The European Neighbourhood Policy’s birth has taken place in parallel with the renewed momentum of the European Security and Defence Policy, which has launched 14 operations since 2003. Both policies’ instruments have converged in the neighbouring area covered by ENP: Georgia, in the East and the Palestinian Territories in the South. In both cases, the Security Sector Reform strategies have been the main focus for ESDP and an important objective for ENP. In this paper, two objectives are pursued: first, to assess the EU’s involvement in both cases in SSR terms; and second, to analyse whether the convergence of ESDP operations with a broader EU neighbourhood policy implies that the former has become an instrument for the EU external action.
Introduction*

The process of 2004 enlargement has supposed many things to the European Union. Among the most important has been the EU's immersion in a new geopolitical context, where new neighbours have appeared in the East, whereas the old Mediterranean neighbours are concerned with the Union's every next movement. Given this situation, the European Union's engagement with its immediate periphery represents a strong bet for itself, as well as for its well-know "transformative power" (Leonard, 2005; Barbé, 2005). In Roland Dannreuther's words, "the EU's engagement with its immediate periphery represents a highly important, and possibly the most important, post-Cold War geopolitical challenge for its foreign and security policy" (2004: 2).

In order to meet this challenge, the Union has developed a new policy, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), as a new framework for its relations with its vicinity. The birth of the new policy has run in parallel with a new momentum of EU's foreign policy development: the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), which since 2003, the ENP's year of birth, has deployed 14 external operations, some of them in the neighbouring area.

The coincidence of this two policies' instruments in the same area has taken place in the East, in Georgia, and in the South, in Palestine. In both cases, ESDP's operations have focused on the state's reform, especially regarding security actors. This accent on the security sector corresponds to a new "emerging thinking" in international development's theory and practice: the Security Sector Reform (SSR).

In this paper, two aims are pursued. First, we will assess how two policies, the ENP and the ESDP, can be located within the Security Sector Reform's framework. That is, how the deployed instruments undertake the SSR's objectives. Secondly, this exercise pretends to analyse if ESDP's instruments can help to advance or fulfil a broader external action under the ENP's umbrella.

The paper is organised in four sections. The first one is devoted to elaborate a brief explanation of the Security Sector Reform's definition and guidelines. The second section deals with the relation of both, the ENP and the ESDP in terms of pursuing Security Sector Reform objectives. Thirdly, two empirical cases where the policies' instruments are deployed are assessed, the case of Georgia and the case of the Palestinian Territories. Fourthly, this paper will put forward an analysis of the two policies' relationship with the concept of Security Sector Reform. Finally, a brief conclusion with remarks for further research completes this paper.

The concept of Security Sector Reform

The fall of the Communist regimes of Eastern Europe supposed a challenge for the Euro-Atlantic community. The Soviet legacy in terms of security forces hindered the viability of the Eastern European states in a changing world, as well as its integration in the Western institutions. Politized armies, corrupted police forces, or top-heavy secret services were among the main problems detected in these countries.

This change occurred in the framework of a "new thinking" regarding security (Barbé, 1995). The 1990s gave birth to a broader conception of security, which incorporated an amount of new issues in the agenda and which blurred the limits of external and internal security.

The convergence between the new theoretical trend and the need of integrating those countries in the Euro-Atlantic community (namely, NATO and European Union) gave rise to the ideas on external actors helping along the processes of the domestic Security Sector Reform in these countries.

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countries, in particular focusing the need for greater accountability, democratic legitimacy and respect for human rights in the security-related state institutions in order to achieve sustainable development (Avagyan and Hiscock, 2005). Initially, the SSR applied only to the army, the police and the security services and the efforts were concentrated in depolitization and des-ideologization (Hadzic: 2004). However, as the concept of Security Sector Reform was applied to other geographical areas (e.g. Latin America, Asia and Africa), its scope broadened and new reformist actions were considered.

Currently, a growing number of academic and political works have been produced around this topic. As a consequence, this has multiplied the number of definitions for the concept of SSR nowadays.

