Small states, status seeking and power in International Relations: a comparative between Qatar, Singapore and Rwanda

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Declaro, con mi firma al pie, que el presente trabajo es original y que no contiene plagios o usos indebidos de otras fuentes y acepto las consecuencias que podría tener contravenir el presente compromiso.
Summary:

Small states can achieve influence and power in the international system by implementing some status-seeking strategies oriented to upgrade their relevance towards the hegemon. This essay will try to discern some ‘status markers’ in order to identify properly a consistent strategy and then it will be observed if Singapore, Qatar and Rwanda fulfil these markers. We will conclude it is possible to identify status-seeking strategies, and the analysed three countries are implementing their own in a similar way. Thus, they achieve a ‘sit at the table’ of the international system despite having no material resources.

Keywords: small states, status, status seeking, agency, Qatar, Rwanda, Singapore

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0. Introduction

A small country from the Gulf peninsula, Qatar, disrupted world football statu quo in early 2010s when was appointed by FIFA as host for 2022 World Cup\(^1\), announced a 5-year €165 million commercial T-shirt agreement with FC Barcelona team\(^2\) and acquired Paris Saint Germain football team\(^3\). Qatar, the same Arab nation who launched in 1996 Al Jazeera TV station - a major media player in the post 9/11 era and in the 2010-11 Arab Uprisings- and the same Arab nation who partnered France in 2011 military intervention in Libya.

From an International Relations (IR)' systemic point of view, it shouldn’t happen this way. Countries are supposed to play the role allowed by their material capabilities. So, a small country like Qatar (just 11.586 km\(^2\) and 2.3 million inhabitants) couldn’t be a key player in the international system. But despite that, Qatar was playing a role. A role that annoyed his Saudi neighbours, the regional hegemon, who decided to start a blockade against Qatar in June 2017 jointly with the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain and Egypt. In a nutshell, their main demands were: to shut down Al Jazeera and to end his maverick foreign policy.

This diplomatic crisis had a huge impact in another small country’s public opinion: Singapore. Years before Qatar appeared as a player in the global arena, another small country like Singapore also shook the official narrative on power. In 70s-80s, this Southeastern Asian island surprised the international community by achieving a first-class economical progression. In 2017, Qatari crisis raised the spectre of a ‘Singaporean crisis’ lead by Malaysia or Indonesia. Singapore diplomat Kishore Mahbubani openly assured: “This Qatar episode holds many lessons for Singapore” (Mahbubani 2017).

Singapore, a small successful country viewed as a lighthouse for another small country who also wants to punch above his weight as Rwanda. In fact, in 2008 Rwandan president Paul

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Kagame requested the director of the Brenthurst Foundation, Greg Mills, to prepare a summary of Singapore’s key lessons as a development model to follow⁴.

Qatar, Singapore and Rwanda: three small countries, each one with their own material, political and cultural characteristics and capabilities, who are trying to surpass their tangible smallness throughout a consistent status-seeking strategy.

By analysing these three subjects, we will try to comprehend which strategies follows a small state in order to gain status over its substantially low material resources —or, in Qatar’s case, his low material resources compared to his neighbours and regional hegemons.

In fact, from a materialistic point of view, Norway is also a small state with just 5.2 million inhabitants, but it’s commonly studied as a middle-power peer to peer with Canada, with some kind of normative impact in world politics. Norway's niche diplomacy focused on peace building has achieved to project worldwide a strong image of the nation. U.S. President Barack Obama assured in December 2009 that “Norway punches above its weight”⁵, a public recognition about Norway’s role in the world. And the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs Knut Vollebæk explained in 2010 that his niche diplomacy focused on peace building “not necessarily is an expression of altruism (...). This gave us access also to other fields where I could speak about salmon and other things after a while (...). This made us both useful and interesting” (Røen, Risvik and De Carvalho, 2010:102). Basically, gaining status as a way to gain power: “Social honour, or prestige, may even be the basis of economic power, and very frequently has been” (Weber, 1979:927).

Similarly to Norway's case, there are some studies about status seeking strategies of other small developed countries. But there are few focused on those of developing ones. This article tries to broke this tendency by focusing on small states outside the European frame.

‘Power’ is a key concept in IR theory. Joseph S. Nye defined ‘power’ as the ability to influence the behaviour of others in order to obtain the outcome you desire (Nye, 2004). By seeking an upgraded status category, these three small states are pursuing a certain form of power. Thus, by analysing their status strategies we also could try to bring some light to the concept by a new way.

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1. Methodology

In this essay we will try to answer the following research question: “Despite lacking material resources, can small states achieve a certain degree of influence in the international system applying status-seeking strategies?”

Through our research we will try to work with and link two contested and/or insufficiently developed concepts in the IR discipline as ‘small state’ and ‘status’. We can state that both concepts have obtained relatively poor attention from many IR scholars. Therefore, we point out we are entering in an undetermined area where not much guides are provided, although we hope that this exercise may be useful for future analysis on the subject. By taking this photo we will observe if small states are able to achieve power by implementing strategies specifically oriented to upgrading their status.

In order to make operative our research question, we will formulate two working hypotheses. Our first hypothesis is that small states from different geographical and cultural regions, and with different development levels, can achieve a higher level of status than their material capabilities. We will try to prove that strategies to reach a higher status could be similar despite these differences. We also formulate the hypothesis that these status-seeking strategies are basically based in ‘soft power’ tools, as a difference with great powers that mostly rely in ‘hard power’ tools to maintain their status.

As independent variables we will observe many ‘status markers’ described in paragraphs ahead (national wealth progression, acquisition of high-technology weapons, hosting international sports events, etc.), while the dependent variable will be international status of small states.

In the following chapter we will define both ‘small state’ and ‘status’, we will observe if there are defined strategies to gain social status in the international system and then we will identify which markers we can analyse in order to identify a consistent status-seeking strategy. In the third chapter we will analyse to what extent Singapore, Qatar and Rwanda fulfil these markers, obtaining a photograph of their similarities and differences regarding status-seeking strategies. Finally, we will draw some conclusions.
2. Theoretical framework

2.1. IR theories

The fundamental ordering principle of international politics is anarchy. There is no ‘world government’, thus every country looks for its own interests in a system characterised by states’ unregulated use of power. Despite this basic definition of world politics, hierarchy is also a key concept to understand how international system works. Hierarchy understood as social contracts between sovereign states that bind both dominant and subordinate members, achieving significant effects on the foreign policies of states as well as patterns of international conflict and cooperation (Lake, 2009). Systemic anarchy and hierarchic relations between supposed peers are perfectly compatible, as authors like Organski (1958), Keohane (1969), Waltz (1993), Buzan & Waever (2000) or Lake (2009) have largely theorised.

