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Globalization and the Symphony of the New (Post-modern) World: From Westphalia to Maastricht...passing by Washington DC.

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Abstract

Taking on the challenge of understanding and explaining the Symphony of (today's) New World in realistic terms (not realist), this essay aims to analyse the Post-Cold war era by devising a multi-conceptual framework that combines different theoretical contributions not yet linked in a fully explanatory way. This paper suggests two inter-related analytical contexts (or background melodies) to understand Dvorak's "New World". First, the socio-economic structural context that falls under the controversial category of Globalization and, second, the post-modern political structural context that is built on Robert Cooper's threefold analysis (Pre-modern, Modern and Post-modern) of today's world [Cooper, R: 1997, 1999]. Lastly, the closing movement (*allegro con fuoco*) enters the normative arena to assess American foreign policy options in the light of the theoretical framework devised in the first part of the essay.

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I. ADAGIO; ALLEGRO MOLTO: A NEW INTERPRETATION OF DVORAK'S MASTERWORK

"Dvorak's *New World Symphony*" is one of the best known and best loved pieces of serious music ever written. It contains many highly memorable American folksong-inspired melodies, held together in a tight, well-argued symphonic structure. The famous largo (played by English horn in the second movement) could easily have been sung in the cotton fields of the pre-Civil War South. The melody and rhythms of the Scherzo were probably drawn from Indian dance scenes he had sketched for a (never completed) opera project based on the story of Hiawatha. And the spirit of the piece as a whole reflects the vitality he felt in the still-young culture of the new world" (C. Michael Kelly, 1987).

In *Globalization and American Power*, K.Waltz [2000] responds to those who, like Thomas L. Friedman, consider globalization to be a process with far-reaching economic, political and cultural consequences, by underestimating the effects of globalization and interdependence in International Politics. According to Waltz, the world simply hasn't changed much; the nation-state still remains as the main player in international affairs and interdependence is having a rather limited impact on how international politics are (and should be) pursued.

Like most realists, Kenneth Waltz's emphasis on the continuity of history (over the discontinuities and transformations) leads him to a static, anachronistic and, therefore, misleading understanding of the structure of today's world. Not surprisingly, his analytic "misperceptions" lead him to questionable normative conclusions as well. The world is not trapped anymore in the realist balance of power system of the Cold War period. And the world is not moving either towards Francis Fukuyama's "End of History" or to Huntington's "Clash of Civilizations"¹. The New World emerging after the Fall of Communism in 1989 is more complex and subtle. Paraphrasing the quote at the opening of this essay and playing with the musical metaphor that this paper evokes, "the vitality and still-young culture" of the new world order requires new intrepid interpretations. Increasing complexity, fragmentation, and uncertainty need to be faced by new theoretical frameworks that go beyond the traditional confrontation between liberal and realists. Both have, though, something to offer. As Joseph Nye [1987: 9] put it "International relations theory is unnecessarily impoverished by exclusivist claims and by forgetting its history. Both Liberal and Realist theories have something to offer. Our current predicament is too serious to ignore either".

Taking on the challenge of understanding and explaining the Symphony of (today's) New World in realistic terms (not realist), this essay aims to analyse the Post-Cold war era by devising a multi-conceptual framework that combines different theoretical contributions not yet linked in a fully explanatory way. This paper suggests two inter-related analytical contexts (or background melodies) to understand today's world. First, the socio-economic structural context that falls under the controversial category of Globalization and, second, the post-modern political structural context that is built on Robert Cooper's threefold analysis (Pre-modern, Modern and Post-modern) of today's world [Cooper, R: 1997, 1999]. Lastly, the closing movement (*allegro con fuoco*) enters the normative arena to assess American foreign policy options in the light of the theoretical framework devised in the first part of the essay.

II. LARGO : GLOBALIZATION, THE NEW SOCIO-ECONOMIC STRUCTURAL CONTEXT (BETWEEN FRIEDMAN'S "CHEERLEADING" AND RAMONET'S "BOOING")

Something profound is happening, journalists, scholars, politicians, businessmen use the word Globalization to signify that the world is changing, that a new order is emerging. Yet, the ubiquity of the term globalization suggests that there is some confusion and disagreement as to what globalization actually means. The embarrassment is such that it has also reached the ivory tower where classic theorists struggle with what has been called "the interregnum between the modern and the post-modern era".

