

**PARTNERSHIP FORMATION  
IN THE CONTEXT OF WOMEN'S  
GROWING EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT**

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**Resum.-** Aquesta recerca analitza l'efecte de l'expansió del sistema educatiu en els processos de selecció de parella i, més concretament, els mecanismes que porten als individus a fer una tria determinada de les seves parelles. El treball verifica dues hipòtesis en certa mida complementàries però que poden arribar a tenir diferents efectes en el mercat matrimonial. La primera, inspirada pels teòrics de la industrialització com Treiman (1970), argumenta que cada vegada tindrà menys importància l'origen familiar en el procés de selecció de la parella i, per contra, prevaldran més els mèrits individuals com el nivell educatiu. La segona, inspirada per autors com Smits et al. (1998), argumenta que la selecció de la parella cada vegada estarà més determinada pels factors d'atracció personal que no pas per les característiques socioeconòmiques dels individus. La investigació abasta la població nascuda entre 1920 i la meitat dels seixanta a Espanya, mentre que l'eina metodològica consisteix en l'ús de la regressió logística aplicada a dades longitudinals.

**Paraules clau.-** Sistema educatiu, selecció de parella, mercat matrimonial, atracció personal.

**Resumen.-** Esta investigación analiza el efecto de la expansión del sistema educativo en los procesos de selección de la pareja y, de manera más específica, los mecanismos que llevan a los individuos a hacer una selección determinada de sus parejas. Se analiza la veracidad de dos hipótesis en cierta medida complementarias, pero que pueden llegar a tener diferentes efectos sobre el mercado matrimonial. La primera, inspirada por los teóricos de la industrialización como Treiman (1970), argumenta que cada vez tendrán más importancia los méritos individuales, como el nivel educativo, en el proceso de selección de la pareja en detrimento de otros factores como el origen familiar. La segunda, inspirada por autores como Smits et al. (1998), argumenta que la selección de la pareja estará más determinada por el simple elemento de la atracción personal en vez de las características socioeconómicas de los individuos. La investigación abarca la población nacida entre 1920 y la mitad de los años sesenta, mientras que la metodología se basa en modelos de regresión logística aplicados a datos longitudinales.

**Palabras clave.-** Sistema educativo, selección de pareja, mercado matrimonial, atracción personal.

**Abstract.-** The paper analyses the effect of educational expansion on the partner selection process and examines, more specifically, the mechanisms whereby individuals make choices about future partners. Two complementary explanatory hypotheses are tested. The first, inspired by industrialist theorists such as Treiman (1970), argues that the importance of family background on individual's achievement decreases while the importance of individual educational features or formal merits increases. The second, inspired by authors such as Smits et al. (1998), suggests that marriage choices are fundamentally guided by the attraction of persons from any social background. Each hypothesis involves different partners' selection processes. The population studied consists of cohorts born between 1920s and the mid-1960s in Spain. The analytical method used is a logistic regression model applied to longitudinal data.

**Key words.-** Assortative mating, women's educational expansion, marriage market, Spain.

**Résumé.-** Cette étude analyse les conséquences de l'expansion du système éducatif sur le processus de sélection du conjoint, et de manière plus spécifique les mécanismes qui amènent les individus à effectuer un choix déterminé du conjoint. Nous analysons tout d'abord la véracité des deux hypothèses, d'une certaine mesure complémentaire, mais qui peuvent avoir différents effets sur le marché matrimonial. La première, inspirée des théories de l'industrialisation, comme celle de Treiman (1970), suppose que les mérites individuels, comme le niveau éducatif, auront chaque fois plus d'importance dans le choix du conjoint, au détriment d'autres facteurs comme l'origine familiale. La deuxième, inspirée par des auteurs comme Smits et al. (1998), déclare que la sélection du conjoint sera plus déterminée par le seul élément de l'attraction personnelle, et ce, au détriment des caractéristiques socio-économiques des individus. Ensuite la recherche embrasse les populations nées entre 1920 et le milieu des années 70. La méthode se base sur des modèles de régression logistique appliqués sur des données longitudinales.

**Mots clés.-** Marché matrimonial, couple, niveau d'instruction, système éducatif.

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## PARTNERSHIP FORMATION IN THE CONTEXT OF WOMEN'S GROWING EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT

The educational expansion in Spain started in the mid-1950s, soon after the second large wave of emigration from the countryside, which coincided with a period of growing industrialisation. The expansion of higher education, however, only reached the working and middle-classes some time later in the 1970s. This paper analyses the effect of the educational expansion on the partner selection process. In particular, it focuses on the mechanisms whereby individuals make choices about future partners.

Educational expansion can affect the marriage market in different ways. It can be the case that the educational system functions as a *marriage market* in which different educational groups meet and reproduce intergenerational class differences. However, once a minimum level of education becomes universal, we would expect that educational attainment would become a less important individual feature in the selection of partners. In this case, partners would simply pursue the ideal of romantic love regardless of the future candidate's schooling or earning potentials.

The value of studying the *couple's educational homogamy* mainly resides in its capacity to capture degrees of *social openness*. As Smits, Lammers and Ultee put it; "if the boundaries between social groups are weak, the social structure of that society is said to be open; if the boundaries are strong, the social structure is said to be closed" (1998: 264). Thus, a low level of educational homogamy will reflect a high level of social mixing between partners, that is, marriages between persons who belong to different educational groups and thus presumably to different social classes.

There are several reasons, however, for predicting an increase in marital educational homogamy rather than marital educational heterogamy. The first comes from search theory rationality, which presupposes that individuals aim to match themselves with "like individuals" in order to reproduce their own status. This is a *social origin mechanism* that operates in the process of spouse selection. According to this assumption, it would be irrational for a highly educated person (where high levels of education are a proxy for high

social class) to marry a poorly educated person. It is worth noting, however, that in the traditional action model *men's hypogamy* (husbands having higher educational attainment than wives) has been commonplace. This is so because social class was supposed to be embodied by the figure of the male provider. The increase in women's labour force participation has, however, clearly challenged this assumption.

The second rational mechanism is *gender related*. It is predicted that women would attempt *educational assortative mating*. In other words, women seek to form partnerships with persons with similar social opportunities (as described by Blossfeld, Timm and Dasko 1998). By pursuing assortative mating, women can avoid asymmetrical and oppressive gender relationships. In choosing an equal, they are no longer disadvantaged when bargaining on the organisation of market and family and caring time (Oppenheimer 1988). Nonetheless, similar human capital investments are not always equivalent to similar comparative advantages in the market place. A certain level of gender discrimination and segmentation in the labour force persists. In the optimal scenario of a gender-egalitarian society, women's may not need to pursue rational calculations in partnership formation and, again, maybe romantic love would operate as the guiding principle in the selection of spouses.

The third and final mechanism, which may favour a couple's educational homogamy, is simply *space-related*. This acknowledges that the proximity of individuals in their common relational networks facilitates the initiation of intimate relationships. Couples' educational homogamy may occur simply because relationships are structurally determined by the *contact opportunities* which emerge first in school and, later on, in the working place (Blau 1994).

This paper explores whether education really matters in the marriage choices of individuals in Spanish society. The population studied consists of cohorts born between 1920s and the mid-1960s. This research also aims at measuring the degree and intergenerational patterns of educational homogamy. The methodological tool used to do this is logistic regression. If this procedure proves to be insufficient in explaining partners' selection processes, we can claim that mate selection is better explained either by choices based on the individual's subjectivity or on rational calculations that escape our knowledge.

There are two complementary explanatory hypotheses. The first, inspired by industrialist theorists such as Treiman's (1970), argues that the importance of family background on



individual's achievement decreases while the importance of individual educational features or formal merits increases. Therefore, intergenerational marital homogamy with regard to education is likely to increase as modernisation occurs. The second is the romantic-love hypothesis, as suggested by authors such as Smits et al. (1998), which suggests that marriage choices are fundamentally guided by the attraction of persons from any social background. If this is true, educational homogamy would tend to decrease as modernisation occurs. In other words, individuals follow their subjective preferences, rather than their material interests in choosing a partner; this implies a higher degree of social mixing.

In the next section, I describe the process of educational expansion and the consequences for the marriage market in Spain. This is necessary for understanding major changes in the marriage market. The description of the statistical method (i.e. competing risks models) and the discussion of the main findings follow the aforementioned sections.

### **1.- The closing the gender gap in education: historical and generational trends**

The growing presence of women in the educational system has been perceived as one of the main achievements of the present century. This was instigated in Spain by profound social and economic changes. Over the period of study, 1940-1990, the Spanish educational system witnessed a dramatic turn from very selective schooling limited to upper classes to a more democratic system. Compared with other western European countries, the state became responsible for public education relatively late. Before, education was for many years the result of private initiatives. During the dictatorship (1939-1975), for instance, the state took on a *subsidiary role* in the provision of education. This non-invasive approach meant delegating a great deal of responsibility to institutions such as the Catholic Church, which was quite active in post-compulsory education. The result was that educational provision targeted only certain social groups in the wealthy communities.

In this same period (1939-75), universities were run by the state. The Ministry organised the curricula though the influence of the church was strong here, too. University studies functioned primarily to channel the children of the elite into the elite professions (Boyd-Barrett 1995). There can be no doubt that there was extremely high social closure among individuals who reached higher education. Nonetheless, it is difficult to speculate about

marriage choices at that time because the Catholic conservatism of that period discounted women's educational attainment (Carabaña 1981). Thus, highly-educated men could marry women with low or high educational attainment as long as they seemed potentially "good mothers".


During and immediately after the Francoist period, general educational attainment was very poor and there were high levels of illiteracy. A survey conducted among the working population in 1965 (cross-sectional data) showed that 5% had had no education; 90% had been to primary school; 3% had been to secondary school; and 2% had been to university. A turning point in the educational system came about in 1970, a few years before Franco's death, with the introduction of a new educational act (*Ley General de Educación, LGE*). This was regarded as the beginning of a qualitative transition from one model of education to another (Boyd-Barret 1995\*). The act aimed to modernise the educational system so that it could produce workers with the skills required in the market place. The main achievement of the reform was the introduction of free, compulsory education for children between the ages of 6 and 14. It did not, however, succeed in lowering high drop-out rates, which ranged around 30 per cent (Boyd-Barret 1995\*).

In general, the provision of compulsory education was achieved in a relatively brief period and education at the primary level became universal. Under this public system, elitism and the influence of the Church also began to wane. Nonetheless, social class differences were still reproduced by discrimination between pupils who attended state schools and those who attended grant-aided private schools. This distinction, however, tended to disappear during the 1980s.