UN is composed by 193 states. Therefore, despite anarchy, despite each one of these countries have one vote at the UN General Assembly, it’s also observable they are not in the same position in the International system. In fact, 50% of worldwide territory is controlled by just eight governments: Russia, Canada, China, U.S., Brazil, Australia, India and Argentina. And, on the other hand, six states hold sovereignty over 50% of world population (Barbé 2007: 171): China, India, U.S., Indonesia, Brazil and Pakistan. From an economic point of view, the intergovernmental political forum of major industrialised countries in the world, G8, was formed until 2014 by U.S., Japan, Germany, France, UK, Italy, Canada and Russia. And top 10 countries by GDP in 2017 (World Bank 2017) were: U.S., China, Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom, France, India, Italy, Brazil and Canada. Finally, nine countries possess nuclear weapons: U.S., Russia, UK, France, China, India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea.

By analysing these five classifications we can easily observe that territory, population, political and economical power are not necessary correlated. There are 'small countries' in territorial terms –Japan has just 377,915 km2, ranking 63 in CIA’s World Factbook- that are giants from an economic perspective. Even South Korea, the Netherlands or Switzerland are major players

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6 Suspended from organisation in 2014 as a sanction for Crimea's annexation
7 Israel has not confirmed that it has nuclear weapons, while Federation of American Scientists argues they have between 100 and 200; https://fas.org/nuke/guide/israel/nuke/index.html
in global economy (12th, 17th and 20th, respectively\(^8\)) that doesn’t appear in any of these classical lists. On the other hand, in these rankings we can find territorial giants but political dwarfs like Argentina or Australia. And small states with nuclear armament, like Israel and North Korea. Finally, looking at the end of all these charts, we can observe up to 58 unities (states and territories) which have populations under one million people.

From a realist conception of the world “The strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept” (Thucydides, trans. 1972:401-2), just great powers rule the world and are the ‘subjects’ of the international system and the rest can simply obey what they establish, becoming ‘objects’. From a realist perspective, states have no legal or moral restrictions in international affairs and they just pursue their own interest. Thus, this IR school considers just great powers deserve academic attention. Even the founding figure of neo-realism, Kenneth Waltz, considered “ridiculous” to focus on other countries but great powers (Waltz, 1979:72). As realism and neo-realism have been the main theories in IR studies, this is the reason why very few countries deserved a real academic interest.

Nevertheless, once the U.S.S.R. collapsed and Cold War finished, ‘hard power’ (military coercion, economical sanctions…) becomes increasingly less important in IR analysis. As many scholars point out, nuclear weapons -considered as one of the most important hard power tools- limit wars between major powers (Waltz, 1993; Buzan & Waever, 2003; Larson, Paul and Wohlfirth, 2014). Therefore, deterministic theories like Realism and Neo-realism -based on material elements and the solely relevance of hard power- loose explanatory capacities in front of constructivist ones, based on the ideational dimension of world politics -ideas, norms, institutions, interests, human behaviour, money, rights, power relations…- and focusing on the agency-structure relation. As power is considered relational, social and perceptual, studies on small and middle powers agency become more prominent in the IR academia. In fact, Keohane already stated in 1969: "If Lilliputians can tie up Gulliver, or make him do their fighting for them, they must be studied as carefully as the giant" (Keohane 1969:310).

\(^8\) International Monetary Fund (n.d.) “GDP, current prices”. Retrieved from: http://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/NGDPD@WEO/OEMDC/ADVEC/WEO/JPN/FRA/ESP
2.2. Small state

Despite Keohane’s claim, little progress has been achieved in this area. Even ‘small state’ remains a contested concept in the IR literature. And paradoxically we could say that Keohane’s literary image entails a great-powerness point of view of the world. As an American academic, Keohane presumed every mini-creature who tied the giant was a Lilliputian. But assuming this image... how the giant, lying naked on the floor, could know that every small creature who tied him was a Lilliputian? Maybe there were pygmies, smurfs, dwarfs, midgets, trolls, gnomes, elves, pixies, or even fairies, with different sizes and their own character. Similarly, every small state who ties the great power has its own character too, being quite difficult to study them as a group.

In fact, the discipline of IR has not agreed a clear definition of what a ‘small state’ is. Baehr concluded in 1975 that ‘small state’ is simply not a useful analytical category, as ‘smallness’ does not ipso facto explain anything (Baehr:1975:466). Since then, the lack of progress in identifying the behavioural characteristics of small states is broadly documented by many scholars9.

Once the academical incapability to define what a small state is has been stated, it is also a reality that in the United Nations (UN) exists an informal grouping established precisely by Singapore in 1992 entitled ‘Forum of Small States (FOSS)’ in order to lobby for each other, discuss issues, exchange ideas and coordinate positions (Chew, 2015:36). Membership in FOSS is based not in physical size but by population, considering 10 million inhabitants as the barrier. Nowadays, FOSS comprises 107 countries (MFA of Singapore, 2018), from New Zealand to Uruguay, as is sustained in a non-ideological and non-geographical base.

From that point of view, Singapore (5.6 million inhabitants) and Qatar (2.4) are ‘small states’. Rwanda surpassed that barrier in 2013 and in 2018 officially has a population of 12 million inhabitants10. Many scholars have proposed to identify smallness with the size of the state, but this limitation heads us to a proved non-useful category when a minor modification is done.

To cope with the academical cul-de-sac explained above, we could try to recover a systemic role approach to ‘small state’ definition suggested by Keohane himself. He differentiates

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9 Archer and Nugent (2002; 2-5); Neumann and Gstöhl (2006, 9-16), Maas (2009:65); Bailes (2013:3); Kruizinga (2016:421)
between “system-determining states”, “system-influencing states”, “system-affecting states” and “system-ineffectual states” (Keohane, 1969:295-6). From that point of view, small states are those located into the category “system-ineffectual states”, and their leaders “consider that it can never, acting alone or in a small group” could make a significant impact on the system.

To some extent, this definition matches with the one suggested by Mouritzen and Wivel, considering small states as “the weaker part in an asymmetric relationship unable to change the nature or functioning of the relationship on their own” (Mouritzen and Wivel, 2005:4).

Approaching the phenomena by other side, we could accept a ‘small state’ is not a ‘great power’. A neo-Realist scholar as Danilovic analyses great powers from three angles: a) power potential, both economic and military as well as demographic and territorial; b) their scope of interests and their capabilities to sustain the interests that transcend the boundaries of their home region; c) their willingness to pursue a great power role (Danilovic 2002:45-46).

Similarly, Buzan and Waever consider ‘superpowers’ as countries with: a) first-class military-political capabilities and the economies to support such capabilities; b) they must be capable of global military and political reach; c) they need to see themselves as having this rank (Buzan and Waever, 2004:34-35).

Finally, Barbé also define ‘powers’ as those countries who have the military and economic resources to fix the rules and to defend these rules (Barbé, 2007:185-190).

