Public Participation in a Decentralized City: The Case of Barcelona

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I. RETHINKING LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN A CHANGING ENVIRONMENT

1. EXTERNAL PRESSURES ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT

Local government is under pressure in most Western European countries. Factors such as economic decline, fiscal crisis, uncertainty about the future and lack of public accountability are challenging the traditional form of local government.

Local government is placed in a wider context and its own definition will depend on how this environment is changing. Local authorities do not play an essential role, but one derived from external constraints. We must assess local government in a certain time and place, without making general assumptions about its nature. As Professor Mackenzie put it: "There is no general theory of local government. There is no normative general theory from which we can deduce what local government ought to be; there is no positive general theory from which we can derive testable hypotheses about what it is"(1).

Under the welfare state model, local authorities became an executive branch of the centre. During this period, local government got both financial resources and responsibilities to perform welfare policies. This was possible because of a context defined by economic growth and political stability. After the oil crisis in 1973, this context changed, introducing the current pressures on local government. There have been two outstanding changes:

Firstly, advanced capitalist countries have suffered a process of deindustrialization. It has been the outcome of both an increase in the service sector and a change in the traditional forms of production. This subject has been developed by a prolific literature around the Fordism/Post-Fordism concepts(2). Without getting into this debate, it is important to underline the impact of this academic discussion on the current definition of local government(3). In the new context, local authorities are no more the executive branch of the centre and, having to face the situation of economic decline, they have begun to perform new activities such as economic development, strategic planning and to rifle through new financial resources. As a result, local government has to adapt its structures and processes to the new situation, recognizing the need to be more efficient, more responsive and more flexible. It will alter both the way of working and the role of local authorities.

Secondly, some authors have identified an increase of both social fragmentation and public assertiveness(4). The traditional class division of society has been complemented by new social cleavages such as race and gender or new social movements such as ecology and pacifism. All these new groups are now acting inside local government, forcing municipal authorities to take into account their
demands and expectations. Moreover, individuals have become more demanding. They have more segmented demands and claim for a more responsive politics. Local authorities must respond to these challenges and, therefore, have to adapt their political style and way of working.

2. THE SPANISH CASE

A. Spanish local government in a wider democratization process

The Spanish case draws up some peculiarities, derived from the fact that Spanish local government must be placed into a wider democratization process. The Spanish political system has progressed to democracy after an authoritarian period, where municipal administration was characterized by a centralist and uniform design. In this period, local political action was converted into an area of resistance and popular mobilization. It would explain the great expectations which its democratization awakened.

Therefore, Spanish local government in the 1970s may be characterized by both the democratization process and the general economic crisis(5). The first feature implied that local authorities were expected to satisfy growing public’s claims, moving nearer to the so-call welfare municipality. On the other hand, the context of economic decline constrained the possibilities of growth. Thus, there is a tension in Spanish local government, a struggle between two apparently opposite sets of factors: internal democratization versus general economic decline.

The transition to democracy strongly affected the future model of local government and was characterized by a set of factors. One of them is linked with decentralization. Decentralization responds to the need of satisfying growing demands for services and also the political wish to get a government closer to the public. In the local world, it means a will to increase public participation faced with the will to modernize management.

Table 1(6)

Another factor is local dependency on several supra-municipal bodies. Spanish democratization has designed a model close to a federal state, the so-call state of Autonomies. Whereas local authorities only have statutory powers, Autonomous Communities have got legislative powers. Moreover, Autonomous governments have competences on local matters and are a strong financial resource for municipal authorities. It produces a situation of both competition among different levels of government (central, autonomous and local) and overlap in their functions.
Obviously, in a context of struggle local authorities are the weakest political actor. As we can see in Table 1, local financial power has been stabilized during the last 10 years, while Autonomous Administration is getting most of the central transferences.

The last point is reinforced by the Spanish municipal map, which is characterized by local entities of very small size and by a high degree of imbalance. This territorial organization has not yet been reformed and is one of the matters of our democracy that still have to be settled. A reform of the municipal map which revises the dimensions of its units seems a basic condition to re-plan the patterns of participation, service provision and the effective modernization of its management(7).

Being our concern public participation, it was thought that the new democratic councils would be able to promote participative politics. To tell the truth, however, Spanish town councils have been themselves overtaken by the needs of daily management and by the need to overcome a traditional lack of public services. Local authorities have been forced to stress the management side, and public participation is still waiting for better times.

At the same time, on the service provision side, the democratization process was seen as the way to reach the welfare municipalities. Meanwhile, the model of welfare local government had been challenged in other European countries. Indeed, this model was analysed by academics as inappropriate for the current context. Therefore, the Spanish dilemma was, and likely still is, to cope with both the need of a welfare system and the fact of its crisis.

B. A new context for Spanish local government

All these external factors have impact on local government. It seems clear that the traditional model of local government has been challenged, although its future is not clear yet. There are several ideological ways of looking at the future, but most of them tend to emphasize diversity, pluralism and choice. "Part of this challenge has involved a reappraisal of the functioning of the welfare state, within whose operations local government has long played a key role"(8).

Placing Spanish local government in the wider EC context, we must pay attention to the economic and political dimension. Looking at the Spanish economic situation, we may outline a set of factors: 1) there is a high level of unemployment, which can not only be regarded as structural (neoclassical policies) but also as Keynesian (demand-side policies are required), 2) there is a lack of competitiveness and a need to improve the relation between productivity and wages (supply-side policies are required), 3) trade unions and business associations are weaker than in the rest of Europe, which allows a more flexible approach to political economy but also
makes harder a general agreement about policy objectives, 4) there are fiscal constraints but they can be partly solved by initiatives to avoid defraudation, and 5) there are problems of inflation and public deficit.

In fact, the PSOE economic policies are aimed to face all these features from a conservative scenario, leaving aside initiatives on the demand-side and concentrating most of their efforts on the supply-side: salary control, improving competitiveness, assuming levels of unemployment, concern about inflation and public deficit, etc. As a result, the Spanish Government may be accepting that the welfare state is only possible at its minimum level.

The state's fiscal crisis has a special impact on local government. The main reason for this is that local government lacks significant control over either the supply or the demand side of its role. It means that local authorities are unable to limit their range of responsibilities and, at the same time, they are also largely unable to increase their own financial resources. Consequently, in a context where there are pressures both to cut public expenditures and to raise public demands, local government suffers severe contradictions and difficulties. This general trend can also explain the Spanish case and the need to look for new ways of doing things.

