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An undominated Nash equilibrium for voting by committees with exit
Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d’Economia i d’Història Econòmica)
Neme, Alejandro (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina))
Berga, Dolors (Universitat de Girona. Departament d’Economia)
Bergantiños Cid, Gustavo (Universidade de Vigo)

Data: 2007
Resum: We consider the problem of a society whose members choose, with a voting by committees, a subset of new members from a given set of candidates. After knowing the elected candidates, former members may decide either stay or exit the society. We analyze the voting behavior of members who take into account the effect of their votes not only on the elected candidates, but also on the final composition of the society. For additive and monotonic preferences with dichotomous bads we construct a strategy profile that is an undominated pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the induced voting game.
Drets: Tots els drets reservats
Llengua: Anglès
Document: article ; recerca ; submittedVersion
Matèria: Voting ; Committees ; Undominated Nash Equilibrium
Publicat a: Mathematical social sciences, Vol. 54 Núm. 2 (September 2007) , p. 152-175, ISSN 0165-4896

DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2007.03.004

32 p, 277.3 KB

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