By analysing these three authors, we can abstract the idea that three elements are bound to be taken into account at the time of analysing each country: a) distribution of power (resources); b) systemic role - role played in the international system (agenda setting, stability/order/change of the structure, etc.); c) identity/self-perception (interests: domestic or regional/global).

Accepting this three-side approach as valid to analyse countries (resources, systemic role and self-perception), we can conclude ‘great powers’ rank high in each one of them, and ‘small states’ rank low. Between them, ‘middle powers’ have material capabilities, a notable degree of foreign policy autonomy and the willingness to play outsized roles in their regions (Gilley and O’Neil, 2014:4-7). So, ‘middle powers’ are both “system-influencing states” and “system-affecting states”, using Keohane’s classification.

From a neo-realist point of view, we are bound to classify Rwanda as a small state: it’s a system-ineffectual nation, has no military power and plays no-role in the international system. But it will be unfair saying Rwandan elites’ have no interests beyond domestic ones. Danilovic herself accepts constructivist concepts as ‘role’ or ‘willingness’ as a dimension to be considered. So, the ‘smallness’ or ‘greatness’ of a small state could be understood as an elite’s
construction (Thorhallsson and Wivel, 2006:664; Browning, 2006; Gvalia, Siroky et al. 2013:102; Gibert and Grzelczyk, 2016:3; Kruizinga, 2016:433; Mohammadzadeh, 2017:34) and it is basic to analyse this aspect as a keystone to understand foreign policies of one or another country.

That means: ideas matter. Attitudes mater. Small states have agency enough to defy their territorial limitations (Chong, 2010). In fact, Rwandan president, Paul Kagame, refuses his country to be considered as a ‘small state’. He proclaimed: “They called us a small failed state. But we refused to fail. We refused to be small. We are not small. A good idea cannot be small. Good ideology cannot be small. People, a nation cannot be small” (Kwibuka, 2016).

Yet in 1984, the Norwegian diplomat Jan Egeland suggested the concept ‘Potent Small State’ to label those small states committed to act as norm entrepreneurs worldwide in the human rights area (Egeland, 1984). That means some small states perceive themselves as greater than their limited material capabilities and, thus, they try to achieve a greater role in world politics throughout playing an active role. That is, trying to influence/affect the system.

Assuming the suggested definition of ‘small state’ -system-ineffectual country with no material resources, no role in the system and with no willing to go beyond domestic affairs-, it’s also arguable that in the late sixties, probably small states didn’t have chances to influence the world. But in early 21st century, many small states are trying to punch above their weight and are “able to have a systemic impact in a small group or through an international institution”, using Keohane’s definition to “system-affecting states”. That is, some small states have nowadays the capability to reach an upgraded category: throughout their improved status they try to surpass their material capabilities and reach the next level of this hierarchy. Even Waltz recognised it: “In the nuclear era, countries with smaller economic bases can more easily achieve great-power status” (Waltz, 1993:62).

It’s from this point of view we will analyse Qatar, Singapore and Rwanda: three small states whose elites are committed to achieve a greater status than their material capabilities could provide them in the anarchic self-help international system.
2.3. Status

Even classic realists like Thomas Hobbes, Niccolò Machiavelli and Thucydides were convinced that status matters (Rehnson, 2017:8-9), as countries can achieve or lose power depending on how they are perceived by the rest of the international community. A neoclassical realist as Gilpin considered “prestige, rather than power, as the everyday currency of international relations” (Gilpin, 1981:31).

It is generally argued that status matters because greater the status you have, greater bolts are unlocked to your interests. A core assumption of the literature on status is that nations use their status to achieve pursued goals in security and wealth areas (Plourde, 2008; Neumann, De Carvalho, 2014:15; Renshon, 2017:3; Biba 2016:456). In fact, former Norwegian foreign minister Thorbjørn Jagland recognised in 2001:

“While we show solidarity and a helping hand to fellow human beings in misery, we become a much more central actor in international politics than what our nature-given preconditions would have made us, something which makes us an experienced contributor and interesting conversation partner, and opens doors which otherwise would have been shut” (Matlary, 2002:60).

Despite status is important in world affairs and IR discipline, nobody knows what status concretely is or where it comes from or how to count it (Neumann and De Carvalho, 2014; Larson, Paul and Wohlforth, 2014:8-9; Rehnson, 2017:3,8,16,19; Duque, 2018:1). Assuming this second academical handicap, following Max Weber we will assume that status depends on social recognition: it concerns identification processes in which an actor gains admission into a club once they follow the rules of membership and thus obtain privileges (Weber, 1978).

Hence, ‘status’ is a relational, social and positional term; it depends on other’s points of view (Neumann, De Carvalho, 2014:4; Dafoe, Renshon and Huth, 2014: 5-6). And, paraphrasing one of the most important authors of the IR Constructivist school, Alexander Wendt, it’s also possible to defend that “status is what states (albeit the most powerful states) make of it” (Larson, Paul and Wohlforth, 2014:9).

For small states, we will consider status as the relevance oneself achieves both in front of the great power and vis-à-vis a comparison group. In the anarchic self-help international system characterised by states’ unregulated use of power, ‘status’ regulates which nation counts and which is negligible. Status conceived as an actor’s position in a social hierarchy. And
understood in a multidimensional sense: an actor can have a high status in a concrete field but a low status in another one, or even accumulate a large status but no enforcement capability (Lake, 2009; Larson, Paul and Wohlfforth, 2014:14).

We can conclude that status is highly subjective and interrelated. Hence, if everybody accepts status is important, in fact it is. Once this assumption has been established, strategies to gain status also are important from an IR point of view.
2.4. Status-seeking strategies

We will assume as valid the following definition of status-seeking strategies:

“Status-seeking refers to acts undertaken to maintain or better one’s placement. As this is something that is done in competition with others, it is by definition a hierarchized activity.” (Neumann, De Carvalho, 2014:5)

But there’s not a unique competition. Not all states compete with each other. Great powers have their own league, due to their own material capabilities (Neumann and De Carvalho, 2014). And, in fact, these high-status states “serve as a status-conferring authority for lesser powers” (Larson, Paul and Wohlforth, 2014:10). In contrast, small states are “motivated by the desire to be seen, to share the limelight and to be recognised for their contributions” (Pedersen, 2017:3). So, we will draw great powers from the equation.

In fact, small states have their own status-seeking strategies, completely different from those of great powers. And these strategies play a core role in their foreign policies, as this is the way to obtain a seat at the table (Neumann and De Carvalho, 2014:1; Wohlforth, De Carvalho, Leira and Neumann, 2017:3). In fact, the Singapore diplomat Bilahari Kausikan validates this remark:

“Size -physical size- matters and small states are intrinsically irrelevant to the workings of the international system (...) for small states, relevance is not something to be taken for granted but an artifact: created by human endeavour, and having been created, preserved by human endeavour. The creation and maintenance of relevance must be the overarching strategic objective of small states” (Kausikan, 2015).