If this is true, perhaps we should take into account the Saunders' Dual Thesis. According to his arguments, central government would be concentrated on production and local authorities on consumption. It also implies that central activities would be based on class-based relations and would follow a corporatist and centralist pattern; whereas local action would be more related with citizens' claims and would take a pluralist and decentralized form. Local authorities, therefore, would be the principal responsible for service provision in front of the citizens. Although there is a lack of financial resources, local authorities should face public claims adopting new strategies and changing their patterns of both service provision and relations with the citizenry.

At political level, the Socialist Party is facing an increase in the resistance to redistributive policies, a transformation of the social actors (new cleavages) and a growth of individualist and assertive attitudes. This is common in many West European countries, but Spain has some comparative advantages and disadvantages: when it is necessary to rethink the Welfare State model, Spain has less commitments and its approach can be fresher; but there is also a trend to keep a traditionally negative idea about the state (authoritarian and inefficient) and to develop either a dogmatic or pragmatic political style. There is thus a tendency to change the role of politics which will obviously affect local government.

Thus, the traditional model of welfare municipalities is under challenge in Western democracies. The Spanish case has important peculiarities. Our
democratization process awakened expectations about the welfare model but, in fact, Spanish Councils have never been welfare municipalities. From a different starting-point, Spanish local authorities have made a great effort in order to create municipal infrastructures and to develop the organizational network for delivering services. This underlined the councillors' concern for administrative issues. Most of the municipal activity pointed out modernization, efficiency, organization and, in general, service provision. Briefly, administrative concern has implied placing political issues in the background. There have been introduction of informatic technology, changes in organizational structures and contracting-out experiences; but there has not been a serious attempt to face political matters such as public participation or analysis of ideological implications. In sum, local authorities have developed an organizational role, have been involved in the day-to-day management and have left aside their political dimension. Political parties were out of local politics, while the figure of the enterprise as a paradigm of efficiency was the ideal of Council for many Spanish councillors. Indeed, the current problem of local authorities is how to recover their political role.

3. BARCELONA: A CASE OF INCREASING PACE OF CHANGE

   Barcelona must be placed in the context described above, but has also some special characteristics derived from its condition as metropolitan area. The metropolitan area of Barcelona is in fact involved in a transition process from an industrial mode of production to a service-oriented one. If the city wants to be successful in this process, Barcelona will need to integrate itself into the multinational network of cities. Interconnection, competitiveness, high technology and flexibility are regarded as the key features for the new cities(12).

   The current situation of Barcelona may be defined by a set of factors: 1) decentralization and loss of population, 2) increase of the service sector, 3) need of infrastructure, especially related to transports and communications (the Olympic Games' works have been designed to cope with these problems), 4) industries moving away from the centre to the periphery, and 5) growth of general prosperity, but simultaneous emerging tensions such as social housing shortage or uneven development. Nevertheless, more important than the changes themselves is their speed. Barcelona has not finished its industrial revolution yet, but is already involved in a transition process to a post-industrial model of city. To make compatible industrialization and post-industrialization is a complicated task, which produces many tensions and contradictions.

   Local authorities have to play a key role in order to drive this process. They probably do not have to plan everything, but they do have to co-ordinate and promote the whole process. In this sense, on the one hand, initiatives as public-private
partnerships are now the most common way to face structural problems. On the other hand, and most important for our paper, decentralization is the tool used to cope with particular citizens' claims, both as service recipients and as political participants. Our work will try to deal with the real impact of this decentralization process.

4. RE-THINKING LOCAL GOVERNMENT

Following the external changes, local government is involved in a process of rethinking its role and way of working. As Gyford(13) suggested, there are two broad processes: 1) a reappraisal of local government's relations with its public, and 2) an operational reappraisal.

The challenge to the old working patterns is part of the operational reappraisal. As it is not the topic of this paper, we will only mention that the traditional patterns of local service provision have been replaced by new ones, with broader participation of other actors and higher concern over efficiency and economy.

Crucial for our paper is the first conceptual reappraisal about relations between the council and its public. New social groups and individuals developing new roles have emerged at local level. Local authorities, therefore, must re-think both their relationship with them and how these new relations are affecting the municipal organization and management. "This reassessment has embraced the identification of new social groups making their own demands and the recognition of the role of the individual citizen and consumer to supplement, if not replace, those of the ratepayer, voter and client"(14). It means that local authorities must recognize that they are acting in a more fragmented environment and for a more active public.

In our case study, Barcelona has experienced a decentralization process with the explicit objective of facilitating public involvement in local affairs. The question is whether this process is driving active individual roles or not; whether the process is being successful in increasing public participation and what kind of participation we are talking about.

Public participation in local government means many things. An individual taking part in the decision-making process is not the same as another being informed about policy outcomes. Nor is it an individual served by the council and another claiming for a certain way of delivering the same service. In other words, when we talk about public participation in local government we can be talking about many different things, depending on the emphasis placed on the commercial, the political or the economic sides. Decentralization can be a common feature for different perspectives about public participation and, therefore, we are interested in making clear what kind of relation between the council and its public is being established,
given the decentralization model of Barcelona.

In order to clarify the case of Barcelona we shall use Gyford's typology of different roles and relations. In the next section we shall briefly describe his analytical framework, which will be used after the analysis of the specific decentralization process of Barcelona.

5. THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

As we mentioned, individuals can play different roles according to their different ways of acting in society. Gyford identifies three basic fields of activity (economic, political and service recipient) and two dimensions for each (passive and active). The combination of fields and dimensions produce six different ideal types of roles:

**Figure 1**

On the economic side, individuals can play a passive role as taxpayers. This means that they are exclusively seen as providers of financial resources, victims of the municipal taxes without any chance to influence public decisions. Individuals as shareholders are more active and imply a "particular concern about protecting the interests of those who finance local services"(15).

Individuals show their political preference by developing their electoral role. Performing this role, voters are passive providers of political legitimation, but they do not have the opportunity of taking part in the political process. To the contrary, individuals as citizens develop a more active role, having the chance of both expressing particular opinions and controlling the decision making process.

Finally, as service recipients, individuals may be seen as either clients or consumers. The client role is passive, and stresses a relationship of dependency between the public and the professionals of service provision. Public is a plain recipient of whatever service. Meanwhile, the consumer role underlines activity -the public wish of determining the nature of each service and the way of delivering it.

