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**The Catalan Parliament and the  
Mediterranean: a preliminary  
assessment**

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## Introduction

In his typology of states forms and regional autonomy in EU member states, John Loughlin defines Spain as a 'Regionalized Unitary state', as opposed to Federal states, Decentralized Unitary states, or Centralized unitary states (Loughlin 2000: 24 and 26-27). Only the federal states category allows for some, limited, possibility for the right of regions to conclude international treaties. All the other three categories are given a clear and unambiguous 'No' to the right to conduct institutionalised foreign policy. Therefore Spain's *comunidades autónomas* cannot and should not have foreign relations worth analysing or studying.

Reality is of course quite different for most of Spain's autonomous communities, and especially for Catalonia. This is a fact that is well recognised by academic observers and analysts alike, including of course Loughlin himself (García 1995; Aldecoa and Keating 1999; Loughlin 1996; Loughlin 2000). Indeed, the Catalan government, the *Generalitat*, has been very active in foreign relations, in particular thanks to the direct involvement of his unrelenting and long-standing President, Jordi Pujol. He is the leader of *Convergència i Unió* (CiU, a centre-right nationalist Catalan party), which has been in power in Catalonia since the first autonomous elections were held back in 1980.

One should also stress at this stage that the academic research conducted in universities comes mainly from those located in Spain's autonomous communities, especially the so-called 'historic' ones (or 'fast-track' ones as they achieved autonomy first). These *comunidades históricas* are Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia. Thus, Caterina García's contribution to an edited volume on Spain's foreign policy (Gillespie, Rodrigo and Story 1995) refers to all of them, even if she concentrates on Catalonia (García 1995).<sup>1</sup>

Another edited volume dedicated to 'Paradiplomacy', i.e. the parallel diplomacy of non-central state governments, or in other words, the foreign relations of sub-national governments (to use the sub-title of this particular volume) is mainly, although not exclusively, a Basque Country university project (Aldecoa and Keating 1999). Significantly, a Spanish version of that particular book has also been published (Aldecoa and Keating 2001). As for the literature available in Spanish, as well as in the other official languages of the Communities (Catalan, Galician, Valencian, etc.), it is much larger.

Europe, and the European Union in particular, represents the main area of interest of Catalonia. Its interest in the Mediterranean basin is more recent but important all the same and undoubtedly growing (interviews). These two areas of interest for Catalonia have combined well in the EMP (the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership), which was launched in Barcelona in November 1995. It has also been said that its launch was a 'reward' for Pujol's support of the (Socialist) central government in Madrid. Similarly, it has been argued that the associated event of the first Euro-Mediterranean Civil Forum received ample financial support from both governments in Madrid and in Barcelona (interviews). As for the three main priority areas for Catalonia before the EMP was launched, García (1993: 19) lists Europe first, then the USA and Japan, and finally Latin America. She includes the Mediterranean in Europe. Therefore, the initial interest had to do with European regions in the Mediterranean. It is more recently that the Southern Mediterranean states are being given particular attention.

It is therefore appropriate to study the Catalan involvement in the adequately named 'Barcelona process'. However this study will possess a distinct bias by focusing on *the role of the Catalan Parliament*. This is mainly due to the expanding importance of a relatively recent phenomenon, which has been dubbed 'parliamentary diplomacy' (see Stavridis 2002c). It is also due to the fact that the external policy of Catalonia has been examined elsewhere (García 1993; García 1995; Soler 2003) and is clearly monitored by a variety of institutions in forms of reports and other studies (see the various compilations of data, speeches and other activities by the various departments of, and associate institutes to, the *Generalitat*).<sup>2</sup>

What this work is not about is a theoretical study of how regionalised states should organise their foreign affairs, nor is it an attempt to try and find a more precise meaning to the term

'paradiplomacy'. Aldecoa has suggested 'plurinational diplomacy', rather than 'paradiplomacy' or 'protodiplomacy', but this will not be a focus of this work at all (see Aldecoa 1999: 82-85; Aguirre 1999: 185-209). There is no discussion either of the foreign relations of states within federations, even if there is little doubt that their foreign policy constitute 'models' for autonomous regions (Michelmann and Soldatos 1990; Hocking 1994). We do not enter finally in the question of what is actually meant by a 'region' nor the many different realities that exist in the world, nor do we discuss the existing regional organisations and how these are affected if they include, as the EU's Committee of the Regions does, both 'natural' and artificial regions (see García 1993; De Castro 1999: 100-101).