Along the same line, we could question ourselves if there is just one single status hierarchy, or more than one. “Status is manifested in voluntary deference directed toward the higher-status actor” (Larson, Paul and Wohlforth, 2014:10). In a multipolar world, not every status seeker focus its strategy towards the same higher-status actors: Belarus maybe doesn’t play at the same ‘status league’ than Estonia towards the European Union; North Korea doesn’t play at the same ‘status league’ towards China than South Korea; Georgia doesn’t play at the same ‘status league’ towards NATO than Azerbaijan, etc. Each status seeker try to gain influence in different fields and what could be understood as a merit towards one status-conferring actor could be seen as a fault towards another.
Small countries don’t try to challenge great powers, “they will generally aim for a position just below them; alongside the hegemon (...) by showing how useful one can be” (Neumann and De Carvalho, 2015:16). This essay will assume that Qatar, Rwanda and Singapore, all three compete in the almost similar ‘status league’ towards the U.S., considered as the status-conferring master. Subsequently, U.S. top allies -the U.K., Israel, France, Japan— are seen as susceptible as the U.S. to confer status to these three players.

As we have previously said, status is positional and relative: you gain status in favour of your competitor’s one. But, as a multidimensional and socially constructed hierarchy, “it is a race that more than one can win” (Lake, 2014:268). But even being small states, do really Qatar, Rwanda and Singapore compete with themselves? There really exists a ‘small states status league’? Rehnson has a precise answer: “Even internationally, status is local” (Rehnson 2017:22). As Nordic countries compete with each other, Qatar competes against Gulf neighbours; Rwanda, against the Sub-Saharan African countries, and Singapore against the South-East Asian nations. In each of these territorial contexts, each state tries to gain U.S. recognition as the international system hegemon and status assigner. And Qatar, Rwanda and Singapore are trying to achieve better marks than their bigger neighbours.

2.5. Status markers

Singaporean diplomat Kausikan explained there is no “magic formula” to gain status, but underlined what he considers the pillar: a successful economy (Kausikan, 2015). Assuming the basic limitation that neither the Academia nor politicians precisely understand or agree where status comes from, we also assume that there are actions considered to be seen as status-gaining ones. This way, many scholars had argued that decisions like the purchase of military equipment by non-great powers or being involved in military operations worldwide cannot plausibly be explained with reference to strategic necessity and are better understood in the framework of bandwagoning for status (Pedersen, 2017; Massie, 2011; Carvalho Pinto, 2017). And, even, the desire for enhanced status may lead emerging powers to spend money on highly visible measures of status -such as space programs- rather than using their wealth to enforce domestic policies (Larson, Paul and Wohlforth, 2014:27).

Larson, Paul and Wohlforth argue that there are some ‘status markers’ we can observe in order to infer that a country is seeking to improve its status. This markers include: membership in elite clubs such as the Group of 8 (G8), permanent membership in the UNSC, leadership
positions in international organisations, hosting international sports events, formal state visits, summit meetings, inclusion in informal problem-solving groups, space programs, acquisition of high-technology weapons, major diplomatic initiatives, promotion of a state’s soft power or culture, and efforts to surpass others’ economic growth rates (Larson, Paul and Wohlfforth, 2014:10-12).

This list matches with many partial considerations of other scholars: “The role played by the small state has to be noticed by the great power, and the recognition needs to be public” (Pedersen, 2017:5); as status is social, “events that change perceptions of status must be visible to all potential observers” (Rehnson, 2017:24); “being a major donor to the UN for instance gives competitive status among certain peer groups of small states, but also gives acknowledgement from great powers for system maintenance” (Wohlfforth, De Carvalho, Leira and Neumann 2017:7). Other scholars also suggest that actions to change status may involve military assertiveness, joining international organisations or hosting the Olympic games (Larson and Shevchenko, 2003; 2010; Pu and Schweller, 2014).

We will assume all these ‘status markers’ as a guiding tool to unveil Qatar, Rwanda and Singapore’s strategies to gain a presence in the global forum. Often an overwhelming presence in contrast to their smallness.

According to these multiple references, in this essay we will observe the following ‘status markers’, conveniently adapted to small states’ characteristics -as no one of them have real options to hold a permanent seat in the UNSC or be part of the G8:
Politics and Economy

a) Political project
b) National wealth progression
c) Major diplomatic initiatives
d) Formal state visits and summit meetings
e) Membership in the UNSC and leadership positions in international organisations

Security

f) Acquisition of high-technology weapons
g) Peacekeeping operations
h) Military alliances

Science, Sports & Culture

i) Space programs
j) Hosting/sponsoring international sports events
k) Promotion of a state’s soft power or culture

Identified these markers here and now, it is also smart to recognise that “there is no objective, time-invariant formula for what qualities or attributes confer status” (Renshon, 2017:4). But, accepting this limitation, we tend to think that a small state involved in all those initiatives will be a state trying to play a role in the world scenario.
3. Comparison

3.0. General overview

Qatar is a small barren peninsula on the Northeastern coast of the Arabian Peninsula with just 11,581 km² and 2.3 million inhabitants, bordering Saudi Arabia (2.149,690 km² and 28.5m inhabitants) and the Persian Gulf. Other key regional neighbours are: Iran (1.648,195 km² and 82m people), United Arab Emirates (83.600 km² and 6m people). Despite the small territory, Qatar sits on top of the world's largest single gas field, North Dome, frontier and shared with Iran – called South Pars at the Iranian side. In fact, Qatar owns the world's third-largest reserves of natural gas (24,3 million m³), behind Russia (47.8) and Iran (33.5). Therefore is one of the largest export economy in the world and is the richest country per capita, with $128,700 GDP per capita (International Monetary Fund, 2017).

Singapore is an island in Southeast Asia with just 719 km² and 5,8m population. Neighbours with similar status ambitions are Malaysia (329,847 km² and 31m inhabitants) and Indonesia (1.904,569 km² and 260m inhabitants -the world's 4th most populous country). Singapore has no natural resources thus his economy depends heavily on trade: from poor country in the 1960s, Singapore is nowadays a high-income economy with a gross national income of $52,600 per capita, provides one of the world’s most business-friendly regulatory environment and is ranked by the World Bank among the world’s most competitive economies.

Rwanda is a landlocked country from Central and East Africa with just 26,338 km² and 11,2 million inhabitants and with no relevant enough natural resources. Regional status competitors are: Kenya (580,367 km² and 47m people), Uganda (241,038 km² and 39.5m people) and Tanzania (947,300 km² and 53.9m people). Compared to Qatar and Singapore, Rwanda is an economic dwarf. In fact, his tiny export economy is just the 155th in the world, exporting

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$869M and importing $2.05B in 2016\textsuperscript{13}. Besides, is a net Official Development Assistance (ODA) recipient, receiving $1.148,4M in 2016\textsuperscript{14}.

