federal governments. (Kiriya, 2019). He continues to highlight the "general belief' that media is a State institution:

"The most important variable among them is the general belief of the different actors (including audiences, dispersed administrative and regulatory bodies, authorities and so on) that the media is the State institution, oriented, among other institutions, toward the State modernization. This factor as we suppose influenced, in a great extent, the split of the public sphere and other peculiarities of the Russian media system." (Kiriya, 2019, p. 7).

Russian sociologist Olessia Koltsova has studied newsroom practices in the news outlet of St Petersburg, and she found a lot of schemes of influence on decision-making in newsrooms in the early 2000s Russian media. The first one, she points out, is the owners' influence exercised in newsrooms:

“They (the news editors) claim they have regular talks with their bosses that provide general guidelines for news policy (for example, lists of taboo topics/persons), and the rest has to divined from a knowledge of the larger political situation. This knowledge, apart from watching television, is gained through informal interaction with different elites. News editors may also receive telephone calls concerning particular events or persons.” (Koltsova: 2006 p.323).

A second group of influences, Koltsova has found, was exercised by

“state executives and legislators, including elected bodies, the administration, the police, state-owned education and medical care organizations, in short, everyone who has access to deficit public resources. These resources give power to solve private problems when used outside the prescribed way of implementation. Although all those actors belong to the state institutionally, 'the state' cannot be seen as a unified actor (Koltsova: 2006, p. 323)

Other scholars conclude that the journalists and TV presenters in Russia, as it may also be the case elsewhere, are acting out of conformism (Shimpfoss & Yablokov, 2014).

“Media personalities and reporters on Russian federal television channels do have the options to avoid reporting news which contradicts their own political convictions. Those media personalities and reporters who work in positions which involve direct promotion of Kremlin positions have usually chosen to do so and do it deliberately” (Shimpfoss & Yablokov: 2014, p. 12).

3.5.4. 2013 – now: tightening government control over media

The third period of media system in Russia and its' relation to the State, we will argue here, has started after the annexation of Crimea and the two current Putin's presidencies (2013 – at the moment we are writing these lines) Although the vertical sets of relations between the government and various state agencies and the media institutions exist in the contemporary Russia mostly through the relations between the state actors and the media owners, a tighter government control is being implemented on the media.

The government has started to rely on legislative restrictions as means of media control. In 2016 it became impossible for foreign owners to own over 20% of the media outlet, and a foreigner could no longer be an editor-in-chief of the outlet, thus the Western conglomerates have mostly left Russia, selling their shares to the Russian owners or

drastically restructuring the assets²⁹. Several legislations were passed: the law on NGOs as Foreign Agents (2012³⁰) (and later – media (2017³¹) and persons (2020³²) as Foreign Agents; amendments to the law on extremism and its’ propaganda: the latest was introducing larger fees for the media and individuals mentioning organizations from the ‘list of extremist organizations’ without saying that they are on that list (2021³³); the law on propaganda of ‘non-traditional’ sexual relations (2013³⁴); legislation prohibiting ‘insult’ of the government officials or the state (2019³⁵); and in 2021 Internet providers were legally obliged by the law (511) to take down pages with information prohibited by Russian legislation³⁶. Law on propaganda of LGBT was adapted in 2013, it prohibits ‘propaganda’ of LGBT values in the media or elsewhere in public spaces (Federal Law #135³⁷). All of the above has given broad powers to the state media and telecom watchdog organization, Roskomnadzor.

Online media Meduza was declared a ‘foreign agent’ in 2021, and every news organization has to say that they are a ‘foreign agent’ when citing or mentioning them³⁸. Several weeks later, online news source VTimes was also declared a ‘foreign agent’³⁹. The label gives negative (since the times of the USSR) connotation to the media outlet, and requires it, as well as other media if citing this one, to publish a disclaimer saying their publications are distributed by a media outlet “fulfilling the function of a foreign agent”⁴⁰. The full list of media which are classified as ‘foreign agents’ is updated regularly on the website of ministry of justice, and currently includes fifteen media outlets and five individuals.⁴¹ In 2020, a

²⁹ See The Guardian: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/26/russia-limit-foreign-ownership-media>

³⁰ <https://rg.ru/2012/07/23/nko-dok.html>

³¹ <https://rg.ru/2017/11/25/fz327-site-dok.html>

³² <http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202012300043>

³³ See *Rossiiskaya gazeta*: <https://rg.ru/2021/05/12/gosduma-podderzhala-shtrafy-za-neukazanie-statusa-terroristov-v-smi.html>

³⁴ See *Rossiiskaya gazeta*: <https://rg.ru/2013/06/30/deti-site-dok.html>

³⁵ See *Pravo.Ru*: <http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001201903180022?index=1&rangeSize=1>

³⁶ See *Rossiiskaya gazeta*: <https://rg.ru/2021/01/12/informatsiya-dok.html>

³⁷ <https://rg.ru/2013/06/30/deti-site-dok.html>

³⁸ see *The Bell*: <https://thebell.io/en/foreign-agent-label-given-to-top-independent-media-outlet-meduza>

³⁹ See *Reuters*: <https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/russia-labels-vtimes-media-outlet-foreign-agent-ministry-2021-05-14/>

⁴⁰ See *Reuters*: <https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/russia-labels-vtimes-media-outlet-foreign-agent-ministry-2021-05-14/>

⁴¹ See Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation: <https://minjust.gov.ru/ru/documents/7755/>

Federal law 426 was adapted which indicates that employees of media which are considered 'foreign agents' may also be labeled as such⁴².

On the other hand, the capitalism that was established in Russia, is often called a "natural-resource based capitalism" (Vasileva-Dienes, 2019) and is dominated by a small number of companies in an energy and resource sectors, the two giants of which, Rosneft and Gazprom, were brought back under the ownership of the government (Friedberg, 2017).

"Much like in China, Russia's "political-economic landscape is now dominated by big businesses close to or part of the state, especially in sectors deemed 'strategic.' And, as in China, the state seeks to play a central role in guiding and directing the development of the national economy" (Friedberg, 2017 p 25).

In many cases this means that the owners of the companies that have media as an asset, do not negotiate with the government any longer. In other words, since most of the owners of TV companies or the press are in the energy sector which owns or have shares belonging to the government, it is no longer necessary to bargain or give privileges from the government to the owners in exchange of favorable coverage. Media ownership structure is still complex. First, there exist state-owned media and that close to the state. The old elite of the 1990s (Boris Berezovsky, Vladimir Gussinsky, Vladimir Potanin) were completely replaced by two oligarchs (Yuri Kovalchuk, the head of the bank Rossiya, and Alisher Usmanov, the steel magnate) who have since taken control of the most important television channels (Kiriya, 2017, 2019). First Channel is 39% publicly owned and has another 25% in the hands of National Media Group closely affiliated with the government (Yuri Kovalchuk): the channel Rossiya is 100% state-owned through the All-Russia State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company (VGTRK)⁴³. The so-called "third button" or NTV, is officially a commercial (not public) channel, but it is owned by Gazprom-Media, a division of Gazprom company, where the state owns 50,23 %⁴⁴. (Dergacheva & Tous-rovirosa: 2021).

⁴² See at DW: <https://www.dw.com/en/russia-putin-expands-foreign-agent-law-to-target-individuals/a-56095483>

⁴³ Matveev Maksim, Gataulin Fail (2017). "What common is there between Kovaltchuk, Rotenbesr and Sherlock Holmes? A battle for the "1st button" Accessed at: <https://realnoevremya.ru/articles/53920-komu-prinadlezhat-telekanaly-rossii> on the 10th of December 2019.

⁴⁴ official website of PAO Gazprom. Accessed on the 1st of January 2020. <https://www.gazprom.com/about/2019>

As it is explained by Dergacheva & Tous-Rovirosa (2021), among the 10 most cited federal TV channels, only one of them is not connected to the state through ownership: TV channel *Dozhd*, which is only present in online broadcasting. Even *Euronews* has a 16% ownership by *VGTRK*. Others belong to ministry of defense (*Zvezda*); National Media Group (RenTV); TV Center (government of Moscow property department); Rosimuschestvo (federal government department of property) – *Russia Today*. According to the latest report by Levada Center, over 72% of the population in Russia find out about news from television, age-wise 93% of the elder people (over 65) do so, and only 42% of the youngest audience (under 25) (Goncharov & Volkov: 2019). For the youngest, the main source of information and news is social networks. The level of trust in television as a news source has fallen in 10 years from 83% to 55% (Ibid: 2019). In the last report of the Reuters Institute (2019), the trend was that the trust in news overall was only 42 %, although varied from country to country⁴⁵. Dergacheva & Tous-Rovirosa, p. 15).

The main newspapers on the federal level are also in many cases connected to the state through ownership. For example, all three of the most cited newspapers ownerships have close government ties: *Izvestiya* (National Media Group); *Kommersant* (belongs to an oligarch Alisher Usmanov, who was in a list of businessmen close to Vladimir Putin in 2018); and *Rossiyskaya gazeta* (100% government owned) are the three most-read news sources (Goncharov & Volkov: 2019). Newspaper readership, however, has been falling and is now under 2%, but the online presence of these and other sources is gaining readership (35% of population receive news from online news outlets and social networks) (Goncharov & Volkov: 2019). This is a trend which is evident elsewhere: for instance, latest Ofcom report has indicated that the circulation of (print) newspapers in the UK has decreased from 22 million in 2010 to 10.4 million in 2018, a decline of 52.5% ⁴⁶.

As it has happened all over the world, the media ecosystem has changed significantly during the last decade, and there also exists a certain number of independent newspapers, radio stations, and online news outlets. While none of them have the same citation indexes or circulation that would be close to the media mentioned above, they also have their

⁴⁵ See Digital News report 2019 by Reuters: <https://www.digitalnewsreport.org/interactive-2019/>

⁴⁶ Thorpe, Esther. How people in the UK are accessing news: 6 key findings.

<https://whatsnewinpublishing.com/how-people-in-the-uk-are-accessing-news-6-key-findings/>
Accessed on the 6th of March 2020

readership and audience, if mostly online. The latest report of Levada Center (Goncharov and Volkov: 2019) on news consumption in Russia places the audience of so-called “independent” news outlets at 35%.

The only sector that could be considered ‘independent’ (from state influence), are the small private media outlets, most often existing only on the Internet. The question of their impartiality remains open, since some of the press with a ‘different’ view is subsidized by opposition (as in case of “*Nastoyaschee Vremya*” channel, for example, sponsored by an oligarch in exile Mikhail Khodorkovsky⁴⁷) or foreign governments (such as, for instance, *Radio Liberty*⁴⁸). However, most of these outlets have limited niche audience.

3.6. Hypothesis formulation

We have discussed hybrid regime states and their media systems as different from the ‘western’ classification but in many cases having strong state influence. In this context, we have explored the state strategic narrative building in Russia as neo-conservative, and determined, based on the previous research, that at its’ core is a dichotomy ‘Russia’ and the “west”. This, we concluded, also influences possible definition of LGBT community as an ‘Out’-group. We have also highlighted the role of social networks and Twitter in autocracies as both liberating and supporting authoritarian rule. Thus, we can formulate three Hypothesis according to our Research Questions:

Hypothesis 1:

If the discussions on Twitter are connected with news on LGBT, the main actors expressing state conservative narrative might be pro-government journalists or media accounts

Hypothesis 2:

H2: If the concept originates in the ‘state narrative’ on LGBT, it might be one of the dominating concepts in Twitter discussions around LGBT news topics

Hypothesis 3:

⁴⁷ <https://khodorkovsky.com/mbk-media/>

⁴⁸ <https://pressroom.rferl.org/about-usm>

If the journalists and media used the 'state narrative' on LGBT in their news pieces or Twitter posts, it might be related to the internal editorial policies of the media they are working for. We will discuss methodology we undertook to answer the research questions and verify the hypothesis in the next chapter.

CHAPTER IV

METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS

CHAPTER IV METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS

Section 4.1 Research methodology

We are using an explanatory sequential mixed methods design in this study. “It involves a two-phase data collection project in which the researcher collects quantitative data in the first phase, analyzes the results, and then uses the results to plan build on to qualitative phase. The quantitative results typically inform the types of participants to be purposefully selected for the qualitative phase and the types of questions that will be asked of the participants”, - (Creswell: 2018, p. 304). Using quantitative as well as qualitative techniques allow us to see patterns at both micro as well as macro levels of the analysis (Kelli: 2005). As we have already described in the Chapter I, Introduction (pp 3-4), we used Social Network Analysis, Computational text analysis and Content Analysis with human coding as quantitative methods, and semi-structured interviews as the qualitative methods part of this research. Quantitative studies allow us to describe the phenomena numerically and using statistics, determine relationship between variables, (Stockemer:2019). Qualitative research, on the other hand, aims to highlight details and descriptions of the phenomenon under investigation, (Creswell: 2018). Combining the two let the researchers enhance their understanding of the phenomenon.

“The key features common to all qualitative methods can be seen when they are contrasted with quantitative methods. Most quantitative data techniques are data condensers. They condense data in order to see the big picture. Qualitative methods, by contrast, are best understood as data enhancers. When data are enhanced, it is possible to see key aspects of cases more clearly” (Ragin: 1994, p. 92)

Our research was carried out in four stages. In order to answer the Research question 1 (RQ1: Which actors play the most important role in Twitter networks around LGBT issues-related news stories in Russia?) and Hypothesis 1, (If the discussions on Twitter related to news on LGBT, the main actors expressing state conservative narrative might be pro-government journalists or media accounts), we applied Social Network Analysis (see in detail Section 4.3. Methodology and Results. Social Network Analysis). In total, as it is described in Section 4.2 Methodology and Results. Data Collection and Sampling, there were 19 810

tweets gathered. Apart from answering the RQ1 and H1, Social Network Analysis was the first stage for identifying possible interviewees as they were those media accounts which were identified as the top nodes in each of the sample. Further on, Social Network Analysis had let us to identify top 50 most central nodes in each year's sample for the human coding content analysis (see in detail Section 4.4 Methodology and Results. Content analysis with human coding). We used Netlytic (Gruzd, 2016) and ORA (Carley et al., 2013) at this stage to do a social network analysis.

The second stage of the analysis was Content Analysis with human coding of the top 50 most central Tweets of the four samples for each year. In total, there were 200 tweets to code with three variables. This step allowed us to validate the Hypothesis 1, whether the main actors expressing state conservative narrative in Twitter discussions around news on LGBT might be pro-government journalists or media accounts (see in detail Section 4.4 Methodology and Results. Content analysis with human coding). We used SPSS V20 by IBM (Sage: 2020) in order to validate the hypothesis.

The third stage of our research was answering the Research Question 2, (RQ2: What are the concepts used in describing or evaluating LGBT community in Twitter networks in Russia around news stories on LGBT issues?) and validating the Hypothesis 2 (H2: If the concept originates in the 'state narrative' on LGBT, it might be one of the dominating concepts in Twitter discussions around LGBT news topics). In order to do this, we applied computational text analysis to the whole sample of tweets, taken year by year. We used WordStat version 8 by Provalis research (Brown, 2007; Pollach: 2011) to extract the main topics from the whole sample of tweets (19 810) and validate the Hypothesis 2.

The fourth stage of this research were semi-structured qualitative interviews with journalists from the media which was identified as central nodes in the discussions during the Stage 1 (Social Network Analysis). During the Stage 4, we answered Research Question 3: (RQ3: Which power mechanisms might be behind concepts on LGBTQ and main actors in Twitter discussions around news stories on LGBTQ issues?). We have also checked the validity of the Hypothesis 3 (H3: If the journalists and media used the 'state narrative' on LGBTQ in Twitter posts, it might be related to the affiliation of the media they are working for). The fourth stage was using only qualitative methods such as the semi-structured interviews, which were conducted by the author of this dissertation. There were in total ten interviews

carried out with ten journalists from ten different Russian media, which were present among the most central nodes during the SNA stage (see in detail Section 3.5: Semi-structured interviews).

4.1.1 Ethical issues of using Twitter as a data source

There are also ethical issues that need to be considered while using Twitter as a data source. As Williams et al. (2017) argue, disclosing Twitter information requires ethical considerations in social science research. This is especially important if a researcher gathers sensitive user characteristics or predicts them with an algorithm (for example, nationality, race, or sexual orientation). This study, though, did not gather such metadata or predict any of these characteristics. Twitter's terms of service are such that publicly available tweets are an open source, and a user agrees with this when creating a Twitter account. Nevertheless, some topics that social scientists study may ultimately be harmful to individuals (Williams et al., 2017). Two methodological steps in our research used algorithm (SNA and computational text analysis), and there are no tweets disclosed. The third step involved content analysis, and initially, we wanted to include all 200 tweets that we analyzed from the list of top users as an appendix (in Russian). However, this would have been a breach of information disclosure on a sensitive topic for Russia (due to the issue of online search, where quoted text is easily searchable). So, in the appendix for our content analysis results, we only left tweets of media-associated users whose information is publicly available, and we deleted the tweets of other users in order to protect them. We will be making them available upon request from the scientific community. Thus, our algorithmic methods are not breaching the ethical issues involved in using Twitter in social science research (Williams et al., 2017), and we are protecting private users from further identification associated with their tweets. The tweets that we translated to English will not be identifiable through search engines. Within the text itself, we are only citing tweets (if any) according to Twitter's guidance for broadcasting (2021).⁴⁹ They state that when citing a tweet, the tweet author's profile picture, @username, and display name must always be displayed and linked to the user's Twitter profile. Another important rule is that the text of the tweet should not be altered in any way, so we are only citing media-affiliated tweets. All the CSV Twitter data for four years

⁴⁹ See Twitter guidelines here: <https://developer.twitter.com/en/developer-terms/display-requirements>

as well as content analysis of all users are stored as a github depository with access only by direct link due to ethics issues (Appendix 8)

4.1.2 Data collection and sampling of Twitter discussions around news on LGBT topics

Sampling in social media is considered vastly different from the sampling in traditional media (Kim et al: 2018; Neuman et al: 2014). Since the content in social media is not only produced by news organizations but mostly by unpaid users, they do not follow the usual news cycle. For example, there might be no discussions on certain topics during days or even months, while the news organizations are usually obliged to cover something every day. On the other hand, days of the week or times of the day are much less important in social media: there is still discussion going on during weekends while for the traditional media this is not the case (Neuman et al: 2014). It is, therefore, almost impossible to use days as a unit of analysis and include all stories published during this day, as traditional sampling methods suggest (Kim et al: 2018). But the content on Twitter is not consistent across days, the data fluctuates, sometimes there are days without any tweets, and therefore, some other approach is needed.

Twitter researchers use several approaches to sampling.

The first one is using a Simple Random Sample (SRS) method by which they produce a study sample from a vast number of tweets, usually collected according to hashtags or keywords (Kim et al: 2018). In some cases, when the number of tweets collected from Twitter API is not too large, the whole population can be analyzed. For example, a study of a Twitter discussion around a protest march in Russia with a hashtag #PeaceMarch produced only 998 tweets during the period of three weeks before and after the march (Nilolayenko: 2019). Thus, the researchers were able to code and analyze all the Tweets, and sample coincided with the population. However, usually the events or topics that researchers are intending to analyze are spread in time, or the research is covering several years. In these cases, one of the methods to gather the initial data set is to analyze topics in Twitter around hashtags based on case studies. This is an approach undertaken by Cristancho et al (2020) Using case studies for Twitter research, they analyzed events connected to political action in Spain during the economic crisis, which took place during a 40-month period. In order to do that,

they identified events and gathered tweets around these case studies using a set of keywords and hashtags for each.

The same kind of case studies approach using SRS method and case studies was used by Hunt et al (2019) when studying events and misinformation around Hurricanes Harvey and Irma: two specific fake news claims were chosen by the researchers for each of the events, and the data collection happened around the dates of the specific cases (Hunt et al: 2019).

Research on propaganda and fake news (Guriano et al: 2020) has also focused on four case studies identified as the fake news spread online that might have propped the greatest number of Twitter reactions around them.

It must be noted that because of fast development of computational text analysis and machine learning technologies, more and more researchers are using big data (all the collected Tweets in the corpus) without the need for further sampling. Usually, the data is saved in json (Twitter information) or .csv files via Twitter API scraping software, Python-based (as in, for example, Romero-Frías & Arroyo-Machado: 2018 or Hunt et al: 2019), or, as in case of our research, web-based Netlytic (Gruzd: 2016). Netlytic collects tweets from the Twitter API every 15 minutes for the dates indicated in real time and saves them as .csv databases.

Stier (2016) analysed all the tweets of Democratic and Republican parties, identifying topical themes. Stieglitz et al (2018) did a research based on all tweets collected 4 days prior to Eurovision contest each year. Simikawa & Jatowt (2020) looked into all of the tweets on history-oriented posts in based on a 28-month-long snapshot of Twitter data, using only computational methods.

Sometimes, there is a combination of the two: as, for example, in Moukarzel et al (2021) who both did a Social Network Analysis based on the whole data base of tweets collected during the 'breastfeeding week' as well as manually coded a random sample of Tweets to understand to which categories did the users belong institutionally and otherwise. Pérez-Altale & Saúl Blanco (2016) have also applied SNA on the whole dataset of Tweets around Tunisian uprising in 2014, further on using a SRS to do a content analysis of tweets.

The second one is constructed week sampling (Kim et al: 2018). It is more convenient for those researchers who intend to gather tweets of particular accounts. For example, similar

to traditional multi-stage method of sampling (e.g., Wimmer & Dommick: 1996), a weekday is selected from each week of the period analyzed. As in Artwick (2014), who studied the tweets by newspaper reporters. The same sampling technique was used in Giglietto & Selva (2014) study of the tweets around TV series.

The third one is convenience sampling. This is a method which researchers use according to their purposes. For example, Israel-Turim et al (2021) have analyzed fifty Twitter accounts of the generalist Spanish media with the most followers for the years 2017, 2018 and 2019 in a study of whom the accounts were following in this timeframe. Earlier, Clark and Ferguson (2011) studied Twitter accounts of local television stations, and only selected the first page of each account. Another more recent example is the research on Internet of Things in the European context (Ustek-Spilda et al: 2021) who analyzed Twitter accounts which were mentioned around large-scale Internet of Things' events. In contrast with traditional media research, convenience sampling in social media is less problematic (Kim et al: 2018). As the Twitter accounts are usually public, the researcher may have access to the accounts chosen as a sample. For instance, always selecting the first page of the account introduces the element of chance for the research.

The research we present now is using sampling by hashtags around particular news stories related to the topic analyzed ('state narrative' on LGBT in Russia), as it has been done in previous Twitter research (e.g. Pérez-Altable & Blanco: 2016; Pond & Lewis: 2017; Wang & Guo: 2018; Nikolaenko et al: 2019). Due to the nature of the dissertation work, in order to collect news stories and Tweets in Russia about the LGTB during a significant period of time, the stories around hashtags had to be gathered for several years. Thus, I used the method of case studies for Twitter research (Cristancho et al: 2020; Guriano et al: 2020; Hunt et al: 2019) and gathered Twitter API data around a period during each year when events which provoked Tweeting around chosen hashtags and key words. We used the Russian hashtags since most of the English ones would capture unnecessary foreign data.

The hashtag, as it is widely known, is a word with a sign # which makes it easily searchable on social media, is usually placed at the end of a post. Sometimes it can also be found in the text of a tweet so a hashtag- based search usually can find a significant proportion of tweets on a selected topic (Nilolayenko et al: 2019).

In order to solve RQ and hypothesis, the news related to a hashtag #LGBT and other related hashtags and keywords (see table 1 and 2) were selected during the period of four consecutive years (2017; 2018; 2019; 2020). While the hashtags reflected a general LGBT topic, particular key words were used to focus on four specific news stories in order to minimize the sample. Further on, the whole corpus was used to create four Social Network Analysis for each consecutive case and year; the whole corpus was used for computational text analysis and sampling of the first fifty nodes according to total degree centrality was used to create a sample tweets for the content analysis using human coding.

Table 1: Hashtags used for data collection

Hashtags used to capture the data	Russian translation hashtags
#LGBT	#ЛГБТ
#LGBTQ	#ЛГБТИ
#GAYSINCHECHNYA	#ГЕИВЧЕЧНЕ
#LGBTRUSSIA	#ЛГБТРОССИЯ
#YESIWILLCHOOSE	#ДАВЫБЕРУ
#NOTOAMENDMENTS ⁵⁰	#НЕТПОПРАВКАМ
#CHECHNYAGAYS	#ЧЕЧНЯГЕИ
#HOMOSEXUAL	#ГОМОСЕСКУАЛИСТ
#RUSSIALGBT	#РОССИЯЛГБТ

From our methodological perspective, keywords are different from hashtags because they let us identify a particular news story around which the discussion is being made. Without the keywords, the process of collecting data around news stories would have collected large amounts of unnecessary and unrelated data. We used the Russian keywords, since most of the English ones would capture unnecessary foreign data. Thus, we chose to use the following keywords related to the news stories described in below.

Table 2. Keywords used for data collection

⁵⁰ Connected to the news story in 2020 (RadioLiberty: 2020) about voting for amendments to the constitution

Keywords used to capture the data	Russian translation keywords
Chechnya	Чечня
Gays	Геи
Lesbians	Лесбиянки
Prosecution	Преследование
Amendments	Поправки
School	Школа
Tolerance contest	Конкурс толерантности
Propaganda	Пропаганда

The criteria of selection were the number of tweets (over 1000, excluding retweets) around chosen hashtags and news (case studies). I checked the Twitter API stream through a Python application for each month of each year and chose the news stories (cases) concerning LGBT prosecution which spiked the activity of Twitter users. The cases and time periods are explained in a section below and in the Table 2.2.3.

4.1.3 News stories explained:

News story in 2017: Gay people are being prosecuted and murdered in Chechnya: 2017

In the end of March 2017, newspaper “*Novaya Gazeta*” released an article which described how in the republic of Chechnya in Russia, over one hundred men were accused of homosexuality and detained, at least three of them have been killed. The article was titled “Honor Killing” [Ubiystvo Chesti]⁵¹. Russian and foreign media have been quick to re-print the accusations; some had conducted their own investigations confirming them (e.g. *The Guardian* correspondent in Russia, Shawn Walker, has been one of those who carried out an

⁵¹ The article of *Novaya Gazeta* (in Russian) can be found here: <https://novayagazeta.ru/articles/2017/04/01/71983-ubiystvo-chesti>


investigation in April 2017 with the title “Chechens tell of prison beatings and electric shocks in anti-gay purge: ‘They called us animals’. Up to several hundred gay men are feared to have been rounded up and some killed in ultra-conservative Russian republic”) ⁵². However, no action was taken by the government of either Russia or Chechnya, as Walker highlights, the authorities’ response had been that there were no gay people in Chechnya, and if there were, their families would have taken punishment in their own hands. As Suzan Hast (2021) explains:

“Sexuality is a taboo subject in Chechnya, and the shame around what are deemed improper relations, be they gay or not, makes LGTB rights hard to pursue in any form in Chechnya, even simply collecting information is difficult. The poor state of LGTB rights in Russia is not unknown, and even less a novelty is the imprisonment and torture of individuals (for various reasons) in post-war Chechnya. What is surprising though is the lack of attention Chechen politics receives in terms of research and media exposure.” (Hast: 2021, p. 186)

Nevertheless, this story had been covered by both domestic and international media, and its’ follow-ups have been visible through the years. We will see later that our news story in 2019 is also connected to the same topic. As Kiriya (2019) explains:

“Novaya Gazeta” belongs to the part of oppositional media which has been institutionalized within the system of state-related ownership. “Echo Moskvy belongs to Gazprom, Novaya Gazeta is under the control of the businessman Lebedev. Such media do not play the role of mediators (the basic function of the public sphere according to Habermas), but rather ensure the isolation and marginalization of the opposition and critically thinking people. Consequently, such media can be called ‘information ghettos.’ (Kiriya: 2019, p. 14).

⁵² Walker, Shawn. (2017). <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/apr/13/they-called-us-animals-chechens-prison-beatings-electric-shocks-anti-gay-purge>



Новая Газета
@novaya_gazeta



МВД Чечни не обнаружило фактов преследования геев в республике

НОВАЯ ГАЗЕТА

МВД Чечни не обнаружило фактов преследования геев в республике

МВД Чечни не обнаружило фактов преследования геев в республике
Правоохранительные органы Чечни не нашли подтверждений информации о преследовании гомосексуалов в республике. Об этом...
novayagazeta.ru

5:10 PM · May 13, 2017



3 4 Copy link to Tweet

A tweet from “Novaya Gazeta” on one of the stories. *The text of the tweet says: “Ministry of Interior did not find proofs of gay prosecution in Chechnya” (@novaya_gazeta: 2017).*


News story in 2018: Police in Russia confiscated paintings from contest about tolerance in one of the schools. There was an LGBT couple on one of the paintings and rainbow on others.

As *the Insider* reported, “police in Russia confiscated 17 pictures painted by schoolkids for a UN “International Day of Tolerance,” one of which showed people of the same sex together. Police went to School 155 in the city of Yekaterinburg and seized 17 drawings to investigate, the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs said on Thursday, Russian state news agency *RIA Novosti* reported”⁵³. According to *The Moscow Times*, police did so “in order to

⁵³ *The Insider*: <https://www.insider.com/russia-police-took-kids-tolerance-day-painting-of-lgbt-couples-report-2018-11>

investigate possible violations of the country's ban on gay propaganda after parents complained that they depicted same-sex couples. Russia outlawed "homosexual propaganda" among minors in 2013, a move that allowed courts to ban gay pride events and was followed by a surge in anti-LGBT sentiment in polls.⁵⁴ One drawing had silhouettes of a female couple, a male couple and a mixed couple.

"Around 10 other posters hang next to this picture showing a rainbow (a symbol of the sexual minority movement), planets and people of different nationalities. Another work contains the motto 'We're for peace! We're for tolerance!'⁵⁵" The paintings were made by children from 5 till 11 years old.



⁵⁴ *The Moscow Times*: <https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2018/11/29/russian-police-investigate-childrens-art-exhibit-for-gay-propaganda-a63652>

⁵⁵ *The Moscow Times*: <https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2018/11/29/russian-police-investigate-childrens-art-exhibit-for-gay-propaganda-a63652>

A Tweet from RTVI on news about tolerance contest. *The text of the news says: "In Yekateriburg, the office of prosecutor has confiscated children's drawings from the "Tolerant world" contest. Could you guess what hadn't they liked?" (@RTVi: 2020). Texts on the pictures say: "we can not choose"; " we are all unique"; "we are tolerant.. how about you?".*

News story in 2019: Gay people are being prosecuted and murdered in Chechnya: 2019

The Russian LGBT Network Activists in Russia said there had been a new crackdown against LGBT people in Chechnya in January 2019. At that time, as *the BBC* reported, they stated there were imprisoned 40 people, and two of them died under torture.

"The group has been monitoring alleged abuses in the mainly Muslim Russian republic since 2017 when dozens of gay people were reportedly detained. A government spokesman has dismissed their latest report as "complete lies. Chechnya, and its authoritarian leader Ramzan Kadyrov, has consistently denied allegations of illegal detentions and human rights abuses.⁵⁶"

⁵⁶ The BBC: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-57279008>




Медиазона
@mediazzona



«Пытки стали более жестокими и изощренными. Пытают не только мужчин, но и женщин. Задержанных избивают и насилуют электрошоковыми дубинками»

Чеченские силовики удерживают нескольких геев в отделах полиции Аргуна и Грозного, сообщает «Российская ЛГБТ-сеть»



206 11 Copy link to Tweet

A Tweet from *online media Mediazona* on news about LGBT prosecution in Chechnya in January 2019. The text of the tweet says: “The torture has become more brutal and sophisticated. Not only men are tortured, but women as well. Detainees are beaten and raped with electric shock batons " Chechen security forces detain several gays in the police departments of Argun and Grozny, reports the Russian LGBT Network” (@Mediazzona: 2019).

News story in 2020: A viral video was released, warned Russians that if they did not vote to define marriage as a union between a man and a woman in Constitutional amendments, gay couples will start adopting children in Russia

In June 2020, when preparation for all-Russia referendum to vote for a constitutional reform were on their way, a viral video was released by RIA FAN, a private pro-Kremlin media outlet (also connected to ‘Russian troll factory’ in StPetersburg). Constitutional

amendments (reforms) included a ban on same-sex marriage - by defining marriage as between a man and a woman - and introducing a reference to Russia's ancestral "faith in God"⁵⁷ (BBC: 2021). In addition, reforms allowed Vladimir Putin to stay in power for longer, resetting the clock on his current term as a president, and did a lot of changes concerning international law agreements and arrangements in favor of Russian law.

The video, as CNN⁵⁸ reported, warned Russians that if they did not vote to define marriage as a union between a man and a woman, gay couples will start adopting children in Russia. It shows a young boy being taken from an orphanage by his new adoptive father.

"And where's my mother?" the boy asks. "There's your mother," the father says, nodding to another actor -- a caricature of a flamboyantly gay man -- waiting in a car outside. The video then ends with a voiceover. "Is this the Russia you want?" it says. "Decide the future of the country. Vote for the amendments to the constitution."⁵⁹ (CNN: 2020).


As Radio Liberty reported, the video caused "outrage in social networks"⁶⁰.

⁵⁷ The BBC: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-53255964>

⁵⁸ CNN: <https://edition.cnn.com/2020/06/03/europe/anti-lgbtq-video-russia-referendum-intl/index.html>

⁵⁹ CNN: <https://edition.cnn.com/2020/06/03/europe/anti-lgbtq-video-russia-referendum-intl/index.html>

⁶⁰ Radio Liberty: <https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-lgbt-constitution-vote/30649260.html>



A Tweet from Petr Verzilov, member of art-group “Voina” (the War), where initially members of Pussy Riot came from. The text of the tweet says: “AAAA. An official video for the 1st of July: Vote for constitutional amendments or all the Russian children would be taken home by GAYS!!” (@gruppa_voina: 2020)

We are presenting a table with all the news stories, periods and number of tweets that were gathered, below in a Table 3.

Table 3: Cases and time periods for data collection

Cases (news)	Dates (news)	Period under study	Tweets collected
Prosecution of LGBT people in Chechen Republic of the Russian Federation	1.04.2017 – 07.04.2017	15/03/2017 – 15/05/2017	4,682

Police prosecutes local school which had a drawing contest featuring LGBT couples	20.11.2018 – 30.11.2018	20.11.2018 - 20.12.2018	7537
Russian LGBT network claims there are more victims in Chechnya.	20.01.2019 – 25.01.2019	20/01/2019 – 20/02/2019	1,028
News around changing the Russian constitution and making a definition of “family” as a “union of a man and a woman” and a viral video around it	25.06.2020 – 03.07.2020	04/06/2020 – 04/07/2020	6,563
Total number of tweets for the whole sample is 19810 Tweets			

4.1.4 Data collection and visualization tools

We used the Netlytic platform (<http://netlytic.org>), a web-based platform dedicated to stream data capture, Social Network Analysis visualization, and text analysis (Gruzd: 2016), to capture in real-time the activity of the Twitter sphere in Russia. Some of the latest research using Netlytic includes conversations around COVID19 (Gruzd & Mai:2020; Pascual-

Ferrá: 2020); feminist identity under President Trump: campaign #daywithoutawoman (Lommel et al: 2019); Twitter discussions around news in Russia (Tous-Rovirosa & Dergacheva: 2021), as well as others. We set Netlytic to automatically collect tweets every 15 minutes on the dates specified in table 1. Further on, I saved the collected data sets in .csv and .graphml files for computational text analysis, Social Network Analysis and content analysis. Total number of tweets collected through the four years was 19 810 tweets.

We further used ORA (Gruzd & Haythornthwaite: 2013), a social network analysis and visualization application developed by Carnegie Mellon University, School of Computer Science (Carley et al: 2013). The difference between Netlytic and ORA, is that the second one not only allows visualization and visual analysis of social networks, but also a thorough analysis of the whole dataset in terms of each node's centrality for the network. We, therefore, used ORA to specifically see which ten Twitter user (nodes) were the most central at the four discussions in order to choose the interviewees for the Stage 4 of the analysis, and top 50 of each four data sets for the content analysis (see in detail in the Section 4.3: Content analysis with human coding)

Identifying bots is important for studying political communication, as well as disinformation campaigns (Rauchfleischl & Kaiser: 2020). A lot of Twitter researchers have opted to use an online bot detection service BotOrNot (today, it is called botometer). In order to detect possible presence of 'bots' among the top ten nodes in each discussion, we used a two-stage method of detecting, as it is recommended by Rauchfleischl & Kaiser: 2020. Several methods allow scholars and OSN administrators to detect bots automatically (Mendoza et al: 2011). One of them is the online bot detection service Botometer, formerly – BotOrNot (Davis et al: 2016).

“The use of the BotOrNot service starts with a client specifying a Twitter screen name. TheBotOrNot website and API use Twitter's REST API to obtain the account's recent history, including recent tweets from that account as well as mentions of that screen name. Once the requested data is received from Twitter's API, the BotOrNotwebsite or API forwards it to the BotOrNot server. The server computes the bot-likelihood score using the classification algorithm” (Davis et al: 2016, p. 2).

'Bot' scores range from 0, the lowest, to 5, the highest. The higher score an account receives, the more likely that it may be a bot (Rauchfleischl & Kaiser, 2020). BotOrNot has

been criticized by some researchers for providing false results, especially with languages other than English (ibid, 2020). Our measurement has proved it to an extent, since practically all the media accounts received a very high ‘bot’ score. The reason for that may be that Classification System BotOrNot’s

However, they say that it could be clarified by introducing a second stage of the review. Classification System BotOrNot takes into account over 1000 features using meta-data, network feature, accounts’ social contacts, and entropy of the distributions of their number of followers, followees, posts, etc. In addition, it analyzes:

“Timing patterns of content generation and consumption, such as tweet rate and inter-tweet time distribution. Content features are based on linguistic cues computed through natural language processing, especially part-of-speech tagging. Sentiment features are built using general-purpose and Twitter specific sentiment analysis algorithms, including happiness, arousal-dominance-valence, and emoticon scores.” (Davis et al, 2016, p. 2).

We think that because our data was written in Russian language, the system BotOrNot could not analyze contents of tweets correctly, as it had happened before in languages other than English (Rauchfleischl & Kaiser, 2020). Nevertheless, it did analyze other parameters. So, the results that media Twitter accounts received of being closer to ‘bots’, are most probably due to their patterns of posting (most of them use some automated system for posting tweets, such as, for example, Social Juke Box, which lets organizations and individuals set specific and intervals times for posting.⁶¹ Yet, we believe its prediction of bots of individual accounts had been correct. We have read through all the tweets related to top ten nodes in each sample as the second step using (Strukal et al: 2017) suggestion that Russian political bots were mostly reposting links to media sources. Findings of (González-Bailón & Domenico, 2021) confirm that bots’ centrality is less than that of verified accounts. All the results are in the following section below.

4.2. Social Network Analysis

For the presented study, we focused on conversations on Twitter around the news with LGBT-related topics in the Russian-language Twitter, during month-long periods in 2017, 2018, 2019 and 2020 (see table 2.2.3 in Section 2.1 Methodology and Results. Research

⁶¹ <https://blog.thesocialms.com/9-twitter-automation-tools-save-time/>

methodology). In order to answer the RQ 1 (Which actors play the most important role in Twitter networks around LGBTQ issues-related news stories in Russia?), Social Network Analysis was applied on four data samples (19810 Tweets). On Twitter, a social network approach can provide a “bird’s eye view” of public discourse online. (Pascual-Ferrá et al: 2021). Social network analysis (SNA) uses graph theory to represent the structure, makeup, and interaction between members of a network (Carrington et al: 2005). As defined by Otte & Rousseau (2002), Social Network Analysis is not a formal theory, but instead an extensive blueprint for exploring social structures. The relations between actors are the prime concern for the SNA, and individual characteristics are only secondary (Otte, Rousseau: 2002). The social network Twitter, which was first launched in 2006, with texts of only 140 characters and open access to tweets, principles of ‘following’ and an open-source programming interface, make it a perfect medium for the research of online behavior (Himmelboim et al: 2017).

Some of the latest examples of Social Network Analysis of Twitter are the research of the Spanish government’s campaign #EsteVirusLoParamosUnidos during the COVID19 pandemic (Tous-Rovirosa & Dergacheva: 2021); fake news during COVID pandemic (Gruzd & May:2020). Some of the earlier works include: Arab spring revolutions (Pérez-Altable & Blanco: 2016, Lotan, Graeff, Ananny, Gaffney, Pearce, and Boyd: 2011), UK riots (Cassilli and Tubaro:2012), earthquakes (Sakaki, Okazaki & Matsuo: 2010), and teaching (Stepanyan, Borau, Ullrich: 2010), to name a few.

As it would also be suggested in this research, the analysis of Pérez-Altable & Blanco (2016) has been done in several stages, when in stage one the network of digital activism on Twitter was mapped using the social network analysis, and during the stage two several qualitative methods of research were deployed: content analysis and semi- structured interviews. As we have discussed earlier, our analysis is done in four stages: in this section we are discussion stage one, mapping of the Twitter discussions network using SNA and answering the RQ: Which actors play the most important role in Twitter networks around LGBT issues-related news stories in Russia?