Thus, this study consists of four parts. It begins with an overview of the Spanish political system and how Catalonia fits into it, with an emphasis on Spain's foreign policy decision-making process (section 1). The following sections cover Catalonia and the Mediterranean (section 2), before concentrating on the Catalan Parliament (section 3). This study then concludes with a summary of the main findings and a set of guidelines for possible future research (Conclusions).

## **I. Setting the scene: Catalonia, the Spanish political system, and foreign affairs**

### **1. Catalonia and the Spanish Political System**

Spain is a parliamentary monarchy and the 1978 Constitution 'grants the state exclusive powers in matters of international relations' according to Article 149.1.3 (García 1995: 124) but it does not define what international relations means. The main foreign policy actors are the King, the Prime Minister and the Parliament (Gillespie, Rodrigo and Story 1995: 202-204). Foreign policy, let alone defence matters, belongs to the central government. But, very soon (see García 1995: 125-129), the existence of autonomous communities that engaged with other parts of the world has meant that this strict interpretation is only useful at a theoretical level but not in practice. All autonomies, including the most recent ones (that is to say those that are not deemed to be 'historic ones'), now possess international relations. The complexity of the Spanish political system also stems from the fact that it means that there are at least four different levels of governance that deal with international relations: the central one, the regional one, the local one, and finally, the European one (mainly, although not exclusively the EU, other institutional frameworks include the Council of Europe). One must add that at the EU level all three levels are represented one way or another in its respective institutions and other institutionalised organs (Council, Commission, EP, Committee of the regions, etc).

### **2. Catalonia and foreign affairs**

Be it for promoting Catalan identity, culture and language, or be it for strengthening the economic clout that this rich region of Spain clearly possesses, the Catalan government has been particularly active vis-à-vis Europe, especially through regional and other structures, such as the Assembly of European Regions, the Committee of the Regions or the so-called 'Four Motors of Europe' process (Weyand 1996; Loughlin 2000; see also Sodupe 1999: especially 63-67). The Catalan government has also been helped, or perhaps spurred, by the fact that the local authorities of the city of Barcelona<sup>3</sup> are also promoting their own external relations through the vast expanding net of inter-cities links which have been mushrooming over the years. There is:

'an ongoing conflict between the city of Barcelona and the *Generalitat*, exacerbated by the city having been Socialist while the *Generalitat* has been *Convergència i Unió* (centre-right Catalan nationalist)' (Loughlin 2000: 31).

There are therefore both a 'central Spain versus regional authority' dichotomy, and a 'city versus region' dichotomy worth considering, not only because of the varying and various political combinations it creates, but also because of the occasional existence of coalition politics within or across the various levels of governments in Spain. During the 1990s the CiU

(*Convergència i Unió*) supported initially the Socialist government of Felipe González (1993-1996) and later (1996-2000) that of the Partido Popular of José María Aznar, thus presenting Catalonia with an unexpected clout in nation-wide Spanish politics. The city versus region dichotomy is also visible in a variety of international and other initiatives. Thus, the *Fòrum 2004*, an initiative to make Barcelona an international centre for conflict resolution<sup>4</sup>, is the brainchild of Barcelona's former Mayor Pasqual Maragall from the Catalan Socialist Party (PSC), the Catalan-wing of the Socialists (PSOE). By securing the support of 230 local authorities of Catalonia in order to involve the whole of Catalonia, and not only the city of Barcelona, *Fòrum 2004* considers it has obtained a great success (*El País*, 12.3.2003). Even if publicly everyone is delighted by the progress of this particular project, the role of the current electoral period that is taking place in Catalonia should not be underestimated all the same. It is expected that the municipal elections will bring CiU to power in May and that the Socialists (PSC) will win the October elections at the autonomous level (regional government). In other words, it will mean an exact reversal to the situation that has existed to date in Catalonia.

