



PAPERS DE DEMOGRAFIA

462

GARHA, Nachatter Singh (2018) "Indian Diaspora: National register, UN Global Migration Database and Big Data". *Papers de Demografia*, 462: 1-35. Bellaterra: Centre d'Estudis Demogràfics.

Abstract- *Indian Diaspora: National register, UN Global Migration Database and Big Data*

In 2017, the Indian Diaspora was one of the biggest in the world. But until the last decade of the twentieth century, owing to the limited interest of the successive Indian governments, no regular register was maintained for the diaspora population. In 1990s, the accelerated emigration under globalization and the growing interests of Indian government to use diaspora as a source of political and economic power, raised the need to quantify the size and demarcate the geographical and political boundaries of the diaspora. Consequently, from 2001 the Indian government started to collect data about its diaspora population from the countries of destination. This data often suffers from incomplete coverage, conflicting political interests, and methodological nationalism; and provides distorted images of the diaspora. Recently, the emergence of 'UN Global Migration Database' and 'Big Data' create an opportunity to explore other aspects of the diaspora population. In this paper, our main objectives are: firstly, to quantify the size of diaspora population and demarcate the geopolitical boundaries of the Indian diaspora from available sources; secondly, to explore the role of the UNGMD and Big Data (Facebook) in explaining the socio-demographic characteristics and internal diversity of the Indian diaspora; and finally, to present the advantages and shortcomings of existing data sources on Indian diaspora population.

Key words: Indian diaspora; National register; UN Global Migration Database; Big Data; Internal diversity.

CONTENTS

1.- Introduction	1
2.- Diaspora: concept and theory	3
3.- The evolution of the Indian Diaspora	5
3.1.- Colonial Period (1833-1947)	5
3.2.- Post Independence period (1947-1990)	6
3.3.- India's neoliberal shift	7
3.4.- The period of nationalist revival (2014-present)	8
4.- Indian Diaspora through different Data Sources	9
4.1.- Indian government and diaspora	9
4.2.- United Nations Global Migration Database and Indian Diaspora	13
4.3.- Emergence of Big data and Indian Diaspora	17
5.- Comparison of different Data Sources	25
6.- Conclusions	28
References	32

LIST OF FIGURES

1.- The territorial distribution of overseas Indians in 2001 and 2017	11
2.- Top 15 countries of destination in the Indian diaspora, 2001 and 2017	12
3.- The territorial distribution of PIOs and NRIs, 2001 and 2017	12
4.- Top 15 Diasporas (in terms of population size in UNGMD) in the world, 2017	15
5.- The territorial distribution and cartogram of the Indian diaspora in 2017	15
6.- The evolution of the size, growth rate and sex-ratio of Indian diaspora population at continent level,1990-2017	16
7.- Top 15 destination of Indian diaspora based on the United Nations Global Migration Database, 1990 and 2017	17
8.- The territorial distribution and cartogram of Indian Diaspora (13-65) through Facebook data, 2017	19
9.- Top 15 destination of Indian diaspora based on the Facebook data, 2017	19
10.- The age structure of Indian immigrants in 20 top destinations of Indian diaspora through Facebook, 2017.....	20
11.- The share of different ethno-linguistic groups in the Indian diaspora through Facebook, 2017, and in India, 2011	21
12.- Internal diversity (ethnic and linguistic groups) of Indian diaspora through Facebook data and top destination countries, 2017	23
13.- A comparison of the size and continental distribution of the Indian diaspora population through different data sources in 2017	27

LIST OF TABLES

1.- The advantages and shortcomings of different data sources used to quantify the size and demarcate the geopolitical boundaries of the Indian diaspora	28
---	----

INDIAN DIASPORA: NATIONAL REGISTER, UN GLOBAL MIGRATION DATABASE AND BIG DATA¹

Nachatter Singh GARHA²

ORCID: 0000-0002-4506-680X

Centre d'Estudis Demogràfics (CED) - CERCA - UAB

1.- Introduction

The hyper-migration accompanied with the process of globalization at the turn of the new millennium has revived the phenomenon of transnational communities and diasporas (Faist 2010). This revival of interest is not only limited to the demarcation of geopolitical boundaries of the diaspora, but also includes the socioeconomic and demographic analysis of its population. The increased diaspora engagement was driven by three main sets of interests and resources represented by the diasporas i.e. the extraction of material resources for economic gain, the creation or maintenance of domestic and international political legitimacy, and the utilization of those abroad as a culturo-linguistic resource to be used in defining the boundaries of national identity (Waterbury 2010; Barry 2006; Itzigsohn 2000). Moreover, diasporas also serve in the construction of national myths that are further used to legitimize nationalist political agendas and the modes of inclusion and exclusion that designate, 'who' will have access to political representation and the resources of the state and who will not (King and Melvin 1999). To reap the economic and political benefits from the diaspora, the origin countries have started to engage with their diaspora populations all around the world, claiming them as their goodwill ambassador or tools of soft power (Hercog and Siegel 2013; Kugiel 2017).

¹ This paper forms a part of the doctoral thesis of the author, "Indian Diaspora to Spain: Demo-Spatial Analysis and Neighbourhood Relations", enrolled in the Demography PH.D. Program in Autonomous University of Barcelona (UAB), under the direction of Dr. Andreu Domingo; and the I+D+I project Demography, Migrations and New Statistics Frontiers: Big Data, Continuous Population Registers and Administrative Records-BIG-GEDEM (CSO2017-85670-R) funded by the Spanish Ministry of Economy, Industry and Competitiveness (PI: Andreu Domingo).

² Contact: nsingh@ced.uab.es

The growing engagements of the countries of origin in their diasporas have created an unprecedented demand for accurate, up-to-date and policy-relevant migration data (both stock and flow). The administrative and other national statistical records over the diaspora population, frequently suffer from poor coverage and are subjected to "methodological nationalism" (Faist 2012). They respond to different historical realities and political interests of collecting agencies and provide distorted images of the diaspora population and territory. The lack of accurate data and the ambiguity in the available statistics are also connected to what can be called the "data politics" of the diaspora phenomenon (Sheffer 2003). Diaspora population can be a source of cooperation or conflict between the parties involved in the immigration process i.e. homelands, host governments, and the diasporic entities. It makes the counting of the diaspora population a sensitive and politically charged issue. Sheffer argues that 'to some extent the unavailability and inaccuracy of such data are neither accidental nor the result of "objective" difficulties in data collection and processing... the problem stems from deliberate policies of homelands and host governments intended to suppress or falsify information about modern diasporism, that is, to conceal its actual impressive magnitude, rapid growth, and emerging significance' (2003: 99). The problem of the inaccuracy and unavailability of migration data, force researchers and policy makers to look for alternative data sources, which are not affected by the data politics, and can be used to explore the actual size and characteristics of different diaspora populations all around the world.

Indian Diaspora, is one of the largest in the world. But owing to the limited interest of the successive Indian governments, until the last decade of the twentieth century no regular register was maintained for the diaspora population. In 1990s, massive emigration under globalization, the neo-liberal shift in Indian economic policies, and the ever-increasing desire of Indian government to commodify and categorise its diaspora as a source of political and economic power in the global context (Modi and Taylor 2017), raised interest in quantifying the size of diaspora population and demarcating its geopolitical boundaries. Since 2001, Indian Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), have started to collect and publish information about overseas Indians on their official website. This data has been collected from the countries of destination and often suffers from the political interests of the Indian government and the host countries, in including or excluding some members of diaspora population, based on the current diplomatic relations.

The shortcomings of the data collected by the Indian government force us to look for a supra-state data register, which is not affected by the data-politics of the Indian

government, and quantifies the flow and stock of Indian immigrants settled around the world. The United Nations Global Migration Database (UNGMD) collects and harmonises migration flow and stock data from all countries, owing to its global coverage, it can be used to measure the size and demarcate the geographical boundaries of the Indian diaspora. The information collected is limited to the number of people who were born in India and are living abroad. It doesn't provide any information about the socio-demographic characteristics of the diaspora population. To know about these characteristics, we need another data sources that can capture this information. Recently, the irruption of Big Data and especially, social media site Facebook has allowed us to explore the internal dynamics and diversity of the Indian diaspora population. As the Facebook collects data about the active users, it provides us with the most up-to-date information of the Indian diaspora.

Owing to the unavailability of relevant data sources, quantifying the Indian diaspora population has remained a very difficult task for the diaspora researchers. In this paper, we want to fill this gap in current academic research by applying different data sources that captures diaspora population through different ways. Our starting point is that there is no single register available that can capture the exact size, internal diversity and geopolitical dimensions of the Indian diaspora at any point in time. Hence, to study the expansion and internal diversity of the diaspora population, we have to depend on different data sources, including national registers, supra-state registers, and Big Data. In this study, our main objectives are: first, to analyse and contrast different data sources which can be used to measure the size of the Indian diaspora population and demarcate its geopolitical boundaries; secondly, to analyse the advantages and shortcomings of these data sources in highlighting the dynamics and internal diversity of the Indian diaspora.

