Departament d'Economia Aplicada
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona

WORKING PAPER 26-05

Social mobility, Protests, and Migration: Evidence from Latin American Countries

Maria Marino
Xavier Ramos
Riccardo Turati

Departament d'Economia Aplicada
Edifici B
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona
08193 Bellaterra, Barcelona, Spain.
d.econ.aplicada@uab.cat
www.uab.cat/en/applied-economics
@ecapuab.bsky.social

UAB
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona

Social mobility, Protests, and Migration: Evidence from Latin American Countries

Maria Marino[1], Xavier Ramos[2], and Riccardo Turati[3]

[1] *Department of Econometrics, Statistics and Applied Economics, UB (Spain)*
[2] *DEA, UAB (Spain), IZA (Germany), EQUALITAS (Spain)*
[3] *DEA, UAB (Spain), IZA (Germany), RFBerlin (Germany)*

July, 2026

Abstract

This paper investigates the relationship between intergenerational social mobility, migration aspirations, and participation in political demonstrations. Using individual-level data from the Latinobarómetro between 2002 and 2023, we show that individuals experiencing negative intergenerational educational mobility are more likely to express a desire to migrate and to participate into peaceful protests, whereas those with positive mobility exhibit the opposite pattern. Our analysis further suggests that the decision to migrate and to protest may be shaped by a common underlying decision process. Finally, we find that confidence in political institutions and positive economic expectations substantially mitigate expressions of social discontent in the form of migration aspirations and protest participation. Overall, the results indicate that unequal opportunities across generations are an important determinant of both migration intentions and political engagement.

JEL classification: D74, J61, J62, O15, F22.
Keywords: Social Mobility, Protest, Migration.

The research benefited from financial support from the Ministerio de Ciencia Innovación y Universidades (PID2024-156256OB-I00 and PID2022-137352NB-C41), from the Generalitat de Catalunya, Serra Húnter Programme, Fundación Ramón Areces (CISP23S18807), the university of Barcelona (SGR-2021-261), and grant H2020-MSCA-IF-2019-891256. We also wish to thank seminar participants at DISES, University of Salerno (Italy). ✉ Corresponding author: Riccardo Turati, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Department of Applied Economics, Campus de la UAB, 08193, Bellaterra; email:riccardo.turati@uab.cat.

1 Introduction

Although income inequality in Latin America has decreased in recent decades (Lustig et al., 2013; Alvaredo and Gasparini, 2015), the region still remains the most unequal in the world. When focusing on inequality in opportunities for younger generations - as proxied by indicators of social mobility - the picture is even gloomier. Recent estimates show that, despite recent improvement (Neidhöfer et al., 2018), it is the region with lowest intergenerational educational mobility (Ahsan et al., 2023). Furthermore, studies on many Latin American countries, such as Brazil (Ferreira and Veloso, 2006; Dunn, 2007; Britto et al., 2022), Chile (Nuñez and Miranda, 2010), Uruguay (Leites et al., 2025) and Mexico (Torche, 2010) show that these countries have lower intergenerational income mobility than many Western countries, including the United States. Average mobility across generations conceal often pronounced disparities in mobility across regions of a country (Chetty et al., 2014; Corak et al., 2017), which in Latin America are larger than in other regions of the world. A recent study in Mexico, for instance, shows that in the poorest regions of the South, 70% of those born in the bottom quintile of the national household assets distribution remain there in adulthood, whereas the equivalent percentage for the richest region is 20% (Monroy-Gómez-Franco and Corak, 2020).

According to political economy models (Hirschman and Rothschild, 1973; Meltzer and Richard, 1981; Piketty, 1995; Benabou and Ok, 2001; Alesina et al., 2004), people should react to the shape of the income distribution and the level of social mobility by demanding more redistributive policies. Nevertheless, rising income inequality and broken social ladders have not always led to more demand for redistribution as these models anticipated (see Kenworthy and McCall, 2008; Ashok et al., 2015; Roth and Wohlfart, 2018; Stantcheva, 2024).

A less explored channel is whether people react to inequalities with other behaviors rather than asking for more redistribution. Hirschman (1970) contends that dissatisfied individuals have three choices: voicing their discontent to change the situation while continuing as a member, exiting the organization, or remaining loyal. Exit and voice thus constitute two alternative means of expressing grievances. In line with previous studies in developed societies (Pfaff and Kim, 2003; Opp, 2016; Karadja and Prawitz, 2019), protests (voice) and emigration (exit) are alternative actions individuals can take when they are profoundly dissatisfied with the socio-economic opportunities their country provides. However, scant evidence for Hirschman's framework is provided for the Latin American region, despite it is a region characterized by massive protests and emigration flows (Brannen et al., 2020; Özden et al., 2011; Abel and Sander, 2014; Machado et al., 2011; Justino and Martorano, 2019).

This paper empirically explores the implications of Hirschman's framework by assessing whether intergenerational mobility is related to aspirations to migrate (exit) and participation in political demonstrations (voice) across Latin American countries. Our analysis takes advantage of the *Latinobarómetro* data, which provides harmonized information across 18 Latin American countries. One unique feature of this dataset is that it provides individual-level information on proxies of intergenerational (educational) mobility, aspirations to migrate, and participation in authorized demonstrations for more than 130,000 individuals over 9 waves between 2002 and 2023.[1] Relying on Neidhöfer et al. (2018)'s measurement approach, we construct measures of both positive and negative intergenerational educational mobility and

[1]The variables of interest are available in the following 9 waves: 2002, 2003, 2005 to 2008, 2015, 2020, and 2023.

explore the relationship between actual intergenerational mobility and individual willingness to migrate and participation in demonstrations through linear regression models after accounting for a wide set of individual socioeconomic and demographic controls as well as country-year fixed effects. We model the decision processes (i.e., migration and protest) both as separate ones and as the product of a joint decision process through a Conditional Mixed Process (Roodman, 2011; Wahba, 2015). Finally, we exploit the rich individual-level heterogeneity to capture whether economic conditions, expectations and perceptions toward the future, as well as confidence in institutions and experience of crime shape the relationship between experienced intergenerational mobility and the likelihood of aspiring to migrate and protesting.

Our analysis provides three relevant findings. First, we show that intergenerational educational mobility is consistently associated with the willingness to emigrate and to participate in political demonstrations. Individuals facing negative intergenerational educational mobility (14% of our sample) are more willing to emigrate and are also more likely to participate in peaceful demonstrations. On the contrary, individuals experiencing positive intergenerational mobility are less willing to emigrate. These results resonate with Hirschman (1970)'s framework: individuals who are more likely to be dissatisfied with current conditions (i.e., negative mobility) are more likely to exit and voice. Moreover, the size of the estimates is not negligible and is comparable to other drivers of emigration and protest, such as perceptions of income sufficiency or half the size of the estimates for having high education or for being a victim of crime. Second, when modeling the two decision processes together through a Conditional Mixed Process, we show a positive relationship between error terms, suggesting that unobserved factors shape similarly both aspiration to migrate and protest decisions, pointing at a commonly rooted decision process. Third, our heterogeneity analysis reveals that, while economic and sociodemographic conditions, excluding education, have a marginal influence in shaping the relationship between intergenerational mobility and our outcomes, better expectations toward the future and high confidence in political institutions substantially reduce the willingness to emigrate and to protest among individuals experiencing negative mobility. Therefore, policies aimed at improving expectations, perceptions, and confidence in institutions may be effective in reducing such expressions of grievance and dissatisfaction.

This paper contributes to several strands of the literature. First, it contributes to the burgeoning literature investigating the empirical determinants of political protest (Dalton et al., 2010; Welzel and Deutsch, 2012; Rüdig and Karyotis, 2014; Kurer et al., 2019; Ponticelli and Voth, 2020; Donni et al., 2021; Cantoni et al., 2022, 2024; Gomez-Ruiz et al., 2025a). Although numerous studies investigate the link between economic inequality and conflict, their findings are frequently mixed (Lichbach, 1989; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006; Boix, 2003; Solt, 2015; Dubrow et al., 2008). Yet surprisingly little attention has been paid to how intergenerational mobility influences political protest. Campante and Chor (2012) identify the lack of social mobility as one of the reasons behind the Arab Spring: the mismatch between (increasing) educational mobility and (decreasing) economic mobility has increased anger and frustration toward government, which has in turn increased the propensity to engage in collective action. Bodnaruk Jazayeri (2016) find that the MENA states with higher levels of identity-based inequalities experience more conflict. Bai and Jia (2016) show that prospects of decreasing mobility after the abolition of the civil exam system (initially reserved only for commoners) were a key determinant of the 1911 Xinhai Revolution that overthrew the Qing dynasty, the last imperial dynasty of China. More recently, Houle and Miller (2019) find that countries with

low social mobility levels are more likely to experience riots, general strikes, antigovernment demonstrations, political assassinations, guerrillas, revolutions, and civil wars. We contribute to this literature by providing novel empirical evidence of the role played by negative intergenerational educational mobility in shaping participation in peaceful political demonstrations in one of the most active regions in terms of massive protests (Latin America), while finding no evidence related to violent or unlawful protest.

The paper also contributes to the literature investigating the determinants of migration aspirations (e.g., Wood et al., 2010; Dustmann and Okatenko, 2014; Chort, 2014; Bertoli and Ruyssen, 2018; Migali and Scipioni, 2019; Docquier et al., 2020; Ruyssen and Salomone, 2018; Beine et al., 2020; Bekaert et al., 2021; Aslany et al., 2021; Clemens and Mendola, 2024). Our approach follows the stance taken in this literature, which conceptualizes migration as a two-step process, where aspirations to migrate represent the first stage (Paul, 2011; Docquier et al., 2014). In the Latin American context, existing work shows that low socioeconomic status alone is insufficient to fully explain individuals' willingness to migrate (e.g., Becerra et al., 2010; Becerra, 2012). For example, Frigo and Lodigiani (2025) finds that individuals living in regions of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico exposed to child sexual abuse scandals are more likely to express a desire to emigrate, driven by heightened concerns about child well-being and declining trust in national institutions. Our paper adds to this body of research by showing that compressed economic opportunities and inequality, proxied through our measures of intergenerational educational mobility, play a significant role in shaping the migration aspirations of potential movers. Such result complements the existing evidence of the relationship between inequality and actual migration flows (e.g., Stark, 2006; Phan and Coxhead, 2010; Czaika, 2013). Additionally, it reveals that confidence in the institutions and expectations are key elements shaping the relationship between intergenerational mobility and aspiration to migrate (Bertoli et al., 2020).

Finally, our paper also contributes to the literature that examines the implications of social mobility. Beyond the implications on economic growth (Bénabou, 1996; Neidhöfer et al., 2024), social mobility also influences individual decisions and behavior. Since the seminal work by Becker and Tomes (1986), we know that mobility expectations influence human-capital decisions. Black and Devereux (2011) explain how social mobility affect educational attainment, occupational sorting, and risk-taking, while Gugushvili et al. (2018) show how upward and downward mobility alter stress and expectations, which in turn affect smoking, drinking, and preventive health behaviors. More recently, Chetty et al. (2014) and Chetty and Hendren (2018a,b) show that exposure to upward or downward mobility in the US during childhood changes aspirations, school choices, and later-life earnings. Recent work has explored how social mobility shapes aspirations (Ray, 2006). Genicot and Ray (2017) predict that mobility prospects and social comparisons jointly shape aspirations, while Dalton et al. (2016) show how low-mobility environments depress goals and motivation, resulting in aspirations failure. As outlined above, social mobility also influences political and economic preferences. By linking social mobility to migration aspirations and protest participation, our paper contributes to this literature. Moreover, by providing evidence that negative intergenerational mobility is associated with migration aspiration, the first step to actual migration, these results suggest a potential underestimation of actual negative intergenerational educational mobility across Latin American countries, due to potential selection into migration.

The structure of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents and describes the

data, the measures of intergenerational mobility, aspirations to migrate and participation in political manifestations. Section 3 describes our empirical strategy and empirical challenges, while Section 4 reports the main findings, together with robustness checks and heterogeneity analyses. Finally, Section 5 concludes.