### 3.1. Politics and Economy

a) Political project

As policies are conceived and implemented by politicians, we will identify as ‘status marker’ the elite’s role, their institutional cohesion and their persistence in power (a1) and if they have promoted any kind of political roadmap towards achieving a greater role (a2), from being a “system-ineffectual state” to a “system-affecting state”.

Assuming the individual-level variables are interesting in conducting small states’ policies, we can observe Singapore, Qatar an Rwanda’s ruling elites share some particularities to be considered: 1) all three initial leaders studied in the West: Lee Kwan Yew studied at Fitzwilliam College, University of Cambridge, from 1947 to 1949; Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani was a graduate of Sandhurst, the British Royal Military Academy and Paul Kagame was sent in 1990 by the Ugandan army for training at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; and 2) they hold a clear and prolonged hegemony (People’s Action Party rules Singapore since independence; Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani and his son, Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, since the 1995 bloodless palace coup against Khalifa bin Hamad Al Thani; Paul Kagame since 1994) thus they can implement middle and long-term policies.

Said that, each nation has developed its own political project by his way. But each of them have published a political roadmap where they show where they want to be in the years ahead: Rwanda launched in 2000 the “Rwanda Vision 2020” and in April 2004 the “Rwanda National Meetings, Incentives, Conferences/Conventions and Events/Exhibitions (MICE) Tourism Strategy”; Qatar approved in 2003 a new Constitution, launched in July 2008 the “Qatar National Vision 2030” and in March 2011 the “Qatar National Development Strategy 2011-2016”, and Singapore in November 2014 kicked-off the initiative “Smart Nation”. Despite not

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having a written political roadmap, first Singaporean prime minister Lee Kuan Yew have always displayed a strong commitment towards achieving a greater role in the system.

Lee’s aim and Rwanda’s and Qatar’s roadmaps share some similarities: they conceive an efficient and effective administration and first-class infrastructures as the key pillars were to build the rest of the project, and they understand their own markets are too small thus they see the rest of the world as their natural environment -both by transforming their own labour force from rural to a high-skilled one, and by opening their markets to foreign investments. By achieving these goals, they three also understand they are ensuring their own sovereignty.

This political commitment -showed in official papers, speeches or even in the approval of a new Qatari Constitution- is a sign to promote a liberal and Western-minded image of themselves and can be understood as a way to gain status towards the U.S.

b) National wealth progression

Both Qatar and Singapore are small countries with an extremely wealthy economy, while Rwanda is one of the poorest nations in the world. Thus, Rwanda’s economy cannot be compared with Qatari or Singaporean ones -despite sixty years ago, probably three economies were equally poor. Therefore, as markers we will use how fastest GDP growth is progressing (b1) and how rating agencies qualify each economy compared with neighbours (b2) -thus, which ‘status’ deserve each economy.

Three analysed countries have had a “momentum” in world economy: Singapore in the 60s-70s, Qatar in the 2000s and Rwanda nowadays. GDP growth in Singapore was amongst the world's highest, at an average of 7.7% since independence and topping 9.2% in the first 25 years\textsuperscript{15}; Qatar also ranked first from 2000 to 2010, achieving a GDP growth averaged 15.9% a year, outstripping even that of China (Ibrahim and Harrigan, 2012), and Rwanda is the 2018

The fastest growing economy in the world\textsuperscript{16}, considering that in 2017 his economy grew by 6.1%, beating 5.2% projections set earlier\textsuperscript{17}.

Having natural resources or not, three small states have boosted their economies in order to matter in world politics. Singaporean diplomat Bilahari Kausikan recognised: “Success must be defined first of all in economic terms. Will a barren rock ever be taken seriously?” (Kausikan, 2015). In fact, Singapore it is commonly shown as a case study in rapid development (International Monetary Fund, 1995).

Accepting status is regional, all three small states have better sovereign ratings than their neighbours. In fact, Singapore is the only country in Asia with an AAA sovereign rating from all major rating agencies, and even one of only a few countries worldwide. Despite Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) boycott, Qatar’s ratings are even better than most of their neighbours: in August 2018, Moody’s Qatar’s rate was ‘Aa3’, while Saudi Arabia’s rate was ‘A1’; Bahrain had a ‘B2’ and Egypt, a ‘B3’. Just UAE’s rating was one step better: ‘Aa2’. As Moody’s doesn’t rate most African countries, we will use Fitch as marker. According to that, Rwanda’s rating is considered as one of the powerful ones in the region: ‘B+ (Stable)’ since January 2016. Uganda’s economy also holds the same label, and Kenya had a ‘B+ (Negative)’ rating from July 2015 to February 2018, then upgraded to the same ‘B+ (Stable)’ category. South Africa, the regional hegemon, is qualified with just in the ‘BB+ (Stable)’ category. Other neighbours, as the Democratic Republic of Congo (RDC) or Burundi, even aren’t rated.

It’s also remarkable World Bank considers Singapore as the economy with the most business-friendly regulation, while Rwanda is the second easiest country to do business in Africa (The World Bank, 2016). Both have also shown its interest to become tech hubs in their own regions, as material capabilities are not a condition to cloud economy.

c) Major diplomatic initiatives


We will analyse if these supposed “system-ineffectual states” play a diplomatic role in their region or far away, by implementing initiatives in political or economical areas (c1).

These three countries have excelled in promoting diplomatic initiatives as a way to appear as a player in international arena. It is also argued it is a way to maintain regional peace and, therefore, to maintain its own economy and even sovereignty, throughout defending the preeminence of the rule of law (Koh, 2018).

Briefly summarised, Singapore was one of the six founding nations of ASEAN and the APEC Secretariat is established in Singapore since 1993; Singapore also hosted in April 1993 the “Wang-Koo summit” and in November 2015 the the “Xi-Ma meeting” in order to promote dialogue between the Republic of China and the People's Republic of China. In fact, this expertise in critical meetings head Singapore towards a major historical meeting in June 12, 2018, such was the first U.S.-North Korea presidential summit since the political partition of the Korean peninsula in 1945. Singapore recognised they didn’t put their hand up, but they were asked, as Singapore maintained diplomatic relations with both U.S. and North Korea.

Beyond Asia, Singapore also created the UN’s Forum of Small States (FOSS) in 1992; proposed the creation of the East Asia-Latin America Forum (EALAF) in 1998; created the Global Governance Group (3G) in 2009, and was accepted as Observer in the Arctic Council in 2013. It’s also highly remarkable Singapore has often been invited to participate in G20 events since 2010, despite not being a major economy.

