Political alliances and organisational change in political parties: a framework for analysis

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In recent decades, organisational change within political parties has aroused the interest of many an academic. In contrast, it has also encouraged the use of a wide range of theoretical approaches and, as a result, led to a degree of conceptual confusion. In an elaborate assessment, Harmel (2002) distinguishes up to three major approaches in the study of party change: the life cycle approach, the system level approach and the discrete change approach.

On the other hand, political science has paid very little attention to the organisational study of political alliances. This appears to be fundamentally due to the fact that, as indicated in the scant theoretical work done in this area, the most logical situation would be for most pacts between parties to be ephemeral (Duverger, 1954; Panebianco, 1988). It is for this reason that the interest of academia has been in the study of the reasons behind their formation and collapse, the most common phenomena. This is the area where academia has shown a preference for the study of political coalitions and coalition governments.

Nonetheless, it is precisely their rarity and exceptional nature that can turn the organisational study of alliances into small diamonds from the study of political parties. The first reason for this is that regardless of their duration, alliances between parties can be found in many parts of Europe. Secondly, understanding the reasons behind the formation, continuation, transformation and collapse of alliances is a fundamental way to best understand the organisational changes and dynamics found in the parties that make up alliances, which is precisely the objective of this article.

Thus, the intention of this article is to develop an analytical framework that can be used to explain the reasons for organisational change in political parties that are part of political alliances. To do this, it bases its case on a fundamental premise: that parties are organisations and that the organisation analysis of pacts between them must, due to this very fact, precede any other analysis. On the basis of this premise, an attempt is made to construct an analytical framework that allows the user to: improve
their knowledge of the theory of political alliances; and to make progress on the study of the effects of these alliances on the parties that comprise them, with a special focus on organisational change.

The analytical framework proposed in this article is consistent with the tradition of the *discrete change approach*. This framework is built using the *synthetic model for organisational change* in political parties prepared by Panebianco (1990: chapter XIII) as a reference. This *genetic* model of organisational change is later complemented by observations of work by Panebianco and, in particular, with the review of the literature on the organisational effects of alliances in political parties. With these amendments, a new analytical schema is completed from which one can deduce four main models of organisational change in parties within political alliances. The second part of the article attempts to verify the explanatory power of each model based on the study of organisational change in Unió Democràtica de Catalunya within the Convergencia i Unió alliance between 1978 and 2001.

**Alliances and organisational change: a framework for analysis**

*Panebianco’s synthetic model of organisational change*

Given the compatibility of the premises with the synthetic model for organisational change devised by Panebianco (1988), a decision is taken to adopt this author’s analytical framework. Although any theoretical option is always a matter of opinion, in this case it would appear to be justifiable due to the importance placed on the work by all students of organisational change and the undeniable advantage of adopting the whole conceptualisation prepared by the author.

In his *Political Parties: organization and power*, Panebianco (1988) proposes two main models for change in political parties. The first, and more widely known of these, the *model of organisational evolution* (Panebianco, 1988: 17) links the transformations that occur between the different moments that give rise (genetic model) to different political parties and their institutionalisation. In addition to the organisational evolution of
political parties from their inception to the time of their institutionalisation, Panebianco also devises what he calls the *synthetic model of organisational change*. The aim of this new model is to explain both the changes that arise out from inception to institutionalisation and the evolution of the party once the latter has occurred. This second model is the one that refers to *organisational change* and which is examined in the fourth part of the book (Figure 1).

Figure 1

**Synthetic model of organisational change in political parties according to Panebianco**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Enviromental challenges</th>
<th>Change in dominant coalition composition</th>
<th>Modification of the rules</th>
<th>Preconditions for change (generational turnover, organisational rigidity, etc.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Change of the dominant coalition’s conformation</td>
<td>Succession of ends</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

Panebianco’s theory is that most (but not all) organisational changes are the products of a first interaction: the coincidence of an *external stimulus* (also *environmental challenge*) with certain *preconditions* for change within the party. The external stimulus functions as a *catalyst* without which the preconditions do not react. Once this first interaction has taken place, a second phase begins, marked by *endogenous factors*: the dissolution of the old dominant coalition and the formation of new alliances that are clearly shown in a new *composition* of the dominant coalition. Finally, the third phase is characterised by a new interaction of *endogenous factors*: changes to the *rules of the game* and *official objectives* (*identity*) or, more often, to the party line. As Panebianco points out, the change in the configuration of the dominant coalition involve all those interactions; in other words, the three phases are divided purely for purposes of analysis. In reality, all phenomena tend to occur at the same time. This would
therefore suggest that in this model, the conditions for organisational change involve the interaction of all factors.

**Criticisms of the model and theoretical alternatives**

Despite its importance, the choice of the Panebianco model is not without its difficulties and problems. Below we examine three of the main aspects relating to the characterisation of the dominant coalition, struggles for factional domination or leadership and organisational stability and, finally, the consequences of organisational change.