2 Data and Stylized Facts

To investigate the implications of intergenerational social mobility on outcomes that express discontent with the current situation, such as participation in protest and migration (Hirschman, 1970), we rely on the *Latinobarómetro* dataset (Latinobarómetro, 2024). This harmonized retrospective survey has been designed to study the development of democracy, economy, and values and preferences across 18 Latin American countries since 1981.[2] The dataset is particularly well-suited for our analysis as it provides, for a large set of individuals over time, harmonized information on three key dimensions: (i) the respondent's and her parents' completed years of education, from which we construct our measures of intergenerational educational mobility; (ii) whether the respondent and her family have *ever considered going to live abroad*, from which we derive our proxy of migration aspirations; and (iii) whether the respondent has *ever participated in an authorized demonstration*, which we use as a proxy for political voice. We discuss the construction and the limitations of each of these measures in detail in the subsections below. Given the survey's design, this dataset is particularly apt for cross-sectional analysis, but it lacks any major detailed information on household structure.[3] However, while the majority of countries have been surveyed since 1996, not all waves include the minimum set of variables required for our analysis (i.e., social mobility, migration, and participation in protest). We therefore use a subset of the full dataset, depending on the availability of the distinct proxies. Specifically, our main independent variables and dependent variables are available in the following 9 waves: 2002, 2003, 2005 to 2008, 2015, 2020, and 2023.[4]

Sample Selection - To ensure the comparability of our analysis with the existing literature on migration aspirations and political participation, we apply two main sample restrictions. First, we restrict the sample to respondents aged between 22 and 50 years old. The lower bound ensures that respondents are sufficiently old to have completed (or be very close to completing) their formal education, thereby providing a meaningful comparison between their own years of completed schooling and that of their parents. The upper bound reflects the fact that migration is empirically a phenomenon concentrated among working-age individuals, with international migration rates dropping sharply after age 50 (Hanson and McIntosh, 2010; Dao et al., 2018).[5]

[2]The list of countries includes: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Dominican Republic, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

[3]This limitation may matter if households make strategic choices among their members. For instance, Bratti et al. (2020) shows that within Mexican households, the likelihood of migrating may differ by birth order. Our study therefore exploits the rich cross-country and across-individual variation in the data, while remaining silent on potential within-household variation.

[4]The full sample size and characteristics are presented in Table 1.

[5]Restricting the sample to this age range also alleviates concerns related to recall bias, since the survey questions on migration aspirations and participation in demonstrations refer

Second, we restrict the sample to citizens of the country of residence. This choice ensures that the measures of intergenerational mobility, migration aspirations and protest participation refer to individuals embedded in the political and institutional environment of the country surveyed, and avoids contamination from the migration trajectories of foreign-born respondents, for whom the relationship between parental education, current education, and migration aspirations would be qualitatively different.[6]

After applying these two restrictions, our estimation sample consists of approximately 80,000 individual observations across 18 Latin American countries and 9 survey waves.

2.1 Intergenerational Educational Mobility

Concerning *intergenerational social mobility*, we follow the approach of Neidhöfer et al. (2018), which relies on the same dataset and build a measure of educational social mobility. Given that Latinobarómetro provides the number of completed years of education for both parents and children, we measure intergenerational mobility as the simple difference between the respondent's and her parent's completed years of education.[7] As the literature mentions, educational intergenerational mobility captures both the role of education in human development as well as serving as a proxy for social status (e.g., Hertz et al., 2008; Neidhöfer, 2019).[8]

To have a parsimonious and easily interpretable measure of intergenerational educational mobility that we can relate to our proxies of emigration and protest, we discretize the continuous constructed variable of intergenerational educational mobility to capture whether the survey respondent experienced either positive or negative intergenerational mobility. To this end, we construct two dummy variables that capture whether individuals hold a higher number of completed years of education than their parent, therefore experiencing *positive* social mobility ($Social\ Mobility^{+}$), or whether they hold a lower number of completed years of education,

to whether the respondent has *ever* considered migrating or *ever* participated in an authorized demonstration. Limiting the sample to respondents below 50 reduces the average gap between the recalled behavior and the moment of the survey response.

[6]Information on citizenship is directly elicited in five waves (2007, 2008, 2015, 2020, and 2023), in which respondents are explicitly asked whether they hold the citizenship of the country of residence. For the remaining four waves (2002, 2003, 2005, and 2006), no direct citizenship question is available; however, respondents are asked how proud they are of their nationality, and some respondents explicitly indicates that they do not hold the nationality of the country of residence. We exploit this information to construct a harmonized citizenship indicator across all nine waves, combining the direct citizenship question (where available) with the self-reported lack of national identification (where the direct question is not available). While this approach is not free of measurement error, since the indirect measure may underestimate the number of non-citizens in the earlier waves, it provides the most consistent classification available in Latinobarómetro.

[7]Latinobarómetro records the number of completed years of education only for the parent with the highest education, without identifying whether that parent is the father or the mother. This prevents us from comparing respondents to their same-sex parent. This may lead to misclassification for women, potentially inflating the estimated effect of negative mobility for women (Ruyssen and Salomone, 2018).

[8]An alternative way to measure intergenerational social mobility is through income. Latinóbarometro provides information on both respondent and parents income only on a limited set of waves. We nonetheless compute it, and Table 1 provides evidence of its coverage, and descriptive statistics of the discretized version of it, which can be either positive ($Social\ Mobility\ Inc.^{+}$) or negative ($Social\ Mobility\ Inc.^{-}$). We provide evidence that results are robust also by using income mobility.

Figure 1: Intergenerational Educational Mobility
Country-specific Evidence



Sources: Authors' elaboration on Latinobarómetro data (2002-2023). The figure shows the average share of respondents with positive social mobility on education (blue bar) and negative social mobility (cranberry bar).

therefore experiencing *negative* social mobility ($Social\ Mobility^{-}$).[9]

Figure 1 provides the average share of respondents experiencing positive and negative intergenerational educational mobility in each country. Overall, the Figure shows that upward educational mobility substantially outweighs downward mobility in all countries, suggesting that most individuals attain higher education levels than their parents. On average, 66% of respondents have higher educational attainment than their parents, while only 14.5% experienced negative mobility in education. However, there is considerable heterogeneity across countries.[10] Countries like Paraguay (72%), Bolivia (69%), and Brazil (68%) experienced above-average levels of positive mobility, while Honduras, Nicaragua, and Guatemala are characterized by less than 60% of the population experiencing positive intergenerational mobility. Conversely, these countries are also characterized by the highest degree of negative intergenerational mobility in education, with Nicaragua holding the highest share of individuals experiencing negative intergenerational mobility (23%).

2.2 Migration aspirations

Concerning *emigration* outcomes, we follow the literature that describes emigration as a two-step process (e.g., Docquier et al., 2014, 2020). The first step relates to the intention or aspiration to emigrate abroad, seeking better opportunities rather than remaining in the country of residence. Such aspirations depend on the availability of information about the potential host

[9]Table A-1 in the Appendix provides variable details and definitions.
[10]Figure A-2 in the Appendix provides the visual geographical distribution.

society, as well as many individual economic and non-economic factors (Chort, 2014; Dustmann and Okatenko, 2014; Ruyssen and Salomone, 2018; Aslany et al., 2021; Frigo and Lodigiani, 2025). The second step relates to the realization of such aspirations, which depends on various objective constraints, such as the possibility of overcoming migration costs or having the right to enter the foreign country depending on its migration policy (Dao et al., 2018; Clemens and Mendola, 2024).

In this paper, we focus on the first step, exploring proxies of migration aspiration. Latinobarómetro inquires about aspiration to migrate by asking the following question from 2002 onward: *"Have you and your family ever considered going to live abroad?"* We define aspiring migrants as those who answered this question affirmatively. The advantage of focusing on aspiration to migrate rather than actual realized migration is threefold. First, aspiring migrants are less likely to be influenced by potential host country culture and values compared to individuals who actually emigrated and live abroad (e.g., Jaschke et al., 2022; Portes and Zhou, 2025). Second, datasets providing information on migrants with retrospective questions on parents' education and participation in protest are scant. Third, migration intentions and aspirations are highly correlated with actual migration flows (see Bertoli and Ruyssen, 2018; Docquier et al., 2020).[11]

2.3 Protest participation

An alternative way to express discontent, as previously described, is by voicing it through participation in *political protests* and demonstrations. The literature shows that democratic protests, particularly non-violent ones, have substantially contributed to democratic changes in many developing countries (e.g., Teorell, 2010; Marino et al., 2020; Aidt and Franck, 2015, 2019). Latinobarómetro inquires about individuals' political participation by asking whether they have actively participated in several political activities, such as joining a demonstration, signing a petition or joining boycotts.[12] Our main proxy of voice is based on the question on participation in *authorized* demonstrations.[13]

The emphasis on "authorized" demonstrations deserves some discussion. Authorized demonstrations represent the most institutionalized - typically subject to administrative procedures (notifying or requesting permission from local authorities) form of voicing and may partly re-

[11] Compared to other existing measures of migration aspiration (e.g., the Gallup World Poll), the Latinobarómetro question captures aspirations for both permanent and temporary migration, and therefore cannot characterize the time horizon of the aspired emigration. Nonetheless, Figure A-3(a) in the Appendix shows that the average shares of aspiring migrants from Latinobarómetro are highly correlated with the analogous Gallup World Poll measure, which is designed to capture permanent emigration aspiration.

[12] The question asked in Latinobarómetro is: *"Now I want you to look at this card. I am going to read out a variety of political activities that people can undertake and I would like you to tell me, if you have ever done any of them (1), if you would ever do any of them (2), or if you would never do any of them (3)."*

[13] We create a dummy variable distinguishing between those who have already actively participated in an authorized demonstration compared to those who are willing or unwilling to do so, since Latinobarómetro inquire whether individuals: (a) have already participated, (b) could participate, and (c) would never participate to an authorized demonstration. Figure A-3(b) in the Appendix shows that the average shares of participants to demonstration from Latinobarómetro are positively correlated with the sum of peaceful demonstration available from the Social Conflict Analysis Database (SCAD).

Figure 2: Intention to Migrate and Protest Participation
Country-specific Evidence



Sources: Authors' elaboration on Latinobarómetro data (2002-2023). The figure shows the average share of respondents with intention to migrate abroad (blue bar) and participated in authorized demonstration (cranberry bar).

flect engagement with organized political movements or parties (Hicken, 2011; Robinson and Verdier, 2013; Gonzalez-Ocantos and Oliveros, 2019). To assess the extent to which our results are specific to conventional voicing or extend to other forms of unconventional political participation, we exploit additional Latinobarómetro questions on alternative forms of political action, which are available for a subset of waves: participation in *unauthorized* demonstrations (available in 5 waves), occupation of land, buildings, or factories (4 waves), and participation in riots (3 waves). These additional outcomes allow us to test whether the relationship between intergenerational educational mobility and political voice is driven by non violent, institutionalized participation, or whether it extends to more contentious or violent forms of protest.

2.4 Stylized facts

Figure 2 shows the average country-specific share of respondents who declare their intention to migrate and have actually participated in an authorized political demonstration. At first glance, it appears that across our sample of Latin American countries, individuals are more likely to express their willingness to emigrate abroad rather than voicing their concerns through active political participation: on average, one out of four individuals is willing to emigrate abroad, while only 14% of them participated in a demonstration. Beyond average differences of these two shares, difference between these two shares vary substantially across countries. Countries such as the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, or Ecuador show a stark difference between the two types of behavior, while other countries such as Uruguay, Brazil, or Chile are characterized

Figure 3: Social Mobility, Protest and Emigration
Evolution over time



Sources: Authors' elaboration on Latinobarómetro data (2002-2023). The figure shows the yearly average share of respondents with intention to migrate abroad (dot), that participated to an authorized demonstration (square), that experienced positive intergenerational social mobility (triangle) and negative intergenerational social mobility (diamond).

by similar shares of aspiring migrants and active participants in demonstrations. The combined evidence shown in Figures 1 and 2 reveals the relevant heterogeneity across Latin American countries and across the three dimensions of interest for this study.

To better grasp the evolution over time in terms of social mobility, active political participation, and emigration intentions, Figure 3 presents their time trends. Two main empirical patterns emerge from the Figure. First, in line with the literature (Neidhöfer et al., 2018), intergenerational social mobility trends are encouraging: the Figure shows a mild positive trend in the share of individuals experiencing positive social mobility, while the opposite pattern is observed for negative social mobility. Second, both active political participation and emigration intentions have been characterized by a mild U-shaped trend, reaching their lowest value in 2015 and increasing during the post-COVID-19 pandemic period.

The raw country-year correlations between migration intentions, participation in demonstrations, and social mobility are presented in Figure A-4 in the Appendix. The Figure reveals that positive intergenerational mobility is slightly negatively correlated with both migration and political participation outcomes, while negative intergenerational mobility is positively correlated with them. This descriptive evidence suggests that experiencing negative intergenerational mobility may foster behaviors expressing discontent with the current situation, such as political demonstrations or willingness to emigrate. Nonetheless, many confounding factors can influence this relationship, which we attempt to control for in the empirical strategy described in Section 3.

Table 1: Social Mobility, Protest and Emigration
Sample and Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Mean	S.D.	Min.	Max.	Obs.
PANEL A - Outcome					
Respondent had considered living abroad (him/family)	0.28	0.45	0.00	1.00	80098
Respondent participated to authorized demonstration	0.14	0.35	0.00	1.00	80098
Respondent participated in unauthorized protests	0.06	0.24	0.00	1.00	45368
Respondent occupied land, buildings or factories	0.01	0.12	0.00	1.00	34482
Respondent participated in riots	0.01	0.10	0.00	1.00	25198
PANEL B - Social Mobility					
$Social\ Mobility^{+}$	0.68	0.46	0.00	1.00	80098
$Social\ Mobility^{-}$	0.13	0.34	0.00	1.00	80098
$Social\ Mobility\ Inc.^{+}$	0.26	0.44	0.00	1.00	25079
$Social\ Mobility\ Inc.^{-}$	0.24	0.42	0.00	1.00	25079
PANEL C - Individual Controls					
Age	34.24	8.23	22.00	50.00	80098
Female	0.51	0.50	0.00	1.00	80098
Head Household	0.52	0.50	0.00	1.00	80098
City Size	5.48	2.27	1.00	8.00	80098
Highly Educated	0.41	0.49	0.00	1.00	80098
Employed	0.66	0.47	0.00	1.00	80098
Catholic	0.67	0.47	0.00	1.00	80098
$Wealth_I$	0.03	1.39	-2.30	2.16	80098
Subjective Inc.	0.46	0.50	0.00	1.00	80098
Sat. Democracy	0.33	0.47	0.00	1.00	80098
Sat. Economy	0.23	0.42	0.00	1.00	80098
Trust	0.17	0.38	0.00	1.00	80098
Confidence Gov.	0.33	0.47	0.00	1.00	80098
Confidence Parties	0.17	0.37	0.00	1.00	80098
Crime Victim	0.40	0.49	0.00	1.00	80098
Country Economy	0.14	0.35	0.00	1.00	80098

Sources: Authors' elaboration on Latinobarómetro data (2002-2023).

