

Spanish Regions and the 1993 Community Challenge

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INTRODUCTION

In Spain the political transition from authoritarianism to democracy was characterized by the need to find a solution to the permanent crisis of the old centralist state, that is, to provide a positive response to the historical claims of Catalonia and the Basque Country. The double right-left/centre-periphery consensus which established political autonomy for these minorities is the outcome of the 1978 Spanish Constitution, and the generalization of this autonomy was probably the only compromise possible in these circumstances.

Spain's entry into the European Community in 1986 was seen as the final step in a political and social process which started after the death of General Franco, thus putting an end to the country's secular isolation from events taking place in the rest of Europe.

Nevertheless, as for other nonunitarian Member states, the entry into the EC has also created problems of a political and institutional nature, which highlight the shortcomings of the constitutional agreement on the regions. Despite this, European integration and devolution are not contradictory, but complementary and increasingly interdependent processes.

Here we will give a brief overview of the devolution process, focussing on the main and most controversial problems. Second, we will discuss the regional impact of the European Community. Finally, the findings based on interviews carried out with two samples of political and socio-economic elites in four relevant regions will allow us to examine the regional attitudes regarding the EC as well as the Community initiatives and instruments that could promote institutional and regional development in a post-1992 context (1).

I. THE DEVOLUTION PROCESS

1. Constitutional provisions

The Spanish Constitution establishes a hybrid system which is neither federal nor regional, but based on the principles of the "unity of the Spanish nation" and the "autonomy of the nationalities and regions which constitute it". Due to the constitutional pact, the unity-autonomy binomial expresses the difficulties faced by the parties in reaching a satisfactory agreement as to the organization of the territorial state. The rather complex and ambiguous nature of the division of power between the central and regional institutions has been a source of constant political

and judicial controversies leading in many cases to the Constitutional Court.

In principle the Constitution has not established a totally decentralized state, since the creation of an Autonomous Community (AC) did not depend on the Spanish Parliament but on a representative territorial assembly which was responsible for formulating a Statute of Autonomy. The Statutes of Autonomy are legally protected against future change and hence have a similar standing to the Constitution in establishing the distribution of powers. Statutes fall into two main categories which reflect two different ways of reaching autonomy: special and general. The first one covers the three national minorities (The Basque Country, Catalonia and Galicia) with the addition of Andalusia. The four Communities have "full" autonomy Statutes which must be ratified by referendum. The general way, which corresponds to eleven regions, is just a transitional one: after a five-year period the regional authorities can request wider powers to obtain "full" autonomy (as has already happened in some cases). In addition, the Spanish Parliament can transfer legislative and executive functions without any statutory reform (this took place in the Canary Islands and Valencia). Due to the constitutional recognition of this "traditional rights", Navarra enjoys a full autonomy regime too. Thus the Spanish system, despite the initial heterogeneity, in fact tends towards homogeneity.

Obviously, devolution includes institutional and administrative organization. The Constitution establishes three kinds of institutions: a legislative assembly elected by universal suffrage, a government council headed by a president, and a high court of justice. According to the principle of selfgovernment, each AC determines its own administrative organization.

The distribution of functions is based on two lists. According to section 148.2 each AC can take on the following functions: organization of regional administration; local administration (some minor functions); territorial planning (urban planning, housing, public works, environment, etc.); social services, culture and economic policy (tourism, small trades and industry, agriculture and fishing, communications and regional development).

However, the real limitation to devolution relates to the central state functions (section 149.1). The legal provision is rather ambiguous and has given rise to numerous conflicts requiring the intervention of Constitutional Court, either at the request of central or regional governments (especially Catalonia, Basque Country and Galicia). As a general rule, the Constitution attributes to the central *institutions* the "basic legislation" or "basic norms" relating to functions that can be taken on too by the AC's in their Statutes (agriculture, banking and credit, health,

education, economic planning, territorial setting, employment, transport, environment, public mass media, local government, etc.). In addition, in some areas central and regional authorities are both fully competent (culture or research policy). This leads to a system of shared legislative functions in which the limits between the two powers are rather unclear. Thus, public actors often operate unilaterally invading each other's competences.

