

---

This is the **published version** of the bachelor thesis:

Solans Rodríguez, Júlia; Grasa, Rafael, dir. The role of the organization for security and co-operation in Europe in the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan in Nagorno- Karabakh. 2021. (1404 Grau en Relacions Internacionals)

---

This version is available at <https://ddd.uab.cat/record/272729>

under the terms of the  license



**Universitat Autònoma  
de Barcelona**

**Faculty of Political Science and Sociology  
Bachelor Thesis**

**THE ROLE OF THE ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY  
AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE IN THE CONFLICT  
BETWEEN ARMENIA AND AZERBAIJAN IN  
NAGORNO- KARABAKH**

Júlia Solans Rodríguez

Tutor: Rafael Grasa

Bachelor in International Relations

May 2022

**Table of contents**

1.Introduction .....2

2.Contextual framework .....4

3.Conceptual and analytical framework .....5

4.Analysis of the peace-making proposals .....8

    4.1. Long-lasting solutions, not small compromises. ....10

    4.2. High secrecy of the peace process .....10

    4.3. Recognition. Legitimacy .....12

5.Conclusions .....13

6.References and literature .....15

## 1. Introduction

**Comentado [Rafael Gr1]:** Bé, encara que caldrà modificar-lo al final

The aim of this study is to describe and analyse the development and evolution of the OSCE's role in the peace process of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, focusing mainly on the importance of the peace-making actions of the Minsk Group in the mediation process. Therefore, the following paper will not deal in detail with the deep historical roots of this conflict and its various escalations, which would require more pages of study.

This paper aims to determine the main mistakes made in the mediation of the peace process of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. It will try to determine what they are and find out whether the tools and mechanisms implemented in terms of peace making by the OSCE have been effective or not. It will also detail the different roles that the components of the Minsk Group have in the peace process, highlighting the importance of cooperation between Russia and the United States in the quest for conflict resolution.

Indeed, the research questions are:

1. What has been the role of the OSCE in the peace process of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict since 1992 (the initial date considered)? Who has been leading the mediation attempts in the peace process?
2. What has been the role of the international organization in the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave?
3. Should it be left to the Minsk Group and the three co-chairs, or it is time for a change of distribution?

In order to address the research questions, the study will begin with a contextual framework that will be devoted to getting into the subject, so it will be a brief description of the conflict and the different actors that are involved in the enclave. The contextual framework will be followed by a conceptual and analytical framework, in which it will explain what mediation is, discuss the importance of a third actor in conflict mediation and how the OSCE exercises the role of mediator with an extensive literature review. This section will end with an explanation of peace-making, which will be the concept under which the role of the OSCE Minsk Group will be analysed.

In the discussion, the different trends in the initiatives and mechanisms that have led to the failure of the conflict resolution proposed by the Minsk Group, created by the OSCE as the main actor in the mediation process, will be analysed (Gsell, 2001).

This will also clarify the limitations of conflict management when the dispute centers on two major international principles such as respect for territorial integrity and the right of ethnic minorities to self-determination. Other difficulties hindering OSCE action, such as the lack of political will of the parties to reach compromises to resolve the conflict, will also attempt to shed light on the difficulty of finding a solution to the conflict (Cavanaugh, 2016).

Finally, the paper's conclusions will attempt to explain whether the reasons for the non-resolution of the conflict are due to the conduct of international mediators such as the OSCE and the format of the negotiations, or to the local actors and their dynamics. In any case, several proposals will be given to unblock the different mediation proposals.

## 2. Contextual framework

The dispute over the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh between Armenia and Azerbaijan dates back to 1988, in the midst of the USSR's decomposition. In Soviet times, the territory was host to a majority Armenian population although it preserved the status of an autonomous 'Oblast' within the Republic of Azerbaijan (Yamakov, 1991). The Kremlin remained at a standstill until 1988, when the Nagorno-Karabakh authorities announced their intentions to separate from Azerbaijan to become part of the Armenian SSR. Azerbaijan's negative response to the loss of part of its territory precipitated the war between the two sides.

After the collapse of the USSR in 1991, Azerbaijan removed the autonomous status of Nagorno-Karabakh, and in return a referendum on independence was held in which the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (now called the Republic of Artsakh) declared its independence. It constitutes a *de facto* republic as it is comprised of a permanent population in a defined territory with a defined government and its ability to engage in relations with other states, although it is not generally recognised internationally, and is therefore not considered a *de iure* (de law) republic (Torosyan, 2019). As a result, the armed conflict would continue until 1994, when a ceasefire was established in the Bishkek Protocol. In addition, the so-called Line of Contact was established, which established the Azeri territories conquered by Armenia during the armed conflict (14% of Azeri territory) (Luchterhandt, 2013).

