

**The Dynamics of Electoral Competition in a Modern
Society: Models of Spanish Voting Behavior, 1979 and 1982**

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In an earlier work, based primarily upon our analysis of a 1979 survey of Spanish voting behavior (1), my colleagues and I set forth an interpretation of the emergence and evolution of the Spanish party system that heavily stressed the importance of individual party elites in creating institutions, mobilizing clienteles and projecting images to Spanish voters. We found that these elite variables interacted with mass-level features of Spanish society in often complicated ways, and that the nature of this interaction had to be analyzed in detail in order to gain a proper understanding of the dynamics of partisan competition in Spain in the late 1970s. Implicit in our argument was a much greater emphasis on elite-level factors than social-structural determinants of the vote.

The purpose of this paper is to subject our earlier arguments to rigorous multivariate tests in an effort to determine if we were correct in stressing the importance of elites over most social cleavages as the principal determinants of the shape of the Spanish party system. It is intended to determine the strength of our hypotheses when controlled for a wide (if not exhaustive) variety of other variables. It will also present partial data from our 1982 survey to update the argument, and to determine whether the validity of our arguments was undermined in any significant way by the electoral earthquake of 1982. It will begin, therefore, with a summary restatement of our explanation of voting behavior in the 1979 election, and will then move on to briefly summarize our explanation of the party-system restructuring of 1982. Finally, I will conclude with speculations about why Spanish voters differ in several important respects from voters in other West European societies, and how these voting patterns may be regarded as harbingers of the future of electoral competition in many modern societies in the television age.

Success and Failure in the 1977 and 1979 Elections

The relative success or failure of the four major Spanish parties in the first two democratic elections was, as set forth in Spain After Franco, the product of the confluence of several different factors. For the UCD, one major advantage was that it was able to stake out for itself a broad segment of the ideological continuum near the densely populated center of that spectrum. As has been repeatedly demonstrated, most Spanish voters regarded themselves as moderates of the center-left. Indeed, when asked to locate themselves on a ten-point left-right continuum (with 1 as extreme left, 10 as extreme right, and 5.5 as the exact center of the scale) 39% of our respondents placed themselves at either position 4 or 5, and a near majority of respondents surveyed (49%) were located in the three centrist positions, 4, 5 and 6. Even though the UCD was perceived as a right-of-center party (its mean position on the ten-point scale, as seen by our respondents, was 6.4), party leader Adolfo Suárez successfully capitalized upon progressive reforms enacted under his Governments between 1976 and 1978 (the most important being the transition to

democracy, the writing of a Constitution backed by a solid consensus, and enactment of fiscal and other reforms) and thereby attracted to the UCD a large bloc of moderate progressive voters. Indeed, our survey data revealed that the largest bloc of UCD supporters were those who regarded themselves in 1979 as just to the left of center. The mean ideological self location of UCD voters in our sample was 5.9, which is very close to the exact center of the left-right continuum.

The ideological stance of the UCD maximized its electoral appeal to a broad array of moderate voters in another way as well: the composition of its elite reflected a coalition among "political families" which, in most other Western European countries, make up very sizable portions of the electorate. The UCD was created through a merger among Christian democratic, social democratic and liberal groups which had emerged as a "moderate opposition" to the Franquist regime in its final years. To this broad coalition of forces was added a sizable component of reformers whose origins were within the Franquist regime itself, the most important of whom was Adolfo Suárez. As a result of this elite heterogeneity, the UCD was able to appeal to a wide variety of groups: its eclectic "ideological" stance could attract Christian democrats, social democrats and liberals not to mention those who did not wish to repudiate the former regime outright but wanted to adapt Spain's political institutions to greatly different circumstances through evolutionary means (2). The electoral clientele of the UCD was heterogeneous, in another way as well. The party explicitly defined itself as interclassist, and was quite successful in implementing its campaign strategies for attracting voters from a wide variety of social strata.

The UCD also had other important assets. The visibility and popularity of Adolfo Suárez (particularly in the aftermath of the "Politics of consensus") was a central feature of the UCD's 1979 election campaign, and certainly contributed to its victory in that contest. Indeed, Suárez was significantly more popular among Spanish voters than was his party: 35.3% of our respondents evaluated Suárez favorably (by placing him at position 7, 8, 9 or 10 on a feeling thermometer), while only 29.2% were that favorably disposed towards the UCD (3). Given this level of popularity, Suárez was able to attract to the UCD a sizable bloc of voters who might otherwise have supported rival parties.

As the party of Government in both the 1977 and 1979 election campaigns, the UCD had organizational and financial resources not available to other parties. Personal ties to individuals who had worked for many years within the Movimiento or the Franquist sindicatos gave the UCD access to a preexisting infrastructure in nearly all provinces that most other parties lacked. This was particularly important in the first democratic election, which removed from the political scene most of the UCD's poorly organized Christian democratic, social democratic and liberal rivals near the center of the political spectrum. Finally, given its governmental status and its plurality in the Cortes, it was able to secure enactment of regulations (concerning the formation of

parliamentary groups, etc.) and electoral and campaign-financing laws from which it benefited disproportionately (4).

The PSOE also did well in the first two elections, but not as well as it had anticipated in 1979, and by no means as well as it did in 1982. One of its principal advantages over potential rivals was its basic ideological stance: its perceived location on the left-right continuum placed it closer to the modal center-left portion of the electorate than any other party. The mean placement on that scale of the PSOE by our respondents (3.9) was less than a point away from the mean of the self-locations of the Spanish electorate sampled by our survey (4.7), and was significantly closer to the modal center-left bloc of voters than was the UCD (6.4).

In addition, the leader of the Socialist party, Felipe González, was youthful, attractive and popular. Indeed, in the aftermath of the 1979 election, González and Suárez were both given favorable mean ratings of 5.5 on an eleven-point "feeling thermometer" by our respondents. These evaluations were significantly higher than those of the leaders of the PCE and AP: the mean thermometer score for Santiago Carrillo was 3.7, and Manuel Fraga was placed at only 3.1 on that same scale.

The PSOE, which defined itself as a working-class party, was assisted in its efforts to win the support of workers through the activities of its affiliated trade union, the UGT. But by redefining the concept of "working class" to include large segments of the middle and upper-middle classes, its leaders were able to formulate and implement predominantly inter-classist electoral strategies.

A final advantageous characteristic of the PSOE was that it was a member of the Socialist International. Thus, personal ties to prominent Western European political leaders (most importantly François Mitterrand and Willy Brandt), as well as the electoral and governmental successes of socialist parties in other countries, added to both the visibility and prestige of the PSOE, particularly in the 1977 election.

In those earlier elections, however, the PSOE also had certain disadvantageous characteristics. In 1979 the most significant of these was its self-designation as a "Marxist" party and its retention of steam-age revolutionary rhetoric in its formal ideological and programmatic statements. This alleged evidence of PSOE radicalism was skillfully manipulated by UCD leaders in the 1979 election to frighten moderate center-left voters away from the Socialist party. Since only 15% of the total Spanish electorate in 1979 identified with the term "Marxism" (5), it is clear that the formal declarations adopted at the 27th party congress in 1976 would appeal to only a small segment of the population, and could repel many voters. At least partly as a result of its formal ideological stance, the PSOE did less well than the UCD in attracting support from that largest bloc of Spanish voters just to the left of center. These ideological commitments also undercut the party's campaign efforts to

attract a broadly interclassist electorate.

The PCE and AP were in decidedly less advantageous positions, particularly insofar as they were perceived by voters to be much farther than the UCD and PSOE from the modal center of the ideological spectrum: their mean locations on the left-right continuum, as perceived by our respondents in 1979, were 2.5 and 7.9, respectively. In addition, each of them inherited highly polarizing images from the past.

The PCE, however, had made great efforts to alter its public image and enhance its appeal to more moderate voters. Its ideology had been reoriented towards Eurocommunism prior to the 1979 election: the term "Leninist" had been removed from its ideological self-designation, the closed "devotee" cell structure of the party had been replaced by a more open "mass mobilization" style, and the party pledged to respect the democratic rules-of-the-game under the new regime. Its moderate, restrained and constructive behavior after its legalization in 1977, moreover, went a long way towards undermining the demonic image inherited from the past. It was particularly successful in avoiding clashes with the Church (despite overt intervention by the Episcopal Conference against leftist parties in the 1979 election campaign). This helped to avoid reactivating the religious cleavage in Spanish society which had been so divisive in the past. Recruitment by the party of many prestigious intellectuals, artists, technicians and liberal professionals also broadened the party's appeal to many voters. The net result of its constructive behavior during the constituent process and of the moderation of its campaign strategies was an increase in the PCE's share of the vote from 9.2% in 1977 to 10.8% in the 1979 parliamentary elections.

Finally, the PCE possessed one resource not shared by other parties: as the principal party of clandestine opposition to the former regime the PCE had built up a mass membership and a provincial infrastructure which greatly exceeded those of other parties, including the PSOE. This constituted a significant electoral resource, particularly with regard to the provision of volunteer labor during the campaign and the raising of the party's visibility to the electorate. The greater degree of institutionalization (compared to the PSOE) which resulted from decades of clandestine opposition activities also gave the Communist party a more stable organizational base during the early and middle stages of the transition to democracy, a more experienced and disciplined leadership (at least over the short term), and a powerful trade union ally: the Comisiones Obreras.

Alianza Popular also underwent significant changes during the period between the first two elections; but these were more in the form of hasty repairs following a major disaster than of carefully conceived incremental adjustments. The stimulus for these alterations was the complete collapse of the original AP elite

coalition in the course of deliberations over the new Constitution. Manuel Fraga and his immediate collaborators had reservations about some segments of the constitutional text (particularly concerning decentralization of the Spanish state and explicit recognition of the multinational make-up of its population), but he and the AP executive committee decided that the interests of the country would best be served by supporting that document in the December 1978 referendum. The more right-wing members of its parliamentary delegation, however, refused to support the new Constitution, and left the party in protest. The departure from the AP of much of its right wing on the very eve of the 1979 elections constituted a major crisis.

But the removal from its leadership of some prominent figures closely associated with Franquismo, whose commitment to democracy was dubious, presented Fraga with an opportunity to modify both the ideology and the, public image of the party. The result was creation of a new Coalición Democrática, of which AP would be the core and the principal organizational infrastructure, but which would include at the highest levels certain new individuals whose commitment to democracy was not suspect. All defensive references to the Franquist past were expunged from the party's ideology and were studiously avoided in public statements by the new coalition's leaders.