We will also use the top fifty total centrality nodes resulting from this SNA to do a content analysis in order to see the validity of Hypothesis 1: If the discussions on Twitter connected with news on LGBTQ, the main actors expressing state conservative narrative might be pro-

government journalists or media accounts. The Social Network Analysis of the samples is also a tool which was going to help identify candidates for the stage 4 of the research: semi-structures interviews.

Once the data sets were collected, we used a Netlytic application to build a name network with this Twitter data. Netlytic is an analysis tool, which allows to capture and import the data online, as well as form and visualize communication networks. It is cloud-based and available via subscription on <http://netlytic.org>. Gruzd: (2016). The Name Network analysis is studying the messages' content and connecting nodes (in our case – Twitter users) between each other in case they reply, repost or mention the tweet of another user (Gruzd: 2009). As Gruzd and Haythornthwaite suggest in their analysis (2013), the resulting social network dataset was further exported to ORA, network visualization application. ORA software is often used in the studies of Twitter, when the research looks at the mentions network (or Name Network, in case of this research). ORA can support the evaluation of the social network data, as well as meta-network data, organizational data and others (Carley: 2018). Through analyzing the name networks via ORA, we also obtained centrality measures of each network. After that, we were able to identify which Twitter users were the most central nodes were in the networks.

“Twitter is a directed network, which means network visualizations of Twitter data will show a tie or an edge when a user mentions or replies to another user, not if they are following each other. That is different from Facebook, which is an undirected network and would show connections between “friends” as ties or edges” (Pascual-Ferrá et al: 2021 p.2).

Netlytic lets researchers use several layouts for the social network visualizations. For the presented research we used the Distributive Recursive Layout (DrL), which is “a force-directed graph layout, effective for visualizing large networks.” (Gruzd: 2016). In this layout, long edges are hidden to emphasize so-called clusters or of conversation. In the name networks of present research, clusters are sharing the hashtag and they are related on either sub-topic or theme around a particular Twitter user.


In order to identify and label the accounts as ‘pro-government’, ‘opposition’ or ‘neutral’, we used the technique developed by Stukal et al (2017) during their study of Russian political bots on Twitter and Wade et al (2020) on identifying political preference according to

political issues. The analysis was performed by the author of this dissertation. It will be explained in detail in the section on 4.3 content analysis with human coding.

Reliability test (Cohen's K) was done with another coder, a graduate student at the University of Turku (Finland), Russian speaking. The second coder was only voluntarily assisting with coding a small sample in order to check the reliability (the results of reliability test are explained in detail in Section 4.3 Content Analysis with human coding). In addition, were asked to read the first ten posts of the user. The same algorithm we later used for a human coding content analysis section.

For better clarity and to see also which users were central for the conversation apart from their visibility, we imported the network to ORA (in Graph.MI format). We did it for all the four datasets in this section. ORA identified the top 10 nodes with the highest total centrality measures. This means, that both in-degree (mentions and replies to the user) and out-degree (the users' mentions and replies) were repeatedly top-ranked in the sample. We made the same identification for all the datasets in this section. Total degree is the sum of users' in-degree and out-degree centrality, which means both the users who receive the most of replies and mentions, as well as those who reply and mention others a lot more.

Graph I: Name Network (DrL). Twitter users in the center of visually identifiable clusters. Twitter discussion around (Novaya gazeta: 2017): news story on prosecution of LGBT in Chechnya. Tweets collected for the period 15/03/2017 – 15/05/2017.



Source: Own elaboration, Netlytic

Network diameter is 5 nodes. The density measure ($N = 0.00$), the reciprocity measure ($N = 0.00$), and the centralization measure ($N = 0.01$) are low. The modularity measure ($N = 0.94$) is high.

The layout shows many different conversations and helps to visually identify who (which Twitter user) has been in the center of these conversations. From the Graph I., we can see the following users being in the center:

Table 4: Twitter users in the center of visually identifiable clusters. Twitter discussion around (Novaya gazeta: 2017): news story on prosecution of LGBT in Chechnya. Tweets collected for the period 15/03/2017 – 15/05/2017.

User	Full Name	Description
------	-----------	-------------

@Meduzaproject	Online media source, Meduza Project	Media account
@tvrian	TV Channel Dozhd	Media account
@Novaya_gazeta	Newspaper NovayaGazeta	Media account
@rianru	State News Agency RIA Novosti	Media account
@ru_rbc	News agency Russia Business Consulting	Media account
@youtube	YouTube video hosting	Video hosting account
@granitweet	Online media source Grani.Ru	Media account
@rkadyrov	Ramzan Kadyrov, the President of Chechen Republic	Private account

Source: Own elaboration, Netlytic

As we can see from the Table 4, almost all the visible clusters are concentrated around media sources.

In the Table 5 we observe that most of the nodes with highest total degree centrality are Twitter users related to media.

Table 5: Top Nodes (Twitter users) by total degree centrality. Twitter discussion around (Novaya Gazeta: 2017): news story on prosecution of LGBT in Chechnya. Tweets collected for the period 15/03/2017 – 15/05/2017.

User ID	User description	User political spectrum (see explanation on defining users' political spectrum on pp. 70 & 88)
Meduzaproject	Media	Opposition
Youtube	Video service	Neutral


Ru_rbc	Media	Mostly neutral
dw_russian	Media	Opposition/neutral
changeorgrus	Online signatures	Neutral
rianru	Media	State-owned
novaya_gazeta	Media	Opposition
spacelordrock	Private	Pro-government
a_gasparyan	Private	Journalist/anchor/ pro-government
bbcrussian	Media	Mostly Neutral

Source: Own elaboration, ORA

According to the total centrality measures, in this network there are seven media accounts out of ten. Results for this network show that media accounts play the most central, and thus most important part in this discussion around LGBT.

Further on, we used an online service 'botometer' (Davis: 2016) (formerly BotOrNot) in order to identify possible bots in the top ten nodes of the conversation.

Graph II: Bot detection for top ten Twitter users by total centrality. Twitter discussion around (Novaya gazeta: 2017): news story on prosecution of LGBT in Chechnya. Tweets collected for the period 15/03/2017 – 15/05/2017




Source: own elaboration, Botometer

As we have explained earlier, the results that media Twitter accounts received of being closer to ‘bots’, are most probably due to their patterns of posting. Yet, we believe its prediction of bots of individual accounts had been correct. We have read through all the tweets related to top ten nodes in each sample as the second step using (Strukal et al: 2017) suggestion that Russian political bots were mostly reposting links to media sources.

In the sample around news story of 2017, Botometer indeed placed all the media accounts as close to bots but did not identify any private accounts as such. We believe that in this case, because it may not be efficient with Russian language (Rauchfleischl & Kaiser, 2020), it calculated scores connected to posting and following patters. In order to make sure the accounts are not bots, we have real through the first page of each of the account. Because Strukal et al: 2017 stated most political bots from Russia were those that posted media links,

we made sure none of private users detected by SAN as top ten nodes had only media links on their first page.

Graph III: Name Network (DrL). Twitter users in the center of visually identifiable clusters. Twitter discussion around (*The Moscow Times*: 2018): news story on police prosecuting local school which had a drawing contest featuring LGBT couples. Tweets collected for the period 20/11/2018 – 20/12/2018



Source: Own elaboration, Netlytic

Network diameter is 10 nodes. The density measure ($N = 0.00$), the reciprocity measure ($N = 0.02$), and the centralization measure ($N = 0.01$) are low. The modularity measure ($N = 0.99$) is high. As we can observe after visually examining this network, there are a lot of spread-out clusters in this Twitter discussion. According to visual examination, the clusters mostly represent private Twitter accounts (see Table 2.2.3) with an exception of one media

account. We can, nevertheless, visually identify who (which Twitter user) has been in the center of these conversations (Table 2.2.3).

Table 6. Twitter users in the center of visually identifiable clusters. Twitter discussion around (*The Moscow Times*: 2018): news story on police prosecuting local school which had a drawing contest featuring LGBT couples. Tweets collected for the period 20/11/2020 – 20/12/2020

User	Full Name	Description
@lgbtkislota	N/A	Private Twitter account
@yourmoonmommy	N/A	Private Twitter account
@I_korotchenko	Igor Korotchenko	Private Twitter account, editor
@jin13bts	N/A	Private Twitter account
@bigfordov	N/A	Private Twitter account
@youtube	YouTube	Video hosting account

Source: Own elaboration, Netlytic

However, the ORA analysis of the total degree centrality of the nodes, shows a slightly different picture, because it takes into accounts nodes that we cannot visually identify on the graph.

Table 7. Top Nodes (Twitter users) by total degree centrality. Twitter discussion around (*The Moscow Times*: 2018): news story on police prosecuting local school which had a drawing contest featuring LGBT couples. Tweets collected for the period 20/11/2020 – 20/12/2020

User ID	User description	User political spectrum (see explanation on defining users' political spectrum on pp. 70 & 88)
yourmoonarmy	Private	Neutral

youtube	Video hosting	N/A
I_korotchenko	Private, media outlet editor (Natsionalnaya Oborona journal)	Pro-government
beria911	Private	Opposition
dangerouscaxap	Private, blocked by Twitter	Not known
dw_russian	Media	Opposition
echomskru	Media	Opposition
treugolny_hui	Private	Opposition
bangtans_mutual	Private, blocked by Twitter	Not known
luiza4kalova	Private, blocked by Twitter	Not known

Source: Own elaboration, ORA

Graph IV: Bot detection for top ten nodes (Twitter users). Twitter discussion around [*The Moscow Times*: 2018]: news story on police prosecuting local school which had a drawing contest featuring LGBT couples. Tweets collected for the period 20/11/2018 – 20/12/2018



Source: Own elaboration, Botometer


Here once again botometer placed media Twitter accounts closer to ‘bots’, we believe that this is due to their patterns of posting. In the sample around news story of 2018, Botometer again did not identify bots among individual accounts but placed one as close to a ‘bot’ (@i_korotchenko). User’s Twitter profile states that he is an editor of a magazine ‘Natsionalnaya Oborona’, and reading through the first page of his account, it is clear that the account is pro-government.

Some of the accounts in the 2018 sample were blocked by Twitter. The microblogging service has tools to detect and block suspicious accounts for several reasons (Stukal et al: 2017), it can, for instance, suspect that an account is spamming and block it in case it follows a lot of accounts but is not followed back that much (Bindu et al: 2018). It is difficult to know and would require a further research as to what happened in this case. However, when Stukal et al (2017) discussed Twitter bot behavior in the political sector of Russian Twitter.

they claimed that the majority of the bots studied in their research were reposting the news headlines in order to raise the ranking of a certain news outlet or topic (Stukal et al: 2017). It is not the case in this study, and accounts which were subsequently blocked by Twitter did not Tweet a news heading, since we have the tweet itself available in the database. Nevertheless, as Stukal et al (2017) point out, the Russian political bot accounts are sometimes automated but at some points in time – human controlled. This is done in order to trick Twitter and other users into believing the accounts are genuine. It is possible that during the time of our dataset gathering, the accounts were controlled by humans, and reverted to bots only afterwards, although further research is needed to confirm this assumption.

Results for the sample 2018 show that not only media accounts play the most central, and thus most important part in the discussion around LGBT-related school scandal. However, there are at least three media representatives among the most central nodes. We could also suggest that the bot-like blocked accounts might have also had connections to media, although this would require further research.

Graph V: Name Network (DrL). Twitter users in the center of visually identifiable clusters. Twitter discussion around (Mediazona, 2019). News story on new prosecution of LGBT in Chechnya. Tweets collected 20/01/2019 – 20/02/2019 20/02/2019.



Source: own elaboration, Netlytic

Network diameter is 3 nodes. The density measure ($N = 0.00$), the reciprocity measure ($N = 0.00$), and the centralization measure ($N = 0.04$) are low. The modularity measure ($N = 0.89$) is high.

As we can observe after visually examining this network, the clusters here are closer to each other and less dispersed. There are visually identifiable both media accounts, as well as private Twitter users (see Table 2.2.5).

Table 8. Twitter users in the center of visually identifiable clusters. Tweets collected Twitter discussion around [Mediazona (2019)]. News story on new prosecution of LGBT in Chechnya. Tweets collected 20/01/2019 – 20/02/2019 20/02/2019.

User	Full Name	Description
@mediazzzona	Online media source MediaZona	Media account
@febrarium	N/A	Private Twitter account

@svobodaradio	Online media source Radio Svoboda	Media account
@vox_seminarium	N/A	Private Twitter account
@currenttimetv	Online media source Nasoyashee Vremya	Media account
@oldlentach	Online media source Lenta.Ru	Media account
@roshenland	N/A	Private Twitter account
@tvjihad	N/A	Private Twitter account
@ponny1	Maria Baronova	Private Twitter account.

Source: Own elaboration, Netlytic

ORA analysis of the total degree centrality of the nodes shows more media accounts as being central for this network (see Table 9).

Table 9. Top nodes (Twitter users) by total degree centrality. Twitter discussion around [Mediazona, 2019]. News story on new prosecution of LGBT in Chechnya. Tweets collected 20/01/2019 – 20/02/2019 20/02/2019.

User ID	User description	User political spectrum
currenttimetv	Media	Opposition
svobodaradio	Media	Opposition
vox_seminarium	Private	Neutral
Roshenland	Private	Pro-government
mbkhmedia	Media	Opposition

granitweet	Media	Opposition
febrarium	Private	Opposition
oldlentach	Media	Neutral
tvjihad	Private	Opposition
dw_russian	Media	Opposition

Source: Own elaboration, ORA

According to the total centrality measures, in this network there are six media accounts out of ten. Results for this network show that media accounts play the most central, and thus most important part in the discussion around LGBT.


Graph VI: Bot detection for top ten nodes (Twitter users). Twitter discussion around (Mediazona,2019): news story on new prosecution of LGBT in Chechnya. Tweets collected for the period 20/01/2019 – 20/02/2019 20/02/2019.



Source: Own elaboration, botometer

As in previous samples, botometer placed media Twitter accounts closer to bots. In the sample around news story of 2019, botometer identified two individual accounts whose posting had been close to a ‘bot’ (@vox_seminarium and @tvjihad). Reading through users Twitter profiles, we could not confirm that they were bots at the time of the research. However, as Strukal et al (2017) as well as Rauchfleischl & Kaiser (2020) note, there is a possibility that account may change hands, and be a human-administrated account at one point in time, and automated ‘bot’ at another. At the time of the research, they did not appear as automated bots.

Graph VII: Name Network (DrL). Twitter discussion around (Radio Liberty. (2020): news story around changing the Russian constitution and making a definition of “family” as a “union of a man and a woman” and a viral video around it. Tweets collected for the period 4/06/2020 – 4/07/2020



Source: Own elaboration, Netlytic

Network diameter is 2 nodes. The density measure ($N = 0.00$), the reciprocity measure ($N = 0.00$), and the centralization measure ($N = 0.04$) are low. The modularity measure ($N = 0.97$) is high. There are a few visible clusters here, with some of them media accounts, but many clusters are not visible, since visually, they are so spread out. ORA calculations will help us to see more central nodes in this network.

Table 10. Twitter users in the center of visually identifiable clusters. Twitter discussion around (Radio Liberty. (2020): news story around changing the Russian constitution and making a definition of “family” as a “union of a man and a woman” and a viral video around it. Tweets collected for the period 4/06/2020 – 4/07/2020

User	Full Name	Description
@meduzaproject	Online media source Meduza	Media account
@gruppa_voina	Gruppa Voina	Art group (Pussy Riot connected)
@granitweet	Online media source Grani.Ru	Media account
@support_s_marca	N/A	Private Twitter account
@fake_midrf	N/A	Private Twitter account

Source: own elaboration, Netlytic

ORA analysis of the total degree centrality of the nodes, shows more media and media-like accounts as being central for this network (see Table 2.2.7)

Table 11. Top ten nodes of the name network 2020 according to total centrality measures. Twitter discussion around (Radio Liberty. (2020): news story around changing the Russian constitution and making a definition of “family” as a “union of a man and a woman” and a viral video around it. Tweets collected for the period 4/06/2020 – 4/07/2020


User ID	User description	User political spectrum
gruppa_voina	Art group	Opposition
fake_midrf	Private	Opposition, satire, Popular blogger
granitweet	Media	Opposition
support_c_mapca	Private	Opposition
meduzaproject	Media	Opposition
navalny	Private	Politician, opposition, extremely popular blogger, has a lot of followers
smehyatwittersky	Private	Pro-government
spacelordrock	Private	Pro-government

25bcv	Private	Blocked by Twitter
A_kapustin	Private, blogger (has a lot of followers)	Opposition

Source: own elaboration, ORA

In the Network based on 2020 sample, only two accounts are media. However, three more are media-like: two of them – opposition bloggers, and one – art group, which is also highly popular with their posts (Gruppa Voina, the group Pussy Riot was initially from this art group). We can therefore conclude that at least half of the accounts here are also connected to media.

Graph VIII: Bot detection for top ten nodes (Twitter users). Twitter discussion around (Radio Liberty. (2020): news story around changing the Russian constitution and making a definition of “family” as a “union of a man and a woman” and a viral video around it. Tweets collected for the period 4/06/2020 – 4/07/2020



Source: own elaboration, botometer

Apart from one media account, botometer placed all of the private Twitter accounts as 'non-bots' in this case.

4.2.1 Results of SNA

There are several observations we could make for all the networks. The network diameter varied between 10 and 2 nodes, which meant that more people talked about the event in 2017 than the other events. This is perhaps not surprising, since the story of gay people prosecution in Chechnya, when initially started, had provoked a large response in the country and abroad. As *Deutsche Welle* reported:

“At the beginning of April, the Russian newspaper "Novaya Gazeta" reported that over one hundred men were arrested for being gay or bisexual in Chechnya. It says at least three of

them were killed. Several Western media outlets have since reported about beatings, torture and electric shocks the men were subjected to in police custody, as Chechen authorities tried to get them to admit to their sexual orientation and to hand over the names of gay acquaintances.” (DW: 2017⁶²)

Density, centralization and reciprocity remained low for all the networks. Modularity, on the other hand, always remained high, representing certain fragmentation of the networks. There are a few possible explanations to this phenomenon. One is that the sizes of the datasets might be too large to get high values of density and reciprocity for the whole network (Pascual-Ferrá et al: 2021). Another one is that the topics themselves were news stories, and conversation on Twitter around news more often produces commentary, and finally, more people may be using Twitter for broadcasting purposes rather than for a two-way conversation (ibid: p. 7).

As a result of Social Network Analysis, we are answering the RQ1: Which actors play the most important role in Twitter networks around LGBT issues-related news stories in Russia?

Results showed that media accounts play the most central, and thus most important part in the Twitter discussion around LGBT. Considering for the review central nodes (Twitter users) of all the networks, we can say now that the media accounts, as well as those closely connected to media (journalists, editors, or bloggers) constitute 52.5% of the accounts with the most total degree centrality. Thus, we answer the Research Question 1: Which actors play the most important role in Twitter networks around LGBTQ issues-related news stories in Russia? as follows:

Media-related actors (52.2% of nodes) play an important role around LGBTQ issues-related news stories in Twitter networks in Russia, although private users are also playing a significant role.

In the next section, human-based content analysis of the 200 most central tweets of the whole sample, we will see whether the Hypothesis 1 - If the discussions on Twitter connected with news on LGBT, the main actors expressing state conservative narrative might be pro-government journalists or media accounts – could be validated.

⁶² *Deutsche Welle* (2017): <https://www.dw.com/en/gay-men-flee-persecution-and-honor-killings-in-chechnya/a-38457383>

4.3. Content Analysis of Tweets with human coding

4.3.1 Sampling of tweets for the content analysis

Sampling for content analysis of Tweets was done according to the total centrality of a Twitter user in a network (See Section 1: Social Network Analysis in Chapter 2: Methodology and Results). There are several ways news media and journalists, as well as news topics are analyzed by the researchers on Twitter (Malik & Pfeffer, 2016; Komori et al, 2021; Groshek & Tandoc, 2017; Kirilenko & Stepchenkova, 2014; Bodrunova et. al: 2017). One of them is harvesting the data solely from pre-selected media and (or) journalists' accounts. For example, Malik & Pfeffer (2016) were using a list of 6000 pre-identified accounts of media and journalists among the dataset of over 1.8 million tweets. But the authors themselves admitted that the usage of pre-identified list could have underestimated the data on media, since they could have missed other media-related accounts outside the list (ibid: 2016).

Another method of sampling the large number of Twitter data, is selecting the most 'important' tweets, whether those that were most retweeted (Komori et al: 2021) or manually code the most important users (Groshek & Tandoc: 2017; Kirilenko & Stepchenkova: 2014). As the first stage, the researchers collect all the tweets on a particular topic or news during a period of time, and as the second stage they manually code the most important (central for the network) nodes or Twitter users who participated in these discussions.

This is the case of the present research: we manually coded top fifty twitter users (nodes, Appendix 3) who had the biggest number of centralities in the four networks which resulted from Social Network Analysis of these nodes (for years 2017; 2018; 2019 and 2020) (See Section 1: Social Network Analysis in Chapter 2: Methodology and Results). We thus composed a sample of 200 Twitter users (see Appendix 3). Further on, we analyzed their accounts, reading through the first ten posts on their profile page, as well as the profile information. This was done before in a research of gatekeeping on Twitter by Groshek & Tandoc (2017), who manually categorized Twitter accounts by examining the Twitter profile of each user and making coding decisions based on how users self-identified. The accounts were classified as belonging to media/journalist and the political orientation as pro-government, opposition or neutral. The first tweet from this account was then read and

classified according to its' expressed attitude towards LGBT community. Only the original tweets were taken as a unit of analysis; those that merely reproduced tweets by others were discarded. The account which followed the discarded was then taken into consideration for a content analysis as advised by previous research (Groshek & Tandoc, 2017).

4.3.2 Defining variables for content analysis

Following the previous research on Twitter discussions around news topics, (Groshek & Tandoc, 2017; Kirilenko & Stepchenkova, 2014; Tous-Rovirosa & Dergacheva, 2021), we identified accounts as media or non-media and pro-government or opposition. This was done by reading through the first ten posts of each account and profile information, and seeing how the users self-identified, thus making coding decisions (Groshek & Tandoc, 2017). In order to identify and label the accounts as 'pro-government', 'opposition' or 'neutral', we used the following technique developed by Stukal et al (2017) during their study of Russian political bots on Twitter. The two coders were instructed to read through the profile information, including a link to other social networks if present and to look at interactions with other users. If they expressed support towards state initiatives, the president, cited and supported news on these issues, discussed opposition in a negative way or used memes of the same character, they were labeled as 'pro-government'. In case they supported opposition, criticized state initiatives or news, or used memes of the same character, cited oppositional media sources, they were labeled as 'opposition'. In case nothing of the kind was found in the first ten posts or information on profiles, they were labeled as 'neutral'. Previous research showed the importance of considering difference at the political issue level between social network users (an example would be gun control in the US or jail sentence for Alexey Navalny in Russia), thus labeling occurs according to polarizing issues (Wade et al, 2020).

Thus, the first two variables were:

Affiliation:

1 – Media (or journalists)

2 – Non-media

Political views

1 – pro-government

2 – opposition

3 – neutral

The analysis was performed by the author of this dissertation. Reliability test was done with another coder, a graduate student at the University of Turku (Finland), Russian speaking. The second coder, as it was mentioned in the (Section 4.2: Social Network Analysis) was only voluntarily assisting with coding a small sample in order to check the reliability. Intercoder reliability is usually calculated by having two or more coders categorize content, and then using these categorizations to calculate a numerical index of the extent of agreement between them (Lombard & Snyder: 2002). We used Cohen’s Kappa, and the results are shown in the Table 12.

Table 12. Cohen’s Kappa reliability code results

Variable	Cohen’s k	Interpretation
Media affiliation	0.89	Almost perfect agreement
Political Affiliation	0.73	Substantial agreement
Attitude towards LGBT	0.086	No agreement

The reliability analysis showed at first that the variable number 3, attitude towards LGBT community, was problematic.

In the beginning of content analysis, it included five definition choices:

Views on LGBT community

1 - Placing the LGBT as in-group (us): positive comments about LGBT community

2 - Placing the LGBT as in-group (us): calls to protect and treat fairly the LGBT community

3 - Placing the LGBT as out-group (them versus us): hate speech, insults, threats towards LGBT

4 - Placing the LGBT as out-group: referring to LGBT community as 'others', 'different', 'minorities', 'deviant; connecting LGBT communities to the 'West' etc

5 - Neutral

The Russian 'State Narrative' seems to be at the moment framing the LGBT community as an 'Out-group' one, as we are trying to demonstrate in this research. (see Chapter 3, Section 4, Framing of the 'State Narrative' in Russia). Our research is studying to which extent this is done in social media.

However, the third variable (attitude towards LGBT) showed significant difference between the two coders, with coders not agreeing (see Table 12). Thus, we decided to modify the variable and include three categories of analysis for the variable. The final modification of the variable 3 looked like the following:

Views on LGBT community:

1 - Placing the LGBT as IN-group (us): calls to protect and treat fairly the LGBT community (including news on the protection and calls to protection, fair treatment etc.); positive comments about LGBT community

2 - Placing the LGBT as OUT-group (them versus us): referring to LGBT community as 'others', 'different', 'minorities', 'deviant; connecting LGBT communities to the 'West' (including news mentioning these topics); hate speech, insults, threats towards LGBT

3 – Neutral: not talking about LGBT as either in-group or out-group, stating neutral facts or talking more about other issues in the text of the tweet

Table 13. Cohen's Kappa reliability code results after changing the variable 3:

Variable	Cohen's k	Interpretation
Media affiliation	0.89	Almost perfect agreement


Political Affiliation	0.73	Substantial agreement
Attitude towards LGBT	0.74	Substantial agreement

The second reliability tests' results showed an 80% agreement between the researchers on the variables, which is considered acceptable (Feng, 2013)

4.3.3. Content analysis of the sample

In order to check the Hypothesis 1

H1: If the discussions on Twitter connected with news on LGBT the main actors expressing state conservative narrative might be pro-government journalists or media accounts, We used SPSS version 20 by IBM (Sage: 2020) for performing the content analysis of the sample of Tweets with human coding. The coded sample is attached as an Appendix 1. First, we are reflecting here some of the descriptive statistics of the sample.




Graph IX: media affiliation. Content analysis sample of users. Twitter discussion around news stories (Novaya Gazeta, 2017; The Moscow Times, 2018; Mediazona, 2019; Radio Liberty, 2020)

(Source: own elaboration, SPSS)

As we can see from the Graph I, there were less than third (27%) media affiliated accounts, and two thirds (73%) of non-media affiliated Twitter users in the sample.


Graph X: Political views. Content analysis sample of users. Twitter discussion around news stories (Novaya Gazeta, 2017; The Moscow Times, 2018; Mediazona, 2019; Radio Liberty, 2020)



(Source: own elaboration, SPSS)

Political affiliation of the whole sample was uneven and included more than half of the accounts with oppositional political views. This is due to the general Twitter users' characteristics in Russia (see Chapter II Literature Review, Section 2.4: Twitter in Russian context).

Graph XI: Views on LGBT. Content analysis sample of users. Twitter discussion around news stories (Novaya Gazeta, 2017; The Moscow Times, 2018; Mediazona, 2019; Radio Liberty, 2020)




(Source: own elaboration, SPSS)

The views in LGBT of the whole sample are almost equally divided between 'In-group' (41.5%) and 'Out-group' (39.5%), with 'neutral' taking a modest 19.5%, showing strong polarization about this issue on the analyzed sample.

We also did a three-variables Crosstabulation in order to visually reflect the data on all three variables in the Graph XI and Table 14.

Graph XII: Political views * views on LGBT * affiliation Crosstabulation. Content analysis sample of users. Twitter discussion around news stories (Novaya Gazeta, 2017; The Moscow Times, 2018; Mediazona, 2019; Radio Liberty, 2020)



Source: Own elaboration, SPSS

As we can see on this graph, there are more negative views on LGBT as an ‘Out-group’ within media-affiliated accounts with pro-government views (11) than those with oppositional views (5). Among those with positive views on LGBT as an ‘In-group’ there are much more representatives of oppositional media (20) than pro-government one (4).

Table 14. Political views * views on LGBT Crosstabulation. Content analysis sample of users. Twitter discussion around news stories (Novaya Gazeta, 2017; The Moscow Times, 2018; Mediazona, 2019; Radio Liberty, 2020)

Affiliation	views on LGBT	Total
-------------	---------------	-------

		In-group positive comments	Out-group negative comments	neutral	
media/journalists	political views pro-government	4	11	4	19
	opposition	20	5	4	29
	neutral	2	1	3	6
	Total	26	17	11	54
non-media	political views pro-government	6	24	3	33
	opposition	35	27	11	73
	neutral	16	10	14	40
	Total	57	61	28	146

Source: Own elaboration, SPSS

There are some other possible findings that may be checked statistically. We can see from the table that overall, non-media affiliated Twitter users with oppositional views are more likely to express positive comments on LGBT as ‘In-group’ (35) than those that have pro-government views (6). However, when we look at expressing views on LGBT as an ‘Out-group’ among the non-media Twitter users, it seems that there are about the same number of those from opposition (27) and pro-government (24) groups expressing those views. These observations differ from those of media users. In the next section, we are checking them statistically.

4.3.4 Logistic regression

In order to check the Hypothesis 1, (If in the discussions on Twitter connected with news on LGBT the main actors expressing state conservative narrative might be pro-government journalists or media accounts), a logistic regression was performed (UCLA: 2021). Since we had two categorical independent variables (IV: political views and media affiliation) and one categorical dependent variable (DV: Views on LGBT), we tried logistic regression (UCLA:

Model	25.292	3	.000
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Source: own elaboration, SPSS

Table 18: Model Summary

Step	-2 Log likelihood	Cox & Snell R Square	Nagelkerke R Square
1	197.902 ^a	.145	.194

a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 4 because parameter estimates changed by less than .001.

Source: own elaboration, SPSS

In this case, the Independent Variables (political views and media affiliation) are significant, but R2 is not great (0.194 Nagelkerke R2).

As a step three of our analysis, we excluded the "neutral" category from Independent Variable Political Views, so that we could see the significance of Independent Variables based only on 'pro-government' or 'oppositional' views, since this was the suggestion in our Hypothesis 1.

Table 19: Categorical Variables Coding

		Frequency	Parameter coding (1)
affiliation	media/journalists	40	1.000
	non-media	92	.000
political views	pro-government	45	1.000
	opposition	87	.000

Source: own elaboration, SPSS

Table 20: Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients 2

	Chi-square	df	Sig.
Step 1 Step	24.938	2	.000
Block	24.938	2	.000
Model	24.938	2	.000

Source: own elaboration, SPSS

Table 21: Model Summary 2

Step	-2 Log likelihood	Cox & Snell R Square	Nagelkerke R Square
1	158.023 ^a	.172	.230

a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 4 because parameter estimates changed by less than .001. Source: own elaboration, SPSS

Table 22: Classification Table^a

Observed	Predicted		
	views on LGBT		Percentage Correct
	In-group positive comments	Out-group negative comments	

Step 1	views on LGBT	In-group	positive	55	10	84.6
		comments				
		Out-group	negative	32	35	52.2
		comments				
Overall Percentage						68.2

a. The cut value is .500

Once again, we ran the logistic regression. We have included Constant in the model this time. Chi-square test is showing that correlation is significant (Table 20). As Liao & McGee (2003) explain “R², defined as the proportion of variation in the outcome variable explained by the model, is a popular measure of the strength of association between the outcome and the predictors” (Liao & McGee, 2003, p. 161). R² coefficient in this case is 0.230 (Nagelkerke R²), which is, according to some authors (e.g. Falk & Miller, 1992; Cohen, 1988) substantial in social science. We also received a result of 68% of group membership predicted correctly.

We can therefore say that the Hypothesis 1 is valid, and the affiliation of media Twitter user played its’ role in expressing the ‘State Narrative’ on LGBT community in Twitter discussions.

4.3.5. Additional statistical results of content analysis

In order to find out whether there are other significant correlations might have been found in our sample, we compared two categorical independent variables (IV: political views and media affiliation) and one categorical dependent variable (DV: Views on LGBT) using cross-tabulation of two variables in SPSS. We compared all three variables: affiliation, political views and attitude towards LGBT community in pairs in two different crosstabulations.

First, we performed a cross-tabulation on the variables ‘political views’ and ‘views on LGBT

Table 23: Political views and views on LGBT Crosstabulation. Content analysis sample of users. Twitter discussion around news stories (Novaya Gazeta, 2017; The Moscow Times, 2018; Mediazona, 2019; Radio Liberty, 2020)

political views * views on LGBT Crosstabulation

Count

		views on LGBT			
		In-group positive comments	Out-group negative comments	neutral	Total
political views	pro-government	10	35	7	52
	opposition	55	32	15	102
	neutral	18	11	17	46
Total		83	78	39	200

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	34.322 ^a	4	.000
Likelihood Ratio	32.897	4	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	.008	1	.927
N of Valid Cases	200		

a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 8.97.

Here, we checked the Pearson Chi-Square test to see if the dependency of views on LGBT on political views existed and found that it did. Chi-Square test was valid in this case.


Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approximate Significance
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.414	.000
	Cramer's V	.293	.000
N of Valid Cases		200	

Finally, we checked the Cramer’s V measure, and found that its’ value is (0.293), which shows a moderate association between views on LGBT and political views.

Therefore, as a result of these statistical calculations in SPSS, we found that the views on LGBT are moderately dependent on political views in these Twitter discussions. The Chi-Square test is valid and shows dependency, and Cramer’s V is (0.293), therefore the association is moderate. We then visualized the results at the Graph XII.

Graph XIII. Views on LGBT – political views cross-tabulation. Content analysis sample of users. Twitter discussion around news stories (Novaya Gazeta, 2017; The Moscow Times, 2018; Mediazona, 2019; Radio Liberty, 2020)



Further on, we performed a cross-tabulation on the variables ‘views on LGBT’ and ‘affiliation’ (media - non-media)

Table 24: views on LGBT * affiliation Crosstabulation Content analysis sample of users. Twitter discussion around news stories (Novaya Gazeta, 2017; The Moscow Times, 2018; Mediazona, 2019; Radio Liberty, 2020)

-
-

views on LGBT * affiliation Crosstabulation

Count

		affiliation		Total
		media/journalists	non-media	
views on LGBT	In-group positive comments	26	57	83
	Out-group negative comments	17	61	78
	neutral	11	28	39
Total		54	146	200

-
-
-

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymptotic Significance (2- sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	1.889 ^a	2	.389
Likelihood Ratio	1.913	2	.384
Linear-by-Linear Association	.438	1	.508
N of Valid Cases	200		

a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 10.53.


Here, we checked the Pearson Chi-Square test to see if the dependency of views on LGBT on affiliation existed and found that it did. Chi-Square test was valid in this case.

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approximate Significance
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.097	.389
	Cramer's V	.097	.389
N of Valid Cases		200	

However, we then checked the Cramer's V, and found, and found that its' value is (0.097), which is low. We then visualized the findings on a Graph XIII:

Graph XIV Views on LGBT – affiliation (media-non media) cross-tabulation. Content analysis sample of users. Twitter discussion around news stories (Novaya Gazeta, 2017; The Moscow Times, 2018; Mediazona, 2019; Radio Liberty, 2020)



Source: own elaboration, SPSS

As the second step, we did a cross-tabulation of views on LGBT and affiliation with media. We found that the views on LGBT are dependent on the affiliation in these Twitter discussions. The Chi-Square test is valid and shows dependency, but Cramer’s V is 0.097 therefore the association is weak.

4.3.6. Results of content analysis

Quantitative content analysis of our sample with human coding has showed that there exists a dependency of the affiliation of media Twitter user and expressing the ‘State Narrative’ on LGBT community in Twitter discussions. We performed logistic regression in SPSS, and

proved that the Hypothesis 1 is valid, and both affiliation (media), as well as political views (pro-government) played its' role in expressing the 'State Narrative' on LGBT community in Twitter discussions. We confirmed that media accounts with pro-government views were expressing more views on LGBT as an 'Out-group'.

We have afterwards looked at other statistical results and our findings show that also for all the users the views on LGBT are moderately dependent on political views in these Twitter discussions. We found an association between affiliation (media or non-media) and views on LGBT as well, but it was a rather weak one.

4.4 Computational text analysis

4.4.1 Topic modeling

During the last decade, more and more social science researchers are turning to computational text analysis as one of the preferred methods of analyzing large amount of textual data (Wilkerson & Casas, 2017; Joulin et al, 2016; Kim, 2020). As Kim et al (2013) highlight, the microblogging Twitter's content analysis requires in many cases a prohibitive cost and the teamwork implied for manual coding. However, it is possible to use computer software which makes the process automatic. Researchers in the fields of computational linguistics have been pioneers in this kind of methodology, but since then, it has been implemented by a lot more specializations in social sciences, including communication studies of Twitter. Some of the recent examples include Liu & Harlow (2020) who analyzed Twitter feeds of immigrant organizations before and after the news of the ban of travel by former President Trump; populism in presidential elections in France vs the US (Maurer & Diehl, 2020) or cyberbullying (McHugh et al., 2019). While adding human-based coded content analysis usually brings more benefits, since the AI cannot always identify satire, slang or sarcasm which are all often used on Twitter (Kim et al, 2013), computational text analysis nevertheless provides unique insights into the big data which would not have been possible before the development of machine learning algorithms (ibid).

The widely used technique of the computational text analysis is topic modeling (Isoaho et al., 2019). Topic modeling uses machine learning to discover patterns in large volumes of data. It relies on "probabilistic models for uncovering the underlying semantic structure of a document collection" (Blei & Lafferty, 2009, p. 1). Following Liu & Harlow (2020), since our

initial universe sample included over 18 000 tweets, we decided to use topic modeling as the most efficient way to classify the text and expose framing, narratives, and the discourses. As in the case of Liu & Harlow (2020), our sample was so large that, according to Hecking & Leydesdorff (2018), human coding of all the sample was practically impossible.

In order to analyze the whole sample of data, we chose to use text analysis software WordStat8.0 by Provails Research. It has been noted previously that WordStat is a useful analytical instrument for text mining and text analysis, especially when there are large amounts of non-structures data (Brown: 2007). In addition, WordStat can extract phrases and new vocabulary from texts, thus going beyond the usual dictionary approach to discourse and narrative features. Its Phrase and cooccurrences features search and display all combinations of words that occur with a predetermined minimum frequency (Pollach, 2011). In other words, the program makes it possible to track not only the most common key words, terms, and phrases but also to measure the statistical and conceptual distances between certain topics. It reports terms which were frequently discussed and identified other words with which they were being discussed (Groshek & Al-Raw, : 2013).

As in the research by Liu & Harrow (2020), via WordStat topic modeling feature, we identified topics composed of keywords that statistically are likely to co-occur, there also appeared a theme which linked these words between each other. We relied on a probabilistic type of topic modeling known as Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA). As Shahin (2019) described, LDA produces topics composed of keywords that statistically are likely to co-occur and specifies the proportion of how often the topic appears in the entire text. It has no be noted though that in some cases, words may co-occur in multiple scenarios. Therefore, in some cases the percentage number of all the topics may be more than 100. It may as well be less than 100, since some topics may not make sense, be a random collection of words, and a lot depends on a researcher whether they are able to recognize all of the topics (Bodrunova: 2021).

Another example of topic modeling in WordStat is the research by Groshek and Al-Rawi (2013), who highlight that the program made it possible to track not only the most common key words, terms, and phrases but also to measure the statistical and conceptual distances between certain topics.

“In other words, the program reported what terms were frequently being discussed in these spaces and identified other words with which they were being discussed. In this way, this study was able to get a sense of not only what people were saying in social media about Mitt Romney or Barack Obama but how they were characterizing each of the candidates with the words and phrases that appeared within the same paragraph (or Tweet, as it were)” (Groshek & Al-Rawi, 2013, p. 567). As Bodrunova (2021) explains: “a topic is a collection of texts that belong with high enough probability to one theme slot and are expected to be linked by topicality of their content.” (Bodrunova: 2021, p. 410). We have used unsupervised topic modeling with WordStat8.0 but created a dictionary of exclusion words (we used WordStat’s existing Russian dictionary and added specific Twitter spam words that we have encountered (see Appendix 2).

4.4.2 Topic modeling in WordStat

We uploaded the whole universe sample of each year of Twitter data (2017; 2018; 2019; 2020) around news stories on LGBT community in Russia to WordStat 8.0, and analyzed the keywords of each data set and phrases which were statistically likely to co-occur in the whole text of all the tweets of the particular period. Since the whole dataset of tweets is in Russian, the word clouds done by the software was originally in Russian (see Appendix 3). We translated it and did reproduction of data in an online service word cloud, assigning the numerical meanings to words in accordance with the WordStat results.

