

**MEN AND WOMEN: FATHERHOOD AND
MOTHERHOOD IN SPAIN; CHURCH, STATE
AND FAMILY**

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ABSTRACT

In this paper, changes in the family life cycle in Spain have been analysed. We can observe three contrasting periods regarding to family formation during 20th century: 1) Until the late 1950s, marriage was constantly delayed; 2) From then up until late 1970s marriage was constantly brought forward, with a more balanced marriage market and marriage had a high cohort prevalence; and 3) During 1980s a clearly delay in the timing arose.

If we look at the total marriage fertility indicators we realise that this indicator has been falling throughout the 20th century. Under the twenty first years of dictatorship the timing in the family extension was almost unchanged, and just the interval between marriage and first child decreased, but it followed a trend already observed before the war. As this indicator reflects, the length from marriage to first child was very high for a significant number of cohorts. Couples married during 1960s brought forward the births of their children. These cohorts, the youngest getting married and the fastest having children brought about the last Spanish "baby-boom", not for having more children but for concentrating their fertility in a very specific period of time, that is, in the middle of the 1960s. Trends reversed during the 1970s, and, for instance, couples had the first child later. It is too early to know clearly the 1980s marriage cohort fertility timing, but it will be more delayed than the former ones. For the present time this trends remains: people form a family later and married couples have children later. This is a key factor to fully understand the current collapse in the cross-sectional levels of fertility.

RÉSUMÉ

Nous analysons dans ce texte les changements dans le cycle de vie des familles en Espagne. On peut observer, pendant le XXième siècle, trois périodes très clairement différenciées: 1) Jusqu'au la fin des années 50 les mariages tendirent à se retarder sur le calendrier; 2) Après les années 50 et jusqu'au la fin des 70 les mariages rajeunirent avec un marché matrimonial plus équilibré; 3) Pendant les années 80, le calendrier de la nuptialité a eu un très claire retard. Le XXième siècle a été marqué par une baisse des indicateurs de fécondité matrimonial. Pendant les 20 premières années de la dictature, le calendrier familial n'a pratiquement pas changé, sauf en ce qui a trait à l'intervalle entre le mariage et la première naissance qui s'est raccourcie, une tendance déjà visible avant la guerre. L'intervalle entre le mariage et la première naissance a été très haut pour un important nombre de cohortes. Pendant les années 60 les couples ont avancé la naissance de leurs enfants. Cettes cohortes, les plus jeunes à se marier et les plus rapides à avoir des enfants, ont provoqué une explosion de naissances, ne pas pour avoir plus d'enfants mais pour les avoir concentré pendant les années 60. Cette tendance s'est modifiée pendant les années 70, et les couples ont commencé à avoir leur premier enfant plus tard. Actuellement, bien qu'il soit encore trop tôt pour savoir quel sera le comportement des cohortes de mariés dans les années 1980, certaines tendances sont claires: les familles se forment plus tard et les couples ont aussi leurs enfants plus tard. Il s'agit d'un facteur clé pour comprendre la baisse actuelle de l'indice conjoncturel de fécondité en Espagne.

RESUMEN

En esta ponencia analizamos los cambios en el ciclo familiar en España. Históricamente, podemos observar durante el siglo XX tres períodos claramente diferenciados: 1) hasta finales de los cincuenta el matrimonio tuvo una tendencia a retraso en el calendario; 2) desde entonces hasta finales de los setenta la pauta de matrimonio por edad fue rejuveneciendo, con un mercado matrimonial más equilibrado y con alta intensidad; y 3) durante los ochenta se ha producido un claro retraso del calendario de la nupcialidad.

Los indicadores de fecundidad dentro del matrimonio han estado cayendo a lo largo de todo el siglo XX. Bajo los veinte primeros años de la dictadura franquista el momento de tener los hijos permaneció estable. Sólo decreció el intervalo entre el matrimonio y el primer hijo, siguiendo una pauta observada ya antes de la Guerra. El intervalo entre el matrimonio y el primer hijo fue en promedio muy alto para un significativo número de cohortes. Las parejas casadas durante los sesenta adelantaron el nacimiento de sus hijos. Estas cohortes, las más jóvenes en casarse y las más rápidas en tener hijos, condujeron a una explosión de nacimientos, no por tener más hijos sino por tenerlos concentrados durante los sesenta. La tendencia ha cambiado de sentido en los setenta y, por ejemplo, las parejas tienen el primer hijo más tarde. Tendencia que sigue en boga: la gente se casa más tarde y una vez casados tienen los hijos después que en cohorte anteriores. Ello constituye un factor clave para entender la presente caída de la fecundidad.

RESUM

En aquesta ponencia analitzem els canvis produïts en el cicle familiar a Espanya. Històricament, podem observar durant el segle XX tres períodes clarament diferenciats: 1) fins a finals dels cinquanta el matrimoni seguí una tendència de retard en el calendari; 2) des d'aleshores fins a finals dels setanta la pauta de matrimoni per edat ha anat rejuvenint, amb un mercat matrimonial més equilibrat i amb una alta intensitat; i 3) durant els vuitanta s'ha produït un clar retard en el calendari de la nupcialitat.

