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| Pàgina inicial > Documents de recerca > Working papers > Efficient and stable collective choices under crowding preferences |
(Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica)| Publicació: | [S.l.] : Centre de Referencia en Economia Analítica, 2004 |
| Descripció: | 29 p. |
| Resum: | We consider a set of agents who have to choose one alternative among a finite set of social alternatives. A final allocation is a pair given by the selected alternative and the group of its users. Agents have crowding preferences over allocations: between any pair of allocations with the same alternative, they prefer the allocation with the largest number of users. We require that a decision be efficient and stable (which guarantees free participation in the group of users and free exit from it). We propose a two-stage sequential mechanism whose unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome is an efficient and stable allocation which also satisfies a maximal participation property. The social choice function implemented by the proposed mechanism is also anonymous and group stable. |
| Drets: | Tots els drets reservats.  |
| Llengua: | Anglès |
| Col·lecció: | Barcelona economics working papers series; 148 |
| Document: | Working paper |
| Matèria: | Béns públics ; Public goods ; Crowding preferences ; Subgame perfect implementation |