The paper is structured as follows: section 2, presents the theoretical aspects regarding the diaspora population. Section 3, shows different images and the diversity of the Indian diaspora captured through different sources. Section 4, compares the advantages and shortcomings of each data source. And finally, section 5, presents some conclusions.

2.- Diaspora: concept and theory

Etymologically the term 'Diaspora' derived from the Greek term *diaspeirein*, in which *dia-* means 'across' and *-speirein*, means 'to sow or scatter seeds'. It was first used to describe

the conditions of dispersed Jewish communities (Safran 1991). In its initial definition diasporas are collectives of individuals who identify themselves, and are identified by others as part of an imagined community that has been dispersed (either forced or voluntary) from its original homeland to two or more host-countries and that is committed to the maintenance or restoration of this homeland (Durham Peters 1999: 23; Demmers 2007: 9). Safran argues that the term diaspora has been used to define displaced people who feel, maintain, invent or revive a connection with a prior home and 'regard their ancestral homeland as their true, ideal home and as the place to which they or their descendants would (or should) eventually return (1991: 83). Diaspora is also defined by the "role played by collective memory, which transmits both the historical facts that precipitated the dispersion and a cultural heritage" (Chaliand and Rageau 1995: 15). Sheffer defines modern diasporas as 'ethnic minority groups of migrant origins residing and acting in host countries but maintaining strong sentimental and material links with their countries of origin - their homelands' (1986: 3).

In their 'Atlas des Diasporas' Chaliand and Rageau utilise four criteria for defining a diaspora: forced dispersion, retention of a collective historical and cultural memory of the dispersion, the will to transmit a heritage, and the ability of the group to survive over time (1991: 14). Based on a variety of social and political contexts, Robin Cohen (1997) proposed a typology of diasporas i.e. victim diasporas, labour and imperial diasporas, trade diasporas, cultural diasporas, global de-territorialised diasporas. Some scholars argue that diaspora enters into a semantic field with other terms and terrains, such as those of exile, migrant, immigrant, and globalisation, and transforms into "the exemplary community of the transnational moment" (Tölölyan 1991). At present in its wider definition diaspora signifies the lives of 'any group living in displacement' (Clifford 1994: 310). In his editorial preface to the first issue of *Diaspora Journal*, Tölölyan writes, "the term that once described Jewish, Greek, and Armenian dispersion now shares meanings with a larger semantic domain that includes words like immigrant, expatriate, refugee, guest-worker, exile-community, overseas community, ethnic community" (1991: 3). Vertovec (1997) claims that in recent writings diaspora conveys at least three discernible meanings which are: 'diaspora' as social form, 'diaspora' as type of consciousness, and 'diaspora' as mode of cultural production. It can be used to describe practically any population which is considered 'deterritorialised' or 'transnational' and whose social, economic and political networks cross the borders of nation-states or, indeed, span the globe. According to Mishra (1996, 422) diaspora is a

product of human imagination, “around which anti-miscegenation narratives of homeland are constructed”.

In the above discussion, we have witnessed the expansion of the term ‘diaspora’ with the inclusion of all displaced people in the diaspora population. In an increasingly transnational world of floating communities, the migration has not remained unidirectional, and people keep on changing their locations frequently, which makes it difficult, if not impossible, to measure the exact size of the diaspora population at certain places and at certain points in time. In the Indian context, the lack of a national registers for the emigrants makes it very difficult to quantify the emigration flows from the country. The data on diaspora populations is collected from destination countries that suffer from data politics (as defined by Sheffer, 2003). In this paper, we consider that diaspora population includes all individuals who live out of their country of birth and maintain links with their homeland and the diaspora territory is the land appropriated by the diaspora population.

3.- The evolution of the Indian Diaspora

The Indian diaspora is a result of a two centuries’-long history of emigration from India. This evolutionary history can be divided into four periods:

3.1.- Colonial Period (1833-1947)

After the abolishment of slavery by England in 1833, to fulfil the demand of workers at sugar plantations, millions of Indian workers were sent to several British, French, Dutch and Danish colonies to work as indentured labour (Lal 1996), which is often described as another form of slavery (Tinker 1993). Tinker (1993) provides three distinct patterns of the Indian emigration during the colonial era: 1) Indentured labour emigration mainly from north and central India, 2) Kangani or maistry labor migration mainly Tamil families from south India, and 3) passage or free emigration (as cited in Kumar 1999, 7). Along with labour emigration, following the routes established by the British officials, a large number of Indian professionals (civil servants, craftsmen, carpenters, ironsmiths and armed forces) and traders (like Sindhis and Punjabis) also migrated to South-East Asia, North-Eastern Africa, North America and Europe (Tinker 1990). During the colonial era, the India diaspora extended from Fiji in the East to the West Indian colonies in the West (Khadria 2001).

During this period, the Indian government –appointed of British officials- treated the diaspora as a reservoir of cheap, docile, and dependable labour, especially to work on plantations (Tinker 1993; Tharoor 2017). Hence, the first official records available about the evolution of the Indian Diaspora consists of the boarding registers of the Indentured labourers, who were transported from the Indian ports of Calcutta, Bombay and Madras to several British, French and Dutch colonies, during the period of 1834 to 1920. According to Lal (2006), more than 1.5 million Indians had been shipped to colonies in the Caribbean, Africa, Asia, and Oceania.

3.2.- Post Independence period (1947-1990)

After the independence and the partition of India in 1947, the UK emerged as the leading receptor of Indian immigrants directly from India and from the African colonies after the rise of nationalist movements in Uganda and Kenya (Tatla 2005). This immigration flourished till the implementation of ‘the 1968 Immigration law’ that prohibited the free entrance of commonwealth citizens to the UK (Hepple 1968). On the other side of the globe, in the 1970s, the USA and Canada opened immigration visas for highly-skilled immigrants from India. It attracted many well-educated Indians and the flow of high-skilled migration diverted towards the USA (Khadria et al. 1991). During the same time, with the oil-boom in the Middle East, the demand for the manual labour for mega construction projects increased sharply, many unskilled or semi-skilled Indians seized the opportunity and migrated to the Middle East countries to work on massive construction projects (Kapiszewski 2006). During this period, the first major problem regarding the diaspora population emerged when the constitution of India and the citizenship law came into force in 1951 and 1955, respectively. The newly formed Indian government pushed the diaspora away by using the state’s physical boundaries to define the nebulous limits of national identity (Argawala 2015). Only those residing within the country’s borders were deemed “Indian”. This message aimed to protect the hundreds of thousands of new migrants who had left present-day Pakistan to enter present-day India and were viewed with suspicion after the partition of independence (Ibíd). The constitution of India considered all those people ‘Overseas Indians’, who had not sought Indian citizenship under the Article 8 of the Constitution. The overseas Indians were divided into several categories - citizens of the country of their adoption; holders of a valid British passport, but without local citizenship (e.g. East African Asians); and the people of the stateless category (e.g. Indians Tamils of Sri Lanka and the Burmese Indians) (Motwani et al.1993). In the coming four decades (1950-

1990), the attitude of the Indian government over emigrants was 'Overseas Indians are traitors', who left their country for economic benefits. It leads to a very inactive policy for emigrants in this period (Khadria 2008).

3.3.- India's neoliberal shift

In the 1990s, economic neo-liberalization and globalization, fuelled the mass emigration of unskilled labour from India to all over the world. The unskilled labour migrated to the Gulf countries and Southern Europe, mainly Italy and Spain (Garha and Domingo 2017). While, the skilled labour and students start migrating to the USA, the UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand (Hawthorne 2014; Lu and Hou 2015). During this period, the economic and political situation of the Indian diaspora population improved greatly, and the government of India start treating the diaspora as 'global Indian family' (Vardarajan 2005, 19). The contribution of the diaspora community to Indian economic development led to a swift change in the Indian government's perception of its own migrants, applauding their achievements with great pride (Hercog and Siegel 2013). The traitors of past decades become the 'angels of development' (Khadria 2008), a significant "strategic resource" and a major tool of India's "soft power" (Kugiel and Pędziwiatr 2014). They are considered as natural goodwill ambassadors, bringing Indian culture, religions, values, cuisine and traditions to the farthest corners of the globe and suddenly the forgotten children of mother India became a source of pride for the country (Sinha-Kerkhoff and Bal 2003). In 1998, the government of India started issuing PIO Cards for the Indians settled in some specific countries, promising visa-free travel and privileges in matters of investment and education (Singh 2014: 247). In August 2000, the Ministry of External Affairs formed a High Level Committee (also known as Singhvi Committee), on the Indian Diaspora to undertake a comprehensive study of the characteristics, aspirations, attitudes, requirements, strengths and weaknesses of the Indian diaspora and their expectations from India. Following the recommendations of the Singhvi committee (2001), the government of India started to celebrate an annual convention of Overseas Indians-Pravasi Bharatiya Divas (PBD, Day of the Overseas Indian). This event has been organized since 2003, with the participation of the higherst-level Indian officials (including presidents and prime ministers of India), and serves as a platform for discussing key issues concerning members of the global Indian diaspora and their links with India (Mani and Varadarajan 2005).