Each of these ideal roles may be performed in a variety of ways. In this sense, Gyford describes three different types of the public's relation with the council: participative ("taking part"), consultative ("the right to be heard") and informative ("access").

If we combine types of roles with types of relations, then we may get some conclusions about the links between the Council and its public. Though different
emphasis on different roles and relations will respond to ideological preferences or political options, the study of the Barcelona case and the application of the analytical concepts may be used for a better understanding of public participation in Barcelona.

We shall focus our study on the decentralization process and, therefore, we are forgetting many other forms of public participation. Consequently, our conclusions shall only refer to the impact of decentralization on public participation, avoiding to generalize our conclusion to public participation in the Barcelona Council on the whole. Nevertheless, the decentralization process is the main municipal strategy aimed to improve public involvement on local matters, and this importance makes outstanding its analysis.

In the next section we shall describe the decentralization process in Barcelona and, later on, try to understand how this process is, or is not, driving an active public participation and what sort of participation we are talking about.

II. LOCAL GOVERNMENT, AND DECENTRALIZATION: THE CASE OF BARCELONA

As has been sustained earlier, a set of wider restructuring processes - at economic, political and social levels - has placed local authorities under pressure. Economic decline, crisis of the welfare state model, and new patterns of social structure and mobilization, are at the heart of the multidimensional local changes(16). To a large extent, both policy outputs and local public management have been challenged.

Local authorities have adopted various approaches to face pressures for change(17). In most of them, municipal decentralization has been a fundamental factor. Although decentralization has been a widespread strategy, it may adopt quite different political meanings, and meet even contradictory objectives, depending on the principles which drive the overall approach for change of each local government.

In Barcelona, decentralization has been the main axis around which the rest of policy and management innovations have been deployed over the last twelve years(18). Therefore, it has provided the appropriate micro-context to improve local public services, and relationship between council and citizens.

At this point, the aim will first be to briefly go over the political and economic determinants of Barcelona's decentralization(19); and secondly, thiglight the main objectives, methodological trends and phases of this process.
1. THE CITY AND ITS CONTEXT: THE DETERMINANTS OF DECENTRALIZATION IN BARCELONA

Our approach to local government can be defined as "contingent-contextual". We sustain that there is no abstract theory from which valid propositions for local political analysis could be derived. However, we do not believe either that any solid explanation of political change in the local sphere could be reduced to a simple institutional description of that. Thus, we maintain that the explanatory variables of local political processes operate, at least in part, on a regional/state scale, and within a bidimensional framework: political and socio-economic.

Consequently, municipal decentralization of Barcelona has to be placed in a wider context of analysis -first the economic/urban crisis of transition, and later the urban stress resulting from an economic growth managed under neoliberal policies- where pressures and key interactions developed. These mark the orientation of the process itself(20).

From the political perspective, it is necessary to make reference to democratic change in Spain. Political transition makes possible a process of "municipal rupture" with respect to Francoist local authorities, and the establishment of a new system of local powers with full representative legitimacy. In Catalonia, local democracy had a strong linkage with the restoration of national self-government, thus acquiring an additional symbolic and political component.

In this context, we are able to maintain that the municipal democratization in Barcelona is not the product of a simple change "from above", negotiated and defined by the political elite, but a process determined by the pressures of broad social sectors, organized around the struggle for local representative powers, responsive to citizens' demands(21).

The first municipal elections, -in April 1979, gave the majority to left-wing parties in Barcelona. The personal and political links existing between those political forces and urban social movements made possible that a range of proposals got in the municipal agenda, among them, the development of the decentralization process.

Nevertheless, this one-dimensional explanation, which has to be reinforced with equally relevant socio-economic factors. Thus, between 1979 and 1985, the general economic crisis, understood as a crisis of a model of growth and not as a simple depression of the economic Cycle(22), openly manifested in its urban dimension.

In Barcelona, urban crisis entails the dismantlement of the traditional
productive bases and forms, increasing unemployment, and social "dualization". Now, citizens' demands will be addressed to the new local authorities, which, without defined frameworks of institutional power, and in a situation of fiscal crisis, are compelled to formulate reactive policies to protect the most deprived groups(23).

The council inserts its anti-crisis policies into the framework of the decentralization process, which reinforces and consolidates it. Thus, decentralization becomes the framework for the design of social welfare policies, and the earliest local economic initiatives.

In short, the municipal democratization of Barcelona driven by urban social agents, the political victory of the left and the necessity to articulate responses to the economic crisis from local arenas with the capability to detect personal needs could be determining factors of the beginning and subsequent unfolding of the municipal decentralization process in Barcelona.

2. ANALYSING DECENTRALIZATION IN BARCELONA: THE MODEL AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS

One of the main political axes of Barcelona's first democratic local government (1979) was the beginning of the decentralization process. In short, municipal decentralization should be understood as the distribution of local power between a political centre at city level and a set of representative institutions, the Districts, into which the municipality of Barcelona is territorially divided.

Municipal decentralization is shaped as a set of inter-dependent processes (allocation of functions to the Districts, formation of their own political majorities, organizational reform, creation of area-based services, etc) which adopt different combinations from a chronological perspective.

The aim of this section will be twofold. Firstly, we will attempt to argue the existence of a model of decentralization of Barcelona, which would be built upon four general defining factors. Secondly, we will try to describe the styles and concrete contents of decentralization, through an analysis of the processes of which it is made up and their successive inter-relations.

A. The decentralization model in Barcelona

The municipal decentralization of Barcelona can be defined as a process with multiple objectives, politically (and, in part, socially) agreed, methodologically rigorous, and of broad scope as long as decision powers are decentralized. These
four characteristics allows us to uphold the existence of a particular model(24).

**A multi-objective process**

At the heart of the process of local political transition and in a context of profound economic recession, decentralization generated the institutional framework necessary for giving viability to the new urban politics. So, urban politics was based on social and physical reconstruction policies at the local level and on the reactivation of endogenous potential as a response to the crisis(25).

But decentralization cannot be reduced solely to its aspect as the appropriate institutional context for a concrete substantive political strategy; it is also the catalyst of a set of inter-related objectives. Thus, decentralization claims to improve local power responsiveness in the face of increasingly complex and fragmented individual or group demands. It is also placed into the process of administrative reform in order to gain efficiency in the management of resources and efficacy in the fulfilment of objectives. It reinforces the emphasis put on the quality of the services provided. And finally, municipal democracy is deepened in two ways: through the increase of its representative capacity and making direct community participation possible.