As for the Content Analysis Section 2.3, we have used the following classification of topics around the LGBT community. According to the theoretical part, Section 3.3. ‘State Narratives’, we define placing the LGBT as:

Views on LGBT community:

1 - Placing the LGBT as In-group (us): calls to protect and treat fairly the LGBT community (including news on the protection and calls to protection, fair treatment etc.); positive comments about LGBT community

2 - Placing the LGBT as Out-group (them versus us): referring to LGBT community as ‘others’, ‘different’, ‘minorities’, ‘deviant; connecting LGBT communities to the ‘West’ (including news mentioning these topics); hate speech, insults, threats towards LGBT

- 1 – Neutral or irrelevant (not about LGBT as either in-group or out-group, neutral facts or other issues unrelated to LGBT)

In this section, we are answering the Research Question 2: What are the concepts used in describing or evaluating LGBT community on Twitter networks in Russia around news stories on LGBT issues? And validating the H2: If the concept originates in the ‘state narrative’ on LGBT, it might be one of the dominating concepts in Twitter discussions around LGBT news topics

4.4.3 Topics discovered during the topic-modeling:

Graph XV. Word Cloud. Twitter discussion around (Novaya gazeta: 2017): news story on prosecution of LGBT in Chechnya. Tweets collected for the period 15/03/2017 – 15/05/2017.



Source: WordStat data, own elaboration in Wordcloud.com

There are top 30 words used in the data set. There are nouns, acronyms, verbs, surnames, and names. The statistical data on the words, in Russian and in English, is in the Appendix 4.

Since the 2017 news story that we described above (*Novaya Gazeta: 2017*) was evolving around alleged prosecution of gay man in the Republic of Chechnya, there are a lot of mentions of “Gays”, which is the most frequently used word. More neutral umbrella term LGBT is used much less than the word ‘Gay’ in its many forms. LGBT is an abbreviation for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender. As it is stated on the glossary terms webpage of the University of California’s LGBT resource center, an umbrella term (LGBT) is used to refer to the community as a whole⁶³.

There are also verbs, such as ‘investigate’ and ‘sign’, ‘torture’ and ‘close’, among others which might be describing the news. As for the most mentioned names and surnames, there are three government officials representing the official view on the story: appointed by the president human rights ‘defender’ Tatiana Moskalkova; press-secretary of President Putin Sergey Peskov and president of Chechen Republic Ramzan Kadyrov.

Much more information, however, can be derived from the Topic Modeling (these are more “complete sentences” than keywords or words).

“The main goal of using any topic modeling algorithm is to detect the so-called topics in a text collection. In communication terms, a topic is a theme around which the discussion is evolving; but, in topic modeling, topics express themselves via collections of words and/or documents that the modeling algorithm considers similar and/or related to each other.”
(Bordunova, 2021 p.409)

Among the topics which were discovered as statistically meaningful for the Twitter discussion in 2017 data set, there were several Placing the LGBT as Out-group (them versus us). Results are presented in Table 25.

Table 25: Topics placing LGBT as an OUT-group. Twitter discussion around (Novaya gazeta: 2017): news story on prosecution of LGBT in Chechnya. Tweets collected for the period 15/03/2017 – 15/05/2017.

⁶³ <https://lgbt.ucsf.edu/glossary-terms>

TOPIC	COHERENCE	FREQ	CASES	% CASES
KADYROV'S SECRETARY. WHERE FROM WOULD BE GAYS IN CHECHNYA THERE WERE NEVER GAYS IN CHECHNYA. IT IS A LIE, SAID KADYROV'S SECRETARY	0,607	392	156	3,51%
ASK FOR APOLIGIES FROM THE NEWSPAPER FOR THE ARTICLE ON GAY PROSECUTION KREMLIN DOES NOT SEE PROOF OF THESE PUBLICATIONS	0,554	322	177	3,98%
LAW ENFORCEMENT NEVER RECEIVED ANY COMPLAINT ON PROSECUTION OF GAYS IN CHECHNYA	0,501	148	66	1,48%
KADYROV AT THE MEETING WITH PUTIN SAID IT WAS PROVOCATION	0,489	172	83	1,87%
IMPOSSIBLE TO FIND GAYS IN CHECHNYA BECAUSE THEY ARE ABSENT THERE	0,470	157	48	1,08%
SHE (HUMAN RIGHTS REPRESENTATIVE APPOINTED BY THE PRESIDENT OF RUSSIA) SUSPECTED A FALSE DENUNCIATION IN THOSE MESSAGES	0,452	157	60	1,35%

KADYROV TOLD PUTIN ABOUT PROVOCATIONS IN THE SITUATION	0,417	106	70	1,57%
THE GAYS WOULD BE PROTECTED WHEN THERE WILL BE REAL FACTS OF THEIR RIGHTS VIOLATED, - LAVROV	0,390	81	31	0,70%
In total, 15.54%				
of topics were classified as placing LGBT as an 'OUT' Group				

Source: WordStat 8.0, own elaboration

All the topics (in Russian) are included in the Appendix 5.

As we can observe here, there are about 15% of topics in this discussion which refer to LGBT community as an 'Out-group'. Among them, for instance, denial of existence of LGBT community (there are no gays in Chechnya); there are no real facts, only provocations etc. We will classify all the topics for identifying LGBT as an 'Out-group' in the Results section below.

Table 26: Topics placing LGBT as an In-group. Twitter discussion around (Novaya gazeta: 2017): news story on prosecution of LGBT in Chechnya. Tweets collected for the period 15/03/2017 – 15/05/2017.

TOPIC	COHERENCE	FREQ	CASES	% CASES
CLOSE UP THE SECRET PRISONS (FOR GAY PEOPLE), PLEASE SIGN THE PETITION AND TELL THIS TO EVERYONE	0,975	3136	350	7,87%
LGBT ACTIVISTS HAVE GONE TO COURT AFTER NOVAYA GAZETA PUBLICATIONS IN ORDER TO	0,634	363	126	2,83%

INVESTIGATE KILLINGS OF HOMOSEXUALS				
“NOVAYA GAZETA” PUBLISHED EVIDENCE ON PEOPLE WHO LEFT THE SECRED PRISONS ALIVE. DETAINED GAYS ARE BEING TORTURED IN SECRET PRISON IN CHECHNYA	0,523	438	343	7,71%
HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICER CHECKED REPORTS ON PROSECUTING GAYS IN CHECHNYA	0,515	174	66	1,48%
EUROPEAN UNION CALLED TO INVESTIGATE REPORTS ON TORTURES OF GAYS IN CHECHNYA AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL CALLED TO INVESTIGATE REPORTS ON TORTURES OF GAYS IN CHECHNYA	0,495	260	145	3,26%
US DEPARTMENT OF STATE CALLS ON RUSSIA TO INVESTIGATE THE UNDERSTAND THE SITUATION WITH GAY PROSECUTION IN CHECHNYA	0,487	156	76	1,71%
PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE STARTED CHECKING AFTER MEDIA PUBLICATIONS ON	0,477	247	121	2,72%

KIDNAPPING OF GAY PEOPLE IN CHECHNYA				
CHECHEN ALREADY KILLED ABOUT; THE KREMLIN PROMISED TO CHECK THE INFORMATION; THE OMBUDSMAN OF RUSSIA STARTED INSPECTION OF INFORMATION; THEY ARE CONSIDERED NON-HUMAN; PREVIOUS MEDIA; IN THE WORDS OF MOSKALKOVA; IT WAS UNDER HITLER	0,459	368	131	2,94%
NEW NEWSPAPER; SIX SECRET PRISONS; MEDIA TOLD; DECLARED SIX SECRET PRISONS; MOSKALKOVA WILL CHECK THE MESSAGES; SIX SECRET PRISONS; REPORTED SIX SECRET PRISONS; SECRET PRISONS	0,456	324	177	3,98%
UN REQUIRED TO INVESTIGATE DATA; UN EXPERTS DEMANDED TO STOP; UN CALLED TO INVESTIGATE; POSTPREDAY OF THE USA UNDER THE UN; INVESTIGATE DATA; PASSION OF GAYS; UN CALLED;	0,452	124	88	1,98%
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL CALLED TO INVESTIGATE COMMUNICATIONS; TO ENSURE THE SAFETY OF GAYS IN CHECHNIA;	0,451	224	114	2,56%

CHAPTER HRC; CHECK MESSAGES; ATTACKS ON GAYS IN CHECHNIA; CHAPTER HRC CALLED TO CHECK; CALLED TO CHECK THE MESSAGES; LGBT REPRESENTATIVES IN CHECHNIA; CHECK THE INFORMATION;	0,427	141	98	2,20%
YOUTUBE, KASHIN (JOURNALIST'S SURNAME) EXPLOSION IN STPETERBBURG METRO; ATTACKS ON GAYS IN CHECHNIA; SOBCHAK'S THIRD APPEAL TO PUTIN; IN CHECHNYA, THEY KILL AND TORTURE GAYS;	0.32	53	97	1.19%
In total,				
42.43%				
of topics were classified as placing LGBT as an 'IN-Group'				

Source: WordStat 8.0, own elaboration

As we can see in Table 26, there were also meaningful topics connected to placing LGBT community as an 'In-group'. Calls to stop the prosecution, sign the petition, share information about the problem, appeals to government authorities and news on international and foreign organizations being concerned. We will classify all the topics for identifying LGBT as an 'In-group' in the Results section below.

Because topic modeling is based on algorithm rather than human coding, there always are topics identified which do not make sense. Some of them may be classified as 'neutral' but there are also many which are rather 'irrelevant'. Table 27 offers some (not all) examples of such topics. We do not count the 'total' percentage here because we did not analyze those and are only providing examples.

Table 27: Examples of neutral topics or irrelevant topics (not containing information on the case). Twitter discussion around (Novaya gazeta: 2017): news story on prosecution of LGBT in Chechnya. Tweets collected for the period 15/03/2017 – 15/05/2017.

TOPIC	COHERENCE	FREQUENCIES	% CASES	% CASES
RUSSIAN MEDIA, MEDIA IN RUSSIA ROSSIJSKIESMI STATUS	0,415	231	58	1,30%
KASAN (CITY)	0,340	122	31	0,70%
DISSIDENT STATUS	0,319	240	80	1,80%

Source: WordStat 8.0, own elaboration

All the other topics (in Russian) are included in the Appendix 4.

Graph XVI. Wordcloud. Twitter discussion around [The Moscow Times: 2018]: news story on police prosecuting local school which had a drawing contest featuring LGBT couples. Tweets collected for the period 20/11/2018 – 20/12/2018



Source: WordStat data, own elaboration in Wordcloud.com

The story was of a much lesser scale than the one on gay prosecution in Chechnya, there are no names or surnames used, since there were none in the story. In addition, because of a rather small scale of the news, some non-related tweets could have been captured. There are a lot of words describing what was drawn on the pictures in question, such as mother; rainbow; flag; love; people; boy; girl. Umbrella terms LGBT and LGBT community terms are also used more than in the previous case.

Among the topics which were discovered as statistically meaningful for the Twitter discussion in 2018 data set, there were several placing the LGBT as Out-group (them versus us). These topics are shown in Table 28.

Table 28: Topics placing LGBT as an Out-group, Twitter discussion around [*The Moscow Times: 2018*]: news story on police prosecuting local school which had a drawing contest featuring LGBT couples. Tweets collected for the period 20/11/2018 – 20/12/2018

TOPIC	COHERENCE	FREQ	CASES	% CASES
TO LIVE PEACEFULLY OR TO HAVE RIGHTS	0,304	29	20	0,45%
GAYS IN GENERAL IS SOMETHING VERY BAD	0,293	36	24	0,54%
TO TREAT NORMALLY BY PARENTS BUT HOW WHEN LGBT	0,293	32	18	0,41%
PROPAGANDA OF LGBT AT SCHOOL	0,257	31	27	0,61%
In total, 2.01% of topics were classified as placing LGBT as an 'OUT' Group				

Source: WordStat 8.0, own elaboration

As we are able to observe, in this discussion only 2% of topics were classified as referring to LGBT community as an 'Out-group'. They include 'state narrative' concepts that LGBT issues are 'propaganda', that gays are 'bad' and not to be treated normally. Nevertheless, in this discussion there were more topics that identified LGBT as an 'In-group'. This example of topic modeling is also one of those where the algorithm had not been able to identify a substantial number of topics. Below in Table 29, are the ones placing LGBT community as an 'In-group'.

Table 29: Topics placing LGBT as an In-group, Twitter discussion around [*The Moscow Times*: 2018]: news story on police prosecuting local school which had a drawing contest featuring LGBT couples. Tweets collected for the period 20/11/2018 – 20/12/2018

TOPIC	COHERENCE	FREQ	CASES	% CASES
I AM LGBT AND I CAN RELATE	0,305	113	49	1,11%

RUSSIAN LGBT COMMUNITY, THE FLAG OF LGBT, TO KNOW IT	0,304	2001	1230	27,78%
A GIRLFRIEND OF YOUR GIRLFRIEND, TWO GUYS, LGBTQ	0,298	65	47	1,06%
CITIES OF RUSSIA; THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS; FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY CAMPAIGN; PEOPLE COVER; PARADE AND TWO LGBT people; SUBJECTS RF; ALEXEYEV NIKOLAY ALEKSEEV PROCESS BANKS;	0,296	76	33	0,75%
A NORMAL ATTITUDE TOWARDS LGBT	0,293	32	18	0,41%
GIRLS BEING TOGETHER	0,292	43	28	0,63%
HEALTH GAY HEALTH, A BOY IN A RAINBOW PANTS	0,278	132	46	1,04%
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE LGBT SOCIETY	0,272	20	11	0,25%
RAINBOW BORN	0,266	41	27	0,61%
(I AM) FOR LGBT	0,263	279	203	4,58%
LGBT TOMORROW	0,248	56	27	0,61%
LOOVEGIRLS, LESBI	0,243	108	34	0,77%
TO MAKE A COMING OUT	0,238	54	49	1,11%
In total,				
32.52%				

of topics were classified as placing LGBT as an 'IN-Group'

Source: WordStat 8.0, own elaboration

One of the possible explanations of a smaller number of topics found by WordStat compared to other years, is that there were too many unrelated to the news, or seemingly unrelated topics in the sample. The problem might have been with the dataset which captured some of unrelated to the piece of news LGBT community conversations, which really could not be assigned to either of the groups. Some of the examples may be:

Table 30: Examples of meaningless topics or neutral topics or irrelevant topics (not containing information on the case). Twitter discussion around [*The Moscow Times*: 2018]: news story on police prosecuting local school which had a drawing contest featuring LGBT couples. Tweets collected for the period 20/11/2018 – 20/12/2018

TOPIC	COHERENCE	FREQ	CASES	% CASES
GAY UNICORNS	0,277	80	45	1,02%
I AM SITTING AND THINKING	0,277	32	19	0,43%
A BOY LIKES A GIRL	0,273	80	45	1,02%
EACH OTHER	0,232	80	45	1,02%
NOT NICE SAD GIRL	0,249	79	67	1,51%
YOUTUBE VIDEO	0,233	70	30	0,68%
I LOVE GIRLS	0,410	196	63	1,42%

Source: WordStat 8.0, own elaboration

Graph XVII. Word Cloud. Twitter discussion around [*Mediazona*, 2019]. News story on new prosecution of LGBT in Chechnya. Tweets collected 20/01/2019 – 20/02/2019 20/02/2019.



Source: WordStat data, own elaboration in Wordcloud.com

The news story in 2019 was the one evolving around alleged prosecution of gay man in the Republic of Chechnya once again. This time, there were allegations of the possible kidnapping of two gay men who testified on the case and once again, the involvement of international organizations. In contrast with the story in 2017, we can see more LGBT term appearing, although the word ‘gay’ is also still widely used. There also appears the word ‘lesbian’, including a wider LGBT community into discussion. This time, in addition to ‘tortures and ‘victimization’, there appears a word ‘genocide’ as one of the mostly used words in the body of texts in 2019 sample.

Among the topics which were discovered as statistically meaningful for the Twitter discussion in 2018 data set, there were several placing the LGBT as OUT-group (them versus us). These topics are shown in Table 31.

Table 31. Topics placing LGBT as an Out-group. Twitter discussion around [Mediazona, 2019]. News story on new prosecution of LGBT in Chechnya. Tweets collected 20/01/2019 – 20/02/2019 20/02/2019.

TOPIC	COHERENCE	FREQ	CASES	% CASES
ISLAM FIGHTS WITH FIERCE. GAY PROSECUTION IN CHECHNYA	0,999	618	27	2,63%
IT IS NOT REALLY NECESSARY TO BE GAY TO BE PROSECUTED IN CHECHNYA	0,998	1334	89	8,66%
PHOTOS OF GAYS OPRESSED BY THE REGIME IN CHECNYA ARE ON THE INTERNET (PHOTO OF ILIYA YASHIN, OPPOSITION MEMBER)	0,733	470	48	4,67%
THERE ARE NO GAYS IN CHECHNYA. INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE WILL DECLINE TO OPEN THE CASE	0,730	297	59	5,74%
ASK TO CHECK INFORMATION ABOUT TORTURES. INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE WILL DECLINE TO INVESTIGATE	0,575	340	117	11,38%

THERE IS A MIINUM OF GAYS IN EVERY SOCIETY.	0,472	193	105	10,21%
GOVERNMENT IS DENYING INFORMATION ABOUT NEW TORTURES AND DETENTIONS OF GAYS IN CHECHNYA	0,415	179	90	8,75%
CHECHEN GOVERNMENT DENIES	0,345	194	71	6,91%
HUNTING GAYS	0,339	54	44	4,28%
In total, 63.2 % of topics were classified as placing LGBT as an 'OUT' Group				

Source: WordStat 8.0, own elaboration

The topics modeling for the year 2019 showed that there appeared more topics classifying LGBT community as an 'Out'-group than in the year 2017 or 2018. Here, we once again see denial of LGBT community existence (there are no gays in Chechnya, investigative committee will decline to investigate). For the first time we see Islam mentioned in the conversation, in the context that it 'fights; with gays. Also, for the first time we see LGBT depicted as liberal opposition, or rather, liberal opposition depicted as 'gay'. We will see how all the topics relate in the Results section.

Table 32. Topics placing LGBT as an In-group. Twitter discussion around [Mediazona, 2019]. News story on new prosecution of LGBT in Chechnya. Tweets collected 20/01/2019 – 20/02/2019 20/02/2019.

TOPIC	COHERENCE	FREQ	CASES	% CASES
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HARRASSMENT AND TORTURE IS REVEALED. GENOCIDE IS HAPPENING BASED ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION	0,997	2336	225	21,89%
KILLING GAYS; ATTENTION TO A VERY IMPORTANT PROBLEM; LET'S HELP THE RUSSIAN LGBT; REQUIREMENT TO INVESTIGATE;	0,974	738	162	15,76%
MEDIA REPORTED; DETENTION; NEW KILLINGS; TORTURE;	0,916	799	159	15,47%
GAY AND LESBIANS IS CHECHNYA ARE KILLED	0,644	668	123	11,96%
DIRECTOR OF PROGRAMS RUSSIAN LGBT; IGOR KOCHETKOV REPORTED; DETENTION OF GAYS; IGOR KOCHETKOV; SK WITH A REQUIREMENT TO INVESTIGATE;	0,513	259	97	9,44%
END OF DECEMBER; LAST MONTH AT LEAST; THE NETWORK DECLARES A NEW WAVE IN CHECHNA. A NEW WAVE OF REPRESSION STARTED;	0,467	148	72	7,00%

TO THE BUILDING OF THE PRESIDENT'S ADMINISTRATION; PROTESTING SINGLE PICKETS ABOUT GAY PROSECUTION IN CHECHNYA	0,454	136	45	4,38%
USA; DEEPLY CONCERNED; ABOUT NEW DETENTIONS OF GAYS IN CHECHNIA; MINORITIES ARE AGAIN EXPOSED; TORTURE AND KILLING OF LGBT	0,412	169	72	7,00%
I CALL ALL THOSE ITS LATVIA NEAR THE EMBASSY OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION IN RIGA; CONSIDERS THIS TOPIC IMPORTANT; PERSECUTION OF GAYS IN CHECHNIA;	0,305	84	34	3,31%
In total,				
89.7 %				
of topics were classified as placing LGBT as an 'In' Group				

Source: WordStat 8.0, own elaboration

This is the case when we can see there were topics identified using the same words in various compositions, thus the total percentage of all topics here exceeds 100%. In spite of this, we can still say that according to Table 31, there were also a lot of topics which placed LGBT as an 'In-group'. Some of the examples are, once again, calls for justice (requirement to investigate). A lot of people this time were describing prosecution of gay people in Chechnya as "genocide based on sexual orientation" (over 21%). This time there were also calls to protest (pickets at Presidential administration and Russian Embassy in Riga). We will see the topics classified in the Results section.

There were the least number of meaningless or neutral topics that were identified in 2019.

Table 33: Examples of meaningless topics or neutral topics or irrelevant topics (not containing information on the case). Twitter discussion around [Mediazona, 2019]. News story on new prosecution of LGBT in Chechnya. Tweets collected 20/01/2019 – 20/02/2019 20/02/2019.

TOPIC	COHERENCE	FREQ	CASES	% CASES
MOSCOW NEWS	0,319	46	37	3,60%

Source: WordStat 8.0, own elaboration

Graph XVIII. Word Cloud. Twitter discussion around (Radio Liberty, 2020): news story around changing the Russian constitution and making a definition of “family” as a “union of a man and a woman” and a viral video around it. Tweets collected for the period 4/06/2020 – 4/07/2020



Source: WordStat data, own elaboration in Wordcloud.com

We have left here the preposition ‘for’ and not included in into our exclusion dictionary, since in this discussion ‘For’ is meaningful. It means to be ‘For’ amendments, to vote ‘For’ (in favor of) amendments. As we have discussed earlier in the section on news stories, constitutional amendments passed in 2020 through a referendum, among others, included a ban on same-sex marriage (by defining marriage as between a man and a woman)⁶⁴. Despite the many mentions of ‘gays’ in texts of Tweets, the word did not make it into the top 30 list. The main obstacle for this might have been the focus of the news story on Constitutional changes rather than gay or LGBT rights.

Nevertheless, there are some words associated with the ‘state narrative’ on ‘usual threats’ to the country, along with LGBT, such as the West (NATO soldiers, in this case).

Table 34. Topics placing LGBT as an Out-group. Twitter discussion on (Radio Liberty, 2020): news story around changing the Russian constitution and making a definition of “family” as a “union of a man and a woman” and a viral video around it. Tweets collected for the period 4/06/2020 – 4/07/2020

TOPIC	COHERENCE	FREQ	CASES	% CASES
GAYS AND LESBIANS CAN NOT EXPERIENCE REAL PARENTAL FEELIGS. UNLESS A LESBIAN IS ALSO A BIRTH MOTHER. GAYS CAN NOT ADAPT CHILDREN	0,993	3848	513	8,30%

⁶⁴ <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-53255964>

AS IF BEFORE THE AMENDMENTS GAYS COULD ADAPT CHILDREN. VOTE FOR AMENDMENTS. ONLY IF WE VOTED NASTY GAYS WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO ADAPT CHILDREN GAYS ARE IN OUR POWER STRUCTURES EVERYWHERE	0,839	1735	429	6,94%
FOR GAYS IT IS LIKE A GAME OF 'MOTHER-DAUGHTER'	0,826	1845	601	9,72%
CONSTITUTION WILL BAN LGBTQ TO PLAY THESE GAMES	0,732	1243	315	5,09%
WE ARE WATCHING THE VIDEO WITH THE FAMILY. I DON'T KNOW WHY GAYS ARE HERE	0,718	1516	370	5,98%
GAYS AND LESBIANS CAN NOT EXPERIENCE REAL PARENTAL FEELINGS. VOTE FOR THE	0,621	1151	575	9,30%

AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION				
TOUGH GUYS CAN STOP WORRYING, THE AMENDMENTS ARE PASSED. NOW GAYS WON'T TAKE THEIR BOYFRIENDS	0,421	543	282	4,56%
THESE GAYS ARE EVERYWHERE IN THE GOVERNMENT	0,399	302	155	2,51%
GAYS COULD NOT GET MARRIED. THERE ARE OTHER ARTICLES THERE TOO WHICH ARE NOT ABOUT GAYS AND PEOPLE DO NOT UNDERSTAND THAT.	0,385	568	297	4,80%
PUTIN ANNOUNCED RECENTLY. RIA FAN DID THE VIDEO THAT ALL THE CHILDREN WILL BE TAKEN AWAY BY GAYS	0,385	209	107	1,73%

THERE ARE NO GAY PEOPLE AMONG ALL THE PEOPLE I KNOW	0,364	286	193	3,12%
GAYS ARE AGAINST THE AMENDMENTS TO THE RUSSIAN CONSTITUTION	0,273	259	194	3,14%
In total, 65.19 % of topics were classified as placing LGBT as an 'OUT' Group				

Source: WordStat 8.0, own elaboration

As we observe from the Table 34, in addition to denial of existence of LGBT (there are no gays among all the people I know), we see topics such as that LGBT people can not have 'parental feelings' ("Gays and lesbians cannot experience real parental feelings") or that there are "gays in the government".

The main difference of the discussion about the news in 2020 is that there are a lot of irony and sarcasm in the tweets. Therefore, Kim et al (2013) are suggesting saying that especially for Twitter texts, it is desirable to have also human-based coding and reading of the texts, since the AI (artificial intelligence) cannot recognize the subtle difference of sarcasm from usual speech. We made two different tables, since sarcasm is different from placing LGBT as an "In-group" although a lot of topics in sarcasm, as we will see, are laughing at the State Strategic Narrative.

Table 35. Topics placing LGBT as an In-group. Twitter discussion on (Radio Liberty, 2020): news story around changing the Russian constitution and making a definition of "family" as a "union of a man and a woman" and a viral video around it. Tweets collected for the period 4/06/2020 – 4/07/2020

TOPIC	COHERENCE	FREQ	CASES	% CASES
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(IF A CHILD IS NOT ADOPTED), THEY WILL GROW UP IN AN OPHRANGE AND WILL DIE SOMEWHERE IN SYRIA	0.613	9988	1113	18%
YOUTUBE SERVICE BLOCKED PROMOTION VIDEO WHICH SHOW GAYS ADOPTING A CHILD IN RUSSIA, BECAUSE IT FOUND DISCRIMINATION	0,351	215	93	1,50%
In total,				
19.5 %				
of topics were classified as placing LGBT as an 'In' Group				

Source: WordStat 8.0, own elaboration

Despite identifying only two topics of placing LGBT as an 'In-group', we can see that even here, there is a reference to the states' narrative in international politics: Syria. We may suggest here that this topic connects the state anti-LGBT position (LGBT cannot be a family, LGBT cannot adapt children etc.) with international politics stand (such as recent Russian involvement in the war with Syria), all of which constitutes the 'state narrative'.

Table 36. Examples of sarcasm. Twitter discussion around (Radio Liberty, 2020): news story on changing the Russian constitution and making a definition of "family" as a "union of a man and a woman" and a viral video around it. Tweets collected for the period 4/06/2020 – 4/07/2020

TOPIC	COHERENCE	FREQ	CASES	% CASES
WITHOUT THESE AMENDMENTS, GAYS WILL TAKE OUR CHILDREN, WE WILL FORGET THE LANGUAGE OF	0,656	1899	294	2,95%

PUSHKIN AND START HARM (WWII) VETERANS. NATO SOLDIERS WILL ALSO BE IN YOUR YARD				
IF YOU VOTE AGAINST AMENDMENTS, GAYS WILL TAKE YOUR CHILDREN. IF YOU DON'T, PLUSCHENKO WITH RUKVOVSKAYA WILL ADAPT THEM, WILL CALL THEM A GNOME. THEY WILL BE FORCED TO JUMP ROPE AND EVERYTHING WILL BE POSTED ON THE INTERNET	0,360	480	282	4,56%

Source: WordStat 8.0, own elaboration

From this example, we can see that Twitter users talk about a lot of concepts which could also be traced to the neo-conservative ‘state narrative’. They mention World War II veterans (which one of the key ‘sacred’ themes of the ‘state narrative’); NATO soldiers who would come to ‘your yard’ (which is another key theme on us versus them and the possible threat from the ‘west’); the language of Pushkin is also something government uses frequently as a part of ‘state narrative’. (e.g. Kivinen & Humphreys: 2021). Thus, we might suggest, the users were placing this ‘state narrative’ on LGBT into a broader ‘state narrative’, understanding it as a part of the forementioned construction rather than a “real problem”.

4.4.4. Results of topic modeling in computational text analysis

As we could observe from all the four samples, there were topics related to the ‘State Narrative’ on LGBT in every discussion. The least number of topics (2.01%) appeared in Twitter discussion around the news story in 2018. However, all three other discussions produced a substantial number or topics which placed LGBT as an ‘Out-group’: 15.54% in 2017; 63.2% in 2019, and 65.19% in 2020. Thus, with this chapter we are answering here

the first part of the Research Question 2: What are the concepts used in describing or evaluating LGBT community as an ‘Out-group’ in Twitter networks in Russia around news stories on LGBT issues? We found the following concepts present in the texts of Twitter discussions: see Table 3.5

Table 37. Topics placing LGBT as an Out-group grouped by concepts. Twitter discussion around news stories (Novaya Gazeta, 2017; The Moscow Times, 2018; Mediazona, 2019; Radio Liberty, 2020)

REFERRING TO LGBT COMMUNITY AS ‘OTHERS’	DENYING THE EXISTENCE OF LGBT COMMUNITY	CONNECTING LGBT COMMUNITIES TO THE ‘WEST’, PROPAGANDA, OPPOSITION	HATE SPEECH, INSULTS, THREATS TOWARDS LGBT. GENERALIZATIONS
TO LIVE PEACEFULLY OR TO HAVE RIGHTS	KADYROV’S SECRETARY. WHERE FROM WOULD BE GAYS IN CHECHNYA	KADYROV TOLD PUTIN ABOUT PROVOCATIONS IN THE SITUATION	GAYS IN GENERAL IS SOMETHING VERY BAD
TO TREAT NORMALLY BY PARENTS BUT HOW WHEN LGBT	THERE WERE NEVER GAYS IN CHECHNYA. IT IS A LIE, SAID KADYROV’S SECRETARY	PROPAGANDA OF LGBT AT SCHOOL	HUNTING GAYS
ISLAM FIGHTS WITH FIERCE. GAY PROSECUTION IN CHECHNYA	ASK FOR APOLIGIES FROM THE NEWSPAPER FOR THE ARTICLE ON GAY PROSECUTION KREMLIN DOES NOT SEE PROOF OF THESE PUBLICATIONS	PHOTOS OF GAYS OPRESSED BY THE REGIME IN CHECHNYA ARE ON THE INTERNET (PHOTO OF ILIYA YASHIN, OPPOSITION MEMBER, WITH A CONDOM IN HIS MOUTH)	AS IF BEFORE THE AMENDMENTS GAYS COULD ADAPT CHILDREN. VOTE FOR AMENDMENTS. ONLY IF WE VOTED NASTY GAYS WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO ADAPT CHILDREN GAYS ARE IN OUR POWER STRUCTURES EVERYWHERE
IT IS NOT REALLY NECESSARY TO BE GAY TO BE PROSECUTED IN CHECHNYA	LAW ENFORCEMENT NEVER RECEIVED ANY COMPLAINT ON PROSECUTION OF GAYS IN CHECHNYA		TOUGH GUYS CAN STOP WORRYING, THE AMENDMENTS ARE PASSED. NOW GAYS WON’T TAKE THEIR BOYFRIENDS
THERE IS A MIINUM OF GAYS IN EVERY SOCIETY.	IMPOSSIBLE TO FIND GAYS IN CHECHNYA		THESE GAYS ARE EVERYWHERE IN THE GOVERNMENT

	BECAUSE THEY ARE ABSENT THERE		
GAYS AND LESBIANS CAN NOT EXPERIENCE REAL PARENTAL FEELINGS. UNLESS A LESBIAN IS ALSO A BIRTH MOTHER. GAYS CAN NOT ADAPT CHILDREN	SHE (HUMAN RIGHTS REPRESENTATIVE APPOINTED BY THE PRESIDENT OF RUSSIA) SUSPECTED A FALSE DENUNCIATION IN THOSE MESSAGES		PUTIN ANNOUNCED RECENTLY. RIA FAN DID THE VIDEO THAT ALL THE CHILDREN WILL BE TAKEN AWAY BY GAYS
FOR GAYS IT IS LIKE A GAME OF 'MOTHER-DAUGHTER'	THE GAYS WOULD BE PROTECTED WHEN THERE WILL BE REAL FACTS OF THEIR RIGHTS VIOLATED, - LAVROV		
WE ARE WATCHING THE VIDEO WITH THE FAMILY. I DON'T KNOW WHY GAYS ARE HERE	THERE ARE NO GAYS IN CHECHNYA. INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE WILL DECLINE TO OPEN THE CASE		
GAYS AND LESBIANS CAN NOT EXPERIENCE REAL PARENTAL FEELINGS. VOTE FOR THE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION	ASK TO CHECK INFORMATION ABOUT TORTURES. INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE WILL DECLINE TO INVESTIGATE		
GAYS COULD NOT GET MARRIED. THERE ARE OTHER ARTICLES THERE TOO WHICH ARE NOT ABOUT GAYS AND PEOPLE DO NOT UNDERSTAND THAT.	GOVERNMENT IS DENYING INFORMATION ABOUT NEW TORTURES AND DETENTIONS OF GAYS IN CHECHNYA		
GAYS ARE AGAINST THE AMENDMENTS TO	CHECHEN GOVERNMENT DENIES		

THE RUSSIAN CONSTITUTION			
	THERE ARE NO GAY PEOPLE AMONG ALL THE PEOPLE I KNOW		

Source: WordStat 8.0, own elaboration

Therefore, answering the first part of RQ2, the following concepts on LGBT community as an ‘Out-group’, had been present in our sample:

- 1) Referring to LGBT community as ‘others. This was one of the topics which occurred a lot: we only observed denying the existence of LGBT community as occurring more.
- 2) Denying the existence of LGBT community. This topic was present in all four discussions and ranged from denying existence of ‘gays’ in Islamic republic of Chechnya, to rejecting the possibility of having known any ‘gays.’
- 3) Connecting LGBT communities to the ‘West’, propaganda, opposition. There were less topics about that, although some of them were quite popular and received a high percentage of cases (such as “photos of gays oppressed by the regime in Chechnya are on the internet (photo of iliya yashin, opposition member, with a condom in his mouth There might be an explanation in higher than average oppositional views on Twitter (see out content analysis section) as well as higher than average level of education and political engagement (Asmolov: 2021), although this would require a further research.
- 4) Hate speech, insults, threats towards LGBT. There were more definitions of LGBT community as ‘bad, ‘nasty’ or ‘threatening (to adopt Russian children) than hate speech, and only one actual ‘threat’, such as ‘gay hunt’ and ‘hunting gays’ was mentioned. Perhaps the results would have been different in a different social network, this would require a different research. Around news discussions on Twitter, there are not many topics which make a direct insult or threat to the LGBT community in Russia.

We could also verify the Hypothesis 2: If the concept originates in the ‘state narrative’ on LGBT, it might be one of the dominating concepts in Twitter discussions around LGBT news

topics. As we could see, in three out of four samples, topics connected to presenting LGBT community as an ‘Out-group’ were discussed in a high percentage of cases.

Answering the second part of the Research Question 2: What are the concepts used in describing or evaluating LGBT community as an ‘In-group’ in Twitter networks in Russia around news stories on LGBT issues? We also grouped the positive topics about LGBT community into several concepts: see Table 36

Table 38. Topics placing LGBT as an In-group grouped by concepts. Twitter discussion around news stories (Novaya Gazeta, 2017; The Moscow Times, 2018; Mediazona, 2019; Radio Liberty, 2020)

CALLS TO PROTECT, TREAT FAIRLY LGBT COMMUNITY	NEWS ABOUT CALLS OR ACTIONS TO TREAT FAIRLY LGBT COMMUNITY	POSITIVE COMMENTS ABOUT LGBT COMMUNITY	NEWS ON PROSECUTION, UNFAIR TREATMENT OF LGBT COMMUNITY
CLOSE UP THE SECRET PRISONS (FOR GAY PEOPLE), PLEASE SIGN THE PETITION AND TELL THIS TO EVERYONE	LGBT ACTIVISTS HAVE GONE TO COURT AFTER NOVAYA GAZETA PUBLICATIONS IN ORDER TO INVESTIGATE KILLINGS OF HOMOSEXUALS	I AM LGBT AND I CAN RELATE	“NOVAYA GAZETA” PUBLISHED EVIDENCE ON PEOPLE WHO LEFT THE SECRET PRISONS ALIVE. DETAINED GAYS ARE BEING TORTURED IN SECRET PRISON IN CHECHNYA
ATTACKS ON GAYS IN CHECHNIA; CHAPTER HRC CALLED TO CHECK; CALLED TO CHECK THE MESSAGES; LGBT REPRESENTATIVES IN CHECHNIA; CHECK THE INFORMATION;	HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICER CHECKED REPORTS ON PROSECUTING GAYS IN CHECHNYA	RUSSIAN LGBT COMMUNITY, THE FLAG OF LGBT, TO KNOW IT	NOVAYA GAZETA REPORTED ABOUT SIX SECRET PRISONS

CITIES OF RUSSIA; THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS; FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY CAMPAIGN; PEOPLE COVER; LGBT PARADE; ALEXEYEV NIKOLAY (LGBT ACTIVIST)	EUROPEAN UNION CALLED TO INVESTIGATE REPORTS ON TORTURES OF GAYS IN CHECHNYA AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL CALLED TO INVESTIGATE REPORTS ON TORTURES OF GAYS IN CHECHNYA	A GIRLFRIEND OF YOUR GIRLFRIEND, TWO GUYS, LGBTQ	YOUTUBE, KASHIN (JOURNALIST'S SURNAME) EXPLOSION IN STPETERBBURG METRO; ATTACKS ON GAYS IN CHECHNIA; SOBCHAK'S THIRD APPEAL TO PUTIN; IN CHECHNYA, THEY KILL AND TORTURE GAYS;
KILLING GAYS; ATTENTION TO A VERY IMPORTANT PROBLEM; LET'S HELP THE RUSSIAN LGBT; REQUIREMENT TO INVESTIGATE;	US DEPARTMENT OF STATE CALLS ON RUSSIA TO INVESTIGATE THE UNDERSTAND THE SITUATION WITH GAY PROSECUTION IN CHECHNYA	A NORMAL ATTITUDE TOWARDS LGBT RAINBOW BORN	HARRASSMENT AND TORTURE IS REVEALED. GENOCIDE IS HAPPENING BASED ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION
TO THE BUILDING OF THE PRESIDENT'S ADMINISTRATION; PROTESTING SINGLE PICKETS ABOUT GAY PROSECUTION IN CHECHNYA	PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE STARTED CHECKING AFTER MEDIA PUBLICATIONS ON KIDNAPPING OF GAY PEOPLE IN CHECHNYA	GIRLS BEING TOGETHER	MEDIA REPORTED; DETENTION; NEW KILLINGS; TORTURE;
I CALL ALL THOSE ITS LATVIA NEAR THE EMBASSY OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION IN RIGA; CONSIDERS THIS TOPIC IMPORTANT; PERSECUTION OF GAYS IN CHECHNIA;	THE KREMLIN PROMISED TO CHECK THE INFORMATION; THE OMBUDSMAN OF RUSSIA STARTED INSPECTION OF INFORMATION;	HEALTH GAY HEALTH	GAY AND LESBIANS IN CHECHNYA ARE KILLED
	UN REQUIRED TO INVESTIGATE DATA; UN	A BOY IN A RAINBOW PANTS	DIRECTOR OF PROGRAMS RUSSIAN LGBT; IGOR KOCHETKOV REPORTED; DETENTION

	EXPERTS DEMANDED TO STOP		OF GAYS;; IGOR KOCHETKOV; SK WITH A REQUIREMENT TO INVESTIGATE;
	AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL CALLED TO INVESTIGATE COMMUNICATIONS; TO ENSURE THE SAFETY OF GAYS IN CHECHNIA;	REPRESENTATIVES OF THE LGBT SOCIETY	END OF DECEMBER; LAST MONTH AT LEAST; THE NETWORK DECLARES A NEW WAVE IN CHECHNA. A NEW WAVE OF REPRESSION STARTED;
	USA; DEEPLY CONCERNED; ABOUT NEW DETENTIONS OF GAYS IN CHECHNIA; MINORITIES ARE AGAIN EXPOSED; TORTURE AND KILLING OF LGBT	(I AM) FOR LGBT	
	YOUTUBE SERVICE BLOCKED PROMOTION VIDEO WHICH SHOW GAYS ADOPTING A CHILD IN RUSSIA, BECAUSE IT FOUND DISCRIMINATION	LGBT TOMORROW	
		LOOVEGIRLS, LESBI	
		TO MAKE A COMING OUT	
		(IF A CHILD IS NOT ADOPTED (BY LGBT),	

		THEY WILL GROW UP IN AN OPHRANGE AND WILL DIE SOMEWHERE IN SYRIA	
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Source: WordStat 8.0, own elaboration

Therefore, answering the second half of the RQ2, the following concepts on LGBT community as an 'In-group', had been present in our sample:

Placing the LGBT as In-group (us):

- 1) Calls to protect, treat fairly LGBT community. These ranged from calls to sign a petition and check the information, to demands from the government to act on the information received on gay prosecution. In the case of 2019, we even had about 20 percent of cases when what was happening in Chechnya had been called a genocide by Twitter users.
- 2) News about calls or actions to treat fairly LGBT community. We have observed news about both foreign (US department of state, Amnesty International etc) as well as Russian (LGBT Network, Novays gazeta, the media (in general)) calls to check the information and act on the news.
- 3) Positive comments about LGBT community. There were more of them (positive comments describing someone who is LGBT) than those which could include, for example, insults. There are cases as, for instance, I am LGBT, I am for LGBT community, we should know the rainbow flag of LGBT and others.
- 4) News on prosecution, unfair treatment of LGBT community. These were mostly news from the two Chechen cases, mentioning 'secret prisons' and 'prosecution of gays'. People were reporting and reposting news on harassment, torture, killings, detentions and repressions of LGBT community.