In May 2004, a special Ministry of Non-Resident Indians' Affairs was established to oversee all issues concerning relations with Indian nationals settled abroad. The Ministry was renamed as the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs (MOIA) in September 2004, with a mission to "connect the Indian Diaspora community with its motherland." Besides dealing with all matters relating to overseas Indians, the ministry was engaged in several initiatives with Overseas Indians for the promotion of trade and investment, emigration, education, culture, health and science and technology. Subsequently, in 2005, the Prime Minister Manmohan Singh announced that his government would extend dual citizenship to all overseas Indians who had migrated out of the country after 26 January 1950, and assured the continuance of economic reforms at a greater speed to unleash India's latent potential (Singh 2014). In 2006 the government introduced the "Overseas Citizenship of India (OCI)" scheme, which for the first time in Indian history allows a limited form of dual citizenship (without any political rights including right to vote), and gives extra privileges to some overseas Indians (mostly settled in the developed world).

3.4.- The period of nationalist revival (2014-present)

This period is very important for the Indian diaspora population; as the Indian government start fostering direct engagement with the diaspora community. Since the new Indian government, led by N. Modi, took power in May 2014, several structural reforms have been introduced to the existing diaspora engagement policy. Addressing the PBD in 2015, Modi's External Affairs Minister summed up the new diaspora policy in terms of 3 C's, as the new diaspora policy encourages the diaspora to 'connect' with India, 'celebrate' their cultural heritage and 'contribute' to the development of the homeland (as cited in Mohan and Rishika 2015, 2). Modi and his government wish to make India a vishwaguru and a 'leading power', but on the whole, as Hindu nationalists -opposed to Congress political ideas and policies nurtured by Nehru and Gandhi-, they seek an alternative agenda grounded in the Hindu nationalist tradition of thought (Hall, 2015). Some prominent authors like Appadurai (2017) claim that Modi 'advocates Hindutva (Hindu nationalism) as the governing ideology of India and... combines extreme cultural nationalism with markedly neoliberal policies and projects', which is at the heart of his diaspora engagement policies. The positive policy consequences of Modi's government are some relaxation in the visa norms for the overseas communities, improving physical connectivity and the ease of doing business in India (Mohan and Rishika 2015).

At present for the Indian government the value of diaspora lies in three fundamental aspects: economic, political and soft power. First, economically it is an important source of capital for India's development, in the form of both remittances and foreign direct investments (FDI). Secondly, overseas Indians play a crucial role in enhancing political ties with other countries, in both formal and informal ways. In non-political circles, in capacities as journalists, entrepreneurs, and academicians, they also exert influence on the policy of their receiving country regarding issues important for India. Thirdly, the Indian diaspora is also an important soft power tool, essential in spreading a positive image of India abroad (Kugiel 2017, 120). It is important to note that, although the Indian diaspora is often considered as an asset for the country, it can also be a liability and a source of tensions in relations with other states e.g. The Indian Tamil minority in Sri Lanka and alleged discrimination against them has been a constant point of friction between India and Sri Lanka; safety and labour rights of Indian workers in the Gulf States have become a serious concern in Indian relations with the region (Kugiel and Pędziwiatr 2014), and most recently the Rohingya crisis in Myanmar is creating conflicts with neighbors in the region (Ghoshal 2017).

4.- Indian Diaspora through different Data Sources

As the diaspora population has become a very inclusive category that includes all individuals who are displaced from their homeland, to study the Indian diaspora population, we have used following data sources that capture and categorise it, based on their definition of an 'Indian immigrant' and 'persons of Indian origin'. It is worth mentioning that the position of the Indian diaspora in the hierarchy of the global diasporas, and the hierarchy of top destinations in the Indian diaspora changes with the change in the data source used.


4.1.- Indian government and diaspora

The government of India does not maintain any permanent register for the emigrant population. Hence, to quantify the size of diaspora population it collects the data from the host countries. In August 2000, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs formed a High Level Committee, on the Indian Diaspora to undertake a comprehensive study of the characteristics, aspirations, attitudes, requirements, strengths and weaknesses of the

Indian diaspora and their expectations from India. This was the first time, the Indian government formally tried to measure the size and demarcate the territorial dimensions of its diaspora. The committee collected information about the diaspora population from different countries of destination around the globe. In this data, the diaspora population was divided into two legal categories: Person of Indian Origin (PIO) and Non-Resident Indians (NRIs). The first category, PIO, are foreign citizens (except for citizens of Pakistan, Bangladesh and other countries specified by the Central Government at different time intervals), who at any time held an Indian Passport; or has either of his/her parents or grandparents or great grandparents (up to fourth generation) born in or permanently resident in India as defined in Government of India Act, 1935 and other territories that became part of India thereafter provided neither was at any time a citizen of Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, China, Nepal, Pakistan or Sri Lanka; or is a spouse of a citizen of India or a person of Indian origin as mentioned before (as cited in Verma 2013). NRI, on the other hand, are defined as Indian citizens who are usually residing outside India and hold Indian Passports. If PIO are sometimes called “old diaspora”, NRI are viewed as “new diaspora” (Gautam 2013). In addition, there are the not so numerous categories of Stateless Persons of Indian Origin, which includes people with no official documents to demonstrate their Indian origin, mostly based in South Asia, in countries such as Sri Lanka, Nepal and Myanmar (Thussu 2013: 76).

According to the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, in 2001, the size of the diaspora population was 16.7 million individuals, of whom the share of PIO and NRIs was 11.3 million and 4.9 million, respectively, and the remaining 0.45 million were stateless persons of Indian origin (the majority of whom live in Myanmar). The diaspora population was dispersed into 131 countries around the globe. Its biggest share was living in Asia (55.2%), followed by North America (15.1%) and Europe (10.6%). In 2017, with the regular emigration of skilled and unskilled labour and their family members from India, natural growth of the Indian diaspora population, and the statistical recognitions of Indians living in the neighbouring countries as PIO, the size of the diaspora population increased to 31.2 million people, of whom 17.9 million were PIO and 13.3 million were NRIs. They were settled in 208 countries around the globe. Similar to 2001, most of them were concentrated in Asia (58.7%) and North America (17.6%), which registered an increase of 3.2% and 2.5% in total diaspora population, respectively. On the contrary, Europe, Latin America and Africa lost their share by 1.2%, 2.1% and 2.4%, respectively (Fig. 1).

Figure 1.- The territorial distribution of overseas Indians in 2001 and 2017




Source: own elaboration with data from Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs, India, 2001 and 2017.

In the last two decades, along with population size, the hierarchy of the top destinations has also changed. In 2001, Myanmar (2.9 million), the USA (1.7 million) and Malaysia (1.6 million) were at the top three positions among the first fifteen destinations of the Indian diaspora. In 2017, the USA emerged as the leading destination, with more than 4.5 million overseas Indians, followed by Saudi Arabia (3.3 million) and Malaysia (3 million). Sri Lanka, Nepal and Qatar entered the list of top 15 destinations, while Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana and Fiji, which were the destinations of the old diaspora, have lost their places in the top fifteen destinations (Fig. 2). It shows the revival of the diaspora population, as the destinations of old diaspora are losing their importance and new destinations occupying their space in the hierarchy of top destinations.

While looking at both categories of the Indian diaspora population, we find that in 2001, most of the PIO were settled in Myanmar (2.5 million), Malaysia (1.7 million), the USA (1 million), South Africa (0.9 million) and Mauritius (0.7 million). Except the USA, where most of the PIO were naturalized citizens, all other countries have descendants of the immigrants who had emigrated (voluntarily or forcefully) from India during the colonial period. This situation changed in 2017, now a majority of the PIO were settled in the USA (3.2 million), Malaysia (2.8 million), Myanmar (2 million), Sri Lanka (1.6 million) and the UK (1.5 million).


As compared to their distribution pattern in 2001, their number multiplied 3 times in the USA and almost doubled in Malaysia and the UK, but declined in Myanmar (Fig. 3).

Figure 2.- Top 15 countries of destination in the Indian diaspora, 2001 and 2017



Source: own elaboration, with data from Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs (MOIA), India, 2001 and 2017.

Figure 3.- The territorial distribution of PIOs and NRIs, 2001 and 2017



Source: own elaboration with data from Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs, India, 2001 and 2017.

The rise in the number of PIO in the USA, the UK and Malaysia is directly related to the naturalization of Indian immigrants who emigrated from India long ago in search of work opportunities, while the fall in the number of PIO in Myanmar is caused by the remigration of the Indian origin population to other countries like Bangladesh, to escape from the discriminatory and hostile policies of the present Myanmar government (Ahsan-Ullah 2016). The recognition of Indian Tamils in Sri Lanka as PIO -who were not included in the 2001 PIO list owing to the fear of political conflict with the neighbouring country Sri Lanka- has increased the size of the diaspora population and added Sri Lanka to the list of major destinations. Countries like Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, which have a large number of Indian workers, have not even a single PIO. It was due to their citizenship laws that prevent the immigrants and their children from becoming naturalized citizens of their resident country (De Bel-Air, 2014).