As will be discussed below, the negotiations will be conducted by the main mediator in this conflict, the OSCE. This organisation will create the Minsk Group. From this date onwards, the situation of "no war, no peace" has prevailed. Both sides maintain different approaches and strategies for resolving the dispute. On the one hand, Armenia argues that this conflict is rooted in a lack of respect for legitimate rights such as the population's right to self-

determination and seeks to regularise the status quo in the territory in the expectation that the region will follow the same course as Kosovo towards international legitimacy (Gsell, 2001). For Azerbaijan, on the other hand, it is a political and military conflict, and its solution to the conflict lies in the liberation of legitimate territories and the return of refugees. Each side defends a vision of the future in which the other has no place.

From the late 1990s onwards, the parties were still seeking an agreed solution to the conflict, while clashes occurred from time to time and did not cease. From 2016 onwards, the clashes increased, leading to an escalation of the conflict, the so-called "Four-Day War". In this war, the line of control was changed by the Azeri offensive, which regained some of the territory and perceived that armed force would be more useful than the diplomatic path. However, this escalation was resolved by Russia taking the initiative to lead the mediation process through tripartite meetings under the Minsk Group procedure, although sidelining the US and France (co-chairs). The resolution of this escalation only resulted in a suspension of hostilities, but not in a resolution of the conflict.

In July 2020, the conflict escalated into armed violence again with an Armenian offensive that was countered by Baku. These events foreshadowed the crisis that would emerge in September of the same year, which were the most severe since 2016. The Line of Conception was characterised by shelling and heavy weaponry, with each side blaming the other for initiating the first air strike. Both Armenia and Azerbaijan mobilised their troops and declared martial law. Again, Russia led the meeting under the framework of the Minsk Group and a humanitarian ceasefire was agreed with the aim of exchanging prisoners and the killed, as well as the start of a process to resolve the conflict (Coyle, 2020). However, the fighting did not cease, and a third agreement was reached in Washington, as both sides were breaking their commitments. Finally, in November, the ceasefire and cessation of hostilities came into effect. However, the accusations have not ceased since November 2020.

Although it may be believed that Armenia has the great advantage of having gained certain Azeri territories, the truth is that it is the weakest link in this conflict because, unlike Azerbaijan, it has no energy resources and no economic potential (González, 2021). Therefore, Azerbaijan has a comparative advantage over Armenia in establishing international relations with other States.

### 3. Conceptual and analytical framework

In this section, my aim is to define the conceptual framework under which I will analyse the role of the OSCE-established Minsk Group in peace-making in the management of the

**Comentado [Rafael Gr2]:** Diversificar cites, no tant gonzález

Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Thus, I will discuss the importance of a third actor in conflict mediation and how the OSCE exercises the role of mediator (to a greater or lesser extent) in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Although there are many factors that affect the effectiveness and failure of mediation with third parties such as the parties and their interaction or the characteristics of the dispute as outlined by Kloeiber (1996), we will focus on the characteristics of the mediator. The focus will not be on all Minsk Group actions, but on those actions in the field of peace-making that address incompatibilities between the contenders.

International mediation is one of the most effective and most efficient tools for the resolution of today's international conflicts (Mahmudlu and Abilov, 2017). Generally, successful conflict management strategies require the intervention of third parties to play the role of mediators (Betts, 1999). As Sung Hee Kim argues, when disputants are unable or unwilling to reach an agreement, third parties tend to intervene, either at their own request or on their own initiative to avoid resorting to violence (Bercovitch and Jackson, 2001).

Zartman argues that the rivalries found in Nagorno-Karabakh perceive their security relations as a zero-sum game in which one party's gain is perceived as the other party's loss (Kolodziej and Zartman, 1996). In these cases, negotiation or bargaining has little room for manoeuvre. This conflict is characterised by inflexibility and the inability of both sides to formulate alternative solutions. Hopmann therefore argues that in order to transform the conflict model towards a more zero-sum, problem-solving approach, the involvement of third parties as mediators can be helpful (Hopmann, 1996). In the absence of willingness on the part of both sides to engage in direct negotiations, the OSCE, among other external factors, will try to mediate in order to reach an agreement. The fact that mediation is being carried out by regional organisations such as the OSCE also means that the preventive diplomacy and mediation responsibilities that fell on the UN at the end of the Cold War are significantly reduced (Cavanaugh, 2016).

It is worth noting that there are several reasons why this conflict has alarmed the international community. First, it is a conflict that has led to a high rate of displacement since 1999. Secondly, there are concerns about instability in the region over oil resources. Access to energy reserves in the Caspian Sea is an important geopolitical consideration. However, the most important reason that alarms the international community is that the management of this conflict will set a precedent for the handling of similar conflicts in other former Soviet republics (Garibov, 2015). As with all secessionist movements, international recognition of Nagorno-Karabakh can be used to legitimise other movements.

