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Buades Piqueres, Francisco Javier; Beltran Garcia, Susana, dir. European approach to the Mediterranean, the new energy diplomacy and its impact on the EU-Algerian relations. 2024. (Màster Universitari en Integració Europea)

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MÁSTER UNIVERSITARIO EN INTEGRACIÓN EUROPEA

Curso 2023-2024

TRABAJO DE FIN DE MÁSTER

EUROPEAN APPROACH TO THE
MEDITERRANEAN, THE NEW ENERGY
DIPLOMACY AND ITS IMPACT ON THE EU-
ALGERIAN RELATIONS

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Campus de la UAB, 21 de junio de 2024

Abstract:

Does the new Energy diplomacy have the potential to boost the relation of the EU with Algeria, in the light of pragmatic-geopolitical turn of the Common Foreign and Security Policy? This thesis employs research tools to answer this question, using the EU-Algerian relations as a case of study, combined with other methodologies such as analysis of literature and foreign action policies, assistance to seminars and conferences or interviews with European policy makers and top researchers experts on different fields. This thesis will try to prove if it is true that there is an evolution in the Common Foreign and Security Policy, from the Union of values to the more geopolitical EU, due to the need of the EU to adapt its foreign policy to a more hostile international environment, and how this is reflected in EU-Algerian relations inside the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean relations, and more recently of the new European energy diplomacy. All of this with the intention to present a full lecture of the topic and to present conclusions on the matter.

Key Words: European Union, Mediterranean, Common Foreign Policy, Energy Diplomacy, Geopolitics, Pragmatism, Strategic Partnerships, Neighborhood Policy, Energy Transition

Abbreviations.

European Union	EU
European Communities	EC
European Economic Communities	EEC
Treaty of the European Union	TEU
Treaty on the Functioning the European Union	TFUE
Common Foreign and Security Policy	CFSP
Common Security and Defense Policy	CSDP
European Security Strategy	ESS
European Union Global Strategy	EUGS
European Union Security Compass	EUSC
European Neighborhood Policy	ENP
Strategic Partnerships	SP
EU External Energy Engagement in a Changing World	EEECW
Middle East and North Africa	MENA
Front de libération nationale	FLN

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Introduction

The EU foreign approach to the Mediterranean can be seen as the continuous evolution of communitarian strategies, policies and needs to a region with strategic relevance for the Union. The development and evolution of Common Foreign and Security Policy and its different approaches adopted, applied to this region can be read as the sum of Brussels wills to guarantee a series of economic and security objectives “ab origine” the Rome Treaty of 1958. But the multipolar competition and geopolitical rivalries have forced the Union to adapt its foreign action to a more contested international society, evolving from the exporter of values approach to a more pragmatic and geopolitical European foreign action.

The Russian war in Ukraine has only accelerate the previous process that push the European Union to adopt a more geopolitical less value oriented Common Foreign Action. This thesis will show if it is true that there is an evolution in the Common Foreign and Security Policy, from the Union of values to the more geopolitical EU, due to the need of the EU to adapt its foreign policy to a more hostile international environment. A special attention will be placed in the analyses of the different instruments of the European Foreign Action to trace and analyze the approaches adopted by it, and the long-lasting implications of the new European energy diplomacy for the Union itself and its neighbors, which has the potential to substantially impact its foreign relations with the Mediterranean State due to its focus on establishing green energies strategic partnerships.

To give the thesis appropriate research tools to prove this hypothesis, the project will focus on EU-Algerian relations as a case of study. Other research methodologies will be used it as well, such as analysis of literature and foreign action policies, assistance to seminars and conferences or interviews with European policy makers and top researchers on different fields. Thus, this thesis will be divided in two main sections: the first part is going to verse about the historical perspective of the EU approach to the Mediterranean, and the analysis of the most relevant Common Foreign and Security Policy instruments for the topic of the thesis, in order two fully understand the mark that applies to the Euro-Mediterranean relations; the second one, will present the EU-Algeria case of study, on the light of the new European energy diplomacy and how the new framework offered by it, open a window of opportunity to intensify the bilateral interactions. The project will conclude with the most important conclusion extracted after the research process

1. Considerations for the EU Approach to the South Mediterranean

The south mediterranean has always been a key region for European interest “ab origine” the the Rome Treaty of 1958, due to its significant importance in terms of stability and economy. The evolution and development of the Union’s action towards the region, can be seen as the result of constant adaptation to changes in the area and the events of the international community, all of this been influenced by historical-commercial ties and the process of enlargements of the Union, being the evidence of the will of the EU to assert its influence in the region and save guard its economic and security interest that has on it. Thus, EU-Mediterranean relations have always been a priority for European foreign action, which have employed different strategies, sub-strategies and policies, that can be seen as the result of a constant learning process and adaptation, and its application to this area especially sensible to sudden events of international society.

1.1. From its Origins until 2008

The Mediterranean has been a zone of particular interest for the European Union from its origin. The European degree of ambition has increased by the past of the years, from an initial moment that was merely reduced to basic economic exchanges, motivated by Italian but specially French interest in the area, to the active involvement in the threats and problems of the region from the Barcelona Process partnership and forward.

The starting point of the EU-Mediterranean Relationship was marked by the decolonization process, and the signature of the first bilateral economic-commercial agreements between the EEC and the states in the region ¹. But shortly after its implementation 1962², it encountered two obstacles that persist until today: the adoption of protectionist measures, by the European Communities; and the unequal treaty that favored Greece or Turkey and the Maghreb States, in detriment of the Mashriq counterparts³. The result of this inconsistent approach of the EEC to the Mediterranean, was responded with the

¹ Treaty establishing the European Economic Community. (1957). Preamble. Translated by authors. "Anxious to maintain and intensify the traditional trade flows between the Member States of the European Economic Community and these independent countries and to contribute to the economic and social development of the latter."

² Antonio Romero, "Las relaciones euromediterráneas: 47 años de (des)encuentro." *UNED. Espacio, Tiempo y Forma. Serie V, Hª Contemporánea* 16 (2004): 399.

³ Bichara, *Europa y el Gran Magreb*. Itierna, (1992).

birth of the Global Policy for the Mediterranean of 1972 (GPM from now on), which tried to overcome these prior limitations. This new policy towards the Mediterranean even if continuist, was the first of its kind to present a unified strategy, proposed by France and Italy in a time of EEC enlargement and the subsequent fear that the relation with region would be relegated to a second level⁴. The Yon Kippur War of 1973 and its long-lasting implications for the region, was responded by the EEC with Venice Declaration ⁵ which marked as a milestone in the evolution of a European Foreign policy⁶.

The entrance of Spain a Portugal in 1986 created a new reality for the European relations with the Mediterranean⁷. This event pushed the EU to revise GPM to adapt it to the changing reality, and leading to the Reinforce Mediterranean Policy of 1990 ⁸, which did not change significant changes due to the acknowledgment of the previous approach as a success⁹. In the context of the Madrid Conference of 1991 and the hope of a feasible peace¹⁰ for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the European Council decided to reinforce the mediterranean policy and the organization of a mediterranean conference in Barcelona¹¹. Thus, on November 27th and 28th of 1995 the summit took place in Barcelona, which established the bases for a Euro-Mediterranean Partnership¹².

⁴ For more on the Global Policy of the Mediterranean see: Tsoukalis, Loukas. "The EEC and the Mediterranean: Is 'Global' Policy a Misnomer?" *Oxford University Press* 53, no. 3 (1977): 422-438; Zając, Justyna. "European Union Policy in the Mediterranean: An International Roles Theory Approach." *Faculty of Journalism and Political Science, University of Warsaw*, (2014): 51-52.

⁵ Venice Declaration. ECF Maps & Data, 1980. https://ecf.org.il/media_items/1476 (Accessed June 19, 2024).

⁶ Elhami Saed. "European Political Cooperation: The Development of a Common Stance in the Middle East." *Department of Political Science, Lund University*, (2010): 21-24.

⁷ Antonio Romero,. "Las relaciones euromediterráneas: 47 años de (des)encuentro." *UNED. Espacio, Tiempo y Forma. Serie V, Hª Contemporánea* 16 (2004): 402.

⁸ European Commission. "Redirecting the Community's Mediterranean Policy: Proposals for the period 1992-96." Brussels, SEC(90)812 final, 1994.

⁹ Antonio Romero, "Las relaciones euromediterráneas: 47 años de (des)encuentro." *UNED. Espacio, Tiempo y Forma. Serie V, Hª Contemporánea* 16 (2004): 400.

¹⁰ For more on the Madrid Peace Conference see: Francisco Rodriguez, "The 1991 Madrid Peace Conference: U.S. Efforts Towards Lasting Peace in the Middle East Between Israel and its Neighbors." *University of New Orleans Theses and Dissertations*, no. 1343, (2011).

¹¹ European Council. "European Council at Corfu of 24 and 25 of June 1994: PRESIDENCY CONCLUSIONS." *Reproduced from the Bulletin of the European Communities* no. 6, (1994).

¹² EEAS. "Barcelona declaration adopted at the Euro-Mediterranean Conference of the 27th and 28th of November 1995." *EEAS Webpage*. https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/euromed/docs/bd_en.pdf (Accessed June 19, 2024).

This new partnership adopted a multilateral approach, and divided the cooperation into political, economic and cultural areas¹³. The Barcelona Agenda proposed concrete actions to be taken in order to create an area of peace and development, that was meant to be achieved following the idea that the economic liberalization will lead to political democratization of the south states, and the Union had to have an active involvement in the process¹⁴. But the changing political reality in the area, with the revival of conflict in the Mediterranean and around, lowered the expectations created in 1995, even with so the "Barcelona spirit"¹⁵ persisted due to cooperation impregnating the different aspects of the two shores relations.

By the arrival of the new millennium the situation in the area had changed dramatically, which impacted negatively on the cooperation in the Mediterranean basin. The European Union responded to this new international scenario with the "wider Europe" ¹⁶, being the begging of the European Neighborhood Policy. This new policy offered sectoral integration and differentiated statues to the neighbor states based on merits, proposing a bilateral focus that broke with the multilateral approach, putting the East and the Mediterranean at same level, while trying to find coherence and equilibrium between these two regions, but also erasing an exclusive mediterranean guide endowed with its own idiosyncrasy and objectives.¹⁷ This new policy was accompanied by the European Security Strategy of 2003, that try to cover the defense and security aspects of the EU in the international arena, being the fight against international terrorism a driving topic for the improvement of bilateral relations with the south basin states.

¹³ Carlos Closa, ed. *La europeización del sistema político español*, (Istmo, 2001)

¹⁴ Martí Grau i Segú, "¿VOLUNTARISMO O LEGADO? EL PROCESO DE BARCELONA Y LAS ALUSIONES HISTÓRICAS EN LA JUSTIFICACIÓN DE LA POLÍTICA MEDITERRÁNEA DE ESPAÑA (1995-2011)." *Estudios Historia Contemporánea, Universidad de Salamanca* 34 (2016): 87-114.

¹⁵ Javier Solana "Discourse during the Euro-Mediterranean Conference in Barcelona of November 27th 1995."

¹⁶ Romano Prodi, "A Wider Europe — A Proximity Policy as the key to stability." Sixth ECSA-World Conference, Brussels, (2002). "The ENP is intended to establish a belt of friends from Marrakech to Murmansk."

¹⁷ Martí Grau i Segú, "¿VOLUNTARISMO O LEGADO? EL PROCESO DE BARCELONA Y LAS ALUSIONES HISTÓRICAS EN LA JUSTIFICACIÓN DE LA POLÍTICA MEDITERRÁNEA DE ESPAÑA (1995-2011)." *Estudios Historia Contemporánea, Universidad de Salamanca* 34 (2016): 87-114.

1.2. From 2008 until today

Even with this European Union was willing to participate actively as an actor¹⁸ in the regions bordering it, the division in the mediterranean conference persisted mainly because of certain states refusing to sign agreements with Israel¹⁹. The UE predilection for the economic cooperation instead of the cultural or political areas also played against the possibility of reaching further compromises that were included in the Barcelona declaration, proving that the expected spill over from the aspects related to the economy to the other two were not happening²⁰, this was happening simultaneously to the relegation of the mediterranean agenda to a secondary position in a moment marked by the EU enlargement to the East. In this scenario, the Union of the Mediterranean was launched in 2008 with the intention to keep the Barcelona Spirit alive and facilitating that the region remained as a preferential area of the CFSP²¹.

The Arab springs of 2011 started an era of instability and social unrest in the south Mediterranean basin, from which it has not been able to recover²². The European Union approached the crisis with pragmatic policy, in support of regimes that were stable even if not democratic, in order to ensure its economic and security interest in the region, and not necessarily in favor of democratic factions and processes that could lead to greater instability²³. The 2011 Springs provoked a migratory crisis that put Schengen on the edge of collapse²⁴, and was responded with the concept of externalization of frontiers, at the same

¹⁸ To know more about the definition of actor use it in this thesis consult: Caldach 'Capítulo 5: Los actores Internacionales', *Relaciones internacionales. Edit. Ediciones Ciencias Sociales, (1991)*.

¹⁹Antonio Romero, "Las relaciones euromediterráneas: 47 años de (des)encuentro." *UNED. Espacio, Tiempo y Forma. Serie V, Hª Contemporánea* 16 (2004): 405.

²⁰ Richard Gillespie, "A political agenda for region-building? The EMP and democracy promotion in North Africa." *Working Paper AY0405-30, Institute of European Studies, University of California, Berkeley*, (2004):1.

²¹ Council of the European Union. "Union for the Mediterranean ministerial conference at Marseille, Final Declaration of Barcelona Process." *15187/08, Presse* 314, (2008).

²² For more see: Charles Dunne, "From the Arab Spring to What, Exactly? 2011 and 2019 Compared." *Arab Centre Washington D.C.*, 2019. <https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/from-the-arab-spring-to-what-exactly-2011-and-2019-compared/> (Accessed June 19, 2024).

²³ For a concrete example of a pragmatic policy: Anholt and Sinatti, "Under the guise of resilience: The EU approach to migration and forced displacement in Jordan and Lebanon." *Contemporary Security Policy* 41, no. 2 (2021): 311-335.

²⁴ For more on the Schengen Crisis see: Yves Pascouau, "The Schengen area in crisis – the temptation of reinstalling borders." *Foundation Robert Schuman in European Issues*, no. 392, (2016.)

time the Union was suffering from the terrorist attacks of the Islamic State. One year later, the European Global Strategy was released as the new foreign policy that focused more on the concept of ²⁵ .

In 2020, the Covid-19 erupted when the Mediterranean region was still on the process of recovering from the worst effects of the Arab Springs²⁶. The area was still suffering from civil wars, social unrest and economic instability, the European Union launched a new agenda to face the situation in the region as a "call for joint action by the EU and Southern Neighbourhood partners" ²⁷. The war in Ukraine of 2022²⁸ and the events of October 9th of 2023 also have impacted the stability in the Mediterranean, accelerating prior geopolitical rivalries and multipolar competition.

2. The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) Framework and its application to the Mediterranean

The evolution of the European approach to the mediterranean has been marked by the need to have a secure neighborhood to trade with. But the events of international society, which have led to a subsequent increase of multipolar rivalries and geopolitical competition, have impacted the multilateral relations between the Union and the mediterranean. Thus, the EU has tried to adapt its strategies and policies to fit in a more contested world in general, making use of different tools used to guarantee the security of the regions around and beyond it and to create solid flux of commercial exchanges, and the Mediterranean being in the center of this evolution. As a result, it results appropriate to analyze how the evolution and impact of the strategies, sub-strategies and policies of the CFSP have impacted the region in general and the Algerian case in particular.

²⁵ Federica Mogherini, "Shared vision, common action: A stronger Europe. A global strategy for the European Union's foreign and security policy." *EEAS Brussels*, (2016).

²⁶ El-Jardal, F. "The Mediterranean Region: A Hotspot of Inequalities in the Aftermath of COVID-19." *IEMed Yearbook*, (2021): 124-131.

²⁷ European Commission. "Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: A renewed partnership with the Southern Neighbourhood - A new Agenda for the Mediterranean." JOIN(2021) 2 final, Brussels, (2021): 1.