One of the areas in which Panebianco’s work has serious limitations is his characterisation of the dominant coalition. On the one hand, Panebianco recognises the conflictive features of the dominant coalition; in defining the dominant coalition, he even speaks of its *essentially precarious nature* and describes it as an *alliance of alliances* (Panebianco, 1988: 39). At the same time, however, the defence given of his approach to organisational stability as an inherent objective of all dominant coalitions leads him to limit to excess the possibility of internal conflict.

According to Panebianco, organisational stability is derived from two complementary rationales. From the outset, any institutionalisation of a party requires a process of *articulating of ends* for which the survival of the organisation becomes, in fact, the sole undisputable aim. This, in turn, requires debate on official aims to take a back seat to debate on the party line and intermediate objectives. This change in the intensity of disputes is conducive to organisational stability. At any rate, this does not rule out the possibility of debate on official aims, which generally involve serious identity crises and which, in turn, end up producing organisational changes being reopened.

Secondly, in order to achieve power, all dominant coalitions tend to justify themselves with certain official aims (ideology), from which they deduce a party line. Since the preservation of the *identity* of the dominant coalition is *in part* derived from maintaining the party line, it is unlikely that the collation can change the party line without eroding the support behind the leadership (opening the door to organisational change). According to
Panebianco, this argument favours a situation where all dominant coalitions have, in addition to the most generic objective of party survival, the continuation of the organisational stability as an objective (Panebianco, 1988: 42-5). Thus, any change is seen as a potential focus of conflict to be avoided.

The problem is that Panebianco uses these thoughts to arrive at a logical inference that is not necessarily derived from his model: since all dominant coalitions tend to adhere to a party line (and a number of official aims), Panebianco assumes that this can be reduced to a unitary actor. For this reason, he links organisational change to theories of entrepreneurial leadership, which are alien to the philosophy of his model. The simplification that follows this logical inference leads Panebianco to hypotheses that are difficult to sustain. Perhaps the most notable is the assertion that the only change possible in times of crisis is the replacement of the whole dominant coalition by the minority elites of the party. Such an assumption is too determinist; it is at odds with the alliance of alliances nature of dominant coalitions and, in the final analysis, rules out the possibility (more than documented through history) of pacts between a party from the old dominant coalition and the minority elites.

The solution to this problem has been to identify various sub-groups within the dominant coalition. In an interesting review of Panebianco’s work, Harmel and Janda (1994) highlight that within the dominant coalition a distinction can be drawn between: 1) The dominant faction, which is the faction that on most occasions is able to impose its criteria on the preparation of strategy; 2) Participative factions, factions that are integrated into the dominant coalition by only playing a marginal role in decision-making; and 3) Minority elites, or factions excluded from the dominant coalition. This distinction by Harmel and Janda makes it possible to more clearly distinguish the different groups within the dominant coalition and, when the time comes, the possible process of reaching pacts between them and the minority elites. Unlike the proposal put forward by Kitschelt (1989) to differentiate between lobbyists, pragmatists and ideologues, the
distinction is made on organisational, not ideological criteria, given that it avoids conflicting with Panebianco’s main assumptions.

Accepting that the dominant coalition is an *alliance of alliances* has notable theoretical difficulties. While a united leadership is put forward, organisational stability can appear (together with the very survival of the party) as an undisputable objective. When such leadership does not exist, asserting it appears to be much more questionable. The only group that can be logically said to have an objective interest in organisational stability is the dominant faction. Depending on the circumstances, other factions may be more interested in promoting organisational change (in order to dominate the party) than in preserving stability. Thus, even when stability appears to have a superior status within the hierarchy to other party objectives, it is clear that, at certain times, certain members of the dominant coalition can subordinate it to other objectives.

There are at least two dynamics not identified by Panebianco that can jeopardise the objective of organisational stability: a leadership crisis within the party, and/or a dispute between factions for internal control. Under these circumstances, stability can be subordinated to the need to clarify the internal power structure. The identification of these dynamics of struggles for *leadership* and *factional domination* are based on the review of Panebianco’s work by Harmel and Janda (1994).

The final objection to the Panebianco model concerns the factors that lead to organisational change. While threats to organisational stability can also be produced by internal dynamics such as the struggle for leadership or factional domination, the possibility that organisational change can have essentially internal origins cannot be ruled out *a priori*. The fact that these dynamics can also occur in conjunction with changes in the internal environment does not mean that they must always occur together, as the Panebianco model suggests. A similar assessment can be found in Harmel and Janda (1994).

On the other hand, even when Panebianco does not exclude other possibilities, his model tends to associate, as an external cause of change, a *deterioration* in the conditions of exchange with the environment identified
by the author fundamentally with the electoral and parliamentary arenas (Panebianco, 1988: 207 and ss): an electoral defeat, the departure of the government, etc. Although from an intuitive perspective it is easiest to cite the possibility as a cause of change, as emphasised in subsequent literature the possibility that organisational change can also be associated with a \textit{substantial improvement} in the conditions of exchange with the environment should not be ruled out\textsuperscript{6}. The most appropriate approach, therefore, would be to refer to \textit{substantial variations} (deterioration as well as improvements) in conditions of exchange with the environment.