Finally, Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics of our full sample. Overall, our sample includes 80.098 individuals and is characterized by a wide set of demographic and socioeconomic characteristics, values, and beliefs, which we include in our baseline empirical specification. Regarding demographic characteristics, the average age of our sample is 34,24 years old, and the sample is quite balanced in terms of gender and household structure. Around 41% of the sample have more than 12 years of completed education. Regarding socioeconomic characteristics, 66% of respondents are either employed or self-employed, and close to 67% self-identify as Catholic. To capture the role of wealth and amenities in political participation and migration decisions, we follow Dustmann and Okatenko (2014) and we construct a Wealth Index ($Wealth_I$), which is the first component of a Principal Component Analysis across variables capturing whether

respondents own specific types of goods or amenities.[14] Additionally, 46% of the sample subjectively believe that their income is sufficient to have a decent life. Regarding attitudes and beliefs, only 33% and 23% of respondents are satisfied with the current status of democracy and market economy, respectively, and only 17% of the whole sample believe that most people can be trusted. Confidence in political actors is rather low, with 33% of the sample having confidence in the government, while only 17% have confidence in political parties. Being a victim of a crime is rather common across Latin American countries (40%), which has lasting effects on migration intentions (Wood et al., 2010). Lastly, only 14% of the sample is satisfied with current country economic conditions, suggesting that overall discontent is widespread across the sample.

3 Empirical Strategy

Section 3.1 first presents our benchmark specification and the estimator needed to model the two decision processes (emigration and protest) simultaneously. Section 3.2 then describes the main methodological issues that may lead to inconsistent estimates, namely endogeneity problems and heterogeneous effects.

3.1 Benchmark Specifications

Our empirical approach aims to model both intention to migrate and participation in demonstrations as functions of intergenerational social mobility, among several other factors. We first define for respondent i living in country c in year t the variable m_{ict}, which takes a value of 1 if respondent i declares their intention to migrate abroad, and 0 otherwise. Following the literature (Dustmann and Okatenko, 2014; Docquier et al., 2020), we approximate the probability of such an individual being an aspiring migrant as a linear function of their individual characteristics, as follows:

$$m_{ict} = \alpha + \beta_1 Social\ Mobility^{+}_{ict} + \beta_2 Social\ Mobility^{-}_{ict} + \Lambda \mathbf{X_{ict}} + \theta_{ct} + \epsilon_{ict}. \quad (1)$$

The variable $Social\ Mobility^{+}_{ict}$ ($Social\ Mobility^{-}_{ict}$) is our proxy for social mobility, which takes a value of 1 if individual i experiences positive (negative) social mobility. The vector $\mathbf{X_{ict}}$ includes a wide set of individual characteristics that can co-determine an individual's likelihood of expressing the intention to emigrate. This vector includes sociodemographic characteristics, as well individuals attitudes and stances, which have been highlighted by the literature (see Aslany et al., 2021, for a systematic review) as drivers of migration aspirations.[15] To account for any time-varying country-specific characteristics, such as economic crises, institutional instability, elections, or the COVID-19 pandemic, we include country-by-year fixed effects (θ_{ct}).

[14] The variables capture whether the respondent: (i) owns a washing machine, (ii) owns a telephone, (iii) owns a car, (iv) lives in a house or apartment connected to sewers, and (v) lives in a house or apartment with hot water available.

[15] This vector includes: (a) a series of dummy variables capturing the respondent's gender, head of household status, high education, employment status, Catholic denomination, perception of subjective income, satisfaction with democracy and market economy, generalized trust, confidence in government and political parties, satisfaction with the status of the economy, and being a victim of crime; (b) continuous variables capturing the respondent's age, wealth, and municipality of residence size.

Finally, ϵ_{ict} are the error terms, which we clustered at the country level (Abadie et al., 2023). The precise definition of all variables used in the analysis is provided in Table A-1 in the Appendix.

We then describe the discrete choice problem associated to participation to demonstration as a similar linear function of individual's characteristics (Dalton et al., 2010; Welzel and Deutsch, 2012). We define the variable p_{ict}, which takes a value of 1 if respondent i of country c in year t declared having participated in an authorized demonstration, and 0 otherwise. Similarly, we approximate the probability to participate in demonstrations as a linear function of observed characteristics as follows:

$$p_{ict} = \mu + \gamma_1 Social\ Mobility^{+}_{ict} + \gamma_2 Social\ Mobility^{-}_{ict} + \Omega \mathbf{X_{ict}} + \eta_{ct} + \zeta_{ict}. \tag{2}$$

As for equation (1), equation (2) accounts for the same wide set of observable characteristics ($\mathbf{X_{ict}}$), which are also relevant determinants for protest participation (Dalton et al., 2010; Rüdig and Karyotis, 2014; Kurer et al., 2019), as well as country-by-year fixed effects (η_{ct}). Similarly, the error terms ζ_{ict} are clustered at the country level.[16]

We first aim to understand the relationship between intergenerational social mobility and emigration and/or protest decisions. To this end, we start by estimating equations (1) and (2) separately, relying on a simple OLS estimator. Coefficients β_1 and γ_1 (β_2 and γ_2) estimate the partial correlation between positive (negative) intergenerational social mobility and the probability of being an aspiring migrant or of participating in an authorized demonstration independently.

We then explore whether the two discrete choice problems are the by-product of a common decision problem by simultaneously estimating equations (1) and (2) using a Conditional Mixed Process estimator (Roodman, 2011; Wahba, 2015). This estimator not only simultaneously estimates the parameters of the two decision processes but also allows for a correlation of the error terms of the two distinct equations (ϵ and ζ), thereby providing empirical evidence of the simultaneity of the decision process if such correlation (ρ_{12}) is statistically different from zero.

3.2 Empirical Challenges

Our baseline approach aims to estimate the partial correlation between intergenerational social mobility, protest, and emigration, while accounting for several confounding factors both at the individual and country level and allowing for simultaneity in the decision process associated with the choices to emigrate and protest. Nonetheless, the methodological assumptions associated with our estimation method, our measurement approach, and the presence of unobserved factors related to the error terms can introduce bias in the estimates, influencing the magnitude, direction, and precision of the estimated parameters. This section highlights these empirical challenges and describes the methodological approaches we implement to address them.

[16] Our choice of control variables has been theoretically driven, informed by the existing literature and by variable availability in our dataset. An alternative approach would have been to implement a supervised machine learning method to identify the most appropriate set of controls. We nonetheless corroborate our choice by implementing a LASSO regression using our full vector of 18 independent variables. The results reveal that 17 out of 18 variables are selected for migration aspiration, and 14 out of 18 for participation in demonstrations, corroborating our initial selection.

First, our standard estimation approach relies on a Linear Probability Model (LPM). While highly tractable, this estimator has been criticized when applied to dichotomous outcomes, as the predicted probabilities may fall outside the 0–1 range. Nonetheless, linear regressions have been widely adopted and validated in the literature for binary dependent variables (Hellevik, 2009). To address these concerns, we will also estimate both specifications using a standard non-linear probit model, which does not suffer from the limitations associated with our linear benchmark approach.

Second, our measurement of intergenerational social mobility may introduce a downward bias in the estimates. Using years of completed education as a proxy for social status has limitations, as a non-negligible share of intergenerational mobility may remain unobserved among individuals with the same number of completed years of schooling. In addition, we convert the continuous measure of intergenerational educational mobility into dichotomous indicators of upward or downward mobility, thereby compressing the underlying variation. Both issues may generate measurement error in our empirical approach. To address these concerns, we provide additional estimates using (a) the continuous measure of educational mobility, defined as the difference in years of completed education between respondents and their parents, and (b) an alternative measure of intergenerational mobility based on income.

Third, the baseline measure we use to measure social mobility is an absolute measure that simply compares years of education between parents and their children. Although this is a standard measure used in previous studies (e.g., Hertz et al., 2008; Neidhöfer, 2019), it does not account for the changes in the distribution of years of education between generations that Latin American countries are likely to have undergone. Indeed, our data shows that the distribution of years of education of the generation of children is left-skewed relative to the distribution of their parents,[17] which implies that the same years of education may not have the same economic implications, such as opportunities and social status, for parents than for children. To take this into account, we define a measure of relative mobility that compares the relative position of parents and children in the distribution of levels of education of their own generations,[18] so a child with the same number of years of education as her parent displays negative mobility instead of zero mobility, as our (baseline) absolute measure of mobility would indicate. This rank-based measure is likely to better capture aspects related to economic status if we assume that education is a good predictor of income.

Another major empirical concern associated with our approach is that the estimated partial correlations may be driven by omitted factors related to both intergenerational mobility and the likelihood of emigrating or protesting. The presence of an omitted variable bias (OVB) is therefore a central concern in this non-experimental setting. Although the empirical strategy outlined in Section 3.1 seeks to mitigate this issue by controlling for a rich set of individual and country–year–specific characteristics, unobserved factors may still threaten the interpretation of our estimates. To further minimize these concerns, we adopt different approaches.

We first adopt the approach proposed by Oster (2019) to assess the extent to which our estimates may be affected by unobserved factors. Building on Altonji et al. (2005), Oster's method assumes that the relationship between our variable of interest (i.e., intergenerational social mobility) and unobserved determinants is proportional to the relationship between the

[17] The distribution is available at Figure A-5 in the Appendix.

[18] In the regressions, we use an indicator variable that takes value 1 for individuals displaying negative relative mobility, meaning holding a lower ranked position then their parent.

variable of interest and the observed controls. In other words, unobserved factors excluded from our baseline specification are assumed not to be entirely independent from the observed characteristics already included in the model. Under this assumption, and given a chosen level of model fit ($R_{\max} \in [0, 1]$), we compute the degree of selection on unobservables relative to observables (δ) that would be required to drive the estimated coefficient on intergenerational social mobility to zero. As a rule of thumb, when the magnitude of $|\delta|$ exceeds 1, concerns about selection on unobservables are substantially attenuated.

To the same end, we then expand the set of individual-level controls by including variables capturing (i) whether the respondent is aware of corruption and (ii) the respondent's self-perceived socioeconomic status. The first variable reflects awareness of bureaucratic or political misconduct, which may directly fuel resentment, protest, and emigration. The second captures individuals' subjective assessment of their position within society, which helps absorb unobserved factors that may influence our estimates through self-perception. Additionally, to reduce potential bias arising from unobserved local factors, we replace our country-by-year fixed effects with region-by-year fixed effects. We harmonize the sub-national regional units in Latinobarómetro with GADM administrative boundaries, and interact all 164 regions with year dummies. This structure absorbs any time-varying shocks at the regional level, thereby further limiting concerns related to omitted regional characteristics.

Another potential empirical challenge stems from the two-way relationship between migration choices and educational attainment. The literature on the brain-gain/brain-drain effects of emigration shows that both actual and prospective migration can influence human capital accumulation and investment, with effects found to be positive (e.g., Beine et al., 2008, 2011; Bocquier et al., 2024; Batista et al., 2025) as well as negative (e.g. McKenzie and Rapoport, 2011). Our empirical approach addresses this potential endogeneity in two ways. First, we control directly for respondents' educational attainment, thereby absorbing any direct effect of migration prospects on educational choices. Second, our specification includes a variable proxying for household assets, similar to Dustmann and Okatenko (2014).[19] If migration prospects influenced household investment choices, our wealth index should absorb it.

We also face an identification challenge. Own and parental education are likely to matter directly for migration aspirations. If we defined both variables in terms of years of education and included them in the regression and defined social mobility as the difference between own and parental education, we would not be able to identify our parameter of interest, that is, the effect of social mobility on migration aspirations, as the three variables would be collinear. We break this collinearity by using a binary measure of social mobility and by not including parent's education but including a wealth index, which is one of the main channels through which parental education is expected to influence migration aspirations. To further alleviate the concern that our estimate of interest may depend on the way we define social mobility, we show that our results are robust to defining mobility in three alternative ways, namely, as the continuous measure of educational mobility, defined as the difference in years of completed education between respondents and their parents, as relative education mobility, and as intergenerational income mobility.