Gains in female achievement in education during the last century are remarkable. Around 1900 as many as 71 per cent of women were illiterate, compared with 56 per cent of men. In the 1930s illiteracy rates changed to 47 per cent of women and 37 per cent of men. The rates in 1990 stood at 7.9 per cent for women and 3.2 per cent for men.<sup>1</sup> The latest figures, however, mainly refer to elderly population who grew up during the civil war and the impoverished post-war period. Generally, individuals born between 1925 and 1950 were instructed in a patriarchal and religious educational system that included few females. Major changes in the gender balance of pupils came with the economic development of the 1960s, continuing its upward trend until today.

Figure 1 illustrates how the gender gap in higher education has narrowed. Overall, there has been a 54 per cent growth in the number of registered students between 1975 and 1984, with the increase mainly due to the growing presence of women. The number of female students increased by 103 per cent, while the number of men increased only by 26 per cent (CIDE 1988). By 1986 the number of women enrolled at university surpassed that of men in all regions, and by 1991 as many as 56 per cent of all graduates aged 25-29 were women. Patterns of gender segregation by speciality still persist: only 16 per cent of architecture and engineering graduates were female<sup>2</sup>.

**Figure 1.- Gendered patterns of enrolment in higher education (absolute numbers) and proportion of single women aged 20-30, 1975-1984.**



Source: Instituto de la Mujer (1988) and Garrido (1993).

The growing presence of women in higher education took place thanks to the reduced costs of education and the improvement of infrastructure across regions. The growing interest of working and middle-class families to provide education to both their male and female children, particularly in a context of unbearably high youth unemployment, also plays a

<sup>1</sup> Figures of illiterate population from 1900 and 1930 as quoted by Capel (1990) and figures for 1990 as quoted by Garrido (1992).

<sup>2</sup> Figure for 1986 as quoted in Garrido (1992) and figures for 1991 are from the Spanish Census of 1991 (INE 1994).

role (CIDE, 1988). Finally, there has clearly been an ideological change, with more women holding higher aspirations for individual autonomy and self-realisation.

Despite the recent significant expansion of higher education to the middle class, authors such as Cabrera, Dávila and González (1998) argue that access is still far from democratic. The original and current sources for the expansion include the economic improvement of middle-class families, very high youth unemployment rates<sup>3</sup>, highly subsidised state universities, and great expectations from university degrees. However, many young students take up higher education opportunities as if they were in a kind of "parking lot", waiting for better occupational prospects (Garrido 1992). Furthermore, the presence of students from modest family backgrounds (i.e. their parents have low educational level) is very small given their actual numbers in the population. These students also tend to apply for degrees with the lowest social prestige. Children whose parents are highly educated instead tend to apply for degrees with greater social prestige that require longer periods of study (e.g. medicine or engineering) (Cabrera, Dávila and González 1998).


In a generational perspective, the rapid improvement in post-compulsory education amongst the younger cohorts stands out (see figure 2). While only 12 per cent of women born in the post-civil war period (1940-1944) had access to post-compulsory education, as many as 45 per cent of the next generation of women born from 1960 to 1964 attained post-compulsory education. The reverse trend in the gender-gap at higher levels of education mainly emerges in cohorts born from the 1950s, onwards. For example, in the 1940-1944 birth cohort the proportion of men who attained a university degree was 10 per cent, double that of women. In the 1960-1964 birth cohort, however, women overtook men with 18 per cent of them completing degrees compared to 12 per cent of men the proportion of men. This is a clear shift in the structure of opportunities for upward and downward marriages between women and men.

### **1.1.- Consequences of educational expansion on marriage choice**

So far, the increase in women's educational attainment has by no means reached universal levels. The expansion of higher education, for instance, still involves a low proportion of individuals. We thus see a polarisation in family formation between highly and lesser

educated women. On the one hand, there is a growing number of educated women who tend to delay marriage and motherhood as late as possible and, on the other, there remains a significant numbers of low educated women who tend to marry and have children at early ages.

**Figure 2.- Women's and men's educational attainment by birth cohort.**



Source: ESD 1991.


This means that as more women enter the educational system, the proportion of young single women in the population will increase. The trend in the level of spinsterhood was depicted in figure 1 together with the absolute number of students enrolled in higher education. The figures give the impression that highly educated women reject (Becker

<sup>3</sup> Youth unemployment rates (age group 20-24) in 1981 were 33% for women and 27% for men; in 1991 were 36% for women and 24 for men; and in 1996 were 45% for women and 34% for men (MTSS 1984 and INE 1991 and 1996).

(1993) would say they lack interest) marriage at ages earlier than 30 years. Indeed, a strong association has been found between educational level and spinsterhood. For instance in 1990, only 22 per cent of women aged 25-29 with only primary education were single, while 79 per cent of women with a university degree were unmarried (Garrido 1992). This pattern fits Becker's theory of marriage, which suggests that better-educated women marry at lower rates because they have less to gain from marriage.

The delay in first partnership by women's educational attainment is illustrated in figure 3.

**Figure 3.- Women's and men's cumulative percentage of entering first partnership by educational level: cohort 1955-1959 (aged 32-36 in 1991).**



Source: ESD1991.

Around 50 per cent of women with *primary studies* married at the age of 22, while 50 per cent of women with *university degrees* married only at the age of 26. By the age of 31, only 10 per cent of those with primary studies and as many as 30 per cent with a university degree were single. For men, the main polarisation process occurs between university and non-university groups, but by the age of 30 these educational effects tend to disappear. This means that education is a good indicator for predicting age at first marriage, above all for women.

Though, better-educated women have certainly changed the timing of marriage, whether or not they personally perceive remaining single as more attractive is far from evident. Yet, in relative terms, women do not seem to avoid partnership formation, but rather to postpone it (Miret 1997). In attitudinal surveys, families invariably are considered to provide the best environment for attaining emotional and economic rewards (Cruz 1995). For the American context, Oppenheimer (1996) mentions both the economies of scale and the economic security gained by dual-earners as desirable arrangements in a context of uncertain labour markets. Dual-earner families are also more attractive and less economically risky than the traditional gender-symmetric family. Likewise, from the gender perspective, partnerships today are depicted as a "multi-dimensional package of mutual interdependencies" where efficiency and rewards are granted even for the better-educated women (Oppenheimer 1996).

An immediate consequence of delaying partnership formation is the reduced time available to reproduce. Although the best educated women might catch up with the fertility levels reached by poorly educated women, some indicators show this is not necessarily the case. For instance, the average number of children born to women within the age groups 35-39, 40-44, 45-50 and 50-54 is very different according to their educational attainment (see Table 1). It is important to note that these figures do not reflect the completed family size of all these women, because women aged 35-39 might continue having children until later ages. For a better approximation, we can look at the oldest groups (women aged 45-50 and 50-54 in 1991). Here we see that the average number of children produced declines with the increase in a woman's education.

As postulated by Oppenheimer (1988), better-educated women with a high investment in human capital would be more inclined to secure a *good match* in order to protect themselves from the high opportunity costs of leaving paid employment. The pressure to

abandon the labour force might arise if a husband with greater advantage in the market place reasoned that his less-advantaged wife should be the more flexible of the couple. The question now is whether women with higher educations are more likely to marry with equals than are less educated women, or whether in the new educational context men are more likely to marry downwards irrespective of their social class. Some of these questions shall be addressed later in this paper. Next, I present a preliminary look at the trends in educational pairings across cohorts.

**Table 1.-Women's average number of children (live births) by educational attainment and age groups, Spain 1991.**

<i>Educational level</i>	<i>Age groups</i>			
	<b>35-39</b>	<b>40-44</b>	<b>45-50</b>	<b>50-54</b>
Illiterate	2.9	3.3	3.6	3.7
Without formal education	2.5	2.7	2.8	2.8
Primary studies	2.1	2.3	2.5	2.5
Secondary studies	1.7	2.0	2.3	2.4
High education	1.4	1.7	2.0	2.1
<b>Total</b>	<b>2.0</b>	<b>2.3</b>	<b>2.5</b>	<b>2.7</b>

Source: INE 1991 (Census data).

## **2.- Trends in educational homogamy**

Educational homogamy has not attracted much attention in sociological studies in Spain. A pioneering study was conducted in 1981 by Carabaña in which he studied occupational homogamy at two levels: homogamy between fathers-in-law and between married couples. The author identified a greater tendency among women to marry men with greater occupational prestige. In contrast, men had a higher tendency to select female partners across the social strata. In the 1980s this pattern was not uncommon given the weak position of women in the labour market. Carabaña showed that daughters of working class parents had a slightly higher social mobility through marriage than sons: 8 per cent fewer working class daughters than sons remained in the same social class after marriage.

All things considered, Carabaña rejected the hypothesis that women had significantly higher occupational mobility than men through marriage. Because of the striking combined effect between the tendency of partners to have fathers with similar occupational prestige and the tendency of partners to have similar prestige (occupational endogamy of couples).



The latter trend stemmed from the segmentation of marriage markets according to different occupational categories.

The occupational homogamy of married couples was also shown in a study conducted by Iglesias (1995). The author highlighted that the marriage market in Spain was to a large extent *occupationally homogamic*. This means that partners with similar occupations tend to mate owing to the fact that most of the relationships took place from the spatial proximity in the workplace and other daily activities. Indeed, he estimated that as many as one out of five marriages were occupationally homogamic in 1980. The categories with a higher degree of marital homogamy were technicians and professionals (46%), followed closely by students (44%). The demographer H.V. Musham (1974) has also argued that the marriage market tends to be restricted by the simple fact that the partners' selection is usually made in a "socially restrained" space.

The findings of both studies suggest that there are two main networks which influence the process of partner selection: classmates, and colleagues. If the educational system can be said to provide the main relational network in which individuals select their partners, marital homogamy should tend to increase as educational expansion occurs. If, on the contrary, individuals tend to date - let us say - for marital purposes at a rather late age, marital heterogamy should also increase significantly.

In the 1940s and 1950s it was common for people to marry very late; the mean age at first marriage was almost 29 years for men and 26 for women. People began marrying earlier at the end of the 1960s and, by 1975, men got married on average at 26 years and women at 24 years. This pattern has reversed ever since the 1980s with a continued delay of marriage. In 1992 men got married on average at 29 years and women at 24 years keeping on average a two year difference between the partners 1997)<sup>4</sup>.

Table 2 summarises trends in educational homogamy in Spain by birth cohorts. If compared with other central and northern European states, the extraordinarily high proportion of homogamous marriages, even in the youngest birth cohorts, stands out. Some authors explain this high degree of homogamy by cultural factors such as the traditionalism of family life in Catholic countries (Smits, Ultee and Lammers 1996). However, I would

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<sup>4</sup> The two-years of difference between partners, however, is an average which may vary according to major changes and adjustments in the marriage market, for instance, due to shortages of women or men in certain areas or the influx of large number of women or men immigrants in a particular area. As Cabré (1993) argues western societies have tended to adjust the age difference between partners whenever there has been a 'shortage' on the part of one of the sexes, before the possibility of staying single.

rather interpret it as the result of both a high degree of *social closure* and structurally limited opportunities for social mixing.