And thus, from our research perspective, decentralization can be defined as a generating process of a new arena of change, based on the objective of altering the passive traditional roles of individuals in their multidimensional relationships with local government. And, alternatively, to promote new interactive relations in the economic, political and service fields which place people -according to the chosen model- nearer to the attitudes and roles of the shareholder, the citizen and the consumer(26).

**Decentralization as a consensual process**

Decentralization has not been an arena of partisan confrontation in Barcelona at city level. On the contrary, it has been built on the basis of a set of agreements which have linked parties, local bureaucracy and, to a large extent, organized civil society. The first major agreement to be produced was about respecting the political majorities of every territory. Thus, the District Presidents, appointed by the Mayor, will correspond to the majoritarian force in every District, independently of the political leaning of city government(27). The potential of political and administrative conflict which can be derived from this situation would be counteracted in a double way, on the one hand by a commitment to coherence and continuity in local management, and on the other hand, by the increase of representative capacity of local institutional politics.

Apart from that fact, consensus has been reached in three basic moments which have marked the fundamental orientation of the decentralization process. Firstly, the agreement on the territorial division of the city (1981-84); later, the
agreement about the material contents of the Programme of Decentralization (1984), which established the scope and extension of the responsibilities to be assumed by the Districts; and, finally, the unanimous approval of the Regulations of Organization and Public Participation (1986) which can be considered as the "constitutional norms" of the Districts of Barcelona.

An element of "rational analysis". The methodology of decentralization

The methodological element is considered as the third aspect of the model. In the method of decentralization a strong analytical component stands out, based on the detailed examination of the organizational restructuring which would come from the implementation of every "transferencial package".

When the decision to decentralize a policy area is to be adopted, the resulting articulation of functions between the centre and the Districts is fully analysed. The objective of the analysis is twofold: on the one hand, to allocate the necessary resources and to design the new services to be provided by the Districts; on the other hand, to functionally rearrange the central structures in order to confront the new roles of programation and strategic coordination.

Therefore, a rapid and massive increase of decentralized functions and resources was ruled out from the outset. Instead, a slower and more piecemeal process was opted for with the aim of creating solid structures with the capacity of supporting innovations.

The scope of decentralization: the political nature of Districts

Barcelona's municipal decentralization has not been reduced to a simple bureaucratic deconcentration of management. First, areas of political decision are decentralized and full regulative functions are granted to the Districts. Second, Districts assume powers of control and participation in the implementation of central territorialized programmes. Lastly, local welfare policies are completely decentralized. Thus, it would be a relatively wide model of decentralization which would enable the shaping of Districts as the habitual institutions of individuals-council and groups-council relations.

B. Decentralizing Barcelona: The phases of the decision-making process

The reconstruction with chronological criteria of the decisional process of decentralization in Barcelona allows us to subsequently study in depth its political, service and public participation aspects. Significant correlations between these aspects and the different phases of the process will also be established.

Strengthening local democracy. The bases of decentralization (1979-1983)
As we said earlier, decentralization was at the centre of the agenda of the first democratic local government in Barcelona. In order to urge on and coordinate the process, the **Area of Municipal Decentralization** was created, run by a councillor of the ruling group. The Area was endowed with an organizational structure formed by two Service Direccions and an Operative Unit for the coordination of the District offices (30).

The creation of the Area expressed the political will to decentralize; but the one marking the real beginning of the process was the "Reglament" (Regulations) of the Municipal District Councils, passed on the 21-12-1979. This "reglament" allowed for the establishment of District Councils made up of a Councillor-President - nominated by the Mayor but proposed by the District's majoritarian party group - and of fifteen District Councillors appointed by political forces proportionally to the votes obtained in that territory. The Regulations of 1979 also created a Permanent Commission formed by a representative of each of the three most voted parties or coalitions. And finally, the capability to create Working Commissions with sectoral or territorial character was attributed to the District Councils. The responsibilities attributed to the District Councils were merely of informative, consultative and proposals-making character, as well as direct information-giving to the public.

The 1979 Regulations operated on a provisional territorial division, with clear disfunctions and without explicit consensus. In October 1980, the City Council commissioned a technical report on the territorial division of the city which would become the main document of discussion over the definitive territorial pattern of decentralization (31).

Summarizing, in the period 1979-1983, the foundations of the decentralization process were laid. A central structure of impulse was created, the Districts were formed and their perspective of fun political representation was established. However, by the end of the period the decentralized powers were still of little importance and the territorial division was going through a provisional phase.

**Political and Institutional consolidation of Districts (1983-1987)**

The period 1983-1987 can be undoubtedly considered as the key phase of the process. During it the main political consensus was set up making possible the qualitative advance of decentralization (1983-1984). Moreover, the mechanisms of transfer - which made the Districts real agents of local political intervention - were implemented (1985-1987).


In relation to the central structure of impulse and coordination, in 1983 was created the **Commission of Municipal Decentralization and Citizen Participation** (CD-CP), presided by the Mayor and formed by two vicepresidents with the rank of
Deputy Mayors, two Service Directions and the whole group of District Councillor-Presidents. Clearly, the character and the political symbology of this structure was strengthened in relation to the previous Area of Decentralization. As we shall see, this fact is coherent with the fundamental contents of other aspects of this phase.

In 1983 the process which brought the definitive approval of the territorial organization of the city was initiated. After a year of works and discussion, the Full Council endorsed in 1984 the city’s division into its present ten Districts.

Usually, urban territorial divisions are carried out using either technocratic or electoral criteria, and its formation process involves political conflict(32). The originality of the case of Barcelona is that this prospect was overcome. Firstly, the territorial division has been set up on the basis of a multiple consensus: local authorities, political parties and organized groups. This consensus was expressed in the participative character of the process and in the unanimity of political approval. Secondly, Districts respond simultaneously to the double challenge of functional viability and of socio-cultural significance, In this sense, they function as references of collective identity and, therefore, as real arenas of participation and interest mobilization(33).

In short, Barcelona’s territorial division successfully responds to a triple challenge of legitimacy: rational, political and social (34).