Els indicadors de fecunditat dins del matrimoni han estat caent al llarg de tot el segle XX. En els primers vint anys de la dictadura franquista el moment de tenir els fills romangué estable. Només disminuï l'interval entre el matrimoni i el primer fill, però això seguí una pauta observada ja abans de la Guerra. L'interval entre el matrimoni i el primer fills fou en promig molt alt per a un significatiu nombre de cohorts. Les parelles casades durant els seixanta adelantaren el naixement dels seus fills. Aquestes cohorts, les més joves en casarse i les més ràpides en tenir els fills, conduïren a una explosió de naixements, no per tenir més fills sinó per tenir-los concentrats durant els seixanta. La tendència ha canviat de sentit i, per exemple, durant els setanta les parelles tingueren el primer fill més tard. Aquesta tendència continua en l'actualitat, éssent un factor clau per entendre l'actual caiguda de la fecunditat.

Men and Women; Fatherhood and Motherhood in Spain; Church, State and Family*

1. Preface.

They were living in the same street, one door in front of the other. Same location, but absolutely different cultures: one couple was catholic, the other one Protestant. Their family forms were different as well: whilst the Protestant were living without children, the Catholics were living surrounded by sons and daughters. The Protestants did not have offspring because their future was obscure and threatening, and the only way to approach it was to have as few children as possible so as not to risk the resources available. The Catholics, given the seriousness of the situation, had just one choice: to sell some children. That is a caricature from the Monty Python's film "The Meaning of Life" that summarises well stereotypes about family forms in different cultures.

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Spain is a Catholic country: in 1492 other religions (and other cultures) such as Muslims or Jewish were thrown out and only Catholics remained. But, we do not just mean that Spain has been Catholic for centuries, but we also refer to the culture evolution from the end of the Spanish Civil War (1939) up until the present day. It's a catholic country, among others reasons, because it has been ruled by a government (Francoist dictatorship: 1940-1975) that did not distinguish between the State and the Catholic Church, and because the law from this last Institution controlled both public and private life (as far as they could). The political democratic reform has brought some brushstrokes of secularism, but Catholic culture remains dominant, if somewhat weaker. So, we can expect to see, both in the past and also in the present, very "traditional" family forms and fertility patterns according, more or less, with the Catholic Church doctrine. However, while family forms do conform to our expectations, fertility levels are one of the lowest in the industrial world.

One way of approaching this question is to inquire into the lives of Spanish people today, their life history and present circumstances. To achieve this aim we propose to use information from an important survey, carried out by the "Instituto Nacional de Estadística" (Spanish Central Statistical Institute) known as "1991 Spanish Socio-Demographic Survey". It consists of a sample of 160,000 individuals (population of Spain totalled 38,872,268 according to the 1991 census) statistically representative of the Spanish population resident in private households and aged ten years and over (communal households are excluded). These individuals were asked to report information about their own family, employment, educational and housing history, including some specific life course events about their parents, siblings and children, and some features about the present residents members of their household. Although using this Survey we have lost deaths before 1991 (the survey took place on the last three months of 1991) and it relies on interviewed's recall. However, Spain has one of the highest life expectancies in industrial countries (although the Civil War provoked very high mortality, specially for men). Moreover, to compensate possible lacks in "collective memory" we will use whatever is possible from

historical data, that is, census information and registers of births and other life events.

2. Contemporary Family Forms and Historical Cohort Patterns in Spain at a glance.

Not surprisingly, contemplating family forms in Spain one gets the impression that nothing has changed very much over recent years. Nonetheless, evidence shows that "multiple family nucleus households" have been losing importance and, for instance, the number of households containing two or more nuclear families decreased by 17% between 1981 and 1990, and the number of people in such households decreased over that period by 16%. Similarly, "stem family households" decreased from 10.4% to 8.0% in the same period (1981-90), and the number of people living in such households decrease from 14.4% to 12.2% (Requena, 1993). "Conjugal Nuclear Family" is the most prominent family form, and those that have appeared with the post-modernity in the Western Societies (such as "young adults living alone" or "living with non related people" households) are virtually non existent in Spain. We could say that there has not been enough time (just twenty years separate us from the end of Francoist dictatorship) or we could state that it is not a question of time but a deep cultural difference between Spain and other Western Societies; or, why not?, we could think about a combination of both reasons. Nevertheless, some important changing elements have emerged and are growing quickly among Spanish society, and one of these is the apparently non-ending fall in fertility levels. We are going here to have a quick look of the contemporary household and family forms and family life cycle in Spain, with a special interest in the continuation of the decline in Spanish fertility, to try to get some explanations about these paradoxical phenomena.