Analyzing the positive topics on LGBT as an in-group, we can suggest that the Twitter users are using positive frames often. Despite the presence of framing LGBT as an 'Out-group', including topics which relate to the 'state narrative' on LGBT and 'traditional' neoconservative values, those with positive framing are also overly present. It is important to mention here that through sarcasm, Twitter users were able to project 'state narrative'

on LGBT into a broader 'state narrative', understanding it as a part of the forementioned construction and laughing at it (although perhaps bitterly). They mentioned that "if we don't vote for amendments, World War II veterans would be beaten" (WWII and its' veterans are the key 'sacred' themes of the 'state narrative' (e.g. Kivinen & Humphreys: 2021); NATO soldiers who would come to 'your yard' (which is another key theme on us versus them and the possible threat from the 'west'); we will forget the language of Pushkin, and Pluschenko (a famous figure skater in the past, which is also a part of 'state narrative' – proudness in sports victories) would adapt the children.

4.5. Semi-Structured Interviews

4.5.1 Questionnaire construction

In the design of our study, semi-structured interviews are the last methodological step which intends to answer the third research question. We are deliberately introducing a qualitative research method using phenomenological approach to complement the quantitative findings. The Hypothesis3 here is related to journalism and editorial practices, thus, we are viewing the interviews' subjects as journalists or people connected to the media in any other way. To be eligible for the interview selection, the respondent had to be a representative of media from one of the top 10 total-degree nodes in the Social Network Analysis of a discussion (or in some cases, as top-50 total-degree nodes in order to ensure enough interviews).

Qualitative researchers study things in their natural settings, attempting to make sense of, or to interpret, phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005, p.3). Pioneering the use of qualitative interviews as a research method, Glaser and Strauss introduced them in 1967. Numerous articles and handbooks have been published since then focusing on various aspects of qualitative interviews as a method which provides a researcher a road to 'multiple realities' (Stake, 1995). To list just a few, "The Ethnographic Interview" (Spradley: 1979); "Research Interviewing: Context and Narrative" (Mishler: 1986); "Handbook of Interview Research" (edited by Gubrium, Holstein, Marvasti, & McKinney, 2012); "The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Research" (Denzin and Lincoln: 2011); "Metodología y técnicas de investigación social" (Corbetta: 2003), and more

recently – “Qualitative Interview Questions: Guidance for Novice Researchers” (Roberts: 2020).

Initially we have considered whether to use structured questionnaires as the fourth step of the research. But in order to find ‘multiple realities’ and interpret what had occurred through the lens of participants of the phenomenon; see the interpretations and meanings the people bring to them, especially given the novelty of the issues being discussed, we decided to use semi-structured interviews as the main research method for the ~~third~~ fourth methodological step. The benefits of mixed methods have been discussed before (Thurman: 2018; Pérez Altable: 2016).

Thurman (2018) describes the exploratory methodological approach based on semi-structured research interviews and on content analysis., demonstrating the value of mixed methods in media research.

“Qualitative interviewing provides an open-ended, in-depth exploration of an aspect of life about which the interviewee has substantial experience, often combined with considerable insight.” (Charmaz: 2008, p. 29). This is exactly what I hoped to achieve interviewing journalists or other people connected with the media in various roles who could describe both the experience of writing on the topics connected to the ‘state narrative’ (on LGBT in our case), as well as their insights on editorial policies of the particular media they are associated with , as has previously been done in journalism studies (Casero-Ripollés: 2016; Hermida 2017).

For the interview to become useful and valid research method, the researcher and her interview guide (questionnaire) must be as open to the new findings as possible. This means that the guide itself must start with opening questions that do not suggest a definite answer but rather, invite the respondent for interpretations and conversation, to narrate a story about her experience. In this research we are using the definition of semi-structured interview by Corbetta (2003):

“Semi-structured interview always has a ‘guide’ with topics which a researcher has to ask throughout the interview. The order and wordings of the questions might depend on the researcher and are not fixed. Therefore, the interview may last more or less time, the

questions may be explained further, and asked in an order which seems more convenient.

The guide may be detailed or less detailed.” (Corbetta: 2003, p. 376).

Researchers are tasked with eliciting an active response from the participants and actively engaging the participants in the interview process (Brinkmann & Kvale, 2015).

The interview questions will be overly broad if the researcher is not knowledgeable about the topic they plan to investigate. Rubin and Rubin (2012). Theoretical background of this study on Russian media system, as well as the findings from the three previous methodological steps allowed us to construct a questionnaire with pre-defined themes (see Appendix 8).

In addition to being aligned closely with the research question, the interview questions must align with the study’s objective (Brinkman & Kvale, 2015). The main objective of this study is: To explore construction of state strategic narrative in online media and Twitter in the competitive authoritarianism country around topics which may involve the governments’ conservative ‘state narrative’, such as news around LGBT issues

The interview questions can be direct, indirect, or even hypothetical. Rubin and Rubin (2012) propose using a hypothetical example to begin a discussion about an experience familiar to the interviewee. Another option would be to ask about highlights, turning points, comparisons, and various dimensions (most, least, best, and worst). The goal, when creating interview questions, is to develop open and broad questions, capable of capturing a detailed account of the participant’s perception of their experience that the researcher can use to answer the research question (Roberts: 2020).

While constructing a questionnaire, the questions in semi-structured interviews can include both a list of main questions as well as follow up questions an outline of topics or themes that will be addressed within the interview (Corbetta, 2003; Rubin & Rubin, 2012; Seidman, 2013). Meanwhile, using the interview guide or questionnaire does not mean that the interview process is the same for every respondent of a semi-structured interview (Corbetta, 2003; Seidman, 2013). The questions included in the guide are not always asked in this order, especially the follow-up questions, although all the themes from the Questionnaire (Appendix 8) must be covered (Corbetta, 2003; Roberts, 2020).

Main questions and follow-up questions:

As many researchers highlight, the main questions of a semi-structured interview should be broad, allowing the subject to answer freely but also tied to the questions and topics (Rubin & Rubin, 2012; Seidman, 2013; Roberts: 2020). As it has been mentioned above, main questions should be closely aligned to the research question and consistent with the structure of the interview. They must introduce the main focus of the research, and in this sense using 'introductory' questions should assist the researchers receive a detailed answer. Shaffer and Elkins (2005) described what they called "introductory" questions as prompts used to get research participants to provide detailed descriptions of what they experienced in relation to the research question. These types of "introductory" or main questions ask the subject to tell the researcher what occurred.

Further on, in semi-structured interviews, the researchers may pose 'follow up' questions (Corbeta: 2003). Follow up questions can keep the participant on track and focused on the topic being explored (Rubin & Rubin, 2012). According to some researchers, there are two types of 'follow up' questions.

(1) *Specifying questions* are used to help subjects provide more specific information within their answers (Shaffer & Elkins, 2005).

(2) *Structuring questions* are used to keep the subject on topic and focused on the topic being investigated or prompt a subject to move on to another topic (Roberts, 2020).

During the interview it is also sometimes necessary to refer to the answers provided in order to clarify or deepen the understanding of the answer. Therefore, it may be useful to ask subjects to rephrase their response with such questions as "Is it correct that....?" (Shaffer & Elkins, 2005). Usage of a closing question is also advised by some researchers: "Asking the research participant a closing question like, "Now that you know what the research is about, is there anything that I should have asked but didn't?" provides them with the opportunity to wind down" (Rubin & Rubin, 2012, p. 112).

According to our research objectives, which involve exploring the construction of strategic 'state narrative' on Twitter, determining the role of state-aligned actors, as well as finding out who are the main actors in these discussions, we developed a questionnaire. It has been also designed as an instrument to assist us in answering the Research Question 3: Which

power mechanisms might be behind concepts on LGBT and main actors in Twitter discussions around news stories on LGBT issues?

Because we determined during previous methodological steps 1 and 2 (SNA and content analysis) that the main actors in the discussions were media-affiliated, we are going to look into editorial policies connected to both news topics as well as social media, in order to answer the research question 3. Therefore, the main topics of the questionnaire, were social media use and editorial influence; exploration of internal editorial policies/ framing the news online communication are social media peers influencing decision making and external influence: what factors may be influencing news writing (as well as social media posting). The Questionnaire (Interview Guide) is attached in the Appendix 6.

4.5.2: Data collection

First, we identified the possible media outlets where we could interview the journalists. This was done during the Social Network Analysis of the samples, which we also used as a tool to help identify candidates for the interview. As it has been explained before in this chapter, the most important nodes (according to total centrality) (ten, afterwards – fifty, as for content analysis. See Appendix 1 for the full list of nodes) were examined to their affiliation with media.

According to this former identification of the most relevant possible interviewees, it was possible for us to interview journalists from the following media outlets:

Table 39: media outlets for the interview stage

Media outlet
Online news source Meduza
Online news source Russian Business Consulting
Russian Information agency Ria Novosti
Online news and radio station Echo Moskvyy
Online news source Nastoyaschee Vremya (MBKH Media)
Online news source Radio Svoboda (Russian division)

Online news source MBKH media
Online news source Znak.Com ⁶⁵
Russian Information Agency Tass.Ru ⁶⁶

As the pandemic due to Covid19 is still not solved everywhere, it was decided to be the best way to contact them was via video calls. Therefore, the data were collected via one-on-one video call interviews with the author of this dissertation. The order of questions was sometimes altered, the interviewer did not want to interrupt what the journalist had to say, and if the questions had been answered previously. Interviews were audio-recorded, and further transcribed into word files (See Appendix 7). According to the objectives and RQ of this PhD, editorial and journalistic practices of working with social networks mentioned during the interviews were afterwards categorized into themes by grouping similar responses.

Based on the objectives of this research, previous studies on the topic and the RQ3: Which power mechanisms might be behind concepts on LGBT and main actors in Twitter discussions around news stories on LGBT issues? We identified the following themes in the interviews, which assist in answering this research question.

As researchers previously indicated, different external sources may limit on journalists' professional autonomy (Reich & Hanitzsch, 2013). We identified seven possible themes that emerged during the interviews. First of all, there are several themes connected to the relationships inside the newsroom (internal editorial influence (Bourdieu: 1997)). There is internal editorial influence, an "invisible censorship" in the newsrooms, conceptualized extensively earlier by social science research (e.g. Bourdieu: 1997).

We included there: 1) connection of journalists with social media accounts of the media; 2) editorial influence on private social media accounts of journalists; 3) internal editorial control on news writing and 4) self-censorship.

⁶⁵ Online media source Znak.Com was added from the lists of top-50 nodes.

⁶⁶ Russian Information Agency Tass.Ru was added from the lists of top-50 nodes.

We have also identified themes connected to external interference: 5) external repressive interference (include measures of physical, economic, political, occupational, judicial or psychological pressure); 6) external restrictive interference (include ways to hinder journalistic work such as blocking access to and withholding information) and 7) external persuasive interference (include bribery and corruption but also measures such as providing privileged access in exchange for influence over journalistic content) (Luostarinen, 1994, pp. 73-88).

Following previous studies of journalistic culture (e.g. Hiltunen, 2019), for the presented research, external interference means all active and invasive methods external actors use to interfere in the journalistic process (Luostarinen, 1994; Shoemaker & Reese: 1996).

What this study intends to add to the previous research on external interference and organizational media culture, is the look into how this external interference and internal influence might work in competitive authoritarian regime with its' specific media system (see Chapter 3, Sections 1: competitive authoritarianism in Russia and Section 3: Media System in Russia). This research will also contribute to the media studies in USSR and Russia, which have been developing lately (Koltsova & Bodrunova: 2019; Sanz et al: 2018).

We are studying the topic of LGBT as one of the sensitive topics which may have external repressive interference both on a media organization as well as on a journalist in Russia (see Federal Law 135 of the Criminal Code), but we go beyond the particular topic in order to discover the overall internal control policies and external interference. Because journalism has gone beyond the traditional newsroom, especially with the help of social media, and has experienced changes in terms of interaction and participation (we have talked about the concept of hybrid journalism in Chapter 2 Section 1: Hybrid journalism), we are also looking into the editorial and journalistic policies towards social networking sites, and Twitter in particular. Therefore, during the analysis one more descriptive topics emerged: 8) Usage of personal social networks by journalists.

4.5.3 Themes found in semi-structured interviews

All eight interviewees provided qualitative data regarding journalistic and editorial practices in the Russian media, especially those concerning social networks and Twitter, as well as internal and external editorial interference. Video calls interviews were requested from all

participants. Video call interviews ranged from 30 to 75 minutes. Transcripts of interviews are in the Appendix 6.

Journalists from the following media sources were interviewed (see Table 3.5.1). The journalists’ names are withheld due to ethical and security reasons: some of the media outlets are now considered ‘foreign agents’ in Russia and identifying their names could harm them. As we have mentioned above, in the Chapter on Media system in Russia, in 2017, a Federal Law 327 was passed which forces media outlets registered abroad or receiving any form of finance from abroad, to label themselves as “foreign agents’ in every publication, including that in social networks and publications of other news organizations. In 2020, a Federal law 426 was adapted which indicates that employees of media which are considered ‘foreign agents’ may also be labeled as such⁶⁷.

Table 40: interviewees (journalists) affiliation with media sources

Interview Number	Media	As explained in Section 4.3 Content analysis: coding decisions. Affiliation	Website
1	MBH Media	Financed by oligarch in exile Mikhail Khodorkovsky opposition	https://mbk-news.appspot.com/ (there are other websites and social media of the project)
2	Online media Znak.com	Regional, private, neutral	https://www.znak.com/
3	Online media Meduza project	Declared as ‘foreign agent’ by the state opposition	https://meduza.io/

⁶⁷ See at DW: <https://www.dw.com/en/russia-putin-expands-foreign-agent-law-to-target-individuals/a-56095483>

4	Russian Business Consulting, regional office	Private Neutral to pro-government	https://www.rbc.ru/
5	Radio Svoboda (Russian office, regional news)	Foreign. Declared as 'foreign agent' by the state opposition	https://www.idelreal.org/
6	Information Agency TASS	Belongs to the government of Russia	https://tass.ru/
7	Information Agency RIA Novosti (Rossiya Segodnya)	Belongs to the government of Russia	https://ria.ru/
8	Radio station Echo Moscvy, regional office	Under control of the pro-government structures (GazpromMedia holding) Opposition	https://echo.msk.ru/

We are discussing the results according to themes and subthemes, with quotes from the interviews, below. We have numbered the interviews in order to protect the journalists (Casero et al: 2015).

Theme: connection of journalists with social media accounts of the media

We have found that 6 out of 8 media sources do not connect journalists with the media's social media accounts, neither do they have a say in what goes to social media and what not. Most often, they don't choose which news or articles would be published in social media and how would the title be changed for each one in order to reach a larger audience. This is especially true for the big media organizations, both private and state-owned (RBC news agency; TASS; RIA Novosti; Lenta.Ru; Radio Svoboda). In smaller private organizations, sometimes the journalists post news in social networks of the media themselves or take part

in creating the introduction and headlines to social media posts (MBKH Media; Meduza). Despite this, every journalist interviewed stated that in their media organization there is a special position or department of 'social media'.

Do connect:

Interviewer 1: "People who have access, that is, the one who sits on the (news) feed, he publishes the material (*in social networks of the media outlet*). Not one person, as far as I remember, just someone who is on duty on the news."

Interviewer 3: "Despite the fact that there is a social media department, and it must write a post on Twitter and Facebook, in fact, I write descriptions of my news piece to Twitter and Facebook. It seems to me that more important for the site than the main page"

Do not connect:

Interviewer 2: "No, we have Twitter, it is quite active. It is completely done by our SMM manager. and it seems we have a new one. I do not know for sure, he started communicating with readers or not. It's just that we really have such a dilemma whether it is worth communicating somewhere to respond to some comments. but until recently we didn't do that, on the contrary, he (*SMM manager*) wanted to start something, I don't know we have started or not."

Interviewer 4: "I just want to say that we do not post to the social networks of our media"

Interviewer 5: "I will say frankly, I do not track the information that is published in social networks (*of our media*). To add more, I cannot understand the principles by which it is selected. Probably, it is determined by how important it is for this region."

Journalists are mostly disconnected from media accounts in social networks; often, they do not know what is posted there and why. Although their news pieces are picked up by the social media department to be posted sometimes, they rarely see or discuss them themselves in social networks of the media. There are only two exceptions, and both have a rather successful following on social networking sites (Meduza and MBKH media). Perhaps this could also be due to the journalistic effort involved in social networks communication.

Theme: editorial influence on private social media accounts of journalists

There are rarely any rules or regulations on posting one's media news into personal accounts. Sometimes, the 'social media department' or an editor asks specifically to share a particular piece of news.

In the case of Interviewer 4, for example, it related to an appeal to the police to let go of the photojournalist detained by the police at demonstration

Interviewer 4: "For example, the news piece about our photographer detained... The editor asked to post it to your social networks, spread it out. It happens infrequently but it happens."

In another case, as Interviewer 1 shares, the editors asked to delete a person from 'friends' due to the issues of security and protection of the journalist himself. "Open Russia" is a nongovernmental organization sponsored by an oligarch in exile Mikhail Khodorkovsky, and it has been closed recently (for the third time in its history) due to restricting legislation on 'unwanted' organizations⁶⁸ (Federal Law 284.1).

Interviewer 1: One of the sources with whom we worked was active everywhere in the headquarters of the Open Russia (*in the region*). That is, he was directly *persona non grata (for the government)*. There was a correspondence that we shared with him our experience of using marijuana in different countries. And, accordingly, it turned out that we are both Western drug addicts... That's why the editor wrote to me "please remove him from Facebook friends".

Often, journalists share their own news in their own, private, social networks. Six out of eight interviewees practice such sharing.

However, some of the editorial practices are stricter, and might even be assigned into two themes: of restricting the personal use of social networks, as well as of internal editorial control. As one of the interviewees emphasized, employees who do not share editorial political views, do not work in this media.

Interviewer 6: "You need to understand that if somehow this person is known as a (*state-owned media*) correspondent, his public post can be used, even if he personally expressed something, as the opinion of the media, his personal opinion as a professional one. A person writes news from an official point of view and right there somewhere on their social

⁶⁸ BBC: <https://www.bbc.com/russian/news-57265377>

networks he starts to say, that in fact, everything is different. Therefore, it is clearly necessary to understand that we have these rules at the stage even when we hire people. We tell them we are the state media, we support the official position of the authorities. Therefore, you must understand where you are going, what if you have some oppositional moods and, as it were, protest activity, and you have oppositional views. So, there will simply be a conflict of your personal interests. People who understand this, they just do not come to work for us.”

Theme: internal editorial control on news writing

Half of the interviewees said that they felt there was editorial influence and control on the way news are written. Some denied it, but it became clear within the interview that the latter exists, nevertheless.

For example, Interviewer 7 talks about ‘some topics’ connected to the Ministry of defense

Interviewer 7: “No, we do not have forbidden topics. If it is forbidden, it is often a military theme. As for the Ministry of Defense, we are of course writing this. But it then goes to our high-ranking editors for approval, and they may simply not deliver approval without approval from the Ministry of Defense. But not to write, we do not do this...”

Another example is when Interviewer 6 describes that only one party is allowed to publish its’ information, and the media supports the current President.

Interviewer 6: “Here everything is noticeably clear as the state media, respectively, it has always *a priori* supported the ruling party and there can be no news here because it is generally funded with budget money... Let us just say that there would never knowingly publish false information discrediting other parties. But in principle, it may not simply publish information from other parties. It will always support the ruling party because it is the state media. Its task is to support, ~~in principle,~~ the policy of the state and the policy of the incumbent president of the current government. That is, everything is very understandable.”

Or Interviewer 4 says there are no ‘stop’- topics or editorial control but mentions ‘exceptional’ cases:

Interviewer 4: “but a very small exception literally was a couple of times when the director, the editor-in-chief and the director asked, well, let's say so strongly not to criticize this or that event”.

Theme: self-censorship

Most of the interviewees said they were using some self-censorship (they did not say it directly). In most cases it related to the external repressive interference (legislation; Roskomnadzor's lists and actions). In other cases, it related to editorial or personal journalistic practices.

For instance, Interviewer 5, who does not work in a state-owned media and could not tell us about any 'restrictive' editorial practices, said there is a practice to send the text of an interview to the person who was interviewed before it is published for him/her to agree or make corrections.

Interviewer 5: "I decide that it is worth coordinating an interview-with those who ask to do it. But as a rule, I think it is important to coordinate interviews."

In other media outlets, they chose to not 'angry' the sides of a conflict, as, for example, in the case of Crimea (and other cases).

Interviewer 3: "It is territorial integrity. Pay attention to the maps that are published by (*our media source, Meduza*). On a lot of them, Crimea is not visible there. because we either get into problems with Ukraine or with Russia... We are the media. We are not activists, and we do not claim whose Crimea is. We do not use words like "annexation" because it is political."

Theme: external repressive interference

As interviewer 8 explains, the external repressive interference leads to self-censorship. It is, once again, connected to the restrictive legislation and broad powers of state media and telecom watchdog organization, Roskomnadzor. As we mentioned above, it monitors the media's publications and broadcasts (as well as its' finances, ownership and registration) and is able to declare one a 'foreign agent', revoke the registration or apply a fine for violation of any of the laws mentioned above

Interviewer 8: "Although here, of course, we are walking on a blade so that simple information is not perceived as propaganda. The main thing is resonance and how to fit between the lines, to get around some things for which we can be punished. For more than a year we have been living as grown-up boys and girls, we know how to do this, although, again, God takes care of the careful. And here you have to be really very careful."

Roskomnadzor's decisions influence news topics and headlines:

Interviewer 3: “We will try to minimize the risks. We don't want to get our website blocked or whatever. For example, we try to fulfill the formal requirements without losing any meaning. We began to write “FBK⁶⁹” less often, we began to write Navalny's headquarters more often. Therefore, we are forced to write “supporters of the fund”. It is necessary to adjust our news in such a way when writing about LGBT specifically⁷⁰. Yes, we are thinking about propaganda. there are several problematic topics, of course, extremism, terrorism, foreign agents, where we are especially closely following the wording.”

Interviewer 8: “During almost every broadcast, where we have to mention FBK for example, and always that it is ‘extremist’ organization. Or if we cite (*online media outlet*) Meduza, we have to say that they are considered ‘foreign agents’⁷¹. it doesn't matter what kind of news, for example, about the bulk of the news, it is still five minutes before the extremist organization FBK, but already foreign agents of FBK, Medusa are already referring to Medusa, it is a foreign agent. Levada center, whose sociology we periodically use, is also a foreign agent⁷². This does not affect the broadcast, and not drastically, of course, but every time we are forced to say these additional words, we have to use the time on air for them.”

One journalist told us about the psychological pressure in social networks, exercised not by the ‘state’ actors but rather, activists online. The editor-in-chief of the Meduza publication was accused in sexual harassment (2018) and stepped down briefly but returned and is an acting editor-in-chief. This provoked numerous social media discussions and questions, including those from feminist movement in Russia⁷³

Interviewer 3: “We are trying to try to understand the logic of these people (*talking about feminism activists*) because they are often in a vulnerable position. But we shouldn't forget about the censorship of activists, and we shouldn't give in to activists, we should remain journalists.

⁶⁹ FBK is a foundation which had been run by an opposition politician, popular blogger Alexey Navalny, who is now serving a jail sentence. FBK was declared a ‘extremist organization’ in 2021. Now all the media sources have to write (or say, if it is broadcasted), that it was considered an extremist organization if mentioning FBK. The foundation is now liquidating itself, since their employees or supporters risk jail sentence if continuing working for ‘extremist organization’ (see, for example, FT: <https://www.ft.com/content/54fe36eb-346e-40f2-8f19-151d5a401f07>)

⁷⁰ Law on propaganda of LGBT was adapted in 2013, it prohibits ‘propaganda’ of LGBT values in the media or elsewhere in public spaces (Federal Law #135)

⁷¹ Online media Meduza was declared a ‘foreign agent’ in 2021, and every news organization has to say so when citing or mentioning them (see for example The Bell: <https://thebell.io/en/foreign-agent-label-given-to-top-independent-media-outlet-meduza/>)

⁷² Levada center, a fund specializing in sociological research, was declared a ‘foreign agent’ in 2016 (See BBC: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-37278649>)

⁷³ See: <https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/hayesbrown/this-metoo-moment-is-tearing-the-russian-internet-apart>)

We try to take into account too. LGBT people are just to a lesser extent, but they are there too. There are claims from the community. Therefore, this is such a collective twitter, it is of course very ruthless and intolerant and very critical of the work of many media, especially paying attention to independent publications. It is unfair.”

Theme: external restrictive interference

According to the interviews, two of the journalists were not accredited to attend parliamentary sessions in the regions, or press-conferences of the governor, or any government-related events.

Interviewer 5. “They are the ones who receive information from parliaments, as I understand it, through accredited journalists. which is why I would not have dared to apply for accreditation in our regional parliament again. It seemed to me that the prospect to win the case of accreditation through the court is low.”

Theme: external persuasive interference

We encountered only one theme which could relate to persuasive influence. Even though the questionnaire did not have specific questions connected to persuasive influence, the respondents were encouraged to talk about any kind of influence, inside or outside the media outlet.

Interviewer 5 “At the first session, which was generally for everyone, the mayor of the city, expressed his opinion at the session publicly that communication in the city assembly is not a barrier. That is, it has some additional advantages to provide.”

Theme: Usage of social networks by journalists

As it turned out during the semi-structured interviews, only four out of eight journalists use Twitter at all, and only one uses it regularly, and posts. Others read it looking for the news, but not on a regular basis. One of the factors which influenced the use of Twitter recently, was that Roskomnadzor has slowed down the speed at which Twitter’s pages are loading in Russia⁷⁴. Therefore, the users cannot load it fast through application or without VPN (Virtual Private Network), which takes an effort to use.

⁷⁴ “Russia's media watchdog (Roskomnadzor) has said it is slowing down the speed of Twitter, accusing the US social media company of failing to remove 3,000 posts relating to suicide, drugs and pornography” <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-56344304>

Interviewer 2: "In my phone, yes, it's very noticeable that Twitter has become slower on the phone".

A lot of journalists use the messenger Telegram for work purposes: they read the so-called 'channels', which provide inside or unchecked information, and have become extremely popular in Russian political and media environments, especially in bigger cities. Seven out of eight interviewees read Telegram channels for work purposes.

Interviewer 8: "And of course, I have a Telegram. It is exceptionally good to keep your finger on the pulse and just watch where the wind is blowing, even assuming that the information may be incorrect."

Interviewer 6: "It is now the main provider of information content for me, Telegram. In the European part of Russia, the news agenda shifted to Telegrams channels to us."

Facebook and Instagram are widely used for primarily personal purposes, and VKontakte (a popular local Russian social network) is used by regional journalists more than federal journalists, especially for the purpose of finding people to interview, take comments from, or invite to a broadcast.

Interviewee 5: "VKontakte which I really do not like, but they are important because it there are many people whom I do not know, local residents. Through them, through VKontakte, communication occurs to ask a question or even use a photo of the hero of the story."

Some journalists use Instagram, a photo and video service owned by Facebook, in "friends-only" mode:

Interviewee 8: "I have a personal Facebook page I use very actively. And there is a closed Instagram page that I started relatively recently since the new year; it is for a very narrow circle."

On the other hand, Facebook, in accordance with an observation by Asmolov (2021), is often used for expressing political views, too:

Interviewee 2: "I use a little bit of everything for some personal purposes and, as it were, for my friends, Instagram and Twitter. For so to speak, some kind of social or political statements to a wide audience, I use mainly Facebook."

4.5.5. Results of semi-structured interviews

In these interviews, we have observed that journalists often confirm that there exists some internal editorial influence, as well as instances of external, mostly repressive influence because of rules and laws that were adapted beginning in 2012 (as described in the State Strategical Narrative section). Internal editorial rules mentioned in the interviews of journalists seem to affect more those from state-owned media. They talked about which topics may be preferable and which entities must be included in the news coverage (such as, for example, the Ministry of Defense in one case and United Russia in another).

Nevertheless, we noted that the restrictive external influence is exercised by the media watchdog Roskomnadzor and adapted legislation. External influence, especially on writing on topics such as LGBT issues and extremist organizations, for example, is exercised by the adapted legislation (e.g., Federal Law 135 on LGBT propaganda). Lists of organizations labeled as “foreign agents” also play a significant role in external influence and self-censorship.

Without exception, all the interviewees stated that they have to be very careful when writing about these topics so that they or the media outlets they are writing for do not come under threat. So, while they do not skip these topics altogether, they claim, they have to apply certain self-censorship while writing about them. In addition, the state-owned and supposedly neutral big federal media are admitting that they rarely write about social events (which includes news around LGBT topics) unless they are of a noticeably extensive scope.

What is also important is that journalists themselves rarely take part in what is posted on the social media accounts of their media outlets; they also rarely comment on or discuss these postings. We may observe from the interviews that despite the media accounts being the most important nodes in Twitter discussions (as was revealed in the Methodology section and the results of the Social Network Analysis section), it is the users that mention, reply to, and comment on the news that comprises their most central nodes, not journalists. While we could not confirm that journalists from certain media outlets were supporting any particular tweets, we found through the interviews that journalists do not post on behalf of media organizations (in all cases except for two, Meduza and MBKH Media), nor do they discuss their news on Twitter.

However, the content of the news stories that become the most important nodes in Twitter discussions is influenced by internal editorial policies, self-censorship, and, most of all, the external restrictive policies of State actors, such as the adapted restrictive legislation and Roskomnadzor. An example of restrictive editorial policies was told us by the Interviewer 6:

Interviewer 6: “Here everything is noticeably clear as the state media, respectively, it has always *a priori* supported the ruling party and there can be no news here because it is generally funded with budget money... Let us just say that there would never knowingly publish false information discrediting other parties. But in principle, it may not simply publish information from other parties. It will always support the ruling party because it is the state media. Its task is to support, in principle, the policy of the state and the policy of the incumbent president of the current government. That is, everything is very understandable.”

Answering the RQ 3 “RQ3: Which power mechanisms might be behind concepts on LGBT and main actors in Twitter discussions around news stories on LGBT issues?”, we suggest the following. The interviews showed that some instances of the internal editorial policies, descriptions of journalistic self-censorship, as well as the State actors using restrictive external interventions (meaning newly adapted restrictive legislation and actions of state watchdog Roskomnadzor), might influence how are influencing the concepts on LGBT (and other sensitive topics) in the news stories are presented. and subsequently, Twitter discussions around them or Twitter posts from media organizations. Our interviewers confirm this:

Interviewer 3: “This does not mean that we will not tell about the problem if it is like in the case of the recent drug case. if we understand that this is an important topic, but we can carry risks. We will try to minimize the risks. We don't want to get our website blocked or. For example, in this case, we try to fulfill the formal requirements without losing any meaning sense. We began to write “FBK⁷⁵” less often, we began to write Navalny's headquarters more often because we are in the title well, you will die, it cannot be written in the title as a foreign agent of the Russian Federation at the request of the authorities. Therefore, we are forced to write “supporters of the fund”. It is necessary to adjust our news in such a way when

⁷⁵ FBK is a foundation which had been run by an opposition politician, popular blogger Alexey Navalny, who is now serving a jail sentence. FBK was declared a ‘extremist organization’ in 2021. Now all the media sources have to write (or say, if it s broadcasted), that is was considered an extremist organization if mentioning FBK. The foundation is now liquidating itself, since their employees or supporters risk jail sentence if continuing working for ‘extremist organization’ (see, for example, FT: <https://www.ft.com/content/54fe36eb-346e-40f2-8f19-151d5a401f07>)

writing about LGBT specifically⁷⁶. Yes, we are thinking about propaganda. there are several problematic topics, of course, extremism, terrorism, foreign agents, where we are especially closely following the wording.”

As an answer to RQ 3, “Which power mechanisms might be behind concepts on LGBT and main actors in Twitter discussions around news stories on LGBT issues?”, we suggest the following. The interviews showed that some instances of the internal editorial policies, descriptions of journalistic self-censorship, and state actors using restrictive external interventions (meaning newly adapted restrictive legislation and actions of state watchdog Roskomnadzor) might influence how LGBT concepts and other sensitive topics in news stories are presented, as well as subsequent Twitter discussions around them.

We suggest here that Hypothesis 3, “If journalists and media used the ‘state narrative’ on LGBT in their news pieces or Twitter posts, it might be related to the internal editorial policies of the media outlets they are working for,” may be validated. Nevertheless, according to the results of the semi-structured interviews, we must add that not only internal editorial policies influence the news content but also, and maybe to a larger extent, the restrictive external interventions of the competitive authoritarian state actors, such as Roskomnadzor and the adapted restrictive legislation.

⁷⁶ Law on propaganda of LGBT was adapted in 2013, it prohibits ‘propaganda’ of LGBT values in the media or elsewhere in public spaces (Federal Law #135)

CHAPTER V

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

CHAPTER 5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

5.1 Discussion

This dissertation seeks to contribute to the theory of state strategic narratives and their creation and dissemination (Miskimonn et al., 2013) in neo-authoritarian countries in the new media ecology. As Oates (2014) confirms, studying strategic 'state narratives' in the digital age can aid in conceptualizing the changing media ecology and political disagreements in neo-authoritarian states. We reviewed the Russian state strategic narrative of anti-Western neo-conservative values and the transition from a Soviet state to a competitive, authoritarian regime, as previously studied by (Kivinen & Mustajoki, 2021; Szostek, 2017; Janeliunas & Kojala, 2019; Makarychev & Medvedev, 2015).

Further, we provided empirical evidence that defining the LGBT community as an out-group is part of this state strategic narrative of anti-Western neo-conservatism, examined its dissemination on Twitter discussions around news, and defined the role of state-aligned actors in the process. News stories around which the data collection was done on Twitter for four years to make up a sample were on the prosecution of gay people in Chechnya in 2017 and 2019; on police involvement in a tolerance picture contest in a regional school; LGBT couples were depicted (2018) and constitutional amendments defined a "family" as a unit consisting of a man and a woman, thus excluding the LGBT community (2020).

Specifically, we showed that media-related accounts play a central and important role in Twitter discussion about LGBT issues in Russian news stories, constituting 52.2% of the most important actors. Further, we demonstrated via content analysis that the affiliations of media (pro-government or opposition) to which Twitter users belong plays a role in expressions of the 'state narrative' on the LGBT community in Twitter discussions. These

findings agree with recent research on Russian strategic narrative construction, such as Stella and Nartova (2016), who examined sexual citizenship and nationalism in Russia, and Oates (2014), who studied media coverage of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 by the state's Channel 1 and changes in the state strategic narrative during this event. Results of the first study emphasize that the politics of sexual and gender relations are clearly seen in government media, and the second study highlights that the state-owned Channel 1 has been transmitting and changing the state strategic narrative.

There were topics related to the 'state narrative' on LGBT issues in every discussion. Four discussions in a four-year sample (2017, 2018, 2019, and 2020) produced a substantial number of topics that defined the LGBT community as an out-group: 15.54% in 2017, 2.2 % in 2018, 63.2% in 2019, and 65.19% in 2020. When describing the LGBT community, the following concepts were mostly used when depicting them as an out-group. First, Twitter users referred to the LGBT community as "others," "different," "minorities," and "deviant." Second, the main theme was denying the existence of the LGBT community. Third, LGBT communities were connected to the "West," and finally, some of the tweets presented insults toward LGBT individuals. The concepts presented here are in line with previous and current research on the rise of a neo-conservative 'state narrative' in Russia (Stella & Nartova, 2016; Makarychev & Medvedev, 2015; Kivinen & Mustajoki, 2021). As our research links pro-government political issue affiliations to expressing the 'state narrative' on LGBT, we add a voice to the group of scholars who argue that political elites in both democratic and authoritarian states may use the new media ecology to support their 'state narratives' (Miskimonn, 2013; McKinnon, 2011; Filatova et al., 2019).

However, as Kivinen and Mustajoki (2021) argue, for Russian cultural identity, the key antinomies are "global processes versus nationalistic closing; and the conservative hegemonic project versus secular liberalism" (p. 148). These contradictions have also been found in the empirical research of our project, with neo-conservative narratives being contested or humored on Twitter. Four discussions in a four-year sample produced a substantial number of topics that defined the LGBT community as an in-group: 42.4% in 2017, 32.5% in 2018, in 89.7 % 2019, and 19.5% in 2020. When describing the LGBT community, the following concepts were mostly used when depicting them as an in-group. Calls to protect, treat LGBT people fairly and seek justice. These ranged from calls to sign a

petition and check the information, to demands from the government to act on the information received on gay prosecution and 'genocide'. We have also observed positive comments describing someone who is LGBT. There are cases as, for instance, I am LGBT, I am for LGBT community, we should know the rainbow flag of LGBT. Analyzing the positive topics on LGBT as an in-group, we also suggested that the Twitter users were using positive frames often. It is important to mention here that through sarcasm, Twitter users were able to project 'state narrative' on LGBT into a broader 'state narrative', understanding it as a part of the forementioned construction and laughing at it (although perhaps bitterly). They mentioned that "if we don't vote for amendments, World War II veterans would be beaten" (WWII and its' veterans are the key 'sacred' themes of the 'state narrative' (e.g. Kivinen & Humphreys: 2021); NATO soldiers who would come to 'your yard' (which is another key theme on us versus them and the possible threat from the 'west'); we will forget the language of Pushkin, and Pluschenko (a famous figure skater in the past, which is also a part of 'state narrative' – proudness in sports victories) would adapt the children.

These findings could be a basis for further research on contesting the current neo-conservative narrative in the new media ecology. Miskimonn et al. (2013) confirm that while transmitting the 'state narrative', "political actors will try to control both conversations in the media ecology and the infrastructure of the media ecology that conditions who gets to participate in those conversations at all" (p. 116). This may become challenging when social media comes into play (Hermida, 2010), and our analysis of Twitter discussions has a potential for further research that could develop that argument. Nevertheless, traditional strategies of influencing media have also adapted into digital journalism, contributing to the demise of utopian cyberjournalism (Meredith, 2013), especially of Twitter, which used to be viewed by many in the social sciences as a tool for organization and democratization (e.g., Penney & Dadas, 2014; Diamond, 2010). In addition, the presented research confirms that the previously defined role of social media in autocracies as free, uncensored political communication (e.g., Hermida, 2012; Lotan et al., 2011) no longer applies. In the Russian case, this could partially be explained by the fact that up until 2013, social networks and the Russian segment of the internet enjoyed relative freedom (Alexanyan et. al., 2012); today, it is much more restricted (Asmolov & Kolozaridi, 2021).

The control mentioned above is also present in the Russian media system. Here, our findings are in agreement with previous research on the topic (Vartanova, 2017; Koltsova & Bodrunova, 2019; Kiriya, 2019). While analyzing the fourth stage of our research, semi-structured interviews with journalists chosen according to the criteria of their media outlets being the central nodes in Twitter discussions in our four-year sample, we were able to find that there exist both internal and external restrictive interventions (Hiltunen, 2019) that influence the work of journalists. According to our results, legal interventions and actions of the state media and watchdog Roskomnadzor seem to be one of the biggest influencers of both self-censorship and editorial policies in the Russian media. The practices of being careful and rephrasing and sometimes withholding information due to fear of it being sanctioned were repeatedly mentioned by our interviewees. This, in turn, influences how restricted topics such as LGBT issues (due to the Law 135 on propaganda of LGBT) are presented in the news and, subsequently, Twitter posts from all media organizations. While according to our interviewees, large federal media rarely cover topics connected to the LGBT community unless they are of significant scope, all media outlets are careful not to report anything that could incur a hefty fine from Roskomnadzor. However, we would disagree with Oates (2014) that the Russian media model supposes that journalists are simply mouthpieces of the political actors. The media environment in Russia is far more diverse and complex, as our interviews suggest. Often, independent publications such as *Meduza* or *Echo Moskvy* cover topics restricted by Roskomnadzor, even if they do have to reword or revise how they report on them. The biggest challenge of the near future will be whether these publications will survive at all given the enforcement of restrictive policies. Nevertheless, as Asmolov (2021) highlights, there are two layers of the Russian internet, one created as a free and unrestricted space and one that falls under the current government's restrictive measures, just as there is a dichotomy in cultural identification (Kivinen & Mustajoki, 2021). For the moment, this dichotomy is still present in the Russian media system, as our interviews have shown: the control and intervention is there, but there are also ways to circumvent the boundaries.