In 2001, NRIs were mainly settled in Saudi Arabia (1.5 million), the UAE (0.9 million), the USA (0.7 million), the UK (0.5 million) and Oman (0.3 million). Of the total NRIs, 63.2% were living in the Gulf countries, where the share of PIO was only 0.4%. As compared to 2001, in 2017, the number of NRIs in Saudi Arabia (3.3 million) and the USA (1.3 million) doubled, and in the UAE (2.8 million), Kuwait (0.9 million), Oman (0.8 million) and Qatar (0.7) tripled. Except the USA, all other countries are in the Gulf region, where the share of NRIs increased to 65.9%, while the share of PIOs reduced to 0.06% (Figure 3). It was mainly due to the large-scale immigration of unskilled or semi-skilled labour to the Gulf countries.

4.2.- United Nations Global Migration Database and Indian Diaspora

In the last three decades (1990- present) under globalization, the size, diversity, distance, and intensity of international migration, has multiplied several times (Czaika and de Haas 2014). The need to study the characteristics of the immigrant population flows and their effect on the sending and host countries have created a demand for accurate, up-to-date and policy relevant migration data collected by some supra-state agency. In response, the United Nations Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) has developed the United Nations Global Migration Database (UNGMD) in 2006. It is a comprehensive collection of empirical data on the number (stock) of international migrants by country of birth or citizenship, sex and age as enumerated by population censuses, population registers, nationally representative surveys and other official statistical sources from more than 200 countries and territories around the world.

In estimating the international migrant stock, international migrants have been equated with the foreign-born population whenever this information is available, which is the case in most countries or areas. In the countries lacking data on place of birth, information on the country of citizenship was used as the basis for the identification of international migrants, thus effectively equating, in these cases, international migrants with foreign citizens. Equating international migrants with foreign citizens when estimating the migrant stock has an important shortcoming. In countries where citizenship is conferred on the basis of *jus sanguinis*, people who were born in the country of residence may be included in the number of international migrants even though they may have never lived abroad. Conversely, persons who were born abroad and who naturalized in their country of residence are excluded from the stock of international migrants when using citizenship as the criterion to define international migrants. Using country of citizenship as the basis for the identification of international migrants also has an impact on the age distribution of international migrants. In countries where citizenship is conferred mainly on the basis of *jus sanguinis*, children born to international migrants tend to be considered foreign citizens and are thus included in the count of international migrants. Conversely, in countries where citizenship is conferred mainly on the basis of *jus soli*, children born to international migrants are granted citizenship upon birth and are thus excluded from the migrant stock.


In relation to the Indian diaspora, owing to its global nature, the UNGMD collects information about all Indian nationals and refugees of Indian origin settled around the world. It provides information for the period of 1990 to 2017 that allows us to measure the evolution of the size of diaspora population and the territorial expansion of the Indian Diaspora during the last three decades. According to the UNGMD, in 2017, India has the largest diaspora in the world with 16.6 million individuals born in India and living abroad, followed by Mexico (13 million), Russian Federation (10.6 million) and China³ (10 million) (Fig. 4).

In 2017, the Indian diaspora was stretched to 130 countries around the globe, in which 70.9% were settled in Asia, 17.5% in North America and 7.9% in Europe. While, Latin America had the least share in the diaspora population i.e. 0.09%. In Asia, the UAE had the highest number of Indian immigrants (3.3 million) followed by Saudi Arabia (2.0 million), Pakistan (1.9 million), Oman (1.1 million) and Kuwait (1.1 million). In North America, 2.3

³ As the UNGMD only consider the people who were born in a country and living abroad permanently, it puts China at the fourth place, if we include all immigrants and their descendants, then China will be at the top in diaspora population with over 35 million people of Chinese origin living abroad.


million Indians were settled in the USA and 0.6 million in Canada. In Europe, the UK had the largest number of Indian immigrants, i.e. 0.8 million (Fig. 5).

Figure 4.- Top 15 Diasporas (in terms of population size in UNGMD) in the world, 2017



Source: own elaboration, with data from United Nations Global Migration Database, 2017.

Figure 5.- The territorial distribution and cartogram of the Indian diaspora in 2017




Source: own elaboration, with data from United Nations Global Migration Database, 2017.

If we see the evolution of the Indian diaspora, the last three decades have witnessed an enormous increase in the diaspora population. In the 1990s, with the Neo-liberal shift in Indian economic policy, the Indian economy was opened to the outer world. It facilitated the movement of skilled or unskilled labour to the Western and the Gulf countries. Initially,

the size of the diaspora population increased slowly from 6.7 million in 1990 to 7.9 million in 2000. But, in the next decades, it grew at a very high rate (7% per annum during 2005-2010) and reached 16.6 million in 2017. From 1990 to 2017, the share of North America and Oceania in the total diaspora population increased by 8% and 1.7%, respectively, that of Europe remained constant, and declined in Asia by 10% (Fig. 6a).

Figure 6.- The evolution of the size, growth rate and sex-ratio of Indian diaspora population at continent level, 1990-2017




Source: own elaboration, with data from United Nations Global Migration Database, 1990-2017.

This period also witnessed the masculinization of the Indian diaspora population. In 1990, the sex ratio was 1.4 males per female and it remained more or less consistent till 2000. But in the following decade, due to the increased immigration of male unskilled or semiskilled workers to the Gulf countries, the sex ratio increased in the favour of males. In 2017, especially in the Gulf countries, like Oman (7.23 male per female), Qatar (6.24), the UAE (3.5), Bahrain (3.1), Kuwait (2.6), and Saudi Arabia (2.3), the sex-ratio was considerably higher as compared to the developed countries, e.g. the USA (1.1), the UK (1), and Canada (1). Nepal (0.4) was the only country in the top 15 destinations, where the sex-ratio was in favour of females (Fig. 6b).

In the year 1990, the top two destinations in the Indian diaspora were Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. The Indian immigrants in Pakistan were the people who moved to Pakistan after the partition of India. The Indian government doesn't consider them Indians anymore, but the Pakistani government and the United Nations commission for refugees still consider them refugees from India. Conversely, most of the immigrants to Saudi Arabia were economic

migrants who migrated to work on mega construction projects or in the service sector (Fig. 7a). In 2017, the situation changed and the UAE and the USA occupied the first two places shifting Saudi Arabia and Pakistan to third and fourth position. Meanwhile, Kuwait and Oman emerged as major destinations for the Indian immigrants. In the developed world Canada, Australia and Italy have also shown a considerable increase in diaspora population during the last three decades (Fig. 7b).

Figure 7.- Top 15 destination of Indian diaspora based on the United Nations Global Migration Database, 1990 and 2017



Source: own elaboration, with data from United Nations Global Migration Database, 1990-2017.

4.3.- Emergence of Big data and Indian Diaspora

At the beginning of the 21st century, the emergence of social media, cloud computing, and processing power through multi-core processors and GPUs, has contributed to the emergence of 'Big Data' (Manovich 2011; Agneeswaran 2012). Big Data has been seen as a source that can capture accelerated demographic phenomena, such as migration, almost in real time, leaving population registers and census-like operations outdated (Mayer-Schonberg and Cukier 2013). At the same time, it changes our perception of population and with it the discipline of demography, from the implicit categorization that it realizes, which according to some authors, like Han (2017), corresponds to the rupture that neoliberalism has imposed in the disciplinary regime of bio-politics, understood as a form of population governance (Foucault 1979). The diaspora population has captured the great advantages of online spaces and has extensively depended on the internet as a "central means of communication" (Kissau & Hunger 2008, 245). Diasporas are collectives of individuals who


have been dispersed (either forced or voluntary) from their original homeland; social media sites like Facebook, help to reduce the communication gap between 'dispersed' community members within the diaspora. Social media provides space for sustaining relations and connections across distance and across diverse subgroups (Georgiou & Silverstone 2007, 17).

Since its creation in February 2004, Facebook with its wide sample range has become a powerful research tool for the social sciences in which millions of social interactions are played out every day. It has 2.01 billion monthly active users around the world as of June 30, 2017 and company estimates that it has an average of 1.32 billion daily active users (Facebook, 2018). It provides a large and diverse pool of participants, who can be selectively recruited for both online and offline studies (Kosinski et al. 2015). As one of the most attractive social network sites, Facebook possesses three basic features - profiles, friends list, and postings (Boyd 2008). Additionally, it facilitates data collection by storing detailed records of its users' demographic profiles, social interactions, and affiliations.