While the AP (CD) moved towards the "center" on that purely political dimension, however, the economic program of the AP moved at the same time towards the neo-liberal right. The corporatist component of the ideologies (or "mentalities") of the traditional Spanish right and of the former regime, coupled with the presence within the AP's founding elite of some individuals (such as Licinio de la Fuente) with quasi-populist values and others (such as Laureano López Rodó) who regarded state intervention in the economy as positive, had led to the formulation of an original AP ideology which included statements favoring a more equitable redistribution of the national income, indicative economic planning under state guidance, and encouragement of agricultural cooperatives, as well as an attack on speculation and monopoly (6). Following the creation of Coalición Democrática, however, the economic program of Alianza Popular has advanced a more "classical-liberal" or neo-liberal defense of free-market capitalism and a reduction in the economic role to be performed by the state. Overall, however, formation of the CD was regarded by its founders and by the press as a move away from the far right: in the 1979 parliamentary campaign, in fact, CD described itself as of the "center-right."

Models of Voting Choice: 1979

In an effort to weigh the relative impact on voting decisions of these factors as well as others traditionally analyzed in studies of electoral behavior, several

rounds of multivariate regression and Probit analyses were conducted. This culminated in the creation of a separate causal diagram of support for each of the four nationwide parties. Included in the initial stages of this analysis were a wide variety of social structural, demographic, contextual, organizational and attitudinal variables. The ultimate dependent variable in the Probit analysis was vote for the party in question in the 1979 elections. An important intervening variable in the regression analysis was affect towards the political party, as measured on an 11-point feeling thermometer. In some respects, this may be regarded as a surrogate for a party identification measure.

Entered into the preliminary phases of this analysis as independent variables were the following socio-economic, associational or demographic characteristics of each respondent: occupational status (objectively defined), manual/nonmanual occupation, employee/self-employed status, age, level of educational attainment, conscious identification as a member of a social class, self-placement in a particular social class (subjective categories ranging from "working class" to "upper class"), membership in the Communist or Socialist trade unions -the CCOO and UGT, respectively- or religious association, sex, family income, and degree of religiosity. The following table measures the strength of each bivariate relationship by presenting the correlation coefficient (Pearson's r) between these variables and the "feeling thermometer" evaluation of each party. (Table 1)

Table1

These figures produce no surprises concerning the basic direction of these relationships: as one might suspect, religious respondents and members of religious associations tended more to support, parties of the center and right; members of Socialist and Communist trade unions favored Socialist and Communist parties; persons in manual or lower-status occupations, those who consciously identified themselves as members of a social class, and especially those who regarded themselves as of the "working class," tended to support parties of the left; women and older voters preferred parties of the center and right; and the two most successful "catch-all" parties (the UCD and PSOE) did better than their more ideologically extreme rivals (the PCE and the AP) in attracting support from the less educated "marais" of the Spanish party system.

What is most noteworthy is the relative strength of these relationships when compared with one another and with other kinds of variables to be discussed below. There is a moderately strong link between partisan preference and religiosity or trade union association. But the relationships between thermometer ratings of parties, on the one hand, and education, sex and particularly the objectively-defined socioeconomic variables, on the other, are rather weak. Even the strongest of the zero-order relationships involving class-related variables (between subjective class

membership and support for the PSOE, and between manual vs. nonmanual occupation and support for the Socialist and Communist parties) "explain" only about 2% of the variance. In part, this low level of class polarization of partisan preferences can be attributed to the success of the UCD and the PSOE in implementing their "interclassist" electoral appeals in the 1977 and 1979 elections. With the drastic decline of support for the UCD in the 1982 election, the level of class voting in Spain (using Alford's index) increased from 20 to 29 (7). But even with this apparent increase in class polarization of the vote, the level of class voting in Spain has remained relatively low, and certainly lower than one might suspect was the case during the highly polarized period of the Second Republic. As can be seen in Table 2, Spain's index of class voting was (particularly in 1979) quite close to the mean figure for Western European democracies, and significantly below the levels reported for Scandinavian countries. Seymour Martin Lipset has pointed out, "The more explicit forms of class consciousness that existed in Europe seem to be on the decline, and class is much less important as a source of political struggle than it once was" (8). The generalized downward trend in class voting throughout Western Europe can clearly be seen in Table 2. In this sense, the low level of class voting in Spain is a distinctly "modern" feature of Spanish electoral behavior. We shall return to this theme below.

Table2

Several provincial-level environmental variables were also included within this analysis: the degree of urbanization of the province, the level of PCE and PSOE affiliation in the province, average frequency of attendance at mass on Sundays, and the percentages of the vote cast in the 1936 election for the PSOE, PCE and, more generally, parties of the left, the center and the right (9). This analysis was intended to examine, in a very preliminary manner, community or structural influences on the development of partisan attitudes, as well as the impact of Socialist and Communist party organization (crudely measured by the level of party affiliation in each province) on partisanship. The bivariate relationship between these environmental factors and the thermometer ratings of the parties follow:

Table3

A full understanding of the impact of environmental and contextual influences on partisan preference would require analysis far beyond the scope of this study. These data tentatively suggest, however, that the nature of possible environmental and contextual influences on partisanship in 1979 accords with one's prior expectations and the findings of earlier studies (10). The Socialist and Communist parties are more highly regarded by respondents in urban, secularized provinces which had given electoral support to parties of the left in 1936, and within which the PCE had (by 1979) established large branches. One cannot undertake a serious

assessment of the actual strength of these relationships until controls for individual-level factors are imposed in the multivariate analysis to follow. But the weakness of the zero-order relationship between levels of PSOE affiliation in each province and our respondents' attitudes towards the Socialist party gives a preliminary indication that the PSOE's recent electoral successes are not highly dependent upon the party's base of militants. The absence of a significant relationship between the PSOE's share of the vote in each province in 1936 and present-day attitudes towards the party also suggests (certain pockets of hardcore support for the party, such as Jaén, notwithstanding) that there were few areas where an explicitly Socialist partisan tradition was able to survive the Franquist interlude of four decades to influence contemporary behavior. Indeed, for both the PSOE and the PCE, there is a stronger relationship with the overall level of support in 1936 for parties of the left in the aggregate than there is with votes in 1936 for each respective party. This would seem to suggest that, rather than a specific partisan predisposition, what may have been "inherited" from the Second Republic was a vague preference for parties of the left: be they Socialist or Communist.

Other data provide further evidence that the era of the Second Republic and the Civil War continues to exert some influence on Spanish political behavior. One item in the 1979 questionnaire asked respondents which side most of their family had supported during the Civil War (the Nationalists, the Republicans, neither or both). Responses to that question are strongly associated with several measures of partisan preference. Support for the Franquist or Nationalist side, for example, correlates with positive affect towards the conservative Coalición Democrática (AP) at .39, with a favorable attitude towards the UCD at .37, and with hostility towards the PSOE and PCE ($r = -.20$ and $-.31$ respectively). As the following path analysis will indicate, the imposition of numerous controls specifies but does not substantially reduce this relationship. Clearly consistent with our earlier emphasis upon the importance of general ideological compatibility and the personal appeal of party leaders as determinants of partisanship, the two variables most strongly associated with attitudes towards the various parties are the thermometer ratings of each party's leader and distance between the respondent's self location on the left-right continuum and his/her placement of each party. The "ideological proximity" variable correlated at .56 with the thermometer rating of the PCE, .45 with affect towards the PSOE, and .61 with the thermometer scores of both the UCD and AP.

Also consistent with our earlier analysis, correlations between thermometer evaluations of each party and its leader were even stronger: .71 between Santiago Carrillo and the PCE; .68 between Felipe González and the PSOE; .76 between Adolfo Suárez and the UCD; and .61 between Manuel Fraga and the AP.

A multivariate analysis gives a better estimate of causal relationships than the zero-order correlations presented above. But in addition, since the electoral impact of many variables (especially the social-structural, demographic and

environmental factors) is most often mediated through intervening attitudinal orientations, an accurate understanding, of the contribution made by each variable could only be derived from construction of a causal model for each party, consisting of several different stages of analysis. The results may be seen in Figures 1 through 4. When a dichotomous item (such as vote for a particular party or membership in the UGT or CCOO) served as the dependent variable, a Probit analysis was undertaken, and the scores reported represent the ratio of "maximum likelihood estimate" over its standard error. When other intervening variables served, in turn, as the dependent variable at a particular stage of the analysis (such as thermometer evaluation of party or its leader, left-right self-placement, proximity to the party on the left-right scale, social class identification, or self-proclaimed degree of religiosity), ordinary-least-squares regression analysis was performed; measures of association presented in those instances are standardized Beta scores. Variables that repeatedly failed to "explain" at least 1% of the variance in the dependent variable (as measured by R-squared in the regression analysis and Rank Order Correlations between observed and fitted values of the dependent variable in Probit equations) were eliminated: this criterion usually required a Beta of .09 or larger, or an M.L.E./S.E. score of 3.0 or better for retention in the model. The results of this exercise may be seen in the following figures:

Figure1

Figure2

Figure3

Figure4

Caution must be exercised in inferring direction of causality among some of these variables (implied by positioning from left to right on the diagram). It is not possible to determine with any certainty, for example, whether affect toward the party leader "causes" affect towards the party, or vice versa. Similarly, it is not clear whether conscious identification with the working class is the cause or the consequence of one's self-placement on the left-right continuum. The causal ordering implied by relative position in the diagram should be regarded as a "best guess," based upon rationales set forth below; and in the case of the relationship between conscious class identification and left-right self designation, I do not even hazard a guess. These methodological caveats do not apply to the variables on the far left side of each diagram, however; the respondent's age, sex, family history, province of residence, education and occupation may safely be regarded as "causally prior" to all the other variables in this analysis.

Religiosity is treated as the first intervening variable in each model, both because religious beliefs are inculcated rather early in life (hence, they are probably causally prior to other relationships included in each diagram), and because our previous analysis indicated that religiosity has a significant impact on several

important political orientations. While our survey was not at all designed to "explain" religiosity, the picture that emerges from this first step in the analysis is reassuring. Briefly stated, older women born into families that had supported the Nationalist side in the civil war, and currently residing in rural provinces where weekly mass attendance is high, tend to be more religious than those individuals with the opposite characteristics.

Many studies have indicated that an individual's self-placement on the left-right continuum is also strongly associated with several political attitudes and behaviors. This variable's location near the left side of the diagram is further justified by the results of studies by DATA (11) indicating that many Spaniards had acquired general ideological predispositions prior to the death of Franco and well in advance of the development of attitudes towards specific parties and party leaders. Not surprisingly, the data reveal that respondents on the right tend to be older and of higher occupational status, had most commonly been born into families that had supported the Nationalist side in the civil war, and strongly tend to be religious.