²⁸ Ernesto Caccagno and Alessandro Marrone, Alessandro. "NATO and a reinforced collective defence: The strategic implications of a Russian war in Europe." *IAI-Istituto Affari Internazionali*, (2024): 77-86.

2.1. Strategies and Sub-strategies inside the Framework of the CFSP

The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) Strategies compound a key element of the European Foreign Action in the world in general, and in the Mediterranean in particular²⁹. These strategies identify the key threats and challenges that European Union faces at the international arena, related to security challenges and stability constraints of the European neighborhood and beyond, establishing strategic priorities for the Union to address in order to its strategic interest and the promotion of values exposed in article 2 of the TUE³⁰. The CFSP strategies can be seen as the will of the Union to play a role as an actor in terms of security and defense, thus they have been evolving and adapting to a more contested world, and this have been reflected on the different approaches of them, which have evolved from the promotion of EU values and the multilateralism to a more geopolitical foreign action. The evolution of the different strategies can be perfectly perceived in the Mediterranean, an area where the Union wants to play a role in preserving peace and stability, being a result of its actorness self-perception in the region.

2.1.I European Security Strategy

The European Security Strategy of 2003 established reference of the CFSP, in terms of identifying main security and stability threats and priorities of it to address³¹. The first strategy reasoned that the unprecedented degree of freedom, prosperity and security Europe had enjoyed at that time, made it imperative for the EU to project security, stability and prosperity abroad ³². Making use of the experience learned during the process of European integration, the union was supposed to contribute to the international peace thorough the strengthening of the rule of law, the promotion of the liberal order, the democracy and multilateralism³³, which has been summarized with the concept of the Union as exporter of

²⁹ For more on the CFSP: Treaty of the European Union. "Chapter 2 Specific Provisions on the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Section 1 Common Provisions." 1991.

³⁰ Treaty of the European Union. "Art. 2." *"The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail."* 1991.

³¹ General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union. "European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a Better World." 2003.

³² Bailes, "The European Security Strategy: An Evolutionary History." *SIPRI*, 2005.

³³ Council of the European Union, ``A secure Europe in a better world: European security strategy''. *General Secretariat of the Council, Publications Office*, 2005.

values³⁴. Even if during this time there was a general an optimism of the Union contribution to this objective due to its unique approach, the Iraq intervention and different tensions in the mediterranean exposed tensions and dilemmas about the limits of the European Foreign Policy³⁵.

In a moment mark by United States as a hegemon and the international fight against terrorism, the strategy refused the idea of a large-scale aggression against any Member State. It focused on new threats which were more diverse, less visible and less predictable³⁶. Five were the menaces exposed by ESS: terrorism was the first introduced, which was international problem back then linked to violent religious extremism and Al Qaeda, and the European societies not being unconnected with this phenomenon; the next to be mentioned was the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the Middle East as an area that was experiencing an arm race and putting the focus on the serious threat of terrorist groups acquiring this kind of armament; the third and fourth were closely related, being the regional conflicts and the state failure as in Somalia or Afghanistan, which were also severely impacted by terrorism, and MENA region as one especially affected by this problem; the last one was the international crime, which was seriously impacting the EU and was also seeing as a problem linked to terrorism and failing states, but not exclusively, was a perceived as a threat to be addressed as a whole³⁷. All in all, terrorism was pace directly or indirectly as a main threat associated with weak or failed states and the zones of conflict, especially in the Middle East and North Africa as a region severely impacted by it.

The ESS highlighted the EU as a security player in processes conflict resolution and peace building in its neighborhood and beyond. The approach of the Union is summarized in “We need both to think globally and to act locally. To defend its security and to promote its

³⁴ Bailes, A.J.K. "The European Security Strategy: An Evolutionary History". *Stockholm: SIPRI*, 2005. <https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/files/PP/SIPRI10.pdf> (Accessed June 19, 2024). See also: Cameron, Fraser. "An EU Strategic Concept." *European Policy Centre, SECURITY POLICY / ISSUE PAPER*, 2003. <https://www.epc.eu/en/Publications/An-EU-Strategic-Concept~22996c> (Accessed June 19, 2024).

³⁵ Federica Bicchì, "Our size fits all': normative power Europe and the Mediterranean." *Journal of European Public Policy* 13, no. 2 (2006): 286-303; Seeberg, Peter, and Cavatorta, Francesco. "The EU's democratization agenda in the Mediterranean: a critical inside-out approach." *Democratization* 16, no. 1 (2009): 3-19.

³⁶ Council of the European Union, "A secure Europe in a better world: European security strategy." *General Secretariat of the Council. Publications Office*, 2005.

³⁷ Ibid, 29 and ff.

values”³⁸, this show a self-perception of its actorness that showed a grade of confidence in its model, which combined with outward-looking, with which the European Union was committed to export its liberal values and democratic norms³⁹. The strategic objectives marked by this strategy focused on addressing the threats previously exposed, also the defense of the international order based on effective multilateralism and building security in its neighborhood⁴⁰. It is remarkable the linkage of establishing international partners in order to achieve the goals proposed, especially the need of engaging with Mediterranean States within the framework of the Barcelona Process and the Arab world⁴¹.

The policy implications that the ESS were meant to endorse the CFSP to be more active, capable, coherent and able to work with partners. It was intentioned to be more active for the Union to pursuit its strategic objectives making use of the mechanism and tools contemplated in the treaties, more capable in terms of military capacities and defense, and more coherent surpassing duplications generated by different instruments of the CFSP and the CSDP. It is remarkable the importance it placed on establishing relations with other states, especially in the Mediterranean Region, to face common threats and placing cooperation as a necessity due to the impossibility of the EU dealing with these problems on its own. All in all, it can be concluded that the ESS was the result of a time where the European Union embraced an exporter of values and model to a world where multilateralism and liberal values were seen as the path to solve international problems.

2.1.II. Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy

The Report on the Implementation of the ESS was a way to analyze the results, while also adapting the strategy to the new international configurations. It concluded that the strategy had been a general success, as a result the Union carried greater international responsibilities

³⁸ Ibid, 33.

³⁹ For more see: Panebianco, Stefania, and Rossi, Roberto. "EU attempts to export norms of good governance to the Mediterranean and Western Balkan countries." Jean Monnet Centre EuroMed, JMWP, 53, 2004.

⁴⁰ Council of the European Union, "A secure Europe in a better world: European security strategy." *General Secretariat of the Council. Publications Office*, 2005.

⁴¹ "The European Union's interests require a continued engagement with Mediterranean partners, through more effective economic, security and cultural cooperation in the framework of the Barcelona Process. A broader engagement with the Arab World should also be considered." Council of the European Union, "A secure Europe in a better world: European security strategy." *General Secretariat of the Council. Publications Office*, 2005.

than at any time in its history in places as far as Afghanistan or Georgia, and placing the enlargement and neighborhood policy, as motors for good governance reforms and catalyst for expanding and strengthening relations with its Eastern Europe and Mediterranean States⁴². At the same time, the report exposed that the international society was facing new threats and challenges that also affected the EU.

The document revised the state of things of threats exposed on the ESS, to which it added two more related to energy security and climate change⁴³. The threats exposed in the ESS were still a problem to solve with variable results after addressing them, but in all the report exposed the need to do more and efficiently, also the necessity to strength the cooperation with the United Nations System, the Union for the Mediterranean and other state partners to more effectively approach these issues⁴⁴. From the other two new menaces exposed from the strategy, the energy security is especially relevant for the purpose of this thesis, since is the first time a document of this kind exposed the need of diversifying the energy providers, as result of a completely dependence from the gas imports from a reduce number of providers. The Report on the ESS also exposed the need for addressing climate change with a sense of urgency, which is linked to the surge of new security threats and conflicts in the international society.

The document acknowledges the changes that the world was experiencing back in the last part of the decade of 2000, and tried to adapt the ESS to them with very continuist proposals. The focus implemented did not change, it continued to support and strengthen the same formulas for addressing the old and new threats, exposing the need of partnerships for effective multilateralism with different international organizations and States, while the will to achieve a more effective and capable EU with greater engagement with its neighborhood prevailed. Thus, the report did not introduce any major change to the ESS, which is seen as a

⁴² Council of the European Union, General Secretariat of the Council. European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a Better World. Luxembourg: Publications Office, 2009. <https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2860/1402>.

⁴³ Ibid, 5-6.

⁴⁴ Ibid, 10-12.

general success, only including a more global approach with the partnerships for effective multilateralism⁴⁵, which was supposed to be implemented also beyond the EU neighborhood.

2.1.III. European Global Strategy

The European Union Global Strategy (EUGS) of the CFSP launched in 2016 to replace the ESS, described the world as more complex and contested⁴⁶. The new configurations of the international society exposed the European Union to new security and stability threats, as a result of the conflicts and crisis that were located in its eastern and south neighborhood. This strategy introduced a new pragmatic focus, as the principle ruling the European Foreign Action, which was meant to combine a “realistic assessment of the strategic environment”⁴⁷ with an “idealistic aspiration to advance in a better world”⁴⁸. Even if a new focus was introduced, the commitment of the EU to multilateralism remained, especially while approaching international crisis and promoting regional governance. The EUGS reduced the ambitions of the previous strategy from norms and security exporter, to focus on supporting resilient societies in countries experiencing extensive contestation and conflict⁴⁹.

The international context on which the EGS was launched was marked by the increasing multipolarity. The world of the beginning of century on which the United States was the hegemon, let pass to the decade of 2010 marked by the surge of new actor with

⁴⁵ To Know more: Bava, Ummu Salma, Giovanni Grevi, and Álvaro Vasconcelos. “Partnerships for Effective Multilateralism: EU Relations with Brazil, China, India and Russia. Paris” *European Union Institute for Security Studies*, 2008.

⁴⁶ European External Action Service. “Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe: A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy.” *Luxembourg: Publications Office*, 2016, 7. <https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2871/9875>. (Accessed June 19, 2024).

⁴⁷ Ibid, 8.

⁴⁸ Ibid, p. 8. See also: Anna E. Juncos “Resilience as the new EU foreign policy paradigm: a pragmatist turn?”, *European Security*, 26(1), (2017):1-18.

⁴⁹ Nathalie Tocci. “A Stronger Europe in a Fragile World: Behind the Scenes of the EU Global Strategy”. *London/New York: Palgrave Macmillan*, 2017. See also: Pol Morillas. “Strategy-Making in the EU: From Foreign and Security Policy to External Action.” *London: Palgrave Macmillan*, 2019.

increasing power and influence in global politics and economy⁵⁰, as the PRC⁵¹ or Russia, having as a result a rising multipolar competition and instability. On this scenario, the EU was becoming especially vulnerable to conflicts in its neighborhood, with the Mediterranean as an area of increasing geopolitical rivalries, on where actors were using region as a theater of operations in an international context marked by this multipolar competition. As a result of a more contested world, on which geopolitics gain importance and multilateralism loses capacity as a viable solution for security and stability menaces, consequently the EU is forced to reorient foreign and security discourse to embrace new approaches⁵².

Thus EUGS embraced this new pragmatic focus of the CFSP, with the will to overcome the one proposed in the ESS. The intention was that this new pragmatic focus should rule the European Foreign Action as a whole, adopting a less idealistic approach that did not intend shaping the international society as a priority, but rather one more realistic which capitalized an increasing concern inside the Union of mitigating the harmful impact of the world on it⁵³. This strategy did not focus on the outward projection like the ESS, instead its focal point was more inward looking that was intended to prioritize the protection of the territory, citizens and democratic governance systems of the EU Member States⁵⁴. As a reflection of this concern, the EUGS placed the priority on achieving through the establishment of strategic partnerships as a key for achieving a strategic autonomy, which was understood as reducing vulnerabilities to the political exploitation of interdependence by foreign actors ⁵⁵.

⁵⁰ To know more: Niall Duggan, Bas Hooijmaaijers, Marek Rewizorski, and Ekaterina Arapova. "Introduction: 'The BRICS, Global Governance, and Challenges for South-South Cooperation in a Post-Western World.'" *International Political Science Review* 43, no. 4 (2022): 469-480.

⁵¹ Mohsen Eslami and Maria Papageorgiou. "China's Increasing Role in the Middle East: Implications for Regional and International Dynamics." *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs*, 2023. Available at: <https://gjia.georgetown.edu/2023/06/02/chinas-increasing-role-in-the-middle-east-implications-for-regional-and-international-dynamics/>. (Accessed June 19, 2024).

⁵² "act autonomously when and where required and to work with partners wherever possible" European Council. *Council Conclusions* 14149/16, (2016) 2.

⁵³ Riccardo Alcaro. "A More Joined-up Union, a Stronger Europe." *Project Joint*, April 30, 2024. Available at: <https://www.jointproject.eu/2024/04/30/a-more-joined-up-union-a-stronger-europe/>. (Accessed June 19, 2024).

⁵⁴ Riccardo Alcaro, Pol Bargués, and Hylke Dijkstra. "A Joined-Up Union, a Stronger Europe. A Conceptual Framework to Investigate EU Foreign and Security Policy in a Complex and Contested World." *Project Joint*, no. 8 (2022): 13 and ff.

⁵⁵ Mark Leonard. *The Age of Unpeace: How Connectivity Causes Conflict*. London: Bantam Press, 2021.

The EUGS was the Union attempt to regain a degree of initiative in a world where the multipolar competition and interstate rivalry was on the rise. Thus, in this environment marked by regional instability, increasing geopolitical competition, questioning of liberal values and multilateral organizations, the EU foreign action reoriented its resources to prevent the situation outside from affecting the Union inside. The result of this was the displacement of the focus on exporting security and prosperity abroad, to the adoption of a pragmatic approach, even if not refusing to the multilateral approach to conflict resolutions. The EUGS was the first to introduce the necessity to achieve strategic partners for and “strategic autonomy” in a wide sense, and not only inscribed to the security and defense fields, seen as the will to make the Union more resilient to the events of international society, a concept that will later on be developed by the European institutions⁵⁶.

3.1.III. Strategic Compass

The European Strategic Compass (from now on ESC) of 2022 is a sub-strategy of the EUGS that is meant to adapt the CDSP to the constant evolution of the international society. Even if it is not a strategy or a report of implementation of the CFSP, it is meant to introduce a new framework for coherence and convergence for the European security and defense agenda⁵⁷, with implications for all the European foreign action. The formulation of the compass has been marked by events as the Covid-19, but more significantly the Russian aggression in Ukraine, that has accelerated tendencies and process that were ongoing, as is the case for the strategic autonomy. The new ESC sums the will for a “more geopolitical EU”⁵⁸ that wants to learn and talk “the language of power”⁵⁹.

The international society has been experiencing a series of shocks that have impacted directly the International relations, been the Covid-19 and the Russian aggression in Ukraine the ones with special impact in the EU. The pandemic of 2019 had enormous geoeconomic

⁵⁶ To know more see: Nathalie Tocci. “Resilience and the Role of the European Union in the World.” *Contemporary Security Policy* 41, no. 2 (2020): 176-194.

⁵⁷ Council of the European Union “A Strategic Compass for Security and Defence”, (2022), 5.

⁵⁸ Ursula von der Leyen. “Speech by President-elect von der Leyen in the European Parliament Plenary on the Occasion of the Presentation of Her College of Commissioners and Their Programme.” *Speech, European Parliament, Brussels*, November 27, 2019.

⁵⁹ Josep Borrell. “Embracing Europe’s Power.” *Project Syndicate*, February 8, 2020. Available at: <https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/embracing-europe-s-power-by-josep-borrell-2020-02>. (Accessed June 19, 2024).

and geopolitical implications, decreasing the trust in multilateral governance, and exposing the vulnerabilities of the global value chains, while also increasing the rivalry between the United States and the PRC⁶⁰. The Russian invasion of Ukraine of 2022 only fueled these tendencies, had great implications in terms of security and stability in the EU⁶¹, having an impact on the European energy supplies, and exposing the need for the Strategic Autonomy of the EUGS that now is seen as more urgent⁶². The response of the EU to this new international environment is the ESC and summarize what the HRVP Josep Borrell has announced as the “geopolitical awakening” of the EU ⁶³.