It is important to stress the role played by the long-standing President of the *Generalitat*, Jordi Pujol, who has been in charge since 1980 and will only now leave this post in the forthcoming elections in October 2003. What García calls 'the international concept of Pujolism' can be summed up as 'the defence of national identity and the promotion of Catalonia's economic interests' (García 1995: 130-131). These concepts mean that the official policy of the Catalan government is to offer an outward-looking, open to the world, Catalonia. Its context has been strengthened by European integration and Spain's participation in the Atlantic Alliance<sup>5</sup> and in the EC/EU, respectively since 1982 and since 1986. The role of regionalism in EU integration will not be analysed here but it should not be underplayed either (see Jeffery 1996; Sodupe 1999; Loughlin 2000). What needs to be stressed however is the importance of personalities. Thus, Pujol is not a unique case. Manuel Fraga in Galicia is yet another example, although there is much less tension and competition with Madrid, especially during PP years in office in Madrid, as Fraga represents a traditional type of conservatism. It is interesting to note that PP and Fraga have collaborated in an effort to block appeals by opposition parties, including nationalist ones, during the current damaging ecological disaster of the *Prestige*, including initiatives made at the level of the European Parliament. Similarly, central political parties sometimes use individuals to try and influence regional politics, as was the case with Manuel Chaves, the current President of the *Junta de Andalucía* (the Andalusian autonomous government) who had held various ministerial portfolios in the González governments. A similar case now will be that of former Spanish Foreign Minister Josep Piqué who is trying to win votes in Catalonia for the PP. Although, one should note that the norm used to be to 'move up' from the regional level to Madrid (interviews). What remains unclear is if the successor to Mr Pujol will have the same personal commitment to an international role for Catalonia. Of course after twenty years of Pujolism, it is likely that its legacy will continue for a while but personalities and personal commitments do matter in foreign affairs (interviews).

Thus, both the European context and the role of personalities are important elements in the international relations of Catalonia. This is important in a study of parliamentary inputs in international affairs because, as I have shown elsewhere<sup>6</sup>, both the EU context and the role of individuals and their personal contacts are particularly important in the international relations of parliaments. Therefore, one needs to stress how important these two factors have been in Catalonia's external relations but also with regard to the Catalan Parliament's foreign affairs.

Before turning to Catalonia and the Mediterranean, one should bear in mind that in addition to the fact that this is an election year in Spain for the municipal and regional elections, there will also be a general (parliamentary) election in 2004. Moreover, the current international situation (terrorism, Iraq, etc) and the changes being made or planned at the EU level (Convention, enlargement, IGC 2004) mean the whole situation is in a state of flux. Thus, it is difficult to assess which decisions are guided by mere electoral gain and which are of more fundamental importance. Hence, the January 2003 document produced by the Catalan government and submitted to the European Convention asking for more regional powers within the EU structure<sup>7</sup> must not only be seen in the EU Convention debate context but also in the framework of the local, regional and national Spanish electoral situations. The same applies to specific initiatives in that direction, including in the field of international relations, such as the recent declaration by Artur Mas, Pujol's top adviser and tipped successor on the need to set up a foreign ministry in

Catalonia, based on the Quebec model. It is not a coincidence that Mas made this announcement whilst he was visiting Quebec (*El País*, 18.02.03).

## II. Catalonia and the Mediterranean

A slight shift in Catalonia's foreign policy priority to include the Mediterranean culminated with the EMP when it was launched in the Catalan capital in November 1995, and therefore adequately named the 'Barcelona Process'. This shift did not come about easily because it meant a wider Spanish foreign policy change from its Europeanization following NATO and EEC accessions (respectively 1982 and 1986). Until then, the Mediterranean meant almost exclusively its Northern rim with the obvious exceptions of energy concerns (oil and gas supplies), Ceuta and Melilla, and the Western Sahara. Once the central government shifted its attention through the EU prism of the EMP to the southern rim of the Mediterranean (a decision taken by the Commission, Germany and the EU Mediterranean states as a counter-balance to Eastern enlargement), Catalonia's own expressed interest in the region gained strength<sup>8</sup>. It is said that Pujol has claimed that he was interested in Morocco well before Spanish Premier Felipe González (an Andalusian) showed any such interest. The main reason why such a shift occurred has to do with the deteriorating economic and social situation in the Southern Mediterranean and an increase in the numbers of illegal immigrants, in the so-called *pateras*, better known worldwide as 'boat people'. Many such immigrants end up in Catalonia as one of the richest region in Spain. For instance, during last year only Catalonia registered nearly 38,000 illegal immigrants, and expelled nearly a thousand of them (*El País*, 15.2.2003). A number that represents a five-fold increase from the previous year. Although most of these immigrants now come from Eastern Europe, and especially Romania, nearly a third of all immigrants who live in Catalonia still come from Morocco.