From the institutional side, the OECD’s work is especially remarkable. According to the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee, the Security Sector Reform should be defined in relation with its main aim. The Committee noted that: “The overall objective of security sector reform is to create a secure environment that is conducive to development, poverty reduction and democracy. This secure environment rest upon two essential pillars: a) the ability of the state, through its development policy and programmes to generate conditions that mitigate the vulnerabilities to which people are exposed; and b) the ability of the state to use the range of policy instruments at its disposal to prevent or address security threats that affect society’s well-being.” (OECD, 2005: 16).

The United Nations Development Programme has adopted this concept as well (UNDP, 2003). However, it’s worth mentioning the long-term work of UNDP in terms of “human security” and development strategies, which are the point of departure of SSR. In UNDP’s terms, “where the justice and security sector is not accountable to democratic institutions of governance, human development is not sustainable” (ibid: 2003, 4).

Among European countries, the member states that are progressively introducing the “new thinking” are the United Kingdom (UK Department for International Development, 2000; 2002), the Netherlands and Germany. According to the UK Department for International Development, the Security Sector Reform is based on the assumption that “security is critical for the success of development efforts and (…) development is critical for security” (2000: 7). This implies that one of the main focus of the international efforts should be addressed to the reform of armed forces. However, this action “must proceed hand-in-hand with wider processes of public sector reform” because “(…) building overall state capacity is a pre-requisite for the long term sustainability of reforms” (ibid: 11). This process of reform should start from the local assessment of the security needs and priorities, and those should be part of national development and governance programmes, paying special attention to the civil society.

The Dutch on their part prefers to talk about “security sector governance”. According to the Clingendael report to the government of The Netherlands (2003), “governments and security bodies must adhere to the principles of democratic governance, which is closely linked to human rights and the rule of law” (2003: 30).

The Clingendael report incorporates thinking from the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) talks about a “security sector system” for designing the group of actors which are directly or indirectly implied in the provision of security, whereas the UNDP identifies a “justice and security sector community”. According to the former, these actors are:

a) **Core security actors**: armed forces, police, gendarmeries, paramilitary forces, presidential guards, intelligence and security services, coast guards, border guards, custom authorities, reserve or local security units.

b) **Security management and oversight bodies**: the executive, national security advisory bodies, legislature and legislative select committees; ministries of defence, internal affairs and foreign affairs; customary and traditional authorities, financial management bodies and civil society organisations.

c) **Justice and law enforcement institutions**: judiciary, justice ministries, prisons, criminal investigation and prosecution services, human rights commissions and ombudsmen, customary and traditional justice systems.
d) **Non-statutory security forces**: liberation armies, guerrilla armies, private body-guard units, private security companies, political parties militias.

Moreover, the Security Sector Reform's actions also cover an increasing number of areas. In this sense, the SSR's approach is a multidimensional one in terms of actions and fields. Miroslav Hadzic (2004) indicates four large actions such as¹:

  a) **Changes in the way of security thinking and practice.** These changes must take place in the whole society, but especially among the local elites.
  b) **Changes in the constitutional and institutional arrangements**, in a more democratic, accountable and Human Rights respectful directions.
  c) **Reform of the armed forces and growing democratic and control over them**, including all state bodies authorized for carry and use arms (Hazdic, 2004: 14).
  d) **Greater security cooperation and security integration.**

For the Clingendael's report (2003), these actions can be transformed into five areas where international action could assist the local government: the achievement of an accountable system ruled by law; assistance in the process for policy development, planning and implementation; increasing professionalism²; strengthening oversight procedures and capacities; and the sound management of security sector expenditures.

From the above, it can be seen that the broad definition, the performance and the extensive community of actors identified by the defendants of the SSR facilitate a great flexibility for the international action. Indeed, actors such as the European Union are progressively adopting this multidimensional approach in areas such as conflict prevention, assistance to fragile states, or post-conflict rehabilitation.

