Publicación: |
Universitat Pompeu Fabra 2015 |
Resumen: |
Before the advent of sophisticated international financial markets, the widely accepted belief was that within a monetary union, a union-wide authority orchestrating fiscal transfers between countries is necessary to provide adequate insurance against country-specific economic fluctuations. This belief prompts a question: Do sophisticated international financial markets obviate the need for such an active union-wide authority? We argue that they do. Specifically, we show that in a benchmark economy with no international financial markets, an activist union-wide authority is necessary to achieve desirable outcomes. With sophisticated financial markets, however, such an authority is unnecessary if its only goal is to provide cross-country insurance. Since restricting the set of policy instruments available to member countries does not create a social externality across them, this result holds in a wide variety of settings. Finally, we establish that an activist union-wide authority concerned just with providing insurance across member countries is needed only when individual countries are either unable or unwilling to pursue desirable policies. |
Resumen: |
The ADEMU Working Paper Series is being supported by the European Commission Horizon 2020 European Union funding for Research & Innovation, grant agreement No 649396. |
Ayudas: |
European Commission 649396
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Derechos: |
Aquest document està subjecte a una llicència d'ús Creative Commons. Es permet la reproducció total o parcial, la distribució, la comunicació pública de l'obra i la creació d'obres derivades, fins i tot amb finalitats comercials, sempre i quan es reconegui l'autoria de l'obra original. |
Lengua: |
Anglès |
Colección: |
Barcelona Graduate School of Economics. ADEMU working paper series |
Colección: |
Ademu Working Papers Series ; 12 |
Documento: |
Working paper |
Materia: |
International transfers ;
Optimal currency area ;
International financial markets ;
Fiscal externalities ;
Cross-country externalities |