Leaving aside the actors' general interest in mediation, each actor also has its own interests in mediation. As Zartman and Touval argue, mediators' intervention is aimed at conflict reduction, and is linked to other motives of their own (Zartman and Touval, 1985). In the end, mediators are part of the network of conflict relations with a stake in the result of the conflict. There are different factors that motivate external actors to mediate, and it depends on whether they are States, international organisations, etc. Often, peace-making is a reason for international organisations to exist. Sometimes international organisations want to increase their role in conflict situations in order to enhance their reputation as peacemakers. In the case of the OSCE in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, it aims to establish a certain reputation in the field of conflict resolution. Although the establishment of peace is not among its objectives, the OSCE wants Nagorno-Karabakh to be an opportunity to demonstrate that it is effective in the field of conflict resolution in the face of criticism for its inaction in Bosnia (Betts, 1999).

In order for mediation to take place, mediators must convince the disputants of the need for their intervention. The disputants must then decide whether to use mediation and choose the mediator who can produce the best result for them. In order to be potentially accepted, a mediator must meet several requirements such as being perceived as capable of providing a more favourable solution than the ongoing conflict, being seen as interested in achieving an acceptable outcome and being able to ensure the outcome (Betts, 1999). The OSCE was accepted as a viable mediator by the disputants and therefore played one of the most important roles.

As will be discussed in the analysis, the OSCE's role in conflict resolution will be a failure and it will lose its relevant role as one of the fundamental pillars of conflict resolution. This is due to the ineffectiveness of mediation because of the availability of mediators and the competition between them, which reduced the degree of influence of mediators to move the parties towards an agreement. It can also be attributed to the mediators' lack of influence and their consequent inability to manipulate the conflict successfully (Garibov, 2015). As Zartman and Touval argue, there are 3 different types of roles that a mediator plays depending on the nature of the conflict, the attitudes of the parties and the involvement of the parties: communicator, formulator or manipulator. In this conflict, the role of communicator was the main role played by all mediators, in particular the OSCE. The OSCE succeeded in providing a mechanism for the exchange of views of all parties. In this one, formulation and manipulation were central to the mediation efforts and the result was a failure (Touval and Zartman, 1989).



During the course of the conflict under study, at least one of the parties has questioned the acceptability of at least one mediator, and the merits of each mediator have been questioned at some point. One example is when a series of Azerbaijani military defeats in 1992 coincided with Iranian negotiations, and Azerbaijani leaders refused to accept Iran as an acceptable mediator. The fact that the disputants had the luxury of accepting and rejecting mediation at will was a function of the involvement of multiple mediators making various offers, so that the parties always had the option of recourse (Betts, 1999).

The mediating role of the OSCE will be analysed under the concept of peace making created by Johan Galtung. He explored a several key concepts such as the attitude-behaviour-contradiction triangle (ABC); the classification of peace strategies into peacekeeping, peace-making and peacebuilding (Shepherd, 2014). These concepts have been used so widely in the field of international relations and peace studies that they have become the official language used by the UN.

Peace-making is the process of encouraging the parties to reach a sustainable agreement to end hostilities essentially through peaceful means such as those provided for in Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations. While peace keeping and peace building are focused on attitudes and behaviours; peace-making is about addressing the incompatibility between parties, the structural factors that lead to the dispute (Galtung, 1985). In essence, it is about forcing the parties alone or together to come together, agree on a ceasefire and then work out a peace agreement that allows for a durable negative peace situation.

#### 4. Analysis of the peace-making proposals

The following discussion begins with a brief description of how, why (to which needs) and when the OSCE Minsk Group was formed. This is followed by an analysis of the peace-making actions of the Minsk Group and the failures in mediation.

Most of the discussion focuses on analysing three features of the Minsk Group's mediation trends that have led to its failure (and which are highly relevant to the peace-making process): short-term solutions, the high secrecy of the peace process, and the importance of the recognition of the parties in mediation.

The peace-making process is characterised by activities such as mediation, conciliation, or judicial arrangements. These elements of peace-making are reflected in the Agenda for Peace created by Boutros Boutros Ghali in 1992 (Boutros-Ghali, 1992). Third-party mediation was the favoured methodology in the conflict resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (Cornell, 2017). When the tension intensified, the parties reached

**Comentado [Rafael Gr3]:** Adaptar a taula continguts

**Comentado [Júlia Sol4]:**

agreement on third-party intervention at the CSCE/OSCE, which created the Minsk Group to address the issue.

The OSCE's mediation efforts have been led by the Minsk Group following the guiding principles of impartiality and respect for the principles of the UN Charter. In 1992, the CSCE Council in Helsinki suggested the creation of a conference that would engage both republics in order to facilitate a political-diplomatic settlement that would establish a lasting peace in the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh. The name was given because the peace conference was supposed to take place in Minsk (Belarus), although this meeting was ultimately abandoned due to the resurgence of combatants. It was finally held in Budapest in 1994 and was distinguished by the change from CSCE to OSCE and the establishment of the Minsk Group. In 1995, the formal co-chair of Minsk group held by Russia and Sweden was formed. The system of shared chairmanship was set up in 1997 and is chaired by Russia, France and the United States. At first, the objective of the Minsk Group was to secure a ceasefire since the group was established during the course of the war (Jiménez, 2021). Thus, the fact that the mechanism was created while the fighting was still going on raises the question of whether it is a peace process that aims to seek long-term solutions or simply a conflict management mechanism that seeks only to prevent hostilities and maintain the ceasefire. As Thomas de Waal puts it, the Minsk Process is a conference that has only been convened on occasion, a group that never meets as such, and a co-chair that operates under a barely known mandate, all under the name of a city in which mediators have never met (De Waal, 2010).