The new geopolitical focus of ESC differs from the traditional perception of the CFSP that perceived the economic, energy and security interdependence as positive for preserving security and stability⁶⁴. The Strategic Compass considers them as pressure points, which foreign countries could exploit in their own benefit, so economic relations have been reinterpreted bearing the idea of possible trade interferences⁶⁵, while energy and security relations have also been submitted to the lenses of geopolitics. The “New Strategic Autonomy” is the one to capitalize the will of the Union to develop an economic and energy sovereignty, increasing the resilience of the Union to events of the international society in a moment marked by fierce multipolar competition⁶⁶.

The Strategic Compass is meant to be a framework for European security and defense, with impact on traditional perceptions and focus of the CFSP. The adoption of the new focus has the consequence of every foreign policy, is seen through lenses of geopolitics, and is

⁶⁰ Riccardo Alcaro and Nathalie Tocci. “Navigating a Covid World: The European Union’s Internal Rebirth and External Quest.” *The International Spectator* 56, no. 2 (2021): 1-18.

⁶¹ Pablo Alvarez-Couceiro. “Europe at a Strategic Disadvantage: A Fragmented Defense Industry.” *War on the Rocks*, April 2023. Available at: <https://warontherocks.com/2023/04/europe-at-a-strategic-disadvantage-a-fragmented-defense-industry/>. (Accessed June 19, 2024).

⁶² Héctor Herranz-Surrallés. “The EU Energy Transition in a Geopoliticizing World.” *Geopolitics*, (2024).

⁶³ Josep Borrell Fontelles. “Europe in the Interregnum: Our Geopolitical Awakening after Ukraine.” In *Groupe d’Études Geopolitics*, (2022).

⁶⁴ Sophie Meunier and Kalypso Nicolaïdis. “The Geopoliticization of European Trade and Investment Policy.” *Journal of Common Market Studies* 57 (2019): 103-113.

⁶⁵ Council of the European Union. “A Strategic Compass for Security and Defence”. Luxembourg: Publications Office, (2022): 5.

⁶⁶ Héctor Herranz-Surrallés. “The EU Energy Transition in a Geopoliticizing World.” *Geopolitics*, (2024): 1-31.

formulated with the objective of achieving an “Open Strategic Autonomy” which is meant to make the EU more resilient to the outside environment. It is a key to understand that the new focus on resilience only applies to the Union, the ESC omits concepts such as multilateral governance and global governance⁶⁷, which can be seen as an evolution from the pragmatism of the EUGS. The new European geopolitical approach of the ESC influences the CFSP and can be seen as a process of adaptation to a hostile international environment, where the Union has reoriented its foreign action to a more defensive position and inward looking.

2.2. European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) and its Southern dimension and Agendas for the Mediterranean

The European Approach to the Mediterranean has been impacted by the evolution of the different focus of the CFSP. In 2004, inside the mark of the ESS, the European Neighborhood Policy was released to guide the European foreign action in the region⁶⁸, which has its southern dimension with its own priorities to address that are different from the one established for the Eastern neighborhood⁶⁹. Inside the mark of EUGS, the Renew Partnership between the EU and its Southern Neighborhood was released in 2021⁷⁰, establishing new priorities and using the focus on strategic alliances exposed the Global Strategy. The Union still claims the legacy of Barcelona, but the evolution of the international society has pushed it to opt for more bilateral and less multilateral and merit-based relations in its Southern Neighborhood.

2.2.I. Southern Dimension of Neighborhood Policy

The European Neighborhood Policy was launched in 2004 to foster stability, security and prosperity in the regions adjoined to the EU. As a sub-strategy of inside the framework of the ESS, it was meant to instrumentalize the address of priorities exposed on it, with the will to face the threats the Union was facing. The ENP exposed the need to develop commitments

⁶⁷ Pol Barga  s. “From ‘Resilience’ to Strategic Autonomy: A Shift in the Implementation of the Global Strategy?” EU-LISTCO, Policy Papers, no. 9 (2022).

⁶⁸ Commission of the European Communities. “European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper” *COM(2004) 373 final*. Brussels, (2004).

⁶⁹ Ibid, 22-23.

⁷⁰ European Commission. “Renewed Partnership with the Southern Neighbourhood: A New Agenda for the Mediterranean”, *JOIN(2021) 2 final*. Brussels, (2021).

between the EU and its neighbor's commitments, to work together in key priority as Economic development for stabilizations, security, migration and mobility⁷¹; a partnership based on shared values, the promotion of democracy, rule of law, respect for human rights and social cohesion⁷². The Southern Agenda sectorizes the ENP of the Mediterranean, taking into consideration the idiosyncrasy of the region.

The southern perspective of the ENP works on the legacy of the Barcelona Process, and the coordination with the Union for the Mediterranean. The Barcelona Conference of 1995, was the launch of the Euro-mediterranean Partnership, established with the objective creating an “area of peace, stability, economic prosperity, upholding democratic values and human rights” ⁷³. The southern agenda developed concrete actions from the goals of 1995, in order to strengthen prosperity, stability and security, but the ENP articulate the relations in a bilateral manner, putting aside the multilateral approach of the Barcelona Process⁷⁴. Even if so, when the agenda was first released the European Union was still committed to the multilateralism and the promotion of its democratic norms and liberal values⁷⁵.

Differentiation is placed as a ruling principle of the EU relations with its neighborhood⁷⁶, with which the Union tries to give proper responses to very too different regions. The result of this principle applied in the Southern Agenda, has as a result people of the region been placed as a cornerstone of it, and the approach of the area been focused in five policy areas: Human development, good governance and the rule of law; Resilience, prosperity and digital transition; Peace and security; Migration and mobility; Green transition: climate resilience, energy, and environment⁷⁷. To address these policy areas, the Union make use of the EU's Neighborhood, Development and International Cooperation

⁷¹ Commission of the European Communities. “European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper” *COM(2004) 373 final*. Brussels, (2004): 6.

⁷² Ibid, 7.

⁷³ Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference. The Barcelona Declaration and Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Barcelona, (1995).

⁷⁴ Fiesolana, “The European Neighbourhood Policy: A Framework for Modernisation?” *Workshop organized by Profs. Marise Cremona and Wojciech Sadurski, European University Institute*, (2006):10-13.

⁷⁵ Commission of the European Communities. “European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper” *COM(2004) 373 final*. Brussels, (2004): 6.

⁷⁶ Ibid, 8.

⁷⁷ Ibid, 22-24.

Instrument⁷⁸ to finance initiatives, that are meant to strengthen resilience, build prosperity and increase trade and investment to support competitiveness and inclusive growth⁷⁹. Even if the ENP is articulated in a bilateral manner, the Union for the Mediterranean and the Meetings bringing together Foreign Ministers has a key role while trying to promote multilateral solutions to common problems⁸⁰.

2.2.II. Review of the European Neighborhood Policy and the New Agenda for the Mediterranean

The latest updates of the European Neighborhood Policy have not introduced a substantial change in the focus even if the international scenario differs completely from the 2003. The Union has adopted a very continuity line, introducing small changes to the original policy only to adapt the mark of reference to a constant evolving situation, on which the Union had been losing influence in the region in favor of other powers as Russia or China. These new updates can be seen as the result of the EU will to maintain its influence in the Mediterranean, in a moment marked by major multipolar competition, divisiveness and geopolitical rivalry.

In 2015 the Review of the ENP was launched, introducing new priorities to the original to address the new challenges of the European Neighborhood. The document was meant to evaluate the progress on the policy areas proposed eleven years prior, exposing a generally negative evolution the EU surroundings had experienced⁸¹, while updating the original policy with a renewed mark of reference for it, in a time marked by the consequences of the Crimea Crisis⁸², the Arab springs and the migratory crisis. To the 2003 priorities, the new document introduced: economic development for stabilization, which acquired a special

⁷⁸ Commission of the European Communities. "Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the Instruments for External Assistance under the Future Financial Perspective 2007-2013", *COM(2004) 626 final. Brussels*, 2004.

⁷⁹ Ibid, 8-9.

⁸⁰ Santiago Florensa. "Union for the Mediterranean: Challenges and Ambitions." *European Institute of the Mediterranean*, October 2023. Available at: <https://www.iemed.org/publicacions-en/hemeroteca/analisi/union-for-the-mediterranean-challenges-and-ambitions/>. (Accessed June 19, 2024.)

⁸¹ Council of the European Union. "European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a Better World". Luxembourg: Publications Office, (2009).

⁸² To know more: Igor A. Yerofeyev, Adam Makuch, Ivan Stebelsky, Serhiy A. Kryzhanivsky, Andriy Lubomyr, and Evhenii O. Zasencko. 2024. "The crisis in Crimea and eastern Ukraine." In *Encyclopedia Britannica*. <https://www.britannica.com/place/Ukraine>. (Accessed June 19, 2024)

relevance in a time marked by the instability, due to the connection between the poor economic performance and the increase on internal political turmoil; the security, a field of key relevance in moment marked by conflict, in the east and the south of the EU; and the migration and mobility, a topic that was back in the time marked by the 2014 migratory crisis, and the need for the Union to avoid this to happen again⁸³. All in all, the review built on the original adding these new priorities that were very focused on the Mediterranean.

The “Renewed Partnership with the Southern Neighborhood: A New Agenda for the Mediterranean” of 2021, was the last big update of the ENP that affected the Mediterranean Region⁸⁴. This was supposed to revitalize the EuroMed relations, proposing a document exclusive of this region and not a general one as in the update of 2015, in moment marked by the Covid-19 and its consequences. The new agenda externalize the inner priorities of the EU to the Mediterranean, putting the focus on the green and digital transition, the rule of law, the respect of the human rights and the good governance; but lacks the active implication of the south neighborhood, on where this document was seen as an imposition of the Union, which did not consider their real problems and needs⁸⁵. The new agenda was very continuist to the lines proposed in the Review of the ENP, been presented in a moment marked by the pandemic and the fear of the Union seen the South Mediterranean completely disengaging from its influence.

2.3. Consideration on the evolution of the CFSP and its ENP

After analyzing the evolution of the European approach to the Mediterranean, the change in the focus of the CFSP Strategies is evident, but at the same time the ENP papers do not reflect this evolution. The Union has been adapting to a more contested world, as a result it has evolved its foreign strategies from the focus on exporter of values of the ESS, to the pragmatic approach of the EUGS, and the geopolitical turn of the Strategic Compass. This evolution of the perspective adopted by the European foreign action have play against the

⁸³ European Commission. “Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy”. *JOIN (2015) 50 final*. Brussels (2015).

⁸⁴ European Commission, “Renewed Partnership with the Southern Neighbourhood: A New Agenda for the Mediterranean”, *JOIN(2021) 2 final*, Brussels, (2021)

⁸⁵ Elizabeth Lannon, "The Externalization of EU Policies in the Renewed Partnership with the Southern Neighbourhood: The Potential Impact of the New Mediterranean Agenda," *IEMed Yearbook* (Barcelona: IEMed, 2021): 17-23.

ENP, which is still inscribed in the logics of the ESS with its merit-based approach, and has not been received enough degree of attention, as it is shown by the fact that it was reviewed after eleven years later of its implementation and the New Agenda for the Mediterranean had to wait eighteen year, without introducing significant changes to the 2004 focus. Even if the Union economic and security interest in the Mediterranean remains, the European approach to the region now seems to favor strategic partnerships that build on common interest with its southern neighbors, which are sustained on shared priorities and not merit based by the ENP. As a result of all of this, it seems that in a moment marked by the UE willing to become more geopolitical, the CFSP Strategies favor the establishment of partnerships based on common interests and not necessarily on common values.

3. The New Energy Diplomacy and its reflection in the EU-Algerian Relations

After seeing the focus evolution of the CFSP in its different strategies and sub-strategies, it is necessary to see it applied in a concrete case. This will be the New Energy Diplomacy and its reflection in the EU-Algerian Relations, because of the renewed importance of this matter after the Russian aggression in Ukraine, and the need of the Union to diversify its energy suppliers. Even if the will of the EU to increase the number of hydrocarbons providers for security reasons dates to the Review of the ESS of 2009, the direct and flagrant violation of the Ukrainian sovereignty committed by Russia, has forced the European Union to implement concrete measures to reduce the level of exposition its gas imports. This part of the thesis will analyze the developments around this case, especially how the new focus adopted by the CFSP affects it.

3.1. REPowerEU and the EU external energy engagement in a changing world

The Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24 of 2022, forced the European Union to act to reduce its dependency of the gas coming from the aggressor. The response to this need was the REPowerEU plan, presented by the European Commission in May 2022 to phase out the Russian fuel imports, launched two months later of the start of the war⁸⁶. This plan is meant to be the new framework for the EU energy policy, with concrete objectives and actions to take, both inside and outside the Union, exposing the need to diversify fossil energy suppliers in the mid-long term, but also focusing on the green energy transition as the key objective to

⁸⁶ European Commission, ``REPowerEU Plan'', COM(2022) 230 final Brussels, (2022).

ensure energetic sovereignty of the Union in the future⁸⁷. The EU external energy engagement in a changing world (from now on EEECW), was joint communication inside this framework, meant to guide the EU's energy and climate diplomacy with global partners⁸⁸. This plan was very influenced by the geopolitical turn the European Union is experiencing, which has impacted directly the focus adopted by the EU when adopting new policies⁸⁹.

3.1.1. The REPowerEU Policy after the Russian War in Ukraine

REPowerEU was presented as a plan to ensure affordable, secure and sustainable energy for Europe. This was not the exception to the tendencies of the moments, and as result adopted a geopolitical and security focus when dealing with the goal of diversifying energy imports⁹⁰. The plan exposed three pillars that needed to be address in order to reduce the Union dependency on energy imports: the acceleration of the green energy transition, as a way of ensuring its own self provisioning of renewal energy, but also implementing it on its partners; the diversification of suppliers, in the mid long term of fossil fuels, and in the long term the green ones; and improving the energy savings, with a more efficient use of the resources, in moment marked by the scarcity of them in the European energy market⁹¹. This plan linked together the first and second pillars, to guarantee that this new era of diplomacy also benefits from the EU green transition.

The REPowerEU is the current framework of reference of the EU energy policy, influenced by the geopolitical turn the Union is experiencing especially after the Russian invasion in Ukraine. The new energy diplomacy of the EU is articulated around the concept of energy and climate relations with global partners, binding together the green transition and foreign engagements, and place the mediterranean as a key region of convergence of this two thanks to the green hydrogen. This new era of the European energy diplomacy has the potential to substantially affect the relation with the Southern Neigborhod, increasing the number of strategic partnerships based on common interest but not shared values.

⁸⁷ Ibid, 20.

⁸⁸ European Commission, "EU external energy engagement in a changing world," *JOIN(2022) 23 final*, Brussels, (2022): 4.

⁸⁹ Giuseppe Sarno and Luca Colantoni, "A Changing Energy Diplomacy: The External Dimension of the REPowerEU Plan," *IAI-Eni Strategic Partnership* (Rome: IAI, 2023): 41-44.

⁹⁰ Ibid, 41-44.

⁹¹ European Commission, ``REPowerEU Plan``, COM(2022) 230 final Brussels, (2022),

3.1.II. The EU External Energy Engagement in a Changing World

The EU external energy engagement in a changing world policy is meant to be the guide for the energy partnerships of the EU, inside this framework the REPowerEU. It has the intention to establish a sustainable, secure and affordable energy systems in Europe and around the world, in line with the Paris climate agreements and other commitments in the environmental field, combining the strategic priority of achieving the Strategic Autonomy of the EU with the international compromises of the Union⁹². This policy prioritizes the establishment of strategic partnerships, in the short-medium term to establish trustful providers of fossil fuels for the Union, and in the medium-long term restructure these relations, with the idea to reconvert its contaminant energy industry in a green one. This new policy clearly reflects the core pragmatic idea of the CFSP: "act autonomously when and where required and to work with partners wherever possible"⁹³.

The document establishes a set of objectives for the EU's external energy policy to achieve, strongly influenced by the war in Ukraine and its consequences for Europe. The goals to achieve are inward and outward looking: as reducing overall energy demand and ensuring fair competition for resources, boosting energy savings, energy efficiency and the development of renewables, supporting Ukraine to build back better, preparing for further EU energy market integration, repairing energy infrastructure and paving the way for a future green hydrogen partnership⁹⁴. All in all, this policy is meant to be the instrumentalization of the REPowerEU in its foreign perspective, and with strategic autonomy as the core concept for it⁹⁵. For the purpose of the thesis, the research focuses on the part dedicated to the diversification of the EU's gas suppliers and the preparation of the Union for the hydrogen trade⁹⁶.