**Table 2.- Distribution of upward, downward and homogamous marriages with regard to educational attainment level for birth cohorts (partner's highest educational attainment level): three educational categories\*.**

*Wives*

<i>Cohorts</i>	Upward Marriage %	Homogamous Marriage %	Downward Marriage %	Total %
<b>1910-1914</b>	(6.0)	(92.9)	(1.1)	100.0
<b>1915-1919</b>	(6.7)	(92.2)	(1.1)	100.0
<b>1920-1924</b>	6.0	93.2	0.7	100.0
<b>1925-1929</b>	7.9	91.0	1.2	100.0
<b>1930-1934</b>	7.4	91.2	1.4	100.0
<b>1935-1939</b>	11.5	86.4	2.1	100.0
<b>1940-1944</b>	13.6	82.5	3.9	100.0
<b>1945-1949</b>	16.7	78.3	5.0	100.0
<b>1950-1954</b>	17.4	74.3	8.3	100.0
<b>1955-1959</b>	19.0	69.1	<b>11.9</b>	100.0
<b>1960-1964</b>	17.0	66.8	<b>16.2</b>	100.0
<b>1965 and later</b>	(14.9)	(68.5)	<b>(16.6)</b>	100.0

*Husbands*

<i>Cohorts</i>	Upward Marriage %	Homogamous Marriage %	Downward Marriage %	Total %
<b>1910-1914</b>	(1.2)	(92.5)	(6.3)	100.0
<b>1915-1919</b>	(2.1)	(92.5)	(5.4)	100.0
<b>1920-1924</b>	1.7	93.0	5.4	100.0
<b>1925-1929</b>	2.4	91.1	6.5	100.0
<b>1930-1934</b>	3.4	89.3	7.3	100.0
<b>1935-1939</b>	2.0	87.7	10.3	100.0
<b>1940-1944</b>	3.4	81.4	15.1	100.0
<b>1945-1949</b>	6.2	76.9	16.9	100.0
<b>1950-1954</b>	9.8	71.1	19.1	100.0
<b>1955-1959</b>	<b>13.1</b>	66.9	20.0	100.0
<b>1960-1964</b>	<b>18.0</b>	65.2	16.8	100.0
<b>1965 and later</b>	<b>(15.7)</b>	(70.9)	(13.4)	100.0

Source: ESD 1991.

\*The classification of educational attainment used to estimate the type of marriage was the following: 1) Low educational level (primary school or less); 2) Secondary studies (high school or technical school); 3) Higher education (college, university or post-graduate studies).

Figures between parentheses warn us that they may not be completely reliable. The eldest cohorts may incur in problems of recall as data are drawn from a retrospective survey, whereas the youngest cohorts are too young to draw definitive conclusions. The Spanish curriculum system is explained in greater detail in appendix 1a.

The opportunities for social mixing are limited because of the generally low educational level of the population, above all in those generations born before the mid-1940s. In this situation, highly educated individuals generally come from the most privileged social groups, and they try to preserve their social status by not marrying down. This may lose its importance with more universal access to education, and we might see a higher degree of marital heterogamy. Indeed, some authors consider educational heterogamy as a good proxy for social modernisation. Ultee and Luijkx (1990), for example, found in their comparative study of 23 countries that the degree of educational homogamy was negatively related to the level of economic development. Therefore, as countries modernise educational homogamy should decrease.

As it was explained in the previous section 1, Spain has had a very rapid change in its educational structure. However, this has not had a dramatic effect on the degree of educational homogamy. As table 2 shows, the only result is a progressive, moderate decline of homogamy rates across the generations. This reinforces the argument, also stated by Carabaña (1994), that couples' educational homogamy is a social constant in Spain.

Heterogamy becomes only slightly significant in the generations born after the middle 1950s. These cohorts benefited from the educational expansion of the 1960s and 1970s.<sup>5</sup> The most outstanding feature in these heterogamic couples is the increase in women's *hypogamic marriages* (i.e. they marry less accomplished men). This illustrates the progressive decline of traditional gender roles in marriages, where husbands had the privilege of formal education given their role as the main economic providers. Interestingly enough, in the earlier cohorts women who married downward tended to have low educational attainment (secondary level at most) (see table 2a), which suggests rather progressive thinking on their part. It should be pointed out that women with university degrees were statistically rare in the older cohorts. In the younger generations, on the contrary, women in downward marriages had rather high levels of education.

There is also an increase in *women's hypergamy* (they marry men with higher educational attainment) across generations, though the initial hypothesis predicted that women would tend to avoid traditional gender partnerships. This pattern may be partly related to the general improvement in the population's educational attainment whereby there is more

room for mobility through either *upward or downward marriages*. In any case, the apparent decrease in homogamous marriages is a clear sign of social change that deserves closer examination.<sup>6</sup>

In contrast, table 2 shows a significant increase in men's upward marriages (i.e. non-traditional marriages) involving as many as 18 per cent of partnerships formed in the 1960-1964 birth cohort. In the earlier cohorts these men usually had low educational attainment, possibly related to their early entrance into paid work. In the younger generations upward marriages mainly involved men with post-compulsory educations (see table 3a). Similarly, in the younger and more highly educated generations men make fewer downward marriages and more homogamous marriages.

This high degree of educational homogamy should only be cautiously interpreted in a comparative perspective. The reason is that small changes in the classification of educational categories can easily modify the resulting distribution of marriage types (homogamous, upward or downward). Therefore, some country differences in the proportion of marriage types may sometimes reflect different educational classifications rather than real differences in marriage types.

The classification in table 2 follows the following divisions: 1) low educational attainment (i.e. primary school or less); 2) high or technical school; and 3) college or university degree. The fact that these categories are large means that estimations of marital mobility in terms of education may be smaller than what would result from a more detailed breakdown. It also means that this classification may return over-estimations of educational homogamy.

My selection of this classification scheme followed an exploration of two other possible systems. First of all, I could have divided the top of the educational structure into more detailed categories. However, the expansion of higher education took place only very recently, and very few cases would have fallen within these top categories. It, thus, seemed more sensible to divide the bottom of the educational structure into smaller groups, given the larger proportion of the population concentrated there (see figure 2). The results of this breakdown are presented in table 3 for the female cohorts.

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<sup>5</sup> Hereafter the distinction between young and old birth cohorts will refer to those born before and after the 1950s.

<sup>6</sup> I will normally refer to women's/men's downward, upward and homogamous partnerships to avoid confusions regarding the type of arrangement.

**Table 3.- Women's distribution of upward, downward and homogamous marriages with regard to educational attainment level for birth cohorts (Partner's highest educational attainment level): four educational categories\*.**

<i>Cohorts</i>	Upward Marriage	Homogamous Marriage	Downward Marriage	Total
<i>Wives</i>	%	%	%	%
1910-1914	(13.6)	(63.6)	(22.8)	100.0
1915-1919	(12.0)	(62.8)	(25.2)	100.0
1920-1924	14.6	61.7	23.7	100.0
1925-1929	17.6	60.3	22.1	100.0
1930-1934	16.2	60.6	23.1	100.0
1935-1939	22.1	55.6	22.3	100.0
1940-1944	23.7	54.7	21.6	100.0
1945-1949	27.0	51.1	22.0	100.0
1950-1954	26.0	53.0	21.0	100.0
1955-1959	25.7	53.4	20.9	100.0
1960-1964	27.3	49.6	23.2	100.0
1965 and later	(28.7)	(48.8)	(22.6)	100.0

Source: ESD 1991.

\*The classification of educational attainment used to estimate the type of marriage was the following: 1) Without formal education (illiterate, literate and uncompleted primary education); 2) Completed primary studies; 3) Secondary studies (high school or technical school); 4) Higher education (college, university or post-graduate studies).

There are striking differences between tables 2 and 3 with regard to the distribution of upward, downward and homogamous marriages by birth cohorts. The most important difference is that in table 3 the proportion of women's downward marriages is much larger than in table 2, which gives the impression that Spanish women have long been forward-thinking in their marital selection, choosing husbands with a lower educational attainment. This is not exactly the case.

Downward marriages have traditionally involved less-well educated women, as originally expected. In the cohorts born before the mid-1950s, for instance, downward marriages usually involved women who had completed their basic education and who married men with even lower educational attainment (see table 2a). For example, as many as 77 per cent of women who had completed no more than a primary education in the birth cohort 1945-1949 married downwards. These downward marriages of less well-educated women came about in a traditional gender environment in which men, typically in agrarian regions, would have interrupted their formal education at an early age to enter paid employment. Women, instead, completed their elementary education and initiated formal or informal work (e.g. family help) some time later. In the 1945-1949 birth cohort 77 per cent of

women with primary studies and 23 per cent of women with post-compulsory educations married downwards. In the younger 1960-1964 birth cohort the distribution shifted: 30 per cent of women with no more than primary studies and 70 per cent of women with post-compulsory educations married downwards. This simply reflects the fact that in modern times downward marriages tend to involve women with higher levels of education.

Which of the tables here presented best captures the reality of educational homogamy across the generations? The main difference between both of them is that while the former over-estimates the homogamy rates, the latter over-estimates female hypogamy. There are, however, several reasons why the classification used in table 2 appears to better approximate educational homogamy than that used in table 3: the distribution by marriage types illustrated in table 2 captures substantial movements across large educational categories. In this table it is not so important that a woman with a low educational level marries someone with even less education; indeed, they are all in the same category of individuals with a "low educational level". After all, they belong to the bottom of the educational structure and their mobility through marriage in terms of differences in the partner's human capital is not so significant. Though the proportion of individuals who fall into the category of "low educational level" is very large, especially in the older generations, it is theoretically sensible to maintain it as a single group.

There is yet another reason for rejecting the classification used in table 3. This has to do with "memory failure" on the part of either men or women. While many women with primary studies declared that they married men with a lower level of educational attainment, very few men in the same or relatively close birth cohorts reported that they had married women with a higher level of education. It is impossible to know who - women or men - remembers less clearly the details of their partner's education. The only solution to overcome this problem is to cluster both categories (no formal education and completed primary studies) into a single one of individuals with a "low educational level". Therefore, logistic regression models will be based on the distribution of upward, downward and homogamous marriages which result from the classification system in table 2. All individuals are pooled into a single sample in order to explore which variables shape their partner selection.

### 3.- Data, methods and variables

The statistical model described next is based on the Socio-demographic Survey (ESD) which I discussed in the introduction. The methodology used is event history analysis with discrete-time. Each observation is equivalent to a *person-year*. That is, there is an observational record for each year that a person is known to be at risk of forming a partnership. In this research a person is considered to be at risk as long as he or she is not living in either a consensual or marital partnership.