In 1994, the only mediation success was achieved by the Minsk Group: a ceasefire. It was achieved in the Bishkek Protocol through the mediation of the Russian representatives of the Minsk Group who encouraged the parties to reach an agreement to cease hostilities, which confirmed a 20% loss of Azerbaijani territory, about 30,000 deaths and a million people displaced. Despite the exchange of gunfire in recent years along the line of contact, the ceasefire held but did not materialise into a peace agreement. As a result, this peace process is characterised by a lack of results in terms of a conclusive resolution of the conflict.

In Zartman's view, the peace process is stuck in a stable and self-serving stalemate between the parties (Hopmann, et al., 2010). This does not mean that mediation is not being changed. On the contrary, the Minsk Group co-chairs have been switching between strategies such as package deal and step-by-step. And while the process has come close to making progress, the Minsk Group has made many missteps that have led to the failure of the OSCE's management.

#### 4.1. Long-lasting solutions, not small compromises.

The peace-making process has the objective of searching for sustainable solutions that provoke a change in their incompatibilities in the long term instead of short and friendly agreements or fragile truces to the increase of hostilities. The peace-making process takes on board the tough aspects and trade-offs of the conflict and does not seek for superficial solutions. Planning for future action in peace-making is of great relevance to peace agreements, especially in the case of interim agreements.

However, we do not see in the Minsk Group's proposals any attempt to change and transform attitudes in the long term, nor any predisposition to pave the way for achieving reconciliation between the actors.

This current cessation of hostilities would only be optimal if there was a need to act immediately because the armed conflict was of great emergency to put an end to the fighting. However, the ceasefire agreement has been maintained to a greater or lesser extent for more than 20 years and the death rate (despite the increase in recent years along the Line of Contact) does not show a pattern of full-scale warfare. As there is a consensus among the international community that there is no imminent danger of war, the conflict is a low priority in the international arena. Therefore, the current format is very limited and inefficient.

The Minsk Group has not prepared a peace-making plan that would form the foundation of the post-agreement phase of the settlement. Such plans to prepare for the "post-agreement" situation are of great relevance in order for the provisional agreement to be sustainable and for the parties to accept the rules of the game from the beginning. In other words, there must be a reliable commitment to avoid a breakdown of the rules immediately after the agreement, which is what has happened in the conflict under study. The actors must have solid security guarantees in order for the compromise in the intermediate phase to be viable. For the peace process to succeed will involve more than the willingness of both parties and the mediators. International funding is needed in terms of economic reconstruction and security support plans.

#### 4.2. High secrecy of the peace process

According to Douglas Noll, in the peace-making process and particularly in the mediation process, it is highly important to foster transparency and communication of information on the state of mediation. The mediator must emphasize the importance of transparency during the process itself and insist on communicating to the international community the

**Comentado [Rafael Gr5]:** Posr supartat a taula cntinguts

status of the negotiations of which they are a part. It should be pointed out, however, that there needs to be a degree of confidentiality in the mediation process in peace processes so that the actors can achieve more risky commitments. Announcing an agreement early may provoke a backlash within the parties, making it more difficult to achieve a settlement between contingents, and making it more difficult to explore other alternatives with their consequent trade-offs (Douglas, 2016).

One of the mistakes made by the Minsk Group in peace-making is the constant high secrecy of the negotiations. The lack of transparency during the entire negotiating process is noteworthy. An example of this is the change of strategy from "package deal" to "step by step" in the second half of 1997. Another example of the high lack of transparency is the absence of information regarding the progress of the OSCE annual reports of 2018 and 2019 (Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe, 2019). The progress of the negotiations, both the advances or difficulties in the negotiations is kept confidential and the public has no information about what is being debated, except when the leaders decide to filter information. In the Nagorno Karabakh mediation process there is no clear spokesperson or public profile that announces the progress of the mediation. This absence of information leads to the encouragement of rumours and other conspiracy theories. Rumours are problematic when the parties are negotiating ambiguous proposals (Cornell, 2017).

According to Stedman, mediators must be able to be represented through a common voice to avoid any misunderstandings and must be able to make both promises and threats in a plausible manner (Stedman and Rothchild, 1996).

