Strategy-proof voting on compact ranges
Barberà, Salvador, 1946- (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica)
Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica)
Serizawa, Shigehiro (Shiga University. Departament of Economics)

Data:	1998
Resum:	Strategy-proof social choice functions are characterized for societies where the space of alternatives is any full dimensional compact subset of a Euclidean space and all voters have generalized single-peaked preferences. Our results build upon and extend those obtained for cartesian product ranges by Border and Jordan (1983). By admitting a large set of non-cartesian ranges, we give a partial answer to the major open question left unresolved in this pioneering article. We prove that our class is composed by generalized median voter schemes which satisfy an additional condition, called the intersection property (Barberà, Massó, and Neme (1997).
Nota:	Altres ajuts: DGICYT/PB92-0590
Nota:	Altres ajuts: CIRIT/GRQ93-2044
Drets:	Tots els drets reservats.
Llengua:	Anglès
Document:	Article ; recerca ; Versió sotmesa a revisió
Publicat a:	Games and economic behavior, Vol. 25 Núm. 2 (1998) , p. 272-291, ISSN 0899-8256

DOI: 10.1006/game.1997.0643

Preprint 23 p, 252.6 KB

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