In order to overcome the one-dimensional nature of traditional realist analysis and precisely because of the compelling changing and complex nature of the New World, this essay proposes a flexible and somewhat eclectic approach. One that combining different theoretical contributions is able to face the challenges posed by new complexities. The first long movement in the evolving argumentation of this paper is Globalization, the socio-economic context of the new world.

Globalization is a (contradictory, unequal, discontinuous, heterogeneous and asynchronous) process of a structural and long-term nature that is driven by economic, technological and political forces. Its far-reaching consequences are, as *The Lexus and the Olive Tree* [Friedman, T: 1999] illustrates, transforming the nature of social organization, power and culture. Globalization is, indeed, a term full of paradoxes. It evokes cooperation and conflict, exclusion and inclusion, convergence and divergence and presents both changes and opportunities. Thomas Friedman, foreign affairs editorialist of *The New York Times*, and Ignacio Ramonet, director of *Le Monde Diplomatique*, represent the probably two most paradigmatic confronting views on globalization [Friedman, T; Ramonet, I : 1999].

According to Friedman, if the Cold War system was symbolized by the Berlin Wall, the new overarching characteristic of globalization is *integration* and the World Wide Web. The new era technologies (computerization, miniaturization, digitalization, satellite communications, fiber optics and the Internet) are inevitably pushing the world towards more integration. Contrary to K.Waltz's opinion, Friedman believes that, while the Cold War system was exclusively defined around nation-states and it was balanced at the centre by two superpowers, the globalization system, in contrast, is built around three new overlapping balances: The first is the traditional balance between nation-states, the second balance is between nation-states and global markets (what Friedman calls Supermarkets and the electronic herd) and the third is the balance between individual and nation-states. The main logic of Globalization is, in Friedman's view, a virtuous one: the restless flow of capital and technology forces governments that want prosperity to abandon archaic statist structures in favour of markets; to abandon corruption in favour of transparency and the rule of law; and to grant economic liberty that will sooner or later entail political liberty.

However, not everything falls under the virtuous circle Friedman describes so impassionedly. As Ramonet [1999]. argues, Globalization imposes the force of two powerful and contradictory dynamics on the world: *fusion* (or what Friedman calls integration) and *fission*. "Several multinational communities are falling victim to fission: Poverty, illiteracy violence and illness are on the rise" says Ramonet. The same flow of capital and technology that creates Friedman's virtuous circle, brings as well poverty, inequalities, destabilizing currency swings, environmental degradation, cultural homogenization, and tribalistic backlash from religious, nationalist, and ethnic groups that see their interests threatened. Indeed, Friedman probably indulges too uncritically that globalization abets, among others, economic inequality². As Ramonet underlines, the combined fortune of the 358 richest people in the world (billionaires) equals more than the annual revenue of 45% of the poorest in the world, or 2.6 billion people. In 1960, the most fortunate 20% of the planet's population were 30 times richer than the poorest 20 %. In 1997, at the height of globalization, the most fortunate were 74 times richer than the world's poorest!"

In short, globalization, with all its complexities, paradoxes and contradictions has introduced a new socio-economic context for international politics. Friedman and Ramonet would probably agree that in the new world order that has emerged since the fall of the Berlin Wall, economics has become at least as important as politics. Having dealt with the socio-economic framework, the next section introduces the second background melody of the new world, that is: the New Postmodern World or the political structural context.

III. *SCHERZO: MOLTO VIVACE* : THE NEW WORLD ORDER: AN EMERGING THREE PARTITE WORLD (PRE-MODERN, MODERN AND POST-MODERN)

1. From Westphalia to Maastricht: The Post-modern World

In his original and thought provoking analysis, R.Cooper [1997] gives an insightful intellectual response to the changing nature of the world and the erosion of the Westphalian World Order. According to him, as a result of the new world order emerging after 1989, a new kind of state-system, which he coins as “post-modern”, can be discerned. In such a system, security is not based on balance of power anymore but on mutual openness and vulnerability as sovereign states have given way to a higher degree of “transparency, permeability, and mutual interference”.³ The result of the change in the international state system is “something like a three part division of the world”. First, there is a “pre-modern model” characterised by a pre-state and post-imperial chaos resulting from the state’s loss of legitimacy and monopoly in providing security. The second part of the world is the “modern world”, which encompasses the majority of countries and where the classical state system remains in place. Thirdly, there is the above-mentioned “post-modern world”. As Robert Cooper’s view suggests, because of the complexity of the state system evolution, it is sterile and even misleading to address the nation-state as the static entity (Waltz believes it to be). Only a flexible approach (encompassing 3 coexisting scenarios) can face the intellectual challenges posed by the erosion of the Westphalian Order.