⁹² To know more about concrete actions of this policy see: Giulia Sofia Sarno and Lorenzo Colantoni 'A Changing Energy Diplomacy: The External Dimension of the REPowerEU Plan', *IAI-Eni Strategic Partnership*, (Rome: IAI, 2023), 45.

⁹³ European Council, Council Conclusions 14149/16 (2016): 2.

⁹⁴ European Commission, "EU external energy engagement in a changing world," JOIN(2022) 23 final Brussels, (2022): 2.

⁹⁵ Ibid, 2.

⁹⁶ To know more: International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), "Geopolitics of the Energy Transformation: The Hydrogen Factor," (2022).

The policy exposes the EU dependency on the gas coming from Russia, but also exposes that in the future it will be substituted by renewal energies⁹⁷. Even if so, the document acknowledges that the surpass of gas by other green sources of energy, such as hydrogen, is yet to be a reality, and the diversification of suppliers of this good has to be a priority to address⁹⁸. Thus, the reduction of the European dependency on energy exports from Russia is placed as a main priority in the short term, while focusing on the green transition which is seen as an opportunity in the medium-long term, not only in the EU but to its strategic partners, being aligned with prior climate compromises of the Union⁹⁹. Simultaneously, lacks a merit base approach, concepts as democracy and rule of law are nowhere to be found in the document, even if there are direct mentions to the renewed agenda for the mediterranean inside the document¹⁰⁰. All in all, the Union's commitment to diversify energy providers and to fight the climate change prevails, while the focus on the strategic autonomy allows greater degree of engagement and partnership with states that do not embody the values of the article 2 of the Treaty of the EU.

The REPowerEU and the EU external energy engagement in a changing world opens a window of opportunity for a greater engagement between the European Union and its southern neighborhood. The establishment of strategic partnership base on energy cooperation, with prospective for the green transformation of their economies, it is mutually beneficial scenario, not only for the Mediterranean states non-renewal energy producers, but also for the rentier states of hydrocarbons, on which the clean energy could create the scenario to overcome its model economy based on exportation of them. Algeria is inside the second group and analyzing it could offer some interesting insights about the new energy diplomacy of the Union applied to a concrete case.

⁹⁷ European Commission, "EU external energy engagement in a changing world," JOIN(2022) 23 final, Brussels, (2022): 1-2.

⁹⁸ Ibid, 3.

⁹⁹ Ibid, 4.

¹⁰⁰ *"This work builds upon the existing new Agenda for the Mediterranean and its Economic and Investment Plan and will start with the EU-Egypt Hydrogen Partnership"* Ibid, 5.

3.2. EU-Algerian relations, evolution and development

The bilateral relations between the European Union and Algeria have been characterized by cooperation in certain fields and disagreement in others. The mutual dependency they both share on each other, in economic and security matters, makes them share a relationship that has been built on common interests but not shared values that has been evolving due to the international context, and the will of the Union to adapt its foreign relations to the need coming from to them. The war in Ukraine and the will of the Union to finish its dependency in gas coming from Russia, has aligned the interest of the EU and Algeria, creating the scenario for enhancing the strategic partnership between this two. The current partnership has been mostly limited to energy cooperation, but latest interactions between them show their willingness to increase the level of the bilateral relation¹⁰¹. However, although the European Union and some of its Member States are key trade partners for Algeria, it appears that Algeria is reluctant to engage actively with the EU, particularly in the European neighborhood policy¹⁰². This can be explained by Algeria's painful past as a colony of France, which has left its mark on the way Algeria interacts with the outside world, particularly with Europe ¹⁰³

3.2.I. Historical Perspective of the Bilateral Relation

Algeria has complex history, marked by its geographical position as a crossroad of civilizations¹⁰⁴. For this thesis, only the Algerian history of XIX century and forward will be address, with the focus on the XX and XXI centuries as being the ones on which the dynamics that influence the most EU-Algeria relations can be found. This state is *suis generis* in the Maghreb region due to its condition as a rentier state, which has had long-lasting implications in its foreign relations with the European Union.

¹⁰¹ Zine Labidine Ghebouli, "Power couple: How Europe and Algeria can move beyond energy cooperation," *European Council on Foreign Relations*, (2024), <https://ecfr.eu/publication/power-couple-how-europe-and-algeria-can-move-beyond-energy-cooperation/>. (Accessed June 19, 2024)

¹⁰² Tobias Schumacher, "The European Neighbourhood Policy: The challenge of demarcating a complex and contested field of study," in *The Routledge Handbook on the European Neighbourhood Policy* (Routledge, 2018).

¹⁰³ Andrew Farrand, "Against the flow: Europe's role in kickstarting Algeria's green transition," *European Council on Foreign Relations*, (2022), <https://ecfr.eu/publication/against-the-flow-europes-role-in-kickstarting-algerias-green-transition/>. (Accessed June 19, 2024)

¹⁰⁴ Consultar Anexos: Mapa de Argelia

Algeria was conquest by France at the beginning of the 19th , starting a process of colonization that lasted until its independence in 1962. A country very impacted by its colonial legacy, which has particularities that differentiate it from other French possessions in the Maghreb and resulted in the lack local administrative structures because of the direct control imposed by the metropolis¹⁰⁵. Up to the point where France considered this North African territory as another region of its state¹⁰⁶, this resulted in war of liberation from 1954 to 1962, caused by the reluctance of the Paris to recognize the independence of Algeria. This war of independence marks the birth of the Algerian political system and state, on which the *Armée de Libération Nationale* gained a fundamental role in the structures of power¹⁰⁷.

The independence of Algeria being gained through fratricide violence and armed conflict, can help to understand the chronicle lack of legitimacy of its political system. After the long war the ALN was the unique entity able to present itself as organized and unified, been capable to impose its ideology by violent means, as it did in the coup d'état of 1965 when it pushed the "*Front de Libération Nationale*" (from now on FLN) to the power, while in the process committing a "original sin"¹⁰⁸ as a result of the direct violation of the Soummam principles¹⁰⁹. The lack of legitimacy of the FLN government supported by the army, explains the active role of Algeria in the international arena, as way gaining recognition outwards. As so, the Algerian foreign action has been using what it is known as the diplomatic and security rents.

The diplomatic rent is associated with the golden era of Algerian diplomacy, when it used its condition of a state surge from the decolonization process¹¹⁰. The diplomatic rent was the first period of the Algerian foreign relations and lasted until its civil war in 1991, marked

¹⁰⁵ Mañe, A., Thieux, L., and Larramendi, M., "Argelia en la encrucijada: condicionantes, tendencias y escenarios," *Documento de Trabajo Opex* 82 (2016): 11-12.

¹⁰⁶ To know more about the applicable legislation of the French Algeria: President of the Republic Français and National Assembly of France, *Loi n° 47-1353, portant statut organique de l'Algérie*, September 20, 1947, Art. 1. See also: *Constitution de 1946, IVe République Français*, May 5, 1946, Art. 60.

¹⁰⁷ Mañe, A., Thieux, L., and Larramendi, M., "Argelia en la encrucijada: condicionantes, tendencias y escenarios," *Documento de Trabajo Opex* 82 (2016): 11-12.

¹⁰⁸ "... the foundation of the State is based on an "original sin", since the group that creates also "occupies" it, does so they seizes it, violating the previous foundational agreements." Ibid., 14. (Translated by authors).

¹⁰⁹ David Guérin, *Ci-gît le colonialisme* (De Gruyter, 1973), 40-65.

¹¹⁰ Akram Belkaïd, "The Algerian Diplomacy in Search of Its Golden Age," *Politique étrangère* 74, no. 2 (2009).

by its paper as an exponent of the non-alignment movement and pro third world vindications in the context of the Cold War, this MENA country was able to present itself as a fundamental actor in the multilateral order and a mediator in international conflicts¹¹¹. Its foreign action helped Algeria to approach positions with the European Communities, after the war of independence and the coup d'état of 1965, which soon followed by the development of more solid bilateral relations in certain fields¹¹². This action positioned the FLN as legit interlocutor in the region, even if its access to power was undemocratic.

The security rent was exploited by Algeria, using its experience fighting against Islamist forces in the Algerian Civil war that gained special relevancy after the September 11 attacks¹¹³. This is the second period of the Algerian foreign relations, started in the decade of 1990 and last until today, was the result of the coup d'état that suspend the legislative election of 1991 that were win by the *Front Islamique du Salut*, which created a political turmoil that led to an open civil war between the government and the Islamic insurgency. The armed conflict lasted for ten years in what is known as the Algerian ``dark decade''¹¹⁴, and the lessons learned on it was used by the Algerian government during the year 2000's, in the context of the international fight against terrorism, to position itself as a security provider for the USA and the EU. This was fundamental for the Algerian system, because of its function confronting the international isolation the state was suffering since the decade of the 1990¹¹⁵.

Even in the scenario of securitization of the first decade of the millennia and the signature the Association Agreement of 2002, the EU and Algeria were not able to reach common compromises within the framework of the ENP. The FLN was reluctant to trade political concessions for economics advantages, an obstacle to advance in the cooperation,

¹¹¹ Amira Chikhaoui, "40 Year Later: The Role of Algerian Diplomacy During the Iran Hostage Crisis," *Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies*, (2021). <https://nesa-center.org/40-years-later-the-role-of-algerian-diplomacy-during-the-iran-hostage-crisis/>. (Accessed June 19, 2024)

¹¹² Council of the European Communities, ``Cooperation Agreement between the European Economic Community and the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria'', *Council Regulation (EEC) No 2210/78* (1978).

¹¹³ "Our war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated." George W. Bush, "Discourse of President of the USA," September 20, 2001.

¹¹⁴ Michael Willis, "Lessons From Algeria's 'Dark Decade'," *Foreign Policy*, , (2014), <https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/01/31/lessons-from-algerias-dark-decade/>. (Accessed June 19, 2024)

¹¹⁵ Fatma Zeraouia, "The Memory of the Civil War in Algeria: Lessons from the Past with Reference to the Algerian Hirak," *Contemporary Review of the Middle East* 7, no. 1 (2020): 25-53.

which have had as the result of the relations been ruled by the agreement of 2002. But the changes in the international society, have position Algerian as a state able to keep the internal stability even when facing internal turmoil and revolts as the Arab springs and the Shirak¹¹⁶, creating the condition for establishing a strategic partnership between the European Union and Algiers based on common interest in the field of energy.

3.2.II. From the perspective of Economics

The rentier state condition of Algeria has had a fundamental importance, while approaching its foreign relations with the European Union. If the diplomatic and security rent were used by Algeria as a way to legitimacy itself in the international arena, the rents coming from the exportation of hydrocarbons allow the Algerian government to be presented as legit in front of its population, offering a relative high level of welfare state protection that replace the lack of democracy in its system. Algerian condition as a rentier state makes it dependent on the international trade, while also make it vulnerable to shocks in the demand of gas and oil¹¹⁷. The reliance of this Maghreb country on exports to support its political system makes it dependent on its principal markets of exportation, which are located in the EU, particularly the Mediterranean State Members¹¹⁸. Even if so, the relative stability of Algeria in comparison with other rentier states in the North of Africa and the Middle East, have allow it to erect itself as a trustful provider of energy to Europe, which consequently has allowed it to enjoy a comfortable position in the bilateral relations with the Union¹¹⁹. Thus, Algeria been conscious of its status as a reliable energy partner, has been less willing to accept conditionality clauses in its relationship with the EU.

The changes in the international society of the last twenty years have increase the negotiating capacities of Algeria, and its reluctance to be subject to the conditionality clauses while negotiating agreements with the EU. The Union has been trying to diversify its energy

¹¹⁶ Laurent Thieux, "La nueva Argelia después del Hirak: discursos y estrategias de legitimación ante sus socios europeos," *Revista CIDOB d'Afers Internacionals* N° 135 (2023): 115-141.

¹¹⁷ World Trade Organization, "Trade Profiles 2023: Algeria," *WTO Webpage*, (2023), https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/daily_update_e/trade_profiles/DZ_s.pdf (Accessed June 19, 2024)

¹¹⁸ European Commission, "Algeria EU trade relations with Algeria. Facts, figures and latest developments," *European Commission Webpage*, (2024), https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/algeria_en. (Accessed June 19, 2024)

¹¹⁹ Eurostat, "Continued drop in EU imports of energy products," *Eurostat Webpage*, (2024), <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/w/ddn-20240322-2>. (Accessed June 19, 2024)

providers as far as 2009, with the intention to reduce dependence on certain suppliers, looking for reducing risk derived from shocks in the offer of gas and oil. This intention to diversify suppliers has played in favor of Algeria, especially after the Covid-19 and the Russian Aggression in Ukraine and the will of the Union to achieve its Open Strategic Autonomy. All in all, it can be said that the current scenario is marked by a mutual dependency Algeria and the EU share, because the first need the other to sustain its rentier state condition while the second need to secure its energy deliveries.

3.3. Bilateral Agreements and Partnerships between the EU and Algeria

Before talking about the current state of things between the EU and Algeria, results necessary to briefly look at the agreements that rule the diplomatic relation. It is remarkable that the Association Agreement of 2002¹²⁰, the one that establishes the areas of cooperation between the parties, dates to before the European Security Strategy and the Neighborhood Policy. The bilateral relation was before 2017 ruled by this agreement, which have not been updated as regularly as in other states of the region, as Morocco or Tunis¹²¹, due to the difficulty to reach common positions inside the framework of the first strategies and sub strategies of the CFSP. But in 2016 the European Union Global Strategy opened a window of opportunity for establishing strategic partnerships based on common interests, and one year later Shared Partner Priorities Agreement was agreed¹²², which is simultaneously under the framework of the Revised ENP of 2015 and the EUGS. The war in Ukraine has closer alienated the interest of the EU and Algeria, but the revision of the agreements between the two still to be updated.

¹²⁰ Council of the European Union, "On the conclusion of the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an Association between the European Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria, of the other part", 2005/690/EC (2005).

¹²¹ European Commission, "Moroccan EU trade relations with Morocco. Facts, figures and latest developments". *European Commission webpage*, (2024): https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/morocco_en#:~:text=The%20EU%20is%20Morocco's%20largest,amounted%20to%20%E2%82%AC53.3%20billion. See also, European Commission "Tunis EU trade relations with Tunisia. Facts, figures and latest developments." *European Commission webpage*, (2024) https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/tunisia_en. (Accessed 19 June 2024).

¹²² Council of the European Union, "PRIORITES COMMUNES DE PARTENARIAT ENTRE LA REPUBLIQUE ALGERIENNE DEMOCRATIQUE ET POPULAIRE (ALGERIE) ET L'UNION EUROPEENNE (UE) AU TITRE DE LA POLITIQUE EUROPEENNE DE VOISINAGE REVISEE," *UE-AL 3101/17 ADD 1* (2017).

3.3.I. Association Agreement and Partnership of Priorities

The Association Agreement between the EU and Algeria entered into force in 2005. It was meant to strengthen links and to establish long lasting relations, based on reciprocity, solidarity, partnership and co-development. It is very influenced by the time it was signed, inside the European Security Strategy framework and it focuses on exporting values, in moment marked by the fight against terrorism and international crime¹²³. The document establishes a series of objectives to address: the establishment of a framework for political dialogue, promotion of economic and social development, the support for economic reforms in Algeria, and the promotion of mutual understandings through the cooperation in various fields¹²⁴. This agreement was signed in a time where Algeria was still recovering from its civil war, and it was in need of international economic and political support, with the dual goal of legitimizing its political system and recover from the war.

The document of Shared Partnership Priorities between Algeria and the EU of 2017 revised the previous Association Agreement, within the framework of the revised European Neighborhood Policy. It was agreed in a completely different scenario than the previous one, on which Algeria had been able to avoid the Arab springs to spread across the country, allowing it to be presented as a stable and trustful energy supplier, while the Union was in need for partners to securitize its southern neighborhood in a time marked by internal division and external destabilization¹²⁵. In this context, the document presented exposes a series of priorities to be address: governance and fundamental rights, socio-economic development and trade, security, migration, and of course energy and the environment¹²⁶. This document is economic, security and political oriented, with the Union focusing more on securing the commercial trade but especially the stability of the Maghreb, and Algeria trying

¹²³ Council of the European Union, ``On the conclusion of the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an Association between the European Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria, of the other part'', (2005/690/EC. (2005) Art. 1.