Three dependent variables have been estimated separately in the logistic regression models. The first is the probability that a man or a woman marries (or lives with) a partner with the same educational level (*homogamous marriages*). The second is that he/she marries a partner with lower educational level (*downward marriages*). The third and last is that he/she marries a partner with a higher educational level (*upward marriages*). The observations begin when the individual is aged 15, and end on the event of the first marriage or union. The observations end at the age of 50 (right censored) or at the time of the interview in 1991 (right censored) if the individual remains single.

The analysis is based on *multistate models*, or models with competing risks, in which there is a single origin state "being single and aged 15-50" and three possible destination states: marrying homogamously, marrying upwards, or marrying downwards. For example, if the dependent variable is the probability of marrying homogamously and at some point the individual marries upwards or downwards, this person would be right censored from the risks set since he or she is no longer at risk of contracting a homogamous marriage. In the models for upward marriage, the highest educational group has been dropped out of the risk set since they have a nil probability of marrying someone above their level. The lowest educational group has accordingly been dropped out of the analysis of downward marriages.

In the sample, selection was partly constrained by the characteristics of the survey. To start with, only individuals who ever enter a first partnership that lasted until the time of the interview in 1991 have been included in the study. Thus, individuals who experienced a partnership breakdown due to death of the partner, separation, or divorce have not been included. The reason for this is that questions about partners were posed only to those individuals who were living in a partnership at the time of the interview, and only the

current partner was described. This entails several problems. First, if a person has had more than one partner in the past only the last one is known and, secondly, there is a sub-representation in eldest cohorts which suffer from a higher incidence of mortality. Nonetheless, the restriction of the analysis to first partnerships does not imply a great deal of sample bias given the low level of separation and divorce in Spain. Divorce was only legalised in 1981. The proportion of marriages that ended in divorce or separation was 2.9 per cent in the 1956-1960 marriage cohort, 4.5 per cent in the 1966-1970 marriage cohort, and 4.9 in the 1976-1980 cohort (Solsona, Houle & Simó 2000).

Concerns about sub-representation in retrospective surveys suggest the suitability of limiting the sample to birth cohorts born from 1920 (aged 70 in 1991) onwards. The historical period of observation is from 1940 to 1990. The years prior to the dictatorship (the civil war lasted from 1936-39) are thus not considered, although its disruptive effects on marriage behaviour may be felt among the older generations.

Another shortcoming of the data is that they provide only cross-sectional information at the time of the interview. We must assume that the educational attainment reported in the interview is the same as it was at the time of marriage. The assumption is probably accurate though as less than 4 per cent of individuals continued within the educational system after they were married. Table 4 briefly describes the explicative variables introduced into the logistic regression models.

The first variables introduced into the logistic regression models were age (a combination of two independent variables to fit the base line of the probability of marriage, see table 3) followed by an interaction term of education and age, and birth cohorts. Overall, five nested models for the marriage formation have been estimated.

#### **4.- Results from the statistical model**

The previous sections have described the trend in assortative partnerships and the peculiarities of educational expansion. Now we turn to the event history analysis on partnership formation. This section has been divided into three parts according to the type of partnership formed: *assortative partnerships* (both partners have the same educational attainment), *female upward partnerships* and *male downward partnerships* (men have a higher educational attainment than women do) and *female downward partnerships* and



*male upward partnerships* (men have an inferior educational attainment than women do).

**Table 4.- Variables Used in the Analysis**


<b>Individual variables:</b>	
Log (current age-14)	Age measured in years.
Log (51-current age)	
Birth Cohorts	Categorical variable, ten-years birth cohorts (last cohort with only five years). Reference category: 1920-1929
Not in School	Time varying dummy variable. Not in school=1; In school:0
Education	Time varying categorical variable: primary education or less, secondary and high education (Reference category varies according to the model)
Duration in school	Time varying measured in number of years
Duration since leaving school	Time varying measured according to the number of years after school: 1-2, 3-4, 5-6, 7-8, 9-10, 11-12, >12. (Ref. category: in school)
<b>Family background:</b>	
Father's education	Time varying (fathers' education when respondent was 16 years old): Primary, Secondary, High education. Reference category: no formal qualification
Change in social origin	Time varying. Relationship between father's and child's education (father's education when respondent was 16 years old): Father's Education lower than daughter's/son's, Father's Education higher than daughter's/son's (Reference category: Father's Education equal to daughter's/son's)
<b>Contextual variables:</b>	
Regions	<i>North</i> (Galicia, Asturias, Cantabria, País Vasco, Navarra, la Rioja and Aragón), <i>Eastern</i> (Cataluña, Comunidad Valenciana and Baleares), <i>Southern</i> (Andalucía, Murcia, Ceuta, Melilla and Canarias). Reference category: <i>Madrid and centre</i> (Castilla-León, Castilla La Mancha and Extremadura).
Size of the place of residence	Small towns (less than 100,000 inhabitants). Reference category: large towns (more than 100,000 inhabitants).

#### **4.1.- The First Transition: assortative partnerships**

The trend in homogamy rates over the life course has been illustrated in figures 4 and 5 for the 1950-1959 birth cohort (individuals aged 32-41 in 1991). The curves obtained are a simulation based on the coefficients of model 2 and summarise the main trends in marital homogamy with regard to educational attainment (table 4a & 5a in the Appendix).

In this simulation individuals had finished school. The likelihood of forming a partnership during the completion of formal education is very low, above all in the youngest cohorts, which tend to delay marriage for as long as possible. Therefore, the workplace must offer an important relational network for partner selection since most people are only "marriage-ready" some years after school completion.

**Figure 4.- Women's transition rates of forming assortative partnerships according to the educational attainment (1950-1959 birth cohort).**



Source: Simulation based on the coefficients of model 2 in table 4a in Appendix.


Note: *up to compulsory* embraces individuals exempted of qualifications or with completed elementary studies.

For women, homogamy rates are higher in the low and high-educated categories, while lower among women with secondary studies. Therefore, the bottom and the top of the educational structure experience the highest homogamy rates over the life course. It is striking, however, that low educated women are far more homogamous than the highly educated. This polarisation by educational attainment indicates that women with a low investment in human capital find it difficult to move out of their social category. In other words, there is a very high degree of *social closure*. It is as if the least attractive candidates for marriage were essentially "stuck" with one another, whereas women with secondary studies enjoy greater mobility through either upward or downward marriages.

The results for men are fundamentally the same as those of women. Again, those at the top and bottom of the educational structure experience the highest homogamy rates over the life course. Men differ from women, however, in the timing at which they enter homogamous marriages. The higher the men's educational level, the later they enter into

homogamous partnerships. The reason why women do not seem to have this delay might be that men's decision to marry is mostly conditional upon school completion or economic independence. Women's decision to marry might be, instead, conditional upon other factors. Indeed, most women assume they will be economically dependent on their companions either temporary or for the long term. Therefore, these differences may reflect the existence of a traditional gender model of family formation that still persists in this 1950-1959 birth cohort. This traditional model of family formation is to a large extent reinforced by the worsening situation for women in the labour force. Women are, for instance, over-represented among unemployed and atypical workers (Moltó 1995).

**Figure 5.- Men's transition rates of forming assortative partnerships according to their educational attainment (1950-1959 birth cohort).**



Source: Simulation based on the coefficients of model 2 in table 5a in Appendix.

Note: *up to compulsory* embraces individuals exempted of qualifications or with completed elementary studies.

In model 3, in contrast to model 2, the effect of high educational attainment of high education on the propensity to marry homogamously becomes positive for women. This means that the propensity to marry homogamously is high for women with college or university degrees. In an intergenerational perspective, education acquires a more significant and positive effect on the women's decision to marry "like partner" in the younger generations (see interaction effects between cohorts and education in models 4 and 5). Therefore, a university degree in the youngest cohort increases the likelihood of engaging in *assortative mating*. For men, high educational attainment has always had an

important effect on the decision to choose homogamous marriages for all generations, being highest for the youngest cohorts.

Time since leaving school has a positive and significant relationship with the likelihood of homogamous mating. More specifically, the temporal effect of leaving school has a u-shape, so that in the first four years after abandoning education the likelihood of marrying someone with the same educational attainment decreases, and it increases significantly after the 7-8 years. Presumably, then, the longer the period men and women stayed single after completing education, the higher their likelihood was to marry homogamously. There is a threshold, however, at which this probability decreases. If they wait for more than 12 years after leaving school (coefficients in model 4) their chances begin to decrease.

The temporal effect of leaving school on the probability of marrying homogamously has the same u-shape for men and women. The only difference is that the increase in the probability that men would marry homogamously occurs some years later than for women. This might just reflect the age-gap differences on marriage by sex.

I now turn to examine the effect of *exogenous variables* on the partner's decision to marry homogamously. Interestingly enough, fathers' education has a significant effect on women while it seems to exert a lesser effect on men. Hence, the likelihood that a woman marries homogamously decreases when the father has elementary education as compared with illiterate fathers or those without even completed primary school. This pattern reinforced the notion of social closure, because the higher the fathers' education the higher the probability that daughters marry homogamously and, thus, remain "stuck" in their social class.

The fact that men are less influenced by their fathers' education may reflect, again, a gendered model of social stratification. Hence, men may manage to surpass their social origins thanks to their occupational achievement, whereas women may be more constrained by their family status and their own educational achievements. Therefore, we shall next look at the effect of women's education when they attain a higher educational level than their fathers. Do they still have the same likelihood of marrying homogamously? The results indicate rather a low probability of marrying homogamously compared with the reference category (i.e. fathers and daughters with the same educational attainment). This means that even in the case that they individually overcome their social class origins (in terms of their fathers' education), it is unlikely that they will choose an equal in terms of

their own educational level. These results contrast with findings in other countries such as Germany (Blossfeld et al. 1998), where a small proportion of individuals managed to move up intergenerationally as a result of their individual educational attainments.

Finally, daughters with lower educational attainment than their fathers have an even lower likelihood of marrying homogamously. In this case, they might feel attracted to the idea of marrying upwards to procure the same family status through marriage. In short, rather than ameliorating rigid social class boundaries, the educational system seems to reproduce the same class structure or even class inequalities. This is so at least for the cohorts analysed here.

In the last model two contextual variables were incorporated: regions and the size of the place of residence. It might be difficult, in principle, to grasp the influence of these contextual variables on longitudinal observations. Nonetheless, by the time people decide to marry they may have achieved a certain territorial stability which, at the same time, determines their marriage choices. Spain has large regional differences in terms of cultural identities and economic structures; it therefore also seems reasonable to test whether territorial differences affect the main effects of other explicative variables. In general, their inclusion in the last model does not seem to fundamentally change the main effects of other variables, although contextual variables turned out to be significant.