2.1 Family formation.

Figure 1 illustrate the percentage, by age, of men that are living with a spouse (including cohabitants) but with no children at home. The proportions are split by whether a man has ever or had never had children, that is, by whether men are at the stage of “family formation” (according to the basic model of “nuclear family life cycle”¹) or at the stage of “completed contraction” (when the last child has left the parental home). There are very few men below the age of 50 in this former stage of the family life, but about 5% of men aged 50-90 years are living with their partner and have never had children. It refers to the number of couples in Spain that from the family formation stage did not move to the next phase, that is, did not have any child. We will now to focus our attention on people in the first stage of the family cycle (from the constitution of a couple to the birth of first child), presenting as well the main features of its historical evolution.

It is not easy to establish how many men who are living with their partner and never have had children are planning to become fathers, but we suggest that the majority of men aged less than 35 years old will become fathers. As we can see in figure 1, the proportion of men that are living with a partner but childless is significant over 20 years old, reaching 10% for men aged 25 and with the highest proportion at 28 years (18%). Percentages for women are similar but at two years younger (there is an age gap in the Spanish marriage market of 2.5-3 years). Thus, one fifth of men at their late thirties are living in their own nuclear family of his own but without children. What are they waiting for?

Though consensual unions are of negligible importance in Spanish society in comparison with other European societies, this kind of

¹ See Höhn, C., 1984.

union is significantly more common among young people. For instance, among men, 10% of those aged 21-23 living with a partner are cohabiting, 5% of men living with a partner aged 25-27 are cohabiting, as are 4% of men aged 28-30 and 3% of men aged 32-34 (at later ages cohabitation is virtually nil). Interestingly, cohabitees are slightly less likely to have children than married people, although the numbers are too small to attach any significance to this. In general terms, though, it is almost unheard of for children to be born into cohabiting families in Spain; indeed, the point at which a cohabiting couple conceive, or plan to conceive, a child is the point at which many will choose to marry. Nevertheless, the proportion of births to non married parents has slightly increased (from 3.9% in 1980 to 9.6% in 1991), paralleling to the fall in the cross-sectional fertility indicators. In conclusion, cohabitation nowadays in Spain should be considered mainly as a "trial marriage", and most children are born to married parents (Heath, S. and Miret, P., 1995). Anyway, our later fertility analysis will include consensual unions.

From the 1991 Spanish Census we also have data on the population by marital status, sex and age. Figure 5 illustrates the proportion of never married by sex and age from this data source. As noted above, contemporary women get married on average 2.5-3 years younger than men and this explains the age difference in the proportion of never married between sexes among people less than 50 years old. Amongst people over 60 years we can check the effects of the imbalance of the marriage market, and the historical trend that was increased by the Spanish Civil War (1936-39): the masculine over-mortality and the lack of births during this period lead to an increase in the asymmetry between sexes within the marriage market, that affect the proportions of ever married women (those over 70 are more than twice as likely to be never married as men of similar age -14% and 7% respectively).

Obviously we do not know the final level of never being married of people who are still marrying for the first time. If we consider 50 years old as the age before which the majority of first marriages are formed, then we can calculate the proportion of

ever marrieds at 50 years old up to the cohort born just after the Civil War. For cohorts born from 1939-43 to 1954-58, the proportions ever married by age group have been estimated on the assumption that they will finally reach similar percentages of ever married at 50 years old as the older cohorts. Table 1 shows two indices of cohort nuptiality for Spain elaborated from census data, i.e., "Proportions of Ever Married" (PEM) and Mean Age at Marriage (MAM). Figures 6 and 7 respectively represent these indicators. Men born in the 1860s, 1870s and early 1880s got married on average at 27.3 years old, and females of the same cohorts at 24.6 years old (a quite constant Mean Age at Marriage for people from fifteen different cohorts). Thus, they got married during the end of the 19th century. Proportions of never married for these cohorts were significantly higher for women than for men (11% of spinsterhood, 7% of bachelorhood), showing an unbalanced marriage market. At the current time these people would be over 100 years old, and certainly they experienced quite a late transition to the first stage of the family cycle. Moreover, those Mean Ages at Marriage in a period with a life expectancy at birth of 35 years² and a life expectancy for those aged 10 years old of 45³ should be considered a very late marriage, and accorded to the nuptiality age pattern that prevailed in Western Europe from the end of the 17th century.

Spain did not experience the trend towards earlier marriage and higher prevalence, followed by many North-Western European countries since the early 1900s. Spanish cohorts born from the late 1860s to the late 1910s, married from the late 1980s up to the late 1940s, experienced an increasingly delayed nuptiality patterns (mainly those born from 1904-08, married from the beginning of the Civil War). Mean Age at Marriage increased during that period 3 years both for men and women, and reached 30.21 years and 27.59 years for cohorts born in 1909-13 and

² In 1900 the life expectancy at birth was 33.8 years for men and 35.1 years for women. For the 1876-80 cohorts, male life expectancy at birth was 32.1, and female life expectancy was 35.0 (Cabr , 1985).