Out of a total of 341,668 immigrants, these include:

- 104,410 (30.5%) from Morocco
- over 20,000 from Ecuador
- over 15,000 from Peru
- over 15,000 from China
- over 10,000 from Colombia
- nearly 10,000 from Pakistan
- and nearly 10,000 from the Dominican Republic.

What is important is that the *Generalitat* now has (or is about to open) offices in Morocco, Poland and Ecuador, mainly because of the (increasing) number of migrants from these countries (interviews<sup>9</sup>). The focus of the work of these new offices will be to help organise migration in a way that suits the needs of the Catalan economy but also, as Catalan firms invest in Morocco, as a means to avoid in the longer term the recourse to illegal immigration with its unacceptable high human cost. In the past five years, it has been reported that;

'some 3,123 would-be illegal immigrants have drowned in Moroccan waters (...) nearly four times the 801 estimated to have been found in Spanish waters'.<sup>10</sup>

The other aspect of the same equation is the lobbying that Catalonia makes through regional institutions within the EU and the wider Europe to promote the Mediterranean as an area of general interest for Europe. In particular, the work of the Conference of Peripheral Maritime Regions of Europe and that of its Inter-Med Committee have been highlighted as particularly important in that respect<sup>11</sup>.

The *Generalitat* should not be seen as a competitor to the central government in Madrid. There are surely political gains to be made but at the end of the day the Catalan government knows very well (as do all the other *Comunidades Autónomas*) that a conflict with Madrid is not only unnecessary but unwelcome, first because there are no counterpart institutions in the South (mainly centralised, authoritarian governments), and second, because if forced to choose

between Madrid and Barcelona, any southern regime will have a rather easy decision to make (interviews).

Catalonia's links with the South are not limited to economic cooperation, trade and investment but these are the most visible ones especially through the controversial issue of immigration, even more so since the 11<sup>th</sup> September 2001 mega-terrorist attacks, and links with terrorism (Spain appears to be one of the EU countries chosen by international terrorist organisations, mainly for back-up and information gathering purposes). As for other dimensions, cultural events are important as a number of such initiatives by the *IEMed* and other relevant institutes show.

### III. The Catalan Parliament and the Mediterranean

The Catalan Parliament has developed over the years a number of institutional arrangements, mainly committees, which have been dealing more and more with international affairs. It now possesses a Permanent Legislative Committee on the EU, external relations, cooperation and solidarity. It has replaced its committee on Spanish-EU relations with one on Catalonia-EU, and it includes a Study Commission on the effects of Globalisation on the Economy and its repercussions on international relations. One should also add that a number of other specialised committees also possess an international dimension be they the ones on culture, or on industry, energy, trade, tourism, or on agriculture and fisheries. As the international role of Catalonia has expanded, the Parliament's international activities have done the same.

The Catalan Parliament has been active in the field of Mediterranean affairs even if, as it has been noted time and time again, foreign policy matters do not, formally and strictly-speaking, belong to the number of competencies given to the regional level. For example, on 15 February 2003, the President of the Parliament, Joan Rigol, headed the mass demonstration against a possible war in Iraq, as the Catalan Parliament had adopted a resolution against such an event in its plenary prior to the demonstration. Another example would be a plenary debate on the Iraqi situation on 27 February 2003 that was shown live on one of the local TV networks. I mention those examples in order to show that reality means that the external relations of Catalonia's (regional) autonomous community extend to discussions, debates, resolutions and other activities in the *Palau del Parlament* in Barcelona even if, again theoretically speaking, the latter is not supposed to deal with such issues.

