

# **Chambers of Commerce as Interest Groups**

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## **Introduction**

### **ORGANIZATION AND ARTICULATION OF INTERESTS IN SPAIN (1978-1988)**

The subject of interest groups in Spain and their relationship to the political system is so complex that any attempt at detailed analysis should be the work of a research team. The objectives of this paper are much more modest. Our aim is solely to contribute to the considerations of some conceptual and methodological problems involved in the study of interest groups and to advance some tentative hypotheses about Chambers of Commerce as interest groups.

In contrast to the output of other European countries and particularly the United States, the bibliography on interest groups in Spain is extremely limited. There are a number of reasons for this.

First of all, studies of this type are by no means as common in the field of Political Science in Spain as they are in Anglo-Saxon countries. As will be seen somewhat further on in this paper, most of the existing studies stem from other disciplines, particularly sociology and history. But Political Science's late blooming interest is not simply an academic matter. Instead, it is closely related to the very birth and development of the contemporary Spanish State. Moreover, the incidence of neocorporatist theories should not be overlooked, particularly as regards the most recent studies on interest groups in Spain. We must recognize that when the academic and scientific discussions of the mid-Seventies were exported to Spain they triggered a spate of theoretical and empirical studies which provide an essential basis from which to develop our work, but also present some methodological differences which I think deserve mention here.

#### **1. Interest groups and the discontinuity of the Spanish political system**

Any study of interest groups in Spain must necessarily take as its principal frame of reference the discontinuity of Spain's political system during the past century. Professor Linz' well-known work on the subject is highly significant (1). In the introduction, he reminds us that in this period of time Spain experienced, "a liberal oligarchic monarchy, a military dictatorship, a short-lived democratic republic, almost forty years of the Franco government and now a democracy in the process of consolidation".

The lack of a stable system of political representation and the parallel development of a party system made it extremely difficult to study the structure of pressure groups and their relationship to political parties and the State's decision-making process. There is little background information available and this makes it hard to advance any working hypotheses.

A good deal has been written about the history of the Restoration period, but none of it from the specific angle of Political Science. The material that does exist reveals that there are two different schools of thought as regards the connection between the political elite and interest groups. one school, the leading spokesman of which is Varela (2), maintains that they were autonomous while the other school, whose leading advocate is Tuñón de Lara (3), insists that there were close links between the political elite and the interest groups.

Although there are more studies on the organization and actions of interest groups during the II Republic, they are basically descriptive and only provide some rough hypotheses about their actions. Social conflict and political polarization combined with the short-lived Republican experience prevented interest groups from ever really consolidating. The special nature of the channels of political representation that existed during the Franco regime conditioned the study of interest groups and their relationship to the political system at that time (4). The absence of political parties caused the different "families" belonging to the regime to be treated as interest groups. However, as Professor Linz points out, "in many ways these two groups (ACNP and Opus Dei) do not fit the normal definition of the term "interest group" because they are political-ideological groups rather than representatives of social interests" (5). A subsequent work by Hermet (6) shares this viewpoint. "The inner circles of the Franco regime are not permanent committees for different interest groups. They are a complex mixture, not so much specifically based on socio-economic elements as on their formula for government and the type of person they produce" (7).

Moreover, some studies point out that the political elite of the Franco years were linked by economic interests (8). In addition, there is other work (9) which reflects the pluralist ideas that inspired the SCRC's Comparative Policy Committee at the end of the Fifties, which, as we shall see later on, had a decisive influence on studies of interest groups. There are also a few theoretical studies on the subject of representing interests (10).

## **2. Neocorporative theories and the study of interest groups**

Reestablishment of democracy meant a radical change in the channels of political representation available to the various social groups and in the role played by these groups.

It is generally acknowledged that political parties not only occupied the political limelight and monopolized the media but were also the focus of academic interest during the first stage of the new system. It was not until the 1980's and the onset of social pacts and the debate on neocorporative practices that the various social groups began to attract the interest of the academic world. Professor Linz

inspired two studies (11) which use a pluralistic approach to analyze how labor organizations and employers' associations were established within the context of political transition. But the most extensive body of work on interest groups examines them within the context of neocorporatism (12) and the organization and behavior of various professional groups (13)

Schmitter is considered the father of neocorporatist theories. His first articles (14) signaled the start of considerable production on this subject, which is still being added to today (15). In Spain a team led by Professor Prez Diaz participated in a study on "The Organization of Business Interests" which embraced most of the Western industrial countries (16). The introduction to this study states: "This is not an illustration or empirical example of collective corporate action viewed from traditional angles such as the theory of pressure groups or lobbies" (17). The study aimed to differ from traditional pluralistic theory in its point of departure and even claimed to advance a new concept. Other authors (18) appear more cautious when defining the conceptual framework of new studies. They favor an evolutionary theory somewhere between pluralism and corporatism, carefully pointing out the unanswered questions that might prevent the consolidation of these new tendencies.