In a parallel plan to the establishment of the ten Districts, a Basic Programme of Decentralization (1983) was elaborated which served as a basis for the elaboration of a very detailed Programme of Decentralization of Responsibilities, Functions and Services passed by the Council in 1984. This Programme expresses a wide concept of municipal decentralization and its implementation will provide the Districts with financial, political and managerial capability. This question articulates the second main axis of the local political consensus in relation with the decentralization process.

b) implementing decentralization (1985-1987)

In this sub-phase, the decentralization process is displaced to less partisan scenarios. We find the first consequence in the technical reinforcement of CD-CP in the framework of which a Commission and a Technical Secretary of Decentralization are created. They will both have to coordinate the transfer process, which will mark the true substantive dimension of municipal decentralization(35).
As mentioned earlier, the methodology of the process consisted in designing, examining and approving projects of singularized transfers of responsibilities. Between 1985 and 1987 the Districts assumed up to a total of twenty transfers which provided them with the capability to decide and manage over a set of policy areas (public security, fire services, urban planning implementation, social services, cultural and leisure facilities, training, etc.).

The immediate effect of this, was the sustained increase -through reallocation- of financial, human, and informative resources of the Districts and, consequently the consolidation of their role as political actors in the local arena.

In this process of change, however, a disfunctionality arose in the normative sphere: the Districts continued under the 1979 Regulations, which had been clearly superceded. Starting from this evidence, the process of elaboration of the Norms of Organization of Districts and of Citizen Participation was initiated. The approval of this regulation in December 1986 constituted the third fundamental axis of political consensus around the decentralization process.

Table 3

With regard to the internal political organization of the Districts, the Norms introduced a new framework: Councillor-President, District Council and Ruling Commission. It is necessary to point out two new elements. On the one hand, article 12 establishes the direct election of District Council members, but the 1st Transitory provision refers its practical implementation to the decision that must incorporate the future Municipal Statute of Barcelona. On the other hand, the replacement of the Permanent Commission by the Ruling one, strengthens the dual scheme "local power-opposition" which operates at a city level(36).

In relation to responsibilities (art. 5-6), the norm put together all the matters which had already been object of transfer, opening the door to its further broadening. Lastly, the Norms of Participation establish a set of participative forms and mechanisms, the performance of which will be discussed later.

Organizational reforms and Participation. The "Qualitative phase" of decentralization (1987-1991)

From 1987, the Barcelona City Council undertook a general organizational reform. It is to be structured in four large areas (Organizational and Economy; Social Welfare; Urbanism and Municipal Services; and Public Thoroughfare). Every large area gathers together a determined number of departments defined in sectoral terms.

This process of general organizational restructuring involves a new change in the structure of impulse and coordination of decentralization. In the framework of the
Area of Organization and Economy a **Technical Commission** was created as an "inter-District linking body between Districts, areas, and departments of the local administration\(^{(37)}\).

The period of 1987-1991 signifies the practical fulfillment of the transfer process, apart from the future regulations which the Municipal Statute will introduce\(^{(38)}\). Therefore, a gradual increase of the responsibilities of the Districts is produced placing these very near to 25% of the whole municipal budget.

**Table 4**

Nevertheless, the distinctive aspect of this phase is the displacement of attention towards the most qualitative factors of the decentralization process. To sum up, we can emphasize two of them.

**a) The organizational modernization of the Districts**

Firstly, the implementation of the model of integrated executive administration which organizes every District into three areas (General, Technical and Personal Services) represents the breaking of the sectoral scheme and creates the conditions for the equally integrated processes of intervention, with multidisciplinary programmes aimed to seize reality in its true complexity.

Secondly, the Programme of Computerized Services and the introduction of monitoring techniques have also implied qualitative advances in the administrative cultural change, generating at the same time higher levels of performance.

**b) The qualitative improvement in the Council-Citizens relations**

In the field of decentralized responsibilities, this objective has been achieved by the transfer of the Municipal Census of Residents to Districts. Districts have also consolidated their information systems and their public attention services: PACs (Points for the Attention of the Citizen) have been established in every District Council, Social Services Information Centres, have been created and Support Teams for relations with the public have been incorporated into the Districts' structures.

Finally, it is necessary to make reference to Citizen Participation. In this field, the Norms of Participation have set up a range of District participative mechanisms: The Consultative Councils of Community Groups, the Working Commissions, Public Audiences, the Referendum and the Popular Consultation, the right of citizen policy initiative and the right of petition.

The use given to these instruments has been very scarce. The indefiniteness with regard to the scope of participation, the non-favourable positions sustained by local managers and the period of crisis and reorganization that the community
movement passes through are factors which can explain the poor balance in this aspect.

III. DECENTRALIZATION, PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT AND NEW ROLES IN BARCELONA

1. INTRODUCTION

Barcelona's decentralization has been a multidimensional process. We can summarize it through the identification of the fundamental aspects implied in each dimension.

-From the perspective of the transfer of functions and services, 93.5% of the responsibilities likely to be decentralized are today managed by the Districts. A new impulse in this direction would require the change of the general territorial model of the Metropolitan Area of Barcelona(39).

-Secondly, the increase of the Districts' political protagonism and the institutional recognition of their own political majorities has led to inter-party conflicts that have been solved on a provisional basis with the strengthening of the Mayor's powers, at the expense of the Districts' area representative character(40).

-Finally, organization and management have been equally modified by the decentralization process. This has implied, on the one hand, an important step forward in the restructuring of the sectoral-bureaucratic model towards new arrangements based on the integration of resources and services. On the other hand, it has implied the increase of rationality and efficiency in provision practices.

All these aspects have involved contradictions and limits simultaneous to the advances brought about. However, the objective of this section plays in another dimension. In short, our aim is to evaluate the impact of the process on public participation. And therefore, to try to answer three key questions: what kind of participation is being promoted? What type of active roles has been developed in Barcelona? and consequently, how have these changes impacted the nature of local government?

2. STRATEGIES OF CHANGE

The decentralization process in Barcelona has been the fundamental mechanism employed to overcome bureaucratic paternalism as a mode both of
political relation and service provision in the local sphere. In the Districts, spaces have been opened for the development of active political roles on the part of social actors and interactive patterns of council-public relations have been promoted.

If we look at the phases of decentralization, we shall intuitively identify outstanding tendencies in terms of public participation. Thus, during 1983 and 1984 individuals would have began to play a more active role in their service dimension but would have remained as both plain voters and taxpayers in their political and economic dimension.

During the 1985-1987 period there was an increase of service decentralization, consolidating the attempt to generate an active-consumer role. There were also the first attempts to impulse a change from a passive-voter to an active-citizen. Finally, from 1987 to 1991 the trends aforementioned have been reinforced.