Also, as a result of certain obvious particular 'sensitivities' in Catalonia, the rights of minorities (usually oppressed ones) tend to be of significant interest to many a parliamentary group in the Catalan Parliament. With regard to the Mediterranean, two such groups that are given particular attention are the Berbers in North African states, the Palestinians in the Middle East, and the Kurds in Turkey and Iraq. The question of the Western Sahara is also mentioned in the Parliament in Barcelona with a view to supporting the Saharawi people. There is also widespread interest in the plight of the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories. Thus, the Catalan Parliament has been active in a number of areas:

- a condemnation of the repression against the Kurds in April 1991, and again in April 1995, and in September 1996; and in particular opposing the death sentence against Abdullah Ocalan in the summer of 1999; in 1988 they had also protested against the use of chemical weapons by Saddam Hussein to kill 5000 Kurds in Northern Iraq.
- Regular expressions of support for the Saharawi people in a number of Resolutions or Declarations (in February 1988; in June 1991; in May 1995).
- Regular expression of support for the Palestinian people in the Middle East (for instance a May 2002 Resolution which followed a Declaration in April 2002)<sup>12</sup>.
- In March 2002, the Catalan Parliament passed a resolution in support of the linguistic and cultural rights of the Berber population in Algeria and for the recognition of their language as one of the immigrant languages to be taught in Catalonia, including at the university level.<sup>13</sup>

As for other parliamentary activities in Mediterranean matters, these would include:

- discussions and debates in the plenary meetings of the Parliament.
- special events to bring it closer to the numerous immigrants who live in Catalonia. Thus, in mid-February 2003, a 50-people strong group of Maghrebi immigrants was invited to visit the Parliament (*El País*, 12.02.03). Such activities are not limited to North African migrants but extend to all immigrant communities who happen to live in Catalonia. For instance, a similar event occurred a few days later with sub-Saharan African migrant groups (*El País*, 16.02.03).

In an extensive interview with Joan Rigol, the Parliament President, on 24 February 2003 in Barcelona, he made a number of points which are of particular interest and relevance to this study:

- Rigol stressed how important the existing institutionalised links with other European parliaments, especially from the EU member states and those parliaments that possess legislative powers, are for the general activities of the Catalan Parliament, including its external actions. He stressed in that respect the links that the Catalan Parliament has developed over the years with the parliaments of Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg in Germany, of Scotland in the UK, and of the Flemish Region in Belgium. He also mentioned the excellent links that exist between Catalonia and Quebec, links that include a parliamentary dimension. Rigol also mentioned that he had found that the so-called 'Quebec model' for Catalonia's politics in general and its external relations in particular (see also above) was not a one-way exercise. Indeed, he had himself read a report by the Quebec Parliament that referred directly to the 'Catalan model' of decentralised policy.
- As for non-European Mediterranean parliaments, Rigol mentioned the near signing of a formal agreement with the Moroccan parliament in 2002, which was blocked by the deteriorating bilateral relations between the Hashemite Kingdom and the Kingdom of Spain. A deterioration, which culminated in the now notorious Perejil incident of June 2002, and the crisis that ensued between the two countries. The Moroccan Parliament remains the most important to date for the Catalan Parliament's relations with non-European Mediterranean states. However, the President also mentioned visits to Algeria and Tunisia, in addition to the ones he had made to Rabat. He stressed that the main reasons for such visits has to do with issues of immigration and investment.
- President Rigol discussed also what role 'parliamentary diplomacy' can and should play in the foreign policy of a given entity. He thinks that it is most useful when it is used to support the official existing diplomacy.
- It is also important to mention that during the interview, Rigol stressed that if the Parliament wants to develop links with the parliament of a country like Morocco, i.e. a state that does not possess a decentralised political system, or that often has problematic relations with Madrid, he makes sure that the Spanish foreign ministry is involved in any such bilateral Catalonia-Morocco effort. If, however, there are well-established counterparts, such as the Quebec Parliament, the President made it clear that Madrid's influence is much smaller than in the Moroccan case.
- With regard to the particular case of Iraq in early 2003, Rigol put a lot of emphasis on the current disjunction between public opinions and governing elites. He personally blamed this situation to a more general crisis of legitimacy that, he argued, most democracies are currently experiencing. He also considered that the stance of the central government in Madrid was not helping either. In the Catalan Parliament, the only MPs who had not voted in favour of the anti-Iraq war resolution were the 12 PP parliamentarians (out of 135 Catalan parliamentarians of all political colours<sup>14</sup>). It is interesting to note, however briefly, that the CiU MPs in the Spanish Parliament initially dissociated themselves from the PP government position on Iraq. Although the PP has had an absolute majority in the *Congreso de Diputados* since the 2000 elections, the CiU usually votes in favour of PP proposals. Later on, the CiU came back to support the Aznar government when the latter presented the agreement made by the 17 February 2003 Extraordinary European Council meeting in Brussels as the basis for its own position on the Iraq situation in the Spanish Parliament a day later (*El País*, 18.02.03). All this occurred despite the massive demonstrations of 15 February 2003 in a number of Spanish cities, including in Central Barcelona where 1.3 million citizens objected to the Aznar policy. But all of the Spanish opposition parties in Parliament –from the