Our survey included two items dealing with subjective identification with a social class. The first asked, "Do you identify with a social class?" Regardless of whether the respondent answered "yes" or "no", he/she was then asked, "To which social class would you say your family belongs?" When entered into subsequent regression and Probit equations as separate items, the resulting measures of association were rather weak. I therefore combined the two items to create a "conscious-identification-with-the-working-class" scale (12). This scale's level of association with other political attitudes and forms of behavior was still quite weak but a bit stronger than the two original variables entered separately into the equations. The apparent origins of this "working-class consciousness" orientation are as follows: those consciously identifying with the working class tended to have low-status occupations, to have been born into families headed by a poorly-educated father and that had sided with the Republicans in the civil war, to have attained a low level of education themselves, and to not be very religious.

Subsequent stages in these analyses varied somewhat from party to party. Our earlier study indicated that membership in the UGT and Comisiones Obreras was significantly related to electoral support for the PSOE and PCE, respectively. Thus, membership in the relevant trade union was included as an intervening variable in the PSOE and PCE models. Membership in either of the two unions tended to be most common among men, those placing themselves on the left politically, and those consciously identifying themselves with the working class. Respondents belonging to the Communist trade union tended, in addition, to be young, poorly educated, employed in low-status occupations, and reside in provinces in which a leftist political tradition seems to have been carried over from the era of the Second Republic. The impact on trade union membership of religiosity and family

support for one side or the other in the civil war is mediated primarily through left-right self-designation and, to a lesser extent, working-class consciousness.

Affect towards the leader of each respective party was treated as the next intervening variable in the analysis and temporally prior to attitudes towards the political party itself. It is at this point that questions about the direction of causality become most salient, particularly with regard to the PSOE and PCE; both of which existed at the time of the Second Republic. Did some respondents dislike Santiago Carrillo because he was a Communist, or did they negatively evaluate the PCE because they disliked Santiago Carrillo? It would also be reasonable to suspect that the causal arrows point in both directions, that attitudes towards the party and its leader reinforce each other. These matters cannot be resolved using data from a single cross-section survey alone. But at least with regard to the UCD and AP, it seems reasonable to treat evaluations of party leaders as causally prior to the development of attitudes towards the parties themselves: both Adolfo Suárez and Manuel Fraga had been highly visible public figures well in advance of the creation of their respective political parties. And even in the case of the century-old PSOE, a large body of data exists suggesting that the Spanish electorate's perception of the PSOE was at least somewhat influenced by the image of Felipe González.

Respondents' evaluations of each political leader were influenced by where they placed themselves on the left-right continuum. Not surprisingly, those on the right tended to like Fraga and Suárez, while those on the left had more favorable attitudes towards Carrillo and González, although affect towards Felipe González was significantly less polarized along ideological lines. Respondents who were older, religious and born into a family that had sided with the nationalist side in the civil war tended to be more favorably disposed towards the leaders of the AP and UCD. Attitudes towards the leaders of the Socialist and Communist parties were positively influenced by membership in their respective trade unions and by a pro-Republican family background. Evaluations of Felipe González were different in some important respects from attitudes towards the other three party leaders, however. Unlike the thermometer evaluations of Fraga, Carrillo and Suárez, affect towards González was not significantly related to the respondent's level of religiosity. More generally, attitudes towards Felipe González were less closely linked to or "explained by" other social structural, demographic or historical variables. This can be seen both in the relative weakness and scarcity of relationships with other variables, and in the significantly lower R-squared figure for González. These data imply that González was much less closely associated with the past or with traditionally divisive social cleavages in the minds of most respondents.

Proximity to each respective party on the left-right continuum is, obviously, strongly related to each respondent's self-placement on that scale. But it is also clear that proximity on the continuum to the party is a function of the respondent's

perception of the ideological stance of the party. An extensive array of variables was initially entered into the regression equations dealing with left-right proximity to the party, but aside from the respondent's self-placement on the continuum, only one other variable was consistently and significantly related to this dependent variable: the thermometer evaluation of each respective party leader. Only in the case of Coalición Democrática (AP) was another variable, religiosity, related to perceived ideological proximity to the party. This would suggest that voters' perceptions of the ideological stance of each party is substantially influenced by their attitudes towards the relevant party leaders.

The impact of party-leader evaluations on partisanship is even stronger when we turn our attention to the next intervening variable in each model: the feeling-thermometer rating of each party. For each of the four major Spanish parties in 1979, by far the most powerful variable "explaining" the development of positive or negative sentiments towards the party is affect towards its leader. Standardized Beta scores linking feeling-thermometer scores for each party and its leader are all very substantial, ranging from .45 (between Fraga and the CD) and .59 (between González and the PSOE). Ideological proximity to the party (or, in the case of the CD, left-right self-placement) is in each instance the second most powerful predictor, but lags far behind our respondents' attitudes towards the relevant party leader. Only in the case of Coalición Democrática (AP) is the gap between the "leadership" and the "ideological" variable relatively narrow (.45 vs .30), suggesting that affect towards the party of the right was less personalistic and more deeply rooted in other fundamental political orientations than was true with regard to the other three parties in 1979.

The last step in each causal model was to undertake a Probit analysis of the decision to cast a ballot in 1979 for each party. The results further underline the importance of affect towards the party leader as a determinant of partisan preference. In every instance, the leader's feeling-thermometer evaluation was either the strongest or (by a narrow margin) the second-strongest predictor of the vote, with affect towards the party as a close runner-up. Proximity to the party on the left-right continuum was also significantly related to electoral support for each party, although the strength of this relationship varied substantially from party to party. Aside from these three common predictors of the vote, the impact of other variables differed from one model to another.

Religiosity was still related (but weakly) to the decision to vote for the UCD and PCE, even after the influence of all other intervening variables had been controlled. For the most part, however, the influence of religiosity on voting choice was mediated through left-right self-placement. Similarly, family support for the Nationalist vs. the Republican side during the civil war had a direct bearing on the decision to vote for the UCD and PSOE, but the otherwise pervasive influence of this

factor was mainly mediated through a large number of intervening attitudinal variables. Membership in the UGT or CCOO substantially predisposed respondents to cast ballots for the Socialist or Communist parties, respectively. And the strength of the PCE in each province (as measured by levels of affiliation with the provincial branch of the party) significantly affected the party's ability to mobilize the vote. The PSOE gained no such electoral benefit from its mass organization. Finally, only in the case of the PSOE was self-conscious identification with the working class directly related to electoral support. The AP received a slightly disproportionate level of support from persons in high-status occupations, but it is noteworthy that this relationship was not mediated through the more subjective dimensions of social class. One is tempted to speculate that this is related to a particular climate of political opinion associated with upper-level occupations: i.e., that business associations or personal friendship networks restricted to the upper strata may expose an individual to pro-AP communications, just as membership in the UGT or Comisiones Obreras places an individual within a pro-Socialist or pro-Communist environment.

An overview of the relationships among all of the variables entered into these models leads to several general conclusions. First, it is significant that none of the environmental variables except the PCE's organizational strength in each province has a direct impact on affect towards or vote for the party. One is tempted to speculate that this would imply that "community pressures" to conform to norms of voting behavior are weak or non-existent, at least at the provincial level. This is not surprising, given the high level of urbanization of the Spanish population and the massive inter-regional and international migration patterns of the past three decades (13), and the growing heterogeneity of many provinces. But the provincial context within which one resides does have an indirect impact on politics: its influence is mediated primarily through the respondent's degree of religiosity. In addition, those residing in provinces with a leftist political tradition (as measured by the percentage of the vote cast for parties of the left in 1936) were more predisposed to join the Comisiones Obreras and to like Santiago Carrillo.

Similarly, with only two exceptions, the political impact of age and sex appears to be mediated through attitudinal variables. The first exception is that older persons gave greater support to the UCD, even after controls have been imposed for attitudinal variables. This makes sense, in light of the fact that one of the initial appeals of the UCD was that it represented a moderate, reformist path to democratization, through which the Franquist regime would be completely dismantled (unlike the initial plans of the founders of Alianza Popular), but without a potentially destabilizing break from or repudiation of the past (as favored by the PCE, PSOE and many young people in universities). The second exception is similar, insofar as it appears to involve the political values and perceptions of many young people in the late stages of the Franquist regime and the early stages of the transition to

democracy: young people tended disproportionately to dislike Manuel Fraga and Adolfo Suárez. Since the young tended more to explicitly repudiate Franco and Franquismo (14), and since both Manuel Fraga and Adolfo Suárez had their political origins within the Franquist regime, young people's negative affect towards Fraga and Suárez appears to be a spillover from the history of the transition itself. Apart from these two exceptions, sex affects partisanship and voting behavior only insofar as women have traditionally tended to be more religious, and insofar as women tend to identify themselves less explicitly with the "working class" (the latter, presumably resulting from their lower levels of participation in the labor force, particularly in blue-collar occupations). Age influences political behavior in part because young people in 1979 tended slightly to identify themselves as members of the "working class" and tended (more strongly) to place themselves towards the left pole of the political spectrum (hence, closer to the PCE and farther from the AP) (15). More significantly, young people have exhibited a strong propensity to be less religious than older Spaniards, about which more will be said below.

A substantial impact on partisan attitudes and behavior appears to have been exerted by the family environment within which individuals were initially socialized. Whether one's family had supported the Nationalist side or the Republicans in the Civil War appears to have influenced the propensity to identify with the "working class", to adopt a leftist or rightist stance on the ideological spectrum, and to be religious or non-religious. But even after these important variables have been controlled, this "family tradition", variable appears to have had an independent influence on attitudes towards Santiago Carrillo, Felipe González, Manuel Fraga, Adolfo Suárez, Coalición Democrática and the UCD, as well as a direct impact on vote for the Socialist party or the UCD. Given our research design, we cannot say much more about the precise manner in which this family-history factor affects contemporary political behavior, but its pervasive impact certainly suggests that much can be learned from more intensive studies of political socialization in Spain.

The weakness of class-related variables, already apparent in our previous examination of the zero-order correlations with partisanship, is even more striking in this multivariate analysis. Only one of the variables pertaining to social class had a significant direct impact on thermometer evaluations of party or its leader: the sole exception was that persons identified with the upper social strata tended more to like Manuel Fraga. Conscious identification with the working class was weakly associated with the decision to vote for the PSOE, and was not significantly related to electoral support for other parties. And the occupational status of the respondent or the respondent's head of household was only weakly related to the decision to vote for Coalición Democrática. Other "objective" indicators of social class position (family income, employee/self employed, and manual vs. nonmanual occupation) washed out completely and were not included in the final causal models.

Among social structural variables, only religiosity and membership in either the Communist or Socialist trade unions (the CCOO and the UGT, respectively) had a consistent and substantial impact on the more overtly political attitudinal or behavioral items under analysis here. Trade unions did, indeed, function as "transmission belts" in channeling support towards their respective parties (16). And even though the Church and religious secondary associations were not explicitly linked to any political party, religious Spaniards tended to support parties on the right of center (17). These two social-structural "anchors" of partisanship in Spain, however, have diminished in significance since the first two democratic elections, as we shall see below.