This lack of clarity and openness benefits the leaders of both contingents because since the beginning of the OSCE's management in 1992 they have always preferred a secretive process, which means no international pressure on the results of the negotiations. In this way, both leaders have almost total control over the substance of the peace process. They not only want to have control over decision-making, but also over every detail of the negotiations. Their task is to jointly conduct the peace process at the desired speed and pace. This privilege allows them to control the peace process through the co-chairmanship of the Minsk Group, and when the negotiations are not moving at the expected pace, they have a target to be blamed: France, Russia or the United States. In this way they are released from making any concessions that could form part of a commitment. If the leaders would focus more on the result they aspire to and less on the form the process takes, they could have created a constant channel of permanent bilateral

contact without the need to establish the Minsk Group (after the Lisbon Summit in 1996 it was established on a discontinuous basis).

Furthermore, the coordination mechanism of the 3+2 meetings has only brought a slow coordination. It is a mechanism that needs ongoing coordination between the co-chairs of the Minsk Group, and currently this management is not conducive to swift and agile diplomacy as it is very difficult to keep up with the pace of negotiations (Hopmann, 1996). As was shown in the only successful OSCE mediation effort, the 1994 cease-fire, with a single mediator, negotiations can be handled more rapidly and effectively. It is a clear example as it was mediated by the Russian representative who after long and tense rounds of negotiations between the two belligerents achieved the cease-fire. So one of the lessons is that a single mediator would have been more agile and productive.

#### 4.3. Recognition. Legitimacy

A successful peace-making process can be carried out when there is a recognition of legitimacy based on the consensus of the parties concerned. A lasting peace treaty must address the grievances and how they will be addressed in order to provide for a future cohabitation between the parties (Douglas, 2016). In addition, it can create new bodies, usually institutions, that are pledged to carry out peace-making. Just as international sources are needed for post-settlement economic restructuring and mediators between the disputants, the support of the Armenian, Azerbaijani and Karabakh population is also of vital importance.

The problem is that the Nagorno-Karabakh peace process talks do not involve the leadership of Nagorno-Karabakh (the self-styled Republic of Arsakh), as Azerbaijan categorically refuses to negotiate with them on the grounds that their territoriality and sovereignty is being challenged (Jiménez, 2021). However, the co-chairs of the Minsk Group and Armenian negotiators are in regular contact with the leaders of the self-proclaimed republic. It should be noted that the Azeri representatives of the Republic are also not included in the negotiation process. Thus, both contenders are not only interested in a highly secretive process, but also in a narrow process in which there is no room for civil society participation in order to be in charge of all the details of the discussion. To that end, they block any attempt at civil society participation in the peace process. This lack of civil society participation shows that there is no effort to build trust before reaching the adoption of an agreement since both actors do not show great motivation to unblock the existing status quo due to the absence of incentives and disincentives to put an end to incompatibilities. This lack of trust resulting from the non-participation of civil society makes it more likely that a provisional agreement incorporating their uncertainties will

**Comentado [Rafael Gr6]:** Posae títol a taula continguts

never be reached. Although the optimal situation for the adoption of an agreement would be confidence from one belligerent towards the other and vice versa, this is a Utopian situation. Therefore, at the very least, the ability to rely on third party actors who can ensure the adoption of an agreement would be optimal.

Both republics have been accepting the maintenance of the status quo of the territory, Armenia for the territorial control it has gained, and Azerbaijan has been enhancing its economic situation (Gsell, 2001).

Moreover, the Karabakh Azerbaijanis comprise a minority and have no elected leadership and no official structure, unlike the Karabakh Armenians. This does not mean that they should not have a role in the negotiations. However, the Karabaki Armenians reject that the Karabakh Azeri minority should be considered a community just like them, so they try to keep the Karabaki nickname for their ethnicity.

Therefore, the participation of the Karabakis is part of the agenda of issues to be negotiated in the peace process. It is not so much controversial whether they should participate or not, but how and in what form they should be included (Cavanaugh, 2016).. This issue has been more intractable than the negotiations for the 1994 cease-fire agreement.

## 5. Conclusions

After the dissolution of the USSR and the emergence of independent states, the OSCE was created with the aim of being the main regional organisation equipped with conflict prevention and resolution tools to take the lead in conflicts such as the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. However, despite having sought to play a leading role in the enclave since 1992, it has failed miserably to fulfil any of its mandated objectives. They have failed to determine the status of Nagorno-Karabakh, to solve the conflict or even to avoid outbreaks of war, as we can see in the latest escalation in 2020 (the cease-fire of the escalation in question was also led by Russia).

The tripartite presidency between the United States, Russia, and France for the purpose of securing the balance of power in the international arena and compromising interests has only hampered rather than helped. It has relaunched the peace process. As the last two ceasefires have shown, having a single mediator (Russia) has made the process faster and more harmonious. Moreover, the shared chairmanship has led to a lack of transparency and clarity as there has been no clear spokesman person and information

was constantly leaked by third parties. Both attributes, transparency, and clarity, are key in a peace-making process.