Nevertheless, they are all agreed on the need to carry out specific studies on interest groups and the relationships between them and the decision-making process or processes in the various public administrations.

On an international level the controversy about the significance of corporatism and its relationship to pluralism is intense. Almond (19) and Berger (20) can be considered among the leading exponents of the two opposing stances. In examining the general lines of various corporatist studies, Berger makes it clear that he does not agree with the studies produced in the 1970's. "The main problem is how interests are shaped by socioeconomic, historical, organizational and political processes. And the problem of the kinds of organization, far from being a question of tacit adaptation to the circumstances, is analyzed as part of the actual problem of defining these interests" (21). "They analyze the particulars of the national historical background, the role of the State and the inherent instabilities in the way the system of representation operates." (22).

On the other hand, Almond writes on these same studies with the viewpoint that corporation is a variety of pluralism and maintains that the differences of focus stem from the change in academic and cultural perspective: in the Sixties these studies were cultivated by U.S. academics working in the field of Political Science. Now most of the work on the subject is coming out of Europe and being done by sociologists and historians. Nevertheless, the root of the controversy lies in the hypothetical differences in methodology. Almond defends the pluralists from the typical accusations: on the one hand, that they paid little or no attention to history, government policies and intra-organizational factors; on the other, that they considered all groups as equals in

terms of their power to exercise pressure and also defended the "social status quo". To a certain extent, this controversy has been repeated in the recent debate on the role of the State (23).

As Robert Salisbury (24) points out, since the Seventies the field of Political Science has been adjusting its studies on pressure groups to the changing conditions in advanced capitalist societies and incorporating the theoretical and methodological advances of the scientific community. Recently Salisbury (25) has produced a work in which he applies the theory of conflict and coalition to the study of interest groups. There have also been attempts to compare "pressure" in Western democracies and genuinely Socialist countries (26). Other new and interesting approaches include applying theories of political choice to pressure groups (27) as well as interacting studies on the political elite and interest groups (28).

Only with a detailed knowledge of the different interest groups and how they are organized, how representative they are and how they influence public decision-making will it be possible to advance in the discussion about the theoretical and methodological differences between pluralism and corporatism.

## **Chambers of Commerce in Catalonia**

### **1.- Chambers of Commerce as a subject of study**

The impact of neocorporatist theories and Spain's experience with social pacts makes the various social powers and their activities a subject of undeniable interest. Media reports about interest groups and their real or imagined activities are beginning to appear and there is a noticeable increase in books that tend to popularize the lobbyist's activity or profession (30). I personally feel that Spain lacks empirical studies on pressure groups. Some of the recent work on employers' associations (31) mentions the role of the Chambers of Commerce and this should be contrasted with earlier studies on the subject.

Examining the role of Chambers of Commerce first implies formulating a series of working hypotheses which should be tested throughout the study (32). Chief among them are whether or not Chambers of Commerce are superimposed on employers' associations, duplicating their activities and serving the same clientele; whether the two types of organizations represent the same interests and whether there is a possibility of conflict between them.

Secondly, and given the fact that membership in Chambers of Commerce is compulsory, a study of what causes certain companies to be active members and what kind of incentives the Chambers give them should replace the usual study on the "logic of membership". Thirdly, and because of their peculiar legal status as public

corporations and the fact they are consulting agencies, we can not only identify their positions on different pieces of proposed legislation and on the actions of the various public administrations but can also measure their capacity to pressure these administrations. Last but not least, we can identify the connections between the political elite and Chamber of Commerce leaders.

## **2. - Chambers of Commerce and the CEOE (Spanish Employers' Association) (apropos of the discussion on Chamber of Commerce income)**

The discussion on the 1989 Budget Act gave us an opportunity to test one of our first working hypotheses.

Chamber of Commerce income largely consists of a percentage of corporate taxes (until recently this was 2%). Furthermore, a small surcharge on the licenses required to engage in industrial or trade operations goes to the Chambers, although this accounts for a very small percentage of their total income.