The Electoral Earthquake of 1982

In 1982, the Spanish party system underwent a restructuring of massive proportions. The governing UCD suffered perhaps the single greatest electoral disaster ever to befall a contemporary Western European Party: its share of the total vote plunged from 35% to 6%, and its delegation in the Congress of Deputies shrank from 168 to 11. The PCE lost over 80% of its delegation in the Congress of Deputies and won only four seats. The magnitude of the Socialist victory in 1982 was almost equally dramatic: the PSOE nearly doubled its share of parliamentary seats to 202 out of 350. And the AP surged from fourth place among nationwide parties to become the leading party of opposition, with its delegation in the Congress increasing from 9 deputies in 1979 to 107. What explains this high level of electoral volatility, and what does this restructuring of the party system imply for the validity of the interpretation of voting behavior set forth above?

One might speculate that this high level of volatility was nothing more than a consequence of the recency of creation of the Spanish party system, that stabilizing party loyalties simply did not have sufficient time to develop, and partisan alignments did not have sufficient time to "freeze" (18). This is almost certainly correct, but it is at best only a partial explanation. As can be seen in Table 4, the level of volatility exhibited by the Spanish electorate in 1982 was dramatically higher than that seen in any of the other "new" party systems which emerged in western industrialized countries following the Second World War. In that table I have compared the Spanish election of 1982 with the most extreme example of high electoral turnover displayed by each of the party systems which emerged in Japan, West Germany and Italy in the aftermath of WWII, and two with more recent cases of redemocratization: Portugal and Greece. For illustrative purposes, I have also included the case of France, which between 1956 and 1958 experienced a change in its electoral law, the collapse of a parliamentary regime and its replacement by a semi-presidential system, and the emergence on the scene of a charismatic figure intent on substantially altering the nature of partisan politics. As can be seen, none of these

cases came close to the volatile behavior of the Spanish electorate in 1982. Why was Spain different? Was this high level of volatility simply a product of the recency of rebirth of partisan competition, in which case, we could regard an examination of Spain as a look back into the past histories of democratic party systems created in the 19th or early 20th centuries?

Table4

To some extent, one must acknowledge that this high level of volatility was the product of the absence of stabilizing psychological ties between parties and voters, which some studies have indicated may take a generation or more to develop (19). Evidence supporting this line of reasoning may be seen in some of the work by Barnes, McDonough and López Pina (20). The panel design of their earlier research permitted them to monitor the evolution of party identification among their respondents. The extremely low level of stable partisan attachments during the first five years of Spanish democracy is revealed in their finding that only 16% of their respondents (vs. 67% for a comparable panel study of American voters) identified with the same party in both the 1978 and 1980 waves of their panel survey. Accordingly, they characterized the Spanish party system as existing in a state of "prealignment" at the time of their study (21). Levels of partisan identification have apparently increased in subsequent years. A more recent panel study, involving reinterviews with 175 of our 1982 survey respondents, revealed that the level of psychological attachment to Spain's parties had increased somewhat during the following decade: 26% of those individuals identified with the same party in both 1982 and 1988 (22). But despite this growth in partisanship, the Spanish electorate continued to lag far behind other Western democracies in its aggregate level of stable partisan alignment: much higher levels of stable partisanship (ranging from two to three times higher) have been observed in recent panel findings from Britain, Germany and the Netherlands (23). And recent Eurobarometer survey data using a common "party attachment" item in all 12 EC member countries revealed that in early 1989 far more Spaniards claimed to be "close to no party" than citizens of any other EC member country (24). Although we lack data concerning the level of stable partisan attachments among Spanish voters at the time of the 1982 election, evidence suggests that the aggregate level of such loyalties was almost certainly lower than in older, more established democracies.

But there is also evidence suggesting that it would be misleading to regard Spain as merely an example of a party system in an early stage of development. A more detailed analysis suggests that Spain exhibits many characteristics of decidedly "modern" political systems. Let us begin this more detailed examination by comparing data from the 1979 and 1982 elections to determine if the findings presented in the first half of this paper were still valid in 1982. Were the high level of personalization of electoral politics and the low level of social-structural anchoring of partisan politics in

the 1979 election merely artifacts of that particular election, or are they enduring features of the Spanish party system over time? Evidence suggests that, by 1982 at least, the same sets of variables that had been the strongest predictors of the vote in the earlier election remained the strongest, and that there were few significant changes in the strengths of the relevant relationships.

Table 5 presents the results of Probit analyses of voting in 1979 and in 1982.

Table5

The five variables that best explained the decision to vote for the PSOE in 1979 were also the only five variables that were significantly related to choosing the PSOE in 1982. The strength of the relationships between the independent and dependent variables, moreover, were quite comparable (25), although membership in the UGT appears to have weakened significantly as a determinant of the vote. It is important to note that no other independent variables had any significant relationship with the decision to vote for the PSOE - i.e., none had an M.L.E./S.E. greater than 3.0.

There were some minor changes between 1979 and 1982 with regard to decisions to vote for the UCD and the PCE (see Tables 6 and 7), but these reflected a weakening of social-structural anchoring of those partisan choices, and actually strengthen our argument about the importance of "leadership" as a determinant of the vote in Spain.

Table6

Table7

In both the cases of the PCE and the UCD, the most significant change between 1979 and 1982 was the substantial decline in the vote-mobilizing ability of the party leader. Indeed, this finding from a multivariate analysis fits well with other data -published elsewhere (26)- indicating that the principal cause of the collapse of support for both parties was the protracted series of leadership struggles that had broken out over the year or two preceding the election. Confidence in the ability to govern of both parties elites declined drastically, and the attractiveness of the leader of the party at the time of the 1982 election was greatly reduced. This is reflected in the data presented above. Those data also reveal that each of the social-structural and organizational correlates of partisan support (religiosity, CCOO membership, age and the level of PCE affiliation within each province) declined during this period. This finding, coupled with the absence of other significant relationships between the voting choice and an exhaustive array of social-structural variables entered into the Probit equations at various stages, reinforces our earlier conclusions about the importance of personalism and the relative weakness of social-structural correlates of partisan

support.

This pattern is most clearly revealed in an examination of electoral support for the CDS, as can be seen in Table 8.

Table 8

Since the CDS was formed as a direct result of Adolfo Suárez's abandonment of the UCD in 1982, it is not surprising to find that three of the four strongest predictors of the vote for the CDS were previous vote for the UCD, a positive evaluation of Suárez, and a negative evaluation of his successor, Landelino Lavilla, "Closeness" to the CDS and proximity to the CDS on the left-right scale were the only two other significant predictors of the vote for the CDS in 1982.

A probit analysis of voting support for the AP, however, reveals some indications of change in the opposite direction, as can be seen in Table 9. It should be noted at the outset that one source of the differences between 1979 and 1982 is an artifact of the survey process itself: as López Pintor and others have pointed out, survey results (especially those conducted prior to 1982) included a significant "hidden vote" for AP, that is, many respondents refused to admit that they were AP supporters (27). Obviously, this disingenuous verbal response would depress the overall level of explained variance. By 1982, far fewer respondents were unwilling to admit that they had supported the AP (28); hence, the percentage of explained variance is increased quite substantially. This methodological caveat notwithstanding, some signs of real change are apparent in these data. The most striking finding is that the level of AP membership in the province emerged from this analysis as a significant predictor of the vote, as can be seen in equation 1982a. But how is this to be interpreted? One might contend that the relationship between AP membership and the propensity to vote for Fraga's party is spurious, or is "standing in" for some other causal relationship. Some other environmental or contextual factor (such as a general ambience supportive of AP within the province) could be responsible for both. As a means of testing this relationship, I introduced a variety of contextual variables into the equation, only one of which related significantly to the decision to cast a ballot for AP in 1982. As can be seen in equation 1982b, the introduction of a variable representing the percentage of the vote received in each province by the AP in 1979 slightly reduced the strength of this relationship, indicating that a general climate of supportive opinion may have contributed to both the voting choice and a high level of AP organizational development in a province. But the relationship between the overall level of AP membership in each province (standardized as a percentage of the electoral census) remains significant. This would seem to imply that AP was developing an organizational infrastructure, increasingly able to make a contribution to the party's electoral fortunes by mobilizing voters. This survey finding also fits with changes in the aggregate level of

organizational strength of the AP: party officials reported in in-depth interviews that membership (which had totalled only 18,435 in February, 1981) rapidly increased throughout 1982. Since this process of organizational growth has continued unabated up to the present (reaching over 261,000 by November, 1989), one is tempted to speculate that the AP has made great strides in developing an organizational basis for its electoral activities. It should also be noted that the social basis of support for the AP among individuals of upper occupational status remained firm throughout this period, while its hold on voters to the right of center increased enormously. The stability of the vote for AP in the 1986 and 1989 elections may be a product of this attitudinal and, to a lesser extent, social-structural anchoring of its base of support. In this respect, the AP electorate stands in contrast with those of the other major nationwide parties.

Table9

The overall conclusion to be derived from this comparison of 1979 and 1982 multivariate analyses of Spanish voting behavior is that our original emphasis on leadership variables, and our findings concerning the relatively weak social anchoring of partisanship, were as valid in the early 1980s as they were in the 1970s. Obviously, a reiteration of this analysis using survey and contextual data from the late 1980s and early 1990s would be desirable as a means of monitoring the evolution of partisanship within the Spanish electorate.

A Speculative Interpretation

How can we best explain this variety of partisanship. Why is it that the images of party leaders are such powerful predictors of the vote, while the social bases of partisanship were weak and (for all parties except the AP) declining in importance between 1979 and 1982? Answers to these questions cannot come from analysis of survey data alone, but require an overall understanding of fundamental changes in Spanish society during this period. We found in our analysis of 1979 survey data that two social-structural features were significantly related to voting behavior –trade union membership and religiosity- but that by 1982 these relationships had begun to decline in electoral importance. Why?

As can be seen in Table 10, trade union membership -which had never been particularly high when seen in comparative perspective- declined precipitously after the 1979 election. Thus, even though the Socialist and Communist parties continued to benefit electorally from the activities of their allied unions, the degree of penetration into Spanish society and, hence, the vote-mobilizing or vote-stabilizing ability, of those labor organizations had been substantially reduced.