5.2. Conclusion

As a conclusion, we want to stress that we answered all three research questions in this study, as well as verified all three hypotheses. After the SNA methodological step of our

research, we answer the Research Question 1: Which actors play the most important role in Twitter networks around LGBTQ issues-related news stories in Russia? as follows:

Media-related actors (52.2% of nodes) play an important role around LGBTQ issues-related news stories in Twitter networks in Russia, although private users are also playing a significant role. As a result of human-coded quantitative content analysis, we verified the Hypothesis 1. If the discussions on Twitter are connected with news on LGBT, the main actors expressing state conservative narrative might be pro-government journalists or media accounts. We proved that there exists a dependency of the affiliation of media and expressing the 'state narrative' on LGBT community in Twitter discussions. We performed logistic regression in SPSS, and proved that the Hypothesis 1 is valid, and both affiliation (media), as well as political views (pro-government) played its' role in expressing the 'state narrative' on LGBT community in Twitter discussions. We confirmed that media accounts with pro-government views were expressing more views on LGBT as an 'Out-group'.

After the computational text analysis stage, topic modeling, we answered Research Question 2: What are the concepts used in describing or evaluating LGBT community as an 'out-group' in Twitter networks in Russia around LGBT news stories? There were both negative (framing LGBT as an 'out-group') as well as positive (framing LGBT as an 'in-group') concepts, which we discussed in detail above. During this stage of analysis we have also verified the Hypothesis 2: If the concept originates in the 'state narrative' on LGBT, it might be one of the dominating concepts in Twitter discussions around LGBT news topics. Indeed, we found that a large proportion of topics modeled were connected to the 'state narrative' on LGBT, which we also discussed in detail in the previous sections.

Finally, we answered Research Question 3 and clarified Hypothesis 3 as a result from our fourth methodological step, semi-structured interviews. RQ3: Which power mechanisms might be behind concepts on LGBT and main actors in Twitter discussions around LGBT news stories? We suggested that there existed some instances of the internal editorial policies, journalistic self-censorship, and state actors using restrictive external interventions. All of the latter might influence how LGBT concepts and other sensitive topics in are presented in news and Twitter discussions. Hypothesis 3, "If journalists and media used the 'state narrative' on LGBT in their news pieces or Twitter posts, it might be related to the internal editorial policies of the media outlets they are working for," was also clarified. According to

the results of the semi-structured interviews, not only internal editorial policies influence the news content but also restrictive external interventions of the competitive authoritarian state actors, such as Roskomnadzor and the adapted restrictive legislation.

We will discuss the limitations of this study in the following section. Our theoretical framework joins that of scholars who defines the ‘state narrative’ in Russia as being gradually developed from its opposition to the West and liberal secularism (Ryabov & Ryabova, 2014; Medvedev & Makarychev, 2015; Healey, 2014; Kondakov, 2014, Essig, 2014). We further look at the construction of the LGBT community as an out-group within this narrative, in contrast with the “homonationalism” (Dhoest, 2020) of the West. However, this is only one small, albeit critically important, part of the ‘state narrative’. In further research, other issues that may be analyzed include those connected with sexual and gender politics and biopolitics in general, as Stella and Nartova (2020) and Makarychev and Medvedev (2015) suggest. We did not focus on Twitter echo chambers, the existence of which in various contexts has been confirmed by many researchers (e.g., Edwards, 2013; Gromping, 2014; Tous-Roviroso & Dergacheva, 2021) and is now being questioned by others (Barbera et al., 2017; Dubois & Blank, 2018); group polarization theory (Sunstein, 2002); or homophily in computer-mediated communications (Yuan & Gay, 2006). This could also lead to further research. There has not been space to study the ‘state narrative’ as directed at international audiences, as it is usually studied (Miskimonn, 2013; Oates, 2014); neither did we have an opportunity to look at the major state-owned media, which transmits ‘state narratives’ directly, such as Channel 1 (Oates, 2014), Rossiiskaya Gazeta (Stella & Nartova, 2016), or Russia Today (Chatterje-Doody & Crilley, 2019). We believe that these gaps could be topics for further research, and our study of Twitter discussions around both state-aligned and independent actors could also contribute to the overall understanding of ‘state narrative’ transmission apart from official media channels. The present research serves as an example of how ‘state narratives’ influence social media, in our case Twitter.

We studied Twitter because so-called Western social networking sites, such as Twitter, take up their own niches in Russia and are preferred by politically active citizens (Bodrunova & Litvinenko, 2016; Zherebtsov & Goussev, 2021). As Asmolov (2021) notes, Facebook, Twitter, and, recently, TikTok, have become and remain popular. Nevertheless, another limitation is that, as previous research indicates, Russian social media is dominated by local Russian social

media networks, such as VKontakte and Odnoklassniki (Koltsova & Bodrunova, 2019; Asmolov, 2021). We think that studying VKontakte is viable, despite the fact that it is owned by a state-aligned mail.ru group and was reported by media sources as actively cooperating with the authorities (including Roskomnadzor) on censoring its users.⁷⁷ Nevertheless, it may provide a wealth of useful empirical data on issues of ‘state narrative’ construction, although researchers may encounter losses of valuable information.

The social impact of this dissertation spans several dimensions. First, international think tanks could use other means of measuring how Russia’s state strategic narrative is being transmitted and contested by Twitter users and media outside of large state-owned media and traditional channels. Human rights and LGBT organizations could include in their campaigns a history of how and why placing the LGBT community as an out-group developed in post-Soviet Russia (and other post-Soviet spaces), emphasizing the anti-Western narrative of the political elites and state-aligned media rather than the inherent attitudes of ordinary people in a deeply patriarchal society. We also believe it is important that we are showing counternarratives, which also exist in these digital communications. Placing the LGBT community in Russia as an in-group is not altogether rare, at least among Twitter users, as it has been proved with this dissertation. This means that politically active, media-savvy Twitter users often support the inclusion of the LGBT community. This needs to be made public because for both the internal audience in Russia and for foreign countries, it is sometimes easy to believe the never-changing, homophobic narrative, even though it is challenged and may change. Society at large would benefit from seeing that there are counternarratives.

There are numerous non-government organizations, in Russia: human rights supporters such as Memorial, the Moscow Helsinki Group, Agora, and Golos, as well as LGBT community support organizations such as the Russian LGBT Network, Children 404, Vykhod, Ravnopravie, Raduzhnaya Associatsiya, Raduzhnyi Dom, Rakurs, and GayRussia. We think that sharing this research with them could offer practical support in their work, showing that there exist different views and counternarratives related to the LGBT community and inclusion. Independent and international media outlets that have offices and journalists based in Russia (such as the Radio Liberty, for example) be aware of the state strategic

⁷⁷ See BBC: <https://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-trending-45874964>

narratives which are often transmitted in the new media ecology. As noted by Brown et al. (2020, p. 838),

“Social media can be a tool to either provide consolatory messaging to promote healing and health, or to spread inflammatory exchanges that perpetuate community discord, further fracture communities and groups, and elevate the risk of retraumatization... Social media can be a powerful tool for enhancing community cohesion, recovery, and resilience.”

Tinati et al. (2014) suggest that studying Twitter may begin to shed light on digital social relations. Our research contributes to this empirical work, showing how media-affiliated and non-media-affiliated oppositional and pro-government users interact around the state strategic narrative. We think that by exposing and discussing such interactions, we can contribute to a roadmap of how these relations develop in neo-authoritarian societies and offer a view on counternarratives that can begin the healing process of understanding social inclusion and develop against the official ‘state narrative’.

This research examines the complex and multi-faceted nature of the dissemination of state strategic narratives on Twitter, specifically a neo-conservative narrative of the Russian state attitude toward the LGBT community. This study contributes to the theory of state strategic narratives and competitive authoritarianism and media systems literature, offering a new framework for the role of state-aligned actors on Twitter in an authoritarian context. This research provides its input to comparative media research and gives methodological guidance for further analysis of state strategic narratives on Twitter.

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IX LIST OF APPENDIXES

Appendix 1: coded sample of Tweets for content analysis, translation of the first 10 tweets

Appendix 2: dictionary of additional excluded words for computational content analysis

Appendix 3: word clouds in Russian

Appendix 4: topic modeling results of computational text analysis in Russian (EXAMPLE, 2017)

Appendix 5: statistics of words and translation into English of the first 30 words

Appendix 6: semi-structured interviews Questionnaire

Appendix 7: transcripts of interviews (one interview translated in English)

Appendix 8: information on this PhD's github repository where raw data can be found

APPENDIX I

	Username	Tweet	Affiliation	Political views	Views on LGBT
1	meduzaproject	«LGBT Network» demanded Investigative Committee to investigate info about repeating detentions and tortures of gay people in Chechnya https://t.co/ervgxY0mO5	1	2	1
2	ru_rbc	Chechen Minister named information on manhunt for gay people a fantasy: https://t.co/MDdl2panXD	1	1	2
3	dw_russian	"We are deeply concerned about the information that in Chechnya the members of the sexual minorities are repeatedly detained and tortured, sometimes leading to their death", - announced German and French ombudsmen. Are tortures and murders of the LGBT people in Chechnya happening again? https://t.co/8KwzevmWUO	1	2	1
4	rianru	Kadyrov named the article about detentions of gay people in Chechnya "a self-PR" for the journalists https://ria.ru/society/20170422/1492878387.html ... pic.twitter.com/rV1XE8NMSi	1	1	2
5	novaya_gazeta	Kadyrov named the info about detentions of gay people in Chechnya "a provocation" https://www.novayagazeta.ru/news/2017/04/19/130872-kadyrov-na-vstreche-s-putinym-prokomentiroval-soobscheniya-o-presledovanii-geev-v-chechne ...	1	2	2
6	spacelordrock	Shit will not sink down until the elections in France come to an end. Chechens who are reading this are looking around in shock wondering where are all	2	1	2

		tose gay activists? In Chechnya! https://twitter.com/spacelordrock/status/856812029637742593 ...			
7	a_gasparyan	There are no gay people in Chechnya. But let them help others, there are plenty of those in Rusia. Let us send them out to great Britain.	1	1	2
8	bbcrussian	Putin for the first time commented upon the situation with gay people rights in Chechnya. https://t.co/p7HHlO021W	1	2	3
9	tvrain	Charlie Hebdo published caricatures on gay people detentions in Chechnya. Among those, there is a cartoon with Kadyrov. https://t.co/F1Q6NSI3Ro	1	2	3
10	echomskru	UN experts demand stopping detentions of gay people in Chechnya. The statement is published on the site - https://t.co/dDvv2EYOPZ	1	2	1

APPENDIX 1.1

APPENDIX 1 CODED SAMPLE OF TWEETS FOR CONTENT ANALYSIS (MEDIA ONLY)

username	tweet	affiliation	politicalviews	viewsonLGBT
meduzaproject	«ЛГБТ-сеть» попросила СК проверить сообщения о	1	2	1
ru_rbc	Чеченский министр назвал фантазиями сообщени	1	1	2
dw_russian	"Мы глубоко обеспокоены информацией о том, чт	1	2	1
rianru	Кадыров назвал статью о преследовании геев в Че	1	1	2
novaya_gazeta	Кадыров назвал сообщения о преследовании геев	1	2	2
spacelordrock	<...>	2	1	2
a_gasparyan	в Чечне нет геев Но пусть помогут остальным у нас	1	1	2
bbcussian	Путин впервые публично затронул ситуацию с пра	1	2	3
tvrain	Charlie Hebdo опубликовал карикатуры на преслед	1	2	3
echomskru	Эксперты ООН требуют прекратить преследования	1	2	1
granitweet	Суд отклонил жалобу \"Новой газеты\" на бездейст	1	2	1
almartyn	<...>	2	1	2
cloudletn	<...>	2	1	2
dejmosv	<...>	2	1	2
fallout3333	<...>	2	1	2
im_zombie_boy	<...>	2	1	2
matterreason	В Чечне преследуют не только геев, но и русских.	1	2	2
questions_	<...>	2	3	2
rkadyrov	<...>	2	1	2
navalny	<...>	2	2	3
svobodaradio	В центре Москвы задержали пятерых активистов,	1	2	1
tass_agency	"Новая газета" пожаловалась в суд на главу СК пос	1	1	1
tatasazo7	<...>	2	1	2
xutahy	<...>	2	2	2
zliyshubin	<...>	2	2	2
1grammlimona	<...>	2	1	3
azazet	<...>	2	2	1
bataysk144	<...>	2	1	2
dikalu_dik	<...>	2	2	2
gazetaru	Совет Европы призвал Москалькову проверить да	1	1	1
hartza69	<...>	2	3	1
iremeslo	<...>	2	1	2
lafemmelise	<...>	2	1	2

lentarofficial	В связи с шумихой #лгбт в #чечня Говорим геев в Ч	1	1	2
lentatoptwit	Олег Кашин: Ни покоя, ни воли. Теракт в Петербур	1	1	3
mediazzzona	Суд зарегистрировал жалобу «Новой газеты» на б	1	2	1
mgfyte	<...>	2	2	3
n_alexeyev	<...>	2	2	3
nnalexander	<...>	2	2	1
ntvru	Песков о якобы гонениях на геев в Чечне: основан	1	1	2
perigors_irena	<...>	2	2	2
rfi_ru	Меркель спросила Путина о соблюдении прав gee	1	2	1
rozakirpicheva	<...>	2	2	2
segodnya_online	В Чечне журналисты разоблачили секретную тюрь	1	1	1
shagova_alena	<...>	2	1	2
shikalo3	<...>	2	1	2
spoonamer	<...>	2	2	2
stalingulag	<...>	2	2	1
untervatnik	<...>	2	2	1
vldsaveliev	<...>	2	2	1
currenttimetv	"Что происходит в Чечне – это геноцид" Поговори	1	2	1
svobodaradio	США обеспокоены сообщениями о новых задержа	1	2	1
vox_seminarium	<...>	2	3	2
roshenland	<...>	2	1	1
mbkhmedia	«Было задержано примерно 40 человек». Директо	1	2	1
granitweet	Российская ЛГБТ-сеть: В Чечне до смерти запытали	1	2	1
febrarium	<...>	2	2	1
oldlentach	В Чечне снова преследуют и пытаются геев. Власти	1	3	1
tvjihad	<...>	2	2	1
dw_russian	"Мы глубоко обеспокоены информацией о том, чт	1	2	1
mediazzzona	Интересно, как быстро Следственный комитет отк	1	2	1
ponny1	<...>	2	2	1
kochetkovigor	<...>	2	2	1
meduzaproject	«ЛГБТ-сеть» попросила СК проверить сообщения о	1	2	1
bbcussian	Правозащитники сообщают о новых задержаниях	1	2	3
novaya_gazeta	ЛГБТ-активисты планировали рассказать радиослу	1	2	1
sprotenmarty	<...>	2	2	1
zaebok_kun	<...>	2	1	2
0r8wclve7ghh0gf	<...>	2	2	2
crimerussia	В Чечне начали эвакуацию геев https://t.co/ykZeu	1	3	2
alcoholity	<...>	2	2	2
znak_com	Российская ЛГБТ-сеть заявила о новой волне прес	1	2	1
berendeya_007	<...>	2	1	3
fasterroy	<...>	2	2	1
wwwlads	<...>	2	1	2
akcentbahargan	<...>	2	1	2
esina_ekaterina	<...>	2	1	2
kommersant	Власти утверждают, что преследования геев в Чеч	1	3	3
rtvi	В Берлине проходит акция против преследования	1	2	2
tass_agency	Герой статьи о преследовании геев в Чечне опров	1	1	3
the_ins_ru	ЛГБТ-сообщество заявило о задержании 40 геев в	1	2	2
bluebillbilly	<...>	2	2	1
caucasianknot	Новые гонения на геев в Чечне указали на бессили	1	2	1
gkire	<...>	2	1	2
golosameriki	США обеспокоены сообщениями о новых задержа	1	2	1
narodprotiv	<...>	2	2	1
bespalov_yuri	<...>	2	1	2
bydlozavr	<...>	2	2	2
interfax_news	Правозащитники сообщили о задержании 40 геев	1	3	3
iwanttobefree12	<...>	2	2	1
kolyn261	<...>	2	2	2
lashevchenko	<...>	2	2	1
lztio0djhv45hg	<...>	2	2	2
mokinalubow	<...>	2	2	2
petrovitch77	<...>	2	1	2
reallemonad	<...>	2	2	2
redenviktorija	<...>	2	2	2

sanek94915804	<...>	2	2	2
the_willenbrock	<...>	2	2	2
ujxuca08znspmoo	<...>	2	2	2
yourmoonarmy	<...>	2	3	3
beria911	<...>	2	3	1
dw_russian	"Здесь маленькая декоративная родина. Не тот бо	1	2	3
echomskru	как на днях ЕСПЧ признал незаконными многочис	1	2	1
luiza4kalova	<...>	2	3	2
abroadunderhood	<...>	2	3	1
nstarikov	<...>	2	2	1
tigruskin	<...>Напишите что вы думаете по этом	2	3	2
anatoliisharii	<...>	2	2	1
kissmyblacklist	<...>	2	2	2
pontyk_blya	<...>	2	3	2
victorkvert2008	<...>	2	2	1
volkova_v	<...>	2	1	1
bts_twt	<...>	2	3	3
bulka_hleba	<...>	2	2	1
m_simonyan	На фотографии 6-ти летний мальчик Джеймс из Те	1	1	2
pani_walewska	<...>	2	2	2
sammmywin	<...>	2	3	1
alina4evers	<...>	2	3	3
bb_ina_	<...>	2	3	1
good78news	Посетители сольного концерта Кристины Орбакай	1	3	1
ilslsfm	<...>	2	3	1
izvestia_ru	На Урале полиция проверит школьные рисунки на	1	1	2
jamespandaman	<...>	2	3	3
kotalkin	<...>	2	3	3
lentarofficial	Полицейским оказались не рады на гей-параде. Вс	1	1	2
lifenevs_ru	Рисунки уральских школьников с ЛГБТ-парами нач	1	1	3
lovinskiii	<...>	2	3	1
publikatsii_ru	!!! Руководитель центра ЛГБТ в Екатеринбурге одо	1	1	2
rianru	В Екатеринбурге изъяли для проверки рисунки шк	1	1	3
svobodaradio	В Волгограде казаки сорвали акцию ЛГБТ-активист	1	2	1
tjournal	У Pornhub итоги в своём стиле: порно по Fortnite —	1	3	3
yourgmaknae	<...>	2	3	1
zvezdanews	В детских рисунках в Екатеринбурге усмотрели пр	1	1	1
1mookmd	<...>	2	3	1
bananastasia	<...>	2	3	3
_ddeep_endd_	<...>	2	3	2
_love_loki	<...>	2	3	1
a_gasparyan	Конституционный суд признал соглашение о грани	1	1	2
i_korotchenko	<...>	2	1	2
dangerouscahap	<...>	2	3	3
theanimebit	<...>	2	3	2
coman42	<...>	2	3	3
penguinpsycho	<...>	2	3	2
v_tretyakov	<...>	2	1	3
vremya_pokazhet	Американцы сначала на каждом углу воспевают "с	1	1	2
coelumm	<...>	2	3	2
fearowe	<...>	2	2	2
honeymadv	<...>	2	1	1
1993_sloboda	<...>	2	3	2
gruppa_voina	<...>	2	2	1
fake_midrf	<...>	2	2	1
support_c_mapca	<...>	2	2	3
mik_updown	<...>	2	2	1
saruman33331	<...>	2	1	2
waspishmonkey	<...>	2	2	1
gamlunti	<...>	2	1	2
studebekker1	<...>	2	2	2
ultramarin17	<...>	2	3	1
seenk	<...>	2	2	3
a_kapustin	СЛУШАЙТЕ А ОДНОМУ МНЕ НЕЛОВКО СМОТРЕТЬ Н	1	2	2

alexiger1	<...>	2	2	1
anast1511	<...>	2	2	2
asgardianriver	<...>	2	2	1
belozyorovva	<...>	2	1	2
buhhu26	<...>	2	2	1
evgenitarasov77	<...>	2	2	1
fischer_kot	<...>	2	2	2
hatshep_sut	<...>	2	2	1
jlf2018	<...>	2	3	1
kerrythriller	<...>	2	2	1
khba24	<...>	2	2	1
nalog399	<...>	2	3	3
ryuken_akuma	<...>	2	2	3
sj_nitro	<...>	2	1	1
zabroshen	<...>	2	3	3
1djhrjzithbyb	<...>	2	3	3
again_again_	<...>	2	2	2
anna_kon_da202	<...>	2	1	1
badbrodyaga	<...>	2	3	3
black_slip_mars	<...>	2	3	3
bullshi_et	<...>	2	2	1
champaniqua	<...>	2	2	3
chippingpeople	<...>	2	2	2
dasha_river	<...>	2	2	1
dennyraiz	<...>	2	2	2
deputat_kot	<...>	2	2	1
dumb_violetdeer	<...>	2	2	3
ezha08211188	<...>	2	3	1
faaaber_	<...>	2	3	3
fake_lnr	<...>	2	2	1
genailv	<...>	2	2	3
gryha_lesch	<...>	2	3	1
guzeeva_crush	<...>	2	2	2
iamalexy1	<...>	2	1	1
isaacclarke09	<...>	2	3	1
kk6ey	<...>	2	2	3
korzunovstanly	<...>	2	2	3
kubig	<...>	2	2	1
lara94987590	<...>	2	3	1

APPENDIX 2:

DICTIONARY OF EXCLUDED WORDS FOR COMPUTATIONAL TEXT ANALYSIS

ABS

ANDROID

APP

BP

CO

CUK

CYNICAREA

DEFAULT

DYHS

FOR

HTT

IPHONE

JPEG

JPG

KBHCYJX

NILETTO

PNG

STICKY

WEB

TWITTER

RE

RT

HTTTP

HTTPS

A

БЫ

В

ВОСЕМНАДЦАТЬ

ВПРОЧЕМ

ВСЁ

ВСЕЮ

ДЕВЯТНАДЦАТЫЙ

ДЕВЯТНАДЦАТЬ

ДЕВЯТЫЙ

ДЕВЯТЬ

ДЕСЯТЫЙ

ДЕСЯТЬ

ДРУГАЯ

Е

ЕЩЁ

ЗАНЯТ

ЗАНЯТА

ЗАНЯТО

ЗАНЯТЫ

ЗАЧЕМ

ЗНАЧИТ

И

ИНА

К

КАЖДАЯ

КОНЕЧНО

ЛУЧШЕ

МЕЛЯ

МНОГОЧИСЛЕННАЯ

МНОГОЧИСЛЕННОЕ

МНОГОЧИСЛЕННЫЕ
МНОГОЧИСЛЕННЫЙ
МОЁ
МОЖХО
МОЧЬ
Н
НАЧАЛА
НЕЁ
НИЗКО
НИЧЕГО
НО
О
ОБЫЧНО
ОДИННАДЦАТЫЙ
ОЧЕНЬ
ПОЧЕМУ
ПОЧТИ
ПЯТНАДЦАТЫЙ
ПЯТНАДЦАТЬ
ПЯТЫЙ
С
САМИМИ
СЕАОЙ
СЕЙЧАС
СНАЧАЛА
ТВОЁ
ТОЮ
ТРИНАДЦАТЫЙ
ТЫСЯЧ

ХОЧЕШЬ

ЧАСТО

ЧАЩЕ

ЧЕГО

ЧЕЛОВЕК

ЧЕМ

ЧЕМУ

ЧЕРЕЗ

ЧЕТВЕРТЫЙ

ЧЕТЫРЕ

ЧЕТЫРНАДЦАТЫЙ

ЧЕТЫРНАДЦАТЬ

ЧТО


ЧТОБ

ЧТОБЫ

ЧУТЬ

ШЕСТНАДЦАТЫЙ

2019 WORD CLOUDS





2020 WORD CLOUDS

ПРОГОЛОСОВАТЬ ЛЮБИМКА
КОНСТИТУЦИИ СОЛДАТЫ INSTAGRAM ПОДОХНЕТ
РУССКИХ ВАШИХ вы АААА
ЗАБЕРУТ ГОЛОСУЙ РЕБ НУЖНО
КОНСТИТУЦИЮ ДОМОЙ
GRUPPA OH или ЗА ВСЕХ ДЕТДОМЕ
УСЫНОВЦТ ИЛИ ЗА ВСЕХ ВАШЕГО
НИБУДЬ НИКАКИЕ
РОЛИК ЕСЛИ
ВЫЕБУТ ВЫРАСТЕТ КТОРОМ
VOINA ИЮЛЦ ДЕТЕЙ ВИДЕО
ОДНОГО
СВОЙ
ПРИМУТ ГДЕ СЕБЕ ОФИЦИАЛЬНЫЙ НАТО
УСЫНОВЯТ ПРИНЯТЬ ОФИЦИАЛЬНЫЙ
ПРИЗЫВАЕТ БЕСПОКОЙТЕСЬ

ПРОГОЛОСОВАТЬ ПРИЗЫВАЕТ
БЕСПОКОЙТЕСЬ СОЛДАТЫ ПЕВЕЦ
ВАШИХ КОНСТИТУЦИИ НАТО OF
РУССКИХ ДОМОЙ НКА ХИТА
РОССИИ
ЗАБЕРУТ ГОЛОСУЙ
КОНСТИТУЦИЮ ГУСЕЙ
ПРИНЯТЬ
ДЕТДОМЕ VOINA
GRUPPA ИНА NILETTO
ПРИМУТ СУК НАШИХ
СТРАНЫ
СРО РОЛИК ИЮЛЦ ВЫЕБУТ
НИКАКИЕ ВИДЕО
свой РЕБ ОФИЦИАЛЬНЫЙ
АААА ч УСЫНОВЯТ УСЫНОВЦТ
ПОДОХНЕТ ВАШЕГО ВЫРАСТЕТ
INSTAGRAM КОТОРОМ ЛЮБИМКА
CYNICAREA ОПУБЛИКОВАЛ

APPENDIX 5

2017

NO	TOPIC	KEYWORDS	COHERENCE	FREQ	CASES	% CASES
5	ЗАКРОЙТЕ СЕКРЕТНЫЕ ТЮРЬМЫ	AVAAZ; SECURE; ЗАКРОЙТЕ; РАССКАЖИТЕ; CLOSE; TORTURE; ПОДПИШИТЕ; ВСЕМ; GAY; СНЕЧНЫА; СЕКРЕТНЫЕ; ТЮРЬМЫ; CAMPAIGN; CENTRES; ДЛУ; CAMPS; СЕКРЕТНЫЕ ТЮРЬМЫ; ЗАКРОЙТЕ СЕКРЕТНЫЕ ТЮРЬМЫ; ПОДПИШИТЕ И РАССКАЖИТЕ ВСЕМ; CAMPAIGN.RU CLOSE; ГАЗЕТУ; ПОДАЛИ; НОВУЮ; СУД; АКТИВИСТЫ; СТАТЬИ; ИЗ; ЗА; ЛГБТ;	0,975	3136	350	7,87%
19	НОВУЮ ГАЗЕТУ ПОДАЛИ В СУД	НОВУЮ ГАЗЕТУ; ПОДАЛИ В СУД; ЗА СТАТЬИ; АКТИВИСТЫ ПОДАЛИ В СУД; ГЕЯХ В ЧЕЧНЕ; ОРГАНИЗАТОРЫ ЛГБТ; ПОСЛЕ СТАТЬИ; РОССИЙСКАЯ ЛГБТ; КАВКАЗЕ ПОДАЛИ В СУД; СК ИЗ; АКТИВИСТЫ GAYRUSSIA ПОДАЛИ В СУД; ЗА ИНФОРМАЦИИ ОБ УБИЙСТВЕ ГОМОСЕКСУАЛОВ; ПРЕСС; СЕКРЕТАРЬ; БЫЛИ; КАДЫРОВА; ЕСЛИ; ОТКУДА; ИХ; ГЕИ; БЫЛО;	0,634	363	126	2,83%
24	СЕКРЕТАРЬ КАДЫРОВА ЧЕЧНЕ БЫЛИ ГЕИ	СЕКРЕТАРЬ КАДЫРОВА; ЧЕЧНЕ БЫЛИ ГЕИ; ОТКУДА НЕ; СЕКРЕТАРЬ КАДЫРОВА ОБЪЯВИЛ ОБ ОТСУТСТВИИ; НЕ БЫЛО; ТО ИХ; СЕКРЕТАРЬ ПРЕЗИДЕНТА; ГЕИ В ЧЕЧНЕ; ПРЕСЛЕДОВАТЬ ИХ НИКТО НЕ МОЖЕТ; СЕКРЕТАРЬ КАДЫРОВА НАЗВАЛ ЛОЖЬЮ МАССОВЫЕ; КАДЫРОВА ЗАЯВИЛИ; МОРАЛЬНО ОПРАВДАЛА; ОТКУДА НЕ ВОЗВРАЩАЮТСЯ; ИЗВИНЕНИИ; ТРЕБУЮТ; СТАТЬЮ; ГАЗЕТЫ; НОВОЙ; ОТ; ПРЕСЛЕДОВАНИИ; ЗА;	0,607	392	156	3,51%
29	НОВОЙ ГАЗЕТЫ ЗА СТАТЬЮ О ПРЕСЛЕДОВАНИЯХ ГЕЕВ	НОВОЙ ГАЗЕТЫ; ЗА СТАТЬЮ О ПРЕСЛЕДОВАНИЯХ ГЕЕВ; ЧЕЧНЕ ТРЕБУЮТ ИЗВИНЕНИИ ОТ; КРЕМЛЕ НЕ ВИДЯТ ПОДТВЕРЖДЕНИЙ ПУБЛИКАЦИЯМ; ПОСЛЕ ПУБЛИКАЦИИ; ЧЕЧНЕ НАЧАЛАСЬ ПРОВЕРКА ИНФОРМАЦИИ; РИА НОВОСТИ; ВЫРАБОТАТЬ ЕДИНОЙ ПОЗИЦИИ ПО СИТУАЦИИ; MEDIUM; SOURCE; SOCIAL; CONTENT; VILLAGE; CAMPAIGN;	0,554	322	177	3,98%
1	MEDIUM	VILLAGE CITY; NEWIZVESTIA STATUS; НОВЫЕ ИЗВЕСТИЯ; VILLAGEMSK STATUS; ПРОЕКТ STATUS; THEVILLAGE ПЕТЕРБУРГ; VILLAGESPB STATUS; ОПУБЛИКОВАЛА; СВИДЕТЕЛЬСТВА; СЕКРЕТНОЙ; ГАЗЕТА; ЛЮДЕЙ; НОВАИ;	0,526	236	97	2,18%
4	НОВАЯ ГАЗЕТА ОПУБЛИКОВАЛА СВИДЕТЕЛЬСТВА	НОВАЯ ГАЗЕТА; ОПУБЛИКОВАЛА СВИДЕТЕЛЬСТВА; ОПУБЛИКОВАЛА СВИДЕТЕЛЬСТВА ЛЮДЕЙ; ВЫШЕДШИХ ЖИВЫМИ ИЗ СЕКРЕТНОЙ ТЮРЬМЫ; СЕКРЕТНОЙ ТЮРЬМЕ; ОПУБЛИКОВАЛА СВИДЕТЕЛЬСТВА ГЕЕВ; ГЕЕВ ПЫТАЮТ В СЕКРЕТНОЙ ТЮРЬМЕ; ЧЕЧНЕ ЗАДЕРЖАННЫХ ГЕЕВ ПЫТАЮТ; ЕННЫЙ;	0,523	438	343	7,71%
10	УПОЛНОМОЧЕННЫЙ ПО ПРАВАМ ЧЕЛОВЕКА	ПРАВАМ ЧЕЛОВЕКА; УПОЛНОМОЧЕННЫЙ ПО ПРАВАМ ЧЕЛОВЕКА; УПОЛНОМО; ПРАВАМ; ЕЛОВЕКА; СООБЩЕСТВА; ПРИТЕСНЕНИИ; ПРОВЕРИЛ СООБЩЕНИЯ О ПРИТЕСНЕНИИ ЛГБТ; СООБЩЕНИЯ О ПРИТЕСНЕНИИ; ЖАЛОБ; ПРАВООХРАНИТЕЛЬНЫЕ; ОРГАНЫ; АЛИ; ПОЛУ; ПОХИЩЕНИИ;	0,515	174	66	1,48%
11	ПРАВООХРАНИТЕЛЬНЫЕ ОРГАНЫ ЖАЛОБ	ПРАВООХРАНИТЕЛЬНЫЕ ОРГАНЫ; ПОХИЩЕНИИ ГЕЕВ В ЧЕЧНЕ; ПРАВООХРАНИТЕЛЬНЫЕ ОРГАНЫ НЕ ПОЛУЧАЛИ ЖАЛОБ; НЕ ПОЛУЧАЛИ; ПРИТЕСНЕНИЯХ ГЕЕВ В ЧЕЧНЕ;	0,501	148	66	1,48%

		ЕВРОПЫ; СОВЕТ; ПРИЗВАЛ; ПОХИЩЕНИИХ; ПЫТКАХ; РАССЛЕДОВАТЬ; СОВЕТА;					
10	СОВЕТ ЕВРОПЫ	СОВЕТ ЕВРОПЫ; ПЫТКАХ ГЕЕВ В ЧЕЧНЕ; СОВЕТ ЕВРОПЫ ПРИЗВАЛ; РАССЛЕДОВАТЬ СООБЩЕНИЯ; СОВЕТ ЕВРОПЫ ПРИЗВАЛ РАССЛЕДОВАТЬ; ЕВРОПЫ ПРИЗВАЛ МОСКАЛЬКОВУ; РАССЛЕДОВАТЬ ДАННЫЕ; СОВЕТ ЕВРОПЫ ПРИЗВАЛ РАССЛЕДОВАТЬ; ГЕНСЕК СОВЕТА ЕВРОПЫ ПРИЗВАЛ МОСКАЛЬКОВУ; СОВЕТ ЕВРОПЫ ПРИЗВАЛ РАССЛЕДОВАТЬ СВЕДЕНИЯ; РАССЛЕДОВАТЬ СЛУЧАИ; AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL ПРИЗВАЛА РАССЛЕДОВАТЬ СООБЩЕНИЯ; СОВЕТ ЕВРОПЫ БУДЕТ РАССЛЕДОВАТЬ СЛУЧАИ; ВСТРЕ; ПУТИНЫМ; ОПРОВЕРГ; КАДЫРОВ; УБИЙСТВАХ; РАМЗАН; СООБЩЕНИЯ;	0,495	260	145	3,26%	
14	КАДЫРОВ НА ВСТРЕЧЕ С ПУТИНЫМ	УБИЙСТВАХ ГЕЕВ В ЧЕЧНЕ; КАДЫРОВ НА ВСТРЕЧЕ С ПУТИНЫМ; РАМЗАН КАДЫРОВ; ОПРОВЕРГ ИНФОРМАЦИЮ; КАДЫРОВ ОБСУДИЛ С ПУТИНЫМ ПУБЛИКАЦИИ; УБИЙСТВАХ ГЕЕВ В ЧЕЧНЕ ПРОВОКАЦИЕЙ; ГЛАВА ЧЕЧНИ РАМЗАН КАДЫРОВ; КАДЫРОВ НАЗВАЛ; РОССИЮ; РАЗОБРАТЬСЯ; ГОСДЕП; США; СИТУАЦИИ; ПРИЗВАЛИ;	0,489	172	83	1,87%	
20	ГОСДЕП США РОССИЮ РАЗОБРАТЬСЯ В СИТУАЦИИ	ГОСДЕП США; РОССИЮ РАЗОБРАТЬСЯ В СИТУАЦИИ; США ПРИЗВАЛИ; РОССИЮ РАССЛЕДОВАТЬ; ПРИТЕСНЕНИЕМ ГЕЕВ В ЧЕЧНЕ; ЗАДЕРЖАНИЕМ ГЕЕВ В ЧЕЧНЕ; ПРИЗВАЛ РОССИЮ РАЗОБРАТЬСЯ В СИТУАЦИИ; ГОСДЕП США ПРИЗЫВАЕТ РОССИЮ РАССЛЕДОВАТЬ;	0,487	156	76	1,71%	
26	СНЕЧНЕ	СНЕЧНЕ; GEEV; MEDUZAPROJECT; MEDUZA; PRESLEDOVANIИ;	T 0,484	687	369	8,29%	
7	АРОВ	NEWS; SMI; GAZETA; НОВОСТИ; NOVAYA;	U S ; 0,479	101	35	0,79%	
21	ПРОВЕРКУ ПОСЛЕ	Н О В О С Т И И Э К О Н О М И К И ;	M E D U Z A ; 0,477	247	121	2,72%	
17 ИЗ	ГЕЕВ В ЧЕЧНЕ НЕВОЗМОЖНО ОТСУТСТВИИ	И К И ;	O J E; 0,470	157	48	1,08%	
22	ЭХО МОСКВЫ	И N E W S S T A	S T ; 0,465	135	56	1,26%	

APPENDIX 5: statistics of words and translation into English of the first 30 words

2017

	FREQUENCY	% SHOWN	NO. CASES	% CASES
Of gays	3877	8,21%	3823	85,91%
News	632	1,34%	487	10,94%
Victimization	521	1,10%	519	11,66%
LGBT	451	0,95%	437	9,82%
Reports	397	0,84%	390	8,76%
Gays	373	0,79%	363	8,16%
New (Gazeta)	368	0,78%	364	8,18%
Kadyrov	358	0,76%	346	7,78%
Newspaper	352	0,75%	347	7,80%
In Chechnya	336	0,71%	336	7,55%
Prisons	322	0,68%	320	7,19%
Campaign	313	0,66%	313	7,03%
Secret	285	0,60%	284	6,38%
No	269	0,57%	246	5,53%
Hunting down	265	0,56%	263	5,91%
Gay	256	0,54%	247	5,55%
Investigate	245	0,52%	244	5,48%
To everyone	234	0,50%	234	5,26%
Sign	234	0,50%	234	5,26%
Close	232	0,49%	232	5,21%
Tell	227	0,48%	227	5,10%
Torture	226	0,48%	226	5,08%
Media	226	0,48%	224	5,03%
Moskalkova (Ombudswoman)	210	0,44%	207	4,65%
Peskov (Putin;s press-secretary)	205	0,43%	202	4,54%
Information	198	0,42%	196	4,40%
Killings	184	0,39%	184	4,13%
Kidnapping	166	0,35%	165	3,71%
Chasing	165	0,35%	164	3,69%

2018:

	FREQUENCY	% TOTAL	NO. CASES	% CASES
LGBT	7034	3,06%	4370	98,69%
Media	1566	0,68%	635	14,34%
Russian LGBT Community	1098	0,48%	502	11,34%
Flag	214	0,09%	172	3,88%
Today	195	0,08%	167	3,77%
People	190	0,08%	165	3,73%
Love	184	0,08%	142	3,21%
Gay	182	0,08%	154	3,48%
Friend	152	0,07%	126	2,85%
Mother	139	0,06%	93	2,10%
Girl	131	0,06%	107	2,42%
To Russia	127	0,06%	113	2,55%
Bisexual	121	0,05%	79	1,78%
Lesbi	116	0,05%	66	1,49%
News	109	0,05%	80	1,81%
Heterosexual	109	0,05%	90	2,03%
Boy	108	0,05%	85	1,92%
Gays	97	0,04%	77	1,74%
I know	95	0,04%	84	1,90%
Rights	93	0,04%	73	1,65%
Community	86	0,04%	74	1,67%
Life	85	0,04%	77	1,74%
Girlfriend	85	0,04%	77	1,74%
You know	83	0,04%	77	1,74%
Meet	82	0,04%	68	1,54%
Normal	82	0,04%	63	1,42%
Rainbow	80	0,03%	69	1,56%
To the community	79	0,03%	73	1,65%
I can	78	0,03%	66	1,49%

2019:

	FREQUENCY	% SHOWN	NO. CASES	% CASES
Of gays	2000	5,44%	1013	98,54%
LGBT	521	1,42%	265	25,78%
Network	283	0,77%	140	13,62%
Victimization	232	0,63%	152	14,79%
Of Russia	205	0,56%	186	18,09%
New	194	0,53%	107	10,41%
Two	183	0,50%	94	9,14%
Torturing	174	0,47%	123	11,96%
Russian	173	0,47%	86	8,37%
Hunting down	171	0,47%	100	9,73%
Happening	162	0,44%	84	8,17%
Lesbians	158	0,43%	80	7,78%
Genocide	156	0,42%	78	7,59%
Open	152	0,41%	76	7,39%
After	148	0,40%	74	7,20%
Lipunov Maxim	148	0,40%	74	7,20%
Talked to	148	0,40%	74	7,20%
Russian citizen	148	0,40%	74	7,20%
Tortures	139	0,38%	57	5,54%
of Russian	139	0,38%	83	8,07%
By gay	126	0,34%	64	6,23%
Answered	123	0,33%	62	6,03%
Power	122	0,33%	62	6,03%
Detained	118	0,32%	60	5,84%
Libel	118	0,32%	59	5,74%
Asked	118	0,32%	59	5,74%
Killings	117	0,32%	73	7,10%
Killed	114	0,31%	57	5,54%
Detained	107	0,29%	54	5,25%

2020:

	FREQUENCY	% TOTAL	NO. CASES	% CASES
For	7886	1,47%	3891	62,93%
Children	7199	1,34%	3959	64,03%
Constitution	4728	0,88%	2436	39,40%
Everyone	4048	0,75%	1992	32,22%
Video	3961	0,74%	1970	31,86%
Will be taken away	3834	0,71%	1925	31,13%
Vote	3656	0,68%	1826	29,53%
Official	3576	0,66%	1790	28,95%
Russian	3574	0,66%	1788	28,92%
Home	3573	0,66%	1787	28,90%
Yours	3489	0,65%	891	14,41%
Somebody	2706	0,50%	1781	28,80%
Will adapt	2437	0,45%	1224	19,80%
Baby	2346	0,44%	1184	19,15%
Constitution	1955	0,36%	979	15,83%
Where	1947	0,36%	997	16,12%
Will vote for	1849	0,34%	923	14,93%
Group Voina	1825	0,34%	1807	29,23%
Orphanage	1786	0,33%	897	14,51%
None	1775	0,33%	888	14,36%
Yours	1770	0,33%	885	14,31%
Worry	1768	0,33%	884	14,30%
Will grow up	1768	0,33%	884	14,30%
Will die	1768	0,33%	884	14,30%
Is needed	1757	0,33%	887	14,35%
NATO	1741	0,32%	879	14,22%
Soldiers	1740	0,32%	878	14,20%
Will f--k	1708	0,32%	854	13,81%
Accept	1708	0,32%	854	13,81%

APPENDIX 6

QUESTIONNAIRE

EXPERIENCE OF WRITING A PARTICULAR NEWS PIECE

1. Could you tell me please, do you remember the situation when you wrote a news piece which was later tweeted by you or the social media department?