#### **4.2.- The Second Transition: female upward partnerships**

The first, and clearest, feature in women's traditional unions is the across-cohorts increase in the likelihood that a woman in any cohort will marry a man with higher education (see table 6a). This might be a structural effect related to their increased educational opportunities. One interesting point, however, emerges in the interaction term between birth cohorts and educational attainment. In the younger cohorts (born after the 1950s) attaining more than an elementary education decreases the likelihood of forming traditional unions. Therefore, in later cohorts women's preferences for spouses with a higher educational attainment and, therefore, higher earning potential fade away as soon as they themselves attain higher education. Thus, the effect of education on marriage decisions has only recently been felt in the highly qualified younger cohorts of women.

The pattern of marrying upwards over the life course is different than in assortative partnerships. The sooner women marry after leaving school, the higher their chances of

marrying someone with a higher levels of education. As time goes by these chances decrease, in particular eight years after leaving school. In reality, an early marriage would be more typical of a conventional marriage. If women marry soon after completing their education, they do not have much time to consolidate their professional career before they face family responsibilities. The absence of state support for working parents (i.e. the scarcity of public child-care) and the additional inequalities in the female labour market makes *negative assortative matings* (i.e. men have higher earning potential) in Spain highly undesirable for a career-oriented women. The main reason is that women with lower (potential) occupational status compared with their male partners may be compelled to drop out of the labour force.

Fathers' education also has a significant and positive effect on women's upward marriages. A father with a post-compulsory education increases the log odds that his daughter will marry upwards as compared with fathers without any qualifications. This might reflect the fact that the traditional gender rationale within better-off families is transferred to the daughters.<sup>7</sup> Furthermore, in model 5, changes in the daughters' social class origins do not seem to have a significant effect on the log odds of marrying upwards after controlling for contextual variables.

The trend of men to downwardly marry also seems to significantly increase in the younger generations (see table 7a in Appendix). However, contrary to women, highly educated men in the later cohorts (born after the 1950s) have a stronger likelihood of forming a traditional marriage than those with only secondary studies. After all, following the same status competition logic, they do not risk being compelled to drop out of the labour force as would often happen to their wives. Instead, women to some extent often facilitate their partners' abilities to combine of career and family.

Duration since leaving school has a significant and positive effect, so that the longer men they wait to marry, the higher their chances of finding a partner with a lower education (the log odds of duration since leaving school=0.05 at the  $p<0.001$  level). After 9-10 years of leaving school, this likelihood decreases.

Fathers' education does not have a significant effect, although changes in social class origin do. If sons surpass their fathers' education, the likelihood of forming traditional marriages

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<sup>7</sup> Here fathers' education is taken as a proxy for social class. In Spain the expansion of public education is very recent which means that highly educated fathers in the older generations must generally coincide with privileged or well-off families. This assumption may not work for fathers in the young birth cohorts.

is higher than if both fathers and sons have the education. However, if fathers have a higher education they do not usually form traditional marriages. Maybe the fact that sons experience family-dissimilarity in terms of their fathers' education favours a more open attitude towards accepting non-traditional unions. Finally, living in small towns seems to make it more likely that men will make traditional marriages.

#### **4.3.- The Third Transition: female downward partnerships**

As mentioned in section 1, downward marriages were not so rare in the recent past. Women at the lowest level of educational attainment in the old generations tended to marry men with even lower levels. Both women and men were at the bottom of the educational structure and presumably shared a similar status. Therefore, they do not fit within this notion of *new unions* in which we expect a substantial "gender imbalance" in favour of women, because traditional gender roles are inverted (i.e. women have a relatively higher educational attainment than men). This is captured in the model where women's downward mobility, for example, can take place only for those with secondary or high educational attainment (women with "low educational level" are removed from the sample as they cannot marry someone below their level). New unions among these two educational groups of women only emerged in Spain in the youngest birth cohorts.

In general, the likelihood that an individual forms a *new union* is very low, with assortative partnerships being far more common, but it tends to increase progressively across the young generations. This trend is partly facilitated by the recent expansion of education beyond compulsory education. Indeed, highly educated women are more likely to marry downwards than those with only secondary education. Furthermore, the time elapsed since leaving school has a significant and positive effect: the more time they are outside the educational system, the higher their chances are of marrying downwards.

Family background also has a significant effect on the decision to marry downwards. Fathers with post-compulsory education negatively affect their daughters likelihood to form *new unions*, as compared with fathers with no educational qualifications (reference category in the model, see table 8a in appendix). These fathers might be less open to their daughters' "modern partnerships". This same negative influence emerges if fathers' education is higher than daughters' education.

The results for men also show an increase in these new unions across-cohorts (see table

9a). However, these unions are more typical among the low educated. Thus men with secondary education levels (high or training school) will marry homogamously or form traditional marriages rather than form *new unions*. This trend is reinforced in the youngest cohort where reaching secondary education has a significant negative effect on the probability of forming new unions. This is the main difference between women and men concerning education: attaining a certain level of education (above elementary school) has a negative effect on men's probability to form *new unions*, whereas attaining an equally high educational level has a positive effect on women's probability to form *new unions*. This is not a coincidence as women, more often than men, have more to lose from "imbalanced relationships" in which male partners have higher educational attainment or earnings potential.

The effect of father's education is different for men than it is for women. For sons, the higher the educational level of the father, the higher the likelihood that they will marry upwards. This means that having a highly educated father has a positive effect on the probability that a man will marry upwards. Moreover, the fact that sons go beyond their fathers' education also has a positive and significant effect on their likelihood of marrying upward. This means that they first overcome their social class origins via their educational attainment and, in a second stage, via their union. These cases may correspond, however, to a minority of men.

## **5.- Summary and conclusions**

I began this paper by posing two hypotheses with regard to educational homogamy. The *industrialist hypothesis* states that individual educational attainment becomes more important than family background in partner selection. This pattern ultimately produces an increase in homogamy rates by educational groups. On the contrary, *the romantic-love hypothesis* states that educational attainment becomes less important in marriage decisions and that we should expect a decrease in educational homogamy.

The Spanish case partly supports the industrialist hypothesis. I say "partly" because, contrary to the expectations of this theory, family background and social origins still have an important effect on marriage decisions. I would then say that the Spanish marriage market is characterised by a high degree of *social closure*. The data show extremely high levels of educational homogamy in the lowest and the highest educational categories. The



high degree of educational homogamy does not arise because educational attainment is more valuable, as the hypothesis implies, but because high investment in human capital still represents a "social mark". This is further reinforced by the persistent importance of family background and social origins on partner selection, above all for women.

These results may simply reflect the fact that educational expansion came about only recently (in the 1970s for higher education) and only partially affected the youngest generations included in the study. It would be interesting to apply the same analysis to a sample with younger cohorts. Generally, there is the impression that the expansion of higher education has been tremendous. However, this perception is slightly exaggerated because while many students have had access to high education, very few have completed the courses and obtained a degree. Indeed, by the end of the 1980s the drop out rate of students from universities fluctuated, on average, between 30 and 50 per cent (Latiesa 1992).

The industrialist hypothesis, which predicts an increase in the value of individual educational attainment, also assumes that employment is based on merit. This might be one of the reasons why it can only partially explain the processes of partner selection in the Spanish context. The expansion of higher education from the 1970s coexisted with high rates of unemployment, above all for young people and women. This situation meant that a large number of jobs were, and continue to be, given on a clientelistic basis. Moreover, working parents can hardly count on state support to combine family responsibilities and paid work. The lack of assistance reinforces the traditional one-earner family model or encourages women to interrupt their careers.

In the situation described above, social class and gender (men always have better chances of promotion regardless of education) are very important factors of social stratification. People from more advantaged backgrounds tend to have better networks for finding work, regardless of their education. Men always enjoy more promotion opportunities than women. At the same time, both class and gender conceal the potential effects of educational achievement on partner selection processes, because rewards from education are not so directly or easily achieved in the labour market. Earning potential is also related to family background and/or the barriers encountered in the labour market as women or lone-parents.

Despite the high degree of educational homogamy, there are signs of change in the

emergence of the so-called *new unions* in the younger generations. This is a foreseeable trend given the larger proportion of women than men in higher education. This study has also revealed that the nature of women's downward marriages has changed across the generations. In the older cohorts (born before the 1950s), and probably in rural areas, women with only an elementary education married downwards. In contrast, in the youngest generations (born after the 1950s) highly educated women are the most likely to choose this type of union. If it is true that in both generational groups (old and young cohorts) women's education was higher than men's, only in the young cohorts do new unions imply a real challenge to the patriarchal family. These educated women would most probably secure their role as workers and mothers in equal terms with their partners, contrary to the role complementarity assumed by low-educated women.

This paper has focused on individuals who decide to marry and has overlooked those who decide to remain single or to delay marriage. These are important aspects of the current marriage market; not only has the mean age at first union increased but so too has the sociological profile of single people. In the past, these were mainly the low educated who did not find "marriageable candidates". Now, instead, they are rather individuals with secondary education or university degrees. This is also a new female strategy, as women seem to be more determined to put their economic security first rather than to invest everything in more or less stable marriages. The positive aspect of delaying marriage (to a certain extent) for women might be that they have higher probabilities of forming *assortative mating partnerships*. If it is true that individuals with equally high investment in human capital are more prone to form dual-earner families, *assortative mating* must be a way to guarantee women's reconciliation between their professional careers and motherhood.

If partnership selection by assortative mating seems to be a reasonable life course strategy for women, traditional marriages (i.e. men have higher earning potential) seems rather the opposite. The increase in this latter type of arrangement can partly be a structural effect given the recent educational expansion and, consequently, higher chances of upward mobility. The type of woman who would most likely choose a partner with higher education is the lowest educated. This pattern illustrates the continuity of a certain kind of family traditionalism, insofar as many women still choose to form marriages with dissimilar partners.

In short, the main feature of the Spanish marriage market is the high degree of educational homogamy. In the 1960-1964 women's birth cohort alone, 67 per cent of all constituted partnerships and 65 per cent in the same men's cohort show this trend. Highly educated women in the youngest generations, however, seem to be at the forefront of most changes. They are, for instance, less prone to form traditional marriages in which men have higher educational attainment than they do and, therefore, higher earning potentials. They might have indeed started to realise the potential conflicts which might arise in traditional partnerships.