As the modern state system, the post-modern world is also a European invention. In the post-Westphalian Order [Linklater, A : 1996], the modern nation-state system is collapsing but, as Cooper (52) puts it, “unlike the pre-modern, it is collapsing into greater order rather than into disorder”. If modern Europe was born with Westphalia, the Treaty of Rome in 1957, the Treaty on Conventional Forces on Europe and, in 1991, the Treaty of Maastricht (a response to the fall of the Berlin Wall and the Reunification of Germany) symbolize the birth to the post-modern system. The European Union is the best (and probably only) place where it is *fully* meaningful to refer to a newly born world transcending the classic state-system. In the aftermath of the Cold War, the EU seems to embody the main characteristics of what Cooper calls the “new world order”: an emphasis on trade and political negotiations rather than military force, new efforts to develop multilateral diplomacy, and a commitment to liberal, humanitarian principles in foreign policy⁴.

The new post-modern World (and the EU as its highest expression) relies on a different kind of state system based on new premises⁵:

a) the *absence of war*, (War is not even thinkable among post-modern states that pursue national interest through peaceful means); As Robert Jervis [2001: 2] has put it: “Given the scale and frequency of war among the great powers in the preceding millennia this (the absence of war) is a change of spectacular proportions, perhaps the single most striking discontinuity that the theory of international politics has anywhere provided.”

b) the existence of a *Security Community*. (Such a concept is useful because it does not only stress the fact that war is unthinkable but also the fact that the international anarchy has been somehow replaced by the existence of a qualitatively different *community*);

c) the centrality of *democracy*. (Democracies don’t fight each other because: 1) the very norms of democracy (compromise, non violence, respect of law) are conducive to peace; 2) democratic transparency and free flow of information prevents or mitigates the emergence of dangerous misperceptions that could lead to war and conflict; 3) democracies tend to be more open and economically interdependent among each other, thus contributing to the creation of a web of common interests;

d) the increasing *interdependence* resulting from the globalization process (socio-economic structural context) matters because it reduces the likelihood of “realist” conflict and war and, most importantly, because it turns peace to become an end in itself. Economic relations (trade and investment) bring about gains that would otherwise be sought through war and conflict;

e) the consolidation and extension of *international institutions*⁶. The current complex setup of institutions reduces the scope of relative gains (one of the realist “favorites”) by: 1) expanding the fields in which a loss can be compensated by a gain (issue linkage); 2) conversely, expanding the range and degree of

possibilities to punish an outsider, unilateral or free-riding behavior). As Robert Gilpin [1975: 286] suggests “the emphasis of liberal economics is on absolute gains: the ultimate defense of liberalism is that over the long run everyone gains, albeit in varying degrees from a liberal economic regime”. The ultimate ideal of liberal economics is the achievement of a “Pareto optimum” world, that is, “a world wherein by improving the position of one individual no one else’s position is deteriorated” [1975: 286].

g) the emergence of *soft power* (Joseph Nye’s insightful concept underlines the power of a country’s cultural and ideological appeal and the ability to get desired outcomes through attraction instead of force. And persuading others to follow you is mainly achievable by convincing other states to agree to norms and institutions that produce your wanted results. As J.Nye himself has pointed out: “If a country can make its position attractive in the eyes of others and strengthen international institutions that encourage others to define their interests in compatible ways, it may not need to spend as many traditional economic or military resources” [Nye, J: 1999].

f) besides the previous *liberal* insights, the New World Order is also characterized by the *constructivist* systemic influence of *common values*. As people and states have become more socialized into a new set of democratic attitudes, rules and values, war has become more difficult and peace more valuable. The sense of Community, based upon an increasingly common identity (attachment to non-violence, democracy, material gains over honor) is, definitely, an important added source of order that challenges the anarchic nature of realist world (dis)order. As Friedman’s “third balance” suggests, in the post-modern world the national feeling is being eroded as the key underpinning of the system in benefit of the individual. Hence, personal allegiances go both beyond and beneath the nation-state, the boundaries of the “imagined community” becoming more blurred and flexible⁷. It is what Bull referred to (already in 1977) as “a system of overlapping authority and multiple loyalty”. Using the classic Locke-Rousseau dichotomy, the post-modern state can be perceived as a new liberal attempt to revert to a more Lockean conception of the state that stresses the individual over the community. In Rousseau’s triumphant view, the nation transcends the individual and is constituted by the so-called general will; the nation is greater than the sum of its parts, while for Locke, the nation was the sum of its individual members and the state was an entity serving the people (and not its highest expression).