Follow up questions:

- Who gave you the topic, how it was communicated to you?
- What is the usual practice in your organization, do you always write pieces on particular topics or various journalists do?
- Do you remember how did you chose the wordings for the text or headlines?
- Was is it easy or difficult for you to decide on which topic to take or not?
- Why do you choose the heading for a news piece or an article? Did anyone else took part in deciding which heading to use?

SOCIAL MEDIA USE AND EDITORIAL INFLUENCE

2. Would you describe please how is the social media used in your editorial practices?

Follow up questions

- Is the use of social networks encouraged in your news media?
- Do you have to use Social Media to "benefit" your media editorial policies
- If yes, which networks are you encouraged to use?
- Which networks do you yourself prefer to use?
- What would you say, you publish more in the social networks, is it the links to your news media, your own opinions on events or something more personal?
- Is anyone from the editorial influence your decisions on what to publish or not in your personal social networks accounts?

DEFINITION OF EDITORIAL POLICIES/ FRAMING

3. Could you please describe to me how are the decisions taken usually in your editorial?

Follow up question:

- when it comes to writing or commenting a news piece, for example, would you say that share the decision on how to portrait something with the programs' (media's) editor, colleagues or make them yourself?

4. Could you tell me a little bit about a set of rules in the editorial practice in your media?

Follow up questions:

- Is there a set of rules in the editorial practice of your media, and if so, what are the main points that they are about?
- Would you say, there are certain topics you are not going to write about according to these practices, and if so, what would they be?
- How would you describe sharing your decisions on a news piece, article or opinion piece with an editor?
- Are there any topics that you would not write about? What are they and why?
- Who defines which topics do you take as news pieces/articles/opinion pieces in your news media?
- Which of the following best describes your decisions on writing a piece within your news organization, if applicable?

EXTERNAL INTERFERENCE AND SENSITIVE TOPICS

5. What is the practice in your media, how do you write about topics which are restricted by Roskomnador? Topics on LGBT for example?

6. Do you feel the legislation that is being adapted influence your editorial decisions in any way, and if yes, how?

ONLINE COMMUNICATION: ARE SOCIAL MEDIA PEERS INFLUENCING DECISION MAKING

7. Could you please tell me more about your experiences on social media, Twitter (of you have one) when your news piece (or tweet) is discussed?

Follow up questions:

- Do you discuss your news pieces or news in general with your peers on Twitter? What do you discuss?

- Do you read Twitter threads that are associated with your discussion or a news piece?
- Would you say, you primarily agree or disagree with what the users say about your news piece and why?
- Do you feel that other users' comments play some role on the editorial policies or your own news writing?

INFORMATION ABOUT INTERVIEWEE

8. How many years /months have you worked in the news media
9. Why have you decided to work in the media?
10. Is there a particular political affiliation you feel that you have?
11. Is there a particular political affiliation you feel that your news media has, and if so, why?
12. Now that you know what the research is about, is there anything that I should have asked but didn't?

APPENDIX 7

INTERVIEWS

7.1 Interview translation

Speaker1: Hello.

Speaker2: Hello. Good morning. I only record the interview because I will need it later for my dissertation. I will send you a link to the publication to see. In fact, the interview is small, there are few questions about editorial policy, mainly regarding social networks.

Could you tell me, please, do you remember the last situation when your news was published on social networks in your editorial office?

Speaker1: Mine?

Speaker2: Specifically.

Speaker1: Well, that was yesterday or the day before yesterday, I guess. This happens almost every day. There is one piece of news that is published. Or many news.

Speaker2: What is the usual practice in your editorial office, for articles on certain topics, do the same or different journalists write?

Speaker1: Different journalists write on different topics.

Speaker2:] Do you choose the wording for the headings of the news yourself?

Speaker1: Editors pick. Correspondents themselves, journalists - they hand over materials to the editor, and the editor decides to leave the heading as the journalist, as the correspondent wrote, or to rewrite something, to correct it.

Speaker2: Do you get the same headlines on social media, or are they changed?

Speaker1: On social media it is different. Sometimes, if you see a snapshot of the news, then the same headline that the editor, the journalist came up with, remains there. Sometimes it happens that a news is published without a picture with some kind of photo or video, and then the journalist completely decides what the headline will be.

Speaker2: Does your media encourage the use of personal social media?

Speaker1: We don't have any restrictions and, roughly speaking, there is no compulsion either. We do not work in such an environment that the entire editorial board has to publish some article on their personal social networks.

Speaker2: What social networks do you prefer to use?

Speaker1: In person or in the editorial office?

Speaker2] In person and in the editorial office. Both.

Speaker1: [] I use a little bit of everything. For some personal purposes and, as it were, for friends - Telegram and Twitter, for, let's say, some kind of socio-political statements to a wide audience - it's basically Facebook. The editorial office is now focused on this big three - Facebook, Vkontakte, Twitter. Plus, we have a page on Odnoklassniki, which lives its own life in general for us. We are also trying to develop Instagram and Tik-Tok in other directions a little, but this requires special attention, therefore, it is in its infancy.

Speaker2: Let's talk a little about editorial policy rules. Is there an editorial policy in your media regarding news and social networks, and are there any specific topics that you cannot write about in accordance with this rule?

Speaker1:] Well, our main rule is that we try to avoid yellow news. In general, they are those news that are very, super popular. Otherwise, I would not say that there are any restrictions. There is news that we know that is interesting to both us and our readers. So we are of course focusing on them. But it happens that journalists are fond of some topic, I don't know, TV shows or video games, or something else, and it's not at all forbidden if he chooses some time once a month and writes, for example, about it. No, well, I would not say that there are any restrictions. I have not personally encountered them.

Speaker2: Which of the following options (but most often) determines the writing of the news in the meeting, if applicable? The first option: decisions are made by the journalist himself, that is, topics for today, plans. Second option: the editor makes the decisions.

Speaker1: Since I'm the editor, I make the decision.

Speaker2: Okay, but then you have an editor in chief.

Speaker1: But I'm just an editor for the Sverdlovsk region. As for the Sverdlovsk region, I decide for myself.

Speaker2: What if it's a federal topic?

Speaker1: The situation in the federal media is a little more complicated there. There is an editor of the federal department who sits on the news feed, he makes a decision on an ad-hoc basis, but in the morning there is an editorial meeting, where the editor-in-chief already speaks, and there he already determines which topics are big for the day, what is worth focusing on.

Speaker2: For example, my dissertation is all about Twitter. Speaking of twitter, do you discuss your news or or other news on twitter with your colleagues?

Speaker1: No, we have twitter, it is quite active, but it is run entirely by the SMM manager. And it seems we have a new manager.. And I think ... I don't know for sure, if he started communicating with the readers or not yet. It's just that we actually have such a dilemma: is it worth communicating somewhere, responding to some comments? But until recently we didn't do that. He wanted to start something, I don't know whether he started or not.

Speaker2: Do you read tweets related to your news that was published there?

Speaker1: Discussions, yes, periodically. Well, since in the Sverdlovsk region there is not a lot of some kind of get-together on Twitter, then to a lesser extent, of course, than on Facebook. But I still use Twitter in a lot of ways. that is, I am subscribed to all publications, I look through all sorts of different ones. Probably so.

Speaker2: By the way, did the speed limit affect your Twitter experience?

Speaker1: Not from the computer, I guess. On my phone - yes, it's very noticeable that twitter has become slower on my phone

Speaker2: Don't you use it less?

Speaker1: Not yet.

Speaker2: Do you think that comments from other users on Twitter or on other social networks influence some editorial decisions or your own news?

Speaker1: Not the news itself, but it affects the editorial decisions on the publication of this or that news on Twitter, because there is also such a thing - what's the correct name? - Reaction, that is, the number of likes and comments. This all affects the numbers, so they consider this when choosing topics for Twitter.

Speaker2: The latest information is ... demographic. How many years have you worked in the media?

Speaker1: In general, in the media - 9.

Speaker2: Have you worked in multiple media or just one? Why did you decide to go to work in the media?

Speaker1: I just liked to write at that time, then the politics was interesting, and that's why I got into media.

Speaker2: Do you have any specific political views? Not necessary to say which, just yes or no.

Speaker1: Well, yes, let's say.

Speaker2: Does your media outlet have specific political views?

Speaker1: I would say yes.

Speaker2: Now you know what the interview was about. Is there anything I should have asked?

Speaker1: I think not .. I don't know. Perhaps you know better.

Speaker2: Thank you so much.

7.2 Interview 1

Speaker2:

Чем могу, помогу. Ты со скидкой на то, что все таки у меня профессия не продвижение в соцсетях, поэтому я только как наблюдатель, как журналист. Давай давай. конечно поехали.

Speaker1:

Поощряют ли вас поставить новости свои в социальные сети?

Speaker2:

Поощрения подразумевает какие то плюшки. в этом смысле плюшек нет.

Speaker1:

Поставить эфир.

Speaker2:

А вот так вот ты знаешь у нас бывает такое очень редко, и как правило для того чтобы поставить эфир на своей странице, даже просить не надо. Мы очень стараемся как то друг друга поддерживать всегда ставить лайки. в этом смысле у нас такое единомыслие. и мне очень нравится что у нас нет никакого вообще диктата, когда начальник начинает: «вот ты знаешь здесь отправь что-то или вот здесь это поставить». Иногда, очень редко, в чате прилетают ребята: «Давайте сегодняшний эфир, например, такой классный был, может расшарим это». Причем не точно. Вот кто хочет, тот расшарит. Причем это бывает очень редко, но когда действительно классный эфир и он классный настолько, что тебе становится стыдно, что господа вот зачем человек это попросил, когда это была должна быть наша инициатива. Мы первые должны были похвалить и сказать: слушай такой классный был эфир! Мы должны были расшарить на личных страницах. То есть у нас нет вообще никаких шероховатости и диктата, в этом смысле повезло.

Ольга Липман смотри я использую.. Я зарегистрирована много где, исключительно для того чтобы искать спикеров. Если вдруг где то, например, он недоступен.. в другой социальной сети я могу вылавливать даже незнакомого человека. И мы договоримся, на связи в эфире. Но у меня есть личная страничка в фейсбуке которая пользуется очень активно мною. И есть еще, пока во всяком случае, закрытая страничка в инстаграме, которую я завела относительно недавно (с нового года). Она для совсем-совсем узкого круга. И даже когда я знаю, что у меня где-то там есть

аккаунт, я не помню пароля. Сама понимаешь. Ну в общем об этом позорным факте моей биографии вообще и всеобщей биографии наверное лучше молчать. Вконтакте просто зарегистрирована, тоже периодически чтобы переписываться со спикерами потенциальными.

Speaker1:

Твиттером для работы? Или личным?

Speaker2:

Пиаром. Кто из нас не поклонник твиттера евгения ройзмана? Дай бог ему здоровья. В этом смысле я только жалкий юзер своего твиттера.. может я конечно там зарегистрирована, но я им не пользуюсь активно. Я пользуюсь исключительно опять же как юзер, я читаю твиты естественно.

Ну и разумеется у меня есть телеграм. Без телеграм это даже как-то странно, потому что там периодически какая-то информация появляется все-таки первее, до официальных сми. Ну плюс к тому очень хорошо держать руку на пульсе и просто смотреть куда ветер дует, даже предполагая что информация может оказаться неверной.

Speaker2:

Нет нет нет. я больше даже читаю телеграмм. Твиттер в меньшей степени. И то ты знаешь, большей части даже постит так в других своих сетях.

Speaker1:

О редакционной политике. по поводу которые темы брать, а какие не брать?

Speaker2:

Для эфиров, для разговора - я новостями на эхе не занимаюсь. а для этого есть специально обученные прекрасные люди.

Speaker1:

Какие темы определяет редактор? Или самостоятельно?.

Speaker2:

Я сама редактор себе. Я сама. Иногда мы друг друга выручаем. То есть сейчас о чем ты думаешь чем я занимаюсь и работаю? У меня завтра два эфира, два разворота - утренний и дневной. И я ищу темы. Иногда мы стараемся. У нас в общем маленький, но очень дружный коллектив, понимаешь. То есть ежедневно нужно найти порядка десяти тем, и каждая из них должна естественно что-то там будить в каждом слушателе, и в зрителе это должно. Тема должна взлетать. Понятно, что у меня как у редактора, у ведущей программы - это моя головная боль. Но у нас взаимовыручка, и периодически кто-нибудь из коллег там даже в ночи может мне прислать какую-нибудь ссылку. Кого то, кто я знаю, что тебе понравится. И конечно это очень трогательно, когда кто-то тебе старается помочь с темами и что-то присылает.

Speaker1:

Какие то темы которые редакционная политика не берёт? Это может быть не из-за политики.

Speaker2: [

Их все.. кроме скучных. Все кроме скучных, абсолютно. То есть главный и главный критерий - это взлетит? Грубо говоря, эту тему будут голосовать, будут обсуждать - потому что это интерактивное - или нет, не будут. Но это все. Когда речь идет о какой то совсем-совсем узкой теме. Или например, я понимаю, что очень узкая аудитория у этой проблемы. Даже если это серьезная проблема, но очень узкая аудитория проблемой размножения кроликов на камчатке заинтересуются. Ну тогда я наверное про кроликов, при всей моей любви к животным, не возьму ничего.

Speaker1:

А влияют ли как-то на передачи различные новые нормы и новые законодательные инициативы и законы, которые были приняты недавно?.

Speaker2:

Например.. если я знаю о чем ты говоришь... вот тебе небольшой пример: практически в каждом эфире все равно какие-то новости например про навалного приходят, пока еще без пяти минут экстремистской организации ФБК, но уже иностранные агенты – ФБК, Медуза. Уже ссылаясь на Медузу, это иностранный агент, Левада-центр, социологию которого мы периодически используем, тоже иностранный агент. То есть сказывается ли это на эфире? Не кардинально, конечно, но каждый раз мы вынуждены делать в эфире эти оговорки: иностранный агент, иностранный агент, иностранный агент. вот так вот.

Speaker1:

Последние передачи которые вы делали по теме например ЛГБТ, это как-то проблематично?

Speaker2: [

Нет, это не проблематично, это не проблематично, хотя здесь, конечно, я понимаю, о чем ты говоришь. Это по лезвию ходить, чтобы простое информирование не было воспринято как пропаганда. а это очень легко можно сделать при желании и загнобить отдельно взятую радиостанцию. Использовать просто то, что они взяли какую-то тему. Но я просто, Даша, не помню, чтобы у нас в городе какие то острые темы были совсем свежие связанные с ЛГБТ, интересные широкому кругу. Из последнего, что я помню, это было очень давно, когда у нас местные патриоты и казаки и прочие люди с альтернативным сознанием устроили пикет, какое-то уж плохо помню мероприятие, которое было связано с темой стигматизации в том числе ЛГБТ людей. Конечно, они устроили целый несанкционированный митинг, конечно пикет - это была тема, мы ее освещали в эфире, и у меня были на связи люди, была на связи модератор того самого мероприятия все об этом рассказывала подробно. Тем нет без проблем. Но главное, еще раз, резонанс. А уж как между строк обойти какие-то вещи за которые нас могут наказать.. Но спасибо, уже не первый год живем, уже взрослые мальчики и девочки, мы это делать умеем. Хотя опять же, бережного бог бережет. И здесь нужно быть правда очень осторожными. Захотят – прицепятся.

Speaker1:

Но последние пару вопросов буквально я.

Speaker2:

Нормально по времени укладывается все.

Speaker1:

Сколько лет вы работали в сми и почему стали журналистом?

Speaker2:

Ах ты, работала я вообще в этом сми или в целом в сми?

Speaker1:

Можно сказать и об этом, и об этом.

Speaker2:

Но нормально, это нормально.. это всего лишь 11 лет на Эхе.. Но это раз в неделю, несерьезно. А потом все уже так плотно на эфирах с 2010 го года. Слушай дальше я не знаю. Учитывая что всю жизнь работаю, то есть надо вспомнить детство золотое. Я правда не периодически когда раньше задавали этот вопрос и честно отвечала потому что я больше ничего не понимаю. Я никогда не хотела быть журналистом честно никогда-никогда. У меня даже в семье журналистов не было, и никакого такого идеального примера перед собой не было. И не было из серии - посмотрела фильм романтический переключать каналы и захотела.. вот есть такой фильм, старый, добрый, классный фильм романтический американский про журналистов. Поэтому это очень странное чувство не знать было по какому то поводу.. Такое чувство.. и нет ты этого не хочешь, не мечтаешь, но об этом знаешь что это случится. Я всегда знала, что буду журналистом, хотя мечтала в детстве стать кинорежиссером.

Speaker1:

Считаете есть какая-то определенная принадлежность?

Speaker2:

Это принципиально. это принципиально. я терпеть не могу ты знаешь, когда СИТ превращаются в секту. И на самом деле я очень горжусь тем что наша редакция Эхо Москвы. То есть нет, но понятно что у нас есть у всех какие то симпатии свои. Но это точно не секта. это когда секты имени путина или секты имени навального - это нехорошо. Мы стараемся звать обязательно, например, спикеров с разными позициями, но лишь бы уголовный кодекс, административный тоже, не нарушали. Мы стараемся освещать все мнения. Это неправда, не совсем так, что СМИ это же не живое что-то. СМИ - это люди, у каждого человека есть свои политические взгляды. Я сейчас о другом говорю. Я говорю о том, что у нас нет диктатуры взглядов, например, главного редактора СМИ – нет, такого нет. И нет «не должна об этом говорить». Вот у нас, у кого-то более радикальные либеральные взгляды, у кого-то менее. Я, например, у меня, как я это называю, жестко умеренные взгляды... жестко умеренные взгляды. Я ненавижу когда человек начинает топить за какую-то конкретную политическую силу. Хотя знаешь, если с конкретным человеком даже если я не являюсь его фанаткой, происходят несправедливые вещи, его сажают в тюрьму и его стараются убить.. пытаются точнее убить, то мои, например, симпатии... он не мой герой, например, но это не означает, что я не буду за него в эфирах заступаться. Даже если это ему самому не нужно, спасибо.

Speaker1:

И последний вопрос у меня, не забыла ли я чего-то спросить?

Speaker2: ... если вдруг какие то еще под вопросы я тебе письменно отвечаю если вдруг что то у тебя возникнет.

7.3 Interview 2

Speaker1:

Здравствуйте, Дарья. Меня слышно?

Speaker2:

Здравствуйте. да теперь да. Лично вам удобнее с видео или без можно? Мне без разницы.

Speaker1:

Видео мне в принципе без разницы, хорошо.

Speaker2:

А. знаете это интервью только будет использовано для академической работы, и оно анонимное. То есть ваше имя нигде не будет фигурировать. Я просто пишу диссертацию по поводу разных тем российских СМИ или СМИ, которые работают в России, так скажем, и по поводу их редакционной политики и соцсетей. И вот эти интервью с журналистами совершенно разных изданий, это важная часть работы. Большое спасибо, что согласились. Оно небольшое совсем, несколько блоков.

Сначала хотелось бы поговорить по поводу соцсетей в СМИ, где вы сейчас работаете. Не могли бы вы вспомнить, когда последний раз был такой случай, что вы писали новость, которая позже была опубликована вами или отделом социальных сетей в соцсетях издания. Что там была за тема? Последний раз.

Speaker1:

Вчерашний митинг

Speaker2:

Самостоятельно или вас опубликовал кто-то другой?

Speaker1: Самостоятельно, и давайте обозначим я в МБХ Медиа. Я работал что то типа с 2010 го года, и последний год я не был.

Speaker2: Да обратимся к вашему опыту. Когда в новом полностью работали в издании была тогда? Наверное, я не знаю есть ли разница между ними.

Speaker1: Тем, как работает издание, есть по разному. Есть какие то темы. Бывало, что редактор присылал и говорил - можете работать. Новость в основном либо я выбирал, потом я подписывал тексты, они ставили на сайт. Я писал по Питеру. Когда пишешь на региональную ленту, ставишь сам, когда ты находишься в регионе. В федеральную, естественно, этим занимаются редакторы.. редакторы и специальные люди у которых есть доступ к админке. Чтобы не тратить время.

Speaker2: В соцсети кто потом выкладывал?

Speaker1: Люди, у которых есть доступ к админке. То есть тот, кто сидит на ленте – он и публикует материал. Это должность нестабильная, не один человек, насколько я помню. Просто кто то дежурит на новостях. У него функция такая. Он ставит в большинстве случаев.

Speaker2: А если вернуться к темам. Вы говорите, сами можете выбирать тему, а потом согласуется с редактором - или может просто написать и отправить?

Speaker1: Знаете, когда как-то бывало что я в принципе достаточно токсичный человек в этом смысле с коллегами. И я, бывает дело так, что если я вижу какую то тему, и мне очень лениво согласовывать с редактором, чтобы он ставил вопросы, и я понимаю что я могу быстро отработать не обосновывая - пишу новость и чувствую что сработал. Сейчас понятно, что уже приходится предлагать обсуждать какие-то определенные ограничения, выслушивать чего-то что не уловил быстро, вату прислал вот. И МБХ это издание в котором вообще нет никакой цензуры. вот про что захотел.. про ток-шоу захотел писать, не знаю, про то как сложно работать в партии Единая Россия - ради бога.

Speaker2: Но вы когда-нибудь писали такие темы, вообще никогда?

Если взглянуть на список вопросов, вот насчет ваших личных социальных сетей поощряется ли вашим журналистам в издании социальные сети использовать?

Speaker1: Можете немножечко раскрыть?

Speaker2: Вопрос: например, если у вас есть твиттер или вконтакте, ставите ли вы туда свои новости, например, МБХ Медиа.. и то есть поощряется ли это.. сотрудникам распространять новости.

Speaker1: Нет, я ставлю в случае, если написал новость. Ссылки на тексты какие то большие практически всегда даю, если я доволен текстом.

Speaker2: То есть, по своему желанию можно захотеть и поставить. А есть ли какие то правила.. то есть допустим, что вы представляете это издание, вы не можете что то определенное писать? Или наоборот. Есть ли какая то редакция в вашей соцсети.

Speaker1: Вообще никакого.. но расскажу одну историю. Вмешательство может быть связано исключительно с безопасностью. Оно никогда не носит какой либо политический характер или около. Но у нас был .. когда у нас появилась как раз редакция Юг - МБХ Медиа, и в какой то день один из сотрудников с которым мы работали, был активен везде в штабе Навального, Открытой России в Краснодаре. то есть он был прямо персоной нон-грата по версии краснодарских ОВД. Утром я проснулся и мне просто анонимно прислали телеграм-следы нашей с ним переписки. В частности, было большое досье на него про то, что он педофил, наркоман, и просто плохой человек, который живет за границей. Что такое - классическая история. И там была переписка, в которой мы с ним делились опытом употребления марихуаны в разных странах. Ну и соответственно оказалось, что мы оба - западные наркоманы и есть маркировка. Вот такая история. И мы очень вам сломали инстаграм, с кем были немножко напарники по этому поводу. Поэтому и редактор написал удалить пожалуйста Сашу из друзей в Фейсбуке. Я удалилась. То есть все это как бы был единственный прецедент. Вообще все мои годы работы в СМИ в разных вот есть такая ситуация была, что нужно было обеспечить безопасность. Так больше ничего.

Speaker2: А скажите пожалуйста какие социальные сети вы предпочитаете использовать сейчас и в прошлом году?

Speaker1: Фейсбук, твиттер, инстаграм, но больше скорее.. как если в фейсбуке в твиттере я позиционировал себя журналистом, свои тексты, а в инстаграме просто обычный человек, обычный пользователь.

Speaker2: Повлияло ли замедление работы твиттера на ваше использование твиттера?

Speaker1: Да да, очень сильно бесит, честно говоря.

Speaker2: Не стали меньше использовать его?

Speaker1: Использую.. это моя любимая соцсеть, я люблю, я получаю как человек удовольствие, когда его читаю. ну конечно невозможно потому что на твиты текстовые не повлияло, но картинки практически не грузятся, тормозит ужасно.

Speaker2: Но вы все равно читаете на телефоне?

Speaker1: На телефоне и на компьютере - нет разницы, точно так же.

Speaker2: У меня просто было еще одно интервью, журналист сказал, на компьютере можно читать. может быть у всех по-разному

Speaker1: Специально все картинки тормозят, но ... худо-бедно

Speaker2: Так, я просто смотрю на что вы уже ответили раньше на несколько вопросов. А не могли бы вы мне рассказать больше о своем опыте общения в твиттере? Допустим, когда вашу новость обсуждают, вы отметитесь на эту тему?

Speaker1: Часто я читаю комментарии, везде во всех соцсетях, отвечаю. Но лукавство конечно немножко там. Пишу там например текст про то, что судят крымских татар в очередной раз, сажают на двадцать лет в тюрьму. Приходит мент и пишет: всё правильно, правильно дядя Вова делает, всё хорошо, ФСБ красавчики.. Типа пошел ты - чем читалось. Мне интересно для себя но никогда не вступаю в дискуссию.

Speaker2: А считаете ли вы, что комментарии других пользователей влияют на редакционную политику или на ваши собственные новости?.

Speaker1: Абсолютно точно нет.

Speaker2: А как вы в редакции справляетесь с темами, которые например запрещены Роскомнадзором. Скажем например тема ЛГБТ.. если возникнет тема ЛГБТ, как об этом пишете?

Speaker1 По факту.. обычная вещь. Вот у меня было за всю карьеру один раз - написал текст. В Ростове на девочек и активисток на одну нападали неизвестные люди а вторую вызывали на допрос в ФСБ. На допрос.. точнее повестки им прислали и уехали. Я писал их истории - и мы просто писали, я просто написал, просто отправил. Никакого обсуждения, никаких переживаний из-за Роскомнадзора не было. Единственное на меня ругаются когда я забываю допустим те же крымские татары им же нет ну вы знаете..

Speaker2: Туда националистическим

Speaker1: [Террористическим вменяют участие фейсбук тахрир она признана террористической организацией. Я периодически забываю написать в скобках «организация» и иногда мне говорят - опять забыл всё это. И есть моменты которые надо обсудить но это по закону мы ничего не можем. Не хочется никому навредить.

Speaker2: Получается региональные новости сами ставили на сайт, а федеральные отправляли на сайт. До того, как вы начали работать редактором, например, заголовки. Чаще всего вы предлагаете заголовки или потом вам правят их?

Speaker1: Стилистика у МБХ - составной заголовок. и здесь речь скорее идет не о том чтобы как то поменять акцент. Вот допустим заголовок. Цитата это лишь описание и иногда не нравится редактору цитата, которую я выбрал. Но она никогда ничего особо не правит. Говорю нет, нет как таковой цензуры и ни со стороны государства ни со стороны «давайте так государство критиковать».

Speaker2: К этому вопросу есть ли у вас какие то политические взгляды неважно какие, и у вашего издания, как вы считаете, есть ли политические взгляды?

Speaker1: Да, абсолютно точно есть.

Speaker2: Ну и политические взгляды не влияют на редакционную политику?

Speaker1: Я считаю что не влияют на политику с той точки зрения что выборы тем для.. Нас финансирует Михаил Ходорковский. Соответственно это не близкий друг Путина. Соответственно мы можем себе позволить писать вещи из-за того что нас не получается задушить какими то методами которыми можно задушить. То есть там например сеть 59 региональных пытаются в независимость, но у них есть контракты, есть финансирование, и когда они хотят какую то грань перейти, им сверху – нет, мы не будем этого делать. Кто может убить МБХ Медиа и сказать «нет мы не будем этого делать потому что иначе у нас будет меньше денег»? Никто не может. Михаил Борисович может.

Speaker2: [] Это прекрасно, это прекрасное сми для работы. Но у нас совсем демографическая такая информация. сколько лет вы работаете в СМИ?.

Speaker1: 7.

Speaker2: Почему вы захотели пойти работать в СМИ, помните ли вы

Speaker1: И слушайте ну такая смешная была история мне было лет 13 мне нравилось сочинение в школе. Я пришел к маме, бабушке говорю, слушайте а где учат писателей? Они говорят - так нигде. Я говорю - а кто еще пишет? Они говорят, журналисты.

Speaker2: Отлично.

Speaker1: Ничего не понимал, но тогда с профессией было ясно.

Speaker2: Но в общем то все я еще хотела спросить. Теперь когда вы знаете о чем было интервью, а есть ли на ваш взгляд какой то вопрос который я должна была бы спросить. И не спросила?

Speaker1:] Спросили я знаю что вы ведете к тому что есть ли у издания политические взгляды.

Speaker2: Нет нет я это только один из вопросов. у меня к властям действует редакционная политика в отношении соцсетей и в принципе редакционная политика

как выбирают темы заголовки. то есть это в основном об этом. политически это просто один из последних вопросов.

Speaker1: Какая тема, если не секрет.

Speaker2: Я говорю о том как государственный норматив традиционных ценностей обсуждается в твиттере, в частности, как сми его туда доносят. да и как журналисты там потом обсуждают. На данном случае - часть интервью. Она просто о том как российские сми сейчас взаимодействуют с сетями и как принимаются решения о том, на какие писать темы и как их подавать примерно. Но я не со всеми разговаривала, с государственными не стала. И хочу сказать большое спасибо.. успехов вам всяческих в работе. мне очень приятно было познакомиться. Я сошлюсь на вас в статье научной, если она выйдет, но без имен.

Speaker1: Договорились, спасибо огромное. до свидания до свидания.

7.4 Interview 3

Speaker1: В общем еще раз. Это все для диссертации, интервью будет анонимным. Ваши фамилия, имя, нигде не будет опубликованы, но вопросы в общем-то не такие. Обычное оно достаточно открытое. То есть вы можете отвечать как хотите и можете на какие то другие вопросы подумать, которые я не задала на которые можно было бы ответить. Или если вы что то не знаете. Смотрите я буду цитировать, но анонимно. Я сто процентов не подведу вас. Да хорошо. Но и это такая академическая работа, она будет на английском. Не знаю, будет ли она опубликована. Ну в смысле она будет опубликована в виде диссертации точно на сайте в Каталонии, но в другом виде не уверена. Но если будет, я вам пришлю ссылки, вы все сможете посмотреть сначала.

Могли бы мы поговорить об опыте написания конкретной новости и её связи с изданием, где вы работаете. Не могли бы рассказать, помните ли вы одну из последних ситуаций, когда вы писали новость которая позже была опубликована вами или отдельным человеком в социальных сетях издания. Какая была тема, почему то публиковалась в соцсетях.

Скажите, формулировки для текста или заголовков новостей или вы выбираете сами обычно или вам дает их редактор или вы совместно решаете. Какая практика в данном случае?

Speaker2: Прочитать заголовки Медузы и идти дальше это его право если ему для его картины дня достаточно. Если он прочитает в соцсетях и только там о кей. Если он наш подписчик, то конечно вдвойне. Если он выйдет из инстаграм читать новости на основной ресурс - не проблема.

Заголовок вообще у нас как отдельный продукт делается. То есть мы должны рассказать небольшую историю. Конечно всегда хорошо, если заголовок не шутка. Чтобы не ошибиться с терминологией, есть второе... ты господи, вторая часть, то есть тезис. и наоборот наверное. То есть тезис: Путин обратился с посланием к федеральному собранию - первая часть заголовка должна быть. Второе - он сказал про....: Он снова сказал про Шер Хана, например. Или: он выплатит деньги семьям школьников.

Speaker1: То есть.. я не поняла

Speaker2: Что конкретно эта новость. Конечно, проще сделано, просто написано, главное по новой. Хотя нет, структура соблюдена: Путин объявил о новых выплатах на детей. Родители всех школьников получают по 10 тысяч рублей. Это не обязательно тут

изголяться, особенно в случае с новостями - фактура сама себе подает. Интересно: он пообещал кому чего заплатят.

Speaker1: Я правильно вас поняла что вы сами предлагаете и придумываете заголовки, и редактор может их принять или не принять.

Speaker2: В случае с новостями будет скорее всего следующим образом, то есть это чаще всего происходит так: редактор новости, человек который пишет новость, он называется редактор, он ее напишет и опубликует. А если есть вопросы к ней, любой человек в редакции, но скорее всего это будет начальник новостного отдела, заместитель главного редактора Дмитрий Данилов, он скажет: что то я не понимаю. Но это может сказать о нем. У нас есть рабочие сроки, вы знаете.

Speaker1: Есть

Speaker2: Корпоративный ящик.. там есть канал который, в котором по любой публикации медузы любой человек может туда прийти и сказать я не понял, или - мне кажется что этот заголовок не работает. Может быть мы изменим и это самый важный канал где мы получаем.. собственно. У нас есть там каналы мы читаем практически все, что нам пишут читатели если они не поняли они считают что заголовок их обманывает. а в нашей редакции если не считать рубрику «Шапито».

Speaker1: Читаете ли вы комментарии читателей в твиттере например, и обращайте либо на них внимание каким то образом

Speaker2: Мы обращаем внимание. Как правило, там бывают придирки к форме. «Я не понял или вы меня обманываете, или вы ошиблись». Мы читаем, если человек нас постит.. то мы скорее увидим. Если он у себя на странице разместил ссылку, мы это увидим в последнюю очередь. Если мы находим, это предмет внутреннего обсуждения. В том же канале он называется «чуть выходящее», мы обсуждаем. То есть слушайте, ну вот есть такая претензия, она например, совершенно не обоснованная. Претензии не к заголовку, а пару недель назад вышел второй выпуск «Радио Долин шоу», когда была премьера недели две назад. Один из пользователей фейсбука написал: Радио Долин звучит как Радио Таллин и попробуйте придумать претензию к этому. Это же как радио холмов.. Радио Тысячи Холмов. Геноцид в Руанде начался с того что по радио объявили «тысячи холмов давайте резать этих тараканов хуту и тутси». Но это бред. Это очень выдуманная, очень надуманная претензия. Но такое.. я

не стал покидать канал серьезного обсуждения. Я сказал серьезный канал. Слово сказал коллега никак нельзя.

Speaker1: Давайте теперь поговорим немножко о редакционной политике. Во всех изданиях есть редакционная политика, зарубежных, российских – неважно.

Speaker2: У меня ухудшилось качество звука. Во всех изданиях есть

Speaker1: Редакционная политика.. редакционная политика в вашем издании что предполагает? Есть ли какие-то темы, которые вы не берете? Есть ли какие-то... какой-то язык, которым вы не пишете вот так вот? Приходите в Медузу. вас как-то посвящают в редакционную политику? Говорят: ты будешь писать новости, но мы не пишем такое, такое, такое?

Speaker2: Прямо цензуры, стоп листов - нет категорически.

Speaker1: Я не об этом, нет не о стоп листах ведь.

Speaker2: Есть некоторые тренды, которые мы обсуждаем. Например, мы знаем, что лучше всего у нас заходят новости со словом «умер». То есть, анализируя статистику, мы понимаем, что новости с заголовком «умер» - это лидеры прочтения, но это естественно, если кто то умер. При этом, многие хотят прочитать, это важная новость. Умер актер такой-то, здесь и знаменитость, и важное событие. И здесь сходимся все мы, в общем. Умер принц Филипп - я уверен, что это один из лидеров месяца материал, но это объективно. Надо ли нам в таком случае механически писать в заголовках что кто то умер? Надо ли нам сообщать о людях, которые могут быть не очень известными, что ли? Даже если это важные фигуры на региональном уровне. Это, например, ректор, в городе, где я учился и жил, но мы не взяли, потому что читателю во Владивостоке это уже не понять. В Лиссабоне, в Перми. Это важно, конечно, но просто потому что кому что. Оптика у нас примерно такая по темам. И если попытаться сформулировать редакционную политику - это важные новости, которые затрагивают, которые будут интересны людям, которые говорят читают по-русски, где бы они ни жили. То есть такое издание общего интереса, и мы на это ориентируемся. Несколько искусственно может быть внимание к зарубежной повестке. Народ отечественный, читатель явно не так интересуется повесткой зарубежной. Но во первых, нам кажется принципиальным писать, потому что такова позиция редакции, такова редакционная оптика. Мы считаем, что это тоже важно. Человек может не интересоваться, живя в том же Владивостоке или Барнауле, что произошло на выборах в Германии. Вот появился,

например, преемник Меркель на партийном посту. Скорее всего, будет канцлером. Это важно. То есть мы не будем собой если мы про это не скажем. Мы видим по цифрам, что произнесенные одиозным успехом как внутренние мы будем брать

Speaker1: Следующий вопрос на какие то темы которые ограничивают Роскомнадзор в России например тема LGBT. У вас есть какие то моменты, которые вы предпочли бы не писать из за таких ограничений, или нет. Или вы просто соблюдайте какие то законодательные ограничения.

Speaker2: Правильнее говорить о LGBT плюс.

Speaker1Россия пока еще.

Speaker2: Это все по многим параметрам проблемная тема, проблемная в ремесленном смысле. Во первых, конечно, Роскомнадзор и прочие регулирующие органы. Никто не хочет быть заблокированными в какой-то стране, потому что это наши читатели. это в общем и мы финансируем чем живем, мы сами зарабатываем. Если у нас резко упадет аудитория, не будет такого, что не знаю, какой-то грант, или меценат скажет вот вам мешок денег, продолжайте делать что делаете. И неважно что вас читают не миллион, а например сто тысяч тех, кто поставил себе. В России это приходится брать в расчет, к сожалению. По возможности Медуза старается расширять пространство возможного или максимально сопротивляться по ограничению ЛГБТ плюс. Но мне кажется, что более показательным примером является отношение к экстремистским и террористическим организациям, а также к иностранным агентам. Медуза одной из первых перестала писать про ИГИЛ «запрещенная организация», ссылаясь на нормы российского законодательства. Это не обязательно делать, оговорку перестали делать. Сейчас мы вынуждены при любом упоминании ФБК, даже если это дважды стоит в предложении, всякий раз оговаривать, что организация признана в России иностранным агентом. По требованиям законодательства мы должны указывать всем в скобках. Пишем, это на нас влияет. Это относится и к другим проблемным темам. Мы стараемся например в таком случае без потери смысла исполнять формальные требования. Мы реже стали писать ФБК, чаще стали писать штабы Навального, потому что мы в заголовке, ну ты умрешь, не может быть в заголовке написано «признан иностранным агентом в российской федерации по требованию властей». Поэтому мы вынуждены писать «сторонники навального». Приходится подстраиваться таким образом. ЛГБТ конкретно, да, мы думаем про пропаганду. Есть несколько проблемных тем, это, конечно, экстремизм, терроризм, иностранные агенты, где мы особенно внимательно следим за формулировками.