As a powerful economical player, Qatar achieved a major hit in 2001, when the Fourth Ministerial Conference of the World Trade Organization (WTO) was held in Doha, starting the so called “Doha Development Round”. Qatar also tried to become a regional powerhouse in regional mediation since 2005, being involved in several conflicts and maintaining pretty good diplomatic relations with declared antagonists in the region (Barakat, 2012). But this strategy was not well-received by its neighbours: during the 2010-11 Arab Uprising, Qatar was accused...
of seeking a destabilisation in the region and in June 2017 started a Saudi-led blockade against the emirate endorsed also by the UAE, Bahrain and Egypt. One year after this diplomatic crisis begun, analysts say Qatar is winning23,24,25. Qatar, a hydrocarbon exporter, also hosted the UN Climate Change Conference COP18 in 2012.

Finally, Rwanda also tries to promote a regional economic consensus as Singapore did in the 60s: on March 21, 2018 was signed in Kigali the African Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA or AfCFTA) in order to create a single continental market for goods and services, to enhance competitiveness and to expand intra African trade.

d) Formal state visits and summit meetings

In diplomacy, being received at The White House is the top achievement a leader could receive. Thus, we will use these visits as markers to identify a status-seeking strategy, also considering positive comments the current U.S. president, Donald Trump, could have pronounced (d1). But as politics is not the only status-conferring sphere, we will also observe official visits to the Vatican or from the Pope to the country -understood as ‘moral’ status-conferring sphere (d2). Also, in the economic arena, we will take Microsoft founder Bill Gates as marker (d3), as he was the world’s wealthiest person for 23 years in a row until 2017, according to Forbes26.


In Qatar’s diplomatic crisis, it is interesting to note Trump initially aligned with Saudi positions -considering the emirate “a funder of terrorism at a very high level” (The White House, 2017). Then, the White House abruptly shifted this position and in April 2018 emir Tamim Bin Hamad Al Thani was warmly welcomed by the entire Trump administration. The American president then praised Qatari emir as “a friend of mine” and “a great gentleman”. In fact, during his term Trump also qualified Singapore and Rwanda’s leaders as “friends” (The White House, 2018c; The White House, 2018a).

In another ‘status league’, related to spiritual beliefs, being received at the Vatican or to host an official pastoral visit can also be considered as a major achievement. Pope John Paul II made an official visit to Singapore in 198627; Qatari Sheikha Moza bint Nasser was received by Pope Francis in June 4, 201628, and Kagame was received by Pope Francis in March 20, 201729.

These three Vatican recognitions are ought to be considered as major Qatari, Singaporean and Rwandan diplomatic achievements: despite Qatar and Singapore are not Christian countries, they deserved Pope’s attention. In Rwanda’s case, Kagame’s government officially considers Catholic institutions and missions “played a decisive role” in the 1994 genocide (Government of the Republic of Rwanda, 2017) and Pope Francis expressed a “humble recognition of the failings of that period”30.

Attracting the interest of leading economical figures it’s also a strategy to gain status. Assuming Bill Gates as a marker, Singapore, Qatar and Rwanda also merited his attention one year or another: in April 13, 2016, Gates visited Doha to receive $50 million from the Qatar Development Fund31; Singapore as a technological hub is a common destination in Gates’

30 Ibid.
trips\textsuperscript{32}, and Rwanda is often cited by Gates as a “success story” in implementing health-care protocols\textsuperscript{33}.

Said this, it is interesting to note two major Rwandan diplomatic hits occurred in 2018: in 20 April Commonwealth Heads of Government accepted Kagame’s offer to host their next meeting in 2020\textsuperscript{34}, and in July Kagame hosted two state visits from Chinese President Xi Jinping\textsuperscript{35} and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi\textsuperscript{36}.

e) Membership in the UNSC and leadership positions in international organisations

We will observe if these small countries have accessed to the UN Security Council (UNSC) in a two-year term as a status maker (e1), assuming that there are 65 out of 193 nations which have never been elected as members of the Security Council since 1946\textsuperscript{37}. Also we will view if any national leads any regional or international organisation, or the country host any headquarter (e2).

The three small states have been members of the UNSC\textsuperscript{38}. Rwanda, in fact, held this honour twice: 1994-95 and in 2013-14; Singapore in 2001-02, and Qatar in 2006-07. Thus, the three small states are taken as peers by the international community.

Both Singapore and Rwanda lead regional organisations. Singapore was one of the five founding nations of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1967 and also


\textsuperscript{33} Gates, B. (2017, February 17) “How countries like Rwanda have achieved such incredible improvements in reducing child deaths” [tweet]. Retrieved from: https://twitter.com/billgates/status/832601079648919952;


hosts the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Secretariat since 5 February 1993. Singapore also hosts since 2002 the “IISS Asia Security Summit: The Shangri-La Dialogue”.

Rwanda’s president Paul Kagame was elected in 28 January 2018 as president of the African Union (AU) for the year 201839. Rwanda is also bidding to lead the Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie (OIF) and has received support from the French president, Emmanuel Macron, in May 201840. If Rwanda achieves this honour, when Commonwealth Heads of Government will met in Kigali in 2020 it will be the country were English-spoken world and French-spoken world will met together.

As said, Qatar has no this regional projection, probably because it is located in what is called “one of the world’s toughest neighbourhoods” (Kamrava, 2013:48). Qatar try to overcome this limitation by being the largest donor from the MENA region to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)41 and to Palestinian refugees42.

### 3.2. Security

**f) Acquisition of high-technology weapons**

As said43, from an IR point of view acquisition of military material could be understood in the framework of bandwagoning for status. In fact, during Al Thani’s 2018 visit to the White House, Trump precisely praised the emir as a great purchaser of military equipment (The White House, 2018b). Thus, we will see if analysed countries practice this kind of purchases (f).

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43 See chapter 2.5
Both Qatar and Singapore import huge quantities of weaponry, being 20th and 21st largest importers of major arms from 2013 to 2017\(^{44}\). Both countries have the U.S. as major supplier: 67% and 70%, respectively. In this aspect, as national wealth is key, Rwanda fulfils no relevant marks.

It is interesting to note the U.S. and Qatar maintain a strong military relationship, as Al Udeid Qatari air base is the largest American military airbase in the Middle East. But Qatar also relies on France to acquire weaponry and in December 29, 2011, Qatar Holding became top investor of the French media and defence group Lagardère\(^{45}\). Lagardère holds a 7.5% stake of the aerospace group EADS -rebranded in 2014 as Airbus Group. On the same track, it’s also remarkable that Singapore is not just an arms-importer small state, as it is also an arms-producer country: the “government-linked”\(^{46}\) ST Engineering company is ranked as the 53th major arms exporter\(^{47}\).

In the sub-Saharan Africa context, Russia is the largest supplier. Thus, Rwanda have in Moscou its main supplier (67.21%) and doesn’t buy U.S. defence equipment. But it’s interesting to note Rwanda’s second major arms supplier is Israel (21.31%), a close U.S. ally.

g) Peacekeeping operations

Accepting nor Qatar, nor Singapore, neither Rwanda face external military threats willing to undermine their sovereignty, their military implication in multilateral operations fits as a status seeking strategy. We will observe how much they contribute to UN peacekeeping operations (g).

