



## Using the Olympics to optimise tourism benefits

Laurence Chalip

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## 1. The economic context of Olympic tourism

Staging an Olympic Games represents a substantial investment by both the public and private sectors. For example, in the ten years leading up to the Sydney Olympics, it has been estimated that the total public investment was A\$2.3 billion, while the private investment was A\$1.2 billion. To give some perspective, the average annual investment over the ten year period is equivalent to approximately 0.06% of Australia's GDP over the same period.

The natural question to ask about that investment is: "What is the return?" In the lead-up to the Olympic Games, there were two economic impact forecasts – the first (at the time of the bid), using input-output modelling (KPGM, 1993), and the second (two years before the Games) using CGE modelling and updated data (Arthur Andersen & CREA, 1999). The two studies generated estimates that were of comparable magnitude. The more recent study has been used as the standard benchmark, estimating that A\$6.5 billion will have been contributed to the Australian GDP between 1994-2006 as a consequence of hosting the Games. Of this amount, A\$5.1 billion is expected to accrue to New South Wales, the state in which the Games were hosted. These projections represent an average annual increment to Australia's GDP of 0.12% (over the 1994-2006 period) as a consequence of hosting the Games. Although this net gain is a small percentage of total GDP, it is nonetheless substantial. The economic return is a key indication of the legacy that an Olympic Games will have left for its host country – a legacy that, as we will see, was founded substantially on the tourism impact of the Games.

## 2. Legacy

In the context of the Olympic Movement, the legacy left by an Olympics is vital. In the lead-up to Sydney's Olympic bid, this was explicitly acknowledged in the planning and execution of bid documents. As one early report put it:

"An Olympic Games that is successfully staged and financially managed leaves a positive legacy for the host city in terms of new and upgraded sporting facilities and venues; new and improved infrastructure; enhanced international recognition; enhanced international reputation; increased tourism; new trade, investment and marketing opportunities; and increased participation in sport."

(Sydney Olympic Games Review Committee, 1990:3)

As this quote clearly indicates, legacy is a multi-faceted outcome. Interestingly, the development of sport facilities is typically the most commonly cited legacy element in both popular discourse and Olympic discussions. The focus on facilities derives from the earliest days of the Olympic Movement, when the Games were intended as a means to stimulate sport development through development of sport venues. Coubertin's words on the matter are widely understood within the Olympic Movement to represent the fundamental tenets of Olympism. He described the centrality of facility development this way: "It seems that [social] reforms risk remaining sterile unless we succeed in creating a centre for popular spectacles and enjoyments in which [to have] youthful exercise, symbol of endurance ... and the hopes of the nation." (Coubertin, 1918)

However, from a contemporary economic perspective, sport facilities may not be a key benefit of the Games. In Barcelona, the diving and baseball facilities eventually had to be torn down because they were so under-utilised. In Atlanta, the Olympic track was torn up shortly after the Games. The Olympic stadium had to be converted for professional baseball if it was going to generate sufficient revenues to survive, and the Olympic swimming venue continues struggles to meet the expenses of its operations. In Sydney, the two main stadia constructed for the Games are projected to require 200 events per year to cover costs – more than double the current rate of bookings. Sydney's Olympic swimming pool is so expensive to rent that the national championships were scheduled for an alternative (and cheaper) Sydney venue.

It has been argued elsewhere that the Games may provide a vital stimulus for urban development (Hughes, 1993). In the Sydney case, there was substantial construction undertaken to host the Games. In the lead-up to the Olympics, new sport facilities were constructed; existing facilities were upgraded; new roads were built; the Sydney airport was expanded; and hotel room capacity in Sydney was increased by 25%. The city of Sydney undertook an extensive urban beautification program that included widening footpaths, installing new street furniture, providing enhanced security (e.g., safety cameras, lighting), adding and upgrading public landscaping, and supplying improved disabled access. The city's beautification program began with an expenditure of A\$1.5 million in the 1994-1995 budget year, and rose each year to over A\$114.4 million in the 1998-1999 budget year. These investments generated substantial employment and economic activity. However, that activity

represents a compression into a few pre-Olympic years of work that would have taken place over a longer period of time. As the pre-Olympic construction was completed and market demand was satiated, non-residential construction activity in Sydney dropped by 18% in the 1999-2000 budget year, and is projected to drop another 13% in the 2000-2001 budget year. Although urban development will certainly be a legacy of the Games, the boom and bust of the resulting construction cycle has been, at best, a mixed economic blessing.