Secondly, the Minsk Group was created when the armed conflict had already begun, so its negotiating structures are created in a context of looking for a quick and agile solution, and not so much a change in the incompatibilities between the actors. They seek a cessation of hostilities but do not create a post-conflict settlement, which is fundamental in terms of peace making. Not only change in attitudes, but also in incompatibilities.

Finally, the recognition of the legitimacy of the parties to participate in the peace process is essential in order to begin mediation and for the future cohabitation between both actors. This has also been a problem in the peace process as both sides deny each other's participation and the self-declared Republic of Artsakh authorities themselves are not included in the mediation.

This has led the OSCE to lose its leading role in conflict management. And this leadership has been passed to Russia, which has been successful in managing a peacekeeping operation on the ground in two weeks, which the OSCE has been attempting since 1994. Thus, the OSCE has missed the opportunity to play a fundamental role as an international organisation in terms of conflict resolution. We can conclude that if no advances are made in a mediation process and there are likely to be setbacks, it is not going to be successful, particularly if the post-war settlement is systemically broken. So, we move from a frozen conflict with a hopeful peace process to a conflict with a frozen peace process. This hypothesis is confirmed by the latest war escalations in 2016 and 2020.

Despite the Minsk Group's peace-making mistakes, local dynamics and analysis of local actors have not helped mediation management either.

Since the Minsk Group has sought to lead a process from which it has clearly lost out, it is worth asking how it can be made to work more effectively. In the following, I have designed some brief recommendations for possible implementation with the aim of unblocking the negotiations.

Firstly, international actors could exert international pressure on local leaders. A certain level can be applied by the international arena, because as the representative of the OSCE chairman in Nagorno-Karabakh said, imposing a solution is dangerous, so the solution must be mutually agreed upon by the parties. An example of this pressure could be the suspension of investments until the adoption of an agreement. Thus, coordination of the co-chairs would be required, which seems to be unlikely.

Secondly, there must be incentives and low risks to ensure cost-effective implementation of the agreements. In order to reduce the risk of non-cooperation in the intermediate period, a referendum on self-determination could be conditioned in some manner. In other words, a self-determination referendum could be conducted under certain conditions, such as the compliance with the return of displaced persons.

The third proposal is related to the format of the mediation. The fact that there are many mediators proposing different solutions is an impediment to the manipulation of time. The problem is that the contenders are not worried about the consequences of continuing the armed confrontation if they know that mediation will always be an available option. There is a lack of a sense of urgency on both sides to end the incompatibilities because there is always a facilitator on hand to mediate.

## 6. References and literature

Bercovitch, Jacob, and Richard Jackson. 2001. "Negotiation or Mediation?: An Exploration of Factors." Retrieved from: <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1571-9979.2001.tb00227.x>

Betts, W. (1999). Third party mediation: an obstacle to peace in Nagorno Karabakh. *SAIS Review* (1989-2003), 161-183. Retrieved from: [https://www.jstor.org/stable/45345845?casa\\_token=UOs\\_ZG3xbqEAAAAA%3AN\\_\\_joxxhWOUSJLfeHN\\_YLIdNhIfS1n3xjvQNQGXFgGGiRrWAsUUhlvmeE9fIUAlkH6qCklRVgeQRWiYYH1MoWE4ffjlrL62EwmXxhdiUZAcpGO81-4](https://www.jstor.org/stable/45345845?casa_token=UOs_ZG3xbqEAAAAA%3AN__joxxhWOUSJLfeHN_YLIdNhIfS1n3xjvQNQGXFgGGiRrWAsUUhlvmeE9fIUAlkH6qCklRVgeQRWiYYH1MoWE4ffjlrL62EwmXxhdiUZAcpGO81-4)

Boutros-Ghali, Boutros (1992). "An agenda for peace: Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping." *International Relations* 11.3: 201-218. Retrieved from: <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/004711789201100302?journalCode=ireb>

Cavanaugh, C. (2016). OSCE and the Nagorno-Karabakh Peace Process. *Security and Human Rights*, 27(3-4), 422-441. Retrieved from: [https://brill.com/view/journals/shrs/27/3-4/article-p422\\_422.xml](https://brill.com/view/journals/shrs/27/3-4/article-p422_422.xml)

Ceyhun Mahmudlu & Shamkhal Abilov (2017): The peace-making process in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict: why did Iran fail in its mediation effort?, *Journal of Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe*, DOI: 10.1080/25739638.2017.1404259. Retrieved from: <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/25739638.2017.1404259>

Cornell, S. E. (Ed.). (2017). *The international politics of the Armenian-Azerbaijani Conflict: The original "frozen conflict" and European security*. Springer. Retrieved from: <https://books.google.es/books?hl=es&lr=&id=pVULD-gAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PP6&dq=The+International+Politics+of+the+Armenian+-Azerbaijani+Conflict+The+Original+%E2%80%9CFrozen+Conflict%E2%80%9D+%26+European+Security&ots=pF6XpKct-l&sig=ObXGdzlRsNQ4Ng9K6eH8VFpt7e0#v=onepage&q&f=false>

