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On cost sharing in the provision of a binary and excludable public good
Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica)
Nicolò, Antonio (University of Manchester. School of Social Sciences)
Sen, Arunava (Indian Statistical Institute)
Sharma, Tridib (Centro de Investigación Económica (México))
Ülkü, Levent (Centro de Investigación Económica (México))

Data: 2014
Resum: We study efficiency and fairness properties of the equal cost sharing with maximal participation (ECSMP) mechanism in the provision of a binary and excludable public good. According to the maximal welfare loss criterion, the ECSMP is optimal within the class of strategyproof, individually rational and no-deficit mechanisms only when there are two agents. In general the ECSMP mechanism is not optimal: we provide a class of mechanisms obtained by symmetric perturbations of ECSMP with strictly lower maximal welfare loss. We show that if one of two possible fairness conditions is additionally imposed, the ECSMP mechanism becomes optimal.
Nota: We thank María Angeles de Frutos, Rajat Deb, Emilio Gutiérrez, Rich McLean, Hervé Moulin, and William Thomson for their comments. We are especially grateful to Shinji Ohseto for his comments and helpful suggestions. We are grateful to an Associate Editor and three referees of this journal for many invaluable comments and suggestions. Jordi Massó acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centers of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2011-0075) and FEDER grant ECO2008-04756 (Grupo Consilidado-C), and from the Generalitat de Catalunya, through the prize "ICREA Academia" for excellence in research and grant SGR2009-419. Antonio Nicolò’s work is partially supported by the project "Intelligent Preference reasoning for multi-agent decision making" (Univ. of Padua).
Nota: Número d'acord de subvenció MINECO/ECO2008-04756
Nota: Número d'acord de subvenció SEV-2011-0075
Nota: Número d'acord de subvenció SGR2009-419
Drets: Tots els drets reservats
Llengua: Anglès
Document: article ; recerca ; submittedVersion
Matèria: Economia matemàtica ; Binary public good ; Excludability ; Equal cost sharing ; Maximal welfare loss
Publicat a: Journal of economic theory, Vol. 155 (January 2014) , p. 30-49, ISSN 0022-0531

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2014.11.003

33 p, 477.2 KB

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