In relation to the Indian diaspora, apart from the size of diaspora population and the territory occupied by it, Facebook is the only data source that enables us to capture its internal diversity. In this study, Facebook's advertising platform (a freely accessible platform created for advertisement purposes) has been used to target the study population (in our case Indian diaspora population), with different socio-demographic characteristics including age, sex, location, language, ethnicity and citizenship. We have extracted data for individuals (13 to 65 + years old), who were born in India and are living in different countries of destination. According to the Facebook data, in 2017, the Indian diaspora consisted of 12.8 million individuals living in 150 countries around the globe. Their territorial distribution was skewed in favour of Asia. Of the total diaspora population 60.7% were living in Asia, 20.9% in North America, 10.5% in Europe, 2.5% in Africa, and 0.8% in Latin America (Fig. 8).


In the top 15 destinations, the UAE was on the top with 2.7 million Indians, followed by the USA (2.1 million) and Saudi Arabia (0.9 million). In Europe, the UK and Germany, and in Asia, neighbouring countries like Nepal, Bangladesh and Pakistan were included in the top 15 destinations. As per the sex composition of the diaspora population, the overall sex-ratio was 2.5 males per female, and the highest values were registered in Gulf countries like, Saudi Arabia (8.6), Qatar (7.8), Kuwait (7.4), Oman (5.9), and Bahrain (5.2). On the contrary, Philippines and Indonesia had the sex-ratio in favour of females i.e. 0.6 and 0.9 males per female, respectively (Fig. 9).

Figure 8.- The territorial distribution and cartogram of Indian Diaspora (13-65) through Facebook data, 2017



Source: own elaboration with Facebook data, August, 2017.

Figure 9.- Top 15 destination of Indian diaspora based on the Facebook data, 2017




Source: own elaboration, with Facebook data, August, 2017.

Facebook data also provide relevant information about the age structure of the Indian diaspora population. In 2017, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Indonesia had the highest share of young adults (13-24 years) of Indian origin population i.e. 59%, 54% and 45%, respectively. On the contrary, the USA, the UK and Canada had the highest share of elderly (50 and more), i.e. 17%, 16% and 14%, respectively. It might be due to the long history of

immigration to these countries and a better social security system that encourages the elderly population to stay in these countries. The highest share of working population (25 to 49 years) was living in Singapore (81%), Saudi Arabia (78%) and Kuwait (78%) (Fig. 10).

Figure 10.- The age structure of Indian immigrants in 20 top destinations of Indian diaspora through Facebook, 2017




Source: own elaboration with Facebook data, August, 2017.

The most important contribution of the Facebook data to the study is its potential to reveal the internal diversity of the Indian Diaspora population. The native Indian population is highly diverse in terms of ethnic origins, languages and religious affiliations (Priya 2016). This internal diversity has an enormous impact on the composition of the diaspora population. As different ethnic groups seek to maintain their identity and languages in the diaspora (Cohen 2004) and it affects their level of integration in the host society, it becomes imperative to study this internal diversity. The use of a particular language in a foreign context, on the one hand, works as a marker of ethnic identity that binds the community, and on the other hand, also shows the connections with the homeland and its memories, which are significant characteristics of a diaspora population. In the past, owing to the lack of data sources on ethnicity, it was very difficult to explore the internal diversity of a diaspora population. Now with the Facebook data on the language used by the users as their mother tongue, one can find their ethnic origins in India. In this paper, with the help of this data, we have explored the ethno-linguistic diversity of the Indian diaspora.

According to the Facebook data, in 2017, the different ethno-linguistic groups were not equally represented in the diaspora population as per their share in the total Indian population⁴. Almost half of the Indian population (49.3%) was made up of the Hindi speakers, but they were underrepresented in the diaspora population (47.2%). Malayalis, Tamils and Punjabis were overrepresented in the diaspora, as their share in the total population was 3.8%, 7.1%, and 3.4% and in the diaspora population was 19.6%, 12.3% and 9.7%, respectively. On the contrary, Bengalis (3.1%), Telugus (5.6%), Gujaratis (2.3%), and Kannadas (1.9%) were underrepresented in the diaspora, as they had high share in the total Indian population i.e. 9.7%, 8.7%, 5.4% and 4.3%, respectively (Fig. 11).

Figure 11.- The share of different ethno-linguistic groups in the Indian diaspora through Facebook, 2017, and in India, 2011



Source: own elaboration, the data from Facebook, August 2017 and census of India, 2011.

Among all major ethno-linguistic groups, the Hindis, with 3.8 million individuals, was the biggest in India and in the Diaspora. In India, they were mainly concentrated in ten states of central and north India i.e. Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Bihar, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Uttarakhand, Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh and Delhi. In the diaspora, they were settled in more than 100 countries, but their territorial distribution was skewed in favour of the Gulf countries, where the UAE (25.6%), Saudi Arabia (12.2%) and Kuwait (7.1%) were their major destinations. The remaining 20% were settled in the North America, where the USA (13.5%) was their major destination followed by Canada (5.8%).


⁴ 2011 census of population in India is the most recent source of data on languages, which we used as a marker of ethnic origin. In India all major ethnic groups have their own language.

The Malayalis was the second largest ethno-linguistic group with 1.7 million individuals settled in 44 countries around the globe. They originated from the south Indian state of Kerala. 85% of them were settled in Gulf countries, where the UAE (43.7%), Saudi Arabia (15.7%), Qatar (9.9%), Oman (8.2%) and Kuwait (7.6%) were their major destinations. A small share of Malayalis were also settled in the USA (2.9%). The Tamils was the third largest group in the diaspora with 1.1 million people living in 48 countries. They emigrated from Tamil Nadu, a southern state of India. They were settled in the UAE (29.8%), Singapore (15.4%), Saudi Arabia (10.2%) and the USA (9.3%). The fourth largest group was Punjabis, with 0.85 million individuals originated from the northern states of Punjab and Haryana, and settled across the world in more than 100 countries. Almost half of their population was concentrated in three countries i.e. Canada (18.8%), the UAE (17.6%), and the USA (12.9%). The UK, which was their major destination in Europe for several decades, had 6.81% share in the total Punjabi diaspora. In Oceania, Australia (9.3%) and New Zealand (4%) were emerging as major destinations for Punjabi students and high-skilled workers.


The Telugu group was in fifth place, with 0.5 million people settled in 36 countries around the world. They originated from Andhra Pradesh, a southern state of India. Their major destinations were the USA (28.4%), the UAE (22.3%) and Kuwait (14.6%). The Telugu group was divided into two subgroups, the highly-skilled part consists of software engineers emigrated from Bangalore to Silicon Valley in the USA and the low-skilled workers immigrated to the Gulf countries. The Bengalis was the sixth largest group with 0.3 million people, living in 54 countries. They emigrated from West Bengal, an eastern state of India. The UAE (21.7%), the USA (16.6%) and Saudi Arabia (12.9%) were their major destinations. The Gujaratis was the seventh largest group consisted of 0.2 million individuals living in 64 countries. They originated from the trading communities of Gujarat, a western state of India. More than half of them were settled in North America, where the USA (39.9%) was their top destination, followed by Canada (10.3%). The UK (9.8%), the UAE (9.3%) and Australia (6.9%) were their main destinations in Europe, Asia, and Oceania, respectively. The Marathis was the eighth largest group consisted of 0.2 million people settled in 36 countries. They emigrated from Maharashtra, a western state of India and most of them settled in the USA (28.9%) and the UAE (20.3%). The Kannada was the smallest among the selected groups with 0.15 million people settled in 32 countries around the globe. They originated from Karnataka state of south India, and mainly settled in the UAE (27.6%), the USA (17.4%) and Saudi Arabia (12.2%) (Fig. 12).

Figure 12.- Internal diversity (ethnic and linguistic groups) of Indian diaspora through Facebook data and top destination countries, 2017


HINDI DIASPORA




MALAYALI DIASPORA




TAMIL DIASPORA




PUNJABI DIASPORA




TELUGU DIASPORA




BENGALI DIASPORA




GUJARATI DIASPORA



MARATHI DIASPORA



KANNADA DIASPORA



Source: own elaboration, the data from Facebook, August, 2017.

As per the sex-ratio of different ethnolinguistic groups, all groups had a high share of males in their total population. The Tamils had the highest numbers of males per female (7.8) in the diaspora population, followed by Malayalis (5.4) and Telugu (5.2). On the contrary, Gujaratis and Marathis have the lowest recorded sex-ratio. But here we should take into account that the use of Facebook is sensitive to gender bias. Especially, in the low skilled

population the use of Facebook is very limited among females. This may be a cause of the high male-female sex ratio registered for all groups.