The Spanish system only partly follows the principles of executive federalism. The regions enforce their own regulations as well as the central "basic" or general legislation. Nevertheless, central institutions maintain some executive functions dealing with "supraregional" services or "general interests" (Muñoz Machado, 1982) which thus provides them with territorial bodies. Central controls over regional administrations are only allowed when they carry out functions previously transferred or delegated by central institutions.

Following traditional federalism, the Constitution establishes several mechanisms to ensure the representation of regional interests at the national level. Some members of the Upper Chamber (Senado) are directly elected by territorial parliaments and these can also deposit bills in the Lower Chamber (Congreso).

Finally, regions enjoy financial autonomy according to the principles of coordination with state. finance and interregional solidarity. The regional financing system is broadly based on shared central revenues, regional tax revenues and contributions from a shared cooperation fund (Fondo de Compensación Interterritorial). Nevertheless, the main revenues -especially the income taxes- belong to the central state.

2. Current practice

2.1. Conflicts

Since 1982, the majority government has freed the socialist party (PSOE) from the obligation of having to negotiate the laws defining the functions and powers of central institutions affecting those of the regions (e.g. public administration, electoral system personnel, education and university, health and police). These laws considerably reduced their range of powers forcing the Constitutional Court to intervene. At the same time the central government has not hesitated in opposing regional legal and administrative arrangements when they were considered to encroach on central competences. By 1989, these controversies had generated more than 800 legal disputes (Aja, 1990) and reflect an extremely high degree of

conflict. However, the decisions of the Constitutional Court, in which regions are not represented, have tended to preserve the intervening powers of the central institutions. Moreover, the 1985 Local Government Act -which established the province as the second level of local administration- allows central government to transfer grants and other resources to provincial and local councils thus implementing central policies by by-passing the regional level.

2.2. Lack of cooperation

Despite appearances, the Spanish Constitution does not provide for the effective integration of regional concerns in the general decision making process. The Senate is in fact a non-specialized chamber, elected on majority basis at the provincial level, where national parties dominate. Only 20% of senators are elected directly from regional parliaments. This situation weakens institutional cohesion, leads to centrifugal tendencies and, in short, undermines the system's ability to function.

In addition, the role of the sectorial conferencies (more than 30) institutionalized since 1983 is in no way comparable to that of similar bodies in West Germany. They barely facilitate the exchange of information already adopted unilaterally or negotiated without the existing procedures (e.g. the financial arrangements). The political negotiation with central authorities is normally carried out by bilateral arrangements. This hinders the adoption of global agreements. In addition, there is no horizontal coordination among regional administrations, not even with the aim to exchange experiences or points of view.

Effective coordination is the result of the political bargaining which has dominated the devolution process, allowing short-term political calculations to prevail over the need for rationality and efficiency. The highly complex nature of its administrative workings reveals some characteristics common to decentralization: fragmentation, disparity of functions, central interferences, absence of a clear model of public administration and -hence- the constant presence of political and institutional conflict.

The existing model of intergovernmental relations reflects two policy-making styles. The first one -of partisan inspiration characterizes the relations between central government and the ten regions under socialist control. Policy-making is fundamentally based on internal party negotiation. The conflict burst out in response to power struggles and not because of institutional disagreements. The second style corresponds to the relations between Madrid and

the AC governed by nationalist forces -particularly Catalonia and the Basque country- or rightwing parties. Here, the behavior of the actors -based on political antagonism- has until now been basically reactive, oscillating between the constitutional management of conflicts and hard bargaining until a bilateral agreement is reached. In the end, one side attitudes (partisan, exploitation of institutional confrontation, mutual distrust and political victimization) have tended to dominate the common values and interests that could promote consensus and cooperation.