Lastly, Section 2 documents substantial cross-country heterogeneity in intergenerational mobility, aspirations to migrate, and participation in political demonstrations. As a result,

[19] Table A-1 in the Appendix provides details on this and all other variables included in the analysis.

estimates based on the full sample may conceal important differences and could be disproportionately driven by specific years or subsets of countries. To explore this potential heterogeneity, we conduct a series of subsample analyses by: (a) splitting the sample into pre–financial crisis and post–financial crisis waves, (b) excluding countries with the lowest levels of upward intergenerational mobility (i.e., Nicaragua, Guatemala, and Honduras), and (c) separating countries according to the World Bank income classification, distinguishing between upper-middle-income and lower-income countries.

4 Results

We present the main empirical results concerning the relationship between intergenerational social mobility, aspiration to migrate, and participation in demonstrations in Section 4.1. Section 4.2 provides the empirical checks designed to address the empirical challenges described in the previous section. Finally, Section 4.3 provides an individual-level heterogeneity analysis to examine whether the estimates are influenced by economic conditions, expectations and perceptions toward the future, and confidence in political institutions.

4.1 Main Results

Table 2 provides the main empirical results of paper. We analyze the partial correlation between intergenerational educational mobility, aspiration to migrate and participation in demonstration as a separated process in columns (1) to (6), while we jointly model them with a Conditional Mixed Process in columns (7) and (8).

Focusing first on the two processes separately, we estimate the partial correlation between intergenerational educational mobility and aspiration to migrate from column (1) to (3), and with participation in demonstrations from column (4) to (6). Our results include the full vector of controls and fixed effects described in Section 3.1. Moreover, we show the estimates for positive and negative social mobility both separately and jointly, to better grasp the stability of the estimates.

The results show a rather stable and consistent correlation between intergenerational educational mobility and choices associated with emigration and protest. First, individuals experiencing negative intergenerational educational mobility (i.e., having fewer years of completed education than the most highly educated parent) are more likely to express willingness to emigrate abroad and to participate in authorized demonstrations. This result is directly related to Hirschman (1970)'s framework, which has been analyzed in the context of developed societies (Pfaff and Kim, 2003; Opp, 2016; Karadja and Prawitz, 2019): individuals who are dissatisfied with current opportunities and experience a negative shock are more likely both to protest (voice) and emigrate (exit). Second, individuals experiencing positive intergenerational educational social mobility are less willing to emigrate, and they have the same probability of participating in demonstrations as those with null intergenerational mobility.

Our estimates of interest are precisely estimated, and their magnitude is not negligible when we compare them with other observable socioeconomic characteristics. Focusing on the estimates in column (3), the partial correlation between negative intergenerational educational mobility and the willingness to migrate has the same size as perceiving to have sufficient income to have a decent life, is two-thirds the size of the estimate of being highly educated,

Table 2: Social Mobility, Protest and Emigration
Main Results

	Separated Processes						Conditional Mixed Process	
	(1) Migration Aspir.	(2) Migration Aspir.	(3) Migration Aspir.	(4) Participate Demon.	(5) Participate Demon.	(6) Participate Demon.	(7) Migration Aspir.	(8) Participate Demon.
Social Mobility^{+}	–0.030***		–0.019***	–0.007*		0.001	–0.020***	–0.002
	(0.004)		(0.005)	(0.004)		(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.004)
Social Mobility^{-}		0.041***	0.026***		0.018**	0.019**	0.025***	0.018**
		(0.003)	(0.004)		(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.007)
Age	–0.003***	–0.003***	–0.003***	0.001***	0.001***	0.001***	–0.003***	0.001***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Female	–0.017***	–0.017***	–0.017***	–0.014***	–0.014***	–0.014***	–0.020***	–0.014***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)
Head Household	0.039***	0.039***	0.039***	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.039***	0.002
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)
City Size	0.011***	0.011***	0.011***	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.011***	–0.000
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Highly Educated	0.048***	0.048***	0.049***	0.062***	0.063***	0.063***	0.045***	0.061***
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.007)	(0.011)
Employed	–0.003	–0.003	–0.003	0.016***	0.016***	0.016***	–0.006	0.016***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)
Catholic	–0.022***	–0.022***	–0.022***	–0.018***	–0.018***	–0.018***	–0.020***	–0.018***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
$Wealth_I$	0.032***	0.032***	0.032***	0.008***	0.007***	0.007***	0.031***	0.006***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)
Subjective Inc.	–0.037***	–0.037***	–0.037***	–0.004	–0.005	–0.005	–0.038***	–0.004
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.003)
Sat. Democracy	–0.020***	–0.019***	–0.020***	0.001	0.001	0.001	–0.021***	0.001
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.003)
Sat. Economy	–0.009	–0.009	–0.009	0.006	0.006	0.006	–0.009*	0.004
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Trust	–0.005	–0.004	–0.005	0.021***	0.021***	0.021***	–0.003	0.024***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.006)
Confidence Gov.	–0.027***	–0.027***	–0.027***	0.009**	0.009**	0.009**	–0.028***	0.009**
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.004)
Confidence Parties	–0.004	–0.004	–0.004	0.030***	0.030***	0.030***	–0.005	0.031***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.007)
Crime Victim	0.071***	0.071***	0.071***	0.042***	0.042***	0.042***	0.071***	0.040***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)
Country Economy	–0.016***	–0.016***	–0.016***	0.007	0.007	0.007	–0.014***	0.008
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.006)
Observations	80098	80098	80098	80098	80098	80098	80098	80098
Countries	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18
Country-year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
CMP Statistics								
σ_1							0.430	
							(0.006)	
σ_2							0.343	
							(0.010)	
ρ_{12}							0.033***	
							(0.005)	

Sources: Authors' elaboration on Latinobarómetro data (2002-2023). Notes: *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p < 0.1. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the country level. The dependent variable in Col. (1) to (3) and (7) is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent aspires to emigrate to a foreign country and 0 otherwise. The dependent variable in Col. (4) to (6) and (8) is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent participated in an authorized demonstration, and 0 otherwise. All estimates include country-by-year fixed effects, and rely on survey-weights. Col (1) to (6) report the results from Linear Probability Models (LPM), while Col. (7) and (8) report the joint estimates resulting from a Conditional Mixed Process (Roodman, 2011). The reference group in columns (1)-(2) and (4)-(5) includes individuals with zero *and* non-zero mobility of the opposite sign; in columns (3), (6), (7) and (8), the reference group is restricted to individuals with zero intergenerational educational mobility.

and half the size relative to being a victim of crime (Wood et al., 2010). Similarly, the lower willingness to emigrate among those experiencing positive educational mobility is comparable to being satisfied with the current status of democracy or the country's economy. Regarding the estimates related with participation in demonstrations in column (6), the estimate associated with negative intergenerational educational mobility is similar to having high trust in people, and one-third the size of the estimate of being highly educated (i.e., more than 12 years of

Table 3: Social Mobility, Protest and Emigration
Alternative Protest Outcomes

	Unauthorized Sample		Occupations Sample		Riot Sample	
	(1) Participate Unauthor. Demon.	(2) Participate Demon.	(3) Occupy Land or Buildings	(4) Participate Demon.	(5) Participate Riots	(6) Participate Riots
Social Mobility^{+}	–0.000	–0.005	0.002	0.001	0.001	0.009
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.006)
Social Mobility^{-}	0.010*	0.021**	–0.000	0.017*	0.001	0.019*
	(0.005)	(0.009)	(0.002)	(0.008)	(0.003)	(0.010)
Observations	45368	45368	34482	34482	25198	25198
Countries	18	18	18	18	18	18
Country-year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Ind. Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Sources: Authors' elaboration on Latinobarómetro data (2002-2023). Notes: *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p < 0.1. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the country level. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if respondent: participated to an unauthorized demonstration (Col. 1), occupied land, building or factories for political reasons (Col. 3), and participated to riots (Col. 5). The dependent variable in Col. (2) to (4) and (6) is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent participated in an authorized demonstration, and 0 otherwise. All estimates include country-by-year fixed effects, and individual level controls as described in equations (1) and (2), and relies on survey-weights. Col (1) to (6) report the results from Linear Probability Models (LPM).

completed education). While the estimates may not be fully comparable across variables given their different metrics, Table B-1 in the Appendix reports standardized coefficients for the full vector of variables as well as for the LASSO-selected subset; the relative magnitude of our variables of interest is broadly confirmed.

Lastly, columns (7) and (8) provide the results when we simultaneously model and estimate the two decision processes through a Conditional Mixed Process (Roodman, 2011). The estimated parameters are consistent with those presented in columns (3) and (6). Nonetheless, the correlation between the error terms (ρ_{12}) is positive and statistically different from zero, suggesting that unobservable factors that influence migration aspirations also positively influence the participation of individuals in demonstrations. Therefore, this evidence suggests that these two decision processes are rooted in a common and broader decision process (Wahba, 2015), as Hirschman (1970) suggests.

4.1.1 Alternative Protest Outcomes

While our main proxy of voice captures participation in authorized demonstrations, Latinobarómetro provides, for a subset of waves, information on alternative forms of political participation that differ both in their degree of institutionalization and in their potential for violence. Specifically, we exploit information on: (i) participation in *unauthorized* demonstrations (available in 5 waves), (ii) occupation of land, buildings, or factories (4 waves), and (iii) participation in riots (3 waves).

Table 3 reports the estimates for the three alternative protest outcomes. For each outcome, we report the results for our main measure of authorized demonstrations on the same subsample, so as to verify that the relationship documented in Table 2 holds also when restricted to the smaller samples for which the alternative outcomes are available.

While our main result on participation in authorized demonstrations is confirmed across the three subsamples (columns 2, 4 and 6), two additional results emerge. First, the documented link between downward mobility and political voice extends, in a weaker form, to peaceful but less institutionalized forms of collective action. The relationship between negative intergen-

erational educational mobility and participation in *unauthorized* demonstrations (column 1) is positive and statistically significant at the 10% level, although the estimated coefficient is roughly half the size of that for authorized demonstrations on the same subsample (0.010 vs. 0.022). Second, and importantly, we find *no* evidence of a relationship between intergenerational educational mobility and the two more contentious forms of political participation: occupations of land, buildings or factories (column 3) and participation in riots (column 5). Both estimates are very close to zero, and not statistically different from zero. These results echoes a recurrent finding in the literature on political mobilization, where inequalities and other structural factors are documented to operate through distinct channels on violent and nonviolent forms of contention (Solt, 2015; Hillesund, 2023; Gomez-Ruiz et al., 2025b; Donni et al., 2021; Marino et al., 2020). Consistent with this evidence, our results suggest that intergenerational educational disadvantages translate into institutionalized expressions of voice, rather than into disruptive or violent action. Overall, these findings reinforce the interpretation of our main analysis in light of Hirschman (1970)'s framework: individuals experiencing downward mobility express their discontent through institutionalized and peaceful channels, either by "voicing" through demonstrations or by aspiring to "exit" through migration, rather than through disruptive or violent action.

4.2 Robustness Checks

Table 4 provides the estimates of the tests implemented to address the empirical concerns described in Section 3.2. We estimate the partial correlation of intergenerational educational mobility on the two outcomes separately: the upper panel presents the results with aspirations to migrate as the outcome, while the lower panel shows the estimates related to participation in authorized demonstrations. We estimate the partial correlation of both positive and negative intergenerational educational mobility simultaneously across the various specifications.