Speaker2: Это территориальная целостность. При этом, с другой стороны, приоритет. Обратите внимание на карты, которые опубликованы Медузой, многие из них. Там не видно чей Крым. Потому что мы либо попадаем на проблемы с Украиной, либо с Россией. Внутренне другой, нам не надо. Мы СМИ, мы не активисты, мы не утверждаем чей Крым, мы не используем слов типа аннексия, потому что оно носит политический окрас. Но мы при этом говорим присоединение, спецоперация. Мы можем, если это оправдано материалом и точкой зрения автора или говорящего, мы можем сказать что это была военная операция и прочее, прочее. Но мы не действуем в духе украинских пропагандистов. Не говорим «аннексия», при этом мы не говорим «воссоединение, присоединение, поглощение». При этом конечно людей, которые.. если цитата, я возьму у вас интервью, вы скажете, то естественно я не буду править. Ваша реплика. Другая проблемная тема - как раз ЛГБТ и права женщин. Потому что.. всякие суициды не берем. Тоже понятно формулировки самоубийства это просто исходя из формулировки способы.. Ты попадаешь на наркотики.. на наркотики - проблемная тема. Я на той неделе имел опыт когда мы с юристами и с редактором обсуждали с главным, и я был вынужден изъять куски текста, потому что они могут трактоваться как способ распространения и изготовления. Мы были вынуждены.. за каждое упоминание портала «Гидра», где продают марки, где продают наркотики главного российского интернет-торговца наркотиками, потому что это тоже сейчас правоприменительная практика, это рассматривается как сообщение о способе распространения. И мы вынуждены были ЛГБТ и женщин темы.. повестка, это тоже проблемные вещи.

Speaker2: Во первых, мы следим за языком и мы стараемся не использовать слова - но собственно мы их и не используем - которые не являются корректными. Мы понимаем что многих людей это задевает, немногих – это принципиально. И мы их не можем себе позволить использовать, то есть мы не можем себе позволить сказать «негр», мы будем говорить чернокожие или черные. мы не можем сказать «гей». Мы говорим – «гомосексуалист» или «человек с гомосексуальностью». Мы не говорим «инвалид», мы говорим «человек с инвалидностью», и так далее. Но есть медицинские темы..тоже является чувствительной темой. Мы тоже учитываем ЛГБТ, и я повторю рискнул бы объединить с жесткой повесткой, является то что чувствительной темой многие наши или не наши герои, герои о которых мы пишем, не защищены они могут быть подвергнуты настоящим репрессиям. Это с одной стороны. Ну и понятно, есть вот эти все ограничительные законы, которые могут ударить по нам в связи с пропагандой. Это не значит, что мы не будем правильно писать. Это не значит, что мы не скажем про проблему, если будет как в случае.. недавний случай с наркотиками. Если мы понимаем, что это важная тема, интересный материал, зачем делать не интересно даже на важную тему. Но мы можем, это несет риски, перевес будет всегда в сторону публикации. То есть мы постараемся минимизировать риски. Мы не хотим получить блокировку, предписание или еще что-то. Но мы не можем не сказать - зачем иначе заниматься журналистикой. Правда, я работаю два года, это лучшее место работы.

Speaker2: Простите чисто ЛГБТ и женской повесткой. С другой стороны тоже может прилететь, конечно. Потому что Медуза те самые. У них редактор, захват, а они в твиттере... опять весь русский твиттер поднимается до этой мрази. «Да они женщин не уважают, да не проникся, сделали этот материал». ...то, другое, и поливают, ну прямо вот таким потоком. Это не ее слова, это не здорово. Мы пытаемся этим... пытаемся понять логику этих людей, потому что часто они в уязвимой позиции. Но про цензуру активистов тоже не надо забывать, и не надо поддаваться активистам. Надо оставаться журналистом. Мы стараемся тоже это учитывать

Speaker1: При этом про какие-то движения говорите?

Speaker2: ЛГБТ просто в меньшей степени, но это тоже есть там. Там тоже есть претензии, со стороны сообщества бывают. Поэтому то есть это такой коллективный твиттер, он конечно бывает очень безжалостным и нетерпимым, очень критично оценивает работу многих СМИ, включая, особенно обращая внимание, на независимые издания, потому что это справедливо. С другой стороны с нас просто больше спрос.

Speaker1: Поощряется редакции использование журналистами личных социальных сетей. и есть ли какие то ограничения или наоборот советы как их использовать?

Speaker2: Использование личных чего?

Speaker1: Соцсетей - твиттер аккаунт, постить на фейсбук

Speaker2: Есть в нашем с вами разговоре и личные высказывания. У нас есть внутренние правила, что надо учитывать главного редактора. То есть могу, но хорошо бы чтобы главный редактор знал ну или кто-то из заместителей. Могу ли я писать все что угодно в социальных сетях? Могу. Есть ли у нас правило о том что? Есть. Это даже не правила, это такой постулат внутренний, что не забывайте, хотя это личные соцсети, на самом деле никаких личных соцсетей не существует, это воспринимается как позиция издания. Если я напишу у себя через фейсбук про то что нужно сжечь всех геев, это как Киселев, то это будет воспринято как: журналист, он считает что нужно жечь сердца геев. Ты не можешь отделить одно от другого, это так не работает нигде и особенно это не работает в Медузе. Если ты говоришь, что Холокоста не было, или шучу про первый тост за Холокост, что там сейчас поминают Навальному западные СМИ.. хотя сейчас уже не никто. Но это будет однозначно ударом по изданию. И есть просьба -

хорошо думать, прежде чем, прежде чем что-то написать, и помнить что ты являешься спецкором родного издания, хочешь не хочешь, а я прошу. Я просил, точнее, спецкора, когда он работал, не публиковать фотографии куда специальный корреспондент едет, если он едет в командировку. Это просто не надо спешить. «Я поехал в Архангельск и с кем-то поговорил». Ну а зачем ты это пишешь, лучше вернись домой, напиши репортаж. И последнее, если тебе показалось мало, еще и расскажи. Всем.. никому не было за то, что они публиковали то что нельзя. Многие, многие это все равно делали, и ничего с ними не происходило. Ну вот некоторый такой запрет, но не запрет. Норма про то, что вы не можете потом говорить, что это мое личное мнение, оно не совпадает с мнением редакции. Нет извините, это не будет работать, все знают что предупреждения заранее не было.

Speaker1: То есть это такая журналистская культура. то есть нигде не прописано правильно или...?

Speaker2: Нет, это возможно даже прописано, в каком -то году или в каком-то из наших внутренних документов. Может в чем-то таком и написано, вполне допускаю, просто санкции.. То есть если я напишу, никто не скажет, что у нас в этой норме записано что конкретно за то что написал пакости, нанес урон изданию, нет. Но это норма

Speaker1: Понятно. а у вас есть твиттер?

Speaker2: У меня есть, но я не заходил много лет, он слишком быстро обновляется.

Speaker1: А какими соцсетями пользуетесь для работы или для себя. чтобы по работе коллективно.

Speaker2: Для работы у нас есть специальные люди и специальные технологии.

Speaker1: Если я скажу

Speaker2: Что

Speaker1: екоторые читают телеграммы для работы некоторые читают твиттер для работы. я вот это имела в виду скорее. и да и стало быть на митингах..

Speaker2: Журналистов для работы.. если не скажу что мой коллега. Ну во первых, как определить, что оправдываться. Во вторых, но это так и есть, если тебя что то наталкивает на мысль, когда ты читаешь даже работаешь, работаешь. У меня есть телега, я ничего не пишу, нет канала. Читаю фейсбук, смотрю телеграм, прости господи. В твиттер я почти не захожу. Вконтакте были раньше сообщества какие то хорошие, но сейчас уже смысла кажется нет.

Speaker1: А значит нет потребности в соцсетях, в высказываниях?

Speaker2: Я перестал, понимаешь, я активно пишу. Когда делать мне нечего, то есть если заняться нечем, у меня механизм высказывания какого-то, и так каждый день, включая есть, у меня эта потребность закрывается на работе. Прекрасная профессия - тем прекрасна, что мы внутреннюю чистку, связанную с этим поведение с повышенной презентацией, за деньги работодатель реализует. У меня не чешется, раньше какие то дурацкие шутки писал, сейчас окончательно пропало желание, но по работе я конечно использую когда я захожу. Публикуем материалы Медузы. Если писать, проектировать еще что то, после производства основного тела текста там идут прямо вот.. есть два поля. На самом деле надо три заполнить по большому счету, и осознано не заполнить третий. В случае с новостями это автоматически все происходит там уходят материалы с заголовком он уже продает - и все. Если это материал чуть сложнее и чуть-чуть больше времени на его производство, любой редактор должен увидеть автора, заставить сделать сайт сам. Например если написана статья, следующее поле нижнее, и опять же правило какого то порядочного поведения с коллегами. Несмотря на то, что есть отдел соцсетей, сам должен написать подборку в твиттер и фейсбук. Я сейчас описанием для сегодняшнего показа.. первым делом, я на самом деле прежде чем сделать само описание, отредактировать, если не писал я, делаю твиттер фейсбук. Мне кажется, что это в большей большей степени витрина с главной страницы через сайт.

Speaker2: у нас заходов, наверное конечно больше, но это не единственная точка входа. Твой материал, ты можешь заходить через соцсети. Это тоже важная штука к этому нельзя относиться наплевательски. Там пишешь подборку для твиттера, подробную и не очень, хоть и с моих постов этих имидж. Если это оправдано в моде, и в фейсбук пишешь. Если ты не трудился еще, или считаешь необязательно так делать, ты можешь на этом закончить, а если считаешь, что материал требует какого то еще особо, особой продажи, что называется продать-читать в твиттере, в телеграм конечно пишешь подводку. Она может быть более подробной, она конечно более интимная, потому что в телеграме ты читаешь ленту, не переходя по ссылкам, у тебя меньше желания переключаться, и история должна то о чем мы говорили, рассказано. И тут если ты все сделал хорошо, то читатель и оценит твою честность, и оценит твое трудолюбие, пойдет, прочитает и послушает. Но ты не можешь экономить говорить о простом. Что все таки сказал. Раздали детям, допустим, всех школьников матерей. Нет,

так нельзя. Ты должен конечно помнить послание, не скучно, хотя в том году он задал нам жару, а в этом году он немножко сходил с ума по поводу мультика Маугли но еще пообещал что все...

Speaker1: Должен сказать что последние несколько демографических вопросов.

Speaker2: Если вам просто интересно, очень классная, классная система которой автоматизирована отправка в соцсети, то есть это отдельный программный продукт, это делается не руками туда.

Speaker1: Писать все равно нужно руками правильно подводки.

Speaker2: [Руками пишешь подводки а они потом встают в такую очередь из фейсбука твиттера вконтакте. Ничего ты можешь очередность менять. ты можешь задавать.. поскольку соцсети если ты и не периодически и мы не знаем. Но если ты очень часто, то алгоритмы подписки - у нас есть возможность выставлять время и на ночь, и в выходные и соцсети не умирают. Уходят материалы какие то новые, с новыми подводками даже ночью. То есть встав в 7 утра мы вам все равно - что то как то у нас не знаете, тема подписки, отлично работает, наоборот работает.

Speaker1: Немножко личный более менее характер, сколько лет примерно вы работаете в СМИ?

Speaker2: Если считать студенческую газету, Пермский университет чисто с 2002 года, стало быть 19 лет, серьезный стаж.

Speaker1: А почему вы решили, если вы помните, пойти в СМИ?

Speaker2: Конечно на истфаке учился. У меня было два пути - либо науку делать, либо учителя. Учителя мне вообще ничего. В журналистике начали платить в начале двухтысячных, особенно в деловой конкретной сфере была пара изданий, где нормальных путей я обходил весело и вообще прикольно. Тексты пишешь не актуален. Здорово. Обожаю журналистику. Не надоедает

Speaker1: Да. а как вы считаете есть ли у вас какие то личные политические взгляды, неважно какие.

Speaker2: Конечно, есть личные политические взгляды, и есть возможность даже их высказывать, если это уместно. Массовое убийство не надо показывать, это как в семейной жизни - ребенок может знать, что папа с мамой любят друг друга, а рассказывать не обязательно с подробностями физиологическими.

Speaker1: У вашего издания тоже есть политические взгляды на важные вопросы?

Speaker2: Я надеюсь, что нет. То есть меня.. меня смущает, когда я вижу признаки или повышенных симпатий. И мы стараемся чтобы не было хотя возможно так кажется, что в нашей стране предмет спора - надо ли человеку предоставить врача, когда это написано в российских законах, что может он имеет на это право, в том числе своего личного, несмотря на то что он сидит в тюрьме. Является видом политического вопроса? Является ли человек, который высказывается за то что надо предоставить, становится ли его точка зрения политической? Является ли это политическим вопросом? По существу, мне кажется что не является. Жрать людей, не давать ему помощь, даже если даже если он.. например он симулирует и не голодает.. на кухню мясо из борща еще раз то это не означает что он не лишен этого права. В общем надеюсь, что нет. надеюсь что мы.. журналистика не предполагает, в смысле чужой журналистики, она предполагает высказывания для публицистики, новости.

Speaker1: Последний раз когда вы знаете о чем это интервью, если ли что-то, что то я забыла спросить? Я забыла спросить, какой вопрос вы задали мне например, если бы я была корреспондентом медузы. необязательно если у вас?

Speaker2: Часто нас упрекают с разных сторон в ангажированности, мне кажется, медуза либеральное издание или наоборот? люди изнутри, либералы могут говорить про то что мы работаем. Я честно говоря запутался на кого конкретно мы работаем. Чего хотелось видеть конечно. поступление на карту в таком случае от Собянина, от ФСБ в случае с делом Сети и прочее, прочее, но это конечно частая претензия. Я могу сказать, что мне доставляет изощренное удовольствие, то есть я чувствую, что я хорошо сделал свою работу, когда у нас выходит материал который протыкает чем то острым стенки пузыря, в том числе и моего личного и прорывается, позволяет сказать, что боль а чего это они так делают. Они же вроде либералы, например. Или наоборот они же продались, почему они так сделали. Я чувствую, что это правильное решение, что ты должен делать работу, ориентируясь на читателей и слушателей, а не на обстоятельства политического какого-то личного свойства. Но я знаю, что по цифрам

это не факт. Я знаю, что еще до выхода я знал что не взорвет.. но про Крылова вы знаете. Константин Крылов в том году умер, Константин Анатольевич Крылов, он автор не самых популярных фантастических книг. Еще он лидер русского национализма, интеллектуальный лидер. Он, может быть, один из самых европейских русских националистов был. Мне казалось важным про него рассказать. Это не супер известный.. это как раз тот случай когда я скинул на канал новость.

Speaker2: умер Крылов, у нас ничего не выходит на сайт и мне пришлось снова в канал новостей сказать: слушайте, это очень важный чувак, надо про него делать новости. Чего то они со скрипом опубликовали а потом мы выпустили.. Меня больше область сделали, там средние были цифры. Но мне кажется, что есть и такая точка зрения. Когда говоришь про русский национализм, вспоминаю Анну Валентиновну Кириллову из Екатеринбурга. Я помню, как приходила в Екатеринбурге на интервью ко мне.. и что то этому националистов не помню... это как то в контексте она говорит ну я типа знать не хочу таких людей. Я искренне удивился, ну слушайте, вы же понимаете, что нацизм и национализм - это разные вещи. Почему в России есть коммунистическая партия, наследники людей которые лишали наших с вами соотечественников. Они могут быть националистами, но возможно и полезны. Я проголосовал бы за политика, который сказал бы давайте дадим деньги ... почему то и почему. просто потому что нет . Я русский человек и думаю что русский .. должен получить я имею в виду на Украине. Да, возможно, мне бы не трогал. И многие националисты нацисты например. Хотя поэтому.. когда у нас коммунист, националист, священник он.. я понимаю что это правильно. Придут другие люди они же вроде либералы.. делают. Интересно подсчитывать, возможно они не безнадежны. Это был не вопрос, извините..

Speaker1: Это не

Speaker2: Вопрос

Speaker1Мнения должны публиковаться разные точки зрения. согласен.

Speaker2: Но собственно это и делается, партийными.

Speaker1: Спасибо вам огромное, не за что, приятно с вами поговорить.

7.5 Interview 4

Speaker1:

Здравствуйте.

Speaker2: [

Здравствуйте. Доброе утро. Я записываю интервью, только потому что мне будет потом нужно для диссертации. Ссылку на публикацию я вам пришлю посмотреть. На самом деле интервью небольшое, немного вопросов по поводу редакционной политики, в основном касаясь социальных сетей.

Не могли бы вы рассказать мне, пожалуйста, помните ли вы последнюю ситуацию, когда ваша новость была опубликована в соцсетях в вашей редакции?

Speaker1:

Именно моя?

Speaker2: Конкретно.

Speaker1: Ну, это было вчера или позавчера, наверное. Такое происходит практически каждый день. Находится одна новость, которую публикуют. Или новости.

Speaker2: Какова обычная практика вашей редакции, для статей на определенные темы, одни и те же или разные журналисты пишут?

Speaker1: Разное пишут журналисты разные.

Speaker2: Формулировки для текста заголовков вы выбираете сами?

Speaker1: Редакторы выбирают. Сами корреспонденты, журналисты - они сдают материалы редактору, и редактор уже решает оставить так как журналист, как корреспондент написал, или что то переписать, подправить.

Speaker2: А в соцсетях вам оставляют те же заголовки или же убирают вместе?

Speaker1: В соцсетях бывает по-разному. Бывает, если видно снимок новости, то там остается тот же заголовок, который придумал редактор, журналист. Иногда бывает, что новость публикуется без пикча с какой-нибудь там фотографией или видео, и тогда полностью журналист уже решает, какой будет заголовок.

Speaker2: Поощряется ли в вашей СМИ использование личных социальных сетей?

Speaker1: У нас нет никаких ограничений и никаких там принуждений, грубо говоря, тоже нет. Мы не работаем в такой обстановке, что вся редакция должна опубликовать какую-то статью в своих личных социальных сетях.

Speaker2: А какие соцсети предпочитаете использовать?

Speaker1: Лично или в редакции?

Speaker2: Лично и в редакции. И то и другое.

Speaker1: Я пользуюсь всем понемногу. Для каких-то личных целей и как бы для друзей - Телеграм и Твиттер, для так скажем каких-то общественно- политических заявлений на широкую аудиторию - это в основном Фейсбук. Редакция сосредоточена сейчас у нас на эту большую тройку - Фейсбук, Вконтакте, Твиттер. Плюс у нас есть страница в Одноклассниках, которая живет своей жизнью вообще для нас. Еще мы пытаемся немножко в других направлениях развивать Инстаграм и Тик-ток, но это требует отдельного внимания, поэтому в зачаточном состоянии.

Speaker2: Немножко поговорим о правилах редакционной политики. Если ли в вашей СМИ редакционная политика касательно новостей и соцсетей, и есть ли какие-то определенные темы о которых вы не можете писать в соответствии с этим правилом?

Speaker1: Ну наше главное правило, что мы стараемся избегать желтых новостей. В общем, таких совсем супер-супер популярных. А так я бы не сказала, что есть прямо какие-то жесткие ограничения. Есть новости, которые мы знаем, что интересно как нам, так и нашим читателям. поэтому мы, конечно, сосредотачиваемся на них. Но бывает что

журналисты увлекаются какой то темой, не знаю, сериалами или видео играми, или еще чем-то, и совершенно не возбраняется, если он раз в месяц выбирает какое-то время и напишет, например, об этом. Нет, ну я бы не сказал, что есть какие то ограничения. Я с ними лично не сталкивался.

Speaker2: А кто из следующих вариантов (но чаще всего) определяет на совещании написание новостей, если применимо? Первый вариант: решения принимает сам журналист, то есть темы на сегодня, планы. Второй вариант: решения принимает редактор.

Speaker1: Так как я редактор, я принимаю решение.

Speaker2: Ну хорошо, у вас есть главный редактор.

Speaker1:] Но я просто редактор по Свердловской области. Что касается Свердловской области, я решаю сам.

Speaker2: А если это федеральная тема?

Speaker1: Федеральные СМИ там немножко сложнее ситуация. Там есть редактор федерального отдела, который сидит на ленте новостей, ситуативно он принимает решение, но по утрам есть планерка редакции, где уже выступает шеф-редактор, и там уже он определяет, какие темы большие на день есть, на чем стоит сосредоточиться.

Speaker2: Вот например, у меня диссертация напроць состоит из твиттера. Кстати про твиттер, обсуждаете ли вы свои новости или новости в твиттере со своими коллегами?

Speaker1: Нет, у нас есть твиттер, он довольно активный, его ведет полностью СММ менеджер. И вроде он у нас новый. И по-моему.. я точно не знаю. он начал общаться с читателями или нет. Просто у нас это на самом деле такая дилемма: стоит ли где-то общаться, отвечать на какие-то комментарии? Но до последнего времени мы этого не делали. Он хотел что-то начать, я не знаю начал или нет.

Speaker2: А вы читаете твиты, связанные с вашими новостями, которые там опубликовали?

Speaker1: Обсуждения, ну периодически да. Ну так как в Свердловской области не сильно большая какая-то тусовка в твиттере, то в меньшей степени конечно чем на фейсбуке. Но я до сих пор пользуюсь твиттером как раз во многом. то есть я подписана на все издания, всякие разные просматриваю. Наверное, так.

Speaker2: Кстати повлияло ли на вашу работу с твиттером ограничение скорости?

Speaker1: С компьютера нет, наверное. У меня в телефоне – да, это прямо очень сильно заметно, что на телефоне стал медленнее работать твиттер

Speaker2: Не стали меньше пользоваться?

Speaker1: Ну пока нет.

Speaker2: Считаете ли вы, что комментарии других пользователей твиттера, или в других социальных сетях влияют на какие то редакционные решения или на ваши собственные новости?

Speaker1: Новости нет, а влияют именно на редакционные решения по публикации той или иной новости в твиттере, потому что там же есть такая штука -как правильно называется?- Реакция, то есть количество лайков и комментариев. Это все влияет на показатели, поэтому отталкиваются от этого, когда выбирают темы для твиттера.

Speaker2: Последняя информация такая.. демографическая. Лет вы сколько проработали в СМИ?

Speaker1: В целом в СМИ - 9.

Speaker2: Вы работали в нескольких сми или только в одном? Почему вы решили пойти работать в СМИ?

Speaker1: Тогда мне нравилось просто писать, тогда и политика была интересная, и да и это сошлось что я попала в СМИ.

Speaker2: [Есть ли у вас какие то определенные политические взгляды? Какие, можно не говорить, просто да или нет.

Speaker1: Ну да, допустим

Speaker2: У вашего средства массовой информации есть ли определенные политические взгляды?

Speaker1: Я бы сказала, да.

Speaker2: Теперь вы знаете, о чем было интервью. Если что-нибудь такое, что я должна была спросить?

Speaker1: Думаю нет.. я не знаю. Наверное, вам виднее.

Speaker2: Большое вам спасибо.

7.6 Interview 5

Speaker1: Добрый вечер.

Speaker2: Здравствуйте. буду спрашивать об опыте работы именно в рбк редакции.

Speaker1: Просто я сразу хочу предупредить что мы же

Speaker2: Да я знаю но это неважно. значит тема приблизительно отношения редакции соцсетям и вообще редакционная политика в отношении. какие новости ставятся в соцсети и как выбираются заголовки темы и так далее. или не хотите отвечать можно переходить к следующему вопросу. можете сами просто предложить что то о чем

Speaker1: Лучше было бы просто хочу сказать что соцсети рбк что таковые не везде

Speaker2: Местные не ставите. и давайте по соцсетям может просто раскопать редакция.

Speaker1: Спасибо.

Speaker2: Не могли бы вы мне рассказать пожалуйста помните ли вы ситуацию когда писали новость которая позже была опубликована в соцсетях. как это произошло. просто вашими словами вот эта новость о чем была.

Speaker1: Но фактически. скажем так в соцсети идут практически все тексты и

Speaker2: Или всех

Speaker1: Тех журналистов. то есть где то в соцсети идет. я бы сказал половина как минимум всех публикаций. и такие срочные новости типа чп отставок и назначений все крупные.

Speaker2: Обычная практика в нашей новостной организации. далее вы пишете статьи на определенные темы. или пишут разные журналисты. ну как бы на разные темы просто в определенный момент они там выбирают что нибудь что писать на сегодня.

Speaker1: У нас есть несколько узко специализированных журналистов там например недвижимость. а кто там например я предпочитаю бизнес. оно бывает шумно там по настроению и социалку и отдых и прочее. то есть жестко закрепленных требований что один пишет второй пишет другое.

Speaker2: А как вы выбираете формулировки для текста или заголовков. то есть это действительно ваше решение либо каким то образом обсуждаете с коллегами или с редактором.

Speaker1: Заголовки для текстов все согласовываются с редактором но политика такая что заголовок предлагает журналист и редактор его отвергает.

Speaker2: Понятно. так как социальные сети используются в вашей редакционной практике то есть например поощряется ли в ваших сми использование социальных сетей личных например тоже. то есть я так понимаю что редакция сама использует многие социальные сети. наверное это все ваши личные сети обязаны использовать например чтобы принести пользу вашей редакции в отношении сми или что то сделать ставите ли вы свои тексты туда.

Speaker1: Да есть любые области приветствуются всегда но сериалы например типа журналистов по поводу фотографа на митинге навалыного иногда просят дайте это по своим соцсетям по. это бывает нечасто но происходит

Speaker2: Какая например тема обращения журналистов а задержание журналистов

Speaker1: Обращение к мвд. когда нас задерживали фотографа

Speaker2: А какие сети вам рекомендует использовать обычно в редакции или нет такого.

Speaker1: Нет такого что практически все лучше.

Speaker2: Предпочитаю меня следующий вопрос только какие из этих предпочитает а что бы вы сказали больше публикуется в ваших социальных сетях. это ссылки на ваши сми и ваше собственное мнение о событиях или что то более лично.

Speaker1: Но я бы сказал так и публикации наши.

Speaker2: А теперь немножко про редакционную политику поговорим. когда например дело доходит до написания или комментирования новости в соцсетях или написания для редакции. можно ли сказать что вы совместно обсуждаете их с редактором и коллегами или просто пишете сами.

Speaker1: Именно по публикации в соцсетях.

Speaker2: Ну и как бы первая часть публикации в сми вторая по публикации в соцсетях.

Speaker1: Но у нас каждый день проходят планера где мы обсуждаем кто что будет делать и есть лента которая просто текучка говорит редактор. обычно что касается публикаций в соцсетях у нас нет ограничений по выходным и праздникам тем более журналисты сами публикуют свои новости не согласовывали подборки но очень небольшим исключением буквально была пару раз когда директор главный редактор и директор просил ну скажем так сильно не критиковать то или иное событие.

Speaker2: А мы сейчас говорим рбк именно части могли бы сказать что есть темы которые вы не можете отмечать соответственно редакционной политикой рбк.

Speaker1: Ни разу с таким не сталкивалась.

Speaker2: То есть любые темы которые вы предлагаете на ленту рбк местного принимая.

Speaker1: Да не было такого чтобы нас просили снять публикацию. но в основном в отличие от других редакций рбк по регионам у нас исключительно особые темы. то есть мы не берем социалку

Speaker2: Популярная тема вы не предлагаете рбк.

Speaker1: Политика очень редко какие то крупные отставки и назначения социалку происшествия это ничего не пишет только бизнес.

Speaker2: А почему. так это редакционная политика как то исторически мы должны освещать только бизнес тему правильно.

Speaker1: Редакционная политика нашей редакции не касается никогда не касается.

Speaker2: о есть это не они вам устанавливали там внутри редакции. внутри редакции решили.

Speaker1: Там даже иногда говорят сверху что мы сильно отличаемся в этом плане от редакции.

Speaker2: Что из следующего лучше всего описывает ваше решение о написании статьи в нашей новой вашей новостной организации. если временно а решение принимаю сам решение принимает мой редактор.

Speaker1: Но скорее редактор

Speaker2: Тогда еще три варианта решения принимает мой редактор. я поддерживаю это решение. это первый вариант. решение принимает мой редактор я к этому решению отношусь нейтрально. и третье решение принимает мой редактор. я против этого решения иногда первую. то есть чаще поддерживаю. ну невозможно же всегда. ну а теперь у вас есть твиттер. твиттер им пользуетесь. у меня просто работа больше твиттера.

Speaker1: Я пользовалась как активный читатель но не как писатель а. сейчас я не могу потому что он жутко тормозит.

Speaker2: Согласна потому что расти точно. недавно случилось.

Speaker1: То есть когда пару недель назад

Speaker2: Но до этого до этого

Speaker1: Читали

Speaker2: Когда например читаете ли вы в твиттере тема связанная с обсуждением вашей новости обсуждением ваших новостей в социальных сетях.

Speaker1: В твиттере и твиттере нет.

Speaker2: Считаете ли вы что комментарии других пользователей влияют на редакционную политику или на ваши собственные новости.

Speaker1: Им то на. но в части когда читатель указывает на какую то ошибку или у него возникают дополнительные вопросы мы эти моменты разбираем и возможно иногда выполняем тексты.

Speaker2: Можно ли сказать что вы согласны или не согласны с тем что пользователи говорят о вашей новости и почему.

Speaker1: В большинстве случаев пользователи оказываются неправы ну просто потому что комментировать либо радио либо. они сами допускают фактические ошибки поскольку мои тексты в основном основаны на экономике математике заранее сильно проверяю цифры и как правило оказывается отлично.

Speaker2: Теперь немножко вопроса о но опять же они анонимные и не будут раскрывать ваши лица. сколько лет мы проработали. примерно можно сказать.

Speaker1: В 2000.

Speaker2: Вы работали в нескольких сми и правильно. а почему вы вообще решили работать.

Speaker1: Честно говоря начинала я не как журналист. просто через год работы что называется сбора и обработки информации решила попробовать как то затянуло.

Speaker2: [Но по моему прекрасно. а есть ли у вас какие то определенные политические взгляды. просто нет.

Speaker1: Нет они есть но я никогда не бросаю их публично даже в личных беседах. так почему. потому что все равно окажешься неправ.

Speaker2: А у ваших средств массовой информации где вы работаете есть ли определенные политические взгляды на ваш взгляд.

Speaker1: Мне кажется есть мнение директора и редактора. которых они придерживаются но как таковых жестких запретов или разрешений нет. и в общем позиция по каждому конфликтным событию она обсуждается внутри редакции между всеми членами команды.

Speaker2: А есть ли какие то такие негласные правила нам внутри редакции о том что. каких именно политических персонажей не обязательно там оппозиционеры могут быть или кто то просто но не предлагаю журналистам политических нет.

Speaker1: Есть просто ряд так называемых. недругов редакции или городских сумасшедших о которых мы стараемся не упоминать.

Speaker2: И последний вопрос теперь когда вы знаете о чем идет речь в этом интервью. есть ли чтонибудь о чем я должна была спросить но не включила интервью. на ваш взгляд

Speaker1: Нужен. мне кажется если уж есть вопрос о том о ком не писать то можно было бы задать вопрос если такие персонажи о ком нужно писать а. нет.

Speaker2: Ни рбк ни меня честно говоря больше интересует

Speaker1: Рбк в особенно касательно ни политических ни экономических

Speaker2: [00:19:18] Элит

Speaker1: Мы не пишем политику и экономику про экономические элиты в общем то что мы должны писать про этого персонажа тоже такого нет.

S

Speaker1: Хорошо спасибо большое

Speaker2: [помогли это мое первое интервью. я очень рад. но в смысле для диссертации всяческих удач будем на сайте.

Speaker1: Спасибо до свидания.

7.7. Interview 6

Speaker1: здравствуйте. можно выключить выглядим конечно конечно. значит еще раз хочу сказать что это интервью я его записываю но оно анонимное. ваше имя нигде. и какие то данные другие демографические какие то не будут упомянуты. оно используется исключительно для академических целей для моей диссертации и каких то возможно статей на ее основе но везде все будет анонимно. если что давайте я вам объясню это на английском. тема работа редакции в целом и взаимодействия журналистов редакции с социальными сетями. как это устроено. в конкретном месте где вы работаете и вообще у вас как у журналиста. не могли бы вы мне рассказать пожалуйста помните ли вы последний случай когда какая то новость или текст которые были вами написаны была представлена вами или отделом социальных сетей в одной из соцсетей редакции.

Speaker2: Но это бывает с определенной регулярностью. я не знаю. на прошлой неделе наверное что то может быть что то было. я скажем прямо пристально скрупулезно не отслеживаю ту информацию которая в соцсетях публикуют в соцсетях. я ее вижу как она может появиться анализом проекта и реалии проекта который сотрудничает как чтобы пристально. если говорить больше чем шире я не могу понимать принципы по которым выбирается. наверное все таки определяется насколько она важна интересна для этого региона. в данном случае поморского. которое охватывает давайте я буду называть своими именами вещи.

Speaker1: Конечно конечно хорошо.

Speaker2: Но вот я ответил на вопрос.

Speaker1: Нет нет я наш проект конкретный я могу назвать просто не проект даже скажем радио свобода.

Speaker2: Я еще раз повторю проект располагается на сайте тем же самым.

Speaker2: В общем то подобные проекты и другие региональные. да существует группа группа в соцсетях вконтакте. насколько я знаю я абсолютно не пользуюсь

Speaker1: Твиттер

Speaker2: Давно есть канал и с какой то регулярностью дважды трижды в неделю. наши новости иногда чаще и чаще чаще они появляются.

Speaker1: Какова практика обычная ваша организация вы сами выбираете темы на которые вам дают эти темы редактор.

Speaker2:Поскольку нахожусь в своем регионе определяю круг тем которые я считаю важными и интересными о которых я знаю мне расскажут одно местные региональные сми и я обсуждаю их с редактором. собственно говоря. большая часть этих тем она оказывается интересной редакции и собственно как мне бывает очень интересно когда появляется предложение редактора какую то тему потому что этому как часто это бывает очень. новый взгляд и просто масштаб наверное. чего тут непонятного. немного задумываешься и понимаешь что это какая то уникальная в разрезе региона событие или явление. и на самом деле себя со стороны бывает важнее. в этом смысле какая то помощь редакторов необходима может быть даже я бы сказал что ощущаю что не так часто такое бывает а вот это такой же уменьшена в масштабах проекция она хочет но это не совсем правильное определение. человек со стороны он видит перспективность какого то явления как темы ты можешь это классно. но такое бывает но опять же если в течение месяца посмотреть и подумать не одна такая тема в основном как бы

Speaker1: Обидно если что касается заголовков. вы сами пишете заголовки для новостей или текста статьи или кто то еще принимает в этом участие.

Speaker2: Нет не было изначально никакой жесткой установки на то что заголовок редакционная. хотя насколько я знаю часто. и допустим я до этого сотрудничал с. Тв работал региональным редактором на сайте и более жесткая вещь. здесь я просто для себя повторил ту же ситуацию решил что по крайней мере так я объясняю тем героям с которыми решаю что стоит согласовать интервью или с теми кто просит это сделать. но как правило считаю важным согласовывать интервью не согласованные бывают разве что лишь когда я договариваемся об этом с человеком наверное как то так. да и по заголовком в основном вернулся я для себя решил на самом деле этого как бы нет здесь в реале процентов на 90 можно сказать что именно те варианты которые я предлагаю это я просто отмечаю. опять же я вижу что здесь я не знаю как бы это достоинство или недостаток но жесткой структуры нет. опять же как то общались я понял что в принципе какие то формальные требования то что я делаю новости какие то тексты в различных форматах в принципе это вроде как устраивает интернет. а на что еще можно сказать тем спасибо.

Speaker1: В нашей редакции темы которые не.

Speaker2: Можно я начну издаю. мне так проще отвечать. когда я работал на телевидении которое является частным которая была сформирована главой мчс губернатором. он даже говорил в интервью что через компанию к этому можно назвать как то там темы о которых мне рассказывали. они были митинги кроме первомайской демонстрации и парады 9 мая. какие то другие формы проявления публичной активности нынешней мая. город маленький регион такой что и как то не чувствовать что происходит как то небольшое количество участников этого замечаний не было. мне рассказывали о криминальном. то есть это такая редакционная политика

тоже была. не показывали гражданских активистов каких то определенных которые могли раздражать главного зрителя губернатора. допустим там были какие то очень смешные ограничения чтобы не показывали какого то менее значимым чиновника например мэра города больше чем он включал внимание. вот из такой среды все это было нормально. значительную часть своей карьеры сейчас остается нормально поставляется в регионе где два телеканала шесть может быть сайтов которые в основном в основном дублируют бюджетные издания и являются общественным финансированием люди которого ведут с правительственными структурами в каком то бизнесу которые по просьбе этих структур администрации региона финансирует это якобы независимые частные компании. то есть это как бы норма. в принципе когда ты шок то нет. потому что все понимают что это надо. нужно это интересно и это происходит. об этом надо рассказывать. но вот когда я все таки чуть пораньше очутился над чем я даже какое то время работал параллельно на сайте и вопросу и возникла необходимость снимать вернее рассказывать писать о публичных акциях. и для меня при том что якобы в начале двухтысячных олег писал когда мне очень сильно чиновниками восхищались меня поддерживали издания с которым я работал не могло ничего об этом сообщили рабочие места эффект накапливаться как у того что есть запретные темы и что там происходит и о задержаниях министр сам рассказывал.

Speaker2: потому что как я не рассказывал о содержании если не рассказывать то само событие. там было много детей которых тоже загоняли вытаскивать из этой акции не разрешенные запреты. и вот тогда через после такого перерыва как то было даже страшно появиться потому что участники нагнетания не говорят ой ты что здесь тут у нас фсб и так далее. ни в коем случае не появляясь извините за два наверное три первых раза я очень сильно с этим содроганием шел к месту акции первый раз даже вообще не нашел. то есть она вроде бы должна была да и я даже не знаю. я могу просто какими то своими подозрениями делиться не знаю будет ли это правильно. мне кажется они выходят после каких то там может быть моих воспоминаний самостоятельно состоятельных каких то настойчивых повторов и дополнительной аргументации. выходят материалы связанные с губернатором может быть даже партией власти. то есть нет запретных тем нет но есть тема которая может быть

оказывается или. недостаточно какой то информации которая предполагает дополнительно точнее дает отличие от официального. может быть может быть я стараюсь эту информацию искать находить. но я не знаю в качестве примера допустим мне показалось это удивление изумление редакторов вызвало то что я написал пришла новость о том что глава республики сказал что не планирует прививать от вируса поскольку у него высокий уровень. есть официальные лица это журналисты которым мои новости тоже что у него никакой информации. а это означает что нужно ставить с предыдущей информацией о том что он вернулся либо переболел вирусом после того как я аргументировал это второй частью. это было изначально новости. но не. ну скажем так есть темы которые вызывают такую дискуссию.

Speaker1: Вот интересно спасибо. вернемся к социальным сетям. поощряется ли в вашей редакции использование нами социальных сетей должны ли вы что публиковать редакционные или если какие то вещи которые вам рекомендуется не публиковать летних

Speaker2: А значит насчет поощряется. я даже не знаю что сказать есть и есть. то есть это было до ну скажем до начала блокады

Speaker1: Я имею в виду поощряется ли материал

Speaker2: Про свои индивидуальные лично для меня характерно. я просто вижу что у меня много друзей в друзьях в соцсетях коллег журналистов и я обращаю внимание не знаю. вот я сейчас пытаюсь проанализировать насколько эта информация достоверна или нет это представление. но немногие из них прямо вот очень часто как репортер публикации а я только и занимаюсь этим.

Speaker1: То есть это личная инициатива или как то с редакторами тоже обсуждается.

Speaker2: Нет это как. у меня есть указания есть обозначение что я журналист и вообще допустим у меня не было такой привычки когда я работал на телевидении там сюжеты вы хотите только нас закрывались насколько я помню. я наверное там и отношение это было другое. но вот последние годы мне было интересно что там допустим делаешь. и естественно хотелось где то в другом месте работать потому что я. пришел начал заниматься стал журналистом потому что рассказывать правду не испытывать давление. слышать о том что существуют такие глупые дурацкие как сказано вначале рассказать о мерах ограничения и собственно я же говорил что это достаточно долгий период испытал этот внутренний дискомфорт при том что у меня была договоренность с руководством того же телеканала что я снимаю то что я имею в виду какие то черный пиар вещи которые могут возникнуть во время выборов из за того что под конец как будто такие предложения начали появляться ушел. я просто игнорировал меня сделанное сделай так как должно быть. должна обратная сторона высказаться если она не смогла сделать какие то мои сюжеты несмотря на то что я не интересовался результатом какие то сюжеты это. но для кого то не выгодны и интересны они не заходили. это все к тому что когда закончился истек контракт я просто его сказал да это я опять же возвращаюсь. может это связано с этим.

Speaker1: Сколько лет уже работает

Speaker2: Сколько

Speaker1: Лет уже в сми.

Speaker2: С 99 го года а до 15 с 2006 го по 15 я проработал на государственном телеканале и там где меня задерживали на митингах считалось крайним чем удивлялись что такое существует. и даже на митинги которые проходили на своих публиковать ничего такого не было у меня была возможность это издание курировал

курировала полпредство институт главного федерального инспектора по регионам. я не вмешиваюсь как бы вмешивались в политику там участвовал редактирование каких то опасных материалов допустим мешал каспаров или то что связано с политикой. да и действия нет абсолютно. я не скажу что мне интересно наверное это важно. когда я общался с редактором я говорил о том что я говорил о том что материалы я продвигаем мне интересно но не на уровне какого то я самоучка а просто на уровне пользователя то есть чего то такого я даже какими то экспериментами в области чрезвычайного рекламировал нет. нет нет никаких обязанностей нет никаких с моей стороны и как это называется. в общем это как бы есть и есть общие вещи. конечно конечно. вся эта ситуация с агентами различными степенями это. этого статуса меня волнует и страшно интересует что как вроде бы я понимаю пока дело не дошло до статуса физлица и агента я могу продолжать делать эти посты хотя да это как бы психологически присутствует.