2.3. The distribution of financial resources

The legal development of the Constitution established -with the exception of the Basque Country and Navarre (2)- a provisional financing system for the AC, which came into force until 1986, based on the evaluation of the central services devolved to the new administrations, the product of transferred taxes and the Interterritorial Cooperation Fund. The first mechanism required the formulation of a very complex method of evaluation and the establishment of seventeen bilateral commissions to estimate the annual cost of transferred services. In fact, the combination of both elements has allowed central authorities to decide the amount of matching revenues according to central budget priorities. At the same-time, the AC did not create their own taxes, avoiding playing the unpopular role of tax collectors. Moreover, the Cooperation Fund (around 30% of central budget investment) has failed in the double function of reducing territorial disparities and providing financial investments for all regions. In these circumstances the new authorities had no other option than to run into increasing indebtedness (15% of total expenditure in 1990).

The new finance system -effective only from 1987 to 1991- is the result of a difficult commitment which has already been called into question. The most important innovations concern the division of the cooperation fund into two independent blocks (less developed and more developed regions) and the prospects for permanent participation in some central revenues. Despite political disagreements and as a consequence of the progressive transfer of functions, in 1990 the participation of regional authorities in total public expenditure rose to 22%, which represented 32.6% of public investment.

II. THE REGIONAL IMPACT OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

1. The institutional impact

As has already been noted, Spain's entry into the EC has had institutional and political consequences at the regional level. As in the other decentralized Member States (Schwan, 1982; Merloni, 1985; Verweyen, 1985; Morata, 1987) the transfer of sovereignty has had negative effects on the constitutional position of the regions which, in contrast to the central government, do not participate directly in Community decision-making. The loss of decision-making powers affects many areas, particularly after the enforcement of the SEA: finance, agriculture, industry, economic planning, territorial policy, transport, research, environment and consumer rights.

Nevertheless, according to the internal distribution of functions, the regions ought to implement Community policies related to their own competences and to those shared with central institutions. The effect of a regulatory Directive on one of these shared areas would normally be the displacement of the central state by European institutions, thus allowing the AC to proceed to the direct implementation of the Community rule (Garcia de Enterría, 1990). Despite the exceptional coercive power of central institutions to ensure regional duties (3), the constitutional requirements are unable to guarantee the execution of European Directives according to the allowed delays. Until now, there has been only one conflict on this subject when in 1989 the Canarian government initially refused to implement the customs tariffs reduction foreseen in the accession treaty. Political negotiation facilitated the resolution of the controversy. Conflicts arise more frequently when both levels of government consider themselves competent (4).

2. Participation in the decision-making process

The integration of subcentral institutions in the Community decision process is still an unsolved problem in the current debate on the European integration. Due to the indifference of Community treaties regarding the constitutional structures of the Member states, only internal approaches have been available. Anyhow, comparative analysis shows that preserving internal balance of powers depends more on political negotiations and intergovernmental cooperation than on constitutional interpretations (Hrbek-Thaysen, 1987; Morata, 1987). In contrast to West Germany, in Spain participation of the regions via the Senate is obviously not feasible. In 1986, faced with pressure from the regional authorities, the central government presented a project for an "Agreement on cooperation in matters of Community affairs".

2.1. The central government proposal

The proposal, negotiated until 1988, has come in a standstill. This was based on the informal "Länder" procedure in force in the Federal Republic of Germany from 1980 to 1986 (Schumann-Hanneleck, 1983). It provided for the transfer of all information affecting regional domains. The subcentral authorities would inform government of their policy criteria with a view to forming the "state will", and forcing the executive to incorporate them, "if possible", into the Spanish position, providing they were compatible with the "general interests" of the state and the process of integration. In order to make the procedure operational, a proposal was made to constitute a regional committee through which AC would coordinate themselves and cooperate with the central authorities in order to provide information and express regional opinions. In addition, the committee could propose the designation of an "observer" and an "extra observer" for the regions as members of the permanent Spanish representation in Brussels, with diplomatic status under the jurisdiction of the Spanish ambassador. The functions of the observers would include sending reports and documents to the regional committee. As members of the permanent representation, both observers could attend meetings of EC committees and working groups, "expressing opinions coinciding with those of official delegation".