**The European Union’s performance in its vicinity in the light of the Security Sector Reform**

*A new design for the EU relations with its neighbourhood*

Last year, the European Union carried out its fifth and biggest enlargement process incorporating ten new members into the European Union core institutions and practices. The accession of these new members implied its inclusion in the EU ‘security community’ after a process of accommodation and adaptation of the candidate countries to the EU values, practices and institutions³. After the ‘big bang’ of enlargement (Haukkala, 2004), the EU has found itself in a geopolitical context quite more complicated than never before. What's more, the extension of the EU boundaries has meant that the Union has found itself drawn closer to regional armed conflicts, political instability and a range of other transnational challenges.

In this context, the General Affairs Council in April 2002 requested the Commission and the High Representative for CFSP ‘to work up ideas on the EU’s relations with its neighbours’. The initiative was welcomed at the Copenhagen European Council in December 2002, where the Heads of Government declared the Union’s aim of avoiding new dividing lines in Europe, as well as promoting stability and prosperity beyond the new EU’s borders. This new horizon took the name of “Wider Europe”, a term proposed by the Commissioner Chris Patten and the HR Javier Solana in their joint letter to the General Affairs Council on August ⁷th 2002. A few months later, in March 2003, the Commission made public the Communication to the Council and the

¹ The SSR actions are adapted from Miroslav Hadzic (2004).
² The process of professionalism should include a normative dimension, as well as a technical one. In this sense, process of training and logistical support are key factors.
This new EU strategy can be considered a strategy of stabilization through partnership (Missiroli, 2003) of its vicinity. In Michelle Comelli’s words, “the EU had to square the circle, and try to stabilise its neighbourhood area without resorting to the most successful approach” (2005: 4), that is, the EU accession/integration approach. The main objective of the European Neighbourhood Policy is “to share the benefits of the EU’s 2004 enlargement with neighbouring countries in strengthening stability, security and well-being for all concerned”. To achieve this objective, “the EU shares the view that states that protect human rights make better neighbours, that there are a link between human rights protection, democracy and conflict prevention” (Smith, 2003: 107). In other words, the promotion of EU standards is used as a method of enhancing stability in the vicinity.

At the same time the European Neighbourhood Policy was developed, the Member States gave a new impetus to another external dimension, the European Security and Defence Policy. Since 2003, the EU has launched 14 operations under the European Security and Defence framework. The nature of the different operations has been diverse. The EU has launched 10 civilian operations, 3 of a military nature and 1 mixed operation composed of both civilian and military elements. Also, the aims of the missions have differed across the geographical areas where the operations have taken place, such as for example: operations aimed at state-building; monitoring operations aimed at increasing security of the territory or monitoring elections in order to enable the fulfilment of a peace agreement; or even operations supporting peacekeeping missions of other international organisations.

Out of all these operations, three of them have been launched in the territory covered by the European Neighbourhood Policy. Specifically, the operations are: EUJUST THEMIS in Georgia and EUPOL COPPS and EU BAM Rafah in the Palestinian Territories. The aim of all of them revolves around the reinforcement of certain institutions according to EU standards in order to contribute to a more stable domestic environment in these two countries. These objectives coincide with the European Neighbourhood Policy’s rationale, as we have mentioned before.

Although this coincidence, the relation between both policies is deemed scarce, due the interpillar nature of the EU’s external dimension. As Julie Kelly (2006: 31) notes although the ENP is designed as an holistic and integrated approach to the neighbourhood, although this policy is primarily “an extension and adaptation of the Commission’s active foreign policy role during enlargement”. However, more and more, the European Security and Defence Policy’s instruments should allow for a comprehensive EU’s approach, where its civil and military instruments are increasingly used in support of each other (Rummel, 2004). One can thus infer that the ESDP’s instruments are progressively tools for a EU foreign policy, since following Charles Grant’s opinion, “ESDP only makes sense as an instrument at the service of European foreign policy” (2003:1).

The Security Sector Reform in the European Union’s strategy and its reflex in EU’s policies towards vicinity

As we have seen, Security Sector Reform has become a “hot topic” in New York, Washington and various European capitals, but it is also increasingly so in Brussels. Currently, Security Sector Reform is an increasingly important issue in the Presidency Reports on ESDP. Indeed, the United Kingdom EU Presidency Report (2005) announced the elaboration of an “EU
concept for ESDP support to Security Sector Reform”. For this purpose, the Union is promoting different kinds of meetings and seminars around this issue.