The announcement that the proposed budget for 1989 (33) would cut this percentage to 1% triggered an interesting press campaign and caused the various Parliamentary groups to take sides on the issue, thus providing us with fresh information.

We shall begin with a summary of how Parliamentary discussions and the press campaign were timed.

I

### **Table1**

#### **Press Campaign**

Reports opposed to the Chambers: 26-IX, 10-X, 25-X

Reports in favor of the Chambers: 30-IX, 12-X, 7-XI

Unbiased reports: 11-X, 16-X, 31-X, 10-XII  
(Final agreement)

The foregoing tables and information gleaned from meetings with members of the Barcelona Chamber of Commerce enable us to establish the nature of the negotiations between the various key organizations and identify their respective pressure activities.

Confrontation between the Chambers of Commerce and the CEOE dates back to before the Budget was presented and was caused by the refusal of several

companies to pay their dues to the Chamber (34). It was then that the government announced its plan to cut the fee in half. There was an immediate public outcry. Most of the Parliamentary groups announced that they were in favor of maintaining the status quo. It should be noted here that the Socialist members of Parliament proposed an audit of the Chambers' financial statements which was virtually identical to the proposals made by AP and MC. A first attempt at pressure and negotiations involved the Chambers of Commerce, the Government and three Parliamentary groups and resulted in recognition of the need for audits. At the same time the press began reporting on the Chambers' "surplus treasury" (35).

Negotiations between the key organizations continued and when amendments were presented to the Senate, the Socialists presented one that was "justified for technical reasons" and proposed that the percentage be increased to 1.5% with 0.5% going to a Chamber of Commerce Export Promotion Plan to be proposed to the Council of Chambers and regulated by the Ministry of Economy and the Treasury. The Socialists' proposed amendment coincided in part with the amendments proposed to Congress by AP and MC, but further proposed increasing Government Control over Chamber of Commerce operations. It should also be noted here that two of the new groups proposing amendments (DC and PL) justified their proposals with a supporting text, the content of which was literally identical to that of the Socialists.

This is a typical example of pressure group action (here, the Chambers of Commerce themselves) when faced with pending legislation. The Chambers negotiated directly with the Government and also through the Opposition groups in Parliament while the media voiced opinions both for and against the issues involved.

R. Martinez' study (36) contains information on the business community's attitude towards the pending legislation.

The use of different channels of contact are shown below (37):

**Table2**

### **3. - Chambers of Commerce: Their organization and powers**

Although some authors trace their origins to the trade guilds that existed before the Liberal revolution, Chambers of Commerce in Spain first appeared as such during the 19th century Restoration (39) and coincided with the first attempts at voicing special interests (40).

In the beginning membership was not compulsory, but legislation enacted at the beginning of this century (41) established what were to be the essential legal characteristics of the Chambers: they were to be public corporations and membership

would be compulsory. This legislation established that they would be "consulting agencies to the Public Administration" and "shall necessarily express their opinions on projects, trade agreements, reform of Customs duties, +X'Xsals and ordenances, the Commercial Code, social legislation and, in general, all issues in which the State affects the interests they represent" (42).

When the II Republic was proclaimed the Chambers issued a statement that illustrated their position vis-a-vis the new regime:

"The Chambers of Commerce, Industry and Navigation act autonomously to promote, protect and defend the interests they represent. They are by nature official corporations and as such are at all times on the side of the politically constituted powers" (43).

Throughout the Republican era the Chambers made various public declarations which expressed their concern over the socioeconomic situation (44).

In the 1940's the vertical trade union attempted to integrate the Chambers of Commerce, but without much success. However, the Chambers were weakened and placed under Government Control (45). In the 60's, when the economy began to be less heavily regulated, the Chambers were permitted to elect their own representative bodies (46).

The history of the Chambers of Commerce has not always developed parallel to the history of the rest of Spain. The traditional protectionist interests of Catalan industry contrasted with the free trade practices in other sectors of the economy. The link between the political elite and the employers' associations has also been historically different. In the mid-Sixties one sector of the business community acted through the Economists' Association (Círculo de Economía) to renew the Chambers' governing bodies (47), although without much success as regards the Catalan Employers' Association (Fomento de Trabajo). Although not many studies have been made on the Catalan Employers' Association (48), it can still safely be said that its interests did not always coincide with those of the Chambers of Commerce and that its publicly expressed attitudes towards Catalan autonomy differed from the views of the Chambers (49).