The technical shortcomings of the proposal were rather obvious: What kind of information should be sent and how could it be evaluated? How to organise coordination and decision-making among seventeen actors with unequal competences? To what extent would the regional opinions be taken into account? However, the main problem is that the most powerful regions want their own representative to have a greater degree of autonomy with respect to the official representation. The central government's refusal to accept this request has blocked any possibility of political agreement on this subject.

2.1. The limited agreement

Due to the lack of consensus, the only effective arrangements reached until now refer to some basic principles and practical aspects. The first item includes the mutual compromise to respect the internal distribution of functions and the loyalty to the Constitution in matters dealing to the EC. Second, in May 1990 both authorities decided to establish a telematic data base, linked to the State Secretary for European Communities, which provides Community information to regional governments. Besides, a coordination agreement has been reached to face the Community law breaches.

The intergovernmental conference for Community Affairs remain the only tool available for regional participation. Nonetheless, we have already mentioned the general deficiencies which characterize this kind of cooperation, so the room for a real intervention in the decision-making process remains very little.

3. Organizational measures

The implementation of Community regulations has meant a reorganization of administrative organigrams and bureaucratic bodies in response to the new requirements.

The vast majority of the organizational rules are directed towards the establishment of mechanisms of coordination which aim to achieve a more precise distribution of responsibilities to each of the ministerial departments involved in matters linked to the EC. They seek too greater efficiency in obtaining resources from the Community's structural funds and gaining access to other forms of finance. The mechanisms established generally I take the form of an interdepartmental commission or committee which, grouping together the General Directors of various departments, carries out responsibilities for coordination and planning activities related to the EC. In general, the department of Presidency centralizes the institutional relations with the European authorities.

4. Links with Community and interest groups

The integration of interest groups through information and consulting procedures is seen as a political priority by most of regional administrations. In Catalonia, the "Patronat Català pro-Europa", a public consortium established in 1982, takes care of organizing, promoting and coordinating activities linked to the Community and other European organizations. Chaired by the President of Catalonia, the "Patronat" assembles representatives of Catalan public and private Universities, Save banks, Chamber of Trade and Industry, Local Government associations and the Townhall of Barcelona. The body's council is organized in three sections: the academic, the parliamentarian and the socio-economic, in which participate enterpreneurial organizations, professional associations and unions, including Catalan representatives of Community lobbies and officials in Brussels.

The main activities of the "Patronat" are the preparation of courses and seminars about the EC especially addressed to economic and professional sectors; the diffusion of the R&D Community programmes; and a consulting service called

"Europa-93" aimed to provide information about the impact of the internal market. In 1986 the institution opened an office in Brussels which supplies information and contacts with the Commission and other Community institutions. Nearly 50% of these are requested by economic, social and professional sectors.

The governments of Basque Country, Canary Islands, Galicia, Murcia and Valencia have set up offices too in Brussels with the legal status of limited trade companies. Initially, the Basque office was established in a Basque Government Decree proposing a Cabinet for European Community Affairs, which amongst other functions would "coordinate relations between Basque Public Institutions on the one hand and Community Bodies and the Council of Europe on the other, and manage and coordinate relations with the European Institutions in general from an Office in Brussels". This decision caused a "conflict of competences" lodged by the central government against the Basque provisions. As a consequence, the Basque authorities decided to create a Public Company ("Interbask") with the aim of "ensuring direct and immediate observation of the activities of the EC, insofar as they affect matters and economic sectors of great importance to the Basque country". Through its proximity to Community institutions, the body carries out consultancy work for public and private organizations, spreads awareness of European issues and takes responsibility for the organization, promotion and coordination of Basque activities relating to the Community. Its administration is ascribed to the Department of the Presidency, Justice and Autonomous Development.

III. REGIONAL ATTITUDES REGARDING THE EC

The results of a sampling carried out in 1989 in Andalusia, Catalonia, Galicia and Valencia among regional elites allow us to evaluate the attitudes regarding the EC. The interviews included 200 parliamentarians -half of the total- distributed according to political and geographical representation, and 100 regional observers (Chambers of Trade and Industry, unions, general and sectorial entrepreneurial organizations, professional corporations, cultural and environmental associations, local government organizations at regional level, and others). We will first characterize the most relevant socio-economic and political aspects of the four regions.