5.- Comparison of different Data Sources

All above mentioned data sources present different size and geopolitical dimension of the Indian diaspora. These differences have mainly emerged from the way these data sources define 'Indian immigrant' and the data politics of collecting agencies. Firstly, the government of India categorises the whole diaspora population into two legal categories i.e. PIO and NRIs. In which PIO, includes the individuals who are the descendants of Indian immigrants (up to fourth generation) or the individuals who migrated long ago and now are naturalized citizens of other countries. The initial purpose behind the formulation of this category was to give recognition to the persons of Indian origin living in countries like Australia, the United Kingdom, the USA, Canada, New Zealand and Singapore, to facilitate the free movement of capital and skills to the country. Some authors criticise the double standard adopted by the Indian government while giving recognition to the PIO in different countries, as it left a huge number of PIO living in neighbouring countries uncounted (Lal 2006). Later on, on the demand of the population of Indian origin in other countries, this category was expanded to include the descendants of the Indian immigrants living in several other countries like Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Nepal. As per the diaspora population, the PIO data captures a large part of it, but the inclusion of all PIO in the diaspora population is a matter of debate, as most of them are fully integrated in the host societies, and have no contact with or intention to return to their ancestral homeland, which are necessary features of the diaspora population.

The second category 'NRIs' is commonly accepted as the diaspora population, as they were displaced from their homeland during the last few decades with Indian passport and maintain strong contact with their homeland. The only problem related with NRIs is regarding the inclusion or exclusion of their children in the diaspora population, who are born at their new destinations. These descendants of Indian immigrants have not emigrated from India, so their inclusion in the diaspora population is not fully justified. In favour of inclusion, we can argue that on the one hand as most of the host countries don't give citizenship (by birth) to the descendants of immigrants, most of them receive Indian citizenship and they have the right to be recognized as NRIs. On the other hand, in the

countries which grant the right to citizenship to all newborns, children born to the Indian immigrants have the right to be recognised as PIO, as one or both of their parents are from India.


The implicit desire of the Indian government behind the creation of these categories was to claim right on the whole population of Indian origin living in different parts of world, as its diaspora population. The strategy of the Indian government is to present the bigger size of the Indian diaspora, to reap the economic benefits from the diaspora population in the form of FDIs and use it as a tool of soft power in global politics. Another more explicit goal is to promote Indian culture around the world and present it as a vishwaguru, as now the Indian diaspora has become a place where the 'sun never sets' (Jain 2012). Hence, for them in 2017, the size of the diaspora population was 31.2 million people, who were scattered around the globe in 208 countries.

The main purpose of the UNGMD is to quantify the immigrant flow and stock in all countries and regions around the globe. As per the Indian diaspora population, it counts all individuals who are born in India and living in different countries with a valid Indian passport or registered as refugees. Hence, in the countries where the data on immigrants is registered on the basis of the 'place of birth', this data does not include 'the descendent of the immigrants who born at their new country of residence' as immigrants; while in the countries where the immigration data is collected on the basis of citizenship, all the immigrants who have accepted the host citizenship remained uncounted, as they are not the citizens of India anymore. As the dispersion of population is the basic prerequisite for the diaspora population, and during the initial phase of immigration, immigrants maintain strong ties with their homeland, the UNGMD, presents a very accurate size and geopolitical dimensions of the new Indian diaspora for the last three decades. As they collect data about the recent immigration flow and the immigrant population living in different countries, according to them, in 2017 the size of the Indian diaspora population was 16.6 million individuals, who were settled in 130 countries.

Finally, Facebook collects information from its active users to use it for commercial purposes. In their advertisement platform they provide information about the individuals who may be potential customers for different businesses. To target the Indians, Facebook uses the category of 'Indian expats', which includes all individuals who originated from India and living outside the borders of India, irrespective of their political and legal status in the host countries. The Facebook data is constantly changing with its active users and not affected by the data politics of the nations involved. Hence, it presents up-to-date accurate

size and spatial distribution of the diaspora population. According to Facebook data, in August 2017, the size of the Indian diaspora population was 12.9 million individuals living in 150 countries around the world. This low count on Facebook as compared to other sources, is mainly due to the absence of children below 13 years of age, as they are not permitted to have a Facebook account (Fig. 13).

Figure 13.- A comparison of the size and continental distribution of the Indian diaspora population through different data sources in 2017



Source: own elaboration with data from MIOA, India, Facebook and UNGMD, 2017.

All the above mentioned data sources have some benefits and limitations (Table 1). The data provided by the MOIA is reliable, as it is collected and published by Indian government agencies. It is the only official source, which is annually updated, and provides a long series of data from 2001 to 2017. It allows exploring the evolution of the Indian diaspora population in the last 17 years and makes a temporal comparison possible. The major shortcomings of this data source are: the lack of information about the demographic profile and socioeconomic status of the diaspora population; and limited information is available about the PIO or NRIs living in neighbouring countries. Secondly, the UNGMD is also a widely accepted good quality data source on global migration stock and flow, prepared by the UN agencies. Apart from the size and geographical distribution of the immigrant population, it also provides information about their sex composition and age structure. It is annually updated and temporal comparison is possible. The data is available from 1990 to 2017. But it has some shortcomings also, firstly, the data on the flow is not available for all countries, secondly, no information is available regarding the age structure of immigrants from the countries of origin. Thirdly, with reference to the Indian diaspora, it does not collect information about the PIO, who makes up a majority in the diaspora population.

Finally, the Facebook data includes self-reported information about the nationality and place of residence and ethnolinguistic affiliations, which helps in studying the internal diversity of the diaspora communities. Secondly, the data is of active users and constantly updated by the Facebook, so it provides up-to-date information about the diaspora community around the globe. However, a major challenge in studying observational data is to draw conclusions that are acceptably free from influences by overt biases. Secondly, the quality of Facebook profile data may be affected by user-induced biases typical for self-reports, such as social desirability and intentional misrepresentation. And lastly, the lack of information about children below 13 years of age left a big portion of the diaspora population unregistered.

Table 1.- The advantages and shortcomings of different data sources used to quantify the size and demarcate the geopolitical boundaries of the Indian diaspora

Characteristics	Indian Government's Record	UN Global Migration Database	Facebook Data
Variables collected	Stock data of Overseas Indians: • Non resident Indians (NRIs) • Persons of Indian Origin (PIOs) • Stateless Indian Territorial distribution (Country level)	Migrant Stock and Flow data: • Indian citizens living abroad • Immigrants living in India Age structure Sex composition Territorial distribution (Country, region and continent level)	Active Users: • Indian Expats (13 to 65+ age) Age structure Sex composition Internal diversity (Ethno-linguistic) Territorial distribution (from city to continents)
Periodicity	Annually updated	Annually updated	Instant update
Validity	Official records by the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs, India.	Globally accepted United Nations official record.	Social Media data collected for advertisement purposes
Data Availability	Available from 2001 to 2017	Available from 1990 to 2017	Only the present moment
Comparability	Temporal comparison	Temporal comparison Harmonized data to compare different countries	Not Possible
Shortcomings	No information about age structure, sex composition and socio-economic profile of Overseas Indians.	No information of age structure for origin countries.	No information about the children below 13 Continuously changing data Less precise data The user based bias Self reported information

Source: own elaboration.

6.- Conclusion

In this paper we have used three sources to quantify the diaspora population and demarcate the geopolitical boundaries of the Indian Diaspora, which are under a constant restructuring with new migratory flows and changing categories of the immigrants involved. These sources inform us about the mixture of migratory movements that contributed to the formation of the diaspora, classified firstly, on the basis of typology, like

forced migration, economic migration, family regrouping and student migration; secondly, on the basis of immigration causes, like with the push factors of expulsion and the pull factors of corresponding attractions; and finally, with respect to the resulting populations, which include the social and demographic reproduction of heterogeneous groups of individuals, grouped under different ethnic and social categories.

The categorization and statistical registration of the diaspora population are two different operations, which are related to the bio-political will of the data collecting agencies (Indian government, United Nations or Facebook) to give visibility to some populations that, otherwise, only depend on self-recognition. In the first case, the Indian Government at the turn of new millennium started to collect data about the diaspora population. This statistical operation is presented as a measure of a pre-existing reality - the Indian diaspora - in a measurable form with an empirical approach. However, it conceals the creative aspect of the categorization of the diaspora population into PIO or NRIs, and their quantification according to this categorization (the people who are included or excluded in one of the categories), and its effect on the resulting cartography of the Indian diaspora. In reality, the revival of the Indian government's interest in the diaspora is mainly fuelled by their economic motives, especially, money received in the form of remittances and foreign direct investment from the diaspora population. It was at the base of the boom of Indian nationalism driven by neoliberal neo-conservatism in India (as stated by Modi and Taylor 2017).

Since 2000, the successive Indian government has maintained double standard for its diaspora. On the one hand with a nationalist agenda of creating a normative image of India as 'vishwaguru' and a 'leading power', they have glorified the achievements of the diaspora population in the western world, as good quality scientists, politicians and artists, to elevate their own position in the world. While, on the other hand their attitude regarding the PIO in neighbouring countries like Pakistan, Myanmar or Sri Lanka has always been of neglect and distrust. In their nationalist agenda these people don't represent India. Some authors criticize that the policies of the Indian government to engage overseas Indians targeted primarily the privileged professional-class diaspora working in high-tech jobs in the US and Western Europe, and the recent laws regarding PIO specifically excluded citizens of neighbouring countries, reflecting fears of inflaming regional tensions (Lall 2003: 122).