Regarding the EU relations with its vicinity, “the EU’s efforts to stabilise its neighbourhood have inevitably led to promoting security sector governance in its external policy” (Hängi and Tanner, 2005: 27). According to Hängi and Tanner, the EU has already developed documents and policies related to Security Sector Reform, such as the enlargement policy, the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights, the development cooperation and external assistance, the conflict prevention policy, the European Security and Defence Policy and some policies in the Justice and Home Affairs framework.

The principle concepts and strategies regarding the EU’s assistance to Security Sector Reform can be found in a recent set of strategic documents of the European Union (Commission Communication on Conflict Prevention, European Security Strategy, and European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper).

One of the first reflections in terms of the emerging SSR concept was adopted by the European Commission. The Communication on Conflict Prevention (2001) recovers the concept of structural stability as the main objective to achieve in order to prevent the causes of conflict. Part and parcel of the structural stability, the Commission explicitly stressed the importance of the Security Sector Reform. Although it recognised the lack of EU involvement in this field, it encouraged an “increasingly active role in the security sector area” (2001: 14).

However, one of the most significant developments in the EU’s construction as an international actor has been the publication of the European Security Strategy (ESS) in December of 2003. For the first time, the Union provided itself with a strategic concept in order to deal with the new threats and challenges emanating from outside the Unions’ borders.

Although the concept of SSR is only explicitly mentioned once in the ESS, one can find the main premise sustaining SSR in the following statement: “Security is a precondition of development. Conflict not only destroys infrastructure, including social infrastructure; it also encourages criminality, deters investment and makes normal economic activity impossible. A number of countries and regions are caught in a cycle of conflict, insecurity and poverty” (ESS, 2003: 3). Related to that, the Union assumes that the lack of governance in the state encourages instability and a number of threats for all the states of the international community, since “(…) the internal and external aspects of security are indissolubly linked” (ibid: 2).

These strategic guidelines are applied to the European neighbours. Actually, among the Strategic Objectives of the Union, the ESS mentions explicitly the need of “building security in our neighbourhood”, because “geography is still important” (ibid: 7). The emphasis on good governance of the neighbouring countries is repeated within the ESS. Furthermore, the EU assumes this as “our task”, in the East as well as in the Mediterranean (ibid: 8). This task can be fulfilled by “spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights are the best means of strengthening the international order” (ibid: 10).

Seeing the echo that the Security Sector Reform has been given in the EU framework documents, it is not surprising to see some mentions also in the European Neighbourhood Policy. The ENP’s Strategy Paper stresses the conditionality of the EU’s privileged relationship with the vicinity on the foundations of commitment to common values such as the rule of law, good governance, the respect for human rights or the promotion of good neighbourly relations. A first analysis of the Action Plans already approved indicates the emphasis in the respect for democracy, human rights and the rule of law. Specifically, the seven Action Plans pay special

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7 One of the last meetings was the seminar entitled “Developing a Security Sector Reform concept for the EU”, held in Brussels on 28 November 2005 (Helly, 2006).
9 “Collapse of the State can be associated with obvious threats, such as organised crime or terrorism. State failure is an alarming phenomenon, that undermines global governance and adds to regional instability” (ESS, 2003: 4)
attention to the reinforcement of national institutions according to democratic standards, as well as the reform of the judiciary system. Although all Action Plans explicitly mention these issues, the Eastern Action Plans are much more detailed in these terms than the Mediterranean ones, with the exception of the Palestinian Territories. Whereas the Mediterranean Action Plans are reduced to the establishment of political dialogue in terms of national reforms, the Eastern Action Plans display a number of concrete priorities and actions to be achieved.

The EU’s performance in the neighbourhood in the light of Security Sector Reform in ENP and ESDP: Georgia and Palestinian Territories

The European Defence and Security Policy operations on the ground to date have high congruity with the “theoretical” or written choices of the Union’s strategic guidelines about Security Sector Reform. More and more, activities pursued under the ESDP, namely conflict prevention and crisis management, have almost exclusively focus on the restructuring of security institutions. EU policy in this sense has developed rather quickly. In 2001 the European Commission expressed its dissatisfaction regarding ESDP resources, especially in relation to the rule of law and civil administration (European Commission, 2001: 25). This stands in sharp contrast with the present date, when the EU has launched seven ESDP operations aimed at reinforcing the rule of law, as well as civil administration.