Thus, the combined adoption of two strategies can be identified. On the one hand, a democratic-collectivist orientation based on the stimulation of citizen participation in the policy making process. On the other hand, a more consumerist and individual-based strategy based on the quality of provision and on the improvement of service consumer relations. On these two complementary lines, there has been uneven progress, with limited contradictions and a diverse pace of change. In order to deepen the analysis, we will make reference to two case studies, which illustrate significantly the two strategies developed.

The economic dimension of Council-individuals relations that Gyford identifies in his typology will not be analysed in this paper. It has been less linked to the decentralization process, although very significant tendencies are recently appearing at city level.

**Case A: Political Participation and Local Citizens.**
**The Case of PIR (Pla Integral Roquetes)**

The problem and the policy response
One of the principal problems which large urban concentrations suffer is the tendency to socially exclude specific groups and areas within them. Economic growth in itself does not generate social balance. Some groups, such as the elderly, the unemployed, young people and ethnic minorities are marginalized from the process of resource allocation through the market. On a parallel form, the spatial dimension of this process creates segregated peripheries facing problems of poor housing, a shortage of cultural and leisure facilities, and so on. In short, a logic of exclusion operates towards certain urban areas, which at the same time are populated by
the most deprived groups(41).

This process has developed in Barcelona in recent decades, worsening by two fundamental factors. On the one hand, it has been exacerbated by the existence until 1979 of a non-democratic local government, subordinated both to the political centre and to local mass housing developers(42). On the other hand, because of the development of a severe urban economic crisis which has lasted until 1986, coinciding with the re-establishment of local democracy.

In front of this situation, in 1988 the Council of Barcelona decided to frame an urban strategy -in the social, economic and planning dimensions- financed by multiple public funds, in a peripheral and multideprived area. This programme was to have an experimental character, in line with the possible extension of the experience to the rest of deprived areas in the city.

The elected area of action was the neighbourhood of Roquetes, with a population of about 18,000, in the Nou Barris District, in the northern area of the city. Both the District and Roquetes are clear examples of a model of marginal urbanization; developed during the 60s and 70s, and populated by working class immigrants.

Now, we will focus the analysis on two main questions: a) the insertion of PIR into the qualitative phase of decentralization, examining its contributions regarding closer and more interactive relations between local government and consumers, and b) the development of active political roles by community groups in the Plan-making process.

Getting closer to the community

In 1988, the District Council of Nou Barris had taken on the immense majority of responsibilities and functions likely to be decentralized (1983-87), thus acquiring a strong potential of intervention in its own area. Simultaneously, it was involved in a reform process of its organizational and management model (1987-1989). These elements laid down the political and administrative bases necessary to initiate the "qualitative phase" of the decentralization process.

In this qualitative context, PIR becomes the Symbol-Action to meet the challenge of increasing responsiveness to local problems through a mode of de-bureaucratized and accessible public provision(43). Two fundamental innovations were developed breaking the traditional patterns of provision and making an impact on the change and improvement of Council-public relations.

a) The decentralization of the whole policy process to a neighbourhood level: PIR involved the design of projects from and for the community, on the basis of its
own human and environmental values and resources (44), thus breaking the vertical logic of designing central and standardized projects.

b) The multilateral integration of professionals and resources into a sole action process. In this way, an organizational model is defined which breaks the logic of sectoral-bureaucratic division of services and is framed on the basis of consumers' (groups-objective) problems, considering them as a combination of inter-dependent variables (45).

In summary, the integrated mode of provision and political relations at neighbourhood level developed in Roquetes have brought local administration closer to its public as well as promoted new active roles of consumers.

Participative politics and local citizens

Besides the aspects indicated in the previous point, the PIR has represented, above all, a real experience of community involvement in local political affairs (46). The relationships of participation have evolved according to the Plan's phase of development.

In the initial and expanding phases of the PIR (1988), political participation of community groups attained its maximum levels. The neighbourhood movement (Associació de Veïns) of Roquetes participated in the decision making process. This participation was articulated in two institutionalized platforms: On the one hand a set of Working Commissions where councillors, local managers and community representatives discuss and decide on policy lines and criteria to order projects of intervention. On the other hand, the Monitoring Comission was an arena to coordinate sectoral working groups, open to the participation of any resident of Roquetes.

The beginning of the consolidation phase of the PIR (1989) involves a certain stagnation of the dynamics of public participation. From this crisis resulted a global change in the model of participation, as much in its mechanisms as in its nature. The Working Commissions lost their decisional role and community groups stopped considering them as operational arenas of political participation. Simultaneously, the Monitoring Comission became a purely deliberative platform, removed from the PIR's micro-decisional dynamics. The community involvement moved, in a sense, closer to a corporatist model with only a very limited number of groups having access to the Commission.

The success of political participation relations in the initial phases and the difficulty of maintaining them in the consolidation stage are strongly correlated with two elements. On the one hand, they are linked to the increase of both the role and the share of relative power of the urban managers in the implementation process (47).
with respect to the more "political" nature of the PIR's formulation stage. On the other hand, they are connected to the initial non-existence, but progressive appearance, of alternative forms of "diffuse participation" -more tied to the services provided, and thus to the consumer role- with clear difficulties to be channelled by the traditional community actors.

To sum up, the PIR can be defined as an experience of local decentralized action where political participation relations develop in the community, that is to say, where organized residents play roles of active citizens in the design and implementation process of the PIR. The intensity of the roles and the specific actors who took part in the game changed, but an arena of political participation remained permanently open.

In terms of Morgan and England’s Heuristics Models, and since the PIR had a mixed implementation structure, it must be seen as a case which gathers up what they call Service Provision as the Responsibility of Public officials, and Service Delivery using neighbourhood Contracting:

*Figure 2(48)*

Case B: Service provision and public participation.
The case of Ciutat Vella

Ciutat Vella is the oldest neighbourhood of Barcelona. It is located in the very centre of the city and has suffered a process of degradation during past decades. There are many social, urbanistic and economic problems and district authorities have faced them from an innovative point of view.