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## **APPENDIX**



**Table 1a.- Distribution of type of partnerships according to the  
by birth cohorts: women.**

<b>Low educated</b>	<b>Single</b>	<b>Upward Marriage</b>	<b>Homogamous Marriage</b>	<b>Total</b>
	%	%	%	%
1910-1914	28,46	4,02	67,52	100,00
1915-1919	20,98	5,05	73,97	100,00
1920-1924	13,50	5,25	81,25	100,00
1925-1929	10,92	7,04	82,04	100,00
1930-1934	8,15	6,70	85,14	100,00
1935-1939	6,43	10,07	83,50	100,00
1940-1944	6,24	11,70	82,06	100,00
1945-1949	5,74	14,88	79,38	100,00
1950-1954	6,63	16,07	77,30	100,00
1955-1959	8,77	19,33	71,90	100,00
1960-1964	18,20	15,79	66,01	100,00
1965 older	88,84	1,95	9,21	100,00

<b>Secondary</b>	<b>Single</b>	<b>Downward Marriage</b>	<b>Upward Marriage</b>	<b>Homogamous Marriage</b>	<b>Total</b>
	%	%	%	%	%
1910-1914	32,29	17,57	50,14	0,00	100,00
1915-1919	37,35	36,40	24,14	2,12	100,00
1920-1924	44,00	15,60	16,02	24,38	100,00
1925-1929	20,17	39,57	13,94	26,32	100,00
1930-1934	26,71	27,38	18,40	27,52	100,00
1935-1939	10,24	26,30	38,98	24,48	100,00
1940-1944	15,15	29,73	37,40	17,72	100,00
1945-1949	14,31	31,13	35,88	18,68	100,00
1950-1954	14,12	33,30	28,46	24,11	100,00
1955-1959	17,01	31,61	21,18	30,19	100,00
1960-1964	33,45	28,35	12,89	25,32	100,00
1965 older	88,73	6,21	1,15	3,91	100,00

<b>High education</b>	<b>Single</b>	<b>Downward Marriage</b>	<b>Homogamous Marriage</b>	<b>Total</b>
	%	%	%	%
1910-1914	60,90	24,98	14,12	100,00
1915-1919	60,50	20,09	19,41	100,00
1920-1924	47,44	21,44	31,12	100,00
1925-1929	39,11	25,50	35,39	100,00
1930-1934	28,25	32,30	39,45	100,00
1935-1939	19,70	30,18	50,12	100,00
1940-1944	17,85	32,71	49,44	100,00
1945-1949	20,82	28,17	51,01	100,00
1950-1954	20,38	30,72	48,90	100,00
1955-1959	24,95	27,27	47,78	100,00
1960-1964	51,41	21,84	26,75	100,00
1965 older	89,08	6,98	3,94	100,00

Source: Encuesta Sociodemográfica, 1991.



Table 2a.- Educational attainment according to the type of partnership by birth cohorts: women

<u>Single</u>	Low educational attainment			Down		
	Low educational attainment	Secondary	High education	Total	Secondary	High education
1910-1914	93,70	0,77	5,53	100,00	15,60	84,40
1915-1919	92,06	2,20	5,74	100,00	52,99	47,01
1920-1924	90,38	1,37	8,25	100,00	11,53	88,47
1925-1929	90,40	1,98	7,62	100,00	43,85	56,15
1930-1934	86,75	4,87	8,38	100,00	34,27	65,73
1935-1939	85,35	4,94	9,71	100,00	46,02	53,98
1940-1944	74,51	12,21	13,28	100,00	49,61	50,39
1945-1949	64,22	15,15	20,62	100,00	54,18	45,82
1950-1954	55,96	19,26	24,78	100,00	54,87	45,13
1955-1959	44,24	24,84	30,92	100,00	57,72	42,28
1960-1964	35,41	32,44	32,14	100,00	66,82	33,18
1965 older	70,63	25,16	4,21	100,00	84,21	15,79

<u>Up</u>	Low educational attainment			Homogamous		
	Low educational attainment	Secondary	Total	Low educational attainment	Secondary	High education
1910-1914	91,71	8,29	100,00	99,43	0,00	0,57
1915-1919	93,96	6,04	100,00	99,40	0,04	0,56
1920-1924	98,60	1,40	100,00	98,88	0,14	0,98
1925-1929	97,71	2,29	100,00	98,62	0,37	1,00
1930-1934	95,51	4,49	100,00	98,19	0,54	1,27
1935-1939	87,67	12,33	100,00	96,81	1,03	2,16
1940-1944	82,26	17,74	100,00	95,05	1,38	3,57
1945-1949	81,41	18,59	100,00	92,66	2,07	5,27
1950-1954	77,73	22,27	100,00	87,59	4,42	7,99
1955-1959	75,93	24,07	100,00	77,84	9,45	12,70
1960-1964	71,08	28,92	100,00	75,68	14,47	9,85
1965 older	82,55	17,45	100,00	84,97	12,87	2,16

Source: 1991 ESD.

Table 3a.- Educational attainment according to the type of partnership by birth cohorts: men

<u>Single</u>	Low educational attainment	Secondary	High education	Total	<u>Up</u>	Low educational attainment	Secondary	Total
1910-1914	94,12	2,12	3,76	100,00	1910-1914	90,40	9,60	100,00
1915-1919	90,92	0,58	8,50	100,00	1915-1919	94,63	5,37	100,00
1920-1924	94,82	1,22	3,97	100,00	1920-1924	88,73	11,27	100,00
1925-1929	89,36	1,82	8,81	100,00	1925-1929	93,64	6,36	100,00
1930-1934	89,36	3,72	6,92	100,00	1930-1934	91,73	8,27	100,00
1935-1939	90,99	5,29	3,72	100,00	1935-1939	72,35	27,65	100,00
1940-1944	81,21	10,05	8,74	100,00	1940-1944	71,78	28,22	100,00
1945-1949	83,70	8,30	7,99	100,00	1945-1949	72,20	27,80	100,00
1950-1954	70,95	17,06	11,99	100,00	1950-1954	69,29	30,71	100,00
1955-1959	60,51	22,20	17,29	100,00	1955-1959	68,39	31,61	100,00
1960-1964	49,90	32,77	17,33	100,00	1960-1964	72,62	27,38	100,00
1965 older	73,70	23,87	2,43	100,00	1965 older	87,09	12,91	100,00

<u>Down</u>	Secondary	High education	Total	<u>Homogamous</u>	Low educational attainment	Secondary	High education	Total
1910-1914	43,13	56,87	100,00	1910-1914	98,74	0,50	0,76	100,00
1915-1919	32,59	67,41	100,00	1915-1919	98,61	0,48	0,91	100,00
1920-1924	42,41	57,59	100,00	1920-1924	98,48	0,24	1,28	100,00
1925-1929	38,85	61,15	100,00	1925-1929	98,15	0,26	1,59	100,00
1930-1934	40,48	59,52	100,00	1930-1934	97,77	0,42	1,81	100,00
1935-1939	58,17	41,83	100,00	1935-1939	95,50	0,91	3,59	100,00
1940-1944	62,10	37,90	100,00	1940-1944	92,05	2,50	5,44	100,00
1945-1949	64,00	36,00	100,00	1945-1949	90,22	2,59	7,19	100,00
1950-1954	62,45	37,55	100,00	1950-1954	83,41	6,71	9,88	100,00
1955-1959	69,75	30,25	100,00	1955-1959	77,18	11,06	11,76	100,00
1960-1964	76,82	23,18	100,00	1960-1964	75,46	16,98	7,55	100,00
1965 older	90,25	9,75	100,00	1965 older	84,82	13,65	1,53	100,00

Source: 1991 ESD.

Table 4a.- Transition rate models for assortative partnerships: women

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
<b>Log(current age-14)</b>	6,99 ***	6,73 ***	0,70 ***	0,58 ***	0,58 ***
<b>Log(51-current age)</b>	13,49 ***	13,03 ***	35,42 ***	28,50 ***	28,54 ***
<b>Birth Cohorts</b>					
1920-1929	Baseline	Baseline	Baseline	Baseline	Baseline
1930-1939	0,22 ***	0,21 ***	0,21 ***	0,20 ***	0,20 ***
1940-1949	0,34 ***	0,35 ***	0,35 ***	0,33 ***	0,33 ***
1950-1959	0,50 ***	0,48 ***	0,48 ***	0,47 ***	0,46 ***
1960-1964	0,65 ***	0,68 ***	0,69 ***	0,66 ***	0,65 ***
<b>Education * Log(current age-14)</b>					
Up to compulsory	Baseline	Baseline	Baseline	Baseline	Baseline
Secondary	0,33 **	-0,16	-0,23	-0,17	-0,15
High education	-0,02	-0,62 ***	-1,35 ***	-2,11 ***	-2,06 ***
<b>Education * Log(51-current age)</b>					
Up to compulsory	Baseline	Baseline	Baseline	Baseline	Baseline
Secondary	-1,22 ***	-0,89 ***	-0,23	-0,16	-0,17
High education	-0,66 ***	-0,48 **	0,57 ***	1,33 ***	1,32 ***
<b>Not in Sch<sup>001</sup></b>		0,99 ***	-1,13 ***		
<b>Cohorts * Education<sup>2</sup></b>					
Cohorts 1930-1939 * Education					
Secondary		0,11	0,00	-0,09	-0,06
High education		0,33	0,33	0,29	0,27
Cohorts 1940-1949 * Education					
Secondary		-0,21	-0,33	-0,42	-0,40
High education		0,47 **	0,51 **	0,49 **	0,50 **
Cohorts 1950-1959 * Education					
Secondary		0,29	0,20	0,13	0,15
High education		0,73 ***	0,78 ***	0,85 ***	0,85 ***
Cohorts 1960-1964 * Education					
Secondary		0,28	0,22	0,22	0,23
High education		0,43 **	0,52 ***	0,76 ***	0,75 ***
<b>Duration in school</b>				-0,10 ***	-0,10 ***
<b>Duration since leaving school</b>			0,01 ***		
<b>Years After School<sup>3</sup></b>					
1 - 2 Years After School				-0,86 ***	-0,84 ***
3 - 4 Years After School				-0,39 ***	-0,38 ***
5 - 6 Years After School				0,01	0,03
7 - 8 Years After School				0,29 ***	0,31 ***
9 - 10 Years After School				0,51 ***	0,52 ***
11 - 12 Years After School				0,53 ***	0,54 ***
> 12 Years After School				0,11 ***	0,11 ***
<b>Father's education</b>					
Exempted of qualificatio			Baseline	Baseline	Baseline
Primary			-0,30 ***	-0,31 ***	-0,27 ***
Secondary			-0,22 **	-0,25 **	-0,20 **
High education			-0,38 ***	-0,40 ***	-0,34 **
<b>Social origin</b>					
Father 's Education = daughter's			Baseline	Baseline	Baseline
Father 's Education < daughter's			-0,61 ***	-0,63 ***	-0,62 ***
Father s Education > daughter's			-0,85 ***	-0,91 ***	-0,90 ***
<b>Last region of residence</b>					
North					0,02
Madrid and centre					Baseline
Eastern					0,17 ***
Southern					0,12 ***
<b>Less than 100,000 inhab.<sup>4</sup></b>					0,19 ***
<b>Constant</b>	-28,53 ***	-28,60 ***	-69,89 ***	-57,22 ***	-57,52 ***
Number of events	28589	28589	28245	28245	28245
Subepisodes	527507	527507	521187	521187	521187
-2 Log Likelihood	197511	196700	199191	198059	197727
Degrees of Freedom	10	19	25	31	35

\* Statistically significant at 0.05 level; \*\* Statistically significant at 0.01 level; \*\*\* Statistically significant at 0.001 level

Baseline: 1 in school; 2 cohort 1920-1929 &amp; up-to-compulsory; 3 in school 4 more than 100,000 inhabitants.