Starting first with our modeling decision, column (1) shows that our estimates are consistent when adopting a non-linear probit model to characterize the decision process associated with emigration and protest. Regarding measurement issues, column (2) reveals that using the continuous version (and its quadratic term) of our variable of interest (i.e., difference in the number of completed years of education relative to the most highly educated parent) provides estimates aligned with those in Table 2: having fewer years of completed education than the parent is associated with a higher intention to emigrate and a higher likelihood of participating in demonstrations. In addition, the positive and statistically significant parameter associated with the quadratic term suggests a U-shaped relationship between intergenerational educational mobility and our outcomes of interest. Column (3) shows that the partial correlation between mobility and migration aspiration does not depend on whether mobility is defined in absolute or relative terms. However, absolute and relative mobility show different correlations with participating in demonstrations, as relative mobility does not seem to correlate with this outcome. Estimates using a measure of intergenerational income mobility have the same signs as estimates based on relative educational mobility (see column (4)). Now, however, the non-significant effects may be related to the reduced sample size that we have when we use the income variable to measure mobility. Finally, column (5) includes an additional dummy variable controlling for respondents with 6 to 12 years of education. The results are virtually identical to those of our benchmark specification in Table 2, suggesting that our estimates are

Table 4: Social Mobility, Protest and Emigration
Robustness Checks

	Estimation	Measurement				Omitted Variable				Sample Heterog.				
	(1) Probit	(2) Conti-nuous	(3) Relative Mobility	(4) Mobility Income	(5) Decomposing Educ.	(6) Oster Approach	(7) No Controls	(8) Corr. & Perc. Inc	(9) Region-Year FEs	(10) Pre 2010 Only	(11) Post 2010 Only	(12) No Low Mobility	(13) Upper Middle Income C.	(14) Low Income C.
Panel A - Migration Asp.														
Social Mobility^{+}	–0.060***				–0.028***	–0.019***	–0.016**	–0.020***	–0.018***	–0.015**	–0.026***	–0.016**	–0.021***	–0.017*
	(0.016)				(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.008)
Social Mobility^{-}	0.080***				0.024***	0.026***	0.036***	0.021***	0.024***	0.025***	0.031**	0.027***	0.025***	0.027***
	(0.013)				(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.011)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Social Mobility		–0.004***												
		(0.001)												
Social Mobility^{2}		0.000												
		(0.000)												
Rel. Social Mobility^{-}			0.022***											
			(0.003)											
Social Mobility Inc.$^{+}$				–0.006										
				(0.008)										
Social Mobility Inc.$^{-}$				0.024**										
				(0.009)										
Observations	80098	80098	80098	25079	80098	80098	80098	69133	80090	51320	28778	69234	36598	43500
Countries/Regions	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	164	18	18	15	8	10
δ_{SM+}						2.350								
δ_{SM-}						1.704								
Country-year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Region-year FE									✓					
Ind. Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Additional C.								✓						
Panel B - Participate Dem.														
Social Mobility^{+}	0.009				–0.001	0.001	0.006	0.003	0.001	0.009	–0.013**	0.002	0.002	0.000
	(0.020)				(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)
Social Mobility^{-}	0.093***				0.018**	0.019**	0.015*	0.019**	0.019***	0.020**	0.018**	0.020**	0.035**	0.004
	(0.033)				(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.008)
Social Mobility		–0.002**												
		(0.001)												
Social Mobility^{2}		0.000												
		(0.000)												
Rel. Social Mobility^{-}			–0.000											
			(0.004)											
Social Mobility Inc.$^{+}$				0.002										
				(0.008)										
Social Mobility Inc.$^{-}$				–0.000										
				(0.007)										
Observations	80098	80098	80098	25079	80098	80098	80098	69133	80090	51320	28778	69234	36598	43500
Countries/Regions	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	164	18	18	15	8	10
δ_{SM+}						–0.545								
δ_{SM-}						9.348								
Country-year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Region-year FE									✓					
Ind. Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Additional C.								✓						

Sources: Authors' elaboration on Latinobarómetro data (2002-2023). Notes: *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p < 0.1. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the country or regional level. The dependent variable in Panel A is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent aspires to emigrate to a foreign country and 0 otherwise, while in Panel B it is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent participated in an authorized demonstration, and 0 otherwise. All estimates include country-by-year fixed effects, and rely on survey-weights. Each column provides a distinct feature: probit model (1), continuous measure of intergenerational mobility on education (2), negative relative mobility on education (3), intergenerational mobility on income (4), including a dummy for respondents with 6 to 12 years of education (5), Oster (2019) approach results (6), no individual controls (7), inclusion of corruption experience and perceived socioeconomic conditions (8), inclusion of region-by-year fixed effects (9), excluding 2015-2020-2023 waves (10), using only 2015-2020-2023 waves (11), excluding Nicaragua, Guatemala and Honduras (low mobility countries) (12), using upper-middle income countries only (13), and lower-income countries only (14).

not driven by the broad categorization of educational groups.

Moving to the empirical checks to reduce concerns associated with omitted variable bias, column (6) assesses the role played by the potential selection driven by unobserved factors. By applying Oster (2019)'s approach and guidelines, we estimate the degree of selection on unobservables (δ) after setting the amount of explained variation (R_{max}) equal to 1.3, the R^2 of our models. The estimated δs are above the cutoff level of one (in absolute terms) for both positive and negative intergenerational educational mobility and for both outcomes, suggesting that selection on unobservables is unlikely to invalidate our estimates. Moreover, the estimates associated with participation in demonstrations seem particularly robust to selection on unobservables, given the relevant size of the estimated δs.

Columns (7) and (8) show that our main results, specifically those associated with negative intergenerational educational mobility, are rather robust when we exclude all the individual controls (col. 7) or when we include individual controls capturing exposure to corruption and perceived income (col. 8). Lastly, column (9) shows that our estimates are robust after controlling for potential regional time-varying shocks, absorbed by the inclusion of region-by-year fixed effects.

Finally, columns (10) to (14) investigate the presence of heterogeneous effects driven by our broad sample of countries and wide time span. Overall, the results are rather consistent with those presented in Table 2. The estimates in columns (10) and (11) are consistent with

our baseline results when focusing on the first period of our sample (from 2002 to 2008) or on the post-2010 period (2015, 2020, 2023). The exclusion of countries characterized by the lowest positive intergenerational educational mobility and substantial high negative mobility does not influence our estimates (col. 12). Lastly, columns (13) and (14) provide the estimates after splitting the sample of countries between upper-middle-income and lower-income countries. The estimates are rather consistent with our baseline results, although smaller and less precisely estimated for participation in authorized demonstrations in lower-income countries (col. 14). This result suggests that a country's economic and institutional conditions may influence individual choice to participate in political demonstrations.[20]

4.3 Heterogeneity Analysis

While our analysis provides consistent results on the relationship between intergenerational educational mobility, aspiration to migrate, and participation in demonstrations, it has so far been silent about the potential factors that can exacerbate or dampen the estimated relationship. This section aims to address this issue by providing an exhaustive heterogeneity analysis relying on subsamples based on individual characteristics that can be grouped into: (a) sociodemographic characteristics, (b) economic conditions, (c) expectations and perceptions, and (d) institutions and crime experience. This section graphically presents the estimated results from equations (1) and (2), while the full set of results is available in Appendix C.

Sociodemographic Characteristics – We explore whether the estimated relationship between intergenerational educational mobility and our two outcomes of interest varies across sociodemographic subgroups. Specifically, we split the sample along five dimensions: (i) gender (male vs. female), (ii) own education level (less than 12 years vs. more than 12 years), (iii) age (below vs. above 34 years old), (iv) household head status (household head vs. not), (v) municipality size (small, below 100,000 inhabitants, vs. large city) and (vi) education level of the parents (less than 12 years vs. more than 12 years). Figure 4 presents the estimated coefficients graphically, while the full set of results is reported in Table C-1.

Turning first to migration aspirations, Figure 4(a) reveals a symmetric pattern across gender: both men and women experiencing positive intergenerational mobility are equally less likely to aspire to migrate, while negative mobility increases migration aspirations symmetrically for both groups. A more pronounced difference emerges along education lines: the negative association between positive mobility and migration aspirations is entirely driven by highly educated individuals, with no statistically significant effect among the less educated, suggesting that the returns to upward mobility in terms of reduced emigration desire are concentrated among those who have already achieved higher education. Considering parental education, on the downward-mobility side, the positive link between negative mobility and the aspiration to migrate is driven by individuals with highly educated parents, with no significant effect for those from less-educated families—suggesting the migration response to downward mobility is strongest among those from more advantaged backgrounds. Regarding age, younger individuals (below 34) display a stronger positive association between negative mobility and

[20] We conducted a similar analysis on one wave of the Afrobarometer (7th), which provides similar proxies in terms of intergenerational educational mobility, willingness to migrate, and protest. Our results, available upon request, show that while negative intergenerational educational mobility is still positively associated with aspirations to migrate, we find no evidence on participation in demonstrations.

Figure 4: Social Mobility, Protest and Emigration
Heterogeneity Analysis - Sociodemographic Characteristics



(a) Aspirations to Migrate (b) Participate in Demonstrations

Sources: Authors' elaboration on Latinobarómetro data (2002-2023). The dependent variable in Figure (a) is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent aspires to emigrate to a foreign country and 0 otherwise, while in Figure (b) it is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent participated in an authorized demonstration, and 0 otherwise. The figures report the estimated coefficients for both positive and negative intergenerational educational mobility jointly estimated, with the 95% interval of confidence. All the results are displayed in Table C-1.

migration aspirations compared to older respondents, consistent with the idea that younger cohorts face greater labor market uncertainty and retain more flexibility to act on emigration intentions.

Figure 4(b) shows the results for protest participation. The estimates of negative mobility on protest participation is statistically significant for women but not for men, suggesting that downwardly mobile women may be particularly prone to expressing discontent through political voice. Similarly, the partial correlation is significant among the less educated and older respondents, while it is somewhat weaker and insignificant among the highly educated and the youngest cohort. Interestingly, as for the case of aspiration to migration, the estimated results reveal stark differences in the point estimates associated to positive intergenerational educational mobility and protest participation across education groups. Overall, this heterogeneity analysis confirms the robustness of the main findings while highlighting that age and education modulate the intensity of the mobility-discontent nexus, particularly for migration aspirations.
Economic Conditions – As the literature highlights, economic conditions play a role in both the decision to emigrate (e.g. Grogger and Hanson, 2011; Dao et al., 2018; Clemens and Mendola, 2024) and in protest participation (Rüdig and Karyotis, 2014; Rodon and Guinjoan, 2018; Kurer et al., 2019). Therefore, we explore whether our estimated partial correlations between intergenerational mobility and our outcomes of interest are influenced by respondents' economic conditions. In particular, we split the sample of individuals according to their: (i) subjective income (insufficient vs. sufficient), (ii) employment status (unemployed vs. employed), (iii) concerns about losing a job (concerned vs. not concerned), (iv) perceived socioeconomic status (low vs. high), and (v) below/above median wealth index. Figure 5 presents the estimated

Figure 5: Social Mobility, Protest and Emigration
Heterogeneity Analysis - Economic Conditions



(a) Aspirations to Migrate (b) Participate in Demonstrations

Sources: Authors' elaboration on Latinobarómetro data (2002-2023). The dependent variable in Figure (a) is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent aspires to emigrate to a foreign country and 0 otherwise, while in Figure (b) it is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent participated in an authorized demonstration, and 0 otherwise. The figures report the estimated coefficients for both positive and negative intergenerational educational mobility jointly estimated, with the 95% interval of confidence. All the results are displayed in Table C-2.

parameters from our heterogeneity analysis on economic conditions.

Focusing on the relationship between intergenerational educational mobility and aspirations to migrate in Figure 5(a), the first result worth noting is that individuals experiencing negative intergenerational educational mobility are consistently more likely to aspire to migrate, regardless of their economic condition. Positive intergenerational educational mobility is associated with a consistently lower likelihood of migration aspirations when economic conditions are particularly favorable, such as having sufficient subjective income, perceiving oneself to belong to a high socioeconomic status, or having a wealth index above the median. The results associated with the likelihood of participating in protests, depicted in Figure 5(b), provide a similar picture: while those experiencing negative intergenerational mobility are more likely to participate in demonstrations across sub-samples based on economic conditions, individuals with positive intergenerational educational mobility are substantially less likely to protest when having sufficient subjective income, and when perceptions of socioeconomic status and personal wealth are positive. These results suggest that economic conditions are not as much a relevant factor influencing the decisions of those experiencing negative intergenerational mobility, but they do play a role in influencing those in a potentially better condition, as proxied by their positive intergenerational mobility.

Expectations and Perceptions – Expectations and perceptions can have a direct influence on individuals' decision processes. Bertoli et al. (2020) show that information frictions, which translate into misaligned expectations of destination countries' economic returns, are relevant factors for predicting international migration flows. Similarly, Bargain et al. (2026) recently show that perceptions about social status predicts protest involvement. We explore the role of

Figure 6: Social Mobility, Protest and Emigration
Heterogeneity Analysis - Expectations and Perceptions



(a) Aspiration to Migrate (b) Participate in Demonstration

Sources: Authors' elaboration on Latinobarómetro data (2002-2023). The dependent variable in Figure (a) is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent aspires to emigrate to a foreign country and 0 otherwise, while in Figure (b) it is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent participated in an authorized demonstration, and 0 otherwise. The Figures report the estimated coefficients for both positive and negative intergenerational educational mobility jointly estimated, with the 95% interval of confidence. All the results are displayed in Table C-3.

expectations and perceptions in shaping our estimates by splitting the sample of individuals based on: (i) country future economic expectations (worse vs. better off), (ii) personal future economic expectations (worse vs. better off), (iii) children's future living conditions (not better vs. better), (iv) country income distribution (unfair vs. fair), and (v) perception of freedom and protection of rights (low vs. high).[21]

Figure 6 reveals that expectations play a non-negligible role in shaping the relationship between mobility, intention to migrate, and protest. Figure 6(a) shows that individuals with better expectations toward the future and a fairer perception of society are less likely to migrate compared to those with worse expectations and perceptions. This result is consistent for both individuals experiencing positive and negative intergenerational social mobility. Similarly, having the perception of living in a society with fair income distribution substantially reduces the likelihood of protest among individuals experiencing negative intergenerational mobility (Figure 6(b)). These results suggest that the role of expectations and perceptions is relevant in shaping outcomes associated with societal discontent, such as emigration and protest.

Institutions and Crime – Lastly, Hirschman (1970)'s framework describes the choice of voice (protest) and exit (emigration) as alternatives to loyalty, which is the expression of support

[21]To conduct the last subsample analysis, we first conduct a principal component analysis on a wide set of dummy variables capturing whether individuals perceive that they have guaranteed freedom of political participation, choice of occupation, religion, and freedom of speech, and whether society guarantees protection for the environment, private property, social security, fair distribution of wealth, equality between men and women, opportunities, solidarity for the poor, a chance to get a job, and protection against crime. We extract the first standardized component and then split the sample of individuals below and above the median.