District authorities have taken advantage of the decentralization process in order to stimulate a new approach to local management. As a starting point, they have tried to develop a strategic way of facing up the district's problems. In this sense, they have fostered a global understanding of the area through both evaluating the people's perceptions and defining wide guiding-objectives ("to improve quality of life"). Evaluation of policy outputs and a global approach to problems have permitted an impulse to integral organization. The main idea is that problems are complex and, therefore, cannot be resolved by means of classical fragmentation of local government. If reality is complex and problems are related one to another, the district wishes to adapt its performance to that situation.

This initial step has had implications on public participation. Firstly, focusing on guiding-values such as life quality, district authorities have showed a shift in perception of their public. The public has started to be seen as individuals with global
and complex claims and, consequently, the council has begun to change its way of working. In terms of the post-fordist literature, there is no point in increasing the "quantity" of public services, but in improving their "quality". Thus, following Gyford's typology, we can anticipate that the public seems to develop a more active-consumerist role. This does not imply that the public is capable of taking part in district decisions; more likely they are working out an active role simply through a consultative or informative relation with the council.

Now we shall analyse two practical examples in order to see with more detail the application of the new managerial and organizational philosophy. We are interested in looking at innovative practices and their impact on public participation. In this sense, we shall briefly describe two cases: urban planning and cultural promotion.

Public Involvement in Urban Planning

Public participation being our concern, we will not explain the objectives and the implementation of district policies, but we shall focus on the organizational chart. We shall map the different actors (including the public) involved in urban planning, looking at the functions and responsibilities of each one.

![Figure 3](image)

At first glance, we can stress that different actors, not only institutional ones, are involved in urban planning. In this sense, PROCIVESA is a mix-firm (public and private) with wide responsibilities, and ARI is an institutional forum where different levels of government (local, metropolitan, regional and central) are represented. Participation of different actors is in itself an innovative practice, but it is not our subject.

In terms of public participation, the Neighbours' Commission was designed as a place where district associations would be represented. Its task is consultative and informative; in so far as district authorities use the commission only as a way of both listening the public's voice and creating global agreements. Following Morgan and England(49), we can model how different actors participate in certain public services: Urban planning in Ciutat Vella, therefore, can be defined in terms of what they call the "Heuristic Model of Exclusive Contracting with For-Profit Firms and Citizen Participation" (See Figure 4).

Looking at the chart, the main conclusion is that public involvement in urban planning only implies receiving services and having the possibility to be listened to by the authorities. Thus, there is a consultative relation with the district, but the public has not really overcome its passive role. Theoretically, individuals have the chance to demand (active role) but, in fact, they have no power to influence decisions. A
practical evaluation of public participation on public planning confirms our conclusions and shows the public developing a passive role, being clients in terms of Gyford's typology.

**Figure 4**

**Public Participation and cultural policies**

The organizational chart designed to implement cultural policies is quite similar to the one described earlier in the sense that different actors participate in public services. Nevertheless, some important differences arise in terms of public involvement. Firstly, there is no exclusive contracting, which means that non-profit associations (neighbours, youth, etc.) can be executors of some public initiatives. Secondly, there are also cases of somehow exclusive contracting, although the contracts do not have to be awarded to a private firm but to a neighbour association.

Therefore, our initial assessment would emphasize that the public is now able to play a more active role as consumers and that council-public relations can be both consultative and participative. In order to reinforce our conclusion we shall offer an example: the creation of "Civic Centres".

A "Civic Centre" is a municipal-owned building used and managed by informal associations in order to foster both cultural activities and social involvement. Thus, district authorities offer an infrastructure which is managed by the public. The guiding-principle is that cultural and social promotion is not a monopolistic task of the council, although there is municipal responsibility to provide the means to enable people to work out their initiatives. In terms of Morgan and England, the public would be involved in the provision of services and would have voice to be consulted about public policies. Only the production of services is still offered through council means. This suggests a Heuristic Model of Service Delivery Using Neighbourhood Contracting:

**Figure 5**

This heuristic model would confirm what we said above: the public is able to participate both having voice and as service provider (managing "Civic Centres"), although service production (the means) would be in the hands of the district authorities. As a result, a more active public role can be identified.

3. EFFECTS OF REFORM STRATEGIES ON THE NATURE AND ROLES OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN BARCELONA

Decentralization may be seen as an approach to local management and,
therefore, as a technical matter. Public participation would then be seen as a mechanical response to particular public policies. Nevertheless, decentralization processes must be placed in a wider setting of the re-thinking of local government as a whole. If this is true, we shall confront an ideological debate. Decentralization and public participation are not just challenging the municipal authorities’ way of working but also the very nature of local government.

How has Barcelona's decentralization process affected public participation? and, how has it impacted on the role of local government? According to the cases explained above, it seems that the public's role is changing under the new managerial and organization forms. At the economic level, the proliferation of mix-firms may be seen as a way of introducing efficiency and economy through collaboration strategies. Nevertheless, some of these mix-firms are now being privatized, which could mean more competition than collaboration in the future. Looking at the political sphere, there have been attempts to create room for public participation. Initiatives and success at this level have been variable depending upon different sectors, stages of policy and types of public-council relations. We have explained how public involvement in social and cultural policies has been quite active, while urban planning implies a rather passive role. Overlapping the political and service dimensions, it can be argued that there have been clear attempts to shift from a client-passive role to and active-consumer one, while the change from voter to citizen is less clear and is constrained to particular issues. Moreover, the public-council relationship has been mainly consultative and informative. Attempts to stimulate a participative relation with the public (taking part in the decision making process) have showed important difficulties and distinctions, as we saw in the PIR case.

To sum up, some general trends can be identified. Firstly, there is an increasing acceptance of local pluralism. Different modes of delivering public services are emerging and, generally, more actors are involved in that provision. Secondly, the lack of a really participative relation between public and council has implied that no empowering strategies are linked with the Barcelona's decentralization process. This sort of initiative, in any case, is constrained to very particular issues and stages of the decision-making process ("Civic Centres" and PIR formulation). Finally, there is a clear concern to improve the so-called triple-E (efficiency, effectiveness and economy), although it is not clear yet whether Barcelona's municipal authorities emphasize private or collective ways to achieve it. At first glance, it looks like local authorities are keeping the power of leadership, making use of private firms and informal associations to reach their objectives. Nevertheless, recent privatizations are challenging this initial impression.

When translating the assessments made earlier to the ideological level, some contradictions appear. Academic literature about the subject draws up three
ideological approaches: new right(50), new urban left(51) and community government(52). Trying to read our conclusions in their language, Barcelona's decentralization process does not have a particular orientation, but shares different elements of each approach.