### 3. Tourism

Scrutiny of the economic impact forecasts suggests that the key economic legacy from Sydney's hosting of the Olympic Games is the tourism that the Games are projected to generate. The Tourism Forecasting Council (1998) in Australia projected that the Games would generate an added 1.6 million international visitors to Australia over the eight year period from 1997-2004. This represents visitors who have decided to visit Australia as a consequence of the added exposure and international profile that Australia obtained as a consequence of hosting the Olympic Games. When these figures were incorporated into the economic impact forecasts cited above, it was estimated that tourist visits induced by the Olympic Games would generate just over A\$2.9 billion of extra tourism foreign exports. Thus, tourism accounted for over 44.6% of the projected economic impact.

What makes this finding all-the-more astonishing is that a detailed review of previous Olympic reports and Olympic research found scant mention of tourism impacts. There were, however, several academic studies following the Los Angeles and Seoul Olympics that sought to quantify the tourism generated as a result of hosting an Olympic Games. The most common research strategy has been to treat visitor numbers as an interrupted time series, and then to model the effect of the Games using econometric techniques. Thus, Hyun (1990) estimated that Seoul's hosting of the Olympic Games would generate approximately 640,000 additional visitors in the long term. Kang and Perdue (1994) estimated the number to be closer to 1 million. On the other hand, a study of the Los Angeles Olympics suggested that there may have been lost tourist visits as a consequence of Los Angeles hosting the Games (Pyo, S. et al., 1988). Other econometric work by Witt and Martin (1987) found no discernible impact of mega-events on

tourism flows once other environmental factors (e.g., income levels, relative prices) were held constant.

There are several possible explanations for these contradictory findings. It may simply be the case that the varying social, economic, and political conditions at different times and in different countries overwhelm the data – either masking real effects, or rendering very different effects in different cases. It may also be that the Games are too short to render a long-term tourism impact. It is, in fact, the long-term effect that matters. For example, in the Australian case, tourists coming to attend the Games account for only 7% of the total number of tourist visits to Australia projected to have been stimulated between 1997-2004 as a consequence of Sydney hosting the Games. But what if the effect is more ephemeral than forecast? The Games enjoy substantial media attention, particularly while they are taking place and in the period immediately preceding, but they do not obtain sustained international attention beyond that period. The classic study by Ritchie and Smith (1991) illustrates the problem. They measured the salience and attractiveness of Calgary as a destination in core United States and European markets before, during, and after the 1988 Winter Olympic Games. They found a substantial increase in the Calgary's saliency and attractiveness during and immediately following the Games. The increase was sustained for a short period, but tailed off over time.

What this work suggests is that the Games have a distinctive capacity to enhance the position of the host city (and country) in international markets – at least in the short-term. The challenge, then, is to find means to exploit that capacity, and to build on it. In order to accomplish that end, Australia launched a coordinated campaign to leverage the Olympic Games to optimise their tourism impact.

## 4. Leveraging

The implementation of strategies and tactics to leverage the Games for tourism development is new. Although other host cities and countries have invested tourism marketing dollars in Olympics-related advertising campaigns, no previous host has put together a coordinated leveraging strategy. In fact, the leveraging effort represents a subtle but significant paradigm

shift. The standard approach has been to examine the impacts of events like the Olympic Games. This approach treats the event itself as the intervention. However, the conscientious application of strategic leveraging recognises that the event itself is not the intervention, rather it is an opportunity to implement particular tactics which may foster and nurture the impacts that are desired.