Speaker1: Но все это мешает работе. наверное поэтому интервью и когда

Speaker2: Я бы сказал. то есть есть определенная категория людей я с. но ведь вопрос ваш. я просто сейчас попытаюсь подробнее но важно как сейчас все проанализировать. значит смотрите есть просто категория людей которые разбираются и учителей. об этом они вроде бы как бы разбираются. для них я не знаю. статус не статус может быть как то их профессиональной деятельности много бюджетников. может быть какие то силовики допустим которых я встречаю просто проводил опросы и были такие случаи когда представляешь это радио свобода это же иностранная но было оказывается. года два назад два мальчика сидят и все похожи. может они там еще и фсб работают. недалеко от бишкека все их знают. и вот они говорят а не они так со знанием дела сказали. но так же точно так же встречаются люди которые по существу начинают рассказывать историю о том как они слушали радио их душили восторженные высказывания. да и сейчас мы слушаем кадырова буквально недавно на акции в поддержку навалного. позавчера позавчера она проходила там я просто поговорила с двумя достаточно пожилыми людьми они рассказали мне почему не пришли и что

они испытывают а потом в конце спрашивают откуда замечательная страна. самое смешное наверно для меня это немножечко звучит но насколько я понимаю на сайте есть трансляция наверно сайт там сейчас больше известно по сайту а нас слушают и чтобы напрямую сталкиваться нет но стали возникать определенные сложности есть.

Speaker2: но смотрите я журналист. года четыре назад судился с государственным собранием с парламентом где у них была процедура аккредитации ограничение в доступе соседей речь о сессиях. то есть есть еще такое понятие как работать человек пока это не обсуждается. я выиграл суд. смысл в том что я тоже вам расскажу может быть пригодиться. везде по разному. вот этот механизм ограничений у нас он следующий госсобрания объяснял мне в том числе в письмах что они не являются собственниками помещений они их как бы арендуют правительство республики или в администрацию. в общем правительства к нему примыкает большой зал где совещаний и в этом доме правительства второй этаж занимает аппарат государственного собрания там есть спикера замах и даже одного или двух депутатов которые постоянно работу остальных оппозиционных депутатов и выбрали помещение. и мы не собственники и поэтому собственно пройти журналистов на заседание использование действующего законодательства о средствах массовой информации о свободе получения информации. потому что там внизу на входе сидит охранник у которого списки списки которая представляла госсобрания и списки свободных сми там подавали по процедуре заранее указано соответствующих палат в положение об аккредитации. те у кого корочки есть. и собственно я пошел руководствуясь законом о сми. мне сказали тебя нет списки мы ничего не можем сделать. я попросил то зафиксировать мою фиксировал то что меня не пустили. потребовал ответа мне дали ответ обжаловал в прокуратуре.

Speaker2: прокуратура просто на просто отправила в парламент политику что все в порядке. я сказал что все в порядке. и после этого они ввели процедуру ручной ручной фиксации прихода. отстоял чиновник встречал меня в что я у них в списке по умолчанию. просто чтобы больше исполнять решение суда и не сталкиваться с

многочисленными бесконечными штрафами выплатой просто так. и в этот момент я уже сотрудничал начал сотрудничество как раз реалии. и тот же самый жестокий пресс службы я уточню как здесь. вы же видите что я пишу все вещи. в момент перехода я завершил работать. соответственно я задумался. вот и собственно статус иностранного сми значит я консультировался с юристами и. мне говорили что это все как бы только и будет ясно значит для меня каким то барьером все таки проконсультироваться с нашими исками. у нас ситуация такая что в регионах не допуска нигде нет. то есть именно они получают информацию из парламентов насколько я понял через журналистов которые имеют аккредитацию. собственно поэтому я бы не решился. мне показалось что перспектива через суд как то выиграть здесь все таки ниже. потому что на суде требуется все таки представить документы о регистрации. что это будет как готовы. меня просто не было информации. готовы ли какие то документы предоставлять из офиса радио свобода на уровне юристов обсуждалось на уровне с редакторами.

Speaker2: я услышал о том что нет аккредитации значит информацию каким то другим образом получать. плюс все таки наладилась прямая видеотрансляция из парламента. просто на тот момент когда я побывал это было прямо очень нерегулярно и было сложно предсказать будет или нет трансляции. сейчас она регулярная. и плюс еще усилилась усилилась усилили меры безопасности у здания правительства. это не связано с вирусом. задолго до этого дошло. то есть раньше доступ на территорию россии открыт лишь небольшой город. и вообще возникло возник забор первая постройка как бы при бывшем губернаторе. я должен пояснить вокруг этого здания. до него в общем то было советское здание обкома из серого покрытый серой гранитной кошкой. какое нибудь личное здание административное главное здание в регионе. и никаких заборов ничего там даже в москве проходили прямо под окнами. какая площадка удобнее маркелов с забором устроил но тем не менее ворота этого забора были открыты какие то приличные кучи. дорога по диагонали мэрии то есть она сокращая как бы функционировала действовала. а вот новый губернатор просто на просто там какие то установили электронные замки на территории самого дома правительства теперь в проекте можно проходить через кпп а раньше просто через

карточку все время открыто проходил и на этом можно говорить куда ты летишь. это усложнение оно тоже появилось одновременно. так и я теперь должен вас спросить. вопрос был о чем сегодня

Speaker1: Говорили поговорить об аккредитации но я понимаю. спасибо за такой детальный ответ. хотя узнать есть ли у нас теперь

Speaker2: Одно здание подождите можно еще я здесь добавлю саша про парламент рассказал. вот допустим с городским собранием города там история немножко другая там у меня тоже была аккредитация оставались они не хотели этого делать. я тоже пошел. меня не пустили. письмо с претензией и председателю городского собрания. они забежали засуетились и организовали было. это было до госсобрания а затем когда я уже оказался в урале и у них аккредитации оказались как обычно все пришлось на 19 й. появился новый созыв я походил уточнял письмом заручился редакционный городское собрание и они думали думали и в общем то все это вылилось в то что на первой сессии которая вообще была для всех мэр города который ну не совсем может быть промышленным высказал свое мнение на сессии публично о том что коммуникация собственно говоря в городском собрании и не является барьером. то есть она иметь какие то дополнительные преимущества обеспечить непонятно в чем кстати говоря дополнительные преимущества. а так если ей желают чтобы можно ну и в общем то все и туда то что открыт он оказался прав. ничего. я думаю что мое письмо там анализировали потому что как раз и говорилось что я даже объяснял что радио свобода по сути не может пройти этот координационный барьер потому что требуются свидетельства о регистрации этого свидетельства нет его не выдает роскомнадзор. несмотря на то что в стране находится письмо путина власть с различными советуется писал его. и видимо они проанализировали чего я еще сослался на решение суда по госсобрания.

Speaker1: А если говорить

Speaker2: С чиновниками ну если честно то с ними сложно вообще всегда было общаться. пресс службы в общем то отвечают а герои обычные они продолжают обращаться к людям. им есть какие то причины. они выбирают по принципу написать эти качества я не смогу обратиться они ничего не сделают. а какие. большинство %99 республиканских сми поэтому не

Speaker1: Работает хотя роскомнадзор вы упомянули. а вот когда вы пишете на темы такие чувствительные темы которые допустим в законодательстве или роскомнадзором регулируется так скажем если например тема лгбт никак не подходите пишете.

Speaker2: У меня был единственный наверное случай связанный там полтора исключены. а здесь несколько лет назад активист николай алексеев становятся известны. он проводил акцию такую уведомление писал всевозможные российские города и все региональные центры насколько я понимаю о проведении акций в поддержку лгбт сообщества и защиты их прав и решали очень оригинально отреагировали власти ввести говорили что нет. а у нас предложили провести и в деревне которая входит в состав города но она как бы поверх тройки километров от самого города. куда в том числе наверное рейсами ходят. я когда это произошло находился в пути ехал из якутска в чебоксары чтобы вернуться. и собственно я все эти новости всю эту переписку прочитал и уехал и уселся писать я на место ездил. я следил за информацией там происходили какие то негативные события. туда приехали то казаки патриотическая молодежь. они там устроили пикеты и подняли на уши. станут ли они защищать начали те сообщества которые якобы должны были приехать виртуально возбудились. вернее даже не виртуально а на самом деле это не обсуждалось радио эфире события очень сильно наехали на чиновничью городской администрации которая дала такое разрешение. мол какое то общественного гнева сделалась крайней. тем более если она уехала в крым. в администрации ялты кем то стал чиновником. и вот эту историю я описал с точки зрения здравого смысла что у нас

еще есть на эту историю некие такие реакции роскомнадзора. мне было как то с ним не сталкивался. я знаю что местным журналистам местным сми а у нас ведь есть сми которые регистрируются именно конкретно в моем городе королева у нас пока еще есть филиал роскомнадзора.

Speaker2: роскомнадзор местные все таки следит за сферой своей компетенции которая как сми которые регистрируются через них на каком то более крупном уровне. была история громкая и их женщина так называл илья варламов памятник суд не просто сослались на его судили не варламова именно так. нет я единственное с чем я сталкивался. я писал письмо нашему роскомнадзору потому что была проблема после каких то выборов то ли 16 15 го года с работой нашего сайта. вполне возможно какие то ограничения не у нас просто в регионе был опыт когда видимо видимо это такая гипотеза как бы она ничем не подтверждена но выполняя указания властей республики оператор интернета единственный на тот момент ростелеком морган телеком назывался до этого ограничивал доступ в интернет сайту он называется базируется в истории публиковал очень критически очень чувствительные для региона информации национальных сообществ. черных национальная оппозиция они не воспринимали будущего губернатора они очень плохо соответственно относились последовало и так далее. вот этот сайт на определенной мере просто закрывали. и эта история она как то она была. они писали в общем то ничем не закончилось но вполне очевидно ограничение какой то фильтр на этот сайт включая и нас будут какие то проблемы с нашим сайтом. мне предоставили ответную. когда ему предоставили несколько дней три четыре не было и у нас в республике чемпионов все нормально.

Speaker1: И если у нас теперь

Speaker2: Есть но он есть как есть я крайне редко пользуюсь я просто. но я не знаю это хорошо или плохо. мне кажется когда много разных соцсетей это прямо очень меня устраивает. мои одноклассники информация где я как то поддерживаю связь с многочисленными родственниками очень дальними которые живут в разных городах.

это прямо идеально. вконтакте которую я очень не люблю но они важны поскольку он важен поскольку много много людей которых я не знаю местных жителей. через ними происходит через вконтакте коммуникация происходит задать вопрос или даже использовать фотографию героя если я не выехал разбираться а потом не очень хорошо себя чувствовал что могу унижать и как то за последний год освоил жанр интервью этого дистанционного либо телефонного имперского при ответном письме выбирают сами герои. кстати почему то начинаешь переписываться но в принципе мне удобно что расшифровка и заниматься до сих пор там полторы недели назад очень мощные сенсационный триллер. тут не так много событий как то как то руки не доходят. вот и фейсбук где мне очень нравятся девушки. человек с которым я которого я удалил впоследствии из друзей его как бы как это называется. комментарии которые мне не нравились. но как бы не могут какие то комментарии не нравится я оставляю комментаторов вспоминаю но здесь просто человек с ними как у многих наверное бывает аргументации человек не настроен на диалог. диалог возможен и он этот человек в свое время когда то ссылку на фейсбук был отключен. потом посмотрим посмотрим. наверняка седьмом восьмом было всего удобнее.

Speaker1: Еще пара вопросов буквально. есть ли у вас какие то определенные политические взгляды.

Speaker2: Я думаю что они определенные. и я думаю что я прежде всего человек принимающий окружающую действительность сквозь призму политических событий. мои политические взгляды в том числе формируют и то что пристрастия. что касается потребления сми которое тоже в значительной степени это политика. если говорить о них. но я думаю что я поддерживал бы алексея навалного. если бы он был политиком практикующий я его поддерживаю в качестве. то есть нет он и есть он не является политиком. просто реальная действующая политическая система россии и его всеми силами отвергает. вот у меня есть претензии и значительные к системной оппозиции начиная от яблока которое допустим в моем регионе есть я партия яблоко которое я не знаю для чего оно существует уже все эти годы. достаточно сказать что я встречаю

руководителя этого отделения. митинги которые проводят коммунисты после победы представители кпрф на думских выборах женщина а ее дочь из кандидатов в депутаты соперницы говорит я голосовала за коммунистов или опять же история. я говорю давайте сделаем. я хочу сделать с вами интервью с представителями яблока которые в кои то веки тут сейчас участвовать в избирательной кампании с этим интервью мы взялись больше месяца. господи боже мой сколько с ними крови я потерял. ужас полнейший. а вот эта героиня дочь она принесла какие то бумажки пресс релизы многолетней давности о своих заслугах. а как же человек она не захотела отвечать.

Speaker2: кончилось тем что ее мама написала письмо попросила восстановить музыку. неделю или к тем же самым коммунистам которых потерял я. вот смотрите опять же реальная политическая действительность что коммунисты самые главные оппозиции и в общем то если выборы региональные нужно кого то избирать то тебе приходится. я голосовал за коммунистов наверное дважды выборы которые проводятся на федеральном уровне но к ним как бы наверное больше повышается требовательность. и в принципе когда я вижу что на президентских выборах нет ни одного нормального кандидата они не допущены в принципе меня не устраивает то что сам как я не понимаю что это за человек что он популярный не то что ли. то есть это не тот стимул которым я руководствуюсь я просто не участвую в этих выборах я к этому готов заявлять что я делаю тех же самых соцсетях это не так важно высказать свою политическую позицию или конституционное голосование. это издевательство над всеми процедурами. я об этом тоже пишу сообщают местные выборы еще раз но даже эти думские выборы там была очень такая ситуация что. по сути коммунистический кандидат естественно таким значительным и хорошо правильно себя позиционировал. его кампания была очень интересной. это один из немногих действующих политиков которые в том числе интерес к наверное. а что еще можно сказать про политику.

Speaker1: Хотя как вы считаете по вашему мнению есть ли у вашего средства массовой информации какие то определенные политические взгляды. где сейчас работаете.

Speaker2: Я думаю есть как и в принципе я боюсь что может быть не столь подробно и не знаю о политических взглядах своих коллег по

Speaker1: Не говорю коллег я говорю про скорее общую редакционную политику история

Speaker2: Общая редакционная политика. но она как то вот здесь когда я могу говорить о том что есть такая надо воспринимать сквозь призму также и каких то политических пристрастий журналистов. вот допустим когда новости связанные с навальным допустим естественно одна из приоритетных тем я думаю что по тому что большие российские сми об этом не рассказывают и в регионах об этом тоже могут рассказать что там дети собирают машинки ракеты. то есть у нас сейчас я вот как раз думаю над тем как это все у нас в преддверии 21 числа официальное издание опубликовало и официальное издание. потому что опять на митинги в поддержку наваляного никто не пришел что было мало тысяч человек. то есть очень немного всех запугали. очень много каких то инструментов взаимодействия но главным образом видимо высший административный через учебные сборы. и тут в чате обсуждала как и когда вы обсуждали час три тысячи человек заявлялось да и не приоритет. а поскольку вот поскольку мало где напишут допустим поскольку сайт такой павловский регион многонациональный и взгляды наваляного у многих вызывают взгляды мнения по национальному вопросу по тому же криму тут очень плотные ревизии подвергаются. и когда что то так недвусмысленно говорит или наоборот бессмысленно может появиться в разряд новостей тоже выносятся. но я не знаю как тут еще вот что сказать. в принципе ограничений каких то нет. опять же исходя из всего своего предыдущего опыта я вижу что довольно таки все свободно а я не готов говорить что идеальным вообще кажется что невозможно найти какую то идеальную для сми которая. все спектру весь спектр политических пристрастий рассказывал про то как что то там организует единая россия допустим хотя очень сильно пытаюсь стараюсь.

Speaker2: Считаю что это важно наоборот отвлечь какой нейтральные. может быть чего то не так сложно потому что много ну не много но есть примеры когда прямо не затей либо очень пользователей соцсетей или блогеров блогеров какие то там может быть журналисты. самый распространенный жанр это когда исполнить пожелание чиновника из администрации или из министерства внутренней политики и наехать на тех же самых коммунистов. и мне очень интересно в комментариях участвуют одни и те же общественно значимые персоны и хвалил поправок к конституции эти же люди участвуют в обсуждении и очередного послания путина они же как бы находят очевидные преимущества. это примерно круг очень понятно. то есть я вам говорил о том каков контраст. для меня очень важно в регионе оставаться региональным и испытывать на себе этот контраст. естественно по сравнению вот об этом я могу сказать что с той картиной которую представляют региональные сми я вижу как я предполагаю федеральные сми я их не смотрю вижу вижу мельком когда жена у меня включает программу когда она задерживается потому что программа время резиновая считай на полчаса задержаться там можно увидеть ток шоу. я только слышан. мне не нравится картинка какую то мрачный фон там и рожи ведущих и личную тоже как то. и этот как раз есть какой то более глубокий анализ я способен потому что это будет анализ нюансов. если говорить о том какую политическую картину представляет радио свобода если приоритеты. я предполагаю что критики и приоритеты могут быть те движения и партии которые по нынешней российской действительности действительности потенциально являются запрещенными.

Speaker1: И последний вопрос теперь когда вы знаете о чем речь в интервью изданию я должна спросить они объясняет.

Speaker2: Нет я просто вижу что у нас для вас важно рассказать о присутствии и о каком то позиционирование в соцсетях по информационной политике. но для меня для меня было важно рассказать о том чем меня устраивает эта работа почему это сотрудничество почему я его у себя единственно верным вижу я. я просто бы сказал что это. звучит но на самом деле мне пока не видится. где бы я мог работать. потому

что я когда решил стать журналистом в принципе я понимал что это работа которая связана с личной свободой человека и какие то запреты. они как бы они не соответствуют прежде всего по шуму который и который является синонимом журналиста говорить правду. поэтому мне очень сложно представить где бы я мог еще работать если такой возможности не будет. если возникнут какие то непреодолимые проблемы закроемся.

Speaker1: Спасибо вам огромное за интервью у вас ребята. всяческих успехов. и если будет какая то статья обязательно всем

Speaker2: Хорошо

Speaker1: И нам дайте. огромное спасибо. доброго.

7.8 Interview 7

Speaker1: здравствуйте здравствуйте слышите меня хорошо.

Speaker2: Да очень хорошо о выделили время.

Speaker1: Поэтому конечно без нас что

Speaker2: Удобно сразу сказать что это интервью исключительно для академических целей.

Speaker1: Да без проблем.

Speaker2: И интервью о том как пересекается редакционная политика и социальные сети и в редакциях российских сми. можно начинать. да да да конечно. расскажите мне пожалуйста помните ли вы ситуацию когда вы написали новость в агентстве и ее поставили в социальные сети вы или отдел социальных сетей. какая тема была. новости.

Speaker1: Вы имеете в виду когда именно принадлежащая агентству социальная сеть бронирования берет

Speaker2: Чуть ли не ваш личный аккаунт.

Speaker1: А там новость премьеру бронированной соцсети агентство вы знаете да у вас есть. если конкретно тасс интересуют социальные сети при этом я сразу скажу что в

принципе журналисты даже не особо но как бы не отслеживали какие новости ставят соцсети потому что социальная сеть одна там была допустим какая нибудь там фейсбук местная вконтакте сеть журналистов в состоит из нескольких десятков журналистов по всем регионам поэтому задача журналиста просто написать новость которую он отправляет на ленту а далее уже отдельные редакторы берут ее с ленты ставят либо на сайт либо в социальную сеть в социальные сети. поэтому здесь видимо что касается тасс здесь настолько длинный как бы еще что коридор да список ее сотрудников поэтому уже ставит свои новости поэтому там дальше мы особо и не отслеживали какие новости берут редакторы соцсетей какие не берут. это отдельный редактор отдельная редакция которая сама формирует свою политику и она сама выбирает что с нами делать сами себе что не ставит и так как эта социальная сеть обычно федеральная у нас нет региональных социальных сетей. то что касается в регионах они сами оценивают они берут те новости которые допустим выходят на федеральный уровень что то случилось в регионе но оно вышло на федеральный уровень соответственно являются героями повестки и их ставят допустим в фейсбук.

Speaker2: Понятно понятно спасибо. кто обычно вам давал темы новостей и какова вообще была такая практика в организации. далее определенный журналист стал статьей новый на определенные темы или просто разные журналисты сами выбирали темы.

Speaker1: Мы сейчас говорим смотрите как раз есть я именно работала оригинальным редактором я работала с регионами но у нас очень много разных редакций да есть редакция политической информации экономической информации там редакция которая занимается непосредственно исключительно транспортным направлением редакция национальных национальных проектов и по сути каждый журналист который входит в ту или иную редакцию например если ты журналист в регионе он четко понимает свои собственные задачи и сам формирует план новостей и тематику новостей исходя из общей авиационной политики. у него есть некие стандарты которые говорят ему о том что ключевыми задачами тасс является освещение ситуации

в регионе важные ключевые заявления губернаторов первых лиц. а допустим это происшествия которые происходят в регионе существенно некоторые существенным образом отражаются и влияют на большое количество проживающих там людей и какие то интересные просто читаем и новости которые могут заинтересовать жителей других регионов. и журналисты уже по большей части на %90 сам формирует свою свое видение новостной повестки. а далее уже есть некий фильтр сидит выпускающий редактор в москве который оценивает насколько эта новость достойна появиться на ленте. часто бывает такое что журналист посчитал новость интересной написал ее редактору и не выпустил потому что с точки зрения редактора это новость недостойно не легким сайт и других источников информации.

Speaker2: А есть ли какие то темы которые не стоит ставить которые есть.

Speaker1: Есть такие темы как и во всех редакциях допустим абсолютно не приветствуются темы ну скажем так аккуратно педофилии да потому что есть социальные всевозможные исследования что такие темы могут порождать нездоровый интерес. скажем так психологически уравновешенный людей да. поэтому такие с какими темами очень аккуратно

Speaker2: Например

Speaker1: Лгбт это тоже тематика скажем так не близкая к зданию. а может она может быть освещена в том случае когда дело доходит до резонансных конфликтных историй. то есть не сама по себе тема а может как то использоваться. обычно она не используется в плане того что математика в принципе что там происходит в обычном режиме не освещается но если появляется какой то резонансный конфликт ну допустим какой то. связаны с сына путина от ненависти кого то убили избили до этого дошло до расследования то естественно если это уже резонансная история которая выходит на федеральный уровень то неважно к тому же гопота габт. эта тема очень

выходит к тому что она получила уже такой социальный резонанс. важно а вот именно какие то такие вещи которые связаны с какими то тенденциями в этом направлении. конечно они не освещаются но в принципе это не специализация информационного агентства

Speaker2: А есть ли какие то скажем так редакционные правила советы в каком ключе отвечать.

Speaker1: Конечно здесь все очень четко и понятно я понимаю почему может быть такой вопрос. потому что многие считают что тасс что то о чем то не пишут что то замалчивают. тут немножко другая ситуация. что такое тасс. это государственные сми которые в принципе как бы имея статус государственного сми освещают позицию официальную государственную позицию властей позицию чиновников позицию официальных структур. поэтому здесь есть четкий перекоп и он понятен аналогичную в сторону официальной информации. допустим очень много неофициальной информации которая может быть важна для кого то нужна кому то а мы все прекрасно понимаем что далеко не все интересны для общества темы готовы комментировать официально. но так как у нас есть четкое понимание что это официальный источник информации которая может опираться только на официальные комментарии. поэтому здесь идет исключительно очень редко старается пользоваться источниками не официальными допустим если есть информация какая то появляется. как сообщил собственный источник тасс. но тут нужно понимать что это переписывание источник который там годами его надежность подтверждена годами что журналист редактор четко знает что это конкретный не просто дядя петя который там сидит откуда то сливает информацию что это конкретное должностное лицо которое в силу своей должности не имеет права как бы официально себя называть мы готовы предоставить информацию под источник. вот поэтому да тут не стоит ждать каких то там глубоких скандальных каких то интриг расследований скандалов. потому что ну так это официальное сми никто не скрывает. поэтому так всегда позиция официального спикера как и официальных источников информации.

Speaker2: Понятно спасибо. а поощряется ли тасс в региональных или федеральных редакция использование личных социальных сетей сотрудниками. то есть если какие то рекомендации по кредитам нашим новостям твиттер.

Speaker1: Ну в принципе каким то образом каким то образом мне никогда нет никаких запретов. какая позиция должна быть там не знаю там вероисповедания не знаю там пристрастия что там еще наклонности журналиста как у человека если это не бронированный какой то канал но нужно понимать что если каким то образом человек этот известен как корреспондент тасс дату его появления могут использоваться как скажем даже если он лично что то какое то мнение выразил то другие сми могут его использовать личное мнение как профессиональную. поэтому есть такая рекомендация будущим журналистам что коллеги раз вы являетесь официально сша журналистами государственных охранного агентства то вы должны понимать что ваши высказывания публичные и в том числе в соцсетях не должны противоречить как бы. по той политики и той политике позиции которой о которой вы пишете которую вы высказывать публично. потому что такое только такое тоже странно будет смотреться. человек пишет новости с официальной подачи и тут же где то он в социальных сетях в каких то там что то начинает говорить а вот на самом деле все по другому. поэтому четко нужно понимать мы на стадии даже когда людей берем. мы им говорим мы государственное сми мы поддерживаем официальную позицию власти. поэтому вы должны понимать куда вы идете что если у вас есть некие оппозиционные настроения и как бы протестная активность и вы в принципе протестные настроения. так что здесь просто будет конфликт конфликт ваших личных интересов. люди которые это понимают они просто не идут работать.

Speaker2: Да не надо. вы лично больше публикуется в социальных сетях своих рассказали это ссылки на сми или ваше собственное мнение или что то или что то просто

Speaker1: Имеете в виду про меня как человека который публикуют в своих социальных сетях.

Speaker2: Ну давайте вернемся к тому времени когда вы работали хорошо.

Speaker1: Ну вы знаете я всегда стараюсь публиковать в социальных сетях на процентов личную информацию потому что для меня изначально заводи́ла свою социальную сеть не как журналист или редактор определенного сми а и подписывались на друзей с которыми я лично знакома и прочее вместо моих детей знаю их детей мы пересекаемся. если ты журналист и мы куда то ездим в пресс тур какие то личные вещи обсуждаем. котики собачки путешествия в первую очередь социальные сети для этого конечно я использую всегда соцсети в том числе для контактов каких то профессиональных. потому что сейчас намного проще найти человека чем мне визитку сохранять и прочее. я могу поделиться какой то ссылкой какой то ссылкой в своих социальных сетях своей рабочей какого то текста. но если я понимаю что она может быть интересна для людей которые на меня подписаны я например я в какой то регион съездила в своем интервью губернатора да не важно что там сказал губернатор в этом интервью. интересно что я побывала в таком регионе пообщался с этим человеком а там дальше уже как тому кто то может согласиться кто то может не согласиться что заявил конкретный губернатор. поэтому для меня всегда соцсети это были больше такая нейтральная площадка. я лично как журналист как редактор старалась никогда не публиковать своих личных соцсетях какие то тексты и темы которые могли бы вызвать какой то конфликт интересов либо какой то там резонанс да в плане того что там что я прекрасно понимаю что у меня есть некая ответственность за то что я говорю как человек и по сравнению с тем как бы я работаю как официальное лицо. и здесь я всегда была очень аккуратно осторожно потому что я не вижу смысла. люди у меня могут быть разные подписчики у меня могут быть друзья которые у которых которые отличают взгляды которых отличаются от моих. поэтому да просто никогда не идут на то чтобы каким то образом какой то контент публиковать который может вызвать неоднозначную реакцию.

Speaker2: Спасибо. у меня работа в основном базируется на твиттере. поэтому несколько вопросов про твиттер хотя есть ли у вас еще твиттер аккаунт в твиттере чему у меня

Speaker1: Был аккаунт в твиттере. я в какой то момент его молоко не удовлетворяют современным требованиям потому что у него есть четкое ограничение по количеству знаков. у него есть там ограничения по размещению контента в плане там что то с картинок по моему там картинки не проходят.

Speaker2: Наверное проходят но возможен когда то что то было.

Speaker1: Вот поэтому в какой то момент он был популярен но когда ему на смену пришли другие социальные сети я подумала что другие социальные сети для меня намного более интересны в том числе например фейсбук который позволяет там видеть в принципе биографию человека. но больше больше дает информацию

Speaker2: А новости вы читаете не в социальных сетях получается. то есть

Speaker1: [Она сейчас для меня основной поставщик именно информационного контента это телеграмм

Speaker1: Да. потому что есть я не знаю как допустим в других странах или где то в отдельных регионах может быть там на дальний восток и прочее а в европейской части на европейской части россии именно новостная повестка сместился в телеграмм к нам и очень много часто в принципе новостных и не только не только сми создают свои там

часто свои каналы. очень кроме того что там профессиональных много где допустим те же пресс службы собирают как практик расписание собирают там пресс службы журналистов и им. этот человек кладет какую то информацию телеграмм каналы профессиональные и бронированные каких то сми и не мародеры. это отдельная проблема не бронированные телеграмм каналов значит с ним пытаются бороться потому что они не подпадают под ни под какие законы они могут писать редакция их никак ни за что не поймает. но при этом они пользуются популярностью у людей которые хотят каких то интриг жареные не проверенных фактов.

Speaker2: А когда телеграмм блокировали на территории россии все равно удобно

Speaker1: Пользоваться было не очень удобно но обходные пути были на пользу всем были обходные пути да было несколько скажем скажем так каких то других ссылок через которые можно было подключиться. какие то были специальные как они называются не знаю какие то настроить ввп были какие то специальные которые нужно было включить выключить. да и в принципе такого чтобы совсем в течение дня ничего не работало ну может быть было на старте буквально я не знаю. помните когда только это все началось в какой то момент. но к вечеру уже все уже нашли ключ и.

SpeakeСпасибо. теперь такой была информация которая только для академической. сколько лет вы проработали в сми.

Speaker1: Вообще в принципе ну так ну щас скажу. с 2000 года это сколько получается.

Speaker2: Двадцать один больше

Speaker Но больше тридцати лет. у меня там была пара перерывов на декретном они были короткие.

Speaker2: почему вы вообще решили работать с.

Speaker1: [Но если прямо философски то на самом деле я собиралась поступать на переводчика на романо германской филологии что то такое. мне кто то из знакомых сказал ой а я решила на журналистику поступить. и потом я поняла что журналистика это мое потому что я на самом деле писала какие то не очень хорошие сочинения которые в конкурсах все время побеждали в каких то газетах районных даже публиковали что то как то так само собой пошло и как то само меня выбрало я даже не перебрал. я не скажу что у меня было такое решение что у нас настолько само гармонично все вписалась.

Speaker2: как вы сказали бы. есть ли у вас какая то определенная политическая принадлежность неважно какая. ну наверное определенным

Speaker1: Наверное определенных политических взглядов у меня нет но очень скажем так жестко отношусь к скажем там к чёрной политике такой да то обливать грязью то есть вот этого всего я категорически не приемлю я считаю что каждый человек имеет право на свои политические взгляды. каждый журналист может нам освещать эти политические взгляды пока они не доходят до голословные обвинения использования черных технологий всевозможных там подставы вбросов и прочее да. то есть я могу спокойно общаться с губернатором который единую россию поддерживает и который оппозиционную партию поддерживает и у каждого я найду какие то его там в чем то он будет каждый из них прав но потому что это он это всегда умные люди. нет такого что там они там берут воруют и прочее. это всегда умный интеллигентный воспитанные образованные люди у которых у каждого из них своя правда. ну где то да кто то в чем то может быть прав кто то нет. но главное что эти люди действительно выражают свою собственную точку зрения.

Speaker2: и мы немножко об этом уже говорили но вопрос есть ли у средства массовой информации в данном случае определенной политической принадлежности взгляда.

Speaker1: здесь здесь все очень очень четко как государственное сми соответственно оно всегда априори поддерживало партию власти и новость здесь не может быть потому что оно вообще как бы финансируется на бюджетные деньги. соответственно как бы у тасс никогда не было перегибов в плане. скажем так в плане того что там никогда не будет осознанно публиковать недостоверную информацию порочащие другие партии. но оно просто в принципе может просто не публиковать информацию от других партий партии. но оно всегда будет поддерживать правящую партию потому что это государственные сми его задача поддерживать в принципе политику государства и политику действующего президента действующей власти. то есть все очень просто и понятно можно обвинять в чем угодно но говорить о том что он должен давать разные точки зрения разные взгляды в сторону и прочее. только исходя из ракурса что это государственное сми спасибо.

Speaker2: И последний вопрос. теперь когда вы знаете о чем было интервью мы разговаривали есть ли чтонибудь о чем я должна была спросить но не спросила. на мой взгляд. не знаю.

Speaker1: просто не знаю задачу в принципе да как бы вашего исследования. здесь задача в чем. что есть государственные сми в виде тасс. да но наверное проблема в россии в том что должны быть и негосударственные сми которые каким то образом освещают все что за пределами интересов официальных сми. государство здесь намного все сложнее. вот насколько в этой проблеме есть смысл разбираться наверное не в рамках наших интервью.

Speaker2: На самом деле большое спасибо я пишу не только о государственных и негосударственных СМИ которых в принципе достаточно в России пока и что еще я хочу сказать спасибо за совет. спасибо за ваше время

Speaker1: надеюсь что хоть чем то помогло.

7.9 Interview 8

Speaker1: Здравствуйте. вам как удобнее вы или без. спасибо что согласились поговорить. я сразу скажу что это интервью только для диссертации для научной работы. ваше имя не будет фигурировать и как бы там точные демографические данные. просто на видео говорится что интервью с журналистами или бывшими журналистами каких то изданий. вот начнем.

Speaker2: Да конечно.

Speaker1: Интервью в целом о редакционной политике в отношении социальных сетей так и вы были в заголовках тем при публикации в соцсетях и в принципе на лентах агентства. не могли бы вы мне рассказать пожалуйста помните ли вы ситуацию когда ваш материал ваша новость была представлена отделом социальных сетей на какие то официальные соцсети агентства последнее время.

Speaker2: Ну да конечно такое регулярно происходит учитывая что работаю я в основном по области у нас это происходит и в основном это появляется в социальных сетях.

Speaker1: И кто принимает решение о том пойдет новость соцсети или не.

Speaker2: Могу подсказать им. в федеральном агентстве слишком

Speaker1: Не выполнять решения какой то отдел другой

Speaker2: Я на это никак

Speaker1: И. обычная практика вашей организации. пишете эти новости на определенные темы или журналисты пишут могут писать тоже на те же самые темы но она похоже распределена прыгнул распределены или как то тема по журналистам так

Speaker2: Лично у нас не распределена. мы пишем. я могу взять новость на любую тему. и это что касается региональных. что касается они конечно распределены на определенной редакции экономическая редакция происшествий и тому подобное. а что касается региональных то они берутся.

Speaker1: Вы сами выбираете темы или вам редактор дает.

Speaker2: Как мы понимаем что важно мы сами берем иногда какую нибудь мелочь нам редактор

Speaker1: Легко или сложно вам решать какую тему выбрать или не выбрать.

Speaker2: Легко конечно легко.

Speaker1: А почему вы выбираете заголовок для какой то новости или статьи кто нибудь другой принимает участие в составлении заголовков.

Speaker2: Ну как у нас происходит. в основном новость принимаю решения являются. но есть выпускающий редакторы которые могут это подкорректировать на свой вкус. мое видение согласуется с нами или не согласует тут уже зависит от конкретного

выпускающий редактора. но в основном корректировки это редко подвергается. ну грубо говоря если ты сделана грамотно изначально

Speaker1: Существует ли набор правил и редакционная политика в вашем сми. и если да то как власть которая обозначена.

Speaker2: Нет ну конечно мы в каждом сми существует редакционная политика в основном самых главных тем знакомит проходящих людей это момент оформления новостей это определенное количество знаков заголовки это лицо с которого должна была быть понятна новость и соответственно это правильная. указанные источники информации и групп составленные и контекст не обязательно чтобы курбан как то абсолютно непонятно про что новость. ну а что касается основы тупого тела новости это. чтобы было все грамотно понятно четко и не было. ну и про редакционную политику в плане выбора например новостей то конечно мы не берем. простите работа идет на. сейчас секундочку. вечер. кто его касается выбора новостей то редко мы берем мелочь. дтп которое происходит ежедневно разумеется в новостных лентах они появляются но все равно распределять не писать совсем мелко. там от какого то количества погибших если идет какой то риск. даже если это не существенно.

Speaker1: Могли бы вы сказать есть то тему на которую мы не пустим не берем. на самом деле редакционной политики

Speaker2: Нет у нас нет такого что какие то темы нам. запрещено писать часто если чтонибудь происходит но это часто военная тематика. что касается минобороны мы это конечно пишем. но это потом идет на согласование нашим высоко сидящим редакторам и они могут просто чтонибудь о согласовании без согласования с минобороны не поставят. но чтобы не писать мы такого не делаем.

Speaker1: А что касается например тем которые роскомнадзор по наводке

Speaker2: Мы это всегда напишем. что какнибудь очень низком градус все и правильно подавая информацию с такими скобками ссылками пояснили в любом случае

Speaker1: И кто определяет какие темы вы воспринимаете как новости вашим то вы журналисты или это редактор который говорит что эта тема или это не тема.

Speaker2: Но получается мы берем все что считаем важным то что мы видим каждый день что то происходит. мы это видим понимаем оцениваем масштаб. и если вдруг мы что то увидели неправильно оценили масштаб подумали что это мелко. редактор нам который больше в этом варится и больше смотрит. ужас. те же соцсети в которых активно рассказал что эта тема популярна тогда мы ее берем

Speaker1: Активно поощряется использование социальных сетей.

Speaker2: У нас вообще нет уклона.

Speaker1: Если что то что вам нельзя опубликовать в ваших соцсетях. нет абсолютно нет такого. лично вы предпочитаете использовать.

Speaker2: Я вообще не фанатик такой социальный. я считаю что уже можно даже телеграмм считать соцсети уже не просто и розами большее время своей жизни я прошу в телеграмме толку мало. постоянно приходится быть в повестке есть. я в нем зарегистрирована но захожу только по долгу службы если нужно кого то отследить. так нет особо не пользуюсь

Speaker1: Когда ваши новости публикуются в соцсетях. смотрите вы на то как их обсуждают читатели. тема связанная с обсуждением этих новостей.

Speaker2: Лично я и мои новости я отслеживаю у него просто интервью. просто я человек подходит здесь слово азартный или нет но не очень. отклик то есть я не очень люблю писать в стол когда это где то публикуется что важно и отбивает как.

Speaker1: А вы согласны или не согласны с тем что пользователи говорят о нашей новости и комментировать ее тоже

Speaker2: Не комментировали но согласны не согласны. но там же бывают такие темы. я же не пишет тексты аналитические и тут вообще разные мнения могут быть. я часто что попадает на ленту риа новости в социальных сетях. что касается в том числе моих новостей это путешествия. поэтому мнение о происшествии и.

Speaker1: На самом деле несколько вопросов такие больше демографические. сколько лет вы проработали.

Speaker2: Вообще сложно наверное сказать. я уж не помню примерно. больше семи.

Speaker1: И почему мы решили пойти работать по этому.

Speaker2: Сложно сказать я еще с подросткового возраста почему то решила не свое себя. но как то так мне казалось это интересным мне хотелось. вот это основная причина.

Speaker1: Но вы как то разочарованы. нет.

Speaker2 Но та профессия очень сильно. потому что нет никогда личного времени. то есть это работа в основном.

Speaker1: Да да. как вы считаете есть ли у вас какие то определенные политические взгляды. неважно.

Speaker2: Возможно скорее всего есть определенные

Speaker1: Средства массовой информации где он работаете если определенным политическим взглядам.

Speaker2: Скорее да чем нет.

Speaker1: Теперь когда вы знаете о чем было интервью. есть ли чтонибудь о чем я была спросить было.

Speaker1: Нет советов по дополнительным темам или вопросам которые я могла бы простить.

Speaker2: Что касается соцсетей в основном вы сказали что ваша тема на этом сосредоточена то я этим занимаюсь конечно мало но в основном этим это наше время.

это самый быстрый источник распространения информации по поэтому. возможно он один из самых верных но в то же время из за того как быстро распространяется важно фильтровать что видимо публиковать и должны фильтровать что публиковать и иметь какую то правильную подачу. такая подача есть у каких нибудь очень крупных сми типа федерального. но она стандартно нейтральная. и правильно а есть подать миру региональных сми которым очень нужно просмотров любыми способами могут там что нибудь увидите. любые фотографии подцепить любой сделать и это конечно очень не играет на руку здорово подаче информации.

Speaker1: Спасибо вам огромное.

APPENDIX 8 Data Depository

Github information with raw data

All the CSV Twitter data for four years is stored as a github depository with access only by direct link due to ethics issues (Appendix 8)

Data:

2017

2018

2019

2020

And all coding data from content analysis are stored there.

https://github.com/DariaDergacheva/Dergacheva_PhD_Thesis.git