The review of the Panebianco model leads us to a new model of organisational change within political parties not substantially different from the previous model, but with specific characteristics. To summarise, the new model is less determinist and more open than the initial model: it allows change to be the result of substantial variations (positive or negative) in the environment, but also due to purely internal factors (the struggle for leadership and factionalism).

\textbf{Political alliances and their organisational effects on political parties}\textsuperscript{7}

This section reviews the relationship established in the literature between the organisational dynamics associated with political alliances and the effects of these alliances on the parties of which they consist. This should allow the model for organisational change to be completed, adapting it to the specific characteristics of the phenomenon to be studied.

The first definitions and classifications of pacts between parties are attributed to Duverger (1954). This author classifies pacts according to various parameters: a) Their duration, which distinguishes ephemeral \textit{coalitions} from \textit{alliances} that endure for long periods; b) the institutional scope involved, which distinguishes \textit{electoral}, \textit{parliamentary} and \textit{government} pacts; and c) the ideology of parties within the pact. Duverger (1954) is also the first theorist to search for reasons for the creation and functioning of pacts between political parties. His hypotheses establish a connection between alliances and institutional factors, such as the electoral...
system and the party system. Its operation depends on the interrelationship of institutional factors (electoral system and party system) with other organisational factors, such as the existence of joint institutions or programs, with for what Duverger is the central issue in any alliance: the degree of inequality between partners.

Duverger’s seminal contribution has been developed by two theoretical focuses. Curiously, each uses its own nomenclature to refer to the same phenomenon. Thus, the term coalition is particular to the theories of rational action (Riker, 1962), while the approaches more associated with the sociology of organisations (Panebianco, 1988) prefer to refer to alliances. In this way, the initial distinction made by Duverger between coalitions and alliances according to duration has lost its validity: both concepts refer to the same phenomenon, but use different theoretical approaches. Given that the focus of this article is based on the study of parties from their organisational dimension, the term political alliances will be used in the pages below.

Panebianco is one of the few authors to develop the study of pacts between parties in its organisational dimension. Panebianco’s interest focuses on explaining the organisational reasons for what he calls the instability of political alliances. For him, what is important is not the reasons for which alliances are formed, but rather the organisational reasons for their demise or continuation over time. It is for this reason Panebianco points out a fundamental distinction between alliances among opponents and among competitors. The reasons for this distinction are based on the instability that they generate in the parties that comprise them.

Since they pose no threat to the respective hunting grounds of each party, pacts between opposing parties similarly do not threaten their identity and stability. This explains why this type of alliance tends to last. Pacts between competing parties, meanwhile, tend to be more unstable given that in the case of such pacts, there is an implicit threat to the hunting ground of the parties and, therefore, to their identity. In these cases, tensions among competitors bring instability and the subsequent collapse of the alliance. However, Panebianco has identified a second dynamic that
can undermine the stability of alliances between competitors: the de-institutionalizing pressures that faces the smaller party or the party that is less institutionalised. For Panebianco, the solution that is sooner or later adopted by the smaller or less institutionalised party in the dominant coalition is, again, the collapse of the alliance.

Given the inherent fragility of all alliances between competitors, it is important to highlight under what circumstances such alliances can be maintained over time. Panebianco points out the three main circumstances: 1) the parties actually only appear to be competitors, in other words, they are in fact opponents; 2) the difference in size between the allies is very large. In this case, given that the smaller ally is incapable of attracting any real following on the hunting ground of the other, it does not generate internal instability. Furthermore, given that the survival of the smaller party is under serious threat from the danger posed by the larger party, this tends to strengthen its internal unity, in this way also favouring the stability of the alliance; 3) one or more of the parties are highly institutionalised. In this case, scant dependence on the environment and the strong control exercised over the hunting ground can guarantee internal stability, as well as the stability of the alliance.

In spite of this, Panebianco's emphasis on highlighting the instability caused by the operation of the alliance as the key factor behind the collapse leads him to a new logical inference: that all instability processes lead to collapse. It is very possible that his assertion is true on more than a few occasions, but it is doubtful that it will always be the case. If there are instability processes that do not culminate in a collapse (Figure 2), then Panebianco's assumption that stability and continuation are inevitably associated with one another is false due to its incompleteness: alliances can continue with stability, but also with instability (although instability often leads to collapse). This results in a need to analytically separate the concepts of continuation and stability, which have slightly different meanings.\(^{11}\)
There are three fundamental difficulties when separating continuation and stability as independent concepts when analysing political alliances. The first is conceptual, the problem of distinguishing between political alliances and political parties, which has been present since Duverger's initial work (1954). A partial, albeit interesting solution can be found in Eldersveld's (1964) definition of political parties (of the masses or cath-all) as miniature political systems (Ramiro, 2004). The problem with a distinction of this type is that it can pose difficulties in much less articulated parties.