Coyle, J. J. (2020). *Russia's interventions in ethnic conflicts: The case of Armenia and Azerbaijan*. Springer Nature. Retrieved from: <https://books.google.es/books?hl=es&lr=&id=wOILEAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR5&dq=ja>



mes+coyle+rudd+intervention+in+ethnic+conflicts&ots=8s5MR4BvR7&sig=JFsheYCiQPRF1Eq5NbTrqKeUNMk

De Waal, T. (2010). Remaking the Nagorno-Karabakh peace process. *Survival*, 52(4), 159-176. Retrieved from <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00396338.2010.506830?needAccess=true>

Galtung, J. (1985). *Twenty-Five Years of Peace Research: Ten Challenges and Some Responses*. *Journal of Peace Research*, 22(2), 141-158. doi:10.1177/002234338502200205. Retrieved from: <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/002234338502200205>

Galtung, J. (2019). On the anthropology of the United Nations system. In *The nature of United Nations bureaucracies* (pp. 1-22). Routledge. Retrieved from: <https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9780429313028-1/anthropology-united-nations-system-johan-galtung>

Garibov, A. (2015). OSCE and conflict resolution in the post-soviet area: the case of the Armenia-Azerbaijan Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. *Caucasus International*, 5(2), 89. Retrieved from: [https://d1wqtxts1xzle7.cloudfront.net/55800070/Azad\\_Garibov-with-cover-pagev2.pdf?Expires=1652002230&Signature=NTaqGsO134PABcYtH1jf8PoLNkIQd012tKELIGtmF5OWBw2eI~-vophie~Q5KBw9LVEFDAIP2m7~XH0-ph7OP-GfaMiflVnRmMUA~5YqREIYxIwG3JjRDWya3e5OkJIT~68aGWSplvsDYPaKWyluSN8sAEuUW~kdIMX4UfL3l1940RwDQwRIByLCesw77XjUeIT6ELow9zywe0OyySGltyFbdpHzSzMNNIsfMGQk8nAvGmCeX8UH1M8V~SVPIKy9cLAGrQeP7GFDtlmHZxJbqXiuJ3kai8JJHJ8~GaQGL33~e3judxHJ9Fz4915YwxnyO7cY~vyFlqaN49nnhqZn7A\\_\\_&Key-Pair-Id=APKAJLOHF5GGSLRBV4ZA](https://d1wqtxts1xzle7.cloudfront.net/55800070/Azad_Garibov-with-cover-pagev2.pdf?Expires=1652002230&Signature=NTaqGsO134PABcYtH1jf8PoLNkIQd012tKELIGtmF5OWBw2eI~-vophie~Q5KBw9LVEFDAIP2m7~XH0-ph7OP-GfaMiflVnRmMUA~5YqREIYxIwG3JjRDWya3e5OkJIT~68aGWSplvsDYPaKWyluSN8sAEuUW~kdIMX4UfL3l1940RwDQwRIByLCesw77XjUeIT6ELow9zywe0OyySGltyFbdpHzSzMNNIsfMGQk8nAvGmCeX8UH1M8V~SVPIKy9cLAGrQeP7GFDtlmHZxJbqXiuJ3kai8JJHJ8~GaQGL33~e3judxHJ9Fz4915YwxnyO7cY~vyFlqaN49nnhqZn7A__&Key-Pair-Id=APKAJLOHF5GGSLRBV4ZA)

González, M. B. (2021). Rusia y Turquía en Nagorno-Karabaj, entre la militarización y la diplomacia. *Revista del Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos*. Retrieved from: <https://revista.ieee.es/article/view/2727>

Gsell, N. S. (2001). Conflicto del Alto Karabaj: actores y gestión internacional. *Papeles de cuestiones internacionales*. Retrieved from: [https://www.fuhem.es/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/conflicto\\_del\\_Alto-Karabaj\\_N.SAINZ\\_.pdf](https://www.fuhem.es/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/conflicto_del_Alto-Karabaj_N.SAINZ_.pdf)

Hopmann, P. T. (1996). *The negotiation process and the resolution of international conflicts*. University of South Carolina Press. Retrieved from: [https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0022002705282862?casa\\_token=h6aPdX2TO8IAAAAA:PH2Xcl\\_YWAX38jTBd7TEpdzvExobyc01uEt7tzAkFCmePKAteNnj3VRpIlc0nZaatGkyz-qCfApiJg](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0022002705282862?casa_token=h6aPdX2TO8IAAAAA:PH2Xcl_YWAX38jTBd7TEpdzvExobyc01uEt7tzAkFCmePKAteNnj3VRpIlc0nZaatGkyz-qCfApiJg)