When the Statute of Catalan Autonomy was passed, the State powers over the Chambers of Commerce were transferred to the Catalan Government, the Generalitat de Catalunya. (50)

The last Chamber of Commerce elections were held at the end of 1986. The next elections are scheduled for the end of 1990.

### **3.1. Chambers of Commerce: Their authority and jurisdiction**

We shall not make a detailed study of the Chambers' authority and jurisdiction here, but shall instead give a general description of their principal functions, stressing those directly related to representing and defending particular interests.

Certain powers are delegated to the Chambers of Commerce and exercised on behalf of the Government. Among them are the powers to issue certificates attesting to the origin of merchandise, legalize signatures and invoices and issue temporary export certificates. These are all things that facilitate international trade and have traditionally been the province of the Chambers of Commerce which also promote foreign trade, arrange trade fair exhibits and organize trade missions, either independently or in collaboration with the Administration. Members of the Chambers of Commerce who take part in these activities directly benefit from belonging to the Chamber.

Other operations involve offering logistic support to promote business activities (the Chambers of Commerce provide technical and legal information, arrange training programs, provide information on new markets and technologies). Use of these services varies greatly and depends a good deal on the size and type of the individual business firm. Big businesses have their own facilities for these services, while the very smallest businesses are barely aware of the services offered by the Chambers. Only a small percentage of Chambers of Commerce voting members directly benefit from any of these activities.

As part of their general business promoter activities, the Chambers of Commerce are partners in the mixed public/private corporations which manage the trade shows in every Spanish city. A good example of this is the Barcelona Trade Fair, the President of which is a member of the Chamber of Commerce's Executive Committee. The Barcelona City Council and the Generalitat de Catalunya are also partners in the Fair.

Recently the Barcelona Chamber of Commerce and other public corporations have begun appearing before the Barcelona Court of Arbitration as arbitrators in equity (52).

But it is their role as consultants to the Administration which makes them the subject of study as interest groups. Legislation (53) empowers them to "appear before all types of authorities, agencies and corporations" and "exercise actions and file all types of appeals with executive and judicial authorities" (54). This means that the Chambers should be consulted on all pending legislation related to economic and social issues. They are also entitled to -and actually do- file declarations relative to local government budgets, city planning projects and fiscal regulations (55).

### **3.2. Chambers of Commerce: their internal structure and representation**

Compulsory membership in Chambers of Commerce takes the form of a surcharge on all permits to engage in industrial, commercial, professional or maritime activities (56). This means that every licensed individual or company belongs to a Chamber of Commerce.

Most Chamber of Commerce officials naturally favour maintaining the system of compulsory membership, although a very small number would accept a change in the system provided it was "controlled" and that the Chambers were reorganized so as to provide better service.

Even members of the business community themselves are scarcely aware that they belong to the Chamber of Commerce. In 1960 Professors Linz and de Miguel (57) made a study in which only 71% of the businessmen interviewed said they belonged to a Chamber of Commerce. The surveys made by Martínez in 1981 (55), revealed that this percentage was only 55.7% in Madrid, 56.3% in Barcelona and 84.6% in Valencia. The author attributes Valencia's high percentage to the fact that there is a large group of exporters there who regularly use the Chamber's services.

Elections to the Chambers' governing bodies -the Full Committee and the Executive Committee- are held every four years. Members of the Chambers are classified by groups and categories (according to their sector of activity and whether they work in business or industry) and representation in the Full Committee is proportionate to their number and financial contribution. Elections are held within each group. Legislation establishes that if the number of candidates is the same as the number of members to be elected, election is automatic. If the number of candidates is smaller than the number of members to be elected to the Full Committee, all candidates are elected and the Committee will appoint the remaining members of each group.

This rule is symptomatic of an electoral system where participation is limited. When elections were held in Catalonia in 1986, a number of Chambers and groups had trouble finding people willing to be candidates and general inertia led to the reelection of many incumbents (59). In some places, the Chamber's "establishment" negotiated with each sector in order to get representatives in the Chamber (60). In others there was a certain amount of competition (61).

Members of the Full Committee elect the President and the members of the Executive Committee by individual, secret ballot. No significant majority is required. The President and the members of the Executive Committee are the real stars of the Chambers inasmuch as most Chambers hold only the minimum number of Full Committee meetings required by law (six per year). This can be verified by comparing the number of hours the members of the Full Committee and the Executive Committee dedicate to Chamber activities.