This paradigm shift has not gone unnoticed. The Sydney leveraging effort has captured the imagination of the IOC. At a press conference in Sydney prior to the Games, Michael Payne, the IOC's Director of Marketing, said:

“It is great to see the tourist industry fully taking advantage of the opportunity of hosting the Olympic Games. It is the first time that a national tourist organisation has taken advantage of the opportunity of hosting the Games before the Games have been held. It is really a model that I hope we can take forward.”

Australian Tourist Commission (2000)

Australia's tourism leveraging of the Games has been built around four core strategic elements:

- (1) repositioning the country by capitalising on media,
- (2) aggressively seeking convention business,
- (3) minimising the diversion effect of the Games, and
- (4) promoting pre- and post-Games touring .

Each strategy required that a number of different supporting tactics be implemented. The remainder of this paper outlines the tactical implementation of each strategy. It then considers the challenges associated with strategic leveraging, and concludes by considering the implications for economic analysis of Olympic effects.

## 4.1. Repositioning

Since the Games generate media interest, it was quickly recognised that as much as possible should be done to capitalise on that interest. Australian tourism marketers wanted to divest Australia of the “Crocodile Dundee” image by which it was still perceived in many of its international markets. They wanted to project an image of a diverse and modern country with a unique look and feel. The technological sophistication of the Games themselves would be one means to achieve that end. But, more significantly, it was noted that journalists from throughout the world would find Australia to be a particularly appealing place to write about, particularly because Australia would be hosting the Games. If they could be assisted to write stories that were consistent with the image that Australia wants to project, then the country could be repositioned in its core markets. Three key tactics were implemented pursuant to the repositioning strategy:

- (1) the Visiting Journalists Program,
- (2) Olympic media programs, and
- (3) a sponsor relations program.

In the post-Games period, a follow-up strategy is being implemented.

### 4.1.1. The Visiting journalists program

Since 1989, the Australian Tourist Commission (ATC) operated a program called “the Visiting Journalists Program” (VJP). The budget for that program was increased by A\$12 million for the four year period from 1996-2000 in order to capitalise on media interest around the Games. Under the program, print and broadcast journalists were recruited in key markets around the world to visit Australia to write about the country or film. The ATC worked with journalists to help them identify and research stories. The ATC facilitated necessary introductions, and provided background information and visuals (pictures or film clips) to support the journalists’ work. In the two years prior to the Games almost two journalists arrived in Australia each day under this program. The ATC estimates (using comparable worth calculations) that Australia obtained A\$2.3 billion in media coverage internationally as a result of the program.

#### 4.1.2. Olympic media programs

Despite the high volume of pre-Games interest, it was recognised that Australia, and Sydney in particular, would be inundated with media during the Olympic Games. It was anticipated that there would be 6,000 accredited print media, as well as 12,000 accredited broadcast media and technicians. These media would be particularly focused on Olympic sport, but might seek colourful vignettes or images to round out their stories. Pursuant to that need, the ATC worked with the Sydney Olympic Broadcasting Organisation (SOBO) to provide ideas, facts, and video “postcards” that could be used by Olympic broadcasters. There are no figures available to indicate the take-up rate of these elements by accredited Olympic media.

But there was a group that was thought to be even more important (from a tourism point of view) than the accredited media: the unaccredited media. It was anticipated that over 15,000 unaccredited media would arrive in Sydney during the Games. Like their accredited counterparts, they would file stories back home with their media organisations, but they would not have the same access to athletes, competition venues, and media centres enjoyed by the accredited media. The ATC, based on observation in Atlanta, were convinced that these journalists were particularly prone to writing stories about the host city and country, and that the lack of facilities and support given to them would impel them to write negative stories.

In order to counteract that possibility, the ATC formed a partnership with other government agencies (federal, state and local) to create a media centre specifically for unaccredited media. The centre was located in Darling Harbour, close to the centre of the city and several key Olympic venues. It was open 15½ hours each day during the Games, providing meeting rooms, press conferences, internet access, and story support. Although data documenting the impact of the Sydney Media Centre on reporting by international media about Australia are not yet available, the centre was busy throughout the Games, and user surveys suggest a high rate of satisfaction.