1. Socio-economic framework

Andalusia is the most populated and extensive region (6.8 million

inhabitants; 87,268 sq km.). Its standard rate of economic productivity is equivalent to 78% of the Spanish average, with a high percentage of the population employed in agriculture (19%) and a high level of unemployment (ca. 30% in 1987).

Catalonia (6 million inhabitants; 32,000 sq km.), whose average income is one of the first in Spain, is mainly an industrial region which generates nearly one quarter of the Spanish industrial product, with a clear predominance of small and medium-sized industry. The industrial crisis has meant a drastic loss of employment in the sector, offset since 1988 by the extension of modern services sector. As in the other regions, there is a clear need for investment for environmental protection.

Galicia (2.85 million inhabitants; 29,500 sq km.) is a rural region where the primary sector employs 45.6% of active population generating only 11.4 of GRP. The region suffers from serious problems of internal and external communications.

Valencia (3.73 million inhabitants; 23,305 sq km.) generates an average income similar to the Spanish one. The major sectors are agricultural exports (40% from the Spanish ones) and manufacturing, based on small and medium-sized traditional industry.

2. Institutional and political framework

The four AC have a similar institutional structure (parliamentary government, presidential executive and proportional electoral system). The statutes foresee the exercise of functions in most policy areas related to economic policy and industrial development.

Each territory constitutes too a specific political subsystem, which expresses the ideological and cultural pluralism of Spain. Eight parties are represented in the parliament of Catalonia, four of whom exclusively catalan. The region is governed since 1980 by a centre-right nationalist coalition (CiU). In Andalusia and Valencia the PSOE governs with a wide majority since 1982 and 1983, respectively, with the opposition of four other parties. In both regions there is a single regional party. Six parties sit in the parliament of Galicia, of which only two exist at the national level. Since 1981 six party coalitions have come into power until the actual rightwing government (PP).

3. The results

The results of both samples are set out under three main headings: the regional economic structures, the role of the EC and the common regional initiatives.

3.1. The adaptation Of socio-economic structures

Among the observers there is no doubt as to the low level of adaptation of socioeconomic structures for the appointment with 1992 (Table 1). In all regions the opinions are rather negative as to the railway and road transport networks, health and social services, the functionality of urban areas and the levels of technological innovation and labour force skills. We should note the unanimously negative responses to the first two items in Galicia. Political elites and observers agree-although the former are less pessimistic-especially as regards the level of technological innovation (Catalonia), level of labour force skill (Catalonia and Valencia), the structure of small and medium-sized industries (Valencia), the utilization of historico-environmental resources (Andalusia), and the port system (Andalusia).

Among the regions Andalusia registers the highest level of negative judgements on the adaptation of socio-economic structures, with the only -partial-exception being air transport. In Galicia respondents gave quite positive opinions for the port system, university and air transport, which can be accounted for by the importance of fishing industry, the recent creation of three universities and the need to compensate for the shortcomings of the territorial transport system. In Valencia the restructuring of industry and the port system are considered to be satisfactory and this is linked to the recent modernization of the steel industry.

Last, as expected, Catalonia presents the highest level of economic adaptation, at least in some key sectors: industrial economic adaptation, together with the tertiary sector, structure of SMEs (the most dynamic ones) and use of historico-environmental resources. Only Catalonia registers positive responses on levels of associationalism. According to recent empirical analysis (Putnam, 1988), this may explain the higher levels of performance found in that region.

3.2. The impact of 1992

Both regional observers and political elites have a clear idea as to the impact of 1992 on their associations (Table 2). In their view the impact will be very positive in all matters affecting economic development. The increasing level of

unemployment is not considered likely, even though observers in Catalonia, Andalusia and Galicia believe that production costs will increase. According to parliamentarians 1992 will lead to the modernization of regional administration. Significantly, all observers disagree on this point. There is a general agreement as to the likelihood of institutional renewal, the adoption of new environmental standards, and the improvement of social services. No loss of regional identity is anticipated. Nevertheless, both sets of respondents feared the confusion of functions between the different levels of administration, or even some kind of slow down in the decision-making process, specially in Catalonia and Galicia. Andalusian and Galician observers are more worried about deterioration in underdeveloped areas.