The Chambers of Commerce also have a number of permanent employees, headed by a Secretary, to perform the duties delegated to them by the Administration. The number of employees depends upon the size of the Chamber's budget. The larger Chambers of Commerce, such as those of Barcelona and Gerona, are set up more like business firms and also have a Managing Director.

There is at least one Chamber of Commerce in every province. Although there are also county and municipal Chambers of Commerce, current legislation (62) makes it difficult to establish Chambers operating in these smaller spheres.

There are thirteen Chambers of Commerce in Catalonia. Four of them are province-wide and the other nine are county-wide or municipal Chambers. The following table will give an idea of their size.

Table3

Table4

### **3.3. Chambers of Commerce: Their Sociopolitical Composition**

The first part of this paper included various interpretations of the relationships between the political elite and interest groups. Advocates of determinist positions maintain that the political elite represents the dominant social groups and that their political behavior responds to their own interests.

From the perspective of empirical analysis we can verify that various members of the different Chambers of Commerce are also active members of certain political parties. At this stage in our work, we have simply listed the number of Full Committee members elected in 1986 who also ran in the 1987 municipal elections. The results can be seen in the following chart:

Table5

Data collected by R. Martínez in 1981 (63) will give an idea of how Full Committee members place themselves on the left/right political scale:

Table6

From currently available data it would seem that members of the Full Committees of the Chambers of Commerce place themselves towards the center of the left/right scale. One of my working hypotheses is that the data collected in the 1981 study is conditioned by the strained relations between UCD and the employers' organizations at that time. In 1989 and after 7 years of PSOE government, members of the business community would place themselves differently on the scale.

We also have some information about the business community's opinion of the Franco regime. The results of the 1981 survey are as follows:

**Table7**

Currently available information does not appear to substantially alter these percentages, although members of the business community now show a slight tendency to favor the most moderate opinion.

**3 .4. Chambers of Commerce and the socioeconomic context.**

The following are some partial and preliminary findings from the survey currently being made of the members of the Full Committees of the thirteen Catalan Chambers of Commerce (65). They are being surveyed on the current economic situation. Most of the questions being asked are the same questions used by Martínez in the work mentioned above (66).

The business community's concept of the State's role in the economy is somewhat different now than it was in 1981 (67) when the replies were as follows:

**Table8**

Information gathered up to now reveals an increase in the number of people who are in favor of free enterprise and would consequently reduce the State's role to the minimum. Correlatively the advocates of a limited public sector have declined. If these results are confirmed, it might be assumed that less interventionist stances have become stronger in the Eighties. This is in line with the opinions of members of business communities in other European countries.

In the light of the evolution of the business cycle the opinions expressed on productivity are quite interesting.(68)

**Table9**

Figures from 1986-1989 indicate that while the percentages remain more or less the same for those who consider productivity to have increased either somewhat or a good deal, there is a definite decrease in the percentage of people who feel that productivity has declined. This clearly coincides with available gauges of economic performance.

It is interesting not only to compare the opinions on EC membership held in 1981 with those held today after three years of full membership, but also to compare

the opinions on future prospects.

#### **Table10**

Preliminary data on the current impact of EEC membership on particular sectors rather than individual companies are naturally very conditioned by the size of each company, the sector to which it belongs, and, particularly, the importance of imports as compared to its own share of the market.

On a more subjective level, the percentage of businessmen in favor of the Single European Market is overwhelming, just as it is in other European countries.

### **3.5. Do Chambers of Commerce correspond to employers' organizations?**

One of the primary aims of our study is to discover what sort of interests the Chambers of Commerce defend and whether or not they coincide with the interests of employers' associations. A qualitative analysis of replies from several members of the Chambers to questions on the relationships between the Chambers and employers' associations reveals several postures, which can be summarized as follows:

- The Chambers of Commerce defend the same interests as the employers' associations and consequently there is close collaboration between them.
- The employers' organizations are more independent of the Government and thus better able to defend business interests.

It is important to examine the different opinions on how closely linked the Chambers of Commerce are to the different public administrations because these links affect the type of relationships that can be established and the extent of autonomy in mediating in favor of particular interests. Autonomy of action also affects criticism of government action to a greater or lesser extent.