It should be conceded (to realists) that the above-mentioned characteristics don’t fit entirely the new complexities of a world where the modern and even the pre-modern coexist with the emerging post-modern world described in the preceding paragraphs. That is why we should also refer to “Kaplan’s *dominium*” and the “old-fashioned” modern world.

2. R. Kaplan’s dominium: The Pre-Modern World

In this Symphony of the New World there is also place for abrupt, discordant and annoyingly dissonant sounds. They come from the pre-modern world. R. Kaplan’s “The Coming Anarchy” and “The ends of the Earth” (or the story of how scarcity, crime, overpopulation, tribalism, and disease are rapidly destroying the social fabric of our planet) are probably the most well-known accounts of what Cooper coins as “the pre-modern world”.

This is a world where the decline (or difficult construction) of the state prevents the state from fulfilling its “Weberian” prerogative: a legitimate monopoly on the use of force. Good examples of this pre-modern world are Tajikistan, Chechnya, Liberia and some other African States like Rwanda, Sierra Leone or Somalia, former Yugoslavia and, most compellingly, Afghanistan. The pre-modern world can be seen as a “post-imperial chaos”⁸, that is, as the result of the colonial departure in large regions of the world. The break up of European Empires after World War II left a large part of the world with a large number of new states whose borders often reflect arbitrary administrative decisions of colonial powers instead of national identities. As M. Ignatieff [1998: 159]. puts it in *The Warrior’s Honor* : “If you have spent time in Zaire, Rwanda, Afghanistan, the former Yugoslavia, one conclusion stares in your face. More than development, more than aid or emergency relief, more than peacekeepers, these societies need states, with professional armies under the command of trained leaders”⁹. This pre-modern world that Ignatieff would coin as “hobbesian” and Kaplan as “anarchic” is therefore characterized by both weak national identities AND weak political institutions. It is a world where the collapse of public order has been used, as Yugoslavia and Rwanda clearly show, to transform the malleable nature of identities into exclusive and conflictual ethnic allegiances. In short, this is the world marked by social disintegration, poverty and institutional breakdown that Ramonet’s account of globalization tends to emphasize (and Friedman’s tends to neglect).

3. The “Old-Fashioned” Modern World

The “old-fashioned” modern world is an order of states and is based on the traditional systems of balance of power and hegemony. Here modern states try to retain national barriers as absolute obstacles to outside interference and relations among states are based on power. The modern world represents, in Cooper’s words, the successful combination of a national identity, a national territory, a national army, a national economy and national democratic institutions. These kinds of states were the building blocks of the Westphalian order whose best illustration is probably to be found in the so-called nineteenth century Concert of Europe. It is in this environment where traditional realist thinking is more explanatory¹⁰. However, the main characteristic of the new post-modern order is precisely that the modern world is evolving towards the post-modern world that was described in the previous sections.

IV. ALLEGRO CON FUOCO: ENTERING THE NORMATIVE ARENA..... OR THE STORY OF WHAT TO DO WITH HEGEMONY

‘The international saga of the United States since World War II is like a variation on the script from the movie “The Gladiator”: we entered the arena reluctantly but once inside vanquished all challengers. Now we stand alone inside the Coliseum, victorious and sword in hand but with little idea now about what to do with Rome. What’s more, we are not even very sure where the exit signs leading out of the Coliseum are located” (Jeffrey W. Legro, NYT, 2/10/2001).

Having divided the new world emerging after 1989 into two structural contexts and three parts, it is a foregone conclusion that American foreign policy should be flexible enough to be able to deal with a three partite world. Only within the post-modern world and, increasingly, in the evolving modern world, it is meaningful to speak about a policy that rests fully on transparency, mutual surveillance and international institutions. The big challenge is precisely how to deal with the chaotic pre-modern world.