3.3. The new Community functions

There is almost unanimous agreement as to the extension of EC functions (Table 3). In other words, the Community ought to increase its economic powers in all areas, particularly in financing projects for less developed areas, the promotion of technological innovation and the evaluation of regional investment projects. Observers and politicians agree that financing a European defence policy should remain the same, and that there should be a high level of immigration control for non-EC countries.

3.4. The new EC policy instruments

Community policy instruments are welcome in all cases (Table 4). Particularly, regions believe that a Euro-environmental agency, a European communications body and the availability of their own offices in Brussels are indispensable. A central Eurobank, programmes, agencies or consortia for regional cooperation, together with a Community administrative court and the European conference of regional presidents are highly desirable. It is rather difficult to differentiate among politicians and observers or between regions. In any case, observers in Galicia and observers and political elites in Valencia express in general the lowest preferences for a European environmental agency, euro-administrative court and agencies for interregional cooperation, conference of regional presidents, post-graduate diplomas and control of firms and banks.

3.5. Common transregional initiatives

Regions are ready to support initiatives which could promote horizontal relations (Table 5). There is general agreement as to the need to protect the environment, to formulate and implement development projects, plans for applied research, integrated programmes for border regions and policies to improve interregional communications. At the same time, they express a clear wish to build cultural-tourist exchange programmes or activities, promote products and services or joint ventures, strengthening regional air services and training civil service personnel. The idea of a regional lobby in Brussels is generally welcomed.

CONCLUSIONS

Regional devolution and Spain entry into the EC are two relevant aspects of Spanish institutional and political life in the 1980s. The problem is, however, how to make the two compatible. The transfer of internal competences to the Community has taken place in a context of marked differences in the distribution of political power, which in turn give rise to permanent conflicts in centre-periphery relations. These political and administrative shortcomings vis-a-vis social demands and Community challenges necessitate a deep review of political attitudes, with the aim of increasing coordination and cooperation.

Our sample shows a regional political system which is quite well-established, and where cultural identity cleavages are added to ideological ones, particularly in the case of the national minorities. Despite differences in perception, both observers and political elites stress the inadequacy of regional socio-economic structures. Preferences about the new role of the EC cover all suggested areas, particularly economic development and promotion of technological innovation. The same positive attitude is evident in the use of sectorial or regional EC instruments. Lastly, the promotion of transregional cooperation receives a high degree of support. In short, Andalusia, Catalonia, Galicia and Valencia see the increasing powers of the EC as a need linked to the 1993 Single Market. Instead of a risk, they regard it as a chance to develop their own potential and to establish European transregional networks.

Table1

TABLE1								
Adaption of socio-economic structure								
	CATALONIA		ANDALUSIA		GALICIA		VALENCIA	
	(*)	(**)						
	Obs.	Pol.	Obs.	Pol.	Obs.	Pol.	Obs.	Pol.
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Railroad network	86.2	91.2	75.0	79.2	100.0	94.6	89.5	88.5
Road network	55.2	41.2	84.6	64.2	100.0	94.6	94.7	69.2
Health service	85.0	73.5	92.0	64.2	93.4	86.5	78.0	53.8
Social service	81.0	69.1	91.0	69.8	85.3	67.6	76.7	61.5
Urban areas function.	58.6	55.2	70.8	73.6	75.0	56.8	84.2	80.0
Level of technological innovation	58.6	42.4	92.0	80.8	69.6	83.8	78.2	65.4
Skill level of Labour force	60.7	23.5	84.6	79.2	60.9	62.2	73.7	50.0
Commercial network	50.0	45.6	72.0	64.0	81.8	81.1	55.6	61.5
Level of associationalism	34.5	25.4	60.0	75.0	75.0	78.4	57.9	61.5
Structure of small-medium sized indus.	46.4	25.0	87.0	80.0	66.7	74.3	52.9	42.3
University system	93.1	53.0	92.0	50.9	45.8	45.9	63.2	38.5
Air communications	79.3	73.5	41.7	49.1	41.7	40.5	57.9	57.7
Utilization of historical/enviro. resources	34.5	28.4	60.0	28.8	54.5	54.1	66.7	73.1
Industry restructur.	17.9	15.2	54.2	53.8	77.3	64.9	36.8	23.1
Port system	46.4	43.3	56.0	47.2	43.5	37.8	42.1	19.2