³ The life expectancy age 10 years was in 1900 of 45.7 for men and 47.2 for women (Cabr , 1985).

1914-18 for men and women respectively (married on average during the first post-war years). And for these cohorts bachelorhood increased to 9% and spinsterhood jumped up to 15%. If we accept that changes in nuptiality patterns during the early 1900 in North-Western Europe were influenced by a gradual urbanisation and industrialisation, we could suppose that few of these changes affected Spain. In summary, and generally speaking, family constitution through marriage in Spain during these first 40 years of the 20th Century were characterised by an increasing delay in timing. The proportion of men never married reflected a slight, but not very significant, rise (thus, there was not a rejection of the marriage), and consequently the increase in spinster (from 11% to 15%) should refer to a asymmetry in the marriage market, mainly provoked by the differential male morality during the Spanish Civil War.

The nuptiality model during the first twenty years of Francoist dictatorship (1940-1960) did not vary, but from the late 1950s nuptiality patterns broke with the trends followed until then. Throughout this last period age at marriage moved forward: the Mean Age at Marriage between women married just after the war (cohorts 1914-18) and those married during the late 1950s (cohorts 1929-33) differed by 1.5 years (27.6 to 26.1 years respectively), whilst between men of the same cohorts the difference was 1.8 years (30.13 to 28.30 years respectively). Parallely, there was a reversal in the balance between the sexes in the proportion of ever married: 1929-33 cohorts registered similar percentages irrespective sex (90%) and among those that nowadays are around fifty years old, bachelorhood is slightly higher than spinsterhood (see figure 5).

In fact, the Civil War (1936-39) led to a severe set back in Spain's industrial development and a ruralisation of the economy. The sectoral distribution amongst the economically active population during the Francoist dictatorship broke with pre-war trends, and the percentage of the population working in the industrial sector was not recovered until the early-1960s. In the post-civil war and

up until the early 1960s, Spain was basically a rural country, with very poor industrial development (Garrido, 1992⁴).

In respect to political and cultural factors, Francoist family policies and laws were directed at a very specific family model: the patriarchy, i.e., a married couple and their legitimate children, with a hierarchical authority structure based around the father. Motherhood was the main duty for women, a role incompatible with other roles such as waged worker. Fatherhood meant, basically, being the household head and breadwinner. Francoist family policies were fragmentary, but clearly pronatalist and antifeminist (Valiente, 1995).

In the second half of the 1950s, Franco's politics were helped by industrial development. In the mid-1960s the total employed population grew slightly, but generally speaking both men and women left the agricultural sector, men to work in industry and women to work in services. During this period of economic development the unemployment rate was very low. When the period of economic expansion came to an end in 1973, ushering in a period of economic crisis, it had only been ten years since the pre-war economic activity patterns had finally been recovered in 1964 (Garrido, 1992). With this economic prosperity, couples brought forward marriage even more: estimated Mean Age at Marriage for cohorts 1949-53⁵ (aged 36-40 years old in 1991) was 24.3 years for women and 27.29 years for men. For cohorts born between 1939 and 1942, married during the late 1960s, females ever married reached 92% and men ever married reached 91%, and we can assume that this high "quantum" will be maintained up until cohort born in the early 1950s. This nuptiality model of high prevalence and young timing (particularly if we take into account that cohorts have a life expectancy of 70 years for men and 77 years for women) marked the end of the dictatorship period and the entrance into

⁴ Data presented and analysed for this author are taken out from the Spanish Labour Survey.

⁵ From these cohorts to the last ones analysed the proportions of ever married have been estimated considering that they will follow a similar pattern to the older ones.

democracy. Moreover, around 99% of people living with a partner are in their first marriage, irrespective of age, although we are analysing cohorts with a very different marriage duration. Nevertheless, the 1981 Divorce Law broke with a legal rule existing until then (during Francoist dictatorship marriage was “until death will separate the couple”), and marriage separation is now a variable of growing importance in the analysis of the family life cycle.

The family model during these last years of Francoist dictatorship did not change, and was based on absolutely different roles between men and women within the household: in 1965 the proportion of housewives among women aged 30-39 was 80% (14% of women of that age were never married, so we can assume that around 5% of the women were married and working), and the proportion of 30-39 years old men working was 97% (bachelorhood was at 22% for men 30-34 and 14% for those aged 35-39; thus, there was a very significant proportion of men who had not constituted their own family but who were working).

Recent indicators show a new reversal in the timing of nuptiality trends. Cohorts born in 1954-58, that were around 35 years old in 1991 (even if we assume that they will not change their proportion of ever married at 50 years) will present yet a later timing with respect to younger cohorts. In fact, the percentages of ever married by age-group registered by the 1981 census were the higher in recent years (according to this census 84% of men aged 30-34 and 88% of men aged 35-39 were ever married). But there is a very large difference between the 1981 Census and 1991 Census amongst men of younger ages (75% of men aged 30-34 were ever married in 1991) but this is less for older men (85% for the 35-39). This timing delay in marriage patterns is basically a result of the impact of the economic crisis. The beginning of 1980s was characterised in the labour market by a continuous fall in the number of people in work and a complementary increase in unemployment rates.