Figure 7: Social Mobility, Protest and Emigration
Heterogeneity Analysis - Institutions and Crime



(a) Aspiration to Migrate (b) Participate in Demonstration

Sources: Authors' elaboration on Latinobarómetro data (2002-2023). The dependent variable in Figure (a) is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent aspires to emigrate to a foreign country and 0 otherwise, while in Figure (b) it is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent participated in an authorized demonstration, and 0 otherwise. The Figures report the estimated coefficients for both positive and negative intergenerational educational mobility jointly estimated, with the 95% interval of confidence. All the results are displayed in Table C-4.

toward institutions. Therefore, in this last heterogeneity analysis, we explore whether confidence in institutions and security shapes the relationship between intergenerational mobility, aspiration to migrate, and protest. Specifically, we split the sample of individuals based on: (i) confidence in government (not confident vs. confident), (ii) confidence in political parties (not confident vs. confident), (iii) perception that the country is governed for the benefit of powerful people (contrary vs. affirmative), and (iv) being a crime victim (contrary vs. affirmative). Following the intuition of Hirschman (1970)'s framework, we should expect that higher confidence in institutions and security should translate into lower aspiration to migrate and protest.

Results presented in Figure 7 are aligned with this intuition, particularly regarding aspiration toward emigration. Figure 7(a) shows that individuals experiencing negative intergenerational mobility are substantially less likely to be willing to migrate (exit) if they report confidence in government, in political parties, or if they believe that the country is governed for the benefit of the people. Therefore, confidence in institutions substantially minimizes the willingness to migrate among those experiencing negative mobility. In contrast, attitudes toward political institutions do not influence individuals experiencing positive intergenerational mobility. As far as participation in demonstrations outcome is concerned, Figure 7(b) shows noisier and, in some cases, not statistically different from zero estimates for individuals experiencing negative intergenerational mobility when confident in political institutions (such as government or political parties). Lastly, being a victim of a crime is associated with a higher likelihood of participating in a demonstration, both among those who experienced negative and positive mobility.

Overall, this heterogeneity analysis, while confirming the robust relationship between intergenerational mobility (negative and positive) and both aspiration to migrate and participation in peaceful political demonstrations, also reveals that expectations, perceptions, and confidence in institutions are key factors shaping these relations, specifically the higher likelihood of emigrating and protesting among those experiencing negative intergenerational educational mobility.

5 Conclusions

Lack of equal economic opportunities across generations remains a persistent feature of the Latin American region (Neidhöfer et al., 2018), with important implications for development and economic growth (Neidhöfer et al., 2024). These structural conditions can also translate into broader social distress and discontent, which may manifest through expressions of dissatisfaction with the status quo, such as participation in political demonstrations or the aspiration to emigrate (Hirschman, 1970). Drawing on Latinobarómetro data, this paper provides evidence on these consequences of limited intergenerational mobility.

Our results show that individuals experiencing negative intergenerational educational mobility, therefore more likely having fewer economic opportunities than their parents (Adermon et al., 2026), are more likely to express a desire to emigrate and to participate in peaceful political demonstrations. Conversely, those experiencing upward mobility are less likely to do so. These findings highlight the role of unequal opportunities as a potential driver of both societal unrest and migration aspirations.

From a policy perspective, our analysis further reveals that limited equal opportunities cease to be a significant determinant of migration aspirations and protest participation when individuals express confidence in political institutions and hold positive expectations about their country's economic trajectory and their own future prospects. This suggests that policies aimed at expanding public investment in education, strengthening institutional trust and improving economic expectations may help mitigate the discontent generated by unequal opportunities.

While these descriptive results benefit from the breadth of countries and individuals covered over the past two decades, future research should rely on experimental or quasi-experimental designs to draw stronger causal conclusions regarding the relationship between intergenerational mobility, migration, and protest. Specifically, future studies should also seek to overcome some of the limitations acknowledged in this work. First, our measures of migration aspiration and protest participation rely on retrospective questions, which may be subject to recall bias and to a timing mismatch with the individual characteristics used in our heterogeneity analysis. While our age restriction (22–50) helps mitigate this concern, it should be kept in mind when interpreting the heterogeneity results, particularly those based on current economic conditions and expectations. Second, while the statistically significant correlation between the two decision processes (migration and protest) can be interpreted through the lens of Hirschman (1970)'s framework, our analysis cannot fully rule out alternative explanations, such as common unobserved individual traits or network embeddedness that independently drive both outcomes.

References

Abadie, A., Athey, S., Imbens, G. W., and Wooldridge, J. M. (2023). When should you adjust standard errors for clustering? *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 138(1):1–35.

Abel, G. J. and Sander, N. (2014). Quantifying global international migration flows. *Science*, 343(6178):1520–1522.

Acemoglu, D. and Robinson, J. A. (2006). *Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy*. Cambridge University Press.

Adermon, A., Brandén, G., and Nybom, M. (2026). The relationship between intergenerational mobility and equality of opportunity. *The Scandinavian Journal of Economics*, forthcoming.

Ahsan, M. N., Emran, M. S., Jiang, H., Han, Q., and Shilpi, F. (2023). Growing up together: Sibling correlation, parental influence, and intergenerational educational mobility in developing countries. *Policy Research Working Paper*, 10285.

Aidt, T. S. and Franck, R. (2015). Democratization under the threat of revolution: Evidence from the Great Reform Act of 1832. *Econometrica*, 83(2):505–547.

Aidt, T. S. and Franck, R. (2019). What motivates an oligarchic elite to democratize? Evidence from the roll call vote on the great Reform Act of 1832. *The Journal of Economic History*, 79(3):773–825.

Alesina, A., Di Tella, R., and MacCulloch, R. (2004). Inequality and Happiness: Are Europeans and Americans Different? *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 88(9–10):2009–2042.

Altonji, J. G., Elder, T. E., and Taber, C. R. (2005). Selection on observed and unobserved variables: Assessing the effectiveness of Catholic schools. *Journal of political economy*, 113(1):151–184.

Alvaredo, F. and Gasparini, L. (2015). Recent trends in inequality and poverty in developing countries. *Handbook of income distribution*, 2:697–805.

Ashok, V., Kuziemko, I., and Washington, E. (2015). Support for Redistribution in an Age of Rising Inequality: New Stylized Facts and Some Tentative Explanations. *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity*, pages 367–405.

Aslany, M., Carling, J., Mjelva, M. B., and Sommerfelt, T. (2021). Systematic review of determinants of migration aspirations. *Changes*, 1(18):3911–3927.

Bai, Y. and Jia, R. (2016). Elite recruitment and political stability: The impact of the abolition of China's civil service exam. *Econometrica*, 84(2):677–733.

Bargain, O., Jara, H. X., and Rivera, D. (2026). Social gaps, perceived inequality and protests. *World Development*, 199:107248.

Batista, C., Han, D., Haushofer, J., Khanna, G., McKenzie, D., Mobarak, A. M., Theoharides, C., and Yang, D. (2025). Brain drain or brain gain? Effects of high-skilled international emigration on origin countries. *Science*, 388(6749):eadr8861.

Becerra, D. (2012). The impact of anti-immigration policies and perceived discrimination in the United States on migration intentions among Mexican adolescents. *International Migration*, 50(4):20–32.

Becerra, D., Gurrola, M., Ayón, C., Androff, D., Krysik, J., Gerdes, K., Moya-Salas, L., and Segal, E. (2010). Poverty and other factors affecting migration intentions among adolescents in Mexico. *Journal of Poverty*, 14(1):1–16.

Becker, G. S. and Tomes, N. (1986). Human Capital and the Rise and Fall of Families. *Journal of Labor Economics*, 4(3):S1–S39.

Beine, M., Docquier, F., and Oden-Defoort, C. (2011). A panel data analysis of the brain gain. *World development*, 39(4):523–532.

Beine, M., Docquier, F., and Rapoport, H. (2008). Brain drain and human capital formation in developing countries: winners and losers. *The Economic Journal*, 118(528):631–652.

Beine, M., Machado, J., and Ruyssen, I. (2020). Do potential migrants internalize migrant rights in OECD host societies? *Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique*, 53(4):1429–1456.

Bekaert, E., Ruyssen, I., and Salomone, S. (2021). Domestic and international migration intentions in response to environmental stress: a global cross-country analysis. *Journal of Demographic Economics*, 87(3):383–436.

Benabou, R. and Ok, E. A. (2001). Social mobility and the demand for redistribution: the POUM hypothesis. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 116(2):447–487.

Bertoli, S., Moraga, J. F.-H., and Guichard, L. (2020). Rational inattention and migration decisions. *Journal of International Economics*, 126:103364.

Bertoli, S. and Ruyssen, I. (2018). Networks and migrants' intended destination. *Journal of Economic Geography*, 18(4):705–728.

Black, S. E. and Devereux, P. J. (2011). Recent Developments in Intergenerational Mobility. In *Handbook of Labor Economics*, volume 4B, pages 1487–1541. Elsevier.

Bocquier, P., Cha'Ngom, N., Docquier, F., and Machado, J. (2024). The within-country distribution of brain drain and brain gain effects: A case study on Senegal. *Journal of Demographic Economics*, 90(3):384–411.

Bodnaruk Jazayeri, K. (2016). Identity-based political inequality and protest: The dynamic relationship between political power and protest in the Middle East and North Africa. *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, 33(4):400–422.

Boix, C. (2003). *Democracy and redistribution*. Cambridge University Press.

Brannen, S. J., Haig, C. S., and Schmidt, K. (2020). The age of mass protests. *Understanding an escalating global trend*.

Bratti, M., Fiore, S., and Mendola, M. (2020). The impact of family size and sibling structure on the great Mexico–USA migration. *Journal of Population Economics*, 33(2):483–529.

Britto, D., Fonseca, A. d. A., Pinotti, P., Sampaio, B., and Warwar, L. (2022). Intergenerational Mobility in the Land of Inequality. *BAFFI CAREFIN Centre Research Paper No. 2022-186*.

Bénabou, R. (1996). Inequality and Growth. *NBER Macroeconomics Annual*, 11:11–74.

Campante, F. R. and Chor, D. (2012). Why was the Arab world poised for revolution? Schooling, economic opportunities, and the Arab Spring. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 26(2):167–88.

Cantoni, D., Heizlsperger, L.-J., Yang, D. Y., Yuchtman, N., and Zhang, Y. J. (2022). The fundamental determinants of protest participation: Evidence from Hong Kong's antiauthoritarian movement. *Journal of Public Economics*, 211:104667.

Cantoni, D., Kao, A., Yang, D. Y., and Yuchtman, N. (2024). Protests. *Annual Review of Economics*, 16.

Chetty, R. and Hendren, N. (2018a). The Impacts of Neighborhoods on Intergenerational Mobility I: Childhood Exposure Effects. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 133(3):1107–1162.

Chetty, R. and Hendren, N. (2018b). The Impacts of Neighborhoods on Intergenerational Mobility II: County-Level Estimates. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 133(3):1163–1228.

Chetty, R., Hendren, N., Kline, P., and Saez, E. (2014). Where is the land of opportunity? The geography of intergenerational mobility in the United States. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 129(4):1553–1623.

Chort, I. (2014). Mexican migrants to the US: what do unrealized migration intentions tell us about gender inequalities? *World Development*, 59:535–552.

Clemens, M. A. and Mendola, M. (2024). Migration from developing countries: Selection, income elasticity, and Simpson's paradox. *Journal of Development Economics*, 171:103359.

Corak, M. et al. (2017). Divided landscapes of economic opportunity: The Canadian geography of intergenerational income mobility.

Czaika, M. (2013). Are unequal societies more migratory? *Comparative Migration Studies*, 1(1):97–122.

Dalton, P. S., Ghosal, S., and Mani, A. (2016). Poverty and Aspirations Failure. *Economic Journal*, 126(590):165–188.

Dalton, R., Van Sickle, A., and Weldon, S. (2010). The individual–institutional nexus of protest behaviour. *British journal of political science*, 40(1):51–73.

Dao, T. H., Docquier, F., Parsons, C., and Peri, G. (2018). Migration and development: Dissecting the anatomy of the mobility transition. *Journal of Development Economics*, 132:88–101.

Docquier, F., Peri, G., and Ruyssen, I. (2014). The cross-country determinants of potential and actual migration. *International Migration Review*, 48:S37–S99.

Docquier, F., Tansel, A., and Turati, R. (2020). Do emigrants self-select along cultural traits? Evidence from the MENA countries. *International Migration Review*, 54(2):388–422.

Donni, P. L., Marino, M., and Welzel, C. (2021). How important is culture to understand political protest? *World Development*, 148:105661.

Dubrow, J. K., Slomczynski, K. M., and Tomescu-Dubrow, I. (2008). Effects of democracy and inequality on soft political protest in Europe: Exploring the European social survey data. *International Journal of Sociology*, 38(3):36–51.

Dunn, C. E. (2007). The intergenerational transmission of lifetime earnings: Evidence from Brazil. *The BE Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy*, 7(2).

Dustmann, C. and Okatenko, A. (2014). Out-migration, wealth constraints, and the quality of local amenities. *Journal of Development Economics*, 110:52–63.