The recent efforts made by the Indian government to visualize the Indian diaspora can be linked to the tendency towards 'extra-territorialisation' of the powers of state (Collyer 2013), which means integrating emigrants or their descendants into the ideology of the

nation that is taking place in many diasporas with the process of globalization (Dumbrava, 2014). But at the same time it increases tension when ethnic minorities living under foreign jurisdiction, subjected to repression (manifested or imagined) due to their ethnic differences, start claiming rights on their original homeland (Joppke 2005). It applies to the population of Indian-origin in neighbouring countries who are now in a stateless condition, deprived of the citizenship rights in India or their host countries. In sum, the register maintained by the Indian government is a tool to satisfy its political interests and a result of their choice to present the image of India to the outer world. Additionally, it conceals the internal diversity of the Indian diaspora population, which was expelled from their homeland by different economic and political factors.

In the second case, the UNGMD, whose main objective is to capture international migratory movements effectively accounts for the flow and stock of the Indian immigrants in different countries around the globe. It is far from the classical definition of diaspora, but most reliable in terms of the migratory contribution to the diaspora, and allows us to measure the change in the diaspora population due to recent flows. The flow data about the Indian emigrants is sparsely available as the Indian government doesn't collect data about the emigrants, and due to the irregular nature of immigration most of the receiving countries also lack this information. Hence, owing to the lack of the flow data, changes in the stock of immigrants have been used to quantify the size of diaspora population and the changes in its geopolitical boundaries. The UNGMD collects data about the stock of immigrants from all countries on the basis of the place of birth, which is the case in the majority of countries or with citizenship in some countries where the information about the birth place is not available, hence in most of the countries they don't collect data about the descendants of the Indian immigrants who were born in the new country of residency. It is justifiable from their point of view that the children who were born in the diaspora do not have any migratory experience. In the second case, where citizenship is used as the criteria to categorise the population, all Indians who have accepted the citizenship of host countries are excluded from the data. In both situations a large chunk of the Indian population remained uncounted, which reduces the Indian diaspora to the stock formed by the recent migration from India. The ultimate goal of the UNGMD to create a complete picture of global migration flows and immigrants around the world is to large extent foiled by the national statistical sources. Firstly, due to the different definitions of immigrant population in all countries (like, foreign born or foreign national) and secondly, regarding the diaspora

studies it provides no information about the sense of belonging, which is a key argument behind the concept of 'diaspora'.

Finally, Facebook as a data source is unique in terms of the information it provides about the Indian diaspora (their ethnic origins, languages, socio-demographic profile, networks and preferences). This information is hard to get from any other source. Despite several shortcomings caused by age restrictions, users' social class and self-reporting bias, it provides possibility to explore the ethnolinguistic diversity and socio-demographic profile of the Indian diaspora population. The virtual image of the diaspora created by the Facebook data is closest to the reality of the diaspora population, as it corresponds to the individual users and not a state or supra-state institution that collects it. But from the point of view that permits the measurement of migration and transnational movements, it also appears as a fundamental part of bio-politics -although here neither descendants nor ancestral reference populations are counted as happened with the Indian government's registers- creating populations through the circulation of bio-power and the production of socio-spatial relationships (Bailey, 2013). In other words, the reproduction of spatial relationships is built up through transnational bio-politics. If the measure of the diaspora, especially that coming from the official sources of the Indian state, account for the extra-territorialisation of the state, those of Facebook remind us of the 'digital re-location' (as explained by Han 2016) of the population. This relocation beyond the national territories where they reside acts as a counterweight to extra territorialisation. Along with the web of expatriates, the use of the mother tongue in the diaspora by the Facebook users (both immigrants and their descendants) contributes to the creation of a virtual community, which is trying to retain the memories of their homeland culture and traditions.

As the world is changing rapidly and the digital revolution is entering all fields of research, in the near future we will witness a dramatic change in diaspora studies also. The spread of transport and communication technologies has intensified and accelerated the flow of information in the diaspora and connected the individuals who were dispersed in many countries for long time. It has energized the diaspora identities. The potential to count all movements around the world in a short time is making the geopolitical boundaries of diaspora communities more dynamic. It will reduce or, at least, complement the importance of population registers, which are often affected by the data politics of the collecting agencies.

References:

- AGNEESWARN, V. (2012). "Big-data - Theoretical, engineering and analytics perspective". SRINIVAS, S.; BHATNAGAR, V. (Ed.) *Big Data Analytics*, 7678 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Springer Berlin Heidelberg: 8-15.
- AHSAN ULLAH A. K. M. (2016). "Rohingya Crisis in Myanmar: Seeking Justice for the Stateless". *Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice*, 32 (3): 285-301.
- APPADURAI, A. (2017). "Democracy fatigue". GEISELBERGER, H. (Ed.) *The Great Regression*, Chapter 1. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- ARGAWALA, R. (2015). "Tapping the Indian diaspora for Indian development". PORTES, A.; FERNANDEZ-KELLY, P. (Eds.) *The State and the Grassroots: Immigrant Transnational Organizations in Four Continents*. New York: Berghahn Books, 84-110.
- BAILEY, A. J. (2013). "Migration, recession and an emerging transnational bio-politics across Europe". *Geoforum*, 44: 202-210.
- BARRY, K. (2006). "Home and away: The construction of citizenship in an emigration context". *New York University Law Review*, 81 (1): 11-59.
- BOYD, D. (2008). "Why youth love social network sites". BUCKINGHAM, D. (Ed.) *Youth, Identity and Digital Media*. London: The MIT Press, 119-142.
- CHALIAND, G.; RAGEAU, J.P. (1995). *The Penguin Atlas of Diasporas*. New York: Viking.
- CLIFFORD, J. (1994). "Diasporas". *Cultural Anthropology*, 9 (3). Further Inflections: Toward Ethnographies of the Future, 302-338.
- COHEN, R. (1997). *The Global Diaspora: An Introduction*. London: UCL Press.
- COHEN, E. H. (2004). "Components and Symbols of Ethnic Identity: A Case Study in Informal Education and Identity Formation in Diaspora". *Applied Psychology: An International Review*, 53 (1), 87-112.
- COLLYER, M. (2013). "A geography of extra-territorial citizenship: Explanations of external voting". *Migration Studies*, 2 (1): 55-72.
- CZAIKA, M.; HEIN DE HASS (2014). "The Globalization of Migration: Has the World Become More Migratory?". *International Migration Review*, 48 (2): 283-323.
- DE BEL-AIR, F. (2014). *Demography, Migration and the Labour Market in Saudi Arabia. Gulf Labour Markets and Migration*. European University Institute and Gulf Research Center. (http://gulfmigration.eu/media/pubs/exno/GLMM_EN_2014_01.pdf).
- DEMMERS, J. (2007). "New wars and Diasporas: Suggestions for research and policy". *Journal of Peace, Conflict & Development*, 11: 1-26.
- DUMBRAVA, C. (2014). *Nationality, Citizenship and Ethno-Cultural Belonging, Preferential Membership Policies in Europe*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- DURHAM PETERS, J. (1999). "Exile, nomadism and diaspora". NAFICY, H. (Ed.) *Home, Exile, Homeland: Film, Media, and the Politics of Place*. New York and London: Routledge, 17-41.
- FACEBOOK (2018). *Facebook Fast Facts*, CNN Library, Updated 1854 GMT (0254 HKT) March, 2018 (<https://edition.cnn.com/2014/02/11/world/facebook-fast-facts/index.html>).