The Games period itself was not the only opportunity to stimulate and work with media. The Torch Relay provided another opportunity. The relay was expected to generate primarily local media. It was recognised, however, that significant visuals or innovations might attract international media. Each state was asked to identify and then exploit interesting visuals. Thus,

the torch began its run through Australia in the centre of the country – at Uluru (Ayre’s Rock), the world’s largest monolith and an Australian icon. The torch was taken underwater (an Olympic first) at the Great Barrier Reef (another Australian tourist icon), and sugar cane fires were set to accompany the relay in parts of Queensland (the state immediately north of New South Wales).

#### **4.1.3. Sponsor relations programs**

It was soon recognised that the Olympic sponsors would have to make substantial media buys in their core markets in order to leverage their sponsorship investments. The media campaigns of sponsors needed to highlight the fact that they were Olympic sponsors. Since the Games would be in Australia, then the country, as well as the Olympic symbols, became a useful association to sell. Consider, for example, how American Express ambushed Visa during the Barcelona Olympics. During the Games, American Express broadcast commercials showing happy American Express clients using their American Express cards to shop in Barcelona. The association with the city was sufficient to generate an ambushing opportunity. By the time that Sydney had won its bid to host the Games, sponsors were ready to consider ways to link themselves not merely to the Olympics, but also to the host city and country.

Several sponsors consequently joined forces with the ATC to do joint advertorials, and to build images of Sydney and Australia into their advertising. Visa alone generated a destination-relevant spend of over A\$30 million in core markets (including the United States, Canada, Europe, New Zealand, and Asia). In addition, they developed promotions (e.g., merchant passbooks, awards programs) using Australian visuals and awards. Similarly, Kodak launched promotions in the United States using images of Australia to promote its new line of films and cameras. McDonalds worked with the ATC to deliver an in-store campaign in New Zealand (a core Australian tourist market). Joint promotions were also developed with Air New Zealand and Ansett Australia. The ATC estimates that A\$160 million worth of publicity was generated through cooperative arrangements with sponsors.

#### **4.1.4. Follow-up**

In the post-Olympic period, the central challenge is to capitalise on what has been gained as a result of hosting the Olympics. In order to determine the effects of the repositioning strategy,

the ATC has undertaken a brand audit in core international markets. The audit consists of face-to-face surveys that examine respondents' knowledge about Australia, perceptions of Australia, and intention to visit Australia. In order to determine the influence that media during the Games may have had, the survey includes questions about the Olympics.

The resulting data are being used to formulate new advertising and public relations campaigns. In addition to continuation of the VJP, the ATC plans to launch over 90 joint tactical advertising campaigns with more than 200 industry partners to promote holidays in Australia. The total spend (ATC plus industry partners) will be over \$A45 million. The ATC have also implemented a A\$6 million direct marketing campaign which includes redevelopment of the ATC's web site.

#### **4.2. Seeking convention business**

It was expected that the extensive media generated through the repositioning campaign would make Australia a more attractive destination for international tourists. However, among tourist markets, one stood out as key: conventions. Although the convention market is a small piece of the total tourism market, research by convention organisers in Australia suggested that convention delegates are a high yield market – generating a daily spend that is seven fold greater than that of leisure tourists. Thus, convention business became a particular target.

The convention market has two peculiarities that are not shared by the leisure tourism market. First, the organisations planning to host a convention often advertise that fact, and may even call for bids. Second, the decision about where the convention might take place is typically in the hands of one or a few key decision makers. Consequently, the necessary tactics for obtaining large and lucrative conventions include identifying opportunities, and then obtaining the ear of decision makers.