Table 10

Similarly, the potential political influence of the Church has declined in recent years. Spanish society has been undergoing a process of secularization of dramatic proportions. In a 1976 survey, 56% of those interviewed claimed to be "very good Catholics" or "practicing Catholics"; by the time of the 1982 election, only 37% described themselves in that manner; and by the following year, that figure had fallen to 31% (29). Conversely, during this same period the percentage of Spaniards describing themselves as "non-practicing", "indifferent" or "atheist" increased from 17% in 1976, to 33% in 1982, to 45% in 1983 (30). Behavioral measures of religiosity reveal the same pattern of decline: between 1973 and 1985 the percentage of Spaniards who claimed to attend church "Sundays and/or various days during the week" or "almost every Sunday" declined from 78% to 28%, while those who said "never" increased from 13% to 37% (31). Not only has the overall level of religious practice declined, but a substantial majority of Spaniards believe that Church intervention in politics would be improper. Data from a 1984 survey undertaken by the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas showed that only 17% of Spaniards interviewed agreed with the statement that "The Church should support in elections those candidates and political parties which best defend its ideas and interests;" 63% disagreed. Similarly, 67% disagreed with the statement that "The Church should actively participate in politics in order to improve the morality of public life;" only 12% agreed (32).

One clue to the extremely high level of volatility of the Spanish electorate exhibited in 1982 lies in the absence of stabilizing linkages between political parties and supportive secondary organizations. Barnes, et al, have pointed out that the existence of close links between subjective or objective political interests and particular social classes or other groups might speed up the formation of ties between individuals and parties. In fact, social partisanship might lead to stable electoral patterns even without the growth of party ties, in that the social cues received from union or church sources, or even simply from class identification in some situations, might be sufficient to give order to voting without the development of strong individual-level identification with political parties. Trade union, religious and class cues, and possibly other factors, have seemed to encourage stable voting in Germany, Austria and Italy, for example, without correspondingly high levels of party attachment (33).

Analyses of Spanish voting behavior in 1979 and 1982, however, have suggested that these social-structural "anchors" of partisanship were either initially weak, or have become weaker in recent years. Most objective and subjective indicators of class position were never closely linked to partisan choice, and those social structural features that were (religion and trade union affiliation) have declined in their ability to stabilize partisan alignments. In part, this has resulted from the

secularization of Spanish society. In part, this may reflect a traditionally weak and undeveloped structure of secondary associations in Spanish society (34). But for our purposes, the most important point is that neither the social structural nor the, psychological (party identification) roots of stable partisanship were deeply implanted within the Spanish electorate following the 1979 election.

The absence of stable party identification in 1979 did not distinguish Spain from the other "new" party systems which have emerged following the Second World War. The absence of well-developed religious and other secondary organizations, however, does appear to have been a significant difference between the party-building process in Spain and that which occurred in post-war Europe and Japan. This may be part of the explanation of the greater volatility of the Spanish electorate exhibited in 1982 than was characteristic of the German, Italian or Japanese postwar experiences. The much more extensive religious infrastructures in Italy and West Germany certainly constituted stable bases of support for the emerging Christian democratic parties of those countries. The continued existence of traditional ties between local notables and the sizable bloc of voters in rural Japan following the Second World War appears to have been an important source of electoral stability (35); comparable caciquil relationships had vanished from all but a few rural areas in Galicia, Andalucía and Old Castile by the time of the 1979 elections in Spain (36). Indeed, our data suggest that local notables were virtually invisible to most voters in the 1982 election. When asked to name the head of the list for which they had voted, 84% of those residing in the province of Madrid (where the head of the list was also the national party leader) responded correctly. This figure reached 90% among Communist voters and, most surprisingly, 88% among UCD voters (despite the fact that Landelino Lavilla had just become titular leader of his party just a few months prior to the election. In provinces outside of Madrid (except for Catalunya and Euskadi), however, fewer than one voter out of five could correctly name the head of the list for which he or she had voted. Among UCD voters in the provinces only 10% could respond correctly. Only in Euskadi and Catalunya could more than a third correctly name the head of the provincial list. (We shall speculate about the origins of this finding below.)

Differences between electoral behavior in Spain and that seen earlier in countries democratized in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War may be related to the fact that the new Spanish party system was being created in a more modern, affluent society, within which nationwide systems of mass communication were fully developed. Compared with Italy and Japan shortly after the war, for instance, the Spanish economy today is much more developed. As can be seen in Table 11, the structure of the Spanish labor force evolved very rapidly during the two decades preceding democratization. During or shortly after their respective periods of democratization, 42 percent of the Italian labor force (in 1952) and 45 percent of Japanese workers (1950) were still active in agriculture (37). In sharp contrast, by

1982 nearly 48% of Spain's labor force was employed in the service sector of the economy.

Table11

Accompanying this economic development was a process of urbanization which has not only meant that present-day Spain is more urbanized than post-war Italy, it is also slightly more urbanized than present-day Italy: in a 9-country study undertaken by Jean Stoetzel, et al, Spain's composite "urbanization" score (188, of a maximum possible score of 300) was quite close to the West European average in 1982 (195); and Spain was more urbanized than Belgium (169), The Netherlands (172) and Italy (182) (38).

Levels of affluence have increased dramatically in recent years. Between 1958 and 1980 the percentage of family income consumed by expenditures on food, clothing and housing decreased from 74% to 55%. Thirty-five percent of family income is now spent on vacations and other discretionary items (39). And by 1980, over 90% of households had at least one television set-up from 32% in just fourteen years (40).

Associated with this affluence has been a considerable improvement in public health, diet and living conditions, as reflected in low mortality rates and a long average life-span. Indeed, on this dimension Spain ranks above the average of all industrial societies: the average Spanish life-span of 76.6 years is almost three years longer than the average for developed countries (73.7); and Spain ranks ahead of such countries as Canada and the Netherlands (76.5 years), Australia and Norway (76.3), France (75.9), West Germany (75.8), Italy (75.5), the United States (75.0) and Belgium (74.3). In terms of life expectancy, Spain trails behind only Sweden (77.1 years), Iceland (77.4), Switzerland (77.6) and Japan (79.1) (41).

An exploration of electoral behavior in Spain, then, is clearly a study of partisan competition in a new party system created within a highly modern and relatively affluent society. In this regard, the development of partisanship in post-Franco Spain is decidedly different from that which was characteristic of democratization in other West European countries in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, when class cleavages were deeper, when local notables still wielded influence over large rural, agricultural sectors of the population, and when the social policies and public image of Catholic Church had not yet been altered by Vatican Council II. The development of partisanship in Spain has also been profoundly affected by television, which was virtually non-existent at the time when other party systems were being brought into being.

Indeed, these patterns of Spanish partisanship are most easily interpreted in

light of the basic sources of political information available to most Spaniards. We have seen that local elites, are relatively unknown to most voters. In accord with this line of argument, local-level news media are quite poorly developed in Spain. Television was (until very recently) entirely controlled from Madrid, and local and regional news was not anywhere near as extensively covered as (for example) in the United States, where politicians have strong bases of local support. Local or regional newspapers are also not as significant sources of political information as in the United States, where the vast majority of newspapers purchased are local, not nationwide. In 1982, the average daily circulation of all local and regional newspapers combined (excluding Madrid, Euskadi and Catalunya) was just over 1 million (42). This meant that only one local or regional newspaper was sold for every 17 residents in these other provinces of Spain over the age of 15 (43). If only one person were to read each local newspaper sold, this would limit exposure to news about local politicians to less than 6% of the adult population. Even if each newspaper were read by three or even four different persons, only a small minority of the "provincial" population of Spain was exposed to news about local politics. The widespread lack of familiarity with the leaders of provincial party lists fits well with this finding.

So, too, do the regional exceptions to this general pattern. Many regional or local elites are highly visible within Catalunya and Euskadi, particularly leaders of Catalan and Basque nationalist parties. Not accidentally, regional newspapers (one of which, La Vanguardia, has the second-largest daily circulation in all of Spain) are much more influential than their equivalents in other parts of Spain. Average daily sales of the five largest Catalan newspapers (over 422,000 in 1982) amount to one paper for every ten persons residing in Catalunya: this represents a level of penetration into the regional newspaper market nearly twice as great as that achieved by local or regional papers in the rest of Spain (44). And the five largest Basque newspapers sell almost one daily for every six inhabitants of Euskadi (45). Perhaps more importantly, regional television was established first and has been most extensively developed in these two areas.

Spain's "quality" newspapers do an excellent job of presenting a large volume of detailed information about politics, economics and social problems to their readers. Newspapers such as El País and La Vanguardia are at least as good the very best American newspapers, and they present a much larger volume of news on a daily basis than their British counterparts. And the weekly news journal Cambio 16 (despite its occasional sensationalism and lapses of objectivity) is closer to The Economist in terms of detailed coverage of Political and economic news than it is to either Time or Newsweek. And yet we I have demonstrated elsewhere (46), most voters were not primarily motivated by issues in the 1982 election (nor, for that matter, in 1986). The solution to this puzzle is found in the circulation figures for "quality" newspapers in Spain. In 1982, the five "quality" newspapers with nationwide

or at least widespread circulation sold an average of just 827,000 per day (a number equivalent to 4.8% of Spain's total population over the age of 15) (47). If we add to this figure sales of local newspapers (i.e., taking into account sales of all newspapers, local and national), we find that in 1982 there was only one newspaper sold for every 14 Spaniards over the age of 15. In accord with these aggregate data, a massive survey undertaken by the Ministry of Culture in 1978 revealed that only 22% of Spaniards claimed to read a newspaper or magazine every day; another 12% said that they read such publications several times a week; and 9% said that they read newspapers or magazines about once a week (48).

Where, then, do people get political information? At least in part from two media not normally known for their detailed probing into the complexities of policy issues what may be euphemistically called "popular" magazines and television. In sharp contrast with circulation data pertaining to the "quality" press are sales figures for popular magazines, many of which often have articles concerning prominent personalities in politics. Some are oriented towards men (such as Interviu, which features nude centerfolds alongside interviews with politicians), while others are clearly women's magazines (such as Hola!, which features extensive articles on lavish parties attended by prominent Spaniards and the international jet set). While it would be an intimidating task to attempt a political-content analysis of the 150 magazines published weekly in Spain, the mere fact that magazine sales (excluding Cambio 16, which sold only 170,000 copies per week in 1982) amounted to over 9.5 million copies per week -over ten times the daily sales of quality newspapers and five times the circulation of all newspapers combined-suggests that large numbers of Spaniards may be deriving their evaluations of key political figures from the equivalent of People magazine.

Even more striking are data concerning television viewing. The same Ministry of Culture study which found that only 22% of Spaniards read a newspaper or magazine every day also found that in 1978 (when ownership of television sets was significantly below current levels) 80% of Spaniards watched television every day. Whereas over half of those interviewed admitted that they "never" read newspapers or magazines, only 8% said that they "never" watched television (49). The political relevance of these data is revealed in survey findings of Barnes, et al, who discovered that in 1984 46% of those interviewed "often" followed political news on television or radio, and another 28% sometimes did so; at the same time only 23% often and 19% sometimes read about political news in newspapers (50).