(*) Regional observers
(**) Regional parliamentarians

Table2

TABLE2								
Effects of the Single Market implementation								
	CATALONIA		ANDALUSIA		GALICIA		VALENCIA	
	Obs.	Pol.	Obs.	Pol.	Obs.	Pol.	Obs.	Pol.
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
More competition	96.6	98.6	76.9	94.2	88.0	89.2	89.5	94.7
Acces to new markets	93.1	98.6	80.8	94.3	88.5	97.3	94.7	94.7
Technological innovation	100.0	95.8	73.1	94.3	92.0	86.1	84.2	97.4
Restructuring of commercial distribution networks	96.6	98.6	84.6	76.0	100.0	95.0	94.7	98.0
Provide acces to new financials markets	96.6	93.0	76.9	90.6	92.3	91.9	94.7	89.5
Reconversion of agricultural production	88.6	91.2	89.2	86.8	93.7	89.2	90.5	89.5
Concentration of industry	93.1	93.0	80.8	69.8	76.0	83.8	73.7	81.6
Increase unemployment	17.9	13.0	38.5	24.5	41.7	30.6	26.3	31.6
Increase production costs	57.1	50.0	65.4	38.5	37.5	32.4	63.2	42.1
Adoption of new environmental standars	96.6	92.9	79.2	82.4	78.3	89.2	84.2	97.4
Improvement in social services	74.1	90.1	50.0	78.8	36.0	88.9	52.6	81.6
Worsen situation in disadvantaged areas	41.4	44.3	53.8	42.3	52.0	62.2	52.6	28.9
Overlap. of functions	82.8	54.3	84.0	59.6	72.0	64.9	76.5	57.9
Institutional renewal	75.9	77.5	53.8	84.3	72.0	66.7	72.2	65.8
Slow down decision-making process	53.6	51.4	73.1	38.5	70.8	62.2	35.3	47.4
Modernization of regional administration	46.4	63.2	48.0	63.5	32.0	72.2	31.6	65.8
Loss of identity	7.1	16.9	26.9	25.0	19.2	13.5	29.4	23.7

Table3

TABLE3								
Preferences regarding the new role of the EC								
	CATALONIA		ANDALUSIA		GALICIA		VALENCIA	
	Obs.	Pol.	Obs.	Pol.	Obs.	Pol.	Obs.	Pol.
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Financing of projects in underdeveloped areas	96.6	98.6	100.0	100.0	100.0	91.1	94.9	89.5
Promotion of technological innovation	100.0	97.2	92.0	98.0	95.8	94.6	89.5	81.6
Evaluation of regional investment projects	85.7	87.1	84.0	90.4	87.5	81.1	83.3	68.4
Formulating guidelines for vocational training	89.7	85.9	92.0	92.2	66.7	81.1	84.2	64.9
Control over the enforcement of environ. and urban planning standars	86.2	80.0	78.0	92.2	76.4	77.8	62.2	68.4
Euro perspective for scientific research	79.3	87.1	84.0	94.2	65.2	77.8	83.3	63.2
Foreign trade coordin.	77.8	87.1	84.0	84.3	78.3	63.9	83.3	59.5
Promotion of immigrants integration	70.4	78.6	79.2	80.0	63.6	86.8	73.7	50.0
Monitoring of labour market	85.7	81.7	84.0	92.2	47.8	81.1	73.7	60.5
Monitoring of financial markets	66.7	54.3	72.0	66.7	68.2	61.1	55.6	45.9
Emigration control from non-EC states	48.1	54.9	66.7	48.1	43.5	27.0	57.9	35.1
Finance eurodefence policy	25.0	35.2	58.3	34.6	21.7	35.1	36.8	34.2