The mere fact that Sydney won the right to host the Olympic Games helped Australian destinations to capture the ear of convention organisers. In instances when introductions were needed, it was sometimes possible to use relationships with Olympic sponsors to obtain the necessary introduction. Once a destination marketer had the attention of a convention organiser, the fact that Sydney would host the Olympic Games provided a useful basis for

differentiating the destination. As the Director of the Sydney Convention and Visitors Bureau put it, “I tell them that if we can host an Olympic Games, we can host anything.”

The impact was significant. By 1999, industry analysts were ranking Sydney as the number one conference and convention destination in the world. The halo effect was substantial, allowing Melbourne to become the number two conference and convention destination. From the time the Olympic bid was won, through to the end of 1999, Sydney won 202 bids for conference and convention business. Those bids generated 251,280 delegates and over 1.3 million room nights. The estimated economic value to Sydney was A\$919,649,010.

During the lead-up to the Games, it was recognised that plans would need to be put into place after the Games to capitalise on the attention that Sydney obtained. Although advertising and public relations campaigns would continue in international markets after the Games, it was felt that a strong word-of-mouth campaign would be cost effective. It was recognised that conference and convention business would be an effective way to capitalise on word-of-mouth in high yield markets. In the lead-up to the Games, the “Meet in Australia” campaign was born. The ATC invested A\$5 million to work with businesses in Australia to encourage their overseas subsidiaries, parent companies, or trading partners to host their next corporate meeting, conference, or convention in Australia. Although the efficacy of the campaign has not yet been established, anecdotal evidence suggests that a number of companies have, indeed, worked to bring meetings into Australia.

#### **4.3. Minimising diversion effects**

The experience of Los Angeles as an Olympic host clearly demonstrated that visitors could be deterred by an Olympic Games. The expectation that accommodation would be full, attractions would be busy, and transportation would be crowded could cause potential visitors to seek an alternative destination.

Early in 1999, the ATC interviewed tour operators and travel wholesalers in Australia’s primary international markets. Those interviews confirmed that many potential visitors were, indeed, planning to avoid Australia during the Olympic year, and that travel agents were often complicit. The core problems were much the same as those Los Angeles experienced:

International tourists thought Australia would be too full and too busy for non-Olympic visitors.

It was agreed that a campaign was needed that would communicate to tourists, travel agents, and wholesalers that Australia was very much open for business during the Olympic year. It was also felt that the campaign should treat the Olympics as a positive, rather than as something to be overcome. In other words, the challenge was to suggest to international tourist markets that Australia would be a particularly attractive place to visit during the Olympic year. The resulting campaign endeavoured to capture that feeling by building visuals and a storyline suggesting that Australia would be festive and exciting throughout 2000. The slogan for the campaign was, "Australia: Fun and Games".

It is not possible to determine the degree to which this campaign was effective – particularly because most Australian states and some regional destinations also implemented campaigns to attract tourists during the Olympic year. Nevertheless, international visitor data indicate that Australia did not suffer a decline in visitor numbers in the months leading up to the Games (although Sydney's market share may have increased while the market share of some other Australian destinations may have declined). Further, some visitors report that the fact Australia would be hosting the Olympic Games attracted them to Australia, even though they would not be attending the Games.

#### **4.4. Promoting pre- and post-Games touring**

One of the particular challenges of the Sydney Olympics was to generate benefits for the entire country – not just for Sydney or New South Wales. The challenge would be to get Olympic visitors to travel beyond Sydney to see other parts of the country. Although this was a relatively minor strategic element in comparison to the other three, it was politically important to diversify the impact, and generate a more equitable dispersion of tourism benefits from the Games.

The official domestic travel supplier, Traveland, developed an array of tours that Olympic visitors could purchase for travel outside Sydney before, during or after the Games. Although

the company will not publicly release the sales figures for those tours, industry data and the unofficial statements of company executives indicate that this particular campaign lost money.

One of the complicating features of Olympic travel is that most Olympic visitors are not free and independent travellers. Each National Olympic Committee (NOC) nominates a travel company in its country that will sell Olympic tickets and associated Olympic travel. Consequently, the vast majority of Olympic visitors from any particular country will make their travel arrangements through a single travel provider – the one nominated by that country's NOC. In many instances these companies had little or no experience selling travel into Australia, and were unfamiliar with the domestic tourist infrastructure.