The attitudes towards the Generalitat and the Spanish State government are quite revealing. The people surveyed felt that the Generalitat is closer to their problems, although the general consensus of opinion is that the Catalan government has very limited powers in socioeconomic matters. However, it was not felt that an increase in powers of this type would be particularly beneficial.

In an attempt to compare the activities of Chambers of Commerce and employers' organizations we used the same question used by R. Martínez in 1981 to define the powers of these latter organizations. In 1981, the activities of the employers' associations were ranked as follows: (70)

### **Table11**

It is interesting to note that employers' organizations score quite low in terms of trade relations with other countries, which is one of the traditional strong points of the Chambers of Commerce. It is also interesting to note how many people consider they are instrumental in reaching "market agreements", which are specifically prohibited by EC regulations on competition.

In terms of political and electoral activities we must remember that Martínez made his survey not long after the employers' association, Fomento de Trabajo, had taken an active part in the 1980 elections to the Catalan Parliament (71). Employers' associations were subsequently active participants in the elections to the Galician (1981) and Andalusian (1982) Parliaments.

It can be deduced from our data that advocates of "political interventionism" are on the decline, while use of other channels of influence is on the rise.

**Table 1**

## Timing of Parliamentary Discussions

AMENDMENTS (november, 3)		REPORT/ AD HOC COMMITTEE/
PSOE	audit	
PNV	2%	
AP	2% / audit / PCPE	
CDS	2%	
MC	2% / audit / PCPE	
DC		
PL		

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AMENDMENTS SENATE (december, 12)		
PSOE	1.5% / 0.5% a	PCPE
PNV	2%	
AP	2% / audit /	PCPE
CDS	2%	
MC	2% / audit /	PCPE
DC	2% / audit /	PCPE
PL	2% / audit /	PCPE

**Table 2**

<b>Use of different channels of contact</b>	
<b>Contacts with the competent Ministry</b>	32.3
<b>Contacts through employers' associations</b>	77.8
<b>Contacts through Deputies or Senators (38)</b>	3.0
<b>Contacts through the Generalitat (Catalan regional government)</b>	12.1
<b>Contacts through Chambers of Commerce</b>	20.2
<b>Personal contacts</b>	10.1

**Table 3**

<b>Chambers of Commerce in Catalonia</b>	
<b>Province-wide Chambers</b>	<b>No. of Full Committee members</b>
Barcelona	60
Gerona	40
Lerida	40
Tarragona	33
<b>Local Chambers</b>	
Sabadell	40
Manresa	39
Terrassa	32
Reus	26
Palamós	25
Tortosa	25
St. Feliu de Guíxols	21
Valls	17
Tàrrega	16

**Table 4**

<b>Percentage of Full Committee members (1986 - 1990)</b>				
	<b>Industry</b>	<b>Trade</b>	<b>Services</b>	<b>Shipping</b>
<b>Barcelona</b>	43.3	20.0	36.7	1.7
<b>Gerona</b>	40.0	22.5	37.5	2.5
<b>Lerida</b>	47.5	22.5	30.5	-
<b>Tarragona</b>	54.5	24.2	18.1	6.0
<b>Sabadell</b>	62.5	22.5	12.5	-
<b>Manresa</b>	51.3	23.0	25.7	-
<b>Terrassa</b>	59.3	25.0	15.7	-
<b>Reus</b>	50.0	42.3	7.7	-
<b>Palamós</b>	44.0	28.0	28.0	4.0
<b>Tortosa</b>	44.0	40.0	16.0	4.0
<b>St. Feliu G.</b>	38.1	19.0	38.1	4.8
<b>Valls</b>	52.9	23.5	11.7	-
<b>Tarrega</b>	50.0	37.5	6.2	-
<b>Total</b>	49.0	25.6	22.5	1.7

**Table 5**

<b>Full Committee members running for local office</b>			
	<b>Number</b>	<b>Party</b>	<b>Town</b>
<b>Chamber</b>			
Terrassa	1	CiU	Matadepera
Tortosa	1	AP	Tortosa
Sabadell	1	CiU	Sabadell
Lerida	2	CiU	Lerida
Tarrega	3		Tarrega
	1	Ind.	Tarrega
Valls	1	CiU	Valls
Gerona	5	CiU (3) CiU (1) CiU (1)	Girona Olot Sta. Coloma
St. Feliu G.	1	CiU	Llagostera
<b>Total</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>CiU (14) AP (1) Ind. (1)</b>	