The ESDP’s involvement in the neighbourhood has taken place, among other measures, with the launch of three operations, all of them of a civilian nature. The host countries have been Georgia in the East (EUJUST THEMIS) and the Palestinian Territories in the Mediterranean (EUPOL COPPS and EU BAM Rafah). Actually, the ESS also explicitly mentions the will of the European Union of taking “a stronger and more active interest in the problems of the Southern Caucasus” (ESS, p. 8), and the Arab/Israeli conflict as a “strategic priority for Europe” (ESS, 2003: 8).

Georgia

The initial exclusion of the South Caucasus from the European Neighbourhood Policy was revised by the Commission and the Council by June 2004 through the inclusion of the three South Caucasus states in the ENP. The reasons for this change can be explained in different ways. On the one hand, as Bruno Coppieters (2004) states, it was contradictory to require the OSCE and the Council of Europe to integrate countries such as Georgia into a single European or Euro-Atlantic space, while the EU—in name of political realism—was opting for different levels of European integration in the same policy fields. On the other hand, the European Parliament and to a lesser extent, the new EU members, notably Latvia and Lithuania, exerted a notable pressure for the inclusion of these countries in the European Neighbourhood Policy bringing new urgency to this region (Johansson-Nogués, forthcoming; Lynch, 2003).

Regarding Georgia, the toppling of former President Eduard Shevardnadze after the Rose Revolution was a turning point for the EU’s relations with the Caucasian country. The new government lead by President Michail Saakashvili opened a new window of opportunity for the European commitment in the Georgia’s regime change (Lynch, 2005). This new relationship has brought about the inclusion of Security Sector Reform measures in some areas. As for example, immediately after the Rose Revolution, the EC made use of the Rapid Reaction Mechanism in order to strengthen the rule of law and democracy in Georgia in areas such as the penitentiary, the judiciary and the electoral system (Yakemtchouk, 2005).

Specifically, Georgia was included in the European Neighbourhood Policy on 14 June 2004 and although, it does not have yet an ENP Action Plan, it has been subject of the corresponding Country Report10 which makes references to the Revised Country Strategy Paper for Georgia 2003-2006 (European Commission, 2003). Both documents establish three main priority areas for the EU policy, namely: a) promoting rule of law, good governance and respect for human

rights and democratic institutions, including the strengthening of civil society actors; b) reducing poverty; c) enhancing stability and security through confidence building measures aiming at the prevention and settlement of internal conflicts. The ENP Country Strategy Paper was accompanied by the revision of TACIS programmes, which will be part of the European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument in the future. Moreover, as Hänggi and Tanner (2005) indicate, the EU included in the new 2004-2006 TACIS national programme for Georgia the need for cooperation in the reform of the judicial power and of law enforcement institutions (police, border management), as well as the cooperation for increased civil society oversight.11

As it can be observed, the EU promoted Security Sector Reform focus on financial assistance to the national programme reforms (ownership) in areas that can be classified as core security actors, such as the police and the border management bodies; security management and oversight bodies (penitentiary, government departments' reform, civil society); and justice and law enforcement institutions.

In particular, the EU’s commitment to Georgia’s Security Sector Reform has been reflected through the ESDP. In parallel with the ENP’s accent on the judiciary reform, the first EU’s rule of law mission was launched in this Caucasian state. The EUJUST THEMIS operation was established on 16th July 2004 under pressures of the Baltic States, although the mission has its official motivation in the request of the Prime Minister of Georgia, Mr. Zhvania on 3rd June 2004 for the EU to intervene. The objective of the mission is:

“EUJUST THEMIS shall, in full coordination with, and in complementary to EC programmes, as well as other donors’ programmes, assist in the development of a horizontal governmental strategy guiding the reform process for all relevant stakeholders within the criminal justice sector, including the establishment of a mechanism for coordination and priority setting for the criminal justice reform.”