Australian destination marketers worked to identify the NOC-nominated travel companies in core markets, and then to build relationships with them. Once a relationship had been established, the destination marketers worked with those companies to bring their destinations into those companies' brochures as add-on options that Olympic visitors could buy. Perth provides an instructive example. Located on the other side of the continent from Sydney – more than 4,000 km away – destination marketers in Perth feared that their city would fail to attract Olympic visitors. Further, they feared that the Olympic Games would draw away those who might otherwise visit their city. However, people travelling to the Olympic Games from Europe could pass through Perth on their way to the Games. So, Perth worked with companies like SportsWorld (the company marketing the Olympics in the UK) to implement a "gateway" strategy. Accordingly, Perth was sold in Europe, particularly the UK, as the place to visit on the way to or from the Olympic Games. The degree to which Olympic visitors took up that option has not yet been released, but anecdotal evidence suggests that the take-up rate was small.

The same is true for other pre- and post-Games options. Cartan, the company responsible for marketing the Sydney Olympics in the United States, included pre- and post-Games travel packages in its brochures. Although that company has been responsible for selling Olympic travel in the United States since the 1960s, this was the first time they had included such options. They offered trips to Uluru, the Great Barrier Reef, and Melbourne. One company official described the take-up rate of those options as "well below expectations".

## 5. Challenges

The apparent failure to promote pre- and post-Games touring successfully illustrates one of the core facets of leveraging the Games for tourism. The target is not the visitor to the Games; the target is the visitor who might be prompted to come to the host city or country because it will host (or has hosted) the Games. The challenge is to exploit the international attention given to the Games in order to build market awareness and interest, and then to convert that awareness and interest into a visit. Once the Games are over, new strategies and tactics need to be developed to capitalise on what was gained in the years leading up to the Games.

As in the build-up to the Games, the necessary activities require that an array of organisations coordinate their efforts. Much of the leveraging described in this paper has been presented from the point of view of a single organisation: the Australian Tourist Commission. But leveraging an Olympic Games – even if just for tourism – is not a task that is effectively undertaken by one organisation independently. If a consistent market position is to be obtained, then the marketing messages of organisations communicating in target markets need to be compatible. If relationships are going to be formed with travel providers, then networks need to be created. If there are going to be returns to scale, then alliances need to be formed.

The consequent challenge is to synchronise and then coordinate the diverse interests, activities, and perspectives of assorted stakeholders. Within government, this includes public tourism organisations at national, state, regional and local levels, as well as organisations seeking to obtain conference and convention business. In the private sector, it includes tourism providers, such as the airlines, tour operators industry associations, and hospitality providers. Within the Olympic Movement, it includes sport organisations and the Olympic family. Other stakeholders include sponsors, economic development agencies, and local businesses.

In Australia, task forces were formed to bring representatives from these various sectors together into strategic planning units. Networks were formed among the task forces. Information sharing was facilitated via conferences and workshops with target industries where strategies and tactics were discussed. There has been no evaluation of these task

forces, but in most instances participants felt they were valuable. As a consequence, nearly all have elected to continue in the post-Games period in order to provide venues for coordinating other (non-Olympic) economic and leveraging initiatives.

The various leveraging initiatives undertaken during the Games generated new relationships and substantial learning on the part of those required to formulate or implement the associated strategies and tactics. The relationships and learning represent substantial capital assets for those organisations that have obtained them. However, much of that learning rests with the individuals who were directly associated with leveraging the Games. In many instances, those individuals were housed in temporary units of their organisations (typically, an “Olympics unit”), and have been reassigned or had their contracts terminated shortly after the event. No procedures were ever implemented to anchor the learning or relationships engendered by the Games. Consequently, one of the emerging challenges will be to identify means to convert individual relationships into organisational ones, and to bring the learning that has taken place into the organisational memories of Australian companies.