¹²⁴ Ibid, Title II, 2.

¹²⁵ European Parliament, ``SOUTHERN PARTNERS''. *European Parliament Webpage*, (2024) https://www.europarl.europa.eu/erpl-app-public/factsheets/pdf/en/FTU_5.5.8.pdf (Accessed: 19 June 2024).

¹²⁶ Council of the European Union, ``PRIORITES COMMUNES DE PARTENARIAT ENTRE LA REPUBLIQUE ALGERIENNE DEMOCRATIQUE ET POPULAIRE (ALGERIE) ET L'UNION EUROPEENNE (UE) AU TITRE DE LA POLITIQUE EUROPEENNE DE VOISINAGE REVISEE'', *UE-AL 3101/17 ADD 1* (2017) 2-11.

to benefit from and scenario that favored the legitimization of its political system both internally and internationally.

All in all, these two agreements still rule the bilateral relations between the EU and Algeria. They are mostly based on common interest and not on shared values, the best example of this are the conditionality clauses been subjected to the will of Algeria to use them in its own political benefit, as a way to legitimize ongoing processes of political transformation coming from internal turmoil in its territory, but not to introduce reforms dictated by the UE. This could explain the lack of periodical updates of the agreements, even if the current focus adopted by the CFSP allows the establishment of strategic partnerships, because Algeria still use its diplomacy selectively as way to obtain political legitimacy and the economic relations to sustain its condition of rentier state, the Union participate in these dynamics that ensure the stability in this Maghreb state and the constant flux of gas to the EU. The war in Ukraine has highlighted the key importance of this bilateral relation, especially for the EU and its need to diversify energy suppliers, but also for a Algeria that is still recovering from the Covid-19 and the Shirak.

3.3.II. EU-Algeria Energy partnerships in the light of the New Energy Diplomacy

The Russian aggression of Ukraine on February 28th of 2022 marked a point of inflection for European Union foreign relations with its neighborhood. This event was crucial for accelerating previous dynamics inside the Union, especially the geopolitical turn promised by Von der Leyen¹²⁷, which materialized in the launch of series policies that embraced this strategic focus, as the previously mentioned REPowerEU and the Strategic Compass. In this scenario, concepts such as Open Strategic Autonomy or Strategic Partnerships, in the field of energy particularly, have been positioned in the center of the CFSP policies. The current state of things has position Algeria as one of these Energy Strategic Partners, with which the Union could diversify its gas suppliers and reduce its dependency of the one coming from Russia.

The European Union and its Member States has tried to enhance the previous relations with Algeria, taking advantage of the disposition of this Maghreb state to increase the level of

¹²⁷ Ursula von der Leyen, "Speech by President-elect von der Leyen in the European Parliament Plenary on the occasion of the presentation of her College of Commissioners and their programme," (November 27, 2019) https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_19_6408. (Accessed: 19 June 2024).

cooperation¹²⁸. Algeria is also receptive to expand the fields of collaboration with the European Union and its Member States, in a moment marked by the president change of president from the former leader Abdelaziz Buteflika to Abdelmajid Tebboune, after the protest of Shirak that led to a period of internal turmoil¹²⁹. Algeria has tried since then to use the diplomacy as a way to legitimize the perpetuation of the regime, and even if Covid-19 helped to suffocate the civil protest, it also has increased the need to establish solid economic relations to maintain its rentier state condition and its fragile stability. Thus, there is a convergence of interest between the European Union and Algeria that build on the previous mutual dependency, which could allow them to broaden its partnerships.

The recent interaction between the authorities of the EU and its member states and Algeria, have evidenced this will for a renewed approach. The new enhancement in cooperation is focusing mainly on the economic field, more precisely in the energy sector, but it has the potential to also expand to other traditional fields of collaboration such as security. Algeria is already a key partner for Europe in the Mediterranean, in terms of commerce and security, and this new diplomatic impulse will build on previous strategic partnerships. For the purpose of this thesis, it will focus on the energy partnership and how it has been impacted by need of the EU to diversify suppliers after the war in Ukraine.

In the bilateral relations between the European Union and Algeria, the energy has always been an important field for partnership and cooperation due to the natural gas. Even before the 2022, Algeria was the third largest supplier of gas to the EU, only after Russia and Norway, while simultaneously the Union is the major importer of this Algerian hydrocarbon¹³⁰. As a result of the Russian war in Ukraine in 2022, these patrons of commerce have evolved an increase in the EU imports of gas coming from Algeria, and a bigger reliance of the Algerian energy exports to the Union, deepening their shared dependency they both share. This mutual need has been highlighted by the events of international society, that have impelled the increasing cooperation in the field of energy between them.

¹²⁸ EUneighbours, "High Representative Josep Borrell visits Algeria" EUneighbours Webpage (2023). <https://south.euneighbours.eu/news/high-representative-josep-borrell-visits-algeria/> (Accessed: 19 June 2024).

¹²⁹ Laurent Thieux, "La nueva Argelia después del Hirak: discursos y estrategias de legitimación ante sus socios europeos," *Revista CIDOB d'Afers Internacionals* N° 135 (2023): 115-141.

¹³⁰ European Council, "¿De donde procede el gas de la UE?," European Council, June 19, 2024, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/es/infographics/eu-gas-supply/>. (Accessed: 19 June 2024).

The EU- Algerian strategic partnership on energy began in 2015, after the events of the Arab Springs and the need to securitize the flow of hydrocarbons between the two. The acknowledgement of the mutual dependency, led to the realization of the vulnerability that came from it in a moment marked by great regional instability, and the need to structuralize a cooperation in the energy field to ensure a constant supply of gas to the Union from Algeria¹³¹. The partnership established a Political Dialogue on Energy Matters, and year later also an EU-Algerian Energy Business Forum was launched, which served as a framework for discussing and to make Algeria more attractive to investments, particularly gas and renewal projects alike¹³². This strategic partnership focused on the common interest and not on shared values, introducing the pragmatic approach the CFSP was adopting at that time.

The war in Ukraine and the events of the Shirak, reinforce the will of both parts to deepen this strategic partnership. To further develop the cooperation between them, two working groups on gas and renewal and efficient energy, with recent declarations of EU and member states official that open the window for enlarging the current structures of collaboration. One example of this could be the declarations of the European Energy Commissioner Kadri Simson, who in the EU-Algerian Energy Business Forum of October 2022, said that the EU was ready to strengthen its energy partnership with Algeria, and not only reduced to natural gas¹³³. This declaration of intents seems to match the Algerian objectives for its energy sector, opening the window for future understandings in the energy field, even if the recent change of the EU in favor of the green hydrogen is perceived with some skepticism in Algiers¹³⁴.

The energy is still and likely to remain, the main field of cooperation between Algeria and the Union. In the short term this will focus on securitize the flow of gas, but in the

¹³¹ Charlotte Gallot, "EU's Foreign Energy Policy Towards its Southern Neighbours: Enhancing the Effectiveness of its Partnerships: The case of Energy Transition in Algeria and Morocco" *Master Thesis, Luiss University*, (2024).

¹³² Jekaterina Grigorjeva, "Starting a New Chapter in EU-Algeria Energy Relations: Proposal for a Targeted Cooperation," *Jacques Delors Institut* (2016): 173.

¹³³ Zine Labidine Ghebouli, "Power couple: How Europe and Algeria can move beyond energy cooperation," *European Council on Foreign Relations*, (2024), <https://ecfr.eu/publication/power-couple-how-europe-and-algeria-can-move-beyond-energy-cooperation/>. (Accessed June 19, 2024)

¹³⁴ Andrew Farrand, "Against the flow: Europe's role in kickstarting Algeria's green transition," *European Council on Foreign Relations*, (2022) <https://ecfr.eu/publication/against-the-flow-europes-role-in-kickstarting-algerias-green-transition/>. (Accessed: 19 June 2024)

medium long term it will switch to renewal energies collaboration, especially the green hydrogen. These actions follow the lines exposed by the REPowerEU plan, and more concretely the new mark for foreign energy relations of the “EU external energy engagement in a changing world”, showing the application of priorities and approaches of them to a concrete case. This also shows the complete adoption of a foreign policy approach that focus on common interests and not on shared values, which allows the enhancement of cooperation with Algeria, a state that has been reluctant to engage actively with the European Neighborhood Policy and its conditionality rules. All in all, the present situation invites to think that the strategic partnership of the EU and Algeria is likely to keep the inertia or even expand to other fields thanks to the shared threats and common interest.

Conclusions

After the process of research and analysis of this thesis, it can be concluded that there is evidence that supports the hypothesis of this project. Thus, it can be affirmed that the European Union CFSP has evolved from the exporter of values model to embrace a pragmatic and more geopolitical one, due to the need of the Union to adapt its foreign action to a more multipolarly contested and geopolitical tensioned world. This development can be perfectly perceived in the Euro-Mediterranean relations, but especially on the evolution of bilateral relations between the EU and Algeria, which have been favored by new European energy diplomacy of the REPowerEU plan, allowing a major degree of engagement thanks to impulse to the concept of strategic partnership that are based on common interest and not on shared values. The conclusions of this thesis, highlight key elements and facts on the European foreign policy in the mediterranean and beyond that need to be explained in more detail.

When approaching the objectives and interest of the European Union in the Mediterranean two statements can be affirmed. First, the EU has always perceived its Southern Neighborhood as an area of special interest, on which it needs to guarantee the flow of commerce on it attending the needs of its internal market, also to be involved in the conflict resolution process to ensure a secure region that do not destabilize the European continent. The second, even if the Mediterranean does occupy a very significant place in the European foreign action, it is constantly overshadowed by the natural tendency of the Union

to focus on its Eastern neighborhood, thus the mediterranean is very rarely placed as the main area of interest and if so only due to the pressure of the southern member states. Then, the mediterranean in an area of especial interest for the EU due to the interdependency and proximity with it, but simultaneously is constantly placed as a second priority after the Eastern policy that generally attracts more attention by the member states and institutions.

If talking about the evolution of the CFSP, a clear evolution can be traced back to the first policies. Even if the objectives remain unaltered, the will of the union to adapt its foreign action to a more multipolar and contested world, has forced it to adopt different approaches to have an efficient international policy, and thus the EU has evolved from a shared values and merit based CFSP to a one that priorities the establishment of strategic partnerships. The war in Ukraine has only accelerated prior tendencies of the international society, which have fueled the intention of the Union to become more geopolitical to be capable to respond to a more conflicted global reality, and the Strategic Compass of the CDSP is the reflect of this aspiration. Even if the evolution of internal and external factors plays in favor of the EU completely embracing the geopolitical approach for the CFSP, it is still to be fully adopted until the next strategy of it is launched.

Connected to prior conclusion, the current international scenario plays against the multilateral solutions to address shared threats in the mediterranean. The constantly evolving international environment, has led to the incapacity European Neighborhood Policy to address the succession of EU objectives in the region, due to the limitations that imply its conditionality clause for reaching compromises with the European Union, which has favored the Strategic partnerships gaining more and more relevance because its approach based on common interests and not shared values. This new kind of alliances allow a major degree of convergence resulting in an increase in the number of agreements with the Mediterranean States where the big majority of them are non-democratic.

The new energy diplomacy applied the EU-Algerian relations perfectly illustrates the evolution in the approach of the different instruments of the CFSP applied to a given case. This bilateral relation has been historically marked by the mutual dependency they both shared, but until the launched of the figure of the strategic partnerships, the agreements between them had not been at the level of importance of their economic and political ties, due

the reluctance of Algeria to be subjected to the conditionality clause of the ENP. But the window of opportunity opened after the implementation of the EU Global Strategy and specially fueled after the new European energy diplomacy, has increased the degree of engagement between Algeria and the European Union. The current state of things invites to think that more agreements could be reached, especially in the field of energy but not exclusively inscribed in this area of cooperation.

The current international society has been evolving to a scenario where geopolitical competition, multipolar rivalry and tension are definitory characteristics of it. The European Union will have to navigated through this complex situation, defending their interest and being able to talk the language of power when necessary, but not completely forgetting the foundational values from where the EU has been constructing and developing its project. Fully embracing the geopolitical approach on the CFSP, could lead up to permanently letting aside the defense of the European basic principles in its international relations, with long lasting implications for a global order that seems to embrace the unilaterality and conflict, but need the multilateralist EU to revert this current tendency that menace the international order and its institutions. The new European Commission will have a fundamental role in the evolution of the CFSP, due to its capacity to influence this policies, thus it should not forget that the European Union is one of values both inwards and outwards.

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
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
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
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Encuentro de trabajo en CIDOB con Nacho Sánchez Amor, Diputado del Grupo de la Alianza Progresista de Socialistas y Demócratas en el Parlamento Europeo del 14-05- 2024

En esta reunión se repasó los principales retos de la política exterior europea y, muy en particular, la reciente iniciativa de la Escuela Diplomática Europea, cuya gestación ha sido posible gracias a la iniciativa y liderazgo de Sánchez Amor. Durante la sesión, se analizó como la Escuela Diplomática Europea puede ser un mecanismo efectivo para que la arquitectura diplomática de la UE cambie su naturaleza híbrida y gane, progresivamente, mayores niveles de autonomía, posibilitando la formación de personal diplomático a escala europea sin depender de los instrumentos y personal proveniente de los estados miembros.

“La Common Foreign and Security Policy necesita de una escuela diplomática para dotar de coherencia a la acción exterior de la Unión Europea.”

Sobre el Papel de la UE en el Mundo.

- La CFSP tiene como puntos fuertes *el Brussels Effect* y el *Soft Power* capaz de influir en regímenes autoritarios. Hasta donde se llega con el segundo dependen de la voluntad de la Unión de primar los valores a la posible reticencia de los estados de destino.
- El gran reto al que se enfrenta la sociedad internacional es el cuestionamiento de los Derechos Humanos por parte de ciertos estados. Especialmente, de aquellos ubicados en el sur global, los cuales exponen que son una imposición de los países occidentales como una forma de garantizar la dominación de los primeros.
- La Unión ha de emplear su diplomacia cultural como forma de batallar por los valores defendidos en el artículo 2. Esta ha de ser más beligerante en aquellos países que cuestionan estos valores, ya que al fin y al cabo la defensa de estos ha de ser un elemento definitorio de la Acción Exterior Europea. Para ello el SEAE y las misiones diplomáticas de los estados miembros juegan un papel fundamental, y lo que no pueden dejar los segundos a las representaciones de la UE la defensa de valores, mientras que ellos priman los intereses políticos y económicos.

Sobre la Actual Comisión y su Presidenta

Respecto a la actual Comisión y su presidenta comenta. Expone que Ursula Von der Leyen ha excedido sus funciones como presidenta contempladas en los Tratados, al tener una presencia internacional muy superior a la esperada en sus funciones, a costa del VPHR Borrell y el presidente del Consejo Europeo Charles Michael.

Acciones como las llevadas en Israel en octubre tras los ataques de Hamas, o Egipto y Túnez, han levantado cierto resquemor en cierta parte del Parlamento Europeo y la Comisión. A pesar de ello, los gobiernos de los 27 Estados Miembros no han mostrado su disconformidad con la gran presidencia internacional de Von der Leyen, aceptando de facto una situación que implica mayores atribuciones de acción exterior para la UE, a pesar de esta estar regulada por el intergubernamentalismo. Dentro del Parlamento Europeo, el grupo de Populares europeos también se muestra favorable a la actual situación, llegando a proponer la integración de la SEAE dentro de la Comisión, lo que implicaría necesariamente reforzar el papel exterior de la presidencia de esta.

Sobre los servicios de inteligencia nacionales y su relación con las instituciones de la UE.

Es necesario que los servicios de inteligencia de los 27 compartan con las instituciones de la UE la información de la que disponen en momentos de crisis. Es entendible las reservas de estos de desvelar información que, debido a la transparencia exigida a las instituciones de la Unión, pudieran acabar siendo de dominio público con las implicaciones de seguridad que ello supondría. Pero si en Bruselas se tiene la percepción de que no se le informa adecuadamente en situaciones de crisis, esta tendrá la tentación de crear una agencia propia, que es algo que ya se ha empezado a desarrollar pero que se encuentra en fase embrionaria. Sea como sea, la comunicación entre los servicios de inteligencia y las instituciones de la UE ha de ser fluida para una PESC efectiva alcanzar en sus objetivos.