The second difficulty refers to the conditions under which an alliance between competitors can continue despite its unstable nature. In this case, there are powerful arguments that can be used to justify the reasons, despite the process of deinstitutionalisation that all alliances give rise to in the weakest party(s) (Panebianco, 1988), this does not mean that continuation and instability have to go hand-in-hand in conceptual terms. Without doubt, one of the most important is the fact that in every alliance that lasts for a minimum period of time, complicities between the different groups that make up the respective dominant coalitions begin to arise.
As a minimum, the creation of shared interests gives rise to two dynamics that can favour their continuation. Firstly, in the event of an internal crisis in one of the weaker parties, it could transpire that part of the dominant coalition of the other or other parties actively intervenes in its evolution (favouring one group or the other). In this case, although the crisis can produce instability within the alliance, the most likely outcome is that the result of this period of instability within the alliance is more a recomposition of forces rather than a collapse. If the new dominant faction of the weaker party owes its success to the intervention of members of the other party (even if it loses some of its ability to influence), it is unlikely that said instability will lead to the collapse of the alliance. Also, the possibility that the collapse of the alliance will also mean the collapse of the weakest party will most likely also dissuade those dominant factions to impose their will on other groups with external support. In these cases it is very possible that, in time, the alliance will become a political party with indirect affiliation (Figure 2).

The third and final difficulty relates to the reasons a stable alliance may not last. This case is more difficult to deal with. The main reason that could justify the collapse of a temporarily stable alliance is that the parties that make up said alliance are not able to overcome the first crisis created by a deterioration in the process of institutionalisation or the organisational instability of the smaller party.

The revision of theories on the operation of political alliances and their effects on organisational change within political parties suggests the need to integrate the alliance as a new factor in the model. This is due to the important interrelation foreseen by the theory between alliances and organisational change within political parties that make up these alliances. The next section seeks to establish, on the basis of the above, some hypotheses on the possible relationships between this and other factors linked to organisational change.
Organisational change within political alliances: Mechanisms

The review of Panebianco’s synthetic model of organisational change, as well as of his theories on the organisational effects of alliances on political parties has revealed the main factors to be included in our analytical framework. These are: variations in the parliamentary arena, the electoral arena, changes in the power balance within the alliance, the struggle for factional domination and the struggle for leadership. At the same time, this brief examination has shown new hypotheses that underline the merit of progressing towards less determinist, more open models. This, in turn, emerges from the characterisation of organisational change as a complex phenomenon.

Under these circumstances, one of the most useful strategies that can arise is to identify, using what has been established in the theory, different alternative models of organisational change (Rihoux, 2001) and, in the specific case of this research, of organisational change in parties within political alliances. These frameworks for analysis should not be limited to merely providing a theoretical justification for considering each factor. The mechanisms through which each factor can intervene in organisational change should also be established in a similar manner.

It should be pointed out that this research does not have determinist hopes; in other words, alternative models of organisational change are not ruled out. Rather, the objective is to ascertain whether or not the models proposed function on the basis of a case study. Despite the fact that the conclusions reached should be taken with caution until confirmed by additional data, conclusions can be used to tentatively demonstrate their relevance. In any case, the validity of these models should allow progress towards typological explanations (George and Bennet, 2005) of organisational change.

Thus, the theoretical considerations prepared in the previous sections allow us to define a first unicausal model (model I) of organisational change: In this model (which brings together a set of possible routes to organisational change), change can occur as a result of the mere variation
of one of the factors. One example of this first type of route could be, (simplifying) Panebianco’s synthetic model that, as we have seen, associates organisational changes with environmental changes.

The second and third are most specific models of the processes of organisational change in political alliances. In both models, the main element of change is variations in power within the alliance. The interpretative keystone of these outlines resides in the fact that the influence of the alliance is the main element behind organisational change. The difference between the second model and the third model resides in the triggers (Figure 3). Whereas in the second model (model II) the origin is due almost exclusively to the effects of the changes in power within the alliance, in the third (model III) these are caused fundamentally by changes in the electoral or parliamentary arenas.

**Figure 3**
Environmental changes and organisational change in political alliances. Models II & III

In the second model, change can be triggered by at least two phenomena: a) the effect on the party of the particular dynamics of the alliance (deinstitutionalisation, threats to identity, loss of power for one or
more factions); b) or crisis in one of the other parties that make up the alliance. In the first case, the instability generated in the party by the alliance can open the door to a crisis resulting from struggles for factional domination, leadership or all factors at the same time. It is very possible that in all cases, debate on the continuation of the alliance will one way or another come to the public’s attention. The result of the crisis would be an organisational change that will vary according to the initial physiognomy of the dominant coalition and, possibly, the collapse of the alliance. In the second case, the imbalance resulting from the crisis in one of the partners can be taken advantage of by the other members of the dominant coalition to strengthen their positions within and/or without the party itself. This can result in an internal crisis (for factional domination, leadership or both) in which it is very possible that momentary pacts are reached between the various groups of leaders of the different parties involved to shore up their respective positions. As we have explained, in this case the very existence of intra-party commitments can make organisational change possible in the different parties without such change affecting the continuation of the alliance (whilst affecting its stability).