In a chillingly accurate passage that, unfortunately, requires no introduction, Robert Cooper himself wrote in [1997: 50]: “If the non-state actors of the pre-modern world become too dangerous for the established states to tolerate, it is possible to imagine a defensive imperialism. If non-state actors, notably drug, crime or terrorist groups¹¹ use non-state (pre-modern) bases to attack on the more orderly parts of the world then the organized states may eventually have to respond.”¹² As Robert Cooper in 1997, the events of September 11 are also leading some political commentators to dust off an old concept for political order: Empire. Robert Sibley, member of the Ottawa Citizen’s Editorial Board, summarises this view [2001]: “If the US and its allies have to spend the next decade pursuing anti-western terrorists and regimes, perhaps it is time to impose imperial rule on the less enlightened parts of the planet. Defensive imperialism is the only realistic response to barbarians.”

Samuel Huntington concludes in *Why International Primacy matters* [1993]: “The sustained international primacy of the United States is central to the welfare and security of Americans and to the future of freedom, democracy, open economies, and international order in the world”. For the United States, the question of “how to deal with the chaotic pre-modern world” becomes the more general “what to do with hegemony” so that foreign policy is effective in the pre-modern, modern and post-modern world.

Several visions with diverging implications have already been put forward by several scholars. Rothkopf, for instance, supports openly the idea of US cultural imperialism. In his *In Praise of Cultural Imperialism* [1997] Rothkopf recommends: “It is in the economic and political interests of the United States to ensure that if the world is moving toward a common language, it be English; that if the world is moving toward common telecommunications, safety and quality standards, they be American; that if the world is becoming linked by television, radio, and music, the programming be American; and that if common values are being developed, they be values with which Americans are comfortable”. It is probably difficult to find a statement that contributes more to Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations” by supposedly trying to avoid it. Such an American Foreign Policy (disturbingly similar to Bush’s advisers P. Wolfowitz and C. Rice), would no doubt trigger a counterproductive backlash in both the modern and the pre-modern world.

Rather than counterproductive self-proclaimed imperialisms, the primacist best strategy in a new post-modern world increasingly based on new premises (but divided in three parts) is an interdependence strategy that would be more effective in:

a) Modern world: 1) preventing the rise of any peer and revisionist competitor and assure an stable order without the threats resulting from typical balancing of power behaviors; 2) Extending the values and premises of the new emerging post-modern world.

b) Pre-Modern World: providing security, stability and development in the framework of multilateral efforts; "liberal imperialism" if at all, should be implemented multilaterally.

c) Post-modern world: In return for the acceptance of a multilateral framework of leadership (restraint), the US: 1) increases the legitimacy of the *pax americana*; 2) Increases the incentives to comply with the order and decreases the chances for a challenge of the hegemon as a result of a change in the distribution of power (revisionist power).

It is true that interaction with the modern world might (unlikely) require at times modern "realist" policies (containment, deterrence) and that policies on the "pre-modern world" may lead to a new kind of "liberal" and "humanitarian" imperialism. However, taking into account the adjustments that a three partite world require, an overall strategy that emphasizes interdependence, cooperation, international institutions, transparency, mutual surveillance and self-restraint looks like the best policy option for the US to make its unipolar moment last.

As Robert O. Keohane [1984] acknowledges "Cooperation may be fostered by hegemony; and hegemony require cooperation to make and enforce rules". It is the self-imposed restraints on the American exercise of power that makes other states less likely to balance against it. As in the aftermath of the World War II, the US can now solve the problem of a global backlash to its hyperpower by building what Ikenberry has coined as a "stakeholder" hegemony. As Ikenberry himself writes in *Getting Hegemony Right* [2001]: "Our leaders have the ideas, means and political institutions that can allow for stable and cooperative order even in the midst of sharp and sifting asymmetries of power". The setup of institutions created after World War II have made US power "both more far-reaching and durable but also more predictable and malleable". Yes, as realists would claim, hegemony channeled through a multilateral setup reduces Washington's ability "to engage in arbitrary and indiscriminate exercise of power", that is, prevents the US from becoming what Huntington has baptized as "the Rogue Superpower". Institutions, coalitions, multilateral arrangements reduce the autonomy of US policy and allow other players to operate in a world in where US power is more restrained and reliable. The "power of example" is, perhaps, the "post-modern equivalent of imperialism". If the US builds the Empire many commentators, scholars and policymakers think hegemony requires, it should be "an Empire by invitation". W. Wohlforth [1999] says in *The Stability of a Unipolar World*: "Because the system is built around US Power it creates demands for American engagement. The more efficiently Washington responds to these incentives and provides order, the more long-lived and peaceful the system". America's unipolar moment needs not end in antagonistic disarray (as realists believe) if "American Liberal Grand Strategy" adapts to a three-score symphony with an overarching melody that promotes self-restraint and international cooperation. Such a policy will reduce antagonisms to the hegemon's exercise of power and will reinforce the trend towards a new post-modern world in both the old-fashioned Westphalian world and the Hobbesian pre-modern world.