This support in the reform process should be in the sense of the promotion of the respect of human rights and of the democratic principles.

The EUJUST THEMIS team was composed of 13 EU experts whose action has been the support to the Working Group (14 Georgian experts) established by the Georgian government in elaborating a legislative reform regarding justice. The EUJUST THEMIS operation has been developed in two phases: the first one consisting on a broad analysis of the Georgian judiciary (July 2004 to October 2004), and a second one consisting in the elaboration of a criminal justice reform strategy.

Up to this point, it’s evident that the ENP’s priorities regarding the reform of the judiciary in Georgia coincides with the aims and work of the ESDP operation EUJUST THEMIS. Although the recent inclusion of Georgia in the European Neighbourhood Policy makes it difficult to make an assessment about the synergy between two policies, the performance of both have to do with the promotion of the Security Sector Reform. Currently, the Georgian government has expressed its intention to make full use of the work of EUJUST THEMIS and to incorporate it to the foreseen Action Plan. One could thus infer that Georgia is a case where the ESDP operation has serve to ENP’s objectives, showing the potential for synergy between the two policies.

11 In addition to the revision of TACIS programme, the European Commission organized together with the World Bank the Conference of Donors for Georgia in June 2004. The amount of financial assistance was doubled in comparison with the 2001-2003 period (Yakemtchouk, 2005).
13 The participant EU Member States in EUJUST THEMIS were: France, Italy, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, Sweden, Germany, The Netherlands, Poland, Spain and Denmark.
14 In the final phase of EUJUST THEMIS, the Head of the Mission, Mrs. Sylvie Pantz presented to the President of Georgia, Mr. Saakashvili a review of the work and recommendation of EUJUST THEMIS. The President said that the strategy will be a part of the Georgian Action Plan in the framework of ENP. Briefing by the Head of the Mission on the successful conclusion of EUJUST THEMIS, THE/03, 22 July 2005.
Palestinian Territories

Regarding the Mediterranean side of the European Neighbourhood Policy, the Palestinian Territories is a partner of the new policy and it has also been the focus of two ESDP missions. The European Neighbourhood Policy, as well as the ESDP operations, strongly focus on the need for a reform process for the Palestinian institutions.

The EU emphasis on Palestinian reform dates back from the late 1990s and it is considered as a means to end violence, as well as to facilitate negotiation among the parties (Tocci, 2005). Since 2002, the Union directly participates in this process due to its participation in the Quartet and in the International Task Force on Palestinian Reform (Hänggi and Tanner, 2005). As the EU’s involvement has increased, the Security Sector Reform concerns have been incorporated in the agenda.

Regarding the European Neighbourhood Policy, the Palestinian Territories were included in 2003, together with the rest of Mediterranean neighbours. In contrast to the previous case, the Palestinian Territories have its ENP Action Plan which establishes the guidelines of the EU-ANP cooperation and the incentives. The Palestinian Action Plan is qualitatively different to the other Mediterranean Action Plans. Indeed, the EU-Palestinian AP is much more concise in the priorities for action. On the other hand, the priorities for action under the Democracy and Rule of Law epigraph are impregnated with the Security sector Reform guidelines. On the one hand, the focus on the core security actors is limited to the Palestinian Authorities security services and the need to implement a reform. This makes reference to the wide Palestinian Civil Police Development Programme, jointly produced by the Palestinian police and the European Union Co-ordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support. This office, based on the Palestinian Interior Ministry in Ramallah, was established in January 2005 in order to co-ordinate the support of the international community for Police Reform in the Palestinian Territories (Pirozzi, 2006). The reform’s aim is to establish a “transparent and accountable police organisation with a clearly identified role, operating within a sound legal framework, capable of delivering an effective and robust policing service, responsive to the need of the society”\(^\text{15}\).