The third model does not differ markedly from the second except in terms of the trigger for the process, which is external (electoral or parliamentary). In this case, external factors can lead to an internal crisis in one of the partners (leadership crisis, split, etc.) that, as in the case above, gives rise to a struggle for factional power or leadership that extends to all of the alliance. Without reaching internal crisis in one of the parties, however, environmental changes can, for example, lead to new inequalities in the alliance that change the internal balance of power. This can be due, for example, to the unequal effects of a victory (or defeat) or important changes in the size of the partners. In these cases, changes in the balance of power within the alliance can lead to an internal crisis in the most disadvantaged party that later leads to organisational change.
The fourth and final model (model IV) is suggested as an alternative possibility to models two and three (Figure 4). In this analytical schema, it is thought that organisational change can occur without substantial changes within the alliance. In these cases, it is changes in the electoral and/or parliamentary scenario that begin the process of organisational change without causing serious internal crises or power imbalances between partners. Environmental changes open the door to the struggle for factional domination and/or internal leadership, and this leads to organisational change in the party. The peculiar thing is that power balances within the alliance do not play a role in this crisis, even when the crisis can set in train the process of organisational change in one or more of the other partners. This model is one of the internal triggers of model II and IV.

Case study: Unió Democràtica de Catalunya within the Convergència i Unió alliance (1978-2001)

Unió Democràtica de Catalunya (UDC) is a small Catalan party founded in 1931, shortly after the Second Republic was restored. Its sponsors were a group of Catholic intellectuals and politicians who defended the political autonomy of Catalonia and the compatibility of Catholicism and the values of democratic liberalism (Raguer, 1976).
Heavily influenced by the thoughts and actions of Italian priest Luigi Sturzo, UDC designed its structure in the image of most of Europe’s nascent Christian Democrat parties. Even so, the party never became a numerous mass party. The crisis of the Second Republic and the Spanish Civil War that followed made it impossible to develop the party. From 1936, many of its leaders went into exile in Catalonia. In 1939, with the beginning of the Franco dictatorship, the party was permanently declared illegal. During the dictatorship, UDC became a small party of intellectuals and university students that was illegal but tolerated to an extent by the regime.

In the last years of the Franco regime, Unió activated its ties with the DC Internacional and made a decisive step to organise a Spanish Christian Democrat party (Equipo DC). Nonetheless, the appearance of the Unión de Centro Democrático (UCD) of the head of the Spanish government, Adolfo Suárez, condemned this project to failure. In the first general election of Spain’s political transition (1977), UDC avoided disaster but its results were much inferior to what the party has predicted (Tusell, 1985). This led to a major internal crisis. Part of the dominant faction that had historically led the party decided to break away and move towards Suárez’s UCD. The remaining members (Cañellas) had no choice but to reach a precarious agreement to lead the party with what was until then a minority elite (Vila d’Abadal). This agreement broke down when the time came to decide the alliance policy for the 1979 general election. While Cañellas (the sole parliamentarian and electoral leader) opted for a pact with Suárez’s UCD, the internal leaders and the intermediary structure of the party (Vila d’Abadal) pinned their hopes on a pact with Jordi Pujol’s Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya. Both alliances posed significant dangers, since the three parties competed for very similar electoral territory. The alternative, on the other hand, was the disappearance of the party. Finally, the majority of the party opted for the pact with Jordi Pujol, which led to the expulsion of Cañellas and the split of his followers (Barberà, 2000).

In 1978, Unió began a new chapter in its history. Without doubt, the alliance with Jordi Pujol’s CDC enabled Unió to overcome its problem of survival. As fate would have it, just two years after it was formed the
alliance between the CDC and the UDC (Convergencia i Unió, CiU) secured a surprise victory in the first election for the Catalan parliament (1980). The access of CiU to the government was a great comfort for the UDC. From that moment onwards, the problem of disappearance assumed secondary importance. Between 1980 and 1982, the party did not face any major problems. During these years, the UDC changed from a typical model of an (mass) opposition party to the requirements of a party of government (compatibility between leadership and public office, etc.). Nonetheless, this process began to gradually give rise to destabilising effects. The prominence of Pujol in the new Catalan government, the lack of an alternative leader within the UDC and the difficulties faced by the Christian Democrats in reaching public opinion begin to demonstrate that the CDC can constitute an important threat to the identity of Unió. This diagnosis is further aggravated by siren songs from the PDP, the newly-founded party that had grouped together the former Christian Democrat faction of Suárez’s UCD since 1981 (Culla, 2000).