- FAIST, T. (2010). "Diaspora and transnationalism: What kind of dance partners?". BAUBÖCK, R.; FAIST, T. (Eds.) *Diaspora and Transnationalism: Concepts, Theories and Methods*. Amsterdam: IMISCOE Research, Amsterdam University Press, 741-763.
- FAIST, T. (2012). "Toward a Transnational Methodology: Methods to Address Methodological Nationalism, Essentialism, and Positionality". *Revue Européenne des Migrations Internationales*, 28 (1): 51-70.
- FOUCAULT, M. (1979). "Naissance de la biopolitique ('Birth of biopolitics')". *Annuaire du Collège de France, 79 année. Histoire des systèmes de pensée, année 1978-79*. FOUCAULT, M. (2001) *Dits et écrits II, 1976-1988*. Paris: Gallimard, 818-825.
- GARHA, N.S.; DOMINGO, A. (2017). "Sikh Diaspora and Spain: migration, space and hypermobility". *Diaspora Studies*, 10 (2): 193-216.
- GAUTAM, M.K. (2013). "Indian Diaspora: Ethnicity and Diasporic Identity". *CARIM-India Research Report 2013/29*, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute.
- GEORGIU, M.; SILVERSTONE, R. (2007). "Diaspora and contra-flows beyond nation centrism". THUSSU, D.K. (Ed.) *Media on the move: Global flow and contraflow*. London, New York: Routledge.
- GHOSHAL, B. (2017). "India's Responses to the Complex Rohingya Crisis in Myanmar". *Asia Pacific Bulletin*, 404.
- HALL, I. (2015). "Narendra Modi and India's normative power". *International Affairs*, 93 (1): 113-131.
- HAN, B. C. (2016). *Sobre el Poder*. Barcelona: Herder.
- HAN, B. C. (2017). *Psychopolitics: Neoliberalism and New Technologies of Power*. New York: Verso.
- HAWTHORNE, L. (2014). "Indian Students and the Evolution of the Study-Migration Pathway in Australia". *International Migration*, 52 (2): 3-19.
- HEPPLE, B. A. (1968). "Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1968". *The Modern Law Review*, 31 (4): 424-428 (<http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2230.1968.tb01201.x>).
- HERCOG, M.; SIEGEL, M. (2013). "Diaspora Engagement in India: From Non-Required Indians to Angels of Development". COLLYER, M. (Ed.) *Emigration Nations: Policies and Ideologies of Emigrant Engagement*. London: Palgrave, 75-99.
- ITZIGSOHN, J. (2000). "Immigration and the boundaries of citizenship: The institutions of Immigrants' political transnationalism". *International Migration Review*, 34 (4): 1126-1154.
- JAIN S. K. (2012). *Indian Diaspora in the era of globalization*. New Delhi: Kalpaz Publications.
- JOPPKE, C. (2005). *Selecting by Origin. Ethnic migration and liberal state*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- KAPISZEWSKI, A. (2006). *Arab versus Asian Migrant Workers in the GCC Countries*. United Nations Expert Group Meeting on International Migration and Development in the Arab Region, Population Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations Secretariat, Beirut, 15-17 May, 2006, p. 7.
- KHADRIA, B.; CHARBIT, Y.; PALAT, M. (1991). "Contemporary Indian immigration to the United States - is the brain drain over?". *Revue Européenne des Migrations Internationales*, 7 (1): 65-96.
- KHADRIA, B. (2001). "Shifting paradigms of globalization: the twenty-first century transition towards generics in skilled migration from India". *International Migration*, 39 (5): 45-69.

- KHADRIA, B. (2008). "India: Skilled Migration to Developed Countries, Labour Migration to the Gulf". CASTLES, S.; WISE, R.D. (Eds.) *Migration and Development: Perspectives from the South*. Geneva: International Organization for Migration, 79-112.
- KING, C.; MELVIN, N. J. (1999). "Diaspora politics: Ethnic linkages, foreign policy and security in Eurasia". *International Security*, 24 (3): 103-138.
- KISSAU, K.; HUNGER, U. (2008). "The internet as a means of studying transnationalism and diaspora". BAUBOCK, R.; FAIST, T.; ROMANOS, E. (Eds.) *Diaspora and transnationalism: Concepts, theories and methods*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 245- 266.
- KOSINSKI, M.; MATZ, S. C.; GOSLING, S. D.; POPOV, V.; DAVID, S. (2015). "Facebook as a Research Tool for the Social Sciences: Opportunities, Challenges, Ethical Considerations, and Practical Guidelines". *American Psychological*, 70 (6): 543-556.
- KUGIEL, P. (2017). *India's Soft Power: A New Foreign Policy Strategy*. London and New York: Routledge.
- KUGIEL, P.; PEDZIWIATR, K. (2014). *The Indian Diaspora and Poland-India Relations*. The Polish Institute of International Affairs, Warsaw, Poland.
- KUMAR, A. (1999). "The coolie connection: A study of Indian Diaspora". *Journal of Social Inquiry* 14 (1): 7-32.
- LAL, B. (1996). "The odyssey of Indenture: Fragmentation and reconstruction in Indian Diaspora". *Diaspora: Journal of Transnational Studies*, 5 (2), 167-188.
- LAL, B. V.; REEVES, P.; RAI, R. (2006). *The encyclopaedia of the Indian Diaspora*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
- LAL, M. (2003). "Mother India's forgotten children". ØSTERGAARD-NIELSEN, E. (Ed.) *International Migration and Sending Countries: Perceptions, Policies and Transnational Relations*. New York: Palgrave, 121-139.
- LU, Y.; HOU, F. (2015). "International students who become permanent residents in Canada". *Insights on Canadian Society. Statistics Canada*. Catalogue 75-006-X.
- MANI, B.; VARADARAJANA, L. (2005). "The largest gathering of the Global Indian Family: Neoliberalism, Nationalism and Diaspora at Pravasi Bharatiya Divas". *Diaspora*, 14 (1): 45-74.
- MANOVICH, L. (2011). *Trending: the promises and the challenges of big social data*. Updated online 28/4/2011 (<http://manovich.net/content/04-projects/067-trending-the-promises-and-the-challenges-of-big-social-data/64-article-2011.pdf>)
- MAYER-SCHONBERG, V.; CUKIER, K. (2013). *Big Data: A Revolution That Will Transform the Way We Live, Work and Think*. London: Hodder & Stoughton.
- MISHRA, V. (1996). "The Diasporic Imaginary: Theorizing the Indian Diaspora". *Textual Practice* 10 (1): 422-423.
- MODI; TAYLOR, I. (2017). "The Indian Diaspora in Africa: The Commodification of Hindu Rashtra". *Globalizations*, 14 (6): 911-929.
- MOHAN, C. R.; CHAUHAN, R. (2015). "Modi's Foreign Policy: Focus on the Diaspora". *ISAS Working Paper*, 204 (11 April 2015), Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore.
- MOTWANI, J. K.; GOSINE, M.; BAROT-MOTWANI, J. (1993). *Global Indian Diaspora: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow*. New Delhi: GOPIO.
- PRIYA, A. (2016). "Ethnicity in Post-Independent India: A Sociological Perspective on Its Causes and Manifestations". *IOSR Journal of Humanities and Social Science*, 21 (1): 56-61.

- SAFRAN, W. (1991). "Diasporas in Modern Societies: Myths of Homeland and Return." *Diaspora*, 1 (1): 83-99.
- SHEFFER, G. (1986). "A New Field of Study: Modern Diasporas in International Politics". G. SHEFFER (Ed.) *Modern Diasporas in International Politics*. London: Croom Helm, 1-15.
- SHEFFER, G. (2003). "Diasporas in Numbers". SHEFFER, G. (Ed.) *Diaspora Politics: At Home Abroad*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 99-110.
- SINGH, A. (2014). "Ethnic Indians in Indian Diaspora Policy". JHA, P. (Ed.) *Resurgent India*. New Delhi: Ocean Books Pvt. Ltd., 244-251.
- SINGHVI, L. M., et al. (2001). *Report of the High Level Committee on Indian Diaspora*. Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, Non-Resident Indian and Persons of Indian Origin Division.
- SINHA-KERKHOFF, K.; BAL, E. (2003). "Eternal Call of the Ganga: Reconnecting with People of Indian Origin in Surinam". *Economic and Political Weekly*, 38 (38), 4008-4021.
- SURAYANARAYAN, V. (2001). "Indian Communities Abroad". *World Focus*, 22 (3): 12-13.
- TATLA, D. S. (2005). "Sikh Diaspora". *Encyclopedia of Diasporas*, 273-285. Boston, MA: Springer US (http://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-29904-4_27).
- THAROOR, S. (2017). *Inglorious Empire: What the British Did to India*. The UK: Penguin Books (ISBN 978-0-141-98714-9).
- THUSSU, D. K. (2013). *Communicating India's Soft Power: Buddha to Bollywood*. New York-Basingstoke; Palgrave Macmillan.
- TINKER, H. (1990). "Indians in Southeast Asia: Imperial auxiliaries". CLARKE, C. et al. (Eds.) *South Asians overseas*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 39-56.
- TINKER, H. (1993). *A New System of Slavery: The Export of Indian Labour Overseas. 1830-1920*. (2nd ed.). London: Hansib Publishing Limited.
- TOLOYAN, K. (1991). "The Nation States and Its Others: In Lieu of a Preface". *Diaspora*, 1 (1): 3-7.
- VARADRAJANA, L. 2005. *Producing the domestic abroad: Diasporas in international relations*. PhD dissertation, University of Minnesota.
- VERMA, S. (2013). *Instruments of engagement: Assessing India's PIO and OCI Schemes*. CARIM-India RR 2013/21, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, San Domenico di Fiesole (FI): European University Institute, 2013.
- VERTOVEC, S. (1997). "Three Meanings of "Diaspora," Exemplified among South Asian Religions". *Diaspora*, 6 (3): 277-299.
- WATERBURY, M.A. (2010). "Bridging the divide: Towards a comparative framework for understanding kin state and migrant-sending state diaspora politics". BAUBOCK, R.; FAIST, T. (Eds.) *Diaspora and Transnationalism: Concepts, Theories and Methods*. Amsterdam: IMISCOE Research, Amsterdam University Press, 131-148.