## 6. Implications for future work

It could be argued that the leveraging activities described here have rendered a legacy beyond the tourism that has been generated. The effort to build new networks and foster new relationships may, itself, engender significant economic activity, strategic advantage, and/or returns to scale. Although relationships and alliances are known to generate competitive advantage and efficiency, we know very little about the ways that networks generated as a consequence of hosting the Olympics affect local or national economies. Nor do we understand the ways in which the logic of collective action (Sandler, 1992) limits the magnitude, scope, or range of networks and their associated leveraging activities. Work is certainly needed to identify the impacts of Olympic-derived networking, and then to explore the limits on those impacts imposed as a consequence of collective action.

The same could be said for the learning that has taken place as a consequence of the Games. A great deal has been written in the organisational behaviour literature about the strategic advantages that learning can provide organisations. In the case of the Olympics, however, it is

not clear whether that learning will remain or will be lost as the individuals who generated it leave their organisations. We do not yet know how much value is added to business and tourism as a consequence of the learning that takes place; nor do we know how much value is lost if the knowledge is allowed to dissipate. Work is needed to model and quantify the advantages to be gained (or lost) from learning that has resulted from hosting an Olympic Games.

In Australia, leveraging of the Olympic Games was catalysed by initiatives undertaken in the public sector. Those initiatives were costly. Did the public sector investment engender an economic gain superior to what could be obtained through an unfettered free market? We don't know. Nor do we know the degree to which the public investment constituted an income transfer from taxpayers to large travel and tourism corporations. Although the strategies and tactics described above have an intuitive appeal, no economic rationale for the enabling public investments has been established. On what basis do we expect that the public investment in tourism leveraging will yield an economically superior outcome to that which can be obtained through the operation of competitive market forces? If mega-events, like the Olympic Games, are to be leveraged to their best advantage, then we need to understand the economic basis for public investments in leveraging, and we need to test the assumptions on which those investments are founded.

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Australian Tourist Commission  
<http://www.atc.net.au/>

Gamesinfo.com.au  
<http://www.gamesinfo.com.au/>

Kodak: 2000 Olympic Games  
<http://www.kodak.com/US/en/corp/sydneyOlympics/index2.shtml>

McDonalds: Olympic sponsorship history  
<http://www.mcdonalds.com/countries/usa/sports/olympics/sponsor/history.html>

Tourism Forecasting Council  
[http://www.industry.gov.au/content/controlfiles/display\\_details.cfm?ObjectID=80E72BA6-3584-4DAD-B55780EF35713968](http://www.industry.gov.au/content/controlfiles/display_details.cfm?ObjectID=80E72BA6-3584-4DAD-B55780EF35713968)

Sydney Convention and Visitors Bureau  
<http://www.scvb.com.au/index.asp>

VISA Olympic sponsorship  
<http://international.visa.com/av/sponsorships/olympics/main.jsp>

### Using the Olympics to optimise tourism benefits

Hosting an Olympic Games is an expensive enterprise. Its value depends on the legacy that the Games provide. Tourism represents a key element of Olympic legacy. Recent experience of hosting the Games suggests that the tourism effects can be optimised if the organisers and local tourism organisations work to maximise the tourism benefits to be obtained. Since the most significant tourism benefits will accrue through the exposure that the Olympic host city and country obtain, one key strategy for optimisation is to work with media and sponsors to build the destination's brand by capitalising on the media interest that is generated by hosting an Olympic Games. The key challenge of this effort is to build and maintain the necessary strategic alliances to plan and implement leveraging strategies and tactics. A related challenge is to retain the vast learning that takes place as a consequence of the tourism leveraging effort.

**Laurence Chalip**  
Griffith Universitat, Australia



Centre d'Estudis Olímpics  
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona

Edifici N. 1a. planta  
08193 Bellaterra (Barcelona)  
Spain

Phone +34 93 581 1992  
Fax +34 93 581 2139

<http://ceo.uab.cat>  
[ceioe@uab.cat](mailto:ceioe@uab.cat)