Table 1

Periods and factors in organisational change within the UDC (I)

<table>
<thead>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Factors</td>
<td>BACKGR.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. EXTERNAL FACTORS</td>
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<tr>
<td>Parliamentary scenario</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>a.- Catalan parliament</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>CIU (80-84) Rel. majority</td>
<td>CIU (84-88) Abs. majority</td>
<td>CIU (88-92) Abs. majority</td>
<td>CIU (92-95) Abs. Majority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b.- Congress of deputies</td>
<td>UCD (77-79) Consensus</td>
<td>UCD (79-82) Rel. majority</td>
<td>PSOE (82-86) Abs. majority</td>
<td>PSOE (86-93) Abs. majority</td>
<td>PSOE (93-96) Rel. majority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c.- Interdependent scenarios</td>
<td>Support from Spanish gov.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>CIU</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support from Catalan gov.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>UCD ERC Govt. (84-87)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Electoral scenario (Catalonia)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>a.- Direct competitors</td>
<td>CDC UCD UCD</td>
<td>UCD ERC CDS</td>
<td>CDS ERC AP PP</td>
<td>CDS ERC PP</td>
<td>ERC PP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b.-Distance</td>
<td>Large Unfavorable for UDC</td>
<td>Narrow (CiU-UCD) Favor CiU</td>
<td>Large Favor, CiU</td>
<td>Large Favor, CiU</td>
<td>Large Favor, CiU</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Power within CiU**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Power Structure</th>
<th>Institutional</th>
<th>CDC-UDC Power</th>
<th>CiU Structure</th>
<th>Alliance Stability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a.- Institutional</td>
<td></td>
<td>75/25 (UDC)</td>
<td>Reduction</td>
<td>No organic relations</td>
<td>Stable (UDC crisis)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Local exception</td>
<td>Subord. UDC</td>
<td>No organic relations</td>
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<td>Subord. UDC</td>
<td>Liaison committee</td>
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<td>b.- CDC-UDC power</td>
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<td>CiU structure</td>
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<td>Pujol</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Roca</td>
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<td>Coll Alentorn</td>
<td>Coll Alentorn</td>
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<td>c.- Alliance stability</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(UDC crisis)</td>
<td>(UDC crisis)</td>
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</table>

Source: Barberà

In mid-1982, all of these contradictions erupted into an internal crisis of similar or greater magnitude than that of 1977-1978. Over the course of this period, which lasted from 1982 to 1986, the party entered a new organisational phase characterised by division and internal instability. The dominant coalition split into two blocs, organised into factions around the UDC members in the Catalan government (Joan Rigol) on the one hand and the leadership and the intermediary and local structure on the other (Francesc Borrell, Josep A. Duran y Concepció Ferrer). The former argued in favour of the beneficial effects the alliance with the CDC, while the latter were critical of the scant influence of the UDC within the alliance, placing the blame for this at the feet of the CDC. The relatively even balance of power between the two camps would enable the conflict to continue for four years.

At the XI Congress (1982), where the conflict first become apparent, the organisational management led by J.A. Duran secured a comfortable victory over Rigol. Nonetheless, supporters of the alliance with the CDC ensure that the congress rejects any rapprochement by Unió to the PDP. Nevertheless, Duran was unable to upset the balance of power towards the internal leaders: his attempt to approve an ambitious reform to the statute failed (XII Congress, 1983) and, in turn, he loses his battle with Jordi Pujol (leader of the Catalan government and the CDC) over who should appoint the UDC members of the Catalan government (1984). The replacement of Duran with Concepció Ferrer at the head of the party (XIV Congress, 1984) did not change the dynamic of instability and division. Despite Ferrer’s
attempts at *rapprochement* with Rigol, this dynamic persists due to support from Duran (XIV and XV Congress). Meanwhile, negotiations with the PDP were unsuccessful, basically due to the refusal of the Catalan branch of the PDP to dissolve and become part of the UDC.

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<td>NO</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>b.- Factions</td>
<td>Cañellas</td>
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<td>Borrell</td>
<td>Rigol</td>
<td>Duran</td>
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<td>Equal</td>
<td>Dominion</td>
<td>Duran</td>
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| Leadership struggle | NO | NO | Yes | NO | NO |

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<th>INTENSE CHANGE</th>
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<td>Polarchy</td>
<td>Oligarchy</td>
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<td>Equilibrium O.M.-Govt. Type 3</td>
<td>Equilibrium D.O.-Govt. Type 3</td>
<td>Dominion O.M. Type 5</td>
<td>Dominion Leader Type 1</td>
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</table>

Source: Barberà. 1. Type according to Panebianco (1988: 175)