Ferreira, S. G. and Veloso, F. A. (2006). Intergenerational mobility of wages in Brazil. *Brazilian Review of Econometrics*, 26(2):181–211.

Frigo, A. and Lodigiani, E. (2025). For children's sake: the effects of child abuse scandals on migration aspirations. *Journal of Economic Geography*, page lbaf013.

Genicot, G. and Ray, D. (2017). Aspirations and Inequality. *Econometrica*, 85(7):489–519.

Gomez-Ruiz, M., Donni, P. L., and Marino, M. (2025a). Dynamics of protest: Understanding violent and nonviolent protest in Africa. *European Journal of Political Economy*, page 102745.

Gomez-Ruiz, M., Li Donni, P., and Marino, M. (2025b). Dynamics of Protest: Understanding Violent and Nonviolent Protest in Africa. *European Journal of Political Economy*, 90:102745.

Gonzalez-Ocantos, E. and Oliveros, V. (2019). Clientelism in Latin American Politics. In *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics*. Oxford University Press.

Grogger, J. and Hanson, G. H. (2011). Income maximization and the selection and sorting of international migrants. *Journal of Development Economics*, 95(1):42–57.

Gugushvili, A., McKee, M., Murphy, M., Azarova, A., Irdam, D., Doniec, K., and King, L. (2018). Intergenerational Mobility in Relative Educational Attainment and Health-Related Behaviours. *Social Indicators Research*, 141(1):413–441.

Hanson, G. H. and McIntosh, C. (2010). The great mexican emigration. *the Review of Economics and Statistics*, 92(4):798–810.

Hellevik, O. (2009). Linear versus logistic regression when the dependent variable is a dichotomy. *Quality & quantity*, 43(1):59–74.

Hertz, T., Jayasundera, T., Piraino, P., Selcuk, S., Smith, N., and Verashchagina, A. (2008). The inheritance of educational inequality: International comparisons and fifty-year trends. *The BE Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy*, 7(2).

Hicken, A. (2011). Clientelism. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 14:289–310.

Hillesund, S. (2023). Horizontal Inequalities, Political Violence, and Nonviolent Conflict Mobilization: A Review of the Literature. *Journal of Economic Surveys*.

Hirschman, A. O. (1970). *Exit, voice, and loyalty: Responses to decline in firms, organizations, and states*. Harvard university press.

Hirschman, A. O. and Rothschild, M. (1973). The changing tolerance for income inequality in the course of economic development: With a mathematical appendix. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 87(4):544–566.

Houle, C. and Miller, M. K. (2019). Social mobility and democratic attitudes: Evidence from Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa. *Comparative Political Studies*, 52(11):1610–1647.

Jaschke, P., Sardoschau, S., and Tabellini, M. (2022). Scared straight? Threat and assimilation of refugees in Germany. *National Bureau of Economic Research*, w30381:1–55.

Justino, P. and Martorano, B. (2019). Redistributive preferences and protests in latin america. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 63(9):2128–2154.

Karadja, M. and Prawitz, E. (2019). Exit, voice, and political change: Evidence from Swedish mass migration to the United States. *Journal of Political Economy*, 127(4):1864–1925.

Kenworthy, L. and McCall, L. (2008). Inequality, public opinion and redistribution. *Socio-Economic Review*, 6(1):35–68.

Kurer, T., Häusermann, S., Wüest, B., and Enggist, M. (2019). Economic grievances and political protest. *European Journal of Political Research*, 58(3):866–892.

Latinobarómetro (2024). Estudio Latinobarómetro 2024-1996. Corporación Latinobarómetro: Oleada 2024-1996 - Versión agregada: https://www.latinobarometro.org/latinobarometro-2024 . Madrid: JD Systems Institute.

Leites, M., Ramos, X., and Vilá, J. (2025). Intergenerational mobility across the income distribution: Estimates from administrative records for a developing country. *unpublished manuscript*.

Lichbach, M. I. (1989). An evaluation of "does economic inequality breed political conflict?" studies. *World politics*, 41(4):431–470.

Lustig, N., Lopez-Calva, L. F., and Ortiz-Juarez, E. (2013). Declining inequality in Latin America in the 2000s: The cases of Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico. *World development*, 44:129–141.

Machado, F., Scartascini, C., and Tommasi, M. (2011). Political institutions and street protests in Latin America. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 55(3):340–365.

Marino, M., Donni, P. L., Bavetta, S., and Cellini, M. (2020). The democratization process: An empirical appraisal of the role of political protest. *European Journal of Political Economy*, 63:101881.

McKenzie, D. and Rapoport, H. (2011). Can migration reduce educational attainment? Evidence from Mexico. *Journal of population economics*, 24(4):1331–1358.

Meltzer, A. H. and Richard, S. F. (1981). A rational theory of the size of government. *Journal of political Economy*, 89(5):914–927.

Migali, S. and Scipioni, M. (2019). Who's about to leave? A global survey of aspirations and intentions to migrate. *International Migration*, 57(5):181–200.

Monroy-Gómez-Franco, L. and Corak, M. (2020). A land of unequal chances: Social mobility across Mexican regions. *Documento de trabajo CEEY*, (10).

Neidhöfer, G. (2019). Intergenerational mobility and the rise and fall of inequality: Lessons from Latin America. *The Journal of Economic Inequality*, 17(4):499–520.

Neidhöfer, G., Ciaschi, M., Gasparini, L., and Serrano, J. (2024). Social mobility and economic development. *Journal of Economic Growth*, 29(2):327–359.

Neidhöfer, G., Serrano, J., and Gasparini, L. (2018). Educational inequality and intergenerational mobility in Latin America: A new database. *Journal of Development Economics*, 134:329–349.

Nuñez, J. I. and Miranda, L. (2010). Intergenerational income mobility in a less-developed, high-inequality context: The case of Chile. *The BE Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy*, 10(1).

Opp, K.-D. (2016). Exit, voice and the impact of regional, national and European identification. *Dynamics of National Identity: Media and Societal Factors of What We Are*, 167:115.

Oster, E. (2019). Unobservable selection and coefficient stability: Theory and evidence. *Journal of Business & Economic Statistics*, 37(2):187–204.

Özden, Ç., Parsons, C. R., Schiff, M., and Walmsley, T. L. (2011). Where on earth is everybody? The evolution of global bilateral migration 1960–2000. *The World Bank Economic Review*, 25(1):12–56.

Paul, A. M. (2011). Stepwise international migration: A multistage migration pattern for the aspiring migrant. *American Journal of Sociology*, 116(6):1842–1886.

Pfaff, S. and Kim, H. (2003). Exit-voice dynamics in collective action: An analysis of emigration and protest in the East German revolution. *American Journal of Sociology*, 109(2):401–444.

Phan, D. and Coxhead, I. (2010). Inter-provincial migration and inequality during Vietnam's transition. *Journal of Development Economics*, 91(1):100–112.

Piketty, T. (1995). Social mobility and redistributive politics. *The Quarterly journal of economics*, 110(3):551–584.

Ponticelli, J. and Voth, H.-J. (2020). Austerity and anarchy: Budget cuts and social unrest in Europe, 1919–2008. *Journal of Comparative Economics*, 48(1):1–19.

Portes, A. and Zhou, M. (2025). Segmented assimilation: some reflections on a three-decade concept. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 48(8):1642–1650.

Ray, D. (2006). Aspirations, Poverty, and Economic Change. In *Handbook of Development Economics*, pages 409–422. Elsevier.

Robinson, J. A. and Verdier, T. (2013). The Political Economy of Clientelism. *The Scandinavian Journal of Economics*, 115(2):260–291.

Rodon, T. and Guinjoan, M. (2018). Mind the protest gap: The role of resources in the face of economic hardship. *Political Science & Politics*, 51(1):84–92.

Roodman, D. (2011). Fitting fully observed recursive mixed-process models with cmp. *The Stata Journal*, 11(2):159–206.

Roth, C. and Wohlfart, J. (2018). Experienced inequality and preferences for redistribution. *Journal of Public Economics*, 167:251–262.

Rüdig, W. and Karyotis, G. (2014). Who protests in Greece? Mass opposition to austerity. *British Journal of Political Science*, pages 487–513.

Ruyssen, I. and Salomone, S. (2018). Female migration: A way out of discrimination? *Journal of Development Economics*, 130:224–241.

Solt, F. (2015). Economic inequality and nonviolent protest. *Social Science Quarterly*, 96(5):1314–1327.

Stantcheva, S. (2024). Perceptions and preferences for redistribution. *Oxford Open Economics*, 3(Supplement_1):i96–i100.

Stark, O. (2006). Inequality and migration: A behavioral link. *Economics Letters*, 91(1):146–152.

Teorell, J. (2010). *Determinants of democratization: Explaining regime change in the world, 1972–2006*. Cambridge University Press.

Torche, F. (2010). Cambio y persistencia de la movilidad intergeneracional en México. In Torche, F. and Serrano, J., editors, *Movilidad social en México: Población, desarrollo y crecimiento*, chapter 2. Centro de Estudios Espinosa Yglesias Mexico City.

Wahba, J. (2015). Selection, selection, selection: the impact of return migration. *Journal of Population Economics*, 28(3):535–563.

Welzel, C. and Deutsch, F. (2012). Emancipative values and non-violent protest: The importance of 'ecological'effects. *British Journal of Political Science*, 42(2):465–479.

Wood, C. H., Gibson, C. L., Ribeiro, L., and Hamsho-Diaz, P. (2010). Crime victimization in Latin America and intentions to migrate to the United States. *International Migration Review*, 44(1):3–24.

Social mobility, Protests, and Migration: Evidence from Latin American Countries

Maria Marino, Xavier Ramos, and Riccardo Turati

Appendix – For Online Publication

A Sample and Descriptive Statistics

Table A-1: Variables Definition

Variable	Definition
Panel A – Outcome Variables	
Migration Aspir.	=1 if respondent (or family) has ever considered living abroad
Participate Demonstration	=1 if respondent has ever participated in an authorized demonstration
Participate Unauthor. Protests	=1 if respondent has ever participated in unauthorized demonstrations
Occupy Land or Buildings	=1 if respondent has ever occupied land, buildings, or factories
Participate Riots	=1 if respondent has ever participated in riots
Panel B – Social Mobility	
Social Mobility	Difference between respondent's completed years of education and parent's completed years of education (ranges from −15 to +15)
$Social\ Mobility^{+}$	=1 if respondent experienced positive intergenerational educational mobility (i.e., Social Mobility > 0)
$Social\ Mobility^{-}$	=1 if respondent experienced negative intergenerational educational mobility (i.e., Social Mobility < 0)
$Social\ Mobility\ Inc.^{+}$	=1 if respondent's income class exceeds parent's income class
$Social\ Mobility\ Inc.^{-}$	=1 if respondent's income class is below parent's income class
Panel C – Individual Controls	
Age	Respondent's age in completed years (sample restricted to ages 22–50)
Female	=1 if respondent is female
Head Household	=1 if respondent is the head of the household
City Size	Categorical variable (1–8) for the size of the municipality of residence
Highly Educated	=1 if respondent has completed more than 12 years of education
Employed	=1 if respondent is employed as a salaried worker or self-employed
Catholic	=1 if respondent identifies as Catholic
$Wealth_I$	First principal component of a PCA over five binary indicators of household asset ownership: washing machine, telephone, car, sewage connection, and hot water
Subjective Inc.	=1 if respondent considers their income sufficient to cover basic needs
Panel D – Attitudes and Beliefs Controls	
Sat. Democracy	=1 if respondent is very or rather satisfied with democracy
Sat. Economy	=1 if respondent is very or rather satisfied with the market economy
Trust	=1 if respondent believes most people can be trusted
Confidence Gov.	=1 if respondent has a lot or some confidence in the government
Confidence Parties	=1 if respondent has a lot or some confidence in political parties
Crime Victim	=1 if respondent or a family member has been a victim of crime
Country Economy	=1 if respondent rates the current country economic situation as good or very good

Source: All variables are constructed from the Latinobarómetro survey waves 2002, 2003, 2005–2008, 2015, 2020, and 2023. The sample is restricted to citizens aged 22–50.

Figure A-1: Exit, Voice and Loyalty
Graphical Formalization



Sources: Authors' elaboration. The solid line represents the migration decision process: above the solid line individuals emigrate (exit), while below they stay in the country. The dashed line represents the protest decision: above the dashed line individuals manifest their discontent (voice), while below they remain loyal.

Figure A-2: Social Mobility, Protest and Emigration
Geographic Distribution



(a) Aspiration to Migrate



(b) Participate in Demonstration



(c) Social Mobility: Positive



(d) Social Mobility: Negative

Sources: Authors' elaboration on Latinobarómetro data (2002-2023). The figure plots the average share of aspiring migrants (a), of participants to authorized demonstration (b), of individuals with positive social mobility on education (c) and negative social mobility on education (d).