Sobre el Proyecto de Escuela Diplomática Europea

Ha sido un proyecto muy bien acogido tanto por las instituciones, como por los Estados Miembros. Las implicaciones de tener un cuerpo diplomático europeo que no dependa de los estados miembros pueden favorecer a la PESC de sobremanera, ya que actualmente las representaciones de la UE dependen de los préstamos del personal diplomático de los estados miembro, los cuales están formados y entrenados en las dinámicas diplomáticas nacionales y no en las europeas. En consecuencia, para superar la situación actual se ha de formar a personal diplomático propio.

Esta iniciativa sale del Parlamento Europeo, gracias a los fondos de los que dispone para iniciativas propias. Rápidamente recibió gran atención debido a sus implicaciones para la acción exterior de la UE, y por la que recibió 3 interesantes propuestas de distintas educaciones educativas, entre las que figúrala el Instituto Europeo de Florencia, el instituto Europeo de Función Pública de Maastricht y el Colegio de Europa. Finalmente se decidió este último, por su ubicación privilegiada y su larga trayectoria de prestigiosa formación en estudios europeos. Ya van por el tercer proyecto piloto de formación, el cual se considera una historia de exitosa.

La implicación personal de la rectora del Colegio de Europa, Federica Mongerini, ha ayudado en la consolidación de este proyecto de Escuela Diplomática Europea. La antigua alta representante de la PESC, ha abordado este proyecto como un proyecto personal, y actualmente desempeña un rol clave dentro del proyecto. Los estudiantes que conforman el mismo son enviados por los ministerios de exteriores de los estados miembros, lo que tiene implicaciones en el proceso de acceso al mismo, pero que garantiza la implicación y apoyo de los gobiernos nacionales.

En ningún caso este proyecto ha de ser entendido como una forma de complementación de formación del personal diplomático de los Estados Miembros, a falta de formación en la EU dentro de las escuelas diplomáticas nacionales. Este es un proyecto de formación de futuro personal diplomático europeo, y tiene que llevar a cabo el compromiso de los 27, sin los cuales este proyecto no podría tener futuro.

Conclusiones finales

La Unión se enfrenta a un escenario internacional caracterizado por el conflicto y la inestabilidad. El multilateralismo que caracterizó a la sociedad internacional de los años 1990 ha dado lugar a una mayor inestabilidad, como resultado de la transición de un mundo unipolar a uno multipolar. Ejemplo de esta evolución se refleja en la imposición de sanciones entre sujetos de derecho, que han pasado a ser de una *rara avis*, a un elemento más de la acción exterior de estos. Si la Unión se quiere desempeñar como un actor geopolítico dentro de este contexto, la defensa de los valores va a quedar en un segundo plano, con todas las implicaciones que ello acarrea.

Documento redactado a partir de las notas tomadas por mi persona en la reunión del día 14 de mayo de 2024, y que las declaraciones públicas del Eurodiputado Sánchez Amor

pueden corroborar. En cualquier caso, este documento es autoría personal propia, y en ningún caso se le pueden atribuir responsabilidades al señor Nacho Sánchez Amor.

Entrevista al Eurodiputado Javier Nart Peñalver del grupo Renew Europe, del 12 de Marzo de 2024.

Fº Javier Buades Piqueres: [00:00:00] Buenas tardes, soy Francisco Javier Buades, estudiante de máster por la Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona y ahora mismo estoy haciendo una tesis sobre lo que es la política europea hacia el Mediterráneo y cómo ha evolucionado y especialmente su reflejo en las relaciones con Argelia dentro del marco de la nueva diplomacia energética que tanto se está hablando ahora. Quería realizar entrevistas para obtener varios insights y uno de ellos me gustaría que fueran de los de los policy makers y creo que el suyo resultaba, desde mi punto de vista, interesante, ya que nos puede permitir conocer la perspectiva de un europarlamentario. Bien, vamos a ello. Principalmente son tres cuatro cuestiones que son bastante generales las últimas dos y que son un poco más concretas, pero en general son bastante generales. La primera de todas versaría sobre lo que es la ¿Relación de la UE y Argelia? y ¿Cómo considera usted que es, pues, la actual relación que marca el estado de las cosas en ella?

Eurodiputado Javier Nart : [00:01:14] La relación de la Unión Europea y Argelia se fundamenta en el acuerdo de asociación que liberaliza de una bastante los tráficos comerciales entre Europa y Argelia. Pero básicamente la relación entre la Unión Europea y Argelia está impactada por tres países que son evidentemente. Por una parte. Francia. Por otra parte. Italia y España. Empecemos por Francia. Francia es el país que tiene las mayores relaciones históricas, incluso humanas, por la emigración argelina que ha habido, tanto de los que fueron aliados de Argelia en la Guerra de liberación, que son los Harkis y sus descendientes. Aquí es H, A, R, K, I, S y viene a ser tropas auxiliares. Harkis en idioma bereber es un grupo armado que tiene una conexión tribal o familiar. Esta gente cuando pierde la guerra de Argelia, Francia, cuando pierde, cuando se acuerda la independencia, se acuerda con las autoridades del FLN del Frente de Liberación Nacional una situación de olvidar el pasado y que no haya represalias respecto a ninguno. Lo que ocurrió fue unas matanzas tremendas de villas y de familias enteras, porque uno de sus miembros había sido Harkis y esta gente emigra a Francia en la segunda generación. Siguen en este caso son franceses, pero tienen lo que tú ya conoces, que es el problema de no sentirse integrados. Y esto tiene un impacto en las relaciones entre Francia y Argelia. Argelia es extraordinariamente sensible a cualquier planteamiento de estrategia común. Por ejemplo, ante el conflicto en el Sahel. Donde Argelia primero pacto con lo que fue, la plataforma común de los grupos tuareg que se articulaban en dos grandes confederaciones

la plataforma y la coordinación. Una yihadista y la otra, vamos a decir puramente nacionalista, con el gobierno de Malí.

Eurodiputado Javier Nart : [00:03:34] Gobierno de Malí, que ahora, con el apoyo de los rusos, ha roto el convenio y conquistó una de las ciudades, concretamente Kidal. Esto lo que significa es que lo lógico es que hubiera una coordinación entre la Unión Europea, Francia básicamente, y Argelia, al ser un país limítrofe y con un impacto enorme en la estabilidad del Sahel, cosa que Argelia no quiere. Entonces, esto es la consecuencia de no tener jamás una relación ni siquiera de coordinación de igual a igual con Francia en cualquier conflicto que les afecta a los dos, como es la desestabilización en el Sahel. ¿Pero ni siquiera ante un objetivo común, está de acuerdo en llegar a una coordinación con Francia? Es una. Es una relación tensa y siempre problemática, que va unida a los recuerdos de la guerra de liberación con el FLN, pero que la juventud cada vez lo ve mucho más lejos y en consecuencia, la juventud tiene hoy dos historias. Por una parte, la vieja gerontocracia, que sigue dominando los puntos altos del Ejército y de la Administración. La administración argelina está siempre bajo el mando o bajo la directa subordinación al poder, que es el poder del Ejército y, en consecuencia, la gente mayor tiene todavía el recuerdo de esa guerra. Pero la gente joven está totalmente fuera de esa relación. En cualquier caso, hoy quien manda, manda y las relaciones con Francia son complicadas. Dos Italia con Italia es la consecuencia de los problemas con España, donde España anteriormente tenía la mejor relación económica con Argelia, ahora tiene una relación extraordinariamente difícil, cosa que ha sido aprovechada por Italia, que ha asumido el papel de gran comprador de energía del gas argelino y e incluso la creación de un conducto que lleve a través de Italia el gas a Europa, en lugar de los gasoductos que ya existen entre Marruecos, perdón, entre Argelia y España, que son dos, uno que pasa el más importante por territorio marroquí y otro que va directamente a España.

Eurodiputado Javier Nart : [00:05:57] Lo lógico es que eso significara, pues, que España fuera el primer contribuyente, el primer suministrador de gas argelino por cuestiones geográficas a Europa. Pero las consecuencias del acuerdo extraordinariamente oscuro que firmó y las declaraciones que realizó Pedro Sánchez, en el sentido de entender que la solución de autonomía al Sahara era la solución más constructiva y más eficaz para resolver el conflicto, dio lugar a que Argelia rompiera las relaciones económicas con España, denunciara el tratado de amistad que teníamos entre Argelia y España y siguiera suministrando gas, pero cada vez en menos cantidad, cumpliendo con el acuerdo que tenemos sobre el gas, pero sin saber qué va a ser en un futuro en cuanto a la renovación. Y esto lleva a España al absoluto disparate que significa que Rusia ha tomado el lugar de las exportaciones que no se realizan argelinas. Y

entonces nosotros, que estamos frente a Rusia y apoyando todas las decisiones que signifiquen un bloqueo económico de Rusia simultáneamente, somos el país de la Unión Europea que compra más gas a Rusia, mucho más que el que el que comprábamos anteriormente. Y la relación entre España y Argelia está directísimamente tocada por esta declaración absurda.

Eurodiputado Javier Nart : [00:07:30] Si no fuera porque existan elementos oscuros que algún día se desvelarán de por qué España, de una forma gratuita, ha entregado uno de los más importantes activos que tenemos respecto a Marruecos, que es la posición de Naciones Unidas de no reconocimiento de la soberanía marroquí sobre el Sahara. Tenemos conflictos con Marruecos no resueltos. La delimitación de las aguas territoriales a Canarias de las aguas territoriales en el Estrecho, en Ceuta y en Melilla, que ellos las niegan por no reconocer nuestra soberanía. La apertura de la Aduana de Ceuta y la reapertura de la que existe desde el siglo XIX con Melilla, que todo esto fue prometido y garantizado por Marruecos hace ya tres años o dos años y pico, pero que no se llevó a cabo a pesar del regalo que le ha hecho Pedro Sánchez. Hay algo interesante que es que se iba a realizar una visita de Albares, ministro español de Exteriores a Argelia, que fue suspendida porque en la agenda Argelia, como es lógico, había introducido la cuestión del Sahara y de eso España no quería hablar. Y si no quiere hablar es porque tiene unos enormes, enormes problemas. En la relación triangular con Marruecos y Argelia, posición triangular que antes era absolutamente cómoda, que era colocarse detrás de las resoluciones de Naciones Unidas y ni un paso a la derecha, ni a la izquierda, ni palante, ni para atrás ahí. Pero al decir que la solución de la autonomía marroquí es la mejor solución o la más brillante o más buscada, pero es que dice la más no sé cuántos.

Fº Javier Buades Piqueres: [00:09:20] Apropiaada puede ser “apropiada”. Puede ser el término.

Eurodiputado Javier Nart : [00:09:24] Pero búscala. Si eso es importante. Tiene eso. Lo que dice es que se alinea detrás de las posiciones marroquíes y aunque después sigue diciendo que respeta y apoya las resoluciones de las Naciones Unidas. Argelia ha bloqueado nuestras relaciones económicas. Exportamos muy poquito, muy poquito respecto. Ni siquiera el 15% de lo que exportábamos antes en perjuicio de los industriales españoles. Y algún día, algún día, se desvelará la razón por la que Pedro Sánchez dio todo a cambio de nada.

Eurodiputado Javier Nart : [00:10:03] Sí.

Eurodiputado Javier Nart : [00:10:04] Bueno, te he contestado en extenso. ¿No?.

Fº Javier Buades Piqueres: [00:10:07] Está perfecto. De hecho, la siguiente pregunta tiene bastante relación con la primera y es ¿Cómo la guerra de Ucrania, la necesidad de Europa por diversificar distribuidores energéticos puede afectar positiva o negativamente a las futuras relaciones con Argelia?

Eurodiputado Javier Nart : [00:10:25] Bueno. Vamos a ver, las va a facilitar extraordinariamente dejando de lado, excepto en temas puramente retóricos, la crítica que se hace a una democracia muy imperfecta y a una violación de derechos humanos. Pero básicamente, en este momento la relación con Argelia es algo así como la relación con Túnez y es ya sabemos que ustedes son lo que son, pero necesitamos su gas. Y con el llamado presidente tunecino ya sabemos que ustedes lo que es. Pero aguántenos la inmigración para que no salga de las costas. Y al final lo que importa es el gas que llegue y la inmigración que no llegue.

Fº Javier Buades Piqueres: [00:11:13] ¿Y las últimas dos cuestiones serían especialmente cómo ve usted las perspectivas del Parlamento Europeo? Primero, relativo a esta nueva Europa geopolítica que planteaba Von der Leyen en el año 2019. Y la segunda, de hecho, ya se las formuló a las dos. ¿Cómo este nuevo enfoque a la hora de abordar relaciones exteriores y esta priorización de aliados estratégicos sobre la base de intereses geopolíticos y de seguridad, no sobre el respeto no total a los artículos del Tratado de la Unión

Eurodiputado Javier Nart : [00:11:53] Bueno, vamos a ver. El Tratado de la Unión Europea tiene unos artículos muy interesantes.

Eurodiputado Javier Nart : [00:11:58] Especialmente el dos. Voy a matizar porque sería el artículo dos. Los principios del Tratado de la Unión Europea.

Eurodiputado Javier Nart : [00:12:03] Las relaciones se fundamentan en valores democráticos y de derechos humanos. Bien, ahora yo lo que te ruego es que me digas dónde se encuentra el respeto a los derechos humanos y a los valores democráticos en la guerra de exterminio que está realizando Israel en Gaza, que es excesivo la brutal violación de todo, empezando por la 4.ª Convención de Ginebra que Israel infringe sobre los palestinos desde el 67 ocupándoles, despojándoles de todo humillándolos y matándolos en número importante. Y actualmente, ante la barbarie absoluta que significa el intento de Israel de empujar los palestinos hacia Egipto y, en consecuencia, el ir bajando lo que es la bomba demográfica

palestina. Bueno, pues tenemos un acuerdo de asociación con Israel que establece el respeto a los derechos democráticos y a los derechos humanos. Pero nadie ha pedido perdón. Yo sí lo he pedido, pero con un éxito perfectamente describable. Yo he pedido la suspensión del acuerdo y que se reúna lo que dice el artículo creo que es el 85 o 83, que es el que expone que: "en el supuesto de que existan controversias entre las partes Unión Europea e Israel se reúnen de situación bilateral, se exponen cuáles son los puntos en los que no se cumple el tratado de asociación por uno u otra parte y se toma una decisión al respecto si la contestación no es adecuada". Pero claro, la contestación es perfectamente clara porque sigue bombardeando y la gente viviendo bajo plásticos y en algunos de los casos muriéndose de hambre, o teniendo que beber el agua del mar porque no hay agua dulce o impidiéndose el acceso de medicamentos cuando es Israel la que, de acuerdo con el artículo, creo que es el 54 de la 4.^a Convención de Ginebra.

Eurodiputado Javier Nart : [00:14:08] Como potencia ocupante es administradora y en consecuencia debe dar la vida normal a la gente bajo ocupación, que son alimentos, que son casa, que son medicamentos, que son vida, que es trabajo. Cosa que Israel no ha hecho desde hace muchísimos años y Gaza vive del auxilio internacional. Pero es que ahora no puede ni siquiera ese auxilio internacional llegar a Gaza. Pues bien, la Unión Europea. Yo ayer o antes de ayer, en una proposición que hice sobre el tema de Gaza, propuse dentro de mi grupo que se suspendiera el acuerdo y dice vamos a ver si hemos pedido la suspensión del acuerdo respecto a Cuba, cuando Cuba no está realizando ni de largo lo que está haciendo Israel en el territorio palestino. Y cuando además estamos hablando de un país democrático que es Israel, cosa que no es Cuba, y en cambio hemos apoyado y hemos votado a favor de la suspensión del Tratado de un acuerdo que tenemos de diálogo político y no sé cuántos. ¿Y por qué no lo hacemos en Gaza? Pues no lo hacemos en Gaza, porque nuestros principios lo son, mientras no afecten temas fundamentales que son nuestras relaciones económicas, políticas y estratégicas.