Two fundamental events took place in 1986, one internal and one caused by external factors. Joan Rigol, the main partisan ally of the alliance with the CDC, had to step down from the Catalan government as a result of disagreements with Jordi Pujol. The other event, the new victory for the socialists in the 1986 general election, highlights the leadership of Fraga on the right, a circumstance that used by the PDP to rupture its coalition with the AP (Montero, 1989). The end of the coalition with the AP rekindled the interest of the PDP in negotiating with the UDC. Duran seized on this to forge a unity pact with Rigol: the UDC would reject any agreement with the PDP but, at the same time, demand more power from the CDC. Once the strategy had been agreed upon, Duran and Rigol divide up the main posts in the party management.
The electoral hammering suffered by the PDP at the municipal elections of 1987 confirmed the wisdom of Duran’s strategy and facilitated internal pacification. After providing the impetus for significant statutory change (two-year mandates, more powers for the party leader, etc.), Duran was again UDC the party leader at the XVII Congress (1987). In this period, Unió was able to professionalise and modernise itself, gradually increasing its share of institutional power within the alliance (in particular at municipal level, where there is a substantial increase in conflict between the two parties) and increase its public prominence. All of this translated into a resumption of ties between the leaders of the CDC and the UDC in the form of a liaison committee that began operating in 1988 (Culla, 2002).

The greater weight of UDC within the alliance, the possibility that CIU could more actively intervene in Spanish politics and the succession of Pujol were behind the crisis that arose between Mr Pujol and his number two, Miquel Roca, between 1991 and 1993. The UDC leadership very skilfully took advantage of the differences within the CDC to shore up its position within the CIU. Indeed, Duran became the key weapon with which Pujol defeated Roca. This leads to Duran becoming the CiU’s virtual number two and, above all, permanently consolidated his leadership within the UDC (Antich, 1994).

Since then, Unió has experienced a period of deep organisational stability that continues to this day. Neither the fact that Duran was marginalised from the succession of Pujol within the CiU in 2001 nor the departure of the CiU from the government of the Generalitat have for the moment changed the appearance of Unió.

Discussion

Despite the limited length of the case study, it seems sufficient to demonstrate the possible connection of each stage with one or more of the models specified in the analytical framework.

Without doubt, the most remarkable aspect of the changes that took place between 1980 and 1982 is the paradox that organisational change can also go hand-in-hand with a substantial improvement in conditions of
exchange with the environment: in this case, access to the government of Catalonia for the UDC. Undoubtedly, tracing the mechanisms of organisational change followed during this phase that possibly refers to a combination of model I and model III is more difficult. This is due to the fact that changes appear to originate from significant environmental changes and, at the same time, from the effects of these changes on the party. In this regard, the destabilising influence of the effects derived from environmental changes, changes in the balance of power within the alliance, changes in the map of organisational power and the organisational identity of Unió should be emphasised. In the final analysis, these two factors are responsible for the factional split within the UDC.

From the long period of instability that ran from 1982 to 1986, a number of points can be made: a) the difficulty (not predicted in the model) of including anticipation effects and, in particular, actions more based on the expectations of the actors than on events; b) the events that took place in this period appear to refute Panebianco’s proposition that all dominant coalitions are united until replaced by a new minority elite; c) it should be pointed out that the UDC crisis at no stage affected the continuation of the alliance with the CDC. No doubt this is due to the role of arbitrator appointed by Jordi Pujol as head of the Generalitat. During this period, Pujol became the great guarantor of supporters within the UDC of the continuation of the CiU. The protection provided by Pujol allows these supporters to retain their influence within the party and, by extension, equilibrium in the struggle for factional domination. In light of these conditions, it is very clear that any attempt to suggest the collapse of the alliance would have no doubt prompted the very collapse of the party; d) finally, the current characteristic identity crisis within Unió Democràtica reveals the tensions within the dominant coalition between those for whom the smooth operation of the party is the priority and those for whom the alliance is the priority. Under these conditions, it seems reasonable to doubt the determinism of Panebianco once more when he states that the survival of the party is always an objective shared by all members of the dominant coalition.
The organisational change that takes place between 1986 and 1991 is the result of a complex process that, furthermore, takes place over a long period of time. Firstly, the trigger is a change in the power balance between the different factions that is not linked to electoral or parliamentary change. Secondly, the long duration of the process favours a situation where there occurs not only an interaction between some of the different factors pointed out in the theoretical framework, but also between the very process of organisational change and these factors. The *interaction effect* (or *endogeneity effect*) complicates attempts to associate this transformation with any of the theoretical models put forward at the outset. The type of relationship between the different factors involved in the process is a vague reminder of model I; however, due to the interaction between factors it does not square with any of the models set out in theoretical works.

The sequence of mechanisms associated with the most recent organisational change experienced within the UDC squares convincingly with model II. In other words, these mechanisms suggest that organisational change within the party is produced by changes in the balance of power within the alliance. The uniqueness of the process between 1991 and 1993 is again due to the importance of *anticipation effects*. On this occasion, the anticipation effects are related to the succession of Pujol and, in turn, to the possibility that the CiU could have a decisive role in Spain's governability. At certain times, instability within the CDC seems to even threaten the continuation of the alliance. However, as occurred with Unió in the 1980s, instability within the alliance is not necessarily accompanied by its collapse. Indeed, the crisis within the CDC serves to give Duran and the UDC more power and prominence within the CiU. Finally, it confirms the importance for the continuation of the alliance the conjunction of interests between the different groups that comprise the respective dominant coalitions.