**Figure 6**

Looking at Figure 6, the impression is that the community approach could explain the Barcelona case. Nonetheless, there are also empowerment experiences and private initiatives which challenge this approach and open questions for the future. It is clear that Barcelona's local government is changing, but the final result is not clear yet.

**CONCLUSIONS**

Local government must be studied within its external context and, therefore, the Spanish case must be placed into the frame of the democratization process experienced during the last ten years. From this particular environment have emerged the current situation of local government as well as the pressures which are challenging its traditional form. In this paper we have focused our attention on the decentralization process in Barcelona, seen as one of the most innovative attempts to adapt local government to new times. Thus, decentralization is not only an operational reform of the municipal administration, but also a strategy to increase public participation.

Municipal decentralization in Barcelona has been shaped as a set of interdependent processes with different combinations from a chronological perspective. Beneath this we can identify four fundamental characteristics, a fact which allows us to maintain the existence of a particular model. All these aspects can be put in short: decentralization is a basic mechanism to overcome bureaucratic paternalism as a mode of provision and also generates a new arena of change where active individual and social roles develop.

Trying to evaluate the real impact of decentralization on public participation, we have briefly analysed some significant cases. As a result, a shift from a passive-client-voter role to an active-consumer-citizen role has been identified, although its relevance depends on the issue, the stage of policy and the type of public-council relation. The differences arise not only from operational requirements, for there is also an ideological dimension involved.

Decentralization and public participation are not only challenging municipal authorities' way of working, but also the very nature of local government. Increasing
fragmentation and complexity of policy networks and new modes of service provision are at the heart of the recently so-called municipal pluralism. Local authorities would have accepted that the public as a whole must be more actively involved in local affairs. The way how the public participates is not only a technical matter, depending both on ideological perspectives and on the balance of power between social and political actors. In Barcelona the community government approach seems to be dominant, but there is also a set of different elements which range from empowering strategies close to the new urban left to recent privatising tendencies linked to neo-liberal assumptions. The process of decentralizing Barcelona remains an open ground where future political and ideological battles will take place.
**TABLE 1**

% public expenditure at different levels of government

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Central</th>
<th>Autonomous</th>
<th>Local</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>88.1</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>10.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>84.8</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>84.8</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>83.6</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>81.0</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>79.1</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>78.1</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>11.7</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Passive/Traditional Roles</th>
<th>Active/Modern Roles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>economic</td>
<td>Taxpayer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>political</td>
<td>Voter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>service</td>
<td>Client</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shareholder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Citizen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Consumer</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

## Table 2

### Evolution of the economic resources (1984-1987)

**District and council areas**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1984</th>
<th>1985</th>
<th>1986</th>
<th>1987</th>
<th>85/84</th>
<th>86/85</th>
<th>87/87</th>
<th>87/84</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>CAP.1</strong></td>
<td>476</td>
<td>576</td>
<td>678</td>
<td>1445</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>113.1</td>
<td>204</td>
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<td><strong>CAP.2</strong></td>
<td>87</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>850</td>
<td>316</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>470.5</td>
<td>54.8</td>
<td>1413</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>CAP.4</strong></td>
<td>103</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>61.7</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>94</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>CAP.6</strong></td>
<td>934</td>
<td>1420</td>
<td>1672</td>
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<td>52.0</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>-18.7</td>
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<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>1600</td>
<td>2260</td>
<td>3386</td>
<td>4321</td>
<td>41.3</td>
<td>49.8</td>
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### Including decentralized budget and the Department of “Civic Centers”

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<tr>
<th></th>
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<td>31746</td>
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<td>19754</td>
<td>21231</td>
<td>20734</td>
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<td>-2.3</td>
<td>9.1</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>CAP.4</strong></td>
<td>6456</td>
<td>7492</td>
<td>7234</td>
<td>11744</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>-3.4</td>
<td>62.3</td>
<td>82.0</td>
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<tr>
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<td>9940</td>
<td>11400</td>
<td>12766</td>
<td>8932</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>-30.0</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
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<td>71869</td>
<td>74822</td>
<td>79260</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>24.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>------</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Departments</strong></td>
<td>447</td>
<td>372</td>
<td>470</td>
<td>90.7</td>
<td>89.4</td>
<td>86.4</td>
<td>-28.2</td>
<td>26.3</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Districts</strong></td>
<td>49</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>13.6</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>526</td>
<td>416</td>
<td>544</td>
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<td>100.0</td>
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<td><strong>Departments</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Districts</strong></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>103</td>
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### Table 4


<table>
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<th>Year</th>
<th>Barcelona Council</th>
<th>Districts</th>
<th>%</th>
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<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>85.431</td>
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<td>1990</td>
<td>121.312</td>
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<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>128.400</td>
<td>28.800</td>
<td>22.43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 2

PIR as Mixed Model

Service provision

Government → Regulatory role → Neighbourhood association

Service production

Neighbourhood association → Citizens

Service production

Voice

SOURCE: Morgan and England
FIGURE 3
Actor and function in urban planning

Urban planning and housing

Actors
- City council District Area
- PROCIVESA
- ARI
- Neighbours' Commission

Functions
- decision-making control implementation
- planning implementation
- institutional co-ordination
- public consensus

SOURCE: Organizational Chart of Ciutat Vella
FIGURE 4
Model of exclusive contracting

Figure 5

FIGURE 5
Model of neighbourhood contracting

Service provision

Government

regulatory role

Neighbourhood association

Service production

CITIZENS

Voice

SOURCE: Morgan and England, 1988, p. 985
### Figure 6

**FIGURE 6**

**Ideological Approaches**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Community Government</th>
<th>Individuals</th>
<th>Actor's role</th>
<th>provision</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td></td>
<td>citizens &amp; consumers</td>
<td>collaboration</td>
<td>collective and private</td>
</tr>
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<td>New Urban Left</td>
<td>citizens &amp; consumers</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Right</td>
<td>consumers &amp; shareholders</td>
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</table>
NOTES


(19) BORJA: Por unos municipios democráticos. IEAL, 1976.


(21) AAVV: Por una Política Municipal Democrática. CEU, 1975.

This change in October 1991, when a modification is introduced in the Organizational Norms, which reinforces the role of the Mayor in the appointment of District Presidents, at the expense of their representative nature.

A further weakening of the City Council, would require the reestablishment of a Metropolitan Government which guarantee a strategic vision of the city.