The great importance of affect towards national-level party leaders as determinants of the vote in Spain also fits with these data. It has often been noted that television tends to personalize political news, while it does a poor job of conveying to the viewer a significant volume of information about policies and issues. One recent survey of the literature on mass communications concludes that "People

who depend on television news obtain a fragmented view of the world that mediates against their acquisition of substantive current-events information" (51). At the same time, it constitutes a perfect medium for the effective molding or creation of attractive (or unattractive) images for political leaders. Spanish political leaders (such as Adolfo Suárez, who had served for some time as Director General of the national television network) were well aware of this, and all parties except the PCE (for whom the image of Santiago Carrillo was electorally detrimental) heavily stressed the personal images and strong leadership roles of their respective candidates for President of Government (52). As described in a 1983 interview by a prominent Communist leader, in the 1982 election the AP and PSOE, in particular, "represented a very generic kind of change, and I must emphasize that, because the people weren't voting for a program -neither did they vote for an (ideological) option- they voted for something very general, and at the same time, something very generic which was embodied in specific persons. This was a very personalized election. The PSOE focused all of its campaign on one single person, Felipe González. The people were voting for a President of Government."

In contemporary Spain, the relative weakness of party organizations, secondary associations and the "quality" press as sources of political information means that the kinds of superficial, personalized images of politicians, which can best be disseminated through television and popular magazines, have emerged, by default, as important influences on electoral choice.

Not all modern post-industrial societies are alike. Some have well-developed systems of politicized secondary associations: the level of unionization of the labor forces in Scandinavian countries remains strikingly high. In some countries (e.g., West Germany), party organizations have actually deepened their penetration into society over the past two decades. And even within Spain, we see some divergent patterns affecting certain sectors of society: the impressive development of the organizational infrastructure supporting AP (now Partido Popular) should help to stabilize electoral support for that party. Thus, it would be dangerous to make sweeping generalizations about a wide variety of countries.

But some societies appear increasingly to resemble Spain: they are becoming "dealigned" through decay of psychological (party identification) attachments to parties and/or of the organizational basis of "social partisanship" (as best evidenced in the decline of trade union affiliation in the United States). Television viewing is widespread, and tabloid journalism (as exemplified by The National Enquirer, People magazine, and, in many respects, USA Today) appears to be displacing more serious print media among many readers. Thus, insofar as party organizations, politically-relevant secondary associations, class cleavages, newspaper readership, and party identification appear to be declining in several postindustrial societies, while television viewing and attentiveness to tabloid

journalism continue to expand, the pattern of personalized mass politics, coupled with high levels of electoral volatility that we observed in Spain in 1982 may be a harbinger of the future (53). As one of the foremost students of political parties, Maurice Duverger, has observed: "The development of radio and television over the past 25 years has tended to make party propaganda more uniform over the whole national territory and to concentrate it around the leaders transformed into the stars of the electoral spectacle" (54).

Table1

	PCE	PSOE	UCD	AP
Self-employed / Employee	-.02	-.03	.02	.01
Family Income	.01	.08	.11	.00
Years of education	.01	-.14	-.17	-.04
Sex*	-.08	-.02	.14	.10
Conscious Class Identification	.10	.06	-.08	-.08
Occupational Status	-.11	-.16	.02	.11
Member of Religious Association	-.12	-.08	.13	.13
ID with Specific Class	-.13	-.15	.05	.13
Manual / Nonmanual Occupation	-.15	-.16	.03	.13
Age	-.16	-.01	.27	.22
UGT Member	.22	.16	-.20	-.20
CCOO Member	.26	.10	-.23	-.20
Religious Self-Designation**	-.33	-.10	.44	.37

Figures represent correlation coefficient (Pearson's r) between each independent variable and feeling thermometer evaluations of each party.

* A positive score represents female sex, and vice versa.

** This questionnaire item asked respondents to describe themselves as "very good Catholic", "practicing Catholic", "non-very-practicing Catholic", "non-practicing Catholic", "indifferent", "atheist" or "believer in another religion".

Table2

**Table 2
Class Voting (Alford's Index) in Western Europe and the U.S.**

Denmark	(1955)	58*
Sweden	(1960)	55
United Kingdom	(1965)	44
Norway	(1965)	43
United States	(1948)	43
Sweden	(1979)	38
West Germany	(1957)	37
Denmark	(1977)	35
Norway	(1982)	30
Spain	(1979)	29
United Kingdom	(1979)	22
Spain	(1973-79)	20
European Average		18
West Germany		10
United States		5

***These figures measure the difference between the proportion of manual and nonmanual workers who vote for the party or parties of the left. For each country for which data were available, the highest, and the most recent Alford-index scores are presented, so that trends can be observed.**

SOURCES: for Norway, Denmark and Sweden, Ole Borre, "Critical Electoral Change in Scandinavia", in Russell J. Dalton, Scott C. Flanagan and Paul Allen Beck, ed., Electoral Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies: Realignment or Dealignment?, Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 1984, p.352; for West Germany, Russell Dalton, "The West German Party System Between Two Ages", *ibid.*, p.127; for United States and United Kingdom, Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man, expanded and updated edition, Baltimore: average, Ronald Inglehart, "The Changing Structure of political cleavages in western society", in Dalton, et. al., *op. cit.*, p.64; for Spain, our 1979 and 1982 surveys.

Table3

	PCE	PSOE	UCD	AP
PSOE Membership				
in Province	.00	.03	.05	.01
Vote for PSOE in 1936	.05	.01	.03	-.05
Vote for Right in 1936	-.07	-.03	.02	-.02
Vote for PCE in 1936	.07	.02	-.10	-.07
Urbanization	.10	.06	-.11	-.08
Vote for Center in 1936	-.12	-.09	.03	.07
Religious Province	-.16	-.15	.08	.06
PCE Membership				
in Province	.18	.12	-.09	-.08
Vote for Left in 1936	.19	.11	-.05	-.07

Figure1




Figure2




Figure 3




Figure4




Table4

**Table 4
Electoral Volatility, 1945-1985**

		Volatility Score
Spain	1979-1982	43
Japan	1947-1949	26
France	1956-1958	25
Greece	1977-1981	24
Italy	1946-1948	22
Portugal	1985-1987	22
West Germany	1949-1953	14
Average*	1948-1959	10
Average*	1960-1969	8
Average*	1970-1977	9

*This figure is the average volatility score during each period for Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, United Kingdom, Switzerland, Sweden, Finland, the United States, Austria, Japan, Italy, France, Ireland, West Germany, Belgium and Canada.

For other countries, volatility scores are presented for the election in which the highest level of volatility in the post-WWII era occurred. These were calculated on the basis of raw election statistics for each country, from various sources.

Volatility is the vote share for new parties plus the percentage gained by parties that increased their vote shares since the last election.

SOURCE: Russell J. Dalton, Paul Allen Beck and Scott C. Flanagan, "Electoral Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies", in Dalton, Flanagan and Beck, [op.cit.](#), p.10.

Table5

Table 5
Probit Analyses of Vote for PSOE, 1979 and 1982 (1)

	1979	1982
Therm (1979) /		
Closeness to PSOE (1982)	12.8	19.2
Thermometer evaluation of		
Felipe Gonzalez	12.1	13.3
Proximity to PSOE on		
Left-Right Scale	9.0	11.2
Membership in UGT	5.6	3.3
Conscious Identification with		
Working Class	4.4	4.9
R - squared =	.574	.627
Rank Order Correlation =	.455	.582
N =	4176	4393

(1) Note that, due to an unfortunate error in judgement on our part, the item "family side in civil war", which was such a strong predictor of a variety of attitudes and behaviours in our 1979 survey, was not included in our 1982 questionnaire, and therefore is omitted from the analysis. For this reason, the figures presented in the following tables may differ slightly from those presented in the causal diagrams above.

Table6

Table 6 Probit Analyses of Vote for UCD, 1979 and 1982		
	1979	1982
Therm (1979) / Closeness to UCD (1982)	13.3	12.7
Thermometer Suarez (1979) / Lavilla (1982)	11.3	6.0
Proximity to UCD on Left-Right Scale	11.3	6.7
Age	5.0	(.6)*
Religiosity	5.4	(.04)*
R - squared =	.734	.705
Rank Order Correlation =	MD	.481
N =	4299	4499

Table7

Table 7
Probit Analysis of Vote for PCE, 1979 and 1982

	1979	1982
Therm PCE (1979) / Closeness to PCE (1982)	8.4	8.8
Thermometer evaluation of Carrillo	9.0	6.0
Proximity to PCE on Left-Right Scale	3.6	4.6
CCOO Membership	7.5	5.1
PCE Affiliation in Province	3.7	(2.6)*
Religiosity	3.4	(1.2)*
R - squared =	.585	.677
Rank Order Correlation =	.471	.585
N =	4261	4570

* The M.L.E./S.E. scores for variables marked with an asterisk are presented simply to demonstrate the extent to which the strength of the relationships declined between 1979 and 1982. Since these were all below my cut-off point of 3.0, they were excluded from the final equation in each case, that is, these figures were derived from the penultimate equation. The scores for other variables, the R-squared and Rank Order Correlation measures and the number of cases included in the analysis represent the final equation in each case: i.e., after the removal from the equation of the relationships marked with an asterisk.

Table8

Table 8
Probit Analysis of Vote for CDS in 1982

Closeness to CDS	7.8
Cast vote for UCD in 1979	4.9
Thermometer evaluation of Suárez	4.7
Thermometer evaluation of Lavilla	-4.7
Proximity to CDS on Left-Right Scale	4.0

R - squared = .584
N= 4423

Table9

Table 9			
Probit Analysis of Vote for AP, 1979 and 1982			
	1979	1982a	1982b
Therm AP (1979) / Close to AP (1982)	5.4	10.6	10.8
Thermometer Evaluation of Fraga	6.0	9.5	9.0
Proximity to AP on Left-Right Scale	3.7	9.5	9.4
Occupational Status	3.5	4.3	4.3
AP Membership in Prov. as Pct of Elect. Census	-	5.1	4.0
Percent of Vote for AP in Prov. in 1979	-	-	3.8
R - squared =	.511	.746	.754
Rank Order Correlation =	.122	.702	.699
N =	3888	3807	3807

Table10

Table 10
Trade Union Membership as Pct. of Economicaly Active Population

Sweden	(1981)	87%
Denmark	(1980)	75
Ireland	(1975)	75
Belgium	(1975)	65-75
Finland	(1975)	65
Iceland	(1975)	60
Austria	(1981)	59
Israel	(1975)	57
Norway	(1975)	55
New Zealand	(1975)	55
Australia	(1975)	50
United Kigdom	(1982)	49
Italy	(1982)	40
West Germany	(1982)	37
Netherlands	(1983)	33
Switzerland	(1982)	33
France	(1975)	25
United States	(1975)	22-28
Spain	(1979)	22
United States	(1987)	16*
Spain	(1982)	12

Sources: for Australia, Belgium, Finland, France, Ireland, Iceland, Israel, New Zealand and the United States, Klaus von Bayme, *Gewerkschaften und Arbeitsbeziehungen in kapitalistischen Ländern*, Munich, R.Piper, 1977, pp. 78-79; for more recent data for Austria, Denmark, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States (1975) and West Germany, Jelle Visser, "New Data on Union Growth: Updated Information and Corrections to 'Dimensions of Union Growth in Postwar Western Europe'", European University Institute Working Paper, n° 89, Florence, Italy, August, 1984; for Spain, Robert Fishman, personal communication; the 1987 figure for the United States is an estimate extrapolated from figures published in Bureau of the Census, U.S. Department of Commerce, *Statistical Abstract of the United States*, 1989, 109th edition, Washington, D.C., 1989, p.416), since the figures published in the *Statistical Abstract* were calculated on the basis of full-time, employed workers, it was necessary to inflate the denominator by taking into account unemployed full-time workers, so as to be comparable to the "percent of economically active labor force" figures presented for other countries.