**Conclusions**

Without doubt, the most direct conclusions of this work relate to the *refutation* or, as a minimum, the weakening of some of the more
determinist hypotheses of Panebianco’s synthetic model of organisational change. Thus, organisational change does not always involve the replacement of a dominant coalition with a minority elite. Two, it cannot be assumed that organisational stability is always the objective sought by all groups that make up the dominant coalition. Three, it should be remembered that organisational change cannot be due solely to a deterioration in the conditions of exchange with the surrounding environment. Finally, it should be pointed out that there is no reason for the instability of political alliances to necessarily affect their continued existence.

Unlike the corrections to the Panebianco model, the verification of the explanatory power of the different models of organisational change proposed in the analytical framework is much more ambivalent. In this sense, the most important distinction should be made between model IV (of whose existence no evidence was found in this study) and models I, II and III which, with more or fewer nuances, seem to explain the organisational changes within the UDC. The distinction is important insofar as model IV was designed to be counterfactual to the previous models: while models I and III maintained that changes in power in the alliance were a necessary factor in explaining organisational change, model IV argued that this was not the case. Thus, the results appear to suggest (with the prudence and limitations of a case study) the importance of the alliance to understanding organisational change in those parties that make up said alliance. Clearly, future research must verify this tentative conclusion.

The final suggestions relate to the need to integrate anticipation and interaction effects (endogeneity) in the model. In the first case, it advises that expectations in relation to events be added as another dimension of each factor linked to organisational change. However, this entails significant problems in terms of interpretation that complicate research, in particular since it requires what are merely interpretations of reality prepared by their protagonists to be constructed as social phenomena. In the second case, interaction between dependent and independent variables can be associated with the more generic concept of path
dependency. However, as one can easily appreciate, nor is its inclusion in the model exempt from serious problems. The most significant of these problems in particular relates to possibilities for theoretical generalisation. This is due to the fact that when the evolution of a phenomenon is a function of its own history, it is difficult to transfer to other cases.

In theoretical terms, signs from the UDC case appear to suggest the importance of moving forward towards typological explanations of organisational change within political parties. It is probable that such explanations make it possible to better understand power phenomena within political parties. Clearly, data gleaned from a case study should only be viewed in a tentative manner and as having provisional value. Future compared research must demonstrate the validity of each of these models and, possibly, suggest the existence of others not specified in this theoretical framework.

Notes

1. Óscar Barberà is Visiting Fellow at the London School of Economics thanks to a post-doctoral scholarship from the Spanish government. The author wishes to thank Montserrat Baras, Astrid Barrio, Joan Rodríguez, Jordi Argelaguet, Joaquim Molins, Rafael Martínez and William Genieys for their comments. This article is part of the research program "Los partidos de ámbito no estatal en el sistema político español. Una perspectiva comparada (2006-2009)" (SEJ2006-15076-C03-02/CPOL) and of my post-doctoral fellowship, both of them supported by the Spanish Government.


3. Panebianco’s definition of organisational change is fundamentally associated with changes in the organisation’s authority structure (organisational order): "imply alterations serious enough to modify relations among the organisation’s various components" (Panebianco, 1988: 243).

4. In the words of Harmel and Janda: “If the dominant coalition is factionalised, the dominant faction is the one most likely to get its way within the coalition. A participating faction is any non-dominant faction in the dominant coalition. An

5. Doubts can even arise as to whether the very survival of the party can be considered an objective. Hirschman (1970) theorised about this possibility, which has been successfully used to explain crises that bring about the organisation itself. A good example in the work by Hopkin (1999) on the Spanish UCD.


7. Many of the ideas contained in this section are also credited to Astrid Barrio, to whom I extend my thanks for her permission to use them as she completes her doctoral thesis.

8. According to the Duverger schema, both factors (the electoral system and the party system) come together so that in majority-based electoral systems, the determining factor appears to be the number of parties in the political system, while in proportional multiparty systems the influence of proportionality tends to encourage unstable alliances (Duverger, 1954: 343 y ss.).

9. Duverger ties in the concept of inequality with three dimensions: Dimension, which refers to size; the ideology, which refers to the ideological position of the allies and, specifically, the extent of the moderation-extremism; and the structure, which refers primarily to the number of parties that make up the alliance (Duverger, 1954: 344 and ss.).

10. Parties that act in the same political hunting ground are rivals. There is opposition but no competition when hunting grounds of the two parties do not overlap. (Panebianco, 1988: 215-6).

11. While maintenance (or durability) refers to the duration of a phenomenon, stability is associated with the conflictive or non-conflictive nature of said phenomenon.

Bibliography