Nevertheless, there was not any evidence of a rejection of marriage, and consensual unions or other kinds of alternatives to

the conjugal family did not increase significantly. People who did not get married remained single in the parental home and early marriage disappeared completely. In 1985 a short period of economic recovery began, characterised by growth in the employed population. Due to a parallel increase in the economically active population (particularly among women), the unemployment rate did not fall as might otherwise be expected. This recovery ended in 1990, and this decade will be remembered for its very high unemployment rates, especially among young people. The most recent cross-sectional indicators show that the average age at marriage has risen between 1980 and 1991: from 25.4 years to 27.8 years for men and from 23.4 to 25.6 for women. Even though the economic conditions clearly caused a delay in marriage timing, the high prevalence of marriage remains a mystery.

We must note that other non family households such as 'living alone' or 'living with other single people' are still very much less common amongst young people in Spain than in other European Countries. A minority of Spanish young men and women do live alone (3% among the age-group 25-55) and virtually nobody is living in a group of non-related people. And in any case these kinds of new household forms can be considered as a force promoting the fertility decline, because they are insignificant if we compare them with the proportion of young people still staying in the parental home (see figure 3 for men). In Spain, the majority (that is, more than 50%) of young men are living away from home by age 28 and the majority of young women by age 26; and at age 35 17.2% and 15.7% of Spanish men and women respectively are still living with their parents (see Heath, S. and Miret, P, 1995). From this, we can state that the main intermediary variable for the present low fertility levels in Spain is the rapid changes in family formation and, particularly, in nuptiality.

Nevertheless, it should conceal the fact that, though Spain is still one of the European countries with the lowest level of marriage break down, divorce rates have been growing since the approval of the Divorce Law in 1981. Moreover, widowhood as a cause of

the break of a conjugal couple is not insignificant for women over 50 years old. Due to these two factors (divorce and widowhood), in Spain in 1991, 5% of the children aged 5 years are living in a lone parent family, a percentage that peaks at 15 years old with 10% (see figure 3). Certainly, lone parenthood is at low levels amongst young women by comparison with other societies (5% of 30 year old women are lone mothers, a percentage that peaks at 50 years old with 10%), and virtually non-existent amongst men across the age range.

Regarding the present marriage market, we can expect a slight increase in spinsterhood for the cohorts born during the Spanish "baby-boom" (1965-75), when the cohorts increased quickly so that one cohort was significantly larger than that two or three years younger, so women will face an unbalanced marriage market. Nevertheless, for the cohorts born during the fertility decline (1975-1990) the effect will be the opposite (there will be fewer women than men who are two or three years older), and we can expect an increase in the levels of bachelorhood (Cabr , 1993).

There are multiple factors that explain the contemporary delay in nuptiality patterns, but most important are the growing levels of people's young education and the change in women's role within the household. In Spain, a high (and increasing) proportion of young people remain in full-time education. The percentage of women aged 16-19 years old staying on in non-compulsory education rose from 46.1% in 1981 to 69.8% in 1991, whilst the male participation rate rose from 46.1% to 58% over the same period. Amongst 20-24 year olds, female participation rose from 18.4% in 1981 to 36.2% in 1991, and from 16.1% to 27.6% amongst men of the same age. And 25-29 years old reflected over the same period an increase of 10% for women - from 12.2% to 22.2% - and of 6% for men - from 4.2% to 10.2% (Garrido, 1992). Nevertheless it is complicated to establish if people delay family formation because they want to study, or they are studying more and more because of the growing difficulties in the labour market. Moreover, whilst twenty years ago younger people in Spain used to work or study, but not both, and getting married, getting a stable job and leaving the paternal home together shaped a

largely homogeneous transition to adulthood, nowadays we find among the young a wide combination of formal education, unemployment , and part-time jobs.

By other hand, the proportion of housewives among women is still significant but decreasing: in 1989, among women aged 30-34 that proportion was 42.7% and among those aged 35-39 it was 50.9%. It is difficult to state clearly what part of this trend is due to the parallel decrease in the proportion of women that have formed a family of their own, that is, the extent to which women are not housewives because they are not the female household head of a conjugal family (that almost always it is their mother). It would not mean a real change in the status of women within the household. Similarly, we cannot assume that levels of women working full-time in the reproductive sphere are entirely a "cultural" feature, but we should consider the influence of the high levels of unemployment on young women's retirement within the household. On the other hand, in surveys when men define themselves as a "helpers" in the homework, they never state that they share, to an equal extent with their partner, the reproduction tasks. Actually, in Spain, the discussion about family male life cycle, male fertility and changes in the male role within the household are not independent.

