Stability and voting by committees with exit
Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica)
Neme, Alejandro (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina))
Berga, Dolors (Universitat de Girona. Departament d'Economia)
Bergantiños, Gustavo (Universidade de Vigo)

Data:	2004
Resum:	We study the problem of a society choosing a subset of new members from a finite set of candidates (as in Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou, 1991). However, we explicitly consider the possibility that initial members of the society (founders) may want to leave it if they do not like the resulting new society. We show that, if founders have separable (or additive) preferences, the unique strategy-proof and stable social choice function satisfying founder's sovereignty (on the set of candidates) is the one where candidates are chosen unanimously and no founder leaves the society.
Ajuts:	Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación BEC2002-04102-C02-01 Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación AGL2001-2333-C02-01 Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación BEC2002-02130 Agència de Gestió d'Ajuts Universitaris i de Recerca 2001-SGR-00162
Nota:	James Schummer, and Tayfun Sönmez for their helpful comments and suggestions. The work of D. Berga, G. Bergantiños, and J. Massó is partially supported by Research Grants AGL2001-2333-C02-01, BEC2002-04102-C02-01, and BEC2002-02130 from the Spanish Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología, respectively. The work of A. Neme is partially supported by Research Grant 319502 from the Universidad Nacional de San Luis. The work of D. Berga is also partially supported by Research Grant 9101100 from the Universitat de Girona. The work of G. Bergantiños is also partially supported by Research Grant PGIDT00PXI30001PN from the Xunta de Galicia. The work of J. Massó is also partially supported by Research Grant 2001SGR-00162 from the Generalitat de Catalunya. The paper was partially written while A. Neme was visiting the UAB under a sabbatical fellowship from the Generalitat de Catalunya
Nota:	Altres ajuts: PGIDT00PXI30001PN
Nota:	Altres ajuts: UdG/9101100
Drets:	Tots els drets reservats.
Llengua:	Anglès
Document:	Article ; recerca ; Versió sotmesa a revisió
Matèria:	Vot ; Models matemàtics ; Elecció social
Publicat a:	Social choice and welfare, Vol. 23 Núm. 2 (October 2004) , p. 229-247, ISSN 0176-1714

DOI: 10.1007/s00355-003-0246-6

Preprint 32 p, 305.8 KB

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