**Table 6**

<b>How Full Committee members place themselves on the left/right political scale</b>	
1.	0.4
2.	0.4
3.	0.4
4.	5.2
5.	18.7
6.	33.7
7.	25.5
8.	13.7
9.	1.3
10.	0.4

**Table 7**

<b>Bussiness Community's opinion of the Franco regime (1981)</b>	
<b>I approve of everything the regime did</b>	<b>5.9%</b>
<b>On the whole, it did a good job</b>	<b>50.0%</b>
<b>It did a mediocre job but made no major mistakes</b>	<b>15.7%</b>
<b>It made mistakes that could have been avoided</b>	<b>17.6%</b>
<b>I disapprove of everything the regime did</b>	<b>9.8%</b>

**Table 8**

<b>Bussiness Community's concept of the State's role in the economy (1981)</b>	
<b>Defend free enterprise</b>	<b>25.2%</b>
<b>Provide minimum indicative planning measures</b>	<b>26.2%</b>
<b>Maintain a limited public sector</b>	<b>25.2%</b>
<b>Foster a major public sector</b>	<b>7.8%</b>
<b>Exercise public control over the economy</b>	<b>-</b>
<b>Other replies</b>	<b>14.6%</b>

**Table 9**

<b>Evolution of productivity (1973-1980)</b>	
<b>Productivity has increased a good deal</b>	33.0
<b>Has increased somewhat</b>	40.0
<b>Has not increased</b>	8.0
<b>Has decreased somewhat</b>	12.0
<b>Has decreased a good deal</b>	5.0

**Table 10**

<b>Opinions on EC membership (1981)</b>	
<b>Membership would have negative effects</b>	<b>35.7</b>
<b>Membership would have positive effects</b>	<b>30.1</b>
<b>Membership would have no effects</b>	<b>33.0</b>

**Table 11**

<b>Activities of the employers' associations (1981)</b>	
	<b>% of affirmative replies</b>
<b>They represent the business community in its dealings with the government</b>	<b>93</b>
<b>They deal with international organizations</b>	<b>88.7</b>
<b>They have trade relations with other countries</b>	<b>52.6</b>
<b>They do statistical studies</b>	<b>93.3</b>
<b>They provide information on domestic markets</b>	<b>79.8</b>
<b>They provide information on international markets</b>	<b>85.0</b>
<b>They influence political parties' choice of candidates</b>	<b>27.3</b>
<b>They finance parties favorable to business interests</b>	<b>35.4</b>
<b>They finance election propaganda for parties favorable to business interests</b>	<b>43.7</b>
<b>They finance counterpropaganda against parties not favorable to business interests</b>	<b>31.0</b>
<b>They are instrumental in reaching "market agreements"</b>	<b>76.2</b>
<b>The facilitate meetings where problems can be discussed</b>	<b>98.4</b>
<b>They run campaigns to promote a pro-business climate</b>	<b>79.4</b>

## NOTES

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(36) see note 9.

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(38) Recently, Círculo de Empresarios (business lobby) have organized meetings between members of parliament and employers. "El País", march 12, 1989.

(39) Real Decreto, april 9, 1886 establisng Official Chambers to all industrial, comercial and sailing organizations.

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(51) For legal aspects see: NIETO, A. & MANZANEDO, A. Las Cámaras de Comercio. Congreso Italo-Español de profesores de Derecho Administrativo. IEAL 1970.

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(55) This activity can be seen from their official memory and publications.

(56) Until 1989 they paid the surcharge with regular taxes.

(57) See note 7.

(58) See note 9.

(59) For the Chamber of Barcelona, 32 members were re-elected and only for 19 out of 60 were competition for the chair.

(60) Personal information collected by the author.

(61) For the Chamber of Barcelona, there was two candidates for the presidency.

(62) Decreto march 27, 1978. art.7.

(63) MARTÍNEZ, R. (1984). figure 46. pag.215.

(64) Idem figure 48. pag.-219.

(65) For the interview i am helped by Jordi Argelaguet.

(66) See note 9.

(67) MARTÍNEZ, R (1984). figure 75. Pag-285. Percentajes belongs to barcelona employers.

(68) Idem figure 88. pag.353.

(69) Idem figure 113. pag.442.

(70) Idem figure 13. pag.106.

(71) On this issue see LUDEVÍD & SERLAVÓS (1985) chapter 4.