Socialist to the Catalan nationalists- have closed ranks to oppose Aznar's stance on Iraq.<sup>15</sup> The Catalan Platform *Aturem la Guerra* (Stop the War), which groups over 200 NGOs and other entities, complained that only the PP and President Pujol had not participated in the mass demonstration.

#### IV. Conclusions

Thus, one can sum up the findings of this study as follows. The Catalan Parliament does play a role in the international relations of Catalonia. The dichotomy between foreign policy (which is supposed to be decided exclusively at the central government level) and the activities of the regional government (which do not formally include foreign affairs) does simply not reflect the real world. The Catalan Parliament has been mainly active at the international level, in particular through European institutional arrangements. Once the EMP was set up in late 1995, the Mediterranean dimension of EU policy, including that of its member states, was enhanced. Thus, there is now a framework for more collaboration with the non-European Mediterranean states, but even within the EMP's Parliamentary Forum there is no formal space for non-state parliaments. In terms of bilateral links, the Catalan Parliament has mainly been active in its relations with that of Morocco. There is plenty of room for developing its links with other Southern Mediterranean parliamentary bodies. The real obstacle is the absence of counterpart institutions in that part of the world. This is a wider problem of democratisation in the South Mediterranean. The Catalan Parliament, as well as other regional EU parliaments and institutions, can (and should in my view) try and play an important role in that respect.

Another two points deserve mention here. First, there is the question of whether parliamentary diplomacy should be closely supportive of governmental diplomacy. The President of the Catalan Parliament made it quite clear that he did indeed favour this option. I do not elaborate this point further here. Suffice it to add that a different view is that parliamentary diplomacy can also play a role in opening possible avenues of dialogue when the official state diplomacy is encountering serious problems. Therefore, parliamentary diplomacy might be most useful when it acts as an alternative to state diplomacy. Second, it appears quite clear that the parliaments of democratic states or entities also tend to behave like 'moral tribunes' on international affairs. This is important for foreign policy because it reminds us that international relations do not exclusively (and cynically) belong to the realm of *realpolitik* but that democratic and other ethical principles do have a role to play. The key question however remains that of implementing any such parliamentary rhetoric in the actual foreign policy actions of a given state(s).

What follows reviews possible areas for future research based upon the findings of this study as presented in Section 3. One important aspect that has already been identified in this study is the need to make a comparative analysis of the role of the Catalan parliamentarians in Mediterranean affairs, be they based in Barcelona, Madrid or Brussels. That is to say, members of the Catalan Parliament, the Spanish Parliament or the European Parliament, respectively. There is however an important methodological problem: who are the Catalan parliamentarians? Only those belonging to nationalist parties? What about PP members of the Catalan Parliament? Is there any important difference to the fact that there is a PSC for the PSOE (i.e. a Catalan wing) but no equivalent for the PP? Perhaps a more useful alternative would be a comparative study of the international activities of the various political groups present in the Catalan institutions, be they the *Generalitat*, the *Ajuntament* or the *Parlament*.

Yet another useful comparative exercise could be a comparative study of the foreign relations of all autonomous communities, with either a geographical bias or a sectoral, or both. Perhaps a distinction should be made between those *Autonomías* that 'want to transform themselves into states' (Aldecoa 1999: 84) and those that do not favour such an outcome. Here a comparison between say Quebec and Catalonia or other regions from outside Spain may turn out to be more rewarding, even if one bears in mind the limits of comparing elements of federal with non-federal states structures.