2.2. Extension phase of the family life cycle.

So, historically, concerning family formation during 20th century, we can observe three contrasting periods, with the last one just beginning: 1) Up until the late 1950s, marriage was constantly delayed but with a high prevalence, and for women the percentage of never married was high because of an imbalance in the marriage market; 2) From then up until late 1970s marriage was constantly brought forward, with a more balanced marriage market, and marriage had a high cohort prevalence; and 3) During 1980s a clearly delay in the timing which might lead to a low prevalence in nuptiality, but we do not have clear evidence

for thinking so (and, for instance, there is not a significant increase in other household forms and people stay longer at home). But now we should deal with our main issue in this paper, that is, fertility patterns in Spain. We would like to answer some key questions from the dates and facts presented so far. For instance, did the advance in marriage timing and the increase in its prevalence during the economic prosperity of the 1960s lead to high fertility cohort levels? Is the present delay in family formation the main demographic intermediate factor explaining the present very low fertility indicators in Spain? (and if it is, at what extend?).

Firstly, we should note that fertility has been decreasing throughout the 20th century in Spain (from the 4.1 children by women in 1922 to 3.3 just before the Spanish Civil War⁶) After the war, Total Period Fertility Rate had two peaks (at the late 1940s and at late 1960s) and two depressions (at the early 1950s and in 1980s). For instance, in 1950 Total Fertility Rate was 2.7 children by men and 2.4 children by women; and in 1965, in the peak of the last Spanish "baby boom", this indicator was 3.0 and 2.9 children respectively by men and women. The rise in the female Total Period Fertility Rate was more important than the same indicator for men, because a more balanced marriage market lead to a higher decrease in percentages of spinsterhood than is bachelorhood. To understand of the extend of the decline we can show some snapshots of present fertility levels: 2.8 children for men and 2.7 for women in 1975; 2.1 children both for men and women in 1980; 1.6 and 1.5 respectively in 1985 and 1.4 for both sexes at the beginning of the 1990s. From then, Total Fertility Rates did not reflect any increase at all and are showing a levelling off, but it is very difficult to reach lower levels.

Beyond these continuous changes, from a cohort perspective and deeper analysis, the Gross male Reproduction Rate (or number of sons by men) has been falling throughout the 20th century: from 2.7 sons for men in the 1856-1860 birth cohorts to 1.6 sons for

⁶ Total females Fertility Rates before the 1940s have been took out from Fernández., 1978.

men in the 1916-1920 birth cohorts (men married just finished the Civil War), and to 1.3 sons by men born during the 1930s and 1940s. If we combine fertility with mortality we can elaborate the Net male Reproduction Rate, and then we realise that for cohorts born before 1920 this indicator decreased (from 1.2 sons for men for the 1871-75 cohort to 1.0 sons for women for 1921-25 cohort), for cohort born from then was levelled off (1.0/1.1 sons by men). A value of 1.0 for this last indicator means that a man's fertility and mortality are such as to ensure that the man exactly replaces himself. So, for men born in the 20th century up until the 1930s and 1940s, the volume of fathers has been higher or similar to the volume of sons. But again we cannot calculate this indicator for younger cohorts (all this analysis have been extracted from Cabré, 1985).

Continuing with the conceptual framework that we have been using, that is, the "family life cycle", we can ask ourselves about marriage cohort fertility patterns. To deal with this aim we should use the 1991 Spanish Socio-demographic Survey, because birth registers did not provide births by parity and by marriage cohort until 1975. We can elaborate the trends registered for the duration of the "family constitution" stage (i.e. from the marriage up until the birth of the first child) and the changing historical patterns in the "family extension" stage⁷. Table 2 (Indices of marriage cohort fertility for Spain by parity) and figure 8 (Mean length of the interval between marriage and births by marriage cohorts and by parity) will illustrate these issues.

Parity 1 indicators (table 2, column 1) show the proportion of each marriage cohort that reach to the family extension stage, that is, the proportion of marriages that had at least one child. Almost all marriages have had one or more children, although proportion of childless marriages has decreased slightly during the Francoist dictatorship. Among people married during and just after the Civil War (cohorts 1935-44) 7% did not have children; among those married from then up until the economic prosperity (marriage cohorts 1945-60) 6% did not have offspring, and for people

⁷ We include in "marriages" couples living in consensual unions.

married during the economic prosperity (marriage cohorts 1960-80) childlessness was 5%. We can check how this percentage coincides with the proportion of men over 50 years old living with a partner but never having had children (figure 1). People married during the first five years of the 1980s, a period of hard times in the last economic crisis in Spain, did not experience a very significant fall in the percentage with at least one child: among marriage cohorts 1980-84, after 5-10 years of marriage, 93% had a first child. Generally speaking, the extension of first births among married people does not seem sensitive to the economic environment, but the delay in marriage that Spanish young adults are experiencing will lead to a parallel delay in the timing of the first child (and consequently in the other parities). Because of the Spanish model of family formation⁸, if finally the proportion of people ever married (plus cohabitants) decreases (present continuous delaying could cause it), the "quantum" of motherhood and fatherhood in general terms (to have at least one child) will decrease to the same extent.