Singapore and Rwanda are totally committed with UN peacekeeping operations, while Qatar don’t use this ‘UN peacekeeping strategy’ and seeks military status by other ways.

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\(^{45}\) Daneshkhu, S. (2011, December 29) “Qatar Holding becomes top Lagardère investor”, Financial Times. Retrieved from [https://www.ft.com/content/dea9dc7a-3242-11e1-b4ba-00144feabdc0](https://www.ft.com/content/dea9dc7a-3242-11e1-b4ba-00144feabdc0)

\(^{46}\) HistorySG (n.d.) “ST Engineering is created”. Retrieved from: [http://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/history/events/8cbe1a98-2caf-40e5-b0f8-24fb788aca16](http://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/history/events/8cbe1a98-2caf-40e5-b0f8-24fb788aca16)

Singapore collaborate with UN missions since 1970\textsuperscript{48} and Rwanda is the 3rd. largest troop and police contributor to the UN peacekeeping forces\textsuperscript{49, 50}. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov\textsuperscript{51} and Chinese Major General Zhang Yingli\textsuperscript{52} have publicly recognised Rwanda for this implication.

Qatar tried to rank high militarily by being involved in 2011 intervention in Libya led by France\textsuperscript{53} and was also a member of the U.S.-led coalition combating the Islamic State in Syria (Katzman, 2018).

h) Military alliances

Small states try to rely on defence alliances with major powers. Thus, we will see if they have formal alliances or they have expressed their willingness to be part of an alliance (h).

Just Singapore is part of a defensive multi-lateral agreement, while Qatar has expressed his desire to be part of NATO. Rwanda doesn’t fulfil this marker.

As a former British colony, Singapore enjoys good relations with the U.K. which shares ties in the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) along with Malaysia, Australia and New Zealand. And the U.S. Navy uses constantly Singaporean naval facilities to support its operations in Southeast Asia.


Neither Qatar nor Rwanda join any military alliance. But the Qatari Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of State For Defense Affairs, Khalid Bin Mohammed Al-Attiyah, officially proclaimed in June 2018 Qatar wants to be a NATO member: “We are a major ally outside NATO. Our aspiration for full membership is there, should our partnership with NATO develop further” (Altalaya 2018).
3.3. Science, Sports and Culture

i) Space programs

Accepting the so called ‘space race’ between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R was also a status race, and accepting a small state cannot put a man on the moon, we will observe if analysed countries maintain any king of space-related program as a status marker (i).

But both Qatar and Singapore maintain niche programs in this area. Here, as funds are crucial, Rwanda doesn’t maintain any space program -as any other of his East African neighbours does.

Qatar launched the Qatar Exoplanet Survey in 2010 jointly with the Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics, clearly linking space research and improvement of Qatari status\(^54\). Singapore also have a space program, the Centre for Remote Imaging, Sensing and Processing (CRISP), launched in 1995. In 2017, there were over 30 space-related companies in Singapore and more than 1.000 professionals, including over 150 researchers\(^55\).

j) Hosting/sponsoring international sports events

Hosting an international sports event is a sign of status, as sports are largest TV audience attracting programmes. Also, to sponsor a major sports club it’s a way to achieve notable impact in mass media (j).

Three analysed countries rank high in this area, being Qatar the country which shines most. Qatar demonstrates a strong interest in hosting major tournaments in its territory. This strategy started in 2004, when first Qatar motorcycle Grand Prix (motoGP) was organised. In 2006, Qatar organised the Asian Games, and in December 2, 2010, FIFA appointed Qatar as host for 2022 World Cup. Just some days afterwards, in December 10, FC Barcelona announced a 5-


year €165 million commercial T-shirt agreement with Qatar Foundation, in January 2011 Asian Cup was played in Qatar and in June 30, 2011, Qatar Sports Investments bought 70% of Paris Saint Germain football club. In just six months, from December 2010 to June 2011, Qatar emerged as a crucial player in world football status quo.

Since then, Qatar’s implication in world sports has grown, due to the annual ATP Qatar ExxonMobil Open (tennis), the Qatar Masters (golf), the 2014 FINA World Swimming Championships, the 2015 IHF world men’s handball championships, the sports academy Aspire, etc. In December 2019, Doha also will host the IAAF World Championships.

The 2011 Qatar National Development Strategy 2011-2016 underline sports are a method to enhance the nation’s regional and international image (Qatar General Secretariat for Development Planning, 2011:196) and an executive of the Qatari-owned PSG, Frédéric Longuépée, assured in 2017 that the club was part of the global strategy of Qatar to promote and protect the country (Chanavat 2017:4).

Singapore, far away from Qatar intensive strategy, also hosts a worldwide sports events as the Singapore Formula 1 Grand Prix is: the competition is composed by 21 races, and this Asian Southeast small state organises one of it. In fact, Qatar wanted to host a F1 race too, but Bahrain doesn’t allows it. Bahrain first hosted an F1 race in 2004 and the CEO of the Formula One Group, Bernie Ecclestone, explained in 2014 Bahrain has the power to veto Qatar F1 race, as they have an agreement they have to approve other races in the Middle East56. In fact, since 2009 Bahrain allows the UAE to host a F1 race, but not Qatar.

Rwanda, described continuously as a poor small country, doesn’t seem to have the capacity to play this league. But they do. On May 22 2018 it was announced a £30million-a-year sponsorship deal until 2020/21 season between Visit Rwanda and English Arsenal Football Club57. Visit Rwanda argued the country will achieve a deep impact “helping its drive to be an even more successful tourism and investment destination”58. The CEO of the Rwanda Development Board, Clare Akamanzi, explained the deal as a proactive marketing strategy to take Rwanda out of poverty by attracting tourism59,60 By reading those arguments, it is hardly

59 Akamanzi, C. [cakamanzi]. (2018, May 25) “Anyone who criticizes our deal with @Arsenal on account of Rwanda being poor or an aid recipient, either wishes for Rwanda to be perpetually so,
difficult not to compare Qatar 2010 decision to sponsor FC Barcelona T-shirt and the Rwanda-Arsenal agreement.

k) Promotion of a state’s soft power or culture

Assuming ‘soft power’ is the willing to influence other states by cultural ways, we will see if Qatar, Singapore and Rwanda have the will to generate this influence (k).

As three analysed countries are from three different cultural spheres, there is not a common area where they are pushing hard. Assuming that limitation, analysed countries show a strong will to promote their culture far away: Qatar by implementing Al Jazeera TV network; Singapore by being a ‘moral referent’ in the Southeast Asia, and Rwanda being a lighthouse in healthcare in the African context.