Another issue is the role of the city of Barcelona and other local authorities in the foreign relations of Catalonia. It is interesting to note that during the mass demonstrations against a war in Iraq which culminated in events throughout the world on 15 February 2003, it is the various political groups represented in the municipalities (except for the ruling PP ones) which organised the demonstration in Barcelona (the largest ever seen in this city) and which called on their counterparts in the Catalan Parliament to take action as well. A study of Barcelona's international relations might be also a useful study. The *Ajuntament* possesses departments that deal with foreign affairs to a much larger extent than those of the regional government. Such a study would build on Morata's work (1996).

Finally, the theoretical implications of empirical studies should also be addressed. Does the term 'paradiplomacy' describe well the international relations of sub-state entities? How does one include in this approach the input of the parliamentary bodies of those entities? Is parliamentary paradiplomacy a useful addition to the literature? To a large extent, this piece of research has been a pilot-study because it brings in a parliamentary dimension to an existing literature that has mainly focused on the study of the international role and importance of regions. It is hoped that more research will be carried out in the future in a field that will add to our understanding of an important area of foreign policy analysis.

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<sup>1</sup> She also refers to Andalucía.

<sup>2</sup> The Catalan government's website is: [www.gencat.es](http://www.gencat.es).

<sup>3</sup> The local authority of Barcelona (the municipality) is the *Ajuntament* (or *Ayuntamiento* in Spanish). This is a local level of government in the Spanish system. Barcelona's *Ajuntament* website is: [www.bcn.es](http://www.bcn.es).

<sup>4</sup> Its website is: [www.barcelona2004.org](http://www.barcelona2004.org).

<sup>5</sup> It is interesting to note that CiU was in favour of the continuation of NATO membership during the 1986 referendum.

<sup>6</sup> For details, see Stavridis 2002a and 2002b.

<sup>7</sup> The document, and in particular its proposals made in its chapter 4 on how to improve the participation of regions like Catalonia in the EU decision-making process, can be found at: [http://www.convenciacatalana.org/ang/english\\_80\\_proposals.pdf](http://www.convenciacatalana.org/ang/english_80_proposals.pdf). This is an important ongoing debate between Barcelona and Madrid as this will not be the first time that Spanish national regions are asking for more powers. Thus, one should note that there was clear disappointment from Pujol when the Nice treaty reforms did not enhance the role of the regions in the EU decision-making process (interviews). For the wider debate within the EU see the December 2002 Napolitano Report (*Report on the role of regional and local authorities in European integration*, Committee on Constitutional Affairs, Rapporteur: Giorgio Napolitano, Document A5-0427/2002, 4 December 2002).

<sup>8</sup> Symbolically, the Catalan Institute of the Mediterranean was re-named the European Institute of the Mediterranean or (under its acronym) *IEMed* ([www.iemed.org](http://www.iemed.org)). This institute represents

one of many institutionalised forms of international action led in part by the *Generalitat*. For a full list, see García (1995: 133-134).

<sup>9</sup> The *Generalitat* has also just opened an office in Rome to project its international cultural, economic and social dimension (*El País*, 21.02.03).

<sup>10</sup> *International Herald Tribune*, 26 July 2001, quoting a Moroccan immigrant group.

<sup>11</sup> Its website is: [www.crpm.org](http://www.crpm.org).

<sup>12</sup> Information provided by the *Parlament*'s Secretariat.

<sup>13</sup> Resolutio1197/VI del Parlament de Catalunya sobre el suport a la identitat, la llengua i la cultura del poble amazic, 6.03.02, in *Butlleti Oficial del Parlament de Catalunya*, 22.04.02, 15-16.

<sup>14</sup> The current Catalan Parliament (which will be renewed in the October 2003 regional elections) currently consists of 56 CiU parliamentarians, 52 Socialists (PSC), 12 PP, 12 ERC (left wing), and 3 ICV (Greens).

<sup>15</sup> As reported on CNN.com, dated 18 March 2003,

<sup>16</sup> It refers to both formal and informal interviews.