But if we take a look to the total marriage fertility indicators (table 2, last column) we realise that this indicator has been falling throughout the period analysed. War and post-war marriage cohorts (1935-44) had an average of 3.2 children; people married from then up until the economic prosperity period (1945-1960 marriage cohorts) had a mean of 3 children; those who married during the 1960s had 2.7; and 1970-74 marriage cohorts had on average 2.4 and people married during the late 1970s had on average 2.1 (just in the border of the level of reproduction). Consequently, francoist dictatorship pro-natalist policies and a favourable economic environment did not achieve a break with the historical trend of marriage fertility decline. All continuous decreases have an end, though this end can be zero, and present economical conditions and fertility trends may give the impression that this level can be achieved. Against this possibility, there is an increasing proportion of young adults in their late

⁸ We should remember that the current family model in Spain is still to live with your partner and children in the same household, with a very low divorce rates and few second marriages in comparison with other European countries.

twenties (members of the last "baby-boom" cohorts) that expect to constitute a family or household of their own and, some of them, become fathers and mothers.

To split up this total marriage fertility into "parities" would be very useful for our analytical purposes (see table 2) and to take into account the length between marriage and each birth order would help us as well (see figure 7). During the Francoist dictatorship the decline in total marriage fertility levels was basically due to the decrease in the levels of parity "3 and over" and, although logically younger marriage couples have been married for less time, it seems that for the marriage cohort 1975-79 (that have been married for 10-15 years) parity 2 will also be severely affected. Certainly the stereotype of a couple surrounded by children was not the majority in Spain: for example about 80-83% of the post-war marriage cohort had a second child and 53% had a third; and 85% of couples married during the 1960s and early 1970s had a second child and of the former ones, 50% had a third. Francoist policies and/or cultural family value succeeded in maintaining the level of marriage fertility. For present cohorts, the trend seems to be a contraction in the average number of children by couple, but it cannot be clearly stated yet.

Figure 2 illustrate the percentages of father living with their children by the number of children at home in Spain in 1991. The image is far from the caricature which opened this paper. The figure reflects that, consequently with the evolution in the Spanish family life cycle, over 60% of fathers in the population have two or less children living at home, because either they have no (more) children or some of them have not yet left home.

Changes in the timing of family extension are represented in figure 7. We clearly perceive the patterns beyond each historical period that here have been draw, and the changing trends between each of them. Under the twenty first years of the dictatorship the timing in the family extension was almost unchanged. Just the interval between marriage and first child decreased, but it followed a trend already observed before the war. As this indicator reflects, the length from marriage to first

child was very high for a significant number of cohorts: it was 4.2 years on average for 1940-44 marriage cohorts and decreased to 3.7 for the 1955-59 marriage cohorts. For couples married during this period (1940-60) the mean length from marriage to the second child was 6.0 years and to the third 8.6 years. It clearly refers to a certain extent "family planning" (although we are not going to deal with the methods used).

Couples married during 1960s brought forward the births of their children: on average, the 1965-69 marriage cohort had their first child after 3.0 years of marriage, the second after 5.1 years and the third after 8.0 years. These cohorts, the youngest in getting married and the fastest in having children, caused the last Spanish "baby-boom", not for having more children but to concentrate their fertility in a very specific period of time, that is, in the middle of the 1960s.

Trends reversed during the 1970s: couples had the first child later and the timing of having the second and the third for the 1975-79 marriage cohort was similar to the 1955-59 ones. It is too early to know clearly the 1980s marriage cohort fertility timing, but it will be more delayed than the former ones. The trend is still present: people form a family later and married couples have children later. And this is a key factor to fully understand the present collapse in the fertility cross-sectional levels.

3. Conclusion.

A social researcher who tries to foresee future fertility trends by projecting present patterns to the future will fail as people who thought that patterns registered in the 1960s was forever failed. Nowadays, there are so many occasional factors that making accurate forecasting is difficult. But cohorts who married in the 1960s had a specific family life cycle which contrast deeply with present young adults ones: whilst the former married at young ages for Spanish standards (26.9 years on average for men and

24.3 for women), and had children early (for Spanish standards as well), present young adults are delaying family formation and childbearing. The relationships within the household and between the family member and general society are very contrasted also between former and last cohorts: for couples married during the 1960s family model was patriarchy and family constitution took place in a growing economy which allowed to trust in a happy future; at present times, patriarchy model is not the only one and economy is in crisis. Young men and women are staying longer at parental home, studying as much as possible and with obscure future expectations.

On the other hand, living at home for an extended period of time had been not at all unusual. Indeed, people in Spain are expected to live at home until the external conditions make leaving relatively smooth and unproblematic. There is no hint of stigma attached to continued dependence on one's family. On the contrary, leaving home at early ages is often seen as a 'premature' move and even may be viewed negatively.