Furthermore, the Action Plan largely devotes to the reform of the justice institutions. It agrees on the need for adopting a strategy for judicial reform, as well as for implementation of the “Law and Judicial Authority” in order to separate competences between the Ministry of Justice (security management body) and the judiciary (justice and law enforcement institution). This measure is coherent with the necessity of creating an accessible and impartial judiciary and of increasing transparency within the public administration as a part of Security Sector Reform. Finally, the Action Plan continues to advocate the promotion of a wide process of changes in the constitutional and institutional arrangements, such as the organization of fair elections, the redaction a new democratic Constitution, the civil service and public administration reform programme or the sound management of public finances.

Two years after the Palestine’s inclusion in the ENP, the European Union launched two ESDP operations in the Palestinian Territories: EUPOL COPPS and EU Border Assistance Mission in Rafah (EUBAM). Both operations focus on two core security actors of the Security Sector system: the police services and the border guards.

The first operation, EUPOL COPPS, will be launched the 1\(^{\text{st}}\) June 2006 and it will support the work of the European Community in Palestine, the EU Coordination Office for Palestinian Police Support, established on April 2005 sharing premises with the Office of the EU Special Representative for the Middle East Peace Process. The objective will be “to contribute to the establishment of sustainable and effective policing arrangements under Palestinian ownership in accordance with the best international standards, in cooperation with the Community’s institution building programmes as well as other international efforts in the wider context of Security Sector including Criminal Justice Reform”\(^\text{16}\). Once again, the ENP’s aims and those of the ENP operation coincide in the area of Security Sector Reform. In the EUPOL COPPS’s case


is the support for the process of Police reform. One of the aims of the operation is thus to support EU’s performance in the area of Security Sector Reform and broad institutional-building actions.

The second approved operation and the first on the ground has been the EU Border Assistance Mission in Rafah. The operation was launched on 25th November 2005 and it is considered of prime importance for the further EU involvement in the Middle East conflict, in which the EU has searched a “more coherent and strategic actor towards the Middle East Peace Process” (Dannreuther, 2004: 153). According to the Joint Action: “the aim of EU BAM Rafah is to provide a Third Party presence at the Rafah crossing point in order to contribute, in cooperation with the Community’s institutional-building efforts, to the opening of Rafah crossing point and to build up confidence between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian Authority”17. Furthermore, the EU mandate is not just supervise the border guards’ work in Rafah, but also to contribute, “through mentoring to building up the Palestinian capacity in all aspects of border management at Rafah” (Pirozzi, 2006: 5). This would relate to the concept of Security Sector Reform, since as Hänggi and Tanner (2005: 39) notes, the covering aspects of “professional training, legal assistance, capacity building and technical support of border guards” are part of SSR. Although the EU BAM’s mandate is limited to mentoring and supervising, it focuses on a core security actor of the Security Sector system and it can be considered inside a wide process of public reform.

The Security Sector Reform: restricted agenda, but a bridge for eu’s external action

Georgia and the Palestinian Territories are the only two cases where ESDP’s operations have coincided with the European Neighbourhood Policy. The analysis of both cases has served us for two purposes: to assess to what extent the Security Sector Reform ideas are effectively applied, and secondly, to observe the relationship between both policies on the ground.

As first as the fist topic is concerned, it’s evident that the Security Sector Reform has been applied in the cases of Georgia and the Palestinian Territories. However, in both cases the reach of the Security Sector Reform priorities is very limited.

In the case of Georgia, the country is plagued by different conflicts inside the country, such as the South Ossetia and Abkhazia secessionist movements, in which the EU's involvement is scarce. Actually, one of the reasons for the current delay in approving the Action Plan is the Georgian insistence on further EU implication in conflict resolution (Lobjakas, 2006). Nonetheless, the Union is reluctant to intervene, in view of the Russian presence in the Caucasus. This would lead us to conclude that the Georgian context can only be considered as a partial fulfilment of the SSR objectives. The EU is not able to create a secure environment where the Georgian state should have the ability to generate conditions that mitigate the vulnerabilities to which people are exposed; and the ability to use the range of policy instruments at its disposal to prevent or address security threats that affect society’s well-being (OECD, 2005: 16).

The same logic is applicable to the case of Palestinian Territories, where the Security Sector Reform strategies are part of a broader state reform. As we have observed, the Union’s involvement in this process is crucial for Palestinian institutional reform. However, it must not be forgotten that the main source of insecurity to the Palestinians is the Israeli occupation. Thus, the EU emphasis on the SSR is lacking as far as it is not putting pressure regarding Israeli performance.