Nineteenth century Concert of Europe (with only 3 main violins - Castlereagh, Metternich and Talleyrand) has been replaced in the twenty-first century by a larger Orchestra formed by more than 200 musicians (including states -UN reports that the number of states is today 189-, NGOs, Multinationals, and Superempowered individuals like Bin Laden or Jody Williams). The new Orchestra has, however, only one director, the US President, that happens to own most of the musical instruments. His is the honor and responsibility of getting the best interpretation of Dvorak's New World Symphony. The work is a favourite for musicians to play (nearly every section has solos to sing or important musical statements to make) and, still more, for audiences to hear. Why not involving both musicians and audience in the running of the Orchestra as the most performing way of getting the best out of it? Why not, besides Dvorak's 9th Symphony, allowing, for instance, Beethoven's 9th Symphony to enter the program? Europeans would probably like to hear the beautiful Schiller's *Ode of Joy* more often... In short, the audience expects the US to play it again and again and again, but Sam, they expect you to play it differently.

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¹ Is Globalization a source of liberal order or a source of civilizational disorder? It depends on the part of the world. As this essay will argue, globalization is a source of liberal order within the post-modern world. However, in the pre-modern world, globalization can fuel a clash within civilizations rather than between civilizations. Afghanistan, Egypt, Iran, Syria and other Muslim countries are a good example of the tension between modernization and the retrograde "pre-modern" forces of a fundamentalist Islamic world.

² It is true that Friedman himself acknowledges (but probably underemphasizes) that Globalization is "just too unfair to too many people". It is probably arguable that, as Friedman believes, "the globalization system has been dominating the olive-tree impulses in most places". As the last chapter of *The Lexus and the Olive Tree* suggests, governments and the American government in particular should "democratize" globalization, both economically and politically.

³ Precisely because security no longer depends on balance, the new state system is able to incorporate large and potentially powerful states. The peaceful reunification of Germany is a proof in this direction.

⁴ Duchene's (1972) description of the EC as a "civilian power" has regained credence precisely after the Cold War.

⁵ Since most of these new premises were already analysed in detail in the previous paper, an elaborated account is not provided here.

⁶ There is a clear trend towards these goals even in countries like Russia and China, both encompassing a mixture of the old and the new. They are also moving towards a new world based on new premises. The Chinese integration into WTO and Russia's negotiations on incorporation to NATO are excellent examples in this direction.

⁷ The role of the post-Westphalian state in Europe, where both sub-national and transnational citizenship are being strengthened, is precisely, as Andrew Linklater (*Citizenship and Sovereignty in the Post-Westphalian World*) believes, the mediation between the different loyalties and identities present within post-modern societies

⁸ Yugoslavia can also be perceived as an example of post-imperial chaos in that it disintegrates after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the Cold War "Empires" or Spheres of Influence.

⁹ Ignatieff's quote is revealing in that it underlines the need for states in the "pre-modern world". However, it (as *The Warrior's Honor* in general), wrongly dismisses economic development as a major obstacle for overcoming the "pre-modern state". Economic unrest and social injustices are a key element allowing ethnic fuel to spark ethnic conflicts. Contrary to Ignatieff's opinion, economic development and social justice should be therefore considered as key components in any thinkable strategy of building a modern and stable world from the rubble of the chaotic pre-modern world.

¹⁰ This world of balance of power can be found today for instance in Asia (Pakistan, India, China)

¹¹ In the Lexus and the Olive Tree, Friedman also alerted about the superempowered individuals of the new world: "Because globalization has brought down many of the walls that limited the movement and reach of people and because it has simultaneously wired the world into networks, it gives more direct power to individuals than at any time in history. So we have today not only a superpower, not only supermarkets but also superempowered individuals". Bin Laden (Yousef in Friedman's book) and Jody Williams (anti-mine champion) are excellent examples in opposite directions of the new world super-empowered individuals.

¹² It is no coincidence that Tony Blair has taken on the modern version of Kipling's "white man burden" and has named R.Cooper as special advisor on Afghanistan at the same time.