Figure 3 illustrates present percentages of men who are living in their family but not with their partner, by age. It shows that 80% of men age 25 were living at parental home in 1991⁹ (50% of them have certain economical independence, that is, they are working in a stable and continuous job), 30% of the aged 30 years old (2/3 economically independent) and 10% of the aged 35. Clearly, having a job is not enough to leave parental home. We can accuse the young adults of being selfish or taking family constitution too much seriously.

Looking at the family structure of the men aged 30 years old in Spain (figures 1 to 4), we get a quickly idea of present situations of young adults: 50% are fathers (3/5 with one children at home, 2/5 with two children), 20% are living with a partner but with no children, and 30% are living at parental home. By contrast, we can have a look of men aged 80 years old: 70% are living with their

⁹ There are some living not with parents but with other relatives.

partner but without children, 20% are widower living with their family and 10% are living alone.

People's experiences in the family life cycle are specially shaped by socio-economic, political and cultural factors which are specific to each society and can change over time. In this era of fertility decline and economic recession, the male life family cycle have adapted to the situation in Spain, but it is clearly framed with a very particular culture.

Acknowledgement:


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
APPENDIX

Figure 1. Men living with a partner but with no children. Spain, 1991.




Source: 1991 Spanish Sociodemographic Survey.

Figure 2. Fathers living with a partner and with their children, by number of children at home. Spain 1991.




Source: 1991 Spanish Sociodemographic Survey.

Figure 3. Men living with their family but not with a partner. Spain 1991




Source: 1991 Spanish Sociodemographic Survey.

Figure 4. Men living alone. Spain 1991.




Source: 1991 Spanish Sociodemographic Survey.

Figure 5. Proportion of never married by age and sex. Spain 1991.




Source: 1991 Spanish Census.

Figure 6. Proportion of never married at 50 years old by birth period and sex.




Source: 1991 Spanish Census.

Figure 7. Mean Age at marriage by birth period and sex.



Source: Spanish Census.

Figure 8. Mean Length of the Interval between marriage and births by marriage cohorts and by parity.



Source: 1991 Spanish Sociodemographic Survey.

**Table 1. Indices of cohort nuptiality for Spain:
Proportion of ever married (PEM) and Mean Age at Marriage (MAM).**

Birth period	Mean Age at 1991	Males		Females	
		PEM	MAM	PEM	MAM
1864-68	125	93.03	27.27	89.32	24.41
1869-73	120	92.81	27.33	89.12	24.59
1874-78	115	92.77	27.39	88.76	24.67
1879-83	110	92.81	27.34	89.26	24.65
1884-88	105	91.65	27.63	86.29	24.74
1889-93	100	91.17	27.78	85.54	25.04
1894-98	95	90.99	28.01	84.88	25.26
1899-1903	90	91.00	28.55	84.75	25.57
1904-08	85	91.42	29.56	85.11	26.27
1909-13	80	91.75	30.21	85.22	27.15
1914-18	75	92.00	30.13	85.87	27.59
1919-23	70	91.83	29.78	87.90	27.55
1924-28	65	90.91	29.04	88.93	26.98
1929-33	60	90.07	28.30	90.36	26.07
1934-38	55	90.32	27.66	91.65	25.17
1939-43*	50	90.50	27.48	91.78	24.89
1944-48*	45	90.41	27.08	91.69	24.52
1949-53*	40	90.45	26.89	91.67	24.30
1954-58*	35	90.37	27.29	91.44	24.44

* estimation for last years ever married proportions

Source: Census Data.

Table 2. Indices of marriage cohort fertility for Spain by parity:

Marriage cohort	Parity 1	Parity 2	Parity 3	Parity 4+	Total
1900-14	0.98	0.92	0.92	4.36	7.17
1915-19	0.98	0.97	0.86	2.35	5.16
1920-24	0.94	0.86	0.72	1.98	4.50
1925-29	0.94	0.86	0.71	1.45	3.95
1930-34	0.94	0.82	0.59	1.15	3.49
1935-39	0.93	0.78	0.57	0.90	3.18
1940-44	0.93	0.80	0.56	0.91	3.20
1945-49	0.94	0.79	0.52	0.74	2.99
1950-54	0.94	0.82	0.53	0.75	3.05
1955-59	0.94	0.83	0.53	0.58	2.88
1960-64	0.96	0.84	0.50	0.44	2.74
1965-69	0.95	0.85	0.51	0.39	2.71
1970-74	0.95	0.85	0.39	0.19	2.39
1975-79	0.95	0.78	0.25	0.08	2.06
1980-84	0.93	0.62	0.11	0.02	1.68
1985-89	0.74	0.19	0.02	0.01	0.96
1990-91	0.28	0.02	0.01	0.00	0.30

Source: 1991 Spanish Socio-demographic Survey.