Electoral competition through issue selection
Aragonès, Enriqueta
Castanheira, Micael
Giani, Marco
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica

Fecha: 2012
Descripción: 37 p.
Resumen: Politics must tackle multiple issues at once. In a first-best world, political competition constrains parties to prioritize issues according to the voters' true concerns. In the real world, the opposite also happens: parties manipulate voter priorities by emphasizing issues selectively during the political campaign. This phenomenon, known as priming, should allow parties to pay less attention to the issues that they intend to mute. We develop a model of endogenous issue ownership in which two vote-seeking parties (i) invest to attract voters with "better" policy proposals and (ii) choose a communication campaign to focus voter attention on specific issues. We identify novel feedbacks between communication and investment. In particular, we find that stronger priming effects can backfire by constraining parties to invest more resources in all issues, including the ones they would otherwise intend to mute. We also identify under which conditions parties prefer to focus on their "historical issues" or to engage in issue stealing. Typically, the latter happens when priming effects are strong, and historical reputations differentiates parties less.
Derechos: Tots els drets reservats
Lengua: Anglès.
Colección: Working papers
Colección: Working papers ; 903.12
Documento: workingPaper
Materia: Party strategy ; Salience ; Issue selection and ownership ; Priming

Adreça alternativa: https://hdl.handle.net/2072/204092

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Documentos de investigación > Working papers > Unidad de Fundamentos del Análisis Ecocómico. Documentos de trabajo

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