Figure A-3: Protest and Emigration
Correlation with Alternative Data Sources



(a) Migration Intentions



(b) Protest Participation

Sources: Authors' elaboration on Latinobarómetro data (2002-2023), Gallup World Polls (2010-2016), and Social Conflict Analysis Database (2002-2020). Figure (a) shows the correlation between the average share of individuals willing to migrate from the Gallup World Polls (x-axis) and the Latinobarómetro (y-axis). Figure (b) shows the correlation between the sum of peaceful demonstrations from the Social Conflict Analysis Database (x-axis) and the average share of respondents participating to demonstration from Latinobarómetro (y-axis).

Figure A-4: Social Mobility, Protest and Emigration
Raw Country-Specific Correlations



(a) Aspiration to Migrate and Positive Social Mobility



(b) Aspiration to Migrate and Negative Social Mobility



(c) Participation to Demonstration and Positive Social Mobility



(d) Participation to Demonstration and Negative Social Mobility

Sources: Authors' elaboration on Latinobarómetro data (2002-2023). The figure plots the raw country-year correlation between: (a) share of aspiring migrants and share of individuals with positive intergenerational mobility, (b) share of aspiring migrants and share of individuals with negative intergenerational mobility, (c) share of individuals participating to authorized demonstrations and share of individuals with positive intergenerational mobility, and (d) share of individuals participating to authorized demonstrations and share of individuals with negative intergenerational mobility.

Figure A-5: Years of Completed Education - Distribution



Sources: Authors' elaboration on Latinobarómetro data (2002-2023). The figure presents the distribution of years of completed education for survey's respondents, as well as for their parent

B Additional Robustness Checks

Table B-1: Social Mobility, Protest and Emigration
Standardized Linear Probability Model, with LASSO-Selected Variables

	Full Vector Variables		Lasso-Selected Variables	
	(1) Migration Aspir.	(2) Participate Demon.	(3) Migration Aspir.	(4) Participate Demon.
Social Mobility^{+}	–0.009***	0.000	–0.009***	
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	
Social Mobility^{-}	0.009***	0.006**	0.009***	0.006**
	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Age	–0.027***	0.010***	–0.027***	0.010***
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)
Female	–0.009***	–0.007***	–0.008***	–0.007***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Head Household	0.019***	0.001	0.019***	
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	
City Size	0.025***	0.000	0.025***	
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	
Highly Educated	0.024***	0.031***	0.024***	0.031***
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)
Employed	–0.001	0.008***	–0.001	0.008***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Catholic	–0.010***	–0.008***	–0.010***	–0.008***
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)
$Wealth_I$	0.044***	0.010***	0.044***	0.010***
	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.003)
Subjective Inc.	–0.018***	–0.002	–0.018***	–0.002
	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.001)
Sat. Democracy	–0.009***	0.000	–0.009***	
	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.003)	
Sat. Economy	–0.004	0.003	–0.004*	0.003
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Trust	–0.002	0.008***		0.008***
	(0.002)	(0.002)		(0.002)
Confidence Gov.	–0.013***	0.004**	–0.013***	0.004**
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)
Confidence Parties	–0.001	0.011***	–0.002	0.011***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Crime Victim	0.035***	0.021***	0.035***	0.021***
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)
Country Economy	–0.006***	0.002	–0.006***	0.002
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Observations	80098	80098	80098	80098
Countries	18	18	18	18
Country-year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Sources: Authors' elaboration on Latinobarómetro data (2002-2023). Notes: *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p < 0.1. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the country level. The dependent variable in Col. (1) and (3) is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent aspires to emigrate to a foreign country and 0 otherwise. The dependent variable in Col. (2) and (4) is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent participated in an authorized demonstration, and 0 otherwise. All estimates include country-by-year fixed effects, and rely on survey-weights. Col. (1) to (4) report the results from Linear Probability Models (LPM). Standardized coefficients are reported.

C Heterogeneity Analysis - Additional Results

Table C-1: Social Mobility, Protest and Emigration
Heterogeneity Analysis - Sociodemographic Characteristics

	Gender		Education		Age		Household Head		Municipality Size		Parent Education	
	(1) Male	(2) Female	(3) Not Highly Educated	(4) Highly Educated	(5) Less than 34	(6) Older than 34	(7) Not Household Head	(8) Household Head	(9) Small than 100,000	(10) Large City	(11) Parent Not Highly Educated	(12) Parent Highly Educated
Panel A - Migration Asp.												
Social Mobility^{+}	–0.018**	–0.019***	–0.007	–0.038***	–0.016**	–0.021**	–0.026***	–0.012	–0.007	–0.028***	–0.007	0.012
	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.010)
Social Mobility^{-}	0.024***	0.026***	0.028***	0.033**	0.037***	0.011	0.022***	0.027***	0.040***	0.015*	–0.002	0.036***
	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.012)	(0.006)	(0.010)	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.012)
Observations	38938	41160	47360	32738	42097	38001	38452	41646	40354	39744	64917	15181
Countries	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18
Country-year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Ind. Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Panel B - Participate Dem.												
Social Mobility^{+}	0.003	–0.001	0.010	–0.017*	–0.003	0.004	–0.001	0.003	0.009	–0.006	0.010	0.023**
	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.009)
Social Mobility^{-}	0.014	0.023**	0.023**	0.018	0.016	0.023**	0.020*	0.017**	0.021**	0.016	0.012	0.015
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.012)
Observations	38938	41160	47360	32738	42097	38001	38452	41646	40354	39744	64917	15181
Countries	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18
Country-year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Ind. Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Sources: Authors' elaboration on Latinobarómetro data (2002-2023). Notes: *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p < 0.1. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the country or regional level. The dependent variable in Panel A is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent aspires to emigrate to a foreign country and 0 otherwise, while in Panel B is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent participated to an authorized demonstration, and 0 otherwise. All estimates include country-by-year fixed effects, and individual level controls as described in equations (1) and (2), and relies on survey-weights. Each column provides the analysis on a distinctive subsample of individuals, based on their sociodemographic characteristics: (1) men, (2) women, (3) less than 12 years of education, (4) more than 12 years of education, (5) less than 34 or 34 y.o., (6) older than 34 y.o., (7) not being household head, (8) being household head, (9) living in a municipality with less than 100,000 inhabitants, (10) living in a city with more than 100,000 inhabitants, (11) highest educ. parents with less than 12 years of education and (12) highest educ. parents with more than 12 years of education. .

Table C-2: Social Mobility, Protest and Emigration
Heterogeneity Analysis - Economic Conditions

	Subj. Income		Employment		Job Concerns		Perceived Status		Wealth Index	
	(1) Insufficient	(2) Sufficient	(3) Unemp-loyed	(4) Emp-loyed	(5) Concerned Loosing	(6) Not Concerned Loosing	(7) Low Stauts	(8) High Status	(9) Below Median	(10) Above Median
Panel A - Migration Asp.										
Social Mobility^{+}	–0.010	–0.032***	–0.011	–0.023***	–0.023***	–0.015*	–0.009*	–0.027***	–0.006	–0.029***
	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Social Mobility^{-}	0.031***	0.018***	0.022***	0.027***	0.021***	0.033***	0.023***	0.030***	0.030***	0.024***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Observations	43397	36701	26899	53199	43194	36132	40568	39530	40496	39602
Countries	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18
Country-year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Ind. Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Panel B - Participate Dem.										
Social Mobility^{+}	0.007	–0.008*	0.001	0.001	–0.002	0.003	0.009	–0.006	0.013**	–0.010
	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)
Social Mobility^{-}	0.021**	0.015	0.022**	0.018**	0.022**	0.014	0.017**	0.021*	0.021**	0.019*
	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.007)	(0.010)
Observations	43397	36701	26899	53199	43194	36132	40568	39530	40496	39602
Countries	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18
Country-year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Ind. Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Sources: Authors' elaboration on Latinobarómetro data (2002-2023). Notes: *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p < 0.1. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the country or regional level. The dependent variable in Panel A is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent aspires to emigrate to a foreign country and 0 otherwise, while in Panel B is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent participated to an authorized demonstration, and 0 otherwise. All estimates include country-by-year fixed effects, and individual level controls as described in equations (1) and (2), and relies on survey-weights. Each column provides the analysis on a distinctive subsample of individuals, based on their economic conditions: (1) having insufficient subjective income, (2) having sufficient subjective income, (3) being unemployed, (4) being employed, (5) concerned of loosing the job, (6) not concerned of loosing the job, (7) perceive themselves as belonging to a low socioeconomic status, (8) perceive themselves as belonging to a high socioeconomic status, (9) having a wealth index below the sample median, and (10) having a wealth index above the sample median.

Table C-3: Social Mobility, Protest and Emigration Heterogeneity Analysis - Expectations and Perceptions

	Country Future Econ. Exp.		Personal Future Econ. Exp.		Children Future		Income Distribution		Freedom Index	
	(1) Worse Off	(2) Better Off	(3) Worse Off	(4) Better Off	(5) Will Not Live Better	(6) Will Live Better	(7) Unfair Distribution	(8) Fair Distribution	(9) Low Value	(10) High Value
Panel A - Migration Asp.										
Social Mobility^{+}	–0.015**	–0.027***	–0.018*	–0.024***	–0.008	–0.017*	–0.012*	–0.029**	–0.016*	–0.019***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.012)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.013)	(0.009)	(0.006)
Social Mobility^{-}	0.032***	0.016	0.031***	0.018**	0.033*	0.017	0.023***	0.063***	0.054***	0.015**
	(0.006)	(0.011)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.017)	(0.011)	(0.006)	(0.019)	(0.010)	(0.007)
Observations	47951	27495	37248	38683	13264	17421	35570	8518	24056	56042
Countries	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18
Country-year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Ind. Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Panel B - Participate Dem.										
Social Mobility^{+}	0.003	–0.003	0.002	–0.003	0.009	0.009	–0.004	0.014	–0.004	0.003
	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Social Mobility^{-}	0.020***	0.017	0.020***	0.017	0.031**	0.022*	0.024**	0.012	0.016*	0.020**
	(0.007)	(0.014)	(0.006)	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.011)	(0.008)	(0.012)	(0.008)	(0.009)
Observations	47951	27495	37248	38683	13264	17421	35570	8518	24056	56042
Countries	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18
Country-year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Ind. Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Sources: Authors' elaboration on Latinobarómetro data (2002-2023). Notes: *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p < 0.1. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the country or regional level. The dependent variable in Panel A is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent aspires to emigrate to a foreign country and 0 otherwise, while in Panel B is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent participated to an authorized demonstration, and 0 otherwise. All estimates include country-by-year fixed effects, and individual level controls as described in equations (1) and (2), and relies on survey-weights. Each column provides the analysis on a distinctive subsample of individuals, based on their expectations and perceptions: (1) expecting that country future economic expectations will be worse, (2) expecting that country future economic expectations will be better off, (3) expecting that personal future economic expectations will be worse, (4) expecting that personal future economic expectations will be better off, (5) expecting that current children will not live in better future conditions, (6) expecting that current children will live in better future conditions, (7) believe that country is characterized by an unfair income distribution, (8) believe that country is characterized by a fair income distribution, (9) having a freedom index below the median level, and (10) having a freedom index above the median level.

Table C-4: Social Mobility, Protest and Emigration Heterogeneity Analysis - Institutions and Crime

	Confidence Government		Confidence Political Parties		Who benefit from Gov.		Crime Exp.	
	(1) No Confidence	(2) Confident	(3) No Confidence	(4) Confident	(5) Powerful People	(6) Not Powerful People	(7) Not Victim	(8) Crime Victim
Panel A - Migration Asp.								
Social Mobility^{+}	–0.016**	–0.025***	–0.018***	–0.020*	–0.024***	–0.017*	–0.013**	–0.028***
	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.011)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.008)
Social Mobility^{-}	0.032***	0.014	0.032***	0.003	0.036***	0.014	0.025***	0.025***
	(0.005)	(0.010)	(0.005)	(0.015)	(0.007)	(0.014)	(0.006)	(0.008)
Observations	53937	26161	66646	13452	47015	15188	48251	31847
Countries	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18
Country-year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Ind. Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Panel B - Participate Dem.								
Social Mobility^{+}	0.004	–0.007	0.002	–0.006	–0.003	–0.007	0.007	–0.007
	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.009)	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.007)
Social Mobility^{-}	0.021**	0.015	0.021**	0.007	0.013*	0.013	0.012	0.028**
	(0.007)	(0.014)	(0.007)	(0.015)	(0.007)	(0.015)	(0.007)	(0.011)
Observations	53937	26161	66646	13452	47015	15188	48251	31847
Countries	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18
Country-year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Ind. Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Sources: Authors' elaboration on Latinobarómetro data (2002-2023). Notes: *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p < 0.1. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the country or regional level. The dependent variable in Panel A is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent aspires to emigrate to a foreign country and 0 otherwise, while in Panel B is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent participated to an authorized demonstration, and 0 otherwise. All estimates include country-by-year fixed effects, and individual level controls as described in equations (1) and (2), and relies on survey-weights. Each column provides the analysis on a distinctive subsample of individuals, based on their attitudes towards political institutions and experience of crime: (1) no confidence in the government, (2) confident in the government, (3) no confidence in political parties, (4) confident in political parties, (5) believe that country is governed for the benefit of powerful people, (6) believe that country is governed for the benefit of people in general, (7) being victim of crime, and (8) not being victim of crime.