Table 5a.- Transition rate models for assortative partnerships: men

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
<b>Log(current age-14)</b>	10,56 ***	10,40 ***	0,77 ***	0,68 ***	0,68 ***
<b>Log(51-current age)</b>	14,43 ***	14,26 ***	34,82 ***	30,46 ***	30,38 ***
<b>Birth Cohorts</b>					
1920-1929	Baseline	Baseline	Baseline	Baseline	Baseline
1930-1939	0,00	0,00	-0,01	-0,01	-0,02
1940-1949	0,02	0,00	-0,02	-0,03	-0,04 **
1950-1959	0,23 ***	0,16 ***	0,14 ***	0,14 ***	0,12 ***
1960-1964	0,38 ***	0,32 ***	0,34 ***	0,33 ***	0,31 ***
<b>Education * Log(current age-14)</b>					
Up to compulsory	Baseline	Baseline	Baseline	Baseline	Baseline
Secondary	0,30 **	0,13	0,27 **	0,16	0,12
High education	0,93 ***	0,61 ***	0,00	-0,53 ***	-0,62 ***
<b>Education * Log(51-current age)</b>					
Up to compulsory	Baseline	Baseline	Baseline	Baseline	Baseline
Secondary	-1,15 ***	-1,71 ***	-1,42 ***	-1,15 ***	-1,14 ***
High education	-1,33 ***	-1,79 ***	-0,99 ***	-0,31 **	-0,28
<b>Not in School</b>		0,56 ***	-0,77 ***		
<b>Cohorts * Education<sup>2</sup></b>					
Cohorts 1930-1939 * Education					
Secondary		0,11	-0,07	-0,21	-0,20
High education		0,60 ***	0,61 ***	0,60 ***	0,60 ***
Cohorts 1940-1949 * Education					
Secondary		0,68 **	0,51 **	0,37	0,38
High education		1,18 ***	1,22 ***	1,21 ***	1,22 ***
Cohorts 1950-1959 * Education					
Secondary		1,20 ***	1,05 ***	0,90 ***	0,92 ***
High education		1,31 ***	1,32 ***	1,36 ***	1,37 ***
Cohorts 1960-1964 * Education					
Secondary		1,27 ***	1,16 ***	1,07 ***	1,11 ***
High education		1,09 ***	1,12 ***	1,23 ***	1,26 ***
<b>Duration in school</b>				-0,05 ***	-0,05 ***
<b>Duration since leaving school</b>			0,01 ***		
<b>Years After School<sup>3</sup></b>					
1 - 2 Years After School				-0,68 ***	-0,65 ***
3 - 4 Years After School				-0,40 ***	-0,36 ***
5 - 6 Years After School				-0,22 ***	-0,18 ***
7 - 8 Years After School				0,04	0,08 **
9 - 10 Years After School				0,39 ***	0,42 ***
11 - 12 Years After School				0,58 ***	0,61 ***
> 12 Years After School				0,28 ***	0,31 ***
<b>Father's education</b>					
Exempted of qualificatio			Baseline	Baseline	Baseline
Primary			-0,14 ***	-0,15 ***	-0,13 ***
Secondary			0,00	0,00	-0,01
High education			-0,13	-0,13	-0,14
<b>Social origin</b>					
Father 's Education = son's			Baseline	Baseline	Baseline
Father 's Education < son's			-0,30 ***	-0,30 ***	-0,30 ***
Father s Education > son's			-0,33 ***	-0,38 ***	-0,41 ***
<b>Last region of residence</b>					
North					-0,13 ***
Madrid and centre					Baseline
Eastern					0,08 ***
Southern					0,14 ***
<b>Less than 100,000 inhab.<sup>4</sup></b>					-0,14 ***
<b>Constant</b>	-33,70 ***	-33,82 ***	-71,04 ***	-62,82 ***	-62,66 ***
Number of events	29.404	29.404	29.008	29.008	29.008
Subepisodes	656.966	656.966	648.342	648.342	648.342
-2 Log Likelihood	205.203	204.715	207.994	207.044	206.635
Degrees of Freedom	10	19	25	31	35

\* Statistically significant at 0.05 level; \*\* Statistically significant at 0.01 level; \*\*\* Statistically significant at 0.001 level  
Baseline: 1 in school; 2 cohort 1920-1929 & up-to-compulsory; 3 in school 4 more than 100,000 inhabitants.

Table 6a.- Transition rate models for upward partnerships: women

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
<b>Log(current age-14)</b>	9,28 ***	9,08 ***	0,92 ***	0,87 ***	0,87 ***
<b>Log(51-current age)</b>	17,10 ***	16,57 ***	46,99 ***	40,08 ***	40,02 ***
<b>Birth Cohorts</b>					
1920-1929	Baseline	Baseline	Baseline	Baseline	Baseline
1930-1939	0,52 ***	0,48 ***	0,48 ***	0,45 ***	0,44 ***
1940-1949	1,31 ***	1,25 ***	1,22 ***	1,14 ***	1,11 ***
1950-1959	1,83 ***	1,89 ***	1,84 ***	1,72 ***	1,72 ***
1960-1964	1,88 ***	2,08 ***	2,06 ***	1,86 ***	1,87 ***
<b>Education * Log(current age-14)</b>					
Up to compulsory	Baseline	Baseline	Baseline	Baseline	Baseline
Secondary	1,01 ***	0,29	-0,07	-1,19 ***	-1,21 ***
High education	--	--			
<b>Education * Log(51-current age)</b>					
Up to compulsory	Baseline	Baseline	Baseline	Baseline	Baseline
Secondary	-0,92 ***	0,49 **	0,53 **	1,15 ***	1,11 ***
High education					
<b>Not in Sch<sup>not</sup></b>		0,92 ***	-1,32 ***		
<b>Cohorts * Education<sup>2</sup></b>					
Cohorts 1930-1939 * Education					
Low educated		Baseline	Baseline	Baseline	Baseline
Secondary		0,25	0,12	0,12	0,16
Cohorts 1940-1949 * Education					
Low educated		Baseline	Baseline	Baseline	Baseline
Secondary		-0,38	-0,50	-0,41	-0,32
Cohorts 1950-1959 * Education					
Low educated		Baseline	Baseline	Baseline	Baseline
Secondary		-1,17 ***	-1,18 ***	-1,07 ***	-1,00 ***
Cohorts 1960-1964 * Education					
Low educated		Baseline	Baseline	Baseline	Baseline
Secondary		-1,55 ***	-1,51 ***	-1,36 ***	-1,28 ***
<b>Duration in school</b>					
<b>Duration since leaving school</b>			0,01 **	0,00	0,00
<b>Years After School<sup>3</sup></b>					
1 - 2 Years After School				0,94 ***	0,93 ***
3 - 4 Years After School				1,26 ***	1,25 ***
5 - 6 Years After School				1,52 ***	1,52 ***
7 - 8 Years After School				1,66 ***	1,67 ***
9 - 10 Years After School				1,54 ***	1,55 ***
11 - 12 Years After School				1,39 ***	1,41 ***
> 12 Years After School				0,49 ***	0,51 ***
<b>Father's education</b>					
Exempted of qualificatio			Baseline	Baseline	Baseline
Primary			0,54 ***	0,48 ***	0,42 ***
Secondary			0,97 ***	0,91 ***	0,79 ***
High education			0,98 ***	0,93 ***	0,79 ***
<b>Social origin</b>					
Father 's Education = daughter's			Baseline	Baseline	Baseline
Father 's Education < daughter's			0,27 **	0,23 **	0,17
Father s Education > daugther's			0,27	0,21	0,22
<b>Last region of residence</b>					
North					0,06
Madrid and centre					Baseline
Eastern					0,16 ***
Southern					0,06
<b>Less than 100,000 inhab.<sup>4</sup></b>					-0,41 ***
<b>Constant</b>	-38,61 ***	-38,58 ***	-94,77 ***	-84,64 ***	-84,29 ***
Number of events	4.728	4.728	4.688	4.688	4.688
Subepisodes	474.678	474.678	468.766	468.766	468.766
-2 Log Likelihood	46.080	45.746	45.941	45.284	45.094
Degrees of Freedom	8	13	19	25	29

\* Statistically significant at 0.05 level; \*\* Statistically significant at 0.01 level; \*\*\* Statistically significant at 0.001 level  
Baseline: 1 in school; 2 cohort 1920-1929 & up-to-compulsory; 3 in school 4 more than 100,000 inhabitants.