According to Heiner Hänggi and Fred Tanner (2005), these malfunctions in the EU’s SSR strategies are due to the fact that the EU’s focuses more on re-structuring security institutions rather than on strengthening democratic accountability and a broad reform process in order to fight against the main EU’s concerns. In the case of Georgia, the emphasis on judicial reform

makes sense with the main EU concerns about transnational crime. In the case of Palestine, the main aim is the fight against terrorism, as well as having a stance in the Middle East conflict.

Nevertheless, other authors like Ghia Nodia (2004) assume that the EU is incapable to resolve this kind of conflicts. Therefore, it locates its actions in the framework of conflict transformation, more focused on the change of the main actor's behaviour rather than in conflict resolution itself.

Regarding the relationship between ESDP and ENP policies, a first question can be raised: has ESDP the potential to work as an instrument for the European Neighbourhood Policy? The analysis of the relation on the ground shows a certain coherence or convergence between the two policies. The fact is that the ENP is mainly a framework policy without clear instruments, since Action Plans are mainly agreements depending upon the neighbour's will. That is why the ESDP operations in Georgia and Palestine can serve the ENP's purposes. The ESDP fits in this sense in a broader external action's strategy. There are those who argue that this would serve the ESDP as well, as a way of mainstriming the policy. As Udo Diedrichs et al. state, whereas the ENP is “a new label with old methods, (...) ESDP would be a strange label with new methods (2005:10)”.

The convergence between objectives stems from the same nature of the Security Sector Reform, since SSR “spans a range of issues and activities within European Community and Council competence” (Helley, 2003: 2). However, this convergence is not enough in order to achieve a coherent EU's external action. According to authors like Heiner Hänggi and Fred Tanner, “what is lacking is a comprehensive and coherent strategy on the promotion of security sector governance within the broader framework of EU external relations” (2005: 41). Before this situation, the Union's institutions are moving forward this objective. As we have mentioned above, the Council announced the publication of an ESDP concept for Security Sector Reform, but also the Commission has the intention to develop an EC Concept for SSR, covering first pillar activities. Although, the Presidency Report on ESDP 2005 calls for an integrated EU's approach, there is a long path to cover before the interpillar cacophony is bridged.

Finally, a last question related to the ENP-ESDP relation can be posed: is the observed relationship applicable to the rest of neighbours? The ESDP operations are launched in those countries where it is considered that an external assistance is needed. But that is not just a question of will or necessity, but also a matter of opportunity. Actually, it is difficult to imagine an ESDP operation in Morocco, in Jordan or even in Ukraine. These countries are more treated like ESDP subjects (offers to participate in ESDP operations, more consultation and political dialogue), whereas Georgia and Palestine are more ESDP objects. In this sense, it is true that ESDP can have sense in the EU foreign policy and ENP, as long as it exists the possibility to do it and that depends upon the other’s will.

Conclusion

The Security Sector Reform is a concept which is increasingly impregnating the European Union’s policy agenda. Progressively, the European Council or the European Commission have embraced the SST as they articulate policies vis-à-vis determined countries. However, as we have noted in the Georgian and Palestinian cases, this new topic on the EU agenda is applied in a rather restricted way, according to the Union’s needs and preferences.

It has been noted that the ESDP can function in support of the ENP in terms of SSR. Thus, it can be concluded that the SSR could be a suitable concept for trying to bridge the eternal inter-pillar inconsistence in EU’s external action.

Further research should be addressed in different directions. First, regarding Security Sector Reform, it should be interesting to assess the progressive SSR’s entry into the EU’s agenda. Besides, this analysis could serve to infer whether the European Union is a "policy

entrepreneur” in this area and whether it can be located in the avant-garde of the 2new thinking”.

Secondly, research about ESDP relations with the rest of the policies of the multi-dimensional Union’s external action. This exercise could aid to analyse whether the ESDP is becoming an instrument at service of the EU’s aims or conversely, if its rationale continues to be its very existence.

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