Table11

**Table 11
Percentage of Economically Active Population in Each Sector**

	1955	1960	1964	1969
Agriculture	45.8%	41.5%	35.6%	30.1%
Industry	21.5	23.3	25.4	26.3
Services	25.8	28.1	31.2	31.2
	1975	1979	1982	
Agriculture	22.8%	19.9%	17.5%	
Industry	27.2	25.6	26.0	
Services	38.2	45.1	47.7	

SOURCE: Instituto Nacional de Estadística, España: Anuario Estadístico, various years

NOTES

- (1) GUNTHER, Richard, SANI, Gilacomo and SHABAD, Goldie: Spain After Franco: The Making of a Competitive Party System, Berkeley and London: University of California Press, 1986; published in Spain as El Sistema de Partidos Políticos en España: Génesis y Evolución, (trans. by Miguel Jerez Mir), Madrid: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, 1986. Our 1979 survey (N=5,439) was undertaken by DATA, S.A., with generous financial support from the National Science Foundation under grant number SOC77-16451. The opinions, findings and conclusions expressed in these works are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation.
- (2) Juan Linz has pointed out (in "The Legacy of Franco and Democracy", in Horst Baier, Hans Mathias Kepplinger and Kurt Reumann (eds.), Öffentliche Meinung un sozialer Wandel, Westdeutscher Verlag, 1982) that much support for the new regime came from persons who did not reject Franco and the former regime. An explicit repudiation of that regime could have alienated much support from the democratic institutions and the governing UCD.
- (3) This "popularity gap" of 6.1% was significantly greater than that between Felipe González and the PSOE (2.8%) or between Manuel Fraga and the Coalición Democrática (1.8%); and the PCE was actually regarded more favorably (16.2%) than was its leader Santiago Carrillo (16.0%).
- (4) For discussions of the electoral law, see NOHLEN, Dieter: Sistemas Electorales del Mundo, Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, Madrid, 1981; GUNTHER, R., SANI, G. and SHABAD, G.: Spain After Franco, chapter 3; SANI, G. and GUNTHER, R.: ¿"Qué Hubiera Pasado Si... ? El Impacto de la Normativa Electoral", in Juan J. Linz and José Ramón Montero eds.: Crisis y Cambio: Electores y Partidos en la España de los Años Ochenta, Madrid: Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, 1986; and GUNTHER, R.: "Electoral Laws, Party Systems and Elites: The Case of Spain", American Political Science Review, vol. 83, nº 3, September 1989. For analyses of the campaign -and party-financing laws, see DEL CASTILLO VERA, Pilar: La Financiación de Partidos y Candidatos en las Democracias Occidentales, Madrid: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas 1985; and DEL CASTILLO VERA, Pilar: "La Financiación en las Elecciones Legislativas de 1982", in Juan J. Linz and José Ramón Montero: Crisis y Cambio: Electores y Partidos en la España de los Años 80, Madrid: Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, 1987.
- (5) Respondents were asked to choose between "Marxismo" and "No marxismo", with "neither", "both" and "don't know" as the other response options. Only 15.1% of our 1979 survey respondents chose the term "marxismo".
- (6) ALIANZA POPULAR: "Reforma Económica", in ¿Qué es Alianza Popular?: Síntesis; and ALIANZA POPULAR: What Alianza Popular Is, p. 12.
- (7) This index, as first set forth by ROBERT ALFORD in Party and Society: The Anglo-American Democracies, Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963, pp. 79-80, measures the difference between the proportions of manual and nonmanual workers who vote for the party or parties of the left. This index score was calculated for Spain on the basis of our 1979 and 1982 surveys. Parties of the left included the PSOE, the PCE, Euskadiko Ezkerra, Herri Batasuna, Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya, Bloc d'Esquerra d'Alliberament Nacional de Catalunya, Unidade Galega, Bloque Nacional Popular Gallego, Partido Carlista, Organización Revolucionaria de Trabajadores, Partido Socialista de Andalucía, Liga Comunista Revolucionaria (and LKI-LCR), Organización de Izquierda Comunista (including EMK-OIC and MCC-OEC), PSOE-Histórico, Partido del Trabajo de España, Partido del Trabajo de Andalucía, Organización Comunista de España (Bandera Roja) and Izquierda Republicana.
- (8) LIPSET, Seymour Martin: Political Man, expanded and updated edition, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1981, p. 504.
- (9) Urbanization was measured by the percentage of the population in each province residing in municipalities containing over 100,000- persons (as published in José Antonio Carmona Guillén: Estructura Local de España, Madrid: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, 1979). PCE

membership figures (which were standardized by dividing by the electoral census of each province) were derived from the size of each provincial or regional delegation at the Ninth Party Congress in April 1978 (as published in Nuestra Bandera, nº 93, April 1978, p. 16). Regional totals for Euskadi and Catalunya were desegregated to the provincial level in accord with the provincial delegations at the 1981 congress of the PCE-EKP and the 1977 congress of the PSUC (as published in Cambio 16, January, 1981, and BOTELLA, J., CAPO, J. and MARCET, J.: "Aproximación a la Sociología de los Partidos Políticos Catalanes": Revista de Estudios Políticos, nº 10, July-Aug.1979). Regional totals for Galicia and Andalucía were desegregated to the provincial level in accord with information gleaned from interviews in those areas with provincial or regional PCE officials. PSOE membership data (also standardized in accord with the electoral census of each province) were derived from the size of each province's delegation at the 28th Party Congress (May 1979), as presented in an unpublished document furnished by the Secretaría de Organización PSOE. Regional totals for Catalunya were disaggregated in accord with the proportion of PSC-PSOE membership in each province in 1981 (as presented in another unpublished document from the Secretaría de Organización). Figures on mass attendance were from DOUCASTELLA, R.: "El Mapa Religioso de España", in Cambio Social y Religión, cited in LOPEZ GUERRA, Luís: "Las Perspectivas Actuales, Algunas Notas sobre el Caso Español", in Jorge de Esteban, et al, El Proceso Electoral, Barcelona: Editorial Labor, 1977. 1936 election data from LINZ, J. and DE MIGUEL, Jesús M.: "Hacia un Análisis Regional de las Elecciones de 1936 en España", Revista Española de la Opinión Pública, Abril-Junio, 1977.

- (10) Cf., LINZ, Juan J., GOMEZ-REINO, Manuel, ORIZO, Francisco Andrés and VILA, Darío: Informe Sociológico sobre el Cambio Político en España, 1975-1981, Madrid: Fundación FOESSA, 1981, pp. 190-201.
- (11) GOMEZ-REINO, Manuel, ORIZO, Francisco Andrés and VILA CARRO, Darío: "Sociología Política", in Fundación FOESSA: Estudios Sociológicos sobre la Situación Social en España, Madrid: Editorial Euramérica, 1975; and Linz et al., Informe Sociológico, 1975-1981.
- (12) Respondents who said that they did identify with a social class, and followed by reporting that they identified with the upper or upper-middle class were given a score of 1; those who identified with the middle or lower-middle classes were given a score of 3; those not identifying with any social class were scored as 4; and those who consciously identified with the working class were given a score of 7.
- (13) For a general summary of this migration, see GUNTHER, R., SANI, G. and SHABAD, G.: Spain After Franco, pp. 25 and 452-453; for more detailed data on these migrations patterns, see CARRION GARZARAN, Angel, et al, "La Población Española y su Territorio", in FOESSA: Estudios Sociológicos, 1975, or Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Presidencia del Gobierno, España: Anuario Estadístico, Madrid: Boletín Oficial del Estado, various years. A more detailed assessment of the weak relationship between environmental influences and individual attitudes and behaviour in Spain is set forth in GUNTHER, Richard: Politics and Culture in Spain, Ann Arbor: Center for Political Studies, University of Michigan, 1988.
- (14) The correlation (Pearson's r) between age and the "feeling thermometer" evaluation of Franco is .20. The correlation between age and an item asking respondents to choose between the terms "Franquismo" and "anti-Franquismo" (with "neither/both" as an intermediate category) was .17.
- (15) Analysis of our 1982 data indicates that the very youngest age cohort has tended, since the early 1980s, to adopt less leftist political stands. This trend was not significant in earlier elections.
- (16) For more detailed analysis of the political roles of trade unions in the 1979 election, see GUNTHER, R., SANI, G. and SHABAD, G.: Spain After Franco, Chapter 5.
- (17) For more detailed analyses of the role of religion in Spanish politics, see LINZ, et al, Informe Sociológico, 1975-1981, Chapter 10; and LINZ, Juan J.: "Religión y Política", in Linz and Montero, Crisis y Cambio, pp. 201-256. For a more specific analysis of the role of religion and the church in the 1979 campaign, see GUNTHER, R., SANI, G. and SHABAD, G.: Spain After Franco, Chapter 6.