Table 7a.- Transition rate models for downward partnerships: men

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
<b>Log(current age-14)</b>	12,49 ***	11,12 ***	0,73 ***	0,58 ***	0,58 ***
<b>Log(51-current age)</b>	17,71 ***	16,32 ***	35,31 ***	25,16 ***	25,33 ***
<b>Birth Cohorts</b>					
1920-1929	Baseline	Baseline	Baseline	Baseline	Baseline
1930-1939	-0,04	-0,19	-0,21 **	-0,19	-0,19
1940-1949	-0,03	-0,06	-0,09	-0,05	-0,05
1950-1959	-0,14 **	-0,23 **	-0,26 **	-0,23 **	-0,23 **
1960-1964	-0,42 ***	-0,50 ***	-0,48 ***	-0,49 ***	-0,51 ***
<b>Education * Log(current age-14)</b>					
Up to compulsory	--	--	--		
Secondary	Baseline	Baseline	Baseline	Baseline	Baseline
High education	0,78 ***	0,61 **	0,11	-1,01 ***	-1,01 ***
<b>Education * Log(51-current age)</b>					
Up to compulsory	--	--			
Secondary	Baseline	Baseline	Baseline	Baseline	Baseline
High education	-0,86 ***	-0,82 ***	-0,28	0,61 ***	0,59 ***
<b>Not in Sch<sup>ool</sup></b>		1,03 ***	-0,94 ***		
<b>Cohorts * Education<sup>2</sup></b>					
Cohorts 1930-1939 * Education					
Secondary		Baseline	Baseline	Baseline	Baseline
High education		0,30 **	0,32 **	0,28	0,29 **
Cohorts 1940-1949 * Education					
Secondary		Baseline	Baseline	Baseline	Baseline
High education		0,05	0,09	0,05	0,06
Cohorts 1950-1959 * Education					
Secondary		Baseline	Baseline	Baseline	Baseline
High education		0,23	0,29 **	0,25 **	0,26 **
Cohorts 1960-1964 * Education					
Secondary		Baseline	Baseline	Baseline	Baseline
High education		0,27	0,31 **	0,35 **	0,38 **
<b>Duration in school</b>					
<b>Duration since leaving school</b>			0,05 ***	0,00	0,00
<b>Years After School<sup>3</sup></b>					
1 - 2 Years After School				0,37 ***	0,36 ***
3 - 4 Years After School				0,96 ***	0,95 ***
5 - 6 Years After School				1,26 ***	1,24 ***
7 - 8 Years After School				1,32 ***	1,30 ***
9 - 10 Years After School				1,25 ***	1,23 ***
11 - 12 Years After School				0,93 ***	0,91 ***
> 12 Years After School				0,62 ***	0,60 ***
<b>Father's education</b>					
Exempted of qualificatio			Baseline	Baseline	Baseline
Primary			-0,22 ***	-0,22 ***	-0,19 ***
Secondary			-0,14	-0,12	-0,10
High education			0,10	0,15	0,19
<b>Social origin</b>					
Father 's Education = son's			Baseline	Baseline	Baseline
Father 's Education < son's			0,39 **	0,42 **	0,43 **
Father s Education > son's			-0,47 ***	-0,53 ***	-0,55 ***
<b>Last region of residence</b>					
North					-0,03
Madrid and centre					Baseline
Eastern					0,13 **
Southern					0,18 ***
<b>Less than 100,000 inhab.<sup>4</sup></b>					0,08 **
<b>Constant</b>	-40,50 ***	-37,93 ***	-71,06 ***	-53,77 ***	-54,22 ***
Number of events	4.609	4.609	4.568	4.568	4.568
Subepisodes	118.643	118.643	117.675	117.675	117.675
-2 Log Likelihood	35.165	34.726	34.826	34.619	34.583
<b>Degrees of Freedom</b>	8	13	19	25	29

\* Statistically significant at 0.05 level; \*\* Statistically significant at 0.01 level; \*\*\* Statistically significant at 0.001 level  
Baseline: 1 in school; 2 cohort 1920-1929 & up-to-compulsory; 3 in school 4 more than 100,000 inhabitants.

**Table 8a.- Transition rate models for downward partnerships: women**

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
<b>Log(current age-14)</b>	7,13 ***	5,30 ***	0,38 ***	0,22 ***	0,24 ***
<b>Log(51-current age)</b>	12,85 ***	10,77 ***	22,10 ***	11,28 ***	11,79 ***
<b>Birth Cohorts</b>					
1920-1929	Baseline	Baseline	Baseline	Baseline	Baseline
1930-1939	0,41 **	0,28	0,41	0,32	0,36
1940-1949	0,46 **	0,34	0,54 **	0,46	0,47
1950-1959	0,80 ***	0,82 ***	1,00 ***	0,91 ***	0,92 ***
1960-1964	0,99 ***	0,99 ***	1,20 ***	1,08 ***	1,06 ***
<b>Education * Log(current age-14)</b>					
Up to compulsory	--				
Secondary	Baseline	Baseline	Baseline	Baseline	Baseline
High education	-0,12	-0,30	-0,59 **	-1,37 ***	-1,36 ***
<b>Education * Log(51-current age)</b>					
Up to compulsory	--				
Secondary	Baseline	Baseline	Baseline	Baseline	Baseline
High education	0,04	0,07	0,58 **	1,06 ***	1,07 ***
<b>Not in Sch<sup>ool</sup></b>		1,25 ***	-1,07 ***		
<b>Cohorts * Education<sup>2</sup></b>					
Cohorts 1930-1939 * Education					
Secondary		Baseline	Baseline	Baseline	Baseline
High education		0,19	0,03	0,13	0,05
Cohorts 1940-1949 * Education					
Secondary		Baseline	Baseline	Baseline	Baseline
High education		0,24	0,02	0,11	0,12
Cohorts 1950-1959 * Education					
Secondary		Baseline	Baseline	Baseline	Baseline
High education		0,09	-0,02	0,06	0,03
Cohorts 1960-1964 * Education					
Secondary		Baseline	Baseline	Baseline	Baseline
High education		0,25	0,17	0,31	0,28
<b>Duration in school</b>				0,00	0,00
<b>Duration since leaving school</b>			0,07 ***		
<b>Years After School<sup>3</sup></b>					
1 - 2 Years After School				0,79 ***	0,75 ***
3 - 4 Years After School				1,30 ***	1,26 ***
5 - 6 Years After School				1,61 ***	1,56 ***
7 - 8 Years After School				1,54 ***	1,47 ***
9 - 10 Years After School				1,52 ***	1,45 ***
11 - 12 Years After School				1,43 ***	1,36 ***
> 12 Years After School				0,87 ***	0,79 ***
<b>Father's education</b>					
Exempted of qualificatio			Baseline	Baseline	Baseline
Primary			-0,26 ***	-0,26 ***	-0,22 ***
Secondary			-0,47 ***	-0,46 ***	-0,40 **
High education			-0,50 **	-0,50 **	-0,42 **
<b>Social origin</b>					
Father 's Education = daughter's			Baseline	Baseline	Baseline
Father 's Education < daughter's			0,27	0,27	0,26
Father s Education > daughter's			-0,62 ***	-0,66 ***	-0,64 ***
<b>Last region of residence</b>					
North					0,25 ***
Madrid and centre					Baseline
Eastern					0,38 ***
Southern					0,18 **
<b>Less than 100,000 inhab.<sup>4</sup></b>					0,39 ***
<b>Constant</b>	-29,37 ***	-25,58 ***	-45,09 ***	-26,74 ***	-28,26 ***
Number of events	2.391	2.391	2.373	2.373	2.373
Subepisodes	85.565	85.565	85.034	19.872	85.034
-2 Log Likelihood	20.704	20.240	19.963	85.034	19.737
Degrees of Freedom	8	13	19	25	29

\* Statistically significant at 0.05 level; \*\* Statistically significant at 0.01 level; \*\*\* Statistically significant at 0.001 level  
Baseline: 1in school; 2 cohort 1920-1929 & up-to-compulsory; 3 in school 4 more than 100,000 inhabitants.

Table 9a.- Transition rate models for upward partnerships: men

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
<b>Log(current age-14)</b>	10,98 ***	10,94 ***	0,81 ***	0,87 ***	0,86 ***
<b>Log(51-current age)</b>	13,22 ***	12,78 ***	34,03 ***	34,24 ***	34,02 ***
<b>Birth Cohorts</b>					
1920-1929	Baseline	Baseline	Baseline	Baseline	Baseline
1930-1939	0,39 ***	0,40 ***	0,39 **	0,38 **	0,37 **
1940-1949	1,17 ***	1,10 ***	1,06 ***	0,98 ***	0,98 ***
1950-1959	2,35 ***	2,43 ***	2,40 ***	2,29 ***	2,30 ***
1960-1964	2,95 ***	3,23 ***	3,23 ***	3,01 ***	3,03 ***
<b>Education * Log(current age-14)</b>					
Up to compulsory	Baseline	Baseline	Baseline	Baseline	Baseline
Secondary	2,05 ***	1,46 ***	0,90 ***	0,16	0,11
High education					
<b>Education * Log(51-current age)</b>					
Up to compulsory	Baseline	Baseline	Baseline	Baseline	Baseline
Secondary	-1,63 ***	0,03	-0,08	0,20	0,20
High education					
<b>Not in Sch<sup>ool</sup></b>		0,66 ***	-1,13 ***		
<b>Cohorts * Education<sup>2</sup></b>					
Cohorts 1930-1939 * Education					
Low educated		Baseline	Baseline	Baseline	Baseline
Secondary		-0,64	-0,69 **	-0,60	-0,58
Cohorts 1940-1949 * Education					
Low educated		Baseline	Baseline	Baseline	Baseline
Secondary		-0,72 **	-0,74 **	-0,56	-0,55
Cohorts 1950-1959 * Education					
Low educated		Baseline	Baseline	Baseline	Baseline
Secondary		-1,47 ***	-1,48 ***	-1,33 ***	-1,30 ***
Cohorts 1960-1964 * Education					
Low educated		Baseline	Baseline	Baseline	Baseline
Secondary		-2,15 ***	-2,15 ***	-1,94 ***	-1,89 ***
<b>Duration in school</b>				0,05 ***	0,05 ***
<b>Duration since leaving school</b>			-0,01 **		
<b>Years After School<sup>3</sup></b>					
1 - 2 Years After School				1,44 ***	1,44 ***
3 - 4 Years After School				1,43 ***	1,43 ***
5 - 6 Years After School				1,63 ***	1,64 ***
7 - 8 Years After School				1,63 ***	1,64 ***
9 - 10 Years After School				1,70 ***	1,72 ***
11 - 12 Years After School				1,43 ***	1,45 ***
> 12 Years After School				0,77 ***	0,80 ***
<b>Father's education</b>					
Exempted of qualificatio			Baseline	Baseline	Baseline
Primary			0,49 ***	0,44 ***	0,40 ***
Secondary			1,39 ***	1,39 ***	1,29 ***
High education			1,30 ***	1,33 ***	1,26 ***
<b>Social origin</b>					
Father's Education = son's			Baseline	Baseline	Baseline
Father's Education < son's			0,67 ***	0,69 ***	0,67 ***
Father's Education > son's			-0,10	-0,15	-0,17
<b>Last region of residence</b>					
North					-0,02
Madrid and centre					Baseline
Eastern					0,12 **
Southern					-0,04
<b>Less than 100,000 inhab.<sup>4</sup></b>					-0,37 ***
<b>Constant</b>	-36,46 ***	-36,56 ***	-75,19 ***	-78,00 ***	-77,38 ***
Number of events	2.784	2.784	2.758	2.758	2.758
Subepisodes	600.898	600.898	592.884	592.884	592.884
-2 Log Likelihood	29.312	29.143	29.170	28.879	28.780
Degrees of Freedom	8	13	19	25	29

\* Statistically significant at 0.05 level; \*\* Statistically significant at 0.01 level; \*\*\* Statistically significant at 0.001 level  
Baseline: 1 in school; 2 cohort 1920-1929 & up-to-compulsory; 3 in school 4 more than 100,000 inhabitants.