Table4

TABLE4								
Preferred new EC instruments								
	CATALONIA		ANDALUSIA		GALICIA		VALENCIA	
	Obs.	Pol.	Obs.	Pol.	Obs.	Pol.	Obs.	Pol.
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Central-federal bank	96.6	98.6	88.4	98.1	100.0	100.0	100.0	98.1
Telecommunications agency	93.1	98.5	96.0	100.0	100.0	97.1	100.0	100.0
Environmental Agency	96.6	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	97.3	77.0	100.0
Agency to monitor labour market	96.4	100.0	95.8	100.0	100.0	97.3	100.0	100.0
Common programs for trans-regional sectoral policies	93.1	97.1	93.1	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Interregional euroconsortia	96.4	95.6	92.3	92.5	100.0	94.6	100.0	92.5
Administrative court	96.6	95.7	96.2	97.2	94.4	88.9	94.4	97.2
Agencies for interregional cooperation	93.1	94.6	88.5	96.2	90.9	94.6	94.1	96.2
Post-graduate euro-diplomas	85.7	95.7	91.7	96.1	71.4	94.6	88.2	96.1
Conference of regional presidents	96.6	97.2	91.7	92.5	95.5	100.0	71.1	92.5
Representation of regional assemblies	89.3	97.1	76.0	96.2	95.5	100.0	66.7 *	94.4
Offices representing the regions in Brussels	96.6	97.2	84.0	89.2	90.9	100.0	88.9	86.1
Control of firms and banks	86.2	94.4	88.3	90.4	63.6	80.6	66.7	91.9

(*) only "desirable"

Table5

TABLE5								
Preferred common regional initiatives								
	CATALONIA		ANDALUSIA		GALICIA		VALENCIA	
	Obs.	Pol.	Obs.	Pol.	Obs.	Pol.	Obs.	Pol.
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Policies to protect the environment	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	97.3	100.0	100.0
Cultural-tourist exchange programs	96.6	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	97.3	100.0	100.0
Plans for applied research	93.1	98.1	100.0	100.0	100.0	97.3	94.4	100.0
Formulating development programs	96.6	98.5	92.3	100.0	100.0	94.5	94.4	100.0
Integrated programs for contiguous border regions	96.6	98.5	96.0	98.2	100.0	100.0	100.0	88.0
Activities to promote products and services	93.1	94.0	100.0	98.1	91.3	94.5	94.4	100.0
Promoting joint-ventures between industries	92.9	97.0	96.0	98.2	89.5	94.5	100.0	100.0
Increase of interregional rail-road communications	96.6	98.5	100.0	98.0	91.3	94.5	100.0	96.0
Training civil servants	89.3	94.0	92.3	94.3	86.4	94.5	88.9	96.0
Strengthen regional air-line services	96.6	95.5	92.3	92.5	86.4	94.5	72.2	100.0
Lobby in the EC Commision	86.2	79.1	72.7	52.0	85.0	77.1	81.0	63.7

NOTES

- (1) This paper summarizes the Spanish contribution to a research project directed by Robert Leonardi (European University Institute of Florence) on "Regions and European Integration". The project, carried out from 1989 until 1990, involved the survey of elite opinion based on extensive fieldwork and data gathering in four countries (Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain) and the two cases of Corsica and Northern Ireland for a total of twenty-two regional sites.
- (2) The Basque Country and Navarra retained their traditional financial agreement ("concierto económico") with the central state which allows them to collect their own taxes and pass on an agreed sum to the centre.
- (3) According to section 155 of the Spanish Constitution the central authorities, with the previous agreement of the absolute majority of the Senate, are allowed to constrain the autonomous governments to fulfil their constitutional duties.
- (4) In case 252/88 the Constitutional Court has considered that the application of Community Law 'did not alter the internal structure of distribution of competences between the central state and the autonomous governments.

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