Qatar has showed a strong will in playing a role outside his own borders. In November 1, 1996, new emir, Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, launched Al Jazeera TV station and since then has disrupted regional status quo in order to gain status in Western countries (Bahry, 2001). In fact, Saudi Arabia also broke diplomatic relations with Qatar over Al Jazeera coverage of the kingdom from 2002 to 2007. U.S. leaders also worried Al Jazeera’s influence: secretary of state Hillary Clinton claimed in 2011 that the U.S. was losing the global information war and Al Jazeera was “winning” (Democracy Now!, 2011). But this strategy colluded in 2010-11 with those of being a regional mediator powerhouse, when the TV station was accused of a pro-Muslim Brotherhood bias in Arab uprisings. Therefore, Qatar’s reputation as a neutral peacemaker across regional elite’s was seriously damaged (Barakat, 2012). Also Al Jazeera’s reputation as an independent media is under threat (Samuel-Azran & Pecht, 2014:218; The Economist, 2017).
Singapore also tried to play a crucial political role in his area\textsuperscript{62}, and in fact Lee Kuan Yew played a moral position recognised both by Asian and Western leaders. Still nowadays the city-state is a model of good governance and a great example of multiculturalism. And, as said, Singapore has been a model for Rwanda and even is recognised in the central “Rwanda Vision 2020” (Republic of Rwanda, 2000: 27). His task in world economy\textsuperscript{63}, as the most open and globalised country in the world, has also been a milestone in his own promotion. Nowadays, this opening to economy propels Singapore to digital innovation and cloud-based technologies\textsuperscript{64}.

Singapore likewise decided to promote itself as a knowledge-based economy and become the ‘knowledge hub’ of Asia. Nowadays, Singapore’s Nanyang Technological University (NTU) and National University of Singapore (NUS) rank Asias 1st. and 2nd. in QS World University Rankings\textsuperscript{65}. Singapore is also home to a selection of leading universities around the world, like the Singapore-MIT Alliance for Research and Technology, MIT's only research centre outside the U.S.

Rwanda’s soft power promotion is shining in healthcare, as the country operates a universal health care system and is considered to have one of the highest-quality health systems in Africa (Nyandekwe, Nzayirambaho and Kakoma, 2014). Articles in the U.S. press even points out Rwanda as an example for national healthcare system\textsuperscript{66}. An academic comparison of health achievements both in Rwanda and Burundi concludes there exist a significant increase in life expectancy in Rwanda relative to Burundi (Iyer et al, 2018).

Rwanda also ranks at the top of gender issues, as its parliament is that with more women parliamentarians in the world (61,3\textsuperscript{67}) and the government ranks at the 7h position in women in ministerial position’s ranking\textsuperscript{68}.

\begin{footnotes}
\item[62] See section ‘c’
\item[63] See section ‘b’
\item[67] Inter-Parliamentary Union (2018) “Women in national parliaments”. Retrieved from: \url{http://archive.ipu.org/wmn-e/classif.htm}
\end{footnotes}
3.4. Markers comparison

Once analysed the information provided, we will try to systematise it in a table so that we can have a general view of the three case studies. We will assign a value of 1 or a 0 to each marker, depending if its fulfilled or not. Therefore, we will limit to mark each marker as ‘completed’ or ‘uncompleted’.

As seen in the following table, Singapore fulfils each marker, while Qatar and Rwanda fail to do it in some markers. Singapore faces no regional troubles thus can seek status both regionally and globally, whereas Qatar is facing an unprecedented regional blockade, limiting its capabilities to rank positively in the regional level. Rwanda achieves good marks at the sub-Saharan level despite lacking enough wealth to rank globally. But if this study would be adapted specifically to a local reality -assuming neither any country joins the space race nor is buying high-technology weapons-, Rwanda would rank at the top of the table.

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Caption:

a1) Elite’s role  
a2) Political roadmap  
b1) GDP growth progression  
b2) Rating comparison  
c) Major diplomatic initiatives  
d1) Political attention (White House)  
d2) Spiritual attention (Vatican)  
d3) Economical attention (Bill Gates)  
e1) UNSC membership  
e2) Leading international organisations  
f) Acquisition of high-technology weapons  
g) Peacekeeping operations  
h) Military alliances  
i) Involvement in space programs  
j) Hosting/sponsoring international sports events  
k) Promotion of a state’s soft power or culture
4. Conclusion

Once these 16 status-seeking markers have been analysed, it is hardly not to say Singapore, Qatar and Rwanda are performing pretty well their own strategies to achieve a major status and play a major role than their physical limitations initially kept to them. They are not just “system-ineffectual states”, they also are “system-affecting states”. Thus, they could be labelled as ‘small powers’ or ‘potent small states’. One way or another, these small states are sitting at tables not a priori conceived to them: Singapore at the G20 summits and East Asia-Latin America Forum; Qatar at FIFA and the World Trade Organisation; Rwanda at the African Union and the Commonwealth, etc. Small states have agency enough to overtake its limitations and become key players in world arena.

Therefore, despite lacking material resources, small states from different geographical and cultural regions, and with different development levels, can achieve a certain degree of influence in the international system applying status-seeking strategies. And regardless of material, regional and developmental differences, those strategies appear to be quite similar. Our second hypothesis is also validated, as these status-seeking strategies are basically based in ‘soft power’ tools.

It’s also defensible these movements could entail a pro-sovereignty point of view: by maintaining regional peace and the preeminence of the rule of law, small states can guarantee their own existence. Also, by gaining status and being known in Western societies, it is thought Western governments are not likely to allow regional hegemons to bully these small states. Therefore, there’s too a survival goal in these strategies.

As seen in analysed cases, elite’s commitment to achieve a greater role is the linchpin were the entire project can be constructed. Thus, individual-level variables play a crucial role in explaining the foreign policy behaviour of small states. This particularity heads us towards a question: when another elite group will achieve power in those countries, they will maintain these status-seeking strategies? To date, this scenario has not happened in studied countries. In Georgia, an abrupt change in ruling elites was immediately followed by a bandwagoning strategy towards Russia (Gvalia et al, 2013)

It is also remarkable their shared maverick foreign relations: despite pretending to be seen as strong U.S. allies, they maintain diplomatic relations with several U.S. rivals (Singapore with North Korea and China; Qatar with Iran, the Talibans and Hamas; Rwanda with China and
Russia) and also maintain relations with regional enemies (Singapore with China and Taiwan; Qatar with Iran and Israel). As “system-ineffectual states”, they can pleasure maintaining these relations. Great powers know this could be an escape route in any possible crisis. In fact, it’s said small states can achieve status by being useful to system-determining states (Neumann and De Carvalho, 2015:16). This could be a way.

Finally, it’s commonly recognised Singapore and Qatar are “system-affecting states”, not just small states, and it’s quite interesting to oversee how Rwanda is following the same track and is achieving great marks in the African context. Hence, it’s consistent to say other small states - enjoying natural resources or not- who wants to become “system-affecting states” could learn from these experiences.
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