Hopmann, P. Terrence, and I. William Zartman.(2010) "Overcoming the nagorno-karabakh stalemate." *International Negotiation* 15.1: 1-6. Retrieved from: [https://brill.com/view/journals/iner/15/1/article-p1\\_1.xml](https://brill.com/view/journals/iner/15/1/article-p1_1.xml)

Jiménez, J. A. L. (2021). La OSCE y el espacio post-soviético: 30 años de prevención y resolución de conflictos. Una valoración crítica. *Revista electrónica de estudios internacionales (REEI)*, (41), 9. Retrieved from: <https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/articulo?codigo=7983233>

Kleiboer, Marieke. 1996. "Understanding Success and Failure of International Mediation." *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 40 (2): 360-389. doi:10.1177/0022002796040002007. Retrieved from: <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0022002796040002007>

Kolodziej, E., & Zartman, V. A. (1996). *Coping with Conflict: A Global Approach*. En: Kolodziej, E.; Kanet, RE (Ed.) *Coping with conflict after the Cold War*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP. Retrieved from: [https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/002200202237931?casa\\_token=Ghj\\_Auc-KEkAAAAA:JPgCSplqtG2\\_qcuZ1w5OoNMM7BfCZpUebD\\_xij2eYb9T7Vjns5Pyl4yHB26zRoPIQAZgsjSr6ySHP1c](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/002200202237931?casa_token=Ghj_Auc-KEkAAAAA:JPgCSplqtG2_qcuZ1w5OoNMM7BfCZpUebD_xij2eYb9T7Vjns5Pyl4yHB26zRoPIQAZgsjSr6ySHP1c)

Luchterhandt, O. (2013). Learning from Georgia: A non-use-of-force treaty for Nagorno-Karabakh. In *Europe's Next Avoidable War* Palgrave Macmillan, London. Retrieved from: [https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9781137030009\\_20](https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9781137030009_20)

Lucuta, Monica Gabriela (25 de abril de 2014): Peacemaking, peacekeeping, peacebuilding and peace enforcement in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Peace insights. Retrieved from: <https://www.peaceinsight.org/en/articles/peacemaking-peacekeeping-peacebuilding-peace-enforcement-21st-century/?location=&theme=>

Noll, Douglas (26 de noviembre de 2016): Ten Principles of Peacemaking. Mediate. Retrieved from: <https://www.mediate.com/articles/noll5.cfm>

Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe (25 April 2019): OSCE Annual Report 2018.OSCE. Retrieved from: <https://www.osce.org/annual-report/2018>

Pathak, B. (2016). Johan Galtung's Conflict Transformation Theory for Peaceful World: Top and Ceiling of Traditional Peacemaking. Retrieved from: <https://cutt.ly/0G8aLky>

Rubin, J. Z., Pruitt, D. G., & Kim, S. H. (1994). *Social conflict: Escalation, stalemate, and settlement*. McGraw-Hill Book Company. Retrieved from: <https://psycnet.apa.org/record/1993-98838-000>

Shepherd, L. J. (2014). Peacebuilding. In *Gender Matters in Global Politics* (pp. 296-310). Routledge. Retrieved from: <https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781315879819-36/peacebuilding-laura-shepherd>

SOME ASPECTS OF STATE-BUILDING PROCESS IN THE REPUBLIC OF ARTSAKH (NKR)\* H. Torosyan Russian-Armenian University <https://science.rau.am/uploads/documents/1626175767.pdf#page=56> (2019)

Stedman, S. J., & Rothchild, D. (1996). Peace operations: From short-term to long-term commitment. *International Peacekeeping*, 3(2), 17-35. Retrieved from: <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13533319608413610>

Touval, S., & Zartman, I. W. (1989). Mediation in international conflicts. *Mediation research: The process and effectiveness of third-party intervention*, 115-137. Retrieved from: [https://scholar.google.com/scholar?cites=5038549985119844649&as\\_sdt=2005&sciodt=0,5&hl=en](https://scholar.google.com/scholar?cites=5038549985119844649&as_sdt=2005&sciodt=0,5&hl=en)

Yamakov, A. N. (1991). Ethnic Conflict in the Transcaucasus: The Case of Nagorno-Karabakh. *Theory and Society*, 20(5), 631-660. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/657781>

Zartman, I. W., & Touval, S. (1985). International mediation: Conflict resolution and power politics. *Journal of social issues*, 41(2), 27-45. Retrieved from: <https://eclass.aueb.gr/modules/document/file.php/DEOS290/%CE%92%CE%99%CE%92%CE%9B%CE%99%CE%9F%CE%93%CE%A1%CE%91%CE%A6%CE%99%CE%91%20%20%CE%A5%CE%A0%CE%9F%CE%A3%CE%A4%CE%97%CE%A1%CE%99%CE%9A%CE%A4%CE%99%CE%9A%CE%9F%20%CE%A5%CE%9B%CE%99%CE%9A%CE%9F/Zartman-Touval-Mediation-1985.pdf>