Eurodiputado Javier Nart : [00:15:27] Y eso se pone por delante de la retórica. Yo he llegado a decir el artículo segundo de todos nuestros tratados de asociación que es el segundo o tercero, uno de los dos, segundo a veces tercero, a veces que habla del principio de derechos humanos y valores democráticos, que lo eliminemos porque es pura hipocresía y si no lo cumplimos y no queremos cumplirlo, quitémoslo para no tener que avergonzarnos de sencillamente no cumplir aquello que acordamos. Y por lo tanto, te repito una cosa es la retórica y otra cosa es

la práctica. Y en la práctica pues lo que tenemos es una valoración, de lo que es viable. Por ejemplo, el chat que rige desde hace más de 40 años, los destinos del chat, una familia de un clan, de una tribu que además es minoritaria, que es la tribu de Deby. Primero fue el padre Idris y ahora es el hijo, Mahamat Idris Deby. Bueno, pues ahí están. Hace muy pocos días ha desaparecido un responsable de derechos humanos civil de la sociedad civil. Han matado a un presidente de un partido político y su sede la han arrasado. El latrocinio es generalizado y la realidad en Chad es que no tiene nada que ver con los valores democráticos. Pues bien, la Unión Europea está apoyando la transición, que no es transición, sino sucesión. A pesar de que el propio Macron dijo que el apoyo a la transición no era el apoyo a la sucesión, va a ser el apoyo a la sucesión, porque Mahamat se presenta a las elecciones y las va a ganar, faltaría más.

Eurodiputado Javier Nart : [00:17:13] ¿Bueno, pues qué es lo que hace la Unión Europea? Pues darse cuenta de que en el Sahel ya no le queda nada, excepto Chad. Y tiene el riesgo de que si se pone farruco y duro con Chad, pues vendrán los rusos y ocuparán el espacio. De hecho, el presidente Déby acudió hace muy pocos días a Rusia a visitar a Putin. Así que nosotros en nuestra política exterior nos comportamos igual que cualquier gobierno y es defendemos los derechos humanos hasta donde se puede y practicamos la política de lo que es necesario e inevitable. Entonces a mí esa formulación de darse cuenta de que tenemos que tener una relación con países extremadamente incómodos en ocasiones, pero que es inevitable. China, por ejemplo. Pero en fin, no lo envolvamos en el manto hipócrita de los derechos humanos. Porque si aplicamos ese manto, pues tendríamos inmediatamente problemas muy serios con países que para nosotros son estratégicamente necesarios. Y yendo a la parte estratégica. Europa despertó con la guerra de Ucrania. Putin hizo una maniobra rigurosamente equivocada. Primero pensó que siendo Ucrania parte de la historia de Rusia, porque Rusia nace en Kiev, en la Rus de Kiev, en la época de la presencia de los vikingos. Allí Varegos se llaman vikingos. Pero hay otra formulación que se llama escrita por Varegos columna, pues bajaban por el Dnieper y realizaban comercio hasta Bizancio.

Eurodiputado Javier Nart : [00:18:56] De hecho, la guardia personal del emperador de Bizancio era vikinga, básicamente porque eran muy fuertes guerreros y sobre todo, no eran cristianos, lo cual te daba una seguridad de que no iban a tomar el poder porque no iban a tomar el poder unos paganos en territorio ortodoxo, como ocurrió también con la guardia Mora del Rey Alfonso 10.º. Creo que era o la Guardia Navarra que tenía el Sultán de Granada. Cristianos navarros. Esto es muy, muy habitual. Ahora que me estoy derivando. Entonces ataca Ucrania.

Entra en Ucrania pensando que iba a ser un paseo triunfal de que los ucranianos, hartos de la corrupción sistémica que sufrían por sus oligarcas, le iban a recibir como la Rusia que vuelve al territorio ruso de toda la vida y se encuentra con una oposición muy fuerte. ¿Y en realidad esta guerra ha creado la nación ucraniana de una manera indiscutible, segundo, países neutrales Suecia y Finlandia entran en la OTAN y tercero, la OTAN europea se da cuenta de que tiene la necesidad de autodefensa porque el problema está en las puertas. Hasta este momento la Unión Europea también, pero sobre todo Estados Unidos marcaba una política que era la de displicencia respecto a Rusia, considerando que económicamente era una economía en declive. Y es verdad, una población envejecida. Y es verdad, una población además muy, vamos a decir. Y sobre todo con un ejército que era un ejército gigantesco pero muy poco adaptado a la realidad.

Eurodiputado Javier Nart : [00:20:52] La realidad militar del momento y que económicamente era un país cuyo producto interior Bruto estaba entre el de Italia y el de España, por debajo del de Italia y por encima del de España. Y a cambio de eso, un ejército gigantesco que succionaba los recursos necesarios para el desarrollo económico del país. Entonces despertó a la OTAN, a la OTAN europea y ahora tenemos perfectamente claro que tenemos que tener una capacidad de autodefensa que en el término nuclear se llama Francia y Gran Bretaña, a pesar de que no está en la Unión Europea, pero sí está en la OTAN y en consecuencia, que el paraguas norteamericano que había servido para que tuviéramos un apacible sueño y empleáramos la mayor parte de nuestros recursos en desarrollo, pues tenemos ya la necesidad de comenzar efectivamente a tener una capacidad estratégica autónoma, que no significa romper con Estados Unidos, pero tener claro que Estados Unidos tiene sus intereses y que nosotros tenemos el interés directísimo de nuestra propia seguridad. Yo no creo en las balandronadas analfabetas de Trump de que la o la OTAN, pues ese es un tema olvidado, básicamente porque Estados Unidos tiene como principal aliado militar, económico y político a Europa y en consecuencia, no es que seamos importantes, es que somos su principal y más importante aliado. Así que sí es verdad que van a exigir que los europeos contribuyan a su defensa.

Eurodiputado Javier Nart : [00:22:36] Llegando al 2%, cosa que en muchos países era anatema. Por ejemplo, en España, donde la izquierda de pandereta, la izquierda que tenemos, que es de risa, pues siempre dijo que eso de la defensa y que vamos, que matar al enemigo era una cosa de muy mala educación y que como somos pacifistas pues siendo pacifistas pues evitamos la guerra. Mentira, Evitamos la guerra teniendo una capacidad de disuasión militar. Ahora España va a incrementar fuertemente su presupuesto militar junto con otros países que

también lo van a incrementar y en consecuencia, la Europa estratégica no es un sueño como ha sido hasta ahora, sino una necesidad. Hasta ahora nos dedicábamos un poco a jugar al sueño. Por ejemplo, la Brigada mixta o la brigada paneuropea que tenemos en Estrasburgo, donde hay españoles, franceses, alemanes, polacos, luxemburgueses y creo que belgas o holandeses, ya lo verás. Pero que la capacidad operativa es cero, porque intervenir ha intervenido en muy pocas ocasiones cuando era necesario un despliegue inmediato. Ahora sí que vamos a una capacidad de despliegue inmediato, pero de acuerdo con los planes de la Unión Europea. Eso nos va a llevar por lo menos tres años y el problema lo tenemos ahora. En consecuencia el incremento de la presión rusa va a dar como consecuencia una aceleración en la contestación europea del criterio de autodefensa y de defensa estratégica, que no solamente es en Europa o en el Mediterráneo, sino en el Sahel, en África, que es nuestro flanco sur.

Eurodiputado Javier Nart : [00:24:20] Desde luego en el Atlántico eso ya no hay problema. Es una flota que domina el Atlántico y en el Indo-pacífico, donde existe Europa. Tenemos sobre todo las posesiones francesas en el estrecho de Madagascar, en la isla de Reunión, en Nueva Caledonia y en Polinesia. Eso choca en el Pacífico con el proyecto AKUS, que es el proyecto básicamente anglosajón, que es Australia, United Kingdom y Estados Unidos, que fue el origen del conflicto franco australiano cuando Australia decide por submarinos nucleares que le suministra Estados Unidos, mientras que Francia se lo suministraba con propulsión tradicional. En consecuencia, tenemos una expansión de nuestros intereses, pero una enorme lentitud en la implementación. Y un problema muy importante que es la falta de una logística común, casi cada país, tiene su pequeño blindado y carros de combate. Tenemos británicos, tenemos alemanes, tenemos franceses. Y creo que Italia tiene uno propio también. Y en consecuencia, aunque tengas una munición común, lo que no tienes en las piezas de recambio y en aviación, 3/4 de lo mismo. Aviación norteamericana comprada en Europa. Aviación europea, Eurofighter y Aviación Británica y aviación francesa. Cada uno con su proyecto. Y esto realmente complica extraordinariamente las cosas cuando no tienes un ejército homogéneo que lo tiene Rusia. Rusia tiene sus carros de combate homogeneizados. Es una sola potencia y lo que tiene se multiplica el número por eficacia. A pesar de que son de inferior calidad y el entrenamiento no es el más adecuado.

Fº Javier Buades Piqueres: [00:26:21] Pues perfecto. Esas serían todas las cuestiones.

Fº Javier Buades Piqueres: [00:26:25] Agradezco muchísimo las palabras que me he referido. Las tendré muy en cuenta a la hora de desarrollar mi trabajo.

Eurodiputado Javier Nart : [00:26:33] Si hay algo que en un futuro te interesa que te amplíe, encantado.

Fº Javier Buades Piqueres: [00:26:36] Perfecto. Muchísimas gracias por todo. Pase buena tarde.

Eurodiputado Javier Nart : [00:26:41] Que te sea útil.

Fº Javier Buades Piqueres: [00:26:42] Sí, eso es seguro.

Eurodiputado Javier Nart: [00:26:44] Un abrazo.

Fº Javier Buades Piqueres: [00:26:46] Adiós.

Documento redactado a partir de las notas tomadas por mi persona a partir de la grabación de la entrevista con el Eurodiputado Javier Nart el 12 de marzo de 2024. En cualquier caso, este documento es autoría personal propia, y en ningún caso se le pueden atribuir responsabilidades al señor Na

Entrevista Alonso Hernandez Pinzón

Fº Javier Buades Piqueres: [00:00:00] Bueno, pues primero de todo, muchas gracias. Señor Alonso Hernández Pinzón, managing director de la Europea Lawyers Foundation. Voy a realizarle una serie de cuestiones relativas al papel internacional de la de la Unión Europea en los procesos de rendición de cuentas. Y en la primera pregunta sería directamente relacionado con este topic que estamos tratando y que sería el papel de la Unión en estos procesos. ¿Cómo lo puede valorar usted en base a su experiencia personal y profesional?

Alonso Hernandez Pinzón: [00:00:30] Bueno, gracias Javier. No, yo creo que el papel de la Unión Europea depende un poco como hablábamos de los intereses que tenga y eso lo vemos en diferentes ámbitos, no tanto en el comercial como puede ser en relaciones diplomáticas y políticas o incluso bueno, pues en alguna medida relacionada también, por ejemplo en la esfera de la justicia, no, como hemos visto, el papel que desenvuelve la Unión Europea en el tema de la Corte Penal Internacional. Entonces, bueno, yo creo que la Unión Europea actualmente está más pendiente de sus propios intereses que de cumplir. ¿A lo mejor pues las presiones del artículo dos del Tratado de la Unión Europea o bueno, incluso vemos que ha introducido las cláusulas de exención humanitaria, no? ¿Que por ahí podemos ver pues que también hay a veces donde puede ser conveniente utilizarla para no solo para evitar las las consecuencias negativas que, por ejemplo, las sanciones pueden tener, sino también para bajar un poquito el tono, no? En relación a un gobierno. Entonces, bueno, yo creo que son relaciones que se basan en parte no solo en en la Unión Europea en su conjunto, sino en los intereses que tienen o que pueden tener ciertos Estados miembros. Y en este sentido pues por ejemplo el país que desempeña la Presidencia de la Presidencia semestral del Consejo de la Unión Europea pues es clave sobre todo cuando es un país que tiene tradicionalmente una política exterior vinculada a ciertos países como el caso de España o de Portugal o incluso bueno en sentido más amplio, el de Francia o Alemania.

Fº Javier Buades Piqueres: [00:02:05] ¿Y se puede observar una evolución o es una forma de actuar que se ha venido repitiendo a lo largo del tiempo sin que haya variado sustancialmente?

Alonso Hernandez Pinzón: [00:02:15] ¿Yo creo que es una forma de proceder que que evoluciona con con la propia evolución, por, valga la redundancia de de de la política actual, no? Es decir, yo creo que que lo que estamos viendo es lo que se ve a nivel global. No, no es. ¿Pues hace unos años a lo mejor teníamos una una mayor calma no? Entonces pues bueno, esta política podría ser más unitaria y Y ahora, bueno, yo creo que que por regla general vivimos ciertas tensiones a nivel global que tensionan esta esta propia política de la Unión Europea. O sea, tenemos el caso de Rusia, que es claro el caso en Oriente Medio y bueno, pues también hemos tenido casos en algunos países, eh, de manera específica, como puede ser en el sudeste asiático o en Latinoamérica. Entonces yo creo que es un reflejo. Diría que la evolución refleja el sistema o el actual panorama que que se vive en las relaciones internacionales. ¿Entonces, de alguna manera la Unión Europea se adapta a los intereses de de los Estados miembros que que van en paralelo al desarrollo que hay globalmente que actúa como como hablamos antes, en la actualidad es un poco, creo, complicado, no? Sí.

Fº Javier Buades Piqueres: [00:03:29] ¿Y podrías poner algún caso concreto en el que el papel de la Unión en algún proceso de rendición de cuentas haya sido destacable? A lo mejor dado un caso lo.

Alonso Hernandez Pinzón: [00:03:40] En lo negativo o en lo positivo.

Fº Javier Buades Piqueres: [00:03:43] En lo que consideres, cualquiera de los dos nos puede valer.

Alonso Hernandez Pinzón: [00:03:47] Bueno, yo creo que en el caso de Rusia, que es el más conocido, ha habido un un papel un poco sí destacable, pero en la vertiente negativa. Hemos pasado de unas relaciones con Rusia. No sé si decir buenas, pero de alguna forma cordiales, porque a la Unión Europea le interesaba recibir el gas de Rusia. Incluso el antiguo canciller alemán, Gerhard Schroeder, tenía un cargo muy destacado en Gazprom. Entonces había unas

relaciones, pues bueno, yo creo, de conveniencia mutua, a pesar de que Rusia ya tenía, por ejemplo, una política, represiva, de derechos humanos a su población, de fraude democrático, con elecciones fraudulentas y demás. Y hasta que no hemos visto el tema de la invasión de Ucrania, no ha habido de alguna forma un cambio en el paradigma de las relaciones que la Unión Europea mantenía con Rusia. Y aún así, bueno, vemos que hay actualmente países, por ejemplo, como España, que siguen comprando gas a Rusia. Entonces, yo creo que es un caso en el que demuestra que, bueno, de una cierta connivencia se pasó a un poco de tensión para, bueno, al final mantener el status quo, no el que había antes, pero sí uno donde hay unas relaciones de mínimos que convienen a las dos partes. Entonces no se ha cortado del todo, digamos, esas relaciones, sino que se mantienen, como digo yo creo, mínimos para bueno, pues para poder satisfacer los intereses que las dos partes.

Fº Javier Buades Piqueres: [00:05:21] Volviendo, por ejemplo, a lo que comentábamos antes, que se aplica a veces de forma un poco selectiva, a quien hacemos cumplir los derechos humanos o intentamos que cumplan los derechos humanos, y a quien no. Hay algunas regiones en concreto donde la Unión por quizá no compartir tantos intereses o no tenerlos, sí que se empeñe especialmente en hacer cumplir los derechos humanos para evitar la vulneración de estos en general.

Alonso Hernandez Pinzón: [00:05:43] Bueno, pues por ejemplo, tenemos el actual acuerdo de Samoa para los estados ACP de África, Caribe y Pacífico. Y ahí, bueno, pues sí que es verdad que una de las líneas prioritarias, que ya se veía en los Acuerdos de Lomé y de Cotonú, es el respeto a los derechos humanos. Y bueno en general también la democracia y demás. Entonces, a lo mejor ahí la Unión Europea puede jugar un poquito más ese papel de condicionar los acuerdos al respeto de derechos humanos. Pero bueno, la realidad es que hemos visto en bastantes ejemplos y el de Venezuela es uno en el que, bueno, incluso a pesar de haber sanciones, no todos los Estados miembros aplican las aplican de manera correcta. Entonces, hay un doble rasero una vez más dependiendo de de quién es el país y de los intereses que el Estado miembro en cuestión puede tener con ese país no.