- (18) C.f., LIPSET, Seymour Martin and ROKKAN, Stein: Party Systems and Voter Alignments, New York: Free Press, 1967; and CONVERSE, Philip: "Of Time and Partisan Stability", Comparative Political Studies, vol. 2, 1979.
- (19) CONVERSE, Philip: "Of Time and Partisan Stability", Comparative Political Studies, vol. 2, 1969, pp. 139-157.
- (20) BARNES, Samuel, McDONOUGH, Peter and LOPEZ PINA, Antonio: "The Development of Partisanship in New Democracies: The Case of Spain", American Journal of Political Science (hereafter, AJPS), n° 29, 1985, pp. 695-720; and McDONOUGH, Peter and LOPEZ PINA, Antonio: "Continuity and Change in Spanish Politics", in Dalton, et al, Electoral Change.
- (21) McDONOUGH and LOPEZ PINA: "Continuity and Change", p. 367.
- (22) In this study (under the direction of Richard Gunther, José Ramón Montero and Bradley Richardson), the same "partisan proximity" item was administered as had been included in our 1982 questionnaire. Respondents were asked if they felt "very close", "somewhat close", "rather distant" or "very distant" from each of Spain's major parties. We defined "stable partisan attachment" as, first, demonstrating a clear preference for one party over the others, and, second, expressing a similar preference for that same party six and one-half years later. A total of 41% of our panel respondents displayed an attachment to a single party in both 1982 and 1988, but 15% of the sample switched their allegiances to a different party during that time.
- (23) RICHARDSON, Bradley M.: "Inertia in the Midst of Change: Psychological Partisanship in Three Countries", unpublished paper, 1989.
- (24) Sixty-one percent of Spaniards polled in the first wave of the EES '89 Voters Study and Eurobarometer 30 regarded themselves as close to no party. This figure is much higher than the EC average of 38%. Comparable scores for other countries are 18% for the Netherlands, 23% for Denmark, 26% for Italy, 32% for France, 35% for Portugal, 38% for Greece, 40% for Belgium, 42% for West Germany and the United Kingdom (excluding Northern Ireland), 44% for Luxembourg, and 58% for Ireland. (Source: Eurobarometer data presented in Hermann Schmitt and Renato Mannheim, "About Voting and Non-Voting at European Elections of 1989", unpublished paper presented at European Consortium for Political Research annual meeting, Paris, April 1989, Table 1).
- It should be noted that the item used in the Eurobarometer surveys is significantly different from ours, insofar as our item asks for a proximity assessment of each individual party, while the Eurobarometer item merely asks: "Do you consider yourself to be close to any particular party? If so, do you feel yourself to be very close, fairly close, or merely a sympathizer?" The dramatic difference between our marginal results and those of the Eurobarometer study (with 39% of our respondents stating in 1982 that they feel "very close" to at least one party, while only 4% of the Spaniards polled in the Eurobarometer 1989 survey did so) appears to be, at least in part, the result of the fact that we asked for a direct and individual assessment of each party, while the Eurobarometer question was preceded by a filter item.
- (25) Since we used a different measure of affect towards the party in 1982 than in 1979, it is not possible to directly compare the two figures representing the M.L.E/Standard Error of M.L.E. In 1979 we used a feeling thermometer evaluation, while in 1982 we used an item asking respondents to tell us whether they felt "Very Close", "Somewhat Close", "Rather Distant" or "Very Distant" from each party.
- (26) Preliminary and partial analyses are presented in GUNTHER, Richard: "Un Análisis Preliminar de las Alteraciones Producidas en 1982 en el Sistema Español de Partidos", Revista de Estudios Políticos, n°45, Mayo-Junio 1985, pp. 7-41; and "El Realineamiento del Sistema de Partidos de 1982", in Linz and Montero eds., Crisis y Cambio, pp. 27-70. A much more exhaustive exploration of the origins of the 1982 party-system realignment will be published in GUNTHER, R., SHABAD, G., LINZ, J.J., MONTERO, J.R. and PUHLE, H.J.: Electoral Change and Democratic Consolidation in Spain.
- (27) Among our 1979 survey respondents who claimed to have cast valid ballots in 1979, only 4.1%

admitted that they voted for AP (vs. an actual election result that included a 6.1% level of support for AP). This would suggest that as many as one-third of those respondents who cast ballots for the AP lied about their vote and denied having supported the party.

- (28) 23.3% of those respondents claiming to have cast valid ballots said they supported AP, vs. an actual nationwide election result of 26.6%.
- (29) MONTERO, José Ramón: "Iglesia, Secularización y Comportamiento Político en España", Revista Española de Investigaciones Sociológicas, April-June 1986, p. 135; and ORIZO, Francisco Andrés: España, Entre la Apatía y el Cambio Social, Madrid: Mapfre, 1983, p. 177.
- (30) Ibid.
- (31) MONTERO, J.R.: "Iglesia", p. 136.
- (32) Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas: "Iglesia, Religión y Política", Revista Española de Investigaciones Sociológicas, 27, July-September, 1984, pp. 323 and 324.
- (33) BARNES, S., McDONOUGH, P. and LOPEZ PINA, A.: "The Development of Partisanship", p. 11 of manuscript version.
- (34) Only 31% of Spaniards belong to organizations of any kind, as compared with a West European average of 40%. (Source: Jean Stoetzel, ¿Qué Pensamos los Europeos?, Madrid: MAPFRE, 1982, p. 337). For a brilliant historical description and analysis of this phenomenon, see LINZ, Juan J.: "A Century of Politics and Interest in Spain", in Suzanne D. Berger, ed., Organizing Interests in Western Europe: Pluralism, Corporatism and the Transformation of Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981, pp. 365-415.
- (35) FLANAGAN, Scott C.: "Electoral Change in Japan: A Study of Secular Realignment", in Dalton, Flanagan and Beck: Electoral Change; and RICHARDSON, Bradley and FLANAGAN, Scott C.: Politics in Japan, Boston: Little, Brown, 1986.
- (36) GUNTHER, R., SANI, G. and SHABAD, G.: Spain After Franco, pp. 85-86 and 134-135.
- (37) SALVATI, Michele: Sviluppo Economico, Domanda di Lavoro E Struttura dell'Occupazione, Bologna: Il Mulino, 1976, p. 18; and RICHARDSON, B.M. and FLANAGAN, S.: Politics in Japan, p. 402.
- (38) STOETZEL, Jean: ¿Qué Pensamos los Europeos?, p. 337.
- (39) TEZANOS, José Félix: "Cambio Social y Modernización en la España Actual", in Revista Española de Investigaciones Sociológicas, nº 28, Oct. 1984, p. 50.
- (40) TEZANOS, J.F.: "Cambio Social", p. 53.
- (41) Federal Centers for Disease Control, as published in The New York Times, April 7, 1990, P. 10.
- (42) Local or regional newspapers outside of Madrid, Euskadi and Catalunya include La Voz de Galicia, ABC (Sevilla), Heraldo de Aragón, La Verdad de Murcia, Las Provincias, Diario de Navarra, Faro de Vigo, La Nueva España, Levante, Alerta, Diario de Cádiz, La Provincia, Sur, El Norte de Castilla, Ideal, El Día, Ultima Hora, El Comercio, El Correo de Andalucía, Diario de Mallorca, Información, La Voz de Asturias, Hoy, El Ideal Gallego, Diario de Burgos, Baleares, Diario de Las Palmas, El Progreso, La Región, Diário de Avisos, Córdoba, La Hora Leonesa, s, La Mañana, La Gaceta Regional, Sol de España, Los Sitios, Mediterraneo, La Voz de Almería, Jaén, Diario de León, Diario de Ibiza, and Menorca. Circulation figures for 1982 in Anuario El País, 1983, (Ramón Tamames, director), Madrid: Promotora de Informaciones, 1983, pp. 177 and 179.
- (43) In 1982 the number of persons over age 15 was 26,476,000 (Source: Anuario El País, 1983 p. 174). From this figure, I subtracted the proportion of total Spanish population residing in Madrid, Euskadi and Catalunya.

- (44) These newspapers are La Vanguardia, El Periódico, El Noticiero Universal, Avui and El Correo Catalán. Their average daily sales were equivalent to 9.6% of the total number of inhabitants of Catalunya. (Source: Anuario El País, 1983, p. 174).
- (45) These are El Pueblo Vasco, El Diario Vasco, Deía, Egín and La Gaceta del Norte. Their average daily sales of 279,292 are equivalent to 17.4% of population of Euskadi. (Source: Anuario El País, 1983, p. 174).
- (46) "Un Análisis Preliminar", and "El Realineamiento", cited above.
- (47) The five "quality" newspapers are El País (daily circulation in 1982 averaged 268,752), La Vanguardia (196,829), ABC (131,545), Diario 16 (120,284) and Ya (109,433). Source: Anuario El País, 1983, p. 177.
- (48) Ministerio de Cultura, Secretaría General Técnica, Gabinete de Estadística e Informática: La Realidad Cultural de España, Madrid: 1978. In comparison with the 43% of Spaniards who claim to read a newspaper or magazine at least once a week, 65% of West Europeans claim to do so. Spain's level is far below the 87% reported for Denmark and Holland, and Britain's and West Germany's 82%. Only Italy (46%) and France (50%) were close to Spain's (43%) (Source: STOETZEL, Jean: ¿Qué Pensamos los Europeos?, Madrid: MAPFRE, 1982, p. 64).
- (49) Ministerio de Cultura: La Realidad Cultural, pp. 25 and 38.
- (50) GUNTHER, Richard: Politics and Culture in Spain, Politics and Culture Series, nº 5, Ann Arbor: Center for Political Studies, Institute for Social Research, The University of Michigan, 1988, pp. 15-17. I would like to thank Prof. Barnes for sharing these data with me.
- (51) ROBERTS, Donald F. and MACCOBY, Nathan: "Effects of Mass Communication", in Gardner Lindzey and Elliot Aronson: The Handbook of Social Psychology, third edition, volume II, New York: Random House: 1985, p. 561. Ivor Crewe adds that television coverage of politics often focuses on "that aspect of party politics that clearly dissatisfies the majority of electors- rows and other 'yahboo' aspects of party debate" (BUDGE, I., CREWE, I.M. and FARLIE, Party Identification, p. 59). For a strong attack on the extent to which television has personalized and trivialized political news in the United States, see RANNEY, Austin: Channels of Power: The Impact of Television on American Politics, New York: Basic Books, 1983.
- (52) WERT: "La Campaña Electoral", pp. 76-79.
- (53) For data on the decline of newspapers and the rise of television as sources of political information, see RANNEY, A.: Channels of Power, p. 14, and ROBERTS, D.F. and MACCOBY, N.: "Effects of Mass Communication", pp. 553-556. For a survey of literature on the increasing importance of the personal traits of candidates as determinants of the vote, see KINDER, Donald R. and SEARS, David O.: "Public Opinion and Political Action", in Lindzey and Aronson: Handbook of Social Psychology, 1985, pp. 689-691. While some developed societies (such as Sweden) have attained or are increasing in levels of affiliation with secondary groups, at least one important study has suggested that "one visible effect of advanced industrialism is the erosion of traditional group and institutional networks". (See DALTON, Russel J.: "The West German Party System Between Two Ages", in DALTON, R., FLANAGAN, S. and BECK, P.: Electoral Change, p. 106).
- (54) DUVERGER, Maurice: "Duverger's Law: Forty Years Later", in Bernard Grofman and Arend Lijphart, eds., Electoral Laws and their Political Consequences, New York: Agathon Press, 1986, p. 81.