Fº Javier Buades Piqueres: [00:06:35] ¿Sí y por ejemplo, llevado al caso de las relaciones de la UE con la Corte Penal Internacional se pueden llegar a valorar positivo o negativamente a la hora de desempeñar los procesos de rendición de cuentas internacionales?

Alonso Hernandez Pinzón: [00:06:49] Bueno, la Unión Europea ha tenido siempre, no la Unión Europea sino más bien sus Estados miembros, porque la Unión Europea da financiación de alguna forma también al sistema de la Corte. Pero la Corte es una de Estados. Entonces bueno los Estados miembros son miembros de la Corte Penal Internacional. La Unión Europea apoya como la Corte Penal Internacional, ¿No sé si el problema o la clave aquí es que la Corte es un poco Cómo se fundó la Corte? La Corte es un instrumento que se funda para juzgar crímenes bajo su competencia, que básicamente son crímenes de lesa humanidad, crímenes de guerra y demás. Pero cuando os entendía que cuando el actor no era el propio gobierno. Entonces la realidad es que lo que vemos a día de hoy es que los gobiernos muchas veces son los que cometen los crímenes. Entonces, es un mecanismo que de alguna forma estamos viendo que cojea por ese lado. Se constituyó para juzgar crímenes que se cometieron en el territorio de los Estados parte, pero no por los gobiernos, sino por grupos, por ejemplo en África.

Alonso Hernandez Pinzón: [00:07:51] Por eso la Corte ha sido muy exitosa en África, no porque allí se juzgaban grupos rebeldes o demás. Pero bueno, dicho esto, el apoyo que la Corte por parte de los Estados miembros es importante, pero bueno, creo que no va más allá de un apoyo financiero y político, porque claro, es muy difícil que la Unión Europea se de un caso que requiera de la jurisdicción de la Corte, no. Entonces, de alguna forma es un apoyo más formal, creo que importante porque la Corte el gran fallo que tiene es que bueno, estados muy importantes como Estados Unidos, Rusia y China no son parte. Entonces, por mucho que la Unión Europea esté, intente apoyar la Corte como un instrumento de rendición de cuentas, cuando prácticamente bueno, India tampoco está. O sea, estamos hablando ya de que prácticamente puede ser que la mitad de la población mundial que no está representada en la

Corte. Entonces, por mucho que la Unión Europea pueda aportar, hay un claro déficit de representación en la Corte debido a la falta de estos otros Estados.

Fº Javier Buades Piqueres: [00:08:55] Claro, eso por ejemplo. También se podría llegar a dar incluso casos de división interna dentro de los propios Estados que conforman la UE. En caso de que ha sido muy sonado, como es la petición de arresto a buena parte de líderes de Hamas, Netanyahu y creo que si no me equivoco mal el ministro de Defensa israelí. Y bueno, aunque aún no está dictada, falta que se dicte, pero esa posibilidad, ya ha desvelado ciertas grietas dentro de la Unión, dentro de sus Estados miembros. Mejor dicho, se podría llegar incluso al caso de que haya Estados que no apliquen. Esa orden de detención, como podría ser casos, por ejemplo, como el de Hungría, que es un estado bastante pro Israel en este caso.

Alonso Hernandez Pinzón: [00:09:46] ¿Hombre, o sea, tienes razón, no? Básicamente ahí vemos que hay algunos Estados miembros que no han apoyado la solicitud del fiscal, de la Sala de cuestiones preliminares de emitir estas órdenes de detención no. Y tampoco queda mucho, porque aquí el gran elefante en la habitación es Estados Unidos, que es el que tiene la capacidad de sancionar y de hecho ayer mismo pasó sanciones que todavía están por delimitarse, pero que probablemente vayan en relación al fiscal y a gente de la Fiscalía. Pero sí lo que mencionas, vamos a ver, por poder podría darse. No, no está permitido. Que un Estado no aplique la orden de detención, un Estado que es parte. Pero por ejemplo, tenemos un precedente fuera de la UE, que es el caso de de Sudáfrica. La Corte dictó una orden de arresto contra el antiguo jefe de Estado de Sudán y el señor Bashar. Y cuando él estuvo en Sudáfrica hace unos años. Sudáfrica es estado parte, Sudáfrica no quiso aplicar la orden de detención. Lo que hizo fue darle el chivatazo a este señor para que se fuera en lugar de arrestarle. Entonces eso creó un malestar. ¿Pero Sudáfrica sigue siendo un estado parte y no ha ido a más, No? ¿En el tema de la Unión Europea, bueno, yo creo que probablemente no se va a dar esa circunstancia porque los propios líderes israelíes no, no van a, no van a salir, digamos por el momento de de Israel, no? Entonces habrá que ver si llegado el caso, cuando una vez que dejen sus funciones en un futuro, pues la orden de detención sigue pesando sobre ellos y entonces ahí podría quedarse un poco el

conflicto. ¿Pero yo creo que para todas las partes les conviene evitar una clase incidente y por tanto, si estos viajes se anuncian con mucha antelación y demás, entonces eh, yo creo que que todas las partes implicadas estarían por por evitar una situación como esta, no?

Fº Javier Buades Piqueres: [00:11:48] ¿Si, bueno, ya las dos últimas preguntas sería se puede explicar? Se puede esperar que estos compromisos que la UE ha adherido de dentro de lo que los procesos de rendición de cuentas internacional se mantengan Y conectamos con la pregunta, especialmente teniendo en cuenta las elecciones al Parlamento Europeo y lo que ello puede implicar de cara a la constitución de una Comisión y un nuevo Ejecutivo comunitario.

Alonso Hernandez Pinzón: [00:12:13] ¿Bueno, en principio estos compromisos se tienen que mantener no? O sea son de alguna forma vienen dados por el Consejo Europeo, estas directrices en grandes rasgos de lo que son las relaciones exteriores de la Unión Europea. Entonces las elecciones en sí al Parlamento Europeo pues bueno van a condicionar claro el la composición de la Comisión Europea porque el partido que mayor bueno que gane las elecciones, digamos, será quien tenga que presentar a su candidato a la presidencia de la Comisión Europea, pero no sé en qué medida puede afectar. ¿Yo creo que más afecta las elecciones nacionales, no? Que haya una mayoría de un lado de otro en el Consejo Europeo. No, yo creo que eso puede afectar más porque por ejemplo luego el bueno, pues los miembros de la Comisión Europea tienen que pasar un un examen en el Parlamento Europeo y ya ha habido algunos casos en los que no lo han pasado y se solicita el Estado en cuestión que vuelva a proponer otro candidato. Entonces, no sé, yo creo todavía parte. ¿Las elecciones son un poco, no? No se sabe bien qué va a pasar ahí. Diría que por los dos lados, tanto en la extrema derecha como en la extrema izquierda, dependiendo de los países. ¿Entonces puede haber un parlamento fragmentado, pero yo diría que el principio, si no tradicional, de si de los últimos 20 años se mantendrá, que es básicamente los dos partidos mayoritarios que son el Partido Popular y el Partido Socialista Europeos, mantendrán su liderazgo y por tanto, por llegar a unos acuerdos que yo creo que dentro de lo que cabe, pues mantendrán un poquito la la línea de ahora, no? ¿No sé hasta qué punto digamos, puede radicalizarse mucho el Parlamento teniendo en cuenta que hay un gran número de escaños y que,

como digo también el Consejo Europeo o sea los Estados miembros tienen tienen mucho peso, no? Sí.

Fº Javier Buades Piqueres: [00:14:09] Bueno pues hasta aquí serían las cuestiones que tenía preparadas para hoy. Muchas gracias por todo Y bueno, ya ahora.

Foreign Policy Dialogues “Israel-Gaza War: Future of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict and Perspectives on Negotiations”, April 19th 2024

Organized by CIDOB with the support of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, European Union and Cooperation

Third Panel: “Prospects of peace and de-escalation: What Role for the European Union?”

Eduard Soler Lecha Intervention

Thank you, Michelle. I confess that to me, it's difficult to think outside of the box, because I'm very open within the box. But I will do my best. And I'll try also to brainstorm with you which I feel it's the goal of this meeting, before we have this session, particularly before the storm.

A few points. The first one is that those of you that have been exposed to European statements, not on the Arab Israeli conflict, or Palestine, but to the European strategic documents may be familiar with the idea that now Europe is saying that we should accommodate or design our policies and strategies to the world we live in, and not the world we would like to be living in. The other one it is the risks we may incur here if thinking about a not real EU, but the EU you'd like to have? So, in a way, yes. I mean, why not? We can discuss about what a completely different EU could do. But what can we realistically expect Europeans to do right now. And I think that's an important point, taking into consideration the state of affairs and the mood and the political correlations within Europe.

Then, also, I think that it is important to acknowledge that the position of the EU regarding or the completely different the Arab Israeli conflict, and Palestine in particular, has been key and kind of a litmus test in all the attempts that the EU has had since the 1970s, to show ambition, as an international actor and to be recognized as such. So here in a way, and depending on who you talk to, it may be someone who is a specialist on the Middle East, and that will be one thing, but others that will take decisions do not care primarily about the Middle East, but about the European Union as an international actor, that is also something that we need to integrate in how we frame.

Also, our recommendations or how we identify the options, the way the Europeans position on the Middle East is interpreted by the rest of the international actors, including in the Global South, in terms of degree of ambition, and particularly also the capacity to emancipate or to be autonomous regarding the United States of America. Remember, also the importance that historically has had the Venice declaration of 1980. Now that everyone talks about the two state solution, well, this is the Venice declaration, and it's in a very particular moment, where

the EU was able to differentiate from the US to recognize the PLO, as the legitimate representative of the Palestinians, and also the need to associate the PLO now that we are the EU, and you were discussing in the previous session, also an inclusiveness into the solution of the of the problem, then, I think that also if we look back before brainstorming about the presence, we will see that Europeans or the European Union and the member states have always been divided on the Arab Israeli conflict, Palestine or equal in particularly, yet, when there were divisions, they all try to influence and shape the EU policy.

What we have witnessed since 2016, and I think it's something that we need to take into consideration is the fact that we have an increasing number, or at least it was always one actor, and then additionally, a few other actors that are willing to obstruct any EU policy so that there is no European Union policy towards this particular country. The one actor I am referring to is Hungary. And we are living in a world where decisions are taken by consensus. So, this is also something that needs to be integrated when we think what the EU can do the what the You can do if we are referring about foreign policy it means with Hungary otherwise, we have to think outside of the United side of the box. But outside of the, of the EU. So, yes, there was this obstruction. We have seen this division looming, also more extreme, probably, after October, the same, the seventh not only among member states, and perhaps this is the novelty also within institutions.

So, I mean, you compare Ursula von der Leyen and Josep Borrell, and you separate statements. Big gulf between the two. But you see, also I cannot imagine how the discussions may have been in the College of commissioners, remember, the one responsible for Palestine, the Hungarian guy from Orban's party, and then we've seen also then people on the humanitarian front, I mean, having completely different approach.

So, this division is very, I think it's an element that we need to integrate also, when we think about what they can you do, because most likely, they will do things divided. And then we may need this is something that, as I mentioned yesterday, also think about what can some Europeans do? Not the EU, but some Europeans? Do? And for some that are super Europhile, and whose main aim is for the EU to be recognized as an international actor, coherent and everything.

While this is a disaster, isn't it? Because then, I mean, this idea of a European Union that is divided, it's it? I think it's not the worst-case scenario. To me, it would have been even worse if the EU would have stood collectively and unanimously in support of the Israeli policies in in Gaza and this could have been a possibility, or if they you would have agreed not to have

any position at all. Like we have seen this discussion, for instance, regarding Palestinian statehood, I know of someone who was in the meeting when the issue was being discussed the vote in the UN, when Cathy Ashton suggested the possibility of collectively abstaining. And the Foreign Affairs Minister of a very small state said, well, before abstaining contracts an important issue, I prefer to evaporate myself to evaporate myself. Because I mean, what who am I, as Foreign Minister of my country, if I don't have a position, I abstain on an issue of this kind, this could have been an opposition, we do nothing, we say nothing. We close our eyes, and we close our mouth.

So here that there is a lot of cacophony, but at least there are different voices. In terms of what how to structure and how to brainstorm, and I'm passing to the brainstorm dimension, I think we have to differentiate very clearly about what can the EU 27 do? And what can some Europeans do? Member states? And I think that most of the things that we will be able to think about it will be on the second on the latter. So what can feel member states do, and here, despite the fact that we may have differences with what the position expressed in Spain, maybe at least it's a distinct position of what has been the mainstream and it takes courage for a member state to be able to confront countries like Germany or others that are all sorts of leverage and influence on a country like Spain.

I think that's interesting. Those who we know who they are. Luxembourg, Ireland, Slovenia, perhaps Belgium, Portugal, not any longer Malta? Well, not superpowers aren't them. But at least this is a distinct European voice so that we can have different European voices. Regarding the situation in Palestine. I think this is already something, then I would suggest that it would be very important. We were discussing this yesterday. I mean, those countries should be ready for retaliation because there will be measures taken against them. Will the real solidarity among Europeans when Spain or Luxembourg or Ireland may suffer the consequences of Israeli retaliation on their capacity to mobilize other supports in Washington? I think that's also bad; they should be part of the European conversation part of it is also by reaching out to other like-minded actors.

Be beyond Europe, we were discussing, obviously of South Africa, Chile, Brazil positions, and a few others there, perhaps Michelle, I like to challenge her a bit this assumption of the global south as a political unity. I mean, because while India command, we've seen also how there are discussions in Indonesia, the largest Muslim country to recognize Israel in this very moment,

it's true, because they are negotiating Indonesia's entry with to the OECD, or the fact that countries like Morocco, the United Arab Emirates, and so on, well, they haven't taken so much of a harsh position on so this idea of, of the global south as Argentina, as global south of Brazil. The global south is divided in that respect, many within the global south and in the global north with whom this small group of countries could work, at least to have a distinct European, Westerners and liberal voice, in the in the conversation, but this is all about what can states do.

And there is also another dimension, we can also think about what can be done short term and long term. Short term, and probably this is one of the few areas where²⁷ could work together is on humanitarian assistance. And even if we cannot make a big difference in terms of resolving the problem, these perhaps we can do something in easing the suffering. Other people need to upgrade that I mean, it's not the solution, but at least it may be the solution for some individuals.

So, this is also something that I think we need to perhaps think about how to do convincing in the long term. And this is something that our civil society, Europeans can also have, I think that I was inspired by cloudier yesterday, when you were putting the at the centre, the issue of the legal dimension. I think here, one of the few aspects that could change, there will be the perception of the preferences. And everything is if legal cases, which take long, but are starting to be built against European actors to be judged in European courts.

I think, this is something super powerful. I have been thinking all the time after I listened to you, as one of the elements, one of the few elements that could help shrink some of the positions there is also an intimidation, because I think that in this area of group of countries, one of the elements that could make a difference would be if France, of all of the others could join that camp. What would it take for France to join the cause, because if we look at the voting patterns, later as well, in the UN and so on, of all the rest? Well, if someone is to be convinced, perhaps that would be France? Is it possible? How, under which conditions? To me, this is an element also I've been thinking about.

And finally, what can the EU do in Palestine, and then in the regional dimension, the aspect that you've been discussing? Here, I think that at least the Europeans have something, which is the fact that they have not interrupted. And I think Pablo was mentioning that dialogue and engagement with Iran. So perhaps that's one of the elements that and perhaps not Europe alone, the EU, it's something perhaps it could be worked with Turkey, as there are two countries that have a lot to lose if the things deteriorate, and a few others with Iraq and others, but to keep at least those channels of communication with Iran is key in order not to enter into the worst space

of turbulences. And I think the Europeans at least have some credit, even in the worst moments in which these risks, antagonizing the United States of America and the Trump administration, they kept lines of communication open. This is something also that I would like to finish with, in terms of a few ideas to for us to jointly brainstorm about how to operationalize any of them.

Documento redactado a partir de las notas tomadas por mi persona en la intervención de Eduard Soler Lecha el día 19 de abril de 2024 . En cualquier caso, este documento es autoría personal propia, y en ningún caso se le pueden atribuir responsabilidades al Dr Soler.